Adding upstream version 1.3.4+ds.upstream/1.3.4+dsupstream

Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>

1 files changed, 424 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/src/auth_unix.c b/src/auth_unix.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..fc2be02
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/auth_unix.c
@@ -0,0 +1,424 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2009, Sun Microsystems, Inc.
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions are met:
+ * - Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice,
+ *   this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * - Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice,
+ *   this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation
+ *   and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * - Neither the name of Sun Microsystems, Inc. nor the names of its
+ *   contributors may be used to endorse or promote products derived
+ *   from this software without specific prior written permission.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS "AS IS"
+ * AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT HOLDER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE
+ * LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR
+ * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF
+ * SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS
+ * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN
+ * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE
+ * POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+
+/*
+ * auth_unix.c, Implements UNIX style authentication parameters.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 1984, Sun Microsystems, Inc.
+ *
+ * The system is very weak.  The client uses no encryption for it's
+ * credentials and only sends null verifiers.  The server sends backs
+ * null verifiers or optionally a verifier that suggests a new short hand
+ * for the credentials.
+ *
+ */
+#include <pthread.h>
+#include <reentrant.h>
+#include <sys/param.h>
+
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <err.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+
+#include <rpc/clnt.h>
+#include <rpc/types.h>
+#include <rpc/xdr.h>
+#include <rpc/auth.h>
+#include <rpc/auth_unix.h>
+
+/* auth_unix.c */
+static void authunix_nextverf (AUTH *);
+static bool_t authunix_marshal (AUTH *, XDR *);
+static bool_t authunix_validate (AUTH *, struct opaque_auth *);
+static bool_t authunix_refresh (AUTH *, void *);
+static void authunix_destroy (AUTH *);
+static void marshal_new_auth (AUTH *);
+static struct auth_ops *authunix_ops (void);
+
+/*
+ * This struct is pointed to by the ah_private field of an auth_handle.
+ */
+struct audata {
+	struct opaque_auth	au_origcred;	/* original credentials */
+	struct opaque_auth	au_shcred;	/* short hand cred */
+	u_long			au_shfaults;	/* short hand cache faults */
+	char			au_marshed[MAX_AUTH_BYTES];
+	u_int			au_mpos;	/* xdr pos at end of marshed */
+};
+#define	AUTH_PRIVATE(auth)	((struct audata *)auth->ah_private)
+
+/*
+ * Create a unix style authenticator.
+ * Returns an auth handle with the given stuff in it.
+ */
+AUTH *
+authunix_create(machname, uid, gid, len, aup_gids)
+	char *machname;
+	uid_t uid;
+	gid_t gid;
+	int len;
+	gid_t *aup_gids;
+{
+	struct authunix_parms aup;
+	char mymem[MAX_AUTH_BYTES];
+	struct timeval now;
+	XDR xdrs;
+	AUTH *auth;
+	struct audata *au;
+
+	memset(&rpc_createerr, 0, sizeof(rpc_createerr));
+
+	/*
+	 * Allocate and set up auth handle
+	 */
+	au = NULL;
+	auth = mem_alloc(sizeof(*auth));
+#ifndef _KERNEL
+	if (auth == NULL) {
+		rpc_createerr.cf_stat = RPC_SYSTEMERROR;
+		rpc_createerr.cf_error.re_errno = ENOMEM;
+		goto cleanup_authunix_create;
+	}
+#endif
+	au = mem_alloc(sizeof(*au));
+#ifndef _KERNEL
+	if (au == NULL) {
+		rpc_createerr.cf_stat = RPC_SYSTEMERROR;
+		rpc_createerr.cf_error.re_errno = ENOMEM;
+		goto cleanup_authunix_create;
+	}
+#endif
+	auth->ah_ops = authunix_ops();
+	auth->ah_private = (caddr_t)au;
+	auth->ah_verf = au->au_shcred = _null_auth;
+	au->au_shfaults = 0;
+	au->au_origcred.oa_base = NULL;
+
+	/*
+	 * fill in param struct from the given params
+	 */
+	(void)gettimeofday(&now, NULL);
+	aup.aup_time = now.tv_sec;
+	aup.aup_machname = machname;
+	aup.aup_uid = uid;
+	aup.aup_gid = gid;
+	aup.aup_len = (u_int)len;
+	aup.aup_gids = aup_gids;
+
+	/*
+	 * Serialize the parameters into origcred
+	 */
+	xdrmem_create(&xdrs, mymem, MAX_AUTH_BYTES, XDR_ENCODE);
+	if (!xdr_authunix_parms(&xdrs, &aup)) {
+		rpc_createerr.cf_stat = RPC_CANTENCODEARGS;
+		goto cleanup_authunix_create;
+	}
+	au->au_origcred.oa_length = len = XDR_GETPOS(&xdrs);
+	au->au_origcred.oa_flavor = AUTH_UNIX;
+#ifdef _KERNEL
+	au->au_origcred.oa_base = mem_alloc((u_int) len);
+#else
+	if ((au->au_origcred.oa_base = mem_alloc((u_int) len)) == NULL) {
+		rpc_createerr.cf_stat = RPC_SYSTEMERROR;
+		rpc_createerr.cf_error.re_errno = ENOMEM;
+		goto cleanup_authunix_create;
+	}
+#endif
+	memmove(au->au_origcred.oa_base, mymem, (size_t)len);
+
+	/*
+	 * set auth handle to reflect new cred.
