Adding upstream version 6.6.15.upstream/6.6.15

Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>

82 files changed, 87723 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/.gitignore b/arch/x86/kvm/.gitignore
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..615d6ff35
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/.gitignore
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+/kvm-asm-offsets.s
+/kvm-asm-offsets.h
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig b/arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..ed90f1481
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig
@@ -0,0 +1,157 @@
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+#
+# KVM configuration
+#
+
+source "virt/kvm/Kconfig"
+
+menuconfig VIRTUALIZATION
+	bool "Virtualization"
+	depends on HAVE_KVM || X86
+	default y
+	help
+	  Say Y here to get to see options for using your Linux host to run other
+	  operating systems inside virtual machines (guests).
+	  This option alone does not add any kernel code.
+
+	  If you say N, all options in this submenu will be skipped and disabled.
+
+if VIRTUALIZATION
+
+config KVM
+	tristate "Kernel-based Virtual Machine (KVM) support"
+	depends on HAVE_KVM
+	depends on HIGH_RES_TIMERS
+	depends on X86_LOCAL_APIC
+	select PREEMPT_NOTIFIERS
+	select MMU_NOTIFIER
+	select HAVE_KVM_IRQCHIP
+	select HAVE_KVM_PFNCACHE
+	select HAVE_KVM_IRQFD
+	select HAVE_KVM_DIRTY_RING_TSO
+	select HAVE_KVM_DIRTY_RING_ACQ_REL
+	select IRQ_BYPASS_MANAGER
+	select HAVE_KVM_IRQ_BYPASS
+	select HAVE_KVM_IRQ_ROUTING
+	select HAVE_KVM_EVENTFD
+	select KVM_ASYNC_PF
+	select USER_RETURN_NOTIFIER
+	select KVM_MMIO
+	select SCHED_INFO
+	select PERF_EVENTS
+	select GUEST_PERF_EVENTS
+	select HAVE_KVM_MSI
+	select HAVE_KVM_CPU_RELAX_INTERCEPT
+	select HAVE_KVM_NO_POLL
+	select KVM_XFER_TO_GUEST_WORK
+	select KVM_GENERIC_DIRTYLOG_READ_PROTECT
+	select KVM_VFIO
+	select INTERVAL_TREE
+	select HAVE_KVM_PM_NOTIFIER if PM
+	select KVM_GENERIC_HARDWARE_ENABLING
+	help
+	  Support hosting fully virtualized guest machines using hardware
+	  virtualization extensions.  You will need a fairly recent
+	  processor equipped with virtualization extensions. You will also
+	  need to select one or more of the processor modules below.
+
+	  This module provides access to the hardware capabilities through
+	  a character device node named /dev/kvm.
+
+	  To compile this as a module, choose M here: the module
+	  will be called kvm.
+
+	  If unsure, say N.
+
+config KVM_WERROR
+	bool "Compile KVM with -Werror"
+	# KASAN may cause the build to fail due to larger frames
+	default y if X86_64 && !KASAN
+	# We use the dependency on !COMPILE_TEST to not be enabled
+	# blindly in allmodconfig or allyesconfig configurations
+	depends on KVM
+	depends on (X86_64 && !KASAN) || !COMPILE_TEST
+	depends on EXPERT
+	help
+	  Add -Werror to the build flags for KVM.
+
+	  If in doubt, say "N".
+
+config KVM_INTEL
+	tristate "KVM for Intel (and compatible) processors support"
+	depends on KVM && IA32_FEAT_CTL
+	help
+	  Provides support for KVM on processors equipped with Intel's VT
+	  extensions, a.k.a. Virtual Machine Extensions (VMX).
+
+	  To compile this as a module, choose M here: the module
+	  will be called kvm-intel.
+
+config X86_SGX_KVM
+	bool "Software Guard eXtensions (SGX) Virtualization"
+	depends on X86_SGX && KVM_INTEL
+	help
+
+	  Enables KVM guests to create SGX enclaves.
+
+	  This includes support to expose "raw" unreclaimable enclave memory to
+	  guests via a device node, e.g. /dev/sgx_vepc.
+
+	  If unsure, say N.
+
+config KVM_AMD
+	tristate "KVM for AMD processors support"
+	depends on KVM && (CPU_SUP_AMD || CPU_SUP_HYGON)
+	help
+	  Provides support for KVM on AMD processors equipped with the AMD-V
+	  (SVM) extensions.
+
+	  To compile this as a module, choose M here: the module
+	  will be called kvm-amd.
+
+config KVM_AMD_SEV
+	def_bool y
+	bool "AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) support"
+	depends on KVM_AMD && X86_64
+	depends on CRYPTO_DEV_SP_PSP && !(KVM_AMD=y && CRYPTO_DEV_CCP_DD=m)
+	help
+	  Provides support for launching Encrypted VMs (SEV) and Encrypted VMs
+	  with Encrypted State (SEV-ES) on AMD processors.
+
+config KVM_SMM
+	bool "System Management Mode emulation"
+	default y
+	depends on KVM
+	help
+	  Provides support for KVM to emulate System Management Mode (SMM)
+	  in virtual machines.  This can be used by the virtual machine
+	  firmware to implement UEFI secure boot.
+
+	  If unsure, say Y.
+
+config KVM_XEN
+	bool "Support for Xen hypercall interface"
+	depends on KVM
+	help
+	  Provides KVM support for the hosting Xen HVM guests and
+	  passing Xen hypercalls to userspace.
+
+	  If in doubt, say "N".
+
+config KVM_PROVE_MMU
+	bool "Prove KVM MMU correctness"
+	depends on DEBUG_KERNEL
+	depends on KVM
+	depends on EXPERT
+	help
+	  Enables runtime assertions in KVM's MMU that are too costly to enable
+	  in anything remotely resembling a production environment, e.g. this
+	  gates code that verifies a to-be-freed page table doesn't have any
+	  present SPTEs.
+
+	  If in doubt, say "N".
+
+config KVM_EXTERNAL_WRITE_TRACKING
+	bool
+
+endif # VIRTUALIZATION
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/Makefile b/arch/x86/kvm/Makefile
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..80e3fe184
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/Makefile
@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+ccflags-y += -I $(srctree)/arch/x86/kvm
+ccflags-$(CONFIG_KVM_WERROR) += -Werror
+
+ifeq ($(CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER),y)
+OBJECT_FILES_NON_STANDARD_vmenter.o := y
+endif
+
+include $(srctree)/virt/kvm/Makefile.kvm
+
+kvm-y			+= x86.o emulate.o i8259.o irq.o lapic.o \
+			   i8254.o ioapic.o irq_comm.o cpuid.o pmu.o mtrr.o \
+			   hyperv.o debugfs.o mmu/mmu.o mmu/page_track.o \
+			   mmu/spte.o
+
+ifdef CONFIG_HYPERV
+kvm-y			+= kvm_onhyperv.o
+endif
+
+kvm-$(CONFIG_X86_64) += mmu/tdp_iter.o mmu/tdp_mmu.o
+kvm-$(CONFIG_KVM_XEN)	+= xen.o
+kvm-$(CONFIG_KVM_SMM)	+= smm.o
+
+kvm-intel-y		+= vmx/vmx.o vmx/vmenter.o vmx/pmu_intel.o vmx/vmcs12.o \
+			   vmx/hyperv.o vmx/nested.o vmx/posted_intr.o
+kvm-intel-$(CONFIG_X86_SGX_KVM)	+= vmx/sgx.o
+
+kvm-amd-y		+= svm/svm.o svm/vmenter.o svm/pmu.o svm/nested.o svm/avic.o \
+			   svm/sev.o svm/hyperv.o
+
+ifdef CONFIG_HYPERV
+kvm-amd-y		+= svm/svm_onhyperv.o
+endif
+
+obj-$(CONFIG_KVM)	+= kvm.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_KVM_INTEL)	+= kvm-intel.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_KVM_AMD)	+= kvm-amd.o
+
+AFLAGS_svm/vmenter.o    := -iquote $(obj)
+$(obj)/svm/vmenter.o: $(obj)/kvm-asm-offsets.h
+
+AFLAGS_vmx/vmenter.o    := -iquote $(obj)
+$(obj)/vmx/vmenter.o: $(obj)/kvm-asm-offsets.h
+
+$(obj)/kvm-asm-offsets.h: $(obj)/kvm-asm-offsets.s FORCE
+	$(call filechk,offsets,__KVM_ASM_OFFSETS_H__)
+
+targets += kvm-asm-offsets.s
+clean-files += kvm-asm-offsets.h
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..773132c3b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1573 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * Kernel-based Virtual Machine driver for Linux
+ * cpuid support routines
+ *
+ * derived from arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
+ *
+ * Copyright 2011 Red Hat, Inc. and/or its affiliates.
+ * Copyright IBM Corporation, 2008
+ */
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
+
+#include <linux/kvm_host.h>
+#include "linux/lockdep.h"
+#include <linux/export.h>
+#include <linux/vmalloc.h>
+#include <linux/uaccess.h>
+#include <linux/sched/stat.h>
+
+#include <asm/processor.h>
+#include <asm/user.h>
+#include <asm/fpu/xstate.h>
+#include <asm/sgx.h>
+#include <asm/cpuid.h>
+#include "cpuid.h"
+#include "lapic.h"
+#include "mmu.h"
+#include "trace.h"
+#include "pmu.h"
+#include "xen.h"
+
+/*
+ * Unlike "struct cpuinfo_x86.x86_capability", kvm_cpu_caps doesn't need to be
+ * aligned to sizeof(unsigned long) because it's not accessed via bitops.
+ */
+u32 kvm_cpu_caps[NR_KVM_CPU_CAPS] __read_mostly;
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_cpu_caps);
+
+u32 xstate_required_size(u64 xstate_bv, bool compacted)
+{
+	int feature_bit = 0;
+	u32 ret = XSAVE_HDR_SIZE + XSAVE_HDR_OFFSET;
+
+	xstate_bv &= XFEATURE_MASK_EXTEND;
+	while (xstate_bv) {
+		if (xstate_bv & 0x1) {
+		        u32 eax, ebx, ecx, edx, offset;
+		        cpuid_count(0xD, feature_bit, &eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx);
+			/* ECX[1]: 64B alignment in compacted form */
+			if (compacted)
+				offset = (ecx & 0x2) ? ALIGN(ret, 64) : ret;
+			else
+				offset = ebx;
+			ret = max(ret, offset + eax);
+		}
+
+		xstate_bv >>= 1;
+		feature_bit++;
+	}
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+#define F feature_bit
+
+/* Scattered Flag - For features that are scattered by cpufeatures.h. */
+#define SF(name)						\
+({								\
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(X86_FEATURE_##name >= MAX_CPU_FEATURES);	\
+	(boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_##name) ? F(name) : 0);	\
+})
+
+/*
+ * Magic value used by KVM when querying userspace-provided CPUID entries and
+ * doesn't care about the CPIUD index because the index of the function in
+ * question is not significant.  Note, this magic value must have at least one
+ * bit set in bits[63:32] and must be consumed as a u64 by cpuid_entry2_find()
+ * to avoid false positives when processing guest CPUID input.
+ */
+#define KVM_CPUID_INDEX_NOT_SIGNIFICANT -1ull
+
+static inline struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *cpuid_entry2_find(
+	struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *entries, int nent, u32 function, u64 index)
+{
+	struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *e;
+	int i;
+
+	/*
+	 * KVM has a semi-arbitrary rule that querying the guest's CPUID model
+	 * with IRQs disabled is disallowed.  The CPUID model can legitimately
+	 * have over one hundred entries, i.e. the lookup is slow, and IRQs are
+	 * typically disabled in KVM only when KVM is in a performance critical
+	 * path, e.g. the core VM-Enter/VM-Exit run loop.  Nothing will break
+	 * if this rule is violated, this assertion is purely to flag potential
+	 * performance issues.  If this fires, consider moving the lookup out
+	 * of the hotpath, e.g. by caching information during CPUID updates.
+	 */
+	lockdep_assert_irqs_enabled();
+
+	for (i = 0; i < nent; i++) {
+		e = &entries[i];
+
+		if (e->function != function)
+			continue;
+
+		/*
+		 * If the index isn't significant, use the first entry with a
+		 * matching function.  It's userspace's responsibilty to not
+		 * provide "duplicate" entries in all cases.
+		 */
+		if (!(e->flags & KVM_CPUID_FLAG_SIGNIFCANT_INDEX) || e->index == index)
+			return e;
+
+
+		/*
+		 * Similarly, use the first matching entry if KVM is doing a
+		 * lookup (as opposed to emulating CPUID) for a function that's
+		 * architecturally defined as not having a significant index.
+		 */
+		if (index == KVM_CPUID_INDEX_NOT_SIGNIFICANT) {
+			/*
+			 * Direct lookups from KVM should not diverge from what
+			 * KVM defines internally (the architectural behavior).
+			 */
+			WARN_ON_ONCE(cpuid_function_is_indexed(function));
+			return e;
+		}
+	}
+
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+static int kvm_check_cpuid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+			   struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *entries,
+			   int nent)
+{
+	struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *best;
+	u64 xfeatures;
+
+	/*
+	 * The existing code assumes virtual address is 48-bit or 57-bit in the
+	 * canonical address checks; exit if it is ever changed.
+	 */
+	best = cpuid_entry2_find(entries, nent, 0x80000008,
+				 KVM_CPUID_INDEX_NOT_SIGNIFICANT);
+	if (best) {
+		int vaddr_bits = (best->eax & 0xff00) >> 8;
+
+		if (vaddr_bits != 48 && vaddr_bits != 57 && vaddr_bits != 0)
+			return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Exposing dynamic xfeatures to the guest requires additional
+	 * enabling in the FPU, e.g. to expand the guest XSAVE state size.
+	 */
+	best = cpuid_entry2_find(entries, nent, 0xd, 0);
+	if (!best)
+		return 0;
+
+	xfeatures = best->eax | ((u64)best->edx << 32);
+	xfeatures &= XFEATURE_MASK_USER_DYNAMIC;
+	if (!xfeatures)
+		return 0;
+
+	return fpu_enable_guest_xfd_features(&vcpu->arch.guest_fpu, xfeatures);
+}
+
+/* Check whether the supplied CPUID data is equal to what is already set for the vCPU. */
+static int kvm_cpuid_check_equal(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *e2,
+				 int nent)
+{
+	struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *orig;
+	int i;
+
+	if (nent != vcpu->arch.cpuid_nent)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < nent; i++) {
+		orig = &vcpu->arch.cpuid_entries[i];
+		if (e2[i].function != orig->function ||
+		    e2[i].index != orig->index ||
+		    e2[i].flags != orig->flags ||
+		    e2[i].eax != orig->eax || e2[i].ebx != orig->ebx ||
+		    e2[i].ecx != orig->ecx || e2[i].edx != orig->edx)
+			return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static struct kvm_hypervisor_cpuid kvm_get_hypervisor_cpuid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+							    const char *sig)
+{
+	struct kvm_hypervisor_cpuid cpuid = {};
+	struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *entry;
+	u32 base;
+
+	for_each_possible_hypervisor_cpuid_base(base) {
+		entry = kvm_find_cpuid_entry(vcpu, base);
+
+		if (entry) {
+			u32 signature[3];
+
+			signature[0] = entry->ebx;
+			signature[1] = entry->ecx;
+			signature[2] = entry->edx;
+
+			if (!memcmp(signature, sig, sizeof(signature))) {
+				cpuid.base = base;
+				cpuid.limit = entry->eax;
+				break;
+			}
+		}
+	}
+
+	return cpuid;
+}
+
+static struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *__kvm_find_kvm_cpuid_features(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+					      struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *entries, int nent)
+{
+	u32 base = vcpu->arch.kvm_cpuid.base;
+
+	if (!base)
+		return NULL;
+
+	return cpuid_entry2_find(entries, nent, base | KVM_CPUID_FEATURES,
+				 KVM_CPUID_INDEX_NOT_SIGNIFICANT);
+}
+
+static struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *kvm_find_kvm_cpuid_features(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	return __kvm_find_kvm_cpuid_features(vcpu, vcpu->arch.cpuid_entries,
+					     vcpu->arch.cpuid_nent);
+}
+
+void kvm_update_pv_runtime(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *best = kvm_find_kvm_cpuid_features(vcpu);
+
+	/*
+	 * save the feature bitmap to avoid cpuid lookup for every PV
+	 * operation
+	 */
+	if (best)
+		vcpu->arch.pv_cpuid.features = best->eax;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Calculate guest's supported XCR0 taking into account guest CPUID data and
+ * KVM's supported XCR0 (comprised of host's XCR0 and KVM_SUPPORTED_XCR0).
+ */
+static u64 cpuid_get_supported_xcr0(struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *entries, int nent)
+{
+	struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *best;
+
+	best = cpuid_entry2_find(entries, nent, 0xd, 0);
+	if (!best)
+		return 0;
+
+	return (best->eax | ((u64)best->edx << 32)) & kvm_caps.supported_xcr0;
+}
+
+static void __kvm_update_cpuid_runtime(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *entries,
+				       int nent)
+{
+	struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *best;
+
+	best = cpuid_entry2_find(entries, nent, 1, KVM_CPUID_INDEX_NOT_SIGNIFICANT);
+	if (best) {
+		/* Update OSXSAVE bit */
+		if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_XSAVE))
+			cpuid_entry_change(best, X86_FEATURE_OSXSAVE,
+					   kvm_is_cr4_bit_set(vcpu, X86_CR4_OSXSAVE));
+
+		cpuid_entry_change(best, X86_FEATURE_APIC,
+			   vcpu->arch.apic_base & MSR_IA32_APICBASE_ENABLE);
+	}
+
+	best = cpuid_entry2_find(entries, nent, 7, 0);
+	if (best && boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PKU) && best->function == 0x7)
+		cpuid_entry_change(best, X86_FEATURE_OSPKE,
+				   kvm_is_cr4_bit_set(vcpu, X86_CR4_PKE));
+
+	best = cpuid_entry2_find(entries, nent, 0xD, 0);
+	if (best)
+		best->ebx = xstate_required_size(vcpu->arch.xcr0, false);
+
+	best = cpuid_entry2_find(entries, nent, 0xD, 1);
+	if (best && (cpuid_entry_has(best, X86_FEATURE_XSAVES) ||
+		     cpuid_entry_has(best, X86_FEATURE_XSAVEC)))
+		best->ebx = xstate_required_size(vcpu->arch.xcr0, true);
+
+	best = __kvm_find_kvm_cpuid_features(vcpu, entries, nent);
+	if (kvm_hlt_in_guest(vcpu->kvm) && best &&
+		(best->eax & (1 << KVM_FEATURE_PV_UNHALT)))
+		best->eax &= ~(1 << KVM_FEATURE_PV_UNHALT);
+
+	if (!kvm_check_has_quirk(vcpu->kvm, KVM_X86_QUIRK_MISC_ENABLE_NO_MWAIT)) {
+		best = cpuid_entry2_find(entries, nent, 0x1, KVM_CPUID_INDEX_NOT_SIGNIFICANT);
+		if (best)
+			cpuid_entry_change(best, X86_FEATURE_MWAIT,
+					   vcpu->arch.ia32_misc_enable_msr &
+					   MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE_MWAIT);
+	}
+}
+
+void kvm_update_cpuid_runtime(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	__kvm_update_cpuid_runtime(vcpu, vcpu->arch.cpuid_entries, vcpu->arch.cpuid_nent);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_update_cpuid_runtime);
+
+static bool kvm_cpuid_has_hyperv(struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *entries, int nent)
+{
+	struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *entry;
+
+	entry = cpuid_entry2_find(entries, nent, HYPERV_CPUID_INTERFACE,
+				  KVM_CPUID_INDEX_NOT_SIGNIFICANT);
+	return entry && entry->eax == HYPERV_CPUID_SIGNATURE_EAX;
+}
+
+static void kvm_vcpu_after_set_cpuid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct kvm_lapic *apic = vcpu->arch.apic;
+	struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *best;
+	bool allow_gbpages;
+
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(KVM_NR_GOVERNED_FEATURES > KVM_MAX_NR_GOVERNED_FEATURES);
+	bitmap_zero(vcpu->arch.governed_features.enabled,
+		    KVM_MAX_NR_GOVERNED_FEATURES);
+
+	/*
+	 * If TDP is enabled, let the guest use GBPAGES if they're supported in
+	 * hardware.  The hardware page walker doesn't let KVM disable GBPAGES,
+	 * i.e. won't treat them as reserved, and KVM doesn't redo the GVA->GPA
+	 * walk for performance and complexity reasons.  Not to mention KVM
+	 * _can't_ solve the problem because GVA->GPA walks aren't visible to
+	 * KVM once a TDP translation is installed.  Mimic hardware behavior so
+	 * that KVM's is at least consistent, i.e. doesn't randomly inject #PF.
+	 * If TDP is disabled, honor *only* guest CPUID as KVM has full control
+	 * and can install smaller shadow pages if the host lacks 1GiB support.
+	 */
+	allow_gbpages = tdp_enabled ? boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_GBPAGES) :
+				      guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_GBPAGES);
+	if (allow_gbpages)
+		kvm_governed_feature_set(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_GBPAGES);
+
+	best = kvm_find_cpuid_entry(vcpu, 1);
+	if (best && apic) {
+		if (cpuid_entry_has(best, X86_FEATURE_TSC_DEADLINE_TIMER))
+			apic->lapic_timer.timer_mode_mask = 3 << 17;
+		else
+			apic->lapic_timer.timer_mode_mask = 1 << 17;
+
+		kvm_apic_set_version(vcpu);
+	}
+
+	vcpu->arch.guest_supported_xcr0 =
+		cpuid_get_supported_xcr0(vcpu->arch.cpuid_entries, vcpu->arch.cpuid_nent);
+
+	kvm_update_pv_runtime(vcpu);
+
+	vcpu->arch.maxphyaddr = cpuid_query_maxphyaddr(vcpu);
+	vcpu->arch.reserved_gpa_bits = kvm_vcpu_reserved_gpa_bits_raw(vcpu);
+
+	kvm_pmu_refresh(vcpu);
+	vcpu->arch.cr4_guest_rsvd_bits =
+	    __cr4_reserved_bits(guest_cpuid_has, vcpu);
+
+	kvm_hv_set_cpuid(vcpu, kvm_cpuid_has_hyperv(vcpu->arch.cpuid_entries,
+						    vcpu->arch.cpuid_nent));
+
+	/* Invoke the vendor callback only after the above state is updated. */
+	static_call(kvm_x86_vcpu_after_set_cpuid)(vcpu);
+
+	/*
+	 * Except for the MMU, which needs to do its thing any vendor specific
+	 * adjustments to the reserved GPA bits.
+	 */
+	kvm_mmu_after_set_cpuid(vcpu);
+}
+
+int cpuid_query_maxphyaddr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *best;
+
+	best = kvm_find_cpuid_entry(vcpu, 0x80000000);
+	if (!best || best->eax < 0x80000008)
+		goto not_found;
+	best = kvm_find_cpuid_entry(vcpu, 0x80000008);
+	if (best)
+		return best->eax & 0xff;
+not_found:
+	return 36;
+}
+
+/*
+ * This "raw" version returns the reserved GPA bits without any adjustments for
+ * encryption technologies that usurp bits.  The raw mask should be used if and
+ * only if hardware does _not_ strip the usurped bits, e.g. in virtual MTRRs.
+ */
+u64 kvm_vcpu_reserved_gpa_bits_raw(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	return rsvd_bits(cpuid_maxphyaddr(vcpu), 63);
+}
+
+static int kvm_set_cpuid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *e2,
+                        int nent)
+{
+	int r;
+
+	__kvm_update_cpuid_runtime(vcpu, e2, nent);
+
+	/*
+	 * KVM does not correctly handle changing guest CPUID after KVM_RUN, as
+	 * MAXPHYADDR, GBPAGES support, AMD reserved bit behavior, etc.. aren't
+	 * tracked in kvm_mmu_page_role.  As a result, KVM may miss guest page
+	 * faults due to reusing SPs/SPTEs. In practice no sane VMM mucks with
+	 * the core vCPU model on the fly. It would've been better to forbid any
+	 * KVM_SET_CPUID{,2} calls after KVM_RUN altogether but unfortunately
+	 * some VMMs (e.g. QEMU) reuse vCPU fds for CPU hotplug/unplug and do
+	 * KVM_SET_CPUID{,2} again. To support this legacy behavior, check
+	 * whether the supplied CPUID data is equal to what's already set.
+	 */
+	if (kvm_vcpu_has_run(vcpu)) {
+		r = kvm_cpuid_check_equal(vcpu, e2, nent);
+		if (r)
+			return r;
+
+		kvfree(e2);
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	if (kvm_cpuid_has_hyperv(e2, nent)) {
+		r = kvm_hv_vcpu_init(vcpu);
+		if (r)
+			return r;
+	}
+
+	r = kvm_check_cpuid(vcpu, e2, nent);
+	if (r)
+		return r;
+
+	kvfree(vcpu->arch.cpuid_entries);
+	vcpu->arch.cpuid_entries = e2;
+	vcpu->arch.cpuid_nent = nent;
+
+	vcpu->arch.kvm_cpuid = kvm_get_hypervisor_cpuid(vcpu, KVM_SIGNATURE);
+	vcpu->arch.xen.cpuid = kvm_get_hypervisor_cpuid(vcpu, XEN_SIGNATURE);
+	kvm_vcpu_after_set_cpuid(vcpu);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/* when an old userspace process fills a new kernel module */
+int kvm_vcpu_ioctl_set_cpuid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+			     struct kvm_cpuid *cpuid,
+			     struct kvm_cpuid_entry __user *entries)
+{
+	int r, i;
+	struct kvm_cpuid_entry *e = NULL;
+	struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *e2 = NULL;
+
+	if (cpuid->nent > KVM_MAX_CPUID_ENTRIES)
+		return -E2BIG;
+
+	if (cpuid->nent) {
+		e = vmemdup_user(entries, array_size(sizeof(*e), cpuid->nent));
+		if (IS_ERR(e))
+			return PTR_ERR(e);
+
+		e2 = kvmalloc_array(cpuid->nent, sizeof(*e2), GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
+		if (!e2) {
+			r = -ENOMEM;
+			goto out_free_cpuid;
+		}
+	}
+	for (i = 0; i < cpuid->nent; i++) {
+		e2[i].function = e[i].function;
+		e2[i].eax = e[i].eax;
+		e2[i].ebx = e[i].ebx;
+		e2[i].ecx = e[i].ecx;
+		e2[i].edx = e[i].edx;
+		e2[i].index = 0;
+		e2[i].flags = 0;
+		e2[i].padding[0] = 0;
+		e2[i].padding[1] = 0;
+		e2[i].padding[2] = 0;
+	}
+
+	r = kvm_set_cpuid(vcpu, e2, cpuid->nent);
+	if (r)
+		kvfree(e2);
+
+out_free_cpuid:
+	kvfree(e);
+
+	return r;
+}
+
+int kvm_vcpu_ioctl_set_cpuid2(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+			      struct kvm_cpuid2 *cpuid,
+			      struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 __user *entries)
+{
+	struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *e2 = NULL;
+	int r;
+
+	if (cpuid->nent > KVM_MAX_CPUID_ENTRIES)
+		return -E2BIG;
+
+	if (cpuid->nent) {
+		e2 = vmemdup_user(entries, array_size(sizeof(*e2), cpuid->nent));
+		if (IS_ERR(e2))
+			return PTR_ERR(e2);
+	}
+
+	r = kvm_set_cpuid(vcpu, e2, cpuid->nent);
+	if (r)
+		kvfree(e2);
+
+	return r;
+}
+
+int kvm_vcpu_ioctl_get_cpuid2(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+			      struct kvm_cpuid2 *cpuid,
+			      struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 __user *entries)
+{
+	if (cpuid->nent < vcpu->arch.cpuid_nent)
+		return -E2BIG;
+
+	if (copy_to_user(entries, vcpu->arch.cpuid_entries,
+			 vcpu->arch.cpuid_nent * sizeof(struct kvm_cpuid_entry2)))
+		return -EFAULT;
+
+	cpuid->nent = vcpu->arch.cpuid_nent;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/* Mask kvm_cpu_caps for @leaf with the raw CPUID capabilities of this CPU. */
+static __always_inline void __kvm_cpu_cap_mask(unsigned int leaf)
+{
+	const struct cpuid_reg cpuid = x86_feature_cpuid(leaf * 32);
+	struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 entry;
+
+	reverse_cpuid_check(leaf);
+
+	cpuid_count(cpuid.function, cpuid.index,
+		    &entry.eax, &entry.ebx, &entry.ecx, &entry.edx);
+
+	kvm_cpu_caps[leaf] &= *__cpuid_entry_get_reg(&entry, cpuid.reg);
+}
+
+static __always_inline
+void kvm_cpu_cap_init_kvm_defined(enum kvm_only_cpuid_leafs leaf, u32 mask)
+{
+	/* Use kvm_cpu_cap_mask for leafs that aren't KVM-only. */
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(leaf < NCAPINTS);
+
+	kvm_cpu_caps[leaf] = mask;
+
+	__kvm_cpu_cap_mask(leaf);
+}
+
+static __always_inline void kvm_cpu_cap_mask(enum cpuid_leafs leaf, u32 mask)
+{
+	/* Use kvm_cpu_cap_init_kvm_defined for KVM-only leafs. */
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(leaf >= NCAPINTS);
+
+	kvm_cpu_caps[leaf] &= mask;
+
+	__kvm_cpu_cap_mask(leaf);
+}
+
+void kvm_set_cpu_caps(void)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+	unsigned int f_gbpages = F(GBPAGES);
+	unsigned int f_lm = F(LM);
+	unsigned int f_xfd = F(XFD);
+#else
+	unsigned int f_gbpages = 0;
+	unsigned int f_lm = 0;
+	unsigned int f_xfd = 0;
+#endif
+	memset(kvm_cpu_caps, 0, sizeof(kvm_cpu_caps));
+
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(kvm_cpu_caps) - (NKVMCAPINTS * sizeof(*kvm_cpu_caps)) >
+		     sizeof(boot_cpu_data.x86_capability));
+
+	memcpy(&kvm_cpu_caps, &boot_cpu_data.x86_capability,
+	       sizeof(kvm_cpu_caps) - (NKVMCAPINTS * sizeof(*kvm_cpu_caps)));
+
+	kvm_cpu_cap_mask(CPUID_1_ECX,
+		/*
+		 * NOTE: MONITOR (and MWAIT) are emulated as NOP, but *not*
+		 * advertised to guests via CPUID!
+		 */
+		F(XMM3) | F(PCLMULQDQ) | 0 /* DTES64, MONITOR */ |
+		0 /* DS-CPL, VMX, SMX, EST */ |
+		0 /* TM2 */ | F(SSSE3) | 0 /* CNXT-ID */ | 0 /* Reserved */ |
+		F(FMA) | F(CX16) | 0 /* xTPR Update */ | F(PDCM) |
+		F(PCID) | 0 /* Reserved, DCA */ | F(XMM4_1) |
+		F(XMM4_2) | F(X2APIC) | F(MOVBE) | F(POPCNT) |
+		0 /* Reserved*/ | F(AES) | F(XSAVE) | 0 /* OSXSAVE */ | F(AVX) |
+		F(F16C) | F(RDRAND)
+	);
+	/* KVM emulates x2apic in software irrespective of host support. */
+	kvm_cpu_cap_set(X86_FEATURE_X2APIC);
+
+	kvm_cpu_cap_mask(CPUID_1_EDX,
+		F(FPU) | F(VME) | F(DE) | F(PSE) |
+		F(TSC) | F(MSR) | F(PAE) | F(MCE) |
+		F(CX8) | F(APIC) | 0 /* Reserved */ | F(SEP) |
+		F(MTRR) | F(PGE) | F(MCA) | F(CMOV) |
+		F(PAT) | F(PSE36) | 0 /* PSN */ | F(CLFLUSH) |
+		0 /* Reserved, DS, ACPI */ | F(MMX) |
+		F(FXSR) | F(XMM) | F(XMM2) | F(SELFSNOOP) |
+		0 /* HTT, TM, Reserved, PBE */
+	);
+
+	kvm_cpu_cap_mask(CPUID_7_0_EBX,
+		F(FSGSBASE) | F(SGX) | F(BMI1) | F(HLE) | F(AVX2) |
+		F(FDP_EXCPTN_ONLY) | F(SMEP) | F(BMI2) | F(ERMS) | F(INVPCID) |
+		F(RTM) | F(ZERO_FCS_FDS) | 0 /*MPX*/ | F(AVX512F) |
+		F(AVX512DQ) | F(RDSEED) | F(ADX) | F(SMAP) | F(AVX512IFMA) |
+		F(CLFLUSHOPT) | F(CLWB) | 0 /*INTEL_PT*/ | F(AVX512PF) |
+		F(AVX512ER) | F(AVX512CD) | F(SHA_NI) | F(AVX512BW) |
+		F(AVX512VL));
+
+	kvm_cpu_cap_mask(CPUID_7_ECX,
+		F(AVX512VBMI) | F(LA57) | F(PKU) | 0 /*OSPKE*/ | F(RDPID) |
+		F(AVX512_VPOPCNTDQ) | F(UMIP) | F(AVX512_VBMI2) | F(GFNI) |
+		F(VAES) | F(VPCLMULQDQ) | F(AVX512_VNNI) | F(AVX512_BITALG) |
+		F(CLDEMOTE) | F(MOVDIRI) | F(MOVDIR64B) | 0 /*WAITPKG*/ |
+		F(SGX_LC) | F(BUS_LOCK_DETECT)
+	);
+	/* Set LA57 based on hardware capability. */
+	if (cpuid_ecx(7) & F(LA57))
+		kvm_cpu_cap_set(X86_FEATURE_LA57);
+
+	/*
+	 * PKU not yet implemented for shadow paging and requires OSPKE
+	 * to be set on the host. Clear it if that is not the case
+	 */
+	if (!tdp_enabled || !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_OSPKE))
+		kvm_cpu_cap_clear(X86_FEATURE_PKU);
+
+	kvm_cpu_cap_mask(CPUID_7_EDX,
+		F(AVX512_4VNNIW) | F(AVX512_4FMAPS) | F(SPEC_CTRL) |
+		F(SPEC_CTRL_SSBD) | F(ARCH_CAPABILITIES) | F(INTEL_STIBP) |
+		F(MD_CLEAR) | F(AVX512_VP2INTERSECT) | F(FSRM) |
+		F(SERIALIZE) | F(TSXLDTRK) | F(AVX512_FP16) |
+		F(AMX_TILE) | F(AMX_INT8) | F(AMX_BF16) | F(FLUSH_L1D)
+	);
+
+	/* TSC_ADJUST and ARCH_CAPABILITIES are emulated in software. */
+	kvm_cpu_cap_set(X86_FEATURE_TSC_ADJUST);
+	kvm_cpu_cap_set(X86_FEATURE_ARCH_CAPABILITIES);
+
+	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB) && boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS))
+		kvm_cpu_cap_set(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL);
+	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_STIBP))
+		kvm_cpu_cap_set(X86_FEATURE_INTEL_STIBP);
+	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSBD))
+		kvm_cpu_cap_set(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL_SSBD);
+
+	kvm_cpu_cap_mask(CPUID_7_1_EAX,
+		F(AVX_VNNI) | F(AVX512_BF16) | F(CMPCCXADD) |
+		F(FZRM) | F(FSRS) | F(FSRC) |
+		F(AMX_FP16) | F(AVX_IFMA)
+	);
+
+	kvm_cpu_cap_init_kvm_defined(CPUID_7_1_EDX,
+		F(AVX_VNNI_INT8) | F(AVX_NE_CONVERT) | F(PREFETCHITI) |
+		F(AMX_COMPLEX)
+	);
+
+	kvm_cpu_cap_mask(CPUID_D_1_EAX,
+		F(XSAVEOPT) | F(XSAVEC) | F(XGETBV1) | F(XSAVES) | f_xfd
+	);
+
+	kvm_cpu_cap_init_kvm_defined(CPUID_12_EAX,
+		SF(SGX1) | SF(SGX2) | SF(SGX_EDECCSSA)
+	);
+
+	kvm_cpu_cap_mask(CPUID_8000_0001_ECX,
+		F(LAHF_LM) | F(CMP_LEGACY) | 0 /*SVM*/ | 0 /* ExtApicSpace */ |
+		F(CR8_LEGACY) | F(ABM) | F(SSE4A) | F(MISALIGNSSE) |
+		F(3DNOWPREFETCH) | F(OSVW) | 0 /* IBS */ | F(XOP) |
+		0 /* SKINIT, WDT, LWP */ | F(FMA4) | F(TBM) |
+		F(TOPOEXT) | 0 /* PERFCTR_CORE */
+	);
+
+	kvm_cpu_cap_mask(CPUID_8000_0001_EDX,
+		F(FPU) | F(VME) | F(DE) | F(PSE) |
+		F(TSC) | F(MSR) | F(PAE) | F(MCE) |
+		F(CX8) | F(APIC) | 0 /* Reserved */ | F(SYSCALL) |
+		F(MTRR) | F(PGE) | F(MCA) | F(CMOV) |
+		F(PAT) | F(PSE36) | 0 /* Reserved */ |
+		F(NX) | 0 /* Reserved */ | F(MMXEXT) | F(MMX) |
+		F(FXSR) | F(FXSR_OPT) | f_gbpages | F(RDTSCP) |
+		0 /* Reserved */ | f_lm | F(3DNOWEXT) | F(3DNOW)
+	);
+
+	if (!tdp_enabled && IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_64))
+		kvm_cpu_cap_set(X86_FEATURE_GBPAGES);
+
+	kvm_cpu_cap_init_kvm_defined(CPUID_8000_0007_EDX,
+		SF(CONSTANT_TSC)
+	);
+
+	kvm_cpu_cap_mask(CPUID_8000_0008_EBX,
+		F(CLZERO) | F(XSAVEERPTR) |
+		F(WBNOINVD) | F(AMD_IBPB) | F(AMD_IBRS) | F(AMD_SSBD) | F(VIRT_SSBD) |
+		F(AMD_SSB_NO) | F(AMD_STIBP) | F(AMD_STIBP_ALWAYS_ON) |
+		F(AMD_PSFD)
+	);
+
+	/*
+	 * AMD has separate bits for each SPEC_CTRL bit.
+	 * arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c is kind enough to
+	 * record that in cpufeatures so use them.
+	 */
+	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB))
+		kvm_cpu_cap_set(X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBPB);
+	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS))
+		kvm_cpu_cap_set(X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBRS);
+	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_STIBP))
+		kvm_cpu_cap_set(X86_FEATURE_AMD_STIBP);
+	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL_SSBD))
+		kvm_cpu_cap_set(X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSBD);
+	if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS))
+		kvm_cpu_cap_set(X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSB_NO);
+	/*
+	 * The preference is to use SPEC CTRL MSR instead of the
+	 * VIRT_SPEC MSR.
+	 */
+	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_LS_CFG_SSBD) &&
+	    !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSBD))
+		kvm_cpu_cap_set(X86_FEATURE_VIRT_SSBD);
+
+	/*
+	 * Hide all SVM features by default, SVM will set the cap bits for
+	 * features it emulates and/or exposes for L1.
+	 */
+	kvm_cpu_cap_mask(CPUID_8000_000A_EDX, 0);
+
+	kvm_cpu_cap_mask(CPUID_8000_001F_EAX,
+		0 /* SME */ | F(SEV) | 0 /* VM_PAGE_FLUSH */ | F(SEV_ES) |
+		F(SME_COHERENT));
+
+	kvm_cpu_cap_mask(CPUID_8000_0021_EAX,
+		F(NO_NESTED_DATA_BP) | F(LFENCE_RDTSC) | 0 /* SmmPgCfgLock */ |
+		F(NULL_SEL_CLR_BASE) | F(AUTOIBRS) | 0 /* PrefetchCtlMsr */
+	);
+
+	if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SRSO_NO))
+		kvm_cpu_cap_set(X86_FEATURE_SRSO_NO);
+
+	kvm_cpu_cap_init_kvm_defined(CPUID_8000_0022_EAX,
+		F(PERFMON_V2)
+	);
+
+	/*
+	 * Synthesize "LFENCE is serializing" into the AMD-defined entry in
+	 * KVM's supported CPUID if the feature is reported as supported by the
+	 * kernel.  LFENCE_RDTSC was a Linux-defined synthetic feature long
+	 * before AMD joined the bandwagon, e.g. LFENCE is serializing on most
+	 * CPUs that support SSE2.  On CPUs that don't support AMD's leaf,
+	 * kvm_cpu_cap_mask() will unfortunately drop the flag due to ANDing
+	 * the mask with the raw host CPUID, and reporting support in AMD's
+	 * leaf can make it easier for userspace to detect the feature.
+	 */
+	if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_LFENCE_RDTSC))
+		kvm_cpu_cap_set(X86_FEATURE_LFENCE_RDTSC);
+	if (!static_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_NULL_SEG))
+		kvm_cpu_cap_set(X86_FEATURE_NULL_SEL_CLR_BASE);
+	kvm_cpu_cap_set(X86_FEATURE_NO_SMM_CTL_MSR);
+
+	kvm_cpu_cap_mask(CPUID_C000_0001_EDX,
+		F(XSTORE) | F(XSTORE_EN) | F(XCRYPT) | F(XCRYPT_EN) |
+		F(ACE2) | F(ACE2_EN) | F(PHE) | F(PHE_EN) |
+		F(PMM) | F(PMM_EN)
+	);
+
+	/*
+	 * Hide RDTSCP and RDPID if either feature is reported as supported but
+	 * probing MSR_TSC_AUX failed.  This is purely a sanity check and
+	 * should never happen, but the guest will likely crash if RDTSCP or
+	 * RDPID is misreported, and KVM has botched MSR_TSC_AUX emulation in
+	 * the past.  For example, the sanity check may fire if this instance of
+	 * KVM is running as L1 on top of an older, broken KVM.
+	 */
+	if (WARN_ON((kvm_cpu_cap_has(X86_FEATURE_RDTSCP) ||
+		     kvm_cpu_cap_has(X86_FEATURE_RDPID)) &&
+		     !kvm_is_supported_user_return_msr(MSR_TSC_AUX))) {
+		kvm_cpu_cap_clear(X86_FEATURE_RDTSCP);
+		kvm_cpu_cap_clear(X86_FEATURE_RDPID);
+	}
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_set_cpu_caps);
+
+struct kvm_cpuid_array {
+	struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *entries;
+	int maxnent;
+	int nent;
+};
+
+static struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *get_next_cpuid(struct kvm_cpuid_array *array)
+{
+	if (array->nent >= array->maxnent)
+		return NULL;
+
+	return &array->entries[array->nent++];
+}
+
+static struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *do_host_cpuid(struct kvm_cpuid_array *array,
+					      u32 function, u32 index)
+{
+	struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *entry = get_next_cpuid(array);
+
+	if (!entry)
+		return NULL;
+
+	memset(entry, 0, sizeof(*entry));
+	entry->function = function;
+	entry->index = index;
+	switch (function & 0xC0000000) {
+	case 0x40000000:
+		/* Hypervisor leaves are always synthesized by __do_cpuid_func.  */
+		return entry;
+
+	case 0x80000000:
+		/*
+		 * 0x80000021 is sometimes synthesized by __do_cpuid_func, which
+		 * would result in out-of-bounds calls to do_host_cpuid.
+		 */
+		{
+			static int max_cpuid_80000000;
+			if (!READ_ONCE(max_cpuid_80000000))
+				WRITE_ONCE(max_cpuid_80000000, cpuid_eax(0x80000000));
+			if (function > READ_ONCE(max_cpuid_80000000))
+				return entry;
+		}
+		break;
+
+	default:
+		break;
+	}
+
+	cpuid_count(entry->function, entry->index,
+		    &entry->eax, &entry->ebx, &entry->ecx, &entry->edx);
+
+	if (cpuid_function_is_indexed(function))
+		entry->flags |= KVM_CPUID_FLAG_SIGNIFCANT_INDEX;
+
+	return entry;
+}
+
+static int __do_cpuid_func_emulated(struct kvm_cpuid_array *array, u32 func)
+{
+	struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *entry;
+
+	if (array->nent >= array->maxnent)
+		return -E2BIG;
+
+	entry = &array->entries[array->nent];
+	entry->function = func;
+	entry->index = 0;
+	entry->flags = 0;
+
+	switch (func) {
+	case 0:
+		entry->eax = 7;
+		++array->nent;
+		break;
+	case 1:
+		entry->ecx = F(MOVBE);
+		++array->nent;
+		break;
+	case 7:
+		entry->flags |= KVM_CPUID_FLAG_SIGNIFCANT_INDEX;
+		entry->eax = 0;
+		if (kvm_cpu_cap_has(X86_FEATURE_RDTSCP))
+			entry->ecx = F(RDPID);
+		++array->nent;
+		break;
+	default:
+		break;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static inline int __do_cpuid_func(struct kvm_cpuid_array *array, u32 function)
+{
+	struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *entry;
+	int r, i, max_idx;
+
+	/* all calls to cpuid_count() should be made on the same cpu */
+	get_cpu();
+
+	r = -E2BIG;
+
+	entry = do_host_cpuid(array, function, 0);
+	if (!entry)
+		goto out;
+
+	switch (function) {
+	case 0:
+		/* Limited to the highest leaf implemented in KVM. */
+		entry->eax = min(entry->eax, 0x1fU);
+		break;
+	case 1:
+		cpuid_entry_override(entry, CPUID_1_EDX);
+		cpuid_entry_override(entry, CPUID_1_ECX);
+		break;
+	case 2:
+		/*
+		 * On ancient CPUs, function 2 entries are STATEFUL.  That is,
+		 * CPUID(function=2, index=0) may return different results each
+		 * time, with the least-significant byte in EAX enumerating the
+		 * number of times software should do CPUID(2, 0).
+		 *
+		 * Modern CPUs, i.e. every CPU KVM has *ever* run on are less
+		 * idiotic.  Intel's SDM states that EAX & 0xff "will always
+		 * return 01H. Software should ignore this value and not
+		 * interpret it as an informational descriptor", while AMD's
+		 * APM states that CPUID(2) is reserved.
+		 *
+		 * WARN if a frankenstein CPU that supports virtualization and
+		 * a stateful CPUID.0x2 is encountered.
+		 */
+		WARN_ON_ONCE((entry->eax & 0xff) > 1);
+		break;
+	/* functions 4 and 0x8000001d have additional index. */
+	case 4:
+	case 0x8000001d:
+		/*
+		 * Read entries until the cache type in the previous entry is
+		 * zero, i.e. indicates an invalid entry.
+		 */
+		for (i = 1; entry->eax & 0x1f; ++i) {
+			entry = do_host_cpuid(array, function, i);
+			if (!entry)
+				goto out;
+		}
+		break;
+	case 6: /* Thermal management */
+		entry->eax = 0x4; /* allow ARAT */
+		entry->ebx = 0;
+		entry->ecx = 0;
+		entry->edx = 0;
+		break;
+	/* function 7 has additional index. */
+	case 7:
+		entry->eax = min(entry->eax, 1u);
+		cpuid_entry_override(entry, CPUID_7_0_EBX);
+		cpuid_entry_override(entry, CPUID_7_ECX);
+		cpuid_entry_override(entry, CPUID_7_EDX);
+
+		/* KVM only supports 0x7.0 and 0x7.1, capped above via min(). */
+		if (entry->eax == 1) {
+			entry = do_host_cpuid(array, function, 1);
+			if (!entry)
+				goto out;
+
+			cpuid_entry_override(entry, CPUID_7_1_EAX);
+			cpuid_entry_override(entry, CPUID_7_1_EDX);
+			entry->ebx = 0;
+			entry->ecx = 0;
+		}
+		break;
+	case 0xa: { /* Architectural Performance Monitoring */
+		union cpuid10_eax eax;
+		union cpuid10_edx edx;
+
+		if (!enable_pmu || !static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_ARCH_PERFMON)) {
+			entry->eax = entry->ebx = entry->ecx = entry->edx = 0;
+			break;
+		}
+
+		eax.split.version_id = kvm_pmu_cap.version;
+		eax.split.num_counters = kvm_pmu_cap.num_counters_gp;
+		eax.split.bit_width = kvm_pmu_cap.bit_width_gp;
+		eax.split.mask_length = kvm_pmu_cap.events_mask_len;
+		edx.split.num_counters_fixed = kvm_pmu_cap.num_counters_fixed;
+		edx.split.bit_width_fixed = kvm_pmu_cap.bit_width_fixed;
+
+		if (kvm_pmu_cap.version)
+			edx.split.anythread_deprecated = 1;
+		edx.split.reserved1 = 0;
+		edx.split.reserved2 = 0;
+
+		entry->eax = eax.full;
+		entry->ebx = kvm_pmu_cap.events_mask;
+		entry->ecx = 0;
+		entry->edx = edx.full;
+		break;
+	}
+	case 0x1f:
+	case 0xb:
+		/*
+		 * No topology; a valid topology is indicated by the presence
+		 * of subleaf 1.
+		 */
+		entry->eax = entry->ebx = entry->ecx = 0;
+		break;
+	case 0xd: {
+		u64 permitted_xcr0 = kvm_get_filtered_xcr0();
+		u64 permitted_xss = kvm_caps.supported_xss;
+
+		entry->eax &= permitted_xcr0;
+		entry->ebx = xstate_required_size(permitted_xcr0, false);
+		entry->ecx = entry->ebx;
+		entry->edx &= permitted_xcr0 >> 32;
+		if (!permitted_xcr0)
+			break;
+
+		entry = do_host_cpuid(array, function, 1);
+		if (!entry)
+			goto out;
+
+		cpuid_entry_override(entry, CPUID_D_1_EAX);
+		if (entry->eax & (F(XSAVES)|F(XSAVEC)))
+			entry->ebx = xstate_required_size(permitted_xcr0 | permitted_xss,
+							  true);
+		else {
+			WARN_ON_ONCE(permitted_xss != 0);
+			entry->ebx = 0;
+		}
+		entry->ecx &= permitted_xss;
+		entry->edx &= permitted_xss >> 32;
+
+		for (i = 2; i < 64; ++i) {
+			bool s_state;
+			if (permitted_xcr0 & BIT_ULL(i))
+				s_state = false;
+			else if (permitted_xss & BIT_ULL(i))
+				s_state = true;
+			else
+				continue;
+
+			entry = do_host_cpuid(array, function, i);
+			if (!entry)
+				goto out;
+
+			/*
+			 * The supported check above should have filtered out
+			 * invalid sub-leafs.  Only valid sub-leafs should
+			 * reach this point, and they should have a non-zero
+			 * save state size.  Furthermore, check whether the
+			 * processor agrees with permitted_xcr0/permitted_xss
+			 * on whether this is an XCR0- or IA32_XSS-managed area.
+			 */
+			if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!entry->eax || (entry->ecx & 0x1) != s_state)) {
+				--array->nent;
+				continue;
+			}
+
+			if (!kvm_cpu_cap_has(X86_FEATURE_XFD))
+				entry->ecx &= ~BIT_ULL(2);
+			entry->edx = 0;
+		}
+		break;
+	}
+	case 0x12:
+		/* Intel SGX */
+		if (!kvm_cpu_cap_has(X86_FEATURE_SGX)) {
+			entry->eax = entry->ebx = entry->ecx = entry->edx = 0;
+			break;
+		}
+
+		/*
+		 * Index 0: Sub-features, MISCSELECT (a.k.a extended features)
+		 * and max enclave sizes.   The SGX sub-features and MISCSELECT
+		 * are restricted by kernel and KVM capabilities (like most
+		 * feature flags), while enclave size is unrestricted.
+		 */
+		cpuid_entry_override(entry, CPUID_12_EAX);
+		entry->ebx &= SGX_MISC_EXINFO;
+
+		entry = do_host_cpuid(array, function, 1);
+		if (!entry)
+			goto out;
+
+		/*
+		 * Index 1: SECS.ATTRIBUTES.  ATTRIBUTES are restricted a la
+		 * feature flags.  Advertise all supported flags, including
+		 * privileged attributes that require explicit opt-in from
+		 * userspace.  ATTRIBUTES.XFRM is not adjusted as userspace is
+		 * expected to derive it from supported XCR0.
+		 */
+		entry->eax &= SGX_ATTR_PRIV_MASK | SGX_ATTR_UNPRIV_MASK;
+		entry->ebx &= 0;
+		break;
+	/* Intel PT */
+	case 0x14:
+		if (!kvm_cpu_cap_has(X86_FEATURE_INTEL_PT)) {
+			entry->eax = entry->ebx = entry->ecx = entry->edx = 0;
+			break;
+		}
+
+		for (i = 1, max_idx = entry->eax; i <= max_idx; ++i) {
+			if (!do_host_cpuid(array, function, i))
+				goto out;
+		}
+		break;
+	/* Intel AMX TILE */
+	case 0x1d:
+		if (!kvm_cpu_cap_has(X86_FEATURE_AMX_TILE)) {
+			entry->eax = entry->ebx = entry->ecx = entry->edx = 0;
+			break;
+		}
+
+		for (i = 1, max_idx = entry->eax; i <= max_idx; ++i) {
+			if (!do_host_cpuid(array, function, i))
+				goto out;
+		}
+		break;
+	case 0x1e: /* TMUL information */
+		if (!kvm_cpu_cap_has(X86_FEATURE_AMX_TILE)) {
+			entry->eax = entry->ebx = entry->ecx = entry->edx = 0;
+			break;
+		}
+		break;
+	case KVM_CPUID_SIGNATURE: {
+		const u32 *sigptr = (const u32 *)KVM_SIGNATURE;
+		entry->eax = KVM_CPUID_FEATURES;
+		entry->ebx = sigptr[0];
+		entry->ecx = sigptr[1];
+		entry->edx = sigptr[2];
+		break;
+	}
+	case KVM_CPUID_FEATURES:
+		entry->eax = (1 << KVM_FEATURE_CLOCKSOURCE) |
+			     (1 << KVM_FEATURE_NOP_IO_DELAY) |
+			     (1 << KVM_FEATURE_CLOCKSOURCE2) |
+			     (1 << KVM_FEATURE_ASYNC_PF) |
+			     (1 << KVM_FEATURE_PV_EOI) |
+			     (1 << KVM_FEATURE_CLOCKSOURCE_STABLE_BIT) |
+			     (1 << KVM_FEATURE_PV_UNHALT) |
+			     (1 << KVM_FEATURE_PV_TLB_FLUSH) |
+			     (1 << KVM_FEATURE_ASYNC_PF_VMEXIT) |
+			     (1 << KVM_FEATURE_PV_SEND_IPI) |
+			     (1 << KVM_FEATURE_POLL_CONTROL) |
+			     (1 << KVM_FEATURE_PV_SCHED_YIELD) |
+			     (1 << KVM_FEATURE_ASYNC_PF_INT);
+
+		if (sched_info_on())
+			entry->eax |= (1 << KVM_FEATURE_STEAL_TIME);
+
+		entry->ebx = 0;
+		entry->ecx = 0;
+		entry->edx = 0;
+		break;
+	case 0x80000000:
+		entry->eax = min(entry->eax, 0x80000022);
+		/*
+		 * Serializing LFENCE is reported in a multitude of ways, and
+		 * NullSegClearsBase is not reported in CPUID on Zen2; help
+		 * userspace by providing the CPUID leaf ourselves.
+		 *
+		 * However, only do it if the host has CPUID leaf 0x8000001d.
+		 * QEMU thinks that it can query the host blindly for that
+		 * CPUID leaf if KVM reports that it supports 0x8000001d or
+		 * above.  The processor merrily returns values from the
+		 * highest Intel leaf which QEMU tries to use as the guest's
+		 * 0x8000001d.  Even worse, this can result in an infinite
+		 * loop if said highest leaf has no subleaves indexed by ECX.
+		 */
+		if (entry->eax >= 0x8000001d &&
+		    (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_LFENCE_RDTSC)
+		     || !static_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_NULL_SEG)))
+			entry->eax = max(entry->eax, 0x80000021);
+		break;
+	case 0x80000001:
+		entry->ebx &= ~GENMASK(27, 16);
+		cpuid_entry_override(entry, CPUID_8000_0001_EDX);
+		cpuid_entry_override(entry, CPUID_8000_0001_ECX);
+		break;
+	case 0x80000005:
+		/*  Pass host L1 cache and TLB info. */
+		break;
+	case 0x80000006:
+		/* Drop reserved bits, pass host L2 cache and TLB info. */
+		entry->edx &= ~GENMASK(17, 16);
+		break;
+	case 0x80000007: /* Advanced power management */
+		cpuid_entry_override(entry, CPUID_8000_0007_EDX);
+
+		/* mask against host */
+		entry->edx &= boot_cpu_data.x86_power;
+		entry->eax = entry->ebx = entry->ecx = 0;
+		break;
+	case 0x80000008: {
+		unsigned g_phys_as = (entry->eax >> 16) & 0xff;
+		unsigned virt_as = max((entry->eax >> 8) & 0xff, 48U);
+		unsigned phys_as = entry->eax & 0xff;
+
+		/*
+		 * If TDP (NPT) is disabled use the adjusted host MAXPHYADDR as
+		 * the guest operates in the same PA space as the host, i.e.
+		 * reductions in MAXPHYADDR for memory encryption affect shadow
+		 * paging, too.
+		 *
+		 * If TDP is enabled but an explicit guest MAXPHYADDR is not
+		 * provided, use the raw bare metal MAXPHYADDR as reductions to
+		 * the HPAs do not affect GPAs.
+		 */
+		if (!tdp_enabled)
+			g_phys_as = boot_cpu_data.x86_phys_bits;
+		else if (!g_phys_as)
+			g_phys_as = phys_as;
+
+		entry->eax = g_phys_as | (virt_as << 8);
+		entry->ecx &= ~(GENMASK(31, 16) | GENMASK(11, 8));
+		entry->edx = 0;
+		cpuid_entry_override(entry, CPUID_8000_0008_EBX);
+		break;
+	}
+	case 0x8000000A:
+		if (!kvm_cpu_cap_has(X86_FEATURE_SVM)) {
+			entry->eax = entry->ebx = entry->ecx = entry->edx = 0;
+			break;
+		}
+		entry->eax = 1; /* SVM revision 1 */
+		entry->ebx = 8; /* Lets support 8 ASIDs in case we add proper
+				   ASID emulation to nested SVM */
+		entry->ecx = 0; /* Reserved */
+		cpuid_entry_override(entry, CPUID_8000_000A_EDX);
+		break;
+	case 0x80000019:
+		entry->ecx = entry->edx = 0;
+		break;
+	case 0x8000001a:
+		entry->eax &= GENMASK(2, 0);
+		entry->ebx = entry->ecx = entry->edx = 0;
+		break;
+	case 0x8000001e:
+		/* Do not return host topology information.  */
+		entry->eax = entry->ebx = entry->ecx = 0;
+		entry->edx = 0; /* reserved */
+		break;
+	case 0x8000001F:
+		if (!kvm_cpu_cap_has(X86_FEATURE_SEV)) {
+			entry->eax = entry->ebx = entry->ecx = entry->edx = 0;
+		} else {
+			cpuid_entry_override(entry, CPUID_8000_001F_EAX);
+			/* Clear NumVMPL since KVM does not support VMPL.  */
+			entry->ebx &= ~GENMASK(31, 12);
+			/*
+			 * Enumerate '0' for "PA bits reduction", the adjusted
+			 * MAXPHYADDR is enumerated directly (see 0x80000008).
+			 */
+			entry->ebx &= ~GENMASK(11, 6);
+		}
+		break;
+	case 0x80000020:
+		entry->eax = entry->ebx = entry->ecx = entry->edx = 0;
+		break;
+	case 0x80000021:
+		entry->ebx = entry->ecx = entry->edx = 0;
+		cpuid_entry_override(entry, CPUID_8000_0021_EAX);
+		break;
+	/* AMD Extended Performance Monitoring and Debug */
+	case 0x80000022: {
+		union cpuid_0x80000022_ebx ebx;
+
+		entry->ecx = entry->edx = 0;
+		if (!enable_pmu || !kvm_cpu_cap_has(X86_FEATURE_PERFMON_V2)) {
+			entry->eax = entry->ebx;
+			break;
+		}
+
+		cpuid_entry_override(entry, CPUID_8000_0022_EAX);
+
+		if (kvm_cpu_cap_has(X86_FEATURE_PERFMON_V2))
+			ebx.split.num_core_pmc = kvm_pmu_cap.num_counters_gp;
+		else if (kvm_cpu_cap_has(X86_FEATURE_PERFCTR_CORE))
+			ebx.split.num_core_pmc = AMD64_NUM_COUNTERS_CORE;
+		else
+			ebx.split.num_core_pmc = AMD64_NUM_COUNTERS;
+
+		entry->ebx = ebx.full;
+		break;
+	}
+	/*Add support for Centaur's CPUID instruction*/
+	case 0xC0000000:
+		/*Just support up to 0xC0000004 now*/
+		entry->eax = min(entry->eax, 0xC0000004);
+		break;
+	case 0xC0000001:
+		cpuid_entry_override(entry, CPUID_C000_0001_EDX);
+		break;
+	case 3: /* Processor serial number */
+	case 5: /* MONITOR/MWAIT */
+	case 0xC0000002:
+	case 0xC0000003:
+	case 0xC0000004:
+	default:
+		entry->eax = entry->ebx = entry->ecx = entry->edx = 0;
+		break;
+	}
+
+	r = 0;
+
+out:
+	put_cpu();
+
+	return r;
+}
+
+static int do_cpuid_func(struct kvm_cpuid_array *array, u32 func,
+			 unsigned int type)
+{
+	if (type == KVM_GET_EMULATED_CPUID)
+		return __do_cpuid_func_emulated(array, func);
+
+	return __do_cpuid_func(array, func);
+}
+
+#define CENTAUR_CPUID_SIGNATURE 0xC0000000
+
+static int get_cpuid_func(struct kvm_cpuid_array *array, u32 func,
+			  unsigned int type)
+{
+	u32 limit;
+	int r;
+
+	if (func == CENTAUR_CPUID_SIGNATURE &&
+	    boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_CENTAUR)
+		return 0;
+
+	r = do_cpuid_func(array, func, type);
+	if (r)
+		return r;
+
+	limit = array->entries[array->nent - 1].eax;
+	for (func = func + 1; func <= limit; ++func) {
+		r = do_cpuid_func(array, func, type);
+		if (r)
+			break;
+	}
+
+	return r;
+}
+
+static bool sanity_check_entries(struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 __user *entries,
+				 __u32 num_entries, unsigned int ioctl_type)
+{
+	int i;
+	__u32 pad[3];
+
+	if (ioctl_type != KVM_GET_EMULATED_CPUID)
+		return false;
+
+	/*
+	 * We want to make sure that ->padding is being passed clean from
+	 * userspace in case we want to use it for something in the future.
+	 *
+	 * Sadly, this wasn't enforced for KVM_GET_SUPPORTED_CPUID and so we
+	 * have to give ourselves satisfied only with the emulated side. /me
+	 * sheds a tear.
+	 */
+	for (i = 0; i < num_entries; i++) {
+		if (copy_from_user(pad, entries[i].padding, sizeof(pad)))
+			return true;
+
+		if (pad[0] || pad[1] || pad[2])
+			return true;
+	}
+	return false;
+}
+
+int kvm_dev_ioctl_get_cpuid(struct kvm_cpuid2 *cpuid,
+			    struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 __user *entries,
+			    unsigned int type)
+{
+	static const u32 funcs[] = {
+		0, 0x80000000, CENTAUR_CPUID_SIGNATURE, KVM_CPUID_SIGNATURE,
+	};
+
+	struct kvm_cpuid_array array = {
+		.nent = 0,
+	};
+	int r, i;
+
+	if (cpuid->nent < 1)
+		return -E2BIG;
+	if (cpuid->nent > KVM_MAX_CPUID_ENTRIES)
+		cpuid->nent = KVM_MAX_CPUID_ENTRIES;
+
+	if (sanity_check_entries(entries, cpuid->nent, type))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	array.entries = kvcalloc(cpuid->nent, sizeof(struct kvm_cpuid_entry2), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!array.entries)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	array.maxnent = cpuid->nent;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(funcs); i++) {
+		r = get_cpuid_func(&array, funcs[i], type);
+		if (r)
+			goto out_free;
+	}
+	cpuid->nent = array.nent;
+
+	if (copy_to_user(entries, array.entries,
+			 array.nent * sizeof(struct kvm_cpuid_entry2)))
+		r = -EFAULT;
+
+out_free:
+	kvfree(array.entries);
+	return r;
+}
+
+struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *kvm_find_cpuid_entry_index(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+						    u32 function, u32 index)
+{
+	return cpuid_entry2_find(vcpu->arch.cpuid_entries, vcpu->arch.cpuid_nent,
+				 function, index);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_find_cpuid_entry_index);
+
+struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *kvm_find_cpuid_entry(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+					      u32 function)
+{
+	return cpuid_entry2_find(vcpu->arch.cpuid_entries, vcpu->arch.cpuid_nent,
+				 function, KVM_CPUID_INDEX_NOT_SIGNIFICANT);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_find_cpuid_entry);
+
+/*
+ * Intel CPUID semantics treats any query for an out-of-range leaf as if the
+ * highest basic leaf (i.e. CPUID.0H:EAX) were requested.  AMD CPUID semantics
+ * returns all zeroes for any undefined leaf, whether or not the leaf is in
+ * range.  Centaur/VIA follows Intel semantics.
+ *
+ * A leaf is considered out-of-range if its function is higher than the maximum
+ * supported leaf of its associated class or if its associated class does not
+ * exist.
+ *
+ * There are three primary classes to be considered, with their respective
+ * ranges described as "<base> - <top>[,<base2> - <top2>] inclusive.  A primary
+ * class exists if a guest CPUID entry for its <base> leaf exists.  For a given
+ * class, CPUID.<base>.EAX contains the max supported leaf for the class.
+ *
+ *  - Basic:      0x00000000 - 0x3fffffff, 0x50000000 - 0x7fffffff
+ *  - Hypervisor: 0x40000000 - 0x4fffffff
+ *  - Extended:   0x80000000 - 0xbfffffff
+ *  - Centaur:    0xc0000000 - 0xcfffffff
+ *
+ * The Hypervisor class is further subdivided into sub-classes that each act as
+ * their own independent class associated with a 0x100 byte range.  E.g. if Qemu
+ * is advertising support for both HyperV and KVM, the resulting Hypervisor
+ * CPUID sub-classes are:
+ *
+ *  - HyperV:     0x40000000 - 0x400000ff
+ *  - KVM:        0x40000100 - 0x400001ff
+ */
+static struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *
+get_out_of_range_cpuid_entry(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 *fn_ptr, u32 index)
+{
+	struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *basic, *class;
+	u32 function = *fn_ptr;
+
+	basic = kvm_find_cpuid_entry(vcpu, 0);
+	if (!basic)
+		return NULL;
+
+	if (is_guest_vendor_amd(basic->ebx, basic->ecx, basic->edx) ||
+	    is_guest_vendor_hygon(basic->ebx, basic->ecx, basic->edx))
+		return NULL;
+
+	if (function >= 0x40000000 && function <= 0x4fffffff)
+		class = kvm_find_cpuid_entry(vcpu, function & 0xffffff00);
+	else if (function >= 0xc0000000)
+		class = kvm_find_cpuid_entry(vcpu, 0xc0000000);
+	else
+		class = kvm_find_cpuid_entry(vcpu, function & 0x80000000);
+
+	if (class && function <= class->eax)
+		return NULL;
+
+	/*
+	 * Leaf specific adjustments are also applied when redirecting to the
+	 * max basic entry, e.g. if the max basic leaf is 0xb but there is no
+	 * entry for CPUID.0xb.index (see below), then the output value for EDX
+	 * needs to be pulled from CPUID.0xb.1.
+	 */
+	*fn_ptr = basic->eax;
+
+	/*
+	 * The class does not exist or the requested function is out of range;
+	 * the effective CPUID entry is the max basic leaf.  Note, the index of
+	 * the original requested leaf is observed!
+	 */
+	return kvm_find_cpuid_entry_index(vcpu, basic->eax, index);
+}
+
+bool kvm_cpuid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 *eax, u32 *ebx,
+	       u32 *ecx, u32 *edx, bool exact_only)
+{
+	u32 orig_function = *eax, function = *eax, index = *ecx;
+	struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *entry;
+	bool exact, used_max_basic = false;
+
+	entry = kvm_find_cpuid_entry_index(vcpu, function, index);
+	exact = !!entry;
+
+	if (!entry && !exact_only) {
+		entry = get_out_of_range_cpuid_entry(vcpu, &function, index);
+		used_max_basic = !!entry;
+	}
+
+	if (entry) {
+		*eax = entry->eax;
+		*ebx = entry->ebx;
+		*ecx = entry->ecx;
+		*edx = entry->edx;
+		if (function == 7 && index == 0) {
+			u64 data;
+		        if (!__kvm_get_msr(vcpu, MSR_IA32_TSX_CTRL, &data, true) &&
+			    (data & TSX_CTRL_CPUID_CLEAR))
+				*ebx &= ~(F(RTM) | F(HLE));
+		} else if (function == 0x80000007) {
+			if (kvm_hv_invtsc_suppressed(vcpu))
+				*edx &= ~SF(CONSTANT_TSC);
+		}
+	} else {
+		*eax = *ebx = *ecx = *edx = 0;
+		/*
+		 * When leaf 0BH or 1FH is defined, CL is pass-through
+		 * and EDX is always the x2APIC ID, even for undefined
+		 * subleaves. Index 1 will exist iff the leaf is
+		 * implemented, so we pass through CL iff leaf 1
+		 * exists. EDX can be copied from any existing index.
+		 */
+		if (function == 0xb || function == 0x1f) {
+			entry = kvm_find_cpuid_entry_index(vcpu, function, 1);
+			if (entry) {
+				*ecx = index & 0xff;
+				*edx = entry->edx;
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	trace_kvm_cpuid(orig_function, index, *eax, *ebx, *ecx, *edx, exact,
+			used_max_basic);
+	return exact;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_cpuid);
+
+int kvm_emulate_cpuid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	u32 eax, ebx, ecx, edx;
+
+	if (cpuid_fault_enabled(vcpu) && !kvm_require_cpl(vcpu, 0))
+		return 1;
+
+	eax = kvm_rax_read(vcpu);
+	ecx = kvm_rcx_read(vcpu);
+	kvm_cpuid(vcpu, &eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx, false);
+	kvm_rax_write(vcpu, eax);
+	kvm_rbx_write(vcpu, ebx);
+	kvm_rcx_write(vcpu, ecx);
+	kvm_rdx_write(vcpu, edx);
+	return kvm_skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_emulate_cpuid);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..284fa4704
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h
@@ -0,0 +1,281 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+#ifndef ARCH_X86_KVM_CPUID_H
+#define ARCH_X86_KVM_CPUID_H
+
+#include "x86.h"
+#include "reverse_cpuid.h"
+#include <asm/cpu.h>
+#include <asm/processor.h>
+#include <uapi/asm/kvm_para.h>
+
+extern u32 kvm_cpu_caps[NR_KVM_CPU_CAPS] __read_mostly;
+void kvm_set_cpu_caps(void);
+
+void kvm_update_cpuid_runtime(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+void kvm_update_pv_runtime(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *kvm_find_cpuid_entry_index(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+						    u32 function, u32 index);
+struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *kvm_find_cpuid_entry(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+					      u32 function);
+int kvm_dev_ioctl_get_cpuid(struct kvm_cpuid2 *cpuid,
+			    struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 __user *entries,
+			    unsigned int type);
+int kvm_vcpu_ioctl_set_cpuid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+			     struct kvm_cpuid *cpuid,
+			     struct kvm_cpuid_entry __user *entries);
+int kvm_vcpu_ioctl_set_cpuid2(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+			      struct kvm_cpuid2 *cpuid,
+			      struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 __user *entries);
+int kvm_vcpu_ioctl_get_cpuid2(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+			      struct kvm_cpuid2 *cpuid,
+			      struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 __user *entries);
+bool kvm_cpuid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 *eax, u32 *ebx,
+	       u32 *ecx, u32 *edx, bool exact_only);
+
+u32 xstate_required_size(u64 xstate_bv, bool compacted);
+
+int cpuid_query_maxphyaddr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+u64 kvm_vcpu_reserved_gpa_bits_raw(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+
+static inline int cpuid_maxphyaddr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	return vcpu->arch.maxphyaddr;
+}
+
+static inline bool kvm_vcpu_is_legal_gpa(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t gpa)
+{
+	return !(gpa & vcpu->arch.reserved_gpa_bits);
+}
+
+static inline bool kvm_vcpu_is_illegal_gpa(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t gpa)
+{
+	return !kvm_vcpu_is_legal_gpa(vcpu, gpa);
+}
+
+static inline bool kvm_vcpu_is_legal_aligned_gpa(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+						 gpa_t gpa, gpa_t alignment)
+{
+	return IS_ALIGNED(gpa, alignment) && kvm_vcpu_is_legal_gpa(vcpu, gpa);
+}
+
+static inline bool page_address_valid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t gpa)
+{
+	return kvm_vcpu_is_legal_aligned_gpa(vcpu, gpa, PAGE_SIZE);
+}
+
+static __always_inline void cpuid_entry_override(struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *entry,
+						 unsigned int leaf)
+{
+	u32 *reg = cpuid_entry_get_reg(entry, leaf * 32);
+
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(leaf >= ARRAY_SIZE(kvm_cpu_caps));
+	*reg = kvm_cpu_caps[leaf];
+}
+
+static __always_inline u32 *guest_cpuid_get_register(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+						     unsigned int x86_feature)
+{
+	const struct cpuid_reg cpuid = x86_feature_cpuid(x86_feature);
+	struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *entry;
+
+	entry = kvm_find_cpuid_entry_index(vcpu, cpuid.function, cpuid.index);
+	if (!entry)
+		return NULL;
+
+	return __cpuid_entry_get_reg(entry, cpuid.reg);
+}
+
+static __always_inline bool guest_cpuid_has(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+					    unsigned int x86_feature)
+{
+	u32 *reg;
+
+	reg = guest_cpuid_get_register(vcpu, x86_feature);
+	if (!reg)
+		return false;
+
+	return *reg & __feature_bit(x86_feature);
+}
+
+static __always_inline void guest_cpuid_clear(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+					      unsigned int x86_feature)
+{
+	u32 *reg;
+
+	reg = guest_cpuid_get_register(vcpu, x86_feature);
+	if (reg)
+		*reg &= ~__feature_bit(x86_feature);
+}
+
+static inline bool guest_cpuid_is_amd_or_hygon(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *best;
+
+	best = kvm_find_cpuid_entry(vcpu, 0);
+	return best &&
+	       (is_guest_vendor_amd(best->ebx, best->ecx, best->edx) ||
+		is_guest_vendor_hygon(best->ebx, best->ecx, best->edx));
+}
+
+static inline bool guest_cpuid_is_intel(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *best;
+
+	best = kvm_find_cpuid_entry(vcpu, 0);
+	return best && is_guest_vendor_intel(best->ebx, best->ecx, best->edx);
+}
+
+static inline int guest_cpuid_family(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *best;
+
+	best = kvm_find_cpuid_entry(vcpu, 0x1);
+	if (!best)
+		return -1;
+
+	return x86_family(best->eax);
+}
+
+static inline int guest_cpuid_model(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *best;
+
+	best = kvm_find_cpuid_entry(vcpu, 0x1);
+	if (!best)
+		return -1;
+
+	return x86_model(best->eax);
+}
+
+static inline bool cpuid_model_is_consistent(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	return boot_cpu_data.x86_model == guest_cpuid_model(vcpu);
+}
+
+static inline int guest_cpuid_stepping(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *best;
+
+	best = kvm_find_cpuid_entry(vcpu, 0x1);
+	if (!best)
+		return -1;
+
+	return x86_stepping(best->eax);
+}
+
+static inline bool guest_has_spec_ctrl_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	return (guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL) ||
+		guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_AMD_STIBP) ||
+		guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBRS) ||
+		guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSBD));
+}
+
+static inline bool guest_has_pred_cmd_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	return (guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL) ||
+		guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBPB));
+}
+
+static inline bool supports_cpuid_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	return vcpu->arch.msr_platform_info & MSR_PLATFORM_INFO_CPUID_FAULT;
+}
+
+static inline bool cpuid_fault_enabled(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	return vcpu->arch.msr_misc_features_enables &
+		  MSR_MISC_FEATURES_ENABLES_CPUID_FAULT;
+}
+
+static __always_inline void kvm_cpu_cap_clear(unsigned int x86_feature)
+{
+	unsigned int x86_leaf = __feature_leaf(x86_feature);
+
+	reverse_cpuid_check(x86_leaf);
+	kvm_cpu_caps[x86_leaf] &= ~__feature_bit(x86_feature);
+}
+
+static __always_inline void kvm_cpu_cap_set(unsigned int x86_feature)
+{
+	unsigned int x86_leaf = __feature_leaf(x86_feature);
+
+	reverse_cpuid_check(x86_leaf);
+	kvm_cpu_caps[x86_leaf] |= __feature_bit(x86_feature);
+}
+
+static __always_inline u32 kvm_cpu_cap_get(unsigned int x86_feature)
+{
+	unsigned int x86_leaf = __feature_leaf(x86_feature);
+
+	reverse_cpuid_check(x86_leaf);
+	return kvm_cpu_caps[x86_leaf] & __feature_bit(x86_feature);
+}
+
+static __always_inline bool kvm_cpu_cap_has(unsigned int x86_feature)
+{
+	return !!kvm_cpu_cap_get(x86_feature);
+}
+
+static __always_inline void kvm_cpu_cap_check_and_set(unsigned int x86_feature)
+{
+	if (boot_cpu_has(x86_feature))
+		kvm_cpu_cap_set(x86_feature);
+}
+
+static __always_inline bool guest_pv_has(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+					 unsigned int kvm_feature)
+{
+	if (!vcpu->arch.pv_cpuid.enforce)
+		return true;
+
+	return vcpu->arch.pv_cpuid.features & (1u << kvm_feature);
+}
+
+enum kvm_governed_features {
+#define KVM_GOVERNED_FEATURE(x) KVM_GOVERNED_##x,
+#include "governed_features.h"
+	KVM_NR_GOVERNED_FEATURES
+};
+
+static __always_inline int kvm_governed_feature_index(unsigned int x86_feature)
+{
+	switch (x86_feature) {
+#define KVM_GOVERNED_FEATURE(x) case x: return KVM_GOVERNED_##x;
+#include "governed_features.h"
+	default:
+		return -1;
+	}
+}
+
+static __always_inline bool kvm_is_governed_feature(unsigned int x86_feature)
+{
+	return kvm_governed_feature_index(x86_feature) >= 0;
+}
+
+static __always_inline void kvm_governed_feature_set(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+						     unsigned int x86_feature)
+{
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(!kvm_is_governed_feature(x86_feature));
+
+	__set_bit(kvm_governed_feature_index(x86_feature),
+		  vcpu->arch.governed_features.enabled);
+}
+
+static __always_inline void kvm_governed_feature_check_and_set(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+							       unsigned int x86_feature)
+{
+	if (kvm_cpu_cap_has(x86_feature) && guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, x86_feature))
+		kvm_governed_feature_set(vcpu, x86_feature);
+}
+
+static __always_inline bool guest_can_use(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+					  unsigned int x86_feature)
+{
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(!kvm_is_governed_feature(x86_feature));
+
+	return test_bit(kvm_governed_feature_index(x86_feature),
+			vcpu->arch.governed_features.enabled);
+}
+
+#endif
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/debugfs.c b/arch/x86/kvm/debugfs.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..ee8c4c349
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/debugfs.c
@@ -0,0 +1,196 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * Kernel-based Virtual Machine driver for Linux
+ *
+ * Copyright 2016 Red Hat, Inc. and/or its affiliates.
+ */
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
+
+#include <linux/kvm_host.h>
+#include <linux/debugfs.h>
+#include "lapic.h"
+#include "mmu.h"
+#include "mmu/mmu_internal.h"
+
+static int vcpu_get_timer_advance_ns(void *data, u64 *val)
+{
+	struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = (struct kvm_vcpu *) data;
+	*val = vcpu->arch.apic->lapic_timer.timer_advance_ns;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+DEFINE_SIMPLE_ATTRIBUTE(vcpu_timer_advance_ns_fops, vcpu_get_timer_advance_ns, NULL, "%llu\n");
+
+static int vcpu_get_guest_mode(void *data, u64 *val)
+{
+	struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = (struct kvm_vcpu *) data;
+	*val = vcpu->stat.guest_mode;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+DEFINE_SIMPLE_ATTRIBUTE(vcpu_guest_mode_fops, vcpu_get_guest_mode, NULL, "%lld\n");
+
+static int vcpu_get_tsc_offset(void *data, u64 *val)
+{
+	struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = (struct kvm_vcpu *) data;
+	*val = vcpu->arch.tsc_offset;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+DEFINE_SIMPLE_ATTRIBUTE(vcpu_tsc_offset_fops, vcpu_get_tsc_offset, NULL, "%lld\n");
+
+static int vcpu_get_tsc_scaling_ratio(void *data, u64 *val)
+{
+	struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = (struct kvm_vcpu *) data;
+	*val = vcpu->arch.tsc_scaling_ratio;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+DEFINE_SIMPLE_ATTRIBUTE(vcpu_tsc_scaling_fops, vcpu_get_tsc_scaling_ratio, NULL, "%llu\n");
+
+static int vcpu_get_tsc_scaling_frac_bits(void *data, u64 *val)
+{
+	*val = kvm_caps.tsc_scaling_ratio_frac_bits;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+DEFINE_SIMPLE_ATTRIBUTE(vcpu_tsc_scaling_frac_fops, vcpu_get_tsc_scaling_frac_bits, NULL, "%llu\n");
+
+void kvm_arch_create_vcpu_debugfs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct dentry *debugfs_dentry)
+{
+	debugfs_create_file("guest_mode", 0444, debugfs_dentry, vcpu,
+			    &vcpu_guest_mode_fops);
+	debugfs_create_file("tsc-offset", 0444, debugfs_dentry, vcpu,
+			    &vcpu_tsc_offset_fops);
+
+	if (lapic_in_kernel(vcpu))
+		debugfs_create_file("lapic_timer_advance_ns", 0444,
+				    debugfs_dentry, vcpu,
+				    &vcpu_timer_advance_ns_fops);
+
+	if (kvm_caps.has_tsc_control) {
+		debugfs_create_file("tsc-scaling-ratio", 0444,
+				    debugfs_dentry, vcpu,
+				    &vcpu_tsc_scaling_fops);
+		debugfs_create_file("tsc-scaling-ratio-frac-bits", 0444,
+				    debugfs_dentry, vcpu,
+				    &vcpu_tsc_scaling_frac_fops);
+	}
+}
+
+/*
+ * This covers statistics <1024 (11=log(1024)+1), which should be enough to
+ * cover RMAP_RECYCLE_THRESHOLD.
+ */
+#define  RMAP_LOG_SIZE  11
+
+static const char *kvm_lpage_str[KVM_NR_PAGE_SIZES] = { "4K", "2M", "1G" };
+
+static int kvm_mmu_rmaps_stat_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
+{
+	struct kvm_rmap_head *rmap;
+	struct kvm *kvm = m->private;
+	struct kvm_memory_slot *slot;
+	struct kvm_memslots *slots;
+	unsigned int lpage_size, index;
+	/* Still small enough to be on the stack */
+	unsigned int *log[KVM_NR_PAGE_SIZES], *cur;
+	int i, j, k, l, ret;
+
+	if (!kvm_memslots_have_rmaps(kvm))
+		return 0;
+
+	ret = -ENOMEM;
+	memset(log, 0, sizeof(log));
+	for (i = 0; i < KVM_NR_PAGE_SIZES; i++) {
+		log[i] = kcalloc(RMAP_LOG_SIZE, sizeof(unsigned int), GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (!log[i])
+			goto out;
+	}
+
+	mutex_lock(&kvm->slots_lock);
+	write_lock(&kvm->mmu_lock);
+
+	for (i = 0; i < KVM_ADDRESS_SPACE_NUM; i++) {
+		int bkt;
+
+		slots = __kvm_memslots(kvm, i);
+		kvm_for_each_memslot(slot, bkt, slots)
+			for (k = 0; k < KVM_NR_PAGE_SIZES; k++) {
+				rmap = slot->arch.rmap[k];
+				lpage_size = kvm_mmu_slot_lpages(slot, k + 1);
+				cur = log[k];
+				for (l = 0; l < lpage_size; l++) {
+					index = ffs(pte_list_count(&rmap[l]));
+					if (WARN_ON_ONCE(index >= RMAP_LOG_SIZE))
+						index = RMAP_LOG_SIZE - 1;
+					cur[index]++;
+				}
+			}
+	}
+
+	write_unlock(&kvm->mmu_lock);
+	mutex_unlock(&kvm->slots_lock);
+
+	/* index=0 counts no rmap; index=1 counts 1 rmap */
+	seq_printf(m, "Rmap_Count:\t0\t1\t");
+	for (i = 2; i < RMAP_LOG_SIZE; i++) {
+		j = 1 << (i - 1);
+		k = (1 << i) - 1;
+		seq_printf(m, "%d-%d\t", j, k);
+	}
+	seq_printf(m, "\n");
+
+	for (i = 0; i < KVM_NR_PAGE_SIZES; i++) {
+		seq_printf(m, "Level=%s:\t", kvm_lpage_str[i]);
+		cur = log[i];
+		for (j = 0; j < RMAP_LOG_SIZE; j++)
+			seq_printf(m, "%d\t", cur[j]);
+		seq_printf(m, "\n");
+	}
+
+	ret = 0;
+out:
+	for (i = 0; i < KVM_NR_PAGE_SIZES; i++)
+		kfree(log[i]);
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int kvm_mmu_rmaps_stat_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
+{
+	struct kvm *kvm = inode->i_private;
+	int r;
+
+	if (!kvm_get_kvm_safe(kvm))
+		return -ENOENT;
+
+	r = single_open(file, kvm_mmu_rmaps_stat_show, kvm);
+	if (r < 0)
+		kvm_put_kvm(kvm);
+
+	return r;
+}
+
+static int kvm_mmu_rmaps_stat_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
+{
+	struct kvm *kvm = inode->i_private;
+
+	kvm_put_kvm(kvm);
+
+	return single_release(inode, file);
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations mmu_rmaps_stat_fops = {
+	.open		= kvm_mmu_rmaps_stat_open,
+	.read		= seq_read,
+	.llseek		= seq_lseek,
+	.release	= kvm_mmu_rmaps_stat_release,
+};
+
+int kvm_arch_create_vm_debugfs(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+	debugfs_create_file("mmu_rmaps_stat", 0644, kvm->debugfs_dentry, kvm,
+			    &mmu_rmaps_stat_fops);
+	return 0;
+}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c b/arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..2673cd5c4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c
@@ -0,0 +1,5508 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/******************************************************************************
+ * emulate.c
+ *
+ * Generic x86 (32-bit and 64-bit) instruction decoder and emulator.
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 2005 Keir Fraser
+ *
+ * Linux coding style, mod r/m decoder, segment base fixes, real-mode
+ * privileged instructions:
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2006 Qumranet
+ * Copyright 2010 Red Hat, Inc. and/or its affiliates.
+ *
+ *   Avi Kivity <avi@qumranet.com>
+ *   Yaniv Kamay <yaniv@qumranet.com>
+ *
+ * From: xen-unstable 10676:af9809f51f81a3c43f276f00c81a52ef558afda4
+ */
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
+
+#include <linux/kvm_host.h>
+#include "kvm_cache_regs.h"
+#include "kvm_emulate.h"
+#include <linux/stringify.h>
+#include <asm/debugreg.h>
+#include <asm/nospec-branch.h>
+#include <asm/ibt.h>
+
+#include "x86.h"
+#include "tss.h"
+#include "mmu.h"
+#include "pmu.h"
+
+/*
+ * Operand types
+ */
+#define OpNone             0ull
+#define OpImplicit         1ull  /* No generic decode */
+#define OpReg              2ull  /* Register */
+#define OpMem              3ull  /* Memory */
+#define OpAcc              4ull  /* Accumulator: AL/AX/EAX/RAX */
+#define OpDI               5ull  /* ES:DI/EDI/RDI */
+#define OpMem64            6ull  /* Memory, 64-bit */
+#define OpImmUByte         7ull  /* Zero-extended 8-bit immediate */
+#define OpDX               8ull  /* DX register */
+#define OpCL               9ull  /* CL register (for shifts) */
+#define OpImmByte         10ull  /* 8-bit sign extended immediate */
+#define OpOne             11ull  /* Implied 1 */
+#define OpImm             12ull  /* Sign extended up to 32-bit immediate */
+#define OpMem16           13ull  /* Memory operand (16-bit). */
+#define OpMem32           14ull  /* Memory operand (32-bit). */
+#define OpImmU            15ull  /* Immediate operand, zero extended */
+#define OpSI              16ull  /* SI/ESI/RSI */
+#define OpImmFAddr        17ull  /* Immediate far address */
+#define OpMemFAddr        18ull  /* Far address in memory */
+#define OpImmU16          19ull  /* Immediate operand, 16 bits, zero extended */
+#define OpES              20ull  /* ES */
+#define OpCS              21ull  /* CS */
+#define OpSS              22ull  /* SS */
+#define OpDS              23ull  /* DS */
+#define OpFS              24ull  /* FS */
+#define OpGS              25ull  /* GS */
+#define OpMem8            26ull  /* 8-bit zero extended memory operand */
+#define OpImm64           27ull  /* Sign extended 16/32/64-bit immediate */
+#define OpXLat            28ull  /* memory at BX/EBX/RBX + zero-extended AL */
+#define OpAccLo           29ull  /* Low part of extended acc (AX/AX/EAX/RAX) */
+#define OpAccHi           30ull  /* High part of extended acc (-/DX/EDX/RDX) */
+
+#define OpBits             5  /* Width of operand field */
+#define OpMask             ((1ull << OpBits) - 1)
+
+/*
+ * Opcode effective-address decode tables.
+ * Note that we only emulate instructions that have at least one memory
+ * operand (excluding implicit stack references). We assume that stack
+ * references and instruction fetches will never occur in special memory
+ * areas that require emulation. So, for example, 'mov <imm>,<reg>' need
+ * not be handled.
+ */
+
+/* Operand sizes: 8-bit operands or specified/overridden size. */
+#define ByteOp      (1<<0)	/* 8-bit operands. */
+/* Destination operand type. */
+#define DstShift    1
+#define ImplicitOps (OpImplicit << DstShift)
+#define DstReg      (OpReg << DstShift)
+#define DstMem      (OpMem << DstShift)
+#define DstAcc      (OpAcc << DstShift)
+#define DstDI       (OpDI << DstShift)
+#define DstMem64    (OpMem64 << DstShift)
+#define DstMem16    (OpMem16 << DstShift)
+#define DstImmUByte (OpImmUByte << DstShift)
+#define DstDX       (OpDX << DstShift)
+#define DstAccLo    (OpAccLo << DstShift)
+#define DstMask     (OpMask << DstShift)
+/* Source operand type. */
+#define SrcShift    6
+#define SrcNone     (OpNone << SrcShift)
+#define SrcReg      (OpReg << SrcShift)
+#define SrcMem      (OpMem << SrcShift)
+#define SrcMem16    (OpMem16 << SrcShift)
+#define SrcMem32    (OpMem32 << SrcShift)
+#define SrcImm      (OpImm << SrcShift)
+#define SrcImmByte  (OpImmByte << SrcShift)
+#define SrcOne      (OpOne << SrcShift)
+#define SrcImmUByte (OpImmUByte << SrcShift)
+#define SrcImmU     (OpImmU << SrcShift)
+#define SrcSI       (OpSI << SrcShift)
+#define SrcXLat     (OpXLat << SrcShift)
+#define SrcImmFAddr (OpImmFAddr << SrcShift)
+#define SrcMemFAddr (OpMemFAddr << SrcShift)
+#define SrcAcc      (OpAcc << SrcShift)
+#define SrcImmU16   (OpImmU16 << SrcShift)
+#define SrcImm64    (OpImm64 << SrcShift)
+#define SrcDX       (OpDX << SrcShift)
+#define SrcMem8     (OpMem8 << SrcShift)
+#define SrcAccHi    (OpAccHi << SrcShift)
+#define SrcMask     (OpMask << SrcShift)
+#define BitOp       (1<<11)
+#define MemAbs      (1<<12)      /* Memory operand is absolute displacement */
+#define String      (1<<13)     /* String instruction (rep capable) */
+#define Stack       (1<<14)     /* Stack instruction (push/pop) */
+#define GroupMask   (7<<15)     /* Opcode uses one of the group mechanisms */
+#define Group       (1<<15)     /* Bits 3:5 of modrm byte extend opcode */
+#define GroupDual   (2<<15)     /* Alternate decoding of mod == 3 */
+#define Prefix      (3<<15)     /* Instruction varies with 66/f2/f3 prefix */
+#define RMExt       (4<<15)     /* Opcode extension in ModRM r/m if mod == 3 */
+#define Escape      (5<<15)     /* Escape to coprocessor instruction */
+#define InstrDual   (6<<15)     /* Alternate instruction decoding of mod == 3 */
+#define ModeDual    (7<<15)     /* Different instruction for 32/64 bit */
+#define Sse         (1<<18)     /* SSE Vector instruction */
+/* Generic ModRM decode. */
+#define ModRM       (1<<19)
+/* Destination is only written; never read. */
+#define Mov         (1<<20)
+/* Misc flags */
+#define Prot        (1<<21) /* instruction generates #UD if not in prot-mode */
+#define EmulateOnUD (1<<22) /* Emulate if unsupported by the host */
+#define NoAccess    (1<<23) /* Don't access memory (lea/invlpg/verr etc) */
+#define Op3264      (1<<24) /* Operand is 64b in long mode, 32b otherwise */
+#define Undefined   (1<<25) /* No Such Instruction */
+#define Lock        (1<<26) /* lock prefix is allowed for the instruction */
+#define Priv        (1<<27) /* instruction generates #GP if current CPL != 0 */
+#define No64	    (1<<28)
+#define PageTable   (1 << 29)   /* instruction used to write page table */
+#define NotImpl     (1 << 30)   /* instruction is not implemented */
+/* Source 2 operand type */
+#define Src2Shift   (31)
+#define Src2None    (OpNone << Src2Shift)
+#define Src2Mem     (OpMem << Src2Shift)
+#define Src2CL      (OpCL << Src2Shift)
+#define Src2ImmByte (OpImmByte << Src2Shift)
+#define Src2One     (OpOne << Src2Shift)
+#define Src2Imm     (OpImm << Src2Shift)
+#define Src2ES      (OpES << Src2Shift)
+#define Src2CS      (OpCS << Src2Shift)
+#define Src2SS      (OpSS << Src2Shift)
+#define Src2DS      (OpDS << Src2Shift)
+#define Src2FS      (OpFS << Src2Shift)
+#define Src2GS      (OpGS << Src2Shift)
+#define Src2Mask    (OpMask << Src2Shift)
+#define Mmx         ((u64)1 << 40)  /* MMX Vector instruction */
+#define AlignMask   ((u64)7 << 41)
+#define Aligned     ((u64)1 << 41)  /* Explicitly aligned (e.g. MOVDQA) */
+#define Unaligned   ((u64)2 << 41)  /* Explicitly unaligned (e.g. MOVDQU) */
+#define Avx         ((u64)3 << 41)  /* Advanced Vector Extensions */
+#define Aligned16   ((u64)4 << 41)  /* Aligned to 16 byte boundary (e.g. FXSAVE) */
+#define Fastop      ((u64)1 << 44)  /* Use opcode::u.fastop */
+#define NoWrite     ((u64)1 << 45)  /* No writeback */
+#define SrcWrite    ((u64)1 << 46)  /* Write back src operand */
+#define NoMod	    ((u64)1 << 47)  /* Mod field is ignored */
+#define Intercept   ((u64)1 << 48)  /* Has valid intercept field */
+#define CheckPerm   ((u64)1 << 49)  /* Has valid check_perm field */
+#define PrivUD      ((u64)1 << 51)  /* #UD instead of #GP on CPL > 0 */
+#define NearBranch  ((u64)1 << 52)  /* Near branches */
+#define No16	    ((u64)1 << 53)  /* No 16 bit operand */
+#define IncSP       ((u64)1 << 54)  /* SP is incremented before ModRM calc */
+#define TwoMemOp    ((u64)1 << 55)  /* Instruction has two memory operand */
+#define IsBranch    ((u64)1 << 56)  /* Instruction is considered a branch. */
+
+#define DstXacc     (DstAccLo | SrcAccHi | SrcWrite)
+
+#define X2(x...) x, x
+#define X3(x...) X2(x), x
+#define X4(x...) X2(x), X2(x)
+#define X5(x...) X4(x), x
+#define X6(x...) X4(x), X2(x)
+#define X7(x...) X4(x), X3(x)
+#define X8(x...) X4(x), X4(x)
+#define X16(x...) X8(x), X8(x)
+
+struct opcode {
+	u64 flags;
+	u8 intercept;
+	u8 pad[7];
+	union {
+		int (*execute)(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt);
+		const struct opcode *group;
+		const struct group_dual *gdual;
+		const struct gprefix *gprefix;
+		const struct escape *esc;
+		const struct instr_dual *idual;
+		const struct mode_dual *mdual;
+		void (*fastop)(struct fastop *fake);
+	} u;
+	int (*check_perm)(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt);
+};
+
+struct group_dual {
+	struct opcode mod012[8];
+	struct opcode mod3[8];
+};
+
+struct gprefix {
+	struct opcode pfx_no;
+	struct opcode pfx_66;
+	struct opcode pfx_f2;
+	struct opcode pfx_f3;
+};
+
+struct escape {
+	struct opcode op[8];
+	struct opcode high[64];
+};
+
+struct instr_dual {
+	struct opcode mod012;
+	struct opcode mod3;
+};
+
+struct mode_dual {
+	struct opcode mode32;
+	struct opcode mode64;
+};
+
+#define EFLG_RESERVED_ZEROS_MASK 0xffc0802a
+
+enum x86_transfer_type {
+	X86_TRANSFER_NONE,
+	X86_TRANSFER_CALL_JMP,
+	X86_TRANSFER_RET,
+	X86_TRANSFER_TASK_SWITCH,
+};
+
+static void writeback_registers(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
+{
+	unsigned long dirty = ctxt->regs_dirty;
+	unsigned reg;
+
+	for_each_set_bit(reg, &dirty, NR_EMULATOR_GPRS)
+		ctxt->ops->write_gpr(ctxt, reg, ctxt->_regs[reg]);
+}
+
+static void invalidate_registers(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
+{
+	ctxt->regs_dirty = 0;
+	ctxt->regs_valid = 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * These EFLAGS bits are restored from saved value during emulation, and
+ * any changes are written back to the saved value after emulation.
+ */
+#define EFLAGS_MASK (X86_EFLAGS_OF|X86_EFLAGS_SF|X86_EFLAGS_ZF|X86_EFLAGS_AF|\
+		     X86_EFLAGS_PF|X86_EFLAGS_CF)
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+#define ON64(x) x
+#else
+#define ON64(x)
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * fastop functions have a special calling convention:
+ *
+ * dst:    rax        (in/out)
+ * src:    rdx        (in/out)
+ * src2:   rcx        (in)
+ * flags:  rflags     (in/out)
+ * ex:     rsi        (in:fastop pointer, out:zero if exception)
+ *
+ * Moreover, they are all exactly FASTOP_SIZE bytes long, so functions for
+ * different operand sizes can be reached by calculation, rather than a jump
+ * table (which would be bigger than the code).
+ *
+ * The 16 byte alignment, considering 5 bytes for the RET thunk, 3 for ENDBR
+ * and 1 for the straight line speculation INT3, leaves 7 bytes for the
+ * body of the function.  Currently none is larger than 4.
+ */
+static int fastop(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, fastop_t fop);
+
+#define FASTOP_SIZE	16
+
+#define __FOP_FUNC(name) \
+	".align " __stringify(FASTOP_SIZE) " \n\t" \
+	".type " name ", @function \n\t" \
+	name ":\n\t" \
+	ASM_ENDBR \
+	IBT_NOSEAL(name)
+
+#define FOP_FUNC(name) \
+	__FOP_FUNC(#name)
+
+#define __FOP_RET(name) \
+	"11: " ASM_RET \
+	".size " name ", .-" name "\n\t"
+
+#define FOP_RET(name) \
+	__FOP_RET(#name)
+
+#define __FOP_START(op, align) \
+	extern void em_##op(struct fastop *fake); \
+	asm(".pushsection .text, \"ax\" \n\t" \
+	    ".global em_" #op " \n\t" \
+	    ".align " __stringify(align) " \n\t" \
+	    "em_" #op ":\n\t"
+
+#define FOP_START(op) __FOP_START(op, FASTOP_SIZE)
+
+#define FOP_END \
+	    ".popsection")
+
+#define __FOPNOP(name) \
+	__FOP_FUNC(name) \
+	__FOP_RET(name)
+
+#define FOPNOP() \
+	__FOPNOP(__stringify(__UNIQUE_ID(nop)))
+
+#define FOP1E(op,  dst) \
+	__FOP_FUNC(#op "_" #dst) \
+	"10: " #op " %" #dst " \n\t" \
+	__FOP_RET(#op "_" #dst)
+
+#define FOP1EEX(op,  dst) \
+	FOP1E(op, dst) _ASM_EXTABLE_TYPE_REG(10b, 11b, EX_TYPE_ZERO_REG, %%esi)
+
+#define FASTOP1(op) \
+	FOP_START(op) \
+	FOP1E(op##b, al) \
+	FOP1E(op##w, ax) \
+	FOP1E(op##l, eax) \
+	ON64(FOP1E(op##q, rax))	\
+	FOP_END
+
+/* 1-operand, using src2 (for MUL/DIV r/m) */
+#define FASTOP1SRC2(op, name) \
+	FOP_START(name) \
+	FOP1E(op, cl) \
+	FOP1E(op, cx) \
+	FOP1E(op, ecx) \
+	ON64(FOP1E(op, rcx)) \
+	FOP_END
+
+/* 1-operand, using src2 (for MUL/DIV r/m), with exceptions */
+#define FASTOP1SRC2EX(op, name) \
+	FOP_START(name) \
+	FOP1EEX(op, cl) \
+	FOP1EEX(op, cx) \
+	FOP1EEX(op, ecx) \
+	ON64(FOP1EEX(op, rcx)) \
+	FOP_END
+
+#define FOP2E(op,  dst, src)	   \
+	__FOP_FUNC(#op "_" #dst "_" #src) \
+	#op " %" #src ", %" #dst " \n\t" \
+	__FOP_RET(#op "_" #dst "_" #src)
+
+#define FASTOP2(op) \
+	FOP_START(op) \
+	FOP2E(op##b, al, dl) \
+	FOP2E(op##w, ax, dx) \
+	FOP2E(op##l, eax, edx) \
+	ON64(FOP2E(op##q, rax, rdx)) \
+	FOP_END
+
+/* 2 operand, word only */
+#define FASTOP2W(op) \
+	FOP_START(op) \
+	FOPNOP() \
+	FOP2E(op##w, ax, dx) \
+	FOP2E(op##l, eax, edx) \
+	ON64(FOP2E(op##q, rax, rdx)) \
+	FOP_END
+
+/* 2 operand, src is CL */
+#define FASTOP2CL(op) \
+	FOP_START(op) \
+	FOP2E(op##b, al, cl) \
+	FOP2E(op##w, ax, cl) \
+	FOP2E(op##l, eax, cl) \
+	ON64(FOP2E(op##q, rax, cl)) \
+	FOP_END
+
+/* 2 operand, src and dest are reversed */
+#define FASTOP2R(op, name) \
+	FOP_START(name) \
+	FOP2E(op##b, dl, al) \
+	FOP2E(op##w, dx, ax) \
+	FOP2E(op##l, edx, eax) \
+	ON64(FOP2E(op##q, rdx, rax)) \
+	FOP_END
+
+#define FOP3E(op,  dst, src, src2) \
+	__FOP_FUNC(#op "_" #dst "_" #src "_" #src2) \
+	#op " %" #src2 ", %" #src ", %" #dst " \n\t"\
+	__FOP_RET(#op "_" #dst "_" #src "_" #src2)
+
+/* 3-operand, word-only, src2=cl */
+#define FASTOP3WCL(op) \
+	FOP_START(op) \
+	FOPNOP() \
+	FOP3E(op##w, ax, dx, cl) \
+	FOP3E(op##l, eax, edx, cl) \
+	ON64(FOP3E(op##q, rax, rdx, cl)) \
+	FOP_END
+
+/* Special case for SETcc - 1 instruction per cc */
+#define FOP_SETCC(op) \
+	FOP_FUNC(op) \
+	#op " %al \n\t" \
+	FOP_RET(op)
+
+FOP_START(setcc)
+FOP_SETCC(seto)
+FOP_SETCC(setno)
+FOP_SETCC(setc)
+FOP_SETCC(setnc)
+FOP_SETCC(setz)
+FOP_SETCC(setnz)
+FOP_SETCC(setbe)
+FOP_SETCC(setnbe)
+FOP_SETCC(sets)
+FOP_SETCC(setns)
+FOP_SETCC(setp)
+FOP_SETCC(setnp)
+FOP_SETCC(setl)
+FOP_SETCC(setnl)
+FOP_SETCC(setle)
+FOP_SETCC(setnle)
+FOP_END;
+
+FOP_START(salc)
+FOP_FUNC(salc)
+"pushf; sbb %al, %al; popf \n\t"
+FOP_RET(salc)
+FOP_END;
+
+/*
+ * XXX: inoutclob user must know where the argument is being expanded.
+ *      Using asm goto would allow us to remove _fault.
+ */
+#define asm_safe(insn, inoutclob...) \
+({ \
+	int _fault = 0; \
+ \
+	asm volatile("1:" insn "\n" \
+	             "2:\n" \
+		     _ASM_EXTABLE_TYPE_REG(1b, 2b, EX_TYPE_ONE_REG, %[_fault]) \
+	             : [_fault] "+r"(_fault) inoutclob ); \
+ \
+	_fault ? X86EMUL_UNHANDLEABLE : X86EMUL_CONTINUE; \
+})
+
+static int emulator_check_intercept(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt,
+				    enum x86_intercept intercept,
+				    enum x86_intercept_stage stage)
+{
+	struct x86_instruction_info info = {
+		.intercept  = intercept,
+		.rep_prefix = ctxt->rep_prefix,
+		.modrm_mod  = ctxt->modrm_mod,
+		.modrm_reg  = ctxt->modrm_reg,
+		.modrm_rm   = ctxt->modrm_rm,
+		.src_val    = ctxt->src.val64,
+		.dst_val    = ctxt->dst.val64,
+		.src_bytes  = ctxt->src.bytes,
+		.dst_bytes  = ctxt->dst.bytes,
+		.ad_bytes   = ctxt->ad_bytes,
+		.next_rip   = ctxt->eip,
+	};
+
+	return ctxt->ops->intercept(ctxt, &info, stage);
+}
+
+static void assign_masked(ulong *dest, ulong src, ulong mask)
+{
+	*dest = (*dest & ~mask) | (src & mask);
+}
+
+static void assign_register(unsigned long *reg, u64 val, int bytes)
+{
+	/* The 4-byte case *is* correct: in 64-bit mode we zero-extend. */
+	switch (bytes) {
+	case 1:
+		*(u8 *)reg = (u8)val;
+		break;
+	case 2:
+		*(u16 *)reg = (u16)val;
+		break;
+	case 4:
+		*reg = (u32)val;
+		break;	/* 64b: zero-extend */
+	case 8:
+		*reg = val;
+		break;
+	}
+}
+
+static inline unsigned long ad_mask(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
+{
+	return (1UL << (ctxt->ad_bytes << 3)) - 1;
+}
+
+static ulong stack_mask(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
+{
+	u16 sel;
+	struct desc_struct ss;
+
+	if (ctxt->mode == X86EMUL_MODE_PROT64)
+		return ~0UL;
+	ctxt->ops->get_segment(ctxt, &sel, &ss, NULL, VCPU_SREG_SS);
+	return ~0U >> ((ss.d ^ 1) * 16);  /* d=0: 0xffff; d=1: 0xffffffff */
+}
+
+static int stack_size(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
+{
+	return (__fls(stack_mask(ctxt)) + 1) >> 3;
+}
+
+/* Access/update address held in a register, based on addressing mode. */
+static inline unsigned long
+address_mask(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, unsigned long reg)
+{
+	if (ctxt->ad_bytes == sizeof(unsigned long))
+		return reg;
+	else
+		return reg & ad_mask(ctxt);
+}
+
+static inline unsigned long
+register_address(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, int reg)
+{
+	return address_mask(ctxt, reg_read(ctxt, reg));
+}
+
+static void masked_increment(ulong *reg, ulong mask, int inc)
+{
+	assign_masked(reg, *reg + inc, mask);
+}
+
+static inline void
+register_address_increment(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, int reg, int inc)
+{
+	ulong *preg = reg_rmw(ctxt, reg);
+
+	assign_register(preg, *preg + inc, ctxt->ad_bytes);
+}
+
+static void rsp_increment(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, int inc)
+{
+	masked_increment(reg_rmw(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RSP), stack_mask(ctxt), inc);
+}
+
+static u32 desc_limit_scaled(struct desc_struct *desc)
+{
+	u32 limit = get_desc_limit(desc);
+
+	return desc->g ? (limit << 12) | 0xfff : limit;
+}
+
+static unsigned long seg_base(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, int seg)
+{
+	if (ctxt->mode == X86EMUL_MODE_PROT64 && seg < VCPU_SREG_FS)
+		return 0;
+
+	return ctxt->ops->get_cached_segment_base(ctxt, seg);
+}
+
+static int emulate_exception(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, int vec,
+			     u32 error, bool valid)
+{
+	if (KVM_EMULATOR_BUG_ON(vec > 0x1f, ctxt))
+		return X86EMUL_UNHANDLEABLE;
+
+	ctxt->exception.vector = vec;
+	ctxt->exception.error_code = error;
+	ctxt->exception.error_code_valid = valid;
+	return X86EMUL_PROPAGATE_FAULT;
+}
+
+static int emulate_db(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
+{
+	return emulate_exception(ctxt, DB_VECTOR, 0, false);
+}
+
+static int emulate_gp(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, int err)
+{
+	return emulate_exception(ctxt, GP_VECTOR, err, true);
+}
+
+static int emulate_ss(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, int err)
+{
+	return emulate_exception(ctxt, SS_VECTOR, err, true);
+}
+
+static int emulate_ud(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
+{
+	return emulate_exception(ctxt, UD_VECTOR, 0, false);
+}
+
+static int emulate_ts(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, int err)
+{
+	return emulate_exception(ctxt, TS_VECTOR, err, true);
+}
+
+static int emulate_de(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
+{
+	return emulate_exception(ctxt, DE_VECTOR, 0, false);
+}
+
+static int emulate_nm(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
+{
+	return emulate_exception(ctxt, NM_VECTOR, 0, false);
+}
+
+static u16 get_segment_selector(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, unsigned seg)
+{
+	u16 selector;
+	struct desc_struct desc;
+
+	ctxt->ops->get_segment(ctxt, &selector, &desc, NULL, seg);
+	return selector;
+}
+
+static void set_segment_selector(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, u16 selector,
+				 unsigned seg)
+{
+	u16 dummy;
+	u32 base3;
+	struct desc_struct desc;
+
+	ctxt->ops->get_segment(ctxt, &dummy, &desc, &base3, seg);
+	ctxt->ops->set_segment(ctxt, selector, &desc, base3, seg);
+}
+
+static inline u8 ctxt_virt_addr_bits(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
+{
+	return (ctxt->ops->get_cr(ctxt, 4) & X86_CR4_LA57) ? 57 : 48;
+}
+
+static inline bool emul_is_noncanonical_address(u64 la,
+						struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
+{
+	return !__is_canonical_address(la, ctxt_virt_addr_bits(ctxt));
+}
+
+/*
+ * x86 defines three classes of vector instructions: explicitly
+ * aligned, explicitly unaligned, and the rest, which change behaviour
+ * depending on whether they're AVX encoded or not.
+ *
+ * Also included is CMPXCHG16B which is not a vector instruction, yet it is
+ * subject to the same check.  FXSAVE and FXRSTOR are checked here too as their
+ * 512 bytes of data must be aligned to a 16 byte boundary.
+ */
+static unsigned insn_alignment(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, unsigned size)
+{
+	u64 alignment = ctxt->d & AlignMask;
+
+	if (likely(size < 16))
+		return 1;
+
+	switch (alignment) {
+	case Unaligned:
+	case Avx:
+		return 1;
+	case Aligned16:
+		return 16;
+	case Aligned:
+	default:
+		return size;
+	}
+}
+
+static __always_inline int __linearize(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt,
+				       struct segmented_address addr,
+				       unsigned *max_size, unsigned size,
+				       bool write, bool fetch,
+				       enum x86emul_mode mode, ulong *linear)
+{
+	struct desc_struct desc;
+	bool usable;
+	ulong la;
+	u32 lim;
+	u16 sel;
+	u8  va_bits;
+
+	la = seg_base(ctxt, addr.seg) + addr.ea;
+	*max_size = 0;
+	switch (mode) {
+	case X86EMUL_MODE_PROT64:
+		*linear = la;
+		va_bits = ctxt_virt_addr_bits(ctxt);
+		if (!__is_canonical_address(la, va_bits))
+			goto bad;
+
+		*max_size = min_t(u64, ~0u, (1ull << va_bits) - la);
+		if (size > *max_size)
+			goto bad;
+		break;
+	default:
+		*linear = la = (u32)la;
+		usable = ctxt->ops->get_segment(ctxt, &sel, &desc, NULL,
+						addr.seg);
+		if (!usable)
+			goto bad;
+		/* code segment in protected mode or read-only data segment */
+		if ((((ctxt->mode != X86EMUL_MODE_REAL) && (desc.type & 8))
+					|| !(desc.type & 2)) && write)
+			goto bad;
+		/* unreadable code segment */
+		if (!fetch && (desc.type & 8) && !(desc.type & 2))
+			goto bad;
+		lim = desc_limit_scaled(&desc);
+		if (!(desc.type & 8) && (desc.type & 4)) {
+			/* expand-down segment */
+			if (addr.ea <= lim)
+				goto bad;
+			lim = desc.d ? 0xffffffff : 0xffff;
+		}
+		if (addr.ea > lim)
+			goto bad;
+		if (lim == 0xffffffff)
+			*max_size = ~0u;
+		else {
+			*max_size = (u64)lim + 1 - addr.ea;
+			if (size > *max_size)
+				goto bad;
+		}
+		break;
+	}
+	if (la & (insn_alignment(ctxt, size) - 1))
+		return emulate_gp(ctxt, 0);
+	return X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
+bad:
+	if (addr.seg == VCPU_SREG_SS)
+		return emulate_ss(ctxt, 0);
+	else
+		return emulate_gp(ctxt, 0);
+}
+
+static int linearize(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt,
+		     struct segmented_address addr,
+		     unsigned size, bool write,
+		     ulong *linear)
+{
+	unsigned max_size;
+	return __linearize(ctxt, addr, &max_size, size, write, false,
+			   ctxt->mode, linear);
+}
+
+static inline int assign_eip(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, ulong dst)
+{
+	ulong linear;
+	int rc;
+	unsigned max_size;
+	struct segmented_address addr = { .seg = VCPU_SREG_CS,
+					   .ea = dst };
+
+	if (ctxt->op_bytes != sizeof(unsigned long))
+		addr.ea = dst & ((1UL << (ctxt->op_bytes << 3)) - 1);
+	rc = __linearize(ctxt, addr, &max_size, 1, false, true, ctxt->mode, &linear);
+	if (rc == X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
+		ctxt->_eip = addr.ea;
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static inline int emulator_recalc_and_set_mode(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
+{
+	u64 efer;
+	struct desc_struct cs;
+	u16 selector;
+	u32 base3;
+
+	ctxt->ops->get_msr(ctxt, MSR_EFER, &efer);
+
+	if (!(ctxt->ops->get_cr(ctxt, 0) & X86_CR0_PE)) {
+		/* Real mode. cpu must not have long mode active */
+		if (efer & EFER_LMA)
+			return X86EMUL_UNHANDLEABLE;
+		ctxt->mode = X86EMUL_MODE_REAL;
+		return X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
+	}
+
+	if (ctxt->eflags & X86_EFLAGS_VM) {
+		/* Protected/VM86 mode. cpu must not have long mode active */
+		if (efer & EFER_LMA)
+			return X86EMUL_UNHANDLEABLE;
+		ctxt->mode = X86EMUL_MODE_VM86;
+		return X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
+	}
+
+	if (!ctxt->ops->get_segment(ctxt, &selector, &cs, &base3, VCPU_SREG_CS))
+		return X86EMUL_UNHANDLEABLE;
+
+	if (efer & EFER_LMA) {
+		if (cs.l) {
+			/* Proper long mode */
+			ctxt->mode = X86EMUL_MODE_PROT64;
+		} else if (cs.d) {
+			/* 32 bit compatibility mode*/
+			ctxt->mode = X86EMUL_MODE_PROT32;
+		} else {
+			ctxt->mode = X86EMUL_MODE_PROT16;
+		}
+	} else {
+		/* Legacy 32 bit / 16 bit mode */
+		ctxt->mode = cs.d ? X86EMUL_MODE_PROT32 : X86EMUL_MODE_PROT16;
+	}
+
+	return X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
+}
+
+static inline int assign_eip_near(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, ulong dst)
+{
+	return assign_eip(ctxt, dst);
+}
+
+static int assign_eip_far(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, ulong dst)
+{
+	int rc = emulator_recalc_and_set_mode(ctxt);
+
+	if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
+		return rc;
+
+	return assign_eip(ctxt, dst);
+}
+
+static inline int jmp_rel(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, int rel)
+{
+	return assign_eip_near(ctxt, ctxt->_eip + rel);
+}
+
+static int linear_read_system(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, ulong linear,
+			      void *data, unsigned size)
+{
+	return ctxt->ops->read_std(ctxt, linear, data, size, &ctxt->exception, true);
+}
+
+static int linear_write_system(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt,
+			       ulong linear, void *data,
+			       unsigned int size)
+{
+	return ctxt->ops->write_std(ctxt, linear, data, size, &ctxt->exception, true);
+}
+
+static int segmented_read_std(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt,
+			      struct segmented_address addr,
+			      void *data,
+			      unsigned size)
+{
+	int rc;
+	ulong linear;
+
+	rc = linearize(ctxt, addr, size, false, &linear);
+	if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
+		return rc;
+	return ctxt->ops->read_std(ctxt, linear, data, size, &ctxt->exception, false);
+}
+
+static int segmented_write_std(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt,
+			       struct segmented_address addr,
+			       void *data,
+			       unsigned int size)
+{
+	int rc;
+	ulong linear;
+
+	rc = linearize(ctxt, addr, size, true, &linear);
+	if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
+		return rc;
+	return ctxt->ops->write_std(ctxt, linear, data, size, &ctxt->exception, false);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Prefetch the remaining bytes of the instruction without crossing page
+ * boundary if they are not in fetch_cache yet.
