Adding upstream version 6.6.15.upstream/6.6.15

Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>

1 files changed, 1488 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/arch/s390/kvm/vsie.c b/arch/s390/kvm/vsie.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..e55f489e1f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/s390/kvm/vsie.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1488 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * kvm nested virtualization support for s390x
+ *
+ * Copyright IBM Corp. 2016, 2018
+ *
+ *    Author(s): David Hildenbrand <dahi@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
+ */
+#include <linux/vmalloc.h>
+#include <linux/kvm_host.h>
+#include <linux/bug.h>
+#include <linux/list.h>
+#include <linux/bitmap.h>
+#include <linux/sched/signal.h>
+
+#include <asm/gmap.h>
+#include <asm/mmu_context.h>
+#include <asm/sclp.h>
+#include <asm/nmi.h>
+#include <asm/dis.h>
+#include <asm/fpu/api.h>
+#include "kvm-s390.h"
+#include "gaccess.h"
+
+struct vsie_page {
+	struct kvm_s390_sie_block scb_s;	/* 0x0000 */
+	/*
+	 * the backup info for machine check. ensure it's at
+	 * the same offset as that in struct sie_page!
+	 */
+	struct mcck_volatile_info mcck_info;    /* 0x0200 */
+	/*
+	 * The pinned original scb. Be aware that other VCPUs can modify
+	 * it while we read from it. Values that are used for conditions or
+	 * are reused conditionally, should be accessed via READ_ONCE.
+	 */
+	struct kvm_s390_sie_block *scb_o;	/* 0x0218 */
+	/* the shadow gmap in use by the vsie_page */
+	struct gmap *gmap;			/* 0x0220 */
+	/* address of the last reported fault to guest2 */
+	unsigned long fault_addr;		/* 0x0228 */
+	/* calculated guest addresses of satellite control blocks */
+	gpa_t sca_gpa;				/* 0x0230 */
+	gpa_t itdba_gpa;			/* 0x0238 */
+	gpa_t gvrd_gpa;				/* 0x0240 */
+	gpa_t riccbd_gpa;			/* 0x0248 */
+	gpa_t sdnx_gpa;				/* 0x0250 */
+	__u8 reserved[0x0700 - 0x0258];		/* 0x0258 */
+	struct kvm_s390_crypto_cb crycb;	/* 0x0700 */
+	__u8 fac[S390_ARCH_FAC_LIST_SIZE_BYTE];	/* 0x0800 */
+};
+
+/* trigger a validity icpt for the given scb */
+static int set_validity_icpt(struct kvm_s390_sie_block *scb,
+			     __u16 reason_code)
+{
+	scb->ipa = 0x1000;
+	scb->ipb = ((__u32) reason_code) << 16;
+	scb->icptcode = ICPT_VALIDITY;
+	return 1;
+}
+
+/* mark the prefix as unmapped, this will block the VSIE */
+static void prefix_unmapped(struct vsie_page *vsie_page)
+{
+	atomic_or(PROG_REQUEST, &vsie_page->scb_s.prog20);
+}
+
+/* mark the prefix as unmapped and wait until the VSIE has been left */
+static void prefix_unmapped_sync(struct vsie_page *vsie_page)
+{
+	prefix_unmapped(vsie_page);
+	if (vsie_page->scb_s.prog0c & PROG_IN_SIE)
+		atomic_or(CPUSTAT_STOP_INT, &vsie_page->scb_s.cpuflags);
+	while (vsie_page->scb_s.prog0c & PROG_IN_SIE)
+		cpu_relax();
+}
+
+/* mark the prefix as mapped, this will allow the VSIE to run */
+static void prefix_mapped(struct vsie_page *vsie_page)
+{
+	atomic_andnot(PROG_REQUEST, &vsie_page->scb_s.prog20);
+}
+
+/* test if the prefix is mapped into the gmap shadow */
+static int prefix_is_mapped(struct vsie_page *vsie_page)
+{
+	return !(atomic_read(&vsie_page->scb_s.prog20) & PROG_REQUEST);
+}
+
+/* copy the updated intervention request bits into the shadow scb */
+static void update_intervention_requests(struct vsie_page *vsie_page)
+{
+	const int bits = CPUSTAT_STOP_INT | CPUSTAT_IO_INT | CPUSTAT_EXT_INT;
+	int cpuflags;
+
+	cpuflags = atomic_read(&vsie_page->scb_o->cpuflags);
+	atomic_andnot(bits, &vsie_page->scb_s.cpuflags);
+	atomic_or(cpuflags & bits, &vsie_page->scb_s.cpuflags);
+}
+
+/* shadow (filter and validate) the cpuflags  */
+static int prepare_cpuflags(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct vsie_page *vsie_page)
+{
+	struct kvm_s390_sie_block *scb_s = &vsie_page->scb_s;
+	struct kvm_s390_sie_block *scb_o = vsie_page->scb_o;
+	int newflags, cpuflags = atomic_read(&scb_o->cpuflags);
+
+	/* we don't allow ESA/390 guests */
+	if (!(cpuflags & CPUSTAT_ZARCH))
+		return set_validity_icpt(scb_s, 0x0001U);
+
+	if (cpuflags & (CPUSTAT_RRF | CPUSTAT_MCDS))
+		return set_validity_icpt(scb_s, 0x0001U);
+	else if (cpuflags & (CPUSTAT_SLSV | CPUSTAT_SLSR))
+		return set_validity_icpt(scb_s, 0x0007U);
+
+	/* intervention requests will be set later */
+	newflags = CPUSTAT_ZARCH;
+	if (cpuflags & CPUSTAT_GED && test_kvm_facility(vcpu->kvm, 8))
+		newflags |= CPUSTAT_GED;
+	if (cpuflags & CPUSTAT_GED2 && test_kvm_facility(vcpu->kvm, 78)) {
+		if (cpuflags & CPUSTAT_GED)
+			return set_validity_icpt(scb_s, 0x0001U);
+		newflags |= CPUSTAT_GED2;
+	}
+	if (test_kvm_cpu_feat(vcpu->kvm, KVM_S390_VM_CPU_FEAT_GPERE))
+		newflags |= cpuflags & CPUSTAT_P;
+	if (test_kvm_cpu_feat(vcpu->kvm, KVM_S390_VM_CPU_FEAT_GSLS))
+		newflags |= cpuflags & CPUSTAT_SM;
+	if (test_kvm_cpu_feat(vcpu->kvm, KVM_S390_VM_CPU_FEAT_IBS))
+		newflags |= cpuflags & CPUSTAT_IBS;
+	if (test_kvm_cpu_feat(vcpu->kvm, KVM_S390_VM_CPU_FEAT_KSS))
+		newflags |= cpuflags & CPUSTAT_KSS;
+
+	atomic_set(&scb_s->cpuflags, newflags);
+	return 0;
+}
+/* Copy to APCB FORMAT1 from APCB FORMAT0 */
+static int setup_apcb10(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_s390_apcb1 *apcb_s,
+			unsigned long crycb_gpa, struct kvm_s390_apcb1 *apcb_h)
+{
+	struct kvm_s390_apcb0 tmp;
+	unsigned long apcb_gpa;
+
+	apcb_gpa = crycb_gpa + offsetof(struct kvm_s390_crypto_cb, apcb0);
+
+	if (read_guest_real(vcpu, apcb_gpa, &tmp,
+			    sizeof(struct kvm_s390_apcb0)))
+		return -EFAULT;
+
+	apcb_s->apm[0] = apcb_h->apm[0] & tmp.apm[0];
+	apcb_s->aqm[0] = apcb_h->aqm[0] & tmp.aqm[0] & 0xffff000000000000UL;
+	apcb_s->adm[0] = apcb_h->adm[0] & tmp.adm[0] & 0xffff000000000000UL;
+
+	return 0;
+
+}
+
+/**
+ * setup_apcb00 - Copy to APCB FORMAT0 from APCB FORMAT0
+ * @vcpu: pointer to the virtual CPU
+ * @apcb_s: pointer to start of apcb in the shadow crycb
+ * @crycb_gpa: guest physical address to start of original guest crycb
+ * @apcb_h: pointer to start of apcb in the guest1
+ *
+ * Returns 0 and -EFAULT on error reading guest apcb
+ */
+static int setup_apcb00(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long *apcb_s,
+			unsigned long crycb_gpa, unsigned long *apcb_h)
+{
+	unsigned long apcb_gpa;
+
+	apcb_gpa = crycb_gpa + offsetof(struct kvm_s390_crypto_cb, apcb0);
+
+	if (read_guest_real(vcpu, apcb_gpa, apcb_s,
+			    sizeof(struct kvm_s390_apcb0)))
+		return -EFAULT;
+
+	bitmap_and(apcb_s, apcb_s, apcb_h,
+		   BITS_PER_BYTE * sizeof(struct kvm_s390_apcb0));
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * setup_apcb11 - Copy the FORMAT1 APCB from the guest to the shadow CRYCB
+ * @vcpu: pointer to the virtual CPU
+ * @apcb_s: pointer to start of apcb in the shadow crycb
+ * @crycb_gpa: guest physical address to start of original guest crycb
+ * @apcb_h: pointer to start of apcb in the host
+ *
+ * Returns 0 and -EFAULT on error reading guest apcb
+ */
+static int setup_apcb11(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long *apcb_s,
+			unsigned long crycb_gpa,
+			unsigned long *apcb_h)
+{
+	unsigned long apcb_gpa;
+
+	apcb_gpa = crycb_gpa + offsetof(struct kvm_s390_crypto_cb, apcb1);
+
+	if (read_guest_real(vcpu, apcb_gpa, apcb_s,
+			    sizeof(struct kvm_s390_apcb1)))
+		return -EFAULT;
+
+	bitmap_and(apcb_s, apcb_s, apcb_h,
+		   BITS_PER_BYTE * sizeof(struct kvm_s390_apcb1));
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * setup_apcb - Create a shadow copy of the apcb.
