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+// Copyright 2016 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
+// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
+
+// Package chacha20 implements the ChaCha20 and XChaCha20 encryption algorithms
+// as specified in RFC 8439 and draft-irtf-cfrg-xchacha-01.
+package chacha20
+
+import (
+ "crypto/cipher"
+ "encoding/binary"
+ "errors"
+ "math/bits"
+
+ "golang.org/x/crypto/internal/alias"
+)
+
+const (
+ // KeySize is the size of the key used by this cipher, in bytes.
+ KeySize = 32
+
+ // NonceSize is the size of the nonce used with the standard variant of this
+ // cipher, in bytes.
+ //
+ // Note that this is too short to be safely generated at random if the same
+ // key is reused more than 2³² times.
+ NonceSize = 12
+
+ // NonceSizeX is the size of the nonce used with the XChaCha20 variant of
+ // this cipher, in bytes.
+ NonceSizeX = 24
+)
+
+// Cipher is a stateful instance of ChaCha20 or XChaCha20 using a particular key
+// and nonce. A *Cipher implements the cipher.Stream interface.
+type Cipher struct {
+ // The ChaCha20 state is 16 words: 4 constant, 8 of key, 1 of counter
+ // (incremented after each block), and 3 of nonce.
+ key [8]uint32
+ counter uint32
+ nonce [3]uint32
+
+ // The last len bytes of buf are leftover key stream bytes from the previous
+ // XORKeyStream invocation. The size of buf depends on how many blocks are
+ // computed at a time by xorKeyStreamBlocks.
+ buf [bufSize]byte
+ len int
+
+ // overflow is set when the counter overflowed, no more blocks can be
+ // generated, and the next XORKeyStream call should panic.
+ overflow bool
+
+ // The counter-independent results of the first round are cached after they
+ // are computed the first time.
+ precompDone bool
+ p1, p5, p9, p13 uint32
+ p2, p6, p10, p14 uint32
+ p3, p7, p11, p15 uint32
+}
+
+var _ cipher.Stream = (*Cipher)(nil)
+
+// NewUnauthenticatedCipher creates a new ChaCha20 stream cipher with the given
+// 32 bytes key and a 12 or 24 bytes nonce. If a nonce of 24 bytes is provided,
+// the XChaCha20 construction will be used. It returns an error if key or nonce
+// have any other length.
+//
+// Note that ChaCha20, like all stream ciphers, is not authenticated and allows
+// attackers to silently tamper with the plaintext. For this reason, it is more
+// appropriate as a building block than as a standalone encryption mechanism.
+// Instead, consider using package golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20poly1305.
+func NewUnauthenticatedCipher(key, nonce []byte) (*Cipher, error) {
+ // This function is split into a wrapper so that the Cipher allocation will
+ // be inlined, and depending on how the caller uses the return value, won't
+ // escape to the heap.
+ c := &Cipher{}
+ return newUnauthenticatedCipher(c, key, nonce)
+}
+
+func newUnauthenticatedCipher(c *Cipher, key, nonce []byte) (*Cipher, error) {
+ if len(key) != KeySize {
+ return nil, errors.New("chacha20: wrong key size")
+ }
+ if len(nonce) == NonceSizeX {
+ // XChaCha20 uses the ChaCha20 core to mix 16 bytes of the nonce into a
+ // derived key, allowing it to operate on a nonce of 24 bytes. See
+ // draft-irtf-cfrg-xchacha-01, Section 2.3.
+ key, _ = HChaCha20(key, nonce[0:16])
+ cNonce := make([]byte, NonceSize)
+ copy(cNonce[4:12], nonce[16:24])
+ nonce = cNonce
+ } else if len(nonce) != NonceSize {
+ return nil, errors.New("chacha20: wrong nonce size")
+ }
+
+ key, nonce = key[:KeySize], nonce[:NonceSize] // bounds check elimination hint
+ c.key = [8]uint32{
+ binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[0:4]),
+ binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[4:8]),
+ binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[8:12]),
+ binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[12:16]),
+ binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[16:20]),
+ binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[20:24]),
+ binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[24:28]),
+ binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[28:32]),
+ }
+ c.nonce = [3]uint32{
+ binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(nonce[0:4]),
+ binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(nonce[4:8]),
+ binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(nonce[8:12]),
+ }
+ return c, nil
+}
+
+// The constant first 4 words of the ChaCha20 state.