+ */
+static int __do_insn_fetch_bytes(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, int op_size)
+{
+	int rc;
+	unsigned size, max_size;
+	unsigned long linear;
+	int cur_size = ctxt->fetch.end - ctxt->fetch.data;
+	struct segmented_address addr = { .seg = VCPU_SREG_CS,
+					   .ea = ctxt->eip + cur_size };
+
+	/*
+	 * We do not know exactly how many bytes will be needed, and
+	 * __linearize is expensive, so fetch as much as possible.  We
+	 * just have to avoid going beyond the 15 byte limit, the end
+	 * of the segment, or the end of the page.
+	 *
+	 * __linearize is called with size 0 so that it does not do any
+	 * boundary check itself.  Instead, we use max_size to check
+	 * against op_size.
+	 */
+	rc = __linearize(ctxt, addr, &max_size, 0, false, true, ctxt->mode,
+			 &linear);
+	if (unlikely(rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE))
+		return rc;
+
+	size = min_t(unsigned, 15UL ^ cur_size, max_size);
+	size = min_t(unsigned, size, PAGE_SIZE - offset_in_page(linear));
+
+	/*
+	 * One instruction can only straddle two pages,
+	 * and one has been loaded at the beginning of
+	 * x86_decode_insn.  So, if not enough bytes
+	 * still, we must have hit the 15-byte boundary.
+	 */
+	if (unlikely(size < op_size))
+		return emulate_gp(ctxt, 0);
+
+	rc = ctxt->ops->fetch(ctxt, linear, ctxt->fetch.end,
+			      size, &ctxt->exception);
+	if (unlikely(rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE))
+		return rc;
+	ctxt->fetch.end += size;
+	return X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
+}
+
+static __always_inline int do_insn_fetch_bytes(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt,
+					       unsigned size)
+{
+	unsigned done_size = ctxt->fetch.end - ctxt->fetch.ptr;
+
+	if (unlikely(done_size < size))
+		return __do_insn_fetch_bytes(ctxt, size - done_size);
+	else
+		return X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
+}
+
+/* Fetch next part of the instruction being emulated. */
+#define insn_fetch(_type, _ctxt)					\
+({	_type _x;							\
+									\
+	rc = do_insn_fetch_bytes(_ctxt, sizeof(_type));			\
+	if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)					\
+		goto done;						\
+	ctxt->_eip += sizeof(_type);					\
+	memcpy(&_x, ctxt->fetch.ptr, sizeof(_type));			\
+	ctxt->fetch.ptr += sizeof(_type);				\
+	_x;								\
+})
+
+#define insn_fetch_arr(_arr, _size, _ctxt)				\
+({									\
+	rc = do_insn_fetch_bytes(_ctxt, _size);				\
+	if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)					\
+		goto done;						\
+	ctxt->_eip += (_size);						\
+	memcpy(_arr, ctxt->fetch.ptr, _size);				\
+	ctxt->fetch.ptr += (_size);					\
+})
+
+/*
+ * Given the 'reg' portion of a ModRM byte, and a register block, return a
+ * pointer into the block that addresses the relevant register.
+ * @highbyte_regs specifies whether to decode AH,CH,DH,BH.
+ */
+static void *decode_register(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, u8 modrm_reg,
+			     int byteop)
+{
+	void *p;
+	int highbyte_regs = (ctxt->rex_prefix == 0) && byteop;
+
+	if (highbyte_regs && modrm_reg >= 4 && modrm_reg < 8)
+		p = (unsigned char *)reg_rmw(ctxt, modrm_reg & 3) + 1;
+	else
+		p = reg_rmw(ctxt, modrm_reg);
+	return p;
+}
+
+static int read_descriptor(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt,
+			   struct segmented_address addr,
+			   u16 *size, unsigned long *address, int op_bytes)
+{
+	int rc;
+
+	if (op_bytes == 2)
+		op_bytes = 3;
+	*address = 0;
+	rc = segmented_read_std(ctxt, addr, size, 2);
+	if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
+		return rc;
+	addr.ea += 2;
+	rc = segmented_read_std(ctxt, addr, address, op_bytes);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+FASTOP2(add);
+FASTOP2(or);
+FASTOP2(adc);
+FASTOP2(sbb);
+FASTOP2(and);
+FASTOP2(sub);
+FASTOP2(xor);
+FASTOP2(cmp);
+FASTOP2(test);
+
+FASTOP1SRC2(mul, mul_ex);
+FASTOP1SRC2(imul, imul_ex);
+FASTOP1SRC2EX(div, div_ex);
+FASTOP1SRC2EX(idiv, idiv_ex);
+
+FASTOP3WCL(shld);
+FASTOP3WCL(shrd);
+
+FASTOP2W(imul);
+
+FASTOP1(not);
+FASTOP1(neg);
+FASTOP1(inc);
+FASTOP1(dec);
+
+FASTOP2CL(rol);
+FASTOP2CL(ror);
+FASTOP2CL(rcl);
+FASTOP2CL(rcr);
+FASTOP2CL(shl);
+FASTOP2CL(shr);
+FASTOP2CL(sar);
+
+FASTOP2W(bsf);
+FASTOP2W(bsr);
+FASTOP2W(bt);
+FASTOP2W(bts);
+FASTOP2W(btr);
+FASTOP2W(btc);
+
+FASTOP2(xadd);
+
+FASTOP2R(cmp, cmp_r);
+
+static int em_bsf_c(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
+{
+	/* If src is zero, do not writeback, but update flags */
+	if (ctxt->src.val == 0)
+		ctxt->dst.type = OP_NONE;
+	return fastop(ctxt, em_bsf);
+}
+
+static int em_bsr_c(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
+{
+	/* If src is zero, do not writeback, but update flags */
+	if (ctxt->src.val == 0)
+		ctxt->dst.type = OP_NONE;
+	return fastop(ctxt, em_bsr);
+}
+
+static __always_inline u8 test_cc(unsigned int condition, unsigned long flags)
+{
+	u8 rc;
+	void (*fop)(void) = (void *)em_setcc + FASTOP_SIZE * (condition & 0xf);
+
+	flags = (flags & EFLAGS_MASK) | X86_EFLAGS_IF;
+	asm("push %[flags]; popf; " CALL_NOSPEC
+	    : "=a"(rc) : [thunk_target]"r"(fop), [flags]"r"(flags));
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static void fetch_register_operand(struct operand *op)
+{
+	switch (op->bytes) {
+	case 1:
+		op->val = *(u8 *)op->addr.reg;
+		break;
+	case 2:
+		op->val = *(u16 *)op->addr.reg;
+		break;
+	case 4:
+		op->val = *(u32 *)op->addr.reg;
+		break;
+	case 8:
+		op->val = *(u64 *)op->addr.reg;
+		break;
+	}
+}
+
+static int em_fninit(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
+{
+	if (ctxt->ops->get_cr(ctxt, 0) & (X86_CR0_TS | X86_CR0_EM))
+		return emulate_nm(ctxt);
+
+	kvm_fpu_get();
+	asm volatile("fninit");
+	kvm_fpu_put();
+	return X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
+}
+
+static int em_fnstcw(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
+{
+	u16 fcw;
+
+	if (ctxt->ops->get_cr(ctxt, 0) & (X86_CR0_TS | X86_CR0_EM))
+		return emulate_nm(ctxt);
+
+	kvm_fpu_get();
+	asm volatile("fnstcw %0": "+m"(fcw));
+	kvm_fpu_put();
+
+	ctxt->dst.val = fcw;
+
+	return X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
+}
+
+static int em_fnstsw(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
+{
+	u16 fsw;
+
+	if (ctxt->ops->get_cr(ctxt, 0) & (X86_CR0_TS | X86_CR0_EM))
+		return emulate_nm(ctxt);
+
+	kvm_fpu_get();
+	asm volatile("fnstsw %0": "+m"(fsw));
+	kvm_fpu_put();
+
+	ctxt->dst.val = fsw;
+
+	return X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
+}
+
+static void decode_register_operand(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt,
+				    struct operand *op)
+{
+	unsigned int reg;
+
+	if (ctxt->d & ModRM)
+		reg = ctxt->modrm_reg;
+	else
+		reg = (ctxt->b & 7) | ((ctxt->rex_prefix & 1) << 3);
+
+	if (ctxt->d & Sse) {
+		op->type = OP_XMM;
+		op->bytes = 16;
+		op->addr.xmm = reg;
+		kvm_read_sse_reg(reg, &op->vec_val);
+		return;
+	}
+	if (ctxt->d & Mmx) {
+		reg &= 7;
+		op->type = OP_MM;
+		op->bytes = 8;
+		op->addr.mm = reg;
+		return;
+	}
+
+	op->type = OP_REG;
+	op->bytes = (ctxt->d & ByteOp) ? 1 : ctxt->op_bytes;
+	op->addr.reg = decode_register(ctxt, reg, ctxt->d & ByteOp);
+
+	fetch_register_operand(op);
+	op->orig_val = op->val;
+}
+
+static void adjust_modrm_seg(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, int base_reg)
+{
+	if (base_reg == VCPU_REGS_RSP || base_reg == VCPU_REGS_RBP)
+		ctxt->modrm_seg = VCPU_SREG_SS;
+}
+
+static int decode_modrm(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt,
+			struct operand *op)
+{
+	u8 sib;
+	int index_reg, base_reg, scale;
+	int rc = X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
+	ulong modrm_ea = 0;
+
+	ctxt->modrm_reg = ((ctxt->rex_prefix << 1) & 8); /* REX.R */
+	index_reg = (ctxt->rex_prefix << 2) & 8; /* REX.X */
+	base_reg = (ctxt->rex_prefix << 3) & 8; /* REX.B */
+
+	ctxt->modrm_mod = (ctxt->modrm & 0xc0) >> 6;
+	ctxt->modrm_reg |= (ctxt->modrm & 0x38) >> 3;
+	ctxt->modrm_rm = base_reg | (ctxt->modrm & 0x07);
+	ctxt->modrm_seg = VCPU_SREG_DS;
+
+	if (ctxt->modrm_mod == 3 || (ctxt->d & NoMod)) {
+		op->type = OP_REG;
+		op->bytes = (ctxt->d & ByteOp) ? 1 : ctxt->op_bytes;
+		op->addr.reg = decode_register(ctxt, ctxt->modrm_rm,
+				ctxt->d & ByteOp);
+		if (ctxt->d & Sse) {
+			op->type = OP_XMM;
+			op->bytes = 16;
+			op->addr.xmm = ctxt->modrm_rm;
+			kvm_read_sse_reg(ctxt->modrm_rm, &op->vec_val);
+			return rc;
+		}
+		if (ctxt->d & Mmx) {
+			op->type = OP_MM;
+			op->bytes = 8;
+			op->addr.mm = ctxt->modrm_rm & 7;
+			return rc;
+		}
+		fetch_register_operand(op);
+		return rc;
+	}
+
+	op->type = OP_MEM;
+
+	if (ctxt->ad_bytes == 2) {
+		unsigned bx = reg_read(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RBX);
+		unsigned bp = reg_read(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RBP);
+		unsigned si = reg_read(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RSI);
+		unsigned di = reg_read(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RDI);
+
+		/* 16-bit ModR/M decode. */
+		switch (ctxt->modrm_mod) {
+		case 0:
+			if (ctxt->modrm_rm == 6)
+				modrm_ea += insn_fetch(u16, ctxt);
+			break;
+		case 1:
+			modrm_ea += insn_fetch(s8, ctxt);
+			break;
+		case 2:
+			modrm_ea += insn_fetch(u16, ctxt);
+			break;
+		}
+		switch (ctxt->modrm_rm) {
+		case 0:
+			modrm_ea += bx + si;
+			break;
+		case 1:
+			modrm_ea += bx + di;
+			break;
+		case 2:
+			modrm_ea += bp + si;
+			break;
+		case 3:
+			modrm_ea += bp + di;
+			break;
+		case 4:
+			modrm_ea += si;
+			break;
+		case 5:
+			modrm_ea += di;
+			break;
+		case 6:
+			if (ctxt->modrm_mod != 0)
+				modrm_ea += bp;
+			break;
+		case 7:
+			modrm_ea += bx;
+			break;
+		}
+		if (ctxt->modrm_rm == 2 || ctxt->modrm_rm == 3 ||
+		    (ctxt->modrm_rm == 6 && ctxt->modrm_mod != 0))
+			ctxt->modrm_seg = VCPU_SREG_SS;
+		modrm_ea = (u16)modrm_ea;
+	} else {
+		/* 32/64-bit ModR/M decode. */
+		if ((ctxt->modrm_rm & 7) == 4) {
+			sib = insn_fetch(u8, ctxt);
+			index_reg |= (sib >> 3) & 7;
+			base_reg |= sib & 7;
+			scale = sib >> 6;
+
+			if ((base_reg & 7) == 5 && ctxt->modrm_mod == 0)
+				modrm_ea += insn_fetch(s32, ctxt);
+			else {
+				modrm_ea += reg_read(ctxt, base_reg);
+				adjust_modrm_seg(ctxt, base_reg);
+				/* Increment ESP on POP [ESP] */
+				if ((ctxt->d & IncSP) &&
+				    base_reg == VCPU_REGS_RSP)
+					modrm_ea += ctxt->op_bytes;
+			}
+			if (index_reg != 4)
+				modrm_ea += reg_read(ctxt, index_reg) << scale;
+		} else if ((ctxt->modrm_rm & 7) == 5 && ctxt->modrm_mod == 0) {
+			modrm_ea += insn_fetch(s32, ctxt);
+			if (ctxt->mode == X86EMUL_MODE_PROT64)
+				ctxt->rip_relative = 1;
+		} else {
+			base_reg = ctxt->modrm_rm;
+			modrm_ea += reg_read(ctxt, base_reg);
+			adjust_modrm_seg(ctxt, base_reg);
+		}
+		switch (ctxt->modrm_mod) {
+		case 1:
+			modrm_ea += insn_fetch(s8, ctxt);
+			break;
+		case 2:
+			modrm_ea += insn_fetch(s32, ctxt);
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+	op->addr.mem.ea = modrm_ea;
+	if (ctxt->ad_bytes != 8)
+		ctxt->memop.addr.mem.ea = (u32)ctxt->memop.addr.mem.ea;
+
+done:
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static int decode_abs(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt,
+		      struct operand *op)
+{
+	int rc = X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
+
+	op->type = OP_MEM;
+	switch (ctxt->ad_bytes) {
+	case 2:
+		op->addr.mem.ea = insn_fetch(u16, ctxt);
+		break;
+	case 4:
+		op->addr.mem.ea = insn_fetch(u32, ctxt);
+		break;
+	case 8:
+		op->addr.mem.ea = insn_fetch(u64, ctxt);
+		break;
+	}
+done:
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static void fetch_bit_operand(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
+{
+	long sv = 0, mask;
+
+	if (ctxt->dst.type == OP_MEM && ctxt->src.type == OP_REG) {
+		mask = ~((long)ctxt->dst.bytes * 8 - 1);
+
+		if (ctxt->src.bytes == 2)
+			sv = (s16)ctxt->src.val & (s16)mask;
+		else if (ctxt->src.bytes == 4)
+			sv = (s32)ctxt->src.val & (s32)mask;
+		else
+			sv = (s64)ctxt->src.val & (s64)mask;
+
+		ctxt->dst.addr.mem.ea = address_mask(ctxt,
+					   ctxt->dst.addr.mem.ea + (sv >> 3));
+	}
+
+	/* only subword offset */
+	ctxt->src.val &= (ctxt->dst.bytes << 3) - 1;
+}
+
+static int read_emulated(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt,
+			 unsigned long addr, void *dest, unsigned size)
+{
+	int rc;
+	struct read_cache *mc = &ctxt->mem_read;
+
+	if (mc->pos < mc->end)
+		goto read_cached;
+
+	if (KVM_EMULATOR_BUG_ON((mc->end + size) >= sizeof(mc->data), ctxt))
+		return X86EMUL_UNHANDLEABLE;
+
+	rc = ctxt->ops->read_emulated(ctxt, addr, mc->data + mc->end, size,
+				      &ctxt->exception);
+	if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
+		return rc;
+
+	mc->end += size;
+
+read_cached:
+	memcpy(dest, mc->data + mc->pos, size);
+	mc->pos += size;
+	return X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
+}
+
+static int segmented_read(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt,
+			  struct segmented_address addr,
+			  void *data,
+			  unsigned size)
+{
+	int rc;
+	ulong linear;
+
+	rc = linearize(ctxt, addr, size, false, &linear);
+	if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
+		return rc;
+	return read_emulated(ctxt, linear, data, size);
+}
+
+static int segmented_write(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt,
+			   struct segmented_address addr,
+			   const void *data,
+			   unsigned size)
+{
+	int rc;
+	ulong linear;
+
+	rc = linearize(ctxt, addr, size, true, &linear);
+	if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
+		return rc;
+	return ctxt->ops->write_emulated(ctxt, linear, data, size,
+					 &ctxt->exception);
+}
+
+static int segmented_cmpxchg(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt,
+			     struct segmented_address addr,
+			     const void *orig_data, const void *data,
+			     unsigned size)
+{
+	int rc;
+	ulong linear;
+
+	rc = linearize(ctxt, addr, size, true, &linear);
+	if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
+		return rc;
+	return ctxt->ops->cmpxchg_emulated(ctxt, linear, orig_data, data,
+					   size, &ctxt->exception);
+}
+
+static int pio_in_emulated(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt,
+			   unsigned int size, unsigned short port,
+			   void *dest)
+{
+	struct read_cache *rc = &ctxt->io_read;
+
+	if (rc->pos == rc->end) { /* refill pio read ahead */
+		unsigned int in_page, n;
+		unsigned int count = ctxt->rep_prefix ?
+			address_mask(ctxt, reg_read(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RCX)) : 1;
+		in_page = (ctxt->eflags & X86_EFLAGS_DF) ?
+			offset_in_page(reg_read(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RDI)) :
+			PAGE_SIZE - offset_in_page(reg_read(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RDI));
+		n = min3(in_page, (unsigned int)sizeof(rc->data) / size, count);
+		if (n == 0)
+			n = 1;
+		rc->pos = rc->end = 0;
+		if (!ctxt->ops->pio_in_emulated(ctxt, size, port, rc->data, n))
+			return 0;
+		rc->end = n * size;
+	}
+
+	if (ctxt->rep_prefix && (ctxt->d & String) &&
+	    !(ctxt->eflags & X86_EFLAGS_DF)) {
+		ctxt->dst.data = rc->data + rc->pos;
+		ctxt->dst.type = OP_MEM_STR;
+		ctxt->dst.count = (rc->end - rc->pos) / size;
+		rc->pos = rc->end;
+	} else {
+		memcpy(dest, rc->data + rc->pos, size);
+		rc->pos += size;
+	}
+	return 1;
+}
+
+static int read_interrupt_descriptor(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt,
+				     u16 index, struct desc_struct *desc)
+{
+	struct desc_ptr dt;
+	ulong addr;
+
+	ctxt->ops->get_idt(ctxt, &dt);
+
+	if (dt.size < index * 8 + 7)
+		return emulate_gp(ctxt, index << 3 | 0x2);
+
+	addr = dt.address + index * 8;
+	return linear_read_system(ctxt, addr, desc, sizeof(*desc));
+}
+
+static void get_descriptor_table_ptr(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt,
+				     u16 selector, struct desc_ptr *dt)
+{
+	const struct x86_emulate_ops *ops = ctxt->ops;
+	u32 base3 = 0;
+
+	if (selector & 1 << 2) {
+		struct desc_struct desc;
+		u16 sel;
+
+		memset(dt, 0, sizeof(*dt));
+		if (!ops->get_segment(ctxt, &sel, &desc, &base3,
+				      VCPU_SREG_LDTR))
+			return;
+
+		dt->size = desc_limit_scaled(&desc); /* what if limit > 65535? */
+		dt->address = get_desc_base(&desc) | ((u64)base3 << 32);
+	} else
+		ops->get_gdt(ctxt, dt);
+}
+
+static int get_descriptor_ptr(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt,
+			      u16 selector, ulong *desc_addr_p)
+{
+	struct desc_ptr dt;
+	u16 index = selector >> 3;
+	ulong addr;
+
+	get_descriptor_table_ptr(ctxt, selector, &dt);
+
+	if (dt.size < index * 8 + 7)
+		return emulate_gp(ctxt, selector & 0xfffc);
+
+	addr = dt.address + index * 8;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+	if (addr >> 32 != 0) {
+		u64 efer = 0;
+
+		ctxt->ops->get_msr(ctxt, MSR_EFER, &efer);
+		if (!(efer & EFER_LMA))
+			addr &= (u32)-1;
+	}
+#endif
+
+	*desc_addr_p = addr;
+	return X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
+}
+
+/* allowed just for 8 bytes segments */
+static int read_segment_descriptor(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt,
+				   u16 selector, struct desc_struct *desc,
+				   ulong *desc_addr_p)
+{
+	int rc;
+
+	rc = get_descriptor_ptr(ctxt, selector, desc_addr_p);
+	if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
+		return rc;
+
+	return linear_read_system(ctxt, *desc_addr_p, desc, sizeof(*desc));
+}
+
+/* allowed just for 8 bytes segments */
+static int write_segment_descriptor(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt,
+				    u16 selector, struct desc_struct *desc)
+{
+	int rc;
+	ulong addr;
+
+	rc = get_descriptor_ptr(ctxt, selector, &addr);
+	if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
+		return rc;
+
+	return linear_write_system(ctxt, addr, desc, sizeof(*desc));
+}
+
+static int __load_segment_descriptor(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt,
+				     u16 selector, int seg, u8 cpl,
+				     enum x86_transfer_type transfer,
+				     struct desc_struct *desc)
+{
+	struct desc_struct seg_desc, old_desc;
+	u8 dpl, rpl;
+	unsigned err_vec = GP_VECTOR;
+	u32 err_code = 0;
+	bool null_selector = !(selector & ~0x3); /* 0000-0003 are null */
+	ulong desc_addr;
+	int ret;
+	u16 dummy;
+	u32 base3 = 0;
+
+	memset(&seg_desc, 0, sizeof(seg_desc));
+
+	if (ctxt->mode == X86EMUL_MODE_REAL) {
+		/* set real mode segment descriptor (keep limit etc. for
+		 * unreal mode) */
+		ctxt->ops->get_segment(ctxt, &dummy, &seg_desc, NULL, seg);
+		set_desc_base(&seg_desc, selector << 4);
+		goto load;
+	} else if (seg <= VCPU_SREG_GS && ctxt->mode == X86EMUL_MODE_VM86) {
+		/* VM86 needs a clean new segment descriptor */
+		set_desc_base(&seg_desc, selector << 4);
+		set_desc_limit(&seg_desc, 0xffff);
+		seg_desc.type = 3;
+		seg_desc.p = 1;
+		seg_desc.s = 1;
+		seg_desc.dpl = 3;
+		goto load;
+	}
+
+	rpl = selector & 3;
+
+	/* TR should be in GDT only */
+	if (seg == VCPU_SREG_TR && (selector & (1 << 2)))
+		goto exception;
+
+	/* NULL selector is not valid for TR, CS and (except for long mode) SS */
+	if (null_selector) {
+		if (seg == VCPU_SREG_CS || seg == VCPU_SREG_TR)
+			goto exception;
+
+		if (seg == VCPU_SREG_SS) {
+			if (ctxt->mode != X86EMUL_MODE_PROT64 || rpl != cpl)
+				goto exception;
+
+			/*
+			 * ctxt->ops->set_segment expects the CPL to be in
+			 * SS.DPL, so fake an expand-up 32-bit data segment.
+			 */
+			seg_desc.type = 3;
+			seg_desc.p = 1;
+			seg_desc.s = 1;
+			seg_desc.dpl = cpl;
+			seg_desc.d = 1;
+			seg_desc.g = 1;
+		}
+
+		/* Skip all following checks */
+		goto load;
+	}
+
+	ret = read_segment_descriptor(ctxt, selector, &seg_desc, &desc_addr);
+	if (ret != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
+		return ret;
+
+	err_code = selector & 0xfffc;
+	err_vec = (transfer == X86_TRANSFER_TASK_SWITCH) ? TS_VECTOR :
+							   GP_VECTOR;
+
+	/* can't load system descriptor into segment selector */
+	if (seg <= VCPU_SREG_GS && !seg_desc.s) {
+		if (transfer == X86_TRANSFER_CALL_JMP)
+			return X86EMUL_UNHANDLEABLE;
+		goto exception;
+	}
+
+	dpl = seg_desc.dpl;
+
+	switch (seg) {
+	case VCPU_SREG_SS:
+		/*
+		 * segment is not a writable data segment or segment
+		 * selector's RPL != CPL or DPL != CPL
+		 */
+		if (rpl != cpl || (seg_desc.type & 0xa) != 0x2 || dpl != cpl)
+			goto exception;
+		break;
+	case VCPU_SREG_CS:
+		/*
+		 * KVM uses "none" when loading CS as part of emulating Real
+		 * Mode exceptions and IRET (handled above).  In all other
+		 * cases, loading CS without a control transfer is a KVM bug.
+		 */
+		if (WARN_ON_ONCE(transfer == X86_TRANSFER_NONE))
+			goto exception;
+
+		if (!(seg_desc.type & 8))
+			goto exception;
+
+		if (transfer == X86_TRANSFER_RET) {
+			/* RET can never return to an inner privilege level. */
+			if (rpl < cpl)
+				goto exception;
+			/* Outer-privilege level return is not implemented */
+			if (rpl > cpl)
+				return X86EMUL_UNHANDLEABLE;
+		}
+		if (transfer == X86_TRANSFER_RET || transfer == X86_TRANSFER_TASK_SWITCH) {
+			if (seg_desc.type & 4) {
+				/* conforming */
+				if (dpl > rpl)
+					goto exception;
+			} else {
+				/* nonconforming */
+				if (dpl != rpl)
+					goto exception;
+			}
+		} else { /* X86_TRANSFER_CALL_JMP */
+			if (seg_desc.type & 4) {
+				/* conforming */
+				if (dpl > cpl)
+					goto exception;
+			} else {
+				/* nonconforming */
+				if (rpl > cpl || dpl != cpl)
+					goto exception;
+			}
+		}
+		/* in long-mode d/b must be clear if l is set */
+		if (seg_desc.d && seg_desc.l) {
+			u64 efer = 0;
+
+			ctxt->ops->get_msr(ctxt, MSR_EFER, &efer);
+			if (efer & EFER_LMA)
+				goto exception;
+		}
+
+		/* CS(RPL) <- CPL */
+		selector = (selector & 0xfffc) | cpl;
+		break;
+	case VCPU_SREG_TR:
+		if (seg_desc.s || (seg_desc.type != 1 && seg_desc.type != 9))
+			goto exception;
+		break;
+	case VCPU_SREG_LDTR:
+		if (seg_desc.s || seg_desc.type != 2)
+			goto exception;
+		break;
+	default: /*  DS, ES, FS, or GS */
+		/*
+		 * segment is not a data or readable code segment or
+		 * ((segment is a data or nonconforming code segment)
+		 * and ((RPL > DPL) or (CPL > DPL)))
+		 */
+		if ((seg_desc.type & 0xa) == 0x8 ||
+		    (((seg_desc.type & 0xc) != 0xc) &&
+		     (rpl > dpl || cpl > dpl)))
+			goto exception;
+		break;
+	}
+
+	if (!seg_desc.p) {
+		err_vec = (seg == VCPU_SREG_SS) ? SS_VECTOR : NP_VECTOR;
+		goto exception;
+	}
+
+	if (seg_desc.s) {
+		/* mark segment as accessed */
+		if (!(seg_desc.type & 1)) {
+			seg_desc.type |= 1;
+			ret = write_segment_descriptor(ctxt, selector,
+						       &seg_desc);
+			if (ret != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
+				return ret;
+		}
+	} else if (ctxt->mode == X86EMUL_MODE_PROT64) {
+		ret = linear_read_system(ctxt, desc_addr+8, &base3, sizeof(base3));
+		if (ret != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
+			return ret;
+		if (emul_is_noncanonical_address(get_desc_base(&seg_desc) |
+						 ((u64)base3 << 32), ctxt))
+			return emulate_gp(ctxt, err_code);
+	}
+
+	if (seg == VCPU_SREG_TR) {
+		old_desc = seg_desc;
+		seg_desc.type |= 2; /* busy */
+		ret = ctxt->ops->cmpxchg_emulated(ctxt, desc_addr, &old_desc, &seg_desc,
+						  sizeof(seg_desc), &ctxt->exception);
+		if (ret != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
+			return ret;
+	}
+load:
+	ctxt->ops->set_segment(ctxt, selector, &seg_desc, base3, seg);
+	if (desc)
+		*desc = seg_desc;
+	return X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
+exception:
+	return emulate_exception(ctxt, err_vec, err_code, true);
+}
+
+static int load_segment_descriptor(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt,
+				   u16 selector, int seg)
+{
+	u8 cpl = ctxt->ops->cpl(ctxt);
+
+	/*
+	 * None of MOV, POP and LSS can load a NULL selector in CPL=3, but
+	 * they can load it at CPL<3 (Intel's manual says only LSS can,
+	 * but it's wrong).
+	 *
+	 * However, the Intel manual says that putting IST=1/DPL=3 in
+	 * an interrupt gate will result in SS=3 (the AMD manual instead
+	 * says it doesn't), so allow SS=3 in __load_segment_descriptor
+	 * and only forbid it here.
+	 */
+	if (seg == VCPU_SREG_SS && selector == 3 &&
+	    ctxt->mode == X86EMUL_MODE_PROT64)
+		return emulate_exception(ctxt, GP_VECTOR, 0, true);
+
+	return __load_segment_descriptor(ctxt, selector, seg, cpl,
+					 X86_TRANSFER_NONE, NULL);
+}
+
+static void write_register_operand(struct operand *op)
+{
+	return assign_register(op->addr.reg, op->val, op->bytes);
+}
+
+static int writeback(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, struct operand *op)
+{
+	switch (op->type) {
+	case OP_REG:
+		write_register_operand(op);
+		break;
+	case OP_MEM:
+		if (ctxt->lock_prefix)
+			return segmented_cmpxchg(ctxt,
+						 op->addr.mem,
+						 &op->orig_val,
+						 &op->val,
+						 op->bytes);
+		else
+			return segmented_write(ctxt,
+					       op->addr.mem,
+					       &op->val,
+					       op->bytes);
+	case OP_MEM_STR:
+		return segmented_write(ctxt,
+				       op->addr.mem,
+				       op->data,
+				       op->bytes * op->count);
+	case OP_XMM:
+		kvm_write_sse_reg(op->addr.xmm, &op->vec_val);
+		break;
+	case OP_MM:
+		kvm_write_mmx_reg(op->addr.mm, &op->mm_val);
+		break;
+	case OP_NONE:
+		/* no writeback */
+		break;
+	default:
+		break;
+	}
+	return X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
+}
+
+static int push(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, void *data, int bytes)
+{
+	struct segmented_address addr;
+
+	rsp_increment(ctxt, -bytes);
+	addr.ea = reg_read(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RSP) & stack_mask(ctxt);
+	addr.seg = VCPU_SREG_SS;
+
+	return segmented_write(ctxt, addr, data, bytes);
+}
+
+static int em_push(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
+{
+	/* Disable writeback. */
+	ctxt->dst.type = OP_NONE;
+	return push(ctxt, &ctxt->src.val, ctxt->op_bytes);
+}
+
+static int emulate_pop(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt,
+		       void *dest, int len)
+{
+	int rc;
+	struct segmented_address addr;
+
+	addr.ea = reg_read(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RSP) & stack_mask(ctxt);
+	addr.seg = VCPU_SREG_SS;
+	rc = segmented_read(ctxt, addr, dest, len);
+	if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
+		return rc;
+
+	rsp_increment(ctxt, len);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static int em_pop(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
+{
+	return emulate_pop(ctxt, &ctxt->dst.val, ctxt->op_bytes);
+}
+
+static int emulate_popf(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt,
+			void *dest, int len)
+{
+	int rc;
+	unsigned long val, change_mask;
+	int iopl = (ctxt->eflags & X86_EFLAGS_IOPL) >> X86_EFLAGS_IOPL_BIT;
+	int cpl = ctxt->ops->cpl(ctxt);
+
+	rc = emulate_pop(ctxt, &val, len);
+	if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
+		return rc;
+
+	change_mask = X86_EFLAGS_CF | X86_EFLAGS_PF | X86_EFLAGS_AF |
+		      X86_EFLAGS_ZF | X86_EFLAGS_SF | X86_EFLAGS_OF |
+		      X86_EFLAGS_TF | X86_EFLAGS_DF | X86_EFLAGS_NT |
+		      X86_EFLAGS_AC | X86_EFLAGS_ID;
+
+	switch(ctxt->mode) {
+	case X86EMUL_MODE_PROT64:
+	case X86EMUL_MODE_PROT32:
+	case X86EMUL_MODE_PROT16:
+		if (cpl == 0)
+			change_mask |= X86_EFLAGS_IOPL;
+		if (cpl <= iopl)
+			change_mask |= X86_EFLAGS_IF;
+		break;
+	case X86EMUL_MODE_VM86:
+		if (iopl < 3)
+			return emulate_gp(ctxt, 0);
+		change_mask |= X86_EFLAGS_IF;
+		break;
+	default: /* real mode */
+		change_mask |= (X86_EFLAGS_IOPL | X86_EFLAGS_IF);
+		break;
+	}
+
+	*(unsigned long *)dest =
+		(ctxt->eflags & ~change_mask) | (val & change_mask);
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static int em_popf(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
+{
+	ctxt->dst.type = OP_REG;
+	ctxt->dst.addr.reg = &ctxt->eflags;
+	ctxt->dst.bytes = ctxt->op_bytes;
+	return emulate_popf(ctxt, &ctxt->dst.val, ctxt->op_bytes);
+}
+
+static int em_enter(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
+{
+	int rc;
+	unsigned frame_size = ctxt->src.val;
+	unsigned nesting_level = ctxt->src2.val & 31;
+	ulong rbp;
+
+	if (nesting_level)
+		return X86EMUL_UNHANDLEABLE;
+
+	rbp = reg_read(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RBP);
+	rc = push(ctxt, &rbp, stack_size(ctxt));
+	if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
+		return rc;
+	assign_masked(reg_rmw(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RBP), reg_read(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RSP),
+		      stack_mask(ctxt));
+	assign_masked(reg_rmw(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RSP),
+		      reg_read(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RSP) - frame_size,
+		      stack_mask(ctxt));
+	return X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
+}
+
+static int em_leave(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
+{
+	assign_masked(reg_rmw(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RSP), reg_read(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RBP),
+		      stack_mask(ctxt));
+	return emulate_pop(ctxt, reg_rmw(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RBP), ctxt->op_bytes);
+}
+
+static int em_push_sreg(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
+{
+	int seg = ctxt->src2.val;
+
+	ctxt->src.val = get_segment_selector(ctxt, seg);
+	if (ctxt->op_bytes == 4) {
+		rsp_increment(ctxt, -2);
+		ctxt->op_bytes = 2;
+	}
+
+	return em_push(ctxt);
+}
+
+static int em_pop_sreg(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
+{
+	int seg = ctxt->src2.val;
+	unsigned long selector;
+	int rc;
+
+	rc = emulate_pop(ctxt, &selector, 2);
+	if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
+		return rc;
+
+	if (seg == VCPU_SREG_SS)
+		ctxt->interruptibility = KVM_X86_SHADOW_INT_MOV_SS;
+	if (ctxt->op_bytes > 2)
+		rsp_increment(ctxt, ctxt->op_bytes - 2);
+
+	rc = load_segment_descriptor(ctxt, (u16)selector, seg);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static int em_pusha(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
+{
+	unsigned long old_esp = reg_read(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RSP);
+	int rc = X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
+	int reg = VCPU_REGS_RAX;
+
+	while (reg <= VCPU_REGS_RDI) {
+		(reg == VCPU_REGS_RSP) ?
+		(ctxt->src.val = old_esp) : (ctxt->src.val = reg_read(ctxt, reg));
+
+		rc = em_push(ctxt);
+		if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
+			return rc;
+
+		++reg;
+	}
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static int em_pushf(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
+{
+	ctxt->src.val = (unsigned long)ctxt->eflags & ~X86_EFLAGS_VM;
+	return em_push(ctxt);
+}
+
+static int em_popa(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
+{
+	int rc = X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
+	int reg = VCPU_REGS_RDI;
+	u32 val;
+
+	while (reg >= VCPU_REGS_RAX) {
+		if (reg == VCPU_REGS_RSP) {
+			rsp_increment(ctxt, ctxt->op_bytes);
+			--reg;
+		}
+
+		rc = emulate_pop(ctxt, &val, ctxt->op_bytes);
+		if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
+			break;
+		assign_register(reg_rmw(ctxt, reg), val, ctxt->op_bytes);
+		--reg;
+	}
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static int __emulate_int_real(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, int irq)
+{
+	const struct x86_emulate_ops *ops = ctxt->ops;
+	int rc;
+	struct desc_ptr dt;
+	gva_t cs_addr;
+	gva_t eip_addr;
+	u16 cs, eip;
+
+	/* TODO: Add limit checks */
+	ctxt->src.val = ctxt->eflags;
+	rc = em_push(ctxt);
+	if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
+		return rc;
+
+	ctxt->eflags &= ~(X86_EFLAGS_IF | X86_EFLAGS_TF | X86_EFLAGS_AC);
+
+	ctxt->src.val = get_segment_selector(ctxt, VCPU_SREG_CS);
+	rc = em_push(ctxt);
+	if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
+		return rc;
+
+	ctxt->src.val = ctxt->_eip;
+	rc = em_push(ctxt);
+	if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
+		return rc;
+
+	ops->get_idt(ctxt, &dt);
+
+	eip_addr = dt.address + (irq << 2);
+	cs_addr = dt.address + (irq << 2) + 2;
+
+	rc = linear_read_system(ctxt, cs_addr, &cs, 2);
+	if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
+		return rc;
+
+	rc = linear_read_system(ctxt, eip_addr, &eip, 2);
+	if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
+		return rc;
+
+	rc = load_segment_descriptor(ctxt, cs, VCPU_SREG_CS);
+	if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
+		return rc;
+
+	ctxt->_eip = eip;
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+int emulate_int_real(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, int irq)
+{
+	int rc;
+
+	invalidate_registers(ctxt);
+	rc = __emulate_int_real(ctxt, irq);
+	if (rc == X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
+		writeback_registers(ctxt);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static int emulate_int(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, int irq)
+{
+	switch(ctxt->mode) {
+	case X86EMUL_MODE_REAL:
+		return __emulate_int_real(ctxt, irq);
+	case X86EMUL_MODE_VM86:
+	case X86EMUL_MODE_PROT16:
+	case X86EMUL_MODE_PROT32:
+	case X86EMUL_MODE_PROT64:
+	default:
+		/* Protected mode interrupts unimplemented yet */
+		return X86EMUL_UNHANDLEABLE;
+	}
+}
+
+static int emulate_iret_real(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
+{
+	int rc = X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
+	unsigned long temp_eip = 0;
+	unsigned long temp_eflags = 0;
+	unsigned long cs = 0;
+	unsigned long mask = X86_EFLAGS_CF | X86_EFLAGS_PF | X86_EFLAGS_AF |
+			     X86_EFLAGS_ZF | X86_EFLAGS_SF | X86_EFLAGS_TF |
+			     X86_EFLAGS_IF | X86_EFLAGS_DF | X86_EFLAGS_OF |
+			     X86_EFLAGS_IOPL | X86_EFLAGS_NT | X86_EFLAGS_RF |
+			     X86_EFLAGS_AC | X86_EFLAGS_ID |
+			     X86_EFLAGS_FIXED;
+	unsigned long vm86_mask = X86_EFLAGS_VM | X86_EFLAGS_VIF |
+				  X86_EFLAGS_VIP;
+
+	/* TODO: Add stack limit check */
+
+	rc = emulate_pop(ctxt, &temp_eip, ctxt->op_bytes);
+
+	if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
+		return rc;
+
+	if (temp_eip & ~0xffff)
+		return emulate_gp(ctxt, 0);
+
+	rc = emulate_pop(ctxt, &cs, ctxt->op_bytes);
+
+	if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
+		return rc;
+
+	rc = emulate_pop(ctxt, &temp_eflags, ctxt->op_bytes);
+
+	if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
+		return rc;
+
+	rc = load_segment_descriptor(ctxt, (u16)cs, VCPU_SREG_CS);
+
+	if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
+		return rc;
+
+	ctxt->_eip = temp_eip;
+
+	if (ctxt->op_bytes == 4)
+		ctxt->eflags = ((temp_eflags & mask) | (ctxt->eflags & vm86_mask));
+	else if (ctxt->op_bytes == 2) {
+		ctxt->eflags &= ~0xffff;
+		ctxt->eflags |= temp_eflags;
+	}
+
+	ctxt->eflags &= ~EFLG_RESERVED_ZEROS_MASK; /* Clear reserved zeros */
+	ctxt->eflags |= X86_EFLAGS_FIXED;
+	ctxt->ops->set_nmi_mask(ctxt, false);
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static int em_iret(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
+{
+	switch(ctxt->mode) {
+	case X86EMUL_MODE_REAL:
+		return emulate_iret_real(ctxt);
+	case X86EMUL_MODE_VM86:
+	case X86EMUL_MODE_PROT16:
+	case X86EMUL_MODE_PROT32:
+	case X86EMUL_MODE_PROT64:
+	default:
+		/* iret from protected mode unimplemented yet */
+		return X86EMUL_UNHANDLEABLE;
+	}
+}
+
+static int em_jmp_far(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
+{
+	int rc;
+	unsigned short sel;
+	struct desc_struct new_desc;
+	u8 cpl = ctxt->ops->cpl(ctxt);
+
+	memcpy(&sel, ctxt->src.valptr + ctxt->op_bytes, 2);
+
+	rc = __load_segment_descriptor(ctxt, sel, VCPU_SREG_CS, cpl,
+				       X86_TRANSFER_CALL_JMP,
+				       &new_desc);
+	if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
+		return rc;
+
+	rc = assign_eip_far(ctxt, ctxt->src.val);
+	/* Error handling is not implemented. */
+	if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
+		return X86EMUL_UNHANDLEABLE;
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static int em_jmp_abs(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
+{
+	return assign_eip_near(ctxt, ctxt->src.val);
+}
+
+static int em_call_near_abs(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
+{
+	int rc;
+	long int old_eip;
+
+	old_eip = ctxt->_eip;
+	rc = assign_eip_near(ctxt, ctxt->src.val);
+	if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
+		return rc;
+	ctxt->src.val = old_eip;
+	rc = em_push(ctxt);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static int em_cmpxchg8b(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
+{
+	u64 old = ctxt->dst.orig_val64;
+
+	if (ctxt->dst.bytes == 16)
+		return X86EMUL_UNHANDLEABLE;
+
+	if (((u32) (old >> 0) != (u32) reg_read(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RAX)) ||
+	    ((u32) (old >> 32) != (u32) reg_read(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RDX))) {
+		*reg_write(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RAX) = (u32) (old >> 0);
+		*reg_write(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RDX) = (u32) (old >> 32);
+		ctxt->eflags &= ~X86_EFLAGS_ZF;
+	} else {
+		ctxt->dst.val64 = ((u64)reg_read(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RCX) << 32) |
+			(u32) reg_read(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RBX);
+
+		ctxt->eflags |= X86_EFLAGS_ZF;
+	}
+	return X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
+}
+
+static int em_ret(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
+{
+	int rc;
+	unsigned long eip;
+
+	rc = emulate_pop(ctxt, &eip, ctxt->op_bytes);
+	if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
+		return rc;
+
+	return assign_eip_near(ctxt, eip);
+}
+
+static int em_ret_far(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
+{
+	int rc;
+	unsigned long eip, cs;
+	int cpl = ctxt->ops->cpl(ctxt);
+	struct desc_struct new_desc;
+
+	rc = emulate_pop(ctxt, &eip, ctxt->op_bytes);
+	if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
+		return rc;
+	rc = emulate_pop(ctxt, &cs, ctxt->op_bytes);
+	if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
+		return rc;
+	rc = __load_segment_descriptor(ctxt, (u16)cs, VCPU_SREG_CS, cpl,
+				       X86_TRANSFER_RET,
+				       &new_desc);
+	if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
+		return rc;
+	rc = assign_eip_far(ctxt, eip);
+	/* Error handling is not implemented. */
+	if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
+		return X86EMUL_UNHANDLEABLE;
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static int em_ret_far_imm(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
+{
+        int rc;
+
+        rc = em_ret_far(ctxt);
+        if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
+                return rc;
+        rsp_increment(ctxt, ctxt->src.val);
+        return X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
+}
+
+static int em_cmpxchg(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
+{
+	/* Save real source value, then compare EAX against destination. */
+	ctxt->dst.orig_val = ctxt->dst.val;
+	ctxt->dst.val = reg_read(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RAX);
+	ctxt->src.orig_val = ctxt->src.val;
+	ctxt->src.val = ctxt->dst.orig_val;
+	fastop(ctxt, em_cmp);
+
+	if (ctxt->eflags & X86_EFLAGS_ZF) {
+		/* Success: write back to memory; no update of EAX */
+		ctxt->src.type = OP_NONE;
+		ctxt->dst.val = ctxt->src.orig_val;
+	} else {
+		/* Failure: write the value we saw to EAX. */
+		ctxt->src.type = OP_REG;
+		ctxt->src.addr.reg = reg_rmw(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RAX);
+		ctxt->src.val = ctxt->dst.orig_val;
+		/* Create write-cycle to dest by writing the same value */
+		ctxt->dst.val = ctxt->dst.orig_val;
+	}
+	return X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
+}
+
+static int em_lseg(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
+{
+	int seg = ctxt->src2.val;
+	unsigned short sel;
+	int rc;
+
+	memcpy(&sel, ctxt->src.valptr + ctxt->op_bytes, 2);
+
+	rc = load_segment_descriptor(ctxt, sel, seg);
+	if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
+		return rc;
+
+	ctxt->dst.val = ctxt->src.val;
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static int em_rsm(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
+{
+	if (!ctxt->ops->is_smm(ctxt))
+		return emulate_ud(ctxt);
+
+	if (ctxt->ops->leave_smm(ctxt))
+		ctxt->ops->triple_fault(ctxt);
+
+	return emulator_recalc_and_set_mode(ctxt);
+}
+
+static void
+setup_syscalls_segments(struct desc_struct *cs, struct desc_struct *ss)
+{
+	cs->l = 0;		/* will be adjusted later */
+	set_desc_base(cs, 0);	/* flat segment */
+	cs->g = 1;		/* 4kb granularity */
+	set_desc_limit(cs, 0xfffff);	/* 4GB limit */
+	cs->type = 0x0b;	/* Read, Execute, Accessed */
+	cs->s = 1;
+	cs->dpl = 0;		/* will be adjusted later */
+	cs->p = 1;
+	cs->d = 1;
+	cs->avl = 0;
+
+	set_desc_base(ss, 0);	/* flat segment */
+	set_desc_limit(ss, 0xfffff);	/* 4GB limit */
+	ss->g = 1;		/* 4kb granularity */
+	ss->s = 1;
+	ss->type = 0x03;	/* Read/Write, Accessed */
+	ss->d = 1;		/* 32bit stack segment */
+	ss->dpl = 0;
+	ss->p = 1;
+	ss->l = 0;
+	ss->avl = 0;
+}
+
+static bool vendor_intel(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
+{
+	u32 eax, ebx, ecx, edx;
+
+	eax = ecx = 0;
+	ctxt->ops->get_cpuid(ctxt, &eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx, true);
+	return is_guest_vendor_intel(ebx, ecx, edx);
+}
+
+static bool em_syscall_is_enabled(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
+{
+	const struct x86_emulate_ops *ops = ctxt->ops;
+	u32 eax, ebx, ecx, edx;
+
+	/*
+	 * syscall should always be enabled in longmode - so only become
+	 * vendor specific (cpuid) if other modes are active...
+	 */
+	if (ctxt->mode == X86EMUL_MODE_PROT64)
+		return true;
+
+	eax = 0x00000000;
+	ecx = 0x00000000;
+	ops->get_cpuid(ctxt, &eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx, true);
+	/*
+	 * remark: Intel CPUs only support "syscall" in 64bit longmode. Also a
+	 * 64bit guest with a 32bit compat-app running will #UD !! While this
+	 * behaviour can be fixed (by emulating) into AMD response - CPUs of
+	 * AMD can't behave like Intel.
+	 */
+	if (is_guest_vendor_intel(ebx, ecx, edx))
+		return false;
+
+	if (is_guest_vendor_amd(ebx, ecx, edx) ||
+	    is_guest_vendor_hygon(ebx, ecx, edx))
+		return true;
+
+	/*
+	 * default: (not Intel, not AMD, not Hygon), apply Intel's
+	 * stricter rules...
+	 */
+	return false;
+}
+
+static int em_syscall(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
+{
+	const struct x86_emulate_ops *ops = ctxt->ops;
+	struct desc_struct cs, ss;
+	u64 msr_data;
+	u16 cs_sel, ss_sel;
+	u64 efer = 0;
+
+	/* syscall is not available in real mode */
+	if (ctxt->mode == X86EMUL_MODE_REAL ||
+	    ctxt->mode == X86EMUL_MODE_VM86)
+		return emulate_ud(ctxt);
+
+	if (!(em_syscall_is_enabled(ctxt)))
+		return emulate_ud(ctxt);
+
+	ops->get_msr(ctxt, MSR_EFER, &efer);
+	if (!(efer & EFER_SCE))
+		return emulate_ud(ctxt);
+
+	setup_syscalls_segments(&cs, &ss);
+	ops->get_msr(ctxt, MSR_STAR, &msr_data);
+	msr_data >>= 32;
+	cs_sel = (u16)(msr_data & 0xfffc);
+	ss_sel = (u16)(msr_data + 8);
+
+	if (efer & EFER_LMA) {
+		cs.d = 0;
+		cs.l = 1;
+	}
+	ops->set_segment(ctxt, cs_sel, &cs, 0, VCPU_SREG_CS);
+	ops->set_segment(ctxt, ss_sel, &ss, 0, VCPU_SREG_SS);
+
+	*reg_write(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RCX) = ctxt->_eip;
+	if (efer & EFER_LMA) {
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+		*reg_write(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_R11) = ctxt->eflags;
+
+		ops->get_msr(ctxt,
+			     ctxt->mode == X86EMUL_MODE_PROT64 ?
+			     MSR_LSTAR : MSR_CSTAR, &msr_data);
+		ctxt->_eip = msr_data;
+
+		ops->get_msr(ctxt, MSR_SYSCALL_MASK, &msr_data);
+		ctxt->eflags &= ~msr_data;
+		ctxt->eflags |= X86_EFLAGS_FIXED;
+#endif
+	} else {
+		/* legacy mode */
+		ops->get_msr(ctxt, MSR_STAR, &msr_data);
+		ctxt->_eip = (u32)msr_data;
+
+		ctxt->eflags &= ~(X86_EFLAGS_VM | X86_EFLAGS_IF);
+	}
+
+	ctxt->tf = (ctxt->eflags & X86_EFLAGS_TF) != 0;
+	return X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
+}
+
+static int em_sysenter(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
+{
+	const struct x86_emulate_ops *ops = ctxt->ops;
+	struct desc_struct cs, ss;
+	u64 msr_data;
+	u16 cs_sel, ss_sel;
+	u64 efer = 0;
+
+	ops->get_msr(ctxt, MSR_EFER, &efer);
+	/* inject #GP if in real mode */
+	if (ctxt->mode == X86EMUL_MODE_REAL)
+		return emulate_gp(ctxt, 0);
+
+	/*
+	 * Not recognized on AMD in compat mode (but is recognized in legacy
+	 * mode).
+	 */
+	if ((ctxt->mode != X86EMUL_MODE_PROT64) && (efer & EFER_LMA)
+	    && !vendor_intel(ctxt))
+		return emulate_ud(ctxt);
+
+	/* sysenter/sysexit have not been tested in 64bit mode. */
+	if (ctxt->mode == X86EMUL_MODE_PROT64)
+		return X86EMUL_UNHANDLEABLE;
+
+	ops->get_msr(ctxt, MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_CS, &msr_data);
+	if ((msr_data & 0xfffc) == 0x0)
+		return emulate_gp(ctxt, 0);
+
+	setup_syscalls_segments(&cs, &ss);
+	ctxt->eflags &= ~(X86_EFLAGS_VM | X86_EFLAGS_IF);
+	cs_sel = (u16)msr_data & ~SEGMENT_RPL_MASK;
+	ss_sel = cs_sel + 8;
+	if (efer & EFER_LMA) {
+		cs.d = 0;
+		cs.l = 1;
+	}
+
+	ops->set_segment(ctxt, cs_sel, &cs, 0, VCPU_SREG_CS);
+	ops->set_segment(ctxt, ss_sel, &ss, 0, VCPU_SREG_SS);
+
+	ops->get_msr(ctxt, MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_EIP, &msr_data);
+	ctxt->_eip = (efer & EFER_LMA) ? msr_data : (u32)msr_data;
+
+	ops->get_msr(ctxt, MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_ESP, &msr_data);
+	*reg_write(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RSP) = (efer & EFER_LMA) ? msr_data :
+							      (u32)msr_data;
+	if (efer & EFER_LMA)
+		ctxt->mode = X86EMUL_MODE_PROT64;
+
+	return X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
+}
+
+static int em_sysexit(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
+{
+	const struct x86_emulate_ops *ops = ctxt->ops;
+	struct desc_struct cs, ss;
+	u64 msr_data, rcx, rdx;
+	int usermode;
+	u16 cs_sel = 0, ss_sel = 0;
+
+	/* inject #GP if in real mode or Virtual 8086 mode */
+	if (ctxt->mode == X86EMUL_MODE_REAL ||
+	    ctxt->mode == X86EMUL_MODE_VM86)
+		return emulate_gp(ctxt, 0);
+
+	setup_syscalls_segments(&cs, &ss);
+
+	if ((ctxt->rex_prefix & 0x8) != 0x0)
+		usermode = X86EMUL_MODE_PROT64;
+	else
+		usermode = X86EMUL_MODE_PROT32;
+
+	rcx = reg_read(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RCX);
+	rdx = reg_read(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RDX);
+
+	cs.dpl = 3;
+	ss.dpl = 3;
+	ops->get_msr(ctxt, MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_CS, &msr_data);
+	switch (usermode) {
+	case X86EMUL_MODE_PROT32:
+		cs_sel = (u16)(msr_data + 16);
+		if ((msr_data & 0xfffc) == 0x0)
+			return emulate_gp(ctxt, 0);
+		ss_sel = (u16)(msr_data + 24);
+		rcx = (u32)rcx;
+		rdx = (u32)rdx;
+		break;
+	case X86EMUL_MODE_PROT64:
+		cs_sel = (u16)(msr_data + 32);
+		if (msr_data == 0x0)
+			return emulate_gp(ctxt, 0);
+		ss_sel = cs_sel + 8;
+		cs.d = 0;
+		cs.l = 1;
+		if (emul_is_noncanonical_address(rcx, ctxt) ||
+		    emul_is_noncanonical_address(rdx, ctxt))
+			return emulate_gp(ctxt, 0);
+		break;
+	}
+	cs_sel |= SEGMENT_RPL_MASK;
+	ss_sel |= SEGMENT_RPL_MASK;
+
+	ops->set_segment(ctxt, cs_sel, &cs, 0, VCPU_SREG_CS);
+	ops->set_segment(ctxt, ss_sel, &ss, 0, VCPU_SREG_SS);
+
+	ctxt->_eip = rdx;
+	ctxt->mode = usermode;
+	*reg_write(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RSP) = rcx;
+
+	return X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
+}
+
+static bool emulator_bad_iopl(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
+{
+	int iopl;
+	if (ctxt->mode == X86EMUL_MODE_REAL)
+		return false;
+	if (ctxt->mode == X86EMUL_MODE_VM86)
+		return true;
+	iopl = (ctxt->eflags & X86_EFLAGS_IOPL) >> X86_EFLAGS_IOPL_BIT;
+	return ctxt->ops->cpl(ctxt) > iopl;
+}
+
+#define VMWARE_PORT_VMPORT	(0x5658)
+#define VMWARE_PORT_VMRPC	(0x5659)
+
+static bool emulator_io_port_access_allowed(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt,
+					    u16 port, u16 len)
+{
+	const struct x86_emulate_ops *ops = ctxt->ops;
+	struct desc_struct tr_seg;
+	u32 base3;
+	int r;
+	u16 tr, io_bitmap_ptr, perm, bit_idx = port & 0x7;
+	unsigned mask = (1 << len) - 1;
+	unsigned long base;
+
+	/*
+	 * VMware allows access to these ports even if denied
+	 * by TSS I/O permission bitmap. Mimic behavior.
+	 */
+	if (enable_vmware_backdoor &&
+	    ((port == VMWARE_PORT_VMPORT) || (port == VMWARE_PORT_VMRPC)))
+		return true;
+
+	ops->get_segment(ctxt, &tr, &tr_seg, &base3, VCPU_SREG_TR);
+	if (!tr_seg.p)
+		return false;
+	if (desc_limit_scaled(&tr_seg) < 103)
+		return false;
+	base = get_desc_base(&tr_seg);
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+	base |= ((u64)base3) << 32;
+#endif
+	r = ops->read_std(ctxt, base + 102, &io_bitmap_ptr, 2, NULL, true);
+	if (r != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
+		return false;
+	if (io_bitmap_ptr + port/8 > desc_limit_scaled(&tr_seg))
+		return false;
+	r = ops->read_std(ctxt, base + io_bitmap_ptr + port/8, &perm, 2, NULL, true);
+	if (r != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
+		return false;
+	if ((perm >> bit_idx) & mask)
+		return false;
+	return true;
+}
+
+static bool emulator_io_permitted(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt,
+				  u16 port, u16 len)
+{
+	if (ctxt->perm_ok)
+		return true;
+
+	if (emulator_bad_iopl(ctxt))
+		if (!emulator_io_port_access_allowed(ctxt, port, len))
+			return false;
+
+	ctxt->perm_ok = true;
+
+	return true;
+}
+
+static void string_registers_quirk(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
+{
+	/*
+	 * Intel CPUs mask the counter and pointers in quite strange
+	 * manner when ECX is zero due to REP-string optimizations.
+	 */
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+	if (ctxt->ad_bytes != 4 || !vendor_intel(ctxt))
+		return;
+
+	*reg_write(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RCX) = 0;
+
+	switch (ctxt->b) {
+	case 0xa4:	/* movsb */
+	case 0xa5:	/* movsd/w */
+		*reg_rmw(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RSI) &= (u32)-1;
+		fallthrough;
+	case 0xaa:	/* stosb */
+	case 0xab:	/* stosd/w */
+		*reg_rmw(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RDI) &= (u32)-1;
+	}
+#endif
+}
+
+static void save_state_to_tss16(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt,
+				struct tss_segment_16 *tss)
+{
+	tss->ip = ctxt->_eip;
+	tss->flag = ctxt->eflags;
+	tss->ax = reg_read(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RAX);
+	tss->cx = reg_read(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RCX);
+	tss->dx = reg_read(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RDX);
+	tss->bx = reg_read(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RBX);
+	tss->sp = reg_read(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RSP);
+	tss->bp = reg_read(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RBP);
+	tss->si = reg_read(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RSI);
+	tss->di = reg_read(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RDI);
+
+	tss->es = get_segment_selector(ctxt, VCPU_SREG_ES);
+	tss->cs = get_segment_selector(ctxt, VCPU_SREG_CS);
+	tss->ss = get_segment_selector(ctxt, VCPU_SREG_SS);
+	tss->ds = get_segment_selector(ctxt, VCPU_SREG_DS);
+	tss->ldt = get_segment_selector(ctxt, VCPU_SREG_LDTR);
+}
+
+static int load_state_from_tss16(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt,
+				 struct tss_segment_16 *tss)
+{
+	int ret;
+	u8 cpl;
+
+	ctxt->_eip = tss->ip;
+	ctxt->eflags = tss->flag | 2;
+	*reg_write(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RAX) = tss->ax;
+	*reg_write(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RCX) = tss->cx;
+	*reg_write(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RDX) = tss->dx;
+	*reg_write(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RBX) = tss->bx;
+	*reg_write(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RSP) = tss->sp;
+	*reg_write(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RBP) = tss->bp;
+	*reg_write(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RSI) = tss->si;
+	*reg_write(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RDI) = tss->di;
+
+	/*
+	 * SDM says that segment selectors are loaded before segment
+	 * descriptors
+	 */
+	set_segment_selector(ctxt, tss->ldt, VCPU_SREG_LDTR);
+	set_segment_selector(ctxt, tss->es, VCPU_SREG_ES);
+	set_segment_selector(ctxt, tss->cs, VCPU_SREG_CS);
+	set_segment_selector(ctxt, tss->ss, VCPU_SREG_SS);
+	set_segment_selector(ctxt, tss->ds, VCPU_SREG_DS);
+
+	cpl = tss->cs & 3;
+
+	/*
+	 * Now load segment descriptors. If fault happens at this stage
+	 * it is handled in a context of new task
+	 */
+	ret = __load_segment_descriptor(ctxt, tss->ldt, VCPU_SREG_LDTR, cpl,
+					X86_TRANSFER_TASK_SWITCH, NULL);
+	if (ret != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
+		return ret;
+	ret = __load_segment_descriptor(ctxt, tss->es, VCPU_SREG_ES, cpl,
+					X86_TRANSFER_TASK_SWITCH, NULL);
+	if (ret != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
+		return ret;
+	ret = __load_segment_descriptor(ctxt, tss->cs, VCPU_SREG_CS, cpl,
+					X86_TRANSFER_TASK_SWITCH, NULL);
+	if (ret != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
+		return ret;
+	ret = __load_segment_descriptor(ctxt, tss->ss, VCPU_SREG_SS, cpl,
+					X86_TRANSFER_TASK_SWITCH, NULL);
+	if (ret != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
+		return ret;
+	ret = __load_segment_descriptor(ctxt, tss->ds, VCPU_SREG_DS, cpl,
+					X86_TRANSFER_TASK_SWITCH, NULL);
+	if (ret != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
+		return ret;
+
+	return X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
+}
+
+static int task_switch_16(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, u16 old_tss_sel,
+			  ulong old_tss_base, struct desc_struct *new_desc)
+{
+	struct tss_segment_16 tss_seg;
+	int ret;
+	u32 new_tss_base = get_desc_base(new_desc);
+
+	ret = linear_read_system(ctxt, old_tss_base, &tss_seg, sizeof(tss_seg));
+	if (ret != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
+		return ret;
+
+	save_state_to_tss16(ctxt, &tss_seg);
+
+	ret = linear_write_system(ctxt, old_tss_base, &tss_seg, sizeof(tss_seg));
+	if (ret != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
+		return ret;
+
+	ret = linear_read_system(ctxt, new_tss_base, &tss_seg, sizeof(tss_seg));
+	if (ret != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
+		return ret;
+
+	if (old_tss_sel != 0xffff) {
+		tss_seg.prev_task_link = old_tss_sel;
+
+		ret = linear_write_system(ctxt, new_tss_base,
+					  &tss_seg.prev_task_link,
+					  sizeof(tss_seg.prev_task_link));
+		if (ret != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
+			return ret;
+	}
+
+	return load_state_from_tss16(ctxt, &tss_seg);
+}
+
+static void save_state_to_tss32(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt,
+				struct tss_segment_32 *tss)
+{
+	/* CR3 and ldt selector are not saved intentionally */
+	tss->eip = ctxt->_eip;
+	tss->eflags = ctxt->eflags;
+	tss->eax = reg_read(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RAX);
+	tss->ecx = reg_read(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RCX);
+	tss->edx = reg_read(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RDX);
+	tss->ebx = reg_read(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RBX);
+	tss->esp = reg_read(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RSP);
+	tss->ebp = reg_read(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RBP);
+	tss->esi = reg_read(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RSI);
+	tss->edi = reg_read(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RDI);
+
+	tss->es = get_segment_selector(ctxt, VCPU_SREG_ES);
+	tss->cs = get_segment_selector(ctxt, VCPU_SREG_CS);
+	tss->ss = get_segment_selector(ctxt, VCPU_SREG_SS);
+	tss->ds = get_segment_selector(ctxt, VCPU_SREG_DS);
+	tss->fs = get_segment_selector(ctxt, VCPU_SREG_FS);
+	tss->gs = get_segment_selector(ctxt, VCPU_SREG_GS);
+}
+
+static int load_state_from_tss32(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt,
+				 struct tss_segment_32 *tss)
+{
+	int ret;
+	u8 cpl;
+
+	if (ctxt->ops->set_cr(ctxt, 3, tss->cr3))
+		return emulate_gp(ctxt, 0);
+	ctxt->_eip = tss->eip;
+	ctxt->eflags = tss->eflags | 2;
+
+	/* General purpose registers */
+	*reg_write(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RAX) = tss->eax;
+	*reg_write(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RCX) = tss->ecx;
+	*reg_write(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RDX) = tss->edx;
+	*reg_write(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RBX) = tss->ebx;
+	*reg_write(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RSP) = tss->esp;
+	*reg_write(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RBP) = tss->ebp;
+	*reg_write(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RSI) = tss->esi;
+	*reg_write(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RDI) = tss->edi;
+
+	/*
+	 * SDM says that segment selectors are loaded before segment
+	 * descriptors.  This is important because CPL checks will
+	 * use CS.RPL.
+	 */
+	set_segment_selector(ctxt, tss->ldt_selector, VCPU_SREG_LDTR);
+	set_segment_selector(ctxt, tss->es, VCPU_SREG_ES);
+	set_segment_selector(ctxt, tss->cs, VCPU_SREG_CS);
+	set_segment_selector(ctxt, tss->ss, VCPU_SREG_SS);
+	set_segment_selector(ctxt, tss->ds, VCPU_SREG_DS);
+	set_segment_selector(ctxt, tss->fs, VCPU_SREG_FS);
+	set_segment_selector(ctxt, tss->gs, VCPU_SREG_GS);
+
+	/*
+	 * If we're switching between Protected Mode and VM86, we need to make
+	 * sure to update the mode before loading the segment descriptors so
+	 * that the selectors are interpreted correctly.
+	 */
+	if (ctxt->eflags & X86_EFLAGS_VM) {
+		ctxt->mode = X86EMUL_MODE_VM86;
+		cpl = 3;
+	} else {
+		ctxt->mode = X86EMUL_MODE_PROT32;
+		cpl = tss->cs & 3;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Now load segment descriptors. If fault happens at this stage
+	 * it is handled in a context of new task
+	 */
+	ret = __load_segment_descriptor(ctxt, tss->ldt_selector, VCPU_SREG_LDTR,
+					cpl, X86_TRANSFER_TASK_SWITCH, NULL);
+	if (ret != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
+		return ret;
+	ret = __load_segment_descriptor(ctxt, tss->es, VCPU_SREG_ES, cpl,
+					X86_TRANSFER_TASK_SWITCH, NULL);
+	if (ret != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
+		return ret;
+	ret = __load_segment_descriptor(ctxt, tss->cs, VCPU_SREG_CS, cpl,
+					X86_TRANSFER_TASK_SWITCH, NULL);
+	if (ret != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
+		return ret;
+	ret = __load_segment_descriptor(ctxt, tss->ss, VCPU_SREG_SS, cpl,
+					X86_TRANSFER_TASK_SWITCH, NULL);
+	if (ret != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
+		return ret;
+	ret = __load_segment_descriptor(ctxt, tss->ds, VCPU_SREG_DS, cpl,
+					X86_TRANSFER_TASK_SWITCH, NULL);
+	if (ret != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
+		return ret;
+	ret = __load_segment_descriptor(ctxt, tss->fs, VCPU_SREG_FS, cpl,
+					X86_TRANSFER_TASK_SWITCH, NULL);
+	if (ret != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
+		return ret;
+	ret = __load_segment_descriptor(ctxt, tss->gs, VCPU_SREG_GS, cpl,
+					X86_TRANSFER_TASK_SWITCH, NULL);
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int task_switch_32(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, u16 old_tss_sel,
+			  ulong old_tss_base, struct desc_struct *new_desc)
+{
+	struct tss_segment_32 tss_seg;
+	int ret;
+	u32 new_tss_base = get_desc_base(new_desc);
+	u32 eip_offset = offsetof(struct tss_segment_32, eip);
+	u32 ldt_sel_offset = offsetof(struct tss_segment_32, ldt_selector);
+
+	ret = linear_read_system(ctxt, old_tss_base, &tss_seg, sizeof(tss_seg));
+	if (ret != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
+		return ret;
+
+	save_state_to_tss32(ctxt, &tss_seg);
+
+	/* Only GP registers and segment selectors are saved */
+	ret = linear_write_system(ctxt, old_tss_base + eip_offset, &tss_seg.eip,
+				  ldt_sel_offset - eip_offset);
+	if (ret != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
+		return ret;
+
+	ret = linear_read_system(ctxt, new_tss_base, &tss_seg, sizeof(tss_seg));
+	if (ret != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
+		return ret;
+
+	if (old_tss_sel != 0xffff) {
+		tss_seg.prev_task_link = old_tss_sel;
+
+		ret = linear_write_system(ctxt, new_tss_base,
+					  &tss_seg.prev_task_link,
+					  sizeof(tss_seg.prev_task_link));
+		if (ret != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
+			return ret;
+	}
+
+	return load_state_from_tss32(ctxt, &tss_seg);
+}
+
+static int emulator_do_task_switch(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt,
+				   u16 tss_selector, int idt_index, int reason,
+				   bool has_error_code, u32 error_code)
+{
+	const struct x86_emulate_ops *ops = ctxt->ops;
+	struct desc_struct curr_tss_desc, next_tss_desc;
+	int ret;
+	u16 old_tss_sel = get_segment_selector(ctxt, VCPU_SREG_TR);
+	ulong old_tss_base =
+		ops->get_cached_segment_base(ctxt, VCPU_SREG_TR);
+	u32 desc_limit;
+	ulong desc_addr, dr7;
+
+	/* FIXME: old_tss_base == ~0 ? */
+
+	ret = read_segment_descriptor(ctxt, tss_selector, &next_tss_desc, &desc_addr);
+	if (ret != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
+		return ret;
+	ret = read_segment_descriptor(ctxt, old_tss_sel, &curr_tss_desc, &desc_addr);
+	if (ret != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
+		return ret;
+
+	/* FIXME: check that next_tss_desc is tss */
+
+	/*
+	 * Check privileges. The three cases are task switch caused by...
+	 *
+	 * 1. jmp/call/int to task gate: Check against DPL of the task gate
+	 * 2. Exception/IRQ/iret: No check is performed
+	 * 3. jmp/call to TSS/task-gate: No check is performed since the
+	 *    hardware checks it before exiting.
+	 */
+	if (reason == TASK_SWITCH_GATE) {
+		if (idt_index != -1) {
+			/* Software interrupts */
+			struct desc_struct task_gate_desc;
+			int dpl;
+
+			ret = read_interrupt_descriptor(ctxt, idt_index,
+							&task_gate_desc);
+			if (ret != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
+				return ret;
+
+			dpl = task_gate_desc.dpl;
+			if ((tss_selector & 3) > dpl || ops->cpl(ctxt) > dpl)
+				return emulate_gp(ctxt, (idt_index << 3) | 0x2);
+		}
+	}
+
+	desc_limit = desc_limit_scaled(&next_tss_desc);
+	if (!next_tss_desc.p ||
+	    ((desc_limit < 0x67 && (next_tss_desc.type & 8)) ||
+	     desc_limit < 0x2b)) {
+		return emulate_ts(ctxt, tss_selector & 0xfffc);
+	}
+
+	if (reason == TASK_SWITCH_IRET || reason == TASK_SWITCH_JMP) {
+		curr_tss_desc.type &= ~(1 << 1); /* clear busy flag */
+		write_segment_descriptor(ctxt, old_tss_sel, &curr_tss_desc);
+	}
+
+	if (reason == TASK_SWITCH_IRET)
+		ctxt->eflags = ctxt->eflags & ~X86_EFLAGS_NT;
+
+	/* set back link to prev task only if NT bit is set in eflags
+	   note that old_tss_sel is not used after this point */
+	if (reason != TASK_SWITCH_CALL && reason != TASK_SWITCH_GATE)
+		old_tss_sel = 0xffff;
+
+	if (next_tss_desc.type & 8)
+		ret = task_switch_32(ctxt, old_tss_sel, old_tss_base, &next_tss_desc);
+	else
+		ret = task_switch_16(ctxt, old_tss_sel,
+				     old_tss_base, &next_tss_desc);
+	if (ret != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
+		return ret;
+
+	if (reason == TASK_SWITCH_CALL || reason == TASK_SWITCH_GATE)
+		ctxt->eflags = ctxt->eflags | X86_EFLAGS_NT;
+
+	if (reason != TASK_SWITCH_IRET) {
+		next_tss_desc.type |= (1 << 1); /* set busy flag */
+		write_segment_descriptor(ctxt, tss_selector, &next_tss_desc);
+	}
+
+	ops->set_cr(ctxt, 0,  ops->get_cr(ctxt, 0) | X86_CR0_TS);
+	ops->set_segment(ctxt, tss_selector, &next_tss_desc, 0, VCPU_SREG_TR);
+
+	if (has_error_code) {
+		ctxt->op_bytes = ctxt->ad_bytes = (next_tss_desc.type & 8) ? 4 : 2;
+		ctxt->lock_prefix = 0;
+		ctxt->src.val = (unsigned long) error_code;
+		ret = em_push(ctxt);
+	}
+
+	ops->get_dr(ctxt, 7, &dr7);
+	ops->set_dr(ctxt, 7, dr7 & ~(DR_LOCAL_ENABLE_MASK | DR_LOCAL_SLOWDOWN));
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+int emulator_task_switch(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt,
+			 u16 tss_selector, int idt_index, int reason,
+			 bool has_error_code, u32 error_code)
+{
+	int rc;
+
+	invalidate_registers(ctxt);
+	ctxt->_eip = ctxt->eip;
+	ctxt->dst.type = OP_NONE;
+
+	rc = emulator_do_task_switch(ctxt, tss_selector, idt_index, reason,
+				     has_error_code, error_code);
+
+	if (rc == X86EMUL_CONTINUE) {
+		ctxt->eip = ctxt->_eip;
+		writeback_registers(ctxt);
+	}
+
+	return (rc == X86EMUL_UNHANDLEABLE) ? EMULATION_FAILED : EMULATION_OK;
+}
+
+static void string_addr_inc(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, int reg,
+		struct operand *op)
+{
+	int df = (ctxt->eflags & X86_EFLAGS_DF) ? -op->count : op->count;
+
+	register_address_increment(ctxt, reg, df * op->bytes);
+	op->addr.mem.ea = register_address(ctxt, reg);
+}
+
+static int em_das(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
+{
+	u8 al, old_al;
+	bool af, cf, old_cf;
+
+	cf = ctxt->eflags & X86_EFLAGS_CF;
+	al = ctxt->dst.val;
+
+	old_al = al;
+	old_cf = cf;
+	cf = false;
+	af = ctxt->eflags & X86_EFLAGS_AF;
+	if ((al & 0x0f) > 9 || af) {
+		al -= 6;
+		cf = old_cf | (al >= 250);
+		af = true;
+	} else {
+		af = false;
+	}
+	if (old_al > 0x99 || old_cf) {
+		al -= 0x60;
+		cf = true;
+	}
+
+	ctxt->dst.val = al;
+	/* Set PF, ZF, SF */
+	ctxt->src.type = OP_IMM;
+	ctxt->src.val = 0;
+	ctxt->src.bytes = 1;
+	fastop(ctxt, em_or);
+	ctxt->eflags &= ~(X86_EFLAGS_AF | X86_EFLAGS_CF);
+	if (cf)
+		ctxt->eflags |= X86_EFLAGS_CF;
+	if (af)
+		ctxt->eflags |= X86_EFLAGS_AF;
+	return X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
+}
+
+static int em_aam(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
+{
+	u8 al, ah;
+
+	if (ctxt->src.val == 0)
+		return emulate_de(ctxt);
+
+	al = ctxt->dst.val & 0xff;
+	ah = al / ctxt->src.val;
+	al %= ctxt->src.val;
+
+	ctxt->dst.val = (ctxt->dst.val & 0xffff0000) | al | (ah << 8);
+
+	/* Set PF, ZF, SF */
+	ctxt->src.type = OP_IMM;
+	ctxt->src.val = 0;
+	ctxt->src.bytes = 1;
+	fastop(ctxt, em_or);
+
+	return X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
+}
+
+static int em_aad(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
+{
+	u8 al = ctxt->dst.val & 0xff;
+	u8 ah = (ctxt->dst.val >> 8) & 0xff;
+
+	al = (al + (ah * ctxt->src.val)) & 0xff;
+
+	ctxt->dst.val = (ctxt->dst.val & 0xffff0000) | al;
+
+	/* Set PF, ZF, SF */
+	ctxt->src.type = OP_IMM;
+	ctxt->src.val = 0;
+	ctxt->src.bytes = 1;
+	fastop(ctxt, em_or);
+
+	return X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
+}
+
+static int em_call(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
+{
+	int rc;
+	long rel = ctxt->src.val;
+
+	ctxt->src.val = (unsigned long)ctxt->_eip;
+	rc = jmp_rel(ctxt, rel);
+	if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
+		return rc;
+	return em_push(ctxt);
+}
+
+static int em_call_far(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
+{
+	u16 sel, old_cs;
+	ulong old_eip;
+	int rc;
+	struct desc_struct old_desc, new_desc;
+	const struct x86_emulate_ops *ops = ctxt->ops;
+	int cpl = ctxt->ops->cpl(ctxt);
+	enum x86emul_mode prev_mode = ctxt->mode;
+
+	old_eip = ctxt->_eip;
+	ops->get_segment(ctxt, &old_cs, &old_desc, NULL, VCPU_SREG_CS);
+
+	memcpy(&sel, ctxt->src.valptr + ctxt->op_bytes, 2);
+	rc = __load_segment_descriptor(ctxt, sel, VCPU_SREG_CS, cpl,
+				       X86_TRANSFER_CALL_JMP, &new_desc);
+	if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
+		return rc;
+
+	rc = assign_eip_far(ctxt, ctxt->src.val);
+	if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
+		goto fail;
+
+	ctxt->src.val = old_cs;
+	rc = em_push(ctxt);
+	if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
+		goto fail;
+
+	ctxt->src.val = old_eip;
+	rc = em_push(ctxt);
+	/* If we failed, we tainted the memory, but the very least we should
+	   restore cs */
+	if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE) {
+		pr_warn_once("faulting far call emulation tainted memory\n");
+		goto fail;
+	}
+	return rc;
+fail:
+	ops->set_segment(ctxt, old_cs, &old_desc, 0, VCPU_SREG_CS);
+	ctxt->mode = prev_mode;
+	return rc;
+
+}
+
+static int em_ret_near_imm(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
+{
+	int rc;
+	unsigned long eip;
+
+	rc = emulate_pop(ctxt, &eip, ctxt->op_bytes);
+	if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
+		return rc;
+	rc = assign_eip_near(ctxt, eip);
+	if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
+		return rc;
+	rsp_increment(ctxt, ctxt->src.val);
+	return X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
+}
+
+static int em_xchg(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
+{
+	/* Write back the register source. */
+	ctxt->src.val = ctxt->dst.val;
+	write_register_operand(&ctxt->src);
+
+	/* Write back the memory destination with implicit LOCK prefix. */
+	ctxt->dst.val = ctxt->src.orig_val;
+	ctxt->lock_prefix = 1;
+	return X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
+}
+
+static int em_imul_3op(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
+{
+	ctxt->dst.val = ctxt->src2.val;
+	return fastop(ctxt, em_imul);
+}
+
+static int em_cwd(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
+{
+	ctxt->dst.type = OP_REG;
+	ctxt->dst.bytes = ctxt->src.bytes;
+	ctxt->dst.addr.reg = reg_rmw(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RDX);
+	ctxt->dst.val = ~((ctxt->src.val >> (ctxt->src.bytes * 8 - 1)) - 1);
+
+	return X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
+}
+
+static int em_rdpid(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
+{
+	u64 tsc_aux = 0;
+
+	if (!ctxt->ops->guest_has_rdpid(ctxt))
+		return emulate_ud(ctxt);
+
+	ctxt->ops->get_msr(ctxt, MSR_TSC_AUX, &tsc_aux);
+	ctxt->dst.val = tsc_aux;
+	return X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
+}
+
+static int em_rdtsc(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
+{
+	u64 tsc = 0;
+
+	ctxt->ops->get_msr(ctxt, MSR_IA32_TSC, &tsc);
+	*reg_write(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RAX) = (u32)tsc;
+	*reg_write(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RDX) = tsc >> 32;
+	return X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
+}
+
+static int em_rdpmc(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
+{
+	u64 pmc;
+
+	if (ctxt->ops->read_pmc(ctxt, reg_read(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RCX), &pmc))
+		return emulate_gp(ctxt, 0);
+	*reg_write(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RAX) = (u32)pmc;
+	*reg_write(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RDX) = pmc >> 32;
+	return X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
+}
+
+static int em_mov(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
+{
+	memcpy(ctxt->dst.valptr, ctxt->src.valptr, sizeof(ctxt->src.valptr));
+	return X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
+}
+
+static int em_movbe(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
+{
+	u16 tmp;
+
+	if (!ctxt->ops->guest_has_movbe(ctxt))
+		return emulate_ud(ctxt);
+
+	switch (ctxt->op_bytes) {
+	case 2:
+		/*
+		 * From MOVBE definition: "...When the operand size is 16 bits,
+		 * the upper word of the destination register remains unchanged
+		 * ..."
+		 *
+		 * Both casting ->valptr and ->val to u16 breaks strict aliasing
+		 * rules so we have to do the operation almost per hand.
+		 */
+		tmp = (u16)ctxt->src.val;
+		ctxt->dst.val &= ~0xffffUL;
+		ctxt->dst.val |= (unsigned long)swab16(tmp);
+		break;
+	case 4:
+		ctxt->dst.val = swab32((u32)ctxt->src.val);
+		break;
+	case 8:
+		ctxt->dst.val = swab64(ctxt->src.val);
+		break;
+	default:
+		BUG();
+	}
+	return X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
+}
+
+static int em_cr_write(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
+{
+	int cr_num = ctxt->modrm_reg;
+	int r;
+
+	if (ctxt->ops->set_cr(ctxt, cr_num, ctxt->src.val))
+		return emulate_gp(ctxt, 0);
+
+	/* Disable writeback. */
+	ctxt->dst.type = OP_NONE;
+
+	if (cr_num == 0) {
+		/*
+		 * CR0 write might have updated CR0.PE and/or CR0.PG
+		 * which can affect the cpu's execution mode.
+		 */
+		r = emulator_recalc_and_set_mode(ctxt);
+		if (r != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
+			return r;
+	}
+
+	return X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
+}
+
+static int em_dr_write(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
+{
+	unsigned long val;
+
+	if (ctxt->mode == X86EMUL_MODE_PROT64)
+		val = ctxt->src.val & ~0ULL;
+	else
+		val = ctxt->src.val & ~0U;
+
+	/* #UD condition is already handled. */
+	if (ctxt->ops->set_dr(ctxt, ctxt->modrm_reg, val) < 0)
+		return emulate_gp(ctxt, 0);
+
+	/* Disable writeback. */
+	ctxt->dst.type = OP_NONE;
+	return X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
+}
+
+static int em_wrmsr(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
+{
+	u64 msr_index = reg_read(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RCX);
+	u64 msr_data;
+	int r;
+
+	msr_data = (u32)reg_read(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RAX)
+		| ((u64)reg_read(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RDX) << 32);
+	r = ctxt->ops->set_msr_with_filter(ctxt, msr_index, msr_data);
+
+	if (r == X86EMUL_PROPAGATE_FAULT)
+		return emulate_gp(ctxt, 0);
+
+	return r;
+}
+
+static int em_rdmsr(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
+{
+	u64 msr_index = reg_read(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RCX);
+	u64 msr_data;
+	int r;
+
+	r = ctxt->ops->get_msr_with_filter(ctxt, msr_index, &msr_data);
+
+	if (r == X86EMUL_PROPAGATE_FAULT)
+		return emulate_gp(ctxt, 0);
+
+	if (r == X86EMUL_CONTINUE) {
+		*reg_write(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RAX) = (u32)msr_data;
+		*reg_write(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RDX) = msr_data >> 32;
+	}
+	return r;
+}
+
+static int em_store_sreg(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, int segment)
+{
+	if (segment > VCPU_SREG_GS &&
+	    (ctxt->ops->get_cr(ctxt, 4) & X86_CR4_UMIP) &&
+	    ctxt->ops->cpl(ctxt) > 0)
+		return emulate_gp(ctxt, 0);
+
+	ctxt->dst.val = get_segment_selector(ctxt, segment);
+	if (ctxt->dst.bytes == 4 && ctxt->dst.type == OP_MEM)
+		ctxt->dst.bytes = 2;
+	return X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
+}
+
+static int em_mov_rm_sreg(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
+{
+	if (ctxt->modrm_reg > VCPU_SREG_GS)
+		return emulate_ud(ctxt);
+
+	return em_store_sreg(ctxt, ctxt->modrm_reg);
+}
+
+static int em_mov_sreg_rm(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
+{
+	u16 sel = ctxt->src.val;
+
+	if (ctxt->modrm_reg == VCPU_SREG_CS || ctxt->modrm_reg > VCPU_SREG_GS)
+		return emulate_ud(ctxt);
+
+	if (ctxt->modrm_reg == VCPU_SREG_SS)
+		ctxt->interruptibility = KVM_X86_SHADOW_INT_MOV_SS;
+
+	/* Disable writeback. */
+	ctxt->dst.type = OP_NONE;
+	return load_segment_descriptor(ctxt, sel, ctxt->modrm_reg);
+}
+
+static int em_sldt(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
+{
+	return em_store_sreg(ctxt, VCPU_SREG_LDTR);
+}
+
+static int em_lldt(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
+{
+	u16 sel = ctxt->src.val;
+
+	/* Disable writeback. */
+	ctxt->dst.type = OP_NONE;
+	return load_segment_descriptor(ctxt, sel, VCPU_SREG_LDTR);
+}
+
+static int em_str(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
+{
+	return em_store_sreg(ctxt, VCPU_SREG_TR);
+}
+
+static int em_ltr(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
+{
+	u16 sel = ctxt->src.val;
+
+	/* Disable writeback. */
+	ctxt->dst.type = OP_NONE;
+	return load_segment_descriptor(ctxt, sel, VCPU_SREG_TR);
+}
+
+static int em_invlpg(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
+{
+	int rc;
+	ulong linear;
+
+	rc = linearize(ctxt, ctxt->src.addr.mem, 1, false, &linear);
+	if (rc == X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
+		ctxt->ops->invlpg(ctxt, linear);
+	/* Disable writeback. */
+	ctxt->dst.type = OP_NONE;
+	return X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
+}
+
+static int em_clts(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
+{
+	ulong cr0;
+
+	cr0 = ctxt->ops->get_cr(ctxt, 0);
+	cr0 &= ~X86_CR0_TS;
+	ctxt->ops->set_cr(ctxt, 0, cr0);
+	return X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
+}
+
+static int em_hypercall(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
+{
+	int rc = ctxt->ops->fix_hypercall(ctxt);
+
+	if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
+		return rc;
+
+	/* Let the processor re-execute the fixed hypercall */
+	ctxt->_eip = ctxt->eip;
+	/* Disable writeback. */
+	ctxt->dst.type = OP_NONE;
+	return X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
+}
+
+static int emulate_store_desc_ptr(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt,
+				  void (*get)(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt,
+					      struct desc_ptr *ptr))
+{
+	struct desc_ptr desc_ptr;
+
+	if ((ctxt->ops->get_cr(ctxt, 4) & X86_CR4_UMIP) &&
+	    ctxt->ops->cpl(ctxt) > 0)
+		return emulate_gp(ctxt, 0);
+
+	if (ctxt->mode == X86EMUL_MODE_PROT64)
+		ctxt->op_bytes = 8;
+	get(ctxt, &desc_ptr);
+	if (ctxt->op_bytes == 2) {
+		ctxt->op_bytes = 4;
+		desc_ptr.address &= 0x00ffffff;
+	}
+	/* Disable writeback. */
+	ctxt->dst.type = OP_NONE;
+	return segmented_write_std(ctxt, ctxt->dst.addr.mem,
+				   &desc_ptr, 2 + ctxt->op_bytes);
+}
+
+static int em_sgdt(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
+{
+	return emulate_store_desc_ptr(ctxt, ctxt->ops->get_gdt);
+}
+
+static int em_sidt(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
+{
+	return emulate_store_desc_ptr(ctxt, ctxt->ops->get_idt);
+}
+
+static int em_lgdt_lidt(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, bool lgdt)
+{
+	struct desc_ptr desc_ptr;
+	int rc;
+
+	if (ctxt->mode == X86EMUL_MODE_PROT64)
+		ctxt->op_bytes = 8;
+	rc = read_descriptor(ctxt, ctxt->src.addr.mem,
+			     &desc_ptr.size, &desc_ptr.address,
+			     ctxt->op_bytes);
+	if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
+		return rc;
+	if (ctxt->mode == X86EMUL_MODE_PROT64 &&
+	    emul_is_noncanonical_address(desc_ptr.address, ctxt))
+		return emulate_gp(ctxt, 0);
+	if (lgdt)
+		ctxt->ops->set_gdt(ctxt, &desc_ptr);
+	else
+		ctxt->ops->set_idt(ctxt, &desc_ptr);
+	/* Disable writeback. */
+	ctxt->dst.type = OP_NONE;
+	return X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
+}
+
+static int em_lgdt(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
+{
+	return em_lgdt_lidt(ctxt, true);
+}
+
+static int em_lidt(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
+{
+	return em_lgdt_lidt(ctxt, false);
+}
+
+static int em_smsw(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
+{
+	if ((ctxt->ops->get_cr(ctxt, 4) & X86_CR4_UMIP) &&
+	    ctxt->ops->cpl(ctxt) > 0)
+		return emulate_gp(ctxt, 0);
+
+	if (ctxt->dst.type == OP_MEM)
+		ctxt->dst.bytes = 2;
+	ctxt->dst.val = ctxt->ops->get_cr(ctxt, 0);
+	return X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
+}
+
+static int em_lmsw(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
+{
+	ctxt->ops->set_cr(ctxt, 0, (ctxt->ops->get_cr(ctxt, 0) & ~0x0eul)
+			  | (ctxt->src.val & 0x0f));
+	ctxt->dst.type = OP_NONE;
+	return X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
+}
+
+static int em_loop(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
+{
+	int rc = X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
+
+	register_address_increment(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RCX, -1);
+	if ((address_mask(ctxt, reg_read(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RCX)) != 0) &&
+	    (ctxt->b == 0xe2 || test_cc(ctxt->b ^ 0x5, ctxt->eflags)))
+		rc = jmp_rel(ctxt, ctxt->src.val);
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static int em_jcxz(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
+{
+	int rc = X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
+
+	if (address_mask(ctxt, reg_read(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RCX)) == 0)
+		rc = jmp_rel(ctxt, ctxt->src.val);
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static int em_in(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
+{
+	if (!pio_in_emulated(ctxt, ctxt->dst.bytes, ctxt->src.val,
+			     &ctxt->dst.val))
+		return X86EMUL_IO_NEEDED;
+
+	return X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
+}
+
+static int em_out(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
+{
+	ctxt->ops->pio_out_emulated(ctxt, ctxt->src.bytes, ctxt->dst.val,
+				    &ctxt->src.val, 1);
+	/* Disable writeback. */
+	ctxt->dst.type = OP_NONE;
+	return X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
+}
+
+static int em_cli(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
+{
+	if (emulator_bad_iopl(ctxt))
+		return emulate_gp(ctxt, 0);
+
+	ctxt->eflags &= ~X86_EFLAGS_IF;
+	return X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
+}
+
+static int em_sti(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
+{
+	if (emulator_bad_iopl(ctxt))
+		return emulate_gp(ctxt, 0);
+
+	ctxt->interruptibility = KVM_X86_SHADOW_INT_STI;
+	ctxt->eflags |= X86_EFLAGS_IF;
+	return X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
+}
+
+static int em_cpuid(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
+{
+	u32 eax, ebx, ecx, edx;
+	u64 msr = 0;
+
+	ctxt->ops->get_msr(ctxt, MSR_MISC_FEATURES_ENABLES, &msr);
+	if (msr & MSR_MISC_FEATURES_ENABLES_CPUID_FAULT &&
+	    ctxt->ops->cpl(ctxt)) {
+		return emulate_gp(ctxt, 0);
+	}
+
+	eax = reg_read(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RAX);
+	ecx = reg_read(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RCX);
+	ctxt->ops->get_cpuid(ctxt, &eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx, false);
+	*reg_write(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RAX) = eax;
+	*reg_write(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RBX) = ebx;
+	*reg_write(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RCX) = ecx;
+	*reg_write(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RDX) = edx;
+	return X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
+}
+
+static int em_sahf(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
+{
+	u32 flags;
+
+	flags = X86_EFLAGS_CF | X86_EFLAGS_PF | X86_EFLAGS_AF | X86_EFLAGS_ZF |
+		X86_EFLAGS_SF;
+	flags &= *reg_rmw(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RAX) >> 8;
+
+	ctxt->eflags &= ~0xffUL;
+	ctxt->eflags |= flags | X86_EFLAGS_FIXED;
+	return X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
+}
+
+static int em_lahf(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
+{
+	*reg_rmw(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RAX) &= ~0xff00UL;
+	*reg_rmw(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RAX) |= (ctxt->eflags & 0xff) << 8;
+	return X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
+}
+
+static int em_bswap(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
+{
+	switch (ctxt->op_bytes) {
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+	case 8:
+		asm("bswap %0" : "+r"(ctxt->dst.val));
+		break;
+#endif
+	default:
+		asm("bswap %0" : "+r"(*(u32 *)&ctxt->dst.val));
+		break;
+	}
+	return X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
+}
+
+static int em_clflush(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
+{
+	/* emulating clflush regardless of cpuid */
+	return X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
+}
+
+static int em_clflushopt(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
+{
+	/* emulating clflushopt regardless of cpuid */
+	return X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
+}
+
+static int em_movsxd(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
+{
+	ctxt->dst.val = (s32) ctxt->src.val;
+	return X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
+}
+
+static int check_fxsr(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
+{
+	if (!ctxt->ops->guest_has_fxsr(ctxt))
+		return emulate_ud(ctxt);
+
+	if (ctxt->ops->get_cr(ctxt, 0) & (X86_CR0_TS | X86_CR0_EM))
+		return emulate_nm(ctxt);
+
+	/*
+	 * Don't emulate a case that should never be hit, instead of working
+	 * around a lack of fxsave64/fxrstor64 on old compilers.
+	 */
+	if (ctxt->mode >= X86EMUL_MODE_PROT64)
+		return X86EMUL_UNHANDLEABLE;
+
+	return X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Hardware doesn't save and restore XMM 0-7 without CR4.OSFXSR, but does save
+ * and restore MXCSR.
+ */
+static size_t __fxstate_size(int nregs)
+{
+	return offsetof(struct fxregs_state, xmm_space[0]) + nregs * 16;
+}
+
+static inline size_t fxstate_size(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
+{
+	bool cr4_osfxsr;
+	if (ctxt->mode == X86EMUL_MODE_PROT64)
+		return __fxstate_size(16);
+
+	cr4_osfxsr = ctxt->ops->get_cr(ctxt, 4) & X86_CR4_OSFXSR;
+	return __fxstate_size(cr4_osfxsr ? 8 : 0);
+}
+
+/*
+ * FXSAVE and FXRSTOR have 4 different formats depending on execution mode,
+ *  1) 16 bit mode
+ *  2) 32 bit mode
+ *     - like (1), but FIP and FDP (foo) are only 16 bit.  At least Intel CPUs
+ *       preserve whole 32 bit values, though, so (1) and (2) are the same wrt.
+ *       save and restore
+ *  3) 64-bit mode with REX.W prefix
+ *     - like (2), but XMM 8-15 are being saved and restored
+ *  4) 64-bit mode without REX.W prefix
+ *     - like (3), but FIP and FDP are 64 bit
+ *
+ * Emulation uses (3) for (1) and (2) and preserves XMM 8-15 to reach the
+ * desired result.  (4) is not emulated.
+ *
+ * Note: Guest and host CPUID.(EAX=07H,ECX=0H):EBX[bit 13] (deprecate FPU CS
+ * and FPU DS) should match.
+ */
+static int em_fxsave(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
+{
+	struct fxregs_state fx_state;
+	int rc;
+
+	rc = check_fxsr(ctxt);
+	if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
+		return rc;
+
+	kvm_fpu_get();
+
+	rc = asm_safe("fxsave %[fx]", , [fx] "+m"(fx_state));
+
+	kvm_fpu_put();
+
+	if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
+		return rc;
+
+	return segmented_write_std(ctxt, ctxt->memop.addr.mem, &fx_state,
+		                   fxstate_size(ctxt));
+}
+
+/*
+ * FXRSTOR might restore XMM registers not provided by the guest. Fill
+ * in the host registers (via FXSAVE) instead, so they won't be modified.
+ * (preemption has to stay disabled until FXRSTOR).
+ *
+ * Use noinline to keep the stack for other functions called by callers small.
+ */
+static noinline int fxregs_fixup(struct fxregs_state *fx_state,
+				 const size_t used_size)
+{
+	struct fxregs_state fx_tmp;
+	int rc;
+
+	rc = asm_safe("fxsave %[fx]", , [fx] "+m"(fx_tmp));
+	memcpy((void *)fx_state + used_size, (void *)&fx_tmp + used_size,
+	       __fxstate_size(16) - used_size);
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static int em_fxrstor(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
+{
+	struct fxregs_state fx_state;
+	int rc;
+	size_t size;
+
+	rc = check_fxsr(ctxt);
+	if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
+		return rc;
+
+	size = fxstate_size(ctxt);
+	rc = segmented_read_std(ctxt, ctxt->memop.addr.mem, &fx_state, size);
+	if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
+		return rc;
+
+	kvm_fpu_get();
+
+	if (size < __fxstate_size(16)) {
+		rc = fxregs_fixup(&fx_state, size);
+		if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
+			goto out;
+	}
+
+	if (fx_state.mxcsr >> 16) {
+		rc = emulate_gp(ctxt, 0);
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if (rc == X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
+		rc = asm_safe("fxrstor %[fx]", : [fx] "m"(fx_state));
+
+out:
+	kvm_fpu_put();
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static int em_xsetbv(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
+{
+	u32 eax, ecx, edx;
+
+	if (!(ctxt->ops->get_cr(ctxt, 4) & X86_CR4_OSXSAVE))
+		return emulate_ud(ctxt);
+
+	eax = reg_read(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RAX);
+	edx = reg_read(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RDX);
+	ecx = reg_read(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RCX);
+
+	if (ctxt->ops->set_xcr(ctxt, ecx, ((u64)edx << 32) | eax))
+		return emulate_gp(ctxt, 0);
+
+	return X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
+}
+
+static bool valid_cr(int nr)
+{
+	switch (nr) {
+	case 0:
+	case 2 ... 4:
+	case 8:
+		return true;
+	default:
+		return false;
+	}
+}
+
+static int check_cr_access(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
+{
+	if (!valid_cr(ctxt->modrm_reg))
+		return emulate_ud(ctxt);
+
+	return X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
+}
+
+static int check_dr7_gd(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
+{
+	unsigned long dr7;
+
+	ctxt->ops->get_dr(ctxt, 7, &dr7);
+
+	return dr7 & DR7_GD;
+}
+
+static int check_dr_read(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
+{
+	int dr = ctxt->modrm_reg;
+	u64 cr4;
+
+	if (dr > 7)
+		return emulate_ud(ctxt);
+
+	cr4 = ctxt->ops->get_cr(ctxt, 4);
+	if ((cr4 & X86_CR4_DE) && (dr == 4 || dr == 5))
+		return emulate_ud(ctxt);
+
+	if (check_dr7_gd(ctxt)) {
+		ulong dr6;
+
+		ctxt->ops->get_dr(ctxt, 6, &dr6);
+		dr6 &= ~DR_TRAP_BITS;
+		dr6 |= DR6_BD | DR6_ACTIVE_LOW;
+		ctxt->ops->set_dr(ctxt, 6, dr6);
+		return emulate_db(ctxt);
+	}
+
+	return X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
+}
+
+static int check_dr_write(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
+{
+	u64 new_val = ctxt->src.val64;
+	int dr = ctxt->modrm_reg;
+
+	if ((dr == 6 || dr == 7) && (new_val & 0xffffffff00000000ULL))
+		return emulate_gp(ctxt, 0);
+
+	return check_dr_read(ctxt);
+}
+
+static int check_svme(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
+{
+	u64 efer = 0;
+
+	ctxt->ops->get_msr(ctxt, MSR_EFER, &efer);
+
+	if (!(efer & EFER_SVME))
+		return emulate_ud(ctxt);
+
+	return X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
+}
+
+static int check_svme_pa(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
+{
+	u64 rax = reg_read(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RAX);
+
+	/* Valid physical address? */
+	if (rax & 0xffff000000000000ULL)
+		return emulate_gp(ctxt, 0);
+
+	return check_svme(ctxt);
+}
+
+static int check_rdtsc(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
+{
+	u64 cr4 = ctxt->ops->get_cr(ctxt, 4);
+
+	if (cr4 & X86_CR4_TSD && ctxt->ops->cpl(ctxt))
+		return emulate_gp(ctxt, 0);
+
+	return X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
+}
+
+static int check_rdpmc(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
+{
+	u64 cr4 = ctxt->ops->get_cr(ctxt, 4);
+	u64 rcx = reg_read(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RCX);
+
+	/*
+	 * VMware allows access to these Pseduo-PMCs even when read via RDPMC
+	 * in Ring3 when CR4.PCE=0.
+	 */
+	if (enable_vmware_backdoor && is_vmware_backdoor_pmc(rcx))
+		return X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
+
+	/*
+	 * If CR4.PCE is set, the SDM requires CPL=0 or CR0.PE=0.  The CR0.PE
+	 * check however is unnecessary because CPL is always 0 outside
+	 * protected mode.
+	 */
+	if ((!(cr4 & X86_CR4_PCE) && ctxt->ops->cpl(ctxt)) ||
+	    ctxt->ops->check_pmc(ctxt, rcx))
+		return emulate_gp(ctxt, 0);
+
+	return X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
+}
+
+static int check_perm_in(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
+{
+	ctxt->dst.bytes = min(ctxt->dst.bytes, 4u);
+	if (!emulator_io_permitted(ctxt, ctxt->src.val, ctxt->dst.bytes))
+		return emulate_gp(ctxt, 0);
+
+	return X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
+}
+
+static int check_perm_out(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
+{
+	ctxt->src.bytes = min(ctxt->src.bytes, 4u);
+	if (!emulator_io_permitted(ctxt, ctxt->dst.val, ctxt->src.bytes))
+		return emulate_gp(ctxt, 0);
+
+	return X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
+}
+
+#define D(_y) { .flags = (_y) }
+#define DI(_y, _i) { .flags = (_y)|Intercept, .intercept = x86_intercept_##_i }
+#define DIP(_y, _i, _p) { .flags = (_y)|Intercept|CheckPerm, \
+		      .intercept = x86_intercept_##_i, .check_perm = (_p) }
+#define N    D(NotImpl)
+#define EXT(_f, _e) { .flags = ((_f) | RMExt), .u.group = (_e) }
+#define G(_f, _g) { .flags = ((_f) | Group | ModRM), .u.group = (_g) }
+#define GD(_f, _g) { .flags = ((_f) | GroupDual | ModRM), .u.gdual = (_g) }
+#define ID(_f, _i) { .flags = ((_f) | InstrDual | ModRM), .u.idual = (_i) }
+#define MD(_f, _m) { .flags = ((_f) | ModeDual), .u.mdual = (_m) }
+#define E(_f, _e) { .flags = ((_f) | Escape | ModRM), .u.esc = (_e) }
+#define I(_f, _e) { .flags = (_f), .u.execute = (_e) }
+#define F(_f, _e) { .flags = (_f) | Fastop, .u.fastop = (_e) }
+#define II(_f, _e, _i) \
+	{ .flags = (_f)|Intercept, .u.execute = (_e), .intercept = x86_intercept_##_i }
+#define IIP(_f, _e, _i, _p) \
+	{ .flags = (_f)|Intercept|CheckPerm, .u.execute = (_e), \
+	  .intercept = x86_intercept_##_i, .check_perm = (_p) }
+#define GP(_f, _g) { .flags = ((_f) | Prefix), .u.gprefix = (_g) }
+
+#define D2bv(_f)      D((_f) | ByteOp), D(_f)
+#define D2bvIP(_f, _i, _p) DIP((_f) | ByteOp, _i, _p), DIP(_f, _i, _p)
+#define I2bv(_f, _e)  I((_f) | ByteOp, _e), I(_f, _e)
+#define F2bv(_f, _e)  F((_f) | ByteOp, _e), F(_f, _e)
+#define I2bvIP(_f, _e, _i, _p) \
+	IIP((_f) | ByteOp, _e, _i, _p), IIP(_f, _e, _i, _p)
+
+#define F6ALU(_f, _e) F2bv((_f) | DstMem | SrcReg | ModRM, _e),		\
+		F2bv(((_f) | DstReg | SrcMem | ModRM) & ~Lock, _e),	\
+		F2bv(((_f) & ~Lock) | DstAcc | SrcImm, _e)
+
+static const struct opcode group7_rm0[] = {
+	N,
+	I(SrcNone | Priv | EmulateOnUD,	em_hypercall),
+	N, N, N, N, N, N,
+};
+
+static const struct opcode group7_rm1[] = {
+	DI(SrcNone | Priv, monitor),
+	DI(SrcNone | Priv, mwait),
+	N, N, N, N, N, N,
+};
+
+static const struct opcode group7_rm2[] = {
+	N,
+	II(ImplicitOps | Priv,			em_xsetbv,	xsetbv),
+	N, N, N, N, N, N,
+};
+
+static const struct opcode group7_rm3[] = {
+	DIP(SrcNone | Prot | Priv,		vmrun,		check_svme_pa),
+	II(SrcNone  | Prot | EmulateOnUD,	em_hypercall,	vmmcall),
+	DIP(SrcNone | Prot | Priv,		vmload,		check_svme_pa),
+	DIP(SrcNone | Prot | Priv,		vmsave,		check_svme_pa),
+	DIP(SrcNone | Prot | Priv,		stgi,		check_svme),
+	DIP(SrcNone | Prot | Priv,		clgi,		check_svme),
+	DIP(SrcNone | Prot | Priv,		skinit,		check_svme),
+	DIP(SrcNone | Prot | Priv,		invlpga,	check_svme),
+};
+
+static const struct opcode group7_rm7[] = {
+	N,
+	DIP(SrcNone, rdtscp, check_rdtsc),
+	N, N, N, N, N, N,
+};
+
+static const struct opcode group1[] = {
+	F(Lock, em_add),
+	F(Lock | PageTable, em_or),
+	F(Lock, em_adc),
+	F(Lock, em_sbb),
+	F(Lock | PageTable, em_and),
+	F(Lock, em_sub),
+	F(Lock, em_xor),
+	F(NoWrite, em_cmp),
+};
+
+static const struct opcode group1A[] = {
+	I(DstMem | SrcNone | Mov | Stack | IncSP | TwoMemOp, em_pop), N, N, N, N, N, N, N,
+};
+
+static const struct opcode group2[] = {
+	F(DstMem | ModRM, em_rol),
+	F(DstMem | ModRM, em_ror),
+	F(DstMem | ModRM, em_rcl),
+	F(DstMem | ModRM, em_rcr),
+	F(DstMem | ModRM, em_shl),
+	F(DstMem | ModRM, em_shr),
+	F(DstMem | ModRM, em_shl),
+	F(DstMem | ModRM, em_sar),
+};
+
+static const struct opcode group3[] = {
+	F(DstMem | SrcImm | NoWrite, em_test),
+	F(DstMem | SrcImm | NoWrite, em_test),
+	F(DstMem | SrcNone | Lock, em_not),
+	F(DstMem | SrcNone | Lock, em_neg),
+	F(DstXacc | Src2Mem, em_mul_ex),
+	F(DstXacc | Src2Mem, em_imul_ex),
+	F(DstXacc | Src2Mem, em_div_ex),
+	F(DstXacc | Src2Mem, em_idiv_ex),
+};
+
+static const struct opcode group4[] = {
+	F(ByteOp | DstMem | SrcNone | Lock, em_inc),
+	F(ByteOp | DstMem | SrcNone | Lock, em_dec),
+	N, N, N, N, N, N,
+};
+
+static const struct opcode group5[] = {
+	F(DstMem | SrcNone | Lock,		em_inc),
+	F(DstMem | SrcNone | Lock,		em_dec),
+	I(SrcMem | NearBranch | IsBranch,       em_call_near_abs),
+	I(SrcMemFAddr | ImplicitOps | IsBranch, em_call_far),
+	I(SrcMem | NearBranch | IsBranch,       em_jmp_abs),
+	I(SrcMemFAddr | ImplicitOps | IsBranch, em_jmp_far),
+	I(SrcMem | Stack | TwoMemOp,		em_push), D(Undefined),
+};
+
+static const struct opcode group6[] = {
+	II(Prot | DstMem,	   em_sldt, sldt),
+	II(Prot | DstMem,	   em_str, str),
+	II(Prot | Priv | SrcMem16, em_lldt, lldt),
+	II(Prot | Priv | SrcMem16, em_ltr, ltr),
+	N, N, N, N,
+};
+
+static const struct group_dual group7 = { {
+	II(Mov | DstMem,			em_sgdt, sgdt),
+	II(Mov | DstMem,			em_sidt, sidt),
+	II(SrcMem | Priv,			em_lgdt, lgdt),
+	II(SrcMem | Priv,			em_lidt, lidt),
+	II(SrcNone | DstMem | Mov,		em_smsw, smsw), N,
+	II(SrcMem16 | Mov | Priv,		em_lmsw, lmsw),
+	II(SrcMem | ByteOp | Priv | NoAccess,	em_invlpg, invlpg),
+}, {
+	EXT(0, group7_rm0),
+	EXT(0, group7_rm1),
+	EXT(0, group7_rm2),
+	EXT(0, group7_rm3),
+	II(SrcNone | DstMem | Mov,		em_smsw, smsw), N,
+	II(SrcMem16 | Mov | Priv,		em_lmsw, lmsw),
+	EXT(0, group7_rm7),
+} };
+
+static const struct opcode group8[] = {
+	N, N, N, N,
+	F(DstMem | SrcImmByte | NoWrite,		em_bt),
+	F(DstMem | SrcImmByte | Lock | PageTable,	em_bts),
+	F(DstMem | SrcImmByte | Lock,			em_btr),
+	F(DstMem | SrcImmByte | Lock | PageTable,	em_btc),
+};
+
+/*
+ * The "memory" destination is actually always a register, since we come
+ * from the register case of group9.