+ * @vcpu: pointer to the virtual CPU
+ * @crycb_s: pointer to shadow crycb
+ * @crycb_gpa: guest physical address of original guest crycb
+ * @crycb_h: pointer to the host crycb
+ * @fmt_o: format of the original guest crycb.
+ * @fmt_h: format of the host crycb.
+ *
+ * Checks the compatibility between the guest and host crycb and calls the
+ * appropriate copy function.
+ *
+ * Return 0 or an error number if the guest and host crycb are incompatible.
+ */
+static int setup_apcb(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_s390_crypto_cb *crycb_s,
+	       const u32 crycb_gpa,
+	       struct kvm_s390_crypto_cb *crycb_h,
+	       int fmt_o, int fmt_h)
+{
+	switch (fmt_o) {
+	case CRYCB_FORMAT2:
+		if ((crycb_gpa & PAGE_MASK) != ((crycb_gpa + 256) & PAGE_MASK))
+			return -EACCES;
+		if (fmt_h != CRYCB_FORMAT2)
+			return -EINVAL;
+		return setup_apcb11(vcpu, (unsigned long *)&crycb_s->apcb1,
+				    crycb_gpa,
+				    (unsigned long *)&crycb_h->apcb1);
+	case CRYCB_FORMAT1:
+		switch (fmt_h) {
+		case CRYCB_FORMAT2:
+			return setup_apcb10(vcpu, &crycb_s->apcb1,
+					    crycb_gpa,
+					    &crycb_h->apcb1);
+		case CRYCB_FORMAT1:
+			return setup_apcb00(vcpu,
+					    (unsigned long *) &crycb_s->apcb0,
+					    crycb_gpa,
+					    (unsigned long *) &crycb_h->apcb0);
+		}
+		break;
+	case CRYCB_FORMAT0:
+		if ((crycb_gpa & PAGE_MASK) != ((crycb_gpa + 32) & PAGE_MASK))
+			return -EACCES;
+
+		switch (fmt_h) {
+		case CRYCB_FORMAT2:
+			return setup_apcb10(vcpu, &crycb_s->apcb1,
+					    crycb_gpa,
+					    &crycb_h->apcb1);
+		case CRYCB_FORMAT1:
+		case CRYCB_FORMAT0:
+			return setup_apcb00(vcpu,
+					    (unsigned long *) &crycb_s->apcb0,
+					    crycb_gpa,
+					    (unsigned long *) &crycb_h->apcb0);
+		}
+	}
+	return -EINVAL;
+}
+
+/**
+ * shadow_crycb - Create a shadow copy of the crycb block
+ * @vcpu: a pointer to the virtual CPU
+ * @vsie_page: a pointer to internal date used for the vSIE
+ *
+ * Create a shadow copy of the crycb block and setup key wrapping, if
+ * requested for guest 3 and enabled for guest 2.
+ *
+ * We accept format-1 or format-2, but we convert format-1 into format-2
+ * in the shadow CRYCB.
+ * Using format-2 enables the firmware to choose the right format when
+ * scheduling the SIE.
+ * There is nothing to do for format-0.
+ *
+ * This function centralize the issuing of set_validity_icpt() for all
+ * the subfunctions working on the crycb.
+ *
+ * Returns: - 0 if shadowed or nothing to do
+ *          - > 0 if control has to be given to guest 2
+ */
+static int shadow_crycb(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct vsie_page *vsie_page)
+{
+	struct kvm_s390_sie_block *scb_s = &vsie_page->scb_s;
+	struct kvm_s390_sie_block *scb_o = vsie_page->scb_o;
+	const uint32_t crycbd_o = READ_ONCE(scb_o->crycbd);
+	const u32 crycb_addr = crycbd_o & 0x7ffffff8U;
+	unsigned long *b1, *b2;
+	u8 ecb3_flags;
+	u32 ecd_flags;
+	int apie_h;
+	int apie_s;
+	int key_msk = test_kvm_facility(vcpu->kvm, 76);
+	int fmt_o = crycbd_o & CRYCB_FORMAT_MASK;
+	int fmt_h = vcpu->arch.sie_block->crycbd & CRYCB_FORMAT_MASK;
+	int ret = 0;
+
+	scb_s->crycbd = 0;
+
+	apie_h = vcpu->arch.sie_block->eca & ECA_APIE;
+	apie_s = apie_h & scb_o->eca;
+	if (!apie_s && (!key_msk || (fmt_o == CRYCB_FORMAT0)))
+		return 0;
+
+	if (!crycb_addr)
+		return set_validity_icpt(scb_s, 0x0039U);
+
+	if (fmt_o == CRYCB_FORMAT1)
+		if ((crycb_addr & PAGE_MASK) !=
+		    ((crycb_addr + 128) & PAGE_MASK))
+			return set_validity_icpt(scb_s, 0x003CU);
+
+	if (apie_s) {
+		ret = setup_apcb(vcpu, &vsie_page->crycb, crycb_addr,
+				 vcpu->kvm->arch.crypto.crycb,
+				 fmt_o, fmt_h);
+		if (ret)
+			goto end;
+		scb_s->eca |= scb_o->eca & ECA_APIE;
+	}
+
+	/* we may only allow it if enabled for guest 2 */
+	ecb3_flags = scb_o->ecb3 & vcpu->arch.sie_block->ecb3 &
+		     (ECB3_AES | ECB3_DEA);
+	ecd_flags = scb_o->ecd & vcpu->arch.sie_block->ecd & ECD_ECC;
+	if (!ecb3_flags && !ecd_flags)
+		goto end;
+
+	/* copy only the wrapping keys */
+	if (read_guest_real(vcpu, crycb_addr + 72,
+			    vsie_page->crycb.dea_wrapping_key_mask, 56))
+		return set_validity_icpt(scb_s, 0x0035U);
+
+	scb_s->ecb3 |= ecb3_flags;
+	scb_s->ecd |= ecd_flags;
+
+	/* xor both blocks in one run */
+	b1 = (unsigned long *) vsie_page->crycb.dea_wrapping_key_mask;
