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Diffstat (limited to 'src/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20poly1305/xchacha20poly1305.go')
-rw-r--r--src/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20poly1305/xchacha20poly1305.go86
1 files changed, 86 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/src/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20poly1305/xchacha20poly1305.go b/src/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20poly1305/xchacha20poly1305.go
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1cebfe9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20poly1305/xchacha20poly1305.go
@@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
+// Copyright 2018 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
+// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
+
+package chacha20poly1305
+
+import (
+ "crypto/cipher"
+ "errors"
+
+ "golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20"
+)
+
+type xchacha20poly1305 struct {
+ key [KeySize]byte
+}
+
+// NewX returns a XChaCha20-Poly1305 AEAD that uses the given 256-bit key.
+//
+// XChaCha20-Poly1305 is a ChaCha20-Poly1305 variant that takes a longer nonce,
+// suitable to be generated randomly without risk of collisions. It should be
+// preferred when nonce uniqueness cannot be trivially ensured, or whenever
+// nonces are randomly generated.
+func NewX(key []byte) (cipher.AEAD, error) {
+ if len(key) != KeySize {
+ return nil, errors.New("chacha20poly1305: bad key length")
+ }
+ ret := new(xchacha20poly1305)
+ copy(ret.key[:], key)
+ return ret, nil
+}
+
+func (*xchacha20poly1305) NonceSize() int {
+ return NonceSizeX
+}
+
+func (*xchacha20poly1305) Overhead() int {
+ return Overhead
+}
+
+func (x *xchacha20poly1305) Seal(dst, nonce, plaintext, additionalData []byte) []byte {
+ if len(nonce) != NonceSizeX {
+ panic("chacha20poly1305: bad nonce length passed to Seal")
+ }
+
+ // XChaCha20-Poly1305 technically supports a 64-bit counter, so there is no
+ // size limit. However, since we reuse the ChaCha20-Poly1305 implementation,
+ // the second half of the counter is not available. This is unlikely to be
+ // an issue because the cipher.AEAD API requires the entire message to be in
+ // memory, and the counter overflows at 256 GB.
+ if uint64(len(plaintext)) > (1<<38)-64 {
+ panic("chacha20poly1305: plaintext too large")
+ }
+
+ c := new(chacha20poly1305)
+ hKey, _ := chacha20.HChaCha20(x.key[:], nonce[0:16])
+ copy(c.key[:], hKey)
+
+ // The first 4 bytes of the final nonce are unused counter space.
+ cNonce := make([]byte, NonceSize)
+ copy(cNonce[4:12], nonce[16:24])
+
+ return c.seal(dst, cNonce[:], plaintext, additionalData)
+}
+
+func (x *xchacha20poly1305) Open(dst, nonce, ciphertext, additionalData []byte) ([]byte, error) {
+ if len(nonce) != NonceSizeX {
+ panic("chacha20poly1305: bad nonce length passed to Open")
+ }
+ if len(ciphertext) < 16 {
+ return nil, errOpen
+ }
+ if uint64(len(ciphertext)) > (1<<38)-48 {
+ panic("chacha20poly1305: ciphertext too large")
+ }
+
+ c := new(chacha20poly1305)
+ hKey, _ := chacha20.HChaCha20(x.key[:], nonce[0:16])
+ copy(c.key[:], hKey)
+
+ // The first 4 bytes of the final nonce are unused counter space.
+ cNonce := make([]byte, NonceSize)
+ copy(cNonce[4:12], nonce[16:24])
+
+ return c.open(dst, cNonce[:], ciphertext, additionalData)
+}