+ */
+static const struct gprefix pfx_0f_c7_7 = {
+	N, N, N, II(DstMem | ModRM | Op3264 | EmulateOnUD, em_rdpid, rdpid),
+};
+
+
+static const struct group_dual group9 = { {
+	N, I(DstMem64 | Lock | PageTable, em_cmpxchg8b), N, N, N, N, N, N,
+}, {
+	N, N, N, N, N, N, N,
+	GP(0, &pfx_0f_c7_7),
+} };
+
+static const struct opcode group11[] = {
+	I(DstMem | SrcImm | Mov | PageTable, em_mov),
+	X7(D(Undefined)),
+};
+
+static const struct gprefix pfx_0f_ae_7 = {
+	I(SrcMem | ByteOp, em_clflush), I(SrcMem | ByteOp, em_clflushopt), N, N,
+};
+
+static const struct group_dual group15 = { {
+	I(ModRM | Aligned16, em_fxsave),
+	I(ModRM | Aligned16, em_fxrstor),
+	N, N, N, N, N, GP(0, &pfx_0f_ae_7),
+}, {
+	N, N, N, N, N, N, N, N,
+} };
+
+static const struct gprefix pfx_0f_6f_0f_7f = {
+	I(Mmx, em_mov), I(Sse | Aligned, em_mov), N, I(Sse | Unaligned, em_mov),
+};
+
+static const struct instr_dual instr_dual_0f_2b = {
+	I(0, em_mov), N
+};
+
+static const struct gprefix pfx_0f_2b = {
+	ID(0, &instr_dual_0f_2b), ID(0, &instr_dual_0f_2b), N, N,
+};
+
+static const struct gprefix pfx_0f_10_0f_11 = {
+	I(Unaligned, em_mov), I(Unaligned, em_mov), N, N,
+};
+
+static const struct gprefix pfx_0f_28_0f_29 = {
+	I(Aligned, em_mov), I(Aligned, em_mov), N, N,
+};
+
+static const struct gprefix pfx_0f_e7 = {
+	N, I(Sse, em_mov), N, N,
+};
+
+static const struct escape escape_d9 = { {
+	N, N, N, N, N, N, N, I(DstMem16 | Mov, em_fnstcw),
+}, {
+	/* 0xC0 - 0xC7 */
+	N, N, N, N, N, N, N, N,
+	/* 0xC8 - 0xCF */
+	N, N, N, N, N, N, N, N,
+	/* 0xD0 - 0xC7 */
+	N, N, N, N, N, N, N, N,
+	/* 0xD8 - 0xDF */
+	N, N, N, N, N, N, N, N,
+	/* 0xE0 - 0xE7 */
+	N, N, N, N, N, N, N, N,
+	/* 0xE8 - 0xEF */
+	N, N, N, N, N, N, N, N,
+	/* 0xF0 - 0xF7 */
+	N, N, N, N, N, N, N, N,
+	/* 0xF8 - 0xFF */
+	N, N, N, N, N, N, N, N,
+} };
+
+static const struct escape escape_db = { {
+	N, N, N, N, N, N, N, N,
+}, {
+	/* 0xC0 - 0xC7 */
+	N, N, N, N, N, N, N, N,
+	/* 0xC8 - 0xCF */
+	N, N, N, N, N, N, N, N,
+	/* 0xD0 - 0xC7 */
+	N, N, N, N, N, N, N, N,
+	/* 0xD8 - 0xDF */
+	N, N, N, N, N, N, N, N,
+	/* 0xE0 - 0xE7 */
+	N, N, N, I(ImplicitOps, em_fninit), N, N, N, N,
+	/* 0xE8 - 0xEF */
+	N, N, N, N, N, N, N, N,
+	/* 0xF0 - 0xF7 */
+	N, N, N, N, N, N, N, N,
+	/* 0xF8 - 0xFF */
+	N, N, N, N, N, N, N, N,
+} };
+
+static const struct escape escape_dd = { {
+	N, N, N, N, N, N, N, I(DstMem16 | Mov, em_fnstsw),
+}, {
+	/* 0xC0 - 0xC7 */
+	N, N, N, N, N, N, N, N,
+	/* 0xC8 - 0xCF */
+	N, N, N, N, N, N, N, N,
+	/* 0xD0 - 0xC7 */
+	N, N, N, N, N, N, N, N,
+	/* 0xD8 - 0xDF */
+	N, N, N, N, N, N, N, N,
+	/* 0xE0 - 0xE7 */
+	N, N, N, N, N, N, N, N,
+	/* 0xE8 - 0xEF */
+	N, N, N, N, N, N, N, N,
+	/* 0xF0 - 0xF7 */
+	N, N, N, N, N, N, N, N,
+	/* 0xF8 - 0xFF */
+	N, N, N, N, N, N, N, N,
+} };
+
+static const struct instr_dual instr_dual_0f_c3 = {
+	I(DstMem | SrcReg | ModRM | No16 | Mov, em_mov), N
+};
+
+static const struct mode_dual mode_dual_63 = {
+	N, I(DstReg | SrcMem32 | ModRM | Mov, em_movsxd)
+};
+
+static const struct instr_dual instr_dual_8d = {
+	D(DstReg | SrcMem | ModRM | NoAccess), N
+};
+
+static const struct opcode opcode_table[256] = {
+	/* 0x00 - 0x07 */
+	F6ALU(Lock, em_add),
+	I(ImplicitOps | Stack | No64 | Src2ES, em_push_sreg),
+	I(ImplicitOps | Stack | No64 | Src2ES, em_pop_sreg),
+	/* 0x08 - 0x0F */
+	F6ALU(Lock | PageTable, em_or),
+	I(ImplicitOps | Stack | No64 | Src2CS, em_push_sreg),
+	N,
+	/* 0x10 - 0x17 */
+	F6ALU(Lock, em_adc),
+	I(ImplicitOps | Stack | No64 | Src2SS, em_push_sreg),
+	I(ImplicitOps | Stack | No64 | Src2SS, em_pop_sreg),
+	/* 0x18 - 0x1F */
+	F6ALU(Lock, em_sbb),
+	I(ImplicitOps | Stack | No64 | Src2DS, em_push_sreg),
+	I(ImplicitOps | Stack | No64 | Src2DS, em_pop_sreg),
+	/* 0x20 - 0x27 */
+	F6ALU(Lock | PageTable, em_and), N, N,
+	/* 0x28 - 0x2F */
+	F6ALU(Lock, em_sub), N, I(ByteOp | DstAcc | No64, em_das),
+	/* 0x30 - 0x37 */
+	F6ALU(Lock, em_xor), N, N,
+	/* 0x38 - 0x3F */
+	F6ALU(NoWrite, em_cmp), N, N,
+	/* 0x40 - 0x4F */
+	X8(F(DstReg, em_inc)), X8(F(DstReg, em_dec)),
+	/* 0x50 - 0x57 */
+	X8(I(SrcReg | Stack, em_push)),
+	/* 0x58 - 0x5F */
+	X8(I(DstReg | Stack, em_pop)),
+	/* 0x60 - 0x67 */
+	I(ImplicitOps | Stack | No64, em_pusha),
+	I(ImplicitOps | Stack | No64, em_popa),
+	N, MD(ModRM, &mode_dual_63),
+	N, N, N, N,
+	/* 0x68 - 0x6F */
+	I(SrcImm | Mov | Stack, em_push),
+	I(DstReg | SrcMem | ModRM | Src2Imm, em_imul_3op),
+	I(SrcImmByte | Mov | Stack, em_push),
+	I(DstReg | SrcMem | ModRM | Src2ImmByte, em_imul_3op),
+	I2bvIP(DstDI | SrcDX | Mov | String | Unaligned, em_in, ins, check_perm_in), /* insb, insw/insd */
+	I2bvIP(SrcSI | DstDX | String, em_out, outs, check_perm_out), /* outsb, outsw/outsd */
+	/* 0x70 - 0x7F */
+	X16(D(SrcImmByte | NearBranch | IsBranch)),
+	/* 0x80 - 0x87 */
+	G(ByteOp | DstMem | SrcImm, group1),
+	G(DstMem | SrcImm, group1),
+	G(ByteOp | DstMem | SrcImm | No64, group1),
+	G(DstMem | SrcImmByte, group1),
+	F2bv(DstMem | SrcReg | ModRM | NoWrite, em_test),
+	I2bv(DstMem | SrcReg | ModRM | Lock | PageTable, em_xchg),
+	/* 0x88 - 0x8F */
+	I2bv(DstMem | SrcReg | ModRM | Mov | PageTable, em_mov),
+	I2bv(DstReg | SrcMem | ModRM | Mov, em_mov),
+	I(DstMem | SrcNone | ModRM | Mov | PageTable, em_mov_rm_sreg),
+	ID(0, &instr_dual_8d),
+	I(ImplicitOps | SrcMem16 | ModRM, em_mov_sreg_rm),
+	G(0, group1A),
+	/* 0x90 - 0x97 */
+	DI(SrcAcc | DstReg, pause), X7(D(SrcAcc | DstReg)),
+	/* 0x98 - 0x9F */
+	D(DstAcc | SrcNone), I(ImplicitOps | SrcAcc, em_cwd),
+	I(SrcImmFAddr | No64 | IsBranch, em_call_far), N,
+	II(ImplicitOps | Stack, em_pushf, pushf),
+	II(ImplicitOps | Stack, em_popf, popf),
+	I(ImplicitOps, em_sahf), I(ImplicitOps, em_lahf),
+	/* 0xA0 - 0xA7 */
+	I2bv(DstAcc | SrcMem | Mov | MemAbs, em_mov),
+	I2bv(DstMem | SrcAcc | Mov | MemAbs | PageTable, em_mov),
+	I2bv(SrcSI | DstDI | Mov | String | TwoMemOp, em_mov),
+	F2bv(SrcSI | DstDI | String | NoWrite | TwoMemOp, em_cmp_r),
+	/* 0xA8 - 0xAF */
+	F2bv(DstAcc | SrcImm | NoWrite, em_test),
+	I2bv(SrcAcc | DstDI | Mov | String, em_mov),
+	I2bv(SrcSI | DstAcc | Mov | String, em_mov),
+	F2bv(SrcAcc | DstDI | String | NoWrite, em_cmp_r),
+	/* 0xB0 - 0xB7 */
+	X8(I(ByteOp | DstReg | SrcImm | Mov, em_mov)),
+	/* 0xB8 - 0xBF */
+	X8(I(DstReg | SrcImm64 | Mov, em_mov)),
+	/* 0xC0 - 0xC7 */
+	G(ByteOp | Src2ImmByte, group2), G(Src2ImmByte, group2),
+	I(ImplicitOps | NearBranch | SrcImmU16 | IsBranch, em_ret_near_imm),
+	I(ImplicitOps | NearBranch | IsBranch, em_ret),
+	I(DstReg | SrcMemFAddr | ModRM | No64 | Src2ES, em_lseg),
+	I(DstReg | SrcMemFAddr | ModRM | No64 | Src2DS, em_lseg),
+	G(ByteOp, group11), G(0, group11),
+	/* 0xC8 - 0xCF */
+	I(Stack | SrcImmU16 | Src2ImmByte | IsBranch, em_enter),
+	I(Stack | IsBranch, em_leave),
+	I(ImplicitOps | SrcImmU16 | IsBranch, em_ret_far_imm),
+	I(ImplicitOps | IsBranch, em_ret_far),
+	D(ImplicitOps | IsBranch), DI(SrcImmByte | IsBranch, intn),
+	D(ImplicitOps | No64 | IsBranch),
+	II(ImplicitOps | IsBranch, em_iret, iret),
+	/* 0xD0 - 0xD7 */
+	G(Src2One | ByteOp, group2), G(Src2One, group2),
+	G(Src2CL | ByteOp, group2), G(Src2CL, group2),
+	I(DstAcc | SrcImmUByte | No64, em_aam),
+	I(DstAcc | SrcImmUByte | No64, em_aad),
+	F(DstAcc | ByteOp | No64, em_salc),
+	I(DstAcc | SrcXLat | ByteOp, em_mov),
+	/* 0xD8 - 0xDF */
+	N, E(0, &escape_d9), N, E(0, &escape_db), N, E(0, &escape_dd), N, N,
+	/* 0xE0 - 0xE7 */
+	X3(I(SrcImmByte | NearBranch | IsBranch, em_loop)),
+	I(SrcImmByte | NearBranch | IsBranch, em_jcxz),
+	I2bvIP(SrcImmUByte | DstAcc, em_in,  in,  check_perm_in),
+	I2bvIP(SrcAcc | DstImmUByte, em_out, out, check_perm_out),
+	/* 0xE8 - 0xEF */
+	I(SrcImm | NearBranch | IsBranch, em_call),
+	D(SrcImm | ImplicitOps | NearBranch | IsBranch),
+	I(SrcImmFAddr | No64 | IsBranch, em_jmp_far),
+	D(SrcImmByte | ImplicitOps | NearBranch | IsBranch),
+	I2bvIP(SrcDX | DstAcc, em_in,  in,  check_perm_in),
+	I2bvIP(SrcAcc | DstDX, em_out, out, check_perm_out),
+	/* 0xF0 - 0xF7 */
+	N, DI(ImplicitOps, icebp), N, N,
+	DI(ImplicitOps | Priv, hlt), D(ImplicitOps),
+	G(ByteOp, group3), G(0, group3),
+	/* 0xF8 - 0xFF */
+	D(ImplicitOps), D(ImplicitOps),
+	I(ImplicitOps, em_cli), I(ImplicitOps, em_sti),
+	D(ImplicitOps), D(ImplicitOps), G(0, group4), G(0, group5),
+};
+
+static const struct opcode twobyte_table[256] = {
+	/* 0x00 - 0x0F */
+	G(0, group6), GD(0, &group7), N, N,
+	N, I(ImplicitOps | EmulateOnUD | IsBranch, em_syscall),
+	II(ImplicitOps | Priv, em_clts, clts), N,
+	DI(ImplicitOps | Priv, invd), DI(ImplicitOps | Priv, wbinvd), N, N,
+	N, D(ImplicitOps | ModRM | SrcMem | NoAccess), N, N,
+	/* 0x10 - 0x1F */
+	GP(ModRM | DstReg | SrcMem | Mov | Sse, &pfx_0f_10_0f_11),
+	GP(ModRM | DstMem | SrcReg | Mov | Sse, &pfx_0f_10_0f_11),
+	N, N, N, N, N, N,
+	D(ImplicitOps | ModRM | SrcMem | NoAccess), /* 4 * prefetch + 4 * reserved NOP */
+	D(ImplicitOps | ModRM | SrcMem | NoAccess), N, N,
+	D(ImplicitOps | ModRM | SrcMem | NoAccess), /* 8 * reserved NOP */
+	D(ImplicitOps | ModRM | SrcMem | NoAccess), /* 8 * reserved NOP */
+	D(ImplicitOps | ModRM | SrcMem | NoAccess), /* 8 * reserved NOP */
+	D(ImplicitOps | ModRM | SrcMem | NoAccess), /* NOP + 7 * reserved NOP */
+	/* 0x20 - 0x2F */
+	DIP(ModRM | DstMem | Priv | Op3264 | NoMod, cr_read, check_cr_access),
+	DIP(ModRM | DstMem | Priv | Op3264 | NoMod, dr_read, check_dr_read),
+	IIP(ModRM | SrcMem | Priv | Op3264 | NoMod, em_cr_write, cr_write,
+						check_cr_access),
+	IIP(ModRM | SrcMem | Priv | Op3264 | NoMod, em_dr_write, dr_write,
+						check_dr_write),
+	N, N, N, N,
+	GP(ModRM | DstReg | SrcMem | Mov | Sse, &pfx_0f_28_0f_29),
+	GP(ModRM | DstMem | SrcReg | Mov | Sse, &pfx_0f_28_0f_29),
+	N, GP(ModRM | DstMem | SrcReg | Mov | Sse, &pfx_0f_2b),
+	N, N, N, N,
+	/* 0x30 - 0x3F */
+	II(ImplicitOps | Priv, em_wrmsr, wrmsr),
+	IIP(ImplicitOps, em_rdtsc, rdtsc, check_rdtsc),
+	II(ImplicitOps | Priv, em_rdmsr, rdmsr),
+	IIP(ImplicitOps, em_rdpmc, rdpmc, check_rdpmc),
+	I(ImplicitOps | EmulateOnUD | IsBranch, em_sysenter),
+	I(ImplicitOps | Priv | EmulateOnUD | IsBranch, em_sysexit),
+	N, N,
+	N, N, N, N, N, N, N, N,
+	/* 0x40 - 0x4F */
+	X16(D(DstReg | SrcMem | ModRM)),
+	/* 0x50 - 0x5F */
+	N, N, N, N, N, N, N, N, N, N, N, N, N, N, N, N,
+	/* 0x60 - 0x6F */
+	N, N, N, N,
+	N, N, N, N,
+	N, N, N, N,
+	N, N, N, GP(SrcMem | DstReg | ModRM | Mov, &pfx_0f_6f_0f_7f),
+	/* 0x70 - 0x7F */
+	N, N, N, N,
+	N, N, N, N,
+	N, N, N, N,
+	N, N, N, GP(SrcReg | DstMem | ModRM | Mov, &pfx_0f_6f_0f_7f),
+	/* 0x80 - 0x8F */
+	X16(D(SrcImm | NearBranch | IsBranch)),
+	/* 0x90 - 0x9F */
+	X16(D(ByteOp | DstMem | SrcNone | ModRM| Mov)),
+	/* 0xA0 - 0xA7 */
+	I(Stack | Src2FS, em_push_sreg), I(Stack | Src2FS, em_pop_sreg),
+	II(ImplicitOps, em_cpuid, cpuid),
+	F(DstMem | SrcReg | ModRM | BitOp | NoWrite, em_bt),
+	F(DstMem | SrcReg | Src2ImmByte | ModRM, em_shld),
+	F(DstMem | SrcReg | Src2CL | ModRM, em_shld), N, N,
+	/* 0xA8 - 0xAF */
+	I(Stack | Src2GS, em_push_sreg), I(Stack | Src2GS, em_pop_sreg),
+	II(EmulateOnUD | ImplicitOps, em_rsm, rsm),
+	F(DstMem | SrcReg | ModRM | BitOp | Lock | PageTable, em_bts),
+	F(DstMem | SrcReg | Src2ImmByte | ModRM, em_shrd),
+	F(DstMem | SrcReg | Src2CL | ModRM, em_shrd),
+	GD(0, &group15), F(DstReg | SrcMem | ModRM, em_imul),
+	/* 0xB0 - 0xB7 */
+	I2bv(DstMem | SrcReg | ModRM | Lock | PageTable | SrcWrite, em_cmpxchg),
+	I(DstReg | SrcMemFAddr | ModRM | Src2SS, em_lseg),
+	F(DstMem | SrcReg | ModRM | BitOp | Lock, em_btr),
+	I(DstReg | SrcMemFAddr | ModRM | Src2FS, em_lseg),
+	I(DstReg | SrcMemFAddr | ModRM | Src2GS, em_lseg),
+	D(DstReg | SrcMem8 | ModRM | Mov), D(DstReg | SrcMem16 | ModRM | Mov),
+	/* 0xB8 - 0xBF */
+	N, N,
+	G(BitOp, group8),
+	F(DstMem | SrcReg | ModRM | BitOp | Lock | PageTable, em_btc),
+	I(DstReg | SrcMem | ModRM, em_bsf_c),
+	I(DstReg | SrcMem | ModRM, em_bsr_c),
+	D(DstReg | SrcMem8 | ModRM | Mov), D(DstReg | SrcMem16 | ModRM | Mov),
+	/* 0xC0 - 0xC7 */
+	F2bv(DstMem | SrcReg | ModRM | SrcWrite | Lock, em_xadd),
+	N, ID(0, &instr_dual_0f_c3),
+	N, N, N, GD(0, &group9),
+	/* 0xC8 - 0xCF */
+	X8(I(DstReg, em_bswap)),
+	/* 0xD0 - 0xDF */
+	N, N, N, N, N, N, N, N, N, N, N, N, N, N, N, N,
+	/* 0xE0 - 0xEF */
+	N, N, N, N, N, N, N, GP(SrcReg | DstMem | ModRM | Mov, &pfx_0f_e7),
+	N, N, N, N, N, N, N, N,
+	/* 0xF0 - 0xFF */
+	N, N, N, N, N, N, N, N, N, N, N, N, N, N, N, N
+};
+
+static const struct instr_dual instr_dual_0f_38_f0 = {
+	I(DstReg | SrcMem | Mov, em_movbe), N
+};
+
+static const struct instr_dual instr_dual_0f_38_f1 = {
+	I(DstMem | SrcReg | Mov, em_movbe), N
+};
+
+static const struct gprefix three_byte_0f_38_f0 = {
+	ID(0, &instr_dual_0f_38_f0), N, N, N
+};
+
+static const struct gprefix three_byte_0f_38_f1 = {
+	ID(0, &instr_dual_0f_38_f1), N, N, N
+};
+
+/*
+ * Insns below are selected by the prefix which indexed by the third opcode
+ * byte.
+ */
+static const struct opcode opcode_map_0f_38[256] = {
+	/* 0x00 - 0x7f */
+	X16(N), X16(N), X16(N), X16(N), X16(N), X16(N), X16(N), X16(N),
+	/* 0x80 - 0xef */
+	X16(N), X16(N), X16(N), X16(N), X16(N), X16(N), X16(N),
+	/* 0xf0 - 0xf1 */
+	GP(EmulateOnUD | ModRM, &three_byte_0f_38_f0),
+	GP(EmulateOnUD | ModRM, &three_byte_0f_38_f1),
+	/* 0xf2 - 0xff */
+	N, N, X4(N), X8(N)
+};
+
+#undef D
+#undef N
+#undef G
+#undef GD
+#undef I
+#undef GP
+#undef EXT
+#undef MD
+#undef ID
+
+#undef D2bv
+#undef D2bvIP
+#undef I2bv
+#undef I2bvIP
+#undef I6ALU
+
+static unsigned imm_size(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
+{
+	unsigned size;
+
+	size = (ctxt->d & ByteOp) ? 1 : ctxt->op_bytes;
+	if (size == 8)
+		size = 4;
+	return size;
+}
+
+static int decode_imm(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, struct operand *op,
+		      unsigned size, bool sign_extension)
+{
+	int rc = X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
+
+	op->type = OP_IMM;
+	op->bytes = size;
+	op->addr.mem.ea = ctxt->_eip;
+	/* NB. Immediates are sign-extended as necessary. */
+	switch (op->bytes) {
+	case 1:
+		op->val = insn_fetch(s8, ctxt);
+		break;
+	case 2:
+		op->val = insn_fetch(s16, ctxt);
+		break;
+	case 4:
+		op->val = insn_fetch(s32, ctxt);
+		break;
+	case 8:
+		op->val = insn_fetch(s64, ctxt);
+		break;
+	}
+	if (!sign_extension) {
+		switch (op->bytes) {
+		case 1:
+			op->val &= 0xff;
+			break;
+		case 2:
+			op->val &= 0xffff;
+			break;
+		case 4:
+			op->val &= 0xffffffff;
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+done:
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static int decode_operand(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, struct operand *op,
+			  unsigned d)
+{
+	int rc = X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
+
+	switch (d) {
+	case OpReg:
+		decode_register_operand(ctxt, op);
+		break;
+	case OpImmUByte:
+		rc = decode_imm(ctxt, op, 1, false);
+		break;
+	case OpMem:
+		ctxt->memop.bytes = (ctxt->d & ByteOp) ? 1 : ctxt->op_bytes;
+	mem_common:
+		*op = ctxt->memop;
+		ctxt->memopp = op;
+		if (ctxt->d & BitOp)
+			fetch_bit_operand(ctxt);
+		op->orig_val = op->val;
+		break;
+	case OpMem64:
+		ctxt->memop.bytes = (ctxt->op_bytes == 8) ? 16 : 8;
+		goto mem_common;
+	case OpAcc:
+		op->type = OP_REG;
+		op->bytes = (ctxt->d & ByteOp) ? 1 : ctxt->op_bytes;
+		op->addr.reg = reg_rmw(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RAX);
+		fetch_register_operand(op);
+		op->orig_val = op->val;
+		break;
+	case OpAccLo:
+		op->type = OP_REG;
+		op->bytes = (ctxt->d & ByteOp) ? 2 : ctxt->op_bytes;
+		op->addr.reg = reg_rmw(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RAX);
+		fetch_register_operand(op);
+		op->orig_val = op->val;
+		break;
+	case OpAccHi:
+		if (ctxt->d & ByteOp) {
+			op->type = OP_NONE;
+			break;
+		}
+		op->type = OP_REG;
+		op->bytes = ctxt->op_bytes;
+		op->addr.reg = reg_rmw(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RDX);
+		fetch_register_operand(op);
+		op->orig_val = op->val;
+		break;
+	case OpDI:
+		op->type = OP_MEM;
+		op->bytes = (ctxt->d & ByteOp) ? 1 : ctxt->op_bytes;
+		op->addr.mem.ea =
+			register_address(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RDI);
+		op->addr.mem.seg = VCPU_SREG_ES;
+		op->val = 0;
+		op->count = 1;
+		break;
+	case OpDX:
+		op->type = OP_REG;
+		op->bytes = 2;
+		op->addr.reg = reg_rmw(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RDX);
+		fetch_register_operand(op);
+		break;
+	case OpCL:
+		op->type = OP_IMM;
+		op->bytes = 1;
+		op->val = reg_read(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RCX) & 0xff;
+		break;
+	case OpImmByte:
+		rc = decode_imm(ctxt, op, 1, true);
+		break;
+	case OpOne:
+		op->type = OP_IMM;
+		op->bytes = 1;
+		op->val = 1;
+		break;
+	case OpImm:
+		rc = decode_imm(ctxt, op, imm_size(ctxt), true);
+		break;
+	case OpImm64:
+		rc = decode_imm(ctxt, op, ctxt->op_bytes, true);
+		break;
+	case OpMem8:
+		ctxt->memop.bytes = 1;
+		if (ctxt->memop.type == OP_REG) {
+			ctxt->memop.addr.reg = decode_register(ctxt,
+					ctxt->modrm_rm, true);
+			fetch_register_operand(&ctxt->memop);
+		}
+		goto mem_common;
+	case OpMem16:
+		ctxt->memop.bytes = 2;
+		goto mem_common;
+	case OpMem32:
+		ctxt->memop.bytes = 4;
+		goto mem_common;
+	case OpImmU16:
+		rc = decode_imm(ctxt, op, 2, false);
+		break;
+	case OpImmU:
+		rc = decode_imm(ctxt, op, imm_size(ctxt), false);
+		break;
+	case OpSI:
+		op->type = OP_MEM;
+		op->bytes = (ctxt->d & ByteOp) ? 1 : ctxt->op_bytes;
+		op->addr.mem.ea =
+			register_address(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RSI);
+		op->addr.mem.seg = ctxt->seg_override;
+		op->val = 0;
+		op->count = 1;
+		break;
+	case OpXLat:
+		op->type = OP_MEM;
+		op->bytes = (ctxt->d & ByteOp) ? 1 : ctxt->op_bytes;
+		op->addr.mem.ea =
+			address_mask(ctxt,
+				reg_read(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RBX) +
+				(reg_read(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RAX) & 0xff));
+		op->addr.mem.seg = ctxt->seg_override;
+		op->val = 0;
+		break;
+	case OpImmFAddr:
+		op->type = OP_IMM;
+		op->addr.mem.ea = ctxt->_eip;
+		op->bytes = ctxt->op_bytes + 2;
+		insn_fetch_arr(op->valptr, op->bytes, ctxt);
+		break;
+	case OpMemFAddr:
+		ctxt->memop.bytes = ctxt->op_bytes + 2;
+		goto mem_common;
+	case OpES:
+		op->type = OP_IMM;
+		op->val = VCPU_SREG_ES;
+		break;
+	case OpCS:
+		op->type = OP_IMM;
+		op->val = VCPU_SREG_CS;
+		break;
+	case OpSS:
+		op->type = OP_IMM;
+		op->val = VCPU_SREG_SS;
+		break;
+	case OpDS:
+		op->type = OP_IMM;
+		op->val = VCPU_SREG_DS;
+		break;
+	case OpFS:
+		op->type = OP_IMM;
+		op->val = VCPU_SREG_FS;
+		break;
+	case OpGS:
+		op->type = OP_IMM;
+		op->val = VCPU_SREG_GS;
+		break;
+	case OpImplicit:
+		/* Special instructions do their own operand decoding. */
+	default:
+		op->type = OP_NONE; /* Disable writeback. */
+		break;
+	}
+
+done:
+	return rc;
+}
+
+int x86_decode_insn(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, void *insn, int insn_len, int emulation_type)
+{
+	int rc = X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
+	int mode = ctxt->mode;
+	int def_op_bytes, def_ad_bytes, goffset, simd_prefix;
+	bool op_prefix = false;
+	bool has_seg_override = false;
+	struct opcode opcode;
+	u16 dummy;
+	struct desc_struct desc;
+
+	ctxt->memop.type = OP_NONE;
+	ctxt->memopp = NULL;
+	ctxt->_eip = ctxt->eip;
+	ctxt->fetch.ptr = ctxt->fetch.data;
+	ctxt->fetch.end = ctxt->fetch.data + insn_len;
+	ctxt->opcode_len = 1;
+	ctxt->intercept = x86_intercept_none;
+	if (insn_len > 0)
+		memcpy(ctxt->fetch.data, insn, insn_len);
+	else {
+		rc = __do_insn_fetch_bytes(ctxt, 1);
+		if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
+			goto done;
+	}
+
+	switch (mode) {
+	case X86EMUL_MODE_REAL:
+	case X86EMUL_MODE_VM86:
+		def_op_bytes = def_ad_bytes = 2;
+		ctxt->ops->get_segment(ctxt, &dummy, &desc, NULL, VCPU_SREG_CS);
+		if (desc.d)
+			def_op_bytes = def_ad_bytes = 4;
+		break;
+	case X86EMUL_MODE_PROT16:
+		def_op_bytes = def_ad_bytes = 2;
+		break;
+	case X86EMUL_MODE_PROT32:
+		def_op_bytes = def_ad_bytes = 4;
+		break;
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+	case X86EMUL_MODE_PROT64:
+		def_op_bytes = 4;
+		def_ad_bytes = 8;
+		break;
+#endif
+	default:
+		return EMULATION_FAILED;
+	}
+
+	ctxt->op_bytes = def_op_bytes;
+	ctxt->ad_bytes = def_ad_bytes;
+
+	/* Legacy prefixes. */
+	for (;;) {
+		switch (ctxt->b = insn_fetch(u8, ctxt)) {
+		case 0x66:	/* operand-size override */
+			op_prefix = true;
+			/* switch between 2/4 bytes */
+			ctxt->op_bytes = def_op_bytes ^ 6;
+			break;
+		case 0x67:	/* address-size override */
+			if (mode == X86EMUL_MODE_PROT64)
+				/* switch between 4/8 bytes */
+				ctxt->ad_bytes = def_ad_bytes ^ 12;
+			else
+				/* switch between 2/4 bytes */
+				ctxt->ad_bytes = def_ad_bytes ^ 6;
+			break;
+		case 0x26:	/* ES override */
+			has_seg_override = true;
+			ctxt->seg_override = VCPU_SREG_ES;
+			break;
+		case 0x2e:	/* CS override */
+			has_seg_override = true;
+			ctxt->seg_override = VCPU_SREG_CS;
+			break;
+		case 0x36:	/* SS override */
+			has_seg_override = true;
+			ctxt->seg_override = VCPU_SREG_SS;
+			break;
+		case 0x3e:	/* DS override */
+			has_seg_override = true;
+			ctxt->seg_override = VCPU_SREG_DS;
+			break;
+		case 0x64:	/* FS override */
+			has_seg_override = true;
+			ctxt->seg_override = VCPU_SREG_FS;
+			break;
+		case 0x65:	/* GS override */
+			has_seg_override = true;
+			ctxt->seg_override = VCPU_SREG_GS;
+			break;
+		case 0x40 ... 0x4f: /* REX */
+			if (mode != X86EMUL_MODE_PROT64)
+				goto done_prefixes;
+			ctxt->rex_prefix = ctxt->b;
+			continue;
+		case 0xf0:	/* LOCK */
+			ctxt->lock_prefix = 1;
+			break;
+		case 0xf2:	/* REPNE/REPNZ */
+		case 0xf3:	/* REP/REPE/REPZ */
+			ctxt->rep_prefix = ctxt->b;
+			break;
+		default:
+			goto done_prefixes;
+		}
+
+		/* Any legacy prefix after a REX prefix nullifies its effect. */
+
+		ctxt->rex_prefix = 0;
+	}
+
+done_prefixes:
+
+	/* REX prefix. */
+	if (ctxt->rex_prefix & 8)
+		ctxt->op_bytes = 8;	/* REX.W */
+
+	/* Opcode byte(s). */
+	opcode = opcode_table[ctxt->b];
+	/* Two-byte opcode? */
+	if (ctxt->b == 0x0f) {
+		ctxt->opcode_len = 2;
+		ctxt->b = insn_fetch(u8, ctxt);
+		opcode = twobyte_table[ctxt->b];
+
+		/* 0F_38 opcode map */
+		if (ctxt->b == 0x38) {
+			ctxt->opcode_len = 3;
+			ctxt->b = insn_fetch(u8, ctxt);
+			opcode = opcode_map_0f_38[ctxt->b];
+		}
+	}
+	ctxt->d = opcode.flags;
+
+	if (ctxt->d & ModRM)
+		ctxt->modrm = insn_fetch(u8, ctxt);
+
+	/* vex-prefix instructions are not implemented */
+	if (ctxt->opcode_len == 1 && (ctxt->b == 0xc5 || ctxt->b == 0xc4) &&
+	    (mode == X86EMUL_MODE_PROT64 || (ctxt->modrm & 0xc0) == 0xc0)) {
+		ctxt->d = NotImpl;
+	}
+
+	while (ctxt->d & GroupMask) {
+		switch (ctxt->d & GroupMask) {
+		case Group:
+			goffset = (ctxt->modrm >> 3) & 7;
+			opcode = opcode.u.group[goffset];
+			break;
+		case GroupDual:
+			goffset = (ctxt->modrm >> 3) & 7;
+			if ((ctxt->modrm >> 6) == 3)
+				opcode = opcode.u.gdual->mod3[goffset];
+			else
+				opcode = opcode.u.gdual->mod012[goffset];
+			break;
+		case RMExt:
+			goffset = ctxt->modrm & 7;
+			opcode = opcode.u.group[goffset];
+			break;
+		case Prefix:
+			if (ctxt->rep_prefix && op_prefix)
+				return EMULATION_FAILED;
+			simd_prefix = op_prefix ? 0x66 : ctxt->rep_prefix;
+			switch (simd_prefix) {
+			case 0x00: opcode = opcode.u.gprefix->pfx_no; break;
+			case 0x66: opcode = opcode.u.gprefix->pfx_66; break;
+			case 0xf2: opcode = opcode.u.gprefix->pfx_f2; break;
+			case 0xf3: opcode = opcode.u.gprefix->pfx_f3; break;
+			}
+			break;
+		case Escape:
+			if (ctxt->modrm > 0xbf) {
+				size_t size = ARRAY_SIZE(opcode.u.esc->high);
+				u32 index = array_index_nospec(
+					ctxt->modrm - 0xc0, size);
+
+				opcode = opcode.u.esc->high[index];
+			} else {
+				opcode = opcode.u.esc->op[(ctxt->modrm >> 3) & 7];
+			}
+			break;
+		case InstrDual:
+			if ((ctxt->modrm >> 6) == 3)
+				opcode = opcode.u.idual->mod3;
+			else
+				opcode = opcode.u.idual->mod012;
+			break;
+		case ModeDual:
+			if (ctxt->mode == X86EMUL_MODE_PROT64)
+				opcode = opcode.u.mdual->mode64;
+			else
+				opcode = opcode.u.mdual->mode32;
+			break;
+		default:
+			return EMULATION_FAILED;
+		}
+
+		ctxt->d &= ~(u64)GroupMask;
+		ctxt->d |= opcode.flags;
+	}
+
+	ctxt->is_branch = opcode.flags & IsBranch;
+
+	/* Unrecognised? */
+	if (ctxt->d == 0)
+		return EMULATION_FAILED;
+
+	ctxt->execute = opcode.u.execute;
+
+	if (unlikely(emulation_type & EMULTYPE_TRAP_UD) &&
+	    likely(!(ctxt->d & EmulateOnUD)))
+		return EMULATION_FAILED;
+
+	if (unlikely(ctxt->d &
+	    (NotImpl|Stack|Op3264|Sse|Mmx|Intercept|CheckPerm|NearBranch|
+	     No16))) {
+		/*
+		 * These are copied unconditionally here, and checked unconditionally
+		 * in x86_emulate_insn.
+		 */
+		ctxt->check_perm = opcode.check_perm;
+		ctxt->intercept = opcode.intercept;
+
+		if (ctxt->d & NotImpl)
+			return EMULATION_FAILED;
+
+		if (mode == X86EMUL_MODE_PROT64) {
+			if (ctxt->op_bytes == 4 && (ctxt->d & Stack))
+				ctxt->op_bytes = 8;
+			else if (ctxt->d & NearBranch)
+				ctxt->op_bytes = 8;
+		}
+
+		if (ctxt->d & Op3264) {
+			if (mode == X86EMUL_MODE_PROT64)
+				ctxt->op_bytes = 8;
+			else
+				ctxt->op_bytes = 4;
+		}
+
+		if ((ctxt->d & No16) && ctxt->op_bytes == 2)
+			ctxt->op_bytes = 4;
+
+		if (ctxt->d & Sse)
+			ctxt->op_bytes = 16;
+		else if (ctxt->d & Mmx)
+			ctxt->op_bytes = 8;
+	}
+
+	/* ModRM and SIB bytes. */
+	if (ctxt->d & ModRM) {
+		rc = decode_modrm(ctxt, &ctxt->memop);
+		if (!has_seg_override) {
+			has_seg_override = true;
+			ctxt->seg_override = ctxt->modrm_seg;
+		}
+	} else if (ctxt->d & MemAbs)
+		rc = decode_abs(ctxt, &ctxt->memop);
+	if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
+		goto done;
+
+	if (!has_seg_override)
+		ctxt->seg_override = VCPU_SREG_DS;
+
+	ctxt->memop.addr.mem.seg = ctxt->seg_override;
+
+	/*
+	 * Decode and fetch the source operand: register, memory
+	 * or immediate.
+	 */
+	rc = decode_operand(ctxt, &ctxt->src, (ctxt->d >> SrcShift) & OpMask);
+	if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
+		goto done;
+
+	/*
+	 * Decode and fetch the second source operand: register, memory
+	 * or immediate.
+	 */
+	rc = decode_operand(ctxt, &ctxt->src2, (ctxt->d >> Src2Shift) & OpMask);
+	if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
+		goto done;
+
+	/* Decode and fetch the destination operand: register or memory. */
+	rc = decode_operand(ctxt, &ctxt->dst, (ctxt->d >> DstShift) & OpMask);
+
+	if (ctxt->rip_relative && likely(ctxt->memopp))
+		ctxt->memopp->addr.mem.ea = address_mask(ctxt,
+					ctxt->memopp->addr.mem.ea + ctxt->_eip);
+
+done:
+	if (rc == X86EMUL_PROPAGATE_FAULT)
+		ctxt->have_exception = true;
+	return (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE) ? EMULATION_FAILED : EMULATION_OK;
+}
+
+bool x86_page_table_writing_insn(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
+{
+	return ctxt->d & PageTable;
+}
+
+static bool string_insn_completed(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
+{
+	/* The second termination condition only applies for REPE
+	 * and REPNE. Test if the repeat string operation prefix is
+	 * REPE/REPZ or REPNE/REPNZ and if it's the case it tests the
+	 * corresponding termination condition according to:
+	 * 	- if REPE/REPZ and ZF = 0 then done
+	 * 	- if REPNE/REPNZ and ZF = 1 then done
+	 */
+	if (((ctxt->b == 0xa6) || (ctxt->b == 0xa7) ||
+	     (ctxt->b == 0xae) || (ctxt->b == 0xaf))
+	    && (((ctxt->rep_prefix == REPE_PREFIX) &&
+		 ((ctxt->eflags & X86_EFLAGS_ZF) == 0))
+		|| ((ctxt->rep_prefix == REPNE_PREFIX) &&
+		    ((ctxt->eflags & X86_EFLAGS_ZF) == X86_EFLAGS_ZF))))
+		return true;
+
+	return false;
+}
+
+static int flush_pending_x87_faults(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
+{
+	int rc;
+
+	kvm_fpu_get();
+	rc = asm_safe("fwait");
+	kvm_fpu_put();
+
+	if (unlikely(rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE))
+		return emulate_exception(ctxt, MF_VECTOR, 0, false);
+
+	return X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
+}
+
+static void fetch_possible_mmx_operand(struct operand *op)
+{
+	if (op->type == OP_MM)
+		kvm_read_mmx_reg(op->addr.mm, &op->mm_val);
+}
+
+static int fastop(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, fastop_t fop)
+{
+	ulong flags = (ctxt->eflags & EFLAGS_MASK) | X86_EFLAGS_IF;
+
+	if (!(ctxt->d & ByteOp))
+		fop += __ffs(ctxt->dst.bytes) * FASTOP_SIZE;
+
+	asm("push %[flags]; popf; " CALL_NOSPEC " ; pushf; pop %[flags]\n"
+	    : "+a"(ctxt->dst.val), "+d"(ctxt->src.val), [flags]"+D"(flags),
+	      [thunk_target]"+S"(fop), ASM_CALL_CONSTRAINT
+	    : "c"(ctxt->src2.val));
+
+	ctxt->eflags = (ctxt->eflags & ~EFLAGS_MASK) | (flags & EFLAGS_MASK);
+	if (!fop) /* exception is returned in fop variable */
+		return emulate_de(ctxt);
+	return X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
+}
+
+void init_decode_cache(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
+{
+	/* Clear fields that are set conditionally but read without a guard. */
+	ctxt->rip_relative = false;
+	ctxt->rex_prefix = 0;
+	ctxt->lock_prefix = 0;
+	ctxt->rep_prefix = 0;
+	ctxt->regs_valid = 0;
+	ctxt->regs_dirty = 0;
+
+	ctxt->io_read.pos = 0;
+	ctxt->io_read.end = 0;
+	ctxt->mem_read.end = 0;
+}
+
+int x86_emulate_insn(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
+{
+	const struct x86_emulate_ops *ops = ctxt->ops;
+	int rc = X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
+	int saved_dst_type = ctxt->dst.type;
+	bool is_guest_mode = ctxt->ops->is_guest_mode(ctxt);
+
+	ctxt->mem_read.pos = 0;
+
+	/* LOCK prefix is allowed only with some instructions */
+	if (ctxt->lock_prefix && (!(ctxt->d & Lock) || ctxt->dst.type != OP_MEM)) {
+		rc = emulate_ud(ctxt);
+		goto done;
+	}
+
+	if ((ctxt->d & SrcMask) == SrcMemFAddr && ctxt->src.type != OP_MEM) {
+		rc = emulate_ud(ctxt);
+		goto done;
+	}
+
+	if (unlikely(ctxt->d &
+		     (No64|Undefined|Sse|Mmx|Intercept|CheckPerm|Priv|Prot|String))) {
+		if ((ctxt->mode == X86EMUL_MODE_PROT64 && (ctxt->d & No64)) ||
+				(ctxt->d & Undefined)) {
+			rc = emulate_ud(ctxt);
+			goto done;
+		}
+
+		if (((ctxt->d & (Sse|Mmx)) && ((ops->get_cr(ctxt, 0) & X86_CR0_EM)))
+		    || ((ctxt->d & Sse) && !(ops->get_cr(ctxt, 4) & X86_CR4_OSFXSR))) {
+			rc = emulate_ud(ctxt);
+			goto done;
+		}
+
+		if ((ctxt->d & (Sse|Mmx)) && (ops->get_cr(ctxt, 0) & X86_CR0_TS)) {
+			rc = emulate_nm(ctxt);
+			goto done;
+		}
+
+		if (ctxt->d & Mmx) {
+			rc = flush_pending_x87_faults(ctxt);
+			if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
+				goto done;
+			/*
+			 * Now that we know the fpu is exception safe, we can fetch
+			 * operands from it.
+			 */
+			fetch_possible_mmx_operand(&ctxt->src);
+			fetch_possible_mmx_operand(&ctxt->src2);
+			if (!(ctxt->d & Mov))
+				fetch_possible_mmx_operand(&ctxt->dst);
+		}
+
+		if (unlikely(is_guest_mode) && ctxt->intercept) {
+			rc = emulator_check_intercept(ctxt, ctxt->intercept,
+						      X86_ICPT_PRE_EXCEPT);
+			if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
+				goto done;
+		}
+
+		/* Instruction can only be executed in protected mode */
+		if ((ctxt->d & Prot) && ctxt->mode < X86EMUL_MODE_PROT16) {
+			rc = emulate_ud(ctxt);
+			goto done;
+		}
+
+		/* Privileged instruction can be executed only in CPL=0 */
+		if ((ctxt->d & Priv) && ops->cpl(ctxt)) {
+			if (ctxt->d & PrivUD)
+				rc = emulate_ud(ctxt);
+			else
+				rc = emulate_gp(ctxt, 0);
+			goto done;
+		}
+
+		/* Do instruction specific permission checks */
+		if (ctxt->d & CheckPerm) {
+			rc = ctxt->check_perm(ctxt);
+			if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
+				goto done;
+		}
+
+		if (unlikely(is_guest_mode) && (ctxt->d & Intercept)) {
+			rc = emulator_check_intercept(ctxt, ctxt->intercept,
+						      X86_ICPT_POST_EXCEPT);
+			if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
+				goto done;
+		}
+
+		if (ctxt->rep_prefix && (ctxt->d & String)) {
+			/* All REP prefixes have the same first termination condition */
+			if (address_mask(ctxt, reg_read(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RCX)) == 0) {
+				string_registers_quirk(ctxt);
+				ctxt->eip = ctxt->_eip;
+				ctxt->eflags &= ~X86_EFLAGS_RF;
+				goto done;
+			}
+		}
+	}
+
+	if ((ctxt->src.type == OP_MEM) && !(ctxt->d & NoAccess)) {
+		rc = segmented_read(ctxt, ctxt->src.addr.mem,
+				    ctxt->src.valptr, ctxt->src.bytes);
+		if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
+			goto done;
+		ctxt->src.orig_val64 = ctxt->src.val64;
+	}
+
+	if (ctxt->src2.type == OP_MEM) {
+		rc = segmented_read(ctxt, ctxt->src2.addr.mem,
+				    &ctxt->src2.val, ctxt->src2.bytes);
+		if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
+			goto done;
+	}
+
+	if ((ctxt->d & DstMask) == ImplicitOps)
+		goto special_insn;
+
+
+	if ((ctxt->dst.type == OP_MEM) && !(ctxt->d & Mov)) {
+		/* optimisation - avoid slow emulated read if Mov */
+		rc = segmented_read(ctxt, ctxt->dst.addr.mem,
+				   &ctxt->dst.val, ctxt->dst.bytes);
+		if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE) {
+			if (!(ctxt->d & NoWrite) &&
+			    rc == X86EMUL_PROPAGATE_FAULT &&
+			    ctxt->exception.vector == PF_VECTOR)
+				ctxt->exception.error_code |= PFERR_WRITE_MASK;
+			goto done;
+		}
+	}
+	/* Copy full 64-bit value for CMPXCHG8B.  */
+	ctxt->dst.orig_val64 = ctxt->dst.val64;
+
+special_insn:
+
+	if (unlikely(is_guest_mode) && (ctxt->d & Intercept)) {
+		rc = emulator_check_intercept(ctxt, ctxt->intercept,
+					      X86_ICPT_POST_MEMACCESS);
+		if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
+			goto done;
+	}
+
+	if (ctxt->rep_prefix && (ctxt->d & String))
+		ctxt->eflags |= X86_EFLAGS_RF;
+	else
+		ctxt->eflags &= ~X86_EFLAGS_RF;
+
+	if (ctxt->execute) {
+		if (ctxt->d & Fastop)
+			rc = fastop(ctxt, ctxt->fop);
+		else
+			rc = ctxt->execute(ctxt);
+		if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
+			goto done;
+		goto writeback;
+	}
+
+	if (ctxt->opcode_len == 2)
+		goto twobyte_insn;
+	else if (ctxt->opcode_len == 3)
+		goto threebyte_insn;
+
+	switch (ctxt->b) {
+	case 0x70 ... 0x7f: /* jcc (short) */
+		if (test_cc(ctxt->b, ctxt->eflags))
+			rc = jmp_rel(ctxt, ctxt->src.val);
+		break;
+	case 0x8d: /* lea r16/r32, m */
+		ctxt->dst.val = ctxt->src.addr.mem.ea;
+		break;
+	case 0x90 ... 0x97: /* nop / xchg reg, rax */
+		if (ctxt->dst.addr.reg == reg_rmw(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RAX))
+			ctxt->dst.type = OP_NONE;
+		else
+			rc = em_xchg(ctxt);
+		break;
+	case 0x98: /* cbw/cwde/cdqe */
+		switch (ctxt->op_bytes) {
+		case 2: ctxt->dst.val = (s8)ctxt->dst.val; break;
+		case 4: ctxt->dst.val = (s16)ctxt->dst.val; break;
+		case 8: ctxt->dst.val = (s32)ctxt->dst.val; break;
+		}
+		break;
+	case 0xcc:		/* int3 */
+		rc = emulate_int(ctxt, 3);
+		break;
+	case 0xcd:		/* int n */
+		rc = emulate_int(ctxt, ctxt->src.val);
+		break;
+	case 0xce:		/* into */
+		if (ctxt->eflags & X86_EFLAGS_OF)
+			rc = emulate_int(ctxt, 4);
+		break;
+	case 0xe9: /* jmp rel */
+	case 0xeb: /* jmp rel short */
+		rc = jmp_rel(ctxt, ctxt->src.val);
+		ctxt->dst.type = OP_NONE; /* Disable writeback. */
+		break;
+	case 0xf4:              /* hlt */
+		ctxt->ops->halt(ctxt);
+		break;
+	case 0xf5:	/* cmc */
+		/* complement carry flag from eflags reg */
+		ctxt->eflags ^= X86_EFLAGS_CF;
+		break;
+	case 0xf8: /* clc */
+		ctxt->eflags &= ~X86_EFLAGS_CF;
+		break;
+	case 0xf9: /* stc */
+		ctxt->eflags |= X86_EFLAGS_CF;
+		break;
+	case 0xfc: /* cld */
+		ctxt->eflags &= ~X86_EFLAGS_DF;
+		break;
+	case 0xfd: /* std */
+		ctxt->eflags |= X86_EFLAGS_DF;
+		break;
+	default:
+		goto cannot_emulate;
+	}
+
+	if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
+		goto done;
+
+writeback:
+	if (ctxt->d & SrcWrite) {
+		BUG_ON(ctxt->src.type == OP_MEM || ctxt->src.type == OP_MEM_STR);
+		rc = writeback(ctxt, &ctxt->src);
+		if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
+			goto done;
+	}
+	if (!(ctxt->d & NoWrite)) {
+		rc = writeback(ctxt, &ctxt->dst);
+		if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
+			goto done;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * restore dst type in case the decoding will be reused
+	 * (happens for string instruction )
+	 */
+	ctxt->dst.type = saved_dst_type;
+
+	if ((ctxt->d & SrcMask) == SrcSI)
+		string_addr_inc(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RSI, &ctxt->src);
+
+	if ((ctxt->d & DstMask) == DstDI)
+		string_addr_inc(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RDI, &ctxt->dst);
+
+	if (ctxt->rep_prefix && (ctxt->d & String)) {
+		unsigned int count;
+		struct read_cache *r = &ctxt->io_read;
+		if ((ctxt->d & SrcMask) == SrcSI)
+			count = ctxt->src.count;
+		else
+			count = ctxt->dst.count;
+		register_address_increment(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RCX, -count);
+
+		if (!string_insn_completed(ctxt)) {
+			/*
+			 * Re-enter guest when pio read ahead buffer is empty
+			 * or, if it is not used, after each 1024 iteration.
+			 */
+			if ((r->end != 0 || reg_read(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RCX) & 0x3ff) &&
+			    (r->end == 0 || r->end != r->pos)) {
+				/*
+				 * Reset read cache. Usually happens before
+				 * decode, but since instruction is restarted
+				 * we have to do it here.
+				 */
+				ctxt->mem_read.end = 0;
+				writeback_registers(ctxt);
+				return EMULATION_RESTART;
+			}
+			goto done; /* skip rip writeback */
+		}
+		ctxt->eflags &= ~X86_EFLAGS_RF;
+	}
+
+	ctxt->eip = ctxt->_eip;
+	if (ctxt->mode != X86EMUL_MODE_PROT64)
+		ctxt->eip = (u32)ctxt->_eip;
+
+done:
+	if (rc == X86EMUL_PROPAGATE_FAULT) {
+		if (KVM_EMULATOR_BUG_ON(ctxt->exception.vector > 0x1f, ctxt))
+			return EMULATION_FAILED;
+		ctxt->have_exception = true;
+	}
+	if (rc == X86EMUL_INTERCEPTED)
+		return EMULATION_INTERCEPTED;
+
+	if (rc == X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
+		writeback_registers(ctxt);
+
+	return (rc == X86EMUL_UNHANDLEABLE) ? EMULATION_FAILED : EMULATION_OK;
+
+twobyte_insn:
+	switch (ctxt->b) {
+	case 0x09:		/* wbinvd */
+		(ctxt->ops->wbinvd)(ctxt);
+		break;
+	case 0x08:		/* invd */
+	case 0x0d:		/* GrpP (prefetch) */
+	case 0x18:		/* Grp16 (prefetch/nop) */
+	case 0x1f:		/* nop */
+		break;
+	case 0x20: /* mov cr, reg */
+		ctxt->dst.val = ops->get_cr(ctxt, ctxt->modrm_reg);
+		break;
+	case 0x21: /* mov from dr to reg */
+		ops->get_dr(ctxt, ctxt->modrm_reg, &ctxt->dst.val);
+		break;
+	case 0x40 ... 0x4f:	/* cmov */
+		if (test_cc(ctxt->b, ctxt->eflags))
+			ctxt->dst.val = ctxt->src.val;
+		else if (ctxt->op_bytes != 4)
+			ctxt->dst.type = OP_NONE; /* no writeback */
+		break;
+	case 0x80 ... 0x8f: /* jnz rel, etc*/
+		if (test_cc(ctxt->b, ctxt->eflags))
+			rc = jmp_rel(ctxt, ctxt->src.val);
+		break;
+	case 0x90 ... 0x9f:     /* setcc r/m8 */
+		ctxt->dst.val = test_cc(ctxt->b, ctxt->eflags);
+		break;
+	case 0xb6 ... 0xb7:	/* movzx */
+		ctxt->dst.bytes = ctxt->op_bytes;
+		ctxt->dst.val = (ctxt->src.bytes == 1) ? (u8) ctxt->src.val
+						       : (u16) ctxt->src.val;
+		break;
+	case 0xbe ... 0xbf:	/* movsx */
+		ctxt->dst.bytes = ctxt->op_bytes;
+		ctxt->dst.val = (ctxt->src.bytes == 1) ? (s8) ctxt->src.val :
+							(s16) ctxt->src.val;
+		break;
+	default:
+		goto cannot_emulate;
+	}
+
+threebyte_insn:
+
+	if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
+		goto done;
+
+	goto writeback;
+
+cannot_emulate:
+	return EMULATION_FAILED;
+}
+
+void emulator_invalidate_register_cache(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
+{
+	invalidate_registers(ctxt);
+}
+
+void emulator_writeback_register_cache(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
+{
+	writeback_registers(ctxt);
+}
+
+bool emulator_can_use_gpa(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
+{
+	if (ctxt->rep_prefix && (ctxt->d & String))
+		return false;
+
+	if (ctxt->d & TwoMemOp)
+		return false;
+
+	return true;
+}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/fpu.h b/arch/x86/kvm/fpu.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..3ba12888b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/fpu.h
@@ -0,0 +1,140 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+
+#ifndef __KVM_FPU_H_
+#define __KVM_FPU_H_
+
+#include <asm/fpu/api.h>
+
+typedef u32		__attribute__((vector_size(16))) sse128_t;
+#define __sse128_u	union { sse128_t vec; u64 as_u64[2]; u32 as_u32[4]; }
+#define sse128_lo(x)	({ __sse128_u t; t.vec = x; t.as_u64[0]; })
+#define sse128_hi(x)	({ __sse128_u t; t.vec = x; t.as_u64[1]; })
+#define sse128_l0(x)	({ __sse128_u t; t.vec = x; t.as_u32[0]; })
+#define sse128_l1(x)	({ __sse128_u t; t.vec = x; t.as_u32[1]; })
+#define sse128_l2(x)	({ __sse128_u t; t.vec = x; t.as_u32[2]; })
+#define sse128_l3(x)	({ __sse128_u t; t.vec = x; t.as_u32[3]; })
+#define sse128(lo, hi)	({ __sse128_u t; t.as_u64[0] = lo; t.as_u64[1] = hi; t.vec; })
+
+static inline void _kvm_read_sse_reg(int reg, sse128_t *data)
+{
+	switch (reg) {
+	case 0: asm("movdqa %%xmm0, %0" : "=m"(*data)); break;
+	case 1: asm("movdqa %%xmm1, %0" : "=m"(*data)); break;
+	case 2: asm("movdqa %%xmm2, %0" : "=m"(*data)); break;
+	case 3: asm("movdqa %%xmm3, %0" : "=m"(*data)); break;
+	case 4: asm("movdqa %%xmm4, %0" : "=m"(*data)); break;
+	case 5: asm("movdqa %%xmm5, %0" : "=m"(*data)); break;
+	case 6: asm("movdqa %%xmm6, %0" : "=m"(*data)); break;
+	case 7: asm("movdqa %%xmm7, %0" : "=m"(*data)); break;
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+	case 8: asm("movdqa %%xmm8, %0" : "=m"(*data)); break;
+	case 9: asm("movdqa %%xmm9, %0" : "=m"(*data)); break;
+	case 10: asm("movdqa %%xmm10, %0" : "=m"(*data)); break;
+	case 11: asm("movdqa %%xmm11, %0" : "=m"(*data)); break;
+	case 12: asm("movdqa %%xmm12, %0" : "=m"(*data)); break;
+	case 13: asm("movdqa %%xmm13, %0" : "=m"(*data)); break;
+	case 14: asm("movdqa %%xmm14, %0" : "=m"(*data)); break;
+	case 15: asm("movdqa %%xmm15, %0" : "=m"(*data)); break;
+#endif
+	default: BUG();
+	}
+}
+
+static inline void _kvm_write_sse_reg(int reg, const sse128_t *data)
+{
+	switch (reg) {
+	case 0: asm("movdqa %0, %%xmm0" : : "m"(*data)); break;
+	case 1: asm("movdqa %0, %%xmm1" : : "m"(*data)); break;
+	case 2: asm("movdqa %0, %%xmm2" : : "m"(*data)); break;
+	case 3: asm("movdqa %0, %%xmm3" : : "m"(*data)); break;
+	case 4: asm("movdqa %0, %%xmm4" : : "m"(*data)); break;
+	case 5: asm("movdqa %0, %%xmm5" : : "m"(*data)); break;
+	case 6: asm("movdqa %0, %%xmm6" : : "m"(*data)); break;
+	case 7: asm("movdqa %0, %%xmm7" : : "m"(*data)); break;
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+	case 8: asm("movdqa %0, %%xmm8" : : "m"(*data)); break;
+	case 9: asm("movdqa %0, %%xmm9" : : "m"(*data)); break;
+	case 10: asm("movdqa %0, %%xmm10" : : "m"(*data)); break;
+	case 11: asm("movdqa %0, %%xmm11" : : "m"(*data)); break;
+	case 12: asm("movdqa %0, %%xmm12" : : "m"(*data)); break;
+	case 13: asm("movdqa %0, %%xmm13" : : "m"(*data)); break;
+	case 14: asm("movdqa %0, %%xmm14" : : "m"(*data)); break;
+	case 15: asm("movdqa %0, %%xmm15" : : "m"(*data)); break;
+#endif
+	default: BUG();
+	}
+}
+
+static inline void _kvm_read_mmx_reg(int reg, u64 *data)
+{
+	switch (reg) {
+	case 0: asm("movq %%mm0, %0" : "=m"(*data)); break;
+	case 1: asm("movq %%mm1, %0" : "=m"(*data)); break;
+	case 2: asm("movq %%mm2, %0" : "=m"(*data)); break;
+	case 3: asm("movq %%mm3, %0" : "=m"(*data)); break;
+	case 4: asm("movq %%mm4, %0" : "=m"(*data)); break;
+	case 5: asm("movq %%mm5, %0" : "=m"(*data)); break;
+	case 6: asm("movq %%mm6, %0" : "=m"(*data)); break;
+	case 7: asm("movq %%mm7, %0" : "=m"(*data)); break;
+	default: BUG();
+	}
+}
+
+static inline void _kvm_write_mmx_reg(int reg, const u64 *data)
+{
+	switch (reg) {
+	case 0: asm("movq %0, %%mm0" : : "m"(*data)); break;
+	case 1: asm("movq %0, %%mm1" : : "m"(*data)); break;
+	case 2: asm("movq %0, %%mm2" : : "m"(*data)); break;
+	case 3: asm("movq %0, %%mm3" : : "m"(*data)); break;
+	case 4: asm("movq %0, %%mm4" : : "m"(*data)); break;
+	case 5: asm("movq %0, %%mm5" : : "m"(*data)); break;
+	case 6: asm("movq %0, %%mm6" : : "m"(*data)); break;
+	case 7: asm("movq %0, %%mm7" : : "m"(*data)); break;
+	default: BUG();
+	}
+}
+
+static inline void kvm_fpu_get(void)
+{
+	fpregs_lock();
+
+	fpregs_assert_state_consistent();
+	if (test_thread_flag(TIF_NEED_FPU_LOAD))
+		switch_fpu_return();
+}
+
+static inline void kvm_fpu_put(void)
+{
+	fpregs_unlock();
+}
+
+static inline void kvm_read_sse_reg(int reg, sse128_t *data)
+{
+	kvm_fpu_get();
+	_kvm_read_sse_reg(reg, data);
+	kvm_fpu_put();
+}
+
+static inline void kvm_write_sse_reg(int reg, const sse128_t *data)
+{
+	kvm_fpu_get();
+	_kvm_write_sse_reg(reg, data);
+	kvm_fpu_put();
+}
+
+static inline void kvm_read_mmx_reg(int reg, u64 *data)
+{
+	kvm_fpu_get();
+	_kvm_read_mmx_reg(reg, data);
+	kvm_fpu_put();
+}
+
+static inline void kvm_write_mmx_reg(int reg, const u64 *data)
+{
+	kvm_fpu_get();
+	_kvm_write_mmx_reg(reg, data);
+	kvm_fpu_put();
+}
+
+#endif
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/governed_features.h b/arch/x86/kvm/governed_features.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..423a73395
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/governed_features.h
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+#if !defined(KVM_GOVERNED_FEATURE) || defined(KVM_GOVERNED_X86_FEATURE)
+BUILD_BUG()
+#endif
+
+#define KVM_GOVERNED_X86_FEATURE(x) KVM_GOVERNED_FEATURE(X86_FEATURE_##x)
+
+KVM_GOVERNED_X86_FEATURE(GBPAGES)
+KVM_GOVERNED_X86_FEATURE(XSAVES)
+KVM_GOVERNED_X86_FEATURE(VMX)
+KVM_GOVERNED_X86_FEATURE(NRIPS)
+KVM_GOVERNED_X86_FEATURE(TSCRATEMSR)
+KVM_GOVERNED_X86_FEATURE(V_VMSAVE_VMLOAD)
+KVM_GOVERNED_X86_FEATURE(LBRV)
+KVM_GOVERNED_X86_FEATURE(PAUSEFILTER)
+KVM_GOVERNED_X86_FEATURE(PFTHRESHOLD)
+KVM_GOVERNED_X86_FEATURE(VGIF)
+KVM_GOVERNED_X86_FEATURE(VNMI)
+
+#undef KVM_GOVERNED_X86_FEATURE
+#undef KVM_GOVERNED_FEATURE
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/hyperv.c b/arch/x86/kvm/hyperv.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..238afd733
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/hyperv.c
@@ -0,0 +1,2866 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * KVM Microsoft Hyper-V emulation
+ *
+ * derived from arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2006 Qumranet, Inc.
+ * Copyright (C) 2008 Qumranet, Inc.
+ * Copyright IBM Corporation, 2008
+ * Copyright 2010 Red Hat, Inc. and/or its affiliates.
+ * Copyright (C) 2015 Andrey Smetanin <asmetanin@virtuozzo.com>
+ *
+ * Authors:
+ *   Avi Kivity   <avi@qumranet.com>
+ *   Yaniv Kamay  <yaniv@qumranet.com>
+ *   Amit Shah    <amit.shah@qumranet.com>
+ *   Ben-Ami Yassour <benami@il.ibm.com>
+ *   Andrey Smetanin <asmetanin@virtuozzo.com>
+ */
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
+
+#include "x86.h"
+#include "lapic.h"
+#include "ioapic.h"
+#include "cpuid.h"
+#include "hyperv.h"
+#include "mmu.h"
+#include "xen.h"
+
+#include <linux/cpu.h>
+#include <linux/kvm_host.h>
+#include <linux/highmem.h>
+#include <linux/sched/cputime.h>
+#include <linux/spinlock.h>
+#include <linux/eventfd.h>
+
+#include <asm/apicdef.h>
+#include <asm/mshyperv.h>
+#include <trace/events/kvm.h>
+
+#include "trace.h"
+#include "irq.h"
+#include "fpu.h"
+
+#define KVM_HV_MAX_SPARSE_VCPU_SET_BITS DIV_ROUND_UP(KVM_MAX_VCPUS, HV_VCPUS_PER_SPARSE_BANK)
+
+/*
+ * As per Hyper-V TLFS, extended hypercalls start from 0x8001
+ * (HvExtCallQueryCapabilities). Response of this hypercalls is a 64 bit value
+ * where each bit tells which extended hypercall is available besides
+ * HvExtCallQueryCapabilities.
+ *
+ * 0x8001 - First extended hypercall, HvExtCallQueryCapabilities, no bit
+ * assigned.
+ *
+ * 0x8002 - Bit 0
+ * 0x8003 - Bit 1
+ * ..
+ * 0x8041 - Bit 63
+ *
+ * Therefore, HV_EXT_CALL_MAX = 0x8001 + 64
+ */
+#define HV_EXT_CALL_MAX (HV_EXT_CALL_QUERY_CAPABILITIES + 64)
+
+static void stimer_mark_pending(struct kvm_vcpu_hv_stimer *stimer,
+				bool vcpu_kick);
+
+static inline u64 synic_read_sint(struct kvm_vcpu_hv_synic *synic, int sint)
+{
+	return atomic64_read(&synic->sint[sint]);
+}
+
+static inline int synic_get_sint_vector(u64 sint_value)
+{
+	if (sint_value & HV_SYNIC_SINT_MASKED)
+		return -1;
+	return sint_value & HV_SYNIC_SINT_VECTOR_MASK;
+}
+
+static bool synic_has_vector_connected(struct kvm_vcpu_hv_synic *synic,
+				      int vector)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(synic->sint); i++) {
+		if (synic_get_sint_vector(synic_read_sint(synic, i)) == vector)
+			return true;
+	}
+	return false;
+}
+
+static bool synic_has_vector_auto_eoi(struct kvm_vcpu_hv_synic *synic,
+				     int vector)
+{
+	int i;
+	u64 sint_value;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(synic->sint); i++) {
+		sint_value = synic_read_sint(synic, i);
+		if (synic_get_sint_vector(sint_value) == vector &&
+		    sint_value & HV_SYNIC_SINT_AUTO_EOI)
+			return true;
+	}
+	return false;
+}
+
+static void synic_update_vector(struct kvm_vcpu_hv_synic *synic,
+				int vector)
+{
+	struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = hv_synic_to_vcpu(synic);
+	struct kvm_hv *hv = to_kvm_hv(vcpu->kvm);
+	bool auto_eoi_old, auto_eoi_new;
+
+	if (vector < HV_SYNIC_FIRST_VALID_VECTOR)
+		return;
+
+	if (synic_has_vector_connected(synic, vector))
+		__set_bit(vector, synic->vec_bitmap);
+	else
+		__clear_bit(vector, synic->vec_bitmap);
+
+	auto_eoi_old = !bitmap_empty(synic->auto_eoi_bitmap, 256);
+
+	if (synic_has_vector_auto_eoi(synic, vector))
+		__set_bit(vector, synic->auto_eoi_bitmap);
+	else
+		__clear_bit(vector, synic->auto_eoi_bitmap);
+
+	auto_eoi_new = !bitmap_empty(synic->auto_eoi_bitmap, 256);
+
+	if (auto_eoi_old == auto_eoi_new)
+		return;
+
+	if (!enable_apicv)
+		return;
+
+	down_write(&vcpu->kvm->arch.apicv_update_lock);
+
+	if (auto_eoi_new)
+		hv->synic_auto_eoi_used++;
+	else
+		hv->synic_auto_eoi_used--;
+
+	/*
+	 * Inhibit APICv if any vCPU is using SynIC's AutoEOI, which relies on
+	 * the hypervisor to manually inject IRQs.
+	 */
+	__kvm_set_or_clear_apicv_inhibit(vcpu->kvm,
+					 APICV_INHIBIT_REASON_HYPERV,
+					 !!hv->synic_auto_eoi_used);
+
+	up_write(&vcpu->kvm->arch.apicv_update_lock);
+}
+
+static int synic_set_sint(struct kvm_vcpu_hv_synic *synic, int sint,
+			  u64 data, bool host)
+{
+	int vector, old_vector;
+	bool masked;
+
+	vector = data & HV_SYNIC_SINT_VECTOR_MASK;
+	masked = data & HV_SYNIC_SINT_MASKED;
+
+	/*
+	 * Valid vectors are 16-255, however, nested Hyper-V attempts to write
+	 * default '0x10000' value on boot and this should not #GP. We need to
+	 * allow zero-initing the register from host as well.
+	 */
+	if (vector < HV_SYNIC_FIRST_VALID_VECTOR && !host && !masked)
+		return 1;
+	/*
+	 * Guest may configure multiple SINTs to use the same vector, so
+	 * we maintain a bitmap of vectors handled by synic, and a
+	 * bitmap of vectors with auto-eoi behavior.  The bitmaps are
+	 * updated here, and atomically queried on fast paths.
+	 */
+	old_vector = synic_read_sint(synic, sint) & HV_SYNIC_SINT_VECTOR_MASK;
+
+	atomic64_set(&synic->sint[sint], data);
+
+	synic_update_vector(synic, old_vector);
+
+	synic_update_vector(synic, vector);
+
+	/* Load SynIC vectors into EOI exit bitmap */
+	kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_SCAN_IOAPIC, hv_synic_to_vcpu(synic));
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static struct kvm_vcpu *get_vcpu_by_vpidx(struct kvm *kvm, u32 vpidx)
+{
+	struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = NULL;
+	unsigned long i;
+
+	if (vpidx >= KVM_MAX_VCPUS)
+		return NULL;
+
+	vcpu = kvm_get_vcpu(kvm, vpidx);
+	if (vcpu && kvm_hv_get_vpindex(vcpu) == vpidx)
+		return vcpu;
+	kvm_for_each_vcpu(i, vcpu, kvm)
+		if (kvm_hv_get_vpindex(vcpu) == vpidx)
+			return vcpu;
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+static struct kvm_vcpu_hv_synic *synic_get(struct kvm *kvm, u32 vpidx)
+{
+	struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu;
+	struct kvm_vcpu_hv_synic *synic;
+
+	vcpu = get_vcpu_by_vpidx(kvm, vpidx);
+	if (!vcpu || !to_hv_vcpu(vcpu))
+		return NULL;
+	synic = to_hv_synic(vcpu);
+	return (synic->active) ? synic : NULL;
+}
+
+static void kvm_hv_notify_acked_sint(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 sint)
+{
+	struct kvm *kvm = vcpu->kvm;
+	struct kvm_vcpu_hv_synic *synic = to_hv_synic(vcpu);
+	struct kvm_vcpu_hv *hv_vcpu = to_hv_vcpu(vcpu);
+	struct kvm_vcpu_hv_stimer *stimer;
+	int gsi, idx;
+
+	trace_kvm_hv_notify_acked_sint(vcpu->vcpu_id, sint);
+
+	/* Try to deliver pending Hyper-V SynIC timers messages */
+	for (idx = 0; idx < ARRAY_SIZE(hv_vcpu->stimer); idx++) {
+		stimer = &hv_vcpu->stimer[idx];
+		if (stimer->msg_pending && stimer->config.enable &&
+		    !stimer->config.direct_mode &&
+		    stimer->config.sintx == sint)
+			stimer_mark_pending(stimer, false);
+	}
+
+	idx = srcu_read_lock(&kvm->irq_srcu);
+	gsi = atomic_read(&synic->sint_to_gsi[sint]);
+	if (gsi != -1)
+		kvm_notify_acked_gsi(kvm, gsi);
+	srcu_read_unlock(&kvm->irq_srcu, idx);
+}
+
+static void synic_exit(struct kvm_vcpu_hv_synic *synic, u32 msr)
+{
+	struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = hv_synic_to_vcpu(synic);
+	struct kvm_vcpu_hv *hv_vcpu = to_hv_vcpu(vcpu);
+
+	hv_vcpu->exit.type = KVM_EXIT_HYPERV_SYNIC;
+	hv_vcpu->exit.u.synic.msr = msr;
+	hv_vcpu->exit.u.synic.control = synic->control;
+	hv_vcpu->exit.u.synic.evt_page = synic->evt_page;
+	hv_vcpu->exit.u.synic.msg_page = synic->msg_page;
+
+	kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_HV_EXIT, vcpu);
+}
+
+static int synic_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu_hv_synic *synic,
+			 u32 msr, u64 data, bool host)
+{
+	struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = hv_synic_to_vcpu(synic);
+	int ret;
+
+	if (!synic->active && (!host || data))
+		return 1;
+
+	trace_kvm_hv_synic_set_msr(vcpu->vcpu_id, msr, data, host);
+
+	ret = 0;
+	switch (msr) {
+	case HV_X64_MSR_SCONTROL:
+		synic->control = data;
+		if (!host)
+			synic_exit(synic, msr);
+		break;
+	case HV_X64_MSR_SVERSION:
+		if (!host) {
+			ret = 1;
+			break;
+		}
+		synic->version = data;
+		break;
+	case HV_X64_MSR_SIEFP:
+		if ((data & HV_SYNIC_SIEFP_ENABLE) && !host &&
+		    !synic->dont_zero_synic_pages)
+			if (kvm_clear_guest(vcpu->kvm,
+					    data & PAGE_MASK, PAGE_SIZE)) {
+				ret = 1;
+				break;
+			}
+		synic->evt_page = data;
+		if (!host)
+			synic_exit(synic, msr);
+		break;
+	case HV_X64_MSR_SIMP:
+		if ((data & HV_SYNIC_SIMP_ENABLE) && !host &&
+		    !synic->dont_zero_synic_pages)
+			if (kvm_clear_guest(vcpu->kvm,
+					    data & PAGE_MASK, PAGE_SIZE)) {
+				ret = 1;
+				break;
+			}
+		synic->msg_page = data;
+		if (!host)
+			synic_exit(synic, msr);
+		break;
+	case HV_X64_MSR_EOM: {
+		int i;
+
+		if (!synic->active)
+			break;
+
+		for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(synic->sint); i++)
+			kvm_hv_notify_acked_sint(vcpu, i);
+		break;
+	}
+	case HV_X64_MSR_SINT0 ... HV_X64_MSR_SINT15:
+		ret = synic_set_sint(synic, msr - HV_X64_MSR_SINT0, data, host);
+		break;
+	default:
+		ret = 1;
+		break;
+	}
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static bool kvm_hv_is_syndbg_enabled(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct kvm_vcpu_hv *hv_vcpu = to_hv_vcpu(vcpu);
+
+	return hv_vcpu->cpuid_cache.syndbg_cap_eax &
+		HV_X64_SYNDBG_CAP_ALLOW_KERNEL_DEBUGGING;
+}
+
+static int kvm_hv_syndbg_complete_userspace(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct kvm_hv *hv = to_kvm_hv(vcpu->kvm);
+
+	if (vcpu->run->hyperv.u.syndbg.msr == HV_X64_MSR_SYNDBG_CONTROL)
+		hv->hv_syndbg.control.status =
+			vcpu->run->hyperv.u.syndbg.status;
+	return 1;
+}
+
+static void syndbg_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 msr)
+{
+	struct kvm_hv_syndbg *syndbg = to_hv_syndbg(vcpu);
+	struct kvm_vcpu_hv *hv_vcpu = to_hv_vcpu(vcpu);
+
+	hv_vcpu->exit.type = KVM_EXIT_HYPERV_SYNDBG;
+	hv_vcpu->exit.u.syndbg.msr = msr;
+	hv_vcpu->exit.u.syndbg.control = syndbg->control.control;
+	hv_vcpu->exit.u.syndbg.send_page = syndbg->control.send_page;
+	hv_vcpu->exit.u.syndbg.recv_page = syndbg->control.recv_page;
+	hv_vcpu->exit.u.syndbg.pending_page = syndbg->control.pending_page;
+	vcpu->arch.complete_userspace_io =
+			kvm_hv_syndbg_complete_userspace;
+
+	kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_HV_EXIT, vcpu);
+}
+
+static int syndbg_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 msr, u64 data, bool host)
+{
+	struct kvm_hv_syndbg *syndbg = to_hv_syndbg(vcpu);
+
+	if (!kvm_hv_is_syndbg_enabled(vcpu) && !host)
+		return 1;
+
+	trace_kvm_hv_syndbg_set_msr(vcpu->vcpu_id,
+				    to_hv_vcpu(vcpu)->vp_index, msr, data);
+	switch (msr) {
+	case HV_X64_MSR_SYNDBG_CONTROL:
+		syndbg->control.control = data;
+		if (!host)
+			syndbg_exit(vcpu, msr);
+		break;
+	case HV_X64_MSR_SYNDBG_STATUS:
+		syndbg->control.status = data;
+		break;
+	case HV_X64_MSR_SYNDBG_SEND_BUFFER:
+		syndbg->control.send_page = data;
+		break;
+	case HV_X64_MSR_SYNDBG_RECV_BUFFER:
+		syndbg->control.recv_page = data;
+		break;
+	case HV_X64_MSR_SYNDBG_PENDING_BUFFER:
+		syndbg->control.pending_page = data;
+		if (!host)
+			syndbg_exit(vcpu, msr);
+		break;
+	case HV_X64_MSR_SYNDBG_OPTIONS:
+		syndbg->options = data;
+		break;
+	default:
+		break;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int syndbg_get_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 msr, u64 *pdata, bool host)
+{
+	struct kvm_hv_syndbg *syndbg = to_hv_syndbg(vcpu);
+
+	if (!kvm_hv_is_syndbg_enabled(vcpu) && !host)
+		return 1;
+
+	switch (msr) {
+	case HV_X64_MSR_SYNDBG_CONTROL:
+		*pdata = syndbg->control.control;
+		break;
+	case HV_X64_MSR_SYNDBG_STATUS:
+		*pdata = syndbg->control.status;
+		break;
+	case HV_X64_MSR_SYNDBG_SEND_BUFFER:
+		*pdata = syndbg->control.send_page;
+		break;
+	case HV_X64_MSR_SYNDBG_RECV_BUFFER:
+		*pdata = syndbg->control.recv_page;
+		break;
+	case HV_X64_MSR_SYNDBG_PENDING_BUFFER:
+		*pdata = syndbg->control.pending_page;
+		break;
+	case HV_X64_MSR_SYNDBG_OPTIONS:
+		*pdata = syndbg->options;
+		break;
+	default:
+		break;
+	}
+
+	trace_kvm_hv_syndbg_get_msr(vcpu->vcpu_id, kvm_hv_get_vpindex(vcpu), msr, *pdata);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int synic_get_msr(struct kvm_vcpu_hv_synic *synic, u32 msr, u64 *pdata,
+			 bool host)
+{
+	int ret;
+
+	if (!synic->active && !host)
+		return 1;
+
+	ret = 0;
+	switch (msr) {
+	case HV_X64_MSR_SCONTROL:
+		*pdata = synic->control;
+		break;
+	case HV_X64_MSR_SVERSION:
+		*pdata = synic->version;
+		break;
+	case HV_X64_MSR_SIEFP:
+		*pdata = synic->evt_page;
+		break;
+	case HV_X64_MSR_SIMP:
+		*pdata = synic->msg_page;
+		break;
+	case HV_X64_MSR_EOM:
+		*pdata = 0;
+		break;
+	case HV_X64_MSR_SINT0 ... HV_X64_MSR_SINT15:
+		*pdata = atomic64_read(&synic->sint[msr - HV_X64_MSR_SINT0]);
+		break;
+	default:
+		ret = 1;
+		break;
+	}
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int synic_set_irq(struct kvm_vcpu_hv_synic *synic, u32 sint)
+{
+	struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = hv_synic_to_vcpu(synic);
+	struct kvm_lapic_irq irq;
+	int ret, vector;
+
+	if (KVM_BUG_ON(!lapic_in_kernel(vcpu), vcpu->kvm))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (sint >= ARRAY_SIZE(synic->sint))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	vector = synic_get_sint_vector(synic_read_sint(synic, sint));
+	if (vector < 0)
+		return -ENOENT;
+
+	memset(&irq, 0, sizeof(irq));
+	irq.shorthand = APIC_DEST_SELF;
+	irq.dest_mode = APIC_DEST_PHYSICAL;
+	irq.delivery_mode = APIC_DM_FIXED;
+	irq.vector = vector;
+	irq.level = 1;
+
+	ret = kvm_irq_delivery_to_apic(vcpu->kvm, vcpu->arch.apic, &irq, NULL);
+	trace_kvm_hv_synic_set_irq(vcpu->vcpu_id, sint, irq.vector, ret);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+int kvm_hv_synic_set_irq(struct kvm *kvm, u32 vpidx, u32 sint)
+{
+	struct kvm_vcpu_hv_synic *synic;
+
+	synic = synic_get(kvm, vpidx);
+	if (!synic)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	return synic_set_irq(synic, sint);
+}
+
+void kvm_hv_synic_send_eoi(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int vector)
+{
+	struct kvm_vcpu_hv_synic *synic = to_hv_synic(vcpu);
+	int i;
+
+	trace_kvm_hv_synic_send_eoi(vcpu->vcpu_id, vector);
+
+	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(synic->sint); i++)
+		if (synic_get_sint_vector(synic_read_sint(synic, i)) == vector)
+			kvm_hv_notify_acked_sint(vcpu, i);
+}
+
+static int kvm_hv_set_sint_gsi(struct kvm *kvm, u32 vpidx, u32 sint, int gsi)
+{
+	struct kvm_vcpu_hv_synic *synic;
+
+	synic = synic_get(kvm, vpidx);
+	if (!synic)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (sint >= ARRAY_SIZE(synic->sint_to_gsi))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	atomic_set(&synic->sint_to_gsi[sint], gsi);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+void kvm_hv_irq_routing_update(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+	struct kvm_irq_routing_table *irq_rt;
+	struct kvm_kernel_irq_routing_entry *e;
+	u32 gsi;
+
+	irq_rt = srcu_dereference_check(kvm->irq_routing, &kvm->irq_srcu,
+					lockdep_is_held(&kvm->irq_lock));
+
+	for (gsi = 0; gsi < irq_rt->nr_rt_entries; gsi++) {
+		hlist_for_each_entry(e, &irq_rt->map[gsi], link) {
+			if (e->type == KVM_IRQ_ROUTING_HV_SINT)
+				kvm_hv_set_sint_gsi(kvm, e->hv_sint.vcpu,
+						    e->hv_sint.sint, gsi);
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+static void synic_init(struct kvm_vcpu_hv_synic *synic)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	memset(synic, 0, sizeof(*synic));
+	synic->version = HV_SYNIC_VERSION_1;
+	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(synic->sint); i++) {
+		atomic64_set(&synic->sint[i], HV_SYNIC_SINT_MASKED);
+		atomic_set(&synic->sint_to_gsi[i], -1);
+	}
+}
+
+static u64 get_time_ref_counter(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+	struct kvm_hv *hv = to_kvm_hv(kvm);
+	struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu;
+	u64 tsc;
+
+	/*
+	 * Fall back to get_kvmclock_ns() when TSC page hasn't been set up,
+	 * is broken, disabled or being updated.
+	 */
+	if (hv->hv_tsc_page_status != HV_TSC_PAGE_SET)
+		return div_u64(get_kvmclock_ns(kvm), 100);
+
+	vcpu = kvm_get_vcpu(kvm, 0);
+	tsc = kvm_read_l1_tsc(vcpu, rdtsc());
+	return mul_u64_u64_shr(tsc, hv->tsc_ref.tsc_scale, 64)
+		+ hv->tsc_ref.tsc_offset;
+}
+
+static void stimer_mark_pending(struct kvm_vcpu_hv_stimer *stimer,
+				bool vcpu_kick)
+{
+	struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = hv_stimer_to_vcpu(stimer);
+
+	set_bit(stimer->index,
+		to_hv_vcpu(vcpu)->stimer_pending_bitmap);
+	kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_HV_STIMER, vcpu);
+	if (vcpu_kick)
+		kvm_vcpu_kick(vcpu);
+}
+
+static void stimer_cleanup(struct kvm_vcpu_hv_stimer *stimer)
+{
+	struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = hv_stimer_to_vcpu(stimer);
+
+	trace_kvm_hv_stimer_cleanup(hv_stimer_to_vcpu(stimer)->vcpu_id,
+				    stimer->index);
+
+	hrtimer_cancel(&stimer->timer);
+	clear_bit(stimer->index,
+		  to_hv_vcpu(vcpu)->stimer_pending_bitmap);
+	stimer->msg_pending = false;
+	stimer->exp_time = 0;
+}
+
+static enum hrtimer_restart stimer_timer_callback(struct hrtimer *timer)
+{
+	struct kvm_vcpu_hv_stimer *stimer;
+
+	stimer = container_of(timer, struct kvm_vcpu_hv_stimer, timer);
+	trace_kvm_hv_stimer_callback(hv_stimer_to_vcpu(stimer)->vcpu_id,
+				     stimer->index);
+	stimer_mark_pending(stimer, true);
+
+	return HRTIMER_NORESTART;
+}
+
+/*
+ * stimer_start() assumptions:
+ * a) stimer->count is not equal to 0
+ * b) stimer->config has HV_STIMER_ENABLE flag
+ */
+static int stimer_start(struct kvm_vcpu_hv_stimer *stimer)
+{
+	u64 time_now;
+	ktime_t ktime_now;
+
+	time_now = get_time_ref_counter(hv_stimer_to_vcpu(stimer)->kvm);
+	ktime_now = ktime_get();
+
+	if (stimer->config.periodic) {
+		if (stimer->exp_time) {
+			if (time_now >= stimer->exp_time) {
+				u64 remainder;
+
+				div64_u64_rem(time_now - stimer->exp_time,
+					      stimer->count, &remainder);
+				stimer->exp_time =
+					time_now + (stimer->count - remainder);
+			}
+		} else
+			stimer->exp_time = time_now + stimer->count;
+
+		trace_kvm_hv_stimer_start_periodic(
+					hv_stimer_to_vcpu(stimer)->vcpu_id,
+					stimer->index,
+					time_now, stimer->exp_time);
+
+		hrtimer_start(&stimer->timer,
+			      ktime_add_ns(ktime_now,
+					   100 * (stimer->exp_time - time_now)),
+			      HRTIMER_MODE_ABS);
+		return 0;
+	}
+	stimer->exp_time = stimer->count;
+	if (time_now >= stimer->count) {
+		/*
+		 * Expire timer according to Hypervisor Top-Level Functional
+		 * specification v4(15.3.1):
+		 * "If a one shot is enabled and the specified count is in
+		 * the past, it will expire immediately."
+		 */
+		stimer_mark_pending(stimer, false);
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	trace_kvm_hv_stimer_start_one_shot(hv_stimer_to_vcpu(stimer)->vcpu_id,
+					   stimer->index,
+					   time_now, stimer->count);
+
+	hrtimer_start(&stimer->timer,
+		      ktime_add_ns(ktime_now, 100 * (stimer->count - time_now)),
+		      HRTIMER_MODE_ABS);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int stimer_set_config(struct kvm_vcpu_hv_stimer *stimer, u64 config,
+			     bool host)
+{
+	union hv_stimer_config new_config = {.as_uint64 = config},
+		old_config = {.as_uint64 = stimer->config.as_uint64};
+	struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = hv_stimer_to_vcpu(stimer);
+	struct kvm_vcpu_hv *hv_vcpu = to_hv_vcpu(vcpu);
+	struct kvm_vcpu_hv_synic *synic = to_hv_synic(vcpu);
+
+	if (!synic->active && (!host || config))
+		return 1;
+
+	if (unlikely(!host && hv_vcpu->enforce_cpuid && new_config.direct_mode &&
+		     !(hv_vcpu->cpuid_cache.features_edx &
+		       HV_STIMER_DIRECT_MODE_AVAILABLE)))
+		return 1;
+
+	trace_kvm_hv_stimer_set_config(hv_stimer_to_vcpu(stimer)->vcpu_id,
+				       stimer->index, config, host);
+
+	stimer_cleanup(stimer);
+	if (old_config.enable &&
+	    !new_config.direct_mode && new_config.sintx == 0)
+		new_config.enable = 0;
+	stimer->config.as_uint64 = new_config.as_uint64;
+
+	if (stimer->config.enable)
+		stimer_mark_pending(stimer, false);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int stimer_set_count(struct kvm_vcpu_hv_stimer *stimer, u64 count,
+			    bool host)
+{
+	struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = hv_stimer_to_vcpu(stimer);
+	struct kvm_vcpu_hv_synic *synic = to_hv_synic(vcpu);
+
+	if (!synic->active && (!host || count))
+		return 1;
+
+	trace_kvm_hv_stimer_set_count(hv_stimer_to_vcpu(stimer)->vcpu_id,
+				      stimer->index, count, host);
+
+	stimer_cleanup(stimer);
+	stimer->count = count;
+	if (!host) {
+		if (stimer->count == 0)
+			stimer->config.enable = 0;
+		else if (stimer->config.auto_enable)
+			stimer->config.enable = 1;
+	}
+
+	if (stimer->config.enable)
+		stimer_mark_pending(stimer, false);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int stimer_get_config(struct kvm_vcpu_hv_stimer *stimer, u64 *pconfig)
+{
+	*pconfig = stimer->config.as_uint64;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int stimer_get_count(struct kvm_vcpu_hv_stimer *stimer, u64 *pcount)
+{
+	*pcount = stimer->count;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int synic_deliver_msg(struct kvm_vcpu_hv_synic *synic, u32 sint,
+			     struct hv_message *src_msg, bool no_retry)
+{
+	struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = hv_synic_to_vcpu(synic);
+	int msg_off = offsetof(struct hv_message_page, sint_message[sint]);
+	gfn_t msg_page_gfn;
+	struct hv_message_header hv_hdr;
+	int r;
+
+	if (!(synic->msg_page & HV_SYNIC_SIMP_ENABLE))
+		return -ENOENT;
+
+	msg_page_gfn = synic->msg_page >> PAGE_SHIFT;
+
+	/*
+	 * Strictly following the spec-mandated ordering would assume setting
+	 * .msg_pending before checking .message_type.  However, this function
+	 * is only called in vcpu context so the entire update is atomic from
+	 * guest POV and thus the exact order here doesn't matter.
+	 */
+	r = kvm_vcpu_read_guest_page(vcpu, msg_page_gfn, &hv_hdr.message_type,
+				     msg_off + offsetof(struct hv_message,
+							header.message_type),
+				     sizeof(hv_hdr.message_type));
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
+
+	if (hv_hdr.message_type != HVMSG_NONE) {
+		if (no_retry)
+			return 0;
+
+		hv_hdr.message_flags.msg_pending = 1;
+		r = kvm_vcpu_write_guest_page(vcpu, msg_page_gfn,
+					      &hv_hdr.message_flags,
+					      msg_off +
+					      offsetof(struct hv_message,
+						       header.message_flags),
+					      sizeof(hv_hdr.message_flags));
+		if (r < 0)
+			return r;
+		return -EAGAIN;
+	}
+
+	r = kvm_vcpu_write_guest_page(vcpu, msg_page_gfn, src_msg, msg_off,
+				      sizeof(src_msg->header) +
+				      src_msg->header.payload_size);
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
+
+	r = synic_set_irq(synic, sint);
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
+	if (r == 0)
+		return -EFAULT;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int stimer_send_msg(struct kvm_vcpu_hv_stimer *stimer)
+{
+	struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = hv_stimer_to_vcpu(stimer);
+	struct hv_message *msg = &stimer->msg;
+	struct hv_timer_message_payload *payload =
+			(struct hv_timer_message_payload *)&msg->u.payload;
+
+	/*
+	 * To avoid piling up periodic ticks, don't retry message
+	 * delivery for them (within "lazy" lost ticks policy).
+	 */
+	bool no_retry = stimer->config.periodic;
+
+	payload->expiration_time = stimer->exp_time;
+	payload->delivery_time = get_time_ref_counter(vcpu->kvm);
+	return synic_deliver_msg(to_hv_synic(vcpu),
+				 stimer->config.sintx, msg,
+				 no_retry);
+}
+
+static int stimer_notify_direct(struct kvm_vcpu_hv_stimer *stimer)
+{
+	struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = hv_stimer_to_vcpu(stimer);
+	struct kvm_lapic_irq irq = {
+		.delivery_mode = APIC_DM_FIXED,
+		.vector = stimer->config.apic_vector
+	};
+
+	if (lapic_in_kernel(vcpu))
+		return !kvm_apic_set_irq(vcpu, &irq, NULL);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void stimer_expiration(struct kvm_vcpu_hv_stimer *stimer)
+{
+	int r, direct = stimer->config.direct_mode;
+
+	stimer->msg_pending = true;
+	if (!direct)
+		r = stimer_send_msg(stimer);
+	else
+		r = stimer_notify_direct(stimer);
+	trace_kvm_hv_stimer_expiration(hv_stimer_to_vcpu(stimer)->vcpu_id,
+				       stimer->index, direct, r);
+	if (!r) {
+		stimer->msg_pending = false;
+		if (!(stimer->config.periodic))
+			stimer->config.enable = 0;
+	}
+}
+
+void kvm_hv_process_stimers(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct kvm_vcpu_hv *hv_vcpu = to_hv_vcpu(vcpu);
+	struct kvm_vcpu_hv_stimer *stimer;
+	u64 time_now, exp_time;
+	int i;
+
+	if (!hv_vcpu)
+		return;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(hv_vcpu->stimer); i++)
+		if (test_and_clear_bit(i, hv_vcpu->stimer_pending_bitmap)) {
+			stimer = &hv_vcpu->stimer[i];
+			if (stimer->config.enable) {
+				exp_time = stimer->exp_time;
+
+				if (exp_time) {
+					time_now =
+						get_time_ref_counter(vcpu->kvm);
+					if (time_now >= exp_time)
+						stimer_expiration(stimer);
+				}
+
+				if ((stimer->config.enable) &&
+				    stimer->count) {
+					if (!stimer->msg_pending)
+						stimer_start(stimer);
+				} else
+					stimer_cleanup(stimer);
+			}
+		}
+}
+
+void kvm_hv_vcpu_uninit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct kvm_vcpu_hv *hv_vcpu = to_hv_vcpu(vcpu);
+	int i;
+
+	if (!hv_vcpu)
+		return;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(hv_vcpu->stimer); i++)
+		stimer_cleanup(&hv_vcpu->stimer[i]);
+
+	kfree(hv_vcpu);
+	vcpu->arch.hyperv = NULL;
+}
+
+bool kvm_hv_assist_page_enabled(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct kvm_vcpu_hv *hv_vcpu = to_hv_vcpu(vcpu);
+
+	if (!hv_vcpu)
+		return false;
+
+	if (!(hv_vcpu->hv_vapic & HV_X64_MSR_VP_ASSIST_PAGE_ENABLE))
+		return false;
+	return vcpu->arch.pv_eoi.msr_val & KVM_MSR_ENABLED;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_hv_assist_page_enabled);
+
+int kvm_hv_get_assist_page(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct kvm_vcpu_hv *hv_vcpu = to_hv_vcpu(vcpu);
+
+	if (!hv_vcpu || !kvm_hv_assist_page_enabled(vcpu))
+		return -EFAULT;
+
+	return kvm_read_guest_cached(vcpu->kvm, &vcpu->arch.pv_eoi.data,
+				     &hv_vcpu->vp_assist_page, sizeof(struct hv_vp_assist_page));
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_hv_get_assist_page);
+
+static void stimer_prepare_msg(struct kvm_vcpu_hv_stimer *stimer)
+{
+	struct hv_message *msg = &stimer->msg;
+	struct hv_timer_message_payload *payload =
+			(struct hv_timer_message_payload *)&msg->u.payload;
+
+	memset(&msg->header, 0, sizeof(msg->header));
+	msg->header.message_type = HVMSG_TIMER_EXPIRED;
+	msg->header.payload_size = sizeof(*payload);
+
+	payload->timer_index = stimer->index;
+	payload->expiration_time = 0;
+	payload->delivery_time = 0;
+}
+
+static void stimer_init(struct kvm_vcpu_hv_stimer *stimer, int timer_index)
+{
+	memset(stimer, 0, sizeof(*stimer));
+	stimer->index = timer_index;
+	hrtimer_init(&stimer->timer, CLOCK_MONOTONIC, HRTIMER_MODE_ABS);
+	stimer->timer.function = stimer_timer_callback;
+	stimer_prepare_msg(stimer);
+}
+
+int kvm_hv_vcpu_init(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct kvm_vcpu_hv *hv_vcpu = to_hv_vcpu(vcpu);
+	int i;
+
+	if (hv_vcpu)
+		return 0;
+
+	hv_vcpu = kzalloc(sizeof(struct kvm_vcpu_hv), GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
+	if (!hv_vcpu)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	vcpu->arch.hyperv = hv_vcpu;
+	hv_vcpu->vcpu = vcpu;
+
+	synic_init(&hv_vcpu->synic);
+
+	bitmap_zero(hv_vcpu->stimer_pending_bitmap, HV_SYNIC_STIMER_COUNT);
+	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(hv_vcpu->stimer); i++)
+		stimer_init(&hv_vcpu->stimer[i], i);
+
+	hv_vcpu->vp_index = vcpu->vcpu_idx;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < HV_NR_TLB_FLUSH_FIFOS; i++) {
+		INIT_KFIFO(hv_vcpu->tlb_flush_fifo[i].entries);
+		spin_lock_init(&hv_vcpu->tlb_flush_fifo[i].write_lock);
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int kvm_hv_activate_synic(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool dont_zero_synic_pages)
+{
+	struct kvm_vcpu_hv_synic *synic;
+	int r;
+
+	r = kvm_hv_vcpu_init(vcpu);
+	if (r)
+		return r;
+
+	synic = to_hv_synic(vcpu);
+
+	synic->active = true;
+	synic->dont_zero_synic_pages = dont_zero_synic_pages;
+	synic->control = HV_SYNIC_CONTROL_ENABLE;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static bool kvm_hv_msr_partition_wide(u32 msr)
+{
+	bool r = false;
+
+	switch (msr) {
+	case HV_X64_MSR_GUEST_OS_ID:
+	case HV_X64_MSR_HYPERCALL:
+	case HV_X64_MSR_REFERENCE_TSC:
+	case HV_X64_MSR_TIME_REF_COUNT:
+	case HV_X64_MSR_CRASH_CTL:
+	case HV_X64_MSR_CRASH_P0 ... HV_X64_MSR_CRASH_P4:
+	case HV_X64_MSR_RESET:
+	case HV_X64_MSR_REENLIGHTENMENT_CONTROL:
+	case HV_X64_MSR_TSC_EMULATION_CONTROL:
+	case HV_X64_MSR_TSC_EMULATION_STATUS:
+	case HV_X64_MSR_TSC_INVARIANT_CONTROL:
+	case HV_X64_MSR_SYNDBG_OPTIONS:
+	case HV_X64_MSR_SYNDBG_CONTROL ... HV_X64_MSR_SYNDBG_PENDING_BUFFER:
+		r = true;
+		break;
+	}
+
+	return r;
+}
+
+static int kvm_hv_msr_get_crash_data(struct kvm *kvm, u32 index, u64 *pdata)
+{
+	struct kvm_hv *hv = to_kvm_hv(kvm);
+	size_t size = ARRAY_SIZE(hv->hv_crash_param);
+
+	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(index >= size))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	*pdata = hv->hv_crash_param[array_index_nospec(index, size)];
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int kvm_hv_msr_get_crash_ctl(struct kvm *kvm, u64 *pdata)
+{
+	struct kvm_hv *hv = to_kvm_hv(kvm);
+
+	*pdata = hv->hv_crash_ctl;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int kvm_hv_msr_set_crash_ctl(struct kvm *kvm, u64 data)
+{
+	struct kvm_hv *hv = to_kvm_hv(kvm);
+
+	hv->hv_crash_ctl = data & HV_CRASH_CTL_CRASH_NOTIFY;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int kvm_hv_msr_set_crash_data(struct kvm *kvm, u32 index, u64 data)
+{
+	struct kvm_hv *hv = to_kvm_hv(kvm);
+	size_t size = ARRAY_SIZE(hv->hv_crash_param);
+
+	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(index >= size))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	hv->hv_crash_param[array_index_nospec(index, size)] = data;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * The kvmclock and Hyper-V TSC page use similar formulas, and converting
+ * between them is possible:
+ *
+ * kvmclock formula:
+ *    nsec = (ticks - tsc_timestamp) * tsc_to_system_mul * 2^(tsc_shift-32)
+ *           + system_time
+ *
+ * Hyper-V formula:
+ *    nsec/100 = ticks * scale / 2^64 + offset
+ *
+ * When tsc_timestamp = system_time = 0, offset is zero in the Hyper-V formula.
+ * By dividing the kvmclock formula by 100 and equating what's left we get:
+ *    ticks * scale / 2^64 = ticks * tsc_to_system_mul * 2^(tsc_shift-32) / 100
+ *            scale / 2^64 =         tsc_to_system_mul * 2^(tsc_shift-32) / 100
+ *            scale        =         tsc_to_system_mul * 2^(32+tsc_shift) / 100
+ *
+ * Now expand the kvmclock formula and divide by 100:
+ *    nsec = ticks * tsc_to_system_mul * 2^(tsc_shift-32)
+ *           - tsc_timestamp * tsc_to_system_mul * 2^(tsc_shift-32)
+ *           + system_time
+ *    nsec/100 = ticks * tsc_to_system_mul * 2^(tsc_shift-32) / 100
+ *               - tsc_timestamp * tsc_to_system_mul * 2^(tsc_shift-32) / 100
+ *               + system_time / 100
+ *
+ * Replace tsc_to_system_mul * 2^(tsc_shift-32) / 100 by scale / 2^64:
+ *    nsec/100 = ticks * scale / 2^64
+ *               - tsc_timestamp * scale / 2^64
+ *               + system_time / 100
+ *
+ * Equate with the Hyper-V formula so that ticks * scale / 2^64 cancels out:
+ *    offset = system_time / 100 - tsc_timestamp * scale / 2^64
+ *
+ * These two equivalencies are implemented in this function.
+ */
+static bool compute_tsc_page_parameters(struct pvclock_vcpu_time_info *hv_clock,
+					struct ms_hyperv_tsc_page *tsc_ref)
+{
+	u64 max_mul;
+
+	if (!(hv_clock->flags & PVCLOCK_TSC_STABLE_BIT))
+		return false;
+
+	/*
+	 * check if scale would overflow, if so we use the time ref counter
+	 *    tsc_to_system_mul * 2^(tsc_shift+32) / 100 >= 2^64
+	 *    tsc_to_system_mul / 100 >= 2^(32-tsc_shift)
+	 *    tsc_to_system_mul >= 100 * 2^(32-tsc_shift)
+	 */
+	max_mul = 100ull << (32 - hv_clock->tsc_shift);
+	if (hv_clock->tsc_to_system_mul >= max_mul)
+		return false;
+
+	/*
+	 * Otherwise compute the scale and offset according to the formulas
+	 * derived above.
+	 */
+	tsc_ref->tsc_scale =
+		mul_u64_u32_div(1ULL << (32 + hv_clock->tsc_shift),
+				hv_clock->tsc_to_system_mul,
+				100);
+
+	tsc_ref->tsc_offset = hv_clock->system_time;
+	do_div(tsc_ref->tsc_offset, 100);
+	tsc_ref->tsc_offset -=
+		mul_u64_u64_shr(hv_clock->tsc_timestamp, tsc_ref->tsc_scale, 64);
+	return true;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Don't touch TSC page values if the guest has opted for TSC emulation after
+ * migration. KVM doesn't fully support reenlightenment notifications and TSC
+ * access emulation and Hyper-V is known to expect the values in TSC page to
+ * stay constant before TSC access emulation is disabled from guest side
+ * (HV_X64_MSR_TSC_EMULATION_STATUS). KVM userspace is expected to preserve TSC
+ * frequency and guest visible TSC value across migration (and prevent it when
+ * TSC scaling is unsupported).
+ */
+static inline bool tsc_page_update_unsafe(struct kvm_hv *hv)
+{
+	return (hv->hv_tsc_page_status != HV_TSC_PAGE_GUEST_CHANGED) &&
+		hv->hv_tsc_emulation_control;
+}
+
+void kvm_hv_setup_tsc_page(struct kvm *kvm,
+			   struct pvclock_vcpu_time_info *hv_clock)
+{
+	struct kvm_hv *hv = to_kvm_hv(kvm);
+	u32 tsc_seq;
+	u64 gfn;
+
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(tsc_seq) != sizeof(hv->tsc_ref.tsc_sequence));
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(offsetof(struct ms_hyperv_tsc_page, tsc_sequence) != 0);
+
+	mutex_lock(&hv->hv_lock);
+
+	if (hv->hv_tsc_page_status == HV_TSC_PAGE_BROKEN ||
+	    hv->hv_tsc_page_status == HV_TSC_PAGE_SET ||
+	    hv->hv_tsc_page_status == HV_TSC_PAGE_UNSET)
+		goto out_unlock;
+
+	if (!(hv->hv_tsc_page & HV_X64_MSR_TSC_REFERENCE_ENABLE))
+		goto out_unlock;
+
+	gfn = hv->hv_tsc_page >> HV_X64_MSR_TSC_REFERENCE_ADDRESS_SHIFT;
+	/*
+	 * Because the TSC parameters only vary when there is a
+	 * change in the master clock, do not bother with caching.
+	 */
+	if (unlikely(kvm_read_guest(kvm, gfn_to_gpa(gfn),
+				    &tsc_seq, sizeof(tsc_seq))))
+		goto out_err;
+
+	if (tsc_seq && tsc_page_update_unsafe(hv)) {
+		if (kvm_read_guest(kvm, gfn_to_gpa(gfn), &hv->tsc_ref, sizeof(hv->tsc_ref)))
+			goto out_err;
+
+		hv->hv_tsc_page_status = HV_TSC_PAGE_SET;
+		goto out_unlock;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * While we're computing and writing the parameters, force the
+	 * guest to use the time reference count MSR.
+	 */
+	hv->tsc_ref.tsc_sequence = 0;
+	if (kvm_write_guest(kvm, gfn_to_gpa(gfn),
+			    &hv->tsc_ref, sizeof(hv->tsc_ref.tsc_sequence)))
+		goto out_err;
+
+	if (!compute_tsc_page_parameters(hv_clock, &hv->tsc_ref))
+		goto out_err;
+
+	/* Ensure sequence is zero before writing the rest of the struct.  */
+	smp_wmb();
+	if (kvm_write_guest(kvm, gfn_to_gpa(gfn), &hv->tsc_ref, sizeof(hv->tsc_ref)))
+		goto out_err;
+
+	/*
+	 * Now switch to the TSC page mechanism by writing the sequence.
+	 */
+	tsc_seq++;
+	if (tsc_seq == 0xFFFFFFFF || tsc_seq == 0)
+		tsc_seq = 1;
+
+	/* Write the struct entirely before the non-zero sequence.  */
+	smp_wmb();
+
+	hv->tsc_ref.tsc_sequence = tsc_seq;
+	if (kvm_write_guest(kvm, gfn_to_gpa(gfn),
+			    &hv->tsc_ref, sizeof(hv->tsc_ref.tsc_sequence)))
+		goto out_err;
+
+	hv->hv_tsc_page_status = HV_TSC_PAGE_SET;
+	goto out_unlock;
+
+out_err:
+	hv->hv_tsc_page_status = HV_TSC_PAGE_BROKEN;
+out_unlock:
+	mutex_unlock(&hv->hv_lock);
+}
+
+void kvm_hv_request_tsc_page_update(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+	struct kvm_hv *hv = to_kvm_hv(kvm);
+
+	mutex_lock(&hv->hv_lock);
+
+	if (hv->hv_tsc_page_status == HV_TSC_PAGE_SET &&
+	    !tsc_page_update_unsafe(hv))
+		hv->hv_tsc_page_status = HV_TSC_PAGE_HOST_CHANGED;
+
+	mutex_unlock(&hv->hv_lock);
+}
+
+static bool hv_check_msr_access(struct kvm_vcpu_hv *hv_vcpu, u32 msr)
+{
+	if (!hv_vcpu->enforce_cpuid)
+		return true;
+
+	switch (msr) {
+	case HV_X64_MSR_GUEST_OS_ID:
+	case HV_X64_MSR_HYPERCALL:
+		return hv_vcpu->cpuid_cache.features_eax &
+			HV_MSR_HYPERCALL_AVAILABLE;
+	case HV_X64_MSR_VP_RUNTIME:
+		return hv_vcpu->cpuid_cache.features_eax &
+			HV_MSR_VP_RUNTIME_AVAILABLE;
+	case HV_X64_MSR_TIME_REF_COUNT:
+		return hv_vcpu->cpuid_cache.features_eax &
+			HV_MSR_TIME_REF_COUNT_AVAILABLE;
+	case HV_X64_MSR_VP_INDEX:
+		return hv_vcpu->cpuid_cache.features_eax &
+			HV_MSR_VP_INDEX_AVAILABLE;
+	case HV_X64_MSR_RESET:
+		return hv_vcpu->cpuid_cache.features_eax &
+			HV_MSR_RESET_AVAILABLE;
+	case HV_X64_MSR_REFERENCE_TSC:
+		return hv_vcpu->cpuid_cache.features_eax &
+			HV_MSR_REFERENCE_TSC_AVAILABLE;
+	case HV_X64_MSR_SCONTROL:
+	case HV_X64_MSR_SVERSION:
+	case HV_X64_MSR_SIEFP:
+	case HV_X64_MSR_SIMP:
+	case HV_X64_MSR_EOM:
+	case HV_X64_MSR_SINT0 ... HV_X64_MSR_SINT15:
+		return hv_vcpu->cpuid_cache.features_eax &
+			HV_MSR_SYNIC_AVAILABLE;
+	case HV_X64_MSR_STIMER0_CONFIG:
+	case HV_X64_MSR_STIMER1_CONFIG:
+	case HV_X64_MSR_STIMER2_CONFIG:
+	case HV_X64_MSR_STIMER3_CONFIG:
+	case HV_X64_MSR_STIMER0_COUNT:
+	case HV_X64_MSR_STIMER1_COUNT:
+	case HV_X64_MSR_STIMER2_COUNT:
+	case HV_X64_MSR_STIMER3_COUNT:
+		return hv_vcpu->cpuid_cache.features_eax &
+			HV_MSR_SYNTIMER_AVAILABLE;
+	case HV_X64_MSR_EOI:
+	case HV_X64_MSR_ICR:
+	case HV_X64_MSR_TPR:
+	case HV_X64_MSR_VP_ASSIST_PAGE:
+		return hv_vcpu->cpuid_cache.features_eax &
+			HV_MSR_APIC_ACCESS_AVAILABLE;
+	case HV_X64_MSR_TSC_FREQUENCY:
+	case HV_X64_MSR_APIC_FREQUENCY:
+		return hv_vcpu->cpuid_cache.features_eax &
+			HV_ACCESS_FREQUENCY_MSRS;
+	case HV_X64_MSR_REENLIGHTENMENT_CONTROL:
+	case HV_X64_MSR_TSC_EMULATION_CONTROL:
+	case HV_X64_MSR_TSC_EMULATION_STATUS:
+		return hv_vcpu->cpuid_cache.features_eax &
+			HV_ACCESS_REENLIGHTENMENT;
+	case HV_X64_MSR_TSC_INVARIANT_CONTROL:
+		return hv_vcpu->cpuid_cache.features_eax &
+			HV_ACCESS_TSC_INVARIANT;
+	case HV_X64_MSR_CRASH_P0 ... HV_X64_MSR_CRASH_P4:
+	case HV_X64_MSR_CRASH_CTL:
+		return hv_vcpu->cpuid_cache.features_edx &
+			HV_FEATURE_GUEST_CRASH_MSR_AVAILABLE;
+	case HV_X64_MSR_SYNDBG_OPTIONS:
+	case HV_X64_MSR_SYNDBG_CONTROL ... HV_X64_MSR_SYNDBG_PENDING_BUFFER:
+		return hv_vcpu->cpuid_cache.features_edx &
+			HV_FEATURE_DEBUG_MSRS_AVAILABLE;
+	default:
+		break;
+	}
+
+	return false;
+}
+
+static int kvm_hv_set_msr_pw(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 msr, u64 data,
+			     bool host)
+{
+	struct kvm *kvm = vcpu->kvm;
+	struct kvm_hv *hv = to_kvm_hv(kvm);
+
+	if (unlikely(!host && !hv_check_msr_access(to_hv_vcpu(vcpu), msr)))
+		return 1;
+
+	switch (msr) {
+	case HV_X64_MSR_GUEST_OS_ID:
+		hv->hv_guest_os_id = data;
+		/* setting guest os id to zero disables hypercall page */
+		if (!hv->hv_guest_os_id)
+			hv->hv_hypercall &= ~HV_X64_MSR_HYPERCALL_ENABLE;
+		break;
+	case HV_X64_MSR_HYPERCALL: {
+		u8 instructions[9];
+		int i = 0;
+		u64 addr;
+
+		/* if guest os id is not set hypercall should remain disabled */
+		if (!hv->hv_guest_os_id)
+			break;
+		if (!(data & HV_X64_MSR_HYPERCALL_ENABLE)) {
+			hv->hv_hypercall = data;
+			break;
+		}
+
+		/*
+		 * If Xen and Hyper-V hypercalls are both enabled, disambiguate
+		 * the same way Xen itself does, by setting the bit 31 of EAX
+		 * which is RsvdZ in the 32-bit Hyper-V hypercall ABI and just
+		 * going to be clobbered on 64-bit.