+	b2 = (unsigned long *)
+			    vcpu->kvm->arch.crypto.crycb->dea_wrapping_key_mask;
+	/* as 56%8 == 0, bitmap_xor won't overwrite any data */
+	bitmap_xor(b1, b1, b2, BITS_PER_BYTE * 56);
+end:
+	switch (ret) {
+	case -EINVAL:
+		return set_validity_icpt(scb_s, 0x0022U);
+	case -EFAULT:
+		return set_validity_icpt(scb_s, 0x0035U);
+	case -EACCES:
+		return set_validity_icpt(scb_s, 0x003CU);
+	}
+	scb_s->crycbd = ((__u32)(__u64) &vsie_page->crycb) | CRYCB_FORMAT2;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/* shadow (round up/down) the ibc to avoid validity icpt */
+static void prepare_ibc(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct vsie_page *vsie_page)
+{
+	struct kvm_s390_sie_block *scb_s = &vsie_page->scb_s;
+	struct kvm_s390_sie_block *scb_o = vsie_page->scb_o;
+	/* READ_ONCE does not work on bitfields - use a temporary variable */
+	const uint32_t __new_ibc = scb_o->ibc;
+	const uint32_t new_ibc = READ_ONCE(__new_ibc) & 0x0fffU;
+	__u64 min_ibc = (sclp.ibc >> 16) & 0x0fffU;
+
+	scb_s->ibc = 0;
+	/* ibc installed in g2 and requested for g3 */
+	if (vcpu->kvm->arch.model.ibc && new_ibc) {
+		scb_s->ibc = new_ibc;
+		/* takte care of the minimum ibc level of the machine */
+		if (scb_s->ibc < min_ibc)
+			scb_s->ibc = min_ibc;
+		/* take care of the maximum ibc level set for the guest */
+		if (scb_s->ibc > vcpu->kvm->arch.model.ibc)
+			scb_s->ibc = vcpu->kvm->arch.model.ibc;
+	}
+}
+
+/* unshadow the scb, copying parameters back to the real scb */
+static void unshadow_scb(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct vsie_page *vsie_page)
+{
+	struct kvm_s390_sie_block *scb_s = &vsie_page->scb_s;
+	struct kvm_s390_sie_block *scb_o = vsie_page->scb_o;
+
+	/* interception */
+	scb_o->icptcode = scb_s->icptcode;
+	scb_o->icptstatus = scb_s->icptstatus;
+	scb_o->ipa = scb_s->ipa;
+	scb_o->ipb = scb_s->ipb;
+	scb_o->gbea = scb_s->gbea;
+
+	/* timer */
+	scb_o->cputm = scb_s->cputm;
+	scb_o->ckc = scb_s->ckc;
+	scb_o->todpr = scb_s->todpr;
+
+	/* guest state */
+	scb_o->gpsw = scb_s->gpsw;
+	scb_o->gg14 = scb_s->gg14;
+	scb_o->gg15 = scb_s->gg15;
+	memcpy(scb_o->gcr, scb_s->gcr, 128);
+	scb_o->pp = scb_s->pp;
+
+	/* branch prediction */
+	if (test_kvm_facility(vcpu->kvm, 82)) {
+		scb_o->fpf &= ~FPF_BPBC;
+		scb_o->fpf |= scb_s->fpf & FPF_BPBC;
+	}
+
+	/* interrupt intercept */
+	switch (scb_s->icptcode) {
+	case ICPT_PROGI:
+	case ICPT_INSTPROGI:
+	case ICPT_EXTINT:
+		memcpy((void *)((u64)scb_o + 0xc0),
+		       (void *)((u64)scb_s + 0xc0), 0xf0 - 0xc0);
+		break;
+	}
+
+	if (scb_s->ihcpu != 0xffffU)
+		scb_o->ihcpu = scb_s->ihcpu;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Setup the shadow scb by copying and checking the relevant parts of the g2
+ * provided scb.
+ *
+ * Returns: - 0 if the scb has been shadowed
+ *          - > 0 if control has to be given to guest 2
+ */
+static int shadow_scb(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct vsie_page *vsie_page)
+{
+	struct kvm_s390_sie_block *scb_o = vsie_page->scb_o;
+	struct kvm_s390_sie_block *scb_s = &vsie_page->scb_s;
+	/* READ_ONCE does not work on bitfields - use a temporary variable */
+	const uint32_t __new_prefix = scb_o->prefix;
+	const uint32_t new_prefix = READ_ONCE(__new_prefix);
+	const bool wants_tx = READ_ONCE(scb_o->ecb) & ECB_TE;
+	bool had_tx = scb_s->ecb & ECB_TE;
+	unsigned long new_mso = 0;
+	int rc;
+
+	/* make sure we don't have any leftovers when reusing the scb */
+	scb_s->icptcode = 0;
+	scb_s->eca = 0;
+	scb_s->ecb = 0;
+	scb_s->ecb2 = 0;
+	scb_s->ecb3 = 0;
+	scb_s->ecd = 0;
+	scb_s->fac = 0;
+	scb_s->fpf = 0;
+
+	rc = prepare_cpuflags(vcpu, vsie_page);
+	if (rc)
+		goto out;
+
+	/* timer */
+	scb_s->cputm = scb_o->cputm;
+	scb_s->ckc = scb_o->ckc;
+	scb_s->todpr = scb_o->todpr;
+	scb_s->epoch = scb_o->epoch;
+
+	/* guest state */
+	scb_s->gpsw = scb_o->gpsw;
+	scb_s->gg14 = scb_o->gg14;
+	scb_s->gg15 = scb_o->gg15;
+	memcpy(scb_s->gcr, scb_o->gcr, 128);
+	scb_s->pp = scb_o->pp;
+
+	/* interception / execution handling */
+	scb_s->gbea = scb_o->gbea;
+	scb_s->lctl = scb_o->lctl;
+	scb_s->svcc = scb_o->svcc;
+	scb_s->ictl = scb_o->ictl;
+	/*
+	 * SKEY handling functions can't deal with false setting of PTE invalid
+	 * bits. Therefore we cannot provide interpretation and would later
+	 * have to provide own emulation handlers.
