Merging upstream version 6.7.12.

Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>

19 files changed, 213 insertions, 112 deletions

diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/cppc.c b/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/cppc.c
index 8d8752b44f..ff8f25faca 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/cppc.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/cppc.c
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ bool cpc_supported_by_cpu(void)
 		    (boot_cpu_data.x86_model >= 0x20 && boot_cpu_data.x86_model <= 0x2f)))
 			return true;
 		else if (boot_cpu_data.x86 == 0x17 &&
-			 boot_cpu_data.x86_model >= 0x70 && boot_cpu_data.x86_model <= 0x7f)
+			 boot_cpu_data.x86_model >= 0x30 && boot_cpu_data.x86_model <= 0x7f)
 			return true;
 		return boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_CPPC);
 	}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
index 2055fb308f..77a1ceb717 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
@@ -1002,11 +1002,11 @@ static bool cpu_has_zenbleed_microcode(void)
 	u32 good_rev = 0;
 
 	switch (boot_cpu_data.x86_model) {
-	case 0x30 ... 0x3f: good_rev = 0x0830107a; break;
-	case 0x60 ... 0x67: good_rev = 0x0860010b; break;
-	case 0x68 ... 0x6f: good_rev = 0x08608105; break;
-	case 0x70 ... 0x7f: good_rev = 0x08701032; break;
-	case 0xa0 ... 0xaf: good_rev = 0x08a00008; break;
+	case 0x30 ... 0x3f: good_rev = 0x0830107b; break;
+	case 0x60 ... 0x67: good_rev = 0x0860010c; break;
+	case 0x68 ... 0x6f: good_rev = 0x08608107; break;
+	case 0x70 ... 0x7f: good_rev = 0x08701033; break;
+	case 0xa0 ... 0xaf: good_rev = 0x08a00009; break;
 
 	default:
 		return false;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index 48d049cd74..01ac18f561 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -422,6 +422,13 @@ static void __init mmio_select_mitigation(void)
 	if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MDS) || (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_TAA) &&
 					      boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RTM)))
 		setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF);
+
+	/*
+	 * X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF could be enabled by other VERW based
+	 * mitigations, disable KVM-only mitigation in that case.
+	 */
+	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF))
+		static_branch_disable(&mmio_stale_data_clear);
 	else
 		static_branch_enable(&mmio_stale_data_clear);
 
@@ -474,6 +481,57 @@ static int __init mmio_stale_data_parse_cmdline(char *str)
 early_param("mmio_stale_data", mmio_stale_data_parse_cmdline);
 
 #undef pr_fmt
+#define pr_fmt(fmt)	"Register File Data Sampling: " fmt
+
+enum rfds_mitigations {
+	RFDS_MITIGATION_OFF,
+	RFDS_MITIGATION_VERW,
+	RFDS_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED,
+};
+
+/* Default mitigation for Register File Data Sampling */
+static enum rfds_mitigations rfds_mitigation __ro_after_init =
+	IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_RFDS) ? RFDS_MITIGATION_VERW : RFDS_MITIGATION_OFF;
+
+static const char * const rfds_strings[] = {
+	[RFDS_MITIGATION_OFF]			= "Vulnerable",
+	[RFDS_MITIGATION_VERW]			= "Mitigation: Clear Register File",
+	[RFDS_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED]		= "Vulnerable: No microcode",
+};
+
+static void __init rfds_select_mitigation(void)
+{
+	if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_RFDS) || cpu_mitigations_off()) {
+		rfds_mitigation = RFDS_MITIGATION_OFF;
+		return;
+	}
+	if (rfds_mitigation == RFDS_MITIGATION_OFF)
+		return;
+
+	if (x86_read_arch_cap_msr() & ARCH_CAP_RFDS_CLEAR)
+		setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF);
+	else
+		rfds_mitigation = RFDS_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED;
+}
+
+static __init int rfds_parse_cmdline(char *str)
+{
+	if (!str)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_RFDS))
+		return 0;
+
+	if (!strcmp(str, "off"))
+		rfds_mitigation = RFDS_MITIGATION_OFF;
+	else if (!strcmp(str, "on"))
+		rfds_mitigation = RFDS_MITIGATION_VERW;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+early_param("reg_file_data_sampling", rfds_parse_cmdline);
+
+#undef pr_fmt
 #define pr_fmt(fmt)     "" fmt
 
