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author | Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org> | 2024-04-11 08:27:49 +0000 |
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committer | Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org> | 2024-04-11 08:27:49 +0000 |
commit | ace9429bb58fd418f0c81d4c2835699bddf6bde6 (patch) | |
tree | b2d64bc10158fdd5497876388cd68142ca374ed3 /arch/arm64/include/asm/spectre.h | |
parent | Initial commit. (diff) | |
download | linux-ace9429bb58fd418f0c81d4c2835699bddf6bde6.tar.xz linux-ace9429bb58fd418f0c81d4c2835699bddf6bde6.zip |
Adding upstream version 6.6.15.upstream/6.6.15
Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/arm64/include/asm/spectre.h')
-rw-r--r-- | arch/arm64/include/asm/spectre.h | 120 |
1 files changed, 120 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/spectre.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/spectre.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..9cc5014504 --- /dev/null +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/spectre.h @@ -0,0 +1,120 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */ +/* + * Interface for managing mitigations for Spectre vulnerabilities. + * + * Copyright (C) 2020 Google LLC + * Author: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> + */ + +#ifndef __ASM_SPECTRE_H +#define __ASM_SPECTRE_H + +#define BP_HARDEN_EL2_SLOTS 4 +#define __BP_HARDEN_HYP_VECS_SZ ((BP_HARDEN_EL2_SLOTS - 1) * SZ_2K) + +#ifndef __ASSEMBLY__ + +#include <linux/percpu.h> + +#include <asm/cpufeature.h> +#include <asm/virt.h> + +/* Watch out, ordering is important here. */ +enum mitigation_state { + SPECTRE_UNAFFECTED, + SPECTRE_MITIGATED, + SPECTRE_VULNERABLE, +}; + +struct pt_regs; +struct task_struct; + +/* + * Note: the order of this enum corresponds to __bp_harden_hyp_vecs and + * we rely on having the direct vectors first. + */ +enum arm64_hyp_spectre_vector { + /* + * Take exceptions directly to __kvm_hyp_vector. This must be + * 0 so that it used by default when mitigations are not needed. + */ + HYP_VECTOR_DIRECT, + + /* + * Bounce via a slot in the hypervisor text mapping of + * __bp_harden_hyp_vecs, which contains an SMC call. + */ + HYP_VECTOR_SPECTRE_DIRECT, + + /* + * Bounce via a slot in a special mapping of __bp_harden_hyp_vecs + * next to the idmap page. + */ + HYP_VECTOR_INDIRECT, + + /* + * Bounce via a slot in a special mapping of __bp_harden_hyp_vecs + * next to the idmap page, which contains an SMC call. + */ + HYP_VECTOR_SPECTRE_INDIRECT, +}; + +typedef void (*bp_hardening_cb_t)(void); + +struct bp_hardening_data { + enum arm64_hyp_spectre_vector slot; + bp_hardening_cb_t fn; +}; + +DECLARE_PER_CPU_READ_MOSTLY(struct bp_hardening_data, bp_hardening_data); + +/* Called during entry so must be __always_inline */ +static __always_inline void arm64_apply_bp_hardening(void) +{ + struct bp_hardening_data *d; + + if (!cpus_have_const_cap(ARM64_SPECTRE_V2)) + return; + + d = this_cpu_ptr(&bp_hardening_data); + if (d->fn) + d->fn(); +} + +enum mitigation_state arm64_get_spectre_v2_state(void); +bool has_spectre_v2(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *cap, int scope); +void spectre_v2_enable_mitigation(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *__unused); + +bool has_spectre_v3a(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *cap, int scope); +void spectre_v3a_enable_mitigation(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *__unused); + +enum mitigation_state arm64_get_spectre_v4_state(void); +bool has_spectre_v4(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *cap, int scope); +void spectre_v4_enable_mitigation(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *__unused); +void spectre_v4_enable_task_mitigation(struct task_struct *tsk); + +enum mitigation_state arm64_get_meltdown_state(void); + +enum mitigation_state arm64_get_spectre_bhb_state(void); +bool is_spectre_bhb_affected(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry, int scope); +u8 spectre_bhb_loop_affected(int scope); +void spectre_bhb_enable_mitigation(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *__unused); +bool try_emulate_el1_ssbs(struct pt_regs *regs, u32 instr); + +void spectre_v4_patch_fw_mitigation_enable(struct alt_instr *alt, __le32 *origptr, + __le32 *updptr, int nr_inst); +void smccc_patch_fw_mitigation_conduit(struct alt_instr *alt, __le32 *origptr, + __le32 *updptr, int nr_inst); +void spectre_bhb_patch_loop_mitigation_enable(struct alt_instr *alt, __le32 *origptr, + __le32 *updptr, int nr_inst); +void spectre_bhb_patch_fw_mitigation_enabled(struct alt_instr *alt, __le32 *origptr, + __le32 *updptr, int nr_inst); +void spectre_bhb_patch_loop_iter(struct alt_instr *alt, + __le32 *origptr, __le32 *updptr, int nr_inst); +void spectre_bhb_patch_wa3(struct alt_instr *alt, + __le32 *origptr, __le32 *updptr, int nr_inst); +void spectre_bhb_patch_clearbhb(struct alt_instr *alt, + __le32 *origptr, __le32 *updptr, int nr_inst); + +#endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */ +#endif /* __ASM_SPECTRE_H */ |