+		 */
+		if (kvm_xen_hypercall_enabled(kvm)) {
+			/* orl $0x80000000, %eax */
+			instructions[i++] = 0x0d;
+			instructions[i++] = 0x00;
+			instructions[i++] = 0x00;
+			instructions[i++] = 0x00;
+			instructions[i++] = 0x80;
+		}
+
+		/* vmcall/vmmcall */
+		static_call(kvm_x86_patch_hypercall)(vcpu, instructions + i);
+		i += 3;
+
+		/* ret */
+		((unsigned char *)instructions)[i++] = 0xc3;
+
+		addr = data & HV_X64_MSR_HYPERCALL_PAGE_ADDRESS_MASK;
+		if (kvm_vcpu_write_guest(vcpu, addr, instructions, i))
+			return 1;
+		hv->hv_hypercall = data;
+		break;
+	}
+	case HV_X64_MSR_REFERENCE_TSC:
+		hv->hv_tsc_page = data;
+		if (hv->hv_tsc_page & HV_X64_MSR_TSC_REFERENCE_ENABLE) {
+			if (!host)
+				hv->hv_tsc_page_status = HV_TSC_PAGE_GUEST_CHANGED;
+			else
+				hv->hv_tsc_page_status = HV_TSC_PAGE_HOST_CHANGED;
+			kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_MASTERCLOCK_UPDATE, vcpu);
+		} else {
+			hv->hv_tsc_page_status = HV_TSC_PAGE_UNSET;
+		}
+		break;
+	case HV_X64_MSR_CRASH_P0 ... HV_X64_MSR_CRASH_P4:
+		return kvm_hv_msr_set_crash_data(kvm,
+						 msr - HV_X64_MSR_CRASH_P0,
+						 data);
+	case HV_X64_MSR_CRASH_CTL:
+		if (host)
+			return kvm_hv_msr_set_crash_ctl(kvm, data);
+
+		if (data & HV_CRASH_CTL_CRASH_NOTIFY) {
+			vcpu_debug(vcpu, "hv crash (0x%llx 0x%llx 0x%llx 0x%llx 0x%llx)\n",
+				   hv->hv_crash_param[0],
+				   hv->hv_crash_param[1],
+				   hv->hv_crash_param[2],
+				   hv->hv_crash_param[3],
+				   hv->hv_crash_param[4]);
+
+			/* Send notification about crash to user space */
+			kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_HV_CRASH, vcpu);
+		}
+		break;
+	case HV_X64_MSR_RESET:
+		if (data == 1) {
+			vcpu_debug(vcpu, "hyper-v reset requested\n");
+			kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_HV_RESET, vcpu);
+		}
+		break;
+	case HV_X64_MSR_REENLIGHTENMENT_CONTROL:
+		hv->hv_reenlightenment_control = data;
+		break;
+	case HV_X64_MSR_TSC_EMULATION_CONTROL:
+		hv->hv_tsc_emulation_control = data;
+		break;
+	case HV_X64_MSR_TSC_EMULATION_STATUS:
+		if (data && !host)
+			return 1;
+
+		hv->hv_tsc_emulation_status = data;
+		break;
+	case HV_X64_MSR_TIME_REF_COUNT:
+		/* read-only, but still ignore it if host-initiated */
+		if (!host)
+			return 1;
+		break;
+	case HV_X64_MSR_TSC_INVARIANT_CONTROL:
+		/* Only bit 0 is supported */
+		if (data & ~HV_EXPOSE_INVARIANT_TSC)
+			return 1;
+
+		/* The feature can't be disabled from the guest */
+		if (!host && hv->hv_invtsc_control && !data)
+			return 1;
+
+		hv->hv_invtsc_control = data;
+		break;
+	case HV_X64_MSR_SYNDBG_OPTIONS:
+	case HV_X64_MSR_SYNDBG_CONTROL ... HV_X64_MSR_SYNDBG_PENDING_BUFFER:
+		return syndbg_set_msr(vcpu, msr, data, host);
+	default:
+		kvm_pr_unimpl_wrmsr(vcpu, msr, data);
+		return 1;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/* Calculate cpu time spent by current task in 100ns units */
+static u64 current_task_runtime_100ns(void)
+{
+	u64 utime, stime;
+
+	task_cputime_adjusted(current, &utime, &stime);
+
+	return div_u64(utime + stime, 100);
+}
+
+static int kvm_hv_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 msr, u64 data, bool host)
+{
+	struct kvm_vcpu_hv *hv_vcpu = to_hv_vcpu(vcpu);
+
+	if (unlikely(!host && !hv_check_msr_access(hv_vcpu, msr)))
+		return 1;
+
+	switch (msr) {
+	case HV_X64_MSR_VP_INDEX: {
+		struct kvm_hv *hv = to_kvm_hv(vcpu->kvm);
+		u32 new_vp_index = (u32)data;
+
+		if (!host || new_vp_index >= KVM_MAX_VCPUS)
+			return 1;
+
+		if (new_vp_index == hv_vcpu->vp_index)
+			return 0;
+
+		/*
+		 * The VP index is initialized to vcpu_index by
+		 * kvm_hv_vcpu_postcreate so they initially match.  Now the
+		 * VP index is changing, adjust num_mismatched_vp_indexes if
+		 * it now matches or no longer matches vcpu_idx.
+		 */
+		if (hv_vcpu->vp_index == vcpu->vcpu_idx)
+			atomic_inc(&hv->num_mismatched_vp_indexes);
+		else if (new_vp_index == vcpu->vcpu_idx)
+			atomic_dec(&hv->num_mismatched_vp_indexes);
+
+		hv_vcpu->vp_index = new_vp_index;
+		break;
+	}
+	case HV_X64_MSR_VP_ASSIST_PAGE: {
+		u64 gfn;
+		unsigned long addr;
+
+		if (!(data & HV_X64_MSR_VP_ASSIST_PAGE_ENABLE)) {
+			hv_vcpu->hv_vapic = data;
+			if (kvm_lapic_set_pv_eoi(vcpu, 0, 0))
+				return 1;
+			break;
+		}
+		gfn = data >> HV_X64_MSR_VP_ASSIST_PAGE_ADDRESS_SHIFT;
+		addr = kvm_vcpu_gfn_to_hva(vcpu, gfn);
+		if (kvm_is_error_hva(addr))
+			return 1;
+
+		/*
+		 * Clear apic_assist portion of struct hv_vp_assist_page
+		 * only, there can be valuable data in the rest which needs
+		 * to be preserved e.g. on migration.
+		 */
+		if (__put_user(0, (u32 __user *)addr))
+			return 1;
+		hv_vcpu->hv_vapic = data;
+		kvm_vcpu_mark_page_dirty(vcpu, gfn);
+		if (kvm_lapic_set_pv_eoi(vcpu,
+					    gfn_to_gpa(gfn) | KVM_MSR_ENABLED,
+					    sizeof(struct hv_vp_assist_page)))
+			return 1;
+		break;
+	}
+	case HV_X64_MSR_EOI:
+		return kvm_hv_vapic_msr_write(vcpu, APIC_EOI, data);
+	case HV_X64_MSR_ICR:
+		return kvm_hv_vapic_msr_write(vcpu, APIC_ICR, data);
+	case HV_X64_MSR_TPR:
+		return kvm_hv_vapic_msr_write(vcpu, APIC_TASKPRI, data);
+	case HV_X64_MSR_VP_RUNTIME:
+		if (!host)
+			return 1;
+		hv_vcpu->runtime_offset = data - current_task_runtime_100ns();
+		break;
+	case HV_X64_MSR_SCONTROL:
+	case HV_X64_MSR_SVERSION:
+	case HV_X64_MSR_SIEFP:
+	case HV_X64_MSR_SIMP:
+	case HV_X64_MSR_EOM:
+	case HV_X64_MSR_SINT0 ... HV_X64_MSR_SINT15:
+		return synic_set_msr(to_hv_synic(vcpu), msr, data, host);
+	case HV_X64_MSR_STIMER0_CONFIG:
+	case HV_X64_MSR_STIMER1_CONFIG:
+	case HV_X64_MSR_STIMER2_CONFIG:
+	case HV_X64_MSR_STIMER3_CONFIG: {
+		int timer_index = (msr - HV_X64_MSR_STIMER0_CONFIG)/2;
+
+		return stimer_set_config(to_hv_stimer(vcpu, timer_index),
+					 data, host);
+	}
+	case HV_X64_MSR_STIMER0_COUNT:
+	case HV_X64_MSR_STIMER1_COUNT:
+	case HV_X64_MSR_STIMER2_COUNT:
+	case HV_X64_MSR_STIMER3_COUNT: {
+		int timer_index = (msr - HV_X64_MSR_STIMER0_COUNT)/2;
+
+		return stimer_set_count(to_hv_stimer(vcpu, timer_index),
+					data, host);
+	}
+	case HV_X64_MSR_TSC_FREQUENCY:
+	case HV_X64_MSR_APIC_FREQUENCY:
+		/* read-only, but still ignore it if host-initiated */
+		if (!host)
+			return 1;
+		break;
+	default:
+		kvm_pr_unimpl_wrmsr(vcpu, msr, data);
+		return 1;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int kvm_hv_get_msr_pw(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 msr, u64 *pdata,
+			     bool host)
+{
+	u64 data = 0;
+	struct kvm *kvm = vcpu->kvm;
+	struct kvm_hv *hv = to_kvm_hv(kvm);
+
+	if (unlikely(!host && !hv_check_msr_access(to_hv_vcpu(vcpu), msr)))
+		return 1;
+
+	switch (msr) {
+	case HV_X64_MSR_GUEST_OS_ID:
+		data = hv->hv_guest_os_id;
+		break;
+	case HV_X64_MSR_HYPERCALL:
+		data = hv->hv_hypercall;
+		break;
+	case HV_X64_MSR_TIME_REF_COUNT:
+		data = get_time_ref_counter(kvm);
+		break;
+	case HV_X64_MSR_REFERENCE_TSC:
+		data = hv->hv_tsc_page;
+		break;
+	case HV_X64_MSR_CRASH_P0 ... HV_X64_MSR_CRASH_P4:
+		return kvm_hv_msr_get_crash_data(kvm,
+						 msr - HV_X64_MSR_CRASH_P0,
+						 pdata);
+	case HV_X64_MSR_CRASH_CTL:
+		return kvm_hv_msr_get_crash_ctl(kvm, pdata);
+	case HV_X64_MSR_RESET:
+		data = 0;
+		break;
+	case HV_X64_MSR_REENLIGHTENMENT_CONTROL:
+		data = hv->hv_reenlightenment_control;
+		break;
+	case HV_X64_MSR_TSC_EMULATION_CONTROL:
+		data = hv->hv_tsc_emulation_control;
+		break;
+	case HV_X64_MSR_TSC_EMULATION_STATUS:
+		data = hv->hv_tsc_emulation_status;
+		break;
+	case HV_X64_MSR_TSC_INVARIANT_CONTROL:
+		data = hv->hv_invtsc_control;
+		break;
+	case HV_X64_MSR_SYNDBG_OPTIONS:
+	case HV_X64_MSR_SYNDBG_CONTROL ... HV_X64_MSR_SYNDBG_PENDING_BUFFER:
+		return syndbg_get_msr(vcpu, msr, pdata, host);
+	default:
+		kvm_pr_unimpl_rdmsr(vcpu, msr);
+		return 1;
+	}
+
+	*pdata = data;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int kvm_hv_get_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 msr, u64 *pdata,
+			  bool host)
+{
+	u64 data = 0;
+	struct kvm_vcpu_hv *hv_vcpu = to_hv_vcpu(vcpu);
+
+	if (unlikely(!host && !hv_check_msr_access(hv_vcpu, msr)))
+		return 1;
+
+	switch (msr) {
+	case HV_X64_MSR_VP_INDEX:
+		data = hv_vcpu->vp_index;
+		break;
+	case HV_X64_MSR_EOI:
+		return kvm_hv_vapic_msr_read(vcpu, APIC_EOI, pdata);
+	case HV_X64_MSR_ICR:
+		return kvm_hv_vapic_msr_read(vcpu, APIC_ICR, pdata);
+	case HV_X64_MSR_TPR:
+		return kvm_hv_vapic_msr_read(vcpu, APIC_TASKPRI, pdata);
+	case HV_X64_MSR_VP_ASSIST_PAGE:
+		data = hv_vcpu->hv_vapic;
+		break;
+	case HV_X64_MSR_VP_RUNTIME:
+		data = current_task_runtime_100ns() + hv_vcpu->runtime_offset;
+		break;
+	case HV_X64_MSR_SCONTROL:
+	case HV_X64_MSR_SVERSION:
+	case HV_X64_MSR_SIEFP:
+	case HV_X64_MSR_SIMP:
+	case HV_X64_MSR_EOM:
+	case HV_X64_MSR_SINT0 ... HV_X64_MSR_SINT15:
+		return synic_get_msr(to_hv_synic(vcpu), msr, pdata, host);
+	case HV_X64_MSR_STIMER0_CONFIG:
+	case HV_X64_MSR_STIMER1_CONFIG:
+	case HV_X64_MSR_STIMER2_CONFIG:
+	case HV_X64_MSR_STIMER3_CONFIG: {
+		int timer_index = (msr - HV_X64_MSR_STIMER0_CONFIG)/2;
+
+		return stimer_get_config(to_hv_stimer(vcpu, timer_index),
+					 pdata);
+	}
+	case HV_X64_MSR_STIMER0_COUNT:
+	case HV_X64_MSR_STIMER1_COUNT:
+	case HV_X64_MSR_STIMER2_COUNT:
+	case HV_X64_MSR_STIMER3_COUNT: {
+		int timer_index = (msr - HV_X64_MSR_STIMER0_COUNT)/2;
+
+		return stimer_get_count(to_hv_stimer(vcpu, timer_index),
+					pdata);
+	}
+	case HV_X64_MSR_TSC_FREQUENCY:
+		data = (u64)vcpu->arch.virtual_tsc_khz * 1000;
+		break;
+	case HV_X64_MSR_APIC_FREQUENCY:
+		data = APIC_BUS_FREQUENCY;
+		break;
+	default:
+		kvm_pr_unimpl_rdmsr(vcpu, msr);
+		return 1;
+	}
+	*pdata = data;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int kvm_hv_set_msr_common(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 msr, u64 data, bool host)
+{
+	struct kvm_hv *hv = to_kvm_hv(vcpu->kvm);
+
+	if (!host && !vcpu->arch.hyperv_enabled)
+		return 1;
+
+	if (kvm_hv_vcpu_init(vcpu))
+		return 1;
+
+	if (kvm_hv_msr_partition_wide(msr)) {
+		int r;
+
+		mutex_lock(&hv->hv_lock);
+		r = kvm_hv_set_msr_pw(vcpu, msr, data, host);
+		mutex_unlock(&hv->hv_lock);
+		return r;
+	} else
+		return kvm_hv_set_msr(vcpu, msr, data, host);
+}
+
+int kvm_hv_get_msr_common(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 msr, u64 *pdata, bool host)
+{
+	struct kvm_hv *hv = to_kvm_hv(vcpu->kvm);
+
+	if (!host && !vcpu->arch.hyperv_enabled)
+		return 1;
+
+	if (kvm_hv_vcpu_init(vcpu))
+		return 1;
+
+	if (kvm_hv_msr_partition_wide(msr)) {
+		int r;
+
+		mutex_lock(&hv->hv_lock);
+		r = kvm_hv_get_msr_pw(vcpu, msr, pdata, host);
+		mutex_unlock(&hv->hv_lock);
+		return r;
+	} else
+		return kvm_hv_get_msr(vcpu, msr, pdata, host);
+}
+
+static void sparse_set_to_vcpu_mask(struct kvm *kvm, u64 *sparse_banks,
+				    u64 valid_bank_mask, unsigned long *vcpu_mask)
+{
+	struct kvm_hv *hv = to_kvm_hv(kvm);
+	bool has_mismatch = atomic_read(&hv->num_mismatched_vp_indexes);
+	u64 vp_bitmap[KVM_HV_MAX_SPARSE_VCPU_SET_BITS];
+	struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu;
+	int bank, sbank = 0;
+	unsigned long i;
+	u64 *bitmap;
+
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(vp_bitmap) >
+		     sizeof(*vcpu_mask) * BITS_TO_LONGS(KVM_MAX_VCPUS));
+
+	/*
+	 * If vp_index == vcpu_idx for all vCPUs, fill vcpu_mask directly, else
+	 * fill a temporary buffer and manually test each vCPU's VP index.
+	 */
+	if (likely(!has_mismatch))
+		bitmap = (u64 *)vcpu_mask;
+	else
+		bitmap = vp_bitmap;
+
+	/*
+	 * Each set of 64 VPs is packed into sparse_banks, with valid_bank_mask
+	 * having a '1' for each bank that exists in sparse_banks.  Sets must
+	 * be in ascending order, i.e. bank0..bankN.
+	 */
+	memset(bitmap, 0, sizeof(vp_bitmap));
+	for_each_set_bit(bank, (unsigned long *)&valid_bank_mask,
+			 KVM_HV_MAX_SPARSE_VCPU_SET_BITS)
+		bitmap[bank] = sparse_banks[sbank++];
+
+	if (likely(!has_mismatch))
+		return;
+
+	bitmap_zero(vcpu_mask, KVM_MAX_VCPUS);
+	kvm_for_each_vcpu(i, vcpu, kvm) {
+		if (test_bit(kvm_hv_get_vpindex(vcpu), (unsigned long *)vp_bitmap))
+			__set_bit(i, vcpu_mask);
+	}
+}
+
+static bool hv_is_vp_in_sparse_set(u32 vp_id, u64 valid_bank_mask, u64 sparse_banks[])
+{
+	int valid_bit_nr = vp_id / HV_VCPUS_PER_SPARSE_BANK;
+	unsigned long sbank;
+
+	if (!test_bit(valid_bit_nr, (unsigned long *)&valid_bank_mask))
+		return false;
+
+	/*
+	 * The index into the sparse bank is the number of preceding bits in
+	 * the valid mask.  Optimize for VMs with <64 vCPUs by skipping the
+	 * fancy math if there can't possibly be preceding bits.
+	 */
+	if (valid_bit_nr)
+		sbank = hweight64(valid_bank_mask & GENMASK_ULL(valid_bit_nr - 1, 0));
+	else
+		sbank = 0;
+
+	return test_bit(vp_id % HV_VCPUS_PER_SPARSE_BANK,
+			(unsigned long *)&sparse_banks[sbank]);
+}
+
+struct kvm_hv_hcall {
+	/* Hypercall input data */
+	u64 param;
+	u64 ingpa;
+	u64 outgpa;
+	u16 code;
+	u16 var_cnt;
+	u16 rep_cnt;
+	u16 rep_idx;
+	bool fast;
+	bool rep;
+	sse128_t xmm[HV_HYPERCALL_MAX_XMM_REGISTERS];
+
+	/*
+	 * Current read offset when KVM reads hypercall input data gradually,
+	 * either offset in bytes from 'ingpa' for regular hypercalls or the
+	 * number of already consumed 'XMM halves' for 'fast' hypercalls.
+	 */
+	union {
+		gpa_t data_offset;
+		int consumed_xmm_halves;
+	};
+};
+
+
+static int kvm_hv_get_hc_data(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_hv_hcall *hc,
+			      u16 orig_cnt, u16 cnt_cap, u64 *data)
+{
+	/*
+	 * Preserve the original count when ignoring entries via a "cap", KVM
+	 * still needs to validate the guest input (though the non-XMM path
+	 * punts on the checks).
+	 */
+	u16 cnt = min(orig_cnt, cnt_cap);
+	int i, j;
+
+	if (hc->fast) {
+		/*
+		 * Each XMM holds two sparse banks, but do not count halves that
+		 * have already been consumed for hypercall parameters.
+		 */
+		if (orig_cnt > 2 * HV_HYPERCALL_MAX_XMM_REGISTERS - hc->consumed_xmm_halves)
+			return HV_STATUS_INVALID_HYPERCALL_INPUT;
+
+		for (i = 0; i < cnt; i++) {
+			j = i + hc->consumed_xmm_halves;
+			if (j % 2)
+				data[i] = sse128_hi(hc->xmm[j / 2]);
+			else
+				data[i] = sse128_lo(hc->xmm[j / 2]);
+		}
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	return kvm_read_guest(kvm, hc->ingpa + hc->data_offset, data,
+			      cnt * sizeof(*data));
+}
+
+static u64 kvm_get_sparse_vp_set(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_hv_hcall *hc,
+				 u64 *sparse_banks)
+{
+	if (hc->var_cnt > HV_MAX_SPARSE_VCPU_BANKS)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	/* Cap var_cnt to ignore banks that cannot contain a legal VP index. */
+	return kvm_hv_get_hc_data(kvm, hc, hc->var_cnt, KVM_HV_MAX_SPARSE_VCPU_SET_BITS,
+				  sparse_banks);
+}
+
+static int kvm_hv_get_tlb_flush_entries(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_hv_hcall *hc, u64 entries[])
+{
+	return kvm_hv_get_hc_data(kvm, hc, hc->rep_cnt, hc->rep_cnt, entries);
+}
+
+static void hv_tlb_flush_enqueue(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+				 struct kvm_vcpu_hv_tlb_flush_fifo *tlb_flush_fifo,
+				 u64 *entries, int count)
+{
+	struct kvm_vcpu_hv *hv_vcpu = to_hv_vcpu(vcpu);
+	u64 flush_all_entry = KVM_HV_TLB_FLUSHALL_ENTRY;
+
+	if (!hv_vcpu)
+		return;
+
+	spin_lock(&tlb_flush_fifo->write_lock);
+
+	/*
+	 * All entries should fit on the fifo leaving one free for 'flush all'
+	 * entry in case another request comes in. In case there's not enough
+	 * space, just put 'flush all' entry there.
+	 */
+	if (count && entries && count < kfifo_avail(&tlb_flush_fifo->entries)) {
+		WARN_ON(kfifo_in(&tlb_flush_fifo->entries, entries, count) != count);
+		goto out_unlock;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Note: full fifo always contains 'flush all' entry, no need to check the
+	 * return value.
+	 */
+	kfifo_in(&tlb_flush_fifo->entries, &flush_all_entry, 1);
+
+out_unlock:
+	spin_unlock(&tlb_flush_fifo->write_lock);
+}
+
+int kvm_hv_vcpu_flush_tlb(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct kvm_vcpu_hv_tlb_flush_fifo *tlb_flush_fifo;
+	struct kvm_vcpu_hv *hv_vcpu = to_hv_vcpu(vcpu);
+	u64 entries[KVM_HV_TLB_FLUSH_FIFO_SIZE];
+	int i, j, count;
+	gva_t gva;
+
+	if (!tdp_enabled || !hv_vcpu)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	tlb_flush_fifo = kvm_hv_get_tlb_flush_fifo(vcpu, is_guest_mode(vcpu));
+
+	count = kfifo_out(&tlb_flush_fifo->entries, entries, KVM_HV_TLB_FLUSH_FIFO_SIZE);
+
+	for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
+		if (entries[i] == KVM_HV_TLB_FLUSHALL_ENTRY)
+			goto out_flush_all;
+
+		/*
+		 * Lower 12 bits of 'address' encode the number of additional
+		 * pages to flush.
+		 */
+		gva = entries[i] & PAGE_MASK;
+		for (j = 0; j < (entries[i] & ~PAGE_MASK) + 1; j++)
+			static_call(kvm_x86_flush_tlb_gva)(vcpu, gva + j * PAGE_SIZE);
+
+		++vcpu->stat.tlb_flush;
+	}
+	return 0;
+
+out_flush_all:
+	kfifo_reset_out(&tlb_flush_fifo->entries);
+
+	/* Fall back to full flush. */
+	return -ENOSPC;
+}
+
+static u64 kvm_hv_flush_tlb(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_hv_hcall *hc)
+{
+	struct kvm_vcpu_hv *hv_vcpu = to_hv_vcpu(vcpu);
+	u64 *sparse_banks = hv_vcpu->sparse_banks;
+	struct kvm *kvm = vcpu->kvm;
+	struct hv_tlb_flush_ex flush_ex;
+	struct hv_tlb_flush flush;
+	DECLARE_BITMAP(vcpu_mask, KVM_MAX_VCPUS);
+	struct kvm_vcpu_hv_tlb_flush_fifo *tlb_flush_fifo;
+	/*
+	 * Normally, there can be no more than 'KVM_HV_TLB_FLUSH_FIFO_SIZE'
+	 * entries on the TLB flush fifo. The last entry, however, needs to be
+	 * always left free for 'flush all' entry which gets placed when
+	 * there is not enough space to put all the requested entries.
+	 */
+	u64 __tlb_flush_entries[KVM_HV_TLB_FLUSH_FIFO_SIZE - 1];
+	u64 *tlb_flush_entries;
+	u64 valid_bank_mask;
+	struct kvm_vcpu *v;
+	unsigned long i;
+	bool all_cpus;
+
+	/*
+	 * The Hyper-V TLFS doesn't allow more than HV_MAX_SPARSE_VCPU_BANKS
+	 * sparse banks. Fail the build if KVM's max allowed number of
+	 * vCPUs (>4096) exceeds this limit.
+	 */
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(KVM_HV_MAX_SPARSE_VCPU_SET_BITS > HV_MAX_SPARSE_VCPU_BANKS);
+
+	/*
+	 * 'Slow' hypercall's first parameter is the address in guest's memory
+	 * where hypercall parameters are placed. This is either a GPA or a
+	 * nested GPA when KVM is handling the call from L2 ('direct' TLB
+	 * flush).  Translate the address here so the memory can be uniformly
+	 * read with kvm_read_guest().
+	 */
+	if (!hc->fast && is_guest_mode(vcpu)) {
+		hc->ingpa = translate_nested_gpa(vcpu, hc->ingpa, 0, NULL);
+		if (unlikely(hc->ingpa == INVALID_GPA))
+			return HV_STATUS_INVALID_HYPERCALL_INPUT;
+	}
+
+	if (hc->code == HVCALL_FLUSH_VIRTUAL_ADDRESS_LIST ||
+	    hc->code == HVCALL_FLUSH_VIRTUAL_ADDRESS_SPACE) {
+		if (hc->fast) {
+			flush.address_space = hc->ingpa;
+			flush.flags = hc->outgpa;
+			flush.processor_mask = sse128_lo(hc->xmm[0]);
+			hc->consumed_xmm_halves = 1;
+		} else {
+			if (unlikely(kvm_read_guest(kvm, hc->ingpa,
+						    &flush, sizeof(flush))))
+				return HV_STATUS_INVALID_HYPERCALL_INPUT;
+			hc->data_offset = sizeof(flush);
+		}
+
+		trace_kvm_hv_flush_tlb(flush.processor_mask,
+				       flush.address_space, flush.flags,
+				       is_guest_mode(vcpu));
+
+		valid_bank_mask = BIT_ULL(0);
+		sparse_banks[0] = flush.processor_mask;
+
+		/*
+		 * Work around possible WS2012 bug: it sends hypercalls
+		 * with processor_mask = 0x0 and HV_FLUSH_ALL_PROCESSORS clear,
+		 * while also expecting us to flush something and crashing if
+		 * we don't. Let's treat processor_mask == 0 same as
+		 * HV_FLUSH_ALL_PROCESSORS.
+		 */
+		all_cpus = (flush.flags & HV_FLUSH_ALL_PROCESSORS) ||
+			flush.processor_mask == 0;
+	} else {
+		if (hc->fast) {
+			flush_ex.address_space = hc->ingpa;
+			flush_ex.flags = hc->outgpa;
+			memcpy(&flush_ex.hv_vp_set,
+			       &hc->xmm[0], sizeof(hc->xmm[0]));
+			hc->consumed_xmm_halves = 2;
+		} else {
+			if (unlikely(kvm_read_guest(kvm, hc->ingpa, &flush_ex,
+						    sizeof(flush_ex))))
+				return HV_STATUS_INVALID_HYPERCALL_INPUT;
+			hc->data_offset = sizeof(flush_ex);
+		}
+
+		trace_kvm_hv_flush_tlb_ex(flush_ex.hv_vp_set.valid_bank_mask,
+					  flush_ex.hv_vp_set.format,
+					  flush_ex.address_space,
+					  flush_ex.flags, is_guest_mode(vcpu));
+
+		valid_bank_mask = flush_ex.hv_vp_set.valid_bank_mask;
+		all_cpus = flush_ex.hv_vp_set.format !=
+			HV_GENERIC_SET_SPARSE_4K;
+
+		if (hc->var_cnt != hweight64(valid_bank_mask))
+			return HV_STATUS_INVALID_HYPERCALL_INPUT;
+
+		if (!all_cpus) {
+			if (!hc->var_cnt)
+				goto ret_success;
+
+			if (kvm_get_sparse_vp_set(kvm, hc, sparse_banks))
+				return HV_STATUS_INVALID_HYPERCALL_INPUT;
+		}
+
+		/*
+		 * Hyper-V TLFS doesn't explicitly forbid non-empty sparse vCPU
+		 * banks (and, thus, non-zero 'var_cnt') for the 'all vCPUs'
+		 * case (HV_GENERIC_SET_ALL).  Always adjust data_offset and
+		 * consumed_xmm_halves to make sure TLB flush entries are read
+		 * from the correct offset.
+		 */
+		if (hc->fast)
+			hc->consumed_xmm_halves += hc->var_cnt;
+		else
+			hc->data_offset += hc->var_cnt * sizeof(sparse_banks[0]);
+	}
+
+	if (hc->code == HVCALL_FLUSH_VIRTUAL_ADDRESS_SPACE ||
+	    hc->code == HVCALL_FLUSH_VIRTUAL_ADDRESS_SPACE_EX ||
+	    hc->rep_cnt > ARRAY_SIZE(__tlb_flush_entries)) {
+		tlb_flush_entries = NULL;
+	} else {
+		if (kvm_hv_get_tlb_flush_entries(kvm, hc, __tlb_flush_entries))
+			return HV_STATUS_INVALID_HYPERCALL_INPUT;
+		tlb_flush_entries = __tlb_flush_entries;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * vcpu->arch.cr3 may not be up-to-date for running vCPUs so we can't
+	 * analyze it here, flush TLB regardless of the specified address space.
+	 */
+	if (all_cpus && !is_guest_mode(vcpu)) {
+		kvm_for_each_vcpu(i, v, kvm) {
+			tlb_flush_fifo = kvm_hv_get_tlb_flush_fifo(v, false);
+			hv_tlb_flush_enqueue(v, tlb_flush_fifo,
+					     tlb_flush_entries, hc->rep_cnt);
+		}
+
+		kvm_make_all_cpus_request(kvm, KVM_REQ_HV_TLB_FLUSH);
+	} else if (!is_guest_mode(vcpu)) {
+		sparse_set_to_vcpu_mask(kvm, sparse_banks, valid_bank_mask, vcpu_mask);
+
+		for_each_set_bit(i, vcpu_mask, KVM_MAX_VCPUS) {
+			v = kvm_get_vcpu(kvm, i);
+			if (!v)
+				continue;
+			tlb_flush_fifo = kvm_hv_get_tlb_flush_fifo(v, false);
+			hv_tlb_flush_enqueue(v, tlb_flush_fifo,
+					     tlb_flush_entries, hc->rep_cnt);
+		}
+
+		kvm_make_vcpus_request_mask(kvm, KVM_REQ_HV_TLB_FLUSH, vcpu_mask);
+	} else {
+		struct kvm_vcpu_hv *hv_v;
+
+		bitmap_zero(vcpu_mask, KVM_MAX_VCPUS);
+
+		kvm_for_each_vcpu(i, v, kvm) {
+			hv_v = to_hv_vcpu(v);
+
+			/*
+			 * The following check races with nested vCPUs entering/exiting
+			 * and/or migrating between L1's vCPUs, however the only case when
+			 * KVM *must* flush the TLB is when the target L2 vCPU keeps
+			 * running on the same L1 vCPU from the moment of the request until
+			 * kvm_hv_flush_tlb() returns. TLB is fully flushed in all other
+			 * cases, e.g. when the target L2 vCPU migrates to a different L1
+			 * vCPU or when the corresponding L1 vCPU temporary switches to a
+			 * different L2 vCPU while the request is being processed.
+			 */
+			if (!hv_v || hv_v->nested.vm_id != hv_vcpu->nested.vm_id)
+				continue;
+
+			if (!all_cpus &&
+			    !hv_is_vp_in_sparse_set(hv_v->nested.vp_id, valid_bank_mask,
+						    sparse_banks))
+				continue;
+
+			__set_bit(i, vcpu_mask);
+			tlb_flush_fifo = kvm_hv_get_tlb_flush_fifo(v, true);
+			hv_tlb_flush_enqueue(v, tlb_flush_fifo,
+					     tlb_flush_entries, hc->rep_cnt);
+		}
+
+		kvm_make_vcpus_request_mask(kvm, KVM_REQ_HV_TLB_FLUSH, vcpu_mask);
+	}
+
+ret_success:
+	/* We always do full TLB flush, set 'Reps completed' = 'Rep Count' */
+	return (u64)HV_STATUS_SUCCESS |
+		((u64)hc->rep_cnt << HV_HYPERCALL_REP_COMP_OFFSET);
+}
+
+static void kvm_hv_send_ipi_to_many(struct kvm *kvm, u32 vector,
+				    u64 *sparse_banks, u64 valid_bank_mask)
+{
+	struct kvm_lapic_irq irq = {
+		.delivery_mode = APIC_DM_FIXED,
+		.vector = vector
+	};
+	struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu;
+	unsigned long i;
+
+	kvm_for_each_vcpu(i, vcpu, kvm) {
+		if (sparse_banks &&
+		    !hv_is_vp_in_sparse_set(kvm_hv_get_vpindex(vcpu),
+					    valid_bank_mask, sparse_banks))
+			continue;
+
+		/* We fail only when APIC is disabled */
+		kvm_apic_set_irq(vcpu, &irq, NULL);
+	}
+}
+
+static u64 kvm_hv_send_ipi(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_hv_hcall *hc)
+{
+	struct kvm_vcpu_hv *hv_vcpu = to_hv_vcpu(vcpu);
+	u64 *sparse_banks = hv_vcpu->sparse_banks;
+	struct kvm *kvm = vcpu->kvm;
+	struct hv_send_ipi_ex send_ipi_ex;
+	struct hv_send_ipi send_ipi;
+	u64 valid_bank_mask;
+	u32 vector;
+	bool all_cpus;
+
+	if (hc->code == HVCALL_SEND_IPI) {
+		if (!hc->fast) {
+			if (unlikely(kvm_read_guest(kvm, hc->ingpa, &send_ipi,
+						    sizeof(send_ipi))))
+				return HV_STATUS_INVALID_HYPERCALL_INPUT;
+			sparse_banks[0] = send_ipi.cpu_mask;
+			vector = send_ipi.vector;
+		} else {
+			/* 'reserved' part of hv_send_ipi should be 0 */
+			if (unlikely(hc->ingpa >> 32 != 0))
+				return HV_STATUS_INVALID_HYPERCALL_INPUT;
+			sparse_banks[0] = hc->outgpa;
+			vector = (u32)hc->ingpa;
+		}
+		all_cpus = false;
+		valid_bank_mask = BIT_ULL(0);
+
+		trace_kvm_hv_send_ipi(vector, sparse_banks[0]);
+	} else {
+		if (!hc->fast) {
+			if (unlikely(kvm_read_guest(kvm, hc->ingpa, &send_ipi_ex,
+						    sizeof(send_ipi_ex))))
+				return HV_STATUS_INVALID_HYPERCALL_INPUT;
+		} else {
+			send_ipi_ex.vector = (u32)hc->ingpa;
+			send_ipi_ex.vp_set.format = hc->outgpa;
+			send_ipi_ex.vp_set.valid_bank_mask = sse128_lo(hc->xmm[0]);
+		}
+
+		trace_kvm_hv_send_ipi_ex(send_ipi_ex.vector,
+					 send_ipi_ex.vp_set.format,
+					 send_ipi_ex.vp_set.valid_bank_mask);
+
+		vector = send_ipi_ex.vector;
+		valid_bank_mask = send_ipi_ex.vp_set.valid_bank_mask;
+		all_cpus = send_ipi_ex.vp_set.format == HV_GENERIC_SET_ALL;
+
+		if (hc->var_cnt != hweight64(valid_bank_mask))
+			return HV_STATUS_INVALID_HYPERCALL_INPUT;
+
+		if (all_cpus)
+			goto check_and_send_ipi;
+
+		if (!hc->var_cnt)
+			goto ret_success;
+
+		if (!hc->fast)
+			hc->data_offset = offsetof(struct hv_send_ipi_ex,
+						   vp_set.bank_contents);
+		else
+			hc->consumed_xmm_halves = 1;
+
+		if (kvm_get_sparse_vp_set(kvm, hc, sparse_banks))
+			return HV_STATUS_INVALID_HYPERCALL_INPUT;
+	}
+
+check_and_send_ipi:
+	if ((vector < HV_IPI_LOW_VECTOR) || (vector > HV_IPI_HIGH_VECTOR))
+		return HV_STATUS_INVALID_HYPERCALL_INPUT;
+
+	if (all_cpus)
+		kvm_hv_send_ipi_to_many(kvm, vector, NULL, 0);
+	else
+		kvm_hv_send_ipi_to_many(kvm, vector, sparse_banks, valid_bank_mask);
+
+ret_success:
+	return HV_STATUS_SUCCESS;
+}
+
+void kvm_hv_set_cpuid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool hyperv_enabled)
+{
+	struct kvm_vcpu_hv *hv_vcpu = to_hv_vcpu(vcpu);
+	struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *entry;
+
+	vcpu->arch.hyperv_enabled = hyperv_enabled;
+
+	if (!hv_vcpu) {
+		/*
+		 * KVM should have already allocated kvm_vcpu_hv if Hyper-V is
+		 * enabled in CPUID.
+		 */
+		WARN_ON_ONCE(vcpu->arch.hyperv_enabled);
+		return;
+	}
+
+	memset(&hv_vcpu->cpuid_cache, 0, sizeof(hv_vcpu->cpuid_cache));
+
+	if (!vcpu->arch.hyperv_enabled)
+		return;
+
+	entry = kvm_find_cpuid_entry(vcpu, HYPERV_CPUID_FEATURES);
+	if (entry) {
+		hv_vcpu->cpuid_cache.features_eax = entry->eax;
+		hv_vcpu->cpuid_cache.features_ebx = entry->ebx;
+		hv_vcpu->cpuid_cache.features_edx = entry->edx;
+	}
+
+	entry = kvm_find_cpuid_entry(vcpu, HYPERV_CPUID_ENLIGHTMENT_INFO);
+	if (entry) {
+		hv_vcpu->cpuid_cache.enlightenments_eax = entry->eax;
+		hv_vcpu->cpuid_cache.enlightenments_ebx = entry->ebx;
+	}
+
+	entry = kvm_find_cpuid_entry(vcpu, HYPERV_CPUID_SYNDBG_PLATFORM_CAPABILITIES);
+	if (entry)
+		hv_vcpu->cpuid_cache.syndbg_cap_eax = entry->eax;
+
+	entry = kvm_find_cpuid_entry(vcpu, HYPERV_CPUID_NESTED_FEATURES);
+	if (entry) {
+		hv_vcpu->cpuid_cache.nested_eax = entry->eax;
+		hv_vcpu->cpuid_cache.nested_ebx = entry->ebx;
+	}
+}
+
+int kvm_hv_set_enforce_cpuid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool enforce)
+{
+	struct kvm_vcpu_hv *hv_vcpu;
+	int ret = 0;
+
+	if (!to_hv_vcpu(vcpu)) {
+		if (enforce) {
+			ret = kvm_hv_vcpu_init(vcpu);
+			if (ret)
+				return ret;
+		} else {
+			return 0;
+		}
+	}
+
+	hv_vcpu = to_hv_vcpu(vcpu);
+	hv_vcpu->enforce_cpuid = enforce;
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static void kvm_hv_hypercall_set_result(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 result)
+{
+	bool longmode;
+
+	longmode = is_64_bit_hypercall(vcpu);
+	if (longmode)
+		kvm_rax_write(vcpu, result);
+	else {
+		kvm_rdx_write(vcpu, result >> 32);
+		kvm_rax_write(vcpu, result & 0xffffffff);
+	}
+}
+
+static int kvm_hv_hypercall_complete(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 result)
+{
+	u32 tlb_lock_count = 0;
+	int ret;
+
+	if (hv_result_success(result) && is_guest_mode(vcpu) &&
+	    kvm_hv_is_tlb_flush_hcall(vcpu) &&
+	    kvm_read_guest(vcpu->kvm, to_hv_vcpu(vcpu)->nested.pa_page_gpa,
+			   &tlb_lock_count, sizeof(tlb_lock_count)))
+		result = HV_STATUS_INVALID_HYPERCALL_INPUT;
+
+	trace_kvm_hv_hypercall_done(result);
+	kvm_hv_hypercall_set_result(vcpu, result);
+	++vcpu->stat.hypercalls;
+
+	ret = kvm_skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
+
+	if (tlb_lock_count)
+		kvm_x86_ops.nested_ops->hv_inject_synthetic_vmexit_post_tlb_flush(vcpu);
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int kvm_hv_hypercall_complete_userspace(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	return kvm_hv_hypercall_complete(vcpu, vcpu->run->hyperv.u.hcall.result);
+}
+
+static u16 kvm_hvcall_signal_event(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_hv_hcall *hc)
+{
+	struct kvm_hv *hv = to_kvm_hv(vcpu->kvm);
+	struct eventfd_ctx *eventfd;
+
+	if (unlikely(!hc->fast)) {
+		int ret;
+		gpa_t gpa = hc->ingpa;
+
+		if ((gpa & (__alignof__(hc->ingpa) - 1)) ||
+		    offset_in_page(gpa) + sizeof(hc->ingpa) > PAGE_SIZE)
+			return HV_STATUS_INVALID_ALIGNMENT;
+
+		ret = kvm_vcpu_read_guest(vcpu, gpa,
+					  &hc->ingpa, sizeof(hc->ingpa));
+		if (ret < 0)
+			return HV_STATUS_INVALID_ALIGNMENT;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Per spec, bits 32-47 contain the extra "flag number".  However, we
+	 * have no use for it, and in all known usecases it is zero, so just
+	 * report lookup failure if it isn't.
+	 */
+	if (hc->ingpa & 0xffff00000000ULL)
+		return HV_STATUS_INVALID_PORT_ID;
+	/* remaining bits are reserved-zero */
+	if (hc->ingpa & ~KVM_HYPERV_CONN_ID_MASK)
+		return HV_STATUS_INVALID_HYPERCALL_INPUT;
+
+	/* the eventfd is protected by vcpu->kvm->srcu, but conn_to_evt isn't */
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	eventfd = idr_find(&hv->conn_to_evt, hc->ingpa);
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+	if (!eventfd)
+		return HV_STATUS_INVALID_PORT_ID;
+
+	eventfd_signal(eventfd, 1);
+	return HV_STATUS_SUCCESS;
+}
+
+static bool is_xmm_fast_hypercall(struct kvm_hv_hcall *hc)
+{
+	switch (hc->code) {
+	case HVCALL_FLUSH_VIRTUAL_ADDRESS_LIST:
+	case HVCALL_FLUSH_VIRTUAL_ADDRESS_SPACE:
+	case HVCALL_FLUSH_VIRTUAL_ADDRESS_LIST_EX:
+	case HVCALL_FLUSH_VIRTUAL_ADDRESS_SPACE_EX:
+	case HVCALL_SEND_IPI_EX:
+		return true;
+	}
+
+	return false;
+}
+
+static void kvm_hv_hypercall_read_xmm(struct kvm_hv_hcall *hc)
+{
+	int reg;
+
+	kvm_fpu_get();
+	for (reg = 0; reg < HV_HYPERCALL_MAX_XMM_REGISTERS; reg++)
+		_kvm_read_sse_reg(reg, &hc->xmm[reg]);
+	kvm_fpu_put();
+}
+
+static bool hv_check_hypercall_access(struct kvm_vcpu_hv *hv_vcpu, u16 code)
+{
+	if (!hv_vcpu->enforce_cpuid)
+		return true;
+
+	switch (code) {
+	case HVCALL_NOTIFY_LONG_SPIN_WAIT:
+		return hv_vcpu->cpuid_cache.enlightenments_ebx &&
+			hv_vcpu->cpuid_cache.enlightenments_ebx != U32_MAX;
+	case HVCALL_POST_MESSAGE:
+		return hv_vcpu->cpuid_cache.features_ebx & HV_POST_MESSAGES;
+	case HVCALL_SIGNAL_EVENT:
+		return hv_vcpu->cpuid_cache.features_ebx & HV_SIGNAL_EVENTS;
+	case HVCALL_POST_DEBUG_DATA:
+	case HVCALL_RETRIEVE_DEBUG_DATA:
+	case HVCALL_RESET_DEBUG_SESSION:
+		/*
+		 * Return 'true' when SynDBG is disabled so the resulting code
+		 * will be HV_STATUS_INVALID_HYPERCALL_CODE.
+		 */
+		return !kvm_hv_is_syndbg_enabled(hv_vcpu->vcpu) ||
+			hv_vcpu->cpuid_cache.features_ebx & HV_DEBUGGING;
+	case HVCALL_FLUSH_VIRTUAL_ADDRESS_LIST_EX:
+	case HVCALL_FLUSH_VIRTUAL_ADDRESS_SPACE_EX:
+		if (!(hv_vcpu->cpuid_cache.enlightenments_eax &
+		      HV_X64_EX_PROCESSOR_MASKS_RECOMMENDED))
+			return false;
+		fallthrough;
+	case HVCALL_FLUSH_VIRTUAL_ADDRESS_LIST:
+	case HVCALL_FLUSH_VIRTUAL_ADDRESS_SPACE:
+		return hv_vcpu->cpuid_cache.enlightenments_eax &
+			HV_X64_REMOTE_TLB_FLUSH_RECOMMENDED;
+	case HVCALL_SEND_IPI_EX:
+		if (!(hv_vcpu->cpuid_cache.enlightenments_eax &
+		      HV_X64_EX_PROCESSOR_MASKS_RECOMMENDED))
+			return false;
+		fallthrough;
+	case HVCALL_SEND_IPI:
+		return hv_vcpu->cpuid_cache.enlightenments_eax &
+			HV_X64_CLUSTER_IPI_RECOMMENDED;
+	case HV_EXT_CALL_QUERY_CAPABILITIES ... HV_EXT_CALL_MAX:
+		return hv_vcpu->cpuid_cache.features_ebx &
+			HV_ENABLE_EXTENDED_HYPERCALLS;
+	default:
+		break;
+	}
+
+	return true;
+}
+
+int kvm_hv_hypercall(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct kvm_vcpu_hv *hv_vcpu = to_hv_vcpu(vcpu);
+	struct kvm_hv_hcall hc;
+	u64 ret = HV_STATUS_SUCCESS;
+
+	/*
+	 * hypercall generates UD from non zero cpl and real mode
+	 * per HYPER-V spec
+	 */
+	if (static_call(kvm_x86_get_cpl)(vcpu) != 0 || !is_protmode(vcpu)) {
+		kvm_queue_exception(vcpu, UD_VECTOR);
+		return 1;
+	}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+	if (is_64_bit_hypercall(vcpu)) {
+		hc.param = kvm_rcx_read(vcpu);
+		hc.ingpa = kvm_rdx_read(vcpu);
+		hc.outgpa = kvm_r8_read(vcpu);
+	} else
+#endif
+	{
+		hc.param = ((u64)kvm_rdx_read(vcpu) << 32) |
+			    (kvm_rax_read(vcpu) & 0xffffffff);
+		hc.ingpa = ((u64)kvm_rbx_read(vcpu) << 32) |
+			    (kvm_rcx_read(vcpu) & 0xffffffff);
+		hc.outgpa = ((u64)kvm_rdi_read(vcpu) << 32) |
+			     (kvm_rsi_read(vcpu) & 0xffffffff);
+	}
+
+	hc.code = hc.param & 0xffff;
+	hc.var_cnt = (hc.param & HV_HYPERCALL_VARHEAD_MASK) >> HV_HYPERCALL_VARHEAD_OFFSET;
+	hc.fast = !!(hc.param & HV_HYPERCALL_FAST_BIT);
+	hc.rep_cnt = (hc.param >> HV_HYPERCALL_REP_COMP_OFFSET) & 0xfff;
+	hc.rep_idx = (hc.param >> HV_HYPERCALL_REP_START_OFFSET) & 0xfff;
+	hc.rep = !!(hc.rep_cnt || hc.rep_idx);
+
+	trace_kvm_hv_hypercall(hc.code, hc.fast, hc.var_cnt, hc.rep_cnt,
+			       hc.rep_idx, hc.ingpa, hc.outgpa);
+
+	if (unlikely(!hv_check_hypercall_access(hv_vcpu, hc.code))) {
+		ret = HV_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED;
+		goto hypercall_complete;
+	}
+
+	if (unlikely(hc.param & HV_HYPERCALL_RSVD_MASK)) {
+		ret = HV_STATUS_INVALID_HYPERCALL_INPUT;
+		goto hypercall_complete;
+	}
+
+	if (hc.fast && is_xmm_fast_hypercall(&hc)) {
+		if (unlikely(hv_vcpu->enforce_cpuid &&
+			     !(hv_vcpu->cpuid_cache.features_edx &
+			       HV_X64_HYPERCALL_XMM_INPUT_AVAILABLE))) {
+			kvm_queue_exception(vcpu, UD_VECTOR);
+			return 1;
+		}
+
+		kvm_hv_hypercall_read_xmm(&hc);
+	}
+
+	switch (hc.code) {
+	case HVCALL_NOTIFY_LONG_SPIN_WAIT:
+		if (unlikely(hc.rep || hc.var_cnt)) {
+			ret = HV_STATUS_INVALID_HYPERCALL_INPUT;
+			break;
+		}
+		kvm_vcpu_on_spin(vcpu, true);
+		break;
+	case HVCALL_SIGNAL_EVENT:
+		if (unlikely(hc.rep || hc.var_cnt)) {
+			ret = HV_STATUS_INVALID_HYPERCALL_INPUT;
+			break;
+		}
+		ret = kvm_hvcall_signal_event(vcpu, &hc);
+		if (ret != HV_STATUS_INVALID_PORT_ID)
+			break;
+		fallthrough;	/* maybe userspace knows this conn_id */
+	case HVCALL_POST_MESSAGE:
+		/* don't bother userspace if it has no way to handle it */
+		if (unlikely(hc.rep || hc.var_cnt || !to_hv_synic(vcpu)->active)) {
+			ret = HV_STATUS_INVALID_HYPERCALL_INPUT;
+			break;
+		}
+		goto hypercall_userspace_exit;
+	case HVCALL_FLUSH_VIRTUAL_ADDRESS_LIST:
+		if (unlikely(hc.var_cnt)) {
+			ret = HV_STATUS_INVALID_HYPERCALL_INPUT;
+			break;
+		}
+		fallthrough;
+	case HVCALL_FLUSH_VIRTUAL_ADDRESS_LIST_EX:
+		if (unlikely(!hc.rep_cnt || hc.rep_idx)) {
+			ret = HV_STATUS_INVALID_HYPERCALL_INPUT;
+			break;
+		}
+		ret = kvm_hv_flush_tlb(vcpu, &hc);
+		break;
+	case HVCALL_FLUSH_VIRTUAL_ADDRESS_SPACE:
+		if (unlikely(hc.var_cnt)) {
+			ret = HV_STATUS_INVALID_HYPERCALL_INPUT;
+			break;
+		}
+		fallthrough;
+	case HVCALL_FLUSH_VIRTUAL_ADDRESS_SPACE_EX:
+		if (unlikely(hc.rep)) {
+			ret = HV_STATUS_INVALID_HYPERCALL_INPUT;
+			break;
+		}
+		ret = kvm_hv_flush_tlb(vcpu, &hc);
+		break;
+	case HVCALL_SEND_IPI:
+		if (unlikely(hc.var_cnt)) {
+			ret = HV_STATUS_INVALID_HYPERCALL_INPUT;
+			break;
+		}
+		fallthrough;
+	case HVCALL_SEND_IPI_EX:
+		if (unlikely(hc.rep)) {
+			ret = HV_STATUS_INVALID_HYPERCALL_INPUT;
+			break;
+		}
+		ret = kvm_hv_send_ipi(vcpu, &hc);
+		break;
+	case HVCALL_POST_DEBUG_DATA:
+	case HVCALL_RETRIEVE_DEBUG_DATA:
+		if (unlikely(hc.fast)) {
+			ret = HV_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+			break;
+		}
+		fallthrough;
+	case HVCALL_RESET_DEBUG_SESSION: {
+		struct kvm_hv_syndbg *syndbg = to_hv_syndbg(vcpu);
+
+		if (!kvm_hv_is_syndbg_enabled(vcpu)) {
+			ret = HV_STATUS_INVALID_HYPERCALL_CODE;
+			break;
+		}
+
+		if (!(syndbg->options & HV_X64_SYNDBG_OPTION_USE_HCALLS)) {
+			ret = HV_STATUS_OPERATION_DENIED;
+			break;
+		}
+		goto hypercall_userspace_exit;
+	}
+	case HV_EXT_CALL_QUERY_CAPABILITIES ... HV_EXT_CALL_MAX:
+		if (unlikely(hc.fast)) {
+			ret = HV_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+			break;
+		}
+		goto hypercall_userspace_exit;
+	default:
+		ret = HV_STATUS_INVALID_HYPERCALL_CODE;
+		break;
+	}
+
+hypercall_complete:
+	return kvm_hv_hypercall_complete(vcpu, ret);
+
+hypercall_userspace_exit:
+	vcpu->run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_HYPERV;
+	vcpu->run->hyperv.type = KVM_EXIT_HYPERV_HCALL;
+	vcpu->run->hyperv.u.hcall.input = hc.param;
+	vcpu->run->hyperv.u.hcall.params[0] = hc.ingpa;
+	vcpu->run->hyperv.u.hcall.params[1] = hc.outgpa;
+	vcpu->arch.complete_userspace_io = kvm_hv_hypercall_complete_userspace;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+void kvm_hv_init_vm(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+	struct kvm_hv *hv = to_kvm_hv(kvm);
+
+	mutex_init(&hv->hv_lock);
+	idr_init(&hv->conn_to_evt);
+}
+
+void kvm_hv_destroy_vm(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+	struct kvm_hv *hv = to_kvm_hv(kvm);
+	struct eventfd_ctx *eventfd;
+	int i;
+
+	idr_for_each_entry(&hv->conn_to_evt, eventfd, i)
+		eventfd_ctx_put(eventfd);
+	idr_destroy(&hv->conn_to_evt);
+}
+
+static int kvm_hv_eventfd_assign(struct kvm *kvm, u32 conn_id, int fd)
+{
+	struct kvm_hv *hv = to_kvm_hv(kvm);
+	struct eventfd_ctx *eventfd;
+	int ret;
+
+	eventfd = eventfd_ctx_fdget(fd);
+	if (IS_ERR(eventfd))
+		return PTR_ERR(eventfd);
+
+	mutex_lock(&hv->hv_lock);
+	ret = idr_alloc(&hv->conn_to_evt, eventfd, conn_id, conn_id + 1,
+			GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
+	mutex_unlock(&hv->hv_lock);
+
+	if (ret >= 0)
+		return 0;
+
+	if (ret == -ENOSPC)
+		ret = -EEXIST;
+	eventfd_ctx_put(eventfd);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int kvm_hv_eventfd_deassign(struct kvm *kvm, u32 conn_id)
+{
+	struct kvm_hv *hv = to_kvm_hv(kvm);
+	struct eventfd_ctx *eventfd;
+
+	mutex_lock(&hv->hv_lock);
+	eventfd = idr_remove(&hv->conn_to_evt, conn_id);
+	mutex_unlock(&hv->hv_lock);
+
+	if (!eventfd)
+		return -ENOENT;
+
+	synchronize_srcu(&kvm->srcu);
+	eventfd_ctx_put(eventfd);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int kvm_vm_ioctl_hv_eventfd(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_hyperv_eventfd *args)
+{
+	if ((args->flags & ~KVM_HYPERV_EVENTFD_DEASSIGN) ||
+	    (args->conn_id & ~KVM_HYPERV_CONN_ID_MASK))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (args->flags == KVM_HYPERV_EVENTFD_DEASSIGN)
+		return kvm_hv_eventfd_deassign(kvm, args->conn_id);
+	return kvm_hv_eventfd_assign(kvm, args->conn_id, args->fd);
+}
+
+int kvm_get_hv_cpuid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_cpuid2 *cpuid,
+		     struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 __user *entries)
+{
+	uint16_t evmcs_ver = 0;
+	struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 cpuid_entries[] = {
+		{ .function = HYPERV_CPUID_VENDOR_AND_MAX_FUNCTIONS },
+		{ .function = HYPERV_CPUID_INTERFACE },
+		{ .function = HYPERV_CPUID_VERSION },
+		{ .function = HYPERV_CPUID_FEATURES },
+		{ .function = HYPERV_CPUID_ENLIGHTMENT_INFO },
+		{ .function = HYPERV_CPUID_IMPLEMENT_LIMITS },
+		{ .function = HYPERV_CPUID_SYNDBG_VENDOR_AND_MAX_FUNCTIONS },
+		{ .function = HYPERV_CPUID_SYNDBG_INTERFACE },
+		{ .function = HYPERV_CPUID_SYNDBG_PLATFORM_CAPABILITIES	},
+		{ .function = HYPERV_CPUID_NESTED_FEATURES },
+	};
+	int i, nent = ARRAY_SIZE(cpuid_entries);
+
+	if (kvm_x86_ops.nested_ops->get_evmcs_version)
+		evmcs_ver = kvm_x86_ops.nested_ops->get_evmcs_version(vcpu);
+
+	if (cpuid->nent < nent)
+		return -E2BIG;
+
+	if (cpuid->nent > nent)
+		cpuid->nent = nent;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < nent; i++) {
+		struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *ent = &cpuid_entries[i];
+		u32 signature[3];
+
+		switch (ent->function) {
+		case HYPERV_CPUID_VENDOR_AND_MAX_FUNCTIONS:
+			memcpy(signature, "Linux KVM Hv", 12);
+
+			ent->eax = HYPERV_CPUID_SYNDBG_PLATFORM_CAPABILITIES;
+			ent->ebx = signature[0];
+			ent->ecx = signature[1];
+			ent->edx = signature[2];
+			break;
+
+		case HYPERV_CPUID_INTERFACE:
+			ent->eax = HYPERV_CPUID_SIGNATURE_EAX;
+			break;
+
+		case HYPERV_CPUID_VERSION:
+			/*
+			 * We implement some Hyper-V 2016 functions so let's use
+			 * this version.
+			 */
+			ent->eax = 0x00003839;
+			ent->ebx = 0x000A0000;
+			break;
+
+		case HYPERV_CPUID_FEATURES:
+			ent->eax |= HV_MSR_VP_RUNTIME_AVAILABLE;
+			ent->eax |= HV_MSR_TIME_REF_COUNT_AVAILABLE;
+			ent->eax |= HV_MSR_SYNIC_AVAILABLE;
+			ent->eax |= HV_MSR_SYNTIMER_AVAILABLE;
+			ent->eax |= HV_MSR_APIC_ACCESS_AVAILABLE;
+			ent->eax |= HV_MSR_HYPERCALL_AVAILABLE;
+			ent->eax |= HV_MSR_VP_INDEX_AVAILABLE;
+			ent->eax |= HV_MSR_RESET_AVAILABLE;
+			ent->eax |= HV_MSR_REFERENCE_TSC_AVAILABLE;
+			ent->eax |= HV_ACCESS_FREQUENCY_MSRS;
+			ent->eax |= HV_ACCESS_REENLIGHTENMENT;
+			ent->eax |= HV_ACCESS_TSC_INVARIANT;
+
+			ent->ebx |= HV_POST_MESSAGES;
+			ent->ebx |= HV_SIGNAL_EVENTS;
+			ent->ebx |= HV_ENABLE_EXTENDED_HYPERCALLS;
+
+			ent->edx |= HV_X64_HYPERCALL_XMM_INPUT_AVAILABLE;
+			ent->edx |= HV_FEATURE_FREQUENCY_MSRS_AVAILABLE;
+			ent->edx |= HV_FEATURE_GUEST_CRASH_MSR_AVAILABLE;
+
+			ent->ebx |= HV_DEBUGGING;
+			ent->edx |= HV_X64_GUEST_DEBUGGING_AVAILABLE;
+			ent->edx |= HV_FEATURE_DEBUG_MSRS_AVAILABLE;
+			ent->edx |= HV_FEATURE_EXT_GVA_RANGES_FLUSH;
+
+			/*
+			 * Direct Synthetic timers only make sense with in-kernel
+			 * LAPIC
+			 */
+			if (!vcpu || lapic_in_kernel(vcpu))
+				ent->edx |= HV_STIMER_DIRECT_MODE_AVAILABLE;
+
+			break;
+
+		case HYPERV_CPUID_ENLIGHTMENT_INFO:
+			ent->eax |= HV_X64_REMOTE_TLB_FLUSH_RECOMMENDED;
+			ent->eax |= HV_X64_APIC_ACCESS_RECOMMENDED;
+			ent->eax |= HV_X64_RELAXED_TIMING_RECOMMENDED;
+			ent->eax |= HV_X64_CLUSTER_IPI_RECOMMENDED;
+			ent->eax |= HV_X64_EX_PROCESSOR_MASKS_RECOMMENDED;
+			if (evmcs_ver)
+				ent->eax |= HV_X64_ENLIGHTENED_VMCS_RECOMMENDED;
+			if (!cpu_smt_possible())
+				ent->eax |= HV_X64_NO_NONARCH_CORESHARING;
+
+			ent->eax |= HV_DEPRECATING_AEOI_RECOMMENDED;
+			/*
+			 * Default number of spinlock retry attempts, matches
+			 * HyperV 2016.
+			 */
+			ent->ebx = 0x00000FFF;
+
+			break;
+
+		case HYPERV_CPUID_IMPLEMENT_LIMITS:
+			/* Maximum number of virtual processors */
+			ent->eax = KVM_MAX_VCPUS;
+			/*
+			 * Maximum number of logical processors, matches
+			 * HyperV 2016.
+			 */
+			ent->ebx = 64;
+
+			break;
+
+		case HYPERV_CPUID_NESTED_FEATURES:
+			ent->eax = evmcs_ver;
+			ent->eax |= HV_X64_NESTED_DIRECT_FLUSH;
+			ent->eax |= HV_X64_NESTED_MSR_BITMAP;
+			ent->ebx |= HV_X64_NESTED_EVMCS1_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL;
+			break;
+
+		case HYPERV_CPUID_SYNDBG_VENDOR_AND_MAX_FUNCTIONS:
+			memcpy(signature, "Linux KVM Hv", 12);
+
+			ent->eax = 0;
+			ent->ebx = signature[0];
+			ent->ecx = signature[1];
+			ent->edx = signature[2];
+			break;
+
+		case HYPERV_CPUID_SYNDBG_INTERFACE:
+			memcpy(signature, "VS#1\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0", 12);
+			ent->eax = signature[0];
+			break;
+
+		case HYPERV_CPUID_SYNDBG_PLATFORM_CAPABILITIES:
+			ent->eax |= HV_X64_SYNDBG_CAP_ALLOW_KERNEL_DEBUGGING;
+			break;
+
+		default:
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (copy_to_user(entries, cpuid_entries,
+			 nent * sizeof(struct kvm_cpuid_entry2)))
+		return -EFAULT;
+
+	return 0;
+}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/hyperv.h b/arch/x86/kvm/hyperv.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..f83b8db72
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/hyperv.h
@@ -0,0 +1,241 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */
+/*
+ * KVM Microsoft Hyper-V emulation
+ *
+ * derived from arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2006 Qumranet, Inc.
+ * Copyright (C) 2008 Qumranet, Inc.
+ * Copyright IBM Corporation, 2008
+ * Copyright 2010 Red Hat, Inc. and/or its affiliates.
+ * Copyright (C) 2015 Andrey Smetanin <asmetanin@virtuozzo.com>
+ *
+ * Authors:
+ *   Avi Kivity   <avi@qumranet.com>
+ *   Yaniv Kamay  <yaniv@qumranet.com>
+ *   Amit Shah    <amit.shah@qumranet.com>
+ *   Ben-Ami Yassour <benami@il.ibm.com>
+ *   Andrey Smetanin <asmetanin@virtuozzo.com>
+ */
+
+#ifndef __ARCH_X86_KVM_HYPERV_H__
+#define __ARCH_X86_KVM_HYPERV_H__
+
+#include <linux/kvm_host.h>
+#include "x86.h"
+
+/* "Hv#1" signature */
+#define HYPERV_CPUID_SIGNATURE_EAX 0x31237648
+
+/*
+ * The #defines related to the synthetic debugger are required by KDNet, but
+ * they are not documented in the Hyper-V TLFS because the synthetic debugger
+ * functionality has been deprecated and is subject to removal in future
+ * versions of Windows.
+ */
+#define HYPERV_CPUID_SYNDBG_VENDOR_AND_MAX_FUNCTIONS	0x40000080
+#define HYPERV_CPUID_SYNDBG_INTERFACE			0x40000081
+#define HYPERV_CPUID_SYNDBG_PLATFORM_CAPABILITIES	0x40000082
+
+/*
+ * Hyper-V synthetic debugger platform capabilities
+ * These are HYPERV_CPUID_SYNDBG_PLATFORM_CAPABILITIES.EAX bits.
+ */
+#define HV_X64_SYNDBG_CAP_ALLOW_KERNEL_DEBUGGING	BIT(1)
+
+/* Hyper-V Synthetic debug options MSR */
+#define HV_X64_MSR_SYNDBG_CONTROL		0x400000F1
+#define HV_X64_MSR_SYNDBG_STATUS		0x400000F2
+#define HV_X64_MSR_SYNDBG_SEND_BUFFER		0x400000F3
+#define HV_X64_MSR_SYNDBG_RECV_BUFFER		0x400000F4
+#define HV_X64_MSR_SYNDBG_PENDING_BUFFER	0x400000F5
+#define HV_X64_MSR_SYNDBG_OPTIONS		0x400000FF
+
+/* Hyper-V HV_X64_MSR_SYNDBG_OPTIONS bits */
+#define HV_X64_SYNDBG_OPTION_USE_HCALLS		BIT(2)
+
+static inline struct kvm_hv *to_kvm_hv(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+	return &kvm->arch.hyperv;
+}
+
+static inline struct kvm_vcpu_hv *to_hv_vcpu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	return vcpu->arch.hyperv;
+}
+
+static inline struct kvm_vcpu_hv_synic *to_hv_synic(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct kvm_vcpu_hv *hv_vcpu = to_hv_vcpu(vcpu);
+
+	return &hv_vcpu->synic;
+}
+
+static inline struct kvm_vcpu *hv_synic_to_vcpu(struct kvm_vcpu_hv_synic *synic)
+{
+	struct kvm_vcpu_hv *hv_vcpu = container_of(synic, struct kvm_vcpu_hv, synic);
+
+	return hv_vcpu->vcpu;
+}
+
+static inline struct kvm_hv_syndbg *to_hv_syndbg(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	return &vcpu->kvm->arch.hyperv.hv_syndbg;
+}
+
+static inline u32 kvm_hv_get_vpindex(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct kvm_vcpu_hv *hv_vcpu = to_hv_vcpu(vcpu);
+
+	return hv_vcpu ? hv_vcpu->vp_index : vcpu->vcpu_idx;
+}
+
+int kvm_hv_set_msr_common(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 msr, u64 data, bool host);
+int kvm_hv_get_msr_common(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 msr, u64 *pdata, bool host);
+
+static inline bool kvm_hv_hypercall_enabled(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	return vcpu->arch.hyperv_enabled && to_kvm_hv(vcpu->kvm)->hv_guest_os_id;
+}
+
+int kvm_hv_hypercall(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+
+void kvm_hv_irq_routing_update(struct kvm *kvm);
+int kvm_hv_synic_set_irq(struct kvm *kvm, u32 vcpu_id, u32 sint);
+void kvm_hv_synic_send_eoi(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int vector);
+int kvm_hv_activate_synic(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool dont_zero_synic_pages);
+
+void kvm_hv_vcpu_uninit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+
+bool kvm_hv_assist_page_enabled(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+int kvm_hv_get_assist_page(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+
+static inline struct kvm_vcpu_hv_stimer *to_hv_stimer(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+						      int timer_index)
+{
+	return &to_hv_vcpu(vcpu)->stimer[timer_index];
+}
+
+static inline struct kvm_vcpu *hv_stimer_to_vcpu(struct kvm_vcpu_hv_stimer *stimer)
+{
+	struct kvm_vcpu_hv *hv_vcpu;
+
+	hv_vcpu = container_of(stimer - stimer->index, struct kvm_vcpu_hv,
+			       stimer[0]);
+	return hv_vcpu->vcpu;
+}
+
+static inline bool kvm_hv_has_stimer_pending(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct kvm_vcpu_hv *hv_vcpu = to_hv_vcpu(vcpu);
+
+	if (!hv_vcpu)
+		return false;
+
+	return !bitmap_empty(hv_vcpu->stimer_pending_bitmap,
+			     HV_SYNIC_STIMER_COUNT);
+}
+
+/*
+ * With HV_ACCESS_TSC_INVARIANT feature, invariant TSC (CPUID.80000007H:EDX[8])
+ * is only observed after HV_X64_MSR_TSC_INVARIANT_CONTROL was written to.
+ */
+static inline bool kvm_hv_invtsc_suppressed(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct kvm_vcpu_hv *hv_vcpu = to_hv_vcpu(vcpu);
+
+	/*
+	 * If Hyper-V's invariant TSC control is not exposed to the guest,
+	 * the invariant TSC CPUID flag is not suppressed, Windows guests were
+	 * observed to be able to handle it correctly. Going forward, VMMs are
+	 * encouraged to enable Hyper-V's invariant TSC control when invariant
+	 * TSC CPUID flag is set to make KVM's behavior match genuine Hyper-V.
+	 */
+	if (!hv_vcpu ||
+	    !(hv_vcpu->cpuid_cache.features_eax & HV_ACCESS_TSC_INVARIANT))
+		return false;
+
+	/*
+	 * If Hyper-V's invariant TSC control is exposed to the guest, KVM is
+	 * responsible for suppressing the invariant TSC CPUID flag if the
+	 * Hyper-V control is not enabled.
+	 */
+	return !(to_kvm_hv(vcpu->kvm)->hv_invtsc_control & HV_EXPOSE_INVARIANT_TSC);
+}
+
+void kvm_hv_process_stimers(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+
+void kvm_hv_setup_tsc_page(struct kvm *kvm,
+			   struct pvclock_vcpu_time_info *hv_clock);
+void kvm_hv_request_tsc_page_update(struct kvm *kvm);
+
+void kvm_hv_init_vm(struct kvm *kvm);
+void kvm_hv_destroy_vm(struct kvm *kvm);
+int kvm_hv_vcpu_init(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+void kvm_hv_set_cpuid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool hyperv_enabled);
+int kvm_hv_set_enforce_cpuid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool enforce);
+int kvm_vm_ioctl_hv_eventfd(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_hyperv_eventfd *args);
+int kvm_get_hv_cpuid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_cpuid2 *cpuid,
+		     struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 __user *entries);
+
+static inline struct kvm_vcpu_hv_tlb_flush_fifo *kvm_hv_get_tlb_flush_fifo(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+									   bool is_guest_mode)
+{
+	struct kvm_vcpu_hv *hv_vcpu = to_hv_vcpu(vcpu);
+	int i = is_guest_mode ? HV_L2_TLB_FLUSH_FIFO :
+				HV_L1_TLB_FLUSH_FIFO;
+
+	return &hv_vcpu->tlb_flush_fifo[i];
+}
+
+static inline void kvm_hv_vcpu_purge_flush_tlb(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct kvm_vcpu_hv_tlb_flush_fifo *tlb_flush_fifo;
+
+	if (!to_hv_vcpu(vcpu) || !kvm_check_request(KVM_REQ_HV_TLB_FLUSH, vcpu))
+		return;
+
+	tlb_flush_fifo = kvm_hv_get_tlb_flush_fifo(vcpu, is_guest_mode(vcpu));
+
+	kfifo_reset_out(&tlb_flush_fifo->entries);
+}
+
+static inline bool guest_hv_cpuid_has_l2_tlb_flush(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct kvm_vcpu_hv *hv_vcpu = to_hv_vcpu(vcpu);
+
+	return hv_vcpu &&
+		(hv_vcpu->cpuid_cache.nested_eax & HV_X64_NESTED_DIRECT_FLUSH);
+}
+
+static inline bool kvm_hv_is_tlb_flush_hcall(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct kvm_vcpu_hv *hv_vcpu = to_hv_vcpu(vcpu);
+	u16 code;
+
+	if (!hv_vcpu)
+		return false;
+
+	code = is_64_bit_hypercall(vcpu) ? kvm_rcx_read(vcpu) :
+					   kvm_rax_read(vcpu);
+
+	return (code == HVCALL_FLUSH_VIRTUAL_ADDRESS_SPACE ||
+		code == HVCALL_FLUSH_VIRTUAL_ADDRESS_LIST ||
+		code == HVCALL_FLUSH_VIRTUAL_ADDRESS_SPACE_EX ||
+		code == HVCALL_FLUSH_VIRTUAL_ADDRESS_LIST_EX);
+}
+
+static inline int kvm_hv_verify_vp_assist(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	if (!to_hv_vcpu(vcpu))
+		return 0;
+
+	if (!kvm_hv_assist_page_enabled(vcpu))
+		return 0;
+
+	return kvm_hv_get_assist_page(vcpu);
+}
+
+int kvm_hv_vcpu_flush_tlb(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+
+#endif
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/i8254.c b/arch/x86/kvm/i8254.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..cd57a517d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/i8254.c
@@ -0,0 +1,751 @@
+/*
+ * 8253/8254 interval timer emulation
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 2003-2004 Fabrice Bellard
+ * Copyright (c) 2006 Intel Corporation
+ * Copyright (c) 2007 Keir Fraser, XenSource Inc
+ * Copyright (c) 2008 Intel Corporation
+ * Copyright 2009 Red Hat, Inc. and/or its affiliates.
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy
+ * of this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to deal
+ * in the Software without restriction, including without limitation the rights
+ * to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell
+ * copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is
+ * furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in
+ * all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY,
+ * FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL
+ * THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER
+ * LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM,
+ * OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN
+ * THE SOFTWARE.
+ *
+ * Authors:
+ *   Sheng Yang <sheng.yang@intel.com>
+ *   Based on QEMU and Xen.
+ */
+
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
+
+#include <linux/kvm_host.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+
+#include "ioapic.h"
+#include "irq.h"
+#include "i8254.h"
+#include "x86.h"
+
+#ifndef CONFIG_X86_64
+#define mod_64(x, y) ((x) - (y) * div64_u64(x, y))
+#else
+#define mod_64(x, y) ((x) % (y))
+#endif
+
+#define RW_STATE_LSB 1
+#define RW_STATE_MSB 2
+#define RW_STATE_WORD0 3
+#define RW_STATE_WORD1 4
+
+static void pit_set_gate(struct kvm_pit *pit, int channel, u32 val)
+{
+	struct kvm_kpit_channel_state *c = &pit->pit_state.channels[channel];
+
+	switch (c->mode) {
+	default:
+	case 0:
+	case 4:
+		/* XXX: just disable/enable counting */
+		break;
+	case 1:
+	case 2:
+	case 3:
+	case 5:
+		/* Restart counting on rising edge. */
+		if (c->gate < val)
+			c->count_load_time = ktime_get();
+		break;
+	}
+
+	c->gate = val;
+}
+
+static int pit_get_gate(struct kvm_pit *pit, int channel)
+{
+	return pit->pit_state.channels[channel].gate;
+}
+
+static s64 __kpit_elapsed(struct kvm_pit *pit)
+{
+	s64 elapsed;
+	ktime_t remaining;
+	struct kvm_kpit_state *ps = &pit->pit_state;
+
+	if (!ps->period)
+		return 0;
+
+	/*
+	 * The Counter does not stop when it reaches zero. In
+	 * Modes 0, 1, 4, and 5 the Counter ``wraps around'' to
+	 * the highest count, either FFFF hex for binary counting
+	 * or 9999 for BCD counting, and continues counting.
+	 * Modes 2 and 3 are periodic; the Counter reloads
+	 * itself with the initial count and continues counting
+	 * from there.
+	 */
+	remaining = hrtimer_get_remaining(&ps->timer);
+	elapsed = ps->period - ktime_to_ns(remaining);
+
+	return elapsed;
+}
+
+static s64 kpit_elapsed(struct kvm_pit *pit, struct kvm_kpit_channel_state *c,
+			int channel)
+{
+	if (channel == 0)
+		return __kpit_elapsed(pit);
+
+	return ktime_to_ns(ktime_sub(ktime_get(), c->count_load_time));
+}
+
+static int pit_get_count(struct kvm_pit *pit, int channel)
+{
+	struct kvm_kpit_channel_state *c = &pit->pit_state.channels[channel];
+	s64 d, t;
+	int counter;
+
+	t = kpit_elapsed(pit, c, channel);
+	d = mul_u64_u32_div(t, KVM_PIT_FREQ, NSEC_PER_SEC);
+
+	switch (c->mode) {
+	case 0:
+	case 1:
+	case 4:
+	case 5:
+		counter = (c->count - d) & 0xffff;
+		break;
+	case 3:
+		/* XXX: may be incorrect for odd counts */
+		counter = c->count - (mod_64((2 * d), c->count));
+		break;
+	default:
+		counter = c->count - mod_64(d, c->count);
+		break;
+	}
+	return counter;
+}
+
+static int pit_get_out(struct kvm_pit *pit, int channel)
+{
+	struct kvm_kpit_channel_state *c = &pit->pit_state.channels[channel];
+	s64 d, t;
+	int out;
+
+	t = kpit_elapsed(pit, c, channel);
+	d = mul_u64_u32_div(t, KVM_PIT_FREQ, NSEC_PER_SEC);
+
+	switch (c->mode) {
+	default:
+	case 0:
+		out = (d >= c->count);
+		break;
+	case 1:
+		out = (d < c->count);
+		break;
+	case 2:
+		out = ((mod_64(d, c->count) == 0) && (d != 0));
+		break;
+	case 3:
+		out = (mod_64(d, c->count) < ((c->count + 1) >> 1));
+		break;
+	case 4:
+	case 5:
+		out = (d == c->count);
+		break;
+	}
+
+	return out;
+}
+
+static void pit_latch_count(struct kvm_pit *pit, int channel)
+{
+	struct kvm_kpit_channel_state *c = &pit->pit_state.channels[channel];
+
+	if (!c->count_latched) {
+		c->latched_count = pit_get_count(pit, channel);
+		c->count_latched = c->rw_mode;
+	}
+}
+
+static void pit_latch_status(struct kvm_pit *pit, int channel)
+{
+	struct kvm_kpit_channel_state *c = &pit->pit_state.channels[channel];
+
+	if (!c->status_latched) {
+		/* TODO: Return NULL COUNT (bit 6). */
+		c->status = ((pit_get_out(pit, channel) << 7) |
+				(c->rw_mode << 4) |
+				(c->mode << 1) |
+				c->bcd);
+		c->status_latched = 1;
+	}
+}
+
+static inline struct kvm_pit *pit_state_to_pit(struct kvm_kpit_state *ps)
+{
+	return container_of(ps, struct kvm_pit, pit_state);
+}
+
+static void kvm_pit_ack_irq(struct kvm_irq_ack_notifier *kian)
+{
+	struct kvm_kpit_state *ps = container_of(kian, struct kvm_kpit_state,
+						 irq_ack_notifier);
+	struct kvm_pit *pit = pit_state_to_pit(ps);
+
+	atomic_set(&ps->irq_ack, 1);
+	/* irq_ack should be set before pending is read.  Order accesses with
+	 * inc(pending) in pit_timer_fn and xchg(irq_ack, 0) in pit_do_work.
+	 */
+	smp_mb();
+	if (atomic_dec_if_positive(&ps->pending) > 0)
+		kthread_queue_work(pit->worker, &pit->expired);
+}
+
+void __kvm_migrate_pit_timer(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct kvm_pit *pit = vcpu->kvm->arch.vpit;
+	struct hrtimer *timer;
+
+	/* Somewhat arbitrarily make vcpu0 the owner of the PIT. */
+	if (vcpu->vcpu_id || !pit)
+		return;
+
+	timer = &pit->pit_state.timer;
+	mutex_lock(&pit->pit_state.lock);
+	if (hrtimer_cancel(timer))
+		hrtimer_start_expires(timer, HRTIMER_MODE_ABS);
+	mutex_unlock(&pit->pit_state.lock);
+}
+
+static void destroy_pit_timer(struct kvm_pit *pit)
+{
+	hrtimer_cancel(&pit->pit_state.timer);
+	kthread_flush_work(&pit->expired);
+}
+
+static void pit_do_work(struct kthread_work *work)
+{
+	struct kvm_pit *pit = container_of(work, struct kvm_pit, expired);
+	struct kvm *kvm = pit->kvm;
+	struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu;
+	unsigned long i;
+	struct kvm_kpit_state *ps = &pit->pit_state;
+
+	if (atomic_read(&ps->reinject) && !atomic_xchg(&ps->irq_ack, 0))
+		return;
+
+	kvm_set_irq(kvm, pit->irq_source_id, 0, 1, false);
+	kvm_set_irq(kvm, pit->irq_source_id, 0, 0, false);
+
+	/*
+	 * Provides NMI watchdog support via Virtual Wire mode.
+	 * The route is: PIT -> LVT0 in NMI mode.
+	 *
+	 * Note: Our Virtual Wire implementation does not follow
+	 * the MP specification.  We propagate a PIT interrupt to all
+	 * VCPUs and only when LVT0 is in NMI mode.  The interrupt can
+	 * also be simultaneously delivered through PIC and IOAPIC.
+	 */
+	if (atomic_read(&kvm->arch.vapics_in_nmi_mode) > 0)
+		kvm_for_each_vcpu(i, vcpu, kvm)
+			kvm_apic_nmi_wd_deliver(vcpu);
+}
+
+static enum hrtimer_restart pit_timer_fn(struct hrtimer *data)
+{
+	struct kvm_kpit_state *ps = container_of(data, struct kvm_kpit_state, timer);
+	struct kvm_pit *pt = pit_state_to_pit(ps);
+
+	if (atomic_read(&ps->reinject))
+		atomic_inc(&ps->pending);
+
+	kthread_queue_work(pt->worker, &pt->expired);
+
+	if (ps->is_periodic) {
+		hrtimer_add_expires_ns(&ps->timer, ps->period);
+		return HRTIMER_RESTART;
+	} else
+		return HRTIMER_NORESTART;
+}
+
+static inline void kvm_pit_reset_reinject(struct kvm_pit *pit)
+{
+	atomic_set(&pit->pit_state.pending, 0);
+	atomic_set(&pit->pit_state.irq_ack, 1);
+}
+
+void kvm_pit_set_reinject(struct kvm_pit *pit, bool reinject)
+{
+	struct kvm_kpit_state *ps = &pit->pit_state;
+	struct kvm *kvm = pit->kvm;
+
+	if (atomic_read(&ps->reinject) == reinject)
+		return;
+
+	/*
+	 * AMD SVM AVIC accelerates EOI write and does not trap.
+	 * This cause in-kernel PIT re-inject mode to fail
+	 * since it checks ps->irq_ack before kvm_set_irq()
+	 * and relies on the ack notifier to timely queue
+	 * the pt->worker work iterm and reinject the missed tick.
+	 * So, deactivate APICv when PIT is in reinject mode.
+	 */
+	if (reinject) {
+		kvm_set_apicv_inhibit(kvm, APICV_INHIBIT_REASON_PIT_REINJ);
+		/* The initial state is preserved while ps->reinject == 0. */
+		kvm_pit_reset_reinject(pit);
+		kvm_register_irq_ack_notifier(kvm, &ps->irq_ack_notifier);
+		kvm_register_irq_mask_notifier(kvm, 0, &pit->mask_notifier);
+	} else {
+		kvm_clear_apicv_inhibit(kvm, APICV_INHIBIT_REASON_PIT_REINJ);
+		kvm_unregister_irq_ack_notifier(kvm, &ps->irq_ack_notifier);
+		kvm_unregister_irq_mask_notifier(kvm, 0, &pit->mask_notifier);
+	}
+
+	atomic_set(&ps->reinject, reinject);
+}
+
+static void create_pit_timer(struct kvm_pit *pit, u32 val, int is_period)
+{
+	struct kvm_kpit_state *ps = &pit->pit_state;
+	struct kvm *kvm = pit->kvm;
+	s64 interval;
+
+	if (!ioapic_in_kernel(kvm) ||
+	    ps->flags & KVM_PIT_FLAGS_HPET_LEGACY)
+		return;
+
+	interval = mul_u64_u32_div(val, NSEC_PER_SEC, KVM_PIT_FREQ);
+
+	pr_debug("create pit timer, interval is %llu nsec\n", interval);
+
+	/* TODO The new value only affected after the retriggered */
+	hrtimer_cancel(&ps->timer);
+	kthread_flush_work(&pit->expired);
+	ps->period = interval;
+	ps->is_periodic = is_period;
+
+	kvm_pit_reset_reinject(pit);
+
+	/*
+	 * Do not allow the guest to program periodic timers with small
+	 * interval, since the hrtimers are not throttled by the host
+	 * scheduler.
+	 */
+	if (ps->is_periodic) {
+		s64 min_period = min_timer_period_us * 1000LL;
+
+		if (ps->period < min_period) {
+			pr_info_ratelimited(
+			    "requested %lld ns "
+			    "i8254 timer period limited to %lld ns\n",
+			    ps->period, min_period);
+			ps->period = min_period;
+		}
+	}
+
+	hrtimer_start(&ps->timer, ktime_add_ns(ktime_get(), interval),
+		      HRTIMER_MODE_ABS);
+}
+
+static void pit_load_count(struct kvm_pit *pit, int channel, u32 val)
+{
+	struct kvm_kpit_state *ps = &pit->pit_state;
+
+	pr_debug("load_count val is %u, channel is %d\n", val, channel);
+
+	/*
+	 * The largest possible initial count is 0; this is equivalent
+	 * to 216 for binary counting and 104 for BCD counting.
+	 */
+	if (val == 0)
+		val = 0x10000;
+
+	ps->channels[channel].count = val;
+
+	if (channel != 0) {
+		ps->channels[channel].count_load_time = ktime_get();
+		return;
+	}
+
+	/* Two types of timer
+	 * mode 1 is one shot, mode 2 is period, otherwise del timer */
+	switch (ps->channels[0].mode) {
+	case 0:
+	case 1:
+        /* FIXME: enhance mode 4 precision */
+	case 4:
+		create_pit_timer(pit, val, 0);
+		break;
+	case 2:
+	case 3:
+		create_pit_timer(pit, val, 1);
+		break;
+	default:
+		destroy_pit_timer(pit);
+	}
+}
+
+void kvm_pit_load_count(struct kvm_pit *pit, int channel, u32 val,
+		int hpet_legacy_start)
+{
+	u8 saved_mode;
+
+	WARN_ON_ONCE(!mutex_is_locked(&pit->pit_state.lock));
+
+	if (hpet_legacy_start) {
+		/* save existing mode for later reenablement */
+		WARN_ON(channel != 0);
+		saved_mode = pit->pit_state.channels[0].mode;
+		pit->pit_state.channels[0].mode = 0xff; /* disable timer */
+		pit_load_count(pit, channel, val);
+		pit->pit_state.channels[0].mode = saved_mode;
+	} else {
+		pit_load_count(pit, channel, val);
+	}
+}
+
+static inline struct kvm_pit *dev_to_pit(struct kvm_io_device *dev)
+{
+	return container_of(dev, struct kvm_pit, dev);
+}
+
+static inline struct kvm_pit *speaker_to_pit(struct kvm_io_device *dev)
+{
+	return container_of(dev, struct kvm_pit, speaker_dev);
+}
+
+static inline int pit_in_range(gpa_t addr)
+{
+	return ((addr >= KVM_PIT_BASE_ADDRESS) &&
+		(addr < KVM_PIT_BASE_ADDRESS + KVM_PIT_MEM_LENGTH));
+}
+
+static int pit_ioport_write(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+				struct kvm_io_device *this,
+			    gpa_t addr, int len, const void *data)
+{
+	struct kvm_pit *pit = dev_to_pit(this);
+	struct kvm_kpit_state *pit_state = &pit->pit_state;
+	int channel, access;
+	struct kvm_kpit_channel_state *s;
+	u32 val = *(u32 *) data;
+	if (!pit_in_range(addr))
+		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+	val  &= 0xff;
+	addr &= KVM_PIT_CHANNEL_MASK;
+
+	mutex_lock(&pit_state->lock);
+
+	if (val != 0)
+		pr_debug("write addr is 0x%x, len is %d, val is 0x%x\n",
+			 (unsigned int)addr, len, val);
+
+	if (addr == 3) {
+		channel = val >> 6;
+		if (channel == 3) {
+			/* Read-Back Command. */
+			for (channel = 0; channel < 3; channel++) {
+				if (val & (2 << channel)) {
+					if (!(val & 0x20))
+						pit_latch_count(pit, channel);
+					if (!(val & 0x10))
+						pit_latch_status(pit, channel);
+				}
+			}
+		} else {
+			/* Select Counter <channel>. */
+			s = &pit_state->channels[channel];
+			access = (val >> 4) & KVM_PIT_CHANNEL_MASK;
+			if (access == 0) {
+				pit_latch_count(pit, channel);
+			} else {
+				s->rw_mode = access;
+				s->read_state = access;
+				s->write_state = access;
+				s->mode = (val >> 1) & 7;
+				if (s->mode > 5)
+					s->mode -= 4;
+				s->bcd = val & 1;
+			}
+		}
+	} else {
+		/* Write Count. */
+		s = &pit_state->channels[addr];
+		switch (s->write_state) {
+		default:
+		case RW_STATE_LSB:
+			pit_load_count(pit, addr, val);
+			break;
+		case RW_STATE_MSB:
+			pit_load_count(pit, addr, val << 8);
+			break;
+		case RW_STATE_WORD0:
+			s->write_latch = val;
+			s->write_state = RW_STATE_WORD1;
+			break;
+		case RW_STATE_WORD1:
+			pit_load_count(pit, addr, s->write_latch | (val << 8));
+			s->write_state = RW_STATE_WORD0;
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+
+	mutex_unlock(&pit_state->lock);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int pit_ioport_read(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+			   struct kvm_io_device *this,
+			   gpa_t addr, int len, void *data)
+{
+	struct kvm_pit *pit = dev_to_pit(this);
+	struct kvm_kpit_state *pit_state = &pit->pit_state;
+	int ret, count;
+	struct kvm_kpit_channel_state *s;
+	if (!pit_in_range(addr))
+		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+	addr &= KVM_PIT_CHANNEL_MASK;
+	if (addr == 3)
+		return 0;
+
+	s = &pit_state->channels[addr];
+
+	mutex_lock(&pit_state->lock);
+
+	if (s->status_latched) {
+		s->status_latched = 0;
+		ret = s->status;
+	} else if (s->count_latched) {
+		switch (s->count_latched) {
+		default:
+		case RW_STATE_LSB:
+			ret = s->latched_count & 0xff;
+			s->count_latched = 0;
+			break;
+		case RW_STATE_MSB:
+			ret = s->latched_count >> 8;
+			s->count_latched = 0;
+			break;
+		case RW_STATE_WORD0:
+			ret = s->latched_count & 0xff;
+			s->count_latched = RW_STATE_MSB;
+			break;
+		}
+	} else {
+		switch (s->read_state) {
+		default:
+		case RW_STATE_LSB:
+			count = pit_get_count(pit, addr);
+			ret = count & 0xff;
+			break;
+		case RW_STATE_MSB:
+			count = pit_get_count(pit, addr);
+			ret = (count >> 8) & 0xff;
+			break;
+		case RW_STATE_WORD0:
+			count = pit_get_count(pit, addr);
+			ret = count & 0xff;
+			s->read_state = RW_STATE_WORD1;
+			break;
+		case RW_STATE_WORD1:
+			count = pit_get_count(pit, addr);
+			ret = (count >> 8) & 0xff;
+			s->read_state = RW_STATE_WORD0;
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (len > sizeof(ret))
+		len = sizeof(ret);
+	memcpy(data, (char *)&ret, len);
+
+	mutex_unlock(&pit_state->lock);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int speaker_ioport_write(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+				struct kvm_io_device *this,
+				gpa_t addr, int len, const void *data)
+{
+	struct kvm_pit *pit = speaker_to_pit(this);
+	struct kvm_kpit_state *pit_state = &pit->pit_state;
+	u32 val = *(u32 *) data;
+	if (addr != KVM_SPEAKER_BASE_ADDRESS)
+		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+	mutex_lock(&pit_state->lock);
+	if (val & (1 << 1))
+		pit_state->flags |= KVM_PIT_FLAGS_SPEAKER_DATA_ON;
+	else
+		pit_state->flags &= ~KVM_PIT_FLAGS_SPEAKER_DATA_ON;
+	pit_set_gate(pit, 2, val & 1);
+	mutex_unlock(&pit_state->lock);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int speaker_ioport_read(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+				   struct kvm_io_device *this,
+				   gpa_t addr, int len, void *data)
+{
+	struct kvm_pit *pit = speaker_to_pit(this);
+	struct kvm_kpit_state *pit_state = &pit->pit_state;
+	unsigned int refresh_clock;
+	int ret;
+	if (addr != KVM_SPEAKER_BASE_ADDRESS)
+		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+	/* Refresh clock toggles at about 15us. We approximate as 2^14ns. */
+	refresh_clock = ((unsigned int)ktime_to_ns(ktime_get()) >> 14) & 1;
+
+	mutex_lock(&pit_state->lock);
+	ret = (!!(pit_state->flags & KVM_PIT_FLAGS_SPEAKER_DATA_ON) << 1) |
+		pit_get_gate(pit, 2) | (pit_get_out(pit, 2) << 5) |
+		(refresh_clock << 4);
+	if (len > sizeof(ret))
+		len = sizeof(ret);
+	memcpy(data, (char *)&ret, len);
+	mutex_unlock(&pit_state->lock);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void kvm_pit_reset(struct kvm_pit *pit)
+{
+	int i;
+	struct kvm_kpit_channel_state *c;
+
+	pit->pit_state.flags = 0;
+	for (i = 0; i < 3; i++) {
+		c = &pit->pit_state.channels[i];
+		c->mode = 0xff;
+		c->gate = (i != 2);
+		pit_load_count(pit, i, 0);
+	}
+
+	kvm_pit_reset_reinject(pit);
+}
+
+static void pit_mask_notifer(struct kvm_irq_mask_notifier *kimn, bool mask)
+{
+	struct kvm_pit *pit = container_of(kimn, struct kvm_pit, mask_notifier);
+
+	if (!mask)
+		kvm_pit_reset_reinject(pit);
+}
+
+static const struct kvm_io_device_ops pit_dev_ops = {
+	.read     = pit_ioport_read,
+	.write    = pit_ioport_write,
+};
+
+static const struct kvm_io_device_ops speaker_dev_ops = {
+	.read     = speaker_ioport_read,
+	.write    = speaker_ioport_write,
+};
+
+struct kvm_pit *kvm_create_pit(struct kvm *kvm, u32 flags)
+{
+	struct kvm_pit *pit;
+	struct kvm_kpit_state *pit_state;
+	struct pid *pid;
+	pid_t pid_nr;
+	int ret;
+
+	pit = kzalloc(sizeof(struct kvm_pit), GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
+	if (!pit)
+		return NULL;
+
+	pit->irq_source_id = kvm_request_irq_source_id(kvm);
+	if (pit->irq_source_id < 0)
+		goto fail_request;
+
+	mutex_init(&pit->pit_state.lock);
+
+	pid = get_pid(task_tgid(current));
+	pid_nr = pid_vnr(pid);
+	put_pid(pid);
+
+	pit->worker = kthread_create_worker(0, "kvm-pit/%d", pid_nr);
+	if (IS_ERR(pit->worker))
+		goto fail_kthread;
+
+	kthread_init_work(&pit->expired, pit_do_work);
+
+	pit->kvm = kvm;
+
+	pit_state = &pit->pit_state;
+	hrtimer_init(&pit_state->timer, CLOCK_MONOTONIC, HRTIMER_MODE_ABS);
+	pit_state->timer.function = pit_timer_fn;
+
+	pit_state->irq_ack_notifier.gsi = 0;
+	pit_state->irq_ack_notifier.irq_acked = kvm_pit_ack_irq;
+	pit->mask_notifier.func = pit_mask_notifer;
+
+	kvm_pit_reset(pit);
+
+	kvm_pit_set_reinject(pit, true);
+
+	mutex_lock(&kvm->slots_lock);
+	kvm_iodevice_init(&pit->dev, &pit_dev_ops);
+	ret = kvm_io_bus_register_dev(kvm, KVM_PIO_BUS, KVM_PIT_BASE_ADDRESS,
+				      KVM_PIT_MEM_LENGTH, &pit->dev);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		goto fail_register_pit;
+
+	if (flags & KVM_PIT_SPEAKER_DUMMY) {
+		kvm_iodevice_init(&pit->speaker_dev, &speaker_dev_ops);
+		ret = kvm_io_bus_register_dev(kvm, KVM_PIO_BUS,
+					      KVM_SPEAKER_BASE_ADDRESS, 4,
+					      &pit->speaker_dev);
+		if (ret < 0)
+			goto fail_register_speaker;
+	}
+	mutex_unlock(&kvm->slots_lock);
+
+	return pit;
+
+fail_register_speaker:
+	kvm_io_bus_unregister_dev(kvm, KVM_PIO_BUS, &pit->dev);
+fail_register_pit:
+	mutex_unlock(&kvm->slots_lock);
+	kvm_pit_set_reinject(pit, false);
+	kthread_destroy_worker(pit->worker);
+fail_kthread:
+	kvm_free_irq_source_id(kvm, pit->irq_source_id);
+fail_request:
+	kfree(pit);
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+void kvm_free_pit(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+	struct kvm_pit *pit = kvm->arch.vpit;
+
+	if (pit) {
+		mutex_lock(&kvm->slots_lock);
+		kvm_io_bus_unregister_dev(kvm, KVM_PIO_BUS, &pit->dev);
+		kvm_io_bus_unregister_dev(kvm, KVM_PIO_BUS, &pit->speaker_dev);
+		mutex_unlock(&kvm->slots_lock);
+		kvm_pit_set_reinject(pit, false);
+		hrtimer_cancel(&pit->pit_state.timer);
+		kthread_destroy_worker(pit->worker);
+		kvm_free_irq_source_id(kvm, pit->irq_source_id);
+		kfree(pit);
+	}
+}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/i8254.h b/arch/x86/kvm/i8254.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..a768212ba
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/i8254.h
@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+#ifndef __I8254_H
+#define __I8254_H
+
+#include <linux/kthread.h>
+
+#include <kvm/iodev.h>
+
+struct kvm_kpit_channel_state {
+	u32 count; /* can be 65536 */
+	u16 latched_count;
+	u8 count_latched;
+	u8 status_latched;
+	u8 status;
+	u8 read_state;
+	u8 write_state;
+	u8 write_latch;
+	u8 rw_mode;
+	u8 mode;
+	u8 bcd; /* not supported */
+	u8 gate; /* timer start */
+	ktime_t count_load_time;
+};
+
+struct kvm_kpit_state {
+	/* All members before "struct mutex lock" are protected by the lock. */
+	struct kvm_kpit_channel_state channels[3];
+	u32 flags;
+	bool is_periodic;
+	s64 period; 				/* unit: ns */
+	struct hrtimer timer;
+
+	struct mutex lock;
+	atomic_t reinject;
+	atomic_t pending; /* accumulated triggered timers */
+	atomic_t irq_ack;
+	struct kvm_irq_ack_notifier irq_ack_notifier;
+};
+
+struct kvm_pit {
+	struct kvm_io_device dev;
+	struct kvm_io_device speaker_dev;
+	struct kvm *kvm;
+	struct kvm_kpit_state pit_state;
+	int irq_source_id;
+	struct kvm_irq_mask_notifier mask_notifier;
+	struct kthread_worker *worker;
+	struct kthread_work expired;
+};
+
+#define KVM_PIT_BASE_ADDRESS	    0x40
+#define KVM_SPEAKER_BASE_ADDRESS    0x61
+#define KVM_PIT_MEM_LENGTH	    4
+#define KVM_PIT_FREQ		    1193181
+#define KVM_MAX_PIT_INTR_INTERVAL   HZ / 100
+#define KVM_PIT_CHANNEL_MASK	    0x3
+
+struct kvm_pit *kvm_create_pit(struct kvm *kvm, u32 flags);
+void kvm_free_pit(struct kvm *kvm);
+
+void kvm_pit_load_count(struct kvm_pit *pit, int channel, u32 val,
+		int hpet_legacy_start);
+void kvm_pit_set_reinject(struct kvm_pit *pit, bool reinject);
+
+#endif
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/i8259.c b/arch/x86/kvm/i8259.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..8dec646e7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/i8259.c
@@ -0,0 +1,660 @@
+/*
+ * 8259 interrupt controller emulation
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 2003-2004 Fabrice Bellard
+ * Copyright (c) 2007 Intel Corporation
+ * Copyright 2009 Red Hat, Inc. and/or its affiliates.
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy
+ * of this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to deal
+ * in the Software without restriction, including without limitation the rights
+ * to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell
+ * copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is
+ * furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in
+ * all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY,
+ * FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL
+ * THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER
+ * LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM,
+ * OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN
+ * THE SOFTWARE.
+ * Authors:
+ *   Yaozu (Eddie) Dong <Eddie.dong@intel.com>
+ *   Port from Qemu.
+ */
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
+
+#include <linux/mm.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/bitops.h>
+#include "irq.h"
+
+#include <linux/kvm_host.h>
+#include "trace.h"
+
+#define pr_pic_unimpl(fmt, ...)	\
+	pr_err_ratelimited("pic: " fmt, ## __VA_ARGS__)
+
+static void pic_irq_request(struct kvm *kvm, int level);
+
+static void pic_lock(struct kvm_pic *s)
+	__acquires(&s->lock)
+{
+	spin_lock(&s->lock);
+}
+
+static void pic_unlock(struct kvm_pic *s)
+	__releases(&s->lock)
+{
+	bool wakeup = s->wakeup_needed;
+	struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu;
+	unsigned long i;
+
+	s->wakeup_needed = false;
+
+	spin_unlock(&s->lock);
+
+	if (wakeup) {
+		kvm_for_each_vcpu(i, vcpu, s->kvm) {
+			if (kvm_apic_accept_pic_intr(vcpu)) {
+				kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_EVENT, vcpu);
+				kvm_vcpu_kick(vcpu);
+				return;
+			}
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+static void pic_clear_isr(struct kvm_kpic_state *s, int irq)
+{
+	s->isr &= ~(1 << irq);
+	if (s != &s->pics_state->pics[0])
+		irq += 8;
+	/*
+	 * We are dropping lock while calling ack notifiers since ack
+	 * notifier callbacks for assigned devices call into PIC recursively.
+	 * Other interrupt may be delivered to PIC while lock is dropped but
+	 * it should be safe since PIC state is already updated at this stage.
+	 */
+	pic_unlock(s->pics_state);
+	kvm_notify_acked_irq(s->pics_state->kvm, SELECT_PIC(irq), irq);
+	pic_lock(s->pics_state);
+}
+
+/*
+ * set irq level. If an edge is detected, then the IRR is set to 1
+ */
+static inline int pic_set_irq1(struct kvm_kpic_state *s, int irq, int level)
+{
+	int mask, ret = 1;
+	mask = 1 << irq;
+	if (s->elcr & mask)	/* level triggered */
+		if (level) {
+			ret = !(s->irr & mask);
+			s->irr |= mask;
+			s->last_irr |= mask;
+		} else {
+			s->irr &= ~mask;
+			s->last_irr &= ~mask;
+		}
+	else	/* edge triggered */
+		if (level) {
+			if ((s->last_irr & mask) == 0) {
+				ret = !(s->irr & mask);
+				s->irr |= mask;
+			}
+			s->last_irr |= mask;
+		} else
+			s->last_irr &= ~mask;
+
+	return (s->imr & mask) ? -1 : ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * return the highest priority found in mask (highest = smallest
+ * number). Return 8 if no irq
+ */
+static inline int get_priority(struct kvm_kpic_state *s, int mask)
+{
+	int priority;
+	if (mask == 0)
+		return 8;
+	priority = 0;
+	while ((mask & (1 << ((priority + s->priority_add) & 7))) == 0)
+		priority++;
+	return priority;
+}
+
+/*
+ * return the pic wanted interrupt. return -1 if none
+ */
+static int pic_get_irq(struct kvm_kpic_state *s)
+{
+	int mask, cur_priority, priority;
+
+	mask = s->irr & ~s->imr;
+	priority = get_priority(s, mask);
+	if (priority == 8)
+		return -1;
+	/*
+	 * compute current priority. If special fully nested mode on the
+	 * master, the IRQ coming from the slave is not taken into account
+	 * for the priority computation.
+	 */
+	mask = s->isr;
+	if (s->special_fully_nested_mode && s == &s->pics_state->pics[0])
+		mask &= ~(1 << 2);
+	cur_priority = get_priority(s, mask);
+	if (priority < cur_priority)
+		/*
+		 * higher priority found: an irq should be generated
+		 */
+		return (priority + s->priority_add) & 7;
+	else
+		return -1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * raise irq to CPU if necessary. must be called every time the active
+ * irq may change
+ */
+static void pic_update_irq(struct kvm_pic *s)
+{
+	int irq2, irq;
+
+	irq2 = pic_get_irq(&s->pics[1]);
+	if (irq2 >= 0) {
+		/*
+		 * if irq request by slave pic, signal master PIC
+		 */
+		pic_set_irq1(&s->pics[0], 2, 1);
+		pic_set_irq1(&s->pics[0], 2, 0);
+	}
+	irq = pic_get_irq(&s->pics[0]);
+	pic_irq_request(s->kvm, irq >= 0);
+}
+
+void kvm_pic_update_irq(struct kvm_pic *s)
+{
+	pic_lock(s);
+	pic_update_irq(s);
+	pic_unlock(s);
+}
+
+int kvm_pic_set_irq(struct kvm_pic *s, int irq, int irq_source_id, int level)
+{
+	int ret, irq_level;
+
+	BUG_ON(irq < 0 || irq >= PIC_NUM_PINS);
+
+	pic_lock(s);
+	irq_level = __kvm_irq_line_state(&s->irq_states[irq],
+					 irq_source_id, level);
+	ret = pic_set_irq1(&s->pics[irq >> 3], irq & 7, irq_level);
+	pic_update_irq(s);
+	trace_kvm_pic_set_irq(irq >> 3, irq & 7, s->pics[irq >> 3].elcr,
+			      s->pics[irq >> 3].imr, ret == 0);
+	pic_unlock(s);
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+void kvm_pic_clear_all(struct kvm_pic *s, int irq_source_id)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	pic_lock(s);
+	for (i = 0; i < PIC_NUM_PINS; i++)
+		__clear_bit(irq_source_id, &s->irq_states[i]);
+	pic_unlock(s);
+}
+
+/*
+ * acknowledge interrupt 'irq'
+ */
+static inline void pic_intack(struct kvm_kpic_state *s, int irq)
+{
+	s->isr |= 1 << irq;
+	/*
+	 * We don't clear a level sensitive interrupt here
+	 */
+	if (!(s->elcr & (1 << irq)))
+		s->irr &= ~(1 << irq);
+
+	if (s->auto_eoi) {
+		if (s->rotate_on_auto_eoi)
+			s->priority_add = (irq + 1) & 7;
+		pic_clear_isr(s, irq);
+	}
+
+}
+
+int kvm_pic_read_irq(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+	int irq, irq2, intno;
+	struct kvm_pic *s = kvm->arch.vpic;
+
+	s->output = 0;
+
+	pic_lock(s);
+	irq = pic_get_irq(&s->pics[0]);
+	if (irq >= 0) {
+		pic_intack(&s->pics[0], irq);
+		if (irq == 2) {
+			irq2 = pic_get_irq(&s->pics[1]);
+			if (irq2 >= 0)
+				pic_intack(&s->pics[1], irq2);
+			else
+				/*
+				 * spurious IRQ on slave controller
+				 */
+				irq2 = 7;
+			intno = s->pics[1].irq_base + irq2;
+		} else
+			intno = s->pics[0].irq_base + irq;
+	} else {
+		/*
+		 * spurious IRQ on host controller
+		 */
+		irq = 7;
+		intno = s->pics[0].irq_base + irq;
+	}
+	pic_update_irq(s);
+	pic_unlock(s);
+
+	return intno;
+}
+
+static void kvm_pic_reset(struct kvm_kpic_state *s)
+{
+	int irq;
+	unsigned long i;
+	struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu;
+	u8 edge_irr = s->irr & ~s->elcr;
+	bool found = false;
+
+	s->last_irr = 0;
+	s->irr &= s->elcr;
+	s->imr = 0;
+	s->priority_add = 0;
+	s->special_mask = 0;
+	s->read_reg_select = 0;
+	if (!s->init4) {
+		s->special_fully_nested_mode = 0;
+		s->auto_eoi = 0;
+	}
+	s->init_state = 1;
+
+	kvm_for_each_vcpu(i, vcpu, s->pics_state->kvm)
+		if (kvm_apic_accept_pic_intr(vcpu)) {
+			found = true;
+			break;
+		}
+
+
+	if (!found)
+		return;
+
+	for (irq = 0; irq < PIC_NUM_PINS/2; irq++)
+		if (edge_irr & (1 << irq))
+			pic_clear_isr(s, irq);
+}
+
+static void pic_ioport_write(void *opaque, u32 addr, u32 val)
+{
+	struct kvm_kpic_state *s = opaque;
+	int priority, cmd, irq;
+
+	addr &= 1;
+	if (addr == 0) {
+		if (val & 0x10) {
+			s->init4 = val & 1;
+			if (val & 0x02)
+				pr_pic_unimpl("single mode not supported");
+			if (val & 0x08)
+				pr_pic_unimpl(
+						"level sensitive irq not supported");
+			kvm_pic_reset(s);
+		} else if (val & 0x08) {
+			if (val & 0x04)
+				s->poll = 1;
+			if (val & 0x02)
+				s->read_reg_select = val & 1;
+			if (val & 0x40)
+				s->special_mask = (val >> 5) & 1;
+		} else {
+			cmd = val >> 5;
+			switch (cmd) {
+			case 0:
+			case 4:
+				s->rotate_on_auto_eoi = cmd >> 2;
+				break;
+			case 1:	/* end of interrupt */
+			case 5:
+				priority = get_priority(s, s->isr);
+				if (priority != 8) {
+					irq = (priority + s->priority_add) & 7;
+					if (cmd == 5)
+						s->priority_add = (irq + 1) & 7;
+					pic_clear_isr(s, irq);
+					pic_update_irq(s->pics_state);
+				}
+				break;
+			case 3:
+				irq = val & 7;
+				pic_clear_isr(s, irq);
+				pic_update_irq(s->pics_state);
+				break;
+			case 6:
+				s->priority_add = (val + 1) & 7;
+				pic_update_irq(s->pics_state);
+				break;
+			case 7:
+				irq = val & 7;
+				s->priority_add = (irq + 1) & 7;
+				pic_clear_isr(s, irq);
+				pic_update_irq(s->pics_state);
+				break;
+			default:
+				break;	/* no operation */
+			}
+		}
+	} else
+		switch (s->init_state) {
+		case 0: { /* normal mode */
+			u8 imr_diff = s->imr ^ val,
+				off = (s == &s->pics_state->pics[0]) ? 0 : 8;
+			s->imr = val;
+			for (irq = 0; irq < PIC_NUM_PINS/2; irq++)
+				if (imr_diff & (1 << irq))
+					kvm_fire_mask_notifiers(
+						s->pics_state->kvm,
+						SELECT_PIC(irq + off),
+						irq + off,
+						!!(s->imr & (1 << irq)));
+			pic_update_irq(s->pics_state);
+			break;
+		}
+		case 1:
+			s->irq_base = val & 0xf8;
+			s->init_state = 2;
+			break;
+		case 2:
+			if (s->init4)
+				s->init_state = 3;
+			else
+				s->init_state = 0;
+			break;
+		case 3:
+			s->special_fully_nested_mode = (val >> 4) & 1;
+			s->auto_eoi = (val >> 1) & 1;
+			s->init_state = 0;
+			break;
+		}
+}
+
+static u32 pic_poll_read(struct kvm_kpic_state *s, u32 addr1)
+{
+	int ret;
+
+	ret = pic_get_irq(s);
+	if (ret >= 0) {
+		if (addr1 >> 7) {
+			s->pics_state->pics[0].isr &= ~(1 << 2);
+			s->pics_state->pics[0].irr &= ~(1 << 2);
+		}
+		s->irr &= ~(1 << ret);
+		pic_clear_isr(s, ret);
+		if (addr1 >> 7 || ret != 2)
+			pic_update_irq(s->pics_state);
+		/* Bit 7 is 1, means there's an interrupt */
+		ret |= 0x80;
+	} else {
+		/* Bit 7 is 0, means there's no interrupt */
+		ret = 0x07;
+		pic_update_irq(s->pics_state);
+	}
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static u32 pic_ioport_read(void *opaque, u32 addr)
+{
+	struct kvm_kpic_state *s = opaque;
+	int ret;
+
+	if (s->poll) {
+		ret = pic_poll_read(s, addr);
+		s->poll = 0;
+	} else
+		if ((addr & 1) == 0)
+			if (s->read_reg_select)
+				ret = s->isr;
+			else
+				ret = s->irr;
+		else
+			ret = s->imr;
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static void elcr_ioport_write(void *opaque, u32 val)
+{
+	struct kvm_kpic_state *s = opaque;
+	s->elcr = val & s->elcr_mask;
+}
+
+static u32 elcr_ioport_read(void *opaque)
+{
+	struct kvm_kpic_state *s = opaque;
+	return s->elcr;
+}
+
+static int picdev_write(struct kvm_pic *s,
+			 gpa_t addr, int len, const void *val)
+{
+	unsigned char data = *(unsigned char *)val;
+
+	if (len != 1) {
+		pr_pic_unimpl("non byte write\n");
+		return 0;
+	}
+	switch (addr) {
+	case 0x20:
+	case 0x21:
+		pic_lock(s);
+		pic_ioport_write(&s->pics[0], addr, data);
+		pic_unlock(s);
+		break;
+	case 0xa0:
+	case 0xa1:
+		pic_lock(s);
+		pic_ioport_write(&s->pics[1], addr, data);
+		pic_unlock(s);
+		break;
+	case 0x4d0:
+	case 0x4d1:
+		pic_lock(s);
+		elcr_ioport_write(&s->pics[addr & 1], data);
+		pic_unlock(s);
+		break;
+	default:
+		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int picdev_read(struct kvm_pic *s,
+		       gpa_t addr, int len, void *val)
+{
+	unsigned char *data = (unsigned char *)val;
+
+	if (len != 1) {
+		memset(val, 0, len);
+		pr_pic_unimpl("non byte read\n");
+		return 0;
+	}
+	switch (addr) {
+	case 0x20:
+	case 0x21:
+	case 0xa0:
+	case 0xa1:
+		pic_lock(s);
+		*data = pic_ioport_read(&s->pics[addr >> 7], addr);
+		pic_unlock(s);
+		break;
+	case 0x4d0:
+	case 0x4d1:
+		pic_lock(s);
+		*data = elcr_ioport_read(&s->pics[addr & 1]);
+		pic_unlock(s);
+		break;
+	default:
+		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int picdev_master_write(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_io_device *dev,
+			       gpa_t addr, int len, const void *val)
+{
+	return picdev_write(container_of(dev, struct kvm_pic, dev_master),
+			    addr, len, val);
+}
+
+static int picdev_master_read(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_io_device *dev,
+			      gpa_t addr, int len, void *val)
+{
+	return picdev_read(container_of(dev, struct kvm_pic, dev_master),
+			    addr, len, val);
+}
+
+static int picdev_slave_write(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_io_device *dev,
+			      gpa_t addr, int len, const void *val)
+{
+	return picdev_write(container_of(dev, struct kvm_pic, dev_slave),
+			    addr, len, val);
+}
+
+static int picdev_slave_read(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_io_device *dev,
+			     gpa_t addr, int len, void *val)
+{
+	return picdev_read(container_of(dev, struct kvm_pic, dev_slave),
+			    addr, len, val);
+}
+
+static int picdev_elcr_write(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_io_device *dev,
+			     gpa_t addr, int len, const void *val)
+{
+	return picdev_write(container_of(dev, struct kvm_pic, dev_elcr),
+			    addr, len, val);
+}
+
+static int picdev_elcr_read(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_io_device *dev,
+			    gpa_t addr, int len, void *val)
+{
+	return picdev_read(container_of(dev, struct kvm_pic, dev_elcr),
+			    addr, len, val);
+}
+
+/*
+ * callback when PIC0 irq status changed
+ */
+static void pic_irq_request(struct kvm *kvm, int level)
+{
+	struct kvm_pic *s = kvm->arch.vpic;
+
+	if (!s->output)
+		s->wakeup_needed = true;
+	s->output = level;
+}
+
+static const struct kvm_io_device_ops picdev_master_ops = {
+	.read     = picdev_master_read,
+	.write    = picdev_master_write,
+};
+
+static const struct kvm_io_device_ops picdev_slave_ops = {
+	.read     = picdev_slave_read,
+	.write    = picdev_slave_write,
+};
+
+static const struct kvm_io_device_ops picdev_elcr_ops = {
+	.read     = picdev_elcr_read,
+	.write    = picdev_elcr_write,
+};
+
+int kvm_pic_init(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+	struct kvm_pic *s;
+	int ret;
+
+	s = kzalloc(sizeof(struct kvm_pic), GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
+	if (!s)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	spin_lock_init(&s->lock);
+	s->kvm = kvm;
+	s->pics[0].elcr_mask = 0xf8;
+	s->pics[1].elcr_mask = 0xde;
+	s->pics[0].pics_state = s;
+	s->pics[1].pics_state = s;
+
+	/*
+	 * Initialize PIO device
+	 */
+	kvm_iodevice_init(&s->dev_master, &picdev_master_ops);
+	kvm_iodevice_init(&s->dev_slave, &picdev_slave_ops);
+	kvm_iodevice_init(&s->dev_elcr, &picdev_elcr_ops);
+	mutex_lock(&kvm->slots_lock);
+	ret = kvm_io_bus_register_dev(kvm, KVM_PIO_BUS, 0x20, 2,
+				      &s->dev_master);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		goto fail_unlock;
+
+	ret = kvm_io_bus_register_dev(kvm, KVM_PIO_BUS, 0xa0, 2, &s->dev_slave);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		goto fail_unreg_2;
+
+	ret = kvm_io_bus_register_dev(kvm, KVM_PIO_BUS, 0x4d0, 2, &s->dev_elcr);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		goto fail_unreg_1;
+
+	mutex_unlock(&kvm->slots_lock);
+
+	kvm->arch.vpic = s;
+
+	return 0;
+
+fail_unreg_1:
+	kvm_io_bus_unregister_dev(kvm, KVM_PIO_BUS, &s->dev_slave);
+
+fail_unreg_2:
+	kvm_io_bus_unregister_dev(kvm, KVM_PIO_BUS, &s->dev_master);
+
+fail_unlock:
+	mutex_unlock(&kvm->slots_lock);
+
+	kfree(s);
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+void kvm_pic_destroy(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+	struct kvm_pic *vpic = kvm->arch.vpic;
+
+	if (!vpic)
+		return;
+
+	mutex_lock(&kvm->slots_lock);
+	kvm_io_bus_unregister_dev(vpic->kvm, KVM_PIO_BUS, &vpic->dev_master);
+	kvm_io_bus_unregister_dev(vpic->kvm, KVM_PIO_BUS, &vpic->dev_slave);
+	kvm_io_bus_unregister_dev(vpic->kvm, KVM_PIO_BUS, &vpic->dev_elcr);
+	mutex_unlock(&kvm->slots_lock);
+
+	kvm->arch.vpic = NULL;
+	kfree(vpic);
+}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/ioapic.c b/arch/x86/kvm/ioapic.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..995eb5054
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/ioapic.c
@@ -0,0 +1,776 @@
+/*
+ *  Copyright (C) 2001  MandrakeSoft S.A.