 static void __init md_clear_update_mitigation(void)
@@ -498,11 +556,19 @@ static void __init md_clear_update_mitigation(void)
 		taa_mitigation = TAA_MITIGATION_VERW;
 		taa_select_mitigation();
 	}
-	if (mmio_mitigation == MMIO_MITIGATION_OFF &&
-	    boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA)) {
+	/*
+	 * MMIO_MITIGATION_OFF is not checked here so that mmio_stale_data_clear
+	 * gets updated correctly as per X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF state.
+	 */
+	if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA)) {
 		mmio_mitigation = MMIO_MITIGATION_VERW;
 		mmio_select_mitigation();
 	}
+	if (rfds_mitigation == RFDS_MITIGATION_OFF &&
+	    boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_RFDS)) {
+		rfds_mitigation = RFDS_MITIGATION_VERW;
+		rfds_select_mitigation();
+	}
 out:
 	if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MDS))
 		pr_info("MDS: %s\n", mds_strings[mds_mitigation]);
@@ -512,6 +578,8 @@ out:
 		pr_info("MMIO Stale Data: %s\n", mmio_strings[mmio_mitigation]);
 	else if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MMIO_UNKNOWN))
 		pr_info("MMIO Stale Data: Unknown: No mitigations\n");
+	if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_RFDS))
+		pr_info("Register File Data Sampling: %s\n", rfds_strings[rfds_mitigation]);
 }
 
 static void __init md_clear_select_mitigation(void)
@@ -519,11 +587,12 @@ static void __init md_clear_select_mitigation(void)
 	mds_select_mitigation();
 	taa_select_mitigation();
 	mmio_select_mitigation();
+	rfds_select_mitigation();
 
 	/*
-	 * As MDS, TAA and MMIO Stale Data mitigations are inter-related, update
-	 * and print their mitigation after MDS, TAA and MMIO Stale Data
-	 * mitigation selection is done.
+	 * As these mitigations are inter-related and rely on VERW instruction
+	 * to clear the microarchitural buffers, update and print their status
+	 * after mitigation selection is done for each of these vulnerabilities.
 	 */
 	md_clear_update_mitigation();
 }
@@ -2612,6 +2681,11 @@ static ssize_t mmio_stale_data_show_state(char *buf)
 			  sched_smt_active() ? "vulnerable" : "disabled");
 }
 
+static ssize_t rfds_show_state(char *buf)
+{
+	return sysfs_emit(buf, "%s\n", rfds_strings[rfds_mitigation]);
+}
+
 static char *stibp_state(void)
 {
 	if (spectre_v2_in_eibrs_mode(spectre_v2_enabled) &&
@@ -2771,6 +2845,9 @@ static ssize_t cpu_show_common(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr
 	case X86_BUG_GDS:
 		return gds_show_state(buf);
 
+	case X86_BUG_RFDS:
+		return rfds_show_state(buf);
+
 	default:
 		break;
 	}
@@ -2845,4 +2922,9 @@ ssize_t cpu_show_gds(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *bu
 {
 	return cpu_show_common(dev, attr, buf, X86_BUG_GDS);
 }
+
+ssize_t cpu_show_reg_file_data_sampling(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
+{
+	return cpu_show_common(dev, attr, buf, X86_BUG_RFDS);
+}
 #endif
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
index 34cac9ea19..97ea52a4e8 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
@@ -1274,6 +1274,8 @@ static const __initconst struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vuln_whitelist[] = {
 #define SRSO		BIT(5)
 /* CPU is affected by GDS */
 #define GDS		BIT(6)
+/* CPU is affected by Register File Data Sampling */
+#define RFDS		BIT(7)
 