+	 */
+	if (!(atomic_read(&scb_s->cpuflags) & CPUSTAT_KSS))
+		scb_s->ictl |= ICTL_ISKE | ICTL_SSKE | ICTL_RRBE;
+
+	scb_s->icpua = scb_o->icpua;
+
+	if (!(atomic_read(&scb_s->cpuflags) & CPUSTAT_SM))
+		new_mso = READ_ONCE(scb_o->mso) & 0xfffffffffff00000UL;
+	/* if the hva of the prefix changes, we have to remap the prefix */
+	if (scb_s->mso != new_mso || scb_s->prefix != new_prefix)
+		prefix_unmapped(vsie_page);
+	 /* SIE will do mso/msl validity and exception checks for us */
+	scb_s->msl = scb_o->msl & 0xfffffffffff00000UL;
+	scb_s->mso = new_mso;
+	scb_s->prefix = new_prefix;
+
+	/* We have to definitely flush the tlb if this scb never ran */
+	if (scb_s->ihcpu != 0xffffU)
+		scb_s->ihcpu = scb_o->ihcpu;
+
+	/* MVPG and Protection Exception Interpretation are always available */
+	scb_s->eca |= scb_o->eca & (ECA_MVPGI | ECA_PROTEXCI);
+	/* Host-protection-interruption introduced with ESOP */
+	if (test_kvm_cpu_feat(vcpu->kvm, KVM_S390_VM_CPU_FEAT_ESOP))
+		scb_s->ecb |= scb_o->ecb & ECB_HOSTPROTINT;
+	/*
+	 * CPU Topology
+	 * This facility only uses the utility field of the SCA and none of
+	 * the cpu entries that are problematic with the other interpretation
+	 * facilities so we can pass it through
+	 */
+	if (test_kvm_facility(vcpu->kvm, 11))
+		scb_s->ecb |= scb_o->ecb & ECB_PTF;
+	/* transactional execution */
+	if (test_kvm_facility(vcpu->kvm, 73) && wants_tx) {
+		/* remap the prefix is tx is toggled on */
+		if (!had_tx)
+			prefix_unmapped(vsie_page);
+		scb_s->ecb |= ECB_TE;
+	}
+	/* specification exception interpretation */
+	scb_s->ecb |= scb_o->ecb & ECB_SPECI;
+	/* branch prediction */
+	if (test_kvm_facility(vcpu->kvm, 82))
+		scb_s->fpf |= scb_o->fpf & FPF_BPBC;
+	/* SIMD */
+	if (test_kvm_facility(vcpu->kvm, 129)) {
+		scb_s->eca |= scb_o->eca & ECA_VX;
+		scb_s->ecd |= scb_o->ecd & ECD_HOSTREGMGMT;
+	}
+	/* Run-time-Instrumentation */
+	if (test_kvm_facility(vcpu->kvm, 64))
+		scb_s->ecb3 |= scb_o->ecb3 & ECB3_RI;
+	/* Instruction Execution Prevention */
+	if (test_kvm_facility(vcpu->kvm, 130))
+		scb_s->ecb2 |= scb_o->ecb2 & ECB2_IEP;
+	/* Guarded Storage */
+	if (test_kvm_facility(vcpu->kvm, 133)) {
+		scb_s->ecb |= scb_o->ecb & ECB_GS;
+		scb_s->ecd |= scb_o->ecd & ECD_HOSTREGMGMT;
+	}
+	if (test_kvm_cpu_feat(vcpu->kvm, KVM_S390_VM_CPU_FEAT_SIIF))
+		scb_s->eca |= scb_o->eca & ECA_SII;
+	if (test_kvm_cpu_feat(vcpu->kvm, KVM_S390_VM_CPU_FEAT_IB))
+		scb_s->eca |= scb_o->eca & ECA_IB;
+	if (test_kvm_cpu_feat(vcpu->kvm, KVM_S390_VM_CPU_FEAT_CEI))
+		scb_s->eca |= scb_o->eca & ECA_CEI;
+	/* Epoch Extension */
+	if (test_kvm_facility(vcpu->kvm, 139)) {
+		scb_s->ecd |= scb_o->ecd & ECD_MEF;
+		scb_s->epdx = scb_o->epdx;
+	}
+
+	/* etoken */
+	if (test_kvm_facility(vcpu->kvm, 156))
+		scb_s->ecd |= scb_o->ecd & ECD_ETOKENF;
+
+	scb_s->hpid = HPID_VSIE;
+	scb_s->cpnc = scb_o->cpnc;
+
+	prepare_ibc(vcpu, vsie_page);
+	rc = shadow_crycb(vcpu, vsie_page);
+out:
+	if (rc)
+		unshadow_scb(vcpu, vsie_page);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+void kvm_s390_vsie_gmap_notifier(struct gmap *gmap, unsigned long start,
+				 unsigned long end)
+{
+	struct kvm *kvm = gmap->private;
+	struct vsie_page *cur;
+	unsigned long prefix;
+	struct page *page;
+	int i;
+
+	if (!gmap_is_shadow(gmap))
+		return;
+	/*
+	 * Only new shadow blocks are added to the list during runtime,
+	 * therefore we can safely reference them all the time.
+	 */
+	for (i = 0; i < kvm->arch.vsie.page_count; i++) {
+		page = READ_ONCE(kvm->arch.vsie.pages[i]);
+		if (!page)
+			continue;
+		cur = page_to_virt(page);
+		if (READ_ONCE(cur->gmap) != gmap)
+			continue;
+		prefix = cur->scb_s.prefix << GUEST_PREFIX_SHIFT;
+		/* with mso/msl, the prefix lies at an offset */
+		prefix += cur->scb_s.mso;
+		if (prefix <= end && start <= prefix + 2 * PAGE_SIZE - 1)
+			prefix_unmapped_sync(cur);
+	}
+}
+
+/*
+ * Map the first prefix page and if tx is enabled also the second prefix page.
+ *
+ * The prefix will be protected, a gmap notifier will inform about unmaps.
+ * The shadow scb must not be executed until the prefix is remapped, this is
+ * guaranteed by properly handling PROG_REQUEST.
+ *
+ * Returns: - 0 on if successfully mapped or already mapped
+ *          - > 0 if control has to be given to guest 2
+ *          - -EAGAIN if the caller can retry immediately
+ *          - -ENOMEM if out of memory
+ */
+static int map_prefix(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct vsie_page *vsie_page)
+{
+	struct kvm_s390_sie_block *scb_s = &vsie_page->scb_s;
+	u64 prefix = scb_s->prefix << GUEST_PREFIX_SHIFT;
+	int rc;
+
+	if (prefix_is_mapped(vsie_page))
+		return 0;
+
+	/* mark it as mapped so we can catch any concurrent unmappers */
+	prefix_mapped(vsie_page);
+
+	/* with mso/msl, the prefix lies at offset *mso* */
+	prefix += scb_s->mso;
+
+	rc = kvm_s390_shadow_fault(vcpu, vsie_page->gmap, prefix, NULL);
+	if (!rc && (scb_s->ecb & ECB_TE))
+		rc = kvm_s390_shadow_fault(vcpu, vsie_page->gmap,
+					   prefix + PAGE_SIZE, NULL);
+	/*
+	 * We don't have to mprotect, we will be called for all unshadows.
+	 * SIE will detect if protection applies and trigger a validity.
+	 */
+	if (rc)
+		prefix_unmapped(vsie_page);
+	if (rc > 0 || rc == -EFAULT)
+		rc = set_validity_icpt(scb_s, 0x0037U);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Pin the guest page given by gpa and set hpa to the pinned host address.
+ * Will always be pinned writable.
+ *
+ * Returns: - 0 on success
+ *          - -EINVAL if the gpa is not valid guest storage
+ */
+static int pin_guest_page(struct kvm *kvm, gpa_t gpa, hpa_t *hpa)
+{
+	struct page *page;
+
+	page = gfn_to_page(kvm, gpa_to_gfn(gpa));
+	if (is_error_page(page))
+		return -EINVAL;
+	*hpa = (hpa_t)page_to_phys(page) + (gpa & ~PAGE_MASK);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/* Unpins a page previously pinned via pin_guest_page, marking it as dirty. */
+static void unpin_guest_page(struct kvm *kvm, gpa_t gpa, hpa_t hpa)
+{
+	kvm_release_pfn_dirty(hpa >> PAGE_SHIFT);
+	/* mark the page always as dirty for migration */
+	mark_page_dirty(kvm, gpa_to_gfn(gpa));
+}
+
+/* unpin all blocks previously pinned by pin_blocks(), marking them dirty */
+static void unpin_blocks(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct vsie_page *vsie_page)
+{
+	struct kvm_s390_sie_block *scb_s = &vsie_page->scb_s;
+	hpa_t hpa;
+
+	hpa = (u64) scb_s->scaoh << 32 | scb_s->scaol;
+	if (hpa) {
+		unpin_guest_page(vcpu->kvm, vsie_page->sca_gpa, hpa);
+		vsie_page->sca_gpa = 0;
+		scb_s->scaol = 0;
+		scb_s->scaoh = 0;
+	}
+
+	hpa = scb_s->itdba;
+	if (hpa) {
+		unpin_guest_page(vcpu->kvm, vsie_page->itdba_gpa, hpa);
+		vsie_page->itdba_gpa = 0;
+		scb_s->itdba = 0;
+	}
+
+	hpa = scb_s->gvrd;
+	if (hpa) {
+		unpin_guest_page(vcpu->kvm, vsie_page->gvrd_gpa, hpa);
+		vsie_page->gvrd_gpa = 0;
+		scb_s->gvrd = 0;
+	}
+
+	hpa = scb_s->riccbd;
+	if (hpa) {
+		unpin_guest_page(vcpu->kvm, vsie_page->riccbd_gpa, hpa);
+		vsie_page->riccbd_gpa = 0;
+		scb_s->riccbd = 0;
+	}
+
+	hpa = scb_s->sdnxo;
+	if (hpa) {
+		unpin_guest_page(vcpu->kvm, vsie_page->sdnx_gpa, hpa);
+		vsie_page->sdnx_gpa = 0;
+		scb_s->sdnxo = 0;
+	}
+}
+
+/*
+ * Instead of shadowing some blocks, we can simply forward them because the
+ * addresses in the scb are 64 bit long.