+ *  Copyright 2010 Red Hat, Inc. and/or its affiliates.
+ *
+ *    MandrakeSoft S.A.
+ *    43, rue d'Aboukir
+ *    75002 Paris - France
+ *    http://www.linux-mandrake.com/
+ *    http://www.mandrakesoft.com/
+ *
+ *  This library is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ *  modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public
+ *  License as published by the Free Software Foundation; either
+ *  version 2 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ *  This library is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ *  but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ *  MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU
+ *  Lesser General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ *  You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public
+ *  License along with this library; if not, write to the Free Software
+ *  Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA  02111-1307 USA
+ *
+ *  Yunhong Jiang <yunhong.jiang@intel.com>
+ *  Yaozu (Eddie) Dong <eddie.dong@intel.com>
+ *  Based on Xen 3.1 code.
+ */
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
+
+#include <linux/kvm_host.h>
+#include <linux/kvm.h>
+#include <linux/mm.h>
+#include <linux/highmem.h>
+#include <linux/smp.h>
+#include <linux/hrtimer.h>
+#include <linux/io.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/export.h>
+#include <linux/nospec.h>
+#include <asm/processor.h>
+#include <asm/page.h>
+#include <asm/current.h>
+#include <trace/events/kvm.h>
+
+#include "ioapic.h"
+#include "lapic.h"
+#include "irq.h"
+
+static int ioapic_service(struct kvm_ioapic *vioapic, int irq,
+		bool line_status);
+
+static void kvm_ioapic_update_eoi_one(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+				      struct kvm_ioapic *ioapic,
+				      int trigger_mode,
+				      int pin);
+
+static unsigned long ioapic_read_indirect(struct kvm_ioapic *ioapic)
+{
+	unsigned long result = 0;
+
+	switch (ioapic->ioregsel) {
+	case IOAPIC_REG_VERSION:
+		result = ((((IOAPIC_NUM_PINS - 1) & 0xff) << 16)
+			  | (IOAPIC_VERSION_ID & 0xff));
+		break;
+
+	case IOAPIC_REG_APIC_ID:
+	case IOAPIC_REG_ARB_ID:
+		result = ((ioapic->id & 0xf) << 24);
+		break;
+
+	default:
+		{
+			u32 redir_index = (ioapic->ioregsel - 0x10) >> 1;
+			u64 redir_content = ~0ULL;
+
+			if (redir_index < IOAPIC_NUM_PINS) {
+				u32 index = array_index_nospec(
+					redir_index, IOAPIC_NUM_PINS);
+
+				redir_content = ioapic->redirtbl[index].bits;
+			}
+
+			result = (ioapic->ioregsel & 0x1) ?
+			    (redir_content >> 32) & 0xffffffff :
+			    redir_content & 0xffffffff;
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+
+	return result;
+}
+
+static void rtc_irq_eoi_tracking_reset(struct kvm_ioapic *ioapic)
+{
+	ioapic->rtc_status.pending_eoi = 0;
+	bitmap_zero(ioapic->rtc_status.dest_map.map, KVM_MAX_VCPU_IDS);
+}
+
+static void kvm_rtc_eoi_tracking_restore_all(struct kvm_ioapic *ioapic);
+
+static void rtc_status_pending_eoi_check_valid(struct kvm_ioapic *ioapic)
+{
+	if (WARN_ON(ioapic->rtc_status.pending_eoi < 0))
+		kvm_rtc_eoi_tracking_restore_all(ioapic);
+}
+
+static void __rtc_irq_eoi_tracking_restore_one(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	bool new_val, old_val;
+	struct kvm_ioapic *ioapic = vcpu->kvm->arch.vioapic;
+	struct dest_map *dest_map = &ioapic->rtc_status.dest_map;
+	union kvm_ioapic_redirect_entry *e;
+
+	e = &ioapic->redirtbl[RTC_GSI];
+	if (!kvm_apic_match_dest(vcpu, NULL, APIC_DEST_NOSHORT,
+				 e->fields.dest_id,
+				 kvm_lapic_irq_dest_mode(!!e->fields.dest_mode)))
+		return;
+
+	new_val = kvm_apic_pending_eoi(vcpu, e->fields.vector);
+	old_val = test_bit(vcpu->vcpu_id, dest_map->map);
+
+	if (new_val == old_val)
+		return;
+
+	if (new_val) {
+		__set_bit(vcpu->vcpu_id, dest_map->map);
+		dest_map->vectors[vcpu->vcpu_id] = e->fields.vector;
+		ioapic->rtc_status.pending_eoi++;
+	} else {
+		__clear_bit(vcpu->vcpu_id, dest_map->map);
+		ioapic->rtc_status.pending_eoi--;
+		rtc_status_pending_eoi_check_valid(ioapic);
+	}
+}
+
+void kvm_rtc_eoi_tracking_restore_one(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct kvm_ioapic *ioapic = vcpu->kvm->arch.vioapic;
+
+	spin_lock(&ioapic->lock);
+	__rtc_irq_eoi_tracking_restore_one(vcpu);
+	spin_unlock(&ioapic->lock);
+}
+
+static void kvm_rtc_eoi_tracking_restore_all(struct kvm_ioapic *ioapic)
+{
+	struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu;
+	unsigned long i;
+
+	if (RTC_GSI >= IOAPIC_NUM_PINS)
+		return;
+
+	rtc_irq_eoi_tracking_reset(ioapic);
+	kvm_for_each_vcpu(i, vcpu, ioapic->kvm)
+	    __rtc_irq_eoi_tracking_restore_one(vcpu);
+}
+
+static void rtc_irq_eoi(struct kvm_ioapic *ioapic, struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+			int vector)
+{
+	struct dest_map *dest_map = &ioapic->rtc_status.dest_map;
+
+	/* RTC special handling */
+	if (test_bit(vcpu->vcpu_id, dest_map->map) &&
+	    (vector == dest_map->vectors[vcpu->vcpu_id]) &&
+	    (test_and_clear_bit(vcpu->vcpu_id,
+				ioapic->rtc_status.dest_map.map))) {
+		--ioapic->rtc_status.pending_eoi;
+		rtc_status_pending_eoi_check_valid(ioapic);
+	}
+}
+
+static bool rtc_irq_check_coalesced(struct kvm_ioapic *ioapic)
+{
+	if (ioapic->rtc_status.pending_eoi > 0)
+		return true; /* coalesced */
+
+	return false;
+}
+
+static void ioapic_lazy_update_eoi(struct kvm_ioapic *ioapic, int irq)
+{
+	unsigned long i;
+	struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu;
+	union kvm_ioapic_redirect_entry *entry = &ioapic->redirtbl[irq];
+
+	kvm_for_each_vcpu(i, vcpu, ioapic->kvm) {
+		if (!kvm_apic_match_dest(vcpu, NULL, APIC_DEST_NOSHORT,
+					 entry->fields.dest_id,
+					 entry->fields.dest_mode) ||
+		    kvm_apic_pending_eoi(vcpu, entry->fields.vector))
+			continue;
+
+		/*
+		 * If no longer has pending EOI in LAPICs, update
+		 * EOI for this vector.
+		 */
+		rtc_irq_eoi(ioapic, vcpu, entry->fields.vector);
+		break;
+	}
+}
+
+static int ioapic_set_irq(struct kvm_ioapic *ioapic, unsigned int irq,
+		int irq_level, bool line_status)
+{
+	union kvm_ioapic_redirect_entry entry;
+	u32 mask = 1 << irq;
+	u32 old_irr;
+	int edge, ret;
+
+	entry = ioapic->redirtbl[irq];
+	edge = (entry.fields.trig_mode == IOAPIC_EDGE_TRIG);
+
+	if (!irq_level) {
+		ioapic->irr &= ~mask;
+		ret = 1;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * AMD SVM AVIC accelerate EOI write iff the interrupt is edge
+	 * triggered, in which case the in-kernel IOAPIC will not be able
+	 * to receive the EOI.  In this case, we do a lazy update of the
+	 * pending EOI when trying to set IOAPIC irq.
+	 */
+	if (edge && kvm_apicv_activated(ioapic->kvm))
+		ioapic_lazy_update_eoi(ioapic, irq);
+
+	/*
+	 * Return 0 for coalesced interrupts; for edge-triggered interrupts,
+	 * this only happens if a previous edge has not been delivered due
+	 * to masking.  For level interrupts, the remote_irr field tells
+	 * us if the interrupt is waiting for an EOI.
+	 *
+	 * RTC is special: it is edge-triggered, but userspace likes to know
+	 * if it has been already ack-ed via EOI because coalesced RTC
+	 * interrupts lead to time drift in Windows guests.  So we track
+	 * EOI manually for the RTC interrupt.
+	 */
+	if (irq == RTC_GSI && line_status &&
+		rtc_irq_check_coalesced(ioapic)) {
+		ret = 0;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	old_irr = ioapic->irr;
+	ioapic->irr |= mask;
+	if (edge) {
+		ioapic->irr_delivered &= ~mask;
+		if (old_irr == ioapic->irr) {
+			ret = 0;
+			goto out;
+		}
+	}
+
+	ret = ioapic_service(ioapic, irq, line_status);
+
+out:
+	trace_kvm_ioapic_set_irq(entry.bits, irq, ret == 0);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static void kvm_ioapic_inject_all(struct kvm_ioapic *ioapic, unsigned long irr)
+{
+	u32 idx;
+
+	rtc_irq_eoi_tracking_reset(ioapic);
+	for_each_set_bit(idx, &irr, IOAPIC_NUM_PINS)
+		ioapic_set_irq(ioapic, idx, 1, true);
+
+	kvm_rtc_eoi_tracking_restore_all(ioapic);
+}
+
+
+void kvm_ioapic_scan_entry(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, ulong *ioapic_handled_vectors)
+{
+	struct kvm_ioapic *ioapic = vcpu->kvm->arch.vioapic;
+	struct dest_map *dest_map = &ioapic->rtc_status.dest_map;
+	union kvm_ioapic_redirect_entry *e;
+	int index;
+
+	spin_lock(&ioapic->lock);
+
+	/* Make sure we see any missing RTC EOI */
+	if (test_bit(vcpu->vcpu_id, dest_map->map))
+		__set_bit(dest_map->vectors[vcpu->vcpu_id],
+			  ioapic_handled_vectors);
+
+	for (index = 0; index < IOAPIC_NUM_PINS; index++) {
+		e = &ioapic->redirtbl[index];
+		if (e->fields.trig_mode == IOAPIC_LEVEL_TRIG ||
+		    kvm_irq_has_notifier(ioapic->kvm, KVM_IRQCHIP_IOAPIC, index) ||
+		    index == RTC_GSI) {
+			u16 dm = kvm_lapic_irq_dest_mode(!!e->fields.dest_mode);
+
+			if (kvm_apic_match_dest(vcpu, NULL, APIC_DEST_NOSHORT,
+						e->fields.dest_id, dm) ||
+			    kvm_apic_pending_eoi(vcpu, e->fields.vector))
+				__set_bit(e->fields.vector,
+					  ioapic_handled_vectors);
+		}
+	}
+	spin_unlock(&ioapic->lock);
+}
+
+void kvm_arch_post_irq_ack_notifier_list_update(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+	if (!ioapic_in_kernel(kvm))
+		return;
+	kvm_make_scan_ioapic_request(kvm);
+}
+
+static void ioapic_write_indirect(struct kvm_ioapic *ioapic, u32 val)
+{
+	unsigned index;
+	bool mask_before, mask_after;
+	union kvm_ioapic_redirect_entry *e;
+	int old_remote_irr, old_delivery_status, old_dest_id, old_dest_mode;
+	DECLARE_BITMAP(vcpu_bitmap, KVM_MAX_VCPUS);
+
+	switch (ioapic->ioregsel) {
+	case IOAPIC_REG_VERSION:
+		/* Writes are ignored. */
+		break;
+
+	case IOAPIC_REG_APIC_ID:
+		ioapic->id = (val >> 24) & 0xf;
+		break;
+
+	case IOAPIC_REG_ARB_ID:
+		break;
+
+	default:
+		index = (ioapic->ioregsel - 0x10) >> 1;
+
+		if (index >= IOAPIC_NUM_PINS)
+			return;
+		index = array_index_nospec(index, IOAPIC_NUM_PINS);
+		e = &ioapic->redirtbl[index];
+		mask_before = e->fields.mask;
+		/* Preserve read-only fields */
+		old_remote_irr = e->fields.remote_irr;
+		old_delivery_status = e->fields.delivery_status;
+		old_dest_id = e->fields.dest_id;
+		old_dest_mode = e->fields.dest_mode;
+		if (ioapic->ioregsel & 1) {
+			e->bits &= 0xffffffff;
+			e->bits |= (u64) val << 32;
+		} else {
+			e->bits &= ~0xffffffffULL;
+			e->bits |= (u32) val;
+		}
+		e->fields.remote_irr = old_remote_irr;
+		e->fields.delivery_status = old_delivery_status;
+
+		/*
+		 * Some OSes (Linux, Xen) assume that Remote IRR bit will
+		 * be cleared by IOAPIC hardware when the entry is configured
+		 * as edge-triggered. This behavior is used to simulate an
+		 * explicit EOI on IOAPICs that don't have the EOI register.
+		 */
+		if (e->fields.trig_mode == IOAPIC_EDGE_TRIG)
+			e->fields.remote_irr = 0;
+
+		mask_after = e->fields.mask;
+		if (mask_before != mask_after)
+			kvm_fire_mask_notifiers(ioapic->kvm, KVM_IRQCHIP_IOAPIC, index, mask_after);
+		if (e->fields.trig_mode == IOAPIC_LEVEL_TRIG &&
+		    ioapic->irr & (1 << index) && !e->fields.mask && !e->fields.remote_irr) {
+			/*
+			 * Pending status in irr may be outdated: the IRQ line may have
+			 * already been deasserted by a device while the IRQ was masked.
+			 * This occurs, for instance, if the interrupt is handled in a
+			 * Linux guest as a oneshot interrupt (IRQF_ONESHOT). In this
+			 * case the guest acknowledges the interrupt to the device in
+			 * its threaded irq handler, i.e. after the EOI but before
+			 * unmasking, so at the time of unmasking the IRQ line is
+			 * already down but our pending irr bit is still set. In such
+			 * cases, injecting this pending interrupt to the guest is
+			 * buggy: the guest will receive an extra unwanted interrupt.
+			 *
+			 * So we need to check here if the IRQ is actually still pending.
+			 * As we are generally not able to probe the IRQ line status
+			 * directly, we do it through irqfd resampler. Namely, we clear
+			 * the pending status and notify the resampler that this interrupt
+			 * is done, without actually injecting it into the guest. If the
+			 * IRQ line is actually already deasserted, we are done. If it is
+			 * still asserted, a new interrupt will be shortly triggered
+			 * through irqfd and injected into the guest.
+			 *
+			 * If, however, it's not possible to resample (no irqfd resampler
+			 * registered for this irq), then unconditionally inject this
+			 * pending interrupt into the guest, so the guest will not miss
+			 * an interrupt, although may get an extra unwanted interrupt.
+			 */
+			if (kvm_notify_irqfd_resampler(ioapic->kvm, KVM_IRQCHIP_IOAPIC, index))
+				ioapic->irr &= ~(1 << index);
+			else
+				ioapic_service(ioapic, index, false);
+		}
+		if (e->fields.delivery_mode == APIC_DM_FIXED) {
+			struct kvm_lapic_irq irq;
+
+			irq.vector = e->fields.vector;
+			irq.delivery_mode = e->fields.delivery_mode << 8;
+			irq.dest_mode =
+			    kvm_lapic_irq_dest_mode(!!e->fields.dest_mode);
+			irq.level = false;
+			irq.trig_mode = e->fields.trig_mode;
+			irq.shorthand = APIC_DEST_NOSHORT;
+			irq.dest_id = e->fields.dest_id;
+			irq.msi_redir_hint = false;
+			bitmap_zero(vcpu_bitmap, KVM_MAX_VCPUS);
+			kvm_bitmap_or_dest_vcpus(ioapic->kvm, &irq,
+						 vcpu_bitmap);
+			if (old_dest_mode != e->fields.dest_mode ||
+			    old_dest_id != e->fields.dest_id) {
+				/*
+				 * Update vcpu_bitmap with vcpus specified in
+				 * the previous request as well. This is done to
+				 * keep ioapic_handled_vectors synchronized.
+				 */
+				irq.dest_id = old_dest_id;
+				irq.dest_mode =
+				    kvm_lapic_irq_dest_mode(
+					!!e->fields.dest_mode);
+				kvm_bitmap_or_dest_vcpus(ioapic->kvm, &irq,
+							 vcpu_bitmap);
+			}
+			kvm_make_scan_ioapic_request_mask(ioapic->kvm,
+							  vcpu_bitmap);
+		} else {
+			kvm_make_scan_ioapic_request(ioapic->kvm);
+		}
+		break;
+	}
+}
+
+static int ioapic_service(struct kvm_ioapic *ioapic, int irq, bool line_status)
+{
+	union kvm_ioapic_redirect_entry *entry = &ioapic->redirtbl[irq];
+	struct kvm_lapic_irq irqe;
+	int ret;
+
+	if (entry->fields.mask ||
+	    (entry->fields.trig_mode == IOAPIC_LEVEL_TRIG &&
+	    entry->fields.remote_irr))
+		return -1;
+
+	irqe.dest_id = entry->fields.dest_id;
+	irqe.vector = entry->fields.vector;
+	irqe.dest_mode = kvm_lapic_irq_dest_mode(!!entry->fields.dest_mode);
+	irqe.trig_mode = entry->fields.trig_mode;
+	irqe.delivery_mode = entry->fields.delivery_mode << 8;
+	irqe.level = 1;
+	irqe.shorthand = APIC_DEST_NOSHORT;
+	irqe.msi_redir_hint = false;
+
+	if (irqe.trig_mode == IOAPIC_EDGE_TRIG)
+		ioapic->irr_delivered |= 1 << irq;
+
+	if (irq == RTC_GSI && line_status) {
+		/*
+		 * pending_eoi cannot ever become negative (see
+		 * rtc_status_pending_eoi_check_valid) and the caller
+		 * ensures that it is only called if it is >= zero, namely
+		 * if rtc_irq_check_coalesced returns false).
+		 */
+		BUG_ON(ioapic->rtc_status.pending_eoi != 0);
+		ret = kvm_irq_delivery_to_apic(ioapic->kvm, NULL, &irqe,
+					       &ioapic->rtc_status.dest_map);
+		ioapic->rtc_status.pending_eoi = (ret < 0 ? 0 : ret);
+	} else
+		ret = kvm_irq_delivery_to_apic(ioapic->kvm, NULL, &irqe, NULL);
+
+	if (ret && irqe.trig_mode == IOAPIC_LEVEL_TRIG)
+		entry->fields.remote_irr = 1;
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+int kvm_ioapic_set_irq(struct kvm_ioapic *ioapic, int irq, int irq_source_id,
+		       int level, bool line_status)
+{
+	int ret, irq_level;
+
+	BUG_ON(irq < 0 || irq >= IOAPIC_NUM_PINS);
+
+	spin_lock(&ioapic->lock);
+	irq_level = __kvm_irq_line_state(&ioapic->irq_states[irq],
+					 irq_source_id, level);
+	ret = ioapic_set_irq(ioapic, irq, irq_level, line_status);
+
+	spin_unlock(&ioapic->lock);
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+void kvm_ioapic_clear_all(struct kvm_ioapic *ioapic, int irq_source_id)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	spin_lock(&ioapic->lock);
+	for (i = 0; i < KVM_IOAPIC_NUM_PINS; i++)
+		__clear_bit(irq_source_id, &ioapic->irq_states[i]);
+	spin_unlock(&ioapic->lock);
+}
+
+static void kvm_ioapic_eoi_inject_work(struct work_struct *work)
+{
+	int i;
+	struct kvm_ioapic *ioapic = container_of(work, struct kvm_ioapic,
+						 eoi_inject.work);
+	spin_lock(&ioapic->lock);
+	for (i = 0; i < IOAPIC_NUM_PINS; i++) {
+		union kvm_ioapic_redirect_entry *ent = &ioapic->redirtbl[i];
+
+		if (ent->fields.trig_mode != IOAPIC_LEVEL_TRIG)
+			continue;
+
+		if (ioapic->irr & (1 << i) && !ent->fields.remote_irr)
+			ioapic_service(ioapic, i, false);
+	}
+	spin_unlock(&ioapic->lock);
+}
+
+#define IOAPIC_SUCCESSIVE_IRQ_MAX_COUNT 10000
+static void kvm_ioapic_update_eoi_one(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+				      struct kvm_ioapic *ioapic,
+				      int trigger_mode,
+				      int pin)
+{
+	struct kvm_lapic *apic = vcpu->arch.apic;
+	union kvm_ioapic_redirect_entry *ent = &ioapic->redirtbl[pin];
+
+	/*
+	 * We are dropping lock while calling ack notifiers because ack
+	 * notifier callbacks for assigned devices call into IOAPIC
+	 * recursively. Since remote_irr is cleared only after call
+	 * to notifiers if the same vector will be delivered while lock
+	 * is dropped it will be put into irr and will be delivered
+	 * after ack notifier returns.
+	 */
+	spin_unlock(&ioapic->lock);
+	kvm_notify_acked_irq(ioapic->kvm, KVM_IRQCHIP_IOAPIC, pin);
+	spin_lock(&ioapic->lock);
+
+	if (trigger_mode != IOAPIC_LEVEL_TRIG ||
+	    kvm_lapic_get_reg(apic, APIC_SPIV) & APIC_SPIV_DIRECTED_EOI)
+		return;
+
+	ASSERT(ent->fields.trig_mode == IOAPIC_LEVEL_TRIG);
+	ent->fields.remote_irr = 0;
+	if (!ent->fields.mask && (ioapic->irr & (1 << pin))) {
+		++ioapic->irq_eoi[pin];
+		if (ioapic->irq_eoi[pin] == IOAPIC_SUCCESSIVE_IRQ_MAX_COUNT) {
+			/*
+			 * Real hardware does not deliver the interrupt
+			 * immediately during eoi broadcast, and this
+			 * lets a buggy guest make slow progress
+			 * even if it does not correctly handle a
+			 * level-triggered interrupt.  Emulate this
+			 * behavior if we detect an interrupt storm.
+			 */
+			schedule_delayed_work(&ioapic->eoi_inject, HZ / 100);
+			ioapic->irq_eoi[pin] = 0;
+			trace_kvm_ioapic_delayed_eoi_inj(ent->bits);
+		} else {
+			ioapic_service(ioapic, pin, false);
+		}
+	} else {
+		ioapic->irq_eoi[pin] = 0;
+	}
+}
+
+void kvm_ioapic_update_eoi(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int vector, int trigger_mode)
+{
+	int i;
+	struct kvm_ioapic *ioapic = vcpu->kvm->arch.vioapic;
+
+	spin_lock(&ioapic->lock);
+	rtc_irq_eoi(ioapic, vcpu, vector);
+	for (i = 0; i < IOAPIC_NUM_PINS; i++) {
+		union kvm_ioapic_redirect_entry *ent = &ioapic->redirtbl[i];
+
+		if (ent->fields.vector != vector)
+			continue;
+		kvm_ioapic_update_eoi_one(vcpu, ioapic, trigger_mode, i);
+	}
+	spin_unlock(&ioapic->lock);
+}
+
+static inline struct kvm_ioapic *to_ioapic(struct kvm_io_device *dev)
+{
+	return container_of(dev, struct kvm_ioapic, dev);
+}
+
+static inline int ioapic_in_range(struct kvm_ioapic *ioapic, gpa_t addr)
+{
+	return ((addr >= ioapic->base_address &&
+		 (addr < ioapic->base_address + IOAPIC_MEM_LENGTH)));
+}
+
+static int ioapic_mmio_read(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_io_device *this,
+				gpa_t addr, int len, void *val)
+{
+	struct kvm_ioapic *ioapic = to_ioapic(this);
+	u32 result;
+	if (!ioapic_in_range(ioapic, addr))
+		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+	ASSERT(!(addr & 0xf));	/* check alignment */
+
+	addr &= 0xff;
+	spin_lock(&ioapic->lock);
+	switch (addr) {
+	case IOAPIC_REG_SELECT:
+		result = ioapic->ioregsel;
+		break;
+
+	case IOAPIC_REG_WINDOW:
+		result = ioapic_read_indirect(ioapic);
+		break;
+
+	default:
+		result = 0;
+		break;
+	}
+	spin_unlock(&ioapic->lock);
+
+	switch (len) {
+	case 8:
+		*(u64 *) val = result;
+		break;
+	case 1:
+	case 2:
+	case 4:
+		memcpy(val, (char *)&result, len);
+		break;
+	default:
+		printk(KERN_WARNING "ioapic: wrong length %d\n", len);
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int ioapic_mmio_write(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_io_device *this,
+				 gpa_t addr, int len, const void *val)
+{
+	struct kvm_ioapic *ioapic = to_ioapic(this);
+	u32 data;
+	if (!ioapic_in_range(ioapic, addr))
+		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+	ASSERT(!(addr & 0xf));	/* check alignment */
+
+	switch (len) {
+	case 8:
+	case 4:
+		data = *(u32 *) val;
+		break;
+	case 2:
+		data = *(u16 *) val;
+		break;
+	case 1:
+		data = *(u8  *) val;
+		break;
+	default:
+		printk(KERN_WARNING "ioapic: Unsupported size %d\n", len);
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	addr &= 0xff;
+	spin_lock(&ioapic->lock);
+	switch (addr) {
+	case IOAPIC_REG_SELECT:
+		ioapic->ioregsel = data & 0xFF; /* 8-bit register */
+		break;
+
+	case IOAPIC_REG_WINDOW:
+		ioapic_write_indirect(ioapic, data);
+		break;
+
+	default:
+		break;
+	}
+	spin_unlock(&ioapic->lock);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void kvm_ioapic_reset(struct kvm_ioapic *ioapic)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	cancel_delayed_work_sync(&ioapic->eoi_inject);
+	for (i = 0; i < IOAPIC_NUM_PINS; i++)
+		ioapic->redirtbl[i].fields.mask = 1;
+	ioapic->base_address = IOAPIC_DEFAULT_BASE_ADDRESS;
+	ioapic->ioregsel = 0;
+	ioapic->irr = 0;
+	ioapic->irr_delivered = 0;
+	ioapic->id = 0;
+	memset(ioapic->irq_eoi, 0x00, sizeof(ioapic->irq_eoi));
+	rtc_irq_eoi_tracking_reset(ioapic);
+}
+
+static const struct kvm_io_device_ops ioapic_mmio_ops = {
+	.read     = ioapic_mmio_read,
+	.write    = ioapic_mmio_write,
+};
+
+int kvm_ioapic_init(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+	struct kvm_ioapic *ioapic;
+	int ret;
+
+	ioapic = kzalloc(sizeof(struct kvm_ioapic), GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
+	if (!ioapic)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	spin_lock_init(&ioapic->lock);
+	INIT_DELAYED_WORK(&ioapic->eoi_inject, kvm_ioapic_eoi_inject_work);
+	kvm->arch.vioapic = ioapic;
+	kvm_ioapic_reset(ioapic);
+	kvm_iodevice_init(&ioapic->dev, &ioapic_mmio_ops);
+	ioapic->kvm = kvm;
+	mutex_lock(&kvm->slots_lock);
+	ret = kvm_io_bus_register_dev(kvm, KVM_MMIO_BUS, ioapic->base_address,
+				      IOAPIC_MEM_LENGTH, &ioapic->dev);
+	mutex_unlock(&kvm->slots_lock);
+	if (ret < 0) {
+		kvm->arch.vioapic = NULL;
+		kfree(ioapic);
+	}
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+void kvm_ioapic_destroy(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+	struct kvm_ioapic *ioapic = kvm->arch.vioapic;
+
+	if (!ioapic)
+		return;
+
+	cancel_delayed_work_sync(&ioapic->eoi_inject);
+	mutex_lock(&kvm->slots_lock);
+	kvm_io_bus_unregister_dev(kvm, KVM_MMIO_BUS, &ioapic->dev);
+	mutex_unlock(&kvm->slots_lock);
+	kvm->arch.vioapic = NULL;
+	kfree(ioapic);
+}
+
+void kvm_get_ioapic(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_ioapic_state *state)
+{
+	struct kvm_ioapic *ioapic = kvm->arch.vioapic;
+
+	spin_lock(&ioapic->lock);
+	memcpy(state, ioapic, sizeof(struct kvm_ioapic_state));
+	state->irr &= ~ioapic->irr_delivered;
+	spin_unlock(&ioapic->lock);
+}
+
+void kvm_set_ioapic(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_ioapic_state *state)
+{
+	struct kvm_ioapic *ioapic = kvm->arch.vioapic;
+
+	spin_lock(&ioapic->lock);
+	memcpy(ioapic, state, sizeof(struct kvm_ioapic_state));
+	ioapic->irr = 0;
+	ioapic->irr_delivered = 0;
+	kvm_make_scan_ioapic_request(kvm);
+	kvm_ioapic_inject_all(ioapic, state->irr);
+	spin_unlock(&ioapic->lock);
+}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/ioapic.h b/arch/x86/kvm/ioapic.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..539333ac4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/ioapic.h
@@ -0,0 +1,123 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+#ifndef __KVM_IO_APIC_H
+#define __KVM_IO_APIC_H
+
+#include <linux/kvm_host.h>
+#include <kvm/iodev.h>
+#include "irq.h"
+
+struct kvm;
+struct kvm_vcpu;
+
+#define IOAPIC_NUM_PINS  KVM_IOAPIC_NUM_PINS
+#define MAX_NR_RESERVED_IOAPIC_PINS KVM_MAX_IRQ_ROUTES
+#define IOAPIC_VERSION_ID 0x11	/* IOAPIC version */
+#define IOAPIC_EDGE_TRIG  0
+#define IOAPIC_LEVEL_TRIG 1
+
+#define IOAPIC_DEFAULT_BASE_ADDRESS  0xfec00000
+#define IOAPIC_MEM_LENGTH            0x100
+
+/* Direct registers. */
+#define IOAPIC_REG_SELECT  0x00
+#define IOAPIC_REG_WINDOW  0x10
+
+/* Indirect registers. */
+#define IOAPIC_REG_APIC_ID 0x00	/* x86 IOAPIC only */
+#define IOAPIC_REG_VERSION 0x01
+#define IOAPIC_REG_ARB_ID  0x02	/* x86 IOAPIC only */
+
+/*ioapic delivery mode*/
+#define	IOAPIC_FIXED			0x0
+#define	IOAPIC_LOWEST_PRIORITY		0x1
+#define	IOAPIC_PMI			0x2
+#define	IOAPIC_NMI			0x4
+#define	IOAPIC_INIT			0x5
+#define	IOAPIC_EXTINT			0x7
+
+#define RTC_GSI 8
+
+struct dest_map {
+	/* vcpu bitmap where IRQ has been sent */
+	DECLARE_BITMAP(map, KVM_MAX_VCPU_IDS);
+
+	/*
+	 * Vector sent to a given vcpu, only valid when
+	 * the vcpu's bit in map is set
+	 */
+	u8 vectors[KVM_MAX_VCPU_IDS];
+};
+
+
+struct rtc_status {
+	int pending_eoi;
+	struct dest_map dest_map;
+};
+
+union kvm_ioapic_redirect_entry {
+	u64 bits;
+	struct {
+		u8 vector;
+		u8 delivery_mode:3;
+		u8 dest_mode:1;
+		u8 delivery_status:1;
+		u8 polarity:1;
+		u8 remote_irr:1;
+		u8 trig_mode:1;
+		u8 mask:1;
+		u8 reserve:7;
+		u8 reserved[4];
+		u8 dest_id;
+	} fields;
+};
+
+struct kvm_ioapic {
+	u64 base_address;
+	u32 ioregsel;
+	u32 id;
+	u32 irr;
+	u32 pad;
+	union kvm_ioapic_redirect_entry redirtbl[IOAPIC_NUM_PINS];
+	unsigned long irq_states[IOAPIC_NUM_PINS];
+	struct kvm_io_device dev;
+	struct kvm *kvm;
+	spinlock_t lock;
+	struct rtc_status rtc_status;
+	struct delayed_work eoi_inject;
+	u32 irq_eoi[IOAPIC_NUM_PINS];
+	u32 irr_delivered;
+};
+
+#ifdef DEBUG
+#define ASSERT(x)  							\
+do {									\
+	if (!(x)) {							\
+		printk(KERN_EMERG "assertion failed %s: %d: %s\n",	\
+		       __FILE__, __LINE__, #x);				\
+		BUG();							\
+	}								\
+} while (0)
+#else
+#define ASSERT(x) do { } while (0)
+#endif
+
+static inline int ioapic_in_kernel(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+	return irqchip_kernel(kvm);
+}
+
+void kvm_rtc_eoi_tracking_restore_one(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+void kvm_ioapic_update_eoi(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int vector,
+			int trigger_mode);
+int kvm_ioapic_init(struct kvm *kvm);
+void kvm_ioapic_destroy(struct kvm *kvm);
+int kvm_ioapic_set_irq(struct kvm_ioapic *ioapic, int irq, int irq_source_id,
+		       int level, bool line_status);
+void kvm_ioapic_clear_all(struct kvm_ioapic *ioapic, int irq_source_id);
+void kvm_get_ioapic(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_ioapic_state *state);
+void kvm_set_ioapic(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_ioapic_state *state);
+void kvm_ioapic_scan_entry(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+			   ulong *ioapic_handled_vectors);
+void kvm_scan_ioapic_routes(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+			    ulong *ioapic_handled_vectors);
+#endif
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/irq.c b/arch/x86/kvm/irq.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..b2c397dd2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/irq.c
@@ -0,0 +1,171 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * irq.c: API for in kernel interrupt controller
+ * Copyright (c) 2007, Intel Corporation.
+ * Copyright 2009 Red Hat, Inc. and/or its affiliates.
+ *
+ * Authors:
+ *   Yaozu (Eddie) Dong <Eddie.dong@intel.com>
+ */
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
+
+#include <linux/export.h>
+#include <linux/kvm_host.h>
+
+#include "irq.h"
+#include "i8254.h"
+#include "x86.h"
+#include "xen.h"
+
+/*
+ * check if there are pending timer events
+ * to be processed.
+ */
+int kvm_cpu_has_pending_timer(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	int r = 0;
+
+	if (lapic_in_kernel(vcpu))
+		r = apic_has_pending_timer(vcpu);
+	if (kvm_xen_timer_enabled(vcpu))
+		r += kvm_xen_has_pending_timer(vcpu);
+
+	return r;
+}
+
+/*
+ * check if there is a pending userspace external interrupt
+ */
+static int pending_userspace_extint(struct kvm_vcpu *v)
+{
+	return v->arch.pending_external_vector != -1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * check if there is pending interrupt from
+ * non-APIC source without intack.
+ */
+int kvm_cpu_has_extint(struct kvm_vcpu *v)
+{
+	/*
+	 * FIXME: interrupt.injected represents an interrupt whose
+	 * side-effects have already been applied (e.g. bit from IRR
+	 * already moved to ISR). Therefore, it is incorrect to rely
+	 * on interrupt.injected to know if there is a pending
+	 * interrupt in the user-mode LAPIC.
+	 * This leads to nVMX/nSVM not be able to distinguish
+	 * if it should exit from L2 to L1 on EXTERNAL_INTERRUPT on
+	 * pending interrupt or should re-inject an injected
+	 * interrupt.
+	 */
+	if (!lapic_in_kernel(v))
+		return v->arch.interrupt.injected;
+
+	if (kvm_xen_has_interrupt(v))
+		return 1;
+
+	if (!kvm_apic_accept_pic_intr(v))
+		return 0;
+
+	if (irqchip_split(v->kvm))
+		return pending_userspace_extint(v);
+	else
+		return v->kvm->arch.vpic->output;
+}
+
+/*
+ * check if there is injectable interrupt:
+ * when virtual interrupt delivery enabled,
+ * interrupt from apic will handled by hardware,
+ * we don't need to check it here.
+ */
+int kvm_cpu_has_injectable_intr(struct kvm_vcpu *v)
+{
+	if (kvm_cpu_has_extint(v))
+		return 1;
+
+	if (!is_guest_mode(v) && kvm_vcpu_apicv_active(v))
+		return 0;
+
+	return kvm_apic_has_interrupt(v) != -1; /* LAPIC */
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_cpu_has_injectable_intr);
+
+/*
+ * check if there is pending interrupt without
+ * intack.
+ */
+int kvm_cpu_has_interrupt(struct kvm_vcpu *v)
+{
+	if (kvm_cpu_has_extint(v))
+		return 1;
+
+	return kvm_apic_has_interrupt(v) != -1;	/* LAPIC */
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_cpu_has_interrupt);
+
+/*
+ * Read pending interrupt(from non-APIC source)
+ * vector and intack.
+ */
+static int kvm_cpu_get_extint(struct kvm_vcpu *v)
+{
+	if (!kvm_cpu_has_extint(v)) {
+		WARN_ON(!lapic_in_kernel(v));
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	if (!lapic_in_kernel(v))
+		return v->arch.interrupt.nr;
+
+	if (kvm_xen_has_interrupt(v))
+		return v->kvm->arch.xen.upcall_vector;
+
+	if (irqchip_split(v->kvm)) {
+		int vector = v->arch.pending_external_vector;
+
+		v->arch.pending_external_vector = -1;
+		return vector;
+	} else
+		return kvm_pic_read_irq(v->kvm); /* PIC */
+}
+
+/*
+ * Read pending interrupt vector and intack.
+ */
+int kvm_cpu_get_interrupt(struct kvm_vcpu *v)
+{
+	int vector = kvm_cpu_get_extint(v);
+	if (vector != -1)
+		return vector;			/* PIC */
+
+	return kvm_get_apic_interrupt(v);	/* APIC */
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_cpu_get_interrupt);
+
+void kvm_inject_pending_timer_irqs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	if (lapic_in_kernel(vcpu))
+		kvm_inject_apic_timer_irqs(vcpu);
+	if (kvm_xen_timer_enabled(vcpu))
+		kvm_xen_inject_timer_irqs(vcpu);
+}
+
+void __kvm_migrate_timers(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	__kvm_migrate_apic_timer(vcpu);
+	__kvm_migrate_pit_timer(vcpu);
+	static_call_cond(kvm_x86_migrate_timers)(vcpu);
+}
+
+bool kvm_arch_irqfd_allowed(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_irqfd *args)
+{
+	bool resample = args->flags & KVM_IRQFD_FLAG_RESAMPLE;
+
+	return resample ? irqchip_kernel(kvm) : irqchip_in_kernel(kvm);
+}
+
+bool kvm_arch_irqchip_in_kernel(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+	return irqchip_in_kernel(kvm);
+}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/irq.h b/arch/x86/kvm/irq.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..c2d7cfe82
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/irq.h
@@ -0,0 +1,114 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */
+/*
+ * irq.h: in kernel interrupt controller related definitions
+ * Copyright (c) 2007, Intel Corporation.
+ *
+ * Authors:
+ *   Yaozu (Eddie) Dong <Eddie.dong@intel.com>
+ */
+
+#ifndef __IRQ_H
+#define __IRQ_H
+
+#include <linux/mm_types.h>
+#include <linux/hrtimer.h>
+#include <linux/kvm_host.h>
+#include <linux/spinlock.h>
+
+#include <kvm/iodev.h>
+#include "lapic.h"
+
+#define PIC_NUM_PINS 16
+#define SELECT_PIC(irq) \
+	((irq) < 8 ? KVM_IRQCHIP_PIC_MASTER : KVM_IRQCHIP_PIC_SLAVE)
+
+struct kvm;
+struct kvm_vcpu;
+
+struct kvm_kpic_state {
+	u8 last_irr;	/* edge detection */
+	u8 irr;		/* interrupt request register */
+	u8 imr;		/* interrupt mask register */
+	u8 isr;		/* interrupt service register */
+	u8 priority_add;	/* highest irq priority */
+	u8 irq_base;
+	u8 read_reg_select;
+	u8 poll;
+	u8 special_mask;
+	u8 init_state;
+	u8 auto_eoi;
+	u8 rotate_on_auto_eoi;
+	u8 special_fully_nested_mode;
+	u8 init4;		/* true if 4 byte init */
+	u8 elcr;		/* PIIX edge/trigger selection */
+	u8 elcr_mask;
+	u8 isr_ack;	/* interrupt ack detection */
+	struct kvm_pic *pics_state;
+};
+
+struct kvm_pic {
+	spinlock_t lock;
+	bool wakeup_needed;
+	unsigned pending_acks;
+	struct kvm *kvm;
+	struct kvm_kpic_state pics[2]; /* 0 is master pic, 1 is slave pic */
+	int output;		/* intr from master PIC */
+	struct kvm_io_device dev_master;
+	struct kvm_io_device dev_slave;
+	struct kvm_io_device dev_elcr;
+	unsigned long irq_states[PIC_NUM_PINS];
+};
+
+int kvm_pic_init(struct kvm *kvm);
+void kvm_pic_destroy(struct kvm *kvm);
+int kvm_pic_read_irq(struct kvm *kvm);
+void kvm_pic_update_irq(struct kvm_pic *s);
+
+static inline int irqchip_split(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+	int mode = kvm->arch.irqchip_mode;
+
+	/* Matches smp_wmb() when setting irqchip_mode */
+	smp_rmb();
+	return mode == KVM_IRQCHIP_SPLIT;
+}
+
+static inline int irqchip_kernel(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+	int mode = kvm->arch.irqchip_mode;
+
+	/* Matches smp_wmb() when setting irqchip_mode */
+	smp_rmb();
+	return mode == KVM_IRQCHIP_KERNEL;
+}
+
+static inline int pic_in_kernel(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+	return irqchip_kernel(kvm);
+}
+
+static inline int irqchip_in_kernel(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+	int mode = kvm->arch.irqchip_mode;
+
+	/* Matches smp_wmb() when setting irqchip_mode */
+	smp_rmb();
+	return mode != KVM_IRQCHIP_NONE;
+}
+
+void kvm_inject_pending_timer_irqs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+void kvm_inject_apic_timer_irqs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+void kvm_apic_nmi_wd_deliver(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+void __kvm_migrate_apic_timer(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+void __kvm_migrate_pit_timer(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+void __kvm_migrate_timers(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+
+int apic_has_pending_timer(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+
+int kvm_setup_default_irq_routing(struct kvm *kvm);
+int kvm_setup_empty_irq_routing(struct kvm *kvm);
+int kvm_irq_delivery_to_apic(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_lapic *src,
+			     struct kvm_lapic_irq *irq,
+			     struct dest_map *dest_map);
+
+#endif
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/irq_comm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/irq_comm.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..16d076a1b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/irq_comm.c
@@ -0,0 +1,442 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * irq_comm.c: Common API for in kernel interrupt controller
+ * Copyright (c) 2007, Intel Corporation.
+ *
+ * Authors:
+ *   Yaozu (Eddie) Dong <Eddie.dong@intel.com>
+ *
+ * Copyright 2010 Red Hat, Inc. and/or its affiliates.
+ */
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
+
+#include <linux/kvm_host.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/export.h>
+#include <linux/rculist.h>
+
+#include <trace/events/kvm.h>
+
+#include "irq.h"
+
+#include "ioapic.h"
+
+#include "lapic.h"
+
+#include "hyperv.h"
+#include "x86.h"
+#include "xen.h"
+
+static int kvm_set_pic_irq(struct kvm_kernel_irq_routing_entry *e,
+			   struct kvm *kvm, int irq_source_id, int level,
+			   bool line_status)
+{
+	struct kvm_pic *pic = kvm->arch.vpic;
+	return kvm_pic_set_irq(pic, e->irqchip.pin, irq_source_id, level);
+}
+
+static int kvm_set_ioapic_irq(struct kvm_kernel_irq_routing_entry *e,
+			      struct kvm *kvm, int irq_source_id, int level,
+			      bool line_status)
+{
+	struct kvm_ioapic *ioapic = kvm->arch.vioapic;
+	return kvm_ioapic_set_irq(ioapic, e->irqchip.pin, irq_source_id, level,
+				line_status);
+}
+
+int kvm_irq_delivery_to_apic(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_lapic *src,
+		struct kvm_lapic_irq *irq, struct dest_map *dest_map)
+{
+	int r = -1;
+	struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, *lowest = NULL;
+	unsigned long i, dest_vcpu_bitmap[BITS_TO_LONGS(KVM_MAX_VCPUS)];
+	unsigned int dest_vcpus = 0;
+
+	if (kvm_irq_delivery_to_apic_fast(kvm, src, irq, &r, dest_map))
+		return r;
+
+	if (irq->dest_mode == APIC_DEST_PHYSICAL &&
+	    irq->dest_id == 0xff && kvm_lowest_prio_delivery(irq)) {
+		pr_info("apic: phys broadcast and lowest prio\n");
+		irq->delivery_mode = APIC_DM_FIXED;
+	}
+
+	memset(dest_vcpu_bitmap, 0, sizeof(dest_vcpu_bitmap));
+
+	kvm_for_each_vcpu(i, vcpu, kvm) {
+		if (!kvm_apic_present(vcpu))
+			continue;
+
+		if (!kvm_apic_match_dest(vcpu, src, irq->shorthand,
+					irq->dest_id, irq->dest_mode))
+			continue;
+
+		if (!kvm_lowest_prio_delivery(irq)) {
+			if (r < 0)
+				r = 0;
+			r += kvm_apic_set_irq(vcpu, irq, dest_map);
+		} else if (kvm_apic_sw_enabled(vcpu->arch.apic)) {
+			if (!kvm_vector_hashing_enabled()) {
+				if (!lowest)
+					lowest = vcpu;
+				else if (kvm_apic_compare_prio(vcpu, lowest) < 0)
+					lowest = vcpu;
+			} else {
+				__set_bit(i, dest_vcpu_bitmap);
+				dest_vcpus++;
+			}
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (dest_vcpus != 0) {
+		int idx = kvm_vector_to_index(irq->vector, dest_vcpus,
+					dest_vcpu_bitmap, KVM_MAX_VCPUS);
+
+		lowest = kvm_get_vcpu(kvm, idx);
+	}
+
+	if (lowest)
+		r = kvm_apic_set_irq(lowest, irq, dest_map);
+
+	return r;
+}
+
+void kvm_set_msi_irq(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_kernel_irq_routing_entry *e,
+		     struct kvm_lapic_irq *irq)
+{
+	struct msi_msg msg = { .address_lo = e->msi.address_lo,
+			       .address_hi = e->msi.address_hi,
+			       .data = e->msi.data };
+
+	trace_kvm_msi_set_irq(msg.address_lo | (kvm->arch.x2apic_format ?
+			      (u64)msg.address_hi << 32 : 0), msg.data);
+
+	irq->dest_id = x86_msi_msg_get_destid(&msg, kvm->arch.x2apic_format);
+	irq->vector = msg.arch_data.vector;
+	irq->dest_mode = kvm_lapic_irq_dest_mode(msg.arch_addr_lo.dest_mode_logical);
+	irq->trig_mode = msg.arch_data.is_level;
+	irq->delivery_mode = msg.arch_data.delivery_mode << 8;
+	irq->msi_redir_hint = msg.arch_addr_lo.redirect_hint;
+	irq->level = 1;
+	irq->shorthand = APIC_DEST_NOSHORT;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_set_msi_irq);
+
+static inline bool kvm_msi_route_invalid(struct kvm *kvm,
+		struct kvm_kernel_irq_routing_entry *e)
+{
+	return kvm->arch.x2apic_format && (e->msi.address_hi & 0xff);
+}
+
+int kvm_set_msi(struct kvm_kernel_irq_routing_entry *e,
+		struct kvm *kvm, int irq_source_id, int level, bool line_status)
+{
+	struct kvm_lapic_irq irq;
+
+	if (kvm_msi_route_invalid(kvm, e))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (!level)
+		return -1;
+
+	kvm_set_msi_irq(kvm, e, &irq);
+
+	return kvm_irq_delivery_to_apic(kvm, NULL, &irq, NULL);
+}
+
+
+static int kvm_hv_set_sint(struct kvm_kernel_irq_routing_entry *e,
+		    struct kvm *kvm, int irq_source_id, int level,
+		    bool line_status)
+{
+	if (!level)
+		return -1;
+
+	return kvm_hv_synic_set_irq(kvm, e->hv_sint.vcpu, e->hv_sint.sint);
+}
+
+int kvm_arch_set_irq_inatomic(struct kvm_kernel_irq_routing_entry *e,
+			      struct kvm *kvm, int irq_source_id, int level,
+			      bool line_status)
+{
+	struct kvm_lapic_irq irq;
+	int r;
+
+	switch (e->type) {
+	case KVM_IRQ_ROUTING_HV_SINT:
+		return kvm_hv_set_sint(e, kvm, irq_source_id, level,
+				       line_status);
+
+	case KVM_IRQ_ROUTING_MSI:
+		if (kvm_msi_route_invalid(kvm, e))
+			return -EINVAL;
+
+		kvm_set_msi_irq(kvm, e, &irq);
+
+		if (kvm_irq_delivery_to_apic_fast(kvm, NULL, &irq, &r, NULL))
+			return r;
+		break;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_XEN
+	case KVM_IRQ_ROUTING_XEN_EVTCHN:
+		if (!level)
+			return -1;
+
+		return kvm_xen_set_evtchn_fast(&e->xen_evtchn, kvm);
+#endif
+	default:
+		break;
+	}
+
+	return -EWOULDBLOCK;
+}
+
+int kvm_request_irq_source_id(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+	unsigned long *bitmap = &kvm->arch.irq_sources_bitmap;
+	int irq_source_id;
+
+	mutex_lock(&kvm->irq_lock);
+	irq_source_id = find_first_zero_bit(bitmap, BITS_PER_LONG);
+
+	if (irq_source_id >= BITS_PER_LONG) {
+		pr_warn("exhausted allocatable IRQ sources!\n");
+		irq_source_id = -EFAULT;
+		goto unlock;
+	}
+
+	ASSERT(irq_source_id != KVM_USERSPACE_IRQ_SOURCE_ID);
+	ASSERT(irq_source_id != KVM_IRQFD_RESAMPLE_IRQ_SOURCE_ID);
+	set_bit(irq_source_id, bitmap);
+unlock:
+	mutex_unlock(&kvm->irq_lock);
+
+	return irq_source_id;
+}
+
+void kvm_free_irq_source_id(struct kvm *kvm, int irq_source_id)
+{
+	ASSERT(irq_source_id != KVM_USERSPACE_IRQ_SOURCE_ID);
+	ASSERT(irq_source_id != KVM_IRQFD_RESAMPLE_IRQ_SOURCE_ID);
+
+	mutex_lock(&kvm->irq_lock);
+	if (irq_source_id < 0 ||
+	    irq_source_id >= BITS_PER_LONG) {
+		pr_err("IRQ source ID out of range!\n");
+		goto unlock;
+	}
+	clear_bit(irq_source_id, &kvm->arch.irq_sources_bitmap);
+	if (!irqchip_kernel(kvm))
+		goto unlock;
+
+	kvm_ioapic_clear_all(kvm->arch.vioapic, irq_source_id);
+	kvm_pic_clear_all(kvm->arch.vpic, irq_source_id);
+unlock:
+	mutex_unlock(&kvm->irq_lock);
+}
+
+void kvm_register_irq_mask_notifier(struct kvm *kvm, int irq,
+				    struct kvm_irq_mask_notifier *kimn)
+{
+	mutex_lock(&kvm->irq_lock);
+	kimn->irq = irq;
+	hlist_add_head_rcu(&kimn->link, &kvm->arch.mask_notifier_list);
+	mutex_unlock(&kvm->irq_lock);
+}
+
+void kvm_unregister_irq_mask_notifier(struct kvm *kvm, int irq,
+				      struct kvm_irq_mask_notifier *kimn)
+{
+	mutex_lock(&kvm->irq_lock);
+	hlist_del_rcu(&kimn->link);
+	mutex_unlock(&kvm->irq_lock);
+	synchronize_srcu(&kvm->irq_srcu);
+}
+
+void kvm_fire_mask_notifiers(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned irqchip, unsigned pin,
+			     bool mask)
+{
+	struct kvm_irq_mask_notifier *kimn;
+	int idx, gsi;
+
+	idx = srcu_read_lock(&kvm->irq_srcu);
+	gsi = kvm_irq_map_chip_pin(kvm, irqchip, pin);
+	if (gsi != -1)
+		hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(kimn, &kvm->arch.mask_notifier_list, link)
+			if (kimn->irq == gsi)
+				kimn->func(kimn, mask);
+	srcu_read_unlock(&kvm->irq_srcu, idx);
+}
+
+bool kvm_arch_can_set_irq_routing(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+	return irqchip_in_kernel(kvm);
+}
+
+int kvm_set_routing_entry(struct kvm *kvm,
+			  struct kvm_kernel_irq_routing_entry *e,
+			  const struct kvm_irq_routing_entry *ue)
+{
+	/* We can't check irqchip_in_kernel() here as some callers are
+	 * currently initializing the irqchip. Other callers should therefore
+	 * check kvm_arch_can_set_irq_routing() before calling this function.
+	 */
+	switch (ue->type) {
+	case KVM_IRQ_ROUTING_IRQCHIP:
+		if (irqchip_split(kvm))
+			return -EINVAL;
+		e->irqchip.pin = ue->u.irqchip.pin;
+		switch (ue->u.irqchip.irqchip) {
+		case KVM_IRQCHIP_PIC_SLAVE:
+			e->irqchip.pin += PIC_NUM_PINS / 2;
+			fallthrough;
+		case KVM_IRQCHIP_PIC_MASTER:
+			if (ue->u.irqchip.pin >= PIC_NUM_PINS / 2)
+				return -EINVAL;
+			e->set = kvm_set_pic_irq;
+			break;
+		case KVM_IRQCHIP_IOAPIC:
+			if (ue->u.irqchip.pin >= KVM_IOAPIC_NUM_PINS)
+				return -EINVAL;
+			e->set = kvm_set_ioapic_irq;
+			break;
+		default:
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+		e->irqchip.irqchip = ue->u.irqchip.irqchip;
+		break;
+	case KVM_IRQ_ROUTING_MSI:
+		e->set = kvm_set_msi;
+		e->msi.address_lo = ue->u.msi.address_lo;
+		e->msi.address_hi = ue->u.msi.address_hi;
+		e->msi.data = ue->u.msi.data;
+
+		if (kvm_msi_route_invalid(kvm, e))
+			return -EINVAL;
+		break;
+	case KVM_IRQ_ROUTING_HV_SINT:
+		e->set = kvm_hv_set_sint;
+		e->hv_sint.vcpu = ue->u.hv_sint.vcpu;
+		e->hv_sint.sint = ue->u.hv_sint.sint;
+		break;
+#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_XEN
+	case KVM_IRQ_ROUTING_XEN_EVTCHN:
+		return kvm_xen_setup_evtchn(kvm, e, ue);
+#endif
+	default:
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+bool kvm_intr_is_single_vcpu(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_lapic_irq *irq,
+			     struct kvm_vcpu **dest_vcpu)
+{
+	int r = 0;
+	unsigned long i;
+	struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu;
+
+	if (kvm_intr_is_single_vcpu_fast(kvm, irq, dest_vcpu))
+		return true;
+
+	kvm_for_each_vcpu(i, vcpu, kvm) {
+		if (!kvm_apic_present(vcpu))
+			continue;
+
+		if (!kvm_apic_match_dest(vcpu, NULL, irq->shorthand,
+					irq->dest_id, irq->dest_mode))
+			continue;
+
+		if (++r == 2)
+			return false;
+
+		*dest_vcpu = vcpu;
+	}
+
+	return r == 1;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_intr_is_single_vcpu);
+
+#define IOAPIC_ROUTING_ENTRY(irq) \
+	{ .gsi = irq, .type = KVM_IRQ_ROUTING_IRQCHIP,	\
+	  .u.irqchip = { .irqchip = KVM_IRQCHIP_IOAPIC, .pin = (irq) } }
+#define ROUTING_ENTRY1(irq) IOAPIC_ROUTING_ENTRY(irq)
+
+#define PIC_ROUTING_ENTRY(irq) \
+	{ .gsi = irq, .type = KVM_IRQ_ROUTING_IRQCHIP,	\
+	  .u.irqchip = { .irqchip = SELECT_PIC(irq), .pin = (irq) % 8 } }
+#define ROUTING_ENTRY2(irq) \
+	IOAPIC_ROUTING_ENTRY(irq), PIC_ROUTING_ENTRY(irq)
+
+static const struct kvm_irq_routing_entry default_routing[] = {
+	ROUTING_ENTRY2(0), ROUTING_ENTRY2(1),
+	ROUTING_ENTRY2(2), ROUTING_ENTRY2(3),
+	ROUTING_ENTRY2(4), ROUTING_ENTRY2(5),
+	ROUTING_ENTRY2(6), ROUTING_ENTRY2(7),
+	ROUTING_ENTRY2(8), ROUTING_ENTRY2(9),
+	ROUTING_ENTRY2(10), ROUTING_ENTRY2(11),
+	ROUTING_ENTRY2(12), ROUTING_ENTRY2(13),
+	ROUTING_ENTRY2(14), ROUTING_ENTRY2(15),
+	ROUTING_ENTRY1(16), ROUTING_ENTRY1(17),
+	ROUTING_ENTRY1(18), ROUTING_ENTRY1(19),
+	ROUTING_ENTRY1(20), ROUTING_ENTRY1(21),
+	ROUTING_ENTRY1(22), ROUTING_ENTRY1(23),
+};
+
+int kvm_setup_default_irq_routing(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+	return kvm_set_irq_routing(kvm, default_routing,
+				   ARRAY_SIZE(default_routing), 0);
+}
+
+static const struct kvm_irq_routing_entry empty_routing[] = {};
+
+int kvm_setup_empty_irq_routing(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+	return kvm_set_irq_routing(kvm, empty_routing, 0, 0);
+}
+
+void kvm_arch_post_irq_routing_update(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+	if (!irqchip_split(kvm))
+		return;
+	kvm_make_scan_ioapic_request(kvm);
+}
+
+void kvm_scan_ioapic_routes(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+			    ulong *ioapic_handled_vectors)
+{
+	struct kvm *kvm = vcpu->kvm;
+	struct kvm_kernel_irq_routing_entry *entry;
+	struct kvm_irq_routing_table *table;
+	u32 i, nr_ioapic_pins;
+	int idx;
+
+	idx = srcu_read_lock(&kvm->irq_srcu);
+	table = srcu_dereference(kvm->irq_routing, &kvm->irq_srcu);
+	nr_ioapic_pins = min_t(u32, table->nr_rt_entries,
+			       kvm->arch.nr_reserved_ioapic_pins);
+	for (i = 0; i < nr_ioapic_pins; ++i) {
+		hlist_for_each_entry(entry, &table->map[i], link) {
+			struct kvm_lapic_irq irq;
+
+			if (entry->type != KVM_IRQ_ROUTING_MSI)
+				continue;
+
+			kvm_set_msi_irq(vcpu->kvm, entry, &irq);
+
+			if (irq.trig_mode &&
+			    (kvm_apic_match_dest(vcpu, NULL, APIC_DEST_NOSHORT,
+						 irq.dest_id, irq.dest_mode) ||
+			     kvm_apic_pending_eoi(vcpu, irq.vector)))
+				__set_bit(irq.vector, ioapic_handled_vectors);
+		}
+	}
+	srcu_read_unlock(&kvm->irq_srcu, idx);
+}
+
+void kvm_arch_irq_routing_update(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+	kvm_hv_irq_routing_update(kvm);
+}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/kvm-asm-offsets.c b/arch/x86/kvm/kvm-asm-offsets.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..24a710d37
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/kvm-asm-offsets.c
@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * Generate definitions needed by assembly language modules.
+ * This code generates raw asm output which is post-processed to extract
+ * and format the required data.
+ */
+#define COMPILE_OFFSETS
+
+#include <linux/kbuild.h>
+#include "vmx/vmx.h"
+#include "svm/svm.h"
+
+static void __used common(void)
+{
+	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KVM_AMD)) {
+		BLANK();
+		OFFSET(SVM_vcpu_arch_regs, vcpu_svm, vcpu.arch.regs);
+		OFFSET(SVM_current_vmcb, vcpu_svm, current_vmcb);
+		OFFSET(SVM_spec_ctrl, vcpu_svm, spec_ctrl);
+		OFFSET(SVM_vmcb01, vcpu_svm, vmcb01);
+		OFFSET(KVM_VMCB_pa, kvm_vmcb_info, pa);
+		OFFSET(SD_save_area_pa, svm_cpu_data, save_area_pa);
+	}
+
+	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KVM_INTEL)) {
+		BLANK();
+		OFFSET(VMX_spec_ctrl, vcpu_vmx, spec_ctrl);
+	}
+}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/kvm_cache_regs.h b/arch/x86/kvm/kvm_cache_regs.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..75eae9c49
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/kvm_cache_regs.h
@@ -0,0 +1,231 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+#ifndef ASM_KVM_CACHE_REGS_H
+#define ASM_KVM_CACHE_REGS_H
+
+#include <linux/kvm_host.h>
+
+#define KVM_POSSIBLE_CR0_GUEST_BITS	(X86_CR0_TS | X86_CR0_WP)
+#define KVM_POSSIBLE_CR4_GUEST_BITS				  \
+	(X86_CR4_PVI | X86_CR4_DE | X86_CR4_PCE | X86_CR4_OSFXSR  \
+	 | X86_CR4_OSXMMEXCPT | X86_CR4_PGE | X86_CR4_TSD | X86_CR4_FSGSBASE)
+
+#define X86_CR0_PDPTR_BITS    (X86_CR0_CD | X86_CR0_NW | X86_CR0_PG)
+#define X86_CR4_TLBFLUSH_BITS (X86_CR4_PGE | X86_CR4_PCIDE | X86_CR4_PAE | X86_CR4_SMEP)
+#define X86_CR4_PDPTR_BITS    (X86_CR4_PGE | X86_CR4_PSE | X86_CR4_PAE | X86_CR4_SMEP)
+
+static_assert(!(KVM_POSSIBLE_CR0_GUEST_BITS & X86_CR0_PDPTR_BITS));
+
+#define BUILD_KVM_GPR_ACCESSORS(lname, uname)				      \
+static __always_inline unsigned long kvm_##lname##_read(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)\
+{									      \
+	return vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_##uname];			      \
+}									      \
+static __always_inline void kvm_##lname##_write(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,	      \
+						unsigned long val)	      \
+{									      \
+	vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_##uname] = val;			      \
+}
+BUILD_KVM_GPR_ACCESSORS(rax, RAX)
+BUILD_KVM_GPR_ACCESSORS(rbx, RBX)
+BUILD_KVM_GPR_ACCESSORS(rcx, RCX)
+BUILD_KVM_GPR_ACCESSORS(rdx, RDX)
+BUILD_KVM_GPR_ACCESSORS(rbp, RBP)
+BUILD_KVM_GPR_ACCESSORS(rsi, RSI)
+BUILD_KVM_GPR_ACCESSORS(rdi, RDI)
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+BUILD_KVM_GPR_ACCESSORS(r8,  R8)
+BUILD_KVM_GPR_ACCESSORS(r9,  R9)
+BUILD_KVM_GPR_ACCESSORS(r10, R10)
+BUILD_KVM_GPR_ACCESSORS(r11, R11)
+BUILD_KVM_GPR_ACCESSORS(r12, R12)
+BUILD_KVM_GPR_ACCESSORS(r13, R13)
+BUILD_KVM_GPR_ACCESSORS(r14, R14)
+BUILD_KVM_GPR_ACCESSORS(r15, R15)
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * avail  dirty
+ * 0	  0	  register in VMCS/VMCB
+ * 0	  1	  *INVALID*
+ * 1	  0	  register in vcpu->arch
+ * 1	  1	  register in vcpu->arch, needs to be stored back
+ */
+static inline bool kvm_register_is_available(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+					     enum kvm_reg reg)
+{
+	return test_bit(reg, (unsigned long *)&vcpu->arch.regs_avail);
+}
+
+static inline bool kvm_register_is_dirty(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+					 enum kvm_reg reg)
+{
+	return test_bit(reg, (unsigned long *)&vcpu->arch.regs_dirty);
+}
+
+static inline void kvm_register_mark_available(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+					       enum kvm_reg reg)
+{
+	__set_bit(reg, (unsigned long *)&vcpu->arch.regs_avail);
+}
+
+static inline void kvm_register_mark_dirty(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+					   enum kvm_reg reg)
+{
+	__set_bit(reg, (unsigned long *)&vcpu->arch.regs_avail);
+	__set_bit(reg, (unsigned long *)&vcpu->arch.regs_dirty);
+}
+
+/*
+ * kvm_register_test_and_mark_available() is a special snowflake that uses an
+ * arch bitop directly to avoid the explicit instrumentation that comes with
+ * the generic bitops.  This allows code that cannot be instrumented (noinstr
+ * functions), e.g. the low level VM-Enter/VM-Exit paths, to cache registers.
+ */
+static __always_inline bool kvm_register_test_and_mark_available(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+								 enum kvm_reg reg)
+{
+	return arch___test_and_set_bit(reg, (unsigned long *)&vcpu->arch.regs_avail);
+}
+
+/*
+ * The "raw" register helpers are only for cases where the full 64 bits of a
+ * register are read/written irrespective of current vCPU mode.  In other words,
+ * odds are good you shouldn't be using the raw variants.
+ */
+static inline unsigned long kvm_register_read_raw(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int reg)
+{
+	if (WARN_ON_ONCE((unsigned int)reg >= NR_VCPU_REGS))
+		return 0;
+
+	if (!kvm_register_is_available(vcpu, reg))
+		static_call(kvm_x86_cache_reg)(vcpu, reg);
+
+	return vcpu->arch.regs[reg];
+}
+
+static inline void kvm_register_write_raw(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int reg,
+					  unsigned long val)
+{
+	if (WARN_ON_ONCE((unsigned int)reg >= NR_VCPU_REGS))
+		return;
+
+	vcpu->arch.regs[reg] = val;
+	kvm_register_mark_dirty(vcpu, reg);
+}
+
+static inline unsigned long kvm_rip_read(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	return kvm_register_read_raw(vcpu, VCPU_REGS_RIP);
+}
+
+static inline void kvm_rip_write(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long val)
+{
+	kvm_register_write_raw(vcpu, VCPU_REGS_RIP, val);
+}
+
+static inline unsigned long kvm_rsp_read(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	return kvm_register_read_raw(vcpu, VCPU_REGS_RSP);
+}
+
+static inline void kvm_rsp_write(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long val)
+{
+	kvm_register_write_raw(vcpu, VCPU_REGS_RSP, val);
+}
+
+static inline u64 kvm_pdptr_read(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int index)
+{
+	might_sleep();  /* on svm */
+
+	if (!kvm_register_is_available(vcpu, VCPU_EXREG_PDPTR))
+		static_call(kvm_x86_cache_reg)(vcpu, VCPU_EXREG_PDPTR);
+
+	return vcpu->arch.walk_mmu->pdptrs[index];
+}
+
+static inline void kvm_pdptr_write(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int index, u64 value)
+{
+	vcpu->arch.walk_mmu->pdptrs[index] = value;
+}
+
+static inline ulong kvm_read_cr0_bits(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, ulong mask)
+{
+	ulong tmask = mask & KVM_POSSIBLE_CR0_GUEST_BITS;
+	if ((tmask & vcpu->arch.cr0_guest_owned_bits) &&
+	    !kvm_register_is_available(vcpu, VCPU_EXREG_CR0))
+		static_call(kvm_x86_cache_reg)(vcpu, VCPU_EXREG_CR0);
+	return vcpu->arch.cr0 & mask;
+}
+
+static __always_inline bool kvm_is_cr0_bit_set(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+					       unsigned long cr0_bit)
+{
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(!is_power_of_2(cr0_bit));
+
+	return !!kvm_read_cr0_bits(vcpu, cr0_bit);
+}
+
+static inline ulong kvm_read_cr0(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	return kvm_read_cr0_bits(vcpu, ~0UL);
+}
+
+static inline ulong kvm_read_cr4_bits(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, ulong mask)
+{
+	ulong tmask = mask & KVM_POSSIBLE_CR4_GUEST_BITS;
+	if ((tmask & vcpu->arch.cr4_guest_owned_bits) &&
+	    !kvm_register_is_available(vcpu, VCPU_EXREG_CR4))
+		static_call(kvm_x86_cache_reg)(vcpu, VCPU_EXREG_CR4);
+	return vcpu->arch.cr4 & mask;
+}
+
+static __always_inline bool kvm_is_cr4_bit_set(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+					       unsigned long cr4_bit)
+{
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(!is_power_of_2(cr4_bit));
+
+	return !!kvm_read_cr4_bits(vcpu, cr4_bit);
+}
+
+static inline ulong kvm_read_cr3(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	if (!kvm_register_is_available(vcpu, VCPU_EXREG_CR3))
+		static_call(kvm_x86_cache_reg)(vcpu, VCPU_EXREG_CR3);
+	return vcpu->arch.cr3;
+}
+
+static inline ulong kvm_read_cr4(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	return kvm_read_cr4_bits(vcpu, ~0UL);
+}
+
+static inline u64 kvm_read_edx_eax(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	return (kvm_rax_read(vcpu) & -1u)
+		| ((u64)(kvm_rdx_read(vcpu) & -1u) << 32);
+}
+
+static inline void enter_guest_mode(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	vcpu->arch.hflags |= HF_GUEST_MASK;
+	vcpu->stat.guest_mode = 1;
+}
+
+static inline void leave_guest_mode(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	vcpu->arch.hflags &= ~HF_GUEST_MASK;
+
+	if (vcpu->arch.load_eoi_exitmap_pending) {
+		vcpu->arch.load_eoi_exitmap_pending = false;
+		kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_LOAD_EOI_EXITMAP, vcpu);
+	}
+
+	vcpu->stat.guest_mode = 0;
+}
+
+static inline bool is_guest_mode(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	return vcpu->arch.hflags & HF_GUEST_MASK;
+}
+
+#endif
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/kvm_emulate.h b/arch/x86/kvm/kvm_emulate.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..be7aeb9b8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/kvm_emulate.h
@@ -0,0 +1,541 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+/******************************************************************************
+ * x86_emulate.h
+ *
+ * Generic x86 (32-bit and 64-bit) instruction decoder and emulator.
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 2005 Keir Fraser
+ *
+ * From: xen-unstable 10676:af9809f51f81a3c43f276f00c81a52ef558afda4
+ */
+
+#ifndef _ASM_X86_KVM_X86_EMULATE_H
+#define _ASM_X86_KVM_X86_EMULATE_H
+
+#include <asm/desc_defs.h>
+#include "fpu.h"
+
+struct x86_emulate_ctxt;
+enum x86_intercept;
+enum x86_intercept_stage;
+
+struct x86_exception {
+	u8 vector;
+	bool error_code_valid;
+	u16 error_code;
+	bool nested_page_fault;
+	u64 address; /* cr2 or nested page fault gpa */
+	u8 async_page_fault;
+};
+
+/*
+ * This struct is used to carry enough information from the instruction
+ * decoder to main KVM so that a decision can be made whether the
+ * instruction needs to be intercepted or not.
+ */
+struct x86_instruction_info {
+	u8  intercept;          /* which intercept                      */
+	u8  rep_prefix;         /* rep prefix?                          */
+	u8  modrm_mod;		/* mod part of modrm			*/
+	u8  modrm_reg;          /* index of register used               */
+	u8  modrm_rm;		/* rm part of modrm			*/
+	u64 src_val;            /* value of source operand              */
+	u64 dst_val;            /* value of destination operand         */
+	u8  src_bytes;          /* size of source operand               */
+	u8  dst_bytes;          /* size of destination operand          */
+	u8  ad_bytes;           /* size of src/dst address              */
+	u64 next_rip;           /* rip following the instruction        */
+};
+
+/*
+ * x86_emulate_ops:
+ *
+ * These operations represent the instruction emulator's interface to memory.
+ * There are two categories of operation: those that act on ordinary memory
+ * regions (*_std), and those that act on memory regions known to require
+ * special treatment or emulation (*_emulated).
+ *
+ * The emulator assumes that an instruction accesses only one 'emulated memory'
+ * location, that this location is the given linear faulting address (cr2), and
+ * that this is one of the instruction's data operands. Instruction fetches and
+ * stack operations are assumed never to access emulated memory. The emulator
+ * automatically deduces which operand of a string-move operation is accessing
+ * emulated memory, and assumes that the other operand accesses normal memory.
+ *
+ * NOTES:
+ *  1. The emulator isn't very smart about emulated vs. standard memory.
+ *     'Emulated memory' access addresses should be checked for sanity.
+ *     'Normal memory' accesses may fault, and the caller must arrange to
+ *     detect and handle reentrancy into the emulator via recursive faults.
+ *     Accesses may be unaligned and may cross page boundaries.
+ *  2. If the access fails (cannot emulate, or a standard access faults) then
+ *     it is up to the memop to propagate the fault to the guest VM via
+ *     some out-of-band mechanism, unknown to the emulator. The memop signals
+ *     failure by returning X86EMUL_PROPAGATE_FAULT to the emulator, which will
+ *     then immediately bail.
+ *  3. Valid access sizes are 1, 2, 4 and 8 bytes. On x86/32 systems only
+ *     cmpxchg8b_emulated need support 8-byte accesses.
+ *  4. The emulator cannot handle 64-bit mode emulation on an x86/32 system.
+ */
+/* Access completed successfully: continue emulation as normal. */
+#define X86EMUL_CONTINUE        0
+/* Access is unhandleable: bail from emulation and return error to caller. */
+#define X86EMUL_UNHANDLEABLE    1
+/* Terminate emulation but return success to the caller. */
+#define X86EMUL_PROPAGATE_FAULT 2 /* propagate a generated fault to guest */
+#define X86EMUL_RETRY_INSTR     3 /* retry the instruction for some reason */
+#define X86EMUL_CMPXCHG_FAILED  4 /* cmpxchg did not see expected value */
+#define X86EMUL_IO_NEEDED       5 /* IO is needed to complete emulation */
+#define X86EMUL_INTERCEPTED     6 /* Intercepted by nested VMCB/VMCS */
+
+struct x86_emulate_ops {
+	void (*vm_bugged)(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt);
+	/*
+	 * read_gpr: read a general purpose register (rax - r15)
+	 *
+	 * @reg: gpr number.
+	 */
+	ulong (*read_gpr)(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, unsigned reg);
+	/*
+	 * write_gpr: write a general purpose register (rax - r15)
+	 *
+	 * @reg: gpr number.
+	 * @val: value to write.
+	 */
+	void (*write_gpr)(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, unsigned reg, ulong val);
+	/*
+	 * read_std: Read bytes of standard (non-emulated/special) memory.
+	 *           Used for descriptor reading.
+	 *  @addr:  [IN ] Linear address from which to read.
+	 *  @val:   [OUT] Value read from memory, zero-extended to 'u_long'.
+	 *  @bytes: [IN ] Number of bytes to read from memory.
+	 *  @system:[IN ] Whether the access is forced to be at CPL0.
+	 */
+	int (*read_std)(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt,
+			unsigned long addr, void *val,
+			unsigned int bytes,
+			struct x86_exception *fault, bool system);
+
+	/*
+	 * write_std: Write bytes of standard (non-emulated/special) memory.
+	 *            Used for descriptor writing.
+	 *  @addr:  [IN ] Linear address to which to write.
+	 *  @val:   [OUT] Value write to memory, zero-extended to 'u_long'.
+	 *  @bytes: [IN ] Number of bytes to write to memory.
+	 *  @system:[IN ] Whether the access is forced to be at CPL0.
+	 */
+	int (*write_std)(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt,
+			 unsigned long addr, void *val, unsigned int bytes,
+			 struct x86_exception *fault, bool system);
+	/*
+	 * fetch: Read bytes of standard (non-emulated/special) memory.
+	 *        Used for instruction fetch.
+	 *  @addr:  [IN ] Linear address from which to read.
+	 *  @val:   [OUT] Value read from memory, zero-extended to 'u_long'.
+	 *  @bytes: [IN ] Number of bytes to read from memory.
+	 */
+	int (*fetch)(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt,
+		     unsigned long addr, void *val, unsigned int bytes,
+		     struct x86_exception *fault);
+
+	/*
+	 * read_emulated: Read bytes from emulated/special memory area.
+	 *  @addr:  [IN ] Linear address from which to read.
+	 *  @val:   [OUT] Value read from memory, zero-extended to 'u_long'.
+	 *  @bytes: [IN ] Number of bytes to read from memory.
+	 */
+	int (*read_emulated)(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt,
+			     unsigned long addr, void *val, unsigned int bytes,
+			     struct x86_exception *fault);
+
+	/*
+	 * write_emulated: Write bytes to emulated/special memory area.
+	 *  @addr:  [IN ] Linear address to which to write.
+	 *  @val:   [IN ] Value to write to memory (low-order bytes used as
+	 *                required).
+	 *  @bytes: [IN ] Number of bytes to write to memory.
+	 */
+	int (*write_emulated)(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt,
+			      unsigned long addr, const void *val,
+			      unsigned int bytes,
+			      struct x86_exception *fault);
+
+	/*
+	 * cmpxchg_emulated: Emulate an atomic (LOCKed) CMPXCHG operation on an
+	 *                   emulated/special memory area.
+	 *  @addr:  [IN ] Linear address to access.
+	 *  @old:   [IN ] Value expected to be current at @addr.
+	 *  @new:   [IN ] Value to write to @addr.
+	 *  @bytes: [IN ] Number of bytes to access using CMPXCHG.
+	 */
+	int (*cmpxchg_emulated)(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt,
+				unsigned long addr,
+				const void *old,
+				const void *new,
+				unsigned int bytes,
+				struct x86_exception *fault);
+	void (*invlpg)(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, ulong addr);
+
+	int (*pio_in_emulated)(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt,
+			       int size, unsigned short port, void *val,
+			       unsigned int count);
+
+	int (*pio_out_emulated)(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt,
+				int size, unsigned short port, const void *val,
+				unsigned int count);
+
+	bool (*get_segment)(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, u16 *selector,
+			    struct desc_struct *desc, u32 *base3, int seg);
+	void (*set_segment)(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, u16 selector,
+			    struct desc_struct *desc, u32 base3, int seg);
+	unsigned long (*get_cached_segment_base)(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt,
+						 int seg);
+	void (*get_gdt)(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, struct desc_ptr *dt);
+	void (*get_idt)(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, struct desc_ptr *dt);
+	void (*set_gdt)(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, struct desc_ptr *dt);
+	void (*set_idt)(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, struct desc_ptr *dt);
+	ulong (*get_cr)(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, int cr);
+	int (*set_cr)(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, int cr, ulong val);
+	int (*cpl)(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt);
+	void (*get_dr)(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, int dr, ulong *dest);
+	int (*set_dr)(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, int dr, ulong value);
+	int (*set_msr_with_filter)(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, u32 msr_index, u64 data);
+	int (*get_msr_with_filter)(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, u32 msr_index, u64 *pdata);
+	int (*get_msr)(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, u32 msr_index, u64 *pdata);
+	int (*check_pmc)(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, u32 pmc);
+	int (*read_pmc)(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, u32 pmc, u64 *pdata);
+	void (*halt)(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt);
+	void (*wbinvd)(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt);
+	int (*fix_hypercall)(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt);
+	int (*intercept)(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt,
+			 struct x86_instruction_info *info,
+			 enum x86_intercept_stage stage);
+
+	bool (*get_cpuid)(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, u32 *eax, u32 *ebx,
+			  u32 *ecx, u32 *edx, bool exact_only);
+	bool (*guest_has_movbe)(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt);
+	bool (*guest_has_fxsr)(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt);
+	bool (*guest_has_rdpid)(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt);
+
+	void (*set_nmi_mask)(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, bool masked);
+
+	bool (*is_smm)(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt);
+	bool (*is_guest_mode)(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt);
+	int (*leave_smm)(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt);
+	void (*triple_fault)(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt);
+	int (*set_xcr)(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, u32 index, u64 xcr);
+};
+
+/* Type, address-of, and value of an instruction's operand. */
+struct operand {
+	enum { OP_REG, OP_MEM, OP_MEM_STR, OP_IMM, OP_XMM, OP_MM, OP_NONE } type;
+	unsigned int bytes;
+	unsigned int count;
+	union {
+		unsigned long orig_val;
+		u64 orig_val64;
+	};
+	union {
+		unsigned long *reg;
+		struct segmented_address {
+			ulong ea;
+			unsigned seg;
+		} mem;
+		unsigned xmm;
+		unsigned mm;
+	} addr;
+	union {
+		unsigned long val;
+		u64 val64;
+		char valptr[sizeof(sse128_t)];
+		sse128_t vec_val;
+		u64 mm_val;
+		void *data;
+	};
+};
+
+struct fetch_cache {
+	u8 data[15];
+	u8 *ptr;
+	u8 *end;
+};
+
+struct read_cache {
+	u8 data[1024];
+	unsigned long pos;
+	unsigned long end;
+};
+
+/* Execution mode, passed to the emulator. */
+enum x86emul_mode {
+	X86EMUL_MODE_REAL,	/* Real mode.             */
+	X86EMUL_MODE_VM86,	/* Virtual 8086 mode.     */
+	X86EMUL_MODE_PROT16,	/* 16-bit protected mode. */
+	X86EMUL_MODE_PROT32,	/* 32-bit protected mode. */
+	X86EMUL_MODE_PROT64,	/* 64-bit (long) mode.    */
+};
+
+/*
+ * fastop functions are declared as taking a never-defined fastop parameter,
+ * so they can't be called from C directly.
+ */
+struct fastop;
+
+typedef void (*fastop_t)(struct fastop *);
+
+/*
+ * The emulator's _regs array tracks only the GPRs, i.e. excludes RIP.  RIP is
+ * tracked/accessed via _eip, and except for RIP relative addressing, which
+ * also uses _eip, RIP cannot be a register operand nor can it be an operand in
+ * a ModRM or SIB byte.
+ */
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+#define NR_EMULATOR_GPRS	16
+#else
+#define NR_EMULATOR_GPRS	8
+#endif
+
+struct x86_emulate_ctxt {
+	void *vcpu;
+	const struct x86_emulate_ops *ops;
+
+	/* Register state before/after emulation. */
+	unsigned long eflags;
+	unsigned long eip; /* eip before instruction emulation */
+	/* Emulated execution mode, represented by an X86EMUL_MODE value. */
+	enum x86emul_mode mode;
+
+	/* interruptibility state, as a result of execution of STI or MOV SS */
+	int interruptibility;
+
+	bool perm_ok; /* do not check permissions if true */
+	bool tf;	/* TF value before instruction (after for syscall/sysret) */
+
+	bool have_exception;
+	struct x86_exception exception;
+
+	/* GPA available */
+	bool gpa_available;
+	gpa_t gpa_val;
+
+	/*
+	 * decode cache
+	 */
+
+	/* current opcode length in bytes */
+	u8 opcode_len;
+	u8 b;
+	u8 intercept;
+	u8 op_bytes;
+	u8 ad_bytes;
+	union {
+		int (*execute)(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt);
+		fastop_t fop;
+	};
+	int (*check_perm)(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt);
+
+	bool rip_relative;
+	u8 rex_prefix;
+	u8 lock_prefix;
+	u8 rep_prefix;
+	/* bitmaps of registers in _regs[] that can be read */
+	u16 regs_valid;
+	/* bitmaps of registers in _regs[] that have been written */
+	u16 regs_dirty;
+	/* modrm */
+	u8 modrm;
+	u8 modrm_mod;
+	u8 modrm_reg;
+	u8 modrm_rm;
+	u8 modrm_seg;
+	u8 seg_override;
+	u64 d;
+	unsigned long _eip;
+
+	/* Here begins the usercopy section. */
+	struct operand src;
+	struct operand src2;
+	struct operand dst;
+	struct operand memop;
+	unsigned long _regs[NR_EMULATOR_GPRS];
+	struct operand *memopp;
+	struct fetch_cache fetch;
+	struct read_cache io_read;
+	struct read_cache mem_read;
+	bool is_branch;
+};
+
+#define KVM_EMULATOR_BUG_ON(cond, ctxt)		\
+({						\
+	int __ret = (cond);			\
+						\
+	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(__ret))		\
+		ctxt->ops->vm_bugged(ctxt);	\
+	unlikely(__ret);			\
+})
+
+/* Repeat String Operation Prefix */
+#define REPE_PREFIX	0xf3
+#define REPNE_PREFIX	0xf2
+
+/* CPUID vendors */
+#define X86EMUL_CPUID_VENDOR_AuthenticAMD_ebx 0x68747541
+#define X86EMUL_CPUID_VENDOR_AuthenticAMD_ecx 0x444d4163
+#define X86EMUL_CPUID_VENDOR_AuthenticAMD_edx 0x69746e65
+
+#define X86EMUL_CPUID_VENDOR_AMDisbetterI_ebx 0x69444d41
+#define X86EMUL_CPUID_VENDOR_AMDisbetterI_ecx 0x21726574
+#define X86EMUL_CPUID_VENDOR_AMDisbetterI_edx 0x74656273
+
+#define X86EMUL_CPUID_VENDOR_HygonGenuine_ebx 0x6f677948
+#define X86EMUL_CPUID_VENDOR_HygonGenuine_ecx 0x656e6975
+#define X86EMUL_CPUID_VENDOR_HygonGenuine_edx 0x6e65476e
+
+#define X86EMUL_CPUID_VENDOR_GenuineIntel_ebx 0x756e6547
+#define X86EMUL_CPUID_VENDOR_GenuineIntel_ecx 0x6c65746e
+#define X86EMUL_CPUID_VENDOR_GenuineIntel_edx 0x49656e69
+
+#define X86EMUL_CPUID_VENDOR_CentaurHauls_ebx 0x746e6543
+#define X86EMUL_CPUID_VENDOR_CentaurHauls_ecx 0x736c7561
+#define X86EMUL_CPUID_VENDOR_CentaurHauls_edx 0x48727561
+
+static inline bool is_guest_vendor_intel(u32 ebx, u32 ecx, u32 edx)
+{
+	return ebx == X86EMUL_CPUID_VENDOR_GenuineIntel_ebx &&
+	       ecx == X86EMUL_CPUID_VENDOR_GenuineIntel_ecx &&
+	       edx == X86EMUL_CPUID_VENDOR_GenuineIntel_edx;
+}
+
+static inline bool is_guest_vendor_amd(u32 ebx, u32 ecx, u32 edx)
+{
+	return (ebx == X86EMUL_CPUID_VENDOR_AuthenticAMD_ebx &&
+		ecx == X86EMUL_CPUID_VENDOR_AuthenticAMD_ecx &&
+		edx == X86EMUL_CPUID_VENDOR_AuthenticAMD_edx) ||
+	       (ebx == X86EMUL_CPUID_VENDOR_AMDisbetterI_ebx &&
+		ecx == X86EMUL_CPUID_VENDOR_AMDisbetterI_ecx &&
+		edx == X86EMUL_CPUID_VENDOR_AMDisbetterI_edx);
+}
+
+static inline bool is_guest_vendor_hygon(u32 ebx, u32 ecx, u32 edx)
+{
+	return ebx == X86EMUL_CPUID_VENDOR_HygonGenuine_ebx &&
+	       ecx == X86EMUL_CPUID_VENDOR_HygonGenuine_ecx &&
+	       edx == X86EMUL_CPUID_VENDOR_HygonGenuine_edx;
+}
+
+enum x86_intercept_stage {
+	X86_ICTP_NONE = 0,   /* Allow zero-init to not match anything */
+	X86_ICPT_PRE_EXCEPT,
+	X86_ICPT_POST_EXCEPT,
+	X86_ICPT_POST_MEMACCESS,
+};
+
+enum x86_intercept {
+	x86_intercept_none,
+	x86_intercept_cr_read,
+	x86_intercept_cr_write,
+	x86_intercept_clts,
+	x86_intercept_lmsw,
+	x86_intercept_smsw,
+	x86_intercept_dr_read,
+	x86_intercept_dr_write,
+	x86_intercept_lidt,
+	x86_intercept_sidt,
+	x86_intercept_lgdt,
+	x86_intercept_sgdt,
+	x86_intercept_lldt,
+	x86_intercept_sldt,
+	x86_intercept_ltr,
+	x86_intercept_str,
+	x86_intercept_rdtsc,
+	x86_intercept_rdpmc,
+	x86_intercept_pushf,
+	x86_intercept_popf,
+	x86_intercept_cpuid,
+	x86_intercept_rsm,
+	x86_intercept_iret,
+	x86_intercept_intn,
+	x86_intercept_invd,
+	x86_intercept_pause,
+	x86_intercept_hlt,
+	x86_intercept_invlpg,
+	x86_intercept_invlpga,
+	x86_intercept_vmrun,
+	x86_intercept_vmload,
+	x86_intercept_vmsave,
+	x86_intercept_vmmcall,
+	x86_intercept_stgi,
+	x86_intercept_clgi,
+	x86_intercept_skinit,
+	x86_intercept_rdtscp,
+	x86_intercept_rdpid,
+	x86_intercept_icebp,
+	x86_intercept_wbinvd,
+	x86_intercept_monitor,
+	x86_intercept_mwait,
+	x86_intercept_rdmsr,
+	x86_intercept_wrmsr,
+	x86_intercept_in,
+	x86_intercept_ins,
+	x86_intercept_out,
+	x86_intercept_outs,
+	x86_intercept_xsetbv,
+
+	nr_x86_intercepts
+};
+
+/* Host execution mode. */
+#if defined(CONFIG_X86_32)
+#define X86EMUL_MODE_HOST X86EMUL_MODE_PROT32
+#elif defined(CONFIG_X86_64)
+#define X86EMUL_MODE_HOST X86EMUL_MODE_PROT64
+#endif
+
+int x86_decode_insn(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, void *insn, int insn_len, int emulation_type);
+bool x86_page_table_writing_insn(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt);
+#define EMULATION_FAILED -1
+#define EMULATION_OK 0
+#define EMULATION_RESTART 1
+#define EMULATION_INTERCEPTED 2
+void init_decode_cache(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt);
+int x86_emulate_insn(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt);
+int emulator_task_switch(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt,
+			 u16 tss_selector, int idt_index, int reason,
+			 bool has_error_code, u32 error_code);
+int emulate_int_real(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, int irq);
+void emulator_invalidate_register_cache(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt);
+void emulator_writeback_register_cache(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt);
+bool emulator_can_use_gpa(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt);
+
+static inline ulong reg_read(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, unsigned nr)
+{
+	if (KVM_EMULATOR_BUG_ON(nr >= NR_EMULATOR_GPRS, ctxt))
+		nr &= NR_EMULATOR_GPRS - 1;
+
+	if (!(ctxt->regs_valid & (1 << nr))) {
+		ctxt->regs_valid |= 1 << nr;
+		ctxt->_regs[nr] = ctxt->ops->read_gpr(ctxt, nr);
+	}
+	return ctxt->_regs[nr];
+}
+
+static inline ulong *reg_write(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, unsigned nr)
+{
+	if (KVM_EMULATOR_BUG_ON(nr >= NR_EMULATOR_GPRS, ctxt))
+		nr &= NR_EMULATOR_GPRS - 1;
+
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(ctxt->regs_dirty) * BITS_PER_BYTE < NR_EMULATOR_GPRS);
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(ctxt->regs_valid) * BITS_PER_BYTE < NR_EMULATOR_GPRS);
+
+	ctxt->regs_valid |= 1 << nr;
+	ctxt->regs_dirty |= 1 << nr;
+	return &ctxt->_regs[nr];
+}
+
+static inline ulong *reg_rmw(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, unsigned nr)
+{
+	reg_read(ctxt, nr);
+	return reg_write(ctxt, nr);
+}
+
+#endif /* _ASM_X86_KVM_X86_EMULATE_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/kvm_onhyperv.c b/arch/x86/kvm/kvm_onhyperv.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..ded0bd688
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/kvm_onhyperv.c
@@ -0,0 +1,124 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * KVM L1 hypervisor optimizations on Hyper-V.
+ */
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
+
+#include <linux/kvm_host.h>
+#include <asm/mshyperv.h>
+
+#include "hyperv.h"
+#include "kvm_onhyperv.h"
+
+struct kvm_hv_tlb_range {
+	u64 start_gfn;
+	u64 pages;
+};
+
+static int kvm_fill_hv_flush_list_func(struct hv_guest_mapping_flush_list *flush,
+		void *data)
+{
+	struct kvm_hv_tlb_range *range = data;
+
+	return hyperv_fill_flush_guest_mapping_list(flush, range->start_gfn,
+			range->pages);
+}
+
+static inline int hv_remote_flush_root_tdp(hpa_t root_tdp,
+					   struct kvm_hv_tlb_range *range)
+{
+	if (range)
+		return hyperv_flush_guest_mapping_range(root_tdp,
+				kvm_fill_hv_flush_list_func, (void *)range);
+	else
+		return hyperv_flush_guest_mapping(root_tdp);
+}
+
+static int __hv_flush_remote_tlbs_range(struct kvm *kvm,
+					struct kvm_hv_tlb_range *range)
+{
+	struct kvm_arch *kvm_arch = &kvm->arch;
+	struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu;
+	int ret = 0, nr_unique_valid_roots;
+	unsigned long i;
+	hpa_t root;
+
+	spin_lock(&kvm_arch->hv_root_tdp_lock);
+
+	if (!VALID_PAGE(kvm_arch->hv_root_tdp)) {
+		nr_unique_valid_roots = 0;
+
+		/*
+		 * Flush all valid roots, and see if all vCPUs have converged
+		 * on a common root, in which case future flushes can skip the
+		 * loop and flush the common root.
+		 */
+		kvm_for_each_vcpu(i, vcpu, kvm) {
+			root = vcpu->arch.hv_root_tdp;
+			if (!VALID_PAGE(root) || root == kvm_arch->hv_root_tdp)
+				continue;
+
+			/*
+			 * Set the tracked root to the first valid root.  Keep
+			 * this root for the entirety of the loop even if more
+			 * roots are encountered as a low effort optimization
+			 * to avoid flushing the same (first) root again.
+			 */
+			if (++nr_unique_valid_roots == 1)
+				kvm_arch->hv_root_tdp = root;
+
+			if (!ret)
+				ret = hv_remote_flush_root_tdp(root, range);
+
+			/*
+			 * Stop processing roots if a failure occurred and
+			 * multiple valid roots have already been detected.
+			 */
+			if (ret && nr_unique_valid_roots > 1)
+				break;
+		}
+
+		/*
+		 * The optimized flush of a single root can't be used if there
+		 * are multiple valid roots (obviously).
+		 */
+		if (nr_unique_valid_roots > 1)
+			kvm_arch->hv_root_tdp = INVALID_PAGE;
+	} else {
+		ret = hv_remote_flush_root_tdp(kvm_arch->hv_root_tdp, range);
+	}
+
+	spin_unlock(&kvm_arch->hv_root_tdp_lock);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+int hv_flush_remote_tlbs_range(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t start_gfn, gfn_t nr_pages)
+{
+	struct kvm_hv_tlb_range range = {
+		.start_gfn = start_gfn,
+		.pages = nr_pages,
+	};
+
+	return __hv_flush_remote_tlbs_range(kvm, &range);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(hv_flush_remote_tlbs_range);
+
+int hv_flush_remote_tlbs(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+	return __hv_flush_remote_tlbs_range(kvm, NULL);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(hv_flush_remote_tlbs);
+
+void hv_track_root_tdp(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, hpa_t root_tdp)
+{
+	struct kvm_arch *kvm_arch = &vcpu->kvm->arch;
+
+	if (kvm_x86_ops.flush_remote_tlbs == hv_flush_remote_tlbs) {
+		spin_lock(&kvm_arch->hv_root_tdp_lock);
+		vcpu->arch.hv_root_tdp = root_tdp;
+		if (root_tdp != kvm_arch->hv_root_tdp)
+			kvm_arch->hv_root_tdp = INVALID_PAGE;
+		spin_unlock(&kvm_arch->hv_root_tdp_lock);
+	}
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(hv_track_root_tdp);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/kvm_onhyperv.h b/arch/x86/kvm/kvm_onhyperv.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..f9ca3e743
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/kvm_onhyperv.h
@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */
+/*
+ * KVM L1 hypervisor optimizations on Hyper-V.
+ */
+
+#ifndef __ARCH_X86_KVM_KVM_ONHYPERV_H__
+#define __ARCH_X86_KVM_KVM_ONHYPERV_H__
+
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HYPERV)
+int hv_flush_remote_tlbs_range(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t gfn, gfn_t nr_pages);
+int hv_flush_remote_tlbs(struct kvm *kvm);
+void hv_track_root_tdp(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, hpa_t root_tdp);
+#else /* !CONFIG_HYPERV */
+static inline int hv_flush_remote_tlbs(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+	return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+}
+
+static inline void hv_track_root_tdp(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, hpa_t root_tdp)
+{
+}
+#endif /* !CONFIG_HYPERV */
+
+#endif
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c b/arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..245b20973
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c
@@ -0,0 +1,3316 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+
+/*
+ * Local APIC virtualization
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2006 Qumranet, Inc.
+ * Copyright (C) 2007 Novell
+ * Copyright (C) 2007 Intel
+ * Copyright 2009 Red Hat, Inc. and/or its affiliates.
+ *
+ * Authors:
+ *   Dor Laor <dor.laor@qumranet.com>
+ *   Gregory Haskins <ghaskins@novell.com>
+ *   Yaozu (Eddie) Dong <eddie.dong@intel.com>
+ *
+ * Based on Xen 3.1 code, Copyright (c) 2004, Intel Corporation.
+ */
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
+
+#include <linux/kvm_host.h>
+#include <linux/kvm.h>
+#include <linux/mm.h>
+#include <linux/highmem.h>
+#include <linux/smp.h>
+#include <linux/hrtimer.h>
+#include <linux/io.h>
+#include <linux/export.h>
+#include <linux/math64.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <asm/processor.h>
+#include <asm/mce.h>
+#include <asm/msr.h>
+#include <asm/page.h>
+#include <asm/current.h>
+#include <asm/apicdef.h>
+#include <asm/delay.h>
+#include <linux/atomic.h>
+#include <linux/jump_label.h>
+#include "kvm_cache_regs.h"
+#include "irq.h"
+#include "ioapic.h"
+#include "trace.h"
+#include "x86.h"
+#include "cpuid.h"
+#include "hyperv.h"
+#include "smm.h"
+
+#ifndef CONFIG_X86_64
+#define mod_64(x, y) ((x) - (y) * div64_u64(x, y))
+#else
+#define mod_64(x, y) ((x) % (y))
+#endif
+
+/* 14 is the version for Xeon and Pentium 8.4.8*/
+#define APIC_VERSION			0x14UL
+#define LAPIC_MMIO_LENGTH		(1 << 12)
+/* followed define is not in apicdef.h */
+#define MAX_APIC_VECTOR			256
+#define APIC_VECTORS_PER_REG		32
+
+static bool lapic_timer_advance_dynamic __read_mostly;
+#define LAPIC_TIMER_ADVANCE_ADJUST_MIN	100	/* clock cycles */
+#define LAPIC_TIMER_ADVANCE_ADJUST_MAX	10000	/* clock cycles */
+#define LAPIC_TIMER_ADVANCE_NS_INIT	1000
+#define LAPIC_TIMER_ADVANCE_NS_MAX     5000
+/* step-by-step approximation to mitigate fluctuation */
+#define LAPIC_TIMER_ADVANCE_ADJUST_STEP 8
+static int kvm_lapic_msr_read(struct kvm_lapic *apic, u32 reg, u64 *data);
+static int kvm_lapic_msr_write(struct kvm_lapic *apic, u32 reg, u64 data);
+
+static inline void __kvm_lapic_set_reg(char *regs, int reg_off, u32 val)
+{
+	*((u32 *) (regs + reg_off)) = val;
+}
+
+static inline void kvm_lapic_set_reg(struct kvm_lapic *apic, int reg_off, u32 val)
+{
+	__kvm_lapic_set_reg(apic->regs, reg_off, val);
+}
+
+static __always_inline u64 __kvm_lapic_get_reg64(char *regs, int reg)
+{
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(reg != APIC_ICR);
+	return *((u64 *) (regs + reg));
+}
+
+static __always_inline u64 kvm_lapic_get_reg64(struct kvm_lapic *apic, int reg)
+{
+	return __kvm_lapic_get_reg64(apic->regs, reg);
+}
+
+static __always_inline void __kvm_lapic_set_reg64(char *regs, int reg, u64 val)
+{
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(reg != APIC_ICR);
+	*((u64 *) (regs + reg)) = val;
+}
+
+static __always_inline void kvm_lapic_set_reg64(struct kvm_lapic *apic,
+						int reg, u64 val)
+{
+	__kvm_lapic_set_reg64(apic->regs, reg, val);
+}
+
+static inline int apic_test_vector(int vec, void *bitmap)
+{
+	return test_bit(VEC_POS(vec), (bitmap) + REG_POS(vec));
+}
+
+bool kvm_apic_pending_eoi(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int vector)
+{
+	struct kvm_lapic *apic = vcpu->arch.apic;
+
+	return apic_test_vector(vector, apic->regs + APIC_ISR) ||
+		apic_test_vector(vector, apic->regs + APIC_IRR);
+}
+
+static inline int __apic_test_and_set_vector(int vec, void *bitmap)
+{
+	return __test_and_set_bit(VEC_POS(vec), (bitmap) + REG_POS(vec));
+}
+
+static inline int __apic_test_and_clear_vector(int vec, void *bitmap)
+{
+	return __test_and_clear_bit(VEC_POS(vec), (bitmap) + REG_POS(vec));
+}
+
+__read_mostly DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_DEFERRED_FALSE(apic_hw_disabled, HZ);
+__read_mostly DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_DEFERRED_FALSE(apic_sw_disabled, HZ);
+
+static inline int apic_enabled(struct kvm_lapic *apic)
+{
+	return kvm_apic_sw_enabled(apic) &&	kvm_apic_hw_enabled(apic);
+}
+
+#define LVT_MASK	\
+	(APIC_LVT_MASKED | APIC_SEND_PENDING | APIC_VECTOR_MASK)
+
+#define LINT_MASK	\
+	(LVT_MASK | APIC_MODE_MASK | APIC_INPUT_POLARITY | \
+	 APIC_LVT_REMOTE_IRR | APIC_LVT_LEVEL_TRIGGER)
+
+static inline u32 kvm_x2apic_id(struct kvm_lapic *apic)
+{
+	return apic->vcpu->vcpu_id;
+}
+
+static bool kvm_can_post_timer_interrupt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	return pi_inject_timer && kvm_vcpu_apicv_active(vcpu) &&
+		(kvm_mwait_in_guest(vcpu->kvm) || kvm_hlt_in_guest(vcpu->kvm));
+}
+
+bool kvm_can_use_hv_timer(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	return kvm_x86_ops.set_hv_timer
+	       && !(kvm_mwait_in_guest(vcpu->kvm) ||
+		    kvm_can_post_timer_interrupt(vcpu));
+}
+
+static bool kvm_use_posted_timer_interrupt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	return kvm_can_post_timer_interrupt(vcpu) && vcpu->mode == IN_GUEST_MODE;
+}
+
+static inline u32 kvm_apic_calc_x2apic_ldr(u32 id)
+{
+	return ((id >> 4) << 16) | (1 << (id & 0xf));
+}
+
+static inline bool kvm_apic_map_get_logical_dest(struct kvm_apic_map *map,
+		u32 dest_id, struct kvm_lapic ***cluster, u16 *mask) {
+	switch (map->logical_mode) {
+	case KVM_APIC_MODE_SW_DISABLED:
+		/* Arbitrarily use the flat map so that @cluster isn't NULL. */
+		*cluster = map->xapic_flat_map;
+		*mask = 0;
+		return true;
+	case KVM_APIC_MODE_X2APIC: {
+		u32 offset = (dest_id >> 16) * 16;
+		u32 max_apic_id = map->max_apic_id;
+
+		if (offset <= max_apic_id) {
+			u8 cluster_size = min(max_apic_id - offset + 1, 16U);
+
+			offset = array_index_nospec(offset, map->max_apic_id + 1);
+			*cluster = &map->phys_map[offset];
+			*mask = dest_id & (0xffff >> (16 - cluster_size));
+		} else {
+			*mask = 0;
+		}
+
+		return true;
+		}
+	case KVM_APIC_MODE_XAPIC_FLAT:
+		*cluster = map->xapic_flat_map;
+		*mask = dest_id & 0xff;
+		return true;
+	case KVM_APIC_MODE_XAPIC_CLUSTER:
+		*cluster = map->xapic_cluster_map[(dest_id >> 4) & 0xf];
+		*mask = dest_id & 0xf;
+		return true;
+	case KVM_APIC_MODE_MAP_DISABLED:
+		return false;
+	default:
+		WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
+		return false;
+	}
+}
+
+static void kvm_apic_map_free(struct rcu_head *rcu)
+{
+	struct kvm_apic_map *map = container_of(rcu, struct kvm_apic_map, rcu);
+
+	kvfree(map);
+}
+
+static int kvm_recalculate_phys_map(struct kvm_apic_map *new,
+				    struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+				    bool *xapic_id_mismatch)
+{
+	struct kvm_lapic *apic = vcpu->arch.apic;
+	u32 x2apic_id = kvm_x2apic_id(apic);
+	u32 xapic_id = kvm_xapic_id(apic);
+	u32 physical_id;
+
+	/*
+	 * For simplicity, KVM always allocates enough space for all possible
+	 * xAPIC IDs.  Yell, but don't kill the VM, as KVM can continue on
+	 * without the optimized map.
+	 */
+	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(xapic_id > new->max_apic_id))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	/*
+	 * Bail if a vCPU was added and/or enabled its APIC between allocating
+	 * the map and doing the actual calculations for the map.  Note, KVM
+	 * hardcodes the x2APIC ID to vcpu_id, i.e. there's no TOCTOU bug if
+	 * the compiler decides to reload x2apic_id after this check.
+	 */
+	if (x2apic_id > new->max_apic_id)
+		return -E2BIG;
+
+	/*
+	 * Deliberately truncate the vCPU ID when detecting a mismatched APIC
+	 * ID to avoid false positives if the vCPU ID, i.e. x2APIC ID, is a
+	 * 32-bit value.  Any unwanted aliasing due to truncation results will
+	 * be detected below.
+	 */
+	if (!apic_x2apic_mode(apic) && xapic_id != (u8)vcpu->vcpu_id)
+		*xapic_id_mismatch = true;
+
+	/*
+	 * Apply KVM's hotplug hack if userspace has enable 32-bit APIC IDs.
+	 * Allow sending events to vCPUs by their x2APIC ID even if the target
+	 * vCPU is in legacy xAPIC mode, and silently ignore aliased xAPIC IDs
+	 * (the x2APIC ID is truncated to 8 bits, causing IDs > 0xff to wrap
+	 * and collide).
+	 *
+	 * Honor the architectural (and KVM's non-optimized) behavior if
+	 * userspace has not enabled 32-bit x2APIC IDs.  Each APIC is supposed
+	 * to process messages independently.  If multiple vCPUs have the same
+	 * effective APIC ID, e.g. due to the x2APIC wrap or because the guest
+	 * manually modified its xAPIC IDs, events targeting that ID are
+	 * supposed to be recognized by all vCPUs with said ID.
+	 */
+	if (vcpu->kvm->arch.x2apic_format) {
+		/* See also kvm_apic_match_physical_addr(). */
+		if (apic_x2apic_mode(apic) || x2apic_id > 0xff)
+			new->phys_map[x2apic_id] = apic;
+
+		if (!apic_x2apic_mode(apic) && !new->phys_map[xapic_id])
+			new->phys_map[xapic_id] = apic;
+	} else {
+		/*
+		 * Disable the optimized map if the physical APIC ID is already
+		 * mapped, i.e. is aliased to multiple vCPUs.  The optimized
+		 * map requires a strict 1:1 mapping between IDs and vCPUs.
+		 */
+		if (apic_x2apic_mode(apic))
+			physical_id = x2apic_id;
+		else
+			physical_id = xapic_id;
+
+		if (new->phys_map[physical_id])
+			return -EINVAL;
+
+		new->phys_map[physical_id] = apic;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void kvm_recalculate_logical_map(struct kvm_apic_map *new,
+					struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct kvm_lapic *apic = vcpu->arch.apic;
+	enum kvm_apic_logical_mode logical_mode;
+	struct kvm_lapic **cluster;
+	u16 mask;
+	u32 ldr;
+
+	if (new->logical_mode == KVM_APIC_MODE_MAP_DISABLED)
+		return;
+
+	if (!kvm_apic_sw_enabled(apic))
+		return;
+
+	ldr = kvm_lapic_get_reg(apic, APIC_LDR);
+	if (!ldr)
+		return;
+
+	if (apic_x2apic_mode(apic)) {
+		logical_mode = KVM_APIC_MODE_X2APIC;
+	} else {
+		ldr = GET_APIC_LOGICAL_ID(ldr);
+		if (kvm_lapic_get_reg(apic, APIC_DFR) == APIC_DFR_FLAT)
+			logical_mode = KVM_APIC_MODE_XAPIC_FLAT;
+		else
+			logical_mode = KVM_APIC_MODE_XAPIC_CLUSTER;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * To optimize logical mode delivery, all software-enabled APICs must
+	 * be configured for the same mode.
+	 */
+	if (new->logical_mode == KVM_APIC_MODE_SW_DISABLED) {
+		new->logical_mode = logical_mode;
+	} else if (new->logical_mode != logical_mode) {
+		new->logical_mode = KVM_APIC_MODE_MAP_DISABLED;
+		return;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * In x2APIC mode, the LDR is read-only and derived directly from the
+	 * x2APIC ID, thus is guaranteed to be addressable.  KVM reuses
+	 * kvm_apic_map.phys_map to optimize logical mode x2APIC interrupts by
+	 * reversing the LDR calculation to get cluster of APICs, i.e. no
+	 * additional work is required.
+	 */
+	if (apic_x2apic_mode(apic)) {
+		WARN_ON_ONCE(ldr != kvm_apic_calc_x2apic_ldr(kvm_x2apic_id(apic)));
+		return;
+	}
+
+	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!kvm_apic_map_get_logical_dest(new, ldr,
+							&cluster, &mask))) {
+		new->logical_mode = KVM_APIC_MODE_MAP_DISABLED;
+		return;
+	}
+
+	if (!mask)
+		return;
+
+	ldr = ffs(mask) - 1;
+	if (!is_power_of_2(mask) || cluster[ldr])
+		new->logical_mode = KVM_APIC_MODE_MAP_DISABLED;
+	else
+		cluster[ldr] = apic;
+}
+
+/*
+ * CLEAN -> DIRTY and UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS -> DIRTY changes happen without a lock.
+ *
+ * DIRTY -> UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS and UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS -> CLEAN happen with
+ * apic_map_lock_held.
+ */
+enum {
+	CLEAN,
+	UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS,
+	DIRTY
+};
+
+void kvm_recalculate_apic_map(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+	struct kvm_apic_map *new, *old = NULL;
+	struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu;
+	unsigned long i;
+	u32 max_id = 255; /* enough space for any xAPIC ID */
+	bool xapic_id_mismatch;
+	int r;
+
+	/* Read kvm->arch.apic_map_dirty before kvm->arch.apic_map.  */
+	if (atomic_read_acquire(&kvm->arch.apic_map_dirty) == CLEAN)
+		return;
+
+	WARN_ONCE(!irqchip_in_kernel(kvm),
+		  "Dirty APIC map without an in-kernel local APIC");
+
+	mutex_lock(&kvm->arch.apic_map_lock);
+
+retry:
+	/*
+	 * Read kvm->arch.apic_map_dirty before kvm->arch.apic_map (if clean)
+	 * or the APIC registers (if dirty).  Note, on retry the map may have
+	 * not yet been marked dirty by whatever task changed a vCPU's x2APIC
+	 * ID, i.e. the map may still show up as in-progress.  In that case
+	 * this task still needs to retry and complete its calculation.
+	 */
+	if (atomic_cmpxchg_acquire(&kvm->arch.apic_map_dirty,
+				   DIRTY, UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS) == CLEAN) {
+		/* Someone else has updated the map. */
+		mutex_unlock(&kvm->arch.apic_map_lock);
+		return;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Reset the mismatch flag between attempts so that KVM does the right
+	 * thing if a vCPU changes its xAPIC ID, but do NOT reset max_id, i.e.
+	 * keep max_id strictly increasing.  Disallowing max_id from shrinking
+	 * ensures KVM won't get stuck in an infinite loop, e.g. if the vCPU
+	 * with the highest x2APIC ID is toggling its APIC on and off.
+	 */
+	xapic_id_mismatch = false;
+
+	kvm_for_each_vcpu(i, vcpu, kvm)
+		if (kvm_apic_present(vcpu))
+			max_id = max(max_id, kvm_x2apic_id(vcpu->arch.apic));
+
+	new = kvzalloc(sizeof(struct kvm_apic_map) +
+	                   sizeof(struct kvm_lapic *) * ((u64)max_id + 1),
+			   GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
+
+	if (!new)
+		goto out;
+
+	new->max_apic_id = max_id;
+	new->logical_mode = KVM_APIC_MODE_SW_DISABLED;
+
+	kvm_for_each_vcpu(i, vcpu, kvm) {
+		if (!kvm_apic_present(vcpu))
+			continue;
+
+		r = kvm_recalculate_phys_map(new, vcpu, &xapic_id_mismatch);
+		if (r) {
+			kvfree(new);
+			new = NULL;
+			if (r == -E2BIG) {
+				cond_resched();
+				goto retry;
+			}
+
+			goto out;
+		}
+
+		kvm_recalculate_logical_map(new, vcpu);
+	}
+out:
+	/*
+	 * The optimized map is effectively KVM's internal version of APICv,
+	 * and all unwanted aliasing that results in disabling the optimized
+	 * map also applies to APICv.