 static const struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vuln_blacklist[] __initconst = {
 	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(IVYBRIDGE,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		SRBDS),
@@ -1301,9 +1303,18 @@ static const struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vuln_blacklist[] __initconst = {
 	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(TIGERLAKE,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		GDS),
 	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(LAKEFIELD,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED),
 	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ROCKETLAKE,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		MMIO | RETBLEED | GDS),
-	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ATOM_TREMONT,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		MMIO | MMIO_SBDS),
-	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ATOM_TREMONT_D,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		MMIO),
-	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ATOM_TREMONT_L,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		MMIO | MMIO_SBDS),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ALDERLAKE,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		RFDS),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ALDERLAKE_L,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		RFDS),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(RAPTORLAKE,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		RFDS),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(RAPTORLAKE_P,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		RFDS),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(RAPTORLAKE_S,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		RFDS),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ATOM_GRACEMONT,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		RFDS),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ATOM_TREMONT,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RFDS),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ATOM_TREMONT_D,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		MMIO | RFDS),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ATOM_TREMONT_L,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RFDS),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ATOM_GOLDMONT,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		RFDS),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ATOM_GOLDMONT_D,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		RFDS),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ATOM_GOLDMONT_PLUS, X86_STEPPING_ANY,		RFDS),
 
 	VULNBL_AMD(0x15, RETBLEED),
 	VULNBL_AMD(0x16, RETBLEED),
@@ -1337,6 +1348,24 @@ static bool arch_cap_mmio_immune(u64 ia32_cap)
 		ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_SBDR_SSDP_NO);
 }
 
+static bool __init vulnerable_to_rfds(u64 ia32_cap)
+{
+	/* The "immunity" bit trumps everything else: */
+	if (ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_RFDS_NO)
+		return false;
+
+	/*
+	 * VMMs set ARCH_CAP_RFDS_CLEAR for processors not in the blacklist to
+	 * indicate that mitigation is needed because guest is running on a
+	 * vulnerable hardware or may migrate to such hardware:
+	 */
+	if (ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_RFDS_CLEAR)
+		return true;
+
+	/* Only consult the blacklist when there is no enumeration: */
+	return cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_blacklist, RFDS);
+}
+
 static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 {
 	u64 ia32_cap = x86_read_arch_cap_msr();
@@ -1448,6 +1477,9 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 	    boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AVX))
 		setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_GDS);
 
+	if (vulnerable_to_rfds(ia32_cap))
+		setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_RFDS);
+
 	if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_MELTDOWN))
 		return;
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/core.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/core.c
index 19e0681f04..d04371e851 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/core.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/core.c
@@ -231,9 +231,7 @@ static bool __get_mem_config_intel(struct rdt_resource *r)
 static bool __rdt_get_mem_config_amd(struct rdt_resource *r)
 {
 	struct rdt_hw_resource *hw_res = resctrl_to_arch_res(r);
-	union cpuid_0x10_3_eax eax;
-	union cpuid_0x10_x_edx edx;
-	u32 ebx, ecx, subleaf;
+	u32 eax, ebx, ecx, edx, subleaf;
 
 	/*
 	 * Query CPUID_Fn80000020_EDX_x01 for MBA and
@@ -241,9 +239,9 @@ static bool __rdt_get_mem_config_amd(struct rdt_resource *r)
 	 */
 	subleaf = (r->rid == RDT_RESOURCE_SMBA) ? 2 :  1;
 
-	cpuid_count(0x80000020, subleaf, &eax.full, &ebx, &ecx, &edx.full);
-	hw_res->num_closid = edx.split.cos_max + 1;
-	r->default_ctrl = MAX_MBA_BW_AMD;
+	cpuid_count(0x80000020, subleaf, &eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx);
+	hw_res->num_closid = edx + 1;
+	r->default_ctrl = 1 << eax;
 
 	/* AMD does not use delay */
 	r->membw.delay_linear = false;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/internal.h b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/internal.h
index a4f1aa15f0..52e7e7deee 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/internal.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/internal.h
@@ -18,7 +18,6 @@
 #define MBM_OVERFLOW_INTERVAL		1000
 #define MAX_MBA_BW			100u
 #define MBA_IS_LINEAR			0x4
-#define MAX_MBA_BW_AMD			0x800
 #define MBM_CNTR_WIDTH_OFFSET_AMD	20
 
