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Diffstat (limited to '')
| -rw-r--r-- | src/key_call.c | 446 |
1 files changed, 446 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/src/key_call.c b/src/key_call.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..9f4b1d2 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/key_call.c @@ -0,0 +1,446 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2009, Sun Microsystems, Inc. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * - Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * - Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * - Neither the name of Sun Microsystems, Inc. nor the names of its + * contributors may be used to endorse or promote products derived + * from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS "AS IS" + * AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT HOLDER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE + * LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR + * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF + * SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) + * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE + * POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1986-1991 by Sun Microsystems Inc. + */ + + + +/* + * key_call.c, Interface to keyserver + * + * setsecretkey(key) - set your secret key + * encryptsessionkey(agent, deskey) - encrypt a session key to talk to agent + * decryptsessionkey(agent, deskey) - decrypt ditto + * gendeskey(deskey) - generate a secure des key + */ + +#include <pthread.h> +#include <reentrant.h> +#include <stdio.h> +#include <stdlib.h> +#include <unistd.h> +#include <errno.h> +#include <rpc/rpc.h> +#include <rpc/auth.h> +#include <rpc/auth_unix.h> +#include <rpc/key_prot.h> +#include <string.h> +#include <netconfig.h> +#include <sys/utsname.h> +#include <stdlib.h> +#include <signal.h> +#include <sys/wait.h> +#include <fcntl.h> + +#include "debug.h" + +#define KEY_TIMEOUT 5 /* per-try timeout in seconds */ +#define KEY_NRETRY 12 /* number of retries */ + +/* + * Hack to allow the keyserver to use AUTH_DES (for authenticated + * NIS+ calls, for example). The only functions that get called + * are key_encryptsession_pk, key_decryptsession_pk, and key_gendes. + * + * The approach is to have the keyserver fill in pointers to local + * implementations of these functions, and to call those in key_call(). + */ + +cryptkeyres *(*__key_encryptsession_pk_LOCAL)() = 0; +cryptkeyres *(*__key_decryptsession_pk_LOCAL)() = 0; +des_block *(*__key_gendes_LOCAL)() = 0; + +static int key_call( u_long, xdrproc_t, void *, xdrproc_t, void *); + +int +key_setsecret(secretkey) + const char *secretkey; +{ + keystatus status; + + if (!key_call((u_long) KEY_SET, (xdrproc_t)xdr_keybuf, + (void *)secretkey, + (xdrproc_t)xdr_keystatus, &status)) { + return (-1); + } + if (status != KEY_SUCCESS) { + LIBTIRPC_DEBUG(1, ("key_setsecret: set status is nonzero")); + return (-1); + } + return (0); +} + + +/* key_secretkey_is_set() returns 1 if the keyserver has a secret key + * stored for the caller's effective uid; it returns 0 otherwise + * + * N.B.: The KEY_NET_GET key call is undocumented. Applications shouldn't + * be using it, because it allows them to get the user's secret key. + */ + +int +key_secretkey_is_set(void) +{ + struct key_netstres kres; + + memset((void*)&kres, 0, sizeof (kres)); + if (key_call((u_long) KEY_NET_GET, (xdrproc_t)xdr_void, NULL, + (xdrproc_t)xdr_key_netstres, &kres) && + (kres.status == KEY_SUCCESS) && + (kres.key_netstres_u.knet.st_priv_key[0] != 0)) { + /* avoid leaving secret key in memory */ + memset(kres.key_netstres_u.knet.st_priv_key, 0, HEXKEYBYTES); + return (1); + } + return (0); +} + +int +key_encryptsession_pk(remotename, remotekey, deskey) + char *remotename; + netobj *remotekey; + des_block *deskey; +{ + cryptkeyarg2 arg; + cryptkeyres res; + + arg.remotename = remotename; + arg.remotekey = *remotekey; + arg.deskey = *deskey; + if (!key_call((u_long)KEY_ENCRYPT_PK, (xdrproc_t)xdr_cryptkeyarg2, &arg, + (xdrproc_t)xdr_cryptkeyres, &res)) { + return (-1); + } + if (res.status != KEY_SUCCESS) { + LIBTIRPC_DEBUG(1, ("key_encryptsession_pk: encrypt status is nonzero")); + return (-1); + } + *deskey = res.cryptkeyres_u.deskey; + return (0); +} + +int +key_decryptsession_pk(remotename, remotekey, deskey) + char *remotename; + netobj *remotekey; + des_block *deskey; +{ + cryptkeyarg2 arg; + cryptkeyres res; + + arg.remotename = remotename; + arg.remotekey = *remotekey; + arg.deskey = *deskey; + if (!key_call((u_long)KEY_DECRYPT_PK, (xdrproc_t)xdr_cryptkeyarg2, &arg, + (xdrproc_t)xdr_cryptkeyres, &res)) { + return (-1); + } + if (res.status != KEY_SUCCESS) { + LIBTIRPC_DEBUG(1, ("key_decryptsession_pk: decrypt status is nonzero")); + return (-1); + } + *deskey = res.cryptkeyres_u.deskey; + return (0); +} + +int +key_encryptsession(remotename, deskey) + const char *remotename; + des_block *deskey; +{ + cryptkeyarg arg; + cryptkeyres res; + + arg.remotename = (char *) remotename; + arg.deskey = *deskey; + if (!key_call((u_long)KEY_ENCRYPT, (xdrproc_t)xdr_cryptkeyarg, &arg, + (xdrproc_t)xdr_cryptkeyres, &res)) { + return (-1); + } + if (res.status != KEY_SUCCESS) { + LIBTIRPC_DEBUG(1, ("key_encryptsession: encrypt status is nonzero")); + return (-1); + } + *deskey = res.cryptkeyres_u.deskey; + return (0); +} + +int +key_decryptsession(remotename, deskey) + const char *remotename; + des_block *deskey; +{ + cryptkeyarg arg; + cryptkeyres res; + + arg.remotename = (char *) remotename; + arg.deskey = *deskey; + if (!key_call((u_long)KEY_DECRYPT, (xdrproc_t)xdr_cryptkeyarg, &arg, + (xdrproc_t)xdr_cryptkeyres, &res)) { + return (-1); + } + if (res.status != KEY_SUCCESS) { + LIBTIRPC_DEBUG(1, ("key_decryptsession: decrypt status is nonzero")); + return (-1); + } + *deskey = res.cryptkeyres_u.deskey; + return (0); +} + +int +key_gendes(key) + des_block *key; +{ + if (!key_call((u_long)KEY_GEN, (xdrproc_t)xdr_void, NULL, + (xdrproc_t)xdr_des_block, key)) { + return (-1); + } + return (0); +} + +int +key_setnet(arg) +struct key_netstarg *arg; +{ + keystatus status; + + + if (!key_call((u_long) KEY_NET_PUT, (xdrproc_t)xdr_key_netstarg, arg, + (xdrproc_t)xdr_keystatus, &status)){ + return (-1); + } + + if (status != KEY_SUCCESS) { + LIBTIRPC_DEBUG(1, ("key_setnet: key_setnet status is nonzero")); + return (-1); + } + return (1); +} + + +int +key_get_conv(pkey, deskey) + char *pkey; + des_block *deskey; +{ + cryptkeyres res; + + if (!key_call((u_long) KEY_GET_CONV, (xdrproc_t)xdr_keybuf, pkey, + (xdrproc_t)xdr_cryptkeyres, &res)) { + return (-1); + } + if (res.status != KEY_SUCCESS) { + LIBTIRPC_DEBUG(1, ("key_get_conv: get_conv status is nonzero")); + return (-1); + } + *deskey = res.cryptkeyres_u.deskey; + return (0); +} + +struct key_call_private { + CLIENT *client; /* Client handle */ + pid_t pid; /* process-id at moment of creation */ + uid_t uid; /* user-id at last authorization */ +}; +static struct key_call_private *key_call_private_main = NULL; + +static void +key_call_destroy(void *vp) +{ + struct key_call_private *kcp = (struct key_call_private *)vp; + + if (kcp) { + if (kcp->client) + clnt_destroy(kcp->client); + free(kcp); + } +} + +/* + * Keep the handle cached. This call may be made quite often. + */ +static CLIENT * +getkeyserv_handle(vers) +int vers; +{ + void *localhandle; + struct netconfig *nconf; + struct netconfig *tpconf; + struct key_call_private *kcp = key_call_private_main; + struct timeval wait_time; + struct utsname u; + int fd; + extern thread_key_t key_call_key; + extern mutex_t tsd_lock; + +#define TOTAL_TIMEOUT 30 /* total timeout talking to keyserver */ +#define TOTAL_TRIES 