+const (
+ j0 uint32 = 0x61707865 // expa
+ j1 uint32 = 0x3320646e // nd 3
+ j2 uint32 = 0x79622d32 // 2-by
+ j3 uint32 = 0x6b206574 // te k
+)
+
+const blockSize = 64
+
+// quarterRound is the core of ChaCha20. It shuffles the bits of 4 state words.
+// It's executed 4 times for each of the 20 ChaCha20 rounds, operating on all 16
+// words each round, in columnar or diagonal groups of 4 at a time.
+func quarterRound(a, b, c, d uint32) (uint32, uint32, uint32, uint32) {
+ a += b
+ d ^= a
+ d = bits.RotateLeft32(d, 16)
+ c += d
+ b ^= c
+ b = bits.RotateLeft32(b, 12)
+ a += b
+ d ^= a
+ d = bits.RotateLeft32(d, 8)
+ c += d
+ b ^= c
+ b = bits.RotateLeft32(b, 7)
+ return a, b, c, d
+}
+
+// SetCounter sets the Cipher counter. The next invocation of XORKeyStream will
+// behave as if (64 * counter) bytes had been encrypted so far.
+//
+// To prevent accidental counter reuse, SetCounter panics if counter is less
+// than the current value.
+//
+// Note that the execution time of XORKeyStream is not independent of the
+// counter value.
+func (s *Cipher) SetCounter(counter uint32) {
+ // Internally, s may buffer multiple blocks, which complicates this
+ // implementation slightly. When checking whether the counter has rolled
+ // back, we must use both s.counter and s.len to determine how many blocks
+ // we have already output.
+ outputCounter := s.counter - uint32(s.len)/blockSize
+ if s.overflow || counter < outputCounter {
+ panic("chacha20: SetCounter attempted to rollback counter")
+ }
+
+ // In the general case, we set the new counter value and reset s.len to 0,
+ // causing the next call to XORKeyStream to refill the buffer. However, if
+ // we're advancing within the existing buffer, we can save work by simply
+ // setting s.len.
+ if counter < s.counter {
+ s.len = int(s.counter-counter) * blockSize
+ } else {
+ s.counter = counter
+ s.len = 0
+ }
+}
+
+// XORKeyStream XORs each byte in the given slice with a byte from the
+// cipher's key stream. Dst and src must overlap entirely or not at all.
+//
+// If len(dst) < len(src), XORKeyStream will panic. It is acceptable
+// to pass a dst bigger than src, and in that case, XORKeyStream will
+// only update dst[:len(src)] and will not touch the rest of dst.
+//
+// Multiple calls to XORKeyStream behave as if the concatenation of
+// the src buffers was passed in a single run. That is, Cipher
+// maintains state and does not reset at each XORKeyStream call.
+func (s *Cipher) XORKeyStream(dst, src []byte) {
+ if len(src) == 0 {
+ return
+ }
+ if len(dst) < len(src) {
+ panic("chacha20: output smaller than input")
+ }
+ dst = dst[:len(src)]
+ if alias.InexactOverlap(dst, src) {
+ panic("chacha20: invalid buffer overlap")
+ }
+
+ // First, drain any remaining key stream from a previous XORKeyStream.
+ if s.len != 0 {
+ keyStream := s.buf[bufSize-s.len:]
+ if len(src) < len(keyStream) {
+ keyStream = keyStream[:len(src)]
+ }
+ _ = src[len(keyStream)-1] // bounds check elimination hint
+ for i, b := range keyStream {
+ dst[i] = src[i] ^ b
+ }
+ s.len -= len(keyStream)
+ dst, src = dst[len(keyStream):], src[len(keyStream):]
+ }
+ if len(src) == 0 {
+ return
+ }
+
+ // If we'd need to let the counter overflow and keep generating output,
+ // panic immediately. If instead we'd only reach the last block, remember
+ // not to generate any more output after the buffer is drained.
+ numBlocks := (uint64(len(src)) + blockSize - 1) / blockSize
+ if s.overflow || uint64(s.counter)+numBlocks > 1<<32 {
+ panic("chacha20: counter overflow")
+ } else if uint64(s.counter)+numBlocks == 1<<32 {
+ s.overflow = true
+ }
+
+ // xorKeyStreamBlocks implementations expect input lengths that are a
+ // multiple of bufSize. Platform-specific ones process multiple blocks at a
+ // time, so have bufSizes that are a multiple of blockSize.