 #define RMID_VAL_ERROR			BIT_ULL(63)
@@ -296,14 +295,10 @@ struct rftype {
  * struct mbm_state - status for each MBM counter in each domain
  * @prev_bw_bytes: Previous bytes value read for bandwidth calculation
  * @prev_bw:	The most recent bandwidth in MBps
- * @delta_bw:	Difference between the current and previous bandwidth
- * @delta_comp:	Indicates whether to compute the delta_bw
  */
 struct mbm_state {
 	u64	prev_bw_bytes;
 	u32	prev_bw;
-	u32	delta_bw;
-	bool	delta_comp;
 };
 
 /**
@@ -395,6 +390,8 @@ struct rdt_parse_data {
  * @msr_update:		Function pointer to update QOS MSRs
  * @mon_scale:		cqm counter * mon_scale = occupancy in bytes
  * @mbm_width:		Monitor width, to detect and correct for overflow.
+ * @mbm_cfg_mask:	Bandwidth sources that can be tracked when Bandwidth
+ *			Monitoring Event Configuration (BMEC) is supported.
  * @cdp_enabled:	CDP state of this resource
  *
  * Members of this structure are either private to the architecture
@@ -409,6 +406,7 @@ struct rdt_hw_resource {
 				 struct rdt_resource *r);
 	unsigned int		mon_scale;
 	unsigned int		mbm_width;
+	unsigned int		mbm_cfg_mask;
 	bool			cdp_enabled;
 };
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/monitor.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/monitor.c
index f136ac0468..3a6c069614 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/monitor.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/monitor.c
@@ -440,9 +440,6 @@ static void mbm_bw_count(u32 rmid, struct rmid_read *rr)
 
 	cur_bw = bytes / SZ_1M;
 
-	if (m->delta_comp)
-		m->delta_bw = abs(cur_bw - m->prev_bw);
-	m->delta_comp = false;
 	m->prev_bw = cur_bw;
 }
 
@@ -520,11 +517,11 @@ static void update_mba_bw(struct rdtgroup *rgrp, struct rdt_domain *dom_mbm)
 {
 	u32 closid, rmid, cur_msr_val, new_msr_val;
 	struct mbm_state *pmbm_data, *cmbm_data;
-	u32 cur_bw, delta_bw, user_bw;
 	struct rdt_resource *r_mba;
 	struct rdt_domain *dom_mba;
 	struct list_head *head;
 	struct rdtgroup *entry;
+	u32 cur_bw, user_bw;
 
 	if (!is_mbm_local_enabled())
 		return;
@@ -543,7 +540,6 @@ static void update_mba_bw(struct rdtgroup *rgrp, struct rdt_domain *dom_mbm)
 
 	cur_bw = pmbm_data->prev_bw;
 	user_bw = dom_mba->mbps_val[closid];
-	delta_bw = pmbm_data->delta_bw;
 
 	/* MBA resource doesn't support CDP */
 	cur_msr_val = resctrl_arch_get_config(r_mba, dom_mba, closid, CDP_NONE);
@@ -555,49 +551,31 @@ static void update_mba_bw(struct rdtgroup *rgrp, struct rdt_domain *dom_mbm)
 	list_for_each_entry(entry, head, mon.crdtgrp_list) {
 		cmbm_data = &dom_mbm->mbm_local[entry->mon.rmid];
 		cur_bw += cmbm_data->prev_bw;
-		delta_bw += cmbm_data->delta_bw;
 	}
 