+	 */
+	auth->ah_cred = au->au_origcred;
+	marshal_new_auth(auth);
+	return (auth);
+#ifndef _KERNEL
+ cleanup_authunix_create:
+	if (auth)
+		mem_free(auth, sizeof(*auth));
+	if (au) {
+		if (au->au_origcred.oa_base)
+			mem_free(au->au_origcred.oa_base, (u_int)len);
+		mem_free(au, sizeof(*au));
+	}
+	return (NULL);
+#endif
+}
+
+/*
+ * Returns an auth handle with parameters determined by doing lots of
+ * syscalls.
+ */
+AUTH *
+authunix_create_default()
+{
+	int len;
+	char machname[MAXHOSTNAMELEN + 1];
+	uid_t uid;
+	gid_t gid, *gids;
+	AUTH *result;
+
+	memset(&rpc_createerr, 0, sizeof(rpc_createerr));
+
+	if (gethostname(machname, sizeof machname) == -1) {
+		rpc_createerr.cf_error.re_errno = errno;
+		goto out_err;
+	}
+	machname[sizeof(machname) - 1] = 0;
+	uid = geteuid();
+	gid = getegid();
+
+	/* According to glibc comments, an intervening setgroups(2)
+	 * call can increase the number of supplemental groups between
+	 * these two getgroups(2) calls. */
+retry:
+	len = getgroups(0, NULL);
+	if (len == -1) {
+		rpc_createerr.cf_error.re_errno = errno;
+		goto out_err;
+	}
+
+	/* Bump allocation size.  A zero allocation size may result in a
+	 * NULL calloc(3) result, which is not reliably distinguishable
+	 * from a memory allocation error. */
+	gids = calloc(len + 1, sizeof(gid_t));
+	if (gids == NULL) {
+		rpc_createerr.cf_error.re_errno = ENOMEM;
+		goto out_err;
+	}
+
+	len = getgroups(len, gids);
+	if (len == -1) {
+		rpc_createerr.cf_error.re_errno = errno;
+		free(gids);
+		if (rpc_createerr.cf_error.re_errno == EINVAL) {
+			rpc_createerr.cf_error.re_errno = 0;
+			goto retry;
+		}
+		goto out_err;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * AUTH_UNIX sends on the wire only the first NGRPS groups in the
+	 * supplemental groups list.
+	 */
+	if (len > NGRPS)
+		len = NGRPS;
+
+	/* XXX: interface problem; those should all have been unsigned */
+	result = authunix_create(machname, uid, gid, len, gids);
+	free(gids);
+	return result;
+
+out_err:
+	rpc_createerr.cf_stat = RPC_SYSTEMERROR;
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * authunix operations
+ */
+
+/* ARGSUSED */
+static void
+authunix_nextverf(auth)
+	AUTH *auth;
+{
+	/* no action necessary */
+}
+
+static bool_t
+authunix_marshal(auth, xdrs)
+	AUTH *auth;
+	XDR *xdrs;
+{
+	struct audata *au;
+
+	assert(auth != NULL);
+	assert(xdrs != NULL);
+
+	au = AUTH_PRIVATE(auth);
+	return (XDR_PUTBYTES(xdrs, au->au_marshed, au->au_mpos));
+}
+
+static bool_t
+authunix_validate(auth, verf)
+	AUTH *auth;
+	struct opaque_auth *verf;
+{
+	struct audata *au;
+	XDR xdrs;
+
+	assert(auth != NULL);
+	assert(verf != NULL);
+
+	if (verf->oa_flavor == AUTH_SHORT) {
+		au = AUTH_PRIVATE(auth);
+		xdrmem_create(&xdrs, verf->oa_base, verf->oa_length,
+		    XDR_DECODE);
+
+		if (au->au_shcred.oa_base != NULL) {
+			mem_free(au->au_shcred.oa_base,
+			    au->au_shcred.oa_length);
+			au->au_shcred.oa_base = NULL;
+		}
+		if (xdr_opaque_auth(&xdrs, &au->au_shcred)) {
+			auth->ah_cred = au->au_shcred;