+	 */
+	if (!new)
+		kvm_set_apicv_inhibit(kvm, APICV_INHIBIT_REASON_PHYSICAL_ID_ALIASED);
+	else
+		kvm_clear_apicv_inhibit(kvm, APICV_INHIBIT_REASON_PHYSICAL_ID_ALIASED);
+
+	if (!new || new->logical_mode == KVM_APIC_MODE_MAP_DISABLED)
+		kvm_set_apicv_inhibit(kvm, APICV_INHIBIT_REASON_LOGICAL_ID_ALIASED);
+	else
+		kvm_clear_apicv_inhibit(kvm, APICV_INHIBIT_REASON_LOGICAL_ID_ALIASED);
+
+	if (xapic_id_mismatch)
+		kvm_set_apicv_inhibit(kvm, APICV_INHIBIT_REASON_APIC_ID_MODIFIED);
+	else
+		kvm_clear_apicv_inhibit(kvm, APICV_INHIBIT_REASON_APIC_ID_MODIFIED);
+
+	old = rcu_dereference_protected(kvm->arch.apic_map,
+			lockdep_is_held(&kvm->arch.apic_map_lock));
+	rcu_assign_pointer(kvm->arch.apic_map, new);
+	/*
+	 * Write kvm->arch.apic_map before clearing apic->apic_map_dirty.
+	 * If another update has come in, leave it DIRTY.
+	 */
+	atomic_cmpxchg_release(&kvm->arch.apic_map_dirty,
+			       UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS, CLEAN);
+	mutex_unlock(&kvm->arch.apic_map_lock);
+
+	if (old)
+		call_rcu(&old->rcu, kvm_apic_map_free);
+
+	kvm_make_scan_ioapic_request(kvm);
+}
+
+static inline void apic_set_spiv(struct kvm_lapic *apic, u32 val)
+{
+	bool enabled = val & APIC_SPIV_APIC_ENABLED;
+
+	kvm_lapic_set_reg(apic, APIC_SPIV, val);
+
+	if (enabled != apic->sw_enabled) {
+		apic->sw_enabled = enabled;
+		if (enabled)
+			static_branch_slow_dec_deferred(&apic_sw_disabled);
+		else
+			static_branch_inc(&apic_sw_disabled.key);
+
+		atomic_set_release(&apic->vcpu->kvm->arch.apic_map_dirty, DIRTY);
+	}
+
+	/* Check if there are APF page ready requests pending */
+	if (enabled)
+		kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_APF_READY, apic->vcpu);
+}
+
+static inline void kvm_apic_set_xapic_id(struct kvm_lapic *apic, u8 id)
+{
+	kvm_lapic_set_reg(apic, APIC_ID, id << 24);
+	atomic_set_release(&apic->vcpu->kvm->arch.apic_map_dirty, DIRTY);
+}
+
+static inline void kvm_apic_set_ldr(struct kvm_lapic *apic, u32 id)
+{
+	kvm_lapic_set_reg(apic, APIC_LDR, id);
+	atomic_set_release(&apic->vcpu->kvm->arch.apic_map_dirty, DIRTY);
+}
+
+static inline void kvm_apic_set_dfr(struct kvm_lapic *apic, u32 val)
+{
+	kvm_lapic_set_reg(apic, APIC_DFR, val);
+	atomic_set_release(&apic->vcpu->kvm->arch.apic_map_dirty, DIRTY);
+}
+
+static inline void kvm_apic_set_x2apic_id(struct kvm_lapic *apic, u32 id)
+{
+	u32 ldr = kvm_apic_calc_x2apic_ldr(id);
+
+	WARN_ON_ONCE(id != apic->vcpu->vcpu_id);
+
+	kvm_lapic_set_reg(apic, APIC_ID, id);
+	kvm_lapic_set_reg(apic, APIC_LDR, ldr);
+	atomic_set_release(&apic->vcpu->kvm->arch.apic_map_dirty, DIRTY);
+}
+
+static inline int apic_lvt_enabled(struct kvm_lapic *apic, int lvt_type)
+{
+	return !(kvm_lapic_get_reg(apic, lvt_type) & APIC_LVT_MASKED);
+}
+
+static inline int apic_lvtt_oneshot(struct kvm_lapic *apic)
+{
+	return apic->lapic_timer.timer_mode == APIC_LVT_TIMER_ONESHOT;
+}
+
+static inline int apic_lvtt_period(struct kvm_lapic *apic)
+{
+	return apic->lapic_timer.timer_mode == APIC_LVT_TIMER_PERIODIC;
+}
+
+static inline int apic_lvtt_tscdeadline(struct kvm_lapic *apic)
+{
+	return apic->lapic_timer.timer_mode == APIC_LVT_TIMER_TSCDEADLINE;
+}
+
+static inline int apic_lvt_nmi_mode(u32 lvt_val)
+{
+	return (lvt_val & (APIC_MODE_MASK | APIC_LVT_MASKED)) == APIC_DM_NMI;
+}
+
+static inline bool kvm_lapic_lvt_supported(struct kvm_lapic *apic, int lvt_index)
+{
+	return apic->nr_lvt_entries > lvt_index;
+}
+
+static inline int kvm_apic_calc_nr_lvt_entries(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	return KVM_APIC_MAX_NR_LVT_ENTRIES - !(vcpu->arch.mcg_cap & MCG_CMCI_P);
+}
+
+void kvm_apic_set_version(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct kvm_lapic *apic = vcpu->arch.apic;
+	u32 v = 0;
+
+	if (!lapic_in_kernel(vcpu))
+		return;
+
+	v = APIC_VERSION | ((apic->nr_lvt_entries - 1) << 16);
+
+	/*
+	 * KVM emulates 82093AA datasheet (with in-kernel IOAPIC implementation)
+	 * which doesn't have EOI register; Some buggy OSes (e.g. Windows with
+	 * Hyper-V role) disable EOI broadcast in lapic not checking for IOAPIC
+	 * version first and level-triggered interrupts never get EOIed in
+	 * IOAPIC.
+	 */
+	if (guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_X2APIC) &&
+	    !ioapic_in_kernel(vcpu->kvm))
+		v |= APIC_LVR_DIRECTED_EOI;
+	kvm_lapic_set_reg(apic, APIC_LVR, v);
+}
+
+void kvm_apic_after_set_mcg_cap(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	int nr_lvt_entries = kvm_apic_calc_nr_lvt_entries(vcpu);
+	struct kvm_lapic *apic = vcpu->arch.apic;
+	int i;
+
+	if (!lapic_in_kernel(vcpu) || nr_lvt_entries == apic->nr_lvt_entries)
+		return;
+
+	/* Initialize/mask any "new" LVT entries. */
+	for (i = apic->nr_lvt_entries; i < nr_lvt_entries; i++)
+		kvm_lapic_set_reg(apic, APIC_LVTx(i), APIC_LVT_MASKED);
+
+	apic->nr_lvt_entries = nr_lvt_entries;
+
+	/* The number of LVT entries is reflected in the version register. */
+	kvm_apic_set_version(vcpu);
+}
+
+static const unsigned int apic_lvt_mask[KVM_APIC_MAX_NR_LVT_ENTRIES] = {
+	[LVT_TIMER] = LVT_MASK,      /* timer mode mask added at runtime */
+	[LVT_THERMAL_MONITOR] = LVT_MASK | APIC_MODE_MASK,
+	[LVT_PERFORMANCE_COUNTER] = LVT_MASK | APIC_MODE_MASK,
+	[LVT_LINT0] = LINT_MASK,
+	[LVT_LINT1] = LINT_MASK,
+	[LVT_ERROR] = LVT_MASK,
+	[LVT_CMCI] = LVT_MASK | APIC_MODE_MASK
+};
+
+static int find_highest_vector(void *bitmap)
+{
+	int vec;
+	u32 *reg;
+
+	for (vec = MAX_APIC_VECTOR - APIC_VECTORS_PER_REG;
+	     vec >= 0; vec -= APIC_VECTORS_PER_REG) {
+		reg = bitmap + REG_POS(vec);
+		if (*reg)
+			return __fls(*reg) + vec;
+	}
+
+	return -1;
+}
+
+static u8 count_vectors(void *bitmap)
+{
+	int vec;
+	u32 *reg;
+	u8 count = 0;
+
+	for (vec = 0; vec < MAX_APIC_VECTOR; vec += APIC_VECTORS_PER_REG) {
+		reg = bitmap + REG_POS(vec);
+		count += hweight32(*reg);
+	}
+
+	return count;
+}
+
+bool __kvm_apic_update_irr(u32 *pir, void *regs, int *max_irr)
+{
+	u32 i, vec;
+	u32 pir_val, irr_val, prev_irr_val;
+	int max_updated_irr;
+
+	max_updated_irr = -1;
+	*max_irr = -1;
+
+	for (i = vec = 0; i <= 7; i++, vec += 32) {
+		u32 *p_irr = (u32 *)(regs + APIC_IRR + i * 0x10);
+
+		irr_val = *p_irr;
+		pir_val = READ_ONCE(pir[i]);
+
+		if (pir_val) {
+			pir_val = xchg(&pir[i], 0);
+
+			prev_irr_val = irr_val;
+			do {
+				irr_val = prev_irr_val | pir_val;
+			} while (prev_irr_val != irr_val &&
+				 !try_cmpxchg(p_irr, &prev_irr_val, irr_val));
+
+			if (prev_irr_val != irr_val)
+				max_updated_irr = __fls(irr_val ^ prev_irr_val) + vec;
+		}
+		if (irr_val)
+			*max_irr = __fls(irr_val) + vec;
+	}
+
+	return ((max_updated_irr != -1) &&
+		(max_updated_irr == *max_irr));
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__kvm_apic_update_irr);
+
+bool kvm_apic_update_irr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 *pir, int *max_irr)
+{
+	struct kvm_lapic *apic = vcpu->arch.apic;
+	bool irr_updated = __kvm_apic_update_irr(pir, apic->regs, max_irr);
+
+	if (unlikely(!apic->apicv_active && irr_updated))
+		apic->irr_pending = true;
+	return irr_updated;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_apic_update_irr);
+
+static inline int apic_search_irr(struct kvm_lapic *apic)
+{
+	return find_highest_vector(apic->regs + APIC_IRR);
+}
+
+static inline int apic_find_highest_irr(struct kvm_lapic *apic)
+{
+	int result;
+
+	/*
+	 * Note that irr_pending is just a hint. It will be always
+	 * true with virtual interrupt delivery enabled.
+	 */
+	if (!apic->irr_pending)
+		return -1;
+
+	result = apic_search_irr(apic);
+	ASSERT(result == -1 || result >= 16);
+
+	return result;
+}
+
+static inline void apic_clear_irr(int vec, struct kvm_lapic *apic)
+{
+	if (unlikely(apic->apicv_active)) {
+		/* need to update RVI */
+		kvm_lapic_clear_vector(vec, apic->regs + APIC_IRR);
+		static_call_cond(kvm_x86_hwapic_irr_update)(apic->vcpu,
+							    apic_find_highest_irr(apic));
+	} else {
+		apic->irr_pending = false;
+		kvm_lapic_clear_vector(vec, apic->regs + APIC_IRR);
+		if (apic_search_irr(apic) != -1)
+			apic->irr_pending = true;
+	}
+}
+
+void kvm_apic_clear_irr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int vec)
+{
+	apic_clear_irr(vec, vcpu->arch.apic);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_apic_clear_irr);
+
+static inline void apic_set_isr(int vec, struct kvm_lapic *apic)
+{
+	if (__apic_test_and_set_vector(vec, apic->regs + APIC_ISR))
+		return;
+
+	/*
+	 * With APIC virtualization enabled, all caching is disabled
+	 * because the processor can modify ISR under the hood.  Instead
+	 * just set SVI.
+	 */
+	if (unlikely(apic->apicv_active))
+		static_call_cond(kvm_x86_hwapic_isr_update)(vec);
+	else {
+		++apic->isr_count;
+		BUG_ON(apic->isr_count > MAX_APIC_VECTOR);
+		/*
+		 * ISR (in service register) bit is set when injecting an interrupt.
+		 * The highest vector is injected. Thus the latest bit set matches
+		 * the highest bit in ISR.
+		 */
+		apic->highest_isr_cache = vec;
+	}
+}
+
+static inline int apic_find_highest_isr(struct kvm_lapic *apic)
+{
+	int result;
+
+	/*
+	 * Note that isr_count is always 1, and highest_isr_cache
+	 * is always -1, with APIC virtualization enabled.
+	 */
+	if (!apic->isr_count)
+		return -1;
+	if (likely(apic->highest_isr_cache != -1))
+		return apic->highest_isr_cache;
+
+	result = find_highest_vector(apic->regs + APIC_ISR);
+	ASSERT(result == -1 || result >= 16);
+
+	return result;
+}
+
+static inline void apic_clear_isr(int vec, struct kvm_lapic *apic)
+{
+	if (!__apic_test_and_clear_vector(vec, apic->regs + APIC_ISR))
+		return;
+
+	/*
+	 * We do get here for APIC virtualization enabled if the guest
+	 * uses the Hyper-V APIC enlightenment.  In this case we may need
+	 * to trigger a new interrupt delivery by writing the SVI field;
+	 * on the other hand isr_count and highest_isr_cache are unused
+	 * and must be left alone.
+	 */
+	if (unlikely(apic->apicv_active))
+		static_call_cond(kvm_x86_hwapic_isr_update)(apic_find_highest_isr(apic));
+	else {
+		--apic->isr_count;
+		BUG_ON(apic->isr_count < 0);
+		apic->highest_isr_cache = -1;
+	}
+}
+
+int kvm_lapic_find_highest_irr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	/* This may race with setting of irr in __apic_accept_irq() and
+	 * value returned may be wrong, but kvm_vcpu_kick() in __apic_accept_irq
+	 * will cause vmexit immediately and the value will be recalculated
+	 * on the next vmentry.
+	 */
+	return apic_find_highest_irr(vcpu->arch.apic);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_lapic_find_highest_irr);
+
+static int __apic_accept_irq(struct kvm_lapic *apic, int delivery_mode,
+			     int vector, int level, int trig_mode,
+			     struct dest_map *dest_map);
+
+int kvm_apic_set_irq(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_lapic_irq *irq,
+		     struct dest_map *dest_map)
+{
+	struct kvm_lapic *apic = vcpu->arch.apic;
+
+	return __apic_accept_irq(apic, irq->delivery_mode, irq->vector,
+			irq->level, irq->trig_mode, dest_map);
+}
+
+static int __pv_send_ipi(unsigned long *ipi_bitmap, struct kvm_apic_map *map,
+			 struct kvm_lapic_irq *irq, u32 min)
+{
+	int i, count = 0;
+	struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu;
+
+	if (min > map->max_apic_id)
+		return 0;
+
+	for_each_set_bit(i, ipi_bitmap,
+		min((u32)BITS_PER_LONG, (map->max_apic_id - min + 1))) {
+		if (map->phys_map[min + i]) {
+			vcpu = map->phys_map[min + i]->vcpu;
+			count += kvm_apic_set_irq(vcpu, irq, NULL);
+		}
+	}
+
+	return count;
+}
+
+int kvm_pv_send_ipi(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long ipi_bitmap_low,
+		    unsigned long ipi_bitmap_high, u32 min,
+		    unsigned long icr, int op_64_bit)
+{
+	struct kvm_apic_map *map;
+	struct kvm_lapic_irq irq = {0};
+	int cluster_size = op_64_bit ? 64 : 32;
+	int count;
+
+	if (icr & (APIC_DEST_MASK | APIC_SHORT_MASK))
+		return -KVM_EINVAL;
+
+	irq.vector = icr & APIC_VECTOR_MASK;
+	irq.delivery_mode = icr & APIC_MODE_MASK;
+	irq.level = (icr & APIC_INT_ASSERT) != 0;
+	irq.trig_mode = icr & APIC_INT_LEVELTRIG;
+
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	map = rcu_dereference(kvm->arch.apic_map);
+
+	count = -EOPNOTSUPP;
+	if (likely(map)) {
+		count = __pv_send_ipi(&ipi_bitmap_low, map, &irq, min);
+		min += cluster_size;
+		count += __pv_send_ipi(&ipi_bitmap_high, map, &irq, min);
+	}
+
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+	return count;
+}
+
+static int pv_eoi_put_user(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u8 val)
+{
+
+	return kvm_write_guest_cached(vcpu->kvm, &vcpu->arch.pv_eoi.data, &val,
+				      sizeof(val));
+}
+
+static int pv_eoi_get_user(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u8 *val)
+{
+
+	return kvm_read_guest_cached(vcpu->kvm, &vcpu->arch.pv_eoi.data, val,
+				      sizeof(*val));
+}
+
+static inline bool pv_eoi_enabled(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	return vcpu->arch.pv_eoi.msr_val & KVM_MSR_ENABLED;
+}
+
+static void pv_eoi_set_pending(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	if (pv_eoi_put_user(vcpu, KVM_PV_EOI_ENABLED) < 0)
+		return;
+
+	__set_bit(KVM_APIC_PV_EOI_PENDING, &vcpu->arch.apic_attention);
+}
+
+static bool pv_eoi_test_and_clr_pending(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	u8 val;
+
+	if (pv_eoi_get_user(vcpu, &val) < 0)
+		return false;
+
+	val &= KVM_PV_EOI_ENABLED;
+
+	if (val && pv_eoi_put_user(vcpu, KVM_PV_EOI_DISABLED) < 0)
+		return false;
+
+	/*
+	 * Clear pending bit in any case: it will be set again on vmentry.
+	 * While this might not be ideal from performance point of view,
+	 * this makes sure pv eoi is only enabled when we know it's safe.
+	 */
+	__clear_bit(KVM_APIC_PV_EOI_PENDING, &vcpu->arch.apic_attention);
+
+	return val;
+}
+
+static int apic_has_interrupt_for_ppr(struct kvm_lapic *apic, u32 ppr)
+{
+	int highest_irr;
+	if (kvm_x86_ops.sync_pir_to_irr)
+		highest_irr = static_call(kvm_x86_sync_pir_to_irr)(apic->vcpu);
+	else
+		highest_irr = apic_find_highest_irr(apic);
+	if (highest_irr == -1 || (highest_irr & 0xF0) <= ppr)
+		return -1;
+	return highest_irr;
+}
+
+static bool __apic_update_ppr(struct kvm_lapic *apic, u32 *new_ppr)
+{
+	u32 tpr, isrv, ppr, old_ppr;
+	int isr;
+
+	old_ppr = kvm_lapic_get_reg(apic, APIC_PROCPRI);
+	tpr = kvm_lapic_get_reg(apic, APIC_TASKPRI);
+	isr = apic_find_highest_isr(apic);
+	isrv = (isr != -1) ? isr : 0;
+
+	if ((tpr & 0xf0) >= (isrv & 0xf0))
+		ppr = tpr & 0xff;
+	else
+		ppr = isrv & 0xf0;
+
+	*new_ppr = ppr;
+	if (old_ppr != ppr)
+		kvm_lapic_set_reg(apic, APIC_PROCPRI, ppr);
+
+	return ppr < old_ppr;
+}
+
+static void apic_update_ppr(struct kvm_lapic *apic)
+{
+	u32 ppr;
+
+	if (__apic_update_ppr(apic, &ppr) &&
+	    apic_has_interrupt_for_ppr(apic, ppr) != -1)
+		kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_EVENT, apic->vcpu);
+}
+
+void kvm_apic_update_ppr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	apic_update_ppr(vcpu->arch.apic);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_apic_update_ppr);
+
+static void apic_set_tpr(struct kvm_lapic *apic, u32 tpr)
+{
+	kvm_lapic_set_reg(apic, APIC_TASKPRI, tpr);
+	apic_update_ppr(apic);
+}
+
+static bool kvm_apic_broadcast(struct kvm_lapic *apic, u32 mda)
+{
+	return mda == (apic_x2apic_mode(apic) ?
+			X2APIC_BROADCAST : APIC_BROADCAST);
+}
+
+static bool kvm_apic_match_physical_addr(struct kvm_lapic *apic, u32 mda)
+{
+	if (kvm_apic_broadcast(apic, mda))
+		return true;
+
+	/*
+	 * Hotplug hack: Accept interrupts for vCPUs in xAPIC mode as if they
+	 * were in x2APIC mode if the target APIC ID can't be encoded as an
+	 * xAPIC ID.  This allows unique addressing of hotplugged vCPUs (which
+	 * start in xAPIC mode) with an APIC ID that is unaddressable in xAPIC
+	 * mode.  Match the x2APIC ID if and only if the target APIC ID can't
+	 * be encoded in xAPIC to avoid spurious matches against a vCPU that
+	 * changed its (addressable) xAPIC ID (which is writable).
+	 */
+	if (apic_x2apic_mode(apic) || mda > 0xff)
+		return mda == kvm_x2apic_id(apic);
+
+	return mda == kvm_xapic_id(apic);
+}
+
+static bool kvm_apic_match_logical_addr(struct kvm_lapic *apic, u32 mda)
+{
+	u32 logical_id;
+
+	if (kvm_apic_broadcast(apic, mda))
+		return true;
+
+	logical_id = kvm_lapic_get_reg(apic, APIC_LDR);
+
+	if (apic_x2apic_mode(apic))
+		return ((logical_id >> 16) == (mda >> 16))
+		       && (logical_id & mda & 0xffff) != 0;
+
+	logical_id = GET_APIC_LOGICAL_ID(logical_id);
+
+	switch (kvm_lapic_get_reg(apic, APIC_DFR)) {
+	case APIC_DFR_FLAT:
+		return (logical_id & mda) != 0;
+	case APIC_DFR_CLUSTER:
+		return ((logical_id >> 4) == (mda >> 4))
+		       && (logical_id & mda & 0xf) != 0;
+	default:
+		return false;
+	}
+}
+
+/* The KVM local APIC implementation has two quirks:
+ *
+ *  - Real hardware delivers interrupts destined to x2APIC ID > 0xff to LAPICs
+ *    in xAPIC mode if the "destination & 0xff" matches its xAPIC ID.
+ *    KVM doesn't do that aliasing.
+ *
+ *  - in-kernel IOAPIC messages have to be delivered directly to
+ *    x2APIC, because the kernel does not support interrupt remapping.
+ *    In order to support broadcast without interrupt remapping, x2APIC
+ *    rewrites the destination of non-IPI messages from APIC_BROADCAST
+ *    to X2APIC_BROADCAST.
+ *
+ * The broadcast quirk can be disabled with KVM_CAP_X2APIC_API.  This is
+ * important when userspace wants to use x2APIC-format MSIs, because
+ * APIC_BROADCAST (0xff) is a legal route for "cluster 0, CPUs 0-7".
+ */
+static u32 kvm_apic_mda(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned int dest_id,
+		struct kvm_lapic *source, struct kvm_lapic *target)
+{
+	bool ipi = source != NULL;
+
+	if (!vcpu->kvm->arch.x2apic_broadcast_quirk_disabled &&
+	    !ipi && dest_id == APIC_BROADCAST && apic_x2apic_mode(target))
+		return X2APIC_BROADCAST;
+
+	return dest_id;
+}
+
+bool kvm_apic_match_dest(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_lapic *source,
+			   int shorthand, unsigned int dest, int dest_mode)
+{
+	struct kvm_lapic *target = vcpu->arch.apic;
+	u32 mda = kvm_apic_mda(vcpu, dest, source, target);
+
+	ASSERT(target);
+	switch (shorthand) {
+	case APIC_DEST_NOSHORT:
+		if (dest_mode == APIC_DEST_PHYSICAL)
+			return kvm_apic_match_physical_addr(target, mda);
+		else
+			return kvm_apic_match_logical_addr(target, mda);
+	case APIC_DEST_SELF:
+		return target == source;
+	case APIC_DEST_ALLINC:
+		return true;
+	case APIC_DEST_ALLBUT:
+		return target != source;
+	default:
+		return false;
+	}
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_apic_match_dest);
+
+int kvm_vector_to_index(u32 vector, u32 dest_vcpus,
+		       const unsigned long *bitmap, u32 bitmap_size)
+{
+	u32 mod;
+	int i, idx = -1;
+
+	mod = vector % dest_vcpus;
+
+	for (i = 0; i <= mod; i++) {
+		idx = find_next_bit(bitmap, bitmap_size, idx + 1);
+		BUG_ON(idx == bitmap_size);
+	}
+
+	return idx;
+}
+
+static void kvm_apic_disabled_lapic_found(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+	if (!kvm->arch.disabled_lapic_found) {
+		kvm->arch.disabled_lapic_found = true;
+		pr_info("Disabled LAPIC found during irq injection\n");
+	}
+}
+
+static bool kvm_apic_is_broadcast_dest(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_lapic **src,
+		struct kvm_lapic_irq *irq, struct kvm_apic_map *map)
+{
+	if (kvm->arch.x2apic_broadcast_quirk_disabled) {
+		if ((irq->dest_id == APIC_BROADCAST &&
+		     map->logical_mode != KVM_APIC_MODE_X2APIC))
+			return true;
+		if (irq->dest_id == X2APIC_BROADCAST)
+			return true;
+	} else {
+		bool x2apic_ipi = src && *src && apic_x2apic_mode(*src);
+		if (irq->dest_id == (x2apic_ipi ?
+		                     X2APIC_BROADCAST : APIC_BROADCAST))
+			return true;
+	}
+
+	return false;
+}
+
+/* Return true if the interrupt can be handled by using *bitmap as index mask
+ * for valid destinations in *dst array.
+ * Return false if kvm_apic_map_get_dest_lapic did nothing useful.
+ * Note: we may have zero kvm_lapic destinations when we return true, which
+ * means that the interrupt should be dropped.  In this case, *bitmap would be
+ * zero and *dst undefined.
+ */
+static inline bool kvm_apic_map_get_dest_lapic(struct kvm *kvm,
+		struct kvm_lapic **src, struct kvm_lapic_irq *irq,
+		struct kvm_apic_map *map, struct kvm_lapic ***dst,
+		unsigned long *bitmap)
+{
+	int i, lowest;
+
+	if (irq->shorthand == APIC_DEST_SELF && src) {
+		*dst = src;
+		*bitmap = 1;
+		return true;
+	} else if (irq->shorthand)
+		return false;
+
+	if (!map || kvm_apic_is_broadcast_dest(kvm, src, irq, map))
+		return false;
+
+	if (irq->dest_mode == APIC_DEST_PHYSICAL) {
+		if (irq->dest_id > map->max_apic_id) {
+			*bitmap = 0;
+		} else {
+			u32 dest_id = array_index_nospec(irq->dest_id, map->max_apic_id + 1);
+			*dst = &map->phys_map[dest_id];
+			*bitmap = 1;
+		}
+		return true;
+	}
+
+	*bitmap = 0;
+	if (!kvm_apic_map_get_logical_dest(map, irq->dest_id, dst,
+				(u16 *)bitmap))
+		return false;
+
+	if (!kvm_lowest_prio_delivery(irq))
+		return true;
+
+	if (!kvm_vector_hashing_enabled()) {
+		lowest = -1;
+		for_each_set_bit(i, bitmap, 16) {
+			if (!(*dst)[i])
+				continue;
+			if (lowest < 0)
+				lowest = i;
+			else if (kvm_apic_compare_prio((*dst)[i]->vcpu,
+						(*dst)[lowest]->vcpu) < 0)
+				lowest = i;
+		}
+	} else {
+		if (!*bitmap)
+			return true;
+
+		lowest = kvm_vector_to_index(irq->vector, hweight16(*bitmap),
+				bitmap, 16);
+
+		if (!(*dst)[lowest]) {
+			kvm_apic_disabled_lapic_found(kvm);
+			*bitmap = 0;
+			return true;
+		}
+	}
+
+	*bitmap = (lowest >= 0) ? 1 << lowest : 0;
+
+	return true;
+}
+
+bool kvm_irq_delivery_to_apic_fast(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_lapic *src,
+		struct kvm_lapic_irq *irq, int *r, struct dest_map *dest_map)
+{
+	struct kvm_apic_map *map;
+	unsigned long bitmap;
+	struct kvm_lapic **dst = NULL;
+	int i;
+	bool ret;
+
+	*r = -1;
+
+	if (irq->shorthand == APIC_DEST_SELF) {
+		if (KVM_BUG_ON(!src, kvm)) {
+			*r = 0;
+			return true;
+		}
+		*r = kvm_apic_set_irq(src->vcpu, irq, dest_map);
+		return true;
+	}
+
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	map = rcu_dereference(kvm->arch.apic_map);
+
+	ret = kvm_apic_map_get_dest_lapic(kvm, &src, irq, map, &dst, &bitmap);
+	if (ret) {
+		*r = 0;
+		for_each_set_bit(i, &bitmap, 16) {
+			if (!dst[i])
+				continue;
+			*r += kvm_apic_set_irq(dst[i]->vcpu, irq, dest_map);
+		}
+	}
+
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * This routine tries to handle interrupts in posted mode, here is how
+ * it deals with different cases:
+ * - For single-destination interrupts, handle it in posted mode
+ * - Else if vector hashing is enabled and it is a lowest-priority
+ *   interrupt, handle it in posted mode and use the following mechanism
+ *   to find the destination vCPU.
+ *	1. For lowest-priority interrupts, store all the possible
+ *	   destination vCPUs in an array.
+ *	2. Use "guest vector % max number of destination vCPUs" to find
+ *	   the right destination vCPU in the array for the lowest-priority
+ *	   interrupt.
+ * - Otherwise, use remapped mode to inject the interrupt.
+ */
+bool kvm_intr_is_single_vcpu_fast(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_lapic_irq *irq,
+			struct kvm_vcpu **dest_vcpu)
+{
+	struct kvm_apic_map *map;
+	unsigned long bitmap;
+	struct kvm_lapic **dst = NULL;
+	bool ret = false;
+
+	if (irq->shorthand)
+		return false;
+
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	map = rcu_dereference(kvm->arch.apic_map);
+
+	if (kvm_apic_map_get_dest_lapic(kvm, NULL, irq, map, &dst, &bitmap) &&
+			hweight16(bitmap) == 1) {
+		unsigned long i = find_first_bit(&bitmap, 16);
+
+		if (dst[i]) {
+			*dest_vcpu = dst[i]->vcpu;
+			ret = true;
+		}
+	}
+
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Add a pending IRQ into lapic.
+ * Return 1 if successfully added and 0 if discarded.
+ */
+static int __apic_accept_irq(struct kvm_lapic *apic, int delivery_mode,
+			     int vector, int level, int trig_mode,
+			     struct dest_map *dest_map)
+{
+	int result = 0;
+	struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = apic->vcpu;
+
+	trace_kvm_apic_accept_irq(vcpu->vcpu_id, delivery_mode,
+				  trig_mode, vector);
+	switch (delivery_mode) {
+	case APIC_DM_LOWEST:
+		vcpu->arch.apic_arb_prio++;
+		fallthrough;
+	case APIC_DM_FIXED:
+		if (unlikely(trig_mode && !level))
+			break;
+
+		/* FIXME add logic for vcpu on reset */
+		if (unlikely(!apic_enabled(apic)))
+			break;
+
+		result = 1;
+
+		if (dest_map) {
+			__set_bit(vcpu->vcpu_id, dest_map->map);
+			dest_map->vectors[vcpu->vcpu_id] = vector;
+		}
+
+		if (apic_test_vector(vector, apic->regs + APIC_TMR) != !!trig_mode) {
+			if (trig_mode)
+				kvm_lapic_set_vector(vector,
+						     apic->regs + APIC_TMR);
+			else
+				kvm_lapic_clear_vector(vector,
+						       apic->regs + APIC_TMR);
+		}
+
+		static_call(kvm_x86_deliver_interrupt)(apic, delivery_mode,
+						       trig_mode, vector);
+		break;
+
+	case APIC_DM_REMRD:
+		result = 1;
+		vcpu->arch.pv.pv_unhalted = 1;
+		kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_EVENT, vcpu);
+		kvm_vcpu_kick(vcpu);
+		break;
+
+	case APIC_DM_SMI:
+		if (!kvm_inject_smi(vcpu)) {
+			kvm_vcpu_kick(vcpu);
+			result = 1;
+		}
+		break;
+
+	case APIC_DM_NMI:
+		result = 1;
+		kvm_inject_nmi(vcpu);
+		kvm_vcpu_kick(vcpu);
+		break;
+
+	case APIC_DM_INIT:
+		if (!trig_mode || level) {
+			result = 1;
+			/* assumes that there are only KVM_APIC_INIT/SIPI */
+			apic->pending_events = (1UL << KVM_APIC_INIT);
+			kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_EVENT, vcpu);
+			kvm_vcpu_kick(vcpu);
+		}
+		break;
+
+	case APIC_DM_STARTUP:
+		result = 1;
+		apic->sipi_vector = vector;
+		/* make sure sipi_vector is visible for the receiver */
+		smp_wmb();
+		set_bit(KVM_APIC_SIPI, &apic->pending_events);
+		kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_EVENT, vcpu);
+		kvm_vcpu_kick(vcpu);
+		break;
+
+	case APIC_DM_EXTINT:
+		/*
+		 * Should only be called by kvm_apic_local_deliver() with LVT0,
+		 * before NMI watchdog was enabled. Already handled by
+		 * kvm_apic_accept_pic_intr().
+		 */
+		break;
+
+	default:
+		printk(KERN_ERR "TODO: unsupported delivery mode %x\n",
+		       delivery_mode);
+		break;
+	}
+	return result;
+}
+
+/*
+ * This routine identifies the destination vcpus mask meant to receive the
+ * IOAPIC interrupts. It either uses kvm_apic_map_get_dest_lapic() to find
+ * out the destination vcpus array and set the bitmap or it traverses to
+ * each available vcpu to identify the same.
+ */
+void kvm_bitmap_or_dest_vcpus(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_lapic_irq *irq,
+			      unsigned long *vcpu_bitmap)
+{
+	struct kvm_lapic **dest_vcpu = NULL;
+	struct kvm_lapic *src = NULL;
+	struct kvm_apic_map *map;
+	struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu;
+	unsigned long bitmap, i;
+	int vcpu_idx;
+	bool ret;
+
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	map = rcu_dereference(kvm->arch.apic_map);
+
+	ret = kvm_apic_map_get_dest_lapic(kvm, &src, irq, map, &dest_vcpu,
+					  &bitmap);
+	if (ret) {
+		for_each_set_bit(i, &bitmap, 16) {
+			if (!dest_vcpu[i])
+				continue;
+			vcpu_idx = dest_vcpu[i]->vcpu->vcpu_idx;
+			__set_bit(vcpu_idx, vcpu_bitmap);
+		}
+	} else {
+		kvm_for_each_vcpu(i, vcpu, kvm) {
+			if (!kvm_apic_present(vcpu))
+				continue;
+			if (!kvm_apic_match_dest(vcpu, NULL,
+						 irq->shorthand,
+						 irq->dest_id,
+						 irq->dest_mode))
+				continue;
+			__set_bit(i, vcpu_bitmap);
+		}
+	}
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+}
+
+int kvm_apic_compare_prio(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu1, struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu2)
+{
+	return vcpu1->arch.apic_arb_prio - vcpu2->arch.apic_arb_prio;
+}
+
+static bool kvm_ioapic_handles_vector(struct kvm_lapic *apic, int vector)
+{
+	return test_bit(vector, apic->vcpu->arch.ioapic_handled_vectors);
+}
+
+static void kvm_ioapic_send_eoi(struct kvm_lapic *apic, int vector)
+{
+	int trigger_mode;
+
+	/* Eoi the ioapic only if the ioapic doesn't own the vector. */
+	if (!kvm_ioapic_handles_vector(apic, vector))
+		return;
+
+	/* Request a KVM exit to inform the userspace IOAPIC. */
+	if (irqchip_split(apic->vcpu->kvm)) {
+		apic->vcpu->arch.pending_ioapic_eoi = vector;
+		kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_IOAPIC_EOI_EXIT, apic->vcpu);
+		return;
+	}
+
+	if (apic_test_vector(vector, apic->regs + APIC_TMR))
+		trigger_mode = IOAPIC_LEVEL_TRIG;
+	else
+		trigger_mode = IOAPIC_EDGE_TRIG;
+
+	kvm_ioapic_update_eoi(apic->vcpu, vector, trigger_mode);
+}
+
+static int apic_set_eoi(struct kvm_lapic *apic)
+{
+	int vector = apic_find_highest_isr(apic);
+
+	trace_kvm_eoi(apic, vector);
+
+	/*
+	 * Not every write EOI will has corresponding ISR,
+	 * one example is when Kernel check timer on setup_IO_APIC
+	 */
+	if (vector == -1)
+		return vector;
+
+	apic_clear_isr(vector, apic);
+	apic_update_ppr(apic);
+
+	if (to_hv_vcpu(apic->vcpu) &&
+	    test_bit(vector, to_hv_synic(apic->vcpu)->vec_bitmap))
+		kvm_hv_synic_send_eoi(apic->vcpu, vector);
+
+	kvm_ioapic_send_eoi(apic, vector);
+	kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_EVENT, apic->vcpu);
+	return vector;
+}
+
+/*
+ * this interface assumes a trap-like exit, which has already finished
+ * desired side effect including vISR and vPPR update.
+ */
+void kvm_apic_set_eoi_accelerated(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int vector)
+{
+	struct kvm_lapic *apic = vcpu->arch.apic;
+
+	trace_kvm_eoi(apic, vector);
+
+	kvm_ioapic_send_eoi(apic, vector);
+	kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_EVENT, apic->vcpu);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_apic_set_eoi_accelerated);
+
+void kvm_apic_send_ipi(struct kvm_lapic *apic, u32 icr_low, u32 icr_high)
+{
+	struct kvm_lapic_irq irq;
+
+	/* KVM has no delay and should always clear the BUSY/PENDING flag. */
+	WARN_ON_ONCE(icr_low & APIC_ICR_BUSY);
+
+	irq.vector = icr_low & APIC_VECTOR_MASK;
+	irq.delivery_mode = icr_low & APIC_MODE_MASK;
+	irq.dest_mode = icr_low & APIC_DEST_MASK;
+	irq.level = (icr_low & APIC_INT_ASSERT) != 0;
+	irq.trig_mode = icr_low & APIC_INT_LEVELTRIG;
+	irq.shorthand = icr_low & APIC_SHORT_MASK;
+	irq.msi_redir_hint = false;
+	if (apic_x2apic_mode(apic))
+		irq.dest_id = icr_high;
+	else
+		irq.dest_id = GET_XAPIC_DEST_FIELD(icr_high);
+
+	trace_kvm_apic_ipi(icr_low, irq.dest_id);
+
+	kvm_irq_delivery_to_apic(apic->vcpu->kvm, apic, &irq, NULL);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_apic_send_ipi);
+
+static u32 apic_get_tmcct(struct kvm_lapic *apic)
+{
+	ktime_t remaining, now;
+	s64 ns;
+
+	ASSERT(apic != NULL);
+
+	/* if initial count is 0, current count should also be 0 */
+	if (kvm_lapic_get_reg(apic, APIC_TMICT) == 0 ||
+		apic->lapic_timer.period == 0)
+		return 0;
+
+	now = ktime_get();
+	remaining = ktime_sub(apic->lapic_timer.target_expiration, now);
+	if (ktime_to_ns(remaining) < 0)
+		remaining = 0;
+
+	ns = mod_64(ktime_to_ns(remaining), apic->lapic_timer.period);
+	return div64_u64(ns, (APIC_BUS_CYCLE_NS * apic->divide_count));
+}
+
+static void __report_tpr_access(struct kvm_lapic *apic, bool write)
+{
+	struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = apic->vcpu;
+	struct kvm_run *run = vcpu->run;
+
+	kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_REPORT_TPR_ACCESS, vcpu);
+	run->tpr_access.rip = kvm_rip_read(vcpu);
+	run->tpr_access.is_write = write;
+}
+
+static inline void report_tpr_access(struct kvm_lapic *apic, bool write)
+{
+	if (apic->vcpu->arch.tpr_access_reporting)
+		__report_tpr_access(apic, write);
+}
+
+static u32 __apic_read(struct kvm_lapic *apic, unsigned int offset)
+{
+	u32 val = 0;
+
+	if (offset >= LAPIC_MMIO_LENGTH)
+		return 0;
+
+	switch (offset) {
+	case APIC_ARBPRI:
+		break;
+
+	case APIC_TMCCT:	/* Timer CCR */
+		if (apic_lvtt_tscdeadline(apic))
+			return 0;
+
+		val = apic_get_tmcct(apic);
+		break;
+	case APIC_PROCPRI:
+		apic_update_ppr(apic);
+		val = kvm_lapic_get_reg(apic, offset);
+		break;
+	case APIC_TASKPRI:
+		report_tpr_access(apic, false);
+		fallthrough;
+	default:
+		val = kvm_lapic_get_reg(apic, offset);
+		break;
+	}
+
+	return val;
+}
+
+static inline struct kvm_lapic *to_lapic(struct kvm_io_device *dev)
+{
+	return container_of(dev, struct kvm_lapic, dev);
+}
+
+#define APIC_REG_MASK(reg)	(1ull << ((reg) >> 4))
+#define APIC_REGS_MASK(first, count) \
+	(APIC_REG_MASK(first) * ((1ull << (count)) - 1))
+
+u64 kvm_lapic_readable_reg_mask(struct kvm_lapic *apic)
+{
+	/* Leave bits '0' for reserved and write-only registers. */
+	u64 valid_reg_mask =
+		APIC_REG_MASK(APIC_ID) |
+		APIC_REG_MASK(APIC_LVR) |
+		APIC_REG_MASK(APIC_TASKPRI) |
+		APIC_REG_MASK(APIC_PROCPRI) |
+		APIC_REG_MASK(APIC_LDR) |
+		APIC_REG_MASK(APIC_SPIV) |
+		APIC_REGS_MASK(APIC_ISR, APIC_ISR_NR) |
+		APIC_REGS_MASK(APIC_TMR, APIC_ISR_NR) |
+		APIC_REGS_MASK(APIC_IRR, APIC_ISR_NR) |
+		APIC_REG_MASK(APIC_ESR) |
+		APIC_REG_MASK(APIC_ICR) |
+		APIC_REG_MASK(APIC_LVTT) |
+		APIC_REG_MASK(APIC_LVTTHMR) |
+		APIC_REG_MASK(APIC_LVTPC) |
+		APIC_REG_MASK(APIC_LVT0) |
+		APIC_REG_MASK(APIC_LVT1) |
+		APIC_REG_MASK(APIC_LVTERR) |
+		APIC_REG_MASK(APIC_TMICT) |
+		APIC_REG_MASK(APIC_TMCCT) |
+		APIC_REG_MASK(APIC_TDCR);
+
+	if (kvm_lapic_lvt_supported(apic, LVT_CMCI))
+		valid_reg_mask |= APIC_REG_MASK(APIC_LVTCMCI);
+
+	/* ARBPRI, DFR, and ICR2 are not valid in x2APIC mode. */
+	if (!apic_x2apic_mode(apic))
+		valid_reg_mask |= APIC_REG_MASK(APIC_ARBPRI) |
+				  APIC_REG_MASK(APIC_DFR) |
+				  APIC_REG_MASK(APIC_ICR2);
+
+	return valid_reg_mask;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_lapic_readable_reg_mask);
+
+static int kvm_lapic_reg_read(struct kvm_lapic *apic, u32 offset, int len,
+			      void *data)
+{
+	unsigned char alignment = offset & 0xf;
+	u32 result;
+
+	/*
+	 * WARN if KVM reads ICR in x2APIC mode, as it's an 8-byte register in
+	 * x2APIC and needs to be manually handled by the caller.
+	 */
+	WARN_ON_ONCE(apic_x2apic_mode(apic) && offset == APIC_ICR);
+
+	if (alignment + len > 4)
+		return 1;
+
+	if (offset > 0x3f0 ||
+	    !(kvm_lapic_readable_reg_mask(apic) & APIC_REG_MASK(offset)))
+		return 1;
+
+	result = __apic_read(apic, offset & ~0xf);
+
+	trace_kvm_apic_read(offset, result);
+
+	switch (len) {
+	case 1:
+	case 2:
+	case 4:
+		memcpy(data, (char *)&result + alignment, len);
+		break;
+	default:
+		printk(KERN_ERR "Local APIC read with len = %x, "
+		       "should be 1,2, or 4 instead\n", len);
+		break;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int apic_mmio_in_range(struct kvm_lapic *apic, gpa_t addr)
+{
+	return addr >= apic->base_address &&
+		addr < apic->base_address + LAPIC_MMIO_LENGTH;
+}
+
+static int apic_mmio_read(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_io_device *this,
+			   gpa_t address, int len, void *data)
+{
+	struct kvm_lapic *apic = to_lapic(this);
+	u32 offset = address - apic->base_address;
+
+	if (!apic_mmio_in_range(apic, address))
+		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+	if (!kvm_apic_hw_enabled(apic) || apic_x2apic_mode(apic)) {
+		if (!kvm_check_has_quirk(vcpu->kvm,
+					 KVM_X86_QUIRK_LAPIC_MMIO_HOLE))
+			return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+		memset(data, 0xff, len);
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	kvm_lapic_reg_read(apic, offset, len, data);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void update_divide_count(struct kvm_lapic *apic)
+{
+	u32 tmp1, tmp2, tdcr;
+
+	tdcr = kvm_lapic_get_reg(apic, APIC_TDCR);
+	tmp1 = tdcr & 0xf;
+	tmp2 = ((tmp1 & 0x3) | ((tmp1 & 0x8) >> 1)) + 1;
+	apic->divide_count = 0x1 << (tmp2 & 0x7);
+}
+
+static void limit_periodic_timer_frequency(struct kvm_lapic *apic)
+{
+	/*
+	 * Do not allow the guest to program periodic timers with small
+	 * interval, since the hrtimers are not throttled by the host
+	 * scheduler.
+	 */
+	if (apic_lvtt_period(apic) && apic->lapic_timer.period) {
+		s64 min_period = min_timer_period_us * 1000LL;
+
+		if (apic->lapic_timer.period < min_period) {
+			pr_info_ratelimited(
+			    "vcpu %i: requested %lld ns "
+			    "lapic timer period limited to %lld ns\n",
+			    apic->vcpu->vcpu_id,
+			    apic->lapic_timer.period, min_period);
+			apic->lapic_timer.period = min_period;
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+static void cancel_hv_timer(struct kvm_lapic *apic);
+
+static void cancel_apic_timer(struct kvm_lapic *apic)
+{
+	hrtimer_cancel(&apic->lapic_timer.timer);
+	preempt_disable();
+	if (apic->lapic_timer.hv_timer_in_use)
+		cancel_hv_timer(apic);
+	preempt_enable();
+	atomic_set(&apic->lapic_timer.pending, 0);
+}
+
+static void apic_update_lvtt(struct kvm_lapic *apic)
+{
+	u32 timer_mode = kvm_lapic_get_reg(apic, APIC_LVTT) &
+			apic->lapic_timer.timer_mode_mask;
+
+	if (apic->lapic_timer.timer_mode != timer_mode) {
+		if (apic_lvtt_tscdeadline(apic) != (timer_mode ==
+				APIC_LVT_TIMER_TSCDEADLINE)) {
+			cancel_apic_timer(apic);
+			kvm_lapic_set_reg(apic, APIC_TMICT, 0);
+			apic->lapic_timer.period = 0;
+			apic->lapic_timer.tscdeadline = 0;
+		}
+		apic->lapic_timer.timer_mode = timer_mode;
+		limit_periodic_timer_frequency(apic);
+	}
+}
+
+/*
+ * On APICv, this test will cause a busy wait
+ * during a higher-priority task.
+ */
+
+static bool lapic_timer_int_injected(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct kvm_lapic *apic = vcpu->arch.apic;
+	u32 reg = kvm_lapic_get_reg(apic, APIC_LVTT);
+
+	if (kvm_apic_hw_enabled(apic)) {
+		int vec = reg & APIC_VECTOR_MASK;
+		void *bitmap = apic->regs + APIC_ISR;
+
+		if (apic->apicv_active)
+			bitmap = apic->regs + APIC_IRR;
+
+		if (apic_test_vector(vec, bitmap))
+			return true;
+	}
+	return false;
+}
+
+static inline void __wait_lapic_expire(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 guest_cycles)
+{
+	u64 timer_advance_ns = vcpu->arch.apic->lapic_timer.timer_advance_ns;
+
+	/*
+	 * If the guest TSC is running at a different ratio than the host, then
+	 * convert the delay to nanoseconds to achieve an accurate delay.  Note
+	 * that __delay() uses delay_tsc whenever the hardware has TSC, thus
+	 * always for VMX enabled hardware.
+	 */
+	if (vcpu->arch.tsc_scaling_ratio == kvm_caps.default_tsc_scaling_ratio) {
+		__delay(min(guest_cycles,
+			nsec_to_cycles(vcpu, timer_advance_ns)));
+	} else {
+		u64 delay_ns = guest_cycles * 1000000ULL;
+		do_div(delay_ns, vcpu->arch.virtual_tsc_khz);
+		ndelay(min_t(u32, delay_ns, timer_advance_ns));
+	}
+}
+
+static inline void adjust_lapic_timer_advance(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+					      s64 advance_expire_delta)
+{
+	struct kvm_lapic *apic = vcpu->arch.apic;
+	u32 timer_advance_ns = apic->lapic_timer.timer_advance_ns;
+	u64 ns;
+
+	/* Do not adjust for tiny fluctuations or large random spikes. */
+	if (abs(advance_expire_delta) > LAPIC_TIMER_ADVANCE_ADJUST_MAX ||
+	    abs(advance_expire_delta) < LAPIC_TIMER_ADVANCE_ADJUST_MIN)
+		return;
+
+	/* too early */
+	if (advance_expire_delta < 0) {
+		ns = -advance_expire_delta * 1000000ULL;
+		do_div(ns, vcpu->arch.virtual_tsc_khz);
+		timer_advance_ns -= ns/LAPIC_TIMER_ADVANCE_ADJUST_STEP;
+	} else {
+	/* too late */
+		ns = advance_expire_delta * 1000000ULL;
+		do_div(ns, vcpu->arch.virtual_tsc_khz);
+		timer_advance_ns += ns/LAPIC_TIMER_ADVANCE_ADJUST_STEP;
+	}
+
+	if (unlikely(timer_advance_ns > LAPIC_TIMER_ADVANCE_NS_MAX))
+		timer_advance_ns = LAPIC_TIMER_ADVANCE_NS_INIT;
+	apic->lapic_timer.timer_advance_ns = timer_advance_ns;
+}
+
+static void __kvm_wait_lapic_expire(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct kvm_lapic *apic = vcpu->arch.apic;
+	u64 guest_tsc, tsc_deadline;
+
+	tsc_deadline = apic->lapic_timer.expired_tscdeadline;
+	apic->lapic_timer.expired_tscdeadline = 0;
+	guest_tsc = kvm_read_l1_tsc(vcpu, rdtsc());
+	trace_kvm_wait_lapic_expire(vcpu->vcpu_id, guest_tsc - tsc_deadline);
+
+	if (lapic_timer_advance_dynamic) {
+		adjust_lapic_timer_advance(vcpu, guest_tsc - tsc_deadline);
+		/*
+		 * If the timer fired early, reread the TSC to account for the
+		 * overhead of the above adjustment to avoid waiting longer
+		 * than is necessary.
+		 */
+		if (guest_tsc < tsc_deadline)
+			guest_tsc = kvm_read_l1_tsc(vcpu, rdtsc());
+	}
+
+	if (guest_tsc < tsc_deadline)
+		__wait_lapic_expire(vcpu, tsc_deadline - guest_tsc);
+}
+
+void kvm_wait_lapic_expire(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	if (lapic_in_kernel(vcpu) &&
+	    vcpu->arch.apic->lapic_timer.expired_tscdeadline &&
+	    vcpu->arch.apic->lapic_timer.timer_advance_ns &&
+	    lapic_timer_int_injected(vcpu))
+		__kvm_wait_lapic_expire(vcpu);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_wait_lapic_expire);
+
+static void kvm_apic_inject_pending_timer_irqs(struct kvm_lapic *apic)
+{
+	struct kvm_timer *ktimer = &apic->lapic_timer;
+
+	kvm_apic_local_deliver(apic, APIC_LVTT);
+	if (apic_lvtt_tscdeadline(apic)) {
+		ktimer->tscdeadline = 0;
+	} else if (apic_lvtt_oneshot(apic)) {
+		ktimer->tscdeadline = 0;
+		ktimer->target_expiration = 0;
+	}
+}
+
+static void apic_timer_expired(struct kvm_lapic *apic, bool from_timer_fn)
+{
+	struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = apic->vcpu;
+	struct kvm_timer *ktimer = &apic->lapic_timer;
+
+	if (atomic_read(&apic->lapic_timer.pending))
+		return;
+
+	if (apic_lvtt_tscdeadline(apic) || ktimer->hv_timer_in_use)
+		ktimer->expired_tscdeadline = ktimer->tscdeadline;
+
+	if (!from_timer_fn && apic->apicv_active) {
+		WARN_ON(kvm_get_running_vcpu() != vcpu);
+		kvm_apic_inject_pending_timer_irqs(apic);
+		return;
+	}
+
+	if (kvm_use_posted_timer_interrupt(apic->vcpu)) {
+		/*
+		 * Ensure the guest's timer has truly expired before posting an
+		 * interrupt.  Open code the relevant checks to avoid querying
+		 * lapic_timer_int_injected(), which will be false since the
+		 * interrupt isn't yet injected.  Waiting until after injecting
+		 * is not an option since that won't help a posted interrupt.
+		 */
+		if (vcpu->arch.apic->lapic_timer.expired_tscdeadline &&
+		    vcpu->arch.apic->lapic_timer.timer_advance_ns)
+			__kvm_wait_lapic_expire(vcpu);
+		kvm_apic_inject_pending_timer_irqs(apic);
+		return;
+	}
+
+	atomic_inc(&apic->lapic_timer.pending);
+	kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_UNBLOCK, vcpu);
+	if (from_timer_fn)
+		kvm_vcpu_kick(vcpu);
+}
+
+static void start_sw_tscdeadline(struct kvm_lapic *apic)
+{
+	struct kvm_timer *ktimer = &apic->lapic_timer;
+	u64 guest_tsc, tscdeadline = ktimer->tscdeadline;
+	u64 ns = 0;
+	ktime_t expire;
+	struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = apic->vcpu;
+	unsigned long this_tsc_khz = vcpu->arch.virtual_tsc_khz;
+	unsigned long flags;
+	ktime_t now;
+
+	if (unlikely(!tscdeadline || !this_tsc_khz))
+		return;
+
+	local_irq_save(flags);
+
+	now = ktime_get();
+	guest_tsc = kvm_read_l1_tsc(vcpu, rdtsc());
+
+	ns = (tscdeadline - guest_tsc) * 1000000ULL;
+	do_div(ns, this_tsc_khz);
+
+	if (likely(tscdeadline > guest_tsc) &&
+	    likely(ns > apic->lapic_timer.timer_advance_ns)) {
+		expire = ktime_add_ns(now, ns);
+		expire = ktime_sub_ns(expire, ktimer->timer_advance_ns);
+		hrtimer_start(&ktimer->timer, expire, HRTIMER_MODE_ABS_HARD);
+	} else
+		apic_timer_expired(apic, false);
+
+	local_irq_restore(flags);
+}
+
+static inline u64 tmict_to_ns(struct kvm_lapic *apic, u32 tmict)
+{
+	return (u64)tmict * APIC_BUS_CYCLE_NS * (u64)apic->divide_count;
+}
+
+static void update_target_expiration(struct kvm_lapic *apic, uint32_t old_divisor)
+{
+	ktime_t now, remaining;
+	u64 ns_remaining_old, ns_remaining_new;
+
+	apic->lapic_timer.period =
+			tmict_to_ns(apic, kvm_lapic_get_reg(apic, APIC_TMICT));
+	limit_periodic_timer_frequency(apic);
+
+	now = ktime_get();
+	remaining = ktime_sub(apic->lapic_timer.target_expiration, now);
+	if (ktime_to_ns(remaining) < 0)
+		remaining = 0;
+
+	ns_remaining_old = ktime_to_ns(remaining);
+	ns_remaining_new = mul_u64_u32_div(ns_remaining_old,
+	                                   apic->divide_count, old_divisor);
+
+	apic->lapic_timer.tscdeadline +=
+		nsec_to_cycles(apic->vcpu, ns_remaining_new) -
+		nsec_to_cycles(apic->vcpu, ns_remaining_old);
+	apic->lapic_timer.target_expiration = ktime_add_ns(now, ns_remaining_new);
+}
+
+static bool set_target_expiration(struct kvm_lapic *apic, u32 count_reg)
+{
+	ktime_t now;
+	u64 tscl = rdtsc();
+	s64 deadline;
+
+	now = ktime_get();
+	apic->lapic_timer.period =
+			tmict_to_ns(apic, kvm_lapic_get_reg(apic, APIC_TMICT));
+
+	if (!apic->lapic_timer.period) {
+		apic->lapic_timer.tscdeadline = 0;
+		return false;
+	}
+
+	limit_periodic_timer_frequency(apic);
+	deadline = apic->lapic_timer.period;
+
+	if (apic_lvtt_period(apic) || apic_lvtt_oneshot(apic)) {
+		if (unlikely(count_reg != APIC_TMICT)) {
+			deadline = tmict_to_ns(apic,
+				     kvm_lapic_get_reg(apic, count_reg));
+			if (unlikely(deadline <= 0)) {
+				if (apic_lvtt_period(apic))
+					deadline = apic->lapic_timer.period;
+				else
+					deadline = 0;
+			}
+			else if (unlikely(deadline > apic->lapic_timer.period)) {
+				pr_info_ratelimited(
+				    "vcpu %i: requested lapic timer restore with "
+				    "starting count register %#x=%u (%lld ns) > initial count (%lld ns). "
+				    "Using initial count to start timer.\n",
+				    apic->vcpu->vcpu_id,
+				    count_reg,
+				    kvm_lapic_get_reg(apic, count_reg),
+				    deadline, apic->lapic_timer.period);
+				kvm_lapic_set_reg(apic, count_reg, 0);
+				deadline = apic->lapic_timer.period;
+			}
+		}
+	}
+
+	apic->lapic_timer.tscdeadline = kvm_read_l1_tsc(apic->vcpu, tscl) +
+		nsec_to_cycles(apic->vcpu, deadline);
+	apic->lapic_timer.target_expiration = ktime_add_ns(now, deadline);
+
+	return true;
+}
+
+static void advance_periodic_target_expiration(struct kvm_lapic *apic)
+{
+	ktime_t now = ktime_get();
+	u64 tscl = rdtsc();
+	ktime_t delta;
+
+	/*
+	 * Synchronize both deadlines to the same time source or
+	 * differences in the periods (caused by differences in the
+	 * underlying clocks or numerical approximation errors) will
+	 * cause the two to drift apart over time as the errors
+	 * accumulate.
+	 */
+	apic->lapic_timer.target_expiration =
+		ktime_add_ns(apic->lapic_timer.target_expiration,
+				apic->lapic_timer.period);
+	delta = ktime_sub(apic->lapic_timer.target_expiration, now);
+	apic->lapic_timer.tscdeadline = kvm_read_l1_tsc(apic->vcpu, tscl) +
+		nsec_to_cycles(apic->vcpu, delta);
+}
+
+static void start_sw_period(struct kvm_lapic *apic)
+{
+	if (!apic->lapic_timer.period)
+		return;
+
+	if (ktime_after(ktime_get(),
+			apic->lapic_timer.target_expiration)) {
+		apic_timer_expired(apic, false);
+
+		if (apic_lvtt_oneshot(apic))
+			return;
+
+		advance_periodic_target_expiration(apic);
+	}
+
+	hrtimer_start(&apic->lapic_timer.timer,
+		apic->lapic_timer.target_expiration,
+		HRTIMER_MODE_ABS_HARD);
+}
+
+bool kvm_lapic_hv_timer_in_use(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	if (!lapic_in_kernel(vcpu))
+		return false;
+
+	return vcpu->arch.apic->lapic_timer.hv_timer_in_use;
+}
+
+static void cancel_hv_timer(struct kvm_lapic *apic)
+{
+	WARN_ON(preemptible());
+	WARN_ON(!apic->lapic_timer.hv_timer_in_use);
+	static_call(kvm_x86_cancel_hv_timer)(apic->vcpu);
+	apic->lapic_timer.hv_timer_in_use = false;
+}
+
+static bool start_hv_timer(struct kvm_lapic *apic)
+{
+	struct kvm_timer *ktimer = &apic->lapic_timer;
+	struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = apic->vcpu;
+	bool expired;
+
+	WARN_ON(preemptible());
+	if (!kvm_can_use_hv_timer(vcpu))
+		return false;
+
+	if (!ktimer->tscdeadline)
+		return false;
+
+	if (static_call(kvm_x86_set_hv_timer)(vcpu, ktimer->tscdeadline, &expired))
+		return false;
+
+	ktimer->hv_timer_in_use = true;
+	hrtimer_cancel(&ktimer->timer);
+
+	/*
+	 * To simplify handling the periodic timer, leave the hv timer running
+	 * even if the deadline timer has expired, i.e. rely on the resulting
+	 * VM-Exit to recompute the periodic timer's target expiration.
+	 */
+	if (!apic_lvtt_period(apic)) {
+		/*
+		 * Cancel the hv timer if the sw timer fired while the hv timer
+		 * was being programmed, or if the hv timer itself expired.
+		 */
+		if (atomic_read(&ktimer->pending)) {
+			cancel_hv_timer(apic);
+		} else if (expired) {
+			apic_timer_expired(apic, false);
+			cancel_hv_timer(apic);
+		}
+	}
+
+	trace_kvm_hv_timer_state(vcpu->vcpu_id, ktimer->hv_timer_in_use);
+
+	return true;
+}
+
+static void start_sw_timer(struct kvm_lapic *apic)
+{
+	struct kvm_timer *ktimer = &apic->lapic_timer;
+
+	WARN_ON(preemptible());
+	if (apic->lapic_timer.hv_timer_in_use)
+		cancel_hv_timer(apic);
+	if (!apic_lvtt_period(apic) && atomic_read(&ktimer->pending))
+		return;
+
+	if (apic_lvtt_period(apic) || apic_lvtt_oneshot(apic))
+		start_sw_period(apic);
+	else if (apic_lvtt_tscdeadline(apic))
+		start_sw_tscdeadline(apic);
+	trace_kvm_hv_timer_state(apic->vcpu->vcpu_id, false);
+}
+
+static void restart_apic_timer(struct kvm_lapic *apic)
+{
+	preempt_disable();
+
+	if (!apic_lvtt_period(apic) && atomic_read(&apic->lapic_timer.pending))
+		goto out;
+
+	if (!start_hv_timer(apic))
+		start_sw_timer(apic);
+out:
+	preempt_enable();
+}
+
+void kvm_lapic_expired_hv_timer(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct kvm_lapic *apic = vcpu->arch.apic;
+
+	preempt_disable();
+	/* If the preempt notifier has already run, it also called apic_timer_expired */
+	if (!apic->lapic_timer.hv_timer_in_use)
+		goto out;
+	WARN_ON(kvm_vcpu_is_blocking(vcpu));
+	apic_timer_expired(apic, false);
+	cancel_hv_timer(apic);
+
+	if (apic_lvtt_period(apic) && apic->lapic_timer.period) {
+		advance_periodic_target_expiration(apic);
+		restart_apic_timer(apic);
+	}
+out:
+	preempt_enable();
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_lapic_expired_hv_timer);
+
+void kvm_lapic_switch_to_hv_timer(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	restart_apic_timer(vcpu->arch.apic);
+}
+
+void kvm_lapic_switch_to_sw_timer(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct kvm_lapic *apic = vcpu->arch.apic;
+
+	preempt_disable();
+	/* Possibly the TSC deadline timer is not enabled yet */
+	if (apic->lapic_timer.hv_timer_in_use)
+		start_sw_timer(apic);
+	preempt_enable();
+}
+
+void kvm_lapic_restart_hv_timer(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct kvm_lapic *apic = vcpu->arch.apic;
+
+	WARN_ON(!apic->lapic_timer.hv_timer_in_use);
+	restart_apic_timer(apic);
+}
+
+static void __start_apic_timer(struct kvm_lapic *apic, u32 count_reg)
+{
+	atomic_set(&apic->lapic_timer.pending, 0);
+
+	if ((apic_lvtt_period(apic) || apic_lvtt_oneshot(apic))
+	    && !set_target_expiration(apic, count_reg))
+		return;
+
+	restart_apic_timer(apic);
+}
+
+static void start_apic_timer(struct kvm_lapic *apic)
+{
+	__start_apic_timer(apic, APIC_TMICT);
+}
+
+static void apic_manage_nmi_watchdog(struct kvm_lapic *apic, u32 lvt0_val)
+{
+	bool lvt0_in_nmi_mode = apic_lvt_nmi_mode(lvt0_val);
+
+	if (apic->lvt0_in_nmi_mode != lvt0_in_nmi_mode) {
+		apic->lvt0_in_nmi_mode = lvt0_in_nmi_mode;
+		if (lvt0_in_nmi_mode) {
+			atomic_inc(&apic->vcpu->kvm->arch.vapics_in_nmi_mode);
+		} else
+			atomic_dec(&apic->vcpu->kvm->arch.vapics_in_nmi_mode);
+	}
+}
+
+static int get_lvt_index(u32 reg)
+{
+	if (reg == APIC_LVTCMCI)
+		return LVT_CMCI;
+	if (reg < APIC_LVTT || reg > APIC_LVTERR)
+		return -1;
+	return array_index_nospec(
+			(reg - APIC_LVTT) >> 4, KVM_APIC_MAX_NR_LVT_ENTRIES);
+}
+
+static int kvm_lapic_reg_write(struct kvm_lapic *apic, u32 reg, u32 val)
+{
+	int ret = 0;
+
+	trace_kvm_apic_write(reg, val);
+
+	switch (reg) {
+	case APIC_ID:		/* Local APIC ID */
+		if (!apic_x2apic_mode(apic)) {
+			kvm_apic_set_xapic_id(apic, val >> 24);
+		} else {
+			ret = 1;
+		}
+		break;
+
+	case APIC_TASKPRI:
+		report_tpr_access(apic, true);
+		apic_set_tpr(apic, val & 0xff);
+		break;
+
+	case APIC_EOI:
+		apic_set_eoi(apic);
+		break;
+
+	case APIC_LDR:
+		if (!apic_x2apic_mode(apic))
+			kvm_apic_set_ldr(apic, val & APIC_LDR_MASK);
+		else
+			ret = 1;
+		break;
+
+	case APIC_DFR:
+		if (!apic_x2apic_mode(apic))
+			kvm_apic_set_dfr(apic, val | 0x0FFFFFFF);
+		else
+			ret = 1;
+		break;
+
+	case APIC_SPIV: {
+		u32 mask = 0x3ff;
+		if (kvm_lapic_get_reg(apic, APIC_LVR) & APIC_LVR_DIRECTED_EOI)
+			mask |= APIC_SPIV_DIRECTED_EOI;
+		apic_set_spiv(apic, val & mask);
+		if (!(val & APIC_SPIV_APIC_ENABLED)) {
+			int i;
+
+			for (i = 0; i < apic->nr_lvt_entries; i++) {
+				kvm_lapic_set_reg(apic, APIC_LVTx(i),
+					kvm_lapic_get_reg(apic, APIC_LVTx(i)) | APIC_LVT_MASKED);
+			}
+			apic_update_lvtt(apic);
+			atomic_set(&apic->lapic_timer.pending, 0);
+
+		}
+		break;
+	}
+	case APIC_ICR:
+		WARN_ON_ONCE(apic_x2apic_mode(apic));
+
+		/* No delay here, so we always clear the pending bit */
+		val &= ~APIC_ICR_BUSY;
+		kvm_apic_send_ipi(apic, val, kvm_lapic_get_reg(apic, APIC_ICR2));
+		kvm_lapic_set_reg(apic, APIC_ICR, val);
+		break;
+	case APIC_ICR2:
+		if (apic_x2apic_mode(apic))
+			ret = 1;
+		else
+			kvm_lapic_set_reg(apic, APIC_ICR2, val & 0xff000000);
+		break;
+
+	case APIC_LVT0:
+		apic_manage_nmi_watchdog(apic, val);
+		fallthrough;
+	case APIC_LVTTHMR:
+	case APIC_LVTPC:
+	case APIC_LVT1:
+	case APIC_LVTERR:
+	case APIC_LVTCMCI: {
+		u32 index = get_lvt_index(reg);
+		if (!kvm_lapic_lvt_supported(apic, index)) {
+			ret = 1;
+			break;
+		}
+		if (!kvm_apic_sw_enabled(apic))
+			val |= APIC_LVT_MASKED;
+		val &= apic_lvt_mask[index];
+		kvm_lapic_set_reg(apic, reg, val);
+		break;
+	}
+
+	case APIC_LVTT:
+		if (!kvm_apic_sw_enabled(apic))
+			val |= APIC_LVT_MASKED;
+		val &= (apic_lvt_mask[0] | apic->lapic_timer.timer_mode_mask);
+		kvm_lapic_set_reg(apic, APIC_LVTT, val);
+		apic_update_lvtt(apic);
+		break;
+
+	case APIC_TMICT:
+		if (apic_lvtt_tscdeadline(apic))
+			break;
+
+		cancel_apic_timer(apic);
+		kvm_lapic_set_reg(apic, APIC_TMICT, val);
+		start_apic_timer(apic);
+		break;
+
+	case APIC_TDCR: {
+		uint32_t old_divisor = apic->divide_count;
+
+		kvm_lapic_set_reg(apic, APIC_TDCR, val & 0xb);
+		update_divide_count(apic);
+		if (apic->divide_count != old_divisor &&
+				apic->lapic_timer.period) {
+			hrtimer_cancel(&apic->lapic_timer.timer);
+			update_target_expiration(apic, old_divisor);
+			restart_apic_timer(apic);
+		}
+		break;
+	}
+	case APIC_ESR:
+		if (apic_x2apic_mode(apic) && val != 0)
+			ret = 1;
+		break;
+
+	case APIC_SELF_IPI:
+		/*
+		 * Self-IPI exists only when x2APIC is enabled.  Bits 7:0 hold
+		 * the vector, everything else is reserved.
+		 */
+		if (!apic_x2apic_mode(apic) || (val & ~APIC_VECTOR_MASK))
+			ret = 1;
+		else
+			kvm_apic_send_ipi(apic, APIC_DEST_SELF | val, 0);
+		break;
+	default:
+		ret = 1;
+		break;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Recalculate APIC maps if necessary, e.g. if the software enable bit
+	 * was toggled, the APIC ID changed, etc...   The maps are marked dirty
+	 * on relevant changes, i.e. this is a nop for most writes.
+	 */
+	kvm_recalculate_apic_map(apic->vcpu->kvm);
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int apic_mmio_write(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_io_device *this,
+			    gpa_t address, int len, const void *data)
+{
+	struct kvm_lapic *apic = to_lapic(this);
+	unsigned int offset = address - apic->base_address;
+	u32 val;
+
+	if (!apic_mmio_in_range(apic, address))
+		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+	if (!kvm_apic_hw_enabled(apic) || apic_x2apic_mode(apic)) {
+		if (!kvm_check_has_quirk(vcpu->kvm,
+					 KVM_X86_QUIRK_LAPIC_MMIO_HOLE))
+			return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * APIC register must be aligned on 128-bits boundary.
+	 * 32/64/128 bits registers must be accessed thru 32 bits.
+	 * Refer SDM 8.4.1
+	 */
+	if (len != 4 || (offset & 0xf))
+		return 0;
+
+	val = *(u32*)data;
+
+	kvm_lapic_reg_write(apic, offset & 0xff0, val);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+void kvm_lapic_set_eoi(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	kvm_lapic_reg_write(vcpu->arch.apic, APIC_EOI, 0);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_lapic_set_eoi);
+
+/* emulate APIC access in a trap manner */
+void kvm_apic_write_nodecode(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 offset)
+{
+	struct kvm_lapic *apic = vcpu->arch.apic;
+
+	/*
+	 * ICR is a single 64-bit register when x2APIC is enabled, all others
+	 * registers hold 32-bit values.  For legacy xAPIC, ICR writes need to
+	 * go down the common path to get the upper half from ICR2.
+	 *
+	 * Note, using the write helpers may incur an unnecessary write to the
+	 * virtual APIC state, but KVM needs to conditionally modify the value
+	 * in certain cases, e.g. to clear the ICR busy bit.  The cost of extra
+	 * conditional branches is likely a wash relative to the cost of the
+	 * maybe-unecessary write, and both are in the noise anyways.
+	 */
+	if (apic_x2apic_mode(apic) && offset == APIC_ICR)
+		kvm_x2apic_icr_write(apic, kvm_lapic_get_reg64(apic, APIC_ICR));
+	else
+		kvm_lapic_reg_write(apic, offset, kvm_lapic_get_reg(apic, offset));
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_apic_write_nodecode);
+
+void kvm_free_lapic(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct kvm_lapic *apic = vcpu->arch.apic;
+
+	if (!vcpu->arch.apic)
+		return;
+
+	hrtimer_cancel(&apic->lapic_timer.timer);
+
+	if (!(vcpu->arch.apic_base & MSR_IA32_APICBASE_ENABLE))
+		static_branch_slow_dec_deferred(&apic_hw_disabled);
+
+	if (!apic->sw_enabled)
+		static_branch_slow_dec_deferred(&apic_sw_disabled);
+
+	if (apic->regs)
+		free_page((unsigned long)apic->regs);
+
+	kfree(apic);
+}
+
+/*
+ *----------------------------------------------------------------------
+ * LAPIC interface
+ *----------------------------------------------------------------------
+ */
+u64 kvm_get_lapic_tscdeadline_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct kvm_lapic *apic = vcpu->arch.apic;
+
+	if (!kvm_apic_present(vcpu) || !apic_lvtt_tscdeadline(apic))
+		return 0;
+
+	return apic->lapic_timer.tscdeadline;
+}
+
+void kvm_set_lapic_tscdeadline_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 data)
+{
+	struct kvm_lapic *apic = vcpu->arch.apic;
+
+	if (!kvm_apic_present(vcpu) || !apic_lvtt_tscdeadline(apic))
+		return;
+
+	hrtimer_cancel(&apic->lapic_timer.timer);
+	apic->lapic_timer.tscdeadline = data;
+	start_apic_timer(apic);
+}
+
+void kvm_lapic_set_tpr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long cr8)
+{
+	apic_set_tpr(vcpu->arch.apic, (cr8 & 0x0f) << 4);
+}
+
+u64 kvm_lapic_get_cr8(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	u64 tpr;
+
+	tpr = (u64) kvm_lapic_get_reg(vcpu->arch.apic, APIC_TASKPRI);
+
+	return (tpr & 0xf0) >> 4;
+}
+
+void kvm_lapic_set_base(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 value)
+{
+	u64 old_value = vcpu->arch.apic_base;
+	struct kvm_lapic *apic = vcpu->arch.apic;
+
+	vcpu->arch.apic_base = value;
+
+	if ((old_value ^ value) & MSR_IA32_APICBASE_ENABLE)
+		kvm_update_cpuid_runtime(vcpu);
+
+	if (!apic)
+		return;
+
+	/* update jump label if enable bit changes */
+	if ((old_value ^ value) & MSR_IA32_APICBASE_ENABLE) {
+		if (value & MSR_IA32_APICBASE_ENABLE) {
+			kvm_apic_set_xapic_id(apic, vcpu->vcpu_id);
+			static_branch_slow_dec_deferred(&apic_hw_disabled);
+			/* Check if there are APF page ready requests pending */
+			kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_APF_READY, vcpu);
+		} else {
+			static_branch_inc(&apic_hw_disabled.key);
+			atomic_set_release(&apic->vcpu->kvm->arch.apic_map_dirty, DIRTY);
+		}
+	}
+
+	if ((old_value ^ value) & X2APIC_ENABLE) {
+		if (value & X2APIC_ENABLE)
+			kvm_apic_set_x2apic_id(apic, vcpu->vcpu_id);
+		else if (value & MSR_IA32_APICBASE_ENABLE)
+			kvm_apic_set_xapic_id(apic, vcpu->vcpu_id);
+	}
+
+	if ((old_value ^ value) & (MSR_IA32_APICBASE_ENABLE | X2APIC_ENABLE)) {
+		kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_APICV_UPDATE, vcpu);
+		static_call_cond(kvm_x86_set_virtual_apic_mode)(vcpu);
+	}
+
+	apic->base_address = apic->vcpu->arch.apic_base &
+			     MSR_IA32_APICBASE_BASE;
+
+	if ((value & MSR_IA32_APICBASE_ENABLE) &&
+	     apic->base_address != APIC_DEFAULT_PHYS_BASE) {
+		kvm_set_apicv_inhibit(apic->vcpu->kvm,
+				      APICV_INHIBIT_REASON_APIC_BASE_MODIFIED);
+	}
+}
+
+void kvm_apic_update_apicv(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct kvm_lapic *apic = vcpu->arch.apic;
+
+	if (apic->apicv_active) {
+		/* irr_pending is always true when apicv is activated. */
+		apic->irr_pending = true;
+		apic->isr_count = 1;
+	} else {
+		/*
+		 * Don't clear irr_pending, searching the IRR can race with
+		 * updates from the CPU as APICv is still active from hardware's
+		 * perspective.  The flag will be cleared as appropriate when
+		 * KVM injects the interrupt.
+		 */
+		apic->isr_count = count_vectors(apic->regs + APIC_ISR);
+	}
+	apic->highest_isr_cache = -1;
+}
+
+int kvm_alloc_apic_access_page(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+	struct page *page;
+	void __user *hva;
+	int ret = 0;
+
+	mutex_lock(&kvm->slots_lock);
+	if (kvm->arch.apic_access_memslot_enabled ||
+	    kvm->arch.apic_access_memslot_inhibited)
+		goto out;
+
+	hva = __x86_set_memory_region(kvm, APIC_ACCESS_PAGE_PRIVATE_MEMSLOT,
+				      APIC_DEFAULT_PHYS_BASE, PAGE_SIZE);
+	if (IS_ERR(hva)) {
+		ret = PTR_ERR(hva);
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	page = gfn_to_page(kvm, APIC_DEFAULT_PHYS_BASE >> PAGE_SHIFT);
+	if (is_error_page(page)) {
+		ret = -EFAULT;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Do not pin the page in memory, so that memory hot-unplug
+	 * is able to migrate it.
+	 */
+	put_page(page);
+	kvm->arch.apic_access_memslot_enabled = true;
+out:
+	mutex_unlock(&kvm->slots_lock);
+	return ret;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_alloc_apic_access_page);
+
+void kvm_inhibit_apic_access_page(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct kvm *kvm = vcpu->kvm;
+
+	if (!kvm->arch.apic_access_memslot_enabled)
+		return;
+
+	kvm_vcpu_srcu_read_unlock(vcpu);
+
+	mutex_lock(&kvm->slots_lock);
+
+	if (kvm->arch.apic_access_memslot_enabled) {
+		__x86_set_memory_region(kvm, APIC_ACCESS_PAGE_PRIVATE_MEMSLOT, 0, 0);
+		/*
+		 * Clear "enabled" after the memslot is deleted so that a
+		 * different vCPU doesn't get a false negative when checking
+		 * the flag out of slots_lock.  No additional memory barrier is
+		 * needed as modifying memslots requires waiting other vCPUs to
+		 * drop SRCU (see above), and false positives are ok as the
+		 * flag is rechecked after acquiring slots_lock.
+		 */
+		kvm->arch.apic_access_memslot_enabled = false;
+
+		/*
+		 * Mark the memslot as inhibited to prevent reallocating the
+		 * memslot during vCPU creation, e.g. if a vCPU is hotplugged.
+		 */
+		kvm->arch.apic_access_memslot_inhibited = true;
+	}
+
+	mutex_unlock(&kvm->slots_lock);
+
+	kvm_vcpu_srcu_read_lock(vcpu);
+}
+
+void kvm_lapic_reset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool init_event)
+{
+	struct kvm_lapic *apic = vcpu->arch.apic;
+	u64 msr_val;
+	int i;
+
+	static_call_cond(kvm_x86_apicv_pre_state_restore)(vcpu);
+
+	if (!init_event) {
+		msr_val = APIC_DEFAULT_PHYS_BASE | MSR_IA32_APICBASE_ENABLE;
+		if (kvm_vcpu_is_reset_bsp(vcpu))
+			msr_val |= MSR_IA32_APICBASE_BSP;
+		kvm_lapic_set_base(vcpu, msr_val);
+	}
+
+	if (!apic)
+		return;
+
+	/* Stop the timer in case it's a reset to an active apic */
+	hrtimer_cancel(&apic->lapic_timer.timer);
+
+	/* The xAPIC ID is set at RESET even if the APIC was already enabled. */
+	if (!init_event)
+		kvm_apic_set_xapic_id(apic, vcpu->vcpu_id);
+	kvm_apic_set_version(apic->vcpu);
+
+	for (i = 0; i < apic->nr_lvt_entries; i++)
+		kvm_lapic_set_reg(apic, APIC_LVTx(i), APIC_LVT_MASKED);
+	apic_update_lvtt(apic);
+	if (kvm_vcpu_is_reset_bsp(vcpu) &&
+	    kvm_check_has_quirk(vcpu->kvm, KVM_X86_QUIRK_LINT0_REENABLED))
+		kvm_lapic_set_reg(apic, APIC_LVT0,
+			     SET_APIC_DELIVERY_MODE(0, APIC_MODE_EXTINT));
+	apic_manage_nmi_watchdog(apic, kvm_lapic_get_reg(apic, APIC_LVT0));
+
+	kvm_apic_set_dfr(apic, 0xffffffffU);
+	apic_set_spiv(apic, 0xff);
+	kvm_lapic_set_reg(apic, APIC_TASKPRI, 0);
+	if (!apic_x2apic_mode(apic))
+		kvm_apic_set_ldr(apic, 0);
+	kvm_lapic_set_reg(apic, APIC_ESR, 0);
+	if (!apic_x2apic_mode(apic)) {
+		kvm_lapic_set_reg(apic, APIC_ICR, 0);
+		kvm_lapic_set_reg(apic, APIC_ICR2, 0);
+	} else {
+		kvm_lapic_set_reg64(apic, APIC_ICR, 0);
+	}
+	kvm_lapic_set_reg(apic, APIC_TDCR, 0);
+	kvm_lapic_set_reg(apic, APIC_TMICT, 0);
+	for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
+		kvm_lapic_set_reg(apic, APIC_IRR + 0x10 * i, 0);
+		kvm_lapic_set_reg(apic, APIC_ISR + 0x10 * i, 0);
+		kvm_lapic_set_reg(apic, APIC_TMR + 0x10 * i, 0);
+	}
+	kvm_apic_update_apicv(vcpu);
+	update_divide_count(apic);
+	atomic_set(&apic->lapic_timer.pending, 0);
+
+	vcpu->arch.pv_eoi.msr_val = 0;
+	apic_update_ppr(apic);
+	if (apic->apicv_active) {
+		static_call_cond(kvm_x86_apicv_post_state_restore)(vcpu);
+		static_call_cond(kvm_x86_hwapic_irr_update)(vcpu, -1);
+		static_call_cond(kvm_x86_hwapic_isr_update)(-1);
+	}
+
+	vcpu->arch.apic_arb_prio = 0;
+	vcpu->arch.apic_attention = 0;
+
+	kvm_recalculate_apic_map(vcpu->kvm);
+}
+
+/*
+ *----------------------------------------------------------------------
+ * timer interface
+ *----------------------------------------------------------------------
+ */
+
+static bool lapic_is_periodic(struct kvm_lapic *apic)
+{
+	return apic_lvtt_period(apic);
+}
+
+int apic_has_pending_timer(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct kvm_lapic *apic = vcpu->arch.apic;
+
+	if (apic_enabled(apic) && apic_lvt_enabled(apic, APIC_LVTT))
+		return atomic_read(&apic->lapic_timer.pending);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int kvm_apic_local_deliver(struct kvm_lapic *apic, int lvt_type)
+{
+	u32 reg = kvm_lapic_get_reg(apic, lvt_type);
+	int vector, mode, trig_mode;
+	int r;
+
+	if (kvm_apic_hw_enabled(apic) && !(reg & APIC_LVT_MASKED)) {
+		vector = reg & APIC_VECTOR_MASK;
+		mode = reg & APIC_MODE_MASK;
+		trig_mode = reg & APIC_LVT_LEVEL_TRIGGER;
+
+		r = __apic_accept_irq(apic, mode, vector, 1, trig_mode, NULL);
+		if (r && lvt_type == APIC_LVTPC)
+			kvm_lapic_set_reg(apic, APIC_LVTPC, reg | APIC_LVT_MASKED);
+		return r;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+void kvm_apic_nmi_wd_deliver(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct kvm_lapic *apic = vcpu->arch.apic;
+
+	if (apic)
+		kvm_apic_local_deliver(apic, APIC_LVT0);
+}
+
+static const struct kvm_io_device_ops apic_mmio_ops = {
+	.read     = apic_mmio_read,
+	.write    = apic_mmio_write,
+};
+
+static enum hrtimer_restart apic_timer_fn(struct hrtimer *data)
+{
+	struct kvm_timer *ktimer = container_of(data, struct kvm_timer, timer);
+	struct kvm_lapic *apic = container_of(ktimer, struct kvm_lapic, lapic_timer);
+
+	apic_timer_expired(apic, true);
+
+	if (lapic_is_periodic(apic)) {
+		advance_periodic_target_expiration(apic);
+		hrtimer_add_expires_ns(&ktimer->timer, ktimer->period);
+		return HRTIMER_RESTART;
+	} else
+		return HRTIMER_NORESTART;
+}
+
+int kvm_create_lapic(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int timer_advance_ns)
+{
+	struct kvm_lapic *apic;
+
+	ASSERT(vcpu != NULL);
+
+	apic = kzalloc(sizeof(*apic), GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
+	if (!apic)
+		goto nomem;
+
+	vcpu->arch.apic = apic;
+
+	apic->regs = (void *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
+	if (!apic->regs) {
+		printk(KERN_ERR "malloc apic regs error for vcpu %x\n",
+		       vcpu->vcpu_id);
+		goto nomem_free_apic;
+	}
+	apic->vcpu = vcpu;
+
+	apic->nr_lvt_entries = kvm_apic_calc_nr_lvt_entries(vcpu);
+
+	hrtimer_init(&apic->lapic_timer.timer, CLOCK_MONOTONIC,
+		     HRTIMER_MODE_ABS_HARD);
+	apic->lapic_timer.timer.function = apic_timer_fn;
+	if (timer_advance_ns == -1) {
+		apic->lapic_timer.timer_advance_ns = LAPIC_TIMER_ADVANCE_NS_INIT;
+		lapic_timer_advance_dynamic = true;
+	} else {
+		apic->lapic_timer.timer_advance_ns = timer_advance_ns;
+		lapic_timer_advance_dynamic = false;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Stuff the APIC ENABLE bit in lieu of temporarily incrementing
+	 * apic_hw_disabled; the full RESET value is set by kvm_lapic_reset().
+	 */
+	vcpu->arch.apic_base = MSR_IA32_APICBASE_ENABLE;
+	static_branch_inc(&apic_sw_disabled.key); /* sw disabled at reset */
+	kvm_iodevice_init(&apic->dev, &apic_mmio_ops);
+
+	return 0;
+nomem_free_apic:
+	kfree(apic);
+	vcpu->arch.apic = NULL;
+nomem:
+	return -ENOMEM;
+}
+
+int kvm_apic_has_interrupt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct kvm_lapic *apic = vcpu->arch.apic;
+	u32 ppr;
+
+	if (!kvm_apic_present(vcpu))
+		return -1;
+
+	__apic_update_ppr(apic, &ppr);
+	return apic_has_interrupt_for_ppr(apic, ppr);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_apic_has_interrupt);
+
+int kvm_apic_accept_pic_intr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	u32 lvt0 = kvm_lapic_get_reg(vcpu->arch.apic, APIC_LVT0);
+
+	if (!kvm_apic_hw_enabled(vcpu->arch.apic))
+		return 1;
+	if ((lvt0 & APIC_LVT_MASKED) == 0 &&
+	    GET_APIC_DELIVERY_MODE(lvt0) == APIC_MODE_EXTINT)
+		return 1;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+void kvm_inject_apic_timer_irqs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct kvm_lapic *apic = vcpu->arch.apic;
+
+	if (atomic_read(&apic->lapic_timer.pending) > 0) {
+		kvm_apic_inject_pending_timer_irqs(apic);
+		atomic_set(&apic->lapic_timer.pending, 0);
+	}
+}
+
+int kvm_get_apic_interrupt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	int vector = kvm_apic_has_interrupt(vcpu);
+	struct kvm_lapic *apic = vcpu->arch.apic;
+	u32 ppr;
+
+	if (vector == -1)
+		return -1;
+
+	/*
+	 * We get here even with APIC virtualization enabled, if doing
+	 * nested virtualization and L1 runs with the "acknowledge interrupt
+	 * on exit" mode.  Then we cannot inject the interrupt via RVI,
+	 * because the process would deliver it through the IDT.
+	 */
+
+	apic_clear_irr(vector, apic);
+	if (to_hv_vcpu(vcpu) && test_bit(vector, to_hv_synic(vcpu)->auto_eoi_bitmap)) {
+		/*
+		 * For auto-EOI interrupts, there might be another pending
+		 * interrupt above PPR, so check whether to raise another
+		 * KVM_REQ_EVENT.
+		 */
+		apic_update_ppr(apic);
+	} else {
+		/*
+		 * For normal interrupts, PPR has been raised and there cannot
+		 * be a higher-priority pending interrupt---except if there was
+		 * a concurrent interrupt injection, but that would have
+		 * triggered KVM_REQ_EVENT already.
+		 */
+		apic_set_isr(vector, apic);
+		__apic_update_ppr(apic, &ppr);
+	}
+
+	return vector;
+}
+
+static int kvm_apic_state_fixup(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+		struct kvm_lapic_state *s, bool set)
+{
+	if (apic_x2apic_mode(vcpu->arch.apic)) {
+		u32 *id = (u32 *)(s->regs + APIC_ID);
+		u32 *ldr = (u32 *)(s->regs + APIC_LDR);
+		u64 icr;
+
+		if (vcpu->kvm->arch.x2apic_format) {
+			if (*id != vcpu->vcpu_id)
+				return -EINVAL;
+		} else {
+			if (set)
+				*id >>= 24;
+			else
+				*id <<= 24;
+		}
+
+		/*
+		 * In x2APIC mode, the LDR is fixed and based on the id.  And
+		 * ICR is internally a single 64-bit register, but needs to be
+		 * split to ICR+ICR2 in userspace for backwards compatibility.
+		 */
+		if (set) {
+			*ldr = kvm_apic_calc_x2apic_ldr(*id);
+
+			icr = __kvm_lapic_get_reg(s->regs, APIC_ICR) |
+			      (u64)__kvm_lapic_get_reg(s->regs, APIC_ICR2) << 32;
+			__kvm_lapic_set_reg64(s->regs, APIC_ICR, icr);
+		} else {
+			icr = __kvm_lapic_get_reg64(s->regs, APIC_ICR);
+			__kvm_lapic_set_reg(s->regs, APIC_ICR2, icr >> 32);
+		}
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int kvm_apic_get_state(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_lapic_state *s)
+{
+	memcpy(s->regs, vcpu->arch.apic->regs, sizeof(*s));
+
+	/*
+	 * Get calculated timer current count for remaining timer period (if
+	 * any) and store it in the returned register set.
+	 */
+	__kvm_lapic_set_reg(s->regs, APIC_TMCCT,
+			    __apic_read(vcpu->arch.apic, APIC_TMCCT));
+
+	return kvm_apic_state_fixup(vcpu, s, false);
+}
+
+int kvm_apic_set_state(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_lapic_state *s)
+{
+	struct kvm_lapic *apic = vcpu->arch.apic;
+	int r;
+
+	static_call_cond(kvm_x86_apicv_pre_state_restore)(vcpu);
+
+	kvm_lapic_set_base(vcpu, vcpu->arch.apic_base);
+	/* set SPIV separately to get count of SW disabled APICs right */
+	apic_set_spiv(apic, *((u32 *)(s->regs + APIC_SPIV)));
+
+	r = kvm_apic_state_fixup(vcpu, s, true);
+	if (r) {
+		kvm_recalculate_apic_map(vcpu->kvm);
+		return r;
+	}
+	memcpy(vcpu->arch.apic->regs, s->regs, sizeof(*s));
+
+	atomic_set_release(&apic->vcpu->kvm->arch.apic_map_dirty, DIRTY);
+	kvm_recalculate_apic_map(vcpu->kvm);
+	kvm_apic_set_version(vcpu);
+
+	apic_update_ppr(apic);
+	cancel_apic_timer(apic);
+	apic->lapic_timer.expired_tscdeadline = 0;
+	apic_update_lvtt(apic);
+	apic_manage_nmi_watchdog(apic, kvm_lapic_get_reg(apic, APIC_LVT0));
+	update_divide_count(apic);
+	__start_apic_timer(apic, APIC_TMCCT);
+	kvm_lapic_set_reg(apic, APIC_TMCCT, 0);
+	kvm_apic_update_apicv(vcpu);
+	if (apic->apicv_active) {
+		static_call_cond(kvm_x86_apicv_post_state_restore)(vcpu);
+		static_call_cond(kvm_x86_hwapic_irr_update)(vcpu, apic_find_highest_irr(apic));
+		static_call_cond(kvm_x86_hwapic_isr_update)(apic_find_highest_isr(apic));
+	}
+	kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_EVENT, vcpu);
+	if (ioapic_in_kernel(vcpu->kvm))
+		kvm_rtc_eoi_tracking_restore_one(vcpu);
+
+	vcpu->arch.apic_arb_prio = 0;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+void __kvm_migrate_apic_timer(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct hrtimer *timer;
+
+	if (!lapic_in_kernel(vcpu) ||
+		kvm_can_post_timer_interrupt(vcpu))
+		return;
+
+	timer = &vcpu->arch.apic->lapic_timer.timer;
+	if (hrtimer_cancel(timer))
+		hrtimer_start_expires(timer, HRTIMER_MODE_ABS_HARD);
+}
+
+/*
+ * apic_sync_pv_eoi_from_guest - called on vmexit or cancel interrupt
+ *
+ * Detect whether guest triggered PV EOI since the
+ * last entry. If yes, set EOI on guests's behalf.
+ * Clear PV EOI in guest memory in any case.
+ */
+static void apic_sync_pv_eoi_from_guest(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+					struct kvm_lapic *apic)
+{
+	int vector;
+	/*
+	 * PV EOI state is derived from KVM_APIC_PV_EOI_PENDING in host
+	 * and KVM_PV_EOI_ENABLED in guest memory as follows:
+	 *
+	 * KVM_APIC_PV_EOI_PENDING is unset:
+	 * 	-> host disabled PV EOI.
+	 * KVM_APIC_PV_EOI_PENDING is set, KVM_PV_EOI_ENABLED is set:
+	 * 	-> host enabled PV EOI, guest did not execute EOI yet.
+	 * KVM_APIC_PV_EOI_PENDING is set, KVM_PV_EOI_ENABLED is unset:
+	 * 	-> host enabled PV EOI, guest executed EOI.
+	 */
+	BUG_ON(!pv_eoi_enabled(vcpu));
+
+	if (pv_eoi_test_and_clr_pending(vcpu))
+		return;
+	vector = apic_set_eoi(apic);
+	trace_kvm_pv_eoi(apic, vector);
+}
+
+void kvm_lapic_sync_from_vapic(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	u32 data;
+
+	if (test_bit(KVM_APIC_PV_EOI_PENDING, &vcpu->arch.apic_attention))
+		apic_sync_pv_eoi_from_guest(vcpu, vcpu->arch.apic);
+
+	if (!test_bit(KVM_APIC_CHECK_VAPIC, &vcpu->arch.apic_attention))
+		return;
+
+	if (kvm_read_guest_cached(vcpu->kvm, &vcpu->arch.apic->vapic_cache, &data,
+				  sizeof(u32)))
+		return;
+
+	apic_set_tpr(vcpu->arch.apic, data & 0xff);
+}
+
+/*
+ * apic_sync_pv_eoi_to_guest - called before vmentry
+ *
+ * Detect whether it's safe to enable PV EOI and
+ * if yes do so.
+ */
+static void apic_sync_pv_eoi_to_guest(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+					struct kvm_lapic *apic)
+{
+	if (!pv_eoi_enabled(vcpu) ||
+	    /* IRR set or many bits in ISR: could be nested. */
+	    apic->irr_pending ||
+	    /* Cache not set: could be safe but we don't bother. */
+	    apic->highest_isr_cache == -1 ||
+	    /* Need EOI to update ioapic. */
+	    kvm_ioapic_handles_vector(apic, apic->highest_isr_cache)) {
+		/*
+		 * PV EOI was disabled by apic_sync_pv_eoi_from_guest
+		 * so we need not do anything here.
+		 */
+		return;
+	}
+
+	pv_eoi_set_pending(apic->vcpu);
+}
+
+void kvm_lapic_sync_to_vapic(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	u32 data, tpr;
+	int max_irr, max_isr;
+	struct kvm_lapic *apic = vcpu->arch.apic;
+
+	apic_sync_pv_eoi_to_guest(vcpu, apic);
+
+	if (!test_bit(KVM_APIC_CHECK_VAPIC, &vcpu->arch.apic_attention))
+		return;
+
+	tpr = kvm_lapic_get_reg(apic, APIC_TASKPRI) & 0xff;
+	max_irr = apic_find_highest_irr(apic);
+	if (max_irr < 0)
+		max_irr = 0;
+	max_isr = apic_find_highest_isr(apic);
+	if (max_isr < 0)
+		max_isr = 0;
+	data = (tpr & 0xff) | ((max_isr & 0xf0) << 8) | (max_irr << 24);
+
+	kvm_write_guest_cached(vcpu->kvm, &vcpu->arch.apic->vapic_cache, &data,
+				sizeof(u32));
+}
+
+int kvm_lapic_set_vapic_addr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t vapic_addr)
+{
+	if (vapic_addr) {
+		if (kvm_gfn_to_hva_cache_init(vcpu->kvm,
+					&vcpu->arch.apic->vapic_cache,
+					vapic_addr, sizeof(u32)))
+			return -EINVAL;
+		__set_bit(KVM_APIC_CHECK_VAPIC, &vcpu->arch.apic_attention);
+	} else {
+		__clear_bit(KVM_APIC_CHECK_VAPIC, &vcpu->arch.apic_attention);
+	}
+
+	vcpu->arch.apic->vapic_addr = vapic_addr;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int kvm_x2apic_icr_write(struct kvm_lapic *apic, u64 data)
+{
+	data &= ~APIC_ICR_BUSY;
+
+	kvm_apic_send_ipi(apic, (u32)data, (u32)(data >> 32));
+	kvm_lapic_set_reg64(apic, APIC_ICR, data);
+	trace_kvm_apic_write(APIC_ICR, data);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int kvm_lapic_msr_read(struct kvm_lapic *apic, u32 reg, u64 *data)
+{
+	u32 low;
+
+	if (reg == APIC_ICR) {
+		*data = kvm_lapic_get_reg64(apic, APIC_ICR);
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	if (kvm_lapic_reg_read(apic, reg, 4, &low))
+		return 1;
+
+	*data = low;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int kvm_lapic_msr_write(struct kvm_lapic *apic, u32 reg, u64 data)
+{
+	/*
+	 * ICR is a 64-bit register in x2APIC mode (and Hyper-V PV vAPIC) and
+	 * can be written as such, all other registers remain accessible only
+	 * through 32-bit reads/writes.
+	 */
+	if (reg == APIC_ICR)
+		return kvm_x2apic_icr_write(apic, data);
+
+	/* Bits 63:32 are reserved in all other registers. */
+	if (data >> 32)
+		return 1;
+
+	return kvm_lapic_reg_write(apic, reg, (u32)data);
+}
+
+int kvm_x2apic_msr_write(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 msr, u64 data)
+{
+	struct kvm_lapic *apic = vcpu->arch.apic;
+	u32 reg = (msr - APIC_BASE_MSR) << 4;
+
+	if (!lapic_in_kernel(vcpu) || !apic_x2apic_mode(apic))
+		return 1;
+
+	return kvm_lapic_msr_write(apic, reg, data);
+}
+
+int kvm_x2apic_msr_read(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 msr, u64 *data)
+{
+	struct kvm_lapic *apic = vcpu->arch.apic;
+	u32 reg = (msr - APIC_BASE_MSR) << 4;
+
+	if (!lapic_in_kernel(vcpu) || !apic_x2apic_mode(apic))
+		return 1;
+
+	return kvm_lapic_msr_read(apic, reg, data);
+}
+
+int kvm_hv_vapic_msr_write(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 reg, u64 data)
+{
+	if (!lapic_in_kernel(vcpu))
+		return 1;
+
+	return kvm_lapic_msr_write(vcpu->arch.apic, reg, data);
+}
+
+int kvm_hv_vapic_msr_read(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 reg, u64 *data)
+{
+	if (!lapic_in_kernel(vcpu))
+		return 1;
+
+	return kvm_lapic_msr_read(vcpu->arch.apic, reg, data);
+}
+
+int kvm_lapic_set_pv_eoi(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 data, unsigned long len)
+{
+	u64 addr = data & ~KVM_MSR_ENABLED;
+	struct gfn_to_hva_cache *ghc = &vcpu->arch.pv_eoi.data;
+	unsigned long new_len;
+	int ret;
+
+	if (!IS_ALIGNED(addr, 4))
+		return 1;
+
+	if (data & KVM_MSR_ENABLED) {
+		if (addr == ghc->gpa && len <= ghc->len)
+			new_len = ghc->len;
+		else
+			new_len = len;
+
+		ret = kvm_gfn_to_hva_cache_init(vcpu->kvm, ghc, addr, new_len);
+		if (ret)
+			return ret;
+	}
+
+	vcpu->arch.pv_eoi.msr_val = data;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int kvm_apic_accept_events(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct kvm_lapic *apic = vcpu->arch.apic;
+	u8 sipi_vector;
+	int r;
+
+	if (!kvm_apic_has_pending_init_or_sipi(vcpu))
+		return 0;
+
+	if (is_guest_mode(vcpu)) {
+		r = kvm_check_nested_events(vcpu);
+		if (r < 0)
+			return r == -EBUSY ? 0 : r;
+		/*
+		 * Continue processing INIT/SIPI even if a nested VM-Exit
+		 * occurred, e.g. pending SIPIs should be dropped if INIT+SIPI
+		 * are blocked as a result of transitioning to VMX root mode.
+		 */
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * INITs are blocked while CPU is in specific states (SMM, VMX root
+	 * mode, SVM with GIF=0), while SIPIs are dropped if the CPU isn't in
+	 * wait-for-SIPI (WFS).
+	 */
+	if (!kvm_apic_init_sipi_allowed(vcpu)) {
+		WARN_ON_ONCE(vcpu->arch.mp_state == KVM_MP_STATE_INIT_RECEIVED);
+		clear_bit(KVM_APIC_SIPI, &apic->pending_events);
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	if (test_and_clear_bit(KVM_APIC_INIT, &apic->pending_events)) {
+		kvm_vcpu_reset(vcpu, true);
+		if (kvm_vcpu_is_bsp(apic->vcpu))
+			vcpu->arch.mp_state = KVM_MP_STATE_RUNNABLE;
+		else
+			vcpu->arch.mp_state = KVM_MP_STATE_INIT_RECEIVED;
+	}
+	if (test_and_clear_bit(KVM_APIC_SIPI, &apic->pending_events)) {
+		if (vcpu->arch.mp_state == KVM_MP_STATE_INIT_RECEIVED) {
+			/* evaluate pending_events before reading the vector */
+			smp_rmb();
+			sipi_vector = apic->sipi_vector;
+			static_call(kvm_x86_vcpu_deliver_sipi_vector)(vcpu, sipi_vector);
+			vcpu->arch.mp_state = KVM_MP_STATE_RUNNABLE;
+		}
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+void kvm_lapic_exit(void)
+{
+	static_key_deferred_flush(&apic_hw_disabled);
+	WARN_ON(static_branch_unlikely(&apic_hw_disabled.key));
+	static_key_deferred_flush(&apic_sw_disabled);
+	WARN_ON(static_branch_unlikely(&apic_sw_disabled.key));
+}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/lapic.h b/arch/x86/kvm/lapic.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..0a0ea4b5d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/lapic.h
@@ -0,0 +1,281 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+#ifndef __KVM_X86_LAPIC_H
+#define __KVM_X86_LAPIC_H
+
+#include <kvm/iodev.h>
+
+#include <linux/kvm_host.h>
+
+#include "hyperv.h"
+#include "smm.h"
+
+#define KVM_APIC_INIT		0
+#define KVM_APIC_SIPI		1
+
+#define APIC_SHORT_MASK			0xc0000
+#define APIC_DEST_NOSHORT		0x0
+#define APIC_DEST_MASK			0x800
+
+#define APIC_BUS_CYCLE_NS       1
+#define APIC_BUS_FREQUENCY      (1000000000ULL / APIC_BUS_CYCLE_NS)
+
+#define APIC_BROADCAST			0xFF
+#define X2APIC_BROADCAST		0xFFFFFFFFul
+
+enum lapic_mode {
+	LAPIC_MODE_DISABLED = 0,
+	LAPIC_MODE_INVALID = X2APIC_ENABLE,
+	LAPIC_MODE_XAPIC = MSR_IA32_APICBASE_ENABLE,
+	LAPIC_MODE_X2APIC = MSR_IA32_APICBASE_ENABLE | X2APIC_ENABLE,
+};
+
+enum lapic_lvt_entry {
+	LVT_TIMER,
+	LVT_THERMAL_MONITOR,
+	LVT_PERFORMANCE_COUNTER,
+	LVT_LINT0,
+	LVT_LINT1,
+	LVT_ERROR,
+	LVT_CMCI,
+
+	KVM_APIC_MAX_NR_LVT_ENTRIES,
+};
+
+#define APIC_LVTx(x) ((x) == LVT_CMCI ? APIC_LVTCMCI : APIC_LVTT + 0x10 * (x))
+
+struct kvm_timer {
+	struct hrtimer timer;
+	s64 period; 				/* unit: ns */
+	ktime_t target_expiration;
+	u32 timer_mode;
+	u32 timer_mode_mask;
+	u64 tscdeadline;
+	u64 expired_tscdeadline;
+	u32 timer_advance_ns;
+	atomic_t pending;			/* accumulated triggered timers */
+	bool hv_timer_in_use;
+};
+
+struct kvm_lapic {
+	unsigned long base_address;
+	struct kvm_io_device dev;
+	struct kvm_timer lapic_timer;
+	u32 divide_count;
+	struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu;
+	bool apicv_active;
+	bool sw_enabled;
+	bool irr_pending;
+	bool lvt0_in_nmi_mode;
+	/* Number of bits set in ISR. */
+	s16 isr_count;
+	/* The highest vector set in ISR; if -1 - invalid, must scan ISR. */
+	int highest_isr_cache;
+	/**
+	 * APIC register page.  The layout matches the register layout seen by
+	 * the guest 1:1, because it is accessed by the vmx microcode.
+	 * Note: Only one register, the TPR, is used by the microcode.
+	 */
+	void *regs;
+	gpa_t vapic_addr;
+	struct gfn_to_hva_cache vapic_cache;
+	unsigned long pending_events;
+	unsigned int sipi_vector;
+	int nr_lvt_entries;
+};
+
+struct dest_map;
+
+int kvm_create_lapic(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int timer_advance_ns);
+void kvm_free_lapic(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+
+int kvm_apic_has_interrupt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+int kvm_apic_accept_pic_intr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+int kvm_get_apic_interrupt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+int kvm_apic_accept_events(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+void kvm_lapic_reset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool init_event);
+u64 kvm_lapic_get_cr8(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+void kvm_lapic_set_tpr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long cr8);
+void kvm_lapic_set_eoi(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+void kvm_lapic_set_base(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 value);
+u64 kvm_lapic_get_base(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+void kvm_recalculate_apic_map(struct kvm *kvm);
+void kvm_apic_set_version(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+void kvm_apic_after_set_mcg_cap(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+bool kvm_apic_match_dest(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_lapic *source,
+			   int shorthand, unsigned int dest, int dest_mode);
+int kvm_apic_compare_prio(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu1, struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu2);
+void kvm_apic_clear_irr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int vec);
+bool __kvm_apic_update_irr(u32 *pir, void *regs, int *max_irr);
+bool kvm_apic_update_irr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 *pir, int *max_irr);
+void kvm_apic_update_ppr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+int kvm_apic_set_irq(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_lapic_irq *irq,
+		     struct dest_map *dest_map);
+int kvm_apic_local_deliver(struct kvm_lapic *apic, int lvt_type);
+void kvm_apic_update_apicv(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+int kvm_alloc_apic_access_page(struct kvm *kvm);
+void kvm_inhibit_apic_access_page(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+
+bool kvm_irq_delivery_to_apic_fast(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_lapic *src,
+		struct kvm_lapic_irq *irq, int *r, struct dest_map *dest_map);
+void kvm_apic_send_ipi(struct kvm_lapic *apic, u32 icr_low, u32 icr_high);
+
+u64 kvm_get_apic_base(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+int kvm_set_apic_base(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info);
+int kvm_apic_get_state(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_lapic_state *s);
+int kvm_apic_set_state(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_lapic_state *s);
+enum lapic_mode kvm_get_apic_mode(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+int kvm_lapic_find_highest_irr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+
+u64 kvm_get_lapic_tscdeadline_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+void kvm_set_lapic_tscdeadline_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 data);
+
+void kvm_apic_write_nodecode(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 offset);
+void kvm_apic_set_eoi_accelerated(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int vector);
+
+int kvm_lapic_set_vapic_addr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t vapic_addr);
+void kvm_lapic_sync_from_vapic(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+void kvm_lapic_sync_to_vapic(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+
+int kvm_x2apic_icr_write(struct kvm_lapic *apic, u64 data);
+int kvm_x2apic_msr_write(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 msr, u64 data);
+int kvm_x2apic_msr_read(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 msr, u64 *data);
+
+int kvm_hv_vapic_msr_write(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 msr, u64 data);
+int kvm_hv_vapic_msr_read(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 msr, u64 *data);
+
+int kvm_lapic_set_pv_eoi(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 data, unsigned long len);
+void kvm_lapic_exit(void);
+
+u64 kvm_lapic_readable_reg_mask(struct kvm_lapic *apic);
+
+#define VEC_POS(v) ((v) & (32 - 1))
+#define REG_POS(v) (((v) >> 5) << 4)
+
+static inline void kvm_lapic_clear_vector(int vec, void *bitmap)
+{
+	clear_bit(VEC_POS(vec), (bitmap) + REG_POS(vec));
+}
+
+static inline void kvm_lapic_set_vector(int vec, void *bitmap)
+{
+	set_bit(VEC_POS(vec), (bitmap) + REG_POS(vec));
+}
+
+static inline void kvm_lapic_set_irr(int vec, struct kvm_lapic *apic)
+{
+	kvm_lapic_set_vector(vec, apic->regs + APIC_IRR);
+	/*
+	 * irr_pending must be true if any interrupt is pending; set it after
+	 * APIC_IRR to avoid race with apic_clear_irr
+	 */
+	apic->irr_pending = true;
+}
+
+static inline u32 __kvm_lapic_get_reg(char *regs, int reg_off)
+{
+	return *((u32 *) (regs + reg_off));
+}
+
+static inline u32 kvm_lapic_get_reg(struct kvm_lapic *apic, int reg_off)
+{
+	return __kvm_lapic_get_reg(apic->regs, reg_off);
+}
+
+DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(kvm_has_noapic_vcpu);
+
+static inline bool lapic_in_kernel(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	if (static_branch_unlikely(&kvm_has_noapic_vcpu))
+		return vcpu->arch.apic;
+	return true;
+}
+
+extern struct static_key_false_deferred apic_hw_disabled;
+
+static inline bool kvm_apic_hw_enabled(struct kvm_lapic *apic)
+{
+	if (static_branch_unlikely(&apic_hw_disabled.key))
+		return apic->vcpu->arch.apic_base & MSR_IA32_APICBASE_ENABLE;
+	return true;
+}
+
+extern struct static_key_false_deferred apic_sw_disabled;
+
+static inline bool kvm_apic_sw_enabled(struct kvm_lapic *apic)
+{
+	if (static_branch_unlikely(&apic_sw_disabled.key))
+		return apic->sw_enabled;
+	return true;
+}
+
+static inline bool kvm_apic_present(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	return lapic_in_kernel(vcpu) && kvm_apic_hw_enabled(vcpu->arch.apic);
+}
+
+static inline int kvm_lapic_enabled(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	return kvm_apic_present(vcpu) && kvm_apic_sw_enabled(vcpu->arch.apic);
+}
+
+static inline int apic_x2apic_mode(struct kvm_lapic *apic)
+{
+	return apic->vcpu->arch.apic_base & X2APIC_ENABLE;
+}
+
+static inline bool kvm_vcpu_apicv_active(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	return lapic_in_kernel(vcpu) && vcpu->arch.apic->apicv_active;
+}
+
+static inline bool kvm_apic_has_pending_init_or_sipi(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	return lapic_in_kernel(vcpu) && vcpu->arch.apic->pending_events;
+}
+
+static inline bool kvm_apic_init_sipi_allowed(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	return !is_smm(vcpu) &&
+	       !static_call(kvm_x86_apic_init_signal_blocked)(vcpu);
+}
+
+static inline bool kvm_lowest_prio_delivery(struct kvm_lapic_irq *irq)
+{
+	return (irq->delivery_mode == APIC_DM_LOWEST ||
+			irq->msi_redir_hint);
+}
+
+static inline int kvm_lapic_latched_init(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	return lapic_in_kernel(vcpu) && test_bit(KVM_APIC_INIT, &vcpu->arch.apic->pending_events);
+}
+
+bool kvm_apic_pending_eoi(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int vector);
+
+void kvm_wait_lapic_expire(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+
+void kvm_bitmap_or_dest_vcpus(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_lapic_irq *irq,
+			      unsigned long *vcpu_bitmap);
+
+bool kvm_intr_is_single_vcpu_fast(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_lapic_irq *irq,
+			struct kvm_vcpu **dest_vcpu);
+int kvm_vector_to_index(u32 vector, u32 dest_vcpus,
+			const unsigned long *bitmap, u32 bitmap_size);
+void kvm_lapic_switch_to_sw_timer(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+void kvm_lapic_switch_to_hv_timer(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+void kvm_lapic_expired_hv_timer(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+bool kvm_lapic_hv_timer_in_use(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+void kvm_lapic_restart_hv_timer(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+bool kvm_can_use_hv_timer(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+
+static inline enum lapic_mode kvm_apic_mode(u64 apic_base)
+{
+	return apic_base & (MSR_IA32_APICBASE_ENABLE | X2APIC_ENABLE);
+}
+
+static inline u8 kvm_xapic_id(struct kvm_lapic *apic)
+{
+	return kvm_lapic_get_reg(apic, APIC_ID) >> 24;
+}
+
+#endif
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.h b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..253fb2093
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.h
@@ -0,0 +1,307 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+#ifndef __KVM_X86_MMU_H
+#define __KVM_X86_MMU_H
+
+#include <linux/kvm_host.h>
+#include "kvm_cache_regs.h"
+#include "cpuid.h"
+
+extern bool __read_mostly enable_mmio_caching;
+
+#define PT_WRITABLE_SHIFT 1
+#define PT_USER_SHIFT 2
+
+#define PT_PRESENT_MASK (1ULL << 0)
+#define PT_WRITABLE_MASK (1ULL << PT_WRITABLE_SHIFT)
+#define PT_USER_MASK (1ULL << PT_USER_SHIFT)
+#define PT_PWT_MASK (1ULL << 3)
+#define PT_PCD_MASK (1ULL << 4)
+#define PT_ACCESSED_SHIFT 5
+#define PT_ACCESSED_MASK (1ULL << PT_ACCESSED_SHIFT)
+#define PT_DIRTY_SHIFT 6
+#define PT_DIRTY_MASK (1ULL << PT_DIRTY_SHIFT)
+#define PT_PAGE_SIZE_SHIFT 7
+#define PT_PAGE_SIZE_MASK (1ULL << PT_PAGE_SIZE_SHIFT)
+#define PT_PAT_MASK (1ULL << 7)
+#define PT_GLOBAL_MASK (1ULL << 8)
+#define PT64_NX_SHIFT 63
+#define PT64_NX_MASK (1ULL << PT64_NX_SHIFT)
+
+#define PT_PAT_SHIFT 7
+#define PT_DIR_PAT_SHIFT 12
+#define PT_DIR_PAT_MASK (1ULL << PT_DIR_PAT_SHIFT)
+
+#define PT64_ROOT_5LEVEL 5
+#define PT64_ROOT_4LEVEL 4
+#define PT32_ROOT_LEVEL 2
+#define PT32E_ROOT_LEVEL 3
+
+#define KVM_MMU_CR4_ROLE_BITS (X86_CR4_PSE | X86_CR4_PAE | X86_CR4_LA57 | \
+			       X86_CR4_SMEP | X86_CR4_SMAP | X86_CR4_PKE)
+
+#define KVM_MMU_CR0_ROLE_BITS (X86_CR0_PG | X86_CR0_WP)
+#define KVM_MMU_EFER_ROLE_BITS (EFER_LME | EFER_NX)
+
+static __always_inline u64 rsvd_bits(int s, int e)
+{
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(__builtin_constant_p(e) && __builtin_constant_p(s) && e < s);
+
+	if (__builtin_constant_p(e))
+		BUILD_BUG_ON(e > 63);
+	else
+		e &= 63;
+
+	if (e < s)
+		return 0;
+
+	return ((2ULL << (e - s)) - 1) << s;
+}
+
+/*
+ * The number of non-reserved physical address bits irrespective of features
+ * that repurpose legal bits, e.g. MKTME.