5 /* Number of tries */ + + if (key_call_key == -1) { + mutex_lock(&tsd_lock); + if (key_call_key == -1) + thr_keycreate(&key_call_key, key_call_destroy); + mutex_unlock(&tsd_lock); + } + kcp = (struct key_call_private *)thr_getspecific(key_call_key); + if (kcp == (struct key_call_private *)NULL) { + kcp = (struct key_call_private *)malloc(sizeof (*kcp)); + if (kcp == (struct key_call_private *)NULL) { + return ((CLIENT *) NULL); + } + thr_setspecific(key_call_key, (void *) kcp); + kcp->client = NULL; + } + + /* if pid has changed, destroy client and rebuild */ + if (kcp->client != NULL && kcp->pid != getpid()) { + clnt_destroy(kcp->client); + kcp->client = NULL; + } + + if (kcp->client != NULL) { + /* if uid has changed, build client handle again */ + if (kcp->uid != geteuid()) { + kcp->uid = geteuid(); + auth_destroy(kcp->client->cl_auth); + kcp->client->cl_auth = + authsys_create("", kcp->uid, 0, 0, NULL); + if (kcp->client->cl_auth == NULL) { + clnt_destroy(kcp->client); + kcp->client = NULL; + return ((CLIENT *) NULL); + } + } + /* Change the version number to the new one */ + clnt_control(kcp->client, CLSET_VERS, (void *)&vers); + return (kcp->client); + } + if (!(localhandle = setnetconfig())) { + return ((CLIENT *) NULL); + } + tpconf = NULL; + if (uname(&u) == -1) { + endnetconfig(localhandle); + return ((CLIENT *) NULL); + } + while ((nconf = getnetconfig(localhandle)) != NULL) { + if (strcmp(nconf->nc_protofmly, NC_LOOPBACK) == 0) { + /* + * We use COTS_ORD here so that the caller can + * find out immediately if the server is dead. + */ + if (nconf->nc_semantics == NC_TPI_COTS_ORD) { + kcp->client = clnt_tp_create(u.nodename, + KEY_PROG, vers, nconf); + if (kcp->client) + break; + } else { + tpconf = nconf; + } + } + } + if ((kcp->client == (CLIENT *) NULL) && (tpconf)) + /* Now, try the CLTS or COTS loopback transport */ + kcp->client = clnt_tp_create(u.nodename, + KEY_PROG, vers, tpconf); + endnetconfig(localhandle); + + if (kcp->client == (CLIENT *) NULL) { + return ((CLIENT *) NULL); + } + kcp->uid = geteuid(); + kcp->pid = getpid(); + kcp->client->cl_auth = authsys_create("", kcp->uid, 0, 0, NULL); + if (kcp->client->cl_auth == NULL) { + clnt_destroy(kcp->client); + kcp->client = NULL; + return ((CLIENT *) NULL); + } + + wait_time.tv_sec = TOTAL_TIMEOUT/TOTAL_TRIES; + wait_time.tv_usec = 0; + (void) clnt_control(kcp->client, CLSET_RETRY_TIMEOUT, + (char *)&wait_time); + if (clnt_control(kcp->client, CLGET_FD, (char *)&fd)) + fcntl(fd, F_SETFD, 1); /* make it "close on exec" */ + + return (kcp->client); +} + +/* returns 0 on failure, 1 on success */ + +static int +key_call(proc, xdr_arg, arg, xdr_rslt, rslt) + u_long proc; + xdrproc_t xdr_arg; + void *arg; + xdrproc_t xdr_rslt; + void *rslt; +{ + CLIENT *clnt; + struct timeval wait_time; + + if (proc == KEY_ENCRYPT_PK && __key_encryptsession_pk_LOCAL) { + cryptkeyres *res; + res = (*__key_encryptsession_pk_LOCAL)(geteuid(), arg); + *(cryptkeyres*)rslt = *res; + return (1); + } else if (proc == KEY_DECRYPT_PK && __key_decryptsession_pk_LOCAL) { + cryptkeyres *res; + res = (*__key_decryptsession_pk_LOCAL)(geteuid(), arg); + *(cryptkeyres*)rslt = *res; + return (1); + } else if (proc == KEY_GEN && __key_gendes_LOCAL) { + des_block *res; + res = (*__key_gendes_LOCAL)(geteuid(), 0); + *(des_block*)rslt = *res; + return (1); + } + + if ((proc == KEY_ENCRYPT_PK) || (proc == KEY_DECRYPT_PK) || + (proc == KEY_NET_GET) || (proc == KEY_NET_PUT) || + (proc == KEY_GET_CONV)) + clnt = getkeyserv_handle(2); /* talk to version 2 */ + else + clnt = getkeyserv_handle(1); /* talk to version 1 */ + + if (clnt == NULL) { + return (0); + } + + wait_time.tv_sec = TOTAL_TIMEOUT; + wait_time.tv_usec = 0; + + if (clnt_call(clnt, proc, xdr_arg, arg, xdr_rslt, rslt, + wait_time) == RPC_SUCCESS) { + return (1); + } else { + return (0); + } +} |