+
+ full := len(src) - len(src)%bufSize
+ if full > 0 {
+ s.xorKeyStreamBlocks(dst[:full], src[:full])
+ }
+ dst, src = dst[full:], src[full:]
+
+ // If using a multi-block xorKeyStreamBlocks would overflow, use the generic
+ // one that does one block at a time.
+ const blocksPerBuf = bufSize / blockSize
+ if uint64(s.counter)+blocksPerBuf > 1<<32 {
+ s.buf = [bufSize]byte{}
+ numBlocks := (len(src) + blockSize - 1) / blockSize
+ buf := s.buf[bufSize-numBlocks*blockSize:]
+ copy(buf, src)
+ s.xorKeyStreamBlocksGeneric(buf, buf)
+ s.len = len(buf) - copy(dst, buf)
+ return
+ }
+
+ // If we have a partial (multi-)block, pad it for xorKeyStreamBlocks, and
+ // keep the leftover keystream for the next XORKeyStream invocation.
+ if len(src) > 0 {
+ s.buf = [bufSize]byte{}
+ copy(s.buf[:], src)
+ s.xorKeyStreamBlocks(s.buf[:], s.buf[:])
+ s.len = bufSize - copy(dst, s.buf[:])
+ }
+}
+
+func (s *Cipher) xorKeyStreamBlocksGeneric(dst, src []byte) {
+ if len(dst) != len(src) || len(dst)%blockSize != 0 {
+ panic("chacha20: internal error: wrong dst and/or src length")
+ }
+
+ // To generate each block of key stream, the initial cipher state
+ // (represented below) is passed through 20 rounds of shuffling,
+ // alternatively applying quarterRounds by columns (like 1, 5, 9, 13)
+ // or by diagonals (like 1, 6, 11, 12).
+ //
+ // 0:cccccccc 1:cccccccc 2:cccccccc 3:cccccccc
+ // 4:kkkkkkkk 5:kkkkkkkk 6:kkkkkkkk 7:kkkkkkkk
+ // 8:kkkkkkkk 9:kkkkkkkk 10:kkkkkkkk 11:kkkkkkkk
+ // 12:bbbbbbbb 13:nnnnnnnn 14:nnnnnnnn 15:nnnnnnnn
+ //
+ // c=constant k=key b=blockcount n=nonce
+ var (
+ c0, c1, c2, c3 = j0, j1, j2, j3
+ c4, c5, c6, c7 = s.key[0], s.key[1], s.key[2], s.key[3]
+ c8, c9, c10, c11 = s.key[4], s.key[5], s.key[6], s.key[7]
+ _, c13, c14, c15 = s.counter, s.nonce[0], s.nonce[1], s.nonce[2]
+ )
+
+ // Three quarters of the first round don't depend on the counter, so we can
+ // calculate them here, and reuse them for multiple blocks in the loop, and
+ // for future XORKeyStream invocations.
+ if !s.precompDone {
+ s.p1, s.p5, s.p9, s.p13 = quarterRound(c1, c5, c9, c13)
+ s.p2, s.p6, s.p10, s.p14 = quarterRound(c2, c6, c10, c14)
+ s.p3, s.p7, s.p11, s.p15 = quarterRound(c3, c7, c11, c15)
+ s.precompDone = true
+ }
+
+ // A condition of len(src) > 0 would be sufficient, but this also
+ // acts as a bounds check elimination hint.
+ for len(src) >= 64 && len(dst) >= 64 {
+ // The remainder of the first column round.
+ fcr0, fcr4, fcr8, fcr12 := quarterRound(c0, c4, c8, s.counter)
+
+ // The second diagonal round.
+ x0, x5, x10, x15 := quarterRound(fcr0, s.p5, s.p10, s.p15)
+ x1, x6, x11, x12 := quarterRound(s.p1, s.p6, s.p11, fcr12)
+ x2, x7, x8, x13 := quarterRound(s.p2, s.p7, fcr8, s.p13)
+ x3, x4, x9, x14 := quarterRound(s.p3, fcr4, s.p9, s.p14)
+
+ // The remaining 18 rounds.
+ for i := 0; i < 9; i++ {
+ // Column round.
+ x0, x4, x8, x12 = quarterRound(x0, x4, x8, x12)
+ x1, x5, x9, x13 = quarterRound(x1, x5, x9, x13)
+ x2, x6, x10, x14 = quarterRound(x2, x6, x10, x14)
+ x3, x7, x11, x15 = quarterRound(x3, x7, x11, x15)
+
+ // Diagonal round.