+ */
+extern u8 __read_mostly shadow_phys_bits;
+
+static inline gfn_t kvm_mmu_max_gfn(void)
+{
+	/*
+	 * Note that this uses the host MAXPHYADDR, not the guest's.
+	 * EPT/NPT cannot support GPAs that would exceed host.MAXPHYADDR;
+	 * assuming KVM is running on bare metal, guest accesses beyond
+	 * host.MAXPHYADDR will hit a #PF(RSVD) and never cause a vmexit
+	 * (either EPT Violation/Misconfig or #NPF), and so KVM will never
+	 * install a SPTE for such addresses.  If KVM is running as a VM
+	 * itself, on the other hand, it might see a MAXPHYADDR that is less
+	 * than hardware's real MAXPHYADDR.  Using the host MAXPHYADDR
+	 * disallows such SPTEs entirely and simplifies the TDP MMU.
+	 */
+	int max_gpa_bits = likely(tdp_enabled) ? shadow_phys_bits : 52;
+
+	return (1ULL << (max_gpa_bits - PAGE_SHIFT)) - 1;
+}
+
+static inline u8 kvm_get_shadow_phys_bits(void)
+{
+	/*
+	 * boot_cpu_data.x86_phys_bits is reduced when MKTME or SME are detected
+	 * in CPU detection code, but the processor treats those reduced bits as
+	 * 'keyID' thus they are not reserved bits. Therefore KVM needs to look at
+	 * the physical address bits reported by CPUID.
+	 */
+	if (likely(boot_cpu_data.extended_cpuid_level >= 0x80000008))
+		return cpuid_eax(0x80000008) & 0xff;
+
+	/*
+	 * Quite weird to have VMX or SVM but not MAXPHYADDR; probably a VM with
+	 * custom CPUID.  Proceed with whatever the kernel found since these features
+	 * aren't virtualizable (SME/SEV also require CPUIDs higher than 0x80000008).
+	 */
+	return boot_cpu_data.x86_phys_bits;
+}
+
+void kvm_mmu_set_mmio_spte_mask(u64 mmio_value, u64 mmio_mask, u64 access_mask);
+void kvm_mmu_set_me_spte_mask(u64 me_value, u64 me_mask);
+void kvm_mmu_set_ept_masks(bool has_ad_bits, bool has_exec_only);
+
+void kvm_init_mmu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+void kvm_init_shadow_npt_mmu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long cr0,
+			     unsigned long cr4, u64 efer, gpa_t nested_cr3);
+void kvm_init_shadow_ept_mmu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool execonly,
+			     int huge_page_level, bool accessed_dirty,
+			     gpa_t new_eptp);
+bool kvm_can_do_async_pf(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+int kvm_handle_page_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 error_code,
+				u64 fault_address, char *insn, int insn_len);
+void __kvm_mmu_refresh_passthrough_bits(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+					struct kvm_mmu *mmu);
+
+int kvm_mmu_load(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+void kvm_mmu_unload(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+void kvm_mmu_free_obsolete_roots(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+void kvm_mmu_sync_roots(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+void kvm_mmu_sync_prev_roots(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+void kvm_mmu_track_write(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t gpa, const u8 *new,
+			 int bytes);
+
+static inline int kvm_mmu_reload(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	if (likely(vcpu->arch.mmu->root.hpa != INVALID_PAGE))
+		return 0;
+
+	return kvm_mmu_load(vcpu);
+}
+
+static inline unsigned long kvm_get_pcid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t cr3)
+{
+	BUILD_BUG_ON((X86_CR3_PCID_MASK & PAGE_MASK) != 0);
+
+	return kvm_is_cr4_bit_set(vcpu, X86_CR4_PCIDE)
+	       ? cr3 & X86_CR3_PCID_MASK
+	       : 0;
+}
+
+static inline unsigned long kvm_get_active_pcid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	return kvm_get_pcid(vcpu, kvm_read_cr3(vcpu));
+}
+
+static inline void kvm_mmu_load_pgd(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	u64 root_hpa = vcpu->arch.mmu->root.hpa;
+
+	if (!VALID_PAGE(root_hpa))
+		return;
+
+	static_call(kvm_x86_load_mmu_pgd)(vcpu, root_hpa,
+					  vcpu->arch.mmu->root_role.level);
+}
+
+static inline void kvm_mmu_refresh_passthrough_bits(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+						    struct kvm_mmu *mmu)
+{
+	/*
+	 * When EPT is enabled, KVM may passthrough CR0.WP to the guest, i.e.
+	 * @mmu's snapshot of CR0.WP and thus all related paging metadata may
+	 * be stale.  Refresh CR0.WP and the metadata on-demand when checking
+	 * for permission faults.  Exempt nested MMUs, i.e. MMUs for shadowing
+	 * nEPT and nNPT, as CR0.WP is ignored in both cases.  Note, KVM does
+	 * need to refresh nested_mmu, a.k.a. the walker used to translate L2
+	 * GVAs to GPAs, as that "MMU" needs to honor L2's CR0.WP.
+	 */
+	if (!tdp_enabled || mmu == &vcpu->arch.guest_mmu)
+		return;
+
+	__kvm_mmu_refresh_passthrough_bits(vcpu, mmu);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check if a given access (described through the I/D, W/R and U/S bits of a
+ * page fault error code pfec) causes a permission fault with the given PTE
+ * access rights (in ACC_* format).
+ *
+ * Return zero if the access does not fault; return the page fault error code
+ * if the access faults.
+ */
+static inline u8 permission_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_mmu *mmu,
+				  unsigned pte_access, unsigned pte_pkey,
+				  u64 access)
+{
+	/* strip nested paging fault error codes */
+	unsigned int pfec = access;
+	unsigned long rflags = static_call(kvm_x86_get_rflags)(vcpu);
+
+	/*
+	 * For explicit supervisor accesses, SMAP is disabled if EFLAGS.AC = 1.
+	 * For implicit supervisor accesses, SMAP cannot be overridden.
+	 *
+	 * SMAP works on supervisor accesses only, and not_smap can
+	 * be set or not set when user access with neither has any bearing
+	 * on the result.
+	 *
+	 * We put the SMAP checking bit in place of the PFERR_RSVD_MASK bit;
+	 * this bit will always be zero in pfec, but it will be one in index
+	 * if SMAP checks are being disabled.
+	 */
+	u64 implicit_access = access & PFERR_IMPLICIT_ACCESS;
+	bool not_smap = ((rflags & X86_EFLAGS_AC) | implicit_access) == X86_EFLAGS_AC;
+	int index = (pfec + (not_smap << PFERR_RSVD_BIT)) >> 1;
+	u32 errcode = PFERR_PRESENT_MASK;
+	bool fault;
+
+	kvm_mmu_refresh_passthrough_bits(vcpu, mmu);
+
+	fault = (mmu->permissions[index] >> pte_access) & 1;
+
+	WARN_ON(pfec & (PFERR_PK_MASK | PFERR_RSVD_MASK));
+	if (unlikely(mmu->pkru_mask)) {
+		u32 pkru_bits, offset;
+
+		/*
+		* PKRU defines 32 bits, there are 16 domains and 2
+		* attribute bits per domain in pkru.  pte_pkey is the
+		* index of the protection domain, so pte_pkey * 2 is
+		* is the index of the first bit for the domain.
+		*/
+		pkru_bits = (vcpu->arch.pkru >> (pte_pkey * 2)) & 3;
+
+		/* clear present bit, replace PFEC.RSVD with ACC_USER_MASK. */
+		offset = (pfec & ~1) +
+			((pte_access & PT_USER_MASK) << (PFERR_RSVD_BIT - PT_USER_SHIFT));
+
+		pkru_bits &= mmu->pkru_mask >> offset;
+		errcode |= -pkru_bits & PFERR_PK_MASK;
+		fault |= (pkru_bits != 0);
+	}
+
+	return -(u32)fault & errcode;
+}
+
+void kvm_zap_gfn_range(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t gfn_start, gfn_t gfn_end);
+
+int kvm_arch_write_log_dirty(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+
+int kvm_mmu_post_init_vm(struct kvm *kvm);
+void kvm_mmu_pre_destroy_vm(struct kvm *kvm);
+
+static inline bool kvm_shadow_root_allocated(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+	/*
+	 * Read shadow_root_allocated before related pointers. Hence, threads
+	 * reading shadow_root_allocated in any lock context are guaranteed to
+	 * see the pointers. Pairs with smp_store_release in
+	 * mmu_first_shadow_root_alloc.
+	 */
+	return smp_load_acquire(&kvm->arch.shadow_root_allocated);
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+extern bool tdp_mmu_enabled;
+#else
+#define tdp_mmu_enabled false
+#endif
+
+static inline bool kvm_memslots_have_rmaps(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+	return !tdp_mmu_enabled || kvm_shadow_root_allocated(kvm);
+}
+
+static inline gfn_t gfn_to_index(gfn_t gfn, gfn_t base_gfn, int level)
+{
+	/* KVM_HPAGE_GFN_SHIFT(PG_LEVEL_4K) must be 0. */
+	return (gfn >> KVM_HPAGE_GFN_SHIFT(level)) -
+		(base_gfn >> KVM_HPAGE_GFN_SHIFT(level));
+}
+
+static inline unsigned long
+__kvm_mmu_slot_lpages(struct kvm_memory_slot *slot, unsigned long npages,
+		      int level)
+{
+	return gfn_to_index(slot->base_gfn + npages - 1,
+			    slot->base_gfn, level) + 1;
+}
+
+static inline unsigned long
+kvm_mmu_slot_lpages(struct kvm_memory_slot *slot, int level)
+{
+	return __kvm_mmu_slot_lpages(slot, slot->npages, level);
+}
+
+static inline void kvm_update_page_stats(struct kvm *kvm, int level, int count)
+{
+	atomic64_add(count, &kvm->stat.pages[level - 1]);
+}
+
+gpa_t translate_nested_gpa(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t gpa, u64 access,
+			   struct x86_exception *exception);
+
+static inline gpa_t kvm_translate_gpa(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+				      struct kvm_mmu *mmu,
+				      gpa_t gpa, u64 access,
+				      struct x86_exception *exception)
+{
+	if (mmu != &vcpu->arch.nested_mmu)
+		return gpa;
+	return translate_nested_gpa(vcpu, gpa, access, exception);
+}
+#endif
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..f7901cb4d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
@@ -0,0 +1,7161 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * Kernel-based Virtual Machine driver for Linux
+ *
+ * This module enables machines with Intel VT-x extensions to run virtual
+ * machines without emulation or binary translation.
+ *
+ * MMU support
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2006 Qumranet, Inc.
+ * Copyright 2010 Red Hat, Inc. and/or its affiliates.
+ *
+ * Authors:
+ *   Yaniv Kamay  <yaniv@qumranet.com>
+ *   Avi Kivity   <avi@qumranet.com>
+ */
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
+
+#include "irq.h"
+#include "ioapic.h"
+#include "mmu.h"
+#include "mmu_internal.h"
+#include "tdp_mmu.h"
+#include "x86.h"
+#include "kvm_cache_regs.h"
+#include "smm.h"
+#include "kvm_emulate.h"
+#include "page_track.h"
+#include "cpuid.h"
+#include "spte.h"
+
+#include <linux/kvm_host.h>
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/string.h>
+#include <linux/mm.h>
+#include <linux/highmem.h>
+#include <linux/moduleparam.h>
+#include <linux/export.h>
+#include <linux/swap.h>
+#include <linux/hugetlb.h>
+#include <linux/compiler.h>
+#include <linux/srcu.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/sched/signal.h>
+#include <linux/uaccess.h>
+#include <linux/hash.h>
+#include <linux/kern_levels.h>
+#include <linux/kstrtox.h>
+#include <linux/kthread.h>
+
+#include <asm/page.h>
+#include <asm/memtype.h>
+#include <asm/cmpxchg.h>
+#include <asm/io.h>
+#include <asm/set_memory.h>
+#include <asm/vmx.h>
+
+#include "trace.h"
+
+extern bool itlb_multihit_kvm_mitigation;
+
+static bool nx_hugepage_mitigation_hard_disabled;
+
+int __read_mostly nx_huge_pages = -1;
+static uint __read_mostly nx_huge_pages_recovery_period_ms;
+#ifdef CONFIG_PREEMPT_RT
+/* Recovery can cause latency spikes, disable it for PREEMPT_RT.  */
+static uint __read_mostly nx_huge_pages_recovery_ratio = 0;
+#else
+static uint __read_mostly nx_huge_pages_recovery_ratio = 60;
+#endif
+
+static int get_nx_huge_pages(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp);
+static int set_nx_huge_pages(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp);
+static int set_nx_huge_pages_recovery_param(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp);
+
+static const struct kernel_param_ops nx_huge_pages_ops = {
+	.set = set_nx_huge_pages,
+	.get = get_nx_huge_pages,
+};
+
+static const struct kernel_param_ops nx_huge_pages_recovery_param_ops = {
+	.set = set_nx_huge_pages_recovery_param,
+	.get = param_get_uint,
+};
+
+module_param_cb(nx_huge_pages, &nx_huge_pages_ops, &nx_huge_pages, 0644);
+__MODULE_PARM_TYPE(nx_huge_pages, "bool");
+module_param_cb(nx_huge_pages_recovery_ratio, &nx_huge_pages_recovery_param_ops,
+		&nx_huge_pages_recovery_ratio, 0644);
+__MODULE_PARM_TYPE(nx_huge_pages_recovery_ratio, "uint");
+module_param_cb(nx_huge_pages_recovery_period_ms, &nx_huge_pages_recovery_param_ops,
+		&nx_huge_pages_recovery_period_ms, 0644);
+__MODULE_PARM_TYPE(nx_huge_pages_recovery_period_ms, "uint");
+
+static bool __read_mostly force_flush_and_sync_on_reuse;
+module_param_named(flush_on_reuse, force_flush_and_sync_on_reuse, bool, 0644);
+
+/*
+ * When setting this variable to true it enables Two-Dimensional-Paging
+ * where the hardware walks 2 page tables:
+ * 1. the guest-virtual to guest-physical
+ * 2. while doing 1. it walks guest-physical to host-physical
+ * If the hardware supports that we don't need to do shadow paging.
+ */
+bool tdp_enabled = false;
+
+static bool __ro_after_init tdp_mmu_allowed;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+bool __read_mostly tdp_mmu_enabled = true;
+module_param_named(tdp_mmu, tdp_mmu_enabled, bool, 0444);
+#endif
+
+static int max_huge_page_level __read_mostly;
+static int tdp_root_level __read_mostly;
+static int max_tdp_level __read_mostly;
+
+#define PTE_PREFETCH_NUM		8
+
+#include <trace/events/kvm.h>
+
+/* make pte_list_desc fit well in cache lines */
+#define PTE_LIST_EXT 14
+
+/*
+ * struct pte_list_desc is the core data structure used to implement a custom
+ * list for tracking a set of related SPTEs, e.g. all the SPTEs that map a
+ * given GFN when used in the context of rmaps.  Using a custom list allows KVM
+ * to optimize for the common case where many GFNs will have at most a handful
+ * of SPTEs pointing at them, i.e. allows packing multiple SPTEs into a small
+ * memory footprint, which in turn improves runtime performance by exploiting
+ * cache locality.
+ *
+ * A list is comprised of one or more pte_list_desc objects (descriptors).
+ * Each individual descriptor stores up to PTE_LIST_EXT SPTEs.  If a descriptor
+ * is full and a new SPTEs needs to be added, a new descriptor is allocated and
+ * becomes the head of the list.  This means that by definitions, all tail
+ * descriptors are full.
+ *
+ * Note, the meta data fields are deliberately placed at the start of the
+ * structure to optimize the cacheline layout; accessing the descriptor will
+ * touch only a single cacheline so long as @spte_count<=6 (or if only the
+ * descriptors metadata is accessed).
+ */
+struct pte_list_desc {
+	struct pte_list_desc *more;
+	/* The number of PTEs stored in _this_ descriptor. */
+	u32 spte_count;
+	/* The number of PTEs stored in all tails of this descriptor. */
+	u32 tail_count;
+	u64 *sptes[PTE_LIST_EXT];
+};
+
+struct kvm_shadow_walk_iterator {
+	u64 addr;
+	hpa_t shadow_addr;
+	u64 *sptep;
+	int level;
+	unsigned index;
+};
+
+#define for_each_shadow_entry_using_root(_vcpu, _root, _addr, _walker)     \
+	for (shadow_walk_init_using_root(&(_walker), (_vcpu),              \
+					 (_root), (_addr));                \
+	     shadow_walk_okay(&(_walker));			           \
+	     shadow_walk_next(&(_walker)))
+
+#define for_each_shadow_entry(_vcpu, _addr, _walker)            \
+	for (shadow_walk_init(&(_walker), _vcpu, _addr);	\
+	     shadow_walk_okay(&(_walker));			\
+	     shadow_walk_next(&(_walker)))
+
+#define for_each_shadow_entry_lockless(_vcpu, _addr, _walker, spte)	\
+	for (shadow_walk_init(&(_walker), _vcpu, _addr);		\
+	     shadow_walk_okay(&(_walker)) &&				\
+		({ spte = mmu_spte_get_lockless(_walker.sptep); 1; });	\
+	     __shadow_walk_next(&(_walker), spte))
+
+static struct kmem_cache *pte_list_desc_cache;
+struct kmem_cache *mmu_page_header_cache;
+static struct percpu_counter kvm_total_used_mmu_pages;
+
+static void mmu_spte_set(u64 *sptep, u64 spte);
+
+struct kvm_mmu_role_regs {
+	const unsigned long cr0;
+	const unsigned long cr4;
+	const u64 efer;
+};
+
+#define CREATE_TRACE_POINTS
+#include "mmutrace.h"
+
+/*
+ * Yes, lot's of underscores.  They're a hint that you probably shouldn't be
+ * reading from the role_regs.  Once the root_role is constructed, it becomes
+ * the single source of truth for the MMU's state.
+ */
+#define BUILD_MMU_ROLE_REGS_ACCESSOR(reg, name, flag)			\
+static inline bool __maybe_unused					\
+____is_##reg##_##name(const struct kvm_mmu_role_regs *regs)		\
+{									\
+	return !!(regs->reg & flag);					\
+}
+BUILD_MMU_ROLE_REGS_ACCESSOR(cr0, pg, X86_CR0_PG);
+BUILD_MMU_ROLE_REGS_ACCESSOR(cr0, wp, X86_CR0_WP);
+BUILD_MMU_ROLE_REGS_ACCESSOR(cr4, pse, X86_CR4_PSE);
+BUILD_MMU_ROLE_REGS_ACCESSOR(cr4, pae, X86_CR4_PAE);
+BUILD_MMU_ROLE_REGS_ACCESSOR(cr4, smep, X86_CR4_SMEP);
+BUILD_MMU_ROLE_REGS_ACCESSOR(cr4, smap, X86_CR4_SMAP);
+BUILD_MMU_ROLE_REGS_ACCESSOR(cr4, pke, X86_CR4_PKE);
+BUILD_MMU_ROLE_REGS_ACCESSOR(cr4, la57, X86_CR4_LA57);
+BUILD_MMU_ROLE_REGS_ACCESSOR(efer, nx, EFER_NX);
+BUILD_MMU_ROLE_REGS_ACCESSOR(efer, lma, EFER_LMA);
+
+/*
+ * The MMU itself (with a valid role) is the single source of truth for the
+ * MMU.  Do not use the regs used to build the MMU/role, nor the vCPU.  The
+ * regs don't account for dependencies, e.g. clearing CR4 bits if CR0.PG=1,
+ * and the vCPU may be incorrect/irrelevant.
+ */
+#define BUILD_MMU_ROLE_ACCESSOR(base_or_ext, reg, name)		\
+static inline bool __maybe_unused is_##reg##_##name(struct kvm_mmu *mmu)	\
+{								\
+	return !!(mmu->cpu_role. base_or_ext . reg##_##name);	\
+}
+BUILD_MMU_ROLE_ACCESSOR(base, cr0, wp);
+BUILD_MMU_ROLE_ACCESSOR(ext,  cr4, pse);
+BUILD_MMU_ROLE_ACCESSOR(ext,  cr4, smep);
+BUILD_MMU_ROLE_ACCESSOR(ext,  cr4, smap);
+BUILD_MMU_ROLE_ACCESSOR(ext,  cr4, pke);
+BUILD_MMU_ROLE_ACCESSOR(ext,  cr4, la57);
+BUILD_MMU_ROLE_ACCESSOR(base, efer, nx);
+BUILD_MMU_ROLE_ACCESSOR(ext,  efer, lma);
+
+static inline bool is_cr0_pg(struct kvm_mmu *mmu)
+{
+        return mmu->cpu_role.base.level > 0;
+}
+
+static inline bool is_cr4_pae(struct kvm_mmu *mmu)
+{
+        return !mmu->cpu_role.base.has_4_byte_gpte;
+}
+
+static struct kvm_mmu_role_regs vcpu_to_role_regs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct kvm_mmu_role_regs regs = {
+		.cr0 = kvm_read_cr0_bits(vcpu, KVM_MMU_CR0_ROLE_BITS),
+		.cr4 = kvm_read_cr4_bits(vcpu, KVM_MMU_CR4_ROLE_BITS),
+		.efer = vcpu->arch.efer,
+	};
+
+	return regs;
+}
+
+static unsigned long get_guest_cr3(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	return kvm_read_cr3(vcpu);
+}
+
+static inline unsigned long kvm_mmu_get_guest_pgd(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+						  struct kvm_mmu *mmu)
+{
+	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE) && mmu->get_guest_pgd == get_guest_cr3)
+		return kvm_read_cr3(vcpu);
+
+	return mmu->get_guest_pgd(vcpu);
+}
+
+static inline bool kvm_available_flush_remote_tlbs_range(void)
+{
+	return kvm_x86_ops.flush_remote_tlbs_range;
+}
+
+int kvm_arch_flush_remote_tlbs_range(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t gfn, u64 nr_pages)
+{
+	if (!kvm_x86_ops.flush_remote_tlbs_range)
+		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+	return static_call(kvm_x86_flush_remote_tlbs_range)(kvm, gfn, nr_pages);
+}
+
+static gfn_t kvm_mmu_page_get_gfn(struct kvm_mmu_page *sp, int index);
+
+/* Flush the range of guest memory mapped by the given SPTE. */
+static void kvm_flush_remote_tlbs_sptep(struct kvm *kvm, u64 *sptep)
+{
+	struct kvm_mmu_page *sp = sptep_to_sp(sptep);
+	gfn_t gfn = kvm_mmu_page_get_gfn(sp, spte_index(sptep));
+
+	kvm_flush_remote_tlbs_gfn(kvm, gfn, sp->role.level);
+}
+
+static void mark_mmio_spte(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 *sptep, u64 gfn,
+			   unsigned int access)
+{
+	u64 spte = make_mmio_spte(vcpu, gfn, access);
+
+	trace_mark_mmio_spte(sptep, gfn, spte);
+	mmu_spte_set(sptep, spte);
+}
+
+static gfn_t get_mmio_spte_gfn(u64 spte)
+{
+	u64 gpa = spte & shadow_nonpresent_or_rsvd_lower_gfn_mask;
+
+	gpa |= (spte >> SHADOW_NONPRESENT_OR_RSVD_MASK_LEN)
+	       & shadow_nonpresent_or_rsvd_mask;
+
+	return gpa >> PAGE_SHIFT;
+}
+
+static unsigned get_mmio_spte_access(u64 spte)
+{
+	return spte & shadow_mmio_access_mask;
+}
+
+static bool check_mmio_spte(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 spte)
+{
+	u64 kvm_gen, spte_gen, gen;
+
+	gen = kvm_vcpu_memslots(vcpu)->generation;
+	if (unlikely(gen & KVM_MEMSLOT_GEN_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS))
+		return false;
+
+	kvm_gen = gen & MMIO_SPTE_GEN_MASK;
+	spte_gen = get_mmio_spte_generation(spte);
+
+	trace_check_mmio_spte(spte, kvm_gen, spte_gen);
+	return likely(kvm_gen == spte_gen);
+}
+
+static int is_cpuid_PSE36(void)
+{
+	return 1;
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+static void __set_spte(u64 *sptep, u64 spte)
+{
+	WRITE_ONCE(*sptep, spte);
+}
+
+static void __update_clear_spte_fast(u64 *sptep, u64 spte)
+{
+	WRITE_ONCE(*sptep, spte);
+}
+
+static u64 __update_clear_spte_slow(u64 *sptep, u64 spte)
+{
+	return xchg(sptep, spte);
+}
+
+static u64 __get_spte_lockless(u64 *sptep)
+{
+	return READ_ONCE(*sptep);
+}
+#else
+union split_spte {
+	struct {
+		u32 spte_low;
+		u32 spte_high;
+	};
+	u64 spte;
+};
+
+static void count_spte_clear(u64 *sptep, u64 spte)
+{
+	struct kvm_mmu_page *sp =  sptep_to_sp(sptep);
+
+	if (is_shadow_present_pte(spte))
+		return;
+
+	/* Ensure the spte is completely set before we increase the count */
+	smp_wmb();
+	sp->clear_spte_count++;
+}
+
+static void __set_spte(u64 *sptep, u64 spte)
+{
+	union split_spte *ssptep, sspte;
+
+	ssptep = (union split_spte *)sptep;
+	sspte = (union split_spte)spte;
+
+	ssptep->spte_high = sspte.spte_high;
+
+	/*
+	 * If we map the spte from nonpresent to present, We should store
+	 * the high bits firstly, then set present bit, so cpu can not
+	 * fetch this spte while we are setting the spte.
+	 */
+	smp_wmb();
+
+	WRITE_ONCE(ssptep->spte_low, sspte.spte_low);
+}
+
+static void __update_clear_spte_fast(u64 *sptep, u64 spte)
+{
+	union split_spte *ssptep, sspte;
+
+	ssptep = (union split_spte *)sptep;
+	sspte = (union split_spte)spte;
+
+	WRITE_ONCE(ssptep->spte_low, sspte.spte_low);
+
+	/*
+	 * If we map the spte from present to nonpresent, we should clear
+	 * present bit firstly to avoid vcpu fetch the old high bits.
+	 */
+	smp_wmb();
+
+	ssptep->spte_high = sspte.spte_high;
+	count_spte_clear(sptep, spte);
+}
+
+static u64 __update_clear_spte_slow(u64 *sptep, u64 spte)
+{
+	union split_spte *ssptep, sspte, orig;
+
+	ssptep = (union split_spte *)sptep;
+	sspte = (union split_spte)spte;
+
+	/* xchg acts as a barrier before the setting of the high bits */
+	orig.spte_low = xchg(&ssptep->spte_low, sspte.spte_low);
+	orig.spte_high = ssptep->spte_high;
+	ssptep->spte_high = sspte.spte_high;
+	count_spte_clear(sptep, spte);
+
+	return orig.spte;
+}
+
+/*
+ * The idea using the light way get the spte on x86_32 guest is from
+ * gup_get_pte (mm/gup.c).
+ *
+ * An spte tlb flush may be pending, because kvm_set_pte_rmap
+ * coalesces them and we are running out of the MMU lock.  Therefore
+ * we need to protect against in-progress updates of the spte.
+ *
+ * Reading the spte while an update is in progress may get the old value
+ * for the high part of the spte.  The race is fine for a present->non-present
+ * change (because the high part of the spte is ignored for non-present spte),
+ * but for a present->present change we must reread the spte.
+ *
+ * All such changes are done in two steps (present->non-present and
+ * non-present->present), hence it is enough to count the number of
+ * present->non-present updates: if it changed while reading the spte,
+ * we might have hit the race.  This is done using clear_spte_count.
+ */
+static u64 __get_spte_lockless(u64 *sptep)
+{
+	struct kvm_mmu_page *sp =  sptep_to_sp(sptep);
+	union split_spte spte, *orig = (union split_spte *)sptep;
+	int count;
+
+retry:
+	count = sp->clear_spte_count;
+	smp_rmb();
+
+	spte.spte_low = orig->spte_low;
+	smp_rmb();
+
+	spte.spte_high = orig->spte_high;
+	smp_rmb();
+
+	if (unlikely(spte.spte_low != orig->spte_low ||
+	      count != sp->clear_spte_count))
+		goto retry;
+
+	return spte.spte;
+}
+#endif
+
+/* Rules for using mmu_spte_set:
+ * Set the sptep from nonpresent to present.
+ * Note: the sptep being assigned *must* be either not present
+ * or in a state where the hardware will not attempt to update
+ * the spte.
+ */
+static void mmu_spte_set(u64 *sptep, u64 new_spte)
+{
+	WARN_ON_ONCE(is_shadow_present_pte(*sptep));
+	__set_spte(sptep, new_spte);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Update the SPTE (excluding the PFN), but do not track changes in its
+ * accessed/dirty status.
+ */
+static u64 mmu_spte_update_no_track(u64 *sptep, u64 new_spte)
+{
+	u64 old_spte = *sptep;
+
+	WARN_ON_ONCE(!is_shadow_present_pte(new_spte));
+	check_spte_writable_invariants(new_spte);
+
+	if (!is_shadow_present_pte(old_spte)) {
+		mmu_spte_set(sptep, new_spte);
+		return old_spte;
+	}
+
+	if (!spte_has_volatile_bits(old_spte))
+		__update_clear_spte_fast(sptep, new_spte);
+	else
+		old_spte = __update_clear_spte_slow(sptep, new_spte);
+
+	WARN_ON_ONCE(spte_to_pfn(old_spte) != spte_to_pfn(new_spte));
+
+	return old_spte;
+}
+
+/* Rules for using mmu_spte_update:
+ * Update the state bits, it means the mapped pfn is not changed.
+ *
+ * Whenever an MMU-writable SPTE is overwritten with a read-only SPTE, remote
+ * TLBs must be flushed. Otherwise rmap_write_protect will find a read-only
+ * spte, even though the writable spte might be cached on a CPU's TLB.
+ *
+ * Returns true if the TLB needs to be flushed
+ */
+static bool mmu_spte_update(u64 *sptep, u64 new_spte)
+{
+	bool flush = false;
+	u64 old_spte = mmu_spte_update_no_track(sptep, new_spte);
+
+	if (!is_shadow_present_pte(old_spte))
+		return false;
+
+	/*
+	 * For the spte updated out of mmu-lock is safe, since
+	 * we always atomically update it, see the comments in
+	 * spte_has_volatile_bits().
+	 */
+	if (is_mmu_writable_spte(old_spte) &&
+	      !is_writable_pte(new_spte))
+		flush = true;
+
+	/*
+	 * Flush TLB when accessed/dirty states are changed in the page tables,
+	 * to guarantee consistency between TLB and page tables.
+	 */
+
+	if (is_accessed_spte(old_spte) && !is_accessed_spte(new_spte)) {
+		flush = true;
+		kvm_set_pfn_accessed(spte_to_pfn(old_spte));
+	}
+
+	if (is_dirty_spte(old_spte) && !is_dirty_spte(new_spte)) {
+		flush = true;
+		kvm_set_pfn_dirty(spte_to_pfn(old_spte));
+	}
+
+	return flush;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Rules for using mmu_spte_clear_track_bits:
+ * It sets the sptep from present to nonpresent, and track the
+ * state bits, it is used to clear the last level sptep.
+ * Returns the old PTE.
+ */
+static u64 mmu_spte_clear_track_bits(struct kvm *kvm, u64 *sptep)
+{
+	kvm_pfn_t pfn;
+	u64 old_spte = *sptep;
+	int level = sptep_to_sp(sptep)->role.level;
+	struct page *page;
+
+	if (!is_shadow_present_pte(old_spte) ||
+	    !spte_has_volatile_bits(old_spte))
+		__update_clear_spte_fast(sptep, 0ull);
+	else
+		old_spte = __update_clear_spte_slow(sptep, 0ull);
+
+	if (!is_shadow_present_pte(old_spte))
+		return old_spte;
+
+	kvm_update_page_stats(kvm, level, -1);
+
+	pfn = spte_to_pfn(old_spte);
+
+	/*
+	 * KVM doesn't hold a reference to any pages mapped into the guest, and
+	 * instead uses the mmu_notifier to ensure that KVM unmaps any pages
+	 * before they are reclaimed.  Sanity check that, if the pfn is backed
+	 * by a refcounted page, the refcount is elevated.
+	 */
+	page = kvm_pfn_to_refcounted_page(pfn);
+	WARN_ON_ONCE(page && !page_count(page));
+
+	if (is_accessed_spte(old_spte))
+		kvm_set_pfn_accessed(pfn);
+
+	if (is_dirty_spte(old_spte))
+		kvm_set_pfn_dirty(pfn);
+
+	return old_spte;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Rules for using mmu_spte_clear_no_track:
+ * Directly clear spte without caring the state bits of sptep,
+ * it is used to set the upper level spte.
+ */
+static void mmu_spte_clear_no_track(u64 *sptep)
+{
+	__update_clear_spte_fast(sptep, 0ull);
+}
+
+static u64 mmu_spte_get_lockless(u64 *sptep)
+{
+	return __get_spte_lockless(sptep);
+}
+
+/* Returns the Accessed status of the PTE and resets it at the same time. */
+static bool mmu_spte_age(u64 *sptep)
+{
+	u64 spte = mmu_spte_get_lockless(sptep);
+
+	if (!is_accessed_spte(spte))
+		return false;
+
+	if (spte_ad_enabled(spte)) {
+		clear_bit((ffs(shadow_accessed_mask) - 1),
+			  (unsigned long *)sptep);
+	} else {
+		/*
+		 * Capture the dirty status of the page, so that it doesn't get
+		 * lost when the SPTE is marked for access tracking.
+		 */
+		if (is_writable_pte(spte))
+			kvm_set_pfn_dirty(spte_to_pfn(spte));
+
+		spte = mark_spte_for_access_track(spte);
+		mmu_spte_update_no_track(sptep, spte);
+	}
+
+	return true;
+}
+
+static inline bool is_tdp_mmu_active(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	return tdp_mmu_enabled && vcpu->arch.mmu->root_role.direct;
+}
+
+static void walk_shadow_page_lockless_begin(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	if (is_tdp_mmu_active(vcpu)) {
+		kvm_tdp_mmu_walk_lockless_begin();
+	} else {
+		/*
+		 * Prevent page table teardown by making any free-er wait during
+		 * kvm_flush_remote_tlbs() IPI to all active vcpus.
+		 */
+		local_irq_disable();
+
+		/*
+		 * Make sure a following spte read is not reordered ahead of the write
+		 * to vcpu->mode.
+		 */
+		smp_store_mb(vcpu->mode, READING_SHADOW_PAGE_TABLES);
+	}
+}
+
+static void walk_shadow_page_lockless_end(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	if (is_tdp_mmu_active(vcpu)) {
+		kvm_tdp_mmu_walk_lockless_end();
+	} else {
+		/*
+		 * Make sure the write to vcpu->mode is not reordered in front of
+		 * reads to sptes.  If it does, kvm_mmu_commit_zap_page() can see us
+		 * OUTSIDE_GUEST_MODE and proceed to free the shadow page table.
+		 */
+		smp_store_release(&vcpu->mode, OUTSIDE_GUEST_MODE);
+		local_irq_enable();
+	}
+}
+
+static int mmu_topup_memory_caches(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool maybe_indirect)
+{
+	int r;
+
+	/* 1 rmap, 1 parent PTE per level, and the prefetched rmaps. */
+	r = kvm_mmu_topup_memory_cache(&vcpu->arch.mmu_pte_list_desc_cache,
+				       1 + PT64_ROOT_MAX_LEVEL + PTE_PREFETCH_NUM);
+	if (r)
+		return r;
+	r = kvm_mmu_topup_memory_cache(&vcpu->arch.mmu_shadow_page_cache,
+				       PT64_ROOT_MAX_LEVEL);
+	if (r)
+		return r;
+	if (maybe_indirect) {
+		r = kvm_mmu_topup_memory_cache(&vcpu->arch.mmu_shadowed_info_cache,
+					       PT64_ROOT_MAX_LEVEL);
+		if (r)
+			return r;
+	}
+	return kvm_mmu_topup_memory_cache(&vcpu->arch.mmu_page_header_cache,
+					  PT64_ROOT_MAX_LEVEL);
+}
+
+static void mmu_free_memory_caches(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	kvm_mmu_free_memory_cache(&vcpu->arch.mmu_pte_list_desc_cache);
+	kvm_mmu_free_memory_cache(&vcpu->arch.mmu_shadow_page_cache);
+	kvm_mmu_free_memory_cache(&vcpu->arch.mmu_shadowed_info_cache);
+	kvm_mmu_free_memory_cache(&vcpu->arch.mmu_page_header_cache);
+}
+
+static void mmu_free_pte_list_desc(struct pte_list_desc *pte_list_desc)
+{
+	kmem_cache_free(pte_list_desc_cache, pte_list_desc);
+}
+
+static bool sp_has_gptes(struct kvm_mmu_page *sp);
+
+static gfn_t kvm_mmu_page_get_gfn(struct kvm_mmu_page *sp, int index)
+{
+	if (sp->role.passthrough)
+		return sp->gfn;
+
+	if (!sp->role.direct)
+		return sp->shadowed_translation[index] >> PAGE_SHIFT;
+
+	return sp->gfn + (index << ((sp->role.level - 1) * SPTE_LEVEL_BITS));
+}
+
+/*
+ * For leaf SPTEs, fetch the *guest* access permissions being shadowed. Note
+ * that the SPTE itself may have a more constrained access permissions that
+ * what the guest enforces. For example, a guest may create an executable
+ * huge PTE but KVM may disallow execution to mitigate iTLB multihit.
+ */
+static u32 kvm_mmu_page_get_access(struct kvm_mmu_page *sp, int index)
+{
+	if (sp_has_gptes(sp))
+		return sp->shadowed_translation[index] & ACC_ALL;
+
+	/*
+	 * For direct MMUs (e.g. TDP or non-paging guests) or passthrough SPs,
+	 * KVM is not shadowing any guest page tables, so the "guest access
+	 * permissions" are just ACC_ALL.
+	 *
+	 * For direct SPs in indirect MMUs (shadow paging), i.e. when KVM
+	 * is shadowing a guest huge page with small pages, the guest access
+	 * permissions being shadowed are the access permissions of the huge
+	 * page.
+	 *
+	 * In both cases, sp->role.access contains the correct access bits.
+	 */
+	return sp->role.access;
+}
+
+static void kvm_mmu_page_set_translation(struct kvm_mmu_page *sp, int index,
+					 gfn_t gfn, unsigned int access)
+{
+	if (sp_has_gptes(sp)) {
+		sp->shadowed_translation[index] = (gfn << PAGE_SHIFT) | access;
+		return;
+	}
+
+	WARN_ONCE(access != kvm_mmu_page_get_access(sp, index),
+	          "access mismatch under %s page %llx (expected %u, got %u)\n",
+	          sp->role.passthrough ? "passthrough" : "direct",
+	          sp->gfn, kvm_mmu_page_get_access(sp, index), access);
+
+	WARN_ONCE(gfn != kvm_mmu_page_get_gfn(sp, index),
+	          "gfn mismatch under %s page %llx (expected %llx, got %llx)\n",
+	          sp->role.passthrough ? "passthrough" : "direct",
+	          sp->gfn, kvm_mmu_page_get_gfn(sp, index), gfn);
+}
+
+static void kvm_mmu_page_set_access(struct kvm_mmu_page *sp, int index,
+				    unsigned int access)
+{
+	gfn_t gfn = kvm_mmu_page_get_gfn(sp, index);
+
+	kvm_mmu_page_set_translation(sp, index, gfn, access);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Return the pointer to the large page information for a given gfn,
+ * handling slots that are not large page aligned.
+ */
+static struct kvm_lpage_info *lpage_info_slot(gfn_t gfn,
+		const struct kvm_memory_slot *slot, int level)
+{
+	unsigned long idx;
+
+	idx = gfn_to_index(gfn, slot->base_gfn, level);
+	return &slot->arch.lpage_info[level - 2][idx];
+}
+
+static void update_gfn_disallow_lpage_count(const struct kvm_memory_slot *slot,
+					    gfn_t gfn, int count)
+{
+	struct kvm_lpage_info *linfo;
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = PG_LEVEL_2M; i <= KVM_MAX_HUGEPAGE_LEVEL; ++i) {
+		linfo = lpage_info_slot(gfn, slot, i);
+		linfo->disallow_lpage += count;
+		WARN_ON_ONCE(linfo->disallow_lpage < 0);
+	}
+}
+
+void kvm_mmu_gfn_disallow_lpage(const struct kvm_memory_slot *slot, gfn_t gfn)
+{
+	update_gfn_disallow_lpage_count(slot, gfn, 1);
+}
+
+void kvm_mmu_gfn_allow_lpage(const struct kvm_memory_slot *slot, gfn_t gfn)
+{
+	update_gfn_disallow_lpage_count(slot, gfn, -1);
+}
+
+static void account_shadowed(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_mmu_page *sp)
+{
+	struct kvm_memslots *slots;
+	struct kvm_memory_slot *slot;
+	gfn_t gfn;
+
+	kvm->arch.indirect_shadow_pages++;
+	gfn = sp->gfn;
+	slots = kvm_memslots_for_spte_role(kvm, sp->role);
+	slot = __gfn_to_memslot(slots, gfn);
+
+	/* the non-leaf shadow pages are keeping readonly. */
+	if (sp->role.level > PG_LEVEL_4K)
+		return __kvm_write_track_add_gfn(kvm, slot, gfn);
+
+	kvm_mmu_gfn_disallow_lpage(slot, gfn);
+
+	if (kvm_mmu_slot_gfn_write_protect(kvm, slot, gfn, PG_LEVEL_4K))
+		kvm_flush_remote_tlbs_gfn(kvm, gfn, PG_LEVEL_4K);
+}
+
+void track_possible_nx_huge_page(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_mmu_page *sp)
+{
+	/*
+	 * If it's possible to replace the shadow page with an NX huge page,
+	 * i.e. if the shadow page is the only thing currently preventing KVM
+	 * from using a huge page, add the shadow page to the list of "to be
+	 * zapped for NX recovery" pages.  Note, the shadow page can already be
+	 * on the list if KVM is reusing an existing shadow page, i.e. if KVM
+	 * links a shadow page at multiple points.
+	 */
+	if (!list_empty(&sp->possible_nx_huge_page_link))
+		return;
+
+	++kvm->stat.nx_lpage_splits;
+	list_add_tail(&sp->possible_nx_huge_page_link,
+		      &kvm->arch.possible_nx_huge_pages);
+}
+
+static void account_nx_huge_page(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_mmu_page *sp,
+				 bool nx_huge_page_possible)
+{
+	sp->nx_huge_page_disallowed = true;
+
+	if (nx_huge_page_possible)
+		track_possible_nx_huge_page(kvm, sp);
+}
+
+static void unaccount_shadowed(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_mmu_page *sp)
+{
+	struct kvm_memslots *slots;
+	struct kvm_memory_slot *slot;
+	gfn_t gfn;
+
+	kvm->arch.indirect_shadow_pages--;
+	gfn = sp->gfn;
+	slots = kvm_memslots_for_spte_role(kvm, sp->role);
+	slot = __gfn_to_memslot(slots, gfn);
+	if (sp->role.level > PG_LEVEL_4K)
+		return __kvm_write_track_remove_gfn(kvm, slot, gfn);
+
+	kvm_mmu_gfn_allow_lpage(slot, gfn);
+}
+
+void untrack_possible_nx_huge_page(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_mmu_page *sp)
+{
+	if (list_empty(&sp->possible_nx_huge_page_link))
+		return;
+
+	--kvm->stat.nx_lpage_splits;
+	list_del_init(&sp->possible_nx_huge_page_link);
+}
+
+static void unaccount_nx_huge_page(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_mmu_page *sp)
+{
+	sp->nx_huge_page_disallowed = false;
+
+	untrack_possible_nx_huge_page(kvm, sp);
+}
+
+static struct kvm_memory_slot *gfn_to_memslot_dirty_bitmap(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+							   gfn_t gfn,
+							   bool no_dirty_log)
+{
+	struct kvm_memory_slot *slot;
+
+	slot = kvm_vcpu_gfn_to_memslot(vcpu, gfn);
+	if (!slot || slot->flags & KVM_MEMSLOT_INVALID)
+		return NULL;
+	if (no_dirty_log && kvm_slot_dirty_track_enabled(slot))
+		return NULL;
+
+	return slot;
+}
+
+/*
+ * About rmap_head encoding:
+ *
+ * If the bit zero of rmap_head->val is clear, then it points to the only spte
+ * in this rmap chain. Otherwise, (rmap_head->val & ~1) points to a struct
+ * pte_list_desc containing more mappings.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Returns the number of pointers in the rmap chain, not counting the new one.
+ */
+static int pte_list_add(struct kvm_mmu_memory_cache *cache, u64 *spte,
+			struct kvm_rmap_head *rmap_head)
+{
+	struct pte_list_desc *desc;
+	int count = 0;
+
+	if (!rmap_head->val) {
+		rmap_head->val = (unsigned long)spte;
+	} else if (!(rmap_head->val & 1)) {
+		desc = kvm_mmu_memory_cache_alloc(cache);
+		desc->sptes[0] = (u64 *)rmap_head->val;
+		desc->sptes[1] = spte;
+		desc->spte_count = 2;
+		desc->tail_count = 0;
+		rmap_head->val = (unsigned long)desc | 1;
+		++count;
+	} else {
+		desc = (struct pte_list_desc *)(rmap_head->val & ~1ul);
+		count = desc->tail_count + desc->spte_count;
+
+		/*
+		 * If the previous head is full, allocate a new head descriptor
+		 * as tail descriptors are always kept full.
+		 */
+		if (desc->spte_count == PTE_LIST_EXT) {
+			desc = kvm_mmu_memory_cache_alloc(cache);
+			desc->more = (struct pte_list_desc *)(rmap_head->val & ~1ul);
+			desc->spte_count = 0;
+			desc->tail_count = count;
+			rmap_head->val = (unsigned long)desc | 1;
+		}
+		desc->sptes[desc->spte_count++] = spte;
+	}
+	return count;
+}
+
+static void pte_list_desc_remove_entry(struct kvm *kvm,
+				       struct kvm_rmap_head *rmap_head,
+				       struct pte_list_desc *desc, int i)
+{
+	struct pte_list_desc *head_desc = (struct pte_list_desc *)(rmap_head->val & ~1ul);
+	int j = head_desc->spte_count - 1;
+
+	/*
+	 * The head descriptor should never be empty.  A new head is added only
+	 * when adding an entry and the previous head is full, and heads are
+	 * removed (this flow) when they become empty.
+	 */
+	KVM_BUG_ON_DATA_CORRUPTION(j < 0, kvm);
+
+	/*
+	 * Replace the to-be-freed SPTE with the last valid entry from the head
+	 * descriptor to ensure that tail descriptors are full at all times.
+	 * Note, this also means that tail_count is stable for each descriptor.
+	 */
+	desc->sptes[i] = head_desc->sptes[j];
+	head_desc->sptes[j] = NULL;
+	head_desc->spte_count--;
+	if (head_desc->spte_count)
+		return;
+
+	/*
+	 * The head descriptor is empty.  If there are no tail descriptors,
+	 * nullify the rmap head to mark the list as emtpy, else point the rmap
+	 * head at the next descriptor, i.e. the new head.
+	 */
+	if (!head_desc->more)
+		rmap_head->val = 0;
+	else
+		rmap_head->val = (unsigned long)head_desc->more | 1;
+	mmu_free_pte_list_desc(head_desc);
+}
+
+static void pte_list_remove(struct kvm *kvm, u64 *spte,
+			    struct kvm_rmap_head *rmap_head)
+{
+	struct pte_list_desc *desc;
+	int i;
+
+	if (KVM_BUG_ON_DATA_CORRUPTION(!rmap_head->val, kvm))
+		return;
+
+	if (!(rmap_head->val & 1)) {
+		if (KVM_BUG_ON_DATA_CORRUPTION((u64 *)rmap_head->val != spte, kvm))
+			return;
+
+		rmap_head->val = 0;
+	} else {
+		desc = (struct pte_list_desc *)(rmap_head->val & ~1ul);
+		while (desc) {
+			for (i = 0; i < desc->spte_count; ++i) {
+				if (desc->sptes[i] == spte) {
+					pte_list_desc_remove_entry(kvm, rmap_head,
+								   desc, i);
+					return;
+				}
+			}
+			desc = desc->more;
+		}
+
+		KVM_BUG_ON_DATA_CORRUPTION(true, kvm);
+	}
+}
+
+static void kvm_zap_one_rmap_spte(struct kvm *kvm,
+				  struct kvm_rmap_head *rmap_head, u64 *sptep)
+{
+	mmu_spte_clear_track_bits(kvm, sptep);
+	pte_list_remove(kvm, sptep, rmap_head);
+}
+
+/* Return true if at least one SPTE was zapped, false otherwise */
+static bool kvm_zap_all_rmap_sptes(struct kvm *kvm,
+				   struct kvm_rmap_head *rmap_head)
+{
+	struct pte_list_desc *desc, *next;
+	int i;
+
+	if (!rmap_head->val)
+		return false;
+
+	if (!(rmap_head->val & 1)) {
+		mmu_spte_clear_track_bits(kvm, (u64 *)rmap_head->val);
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	desc = (struct pte_list_desc *)(rmap_head->val & ~1ul);
+
+	for (; desc; desc = next) {
+		for (i = 0; i < desc->spte_count; i++)
+			mmu_spte_clear_track_bits(kvm, desc->sptes[i]);
+		next = desc->more;
+		mmu_free_pte_list_desc(desc);
+	}
+out:
+	/* rmap_head is meaningless now, remember to reset it */
+	rmap_head->val = 0;
+	return true;
+}
+
+unsigned int pte_list_count(struct kvm_rmap_head *rmap_head)
+{
+	struct pte_list_desc *desc;
+
+	if (!rmap_head->val)
+		return 0;
+	else if (!(rmap_head->val & 1))
+		return 1;
+
+	desc = (struct pte_list_desc *)(rmap_head->val & ~1ul);
+	return desc->tail_count + desc->spte_count;
+}
+
+static struct kvm_rmap_head *gfn_to_rmap(gfn_t gfn, int level,
+					 const struct kvm_memory_slot *slot)
+{
+	unsigned long idx;
+
+	idx = gfn_to_index(gfn, slot->base_gfn, level);
+	return &slot->arch.rmap[level - PG_LEVEL_4K][idx];
+}
+
+static void rmap_remove(struct kvm *kvm, u64 *spte)
+{
+	struct kvm_memslots *slots;
+	struct kvm_memory_slot *slot;
+	struct kvm_mmu_page *sp;
+	gfn_t gfn;
+	struct kvm_rmap_head *rmap_head;
+
+	sp = sptep_to_sp(spte);
+	gfn = kvm_mmu_page_get_gfn(sp, spte_index(spte));
+
+	/*
+	 * Unlike rmap_add, rmap_remove does not run in the context of a vCPU
+	 * so we have to determine which memslots to use based on context
+	 * information in sp->role.
+	 */
+	slots = kvm_memslots_for_spte_role(kvm, sp->role);
+
+	slot = __gfn_to_memslot(slots, gfn);
+	rmap_head = gfn_to_rmap(gfn, sp->role.level, slot);
+
+	pte_list_remove(kvm, spte, rmap_head);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Used by the following functions to iterate through the sptes linked by a
+ * rmap.  All fields are private and not assumed to be used outside.
+ */
+struct rmap_iterator {
+	/* private fields */
+	struct pte_list_desc *desc;	/* holds the sptep if not NULL */
+	int pos;			/* index of the sptep */
+};
+
+/*
+ * Iteration must be started by this function.  This should also be used after
+ * removing/dropping sptes from the rmap link because in such cases the
+ * information in the iterator may not be valid.
+ *
+ * Returns sptep if found, NULL otherwise.
+ */
+static u64 *rmap_get_first(struct kvm_rmap_head *rmap_head,
+			   struct rmap_iterator *iter)
+{
+	u64 *sptep;
+
+	if (!rmap_head->val)
+		return NULL;
+
+	if (!(rmap_head->val & 1)) {
+		iter->desc = NULL;
+		sptep = (u64 *)rmap_head->val;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	iter->desc = (struct pte_list_desc *)(rmap_head->val & ~1ul);
+	iter->pos = 0;
+	sptep = iter->desc->sptes[iter->pos];
+out:
+	BUG_ON(!is_shadow_present_pte(*sptep));
+	return sptep;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Must be used with a valid iterator: e.g. after rmap_get_first().
+ *
+ * Returns sptep if found, NULL otherwise.
+ */
+static u64 *rmap_get_next(struct rmap_iterator *iter)
+{
+	u64 *sptep;
+
+	if (iter->desc) {
+		if (iter->pos < PTE_LIST_EXT - 1) {
+			++iter->pos;
+			sptep = iter->desc->sptes[iter->pos];
+			if (sptep)
+				goto out;
+		}
+
+		iter->desc = iter->desc->more;
+
+		if (iter->desc) {
+			iter->pos = 0;
+			/* desc->sptes[0] cannot be NULL */
+			sptep = iter->desc->sptes[iter->pos];
+			goto out;
+		}
+	}
+
+	return NULL;
+out:
+	BUG_ON(!is_shadow_present_pte(*sptep));
+	return sptep;
+}
+
+#define for_each_rmap_spte(_rmap_head_, _iter_, _spte_)			\
+	for (_spte_ = rmap_get_first(_rmap_head_, _iter_);		\
+	     _spte_; _spte_ = rmap_get_next(_iter_))
+
+static void drop_spte(struct kvm *kvm, u64 *sptep)
+{
+	u64 old_spte = mmu_spte_clear_track_bits(kvm, sptep);
+
+	if (is_shadow_present_pte(old_spte))
+		rmap_remove(kvm, sptep);
+}
+
+static void drop_large_spte(struct kvm *kvm, u64 *sptep, bool flush)
+{
+	struct kvm_mmu_page *sp;
+
+	sp = sptep_to_sp(sptep);
+	WARN_ON_ONCE(sp->role.level == PG_LEVEL_4K);
+
+	drop_spte(kvm, sptep);
+
+	if (flush)
+		kvm_flush_remote_tlbs_sptep(kvm, sptep);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Write-protect on the specified @sptep, @pt_protect indicates whether
+ * spte write-protection is caused by protecting shadow page table.
+ *
+ * Note: write protection is difference between dirty logging and spte
+ * protection:
+ * - for dirty logging, the spte can be set to writable at anytime if
+ *   its dirty bitmap is properly set.
+ * - for spte protection, the spte can be writable only after unsync-ing
+ *   shadow page.
+ *
+ * Return true if tlb need be flushed.
+ */
+static bool spte_write_protect(u64 *sptep, bool pt_protect)
+{
+	u64 spte = *sptep;
+
+	if (!is_writable_pte(spte) &&
+	    !(pt_protect && is_mmu_writable_spte(spte)))
+		return false;
+
+	if (pt_protect)
+		spte &= ~shadow_mmu_writable_mask;
+	spte = spte & ~PT_WRITABLE_MASK;
+
+	return mmu_spte_update(sptep, spte);
+}
+
+static bool rmap_write_protect(struct kvm_rmap_head *rmap_head,
+			       bool pt_protect)
+{
+	u64 *sptep;
+	struct rmap_iterator iter;
+	bool flush = false;
+
+	for_each_rmap_spte(rmap_head, &iter, sptep)
+		flush |= spte_write_protect(sptep, pt_protect);
+
+	return flush;
+}
+
+static bool spte_clear_dirty(u64 *sptep)
+{
+	u64 spte = *sptep;
+
+	KVM_MMU_WARN_ON(!spte_ad_enabled(spte));
+	spte &= ~shadow_dirty_mask;
+	return mmu_spte_update(sptep, spte);
+}
+
+static bool spte_wrprot_for_clear_dirty(u64 *sptep)
+{
+	bool was_writable = test_and_clear_bit(PT_WRITABLE_SHIFT,
+					       (unsigned long *)sptep);
+	if (was_writable && !spte_ad_enabled(*sptep))
+		kvm_set_pfn_dirty(spte_to_pfn(*sptep));
+
+	return was_writable;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Gets the GFN ready for another round of dirty logging by clearing the
+ *	- D bit on ad-enabled SPTEs, and
+ *	- W bit on ad-disabled SPTEs.
+ * Returns true iff any D or W bits were cleared.
+ */
+static bool __rmap_clear_dirty(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_rmap_head *rmap_head,
+			       const struct kvm_memory_slot *slot)
+{
+	u64 *sptep;
+	struct rmap_iterator iter;
+	bool flush = false;
+
+	for_each_rmap_spte(rmap_head, &iter, sptep)
+		if (spte_ad_need_write_protect(*sptep))
+			flush |= spte_wrprot_for_clear_dirty(sptep);
+		else
+			flush |= spte_clear_dirty(sptep);
+
+	return flush;
+}
+
+/**
+ * kvm_mmu_write_protect_pt_masked - write protect selected PT level pages
+ * @kvm: kvm instance
+ * @slot: slot to protect
+ * @gfn_offset: start of the BITS_PER_LONG pages we care about
+ * @mask: indicates which pages we should protect
+ *
+ * Used when we do not need to care about huge page mappings.
+ */
+static void kvm_mmu_write_protect_pt_masked(struct kvm *kvm,
+				     struct kvm_memory_slot *slot,
+				     gfn_t gfn_offset, unsigned long mask)
+{
+	struct kvm_rmap_head *rmap_head;
+
+	if (tdp_mmu_enabled)
+		kvm_tdp_mmu_clear_dirty_pt_masked(kvm, slot,
+				slot->base_gfn + gfn_offset, mask, true);
+
+	if (!kvm_memslots_have_rmaps(kvm))
+		return;
+
+	while (mask) {
+		rmap_head = gfn_to_rmap(slot->base_gfn + gfn_offset + __ffs(mask),
+					PG_LEVEL_4K, slot);
+		rmap_write_protect(rmap_head, false);
+
+		/* clear the first set bit */
+		mask &= mask - 1;
+	}
+}
+
+/**
+ * kvm_mmu_clear_dirty_pt_masked - clear MMU D-bit for PT level pages, or write
+ * protect the page if the D-bit isn't supported.
+ * @kvm: kvm instance
+ * @slot: slot to clear D-bit
+ * @gfn_offset: start of the BITS_PER_LONG pages we care about
+ * @mask: indicates which pages we should clear D-bit
+ *
+ * Used for PML to re-log the dirty GPAs after userspace querying dirty_bitmap.
+ */
+static void kvm_mmu_clear_dirty_pt_masked(struct kvm *kvm,
+					 struct kvm_memory_slot *slot,
+					 gfn_t gfn_offset, unsigned long mask)
+{
+	struct kvm_rmap_head *rmap_head;
+
+	if (tdp_mmu_enabled)
+		kvm_tdp_mmu_clear_dirty_pt_masked(kvm, slot,
+				slot->base_gfn + gfn_offset, mask, false);
+
+	if (!kvm_memslots_have_rmaps(kvm))
+		return;
+
+	while (mask) {
+		rmap_head = gfn_to_rmap(slot->base_gfn + gfn_offset + __ffs(mask),
+					PG_LEVEL_4K, slot);
+		__rmap_clear_dirty(kvm, rmap_head, slot);
+
+		/* clear the first set bit */
+		mask &= mask - 1;
+	}
+}
+
+/**
+ * kvm_arch_mmu_enable_log_dirty_pt_masked - enable dirty logging for selected
+ * PT level pages.
+ *
+ * It calls kvm_mmu_write_protect_pt_masked to write protect selected pages to
+ * enable dirty logging for them.
+ *
+ * We need to care about huge page mappings: e.g. during dirty logging we may
+ * have such mappings.
+ */
+void kvm_arch_mmu_enable_log_dirty_pt_masked(struct kvm *kvm,
+				struct kvm_memory_slot *slot,
+				gfn_t gfn_offset, unsigned long mask)
+{
+	/*
+	 * Huge pages are NOT write protected when we start dirty logging in
+	 * initially-all-set mode; must write protect them here so that they
+	 * are split to 4K on the first write.
+	 *
+	 * The gfn_offset is guaranteed to be aligned to 64, but the base_gfn
+	 * of memslot has no such restriction, so the range can cross two large
+	 * pages.
+	 */
+	if (kvm_dirty_log_manual_protect_and_init_set(kvm)) {
+		gfn_t start = slot->base_gfn + gfn_offset + __ffs(mask);
+		gfn_t end = slot->base_gfn + gfn_offset + __fls(mask);
+
+		if (READ_ONCE(eager_page_split))
+			kvm_mmu_try_split_huge_pages(kvm, slot, start, end, PG_LEVEL_4K);
+
+		kvm_mmu_slot_gfn_write_protect(kvm, slot, start, PG_LEVEL_2M);
+
+		/* Cross two large pages? */
+		if (ALIGN(start << PAGE_SHIFT, PMD_SIZE) !=
+		    ALIGN(end << PAGE_SHIFT, PMD_SIZE))
+			kvm_mmu_slot_gfn_write_protect(kvm, slot, end,
+						       PG_LEVEL_2M);
+	}
+
+	/* Now handle 4K PTEs.  */
+	if (kvm_x86_ops.cpu_dirty_log_size)
+		kvm_mmu_clear_dirty_pt_masked(kvm, slot, gfn_offset, mask);
+	else
+		kvm_mmu_write_protect_pt_masked(kvm, slot, gfn_offset, mask);
+}
+
+int kvm_cpu_dirty_log_size(void)
+{
+	return kvm_x86_ops.cpu_dirty_log_size;
+}
+
+bool kvm_mmu_slot_gfn_write_protect(struct kvm *kvm,
+				    struct kvm_memory_slot *slot, u64 gfn,
+				    int min_level)
+{
+	struct kvm_rmap_head *rmap_head;
+	int i;
+	bool write_protected = false;
+
+	if (kvm_memslots_have_rmaps(kvm)) {
+		for (i = min_level; i <= KVM_MAX_HUGEPAGE_LEVEL; ++i) {
+			rmap_head = gfn_to_rmap(gfn, i, slot);
+			write_protected |= rmap_write_protect(rmap_head, true);
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (tdp_mmu_enabled)
+		write_protected |=
+			kvm_tdp_mmu_write_protect_gfn(kvm, slot, gfn, min_level);
+
+	return write_protected;
+}
+
+static bool kvm_vcpu_write_protect_gfn(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 gfn)
+{
+	struct kvm_memory_slot *slot;
+
+	slot = kvm_vcpu_gfn_to_memslot(vcpu, gfn);
+	return kvm_mmu_slot_gfn_write_protect(vcpu->kvm, slot, gfn, PG_LEVEL_4K);
+}
+
+static bool __kvm_zap_rmap(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_rmap_head *rmap_head,
+			   const struct kvm_memory_slot *slot)
+{
+	return kvm_zap_all_rmap_sptes(kvm, rmap_head);
+}
+
+static bool kvm_zap_rmap(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_rmap_head *rmap_head,
+			 struct kvm_memory_slot *slot, gfn_t gfn, int level,
+			 pte_t unused)
+{
+	return __kvm_zap_rmap(kvm, rmap_head, slot);
+}
+
+static bool kvm_set_pte_rmap(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_rmap_head *rmap_head,
+			     struct kvm_memory_slot *slot, gfn_t gfn, int level,
+			     pte_t pte)
+{
+	u64 *sptep;
+	struct rmap_iterator iter;
+	bool need_flush = false;
+	u64 new_spte;
+	kvm_pfn_t new_pfn;
+
+	WARN_ON_ONCE(pte_huge(pte));
+	new_pfn = pte_pfn(pte);
+
+restart:
+	for_each_rmap_spte(rmap_head, &iter, sptep) {
+		need_flush = true;
+
+		if (pte_write(pte)) {
+			kvm_zap_one_rmap_spte(kvm, rmap_head, sptep);
+			goto restart;
+		} else {
+			new_spte = kvm_mmu_changed_pte_notifier_make_spte(
+					*sptep, new_pfn);
+
+			mmu_spte_clear_track_bits(kvm, sptep);
+			mmu_spte_set(sptep, new_spte);
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (need_flush && kvm_available_flush_remote_tlbs_range()) {
+		kvm_flush_remote_tlbs_gfn(kvm, gfn, level);
+		return false;
+	}
+
+	return need_flush;
+}
+
+struct slot_rmap_walk_iterator {
+	/* input fields. */
+	const struct kvm_memory_slot *slot;
+	gfn_t start_gfn;
+	gfn_t end_gfn;
+	int start_level;
+	int end_level;
+
+	/* output fields. */
+	gfn_t gfn;
+	struct kvm_rmap_head *rmap;
+	int level;
+
+	/* private field. */
+	struct kvm_rmap_head *end_rmap;
+};
+
+static void rmap_walk_init_level(struct slot_rmap_walk_iterator *iterator,
+				 int level)
+{
+	iterator->level = level;
+	iterator->gfn = iterator->start_gfn;
+	iterator->rmap = gfn_to_rmap(iterator->gfn, level, iterator->slot);
+	iterator->end_rmap = gfn_to_rmap(iterator->end_gfn, level, iterator->slot);
+}
+
+static void slot_rmap_walk_init(struct slot_rmap_walk_iterator *iterator,
+				const struct kvm_memory_slot *slot,
+				int start_level, int end_level,
+				gfn_t start_gfn, gfn_t end_gfn)
+{
+	iterator->slot = slot;
+	iterator->start_level = start_level;
+	iterator->end_level = end_level;
+	iterator->start_gfn = start_gfn;
+	iterator->end_gfn = end_gfn;
+
+	rmap_walk_init_level(iterator, iterator->start_level);
+}
+
+static bool slot_rmap_walk_okay(struct slot_rmap_walk_iterator *iterator)
+{
+	return !!iterator->rmap;
+}
+
+static void slot_rmap_walk_next(struct slot_rmap_walk_iterator *iterator)
+{
+	while (++iterator->rmap <= iterator->end_rmap) {
+		iterator->gfn += (1UL << KVM_HPAGE_GFN_SHIFT(iterator->level));
+
+		if (iterator->rmap->val)
+			return;
+	}
+
+	if (++iterator->level > iterator->end_level) {
+		iterator->rmap = NULL;
+		return;
+	}
+
+	rmap_walk_init_level(iterator, iterator->level);
+}
+
+#define for_each_slot_rmap_range(_slot_, _start_level_, _end_level_,	\
+	   _start_gfn, _end_gfn, _iter_)				\
+	for (slot_rmap_walk_init(_iter_, _slot_, _start_level_,		\
+				 _end_level_, _start_gfn, _end_gfn);	\
+	     slot_rmap_walk_okay(_iter_);				\
+	     slot_rmap_walk_next(_iter_))
+
+typedef bool (*rmap_handler_t)(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_rmap_head *rmap_head,
+			       struct kvm_memory_slot *slot, gfn_t gfn,
+			       int level, pte_t pte);
+
+static __always_inline bool kvm_handle_gfn_range(struct kvm *kvm,
+						 struct kvm_gfn_range *range,
+						 rmap_handler_t handler)
+{
+	struct slot_rmap_walk_iterator iterator;
+	bool ret = false;
+
+	for_each_slot_rmap_range(range->slot, PG_LEVEL_4K, KVM_MAX_HUGEPAGE_LEVEL,
+				 range->start, range->end - 1, &iterator)
+		ret |= handler(kvm, iterator.rmap, range->slot, iterator.gfn,
+			       iterator.level, range->arg.pte);
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+bool kvm_unmap_gfn_range(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_gfn_range *range)
+{
+	bool flush = false;
+
+	if (kvm_memslots_have_rmaps(kvm))
+		flush = kvm_handle_gfn_range(kvm, range, kvm_zap_rmap);
+
+	if (tdp_mmu_enabled)
+		flush = kvm_tdp_mmu_unmap_gfn_range(kvm, range, flush);
+
+	if (kvm_x86_ops.set_apic_access_page_addr &&
+	    range->slot->id == APIC_ACCESS_PAGE_PRIVATE_MEMSLOT)
+		kvm_make_all_cpus_request(kvm, KVM_REQ_APIC_PAGE_RELOAD);
+
+	return flush;
+}
+
+bool kvm_set_spte_gfn(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_gfn_range *range)
+{
+	bool flush = false;
+
+	if (kvm_memslots_have_rmaps(kvm))
+		flush = kvm_handle_gfn_range(kvm, range, kvm_set_pte_rmap);
+
+	if (tdp_mmu_enabled)
+		flush |= kvm_tdp_mmu_set_spte_gfn(kvm, range);
+
+	return flush;
+}
+
+static bool kvm_age_rmap(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_rmap_head *rmap_head,
+			 struct kvm_memory_slot *slot, gfn_t gfn, int level,
+			 pte_t unused)
+{
+	u64 *sptep;
+	struct rmap_iterator iter;
+	int young = 0;
+
+	for_each_rmap_spte(rmap_head, &iter, sptep)
+		young |= mmu_spte_age(sptep);
+
+	return young;
+}
+
+static bool kvm_test_age_rmap(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_rmap_head *rmap_head,
+			      struct kvm_memory_slot *slot, gfn_t gfn,
+			      int level, pte_t unused)
+{
+	u64 *sptep;
+	struct rmap_iterator iter;
+
+	for_each_rmap_spte(rmap_head, &iter, sptep)
+		if (is_accessed_spte(*sptep))
+			return true;
+	return false;
+}
+
+#define RMAP_RECYCLE_THRESHOLD 1000
+
+static void __rmap_add(struct kvm *kvm,
+		       struct kvm_mmu_memory_cache *cache,
+		       const struct kvm_memory_slot *slot,
+		       u64 *spte, gfn_t gfn, unsigned int access)
+{
+	struct kvm_mmu_page *sp;
+	struct kvm_rmap_head *rmap_head;
+	int rmap_count;
+
+	sp = sptep_to_sp(spte);
+	kvm_mmu_page_set_translation(sp, spte_index(spte), gfn, access);
+	kvm_update_page_stats(kvm, sp->role.level, 1);
+
+	rmap_head = gfn_to_rmap(gfn, sp->role.level, slot);
+	rmap_count = pte_list_add(cache, spte, rmap_head);
+
+	if (rmap_count > kvm->stat.max_mmu_rmap_size)
+		kvm->stat.max_mmu_rmap_size = rmap_count;
+	if (rmap_count > RMAP_RECYCLE_THRESHOLD) {
+		kvm_zap_all_rmap_sptes(kvm, rmap_head);
+		kvm_flush_remote_tlbs_gfn(kvm, gfn, sp->role.level);
+	}
+}
+
+static void rmap_add(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, const struct kvm_memory_slot *slot,
+		     u64 *spte, gfn_t gfn, unsigned int access)
+{
+	struct kvm_mmu_memory_cache *cache = &vcpu->arch.mmu_pte_list_desc_cache;
+
+	__rmap_add(vcpu->kvm, cache, slot, spte, gfn, access);
+}
+
+bool kvm_age_gfn(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_gfn_range *range)
+{
+	bool young = false;
+
+	if (kvm_memslots_have_rmaps(kvm))
+		young = kvm_handle_gfn_range(kvm, range, kvm_age_rmap);
+
+	if (tdp_mmu_enabled)
+		young |= kvm_tdp_mmu_age_gfn_range(kvm, range);
+
+	return young;
+}
+
+bool kvm_test_age_gfn(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_gfn_range *range)
+{
+	bool young = false;
+
+	if (kvm_memslots_have_rmaps(kvm))
+		young = kvm_handle_gfn_range(kvm, range, kvm_test_age_rmap);
+
+	if (tdp_mmu_enabled)
+		young |= kvm_tdp_mmu_test_age_gfn(kvm, range);
+
+	return young;
+}
+
+static void kvm_mmu_check_sptes_at_free(struct kvm_mmu_page *sp)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_PROVE_MMU
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < SPTE_ENT_PER_PAGE; i++) {
+		if (KVM_MMU_WARN_ON(is_shadow_present_pte(sp->spt[i])))
+			pr_err_ratelimited("SPTE %llx (@ %p) for gfn %llx shadow-present at free",
+					   sp->spt[i], &sp->spt[i],
+					   kvm_mmu_page_get_gfn(sp, i));
+	}
+#endif
+}
+
+/*
+ * This value is the sum of all of the kvm instances's
+ * kvm->arch.n_used_mmu_pages values.  We need a global,
+ * aggregate version in order to make the slab shrinker
+ * faster
+ */
+static inline void kvm_mod_used_mmu_pages(struct kvm *kvm, long nr)
+{
+	kvm->arch.n_used_mmu_pages += nr;
+	percpu_counter_add(&kvm_total_used_mmu_pages, nr);
+}
+
+static void kvm_account_mmu_page(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_mmu_page *sp)
+{
+	kvm_mod_used_mmu_pages(kvm, +1);
+	kvm_account_pgtable_pages((void *)sp->spt, +1);
+}
+
+static void kvm_unaccount_mmu_page(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_mmu_page *sp)
+{
+	kvm_mod_used_mmu_pages(kvm, -1);
+	kvm_account_pgtable_pages((void *)sp->spt, -1);
+}
+
+static void kvm_mmu_free_shadow_page(struct kvm_mmu_page *sp)
+{
+	kvm_mmu_check_sptes_at_free(sp);
+
+	hlist_del(&sp->hash_link);
+	list_del(&sp->link);
+	free_page((unsigned long)sp->spt);
+	if (!sp->role.direct)
+		free_page((unsigned long)sp->shadowed_translation);
+	kmem_cache_free(mmu_page_header_cache, sp);
+}
+
+static unsigned kvm_page_table_hashfn(gfn_t gfn)
+{
+	return hash_64(gfn, KVM_MMU_HASH_SHIFT);
+}
+
+static void mmu_page_add_parent_pte(struct kvm_mmu_memory_cache *cache,
+				    struct kvm_mmu_page *sp, u64 *parent_pte)
+{
+	if (!parent_pte)
+		return;
+
+	pte_list_add(cache, parent_pte, &sp->parent_ptes);
+}
+
+static void mmu_page_remove_parent_pte(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_mmu_page *sp,
+				       u64 *parent_pte)
+{
+	pte_list_remove(kvm, parent_pte, &sp->parent_ptes);
+}
+
+static void drop_parent_pte(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_mmu_page *sp,
+			    u64 *parent_pte)
+{
+	mmu_page_remove_parent_pte(kvm, sp, parent_pte);
+	mmu_spte_clear_no_track(parent_pte);
+}
+
+static void mark_unsync(u64 *spte);
+static void kvm_mmu_mark_parents_unsync(struct kvm_mmu_page *sp)
+{
+	u64 *sptep;
+	struct rmap_iterator iter;
+
+	for_each_rmap_spte(&sp->parent_ptes, &iter, sptep) {
+		mark_unsync(sptep);
+	}
+}
+
+static void mark_unsync(u64 *spte)
+{
+	struct kvm_mmu_page *sp;
+
+	sp = sptep_to_sp(spte);
+	if (__test_and_set_bit(spte_index(spte), sp->unsync_child_bitmap))
+		return;
+	if (sp->unsync_children++)
+		return;
+	kvm_mmu_mark_parents_unsync(sp);
+}
+
+#define KVM_PAGE_ARRAY_NR 16
+
+struct kvm_mmu_pages {
+	struct mmu_page_and_offset {
+		struct kvm_mmu_page *sp;
+		unsigned int idx;
+	} page[KVM_PAGE_ARRAY_NR];
+	unsigned int nr;
+};
+
+static int mmu_pages_add(struct kvm_mmu_pages *pvec, struct kvm_mmu_page *sp,
+			 int idx)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	if (sp->unsync)
+		for (i=0; i < pvec->nr; i++)
+			if (pvec->page[i].sp == sp)
+				return 0;
+
+	pvec->page[pvec->nr].sp = sp;
+	pvec->page[pvec->nr].idx = idx;
+	pvec->nr++;
+	return (pvec->nr == KVM_PAGE_ARRAY_NR);
+}
+
+static inline void clear_unsync_child_bit(struct kvm_mmu_page *sp, int idx)
+{
+	--sp->unsync_children;
+	WARN_ON_ONCE((int)sp->unsync_children < 0);
+	__clear_bit(idx, sp->unsync_child_bitmap);
+}
+
+static int __mmu_unsync_walk(struct kvm_mmu_page *sp,
+			   struct kvm_mmu_pages *pvec)
+{
+	int i, ret, nr_unsync_leaf = 0;
+
+	for_each_set_bit(i, sp->unsync_child_bitmap, 512) {
+		struct kvm_mmu_page *child;
+		u64 ent = sp->spt[i];
+
+		if (!is_shadow_present_pte(ent) || is_large_pte(ent)) {
+			clear_unsync_child_bit(sp, i);
+			continue;
+		}
+
+		child = spte_to_child_sp(ent);
+
+		if (child->unsync_children) {
+			if (mmu_pages_add(pvec, child, i))
+				return -ENOSPC;
+
+			ret = __mmu_unsync_walk(child, pvec);
+			if (!ret) {
+				clear_unsync_child_bit(sp, i);
+				continue;
+			} else if (ret > 0) {
+				nr_unsync_leaf += ret;
+			} else
+				return ret;
+		} else if (child->unsync) {
+			nr_unsync_leaf++;
+			if (mmu_pages_add(pvec, child, i))
+				return -ENOSPC;
+		} else
+			clear_unsync_child_bit(sp, i);
+	}
+
+	return nr_unsync_leaf;
+}
+
+#define INVALID_INDEX (-1)
+
+static int mmu_unsync_walk(struct kvm_mmu_page *sp,
+			   struct kvm_mmu_pages *pvec)
+{
+	pvec->nr = 0;
+	if (!sp->unsync_children)
+		return 0;
+
+	mmu_pages_add(pvec, sp, INVALID_INDEX);
+	return __mmu_unsync_walk(sp, pvec);
+}
+
+static void kvm_unlink_unsync_page(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_mmu_page *sp)
+{
+	WARN_ON_ONCE(!sp->unsync);
+	trace_kvm_mmu_sync_page(sp);
+	sp->unsync = 0;
+	--kvm->stat.mmu_unsync;
+}
+
+static bool kvm_mmu_prepare_zap_page(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_mmu_page *sp,
+				     struct list_head *invalid_list);
+static void kvm_mmu_commit_zap_page(struct kvm *kvm,
+				    struct list_head *invalid_list);
+
+static bool sp_has_gptes(struct kvm_mmu_page *sp)
+{
+	if (sp->role.direct)
+		return false;
+
+	if (sp->role.passthrough)
+		return false;
+
+	return true;
+}
+
+#define for_each_valid_sp(_kvm, _sp, _list)				\
+	hlist_for_each_entry(_sp, _list, hash_link)			\
+		if (is_obsolete_sp((_kvm), (_sp))) {			\
+		} else
+
+#define for_each_gfn_valid_sp_with_gptes(_kvm, _sp, _gfn)		\
+	for_each_valid_sp(_kvm, _sp,					\
+	  &(_kvm)->arch.mmu_page_hash[kvm_page_table_hashfn(_gfn)])	\
+		if ((_sp)->gfn != (_gfn) || !sp_has_gptes(_sp)) {} else
+
+static bool kvm_sync_page_check(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_mmu_page *sp)
+{
+	union kvm_mmu_page_role root_role = vcpu->arch.mmu->root_role;
+
+	/*
+	 * Ignore various flags when verifying that it's safe to sync a shadow
+	 * page using the current MMU context.
+	 *
+	 *  - level: not part of the overall MMU role and will never match as the MMU's
+	 *           level tracks the root level
+	 *  - access: updated based on the new guest PTE
+	 *  - quadrant: not part of the overall MMU role (similar to level)
+	 */
+	const union kvm_mmu_page_role sync_role_ign = {
+		.level = 0xf,
+		.access = 0x7,
+		.quadrant = 0x3,
+		.passthrough = 0x1,
+	};
+
+	/*
+	 * Direct pages can never be unsync, and KVM should never attempt to
+	 * sync a shadow page for a different MMU context, e.g. if the role
+	 * differs then the memslot lookup (SMM vs. non-SMM) will be bogus, the
+	 * reserved bits checks will be wrong, etc...
+	 */
+	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(sp->role.direct || !vcpu->arch.mmu->sync_spte ||
+			 (sp->role.word ^ root_role.word) & ~sync_role_ign.word))
+		return false;
+
+	return true;
+}
+
+static int kvm_sync_spte(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_mmu_page *sp, int i)
+{
+	if (!sp->spt[i])
+		return 0;
+
+	return vcpu->arch.mmu->sync_spte(vcpu, sp, i);
+}
+
+static int __kvm_sync_page(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_mmu_page *sp)
+{
+	int flush = 0;
+	int i;
+
+	if (!kvm_sync_page_check(vcpu, sp))
+		return -1;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < SPTE_ENT_PER_PAGE; i++) {
+		int ret = kvm_sync_spte(vcpu, sp, i);
+
+		if (ret < -1)
+			return -1;
+		flush |= ret;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Note, any flush is purely for KVM's correctness, e.g. when dropping
+	 * an existing SPTE or clearing W/A/D bits to ensure an mmu_notifier
+	 * unmap or dirty logging event doesn't fail to flush.  The guest is
+	 * responsible for flushing the TLB to ensure any changes in protection
+	 * bits are recognized, i.e. until the guest flushes or page faults on
+	 * a relevant address, KVM is architecturally allowed to let vCPUs use
+	 * cached translations with the old protection bits.
+	 */
+	return flush;
+}
+
+static int kvm_sync_page(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_mmu_page *sp,
+			 struct list_head *invalid_list)
+{
+	int ret = __kvm_sync_page(vcpu, sp);
+
+	if (ret < 0)
+		kvm_mmu_prepare_zap_page(vcpu->kvm, sp, invalid_list);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static bool kvm_mmu_remote_flush_or_zap(struct kvm *kvm,
+					struct list_head *invalid_list,
+					bool remote_flush)
+{
+	if (!remote_flush && list_empty(invalid_list))
+		return false;
+
+	if (!list_empty(invalid_list))
+		kvm_mmu_commit_zap_page(kvm, invalid_list);
+	else
+		kvm_flush_remote_tlbs(kvm);
+	return true;
+}
+
+static bool is_obsolete_sp(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_mmu_page *sp)
+{
+	if (sp->role.invalid)
+		return true;
+
+	/* TDP MMU pages do not use the MMU generation. */
+	return !is_tdp_mmu_page(sp) &&
+	       unlikely(sp->mmu_valid_gen != kvm->arch.mmu_valid_gen);
+}
+
+struct mmu_page_path {
+	struct kvm_mmu_page *parent[PT64_ROOT_MAX_LEVEL];
+	unsigned int idx[PT64_ROOT_MAX_LEVEL];
+};
+
+#define for_each_sp(pvec, sp, parents, i)			\
+		for (i = mmu_pages_first(&pvec, &parents);	\
+			i < pvec.nr && ({ sp = pvec.page[i].sp; 1;});	\
+			i = mmu_pages_next(&pvec, &parents, i))
+
+static int mmu_pages_next(struct kvm_mmu_pages *pvec,
+			  struct mmu_page_path *parents,
+			  int i)
+{
+	int n;
+
+	for (n = i+1; n < pvec->nr; n++) {
+		struct kvm_mmu_page *sp = pvec->page[n].sp;
+		unsigned idx = pvec->page[n].idx;
+		int level = sp->role.level;
+
+		parents->idx[level-1] = idx;
+		if (level == PG_LEVEL_4K)
+			break;
+
+		parents->parent[level-2] = sp;
+	}
+
+	return n;
+}
+
+static int mmu_pages_first(struct kvm_mmu_pages *pvec,
+			   struct mmu_page_path *parents)
+{
+	struct kvm_mmu_page *sp;
+	int level;
+
+	if (pvec->nr == 0)
+		return 0;
+
+	WARN_ON_ONCE(pvec->page[0].idx != INVALID_INDEX);
+
+	sp = pvec->page[0].sp;
+	level = sp->role.level;
+	WARN_ON_ONCE(level == PG_LEVEL_4K);
+
+	parents->parent[level-2] = sp;
+
+	/* Also set up a sentinel.  Further entries in pvec are all
+	 * children of sp, so this element is never overwritten.
+	 */
+	parents->parent[level-1] = NULL;
+	return mmu_pages_next(pvec, parents, 0);
+}
+
+static void mmu_pages_clear_parents(struct mmu_page_path *parents)
+{
+	struct kvm_mmu_page *sp;
+	unsigned int level = 0;
+
+	do {
+		unsigned int idx = parents->idx[level];
+		sp = parents->parent[level];
+		if (!sp)
+			return;
+
+		WARN_ON_ONCE(idx == INVALID_INDEX);
+		clear_unsync_child_bit(sp, idx);
+		level++;
+	} while (!sp->unsync_children);
+}
+
+static int mmu_sync_children(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+			     struct kvm_mmu_page *parent, bool can_yield)
+{
+	int i;
+	struct kvm_mmu_page *sp;
+	struct mmu_page_path parents;
+	struct kvm_mmu_pages pages;
+	LIST_HEAD(invalid_list);
+	bool flush = false;
+
+	while (mmu_unsync_walk(parent, &pages)) {
+		bool protected = false;
+
+		for_each_sp(pages, sp, parents, i)
+			protected |= kvm_vcpu_write_protect_gfn(vcpu, sp->gfn);
+
+		if (protected) {
+			kvm_mmu_remote_flush_or_zap(vcpu->kvm, &invalid_list, true);
+			flush = false;
+		}
+
+		for_each_sp(pages, sp, parents, i) {
+			kvm_unlink_unsync_page(vcpu->kvm, sp);
+			flush |= kvm_sync_page(vcpu, sp, &invalid_list) > 0;
+			mmu_pages_clear_parents(&parents);
+		}
+		if (need_resched() || rwlock_needbreak(&vcpu->kvm->mmu_lock)) {
+			kvm_mmu_remote_flush_or_zap(vcpu->kvm, &invalid_list, flush);
+			if (!can_yield) {
+				kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_MMU_SYNC, vcpu);
+				return -EINTR;
+			}
+
+			cond_resched_rwlock_write(&vcpu->kvm->mmu_lock);
+			flush = false;
+		}
+	}
+
+	kvm_mmu_remote_flush_or_zap(vcpu->kvm, &invalid_list, flush);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void __clear_sp_write_flooding_count(struct kvm_mmu_page *sp)
+{
+	atomic_set(&sp->write_flooding_count,  0);
+}
+
+static void clear_sp_write_flooding_count(u64 *spte)
+{
+	__clear_sp_write_flooding_count(sptep_to_sp(spte));
+}
+
+/*
+ * The vCPU is required when finding indirect shadow pages; the shadow
+ * page may already exist and syncing it needs the vCPU pointer in
+ * order to read guest page tables.  Direct shadow pages are never
+ * unsync, thus @vcpu can be NULL if @role.direct is true.
+ */
+static struct kvm_mmu_page *kvm_mmu_find_shadow_page(struct kvm *kvm,
+						     struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+						     gfn_t gfn,
+						     struct hlist_head *sp_list,
+						     union kvm_mmu_page_role role)
+{
+	struct kvm_mmu_page *sp;
+	int ret;
+	int collisions = 0;
+	LIST_HEAD(invalid_list);
+
+	for_each_valid_sp(kvm, sp, sp_list) {
+		if (sp->gfn != gfn) {
+			collisions++;
+			continue;
+		}
+
+		if (sp->role.word != role.word) {
+			/*
+			 * If the guest is creating an upper-level page, zap
+			 * unsync pages for the same gfn.  While it's possible
+			 * the guest is using recursive page tables, in all
+			 * likelihood the guest has stopped using the unsync
+			 * page and is installing a completely unrelated page.
+			 * Unsync pages must not be left as is, because the new
+			 * upper-level page will be write-protected.
+			 */
+			if (role.level > PG_LEVEL_4K && sp->unsync)
+				kvm_mmu_prepare_zap_page(kvm, sp,
+							 &invalid_list);
+			continue;
+		}
+
+		/* unsync and write-flooding only apply to indirect SPs. */
+		if (sp->role.direct)
+			goto out;
+
+		if (sp->unsync) {
+			if (KVM_BUG_ON(!vcpu, kvm))
+				break;
+
+			/*
+			 * The page is good, but is stale.  kvm_sync_page does
+			 * get the latest guest state, but (unlike mmu_unsync_children)
+			 * it doesn't write-protect the page or mark it synchronized!
+			 * This way the validity of the mapping is ensured, but the
+			 * overhead of write protection is not incurred until the
+			 * guest invalidates the TLB mapping.  This allows multiple
+			 * SPs for a single gfn to be unsync.
+			 *
+			 * If the sync fails, the page is zapped.  If so, break
+			 * in order to rebuild it.
+			 */
+			ret = kvm_sync_page(vcpu, sp, &invalid_list);
+			if (ret < 0)
+				break;
+
+			WARN_ON_ONCE(!list_empty(&invalid_list));
+			if (ret > 0)
+				kvm_flush_remote_tlbs(kvm);
+		}
+
+		__clear_sp_write_flooding_count(sp);
+
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	sp = NULL;
+	++kvm->stat.mmu_cache_miss;
+
+out:
+	kvm_mmu_commit_zap_page(kvm, &invalid_list);
+
+	if (collisions > kvm->stat.max_mmu_page_hash_collisions)
+		kvm->stat.max_mmu_page_hash_collisions = collisions;
+	return sp;
+}
+
+/* Caches used when allocating a new shadow page. */
+struct shadow_page_caches {
+	struct kvm_mmu_memory_cache *page_header_cache;
+	struct kvm_mmu_memory_cache *shadow_page_cache;
+	struct kvm_mmu_memory_cache *shadowed_info_cache;
+};
+
+static struct kvm_mmu_page *kvm_mmu_alloc_shadow_page(struct kvm *kvm,
+						      struct shadow_page_caches *caches,
+						      gfn_t gfn,
+						      struct hlist_head *sp_list,
+						      union kvm_mmu_page_role role)
+{
+	struct kvm_mmu_page *sp;
+
+	sp = kvm_mmu_memory_cache_alloc(caches->page_header_cache);
+	sp->spt = kvm_mmu_memory_cache_alloc(caches->shadow_page_cache);
+	if (!role.direct)
+		sp->shadowed_translation = kvm_mmu_memory_cache_alloc(caches->shadowed_info_cache);
+
+	set_page_private(virt_to_page(sp->spt), (unsigned long)sp);
+
+	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sp->possible_nx_huge_page_link);
+
+	/*
+	 * active_mmu_pages must be a FIFO list, as kvm_zap_obsolete_pages()
+	 * depends on valid pages being added to the head of the list.  See
+	 * comments in kvm_zap_obsolete_pages().
+	 */
+	sp->mmu_valid_gen = kvm->arch.mmu_valid_gen;
+	list_add(&sp->link, &kvm->arch.active_mmu_pages);
+	kvm_account_mmu_page(kvm, sp);
+
+	sp->gfn = gfn;
+	sp->role = role;
+	hlist_add_head(&sp->hash_link, sp_list);
+	if (sp_has_gptes(sp))
+		account_shadowed(kvm, sp);
+
+	return sp;
+}
+
+/* Note, @vcpu may be NULL if @role.direct is true; see kvm_mmu_find_shadow_page. */
+static struct kvm_mmu_page *__kvm_mmu_get_shadow_page(struct kvm *kvm,
+						      struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+						      struct shadow_page_caches *caches,
+						      gfn_t gfn,
+						      union kvm_mmu_page_role role)
+{
+	struct hlist_head *sp_list;
+	struct kvm_mmu_page *sp;
+	bool created = false;
+
+	sp_list = &kvm->arch.mmu_page_hash[kvm_page_table_hashfn(gfn)];
+
+	sp = kvm_mmu_find_shadow_page(kvm, vcpu, gfn, sp_list, role);
+	if (!sp) {
+		created = true;
+		sp = kvm_mmu_alloc_shadow_page(kvm, caches, gfn, sp_list, role);
+	}
+
+	trace_kvm_mmu_get_page(sp, created);
+	return sp;
+}
+
+static struct kvm_mmu_page *kvm_mmu_get_shadow_page(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+						    gfn_t gfn,
+						    union kvm_mmu_page_role role)
+{
+	struct shadow_page_caches caches = {
+		.page_header_cache = &vcpu->arch.mmu_page_header_cache,
+		.shadow_page_cache = &vcpu->arch.mmu_shadow_page_cache,
+		.shadowed_info_cache = &vcpu->arch.mmu_shadowed_info_cache,
+	};
+
+	return __kvm_mmu_get_shadow_page(vcpu->kvm, vcpu, &caches, gfn, role);
+}
+
+static union kvm_mmu_page_role kvm_mmu_child_role(u64 *sptep, bool direct,
+						  unsigned int access)
+{
+	struct kvm_mmu_page *parent_sp = sptep_to_sp(sptep);
+	union kvm_mmu_page_role role;
+
+	role = parent_sp->role;
+	role.level--;
+	role.access = access;
+	role.direct = direct;
+	role.passthrough = 0;
+
+	/*
+	 * If the guest has 4-byte PTEs then that means it's using 32-bit,
+	 * 2-level, non-PAE paging. KVM shadows such guests with PAE paging
+	 * (i.e. 8-byte PTEs). The difference in PTE size means that KVM must
+	 * shadow each guest page table with multiple shadow page tables, which
+	 * requires extra bookkeeping in the role.
+	 *
+	 * Specifically, to shadow the guest's page directory (which covers a
+	 * 4GiB address space), KVM uses 4 PAE page directories, each mapping
+	 * 1GiB of the address space. @role.quadrant encodes which quarter of
+	 * the address space each maps.
+	 *
+	 * To shadow the guest's page tables (which each map a 4MiB region), KVM
+	 * uses 2 PAE page tables, each mapping a 2MiB region. For these,
+	 * @role.quadrant encodes which half of the region they map.
+	 *
+	 * Concretely, a 4-byte PDE consumes bits 31:22, while an 8-byte PDE
+	 * consumes bits 29:21.  To consume bits 31:30, KVM's uses 4 shadow
+	 * PDPTEs; those 4 PAE page directories are pre-allocated and their
+	 * quadrant is assigned in mmu_alloc_root().   A 4-byte PTE consumes
+	 * bits 21:12, while an 8-byte PTE consumes bits 20:12.  To consume
+	 * bit 21 in the PTE (the child here), KVM propagates that bit to the
+	 * quadrant, i.e. sets quadrant to '0' or '1'.  The parent 8-byte PDE
+	 * covers bit 21 (see above), thus the quadrant is calculated from the
+	 * _least_ significant bit of the PDE index.
+	 */
+	if (role.has_4_byte_gpte) {
+		WARN_ON_ONCE(role.level != PG_LEVEL_4K);
+		role.quadrant = spte_index(sptep) & 1;
+	}
+
+	return role;
+}
+
+static struct kvm_mmu_page *kvm_mmu_get_child_sp(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+						 u64 *sptep, gfn_t gfn,
+						 bool direct, unsigned int access)
+{
+	union kvm_mmu_page_role role;
+
+	if (is_shadow_present_pte(*sptep) && !is_large_pte(*sptep))
+		return ERR_PTR(-EEXIST);
+
+	role = kvm_mmu_child_role(sptep, direct, access);
+	return kvm_mmu_get_shadow_page(vcpu, gfn, role);
+}
+
+static void shadow_walk_init_using_root(struct kvm_shadow_walk_iterator *iterator,
+					struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, hpa_t root,
+					u64 addr)
+{
+	iterator->addr = addr;
+	iterator->shadow_addr = root;
+	iterator->level = vcpu->arch.mmu->root_role.level;
+
+	if (iterator->level >= PT64_ROOT_4LEVEL &&
+	    vcpu->arch.mmu->cpu_role.base.level < PT64_ROOT_4LEVEL &&
+	    !vcpu->arch.mmu->root_role.direct)
+		iterator->level = PT32E_ROOT_LEVEL;
+
+	if (iterator->level == PT32E_ROOT_LEVEL) {
+		/*
+		 * prev_root is currently only used for 64-bit hosts. So only
+		 * the active root_hpa is valid here.
+		 */
+		BUG_ON(root != vcpu->arch.mmu->root.hpa);
+
+		iterator->shadow_addr
+			= vcpu->arch.mmu->pae_root[(addr >> 30) & 3];
+		iterator->shadow_addr &= SPTE_BASE_ADDR_MASK;
+		--iterator->level;
+		if (!iterator->shadow_addr)
+			iterator->level = 0;
+	}
+}
+
+static void shadow_walk_init(struct kvm_shadow_walk_iterator *iterator,
+			     struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 addr)
+{
+	shadow_walk_init_using_root(iterator, vcpu, vcpu->arch.mmu->root.hpa,
+				    addr);
+}
+
+static bool shadow_walk_okay(struct kvm_shadow_walk_iterator *iterator)
+{
+	if (iterator->level < PG_LEVEL_4K)
+		return false;
+
+	iterator->index = SPTE_INDEX(iterator->addr, iterator->level);
+	iterator->sptep	= ((u64 *)__va(iterator->shadow_addr)) + iterator->index;
+	return true;
+}
+
+static void __shadow_walk_next(struct kvm_shadow_walk_iterator *iterator,
+			       u64 spte)
+{
+	if (!is_shadow_present_pte(spte) || is_last_spte(spte, iterator->level)) {
+		iterator->level = 0;
+		return;
+	}
+
+	iterator->shadow_addr = spte & SPTE_BASE_ADDR_MASK;
+	--iterator->level;
+}
+
+static void shadow_walk_next(struct kvm_shadow_walk_iterator *iterator)
+{
+	__shadow_walk_next(iterator, *iterator->sptep);
+}
+
+static void __link_shadow_page(struct kvm *kvm,
+			       struct kvm_mmu_memory_cache *cache, u64 *sptep,
+			       struct kvm_mmu_page *sp, bool flush)
+{
+	u64 spte;
+
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(VMX_EPT_WRITABLE_MASK != PT_WRITABLE_MASK);
+
+	/*
+	 * If an SPTE is present already, it must be a leaf and therefore
+	 * a large one.  Drop it, and flush the TLB if needed, before
+	 * installing sp.
+	 */
+	if (is_shadow_present_pte(*sptep))
+		drop_large_spte(kvm, sptep, flush);
+
+	spte = make_nonleaf_spte(sp->spt, sp_ad_disabled(sp));
+
+	mmu_spte_set(sptep, spte);
+
+	mmu_page_add_parent_pte(cache, sp, sptep);
+
+	/*
+	 * The non-direct sub-pagetable must be updated before linking.  For
+	 * L1 sp, the pagetable is updated via kvm_sync_page() in
+	 * kvm_mmu_find_shadow_page() without write-protecting the gfn,
+	 * so sp->unsync can be true or false.  For higher level non-direct
+	 * sp, the pagetable is updated/synced via mmu_sync_children() in
+	 * FNAME(fetch)(), so sp->unsync_children can only be false.
+	 * WARN_ON_ONCE() if anything happens unexpectedly.
+	 */
+	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(sp->unsync_children) || sp->unsync)
+		mark_unsync(sptep);
+}
+
+static void link_shadow_page(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 *sptep,
+			     struct kvm_mmu_page *sp)
+{
+	__link_shadow_page(vcpu->kvm, &vcpu->arch.mmu_pte_list_desc_cache, sptep, sp, true);
+}
+
+static void validate_direct_spte(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 *sptep,
+				   unsigned direct_access)
+{
+	if (is_shadow_present_pte(*sptep) && !is_large_pte(*sptep)) {
+		struct kvm_mmu_page *child;
+
+		/*
+		 * For the direct sp, if the guest pte's dirty bit
+		 * changed form clean to dirty, it will corrupt the
+		 * sp's access: allow writable in the read-only sp,
+		 * so we should update the spte at this point to get
+		 * a new sp with the correct access.
+		 */
+		child = spte_to_child_sp(*sptep);
+		if (child->role.access == direct_access)
+			return;
+
+		drop_parent_pte(vcpu->kvm, child, sptep);
+		kvm_flush_remote_tlbs_sptep(vcpu->kvm, sptep);
+	}
+}
+
+/* Returns the number of zapped non-leaf child shadow pages. */
+static int mmu_page_zap_pte(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_mmu_page *sp,
+			    u64 *spte, struct list_head *invalid_list)
+{
+	u64 pte;
+	struct kvm_mmu_page *child;
+
+	pte = *spte;
+	if (is_shadow_present_pte(pte)) {
+		if (is_last_spte(pte, sp->role.level)) {
+			drop_spte(kvm, spte);
+		} else {
+			child = spte_to_child_sp(pte);
+			drop_parent_pte(kvm, child, spte);
+
+			/*
+			 * Recursively zap nested TDP SPs, parentless SPs are
+			 * unlikely to be used again in the near future.  This
+			 * avoids retaining a large number of stale nested SPs.
+			 */
+			if (tdp_enabled && invalid_list &&
+			    child->role.guest_mode && !child->parent_ptes.val)
+				return kvm_mmu_prepare_zap_page(kvm, child,
+								invalid_list);
+		}
+	} else if (is_mmio_spte(pte)) {
+		mmu_spte_clear_no_track(spte);
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int kvm_mmu_page_unlink_children(struct kvm *kvm,
+					struct kvm_mmu_page *sp,
+					struct list_head *invalid_list)
+{
+	int zapped = 0;
+	unsigned i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < SPTE_ENT_PER_PAGE; ++i)
+		zapped += mmu_page_zap_pte(kvm, sp, sp->spt + i, invalid_list);
+
+	return zapped;
+}
+
+static void kvm_mmu_unlink_parents(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_mmu_page *sp)
+{
+	u64 *sptep;
+	struct rmap_iterator iter;
+
+	while ((sptep = rmap_get_first(&sp->parent_ptes, &iter)))
+		drop_parent_pte(kvm, sp, sptep);
+}
+
+static int mmu_zap_unsync_children(struct kvm *kvm,
+				   struct kvm_mmu_page *parent,
+				   struct list_head *invalid_list)
+{
+	int i, zapped = 0;
+	struct mmu_page_path parents;
+	struct kvm_mmu_pages pages;
+
+	if (parent->role.level == PG_LEVEL_4K)
+		return 0;
+
+	while (mmu_unsync_walk(parent, &pages)) {
+		struct kvm_mmu_page *sp;
+
+		for_each_sp(pages, sp, parents, i) {
+			kvm_mmu_prepare_zap_page(kvm, sp, invalid_list);
+			mmu_pages_clear_parents(&parents);
+			zapped++;
+		}
+	}
+
+	return zapped;
+}
+
+static bool __kvm_mmu_prepare_zap_page(struct kvm *kvm,
+				       struct kvm_mmu_page *sp,
+				       struct list_head *invalid_list,
+				       int *nr_zapped)
+{
+	bool list_unstable, zapped_root = false;
+
+	lockdep_assert_held_write(&kvm->mmu_lock);
+	trace_kvm_mmu_prepare_zap_page(sp);
+	++kvm->stat.mmu_shadow_zapped;
+	*nr_zapped = mmu_zap_unsync_children(kvm, sp, invalid_list);
+	*nr_zapped += kvm_mmu_page_unlink_children(kvm, sp, invalid_list);
+	kvm_mmu_unlink_parents(kvm, sp);
+
+	/* Zapping children means active_mmu_pages has become unstable. */
+	list_unstable = *nr_zapped;
+
+	if (!sp->role.invalid && sp_has_gptes(sp))
+		unaccount_shadowed(kvm, sp);
+
+	if (sp->unsync)
+		kvm_unlink_unsync_page(kvm, sp);
+	if (!sp->root_count) {
+		/* Count self */
+		(*nr_zapped)++;
+
+		/*
+		 * Already invalid pages (previously active roots) are not on
+		 * the active page list.  See list_del() in the "else" case of
+		 * !sp->root_count.
+		 */
+		if (sp->role.invalid)
+			list_add(&sp->link, invalid_list);
+		else
+			list_move(&sp->link, invalid_list);
+		kvm_unaccount_mmu_page(kvm, sp);
+	} else {
+		/*
+		 * Remove the active root from the active page list, the root
+		 * will be explicitly freed when the root_count hits zero.
+		 */
+		list_del(&sp->link);
+
+		/*
+		 * Obsolete pages cannot be used on any vCPUs, see the comment
+		 * in kvm_mmu_zap_all_fast().  Note, is_obsolete_sp() also
+		 * treats invalid shadow pages as being obsolete.
+		 */
+		zapped_root = !is_obsolete_sp(kvm, sp);
+	}
+
+	if (sp->nx_huge_page_disallowed)
+		unaccount_nx_huge_page(kvm, sp);
+
+	sp->role.invalid = 1;
+
+	/*
+	 * Make the request to free obsolete roots after marking the root
+	 * invalid, otherwise other vCPUs may not see it as invalid.
+	 */
+	if (zapped_root)
+		kvm_make_all_cpus_request(kvm, KVM_REQ_MMU_FREE_OBSOLETE_ROOTS);
+	return list_unstable;
+}
+
+static bool kvm_mmu_prepare_zap_page(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_mmu_page *sp,
+				     struct list_head *invalid_list)
+{
+	int nr_zapped;
+
+	__kvm_mmu_prepare_zap_page(kvm, sp, invalid_list, &nr_zapped);
+	return nr_zapped;
+}
+
+static void kvm_mmu_commit_zap_page(struct kvm *kvm,
+				    struct list_head *invalid_list)
+{
+	struct kvm_mmu_page *sp, *nsp;
+
+	if (list_empty(invalid_list))
+		return;
+
+	/*
+	 * We need to make sure everyone sees our modifications to
+	 * the page tables and see changes to vcpu->mode here. The barrier
+	 * in the kvm_flush_remote_tlbs() achieves this. This pairs
+	 * with vcpu_enter_guest and walk_shadow_page_lockless_begin/end.
+	 *
+	 * In addition, kvm_flush_remote_tlbs waits for all vcpus to exit
+	 * guest mode and/or lockless shadow page table walks.
+	 */
+	kvm_flush_remote_tlbs(kvm);
+
+	list_for_each_entry_safe(sp, nsp, invalid_list, link) {
+		WARN_ON_ONCE(!sp->role.invalid || sp->root_count);
+		kvm_mmu_free_shadow_page(sp);
+	}
+}
+
+static unsigned long kvm_mmu_zap_oldest_mmu_pages(struct kvm *kvm,
+						  unsigned long nr_to_zap)
+{
+	unsigned long total_zapped = 0;
+	struct kvm_mmu_page *sp, *tmp;
+	LIST_HEAD(invalid_list);
+	bool unstable;
+	int nr_zapped;
+
+	if (list_empty(&kvm->arch.active_mmu_pages))
+		return 0;
+
+restart:
+	list_for_each_entry_safe_reverse(sp, tmp, &kvm->arch.active_mmu_pages, link) {
+		/*
+		 * Don't zap active root pages, the page itself can't be freed
+		 * and zapping it will just force vCPUs to realloc and reload.
+		 */
+		if (sp->root_count)
+			continue;
+
+		unstable = __kvm_mmu_prepare_zap_page(kvm, sp, &invalid_list,
+						      &nr_zapped);
+		total_zapped += nr_zapped;
+		if (total_zapped >= nr_to_zap)
+			break;
+
+		if (unstable)
+			goto restart;
+	}
+
+	kvm_mmu_commit_zap_page(kvm, &invalid_list);
+
+	kvm->stat.mmu_recycled += total_zapped;
+	return total_zapped;
+}
+
+static inline unsigned long kvm_mmu_available_pages(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+	if (kvm->arch.n_max_mmu_pages > kvm->arch.n_used_mmu_pages)
+		return kvm->arch.n_max_mmu_pages -
+			kvm->arch.n_used_mmu_pages;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int make_mmu_pages_available(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	unsigned long avail = kvm_mmu_available_pages(vcpu->kvm);
+
+	if (likely(avail >= KVM_MIN_FREE_MMU_PAGES))
+		return 0;
+
+	kvm_mmu_zap_oldest_mmu_pages(vcpu->kvm, KVM_REFILL_PAGES - avail);
+
+	/*
+	 * Note, this check is intentionally soft, it only guarantees that one
+	 * page is available, while the caller may end up allocating as many as
+	 * four pages, e.g. for PAE roots or for 5-level paging.  Temporarily
+	 * exceeding the (arbitrary by default) limit will not harm the host,
+	 * being too aggressive may unnecessarily kill the guest, and getting an
+	 * exact count is far more trouble than it's worth, especially in the
+	 * page fault paths.
+	 */
+	if (!kvm_mmu_available_pages(vcpu->kvm))
+		return -ENOSPC;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Changing the number of mmu pages allocated to the vm
+ * Note: if goal_nr_mmu_pages is too small, you will get dead lock
+ */
+void kvm_mmu_change_mmu_pages(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long goal_nr_mmu_pages)
+{
+	write_lock(&kvm->mmu_lock);
+
+	if (kvm->arch.n_used_mmu_pages > goal_nr_mmu_pages) {
+		kvm_mmu_zap_oldest_mmu_pages(kvm, kvm->arch.n_used_mmu_pages -
+						  goal_nr_mmu_pages);
+
+		goal_nr_mmu_pages = kvm->arch.n_used_mmu_pages;
+	}
+
+	kvm->arch.n_max_mmu_pages = goal_nr_mmu_pages;
+
+	write_unlock(&kvm->mmu_lock);
+}
+
+int kvm_mmu_unprotect_page(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t gfn)
+{
+	struct kvm_mmu_page *sp;
+	LIST_HEAD(invalid_list);
+	int r;
+
+	r = 0;
+	write_lock(&kvm->mmu_lock);
+	for_each_gfn_valid_sp_with_gptes(kvm, sp, gfn) {
+		r = 1;
+		kvm_mmu_prepare_zap_page(kvm, sp, &invalid_list);
+	}
+	kvm_mmu_commit_zap_page(kvm, &invalid_list);
+	write_unlock(&kvm->mmu_lock);
+
+	return r;
+}
+
+static int kvm_mmu_unprotect_page_virt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gva_t gva)
+{
+	gpa_t gpa;
+	int r;
+
+	if (vcpu->arch.mmu->root_role.direct)
+		return 0;
+
+	gpa = kvm_mmu_gva_to_gpa_read(vcpu, gva, NULL);
+
+	r = kvm_mmu_unprotect_page(vcpu->kvm, gpa >> PAGE_SHIFT);
+
+	return r;
+}
+
+static void kvm_unsync_page(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_mmu_page *sp)
+{
+	trace_kvm_mmu_unsync_page(sp);
+	++kvm->stat.mmu_unsync;
+	sp->unsync = 1;
+
+	kvm_mmu_mark_parents_unsync(sp);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Attempt to unsync any shadow pages that can be reached by the specified gfn,
+ * KVM is creating a writable mapping for said gfn.  Returns 0 if all pages
+ * were marked unsync (or if there is no shadow page), -EPERM if the SPTE must
+ * be write-protected.
+ */
+int mmu_try_to_unsync_pages(struct kvm *kvm, const struct kvm_memory_slot *slot,
+			    gfn_t gfn, bool can_unsync, bool prefetch)
+{
+	struct kvm_mmu_page *sp;
+	bool locked = false;
+
+	/*
+	 * Force write-protection if the page is being tracked.  Note, the page
+	 * track machinery is used to write-protect upper-level shadow pages,
+	 * i.e. this guards the role.level == 4K assertion below!
+	 */
+	if (kvm_gfn_is_write_tracked(kvm, slot, gfn))
+		return -EPERM;
+
+	/*
+	 * The page is not write-tracked, mark existing shadow pages unsync
+	 * unless KVM is synchronizing an unsync SP (can_unsync = false).  In
+	 * that case, KVM must complete emulation of the guest TLB flush before
+	 * allowing shadow pages to become unsync (writable by the guest).
+	 */
+	for_each_gfn_valid_sp_with_gptes(kvm, sp, gfn) {
+		if (!can_unsync)
+			return -EPERM;
+
+		if (sp->unsync)
+			continue;
+
+		if (prefetch)
+			return -EEXIST;
+
+		/*
+		 * TDP MMU page faults require an additional spinlock as they
+		 * run with mmu_lock held for read, not write, and the unsync
+		 * logic is not thread safe.  Take the spinklock regardless of
+		 * the MMU type to avoid extra conditionals/parameters, there's
+		 * no meaningful penalty if mmu_lock is held for write.
+		 */
+		if (!locked) {
+			locked = true;
+			spin_lock(&kvm->arch.mmu_unsync_pages_lock);
+
+			/*
+			 * Recheck after taking the spinlock, a different vCPU
+			 * may have since marked the page unsync.  A false
+			 * positive on the unprotected check above is not
+			 * possible as clearing sp->unsync _must_ hold mmu_lock
+			 * for write, i.e. unsync cannot transition from 0->1
+			 * while this CPU holds mmu_lock for read (or write).
+			 */
+			if (READ_ONCE(sp->unsync))
+				continue;
+		}
+
+		WARN_ON_ONCE(sp->role.level != PG_LEVEL_4K);
+		kvm_unsync_page(kvm, sp);
+	}
+	if (locked)
+		spin_unlock(&kvm->arch.mmu_unsync_pages_lock);
+
+	/*
+	 * We need to ensure that the marking of unsync pages is visible
+	 * before the SPTE is updated to allow writes because
+	 * kvm_mmu_sync_roots() checks the unsync flags without holding
+	 * the MMU lock and so can race with this. If the SPTE was updated
+	 * before the page had been marked as unsync-ed, something like the
+	 * following could happen:
+	 *
+	 * CPU 1                    CPU 2
+	 * ---------------------------------------------------------------------
+	 * 1.2 Host updates SPTE
+	 *     to be writable
+	 *                      2.1 Guest writes a GPTE for GVA X.
+	 *                          (GPTE being in the guest page table shadowed
+	 *                           by the SP from CPU 1.)
+	 *                          This reads SPTE during the page table walk.
+	 *                          Since SPTE.W is read as 1, there is no
+	 *                          fault.
+	 *
+	 *                      2.2 Guest issues TLB flush.
+	 *                          That causes a VM Exit.
+	 *
+	 *                      2.3 Walking of unsync pages sees sp->unsync is
+	 *                          false and skips the page.
+	 *
+	 *                      2.4 Guest accesses GVA X.
+	 *                          Since the mapping in the SP was not updated,
+	 *                          so the old mapping for GVA X incorrectly
+	 *                          gets used.
+	 * 1.1 Host marks SP
+	 *     as unsync
+	 *     (sp->unsync = true)
+	 *
+	 * The write barrier below ensures that 1.1 happens before 1.2 and thus
+	 * the situation in 2.4 does not arise.  It pairs with the read barrier
+	 * in is_unsync_root(), placed between 2.1's load of SPTE.W and 2.3.