 	/*
 	 * Scale up/down the bandwidth linearly for the ctrl group.  The
 	 * bandwidth step is the bandwidth granularity specified by the
 	 * hardware.
-	 *
-	 * The delta_bw is used when increasing the bandwidth so that we
-	 * dont alternately increase and decrease the control values
-	 * continuously.
-	 *
-	 * For ex: consider cur_bw = 90MBps, user_bw = 100MBps and if
-	 * bandwidth step is 20MBps(> user_bw - cur_bw), we would keep
-	 * switching between 90 and 110 continuously if we only check
-	 * cur_bw < user_bw.
+	 * Always increase throttling if current bandwidth is above the
+	 * target set by user.
+	 * But avoid thrashing up and down on every poll by checking
+	 * whether a decrease in throttling is likely to push the group
+	 * back over target. E.g. if currently throttling to 30% of bandwidth
+	 * on a system with 10% granularity steps, check whether moving to
+	 * 40% would go past the limit by multiplying current bandwidth by
+	 * "(30 + 10) / 30".
 	 */
 	if (cur_msr_val > r_mba->membw.min_bw && user_bw < cur_bw) {
 		new_msr_val = cur_msr_val - r_mba->membw.bw_gran;
 	} else if (cur_msr_val < MAX_MBA_BW &&
-		   (user_bw > (cur_bw + delta_bw))) {
+		   (user_bw > (cur_bw * (cur_msr_val + r_mba->membw.min_bw) / cur_msr_val))) {
 		new_msr_val = cur_msr_val + r_mba->membw.bw_gran;
 	} else {
 		return;
 	}
 
 	resctrl_arch_update_one(r_mba, dom_mba, closid, CDP_NONE, new_msr_val);
-
-	/*
-	 * Delta values are updated dynamically package wise for each
-	 * rdtgrp every time the throttle MSR changes value.
-	 *
-	 * This is because (1)the increase in bandwidth is not perfectly
-	 * linear and only "approximately" linear even when the hardware
-	 * says it is linear.(2)Also since MBA is a core specific
-	 * mechanism, the delta values vary based on number of cores used
-	 * by the rdtgrp.
-	 */
-	pmbm_data->delta_comp = true;
-	list_for_each_entry(entry, head, mon.crdtgrp_list) {
-		cmbm_data = &dom_mbm->mbm_local[entry->mon.rmid];
-		cmbm_data->delta_comp = true;
-	}
 }
 
 static void mbm_update(struct rdt_resource *r, struct rdt_domain *d, int rmid)
@@ -813,6 +791,12 @@ int __init rdt_get_mon_l3_config(struct rdt_resource *r)
 		return ret;
 
 	if (rdt_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_BMEC)) {
+		u32 eax, ebx, ecx, edx;
+
+		/* Detect list of bandwidth sources that can be tracked */
+		cpuid_count(0x80000020, 3, &eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx);
+		hw_res->mbm_cfg_mask = ecx & MAX_EVT_CONFIG_BITS;
+
 		if (rdt_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_CQM_MBM_TOTAL)) {
 			mbm_total_event.configurable = true;
 			mbm_config_rftype_init("mbm_total_bytes_config");
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/rdtgroup.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/rdtgroup.c
index 69a1de9238..2b69e560b0 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/rdtgroup.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/rdtgroup.c
@@ -1620,12 +1620,6 @@ static int mbm_config_write_domain(struct rdt_resource *r,
 	struct mon_config_info mon_info = {0};
 	int ret = 0;
 
-	/* mon_config cannot be more than the supported set of events */
-	if (val > MAX_EVT_CONFIG_BITS) {
-		rdt_last_cmd_puts("Invalid event configuration\n");
-		return -EINVAL;
-	}
-
 	/*
 	 * Read the current config value first. If both are the same then
 	 * no need to write it again.
@@ -1663,6 +1657,7 @@ out:
 
 static int mon_config_write(struct rdt_resource *r, char *tok, u32 evtid)
 {
+	struct rdt_hw_resource *hw_res = resctrl_to_arch_res(r);
 	char *dom_str = NULL, *id_str;
 	unsigned long dom_id, val;
 	struct rdt_domain *d;
@@ -1686,6 +1681,13 @@ next:
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
+	/* Value from user cannot be more than the supported set of events */
+	if ((val & hw_res->mbm_cfg_mask) != val) {
+		rdt_last_cmd_printf("Invalid event configuration: max valid mask is 0x%02x\n",
+				    hw_res->mbm_cfg_mask);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
 	list_for_each_entry(d, &r->domains, list) {
 		if (d->id == dom_id) {
 			ret = mbm_config_write_domain(r, d, evtid, val);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/eisa.c b/arch/x86/kernel/eisa.c
index e963344b04..53935b4d62 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/eisa.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/eisa.c
@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@
 /*
  * EISA specific code
  */
+#include <linux/cc_platform.h>
 #include <linux/ioport.h>
 #include <linux/eisa.h>
 #include <linux/io.h>
@@ -12,7 +13,7 @@ static __init int eisa_bus_probe(void)
 {
 	void __iomem *p;
 
