Adding upstream version 6.6.15.upstream/6.6.15

Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>

1 files changed, 223 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/efi.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/efi.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..2b478ca356
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/efi.c
@@ -0,0 +1,223 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * Extensible Firmware Interface
+ *
+ * Based on Extensible Firmware Interface Specification version 2.4
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2013, 2014 Linaro Ltd.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/efi.h>
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/screen_info.h>
+
+#include <asm/efi.h>
+#include <asm/stacktrace.h>
+
+static bool region_is_misaligned(const efi_memory_desc_t *md)
+{
+	if (PAGE_SIZE == EFI_PAGE_SIZE)
+		return false;
+	return !PAGE_ALIGNED(md->phys_addr) ||
+	       !PAGE_ALIGNED(md->num_pages << EFI_PAGE_SHIFT);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Only regions of type EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES_CODE need to be
+ * executable, everything else can be mapped with the XN bits
+ * set. Also take the new (optional) RO/XP bits into account.
+ */
+static __init pteval_t create_mapping_protection(efi_memory_desc_t *md)
+{
+	u64 attr = md->attribute;
+	u32 type = md->type;
+
+	if (type == EFI_MEMORY_MAPPED_IO)
+		return PROT_DEVICE_nGnRE;
+
+	if (region_is_misaligned(md)) {
+		static bool __initdata code_is_misaligned;
+
+		/*
+		 * Regions that are not aligned to the OS page size cannot be
+		 * mapped with strict permissions, as those might interfere
+		 * with the permissions that are needed by the adjacent
+		 * region's mapping. However, if we haven't encountered any
+		 * misaligned runtime code regions so far, we can safely use
+		 * non-executable permissions for non-code regions.
+		 */
+		code_is_misaligned |= (type == EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES_CODE);
+
+		return code_is_misaligned ? pgprot_val(PAGE_KERNEL_EXEC)
+					  : pgprot_val(PAGE_KERNEL);
+	}
+
+	/* R-- */
+	if ((attr & (EFI_MEMORY_XP | EFI_MEMORY_RO)) ==
+	    (EFI_MEMORY_XP | EFI_MEMORY_RO))
+		return pgprot_val(PAGE_KERNEL_RO);
+
+	/* R-X */
+	if (attr & EFI_MEMORY_RO)
+		return pgprot_val(PAGE_KERNEL_ROX);
+
+	/* RW- */
+	if (((attr & (EFI_MEMORY_RP | EFI_MEMORY_WP | EFI_MEMORY_XP)) ==
+	     EFI_MEMORY_XP) ||
+	    type != EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES_CODE)
+		return pgprot_val(PAGE_KERNEL);
+
+	/* RWX */
+	return pgprot_val(PAGE_KERNEL_EXEC);
+}
+
+/* we will fill this structure from the stub, so don't put it in .bss */
+struct screen_info screen_info __section(".data");
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(screen_info);
+
+int __init efi_create_mapping(struct mm_struct *mm, efi_memory_desc_t *md)
+{
+	pteval_t prot_val = create_mapping_protection(md);
+	bool page_mappings_only = (md->type == EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES_CODE ||
+				   md->type == EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES_DATA);
+
+	/*
+	 * If this region is not aligned to the page size used by the OS, the
+	 * mapping will be rounded outwards, and may end up sharing a page
+	 * frame with an adjacent runtime memory region. Given that the page
+	 * table descriptor covering the shared page will be rewritten when the
+	 * adjacent region gets mapped, we must avoid block mappings here so we
+	 * don't have to worry about splitting them when that happens.