+ *
+ * This works as long as the data lies in one page. If blocks ever exceed one
+ * page, we have to fall back to shadowing.
+ *
+ * As we reuse the sca, the vcpu pointers contained in it are invalid. We must
+ * therefore not enable any facilities that access these pointers (e.g. SIGPIF).
+ *
+ * Returns: - 0 if all blocks were pinned.
+ *          - > 0 if control has to be given to guest 2
+ *          - -ENOMEM if out of memory
+ */
+static int pin_blocks(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct vsie_page *vsie_page)
+{
+	struct kvm_s390_sie_block *scb_o = vsie_page->scb_o;
+	struct kvm_s390_sie_block *scb_s = &vsie_page->scb_s;
+	hpa_t hpa;
+	gpa_t gpa;
+	int rc = 0;
+
+	gpa = READ_ONCE(scb_o->scaol) & ~0xfUL;
+	if (test_kvm_cpu_feat(vcpu->kvm, KVM_S390_VM_CPU_FEAT_64BSCAO))
+		gpa |= (u64) READ_ONCE(scb_o->scaoh) << 32;
+	if (gpa) {
+		if (gpa < 2 * PAGE_SIZE)
+			rc = set_validity_icpt(scb_s, 0x0038U);
+		else if ((gpa & ~0x1fffUL) == kvm_s390_get_prefix(vcpu))
+			rc = set_validity_icpt(scb_s, 0x0011U);
+		else if ((gpa & PAGE_MASK) !=
+			 ((gpa + sizeof(struct bsca_block) - 1) & PAGE_MASK))
+			rc = set_validity_icpt(scb_s, 0x003bU);
+		if (!rc) {
+			rc = pin_guest_page(vcpu->kvm, gpa, &hpa);
+			if (rc)
+				rc = set_validity_icpt(scb_s, 0x0034U);
+		}
+		if (rc)
+			goto unpin;
+		vsie_page->sca_gpa = gpa;
+		scb_s->scaoh = (u32)((u64)hpa >> 32);
+		scb_s->scaol = (u32)(u64)hpa;
+	}
+
+	gpa = READ_ONCE(scb_o->itdba) & ~0xffUL;
+	if (gpa && (scb_s->ecb & ECB_TE)) {
+		if (gpa < 2 * PAGE_SIZE) {
+			rc = set_validity_icpt(scb_s, 0x0080U);
+			goto unpin;
+		}
+		/* 256 bytes cannot cross page boundaries */
+		rc = pin_guest_page(vcpu->kvm, gpa, &hpa);
+		if (rc) {
+			rc = set_validity_icpt(scb_s, 0x0080U);
+			goto unpin;
+		}
+		vsie_page->itdba_gpa = gpa;
+		scb_s->itdba = hpa;
+	}
+
+	gpa = READ_ONCE(scb_o->gvrd) & ~0x1ffUL;
+	if (gpa && (scb_s->eca & ECA_VX) && !(scb_s->ecd & ECD_HOSTREGMGMT)) {
+		if (gpa < 2 * PAGE_SIZE) {
+			rc = set_validity_icpt(scb_s, 0x1310U);
+			goto unpin;
+		}
+		/*
+		 * 512 bytes vector registers cannot cross page boundaries
+		 * if this block gets bigger, we have to shadow it.
+		 */
+		rc = pin_guest_page(vcpu->kvm, gpa, &hpa);
+		if (rc) {
+			rc = set_validity_icpt(scb_s, 0x1310U);
+			goto unpin;
+		}
+		vsie_page->gvrd_gpa = gpa;
+		scb_s->gvrd = hpa;
+	}
+
+	gpa = READ_ONCE(scb_o->riccbd) & ~0x3fUL;
+	if (gpa && (scb_s->ecb3 & ECB3_RI)) {
+		if (gpa < 2 * PAGE_SIZE) {
+			rc = set_validity_icpt(scb_s, 0x0043U);
+			goto unpin;
+		}
+		/* 64 bytes cannot cross page boundaries */
+		rc = pin_guest_page(vcpu->kvm, gpa, &hpa);
+		if (rc) {
+			rc = set_validity_icpt(scb_s, 0x0043U);
+			goto unpin;
+		}
+		/* Validity 0x0044 will be checked by SIE */
+		vsie_page->riccbd_gpa = gpa;
+		scb_s->riccbd = hpa;
+	}
+	if (((scb_s->ecb & ECB_GS) && !(scb_s->ecd & ECD_HOSTREGMGMT)) ||
+	    (scb_s->ecd & ECD_ETOKENF)) {
+		unsigned long sdnxc;
+
+		gpa = READ_ONCE(scb_o->sdnxo) & ~0xfUL;
+		sdnxc = READ_ONCE(scb_o->sdnxo) & 0xfUL;
+		if (!gpa || gpa < 2 * PAGE_SIZE) {
+			rc = set_validity_icpt(scb_s, 0x10b0U);
+			goto unpin;
+		}
+		if (sdnxc < 6 || sdnxc > 12) {
+			rc = set_validity_icpt(scb_s, 0x10b1U);
+			goto unpin;
+		}
+		if (gpa & ((1 << sdnxc) - 1)) {
+			rc = set_validity_icpt(scb_s, 0x10b2U);
+			goto unpin;
+		}
+		/* Due to alignment rules (checked above) this cannot
+		 * cross page boundaries
+		 */
+		rc = pin_guest_page(vcpu->kvm, gpa, &hpa);
+		if (rc) {
+			rc = set_validity_icpt(scb_s, 0x10b0U);
+			goto unpin;
+		}
+		vsie_page->sdnx_gpa = gpa;
+		scb_s->sdnxo = hpa | sdnxc;
+	}
+	return 0;
+unpin:
+	unpin_blocks(vcpu, vsie_page);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/* unpin the scb provided by guest 2, marking it as dirty */
+static void unpin_scb(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct vsie_page *vsie_page,
+		      gpa_t gpa)
+{
+	hpa_t hpa = (hpa_t) vsie_page->scb_o;
+
+	if (hpa)
+		unpin_guest_page(vcpu->kvm, gpa, hpa);
+	vsie_page->scb_o = NULL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Pin the scb at gpa provided by guest 2 at vsie_page->scb_o.
+ *
+ * Returns: - 0 if the scb was pinned.
+ *          - > 0 if control has to be given to guest 2
+ */
+static int pin_scb(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct vsie_page *vsie_page,
+		   gpa_t gpa)
+{
+	hpa_t hpa;
+	int rc;
+
+	rc = pin_guest_page(vcpu->kvm, gpa, &hpa);
+	if (rc) {
+		rc = kvm_s390_inject_program_int(vcpu, PGM_ADDRESSING);
+		WARN_ON_ONCE(rc);
+		return 1;
+	}
+	vsie_page->scb_o = phys_to_virt(hpa);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Inject a fault into guest 2.