-	if (xen_pv_domain() && !xen_initial_domain())
+	if ((xen_pv_domain() && !xen_initial_domain()) || cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_SEV_SNP))
 		return 0;
 
 	p = ioremap(0x0FFFD9, 4);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c
index 117e74c44e..33a214b1a4 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c
@@ -178,10 +178,11 @@ void fpu__init_cpu_xstate(void)
 	 * Must happen after CR4 setup and before xsetbv() to allow KVM
 	 * lazy passthrough.  Write independent of the dynamic state static
 	 * key as that does not work on the boot CPU. This also ensures
-	 * that any stale state is wiped out from XFD.
+	 * that any stale state is wiped out from XFD. Reset the per CPU
+	 * xfd cache too.
 	 */
 	if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_XFD))
-		wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_XFD, init_fpstate.xfd);
+		xfd_set_state(init_fpstate.xfd);
 
 	/*
 	 * XCR_XFEATURE_ENABLED_MASK (aka. XCR0) sets user features
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.h b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.h
index 3518fb26d0..19ca623ffa 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.h
@@ -148,20 +148,26 @@ static inline void xfd_validate_state(struct fpstate *fpstate, u64 mask, bool rs
 #endif
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+static inline void xfd_set_state(u64 xfd)
+{
+	wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_XFD, xfd);
+	__this_cpu_write(xfd_state, xfd);
+}
+
 static inline void xfd_update_state(struct fpstate *fpstate)
 {
 	if (fpu_state_size_dynamic()) {
 		u64 xfd = fpstate->xfd;
 
-		if (__this_cpu_read(xfd_state) != xfd) {
-			wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_XFD, xfd);
-			__this_cpu_write(xfd_state, xfd);
-		}
+		if (__this_cpu_read(xfd_state) != xfd)
+			xfd_set_state(xfd);
 	}
 }
 
 extern int __xfd_enable_feature(u64 which, struct fpu_guest *guest_fpu);
 #else
+static inline void xfd_set_state(u64 xfd) { }
+
 static inline void xfd_update_state(struct fpstate *fpstate) { }
 
 static inline int __xfd_enable_feature(u64 which, struct fpu_guest *guest_fpu) {
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/core.c b/arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/core.c
index a0ce46c0a2..a6a3475e1d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/core.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/core.c
@@ -335,7 +335,16 @@ out:
 kprobe_opcode_t *arch_adjust_kprobe_addr(unsigned long addr, unsigned long offset,
 					 bool *on_func_entry)
 {
-	if (is_endbr(*(u32 *)addr)) {
+	u32 insn;
+
+	/*
+	 * Since 'addr' is not guaranteed to be safe to access, use
+	 * copy_from_kernel_nofault() to read the instruction:
+	 */
+	if (copy_from_kernel_nofault(&insn, (void *)addr, sizeof(u32)))
+		return NULL;
+
+	if (is_endbr(insn)) {
 		*on_func_entry = !offset || offset == 4;
 		if (*on_func_entry)
 			offset = 4;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/mpparse.c b/arch/x86/kernel/mpparse.c
index b223922248..15c700d358 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/mpparse.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/mpparse.c
@@ -196,12 +196,12 @@ static int __init smp_read_mpc(struct mpc_table *mpc, unsigned early)
 	if (!smp_check_mpc(mpc, oem, str))
 		return 0;
 
