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irssi (1.2.0-2) unstable; urgency=low
With the release of Irssi 1.2.0 we now bundle the OTR plug-in as part of
the Irssi source code. During the import phase of the irssi-otr codebase
we fixed a number of issues, but one of them caused us to break backwards
compatibility for old irssi-otr users.
With the updated OTR implementation the secret keys of the user is no
longer stored with an account name of $nickname@$server (for example:
user@chat.freenode.net), but is rather stored with the network (or chatnet
if you like) name from Irssi (for example: Freenode). This should remove
the issue that some users have reported where if they connect to another
server on a given network the OTR implementation generates new keys for
you.
You can see your list of OTR keys in Irssi using /otr info.
Upgrade Path
============
This requires a bit of manual work, but if you look at your ~/.irssi/otr
directory you should have 3 files:
otr.fp - containing the fingerprints of your OTR buddies.
otr.instag - containing the tags from OTR.
otr.key - containing your secret keys.
In otr.fp and otr.key you should manually open these files and modify the
old strings to the new format. The otr.key file is the most important one
since it contains the secret key material. The file contains an
s-expression like structure where the account name key can be found in the
(name name-goes-here) tuple. The otr.fp file contains a list of known
fingerprints. Correct the account name from your preview keys there as
well.
-- Rhonda D'Vine <rhonda@debian.org> Tue, 12 Feb 2019 22:36:01 +0100
irssi (0.8.10~rc5-1) unstable; urgency=low
This package has the beginnings of GNUTLS support for SSL rather
than the upstream OpenSSL code. This may have many bugs in and is
not feature complete. In particular it does not support verification
of the server's certificate. As a result the connection is vunerable
to man in the middle attack. This is only a regression if you use
the -cafile or -capath options to /connect. The data is still
encrypted.
-- David Pashley <david@davidpashley.com> Sun, 17 Jul 2005 19:39:37 +0300
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