+ *
+ * Returns: - > 0 if control has to be given to guest 2
+ *            < 0 if an error occurred during injection.
+ */
+static int inject_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, __u16 code, __u64 vaddr,
+			bool write_flag)
+{
+	struct kvm_s390_pgm_info pgm = {
+		.code = code,
+		.trans_exc_code =
+			/* 0-51: virtual address */
+			(vaddr & 0xfffffffffffff000UL) |
+			/* 52-53: store / fetch */
+			(((unsigned int) !write_flag) + 1) << 10,
+			/* 62-63: asce id (always primary == 0) */
+		.exc_access_id = 0, /* always primary */
+		.op_access_id = 0, /* not MVPG */
+	};
+	int rc;
+
+	if (code == PGM_PROTECTION)
+		pgm.trans_exc_code |= 0x4UL;
+
+	rc = kvm_s390_inject_prog_irq(vcpu, &pgm);
+	return rc ? rc : 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Handle a fault during vsie execution on a gmap shadow.
+ *
+ * Returns: - 0 if the fault was resolved
+ *          - > 0 if control has to be given to guest 2
+ *          - < 0 if an error occurred
+ */
+static int handle_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct vsie_page *vsie_page)
+{
+	int rc;
+
+	if (current->thread.gmap_int_code == PGM_PROTECTION)
+		/* we can directly forward all protection exceptions */
+		return inject_fault(vcpu, PGM_PROTECTION,
+				    current->thread.gmap_addr, 1);
+
+	rc = kvm_s390_shadow_fault(vcpu, vsie_page->gmap,
+				   current->thread.gmap_addr, NULL);
+	if (rc > 0) {
+		rc = inject_fault(vcpu, rc,
+				  current->thread.gmap_addr,
+				  current->thread.gmap_write_flag);
+		if (rc >= 0)
+			vsie_page->fault_addr = current->thread.gmap_addr;
+	}
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Retry the previous fault that required guest 2 intervention. This avoids
+ * one superfluous SIE re-entry and direct exit.
+ *
+ * Will ignore any errors. The next SIE fault will do proper fault handling.
+ */
+static void handle_last_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+			      struct vsie_page *vsie_page)
+{
+	if (vsie_page->fault_addr)
+		kvm_s390_shadow_fault(vcpu, vsie_page->gmap,
+				      vsie_page->fault_addr, NULL);
+	vsie_page->fault_addr = 0;
+}
+
+static inline void clear_vsie_icpt(struct vsie_page *vsie_page)
+{
+	vsie_page->scb_s.icptcode = 0;
+}
+
+/* rewind the psw and clear the vsie icpt, so we can retry execution */
+static void retry_vsie_icpt(struct vsie_page *vsie_page)
+{
+	struct kvm_s390_sie_block *scb_s = &vsie_page->scb_s;
+	int ilen = insn_length(scb_s->ipa >> 8);
+
+	/* take care of EXECUTE instructions */
+	if (scb_s->icptstatus & 1) {
+		ilen = (scb_s->icptstatus >> 4) & 0x6;
+		if (!ilen)
+			ilen = 4;
+	}
+	scb_s->gpsw.addr = __rewind_psw(scb_s->gpsw, ilen);
+	clear_vsie_icpt(vsie_page);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Try to shadow + enable the guest 2 provided facility list.
+ * Retry instruction execution if enabled for and provided by guest 2.
+ *
+ * Returns: - 0 if handled (retry or guest 2 icpt)
+ *          - > 0 if control has to be given to guest 2
+ */
+static int handle_stfle(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct vsie_page *vsie_page)
+{
+	struct kvm_s390_sie_block *scb_s = &vsie_page->scb_s;
+	__u32 fac = READ_ONCE(vsie_page->scb_o->fac) & 0x7ffffff8U;
+
+	if (fac && test_kvm_facility(vcpu->kvm, 7)) {
+		retry_vsie_icpt(vsie_page);
+		if (read_guest_real(vcpu, fac, &vsie_page->fac,
+				    sizeof(vsie_page->fac)))
+			return set_validity_icpt(scb_s, 0x1090U);
+		scb_s->fac = (__u32)(__u64) &vsie_page->fac;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Get a register for a nested guest.
+ * @vcpu the vcpu of the guest
+ * @vsie_page the vsie_page for the nested guest
+ * @reg the register number, the upper 4 bits are ignored.
+ * returns: the value of the register.
+ */
+static u64 vsie_get_register(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct vsie_page *vsie_page, u8 reg)
+{
+	/* no need to validate the parameter and/or perform error handling */
+	reg &= 0xf;
+	switch (reg) {
+	case 15:
+		return vsie_page->scb_s.gg15;
+	case 14:
+		return vsie_page->scb_s.gg14;
+	default:
+		return vcpu->run->s.regs.gprs[reg];
+	}
+}
+
+static int vsie_handle_mvpg(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct vsie_page *vsie_page)
+{
+	struct kvm_s390_sie_block *scb_s = &vsie_page->scb_s;
+	unsigned long pei_dest, pei_src, src, dest, mask, prefix;
+	u64 *pei_block = &vsie_page->scb_o->mcic;
+	int edat, rc_dest, rc_src;
+	union ctlreg0 cr0;
+
+	cr0.val = vcpu->arch.sie_block->gcr[0];
+	edat = cr0.edat && test_kvm_facility(vcpu->kvm, 8);
+	mask = _kvm_s390_logical_to_effective(&scb_s->gpsw, PAGE_MASK);
+	prefix = scb_s->prefix << GUEST_PREFIX_SHIFT;
+
+	dest = vsie_get_register(vcpu, vsie_page, scb_s->ipb >> 20) & mask;
+	dest = _kvm_s390_real_to_abs(prefix, dest) + scb_s->mso;
+	src = vsie_get_register(vcpu, vsie_page, scb_s->ipb >> 16) & mask;
+	src = _kvm_s390_real_to_abs(prefix, src) + scb_s->mso;
+
+	rc_dest = kvm_s390_shadow_fault(vcpu, vsie_page->gmap, dest, &pei_dest);
+	rc_src = kvm_s390_shadow_fault(vcpu, vsie_page->gmap, src, &pei_src);
+	/*
+	 * Either everything went well, or something non-critical went wrong
+	 * e.g. because of a race. In either case, simply retry.
+	 */
+	if (rc_dest == -EAGAIN || rc_src == -EAGAIN || (!rc_dest && !rc_src)) {
+		retry_vsie_icpt(vsie_page);
+		return -EAGAIN;
+	}
+	/* Something more serious went wrong, propagate the error */
+	if (rc_dest < 0)
+		return rc_dest;
+	if (rc_src < 0)
+		return rc_src;
+
+	/* The only possible suppressing exception: just deliver it */
+	if (rc_dest == PGM_TRANSLATION_SPEC || rc_src == PGM_TRANSLATION_SPEC) {
+		clear_vsie_icpt(vsie_page);
+		rc_dest = kvm_s390_inject_program_int(vcpu, PGM_TRANSLATION_SPEC);
+		WARN_ON_ONCE(rc_dest);
+		return 1;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Forward the PEI intercept to the guest if it was a page fault, or
+	 * also for segment and region table faults if EDAT applies.
+	 */
+	if (edat) {
+		rc_dest = rc_dest == PGM_ASCE_TYPE ? rc_dest : 0;
+		rc_src = rc_src == PGM_ASCE_TYPE ? rc_src : 0;
+	} else {
+		rc_dest = rc_dest != PGM_PAGE_TRANSLATION ? rc_dest : 0;
+		rc_src = rc_src != PGM_PAGE_TRANSLATION ? rc_src : 0;
+	}
+	if (!rc_dest && !rc_src) {
+		pei_block[0] = pei_dest;
+		pei_block[1] = pei_src;
+		return 1;
+	}
+
+	retry_vsie_icpt(vsie_page);
+
+	/*
+	 * The host has edat, and the guest does not, or it was an ASCE type
+	 * exception. The host needs to inject the appropriate DAT interrupts
+	 * into the guest.