-	/* Initialize the lapic mapping */
-	if (!acpi_lapic)
-		register_lapic_address(mpc->lapic);
-
-	if (early)
+	if (early) {
+		/* Initialize the lapic mapping */
+		if (!acpi_lapic)
+			register_lapic_address(mpc->lapic);
 		return 1;
+	}
 
 	/* Now process the configuration blocks. */
 	while (count < mpc->length) {
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/nmi.c b/arch/x86/kernel/nmi.c
index 3082cf24b6..6da2cfa23c 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/nmi.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/nmi.c
@@ -636,7 +636,7 @@ void nmi_backtrace_stall_check(const struct cpumask *btp)
 			msgp = nmi_check_stall_msg[idx];
 			if (nsp->idt_ignored_snap != READ_ONCE(nsp->idt_ignored) && (idx & 0x1))
 				modp = ", but OK because ignore_nmis was set";
-			if (nmi_seq & ~0x1)
+			if (nmi_seq & 0x1)
 				msghp = " (CPU currently in NMI handler function)";
 			else if (nsp->idt_nmi_seq_snap + 1 == nmi_seq)
 				msghp = " (CPU exited one NMI handler function)";
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/probe_roms.c b/arch/x86/kernel/probe_roms.c
index 319fef37d9..cc2c34ba72 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/probe_roms.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/probe_roms.c
@@ -203,16 +203,6 @@ void __init probe_roms(void)
 	unsigned char c;
 	int i;
 
-	/*
-	 * The ROM memory range is not part of the e820 table and is therefore not
-	 * pre-validated by BIOS. The kernel page table maps the ROM region as encrypted
-	 * memory, and SNP requires encrypted memory to be validated before access.
-	 * Do that here.
-	 */
-	snp_prep_memory(video_rom_resource.start,
-			((system_rom_resource.end + 1) - video_rom_resource.start),
-			SNP_PAGE_STATE_PRIVATE);
-
 	/* video rom */
 	upper = adapter_rom_resources[0].start;
 	for (start = video_rom_resource.start; start < upper; start += 2048) {
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
index 1526747bed..b002ebf024 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
@@ -9,7 +9,6 @@
 #include <linux/console.h>
 #include <linux/crash_dump.h>
 #include <linux/dma-map-ops.h>
-#include <linux/dmi.h>
 #include <linux/efi.h>
 #include <linux/ima.h>
 #include <linux/init_ohci1394_dma.h>
@@ -904,7 +903,7 @@ void __init setup_arch(char **cmdline_p)
 		efi_init();
 
 	reserve_ibft_region();
-	dmi_setup();
+	x86_init.resources.dmi_setup();
 
 	/*
 	 * VMware detection requires dmi to be available, so this
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/sev-shared.c b/arch/x86/kernel/sev-shared.c
index ccb0915e84..466fe09898 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/sev-shared.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/sev-shared.c
@@ -556,9 +556,9 @@ static int snp_cpuid(struct ghcb *ghcb, struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt, struct cpuid_le
 		leaf->eax = leaf->ebx = leaf->ecx = leaf->edx = 0;
 
 		/* Skip post-processing for out-of-range zero leafs. */
-		if (!(leaf->fn <= cpuid_std_range_max ||
-		      (leaf->fn >= 0x40000000 && leaf->fn <= cpuid_hyp_range_max) ||
-		      (leaf->fn >= 0x80000000 && leaf->fn <= cpuid_ext_range_max)))
+		if (!(leaf->fn <= RIP_REL_REF(cpuid_std_range_max) ||
+		      (leaf->fn >= 0x40000000 && leaf->fn <= RIP_REL_REF(cpuid_hyp_range_max)) ||
+		      (leaf->fn >= 0x80000000 && leaf->fn <= RIP_REL_REF(cpuid_ext_range_max))))
 			return 0;
 	}
 