+	 */
+	if (region_is_misaligned(md))
+		page_mappings_only = true;
+
+	create_pgd_mapping(mm, md->phys_addr, md->virt_addr,
+			   md->num_pages << EFI_PAGE_SHIFT,
+			   __pgprot(prot_val | PTE_NG), page_mappings_only);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+struct set_perm_data {
+	const efi_memory_desc_t	*md;
+	bool			has_bti;
+};
+
+static int __init set_permissions(pte_t *ptep, unsigned long addr, void *data)
+{
+	struct set_perm_data *spd = data;
+	const efi_memory_desc_t *md = spd->md;
+	pte_t pte = READ_ONCE(*ptep);
+
+	if (md->attribute & EFI_MEMORY_RO)
+		pte = set_pte_bit(pte, __pgprot(PTE_RDONLY));
+	if (md->attribute & EFI_MEMORY_XP)
+		pte = set_pte_bit(pte, __pgprot(PTE_PXN));
+	else if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_ARM64_BTI_KERNEL) &&
+		 system_supports_bti() && spd->has_bti)
+		pte = set_pte_bit(pte, __pgprot(PTE_GP));
+	set_pte(ptep, pte);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int __init efi_set_mapping_permissions(struct mm_struct *mm,
+				       efi_memory_desc_t *md,
+				       bool has_bti)
+{
+	struct set_perm_data data = { md, has_bti };
+
+	BUG_ON(md->type != EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES_CODE &&
+	       md->type != EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES_DATA);
+
+	if (region_is_misaligned(md))
+		return 0;
+
+	/*
+	 * Calling apply_to_page_range() is only safe on regions that are
+	 * guaranteed to be mapped down to pages. Since we are only called
+	 * for regions that have been mapped using efi_create_mapping() above
+	 * (and this is checked by the generic Memory Attributes table parsing
+	 * routines), there is no need to check that again here.
+	 */
+	return apply_to_page_range(mm, md->virt_addr,
+				   md->num_pages << EFI_PAGE_SHIFT,
+				   set_permissions, &data);
+}
+
+/*
+ * UpdateCapsule() depends on the system being shutdown via
+ * ResetSystem().
+ */
+bool efi_poweroff_required(void)
+{
+	return efi_enabled(EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES);
+}
+
+asmlinkage efi_status_t efi_handle_corrupted_x18(efi_status_t s, const char *f)
+{
+	pr_err_ratelimited(FW_BUG "register x18 corrupted by EFI %s\n", f);
+	return s;
+}
+
+static DEFINE_RAW_SPINLOCK(efi_rt_lock);
+
+void arch_efi_call_virt_setup(void)
+{
+	efi_virtmap_load();
+	__efi_fpsimd_begin();
+	raw_spin_lock(&efi_rt_lock);
+}
+
+void arch_efi_call_virt_teardown(void)
+{
+	raw_spin_unlock(&efi_rt_lock);
+	__efi_fpsimd_end();
+	efi_virtmap_unload();
+}
+
+asmlinkage u64 *efi_rt_stack_top __ro_after_init;
+
+asmlinkage efi_status_t __efi_rt_asm_recover(void);
+
+bool efi_runtime_fixup_exception(struct pt_regs *regs, const char *msg)
+{
+	 /* Check whether the exception occurred while running the firmware */
+	if (!current_in_efi() || regs->pc >= TASK_SIZE_64)
+		return false;
+
+	pr_err(FW_BUG "Unable to handle %s in EFI runtime service\n", msg);
+	add_taint(TAINT_FIRMWARE_WORKAROUND, LOCKDEP_STILL_OK);
+	clear_bit(EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES, &efi.flags);
+
+	regs->regs[0]	= EFI_ABORTED;
+	regs->regs[30]	= efi_rt_stack_top[-1];
+	regs->pc	= (u64)__efi_rt_asm_recover;
+
+	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SHADOW_CALL_STACK))
+		regs->regs[18] = efi_rt_stack_top[-2];
+
+	return true;
+}
+
+/* EFI requires 8 KiB of stack space for runtime services */
+static_assert(THREAD_SIZE >= SZ_8K);
+
+static int __init arm64_efi_rt_init(void)
+{
+	void *p;
+
+	if (!efi_enabled(EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES))
+		return 0;
+
+	p = __vmalloc_node(THREAD_SIZE, THREAD_ALIGN, GFP_KERNEL,
+			   NUMA_NO_NODE, &&l);
+l:	if (!p) {
+		pr_warn("Failed to allocate EFI runtime stack\n");
+		clear_bit(EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES, &efi.flags);
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+
+	efi_rt_stack_top = p + THREAD_SIZE;
+	return 0;
+}
+core_initcall(arm64_efi_rt_init);