+	 */
+	if (rc_dest)
+		return inject_fault(vcpu, rc_dest, dest, 1);
+	return inject_fault(vcpu, rc_src, src, 0);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Run the vsie on a shadow scb and a shadow gmap, without any further
+ * sanity checks, handling SIE faults.
+ *
+ * Returns: - 0 everything went fine
+ *          - > 0 if control has to be given to guest 2
+ *          - < 0 if an error occurred
+ */
+static int do_vsie_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct vsie_page *vsie_page)
+	__releases(vcpu->kvm->srcu)
+	__acquires(vcpu->kvm->srcu)
+{
+	struct kvm_s390_sie_block *scb_s = &vsie_page->scb_s;
+	struct kvm_s390_sie_block *scb_o = vsie_page->scb_o;
+	int guest_bp_isolation;
+	int rc = 0;
+
+	handle_last_fault(vcpu, vsie_page);
+
+	kvm_vcpu_srcu_read_unlock(vcpu);
+
+	/* save current guest state of bp isolation override */
+	guest_bp_isolation = test_thread_flag(TIF_ISOLATE_BP_GUEST);
+
+	/*
+	 * The guest is running with BPBC, so we have to force it on for our
+	 * nested guest. This is done by enabling BPBC globally, so the BPBC
+	 * control in the SCB (which the nested guest can modify) is simply
+	 * ignored.
+	 */
+	if (test_kvm_facility(vcpu->kvm, 82) &&
+	    vcpu->arch.sie_block->fpf & FPF_BPBC)
+		set_thread_flag(TIF_ISOLATE_BP_GUEST);
+
+	local_irq_disable();
+	guest_enter_irqoff();
+	local_irq_enable();
+
+	/*
+	 * Simulate a SIE entry of the VCPU (see sie64a), so VCPU blocking
+	 * and VCPU requests also hinder the vSIE from running and lead
+	 * to an immediate exit. kvm_s390_vsie_kick() has to be used to
+	 * also kick the vSIE.
+	 */
+	vcpu->arch.sie_block->prog0c |= PROG_IN_SIE;
+	barrier();
+	if (test_cpu_flag(CIF_FPU))
+		load_fpu_regs();
+	if (!kvm_s390_vcpu_sie_inhibited(vcpu))
+		rc = sie64a(scb_s, vcpu->run->s.regs.gprs);
+	barrier();
+	vcpu->arch.sie_block->prog0c &= ~PROG_IN_SIE;
+
+	local_irq_disable();
+	guest_exit_irqoff();
+	local_irq_enable();
+
+	/* restore guest state for bp isolation override */
+	if (!guest_bp_isolation)
+		clear_thread_flag(TIF_ISOLATE_BP_GUEST);
+
+	kvm_vcpu_srcu_read_lock(vcpu);
+
+	if (rc == -EINTR) {
+		VCPU_EVENT(vcpu, 3, "%s", "machine check");
+		kvm_s390_reinject_machine_check(vcpu, &vsie_page->mcck_info);
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	if (rc > 0)
+		rc = 0; /* we could still have an icpt */
+	else if (rc == -EFAULT)
+		return handle_fault(vcpu, vsie_page);
+
+	switch (scb_s->icptcode) {
+	case ICPT_INST:
+		if (scb_s->ipa == 0xb2b0)
+			rc = handle_stfle(vcpu, vsie_page);
+		break;
+	case ICPT_STOP:
+		/* stop not requested by g2 - must have been a kick */
+		if (!(atomic_read(&scb_o->cpuflags) & CPUSTAT_STOP_INT))
+			clear_vsie_icpt(vsie_page);
+		break;
+	case ICPT_VALIDITY:
+		if ((scb_s->ipa & 0xf000) != 0xf000)
+			scb_s->ipa += 0x1000;
+		break;
+	case ICPT_PARTEXEC:
+		if (scb_s->ipa == 0xb254)
+			rc = vsie_handle_mvpg(vcpu, vsie_page);
+		break;
+	}
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static void release_gmap_shadow(struct vsie_page *vsie_page)
+{
+	if (vsie_page->gmap)
+		gmap_put(vsie_page->gmap);
+	WRITE_ONCE(vsie_page->gmap, NULL);
+	prefix_unmapped(vsie_page);
+}
+
+static int acquire_gmap_shadow(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+			       struct vsie_page *vsie_page)
+{
+	unsigned long asce;
+	union ctlreg0 cr0;
+	struct gmap *gmap;
+	int edat;
+
+	asce = vcpu->arch.sie_block->gcr[1];
+	cr0.val = vcpu->arch.sie_block->gcr[0];
+	edat = cr0.edat && test_kvm_facility(vcpu->kvm, 8);
+	edat += edat && test_kvm_facility(vcpu->kvm, 78);
+
+	/*
+	 * ASCE or EDAT could have changed since last icpt, or the gmap
+	 * we're holding has been unshadowed. If the gmap is still valid,
+	 * we can safely reuse it.
+	 */
+	if (vsie_page->gmap && gmap_shadow_valid(vsie_page->gmap, asce, edat))
+		return 0;
+
+	/* release the old shadow - if any, and mark the prefix as unmapped */
+	release_gmap_shadow(vsie_page);
+	gmap = gmap_shadow(vcpu->arch.gmap, asce, edat);
+	if (IS_ERR(gmap))
+		return PTR_ERR(gmap);
+	gmap->private = vcpu->kvm;
+	WRITE_ONCE(vsie_page->gmap, gmap);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Register the shadow scb at the VCPU, e.g. for kicking out of vsie.
+ */
+static void register_shadow_scb(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+				struct vsie_page *vsie_page)
+{
+	struct kvm_s390_sie_block *scb_s = &vsie_page->scb_s;
+
+	WRITE_ONCE(vcpu->arch.vsie_block, &vsie_page->scb_s);
+	/*
+	 * External calls have to lead to a kick of the vcpu and
+	 * therefore the vsie -> Simulate Wait state.
+	 */
+	kvm_s390_set_cpuflags(vcpu, CPUSTAT_WAIT);
+	/*
+	 * We have to adjust the g3 epoch by the g2 epoch. The epoch will
+	 * automatically be adjusted on tod clock changes via kvm_sync_clock.
+	 */
+	preempt_disable();
+	scb_s->epoch += vcpu->kvm->arch.epoch;
+
+	if (scb_s->ecd & ECD_MEF) {
+		scb_s->epdx += vcpu->kvm->arch.epdx;
+		if (scb_s->epoch < vcpu->kvm->arch.epoch)
+			scb_s->epdx += 1;
+	}
+
+	preempt_enable();
+}
+
+/*
+ * Unregister a shadow scb from a VCPU.
+ */
+static void unregister_shadow_scb(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	kvm_s390_clear_cpuflags(vcpu, CPUSTAT_WAIT);
+	WRITE_ONCE(vcpu->arch.vsie_block, NULL);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Run the vsie on a shadowed scb, managing the gmap shadow, handling
+ * prefix pages and faults.
+ *
+ * Returns: - 0 if no errors occurred
+ *          - > 0 if control has to be given to guest 2
+ *          - -ENOMEM if out of memory
+ */
+static int vsie_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct vsie_page *vsie_page)
+{
+	struct kvm_s390_sie_block *scb_s = &vsie_page->scb_s;
+	int rc = 0;
+
+	while (1) {
+		rc = acquire_gmap_shadow(vcpu, vsie_page);
+		if (!rc)
+			rc = map_prefix(vcpu, vsie_page);
+		if (!rc) {
+			gmap_enable(vsie_page->gmap);
+			update_intervention_requests(vsie_page);
+			rc = do_vsie_run(vcpu, vsie_page);
+			gmap_enable(vcpu->arch.gmap);
+		}
+		atomic_andnot(PROG_BLOCK_SIE, &scb_s->prog20);
+
+		if (rc == -EAGAIN)
+			rc = 0;
+		if (rc || scb_s->icptcode || signal_pending(current) ||
+		    kvm_s390_vcpu_has_irq(vcpu, 0) ||
+		    kvm_s390_vcpu_sie_inhibited(vcpu))
+			break;
+		cond_resched();
+	}
+
+	if (rc == -EFAULT) {
+		/*
+		 * Addressing exceptions are always presentes as intercepts.