@@ -1063,11 +1063,11 @@ static void __init setup_cpuid_table(const struct cc_blob_sev_info *cc_info)
 		const struct snp_cpuid_fn *fn = &cpuid_table->fn[i];
 
 		if (fn->eax_in == 0x0)
-			cpuid_std_range_max = fn->eax;
+			RIP_REL_REF(cpuid_std_range_max) = fn->eax;
 		else if (fn->eax_in == 0x40000000)
-			cpuid_hyp_range_max = fn->eax;
+			RIP_REL_REF(cpuid_hyp_range_max) = fn->eax;
 		else if (fn->eax_in == 0x80000000)
-			cpuid_ext_range_max = fn->eax;
+			RIP_REL_REF(cpuid_ext_range_max) = fn->eax;
 	}
 }
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c b/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c
index c67285824e..0f58242b54 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c
@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@
 #include <linux/platform_device.h>
 #include <linux/io.h>
 #include <linux/psp-sev.h>
+#include <linux/dmi.h>
 #include <uapi/linux/sev-guest.h>
 
 #include <asm/cpu_entry_area.h>
@@ -748,7 +749,7 @@ void __init early_snp_set_memory_private(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long padd
 	 * This eliminates worries about jump tables or checking boot_cpu_data
 	 * in the cc_platform_has() function.
 	 */
-	if (!(sev_status & MSR_AMD64_SEV_SNP_ENABLED))
+	if (!(RIP_REL_REF(sev_status) & MSR_AMD64_SEV_SNP_ENABLED))
 		return;
 
 	 /*
@@ -767,28 +768,13 @@ void __init early_snp_set_memory_shared(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long paddr
 	 * This eliminates worries about jump tables or checking boot_cpu_data
 	 * in the cc_platform_has() function.
 	 */
-	if (!(sev_status & MSR_AMD64_SEV_SNP_ENABLED))
+	if (!(RIP_REL_REF(sev_status) & MSR_AMD64_SEV_SNP_ENABLED))
 		return;
 
 	 /* Ask hypervisor to mark the memory pages shared in the RMP table. */
 	early_set_pages_state(vaddr, paddr, npages, SNP_PAGE_STATE_SHARED);
 }
 
-void __init snp_prep_memory(unsigned long paddr, unsigned int sz, enum psc_op op)
-{
-	unsigned long vaddr, npages;
-
-	vaddr = (unsigned long)__va(paddr);
-	npages = PAGE_ALIGN(sz) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
-
-	if (op == SNP_PAGE_STATE_PRIVATE)
-		early_snp_set_memory_private(vaddr, paddr, npages);
-	else if (op == SNP_PAGE_STATE_SHARED)
-		early_snp_set_memory_shared(vaddr, paddr, npages);
-	else
-		WARN(1, "invalid memory op %d\n", op);
-}
-
 static unsigned long __set_pages_state(struct snp_psc_desc *data, unsigned long vaddr,
 				       unsigned long vaddr_end, int op)
 {
@@ -2112,6 +2098,17 @@ void __init __noreturn snp_abort(void)
 	sev_es_terminate(SEV_TERM_SET_GEN, GHCB_SNP_UNSUPPORTED);
 }
 
+/*
+ * SEV-SNP guests should only execute dmi_setup() if EFI_CONFIG_TABLES are
+ * enabled, as the alternative (fallback) logic for DMI probing in the legacy
+ * ROM region can cause a crash since this region is not pre-validated.
+ */
+void __init snp_dmi_setup(void)
+{
+	if (efi_enabled(EFI_CONFIG_TABLES))
+		dmi_setup();
+}
+
 static void dump_cpuid_table(void)
 {
 	const struct snp_cpuid_table *cpuid_table = snp_cpuid_get_table();
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/x86_init.c b/arch/x86/kernel/x86_init.c
index a37ebd3b47..3f0718b4a7 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/x86_init.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/x86_init.c
@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@
  *
  *  For licencing details see kernel-base/COPYING
  */
+#include <linux/dmi.h>
 #include <linux/init.h>
 #include <linux/ioport.h>
 #include <linux/export.h>
@@ -66,6 +67,7 @@ struct x86_init_ops x86_init __initdata = {
 		.probe_roms		= probe_roms,
 		.reserve_resources	= reserve_standard_io_resources,
 		.memory_setup		= e820__memory_setup_default,
+		.dmi_setup		= dmi_setup,
 	},
 
 	.mpparse = {