diff options
| author | Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org> | 2024-05-18 18:50:03 +0000 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org> | 2024-05-18 18:50:03 +0000 |
| commit | 01a69402cf9d38ff180345d55c2ee51c7e89fbc7 (patch) | |
| tree | b406c5242a088c4f59c6e4b719b783f43aca6ae9 /arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S | |
| parent | Adding upstream version 6.7.12. (diff) | |
| download | linux-upstream/6.8.9.tar.xz linux-upstream/6.8.9.zip | |
Adding upstream version 6.8.9.upstream/6.8.9
Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S')
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S | 37 |
1 files changed, 25 insertions, 12 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S b/arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S index 0f8103240f..d4918d03ef 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S @@ -114,6 +114,28 @@ SYM_CODE_START_NOALIGN(startup_64) /* Form the CR3 value being sure to include the CR3 modifier */ addq $(early_top_pgt - __START_KERNEL_map), %rax + +#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT + mov %rax, %rdi + mov %rax, %r14 + + addq phys_base(%rip), %rdi + + /* + * For SEV guests: Verify that the C-bit is correct. A malicious + * hypervisor could lie about the C-bit position to perform a ROP + * attack on the guest by writing to the unencrypted stack and wait for + * the next RET instruction. + */ + call sev_verify_cbit + + /* + * Restore CR3 value without the phys_base which will be added + * below, before writing %cr3. + */ + mov %r14, %rax +#endif + jmp 1f SYM_CODE_END(startup_64) @@ -182,7 +204,7 @@ SYM_INNER_LABEL(secondary_startup_64_no_verify, SYM_L_GLOBAL) /* Enable PAE mode, PSE, PGE and LA57 */ orl $(X86_CR4_PAE | X86_CR4_PSE | X86_CR4_PGE), %ecx #ifdef CONFIG_X86_5LEVEL - testl $1, __pgtable_l5_enabled(%rip) + testb $1, __pgtable_l5_enabled(%rip) jz 1f orl $X86_CR4_LA57, %ecx 1: @@ -193,21 +215,12 @@ SYM_INNER_LABEL(secondary_startup_64_no_verify, SYM_L_GLOBAL) addq phys_base(%rip), %rax /* - * For SEV guests: Verify that the C-bit is correct. A malicious - * hypervisor could lie about the C-bit position to perform a ROP - * attack on the guest by writing to the unencrypted stack and wait for - * the next RET instruction. - */ - movq %rax, %rdi - call sev_verify_cbit - - /* * Switch to new page-table * * For the boot CPU this switches to early_top_pgt which still has the - * indentity mappings present. The secondary CPUs will switch to the + * identity mappings present. The secondary CPUs will switch to the * init_top_pgt here, away from the trampoline_pgd and unmap the - * indentity mapped ranges. + * identity mapped ranges. */ movq %rax, %cr3 |