+ x0, x5, x10, x15 = quarterRound(x0, x5, x10, x15)
+ x1, x6, x11, x12 = quarterRound(x1, x6, x11, x12)
+ x2, x7, x8, x13 = quarterRound(x2, x7, x8, x13)
+ x3, x4, x9, x14 = quarterRound(x3, x4, x9, x14)
+ }
+
+ // Add back the initial state to generate the key stream, then
+ // XOR the key stream with the source and write out the result.
+ addXor(dst[0:4], src[0:4], x0, c0)
+ addXor(dst[4:8], src[4:8], x1, c1)
+ addXor(dst[8:12], src[8:12], x2, c2)
+ addXor(dst[12:16], src[12:16], x3, c3)
+ addXor(dst[16:20], src[16:20], x4, c4)
+ addXor(dst[20:24], src[20:24], x5, c5)
+ addXor(dst[24:28], src[24:28], x6, c6)
+ addXor(dst[28:32], src[28:32], x7, c7)
+ addXor(dst[32:36], src[32:36], x8, c8)
+ addXor(dst[36:40], src[36:40], x9, c9)
+ addXor(dst[40:44], src[40:44], x10, c10)
+ addXor(dst[44:48], src[44:48], x11, c11)
+ addXor(dst[48:52], src[48:52], x12, s.counter)
+ addXor(dst[52:56], src[52:56], x13, c13)
+ addXor(dst[56:60], src[56:60], x14, c14)
+ addXor(dst[60:64], src[60:64], x15, c15)
+
+ s.counter += 1
+
+ src, dst = src[blockSize:], dst[blockSize:]
+ }
+}
+
+// HChaCha20 uses the ChaCha20 core to generate a derived key from a 32 bytes
+// key and a 16 bytes nonce. It returns an error if key or nonce have any other
+// length. It is used as part of the XChaCha20 construction.
+func HChaCha20(key, nonce []byte) ([]byte, error) {
+ // This function is split into a wrapper so that the slice allocation will
+ // be inlined, and depending on how the caller uses the return value, won't
+ // escape to the heap.
+ out := make([]byte, 32)
+ return hChaCha20(out, key, nonce)
+}
+
+func hChaCha20(out, key, nonce []byte) ([]byte, error) {
+ if len(key) != KeySize {
+ return nil, errors.New("chacha20: wrong HChaCha20 key size")
+ }
+ if len(nonce) != 16 {
+ return nil, errors.New("chacha20: wrong HChaCha20 nonce size")
+ }
+
+ x0, x1, x2, x3 := j0, j1, j2, j3
+ x4 := binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[0:4])
+ x5 := binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[4:8])
+ x6 := binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[8:12])
+ x7 := binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[12:16])
+ x8 := binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[16:20])
+ x9 := binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[20:24])
+ x10 := binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[24:28])
+ x11 := binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[28:32])
+ x12 := binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(nonce[0:4])
+ x13 := binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(nonce[4:8])
+ x14 := binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(nonce[8:12])
+ x15 := binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(nonce[12:16])
+
+ for i := 0; i < 10; i++ {
+ // Diagonal round.
+ x0, x4, x8, x12 = quarterRound(x0, x4, x8, x12)
+ x1, x5, x9, x13 = quarterRound(x1, x5, x9, x13)
+ x2, x6, x10, x14 = quarterRound(x2, x6, x10, x14)
+ x3, x7, x11, x15 = quarterRound(x3, x7, x11, x15)
+
+ // Column round.
+ x0, x5, x10, x15 = quarterRound(x0, x5, x10, x15)
+ x1, x6, x11, x12 = quarterRound(x1, x6, x11, x12)
+ x2, x7, x8, x13 = quarterRound(x2, x7, x8, x13)
+ x3, x4, x9, x14 = quarterRound(x3, x4, x9, x14)
+ }
+
+ _ = out[31] // bounds check elimination hint
+ binary.LittleEndian.PutUint32(out[0:4], x0)
+ binary.LittleEndian.PutUint32(out[4:8], x1)
+ binary.LittleEndian.PutUint32(out[8:12], x2)
+ binary.LittleEndian.PutUint32(out[12:16], x3)
+ binary.LittleEndian.PutUint32(out[16:20], x12)
+ binary.LittleEndian.PutUint32(out[20:24], x13)
+ binary.LittleEndian.PutUint32(out[24:28], x14)
+ binary.LittleEndian.PutUint32(out[28:32], x15)
+ return out, nil
+}