+		} else {
+			xdrs.x_op = XDR_FREE;
+			(void)xdr_opaque_auth(&xdrs, &au->au_shcred);
+			au->au_shcred.oa_base = NULL;
+			auth->ah_cred = au->au_origcred;
+		}
+		marshal_new_auth(auth);
+	}
+	return (TRUE);
+}
+
+static bool_t
+authunix_refresh(AUTH *auth, void *dummy)
+{
+	struct audata *au = AUTH_PRIVATE(auth);
+	struct authunix_parms aup;
+	struct timeval now;
+	XDR xdrs;
+	int stat;
+
+	assert(auth != NULL);
+
+	if (auth->ah_cred.oa_base == au->au_origcred.oa_base) {
+		/* there is no hope.  Punt */
+		return (FALSE);
+	}
+	au->au_shfaults ++;
+
+	/* first deserialize the creds back into a struct authunix_parms */
+	aup.aup_machname = NULL;
+	aup.aup_gids = NULL;
+	xdrmem_create(&xdrs, au->au_origcred.oa_base,
+	    au->au_origcred.oa_length, XDR_DECODE);
+	stat = xdr_authunix_parms(&xdrs, &aup);
+	if (! stat)
+		goto done;
+
+	/* update the time and serialize in place */
+	(void)gettimeofday(&now, NULL);
+	aup.aup_time = now.tv_sec;
+	xdrs.x_op = XDR_ENCODE;
+	XDR_SETPOS(&xdrs, 0);
+	stat = xdr_authunix_parms(&xdrs, &aup);
+	if (! stat)
+		goto done;
+	auth->ah_cred = au->au_origcred;
+	marshal_new_auth(auth);
+done:
+	/* free the struct authunix_parms created by deserializing */
+	xdrs.x_op = XDR_FREE;
+	(void)xdr_authunix_parms(&xdrs, &aup);
+	XDR_DESTROY(&xdrs);
+	return (stat);
+}
+
+static void
+authunix_destroy(auth)
+	AUTH *auth;
+{
+	struct audata *au;
+
+	assert(auth != NULL);
+
+	au = AUTH_PRIVATE(auth);
+	mem_free(au->au_origcred.oa_base, au->au_origcred.oa_length);
+
+	if (au->au_shcred.oa_base != NULL)
+		mem_free(au->au_shcred.oa_base, au->au_shcred.oa_length);
+
+	mem_free(auth->ah_private, sizeof(struct audata));
+
+	if (auth->ah_verf.oa_base != NULL)
+		mem_free(auth->ah_verf.oa_base, auth->ah_verf.oa_length);
+
+	mem_free(auth, sizeof(*auth));
+}
+
+/*
+ * Marshals (pre-serializes) an auth struct.
+ * sets private data, au_marshed and au_mpos
+ */
+static void
+marshal_new_auth(auth)
+	AUTH *auth;
+{
+	XDR	xdr_stream;
+	XDR	*xdrs = &xdr_stream;
+	struct audata *au;
+
+	assert(auth != NULL);
+
+	au = AUTH_PRIVATE(auth);
+	xdrmem_create(xdrs, au->au_marshed, MAX_AUTH_BYTES, XDR_ENCODE);
+	if ((! xdr_opaque_auth(xdrs, &(auth->ah_cred))) ||
+	    (! xdr_opaque_auth(xdrs, &(auth->ah_verf))))
+		warnx("auth_none.c - Fatal marshalling problem");
+	else
+		au->au_mpos = XDR_GETPOS(xdrs);
+	XDR_DESTROY(xdrs);
+}
+
+static bool_t
+authunix_wrap(AUTH *auth, XDR *xdrs, xdrproc_t xfunc, caddr_t xwhere)
+{
+	return ((*xfunc)(xdrs, xwhere));
+}
+
+static struct auth_ops *
+authunix_ops()
+{
+	static struct auth_ops ops;
+	extern mutex_t ops_lock;
+
+	/* VARIABLES PROTECTED BY ops_lock: ops */
+
+	mutex_lock(&ops_lock);
+	if (ops.ah_nextverf == NULL) {
+		ops.ah_nextverf = authunix_nextverf;
+		ops.ah_marshal = authunix_marshal;
+		ops.ah_validate = authunix_validate;
+		ops.ah_refresh = authunix_refresh;
+		ops.ah_destroy = authunix_destroy;
+		ops.ah_wrap = authunix_wrap;
+		ops.ah_unwrap = authunix_wrap;
+	}
+	mutex_unlock(&ops_lock);
+	return (&ops);
+}