+		 * As addressing exceptions are suppressing and our guest 3 PSW
+		 * points at the responsible instruction, we have to
+		 * forward the PSW and set the ilc. If we can't read guest 3
+		 * instruction, we can use an arbitrary ilc. Let's always use
+		 * ilen = 4 for now, so we can avoid reading in guest 3 virtual
+		 * memory. (we could also fake the shadow so the hardware
+		 * handles it).
+		 */
+		scb_s->icptcode = ICPT_PROGI;
+		scb_s->iprcc = PGM_ADDRESSING;
+		scb_s->pgmilc = 4;
+		scb_s->gpsw.addr = __rewind_psw(scb_s->gpsw, 4);
+		rc = 1;
+	}
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Get or create a vsie page for a scb address.
+ *
+ * Returns: - address of a vsie page (cached or new one)
+ *          - NULL if the same scb address is already used by another VCPU
+ *          - ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM) if out of memory
+ */
+static struct vsie_page *get_vsie_page(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long addr)
+{
+	struct vsie_page *vsie_page;
+	struct page *page;
+	int nr_vcpus;
+
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	page = radix_tree_lookup(&kvm->arch.vsie.addr_to_page, addr >> 9);
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+	if (page) {
+		if (page_ref_inc_return(page) == 2)
+			return page_to_virt(page);
+		page_ref_dec(page);
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * We want at least #online_vcpus shadows, so every VCPU can execute
+	 * the VSIE in parallel.
+	 */
+	nr_vcpus = atomic_read(&kvm->online_vcpus);
+
+	mutex_lock(&kvm->arch.vsie.mutex);
+	if (kvm->arch.vsie.page_count < nr_vcpus) {
+		page = alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT | __GFP_ZERO | GFP_DMA);
+		if (!page) {
+			mutex_unlock(&kvm->arch.vsie.mutex);
+			return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+		}
+		page_ref_inc(page);
+		kvm->arch.vsie.pages[kvm->arch.vsie.page_count] = page;
+		kvm->arch.vsie.page_count++;
+	} else {
+		/* reuse an existing entry that belongs to nobody */
+		while (true) {
+			page = kvm->arch.vsie.pages[kvm->arch.vsie.next];
+			if (page_ref_inc_return(page) == 2)
+				break;
+			page_ref_dec(page);
+			kvm->arch.vsie.next++;
+			kvm->arch.vsie.next %= nr_vcpus;
+		}
+		radix_tree_delete(&kvm->arch.vsie.addr_to_page, page->index >> 9);
+	}
+	page->index = addr;
+	/* double use of the same address */
+	if (radix_tree_insert(&kvm->arch.vsie.addr_to_page, addr >> 9, page)) {
+		page_ref_dec(page);
+		mutex_unlock(&kvm->arch.vsie.mutex);
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	mutex_unlock(&kvm->arch.vsie.mutex);
+
+	vsie_page = page_to_virt(page);
+	memset(&vsie_page->scb_s, 0, sizeof(struct kvm_s390_sie_block));
+	release_gmap_shadow(vsie_page);
+	vsie_page->fault_addr = 0;
+	vsie_page->scb_s.ihcpu = 0xffffU;
+	return vsie_page;
+}
+
+/* put a vsie page acquired via get_vsie_page */
+static void put_vsie_page(struct kvm *kvm, struct vsie_page *vsie_page)
+{
+	struct page *page = pfn_to_page(__pa(vsie_page) >> PAGE_SHIFT);
+
+	page_ref_dec(page);
+}
+
+int kvm_s390_handle_vsie(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct vsie_page *vsie_page;
+	unsigned long scb_addr;
+	int rc;
+
+	vcpu->stat.instruction_sie++;
+	if (!test_kvm_cpu_feat(vcpu->kvm, KVM_S390_VM_CPU_FEAT_SIEF2))
+		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+	if (vcpu->arch.sie_block->gpsw.mask & PSW_MASK_PSTATE)
+		return kvm_s390_inject_program_int(vcpu, PGM_PRIVILEGED_OP);
+
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(struct vsie_page) != PAGE_SIZE);
+	scb_addr = kvm_s390_get_base_disp_s(vcpu, NULL);
+
+	/* 512 byte alignment */
+	if (unlikely(scb_addr & 0x1ffUL))
+		return kvm_s390_inject_program_int(vcpu, PGM_SPECIFICATION);
+
+	if (signal_pending(current) || kvm_s390_vcpu_has_irq(vcpu, 0) ||
+	    kvm_s390_vcpu_sie_inhibited(vcpu))
+		return 0;
+
+	vsie_page = get_vsie_page(vcpu->kvm, scb_addr);
+	if (IS_ERR(vsie_page))
+		return PTR_ERR(vsie_page);
+	else if (!vsie_page)
+		/* double use of sie control block - simply do nothing */
+		return 0;
+
+	rc = pin_scb(vcpu, vsie_page, scb_addr);
+	if (rc)
+		goto out_put;
+	rc = shadow_scb(vcpu, vsie_page);
+	if (rc)
+		goto out_unpin_scb;
+	rc = pin_blocks(vcpu, vsie_page);
+	if (rc)
+		goto out_unshadow;
+	register_shadow_scb(vcpu, vsie_page);
+	rc = vsie_run(vcpu, vsie_page);
+	unregister_shadow_scb(vcpu);
+	unpin_blocks(vcpu, vsie_page);
+out_unshadow:
+	unshadow_scb(vcpu, vsie_page);
+out_unpin_scb:
+	unpin_scb(vcpu, vsie_page, scb_addr);
+out_put:
+	put_vsie_page(vcpu->kvm, vsie_page);
+
+	return rc < 0 ? rc : 0;
+}
+
+/* Init the vsie data structures. To be called when a vm is initialized. */
+void kvm_s390_vsie_init(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+	mutex_init(&kvm->arch.vsie.mutex);
+	INIT_RADIX_TREE(&kvm->arch.vsie.addr_to_page, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
+}
+
+/* Destroy the vsie data structures. To be called when a vm is destroyed. */
+void kvm_s390_vsie_destroy(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+	struct vsie_page *vsie_page;
+	struct page *page;
+	int i;
+
+	mutex_lock(&kvm->arch.vsie.mutex);
+	for (i = 0; i < kvm->arch.vsie.page_count; i++) {
+		page = kvm->arch.vsie.pages[i];
+		kvm->arch.vsie.pages[i] = NULL;
+		vsie_page = page_to_virt(page);
+		release_gmap_shadow(vsie_page);
+		/* free the radix tree entry */
+		radix_tree_delete(&kvm->arch.vsie.addr_to_page, page->index >> 9);
+		__free_page(page);
+	}
+	kvm->arch.vsie.page_count = 0;
+	mutex_unlock(&kvm->arch.vsie.mutex);
+}
+
+void kvm_s390_vsie_kick(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct kvm_s390_sie_block *scb = READ_ONCE(vcpu->arch.vsie_block);
+
+	/*
+	 * Even if the VCPU lets go of the shadow sie block reference, it is
+	 * still valid in the cache. So we can safely kick it.
+	 */
+	if (scb) {
+		atomic_or(PROG_BLOCK_SIE, &scb->prog20);
+		if (scb->prog0c & PROG_IN_SIE)
+			atomic_or(CPUSTAT_STOP_INT, &scb->cpuflags);
+	}
+}