+	 */
+	smp_wmb();
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int mmu_set_spte(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_memory_slot *slot,
+			u64 *sptep, unsigned int pte_access, gfn_t gfn,
+			kvm_pfn_t pfn, struct kvm_page_fault *fault)
+{
+	struct kvm_mmu_page *sp = sptep_to_sp(sptep);
+	int level = sp->role.level;
+	int was_rmapped = 0;
+	int ret = RET_PF_FIXED;
+	bool flush = false;
+	bool wrprot;
+	u64 spte;
+
+	/* Prefetching always gets a writable pfn.  */
+	bool host_writable = !fault || fault->map_writable;
+	bool prefetch = !fault || fault->prefetch;
+	bool write_fault = fault && fault->write;
+
+	if (unlikely(is_noslot_pfn(pfn))) {
+		vcpu->stat.pf_mmio_spte_created++;
+		mark_mmio_spte(vcpu, sptep, gfn, pte_access);
+		return RET_PF_EMULATE;
+	}
+
+	if (is_shadow_present_pte(*sptep)) {
+		/*
+		 * If we overwrite a PTE page pointer with a 2MB PMD, unlink
+		 * the parent of the now unreachable PTE.
+		 */
+		if (level > PG_LEVEL_4K && !is_large_pte(*sptep)) {
+			struct kvm_mmu_page *child;
+			u64 pte = *sptep;
+
+			child = spte_to_child_sp(pte);
+			drop_parent_pte(vcpu->kvm, child, sptep);
+			flush = true;
+		} else if (pfn != spte_to_pfn(*sptep)) {
+			drop_spte(vcpu->kvm, sptep);
+			flush = true;
+		} else
+			was_rmapped = 1;
+	}
+
+	wrprot = make_spte(vcpu, sp, slot, pte_access, gfn, pfn, *sptep, prefetch,
+			   true, host_writable, &spte);
+
+	if (*sptep == spte) {
+		ret = RET_PF_SPURIOUS;
+	} else {
+		flush |= mmu_spte_update(sptep, spte);
+		trace_kvm_mmu_set_spte(level, gfn, sptep);
+	}
+
+	if (wrprot) {
+		if (write_fault)
+			ret = RET_PF_EMULATE;
+	}
+
+	if (flush)
+		kvm_flush_remote_tlbs_gfn(vcpu->kvm, gfn, level);
+
+	if (!was_rmapped) {
+		WARN_ON_ONCE(ret == RET_PF_SPURIOUS);
+		rmap_add(vcpu, slot, sptep, gfn, pte_access);
+	} else {
+		/* Already rmapped but the pte_access bits may have changed. */
+		kvm_mmu_page_set_access(sp, spte_index(sptep), pte_access);
+	}
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int direct_pte_prefetch_many(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+				    struct kvm_mmu_page *sp,
+				    u64 *start, u64 *end)
+{
+	struct page *pages[PTE_PREFETCH_NUM];
+	struct kvm_memory_slot *slot;
+	unsigned int access = sp->role.access;
+	int i, ret;
+	gfn_t gfn;
+
+	gfn = kvm_mmu_page_get_gfn(sp, spte_index(start));
+	slot = gfn_to_memslot_dirty_bitmap(vcpu, gfn, access & ACC_WRITE_MASK);
+	if (!slot)
+		return -1;
+
+	ret = gfn_to_page_many_atomic(slot, gfn, pages, end - start);
+	if (ret <= 0)
+		return -1;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < ret; i++, gfn++, start++) {
+		mmu_set_spte(vcpu, slot, start, access, gfn,
+			     page_to_pfn(pages[i]), NULL);
+		put_page(pages[i]);
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void __direct_pte_prefetch(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+				  struct kvm_mmu_page *sp, u64 *sptep)
+{
+	u64 *spte, *start = NULL;
+	int i;
+
+	WARN_ON_ONCE(!sp->role.direct);
+
+	i = spte_index(sptep) & ~(PTE_PREFETCH_NUM - 1);
+	spte = sp->spt + i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < PTE_PREFETCH_NUM; i++, spte++) {
+		if (is_shadow_present_pte(*spte) || spte == sptep) {
+			if (!start)
+				continue;
+			if (direct_pte_prefetch_many(vcpu, sp, start, spte) < 0)
+				return;
+			start = NULL;
+		} else if (!start)
+			start = spte;
+	}
+	if (start)
+		direct_pte_prefetch_many(vcpu, sp, start, spte);
+}
+
+static void direct_pte_prefetch(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 *sptep)
+{
+	struct kvm_mmu_page *sp;
+
+	sp = sptep_to_sp(sptep);
+
+	/*
+	 * Without accessed bits, there's no way to distinguish between
+	 * actually accessed translations and prefetched, so disable pte
+	 * prefetch if accessed bits aren't available.
+	 */
+	if (sp_ad_disabled(sp))
+		return;
+
+	if (sp->role.level > PG_LEVEL_4K)
+		return;
+
+	/*
+	 * If addresses are being invalidated, skip prefetching to avoid
+	 * accidentally prefetching those addresses.
+	 */
+	if (unlikely(vcpu->kvm->mmu_invalidate_in_progress))
+		return;
+
+	__direct_pte_prefetch(vcpu, sp, sptep);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Lookup the mapping level for @gfn in the current mm.
+ *
+ * WARNING!  Use of host_pfn_mapping_level() requires the caller and the end
+ * consumer to be tied into KVM's handlers for MMU notifier events!
+ *
+ * There are several ways to safely use this helper:
+ *
+ * - Check mmu_invalidate_retry_hva() after grabbing the mapping level, before
+ *   consuming it.  In this case, mmu_lock doesn't need to be held during the
+ *   lookup, but it does need to be held while checking the MMU notifier.
+ *
+ * - Hold mmu_lock AND ensure there is no in-progress MMU notifier invalidation
+ *   event for the hva.  This can be done by explicit checking the MMU notifier
+ *   or by ensuring that KVM already has a valid mapping that covers the hva.
+ *
+ * - Do not use the result to install new mappings, e.g. use the host mapping
+ *   level only to decide whether or not to zap an entry.  In this case, it's
+ *   not required to hold mmu_lock (though it's highly likely the caller will
+ *   want to hold mmu_lock anyways, e.g. to modify SPTEs).
+ *
+ * Note!  The lookup can still race with modifications to host page tables, but
+ * the above "rules" ensure KVM will not _consume_ the result of the walk if a
+ * race with the primary MMU occurs.
+ */
+static int host_pfn_mapping_level(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t gfn,
+				  const struct kvm_memory_slot *slot)
+{
+	int level = PG_LEVEL_4K;
+	unsigned long hva;
+	unsigned long flags;
+	pgd_t pgd;
+	p4d_t p4d;
+	pud_t pud;
+	pmd_t pmd;
+
+	/*
+	 * Note, using the already-retrieved memslot and __gfn_to_hva_memslot()
+	 * is not solely for performance, it's also necessary to avoid the
+	 * "writable" check in __gfn_to_hva_many(), which will always fail on
+	 * read-only memslots due to gfn_to_hva() assuming writes.  Earlier
+	 * page fault steps have already verified the guest isn't writing a
+	 * read-only memslot.
+	 */
+	hva = __gfn_to_hva_memslot(slot, gfn);
+
+	/*
+	 * Disable IRQs to prevent concurrent tear down of host page tables,
+	 * e.g. if the primary MMU promotes a P*D to a huge page and then frees
+	 * the original page table.
+	 */
+	local_irq_save(flags);
+
+	/*
+	 * Read each entry once.  As above, a non-leaf entry can be promoted to
+	 * a huge page _during_ this walk.  Re-reading the entry could send the
+	 * walk into the weeks, e.g. p*d_large() returns false (sees the old
+	 * value) and then p*d_offset() walks into the target huge page instead
+	 * of the old page table (sees the new value).
+	 */
+	pgd = READ_ONCE(*pgd_offset(kvm->mm, hva));
+	if (pgd_none(pgd))
+		goto out;
+
+	p4d = READ_ONCE(*p4d_offset(&pgd, hva));
+	if (p4d_none(p4d) || !p4d_present(p4d))
+		goto out;
+
+	pud = READ_ONCE(*pud_offset(&p4d, hva));
+	if (pud_none(pud) || !pud_present(pud))
+		goto out;
+
+	if (pud_large(pud)) {
+		level = PG_LEVEL_1G;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	pmd = READ_ONCE(*pmd_offset(&pud, hva));
+	if (pmd_none(pmd) || !pmd_present(pmd))
+		goto out;
+
+	if (pmd_large(pmd))
+		level = PG_LEVEL_2M;
+
+out:
+	local_irq_restore(flags);
+	return level;
+}
+
+int kvm_mmu_max_mapping_level(struct kvm *kvm,
+			      const struct kvm_memory_slot *slot, gfn_t gfn,
+			      int max_level)
+{
+	struct kvm_lpage_info *linfo;
+	int host_level;
+
+	max_level = min(max_level, max_huge_page_level);
+	for ( ; max_level > PG_LEVEL_4K; max_level--) {
+		linfo = lpage_info_slot(gfn, slot, max_level);
+		if (!linfo->disallow_lpage)
+			break;
+	}
+
+	if (max_level == PG_LEVEL_4K)
+		return PG_LEVEL_4K;
+
+	host_level = host_pfn_mapping_level(kvm, gfn, slot);
+	return min(host_level, max_level);
+}
+
+void kvm_mmu_hugepage_adjust(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_page_fault *fault)
+{
+	struct kvm_memory_slot *slot = fault->slot;
+	kvm_pfn_t mask;
+
+	fault->huge_page_disallowed = fault->exec && fault->nx_huge_page_workaround_enabled;
+
+	if (unlikely(fault->max_level == PG_LEVEL_4K))
+		return;
+
+	if (is_error_noslot_pfn(fault->pfn))
+		return;
+
+	if (kvm_slot_dirty_track_enabled(slot))
+		return;
+
+	/*
+	 * Enforce the iTLB multihit workaround after capturing the requested
+	 * level, which will be used to do precise, accurate accounting.
+	 */
+	fault->req_level = kvm_mmu_max_mapping_level(vcpu->kvm, slot,
+						     fault->gfn, fault->max_level);
+	if (fault->req_level == PG_LEVEL_4K || fault->huge_page_disallowed)
+		return;
+
+	/*
+	 * mmu_invalidate_retry() was successful and mmu_lock is held, so
+	 * the pmd can't be split from under us.
+	 */
+	fault->goal_level = fault->req_level;
+	mask = KVM_PAGES_PER_HPAGE(fault->goal_level) - 1;
+	VM_BUG_ON((fault->gfn & mask) != (fault->pfn & mask));
+	fault->pfn &= ~mask;
+}
+
+void disallowed_hugepage_adjust(struct kvm_page_fault *fault, u64 spte, int cur_level)
+{
+	if (cur_level > PG_LEVEL_4K &&
+	    cur_level == fault->goal_level &&
+	    is_shadow_present_pte(spte) &&
+	    !is_large_pte(spte) &&
+	    spte_to_child_sp(spte)->nx_huge_page_disallowed) {
+		/*
+		 * A small SPTE exists for this pfn, but FNAME(fetch),
+		 * direct_map(), or kvm_tdp_mmu_map() would like to create a
+		 * large PTE instead: just force them to go down another level,
+		 * patching back for them into pfn the next 9 bits of the
+		 * address.
+		 */
+		u64 page_mask = KVM_PAGES_PER_HPAGE(cur_level) -
+				KVM_PAGES_PER_HPAGE(cur_level - 1);
+		fault->pfn |= fault->gfn & page_mask;
+		fault->goal_level--;
+	}
+}
+
+static int direct_map(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_page_fault *fault)
+{
+	struct kvm_shadow_walk_iterator it;
+	struct kvm_mmu_page *sp;
+	int ret;
+	gfn_t base_gfn = fault->gfn;
+
+	kvm_mmu_hugepage_adjust(vcpu, fault);
+
+	trace_kvm_mmu_spte_requested(fault);
+	for_each_shadow_entry(vcpu, fault->addr, it) {
+		/*
+		 * We cannot overwrite existing page tables with an NX
+		 * large page, as the leaf could be executable.
+		 */
+		if (fault->nx_huge_page_workaround_enabled)
+			disallowed_hugepage_adjust(fault, *it.sptep, it.level);
+
+		base_gfn = gfn_round_for_level(fault->gfn, it.level);
+		if (it.level == fault->goal_level)
+			break;
+
+		sp = kvm_mmu_get_child_sp(vcpu, it.sptep, base_gfn, true, ACC_ALL);
+		if (sp == ERR_PTR(-EEXIST))
+			continue;
+
+		link_shadow_page(vcpu, it.sptep, sp);
+		if (fault->huge_page_disallowed)
+			account_nx_huge_page(vcpu->kvm, sp,
+					     fault->req_level >= it.level);
+	}
+
+	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(it.level != fault->goal_level))
+		return -EFAULT;
+
+	ret = mmu_set_spte(vcpu, fault->slot, it.sptep, ACC_ALL,
+			   base_gfn, fault->pfn, fault);
+	if (ret == RET_PF_SPURIOUS)
+		return ret;
+
+	direct_pte_prefetch(vcpu, it.sptep);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static void kvm_send_hwpoison_signal(struct kvm_memory_slot *slot, gfn_t gfn)
+{
+	unsigned long hva = gfn_to_hva_memslot(slot, gfn);
+
+	send_sig_mceerr(BUS_MCEERR_AR, (void __user *)hva, PAGE_SHIFT, current);
+}
+
+static int kvm_handle_error_pfn(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_page_fault *fault)
+{
+	if (is_sigpending_pfn(fault->pfn)) {
+		kvm_handle_signal_exit(vcpu);
+		return -EINTR;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Do not cache the mmio info caused by writing the readonly gfn
+	 * into the spte otherwise read access on readonly gfn also can
+	 * caused mmio page fault and treat it as mmio access.
+	 */
+	if (fault->pfn == KVM_PFN_ERR_RO_FAULT)
+		return RET_PF_EMULATE;
+
+	if (fault->pfn == KVM_PFN_ERR_HWPOISON) {
+		kvm_send_hwpoison_signal(fault->slot, fault->gfn);
+		return RET_PF_RETRY;
+	}
+
+	return -EFAULT;
+}
+
+static int kvm_handle_noslot_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+				   struct kvm_page_fault *fault,
+				   unsigned int access)
+{
+	gva_t gva = fault->is_tdp ? 0 : fault->addr;
+
+	vcpu_cache_mmio_info(vcpu, gva, fault->gfn,
+			     access & shadow_mmio_access_mask);
+
+	/*
+	 * If MMIO caching is disabled, emulate immediately without
+	 * touching the shadow page tables as attempting to install an
+	 * MMIO SPTE will just be an expensive nop.
+	 */
+	if (unlikely(!enable_mmio_caching))
+		return RET_PF_EMULATE;
+
+	/*
+	 * Do not create an MMIO SPTE for a gfn greater than host.MAXPHYADDR,
+	 * any guest that generates such gfns is running nested and is being
+	 * tricked by L0 userspace (you can observe gfn > L1.MAXPHYADDR if and
+	 * only if L1's MAXPHYADDR is inaccurate with respect to the
+	 * hardware's).
+	 */
+	if (unlikely(fault->gfn > kvm_mmu_max_gfn()))
+		return RET_PF_EMULATE;
+
+	return RET_PF_CONTINUE;
+}
+
+static bool page_fault_can_be_fast(struct kvm_page_fault *fault)
+{
+	/*
+	 * Page faults with reserved bits set, i.e. faults on MMIO SPTEs, only
+	 * reach the common page fault handler if the SPTE has an invalid MMIO
+	 * generation number.  Refreshing the MMIO generation needs to go down
+	 * the slow path.  Note, EPT Misconfigs do NOT set the PRESENT flag!
+	 */
+	if (fault->rsvd)
+		return false;
+
+	/*
+	 * #PF can be fast if:
+	 *
+	 * 1. The shadow page table entry is not present and A/D bits are
+	 *    disabled _by KVM_, which could mean that the fault is potentially
+	 *    caused by access tracking (if enabled).  If A/D bits are enabled
+	 *    by KVM, but disabled by L1 for L2, KVM is forced to disable A/D
+	 *    bits for L2 and employ access tracking, but the fast page fault
+	 *    mechanism only supports direct MMUs.
+	 * 2. The shadow page table entry is present, the access is a write,
+	 *    and no reserved bits are set (MMIO SPTEs cannot be "fixed"), i.e.
+	 *    the fault was caused by a write-protection violation.  If the
+	 *    SPTE is MMU-writable (determined later), the fault can be fixed
+	 *    by setting the Writable bit, which can be done out of mmu_lock.
+	 */
+	if (!fault->present)
+		return !kvm_ad_enabled();
+
+	/*
+	 * Note, instruction fetches and writes are mutually exclusive, ignore
+	 * the "exec" flag.
+	 */
+	return fault->write;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Returns true if the SPTE was fixed successfully. Otherwise,
+ * someone else modified the SPTE from its original value.
+ */
+static bool fast_pf_fix_direct_spte(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+				    struct kvm_page_fault *fault,
+				    u64 *sptep, u64 old_spte, u64 new_spte)
+{
+	/*
+	 * Theoretically we could also set dirty bit (and flush TLB) here in
+	 * order to eliminate unnecessary PML logging. See comments in
+	 * set_spte. But fast_page_fault is very unlikely to happen with PML
+	 * enabled, so we do not do this. This might result in the same GPA
+	 * to be logged in PML buffer again when the write really happens, and
+	 * eventually to be called by mark_page_dirty twice. But it's also no
+	 * harm. This also avoids the TLB flush needed after setting dirty bit
+	 * so non-PML cases won't be impacted.
+	 *
+	 * Compare with set_spte where instead shadow_dirty_mask is set.
+	 */
+	if (!try_cmpxchg64(sptep, &old_spte, new_spte))
+		return false;
+
+	if (is_writable_pte(new_spte) && !is_writable_pte(old_spte))
+		mark_page_dirty_in_slot(vcpu->kvm, fault->slot, fault->gfn);
+
+	return true;
+}
+
+static bool is_access_allowed(struct kvm_page_fault *fault, u64 spte)
+{
+	if (fault->exec)
+		return is_executable_pte(spte);
+
+	if (fault->write)
+		return is_writable_pte(spte);
+
+	/* Fault was on Read access */
+	return spte & PT_PRESENT_MASK;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Returns the last level spte pointer of the shadow page walk for the given
+ * gpa, and sets *spte to the spte value. This spte may be non-preset. If no
+ * walk could be performed, returns NULL and *spte does not contain valid data.
+ *
+ * Contract:
+ *  - Must be called between walk_shadow_page_lockless_{begin,end}.
+ *  - The returned sptep must not be used after walk_shadow_page_lockless_end.
+ */
+static u64 *fast_pf_get_last_sptep(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t gpa, u64 *spte)
+{
+	struct kvm_shadow_walk_iterator iterator;
+	u64 old_spte;
+	u64 *sptep = NULL;
+
+	for_each_shadow_entry_lockless(vcpu, gpa, iterator, old_spte) {
+		sptep = iterator.sptep;
+		*spte = old_spte;
+	}
+
+	return sptep;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Returns one of RET_PF_INVALID, RET_PF_FIXED or RET_PF_SPURIOUS.
+ */
+static int fast_page_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_page_fault *fault)
+{
+	struct kvm_mmu_page *sp;
+	int ret = RET_PF_INVALID;
+	u64 spte = 0ull;
+	u64 *sptep = NULL;
+	uint retry_count = 0;
+
+	if (!page_fault_can_be_fast(fault))
+		return ret;
+
+	walk_shadow_page_lockless_begin(vcpu);
+
+	do {
+		u64 new_spte;
+
+		if (tdp_mmu_enabled)
+			sptep = kvm_tdp_mmu_fast_pf_get_last_sptep(vcpu, fault->addr, &spte);
+		else
+			sptep = fast_pf_get_last_sptep(vcpu, fault->addr, &spte);
+
+		if (!is_shadow_present_pte(spte))
+			break;
+
+		sp = sptep_to_sp(sptep);
+		if (!is_last_spte(spte, sp->role.level))
+			break;
+
+		/*
+		 * Check whether the memory access that caused the fault would
+		 * still cause it if it were to be performed right now. If not,
+		 * then this is a spurious fault caused by TLB lazily flushed,
+		 * or some other CPU has already fixed the PTE after the
+		 * current CPU took the fault.
+		 *
+		 * Need not check the access of upper level table entries since
+		 * they are always ACC_ALL.
+		 */
+		if (is_access_allowed(fault, spte)) {
+			ret = RET_PF_SPURIOUS;
+			break;
+		}
+
+		new_spte = spte;
+
+		/*
+		 * KVM only supports fixing page faults outside of MMU lock for
+		 * direct MMUs, nested MMUs are always indirect, and KVM always
+		 * uses A/D bits for non-nested MMUs.  Thus, if A/D bits are
+		 * enabled, the SPTE can't be an access-tracked SPTE.
+		 */
+		if (unlikely(!kvm_ad_enabled()) && is_access_track_spte(spte))
+			new_spte = restore_acc_track_spte(new_spte);
+
+		/*
+		 * To keep things simple, only SPTEs that are MMU-writable can
+		 * be made fully writable outside of mmu_lock, e.g. only SPTEs
+		 * that were write-protected for dirty-logging or access
+		 * tracking are handled here.  Don't bother checking if the
+		 * SPTE is writable to prioritize running with A/D bits enabled.
+		 * The is_access_allowed() check above handles the common case
+		 * of the fault being spurious, and the SPTE is known to be
+		 * shadow-present, i.e. except for access tracking restoration
+		 * making the new SPTE writable, the check is wasteful.
+		 */
+		if (fault->write && is_mmu_writable_spte(spte)) {
+			new_spte |= PT_WRITABLE_MASK;
+
+			/*
+			 * Do not fix write-permission on the large spte when
+			 * dirty logging is enabled. Since we only dirty the
+			 * first page into the dirty-bitmap in
+			 * fast_pf_fix_direct_spte(), other pages are missed
+			 * if its slot has dirty logging enabled.
+			 *
+			 * Instead, we let the slow page fault path create a
+			 * normal spte to fix the access.
+			 */
+			if (sp->role.level > PG_LEVEL_4K &&
+			    kvm_slot_dirty_track_enabled(fault->slot))
+				break;
+		}
+
+		/* Verify that the fault can be handled in the fast path */
+		if (new_spte == spte ||
+		    !is_access_allowed(fault, new_spte))
+			break;
+
+		/*
+		 * Currently, fast page fault only works for direct mapping
+		 * since the gfn is not stable for indirect shadow page. See
+		 * Documentation/virt/kvm/locking.rst to get more detail.
+		 */
+		if (fast_pf_fix_direct_spte(vcpu, fault, sptep, spte, new_spte)) {
+			ret = RET_PF_FIXED;
+			break;
+		}
+
+		if (++retry_count > 4) {
+			pr_warn_once("Fast #PF retrying more than 4 times.\n");
+			break;
+		}
+
+	} while (true);
+
+	trace_fast_page_fault(vcpu, fault, sptep, spte, ret);
+	walk_shadow_page_lockless_end(vcpu);
+
+	if (ret != RET_PF_INVALID)
+		vcpu->stat.pf_fast++;
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static void mmu_free_root_page(struct kvm *kvm, hpa_t *root_hpa,
+			       struct list_head *invalid_list)
+{
+	struct kvm_mmu_page *sp;
+
+	if (!VALID_PAGE(*root_hpa))
+		return;
+
+	sp = root_to_sp(*root_hpa);
+	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!sp))
+		return;
+
+	if (is_tdp_mmu_page(sp))
+		kvm_tdp_mmu_put_root(kvm, sp, false);
+	else if (!--sp->root_count && sp->role.invalid)
+		kvm_mmu_prepare_zap_page(kvm, sp, invalid_list);
+
+	*root_hpa = INVALID_PAGE;
+}
+
+/* roots_to_free must be some combination of the KVM_MMU_ROOT_* flags */
+void kvm_mmu_free_roots(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_mmu *mmu,
+			ulong roots_to_free)
+{
+	int i;
+	LIST_HEAD(invalid_list);
+	bool free_active_root;
+
+	WARN_ON_ONCE(roots_to_free & ~KVM_MMU_ROOTS_ALL);
+
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(KVM_MMU_NUM_PREV_ROOTS >= BITS_PER_LONG);
+
+	/* Before acquiring the MMU lock, see if we need to do any real work. */
+	free_active_root = (roots_to_free & KVM_MMU_ROOT_CURRENT)
+		&& VALID_PAGE(mmu->root.hpa);
+
+	if (!free_active_root) {
+		for (i = 0; i < KVM_MMU_NUM_PREV_ROOTS; i++)
+			if ((roots_to_free & KVM_MMU_ROOT_PREVIOUS(i)) &&
+			    VALID_PAGE(mmu->prev_roots[i].hpa))
+				break;
+
+		if (i == KVM_MMU_NUM_PREV_ROOTS)
+			return;
+	}
+
+	write_lock(&kvm->mmu_lock);
+
+	for (i = 0; i < KVM_MMU_NUM_PREV_ROOTS; i++)
+		if (roots_to_free & KVM_MMU_ROOT_PREVIOUS(i))
+			mmu_free_root_page(kvm, &mmu->prev_roots[i].hpa,
+					   &invalid_list);
+
+	if (free_active_root) {
+		if (kvm_mmu_is_dummy_root(mmu->root.hpa)) {
+			/* Nothing to cleanup for dummy roots. */
+		} else if (root_to_sp(mmu->root.hpa)) {
+			mmu_free_root_page(kvm, &mmu->root.hpa, &invalid_list);
+		} else if (mmu->pae_root) {
+			for (i = 0; i < 4; ++i) {
+				if (!IS_VALID_PAE_ROOT(mmu->pae_root[i]))
+					continue;
+
+				mmu_free_root_page(kvm, &mmu->pae_root[i],
+						   &invalid_list);
+				mmu->pae_root[i] = INVALID_PAE_ROOT;
+			}
+		}
+		mmu->root.hpa = INVALID_PAGE;
+		mmu->root.pgd = 0;
+	}
+
+	kvm_mmu_commit_zap_page(kvm, &invalid_list);
+	write_unlock(&kvm->mmu_lock);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_mmu_free_roots);
+
+void kvm_mmu_free_guest_mode_roots(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_mmu *mmu)
+{
+	unsigned long roots_to_free = 0;
+	struct kvm_mmu_page *sp;
+	hpa_t root_hpa;
+	int i;
+
+	/*
+	 * This should not be called while L2 is active, L2 can't invalidate
+	 * _only_ its own roots, e.g. INVVPID unconditionally exits.
+	 */
+	WARN_ON_ONCE(mmu->root_role.guest_mode);
+
+	for (i = 0; i < KVM_MMU_NUM_PREV_ROOTS; i++) {
+		root_hpa = mmu->prev_roots[i].hpa;
+		if (!VALID_PAGE(root_hpa))
+			continue;
+
+		sp = root_to_sp(root_hpa);
+		if (!sp || sp->role.guest_mode)
+			roots_to_free |= KVM_MMU_ROOT_PREVIOUS(i);
+	}
+
+	kvm_mmu_free_roots(kvm, mmu, roots_to_free);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_mmu_free_guest_mode_roots);
+
+static hpa_t mmu_alloc_root(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gfn_t gfn, int quadrant,
+			    u8 level)
+{
+	union kvm_mmu_page_role role = vcpu->arch.mmu->root_role;
+	struct kvm_mmu_page *sp;
+
+	role.level = level;
+	role.quadrant = quadrant;
+
+	WARN_ON_ONCE(quadrant && !role.has_4_byte_gpte);
+	WARN_ON_ONCE(role.direct && role.has_4_byte_gpte);
+
+	sp = kvm_mmu_get_shadow_page(vcpu, gfn, role);
+	++sp->root_count;
+
+	return __pa(sp->spt);
+}
+
+static int mmu_alloc_direct_roots(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct kvm_mmu *mmu = vcpu->arch.mmu;
+	u8 shadow_root_level = mmu->root_role.level;
+	hpa_t root;
+	unsigned i;
+	int r;
+
+	write_lock(&vcpu->kvm->mmu_lock);
+	r = make_mmu_pages_available(vcpu);
+	if (r < 0)
+		goto out_unlock;
+
+	if (tdp_mmu_enabled) {
+		root = kvm_tdp_mmu_get_vcpu_root_hpa(vcpu);
+		mmu->root.hpa = root;
+	} else if (shadow_root_level >= PT64_ROOT_4LEVEL) {
+		root = mmu_alloc_root(vcpu, 0, 0, shadow_root_level);
+		mmu->root.hpa = root;
+	} else if (shadow_root_level == PT32E_ROOT_LEVEL) {
+		if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!mmu->pae_root)) {
+			r = -EIO;
+			goto out_unlock;
+		}
+
+		for (i = 0; i < 4; ++i) {
+			WARN_ON_ONCE(IS_VALID_PAE_ROOT(mmu->pae_root[i]));
+
+			root = mmu_alloc_root(vcpu, i << (30 - PAGE_SHIFT), 0,
+					      PT32_ROOT_LEVEL);
+			mmu->pae_root[i] = root | PT_PRESENT_MASK |
+					   shadow_me_value;
+		}
+		mmu->root.hpa = __pa(mmu->pae_root);
+	} else {
+		WARN_ONCE(1, "Bad TDP root level = %d\n", shadow_root_level);
+		r = -EIO;
+		goto out_unlock;
+	}
+
+	/* root.pgd is ignored for direct MMUs. */
+	mmu->root.pgd = 0;
+out_unlock:
+	write_unlock(&vcpu->kvm->mmu_lock);
+	return r;
+}
+
+static int mmu_first_shadow_root_alloc(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+	struct kvm_memslots *slots;
+	struct kvm_memory_slot *slot;
+	int r = 0, i, bkt;
+
+	/*
+	 * Check if this is the first shadow root being allocated before
+	 * taking the lock.
+	 */
+	if (kvm_shadow_root_allocated(kvm))
+		return 0;
+
+	mutex_lock(&kvm->slots_arch_lock);
+
+	/* Recheck, under the lock, whether this is the first shadow root. */
+	if (kvm_shadow_root_allocated(kvm))
+		goto out_unlock;
+
+	/*
+	 * Check if anything actually needs to be allocated, e.g. all metadata
+	 * will be allocated upfront if TDP is disabled.
+	 */
+	if (kvm_memslots_have_rmaps(kvm) &&
+	    kvm_page_track_write_tracking_enabled(kvm))
+		goto out_success;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < KVM_ADDRESS_SPACE_NUM; i++) {
+		slots = __kvm_memslots(kvm, i);
+		kvm_for_each_memslot(slot, bkt, slots) {
+			/*
+			 * Both of these functions are no-ops if the target is
+			 * already allocated, so unconditionally calling both
+			 * is safe.  Intentionally do NOT free allocations on
+			 * failure to avoid having to track which allocations
+			 * were made now versus when the memslot was created.
+			 * The metadata is guaranteed to be freed when the slot
+			 * is freed, and will be kept/used if userspace retries
+			 * KVM_RUN instead of killing the VM.
+			 */
+			r = memslot_rmap_alloc(slot, slot->npages);
+			if (r)
+				goto out_unlock;
+			r = kvm_page_track_write_tracking_alloc(slot);
+			if (r)
+				goto out_unlock;
+		}
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Ensure that shadow_root_allocated becomes true strictly after
+	 * all the related pointers are set.
+	 */
+out_success:
+	smp_store_release(&kvm->arch.shadow_root_allocated, true);
+
+out_unlock:
+	mutex_unlock(&kvm->slots_arch_lock);
+	return r;
+}
+
+static int mmu_alloc_shadow_roots(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct kvm_mmu *mmu = vcpu->arch.mmu;
+	u64 pdptrs[4], pm_mask;
+	gfn_t root_gfn, root_pgd;
+	int quadrant, i, r;
+	hpa_t root;
+
+	root_pgd = kvm_mmu_get_guest_pgd(vcpu, mmu);
+	root_gfn = root_pgd >> PAGE_SHIFT;
+
+	if (!kvm_vcpu_is_visible_gfn(vcpu, root_gfn)) {
+		mmu->root.hpa = kvm_mmu_get_dummy_root();
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * On SVM, reading PDPTRs might access guest memory, which might fault
+	 * and thus might sleep.  Grab the PDPTRs before acquiring mmu_lock.
+	 */
+	if (mmu->cpu_role.base.level == PT32E_ROOT_LEVEL) {
+		for (i = 0; i < 4; ++i) {
+			pdptrs[i] = mmu->get_pdptr(vcpu, i);
+			if (!(pdptrs[i] & PT_PRESENT_MASK))
+				continue;
+
+			if (!kvm_vcpu_is_visible_gfn(vcpu, pdptrs[i] >> PAGE_SHIFT))
+				pdptrs[i] = 0;
+		}
+	}
+
+	r = mmu_first_shadow_root_alloc(vcpu->kvm);
+	if (r)
+		return r;
+
+	write_lock(&vcpu->kvm->mmu_lock);
+	r = make_mmu_pages_available(vcpu);
+	if (r < 0)
+		goto out_unlock;
+
+	/*
+	 * Do we shadow a long mode page table? If so we need to
+	 * write-protect the guests page table root.
+	 */
+	if (mmu->cpu_role.base.level >= PT64_ROOT_4LEVEL) {
+		root = mmu_alloc_root(vcpu, root_gfn, 0,
+				      mmu->root_role.level);
+		mmu->root.hpa = root;
+		goto set_root_pgd;
+	}
+
+	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!mmu->pae_root)) {
+		r = -EIO;
+		goto out_unlock;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * We shadow a 32 bit page table. This may be a legacy 2-level
+	 * or a PAE 3-level page table. In either case we need to be aware that
+	 * the shadow page table may be a PAE or a long mode page table.
+	 */
+	pm_mask = PT_PRESENT_MASK | shadow_me_value;
+	if (mmu->root_role.level >= PT64_ROOT_4LEVEL) {
+		pm_mask |= PT_ACCESSED_MASK | PT_WRITABLE_MASK | PT_USER_MASK;
+
+		if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!mmu->pml4_root)) {
+			r = -EIO;
+			goto out_unlock;
+		}
+		mmu->pml4_root[0] = __pa(mmu->pae_root) | pm_mask;
+
+		if (mmu->root_role.level == PT64_ROOT_5LEVEL) {
+			if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!mmu->pml5_root)) {
+				r = -EIO;
+				goto out_unlock;
+			}
+			mmu->pml5_root[0] = __pa(mmu->pml4_root) | pm_mask;
+		}
+	}
+
+	for (i = 0; i < 4; ++i) {
+		WARN_ON_ONCE(IS_VALID_PAE_ROOT(mmu->pae_root[i]));
+
+		if (mmu->cpu_role.base.level == PT32E_ROOT_LEVEL) {
+			if (!(pdptrs[i] & PT_PRESENT_MASK)) {
+				mmu->pae_root[i] = INVALID_PAE_ROOT;
+				continue;
+			}
+			root_gfn = pdptrs[i] >> PAGE_SHIFT;
+		}
+
+		/*
+		 * If shadowing 32-bit non-PAE page tables, each PAE page
+		 * directory maps one quarter of the guest's non-PAE page
+		 * directory. Othwerise each PAE page direct shadows one guest
+		 * PAE page directory so that quadrant should be 0.
+		 */
+		quadrant = (mmu->cpu_role.base.level == PT32_ROOT_LEVEL) ? i : 0;
+
+		root = mmu_alloc_root(vcpu, root_gfn, quadrant, PT32_ROOT_LEVEL);
+		mmu->pae_root[i] = root | pm_mask;
+	}
+
+	if (mmu->root_role.level == PT64_ROOT_5LEVEL)
+		mmu->root.hpa = __pa(mmu->pml5_root);
+	else if (mmu->root_role.level == PT64_ROOT_4LEVEL)
+		mmu->root.hpa = __pa(mmu->pml4_root);
+	else
+		mmu->root.hpa = __pa(mmu->pae_root);
+
+set_root_pgd:
+	mmu->root.pgd = root_pgd;
+out_unlock:
+	write_unlock(&vcpu->kvm->mmu_lock);
+
+	return r;
+}
+
+static int mmu_alloc_special_roots(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct kvm_mmu *mmu = vcpu->arch.mmu;
+	bool need_pml5 = mmu->root_role.level > PT64_ROOT_4LEVEL;
+	u64 *pml5_root = NULL;
+	u64 *pml4_root = NULL;
+	u64 *pae_root;
+
+	/*
+	 * When shadowing 32-bit or PAE NPT with 64-bit NPT, the PML4 and PDP
+	 * tables are allocated and initialized at root creation as there is no
+	 * equivalent level in the guest's NPT to shadow.  Allocate the tables
+	 * on demand, as running a 32-bit L1 VMM on 64-bit KVM is very rare.
+	 */
+	if (mmu->root_role.direct ||
+	    mmu->cpu_role.base.level >= PT64_ROOT_4LEVEL ||
+	    mmu->root_role.level < PT64_ROOT_4LEVEL)
+		return 0;
+
+	/*
+	 * NPT, the only paging mode that uses this horror, uses a fixed number
+	 * of levels for the shadow page tables, e.g. all MMUs are 4-level or
+	 * all MMus are 5-level.  Thus, this can safely require that pml5_root
+	 * is allocated if the other roots are valid and pml5 is needed, as any
+	 * prior MMU would also have required pml5.
+	 */
+	if (mmu->pae_root && mmu->pml4_root && (!need_pml5 || mmu->pml5_root))
+		return 0;
+
+	/*
+	 * The special roots should always be allocated in concert.  Yell and
+	 * bail if KVM ends up in a state where only one of the roots is valid.
+	 */
+	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!tdp_enabled || mmu->pae_root || mmu->pml4_root ||
+			 (need_pml5 && mmu->pml5_root)))
+		return -EIO;
+
+	/*
+	 * Unlike 32-bit NPT, the PDP table doesn't need to be in low mem, and
+	 * doesn't need to be decrypted.
+	 */
+	pae_root = (void *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
+	if (!pae_root)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+	pml4_root = (void *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
+	if (!pml4_root)
+		goto err_pml4;
+
+	if (need_pml5) {
+		pml5_root = (void *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
+		if (!pml5_root)
+			goto err_pml5;
+	}
+#endif
+
+	mmu->pae_root = pae_root;
+	mmu->pml4_root = pml4_root;
+	mmu->pml5_root = pml5_root;
+
+	return 0;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+err_pml5:
+	free_page((unsigned long)pml4_root);
+err_pml4:
+	free_page((unsigned long)pae_root);
+	return -ENOMEM;
+#endif
+}
+
+static bool is_unsync_root(hpa_t root)
+{
+	struct kvm_mmu_page *sp;
+
+	if (!VALID_PAGE(root) || kvm_mmu_is_dummy_root(root))
+		return false;
+
+	/*
+	 * The read barrier orders the CPU's read of SPTE.W during the page table
+	 * walk before the reads of sp->unsync/sp->unsync_children here.
+	 *
+	 * Even if another CPU was marking the SP as unsync-ed simultaneously,
+	 * any guest page table changes are not guaranteed to be visible anyway
+	 * until this VCPU issues a TLB flush strictly after those changes are
+	 * made.  We only need to ensure that the other CPU sets these flags
+	 * before any actual changes to the page tables are made.  The comments
+	 * in mmu_try_to_unsync_pages() describe what could go wrong if this
+	 * requirement isn't satisfied.
+	 */
+	smp_rmb();
+	sp = root_to_sp(root);
+
+	/*
+	 * PAE roots (somewhat arbitrarily) aren't backed by shadow pages, the
+	 * PDPTEs for a given PAE root need to be synchronized individually.
+	 */
+	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!sp))
+		return false;
+
+	if (sp->unsync || sp->unsync_children)
+		return true;
+
+	return false;
+}
+
+void kvm_mmu_sync_roots(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	int i;
+	struct kvm_mmu_page *sp;
+
+	if (vcpu->arch.mmu->root_role.direct)
+		return;
+
+	if (!VALID_PAGE(vcpu->arch.mmu->root.hpa))
+		return;
+
+	vcpu_clear_mmio_info(vcpu, MMIO_GVA_ANY);
+
+	if (vcpu->arch.mmu->cpu_role.base.level >= PT64_ROOT_4LEVEL) {
+		hpa_t root = vcpu->arch.mmu->root.hpa;
+
+		if (!is_unsync_root(root))
+			return;
+
+		sp = root_to_sp(root);
+
+		write_lock(&vcpu->kvm->mmu_lock);
+		mmu_sync_children(vcpu, sp, true);
+		write_unlock(&vcpu->kvm->mmu_lock);
+		return;
+	}
+
+	write_lock(&vcpu->kvm->mmu_lock);
+
+	for (i = 0; i < 4; ++i) {
+		hpa_t root = vcpu->arch.mmu->pae_root[i];
+
+		if (IS_VALID_PAE_ROOT(root)) {
+			sp = spte_to_child_sp(root);
+			mmu_sync_children(vcpu, sp, true);
+		}
+	}
+
+	write_unlock(&vcpu->kvm->mmu_lock);
+}
+
+void kvm_mmu_sync_prev_roots(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	unsigned long roots_to_free = 0;
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < KVM_MMU_NUM_PREV_ROOTS; i++)
+		if (is_unsync_root(vcpu->arch.mmu->prev_roots[i].hpa))
+			roots_to_free |= KVM_MMU_ROOT_PREVIOUS(i);
+
+	/* sync prev_roots by simply freeing them */
+	kvm_mmu_free_roots(vcpu->kvm, vcpu->arch.mmu, roots_to_free);
+}
+
+static gpa_t nonpaging_gva_to_gpa(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_mmu *mmu,
+				  gpa_t vaddr, u64 access,
+				  struct x86_exception *exception)
+{
+	if (exception)
+		exception->error_code = 0;
+	return kvm_translate_gpa(vcpu, mmu, vaddr, access, exception);
+}
+
+static bool mmio_info_in_cache(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 addr, bool direct)
+{
+	/*
+	 * A nested guest cannot use the MMIO cache if it is using nested
+	 * page tables, because cr2 is a nGPA while the cache stores GPAs.
+	 */
+	if (mmu_is_nested(vcpu))
+		return false;
+
+	if (direct)
+		return vcpu_match_mmio_gpa(vcpu, addr);
+
+	return vcpu_match_mmio_gva(vcpu, addr);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Return the level of the lowest level SPTE added to sptes.
+ * That SPTE may be non-present.
+ *
+ * Must be called between walk_shadow_page_lockless_{begin,end}.
+ */
+static int get_walk(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 addr, u64 *sptes, int *root_level)
+{
+	struct kvm_shadow_walk_iterator iterator;
+	int leaf = -1;
+	u64 spte;
+
+	for (shadow_walk_init(&iterator, vcpu, addr),
+	     *root_level = iterator.level;
+	     shadow_walk_okay(&iterator);
+	     __shadow_walk_next(&iterator, spte)) {
+		leaf = iterator.level;
+		spte = mmu_spte_get_lockless(iterator.sptep);
+
+		sptes[leaf] = spte;
+	}
+
+	return leaf;
+}
+
+/* return true if reserved bit(s) are detected on a valid, non-MMIO SPTE. */
+static bool get_mmio_spte(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 addr, u64 *sptep)
+{
+	u64 sptes[PT64_ROOT_MAX_LEVEL + 1];
+	struct rsvd_bits_validate *rsvd_check;
+	int root, leaf, level;
+	bool reserved = false;
+
+	walk_shadow_page_lockless_begin(vcpu);
+
+	if (is_tdp_mmu_active(vcpu))
+		leaf = kvm_tdp_mmu_get_walk(vcpu, addr, sptes, &root);
+	else
+		leaf = get_walk(vcpu, addr, sptes, &root);
+
+	walk_shadow_page_lockless_end(vcpu);
+
+	if (unlikely(leaf < 0)) {
+		*sptep = 0ull;
+		return reserved;
+	}
+
+	*sptep = sptes[leaf];
+
+	/*
+	 * Skip reserved bits checks on the terminal leaf if it's not a valid
+	 * SPTE.  Note, this also (intentionally) skips MMIO SPTEs, which, by
+	 * design, always have reserved bits set.  The purpose of the checks is
+	 * to detect reserved bits on non-MMIO SPTEs. i.e. buggy SPTEs.
+	 */
+	if (!is_shadow_present_pte(sptes[leaf]))
+		leaf++;
+
+	rsvd_check = &vcpu->arch.mmu->shadow_zero_check;
+
+	for (level = root; level >= leaf; level--)
+		reserved |= is_rsvd_spte(rsvd_check, sptes[level], level);
+
+	if (reserved) {
+		pr_err("%s: reserved bits set on MMU-present spte, addr 0x%llx, hierarchy:\n",
+		       __func__, addr);
+		for (level = root; level >= leaf; level--)
+			pr_err("------ spte = 0x%llx level = %d, rsvd bits = 0x%llx",
+			       sptes[level], level,
+			       get_rsvd_bits(rsvd_check, sptes[level], level));
+	}
+
+	return reserved;
+}
+
+static int handle_mmio_page_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 addr, bool direct)
+{
+	u64 spte;
+	bool reserved;
+
+	if (mmio_info_in_cache(vcpu, addr, direct))
+		return RET_PF_EMULATE;
+
+	reserved = get_mmio_spte(vcpu, addr, &spte);
+	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(reserved))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (is_mmio_spte(spte)) {
+		gfn_t gfn = get_mmio_spte_gfn(spte);
+		unsigned int access = get_mmio_spte_access(spte);
+
+		if (!check_mmio_spte(vcpu, spte))
+			return RET_PF_INVALID;
+
+		if (direct)
+			addr = 0;
+
+		trace_handle_mmio_page_fault(addr, gfn, access);
+		vcpu_cache_mmio_info(vcpu, addr, gfn, access);
+		return RET_PF_EMULATE;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * If the page table is zapped by other cpus, let CPU fault again on
+	 * the address.
+	 */
+	return RET_PF_RETRY;
+}
+
+static bool page_fault_handle_page_track(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+					 struct kvm_page_fault *fault)
+{
+	if (unlikely(fault->rsvd))
+		return false;
+
+	if (!fault->present || !fault->write)
+		return false;
+
+	/*
+	 * guest is writing the page which is write tracked which can
+	 * not be fixed by page fault handler.
+	 */
+	if (kvm_gfn_is_write_tracked(vcpu->kvm, fault->slot, fault->gfn))
+		return true;
+
+	return false;
+}
+
+static void shadow_page_table_clear_flood(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gva_t addr)
+{
+	struct kvm_shadow_walk_iterator iterator;
+	u64 spte;
+
+	walk_shadow_page_lockless_begin(vcpu);
+	for_each_shadow_entry_lockless(vcpu, addr, iterator, spte)
+		clear_sp_write_flooding_count(iterator.sptep);
+	walk_shadow_page_lockless_end(vcpu);
+}
+
+static u32 alloc_apf_token(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	/* make sure the token value is not 0 */
+	u32 id = vcpu->arch.apf.id;
+
+	if (id << 12 == 0)
+		vcpu->arch.apf.id = 1;
+
+	return (vcpu->arch.apf.id++ << 12) | vcpu->vcpu_id;
+}
+
+static bool kvm_arch_setup_async_pf(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t cr2_or_gpa,
+				    gfn_t gfn)
+{
+	struct kvm_arch_async_pf arch;
+
+	arch.token = alloc_apf_token(vcpu);
+	arch.gfn = gfn;
+	arch.direct_map = vcpu->arch.mmu->root_role.direct;
+	arch.cr3 = kvm_mmu_get_guest_pgd(vcpu, vcpu->arch.mmu);
+
+	return kvm_setup_async_pf(vcpu, cr2_or_gpa,
+				  kvm_vcpu_gfn_to_hva(vcpu, gfn), &arch);
+}
+
+void kvm_arch_async_page_ready(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_async_pf *work)
+{
+	int r;
+
+	if ((vcpu->arch.mmu->root_role.direct != work->arch.direct_map) ||
+	      work->wakeup_all)
+		return;
+
+	r = kvm_mmu_reload(vcpu);
+	if (unlikely(r))
+		return;
+
+	if (!vcpu->arch.mmu->root_role.direct &&
+	      work->arch.cr3 != kvm_mmu_get_guest_pgd(vcpu, vcpu->arch.mmu))
+		return;
+
+	kvm_mmu_do_page_fault(vcpu, work->cr2_or_gpa, 0, true, NULL);
+}
+
+static int __kvm_faultin_pfn(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_page_fault *fault)
+{
+	struct kvm_memory_slot *slot = fault->slot;
+	bool async;
+
+	/*
+	 * Retry the page fault if the gfn hit a memslot that is being deleted
+	 * or moved.  This ensures any existing SPTEs for the old memslot will
+	 * be zapped before KVM inserts a new MMIO SPTE for the gfn.
+	 */
+	if (slot && (slot->flags & KVM_MEMSLOT_INVALID))
+		return RET_PF_RETRY;
+
+	if (!kvm_is_visible_memslot(slot)) {
+		/* Don't expose private memslots to L2. */
+		if (is_guest_mode(vcpu)) {
+			fault->slot = NULL;
+			fault->pfn = KVM_PFN_NOSLOT;
+			fault->map_writable = false;
+			return RET_PF_CONTINUE;
+		}
+		/*
+		 * If the APIC access page exists but is disabled, go directly
+		 * to emulation without caching the MMIO access or creating a
+		 * MMIO SPTE.  That way the cache doesn't need to be purged
+		 * when the AVIC is re-enabled.
+		 */
+		if (slot && slot->id == APIC_ACCESS_PAGE_PRIVATE_MEMSLOT &&
+		    !kvm_apicv_activated(vcpu->kvm))
+			return RET_PF_EMULATE;
+	}
+
+	async = false;
+	fault->pfn = __gfn_to_pfn_memslot(slot, fault->gfn, false, false, &async,
+					  fault->write, &fault->map_writable,
+					  &fault->hva);
+	if (!async)
+		return RET_PF_CONTINUE; /* *pfn has correct page already */
+
+	if (!fault->prefetch && kvm_can_do_async_pf(vcpu)) {
+		trace_kvm_try_async_get_page(fault->addr, fault->gfn);
+		if (kvm_find_async_pf_gfn(vcpu, fault->gfn)) {
+			trace_kvm_async_pf_repeated_fault(fault->addr, fault->gfn);
+			kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_APF_HALT, vcpu);
+			return RET_PF_RETRY;
+		} else if (kvm_arch_setup_async_pf(vcpu, fault->addr, fault->gfn)) {
+			return RET_PF_RETRY;
+		}
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Allow gup to bail on pending non-fatal signals when it's also allowed
+	 * to wait for IO.  Note, gup always bails if it is unable to quickly
+	 * get a page and a fatal signal, i.e. SIGKILL, is pending.
+	 */
+	fault->pfn = __gfn_to_pfn_memslot(slot, fault->gfn, false, true, NULL,
+					  fault->write, &fault->map_writable,
+					  &fault->hva);
+	return RET_PF_CONTINUE;
+}
+
+static int kvm_faultin_pfn(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_page_fault *fault,
+			   unsigned int access)
+{
+	int ret;
+
+	fault->mmu_seq = vcpu->kvm->mmu_invalidate_seq;
+	smp_rmb();
+
+	ret = __kvm_faultin_pfn(vcpu, fault);
+	if (ret != RET_PF_CONTINUE)
+		return ret;
+
+	if (unlikely(is_error_pfn(fault->pfn)))
+		return kvm_handle_error_pfn(vcpu, fault);
+
+	if (unlikely(!fault->slot))
+		return kvm_handle_noslot_fault(vcpu, fault, access);
+
+	return RET_PF_CONTINUE;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Returns true if the page fault is stale and needs to be retried, i.e. if the
+ * root was invalidated by a memslot update or a relevant mmu_notifier fired.
+ */
+static bool is_page_fault_stale(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+				struct kvm_page_fault *fault)
+{
+	struct kvm_mmu_page *sp = root_to_sp(vcpu->arch.mmu->root.hpa);
+
+	/* Special roots, e.g. pae_root, are not backed by shadow pages. */
+	if (sp && is_obsolete_sp(vcpu->kvm, sp))
+		return true;
+
+	/*
+	 * Roots without an associated shadow page are considered invalid if
+	 * there is a pending request to free obsolete roots.  The request is
+	 * only a hint that the current root _may_ be obsolete and needs to be
+	 * reloaded, e.g. if the guest frees a PGD that KVM is tracking as a
+	 * previous root, then __kvm_mmu_prepare_zap_page() signals all vCPUs
+	 * to reload even if no vCPU is actively using the root.
+	 */
+	if (!sp && kvm_test_request(KVM_REQ_MMU_FREE_OBSOLETE_ROOTS, vcpu))
+		return true;
+
+	return fault->slot &&
+	       mmu_invalidate_retry_hva(vcpu->kvm, fault->mmu_seq, fault->hva);
+}
+
+static int direct_page_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_page_fault *fault)
+{
+	int r;
+
+	/* Dummy roots are used only for shadowing bad guest roots. */
+	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(kvm_mmu_is_dummy_root(vcpu->arch.mmu->root.hpa)))
+		return RET_PF_RETRY;
+
+	if (page_fault_handle_page_track(vcpu, fault))
+		return RET_PF_EMULATE;
+
+	r = fast_page_fault(vcpu, fault);
+	if (r != RET_PF_INVALID)
+		return r;
+
+	r = mmu_topup_memory_caches(vcpu, false);
+	if (r)
+		return r;
+
+	r = kvm_faultin_pfn(vcpu, fault, ACC_ALL);
+	if (r != RET_PF_CONTINUE)
+		return r;
+
+	r = RET_PF_RETRY;
+	write_lock(&vcpu->kvm->mmu_lock);
+
+	if (is_page_fault_stale(vcpu, fault))
+		goto out_unlock;
+
+	r = make_mmu_pages_available(vcpu);
+	if (r)
+		goto out_unlock;
+
+	r = direct_map(vcpu, fault);
+
+out_unlock:
+	write_unlock(&vcpu->kvm->mmu_lock);
+	kvm_release_pfn_clean(fault->pfn);
+	return r;
+}
+
+static int nonpaging_page_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+				struct kvm_page_fault *fault)
+{
+	/* This path builds a PAE pagetable, we can map 2mb pages at maximum. */
+	fault->max_level = PG_LEVEL_2M;
+	return direct_page_fault(vcpu, fault);
+}
+
+int kvm_handle_page_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 error_code,
+				u64 fault_address, char *insn, int insn_len)
+{
+	int r = 1;
+	u32 flags = vcpu->arch.apf.host_apf_flags;
+
+#ifndef CONFIG_X86_64
+	/* A 64-bit CR2 should be impossible on 32-bit KVM. */
+	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(fault_address >> 32))
+		return -EFAULT;
+#endif
+
+	vcpu->arch.l1tf_flush_l1d = true;
+	if (!flags) {
+		trace_kvm_page_fault(vcpu, fault_address, error_code);
+
+		if (kvm_event_needs_reinjection(vcpu))
+			kvm_mmu_unprotect_page_virt(vcpu, fault_address);
+		r = kvm_mmu_page_fault(vcpu, fault_address, error_code, insn,
+				insn_len);
+	} else if (flags & KVM_PV_REASON_PAGE_NOT_PRESENT) {
+		vcpu->arch.apf.host_apf_flags = 0;
+		local_irq_disable();
+		kvm_async_pf_task_wait_schedule(fault_address);
+		local_irq_enable();
+	} else {
+		WARN_ONCE(1, "Unexpected host async PF flags: %x\n", flags);
+	}
+
+	return r;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_handle_page_fault);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+static int kvm_tdp_mmu_page_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+				  struct kvm_page_fault *fault)
+{
+	int r;
+
+	if (page_fault_handle_page_track(vcpu, fault))
+		return RET_PF_EMULATE;
+
+	r = fast_page_fault(vcpu, fault);
+	if (r != RET_PF_INVALID)
+		return r;
+
+	r = mmu_topup_memory_caches(vcpu, false);
+	if (r)
+		return r;
+
+	r = kvm_faultin_pfn(vcpu, fault, ACC_ALL);
+	if (r != RET_PF_CONTINUE)
+		return r;
+
+	r = RET_PF_RETRY;
+	read_lock(&vcpu->kvm->mmu_lock);
+
+	if (is_page_fault_stale(vcpu, fault))
+		goto out_unlock;
+
+	r = kvm_tdp_mmu_map(vcpu, fault);
+
+out_unlock:
+	read_unlock(&vcpu->kvm->mmu_lock);
+	kvm_release_pfn_clean(fault->pfn);
+	return r;
+}
+#endif
+
+int kvm_tdp_page_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_page_fault *fault)
+{
+	/*
+	 * If the guest's MTRRs may be used to compute the "real" memtype,
+	 * restrict the mapping level to ensure KVM uses a consistent memtype
+	 * across the entire mapping.  If the host MTRRs are ignored by TDP
+	 * (shadow_memtype_mask is non-zero), and the VM has non-coherent DMA
+	 * (DMA doesn't snoop CPU caches), KVM's ABI is to honor the memtype
+	 * from the guest's MTRRs so that guest accesses to memory that is
+	 * DMA'd aren't cached against the guest's wishes.
+	 *
+	 * Note, KVM may still ultimately ignore guest MTRRs for certain PFNs,
+	 * e.g. KVM will force UC memtype for host MMIO.
+	 */
+	if (shadow_memtype_mask && kvm_arch_has_noncoherent_dma(vcpu->kvm)) {
+		for ( ; fault->max_level > PG_LEVEL_4K; --fault->max_level) {
+			int page_num = KVM_PAGES_PER_HPAGE(fault->max_level);
+			gfn_t base = gfn_round_for_level(fault->gfn,
+							 fault->max_level);
+
+			if (kvm_mtrr_check_gfn_range_consistency(vcpu, base, page_num))
+				break;
+		}
+	}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+	if (tdp_mmu_enabled)
+		return kvm_tdp_mmu_page_fault(vcpu, fault);
+#endif
+
+	return direct_page_fault(vcpu, fault);
+}
+
+static void nonpaging_init_context(struct kvm_mmu *context)
+{
+	context->page_fault = nonpaging_page_fault;
+	context->gva_to_gpa = nonpaging_gva_to_gpa;
+	context->sync_spte = NULL;
+}
+
+static inline bool is_root_usable(struct kvm_mmu_root_info *root, gpa_t pgd,
+				  union kvm_mmu_page_role role)
+{
+	struct kvm_mmu_page *sp;
+
+	if (!VALID_PAGE(root->hpa))
+		return false;
+
+	if (!role.direct && pgd != root->pgd)
+		return false;
+
+	sp = root_to_sp(root->hpa);
+	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!sp))
+		return false;
+
+	return role.word == sp->role.word;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Find out if a previously cached root matching the new pgd/role is available,
+ * and insert the current root as the MRU in the cache.
+ * If a matching root is found, it is assigned to kvm_mmu->root and
+ * true is returned.
+ * If no match is found, kvm_mmu->root is left invalid, the LRU root is
+ * evicted to make room for the current root, and false is returned.
+ */
+static bool cached_root_find_and_keep_current(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_mmu *mmu,
+					      gpa_t new_pgd,
+					      union kvm_mmu_page_role new_role)
+{
+	uint i;
+
+	if (is_root_usable(&mmu->root, new_pgd, new_role))
+		return true;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < KVM_MMU_NUM_PREV_ROOTS; i++) {
+		/*
+		 * The swaps end up rotating the cache like this:
+		 *   C   0 1 2 3   (on entry to the function)
+		 *   0   C 1 2 3
+		 *   1   C 0 2 3
+		 *   2   C 0 1 3
+		 *   3   C 0 1 2   (on exit from the loop)
+		 */
+		swap(mmu->root, mmu->prev_roots[i]);
+		if (is_root_usable(&mmu->root, new_pgd, new_role))
+			return true;
+	}
+
+	kvm_mmu_free_roots(kvm, mmu, KVM_MMU_ROOT_CURRENT);
+	return false;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Find out if a previously cached root matching the new pgd/role is available.
+ * On entry, mmu->root is invalid.
+ * If a matching root is found, it is assigned to kvm_mmu->root, the LRU entry
+ * of the cache becomes invalid, and true is returned.
+ * If no match is found, kvm_mmu->root is left invalid and false is returned.
+ */
+static bool cached_root_find_without_current(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_mmu *mmu,
+					     gpa_t new_pgd,
+					     union kvm_mmu_page_role new_role)
+{
+	uint i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < KVM_MMU_NUM_PREV_ROOTS; i++)
+		if (is_root_usable(&mmu->prev_roots[i], new_pgd, new_role))
+			goto hit;
+
+	return false;
+
+hit:
+	swap(mmu->root, mmu->prev_roots[i]);
+	/* Bubble up the remaining roots.  */
+	for (; i < KVM_MMU_NUM_PREV_ROOTS - 1; i++)
+		mmu->prev_roots[i] = mmu->prev_roots[i + 1];
+	mmu->prev_roots[i].hpa = INVALID_PAGE;
+	return true;
+}
+
+static bool fast_pgd_switch(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_mmu *mmu,
+			    gpa_t new_pgd, union kvm_mmu_page_role new_role)
+{
+	/*
+	 * Limit reuse to 64-bit hosts+VMs without "special" roots in order to
+	 * avoid having to deal with PDPTEs and other complexities.
+	 */
+	if (VALID_PAGE(mmu->root.hpa) && !root_to_sp(mmu->root.hpa))
+		kvm_mmu_free_roots(kvm, mmu, KVM_MMU_ROOT_CURRENT);
+
+	if (VALID_PAGE(mmu->root.hpa))
+		return cached_root_find_and_keep_current(kvm, mmu, new_pgd, new_role);
+	else
+		return cached_root_find_without_current(kvm, mmu, new_pgd, new_role);
+}
+
+void kvm_mmu_new_pgd(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t new_pgd)
+{
+	struct kvm_mmu *mmu = vcpu->arch.mmu;
+	union kvm_mmu_page_role new_role = mmu->root_role;
+
+	/*
+	 * Return immediately if no usable root was found, kvm_mmu_reload()
+	 * will establish a valid root prior to the next VM-Enter.
+	 */
+	if (!fast_pgd_switch(vcpu->kvm, mmu, new_pgd, new_role))
+		return;
+
+	/*
+	 * It's possible that the cached previous root page is obsolete because
+	 * of a change in the MMU generation number. However, changing the
+	 * generation number is accompanied by KVM_REQ_MMU_FREE_OBSOLETE_ROOTS,
+	 * which will free the root set here and allocate a new one.
+	 */
+	kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_LOAD_MMU_PGD, vcpu);
+
+	if (force_flush_and_sync_on_reuse) {
+		kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_MMU_SYNC, vcpu);
+		kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_TLB_FLUSH_CURRENT, vcpu);
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * The last MMIO access's GVA and GPA are cached in the VCPU. When
+	 * switching to a new CR3, that GVA->GPA mapping may no longer be
+	 * valid. So clear any cached MMIO info even when we don't need to sync
+	 * the shadow page tables.
+	 */
+	vcpu_clear_mmio_info(vcpu, MMIO_GVA_ANY);
+
+	/*
+	 * If this is a direct root page, it doesn't have a write flooding
+	 * count. Otherwise, clear the write flooding count.
+	 */
+	if (!new_role.direct) {
+		struct kvm_mmu_page *sp = root_to_sp(vcpu->arch.mmu->root.hpa);
+
+		if (!WARN_ON_ONCE(!sp))
+			__clear_sp_write_flooding_count(sp);
+	}
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_mmu_new_pgd);
+
+static bool sync_mmio_spte(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 *sptep, gfn_t gfn,
+			   unsigned int access)
+{
+	if (unlikely(is_mmio_spte(*sptep))) {
+		if (gfn != get_mmio_spte_gfn(*sptep)) {
+			mmu_spte_clear_no_track(sptep);
+			return true;
+		}
+
+		mark_mmio_spte(vcpu, sptep, gfn, access);
+		return true;
+	}
+
+	return false;
+}
+
+#define PTTYPE_EPT 18 /* arbitrary */
+#define PTTYPE PTTYPE_EPT
+#include "paging_tmpl.h"
+#undef PTTYPE
+
+#define PTTYPE 64
+#include "paging_tmpl.h"
+#undef PTTYPE
+
+#define PTTYPE 32
+#include "paging_tmpl.h"
+#undef PTTYPE
+
+static void __reset_rsvds_bits_mask(struct rsvd_bits_validate *rsvd_check,
+				    u64 pa_bits_rsvd, int level, bool nx,
+				    bool gbpages, bool pse, bool amd)
+{
+	u64 gbpages_bit_rsvd = 0;
+	u64 nonleaf_bit8_rsvd = 0;
+	u64 high_bits_rsvd;
+
+	rsvd_check->bad_mt_xwr = 0;
+
+	if (!gbpages)
+		gbpages_bit_rsvd = rsvd_bits(7, 7);
+
+	if (level == PT32E_ROOT_LEVEL)
+		high_bits_rsvd = pa_bits_rsvd & rsvd_bits(0, 62);
+	else
+		high_bits_rsvd = pa_bits_rsvd & rsvd_bits(0, 51);
+
+	/* Note, NX doesn't exist in PDPTEs, this is handled below. */
+	if (!nx)
+		high_bits_rsvd |= rsvd_bits(63, 63);
+
+	/*
+	 * Non-leaf PML4Es and PDPEs reserve bit 8 (which would be the G bit for
+	 * leaf entries) on AMD CPUs only.
+	 */
+	if (amd)
+		nonleaf_bit8_rsvd = rsvd_bits(8, 8);
+
+	switch (level) {
+	case PT32_ROOT_LEVEL:
+		/* no rsvd bits for 2 level 4K page table entries */
+		rsvd_check->rsvd_bits_mask[0][1] = 0;
+		rsvd_check->rsvd_bits_mask[0][0] = 0;
+		rsvd_check->rsvd_bits_mask[1][0] =
+			rsvd_check->rsvd_bits_mask[0][0];
+
+		if (!pse) {
+			rsvd_check->rsvd_bits_mask[1][1] = 0;
+			break;
+		}
+
+		if (is_cpuid_PSE36())
+			/* 36bits PSE 4MB page */
+			rsvd_check->rsvd_bits_mask[1][1] = rsvd_bits(17, 21);
+		else
+			/* 32 bits PSE 4MB page */
+			rsvd_check->rsvd_bits_mask[1][1] = rsvd_bits(13, 21);
+		break;
+	case PT32E_ROOT_LEVEL:
+		rsvd_check->rsvd_bits_mask[0][2] = rsvd_bits(63, 63) |
+						   high_bits_rsvd |
+						   rsvd_bits(5, 8) |
+						   rsvd_bits(1, 2);	/* PDPTE */
+		rsvd_check->rsvd_bits_mask[0][1] = high_bits_rsvd;	/* PDE */
+		rsvd_check->rsvd_bits_mask[0][0] = high_bits_rsvd;	/* PTE */
+		rsvd_check->rsvd_bits_mask[1][1] = high_bits_rsvd |
+						   rsvd_bits(13, 20);	/* large page */
+		rsvd_check->rsvd_bits_mask[1][0] =
+			rsvd_check->rsvd_bits_mask[0][0];
+		break;
+	case PT64_ROOT_5LEVEL:
+		rsvd_check->rsvd_bits_mask[0][4] = high_bits_rsvd |
+						   nonleaf_bit8_rsvd |
+						   rsvd_bits(7, 7);
+		rsvd_check->rsvd_bits_mask[1][4] =
+			rsvd_check->rsvd_bits_mask[0][4];
+		fallthrough;
+	case PT64_ROOT_4LEVEL:
+		rsvd_check->rsvd_bits_mask[0][3] = high_bits_rsvd |
+						   nonleaf_bit8_rsvd |
+						   rsvd_bits(7, 7);
+		rsvd_check->rsvd_bits_mask[0][2] = high_bits_rsvd |
+						   gbpages_bit_rsvd;
+		rsvd_check->rsvd_bits_mask[0][1] = high_bits_rsvd;
+		rsvd_check->rsvd_bits_mask[0][0] = high_bits_rsvd;
+		rsvd_check->rsvd_bits_mask[1][3] =
+			rsvd_check->rsvd_bits_mask[0][3];
+		rsvd_check->rsvd_bits_mask[1][2] = high_bits_rsvd |
+						   gbpages_bit_rsvd |
+						   rsvd_bits(13, 29);
+		rsvd_check->rsvd_bits_mask[1][1] = high_bits_rsvd |
+						   rsvd_bits(13, 20); /* large page */
+		rsvd_check->rsvd_bits_mask[1][0] =
+			rsvd_check->rsvd_bits_mask[0][0];
+		break;
+	}
+}
+
+static void reset_guest_rsvds_bits_mask(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+					struct kvm_mmu *context)
+{
+	__reset_rsvds_bits_mask(&context->guest_rsvd_check,
+				vcpu->arch.reserved_gpa_bits,
+				context->cpu_role.base.level, is_efer_nx(context),
+				guest_can_use(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_GBPAGES),
+				is_cr4_pse(context),
+				guest_cpuid_is_amd_or_hygon(vcpu));
+}
+
+static void __reset_rsvds_bits_mask_ept(struct rsvd_bits_validate *rsvd_check,
+					u64 pa_bits_rsvd, bool execonly,
+					int huge_page_level)
+{
+	u64 high_bits_rsvd = pa_bits_rsvd & rsvd_bits(0, 51);
+	u64 large_1g_rsvd = 0, large_2m_rsvd = 0;
+	u64 bad_mt_xwr;
+
+	if (huge_page_level < PG_LEVEL_1G)
+		large_1g_rsvd = rsvd_bits(7, 7);
+	if (huge_page_level < PG_LEVEL_2M)
+		large_2m_rsvd = rsvd_bits(7, 7);
+
+	rsvd_check->rsvd_bits_mask[0][4] = high_bits_rsvd | rsvd_bits(3, 7);
+	rsvd_check->rsvd_bits_mask[0][3] = high_bits_rsvd | rsvd_bits(3, 7);
+	rsvd_check->rsvd_bits_mask[0][2] = high_bits_rsvd | rsvd_bits(3, 6) | large_1g_rsvd;
+	rsvd_check->rsvd_bits_mask[0][1] = high_bits_rsvd | rsvd_bits(3, 6) | large_2m_rsvd;
+	rsvd_check->rsvd_bits_mask[0][0] = high_bits_rsvd;
+
+	/* large page */
+	rsvd_check->rsvd_bits_mask[1][4] = rsvd_check->rsvd_bits_mask[0][4];
+	rsvd_check->rsvd_bits_mask[1][3] = rsvd_check->rsvd_bits_mask[0][3];
+	rsvd_check->rsvd_bits_mask[1][2] = high_bits_rsvd | rsvd_bits(12, 29) | large_1g_rsvd;
+	rsvd_check->rsvd_bits_mask[1][1] = high_bits_rsvd | rsvd_bits(12, 20) | large_2m_rsvd;
+	rsvd_check->rsvd_bits_mask[1][0] = rsvd_check->rsvd_bits_mask[0][0];
+
+	bad_mt_xwr = 0xFFull << (2 * 8);	/* bits 3..5 must not be 2 */
+	bad_mt_xwr |= 0xFFull << (3 * 8);	/* bits 3..5 must not be 3 */
+	bad_mt_xwr |= 0xFFull << (7 * 8);	/* bits 3..5 must not be 7 */
+	bad_mt_xwr |= REPEAT_BYTE(1ull << 2);	/* bits 0..2 must not be 010 */
+	bad_mt_xwr |= REPEAT_BYTE(1ull << 6);	/* bits 0..2 must not be 110 */
+	if (!execonly) {
+		/* bits 0..2 must not be 100 unless VMX capabilities allow it */
+		bad_mt_xwr |= REPEAT_BYTE(1ull << 4);
+	}
+	rsvd_check->bad_mt_xwr = bad_mt_xwr;
+}
+
+static void reset_rsvds_bits_mask_ept(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+		struct kvm_mmu *context, bool execonly, int huge_page_level)
+{
+	__reset_rsvds_bits_mask_ept(&context->guest_rsvd_check,
+				    vcpu->arch.reserved_gpa_bits, execonly,
+				    huge_page_level);
+}
+
+static inline u64 reserved_hpa_bits(void)
+{
+	return rsvd_bits(shadow_phys_bits, 63);
+}
+
+/*
+ * the page table on host is the shadow page table for the page
+ * table in guest or amd nested guest, its mmu features completely
+ * follow the features in guest.
+ */
+static void reset_shadow_zero_bits_mask(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+					struct kvm_mmu *context)
+{
+	/* @amd adds a check on bit of SPTEs, which KVM shouldn't use anyways. */
+	bool is_amd = true;
+	/* KVM doesn't use 2-level page tables for the shadow MMU. */
+	bool is_pse = false;
+	struct rsvd_bits_validate *shadow_zero_check;
+	int i;
+
+	WARN_ON_ONCE(context->root_role.level < PT32E_ROOT_LEVEL);
+
+	shadow_zero_check = &context->shadow_zero_check;
+	__reset_rsvds_bits_mask(shadow_zero_check, reserved_hpa_bits(),
+				context->root_role.level,
+				context->root_role.efer_nx,
+				guest_can_use(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_GBPAGES),
+				is_pse, is_amd);
+
+	if (!shadow_me_mask)
+		return;
+
+	for (i = context->root_role.level; --i >= 0;) {
+		/*
+		 * So far shadow_me_value is a constant during KVM's life
+		 * time.  Bits in shadow_me_value are allowed to be set.
+		 * Bits in shadow_me_mask but not in shadow_me_value are
+		 * not allowed to be set.
+		 */
+		shadow_zero_check->rsvd_bits_mask[0][i] |= shadow_me_mask;
+		shadow_zero_check->rsvd_bits_mask[1][i] |= shadow_me_mask;
+		shadow_zero_check->rsvd_bits_mask[0][i] &= ~shadow_me_value;
+		shadow_zero_check->rsvd_bits_mask[1][i] &= ~shadow_me_value;
+	}
+
+}
+
+static inline bool boot_cpu_is_amd(void)
+{
+	WARN_ON_ONCE(!tdp_enabled);
+	return shadow_x_mask == 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * the direct page table on host, use as much mmu features as
+ * possible, however, kvm currently does not do execution-protection.
+ */
+static void reset_tdp_shadow_zero_bits_mask(struct kvm_mmu *context)
+{
+	struct rsvd_bits_validate *shadow_zero_check;
+	int i;
+
+	shadow_zero_check = &context->shadow_zero_check;
+
+	if (boot_cpu_is_amd())
+		__reset_rsvds_bits_mask(shadow_zero_check, reserved_hpa_bits(),
+					context->root_role.level, true,
+					boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_GBPAGES),
+					false, true);
+	else
+		__reset_rsvds_bits_mask_ept(shadow_zero_check,
+					    reserved_hpa_bits(), false,
+					    max_huge_page_level);
+
+	if (!shadow_me_mask)
+		return;
+
+	for (i = context->root_role.level; --i >= 0;) {
+		shadow_zero_check->rsvd_bits_mask[0][i] &= ~shadow_me_mask;
+		shadow_zero_check->rsvd_bits_mask[1][i] &= ~shadow_me_mask;
+	}
+}
+
+/*
+ * as the comments in reset_shadow_zero_bits_mask() except it
+ * is the shadow page table for intel nested guest.
+ */
+static void
+reset_ept_shadow_zero_bits_mask(struct kvm_mmu *context, bool execonly)
+{
+	__reset_rsvds_bits_mask_ept(&context->shadow_zero_check,
+				    reserved_hpa_bits(), execonly,
+				    max_huge_page_level);
+}
+
+#define BYTE_MASK(access) \
+	((1 & (access) ? 2 : 0) | \
+	 (2 & (access) ? 4 : 0) | \
+	 (3 & (access) ? 8 : 0) | \
+	 (4 & (access) ? 16 : 0) | \
+	 (5 & (access) ? 32 : 0) | \
+	 (6 & (access) ? 64 : 0) | \
+	 (7 & (access) ? 128 : 0))
+
+
+static void update_permission_bitmask(struct kvm_mmu *mmu, bool ept)
+{
+	unsigned byte;
+
+	const u8 x = BYTE_MASK(ACC_EXEC_MASK);
+	const u8 w = BYTE_MASK(ACC_WRITE_MASK);
+	const u8 u = BYTE_MASK(ACC_USER_MASK);
+
+	bool cr4_smep = is_cr4_smep(mmu);
+	bool cr4_smap = is_cr4_smap(mmu);
+	bool cr0_wp = is_cr0_wp(mmu);
+	bool efer_nx = is_efer_nx(mmu);
+
+	for (byte = 0; byte < ARRAY_SIZE(mmu->permissions); ++byte) {
+		unsigned pfec = byte << 1;
+
+		/*
+		 * Each "*f" variable has a 1 bit for each UWX value
+		 * that causes a fault with the given PFEC.
+		 */
+
+		/* Faults from writes to non-writable pages */
+		u8 wf = (pfec & PFERR_WRITE_MASK) ? (u8)~w : 0;
+		/* Faults from user mode accesses to supervisor pages */
+		u8 uf = (pfec & PFERR_USER_MASK) ? (u8)~u : 0;
+		/* Faults from fetches of non-executable pages*/
+		u8 ff = (pfec & PFERR_FETCH_MASK) ? (u8)~x : 0;
+		/* Faults from kernel mode fetches of user pages */
+		u8 smepf = 0;
+		/* Faults from kernel mode accesses of user pages */
+		u8 smapf = 0;
+
+		if (!ept) {
+			/* Faults from kernel mode accesses to user pages */
+			u8 kf = (pfec & PFERR_USER_MASK) ? 0 : u;
+
+			/* Not really needed: !nx will cause pte.nx to fault */
+			if (!efer_nx)
+				ff = 0;
+
+			/* Allow supervisor writes if !cr0.wp */
+			if (!cr0_wp)
+				wf = (pfec & PFERR_USER_MASK) ? wf : 0;
+
+			/* Disallow supervisor fetches of user code if cr4.smep */
+			if (cr4_smep)
+				smepf = (pfec & PFERR_FETCH_MASK) ? kf : 0;
+
+			/*
+			 * SMAP:kernel-mode data accesses from user-mode
+			 * mappings should fault. A fault is considered
+			 * as a SMAP violation if all of the following
+			 * conditions are true:
+			 *   - X86_CR4_SMAP is set in CR4
+			 *   - A user page is accessed
+			 *   - The access is not a fetch
+			 *   - The access is supervisor mode
+			 *   - If implicit supervisor access or X86_EFLAGS_AC is clear
+			 *
+			 * Here, we cover the first four conditions.
+			 * The fifth is computed dynamically in permission_fault();
+			 * PFERR_RSVD_MASK bit will be set in PFEC if the access is
+			 * *not* subject to SMAP restrictions.
+			 */
+			if (cr4_smap)
+				smapf = (pfec & (PFERR_RSVD_MASK|PFERR_FETCH_MASK)) ? 0 : kf;
+		}
+
+		mmu->permissions[byte] = ff | uf | wf | smepf | smapf;
+	}
+}
+
+/*
+* PKU is an additional mechanism by which the paging controls access to
+* user-mode addresses based on the value in the PKRU register.  Protection
+* key violations are reported through a bit in the page fault error code.
+* Unlike other bits of the error code, the PK bit is not known at the
+* call site of e.g. gva_to_gpa; it must be computed directly in
+* permission_fault based on two bits of PKRU, on some machine state (CR4,
+* CR0, EFER, CPL), and on other bits of the error code and the page tables.
+*
+* In particular the following conditions come from the error code, the
+* page tables and the machine state:
+* - PK is always zero unless CR4.PKE=1 and EFER.LMA=1
+* - PK is always zero if RSVD=1 (reserved bit set) or F=1 (instruction fetch)
+* - PK is always zero if U=0 in the page tables
+* - PKRU.WD is ignored if CR0.WP=0 and the access is a supervisor access.
+*
+* The PKRU bitmask caches the result of these four conditions.  The error
+* code (minus the P bit) and the page table's U bit form an index into the
+* PKRU bitmask.  Two bits of the PKRU bitmask are then extracted and ANDed
+* with the two bits of the PKRU register corresponding to the protection key.
+* For the first three conditions above the bits will be 00, thus masking
+* away both AD and WD.  For all reads or if the last condition holds, WD
+* only will be masked away.
+*/
+static void update_pkru_bitmask(struct kvm_mmu *mmu)
+{
+	unsigned bit;
+	bool wp;
+
+	mmu->pkru_mask = 0;
+
+	if (!is_cr4_pke(mmu))
+		return;
+
+	wp = is_cr0_wp(mmu);
+
+	for (bit = 0; bit < ARRAY_SIZE(mmu->permissions); ++bit) {
+		unsigned pfec, pkey_bits;
+		bool check_pkey, check_write, ff, uf, wf, pte_user;
+
+		pfec = bit << 1;
+		ff = pfec & PFERR_FETCH_MASK;
+		uf = pfec & PFERR_USER_MASK;
+		wf = pfec & PFERR_WRITE_MASK;
+
+		/* PFEC.RSVD is replaced by ACC_USER_MASK. */
+		pte_user = pfec & PFERR_RSVD_MASK;
+
+		/*
+		 * Only need to check the access which is not an
+		 * instruction fetch and is to a user page.
+		 */
+		check_pkey = (!ff && pte_user);
+		/*
+		 * write access is controlled by PKRU if it is a
+		 * user access or CR0.WP = 1.
+		 */
+		check_write = check_pkey && wf && (uf || wp);
+
+		/* PKRU.AD stops both read and write access. */
+		pkey_bits = !!check_pkey;
+		/* PKRU.WD stops write access. */
+		pkey_bits |= (!!check_write) << 1;
+
+		mmu->pkru_mask |= (pkey_bits & 3) << pfec;
+	}
+}
+
+static void reset_guest_paging_metadata(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+					struct kvm_mmu *mmu)
+{
+	if (!is_cr0_pg(mmu))
+		return;
+
+	reset_guest_rsvds_bits_mask(vcpu, mmu);
+	update_permission_bitmask(mmu, false);
+	update_pkru_bitmask(mmu);
+}
+
+static void paging64_init_context(struct kvm_mmu *context)
+{
+	context->page_fault = paging64_page_fault;
+	context->gva_to_gpa = paging64_gva_to_gpa;
+	context->sync_spte = paging64_sync_spte;
+}
+
+static void paging32_init_context(struct kvm_mmu *context)
+{
+	context->page_fault = paging32_page_fault;
+	context->gva_to_gpa = paging32_gva_to_gpa;
+	context->sync_spte = paging32_sync_spte;
+}
+
+static union kvm_cpu_role kvm_calc_cpu_role(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+					    const struct kvm_mmu_role_regs *regs)
+{
+	union kvm_cpu_role role = {0};
+
+	role.base.access = ACC_ALL;
+	role.base.smm = is_smm(vcpu);
+	role.base.guest_mode = is_guest_mode(vcpu);
+	role.ext.valid = 1;
+
+	if (!____is_cr0_pg(regs)) {
+		role.base.direct = 1;
+		return role;
+	}
+
+	role.base.efer_nx = ____is_efer_nx(regs);
+	role.base.cr0_wp = ____is_cr0_wp(regs);
+	role.base.smep_andnot_wp = ____is_cr4_smep(regs) && !____is_cr0_wp(regs);
+	role.base.smap_andnot_wp = ____is_cr4_smap(regs) && !____is_cr0_wp(regs);
+	role.base.has_4_byte_gpte = !____is_cr4_pae(regs);
+
+	if (____is_efer_lma(regs))
+		role.base.level = ____is_cr4_la57(regs) ? PT64_ROOT_5LEVEL
+							: PT64_ROOT_4LEVEL;
+	else if (____is_cr4_pae(regs))
+		role.base.level = PT32E_ROOT_LEVEL;
+	else
+		role.base.level = PT32_ROOT_LEVEL;
+
+	role.ext.cr4_smep = ____is_cr4_smep(regs);
+	role.ext.cr4_smap = ____is_cr4_smap(regs);
+	role.ext.cr4_pse = ____is_cr4_pse(regs);
+
+	/* PKEY and LA57 are active iff long mode is active. */
+	role.ext.cr4_pke = ____is_efer_lma(regs) && ____is_cr4_pke(regs);
+	role.ext.cr4_la57 = ____is_efer_lma(regs) && ____is_cr4_la57(regs);
+	role.ext.efer_lma = ____is_efer_lma(regs);
+	return role;
+}
+
+void __kvm_mmu_refresh_passthrough_bits(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+					struct kvm_mmu *mmu)
+{
+	const bool cr0_wp = kvm_is_cr0_bit_set(vcpu, X86_CR0_WP);
+
+	BUILD_BUG_ON((KVM_MMU_CR0_ROLE_BITS & KVM_POSSIBLE_CR0_GUEST_BITS) != X86_CR0_WP);
+	BUILD_BUG_ON((KVM_MMU_CR4_ROLE_BITS & KVM_POSSIBLE_CR4_GUEST_BITS));
+
+	if (is_cr0_wp(mmu) == cr0_wp)
+		return;
+
+	mmu->cpu_role.base.cr0_wp = cr0_wp;
+	reset_guest_paging_metadata(vcpu, mmu);
+}
+
+static inline int kvm_mmu_get_tdp_level(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	/* tdp_root_level is architecture forced level, use it if nonzero */
+	if (tdp_root_level)
+		return tdp_root_level;
+
+	/* Use 5-level TDP if and only if it's useful/necessary. */
+	if (max_tdp_level == 5 && cpuid_maxphyaddr(vcpu) <= 48)
+		return 4;
+
+	return max_tdp_level;
+}
+
+static union kvm_mmu_page_role
+kvm_calc_tdp_mmu_root_page_role(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+				union kvm_cpu_role cpu_role)
+{
+	union kvm_mmu_page_role role = {0};
+
+	role.access = ACC_ALL;
+	role.cr0_wp = true;
+	role.efer_nx = true;
+	role.smm = cpu_role.base.smm;
+	role.guest_mode = cpu_role.base.guest_mode;
+	role.ad_disabled = !kvm_ad_enabled();
+	role.level = kvm_mmu_get_tdp_level(vcpu);
+	role.direct = true;
+	role.has_4_byte_gpte = false;
+
+	return role;
+}
+
+static void init_kvm_tdp_mmu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+			     union kvm_cpu_role cpu_role)
+{
+	struct kvm_mmu *context = &vcpu->arch.root_mmu;
+	union kvm_mmu_page_role root_role = kvm_calc_tdp_mmu_root_page_role(vcpu, cpu_role);
+
+	if (cpu_role.as_u64 == context->cpu_role.as_u64 &&
+	    root_role.word == context->root_role.word)
+		return;
+
+	context->cpu_role.as_u64 = cpu_role.as_u64;
+	context->root_role.word = root_role.word;
+	context->page_fault = kvm_tdp_page_fault;
+	context->sync_spte = NULL;
+	context->get_guest_pgd = get_guest_cr3;
+	context->get_pdptr = kvm_pdptr_read;
+	context->inject_page_fault = kvm_inject_page_fault;
+
+	if (!is_cr0_pg(context))
+		context->gva_to_gpa = nonpaging_gva_to_gpa;
+	else if (is_cr4_pae(context))
+		context->gva_to_gpa = paging64_gva_to_gpa;
+	else
+		context->gva_to_gpa = paging32_gva_to_gpa;
+
+	reset_guest_paging_metadata(vcpu, context);
+	reset_tdp_shadow_zero_bits_mask(context);
+}
+
+static void shadow_mmu_init_context(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_mmu *context,
+				    union kvm_cpu_role cpu_role,
+				    union kvm_mmu_page_role root_role)
+{
+	if (cpu_role.as_u64 == context->cpu_role.as_u64 &&
+	    root_role.word == context->root_role.word)
+		return;
+
+	context->cpu_role.as_u64 = cpu_role.as_u64;
+	context->root_role.word = root_role.word;
+
+	if (!is_cr0_pg(context))
+		nonpaging_init_context(context);
+	else if (is_cr4_pae(context))
+		paging64_init_context(context);
+	else
+		paging32_init_context(context);
+
+	reset_guest_paging_metadata(vcpu, context);
+	reset_shadow_zero_bits_mask(vcpu, context);
+}
+
+static void kvm_init_shadow_mmu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+				union kvm_cpu_role cpu_role)
+{
+	struct kvm_mmu *context = &vcpu->arch.root_mmu;
+	union kvm_mmu_page_role root_role;
+
+	root_role = cpu_role.base;
+
+	/* KVM uses PAE paging whenever the guest isn't using 64-bit paging. */
+	root_role.level = max_t(u32, root_role.level, PT32E_ROOT_LEVEL);
+
+	/*
+	 * KVM forces EFER.NX=1 when TDP is disabled, reflect it in the MMU role.
+	 * KVM uses NX when TDP is disabled to handle a variety of scenarios,
+	 * notably for huge SPTEs if iTLB multi-hit mitigation is enabled and
+	 * to generate correct permissions for CR0.WP=0/CR4.SMEP=1/EFER.NX=0.
+	 * The iTLB multi-hit workaround can be toggled at any time, so assume
+	 * NX can be used by any non-nested shadow MMU to avoid having to reset
+	 * MMU contexts.
+	 */
+	root_role.efer_nx = true;
+
+	shadow_mmu_init_context(vcpu, context, cpu_role, root_role);
+}
+
+void kvm_init_shadow_npt_mmu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long cr0,
+			     unsigned long cr4, u64 efer, gpa_t nested_cr3)
+{
+	struct kvm_mmu *context = &vcpu->arch.guest_mmu;
+	struct kvm_mmu_role_regs regs = {
+		.cr0 = cr0,
+		.cr4 = cr4 & ~X86_CR4_PKE,
+		.efer = efer,
+	};
+	union kvm_cpu_role cpu_role = kvm_calc_cpu_role(vcpu, &regs);
+	union kvm_mmu_page_role root_role;
+
+	/* NPT requires CR0.PG=1. */
+	WARN_ON_ONCE(cpu_role.base.direct);
+
+	root_role = cpu_role.base;
+	root_role.level = kvm_mmu_get_tdp_level(vcpu);
+	if (root_role.level == PT64_ROOT_5LEVEL &&
+	    cpu_role.base.level == PT64_ROOT_4LEVEL)
+		root_role.passthrough = 1;
+
+	shadow_mmu_init_context(vcpu, context, cpu_role, root_role);
+	kvm_mmu_new_pgd(vcpu, nested_cr3);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_init_shadow_npt_mmu);
+
+static union kvm_cpu_role
+kvm_calc_shadow_ept_root_page_role(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool accessed_dirty,
+				   bool execonly, u8 level)
+{
+	union kvm_cpu_role role = {0};
+
+	/*
+	 * KVM does not support SMM transfer monitors, and consequently does not
+	 * support the "entry to SMM" control either.  role.base.smm is always 0.
+	 */
+	WARN_ON_ONCE(is_smm(vcpu));
+	role.base.level = level;
+	role.base.has_4_byte_gpte = false;
+	role.base.direct = false;
+	role.base.ad_disabled = !accessed_dirty;
+	role.base.guest_mode = true;
+	role.base.access = ACC_ALL;
+
+	role.ext.word = 0;
+	role.ext.execonly = execonly;
+	role.ext.valid = 1;
+
+	return role;
+}
+
+void kvm_init_shadow_ept_mmu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool execonly,
+			     int huge_page_level, bool accessed_dirty,
+			     gpa_t new_eptp)
+{
+	struct kvm_mmu *context = &vcpu->arch.guest_mmu;
+	u8 level = vmx_eptp_page_walk_level(new_eptp);
+	union kvm_cpu_role new_mode =
+		kvm_calc_shadow_ept_root_page_role(vcpu, accessed_dirty,
+						   execonly, level);
+
+	if (new_mode.as_u64 != context->cpu_role.as_u64) {
+		/* EPT, and thus nested EPT, does not consume CR0, CR4, nor EFER. */
+		context->cpu_role.as_u64 = new_mode.as_u64;
+		context->root_role.word = new_mode.base.word;
+
+		context->page_fault = ept_page_fault;
+		context->gva_to_gpa = ept_gva_to_gpa;
+		context->sync_spte = ept_sync_spte;
+
+		update_permission_bitmask(context, true);
+		context->pkru_mask = 0;
+		reset_rsvds_bits_mask_ept(vcpu, context, execonly, huge_page_level);
+		reset_ept_shadow_zero_bits_mask(context, execonly);
+	}
+
+	kvm_mmu_new_pgd(vcpu, new_eptp);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_init_shadow_ept_mmu);
+
+static void init_kvm_softmmu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+			     union kvm_cpu_role cpu_role)
+{
+	struct kvm_mmu *context = &vcpu->arch.root_mmu;
+
+	kvm_init_shadow_mmu(vcpu, cpu_role);
+
+	context->get_guest_pgd     = get_guest_cr3;
+	context->get_pdptr         = kvm_pdptr_read;
+	context->inject_page_fault = kvm_inject_page_fault;
+}
+
+static void init_kvm_nested_mmu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+				union kvm_cpu_role new_mode)
+{
+	struct kvm_mmu *g_context = &vcpu->arch.nested_mmu;
+
+	if (new_mode.as_u64 == g_context->cpu_role.as_u64)
+		return;
+
+	g_context->cpu_role.as_u64   = new_mode.as_u64;
+	g_context->get_guest_pgd     = get_guest_cr3;
+	g_context->get_pdptr         = kvm_pdptr_read;
+	g_context->inject_page_fault = kvm_inject_page_fault;
+
+	/*
+	 * L2 page tables are never shadowed, so there is no need to sync
+	 * SPTEs.
+	 */
+	g_context->sync_spte         = NULL;
+
+	/*
+	 * Note that arch.mmu->gva_to_gpa translates l2_gpa to l1_gpa using
+	 * L1's nested page tables (e.g. EPT12). The nested translation
+	 * of l2_gva to l1_gpa is done by arch.nested_mmu.gva_to_gpa using
+	 * L2's page tables as the first level of translation and L1's
+	 * nested page tables as the second level of translation. Basically
+	 * the gva_to_gpa functions between mmu and nested_mmu are swapped.
+	 */
+	if (!is_paging(vcpu))
+		g_context->gva_to_gpa = nonpaging_gva_to_gpa;
+	else if (is_long_mode(vcpu))
+		g_context->gva_to_gpa = paging64_gva_to_gpa;
+	else if (is_pae(vcpu))
+		g_context->gva_to_gpa = paging64_gva_to_gpa;
+	else
+		g_context->gva_to_gpa = paging32_gva_to_gpa;
+
+	reset_guest_paging_metadata(vcpu, g_context);
+}
+
+void kvm_init_mmu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct kvm_mmu_role_regs regs = vcpu_to_role_regs(vcpu);
+	union kvm_cpu_role cpu_role = kvm_calc_cpu_role(vcpu, &regs);
+
+	if (mmu_is_nested(vcpu))
+		init_kvm_nested_mmu(vcpu, cpu_role);
+	else if (tdp_enabled)
+		init_kvm_tdp_mmu(vcpu, cpu_role);
+	else
+		init_kvm_softmmu(vcpu, cpu_role);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_init_mmu);
+
+void kvm_mmu_after_set_cpuid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	/*
+	 * Invalidate all MMU roles to force them to reinitialize as CPUID
+	 * information is factored into reserved bit calculations.
+	 *
+	 * Correctly handling multiple vCPU models with respect to paging and
+	 * physical address properties) in a single VM would require tracking
+	 * all relevant CPUID information in kvm_mmu_page_role. That is very
+	 * undesirable as it would increase the memory requirements for
+	 * gfn_write_track (see struct kvm_mmu_page_role comments).  For now
+	 * that problem is swept under the rug; KVM's CPUID API is horrific and
+	 * it's all but impossible to solve it without introducing a new API.
+	 */
+	vcpu->arch.root_mmu.root_role.word = 0;
+	vcpu->arch.guest_mmu.root_role.word = 0;
+	vcpu->arch.nested_mmu.root_role.word = 0;
+	vcpu->arch.root_mmu.cpu_role.ext.valid = 0;
+	vcpu->arch.guest_mmu.cpu_role.ext.valid = 0;
+	vcpu->arch.nested_mmu.cpu_role.ext.valid = 0;
+	kvm_mmu_reset_context(vcpu);
+
+	/*
+	 * Changing guest CPUID after KVM_RUN is forbidden, see the comment in
+	 * kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl().
+	 */
+	KVM_BUG_ON(kvm_vcpu_has_run(vcpu), vcpu->kvm);
+}
+
+void kvm_mmu_reset_context(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	kvm_mmu_unload(vcpu);
+	kvm_init_mmu(vcpu);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_mmu_reset_context);
+
+int kvm_mmu_load(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	int r;
+
+	r = mmu_topup_memory_caches(vcpu, !vcpu->arch.mmu->root_role.direct);
+	if (r)
+		goto out;
+	r = mmu_alloc_special_roots(vcpu);
+	if (r)
+		goto out;
+	if (vcpu->arch.mmu->root_role.direct)
+		r = mmu_alloc_direct_roots(vcpu);
+	else
+		r = mmu_alloc_shadow_roots(vcpu);
+	if (r)
+		goto out;
+
+	kvm_mmu_sync_roots(vcpu);
+
+	kvm_mmu_load_pgd(vcpu);
+
+	/*
+	 * Flush any TLB entries for the new root, the provenance of the root
+	 * is unknown.  Even if KVM ensures there are no stale TLB entries
+	 * for a freed root, in theory another hypervisor could have left
+	 * stale entries.  Flushing on alloc also allows KVM to skip the TLB
+	 * flush when freeing a root (see kvm_tdp_mmu_put_root()).
+	 */
+	static_call(kvm_x86_flush_tlb_current)(vcpu);
+out:
+	return r;
+}
+
+void kvm_mmu_unload(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct kvm *kvm = vcpu->kvm;
+
+	kvm_mmu_free_roots(kvm, &vcpu->arch.root_mmu, KVM_MMU_ROOTS_ALL);
+	WARN_ON_ONCE(VALID_PAGE(vcpu->arch.root_mmu.root.hpa));
+	kvm_mmu_free_roots(kvm, &vcpu->arch.guest_mmu, KVM_MMU_ROOTS_ALL);
+	WARN_ON_ONCE(VALID_PAGE(vcpu->arch.guest_mmu.root.hpa));
+	vcpu_clear_mmio_info(vcpu, MMIO_GVA_ANY);
+}
+
+static bool is_obsolete_root(struct kvm *kvm, hpa_t root_hpa)
+{
+	struct kvm_mmu_page *sp;
+
+	if (!VALID_PAGE(root_hpa))
+		return false;
+
+	/*
+	 * When freeing obsolete roots, treat roots as obsolete if they don't
+	 * have an associated shadow page, as it's impossible to determine if
+	 * such roots are fresh or stale.  This does mean KVM will get false
+	 * positives and free roots that don't strictly need to be freed, but
+	 * such false positives are relatively rare:
+	 *
+	 *  (a) only PAE paging and nested NPT have roots without shadow pages
+	 *      (or any shadow paging flavor with a dummy root, see note below)
+	 *  (b) remote reloads due to a memslot update obsoletes _all_ roots
+	 *  (c) KVM doesn't track previous roots for PAE paging, and the guest
+	 *      is unlikely to zap an in-use PGD.
+	 *
+	 * Note!  Dummy roots are unique in that they are obsoleted by memslot
+	 * _creation_!  See also FNAME(fetch).
+	 */
+	sp = root_to_sp(root_hpa);
+	return !sp || is_obsolete_sp(kvm, sp);
+}
+
+static void __kvm_mmu_free_obsolete_roots(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_mmu *mmu)
+{
+	unsigned long roots_to_free = 0;
+	int i;
+
+	if (is_obsolete_root(kvm, mmu->root.hpa))
+		roots_to_free |= KVM_MMU_ROOT_CURRENT;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < KVM_MMU_NUM_PREV_ROOTS; i++) {
+		if (is_obsolete_root(kvm, mmu->prev_roots[i].hpa))
+			roots_to_free |= KVM_MMU_ROOT_PREVIOUS(i);
+	}
+
+	if (roots_to_free)
+		kvm_mmu_free_roots(kvm, mmu, roots_to_free);
+}
+
+void kvm_mmu_free_obsolete_roots(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	__kvm_mmu_free_obsolete_roots(vcpu->kvm, &vcpu->arch.root_mmu);
+	__kvm_mmu_free_obsolete_roots(vcpu->kvm, &vcpu->arch.guest_mmu);
+}
+
+static u64 mmu_pte_write_fetch_gpte(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t *gpa,
+				    int *bytes)
+{
+	u64 gentry = 0;
+	int r;
+
+	/*
+	 * Assume that the pte write on a page table of the same type
+	 * as the current vcpu paging mode since we update the sptes only
+	 * when they have the same mode.
+	 */
+	if (is_pae(vcpu) && *bytes == 4) {
+		/* Handle a 32-bit guest writing two halves of a 64-bit gpte */
+		*gpa &= ~(gpa_t)7;
+		*bytes = 8;
+	}
+
+	if (*bytes == 4 || *bytes == 8) {
+		r = kvm_vcpu_read_guest_atomic(vcpu, *gpa, &gentry, *bytes);
+		if (r)
+			gentry = 0;
+	}
+
+	return gentry;
+}
+
+/*
+ * If we're seeing too many writes to a page, it may no longer be a page table,
+ * or we may be forking, in which case it is better to unmap the page.
+ */
+static bool detect_write_flooding(struct kvm_mmu_page *sp)
+{
+	/*
+	 * Skip write-flooding detected for the sp whose level is 1, because
+	 * it can become unsync, then the guest page is not write-protected.
+	 */
+	if (sp->role.level == PG_LEVEL_4K)
+		return false;
+
+	atomic_inc(&sp->write_flooding_count);
+	return atomic_read(&sp->write_flooding_count) >= 3;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Misaligned accesses are too much trouble to fix up; also, they usually
+ * indicate a page is not used as a page table.
+ */
+static bool detect_write_misaligned(struct kvm_mmu_page *sp, gpa_t gpa,
+				    int bytes)
+{
+	unsigned offset, pte_size, misaligned;
+
+	offset = offset_in_page(gpa);
+	pte_size = sp->role.has_4_byte_gpte ? 4 : 8;
+
+	/*
+	 * Sometimes, the OS only writes the last one bytes to update status
+	 * bits, for example, in linux, andb instruction is used in clear_bit().
+	 */
+	if (!(offset & (pte_size - 1)) && bytes == 1)
+		return false;
+
+	misaligned = (offset ^ (offset + bytes - 1)) & ~(pte_size - 1);
+	misaligned |= bytes < 4;
+
+	return misaligned;
+}
+
+static u64 *get_written_sptes(struct kvm_mmu_page *sp, gpa_t gpa, int *nspte)
+{
+	unsigned page_offset, quadrant;
+	u64 *spte;
+	int level;
+
+	page_offset = offset_in_page(gpa);
+	level = sp->role.level;
+	*nspte = 1;
+	if (sp->role.has_4_byte_gpte) {
+		page_offset <<= 1;	/* 32->64 */
+		/*
+		 * A 32-bit pde maps 4MB while the shadow pdes map
+		 * only 2MB.  So we need to double the offset again
+		 * and zap two pdes instead of one.
+		 */
+		if (level == PT32_ROOT_LEVEL) {
+			page_offset &= ~7; /* kill rounding error */
+			page_offset <<= 1;
+			*nspte = 2;
+		}
+		quadrant = page_offset >> PAGE_SHIFT;
+		page_offset &= ~PAGE_MASK;
+		if (quadrant != sp->role.quadrant)
+			return NULL;
+	}
+
+	spte = &sp->spt[page_offset / sizeof(*spte)];
+	return spte;
+}
+
+void kvm_mmu_track_write(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t gpa, const u8 *new,
+			 int bytes)
+{
+	gfn_t gfn = gpa >> PAGE_SHIFT;
+	struct kvm_mmu_page *sp;
+	LIST_HEAD(invalid_list);
+	u64 entry, gentry, *spte;
+	int npte;
+	bool flush = false;
+
+	/*
+	 * If we don't have indirect shadow pages, it means no page is
+	 * write-protected, so we can exit simply.
+	 */
+	if (!READ_ONCE(vcpu->kvm->arch.indirect_shadow_pages))
+		return;
+
+	write_lock(&vcpu->kvm->mmu_lock);
+
+	gentry = mmu_pte_write_fetch_gpte(vcpu, &gpa, &bytes);
+
+	++vcpu->kvm->stat.mmu_pte_write;
+
+	for_each_gfn_valid_sp_with_gptes(vcpu->kvm, sp, gfn) {
+		if (detect_write_misaligned(sp, gpa, bytes) ||
+		      detect_write_flooding(sp)) {
+			kvm_mmu_prepare_zap_page(vcpu->kvm, sp, &invalid_list);
+			++vcpu->kvm->stat.mmu_flooded;
+			continue;
+		}
+
+		spte = get_written_sptes(sp, gpa, &npte);
+		if (!spte)
+			continue;
+
+		while (npte--) {
+			entry = *spte;
+			mmu_page_zap_pte(vcpu->kvm, sp, spte, NULL);
+			if (gentry && sp->role.level != PG_LEVEL_4K)
+				++vcpu->kvm->stat.mmu_pde_zapped;
+			if (is_shadow_present_pte(entry))
+				flush = true;
+			++spte;
+		}
+	}
+	kvm_mmu_remote_flush_or_zap(vcpu->kvm, &invalid_list, flush);
+	write_unlock(&vcpu->kvm->mmu_lock);
+}
+
+int noinline kvm_mmu_page_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t cr2_or_gpa, u64 error_code,
+		       void *insn, int insn_len)
+{
+	int r, emulation_type = EMULTYPE_PF;
+	bool direct = vcpu->arch.mmu->root_role.direct;
+
+	/*
+	 * IMPLICIT_ACCESS is a KVM-defined flag used to correctly perform SMAP
+	 * checks when emulating instructions that triggers implicit access.
+	 * WARN if hardware generates a fault with an error code that collides
+	 * with the KVM-defined value.  Clear the flag and continue on, i.e.
+	 * don't terminate the VM, as KVM can't possibly be relying on a flag
+	 * that KVM doesn't know about.
+	 */
+	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(error_code & PFERR_IMPLICIT_ACCESS))
+		error_code &= ~PFERR_IMPLICIT_ACCESS;
+
+	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!VALID_PAGE(vcpu->arch.mmu->root.hpa)))
+		return RET_PF_RETRY;
+
+	r = RET_PF_INVALID;
+	if (unlikely(error_code & PFERR_RSVD_MASK)) {
+		r = handle_mmio_page_fault(vcpu, cr2_or_gpa, direct);
+		if (r == RET_PF_EMULATE)
+			goto emulate;
+	}
+
+	if (r == RET_PF_INVALID) {
+		r = kvm_mmu_do_page_fault(vcpu, cr2_or_gpa,
+					  lower_32_bits(error_code), false,
+					  &emulation_type);
+		if (KVM_BUG_ON(r == RET_PF_INVALID, vcpu->kvm))
+			return -EIO;
+	}
+
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
+	if (r != RET_PF_EMULATE)
+		return 1;
+
+	/*
+	 * Before emulating the instruction, check if the error code
+	 * was due to a RO violation while translating the guest page.
+	 * This can occur when using nested virtualization with nested
+	 * paging in both guests. If true, we simply unprotect the page
+	 * and resume the guest.
+	 */
+	if (vcpu->arch.mmu->root_role.direct &&
+	    (error_code & PFERR_NESTED_GUEST_PAGE) == PFERR_NESTED_GUEST_PAGE) {
+		kvm_mmu_unprotect_page(vcpu->kvm, gpa_to_gfn(cr2_or_gpa));
+		return 1;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * vcpu->arch.mmu.page_fault returned RET_PF_EMULATE, but we can still
+	 * optimistically try to just unprotect the page and let the processor
+	 * re-execute the instruction that caused the page fault.  Do not allow
+	 * retrying MMIO emulation, as it's not only pointless but could also
+	 * cause us to enter an infinite loop because the processor will keep
+	 * faulting on the non-existent MMIO address.  Retrying an instruction
+	 * from a nested guest is also pointless and dangerous as we are only
+	 * explicitly shadowing L1's page tables, i.e. unprotecting something
+	 * for L1 isn't going to magically fix whatever issue cause L2 to fail.
+	 */
+	if (!mmio_info_in_cache(vcpu, cr2_or_gpa, direct) && !is_guest_mode(vcpu))
+		emulation_type |= EMULTYPE_ALLOW_RETRY_PF;
+emulate:
+	return x86_emulate_instruction(vcpu, cr2_or_gpa, emulation_type, insn,
+				       insn_len);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_mmu_page_fault);
+
+static void __kvm_mmu_invalidate_addr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_mmu *mmu,
+				      u64 addr, hpa_t root_hpa)
+{
+	struct kvm_shadow_walk_iterator iterator;
+
+	vcpu_clear_mmio_info(vcpu, addr);
+
+	/*
+	 * Walking and synchronizing SPTEs both assume they are operating in
+	 * the context of the current MMU, and would need to be reworked if
+	 * this is ever used to sync the guest_mmu, e.g. to emulate INVEPT.
+	 */
+	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(mmu != vcpu->arch.mmu))
+		return;
+
+	if (!VALID_PAGE(root_hpa))
+		return;
+
+	write_lock(&vcpu->kvm->mmu_lock);
+	for_each_shadow_entry_using_root(vcpu, root_hpa, addr, iterator) {
+		struct kvm_mmu_page *sp = sptep_to_sp(iterator.sptep);
+
+		if (sp->unsync) {
+			int ret = kvm_sync_spte(vcpu, sp, iterator.index);
+
+			if (ret < 0)
+				mmu_page_zap_pte(vcpu->kvm, sp, iterator.sptep, NULL);
+			if (ret)
+				kvm_flush_remote_tlbs_sptep(vcpu->kvm, iterator.sptep);
+		}
+
+		if (!sp->unsync_children)
+			break;
+	}
+	write_unlock(&vcpu->kvm->mmu_lock);
+}
+
+void kvm_mmu_invalidate_addr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_mmu *mmu,
+			     u64 addr, unsigned long roots)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	WARN_ON_ONCE(roots & ~KVM_MMU_ROOTS_ALL);
+
+	/* It's actually a GPA for vcpu->arch.guest_mmu.  */
+	if (mmu != &vcpu->arch.guest_mmu) {
+		/* INVLPG on a non-canonical address is a NOP according to the SDM.  */
+		if (is_noncanonical_address(addr, vcpu))
+			return;
+
+		static_call(kvm_x86_flush_tlb_gva)(vcpu, addr);
+	}
+
+	if (!mmu->sync_spte)
+		return;
+
+	if (roots & KVM_MMU_ROOT_CURRENT)
+		__kvm_mmu_invalidate_addr(vcpu, mmu, addr, mmu->root.hpa);
+
+	for (i = 0; i < KVM_MMU_NUM_PREV_ROOTS; i++) {
+		if (roots & KVM_MMU_ROOT_PREVIOUS(i))
+			__kvm_mmu_invalidate_addr(vcpu, mmu, addr, mmu->prev_roots[i].hpa);
+	}
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_mmu_invalidate_addr);
+
+void kvm_mmu_invlpg(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gva_t gva)
+{
+	/*
+	 * INVLPG is required to invalidate any global mappings for the VA,
+	 * irrespective of PCID.  Blindly sync all roots as it would take
+	 * roughly the same amount of work/time to determine whether any of the
+	 * previous roots have a global mapping.
+	 *
+	 * Mappings not reachable via the current or previous cached roots will
+	 * be synced when switching to that new cr3, so nothing needs to be
+	 * done here for them.
+	 */
+	kvm_mmu_invalidate_addr(vcpu, vcpu->arch.walk_mmu, gva, KVM_MMU_ROOTS_ALL);
+	++vcpu->stat.invlpg;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_mmu_invlpg);
+
+
+void kvm_mmu_invpcid_gva(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gva_t gva, unsigned long pcid)
+{
+	struct kvm_mmu *mmu = vcpu->arch.mmu;
+	unsigned long roots = 0;
+	uint i;
+
+	if (pcid == kvm_get_active_pcid(vcpu))
+		roots |= KVM_MMU_ROOT_CURRENT;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < KVM_MMU_NUM_PREV_ROOTS; i++) {
+		if (VALID_PAGE(mmu->prev_roots[i].hpa) &&
+		    pcid == kvm_get_pcid(vcpu, mmu->prev_roots[i].pgd))
+			roots |= KVM_MMU_ROOT_PREVIOUS(i);
+	}
+
+	if (roots)
+		kvm_mmu_invalidate_addr(vcpu, mmu, gva, roots);
+	++vcpu->stat.invlpg;
+
+	/*
+	 * Mappings not reachable via the current cr3 or the prev_roots will be
+	 * synced when switching to that cr3, so nothing needs to be done here
+	 * for them.
+	 */
+}
+
+void kvm_configure_mmu(bool enable_tdp, int tdp_forced_root_level,
+		       int tdp_max_root_level, int tdp_huge_page_level)
+{
+	tdp_enabled = enable_tdp;
+	tdp_root_level = tdp_forced_root_level;
+	max_tdp_level = tdp_max_root_level;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+	tdp_mmu_enabled = tdp_mmu_allowed && tdp_enabled;
+#endif
+	/*
+	 * max_huge_page_level reflects KVM's MMU capabilities irrespective
+	 * of kernel support, e.g. KVM may be capable of using 1GB pages when
+	 * the kernel is not.  But, KVM never creates a page size greater than
+	 * what is used by the kernel for any given HVA, i.e. the kernel's
+	 * capabilities are ultimately consulted by kvm_mmu_hugepage_adjust().
+	 */
+	if (tdp_enabled)
+		max_huge_page_level = tdp_huge_page_level;
+	else if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_GBPAGES))
+		max_huge_page_level = PG_LEVEL_1G;
+	else
+		max_huge_page_level = PG_LEVEL_2M;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_configure_mmu);
+
+/* The return value indicates if tlb flush on all vcpus is needed. */
+typedef bool (*slot_rmaps_handler) (struct kvm *kvm,
+				    struct kvm_rmap_head *rmap_head,
+				    const struct kvm_memory_slot *slot);
+
+static __always_inline bool __walk_slot_rmaps(struct kvm *kvm,
+					      const struct kvm_memory_slot *slot,
+					      slot_rmaps_handler fn,
+					      int start_level, int end_level,
+					      gfn_t start_gfn, gfn_t end_gfn,
+					      bool flush_on_yield, bool flush)
+{
+	struct slot_rmap_walk_iterator iterator;
+
+	lockdep_assert_held_write(&kvm->mmu_lock);
+
+	for_each_slot_rmap_range(slot, start_level, end_level, start_gfn,
+			end_gfn, &iterator) {
+		if (iterator.rmap)
+			flush |= fn(kvm, iterator.rmap, slot);
+
+		if (need_resched() || rwlock_needbreak(&kvm->mmu_lock)) {
+			if (flush && flush_on_yield) {
+				kvm_flush_remote_tlbs_range(kvm, start_gfn,
+							    iterator.gfn - start_gfn + 1);
+				flush = false;
+			}
+			cond_resched_rwlock_write(&kvm->mmu_lock);
+		}
+	}
+
+	return flush;
+}
+
+static __always_inline bool walk_slot_rmaps(struct kvm *kvm,
+					    const struct kvm_memory_slot *slot,
+					    slot_rmaps_handler fn,
+					    int start_level, int end_level,
+					    bool flush_on_yield)
+{
+	return __walk_slot_rmaps(kvm, slot, fn, start_level, end_level,
+				 slot->base_gfn, slot->base_gfn + slot->npages - 1,
+				 flush_on_yield, false);
+}
+
+static __always_inline bool walk_slot_rmaps_4k(struct kvm *kvm,
+					       const struct kvm_memory_slot *slot,
+					       slot_rmaps_handler fn,
+					       bool flush_on_yield)
+{
+	return walk_slot_rmaps(kvm, slot, fn, PG_LEVEL_4K, PG_LEVEL_4K, flush_on_yield);
+}
+
+static void free_mmu_pages(struct kvm_mmu *mmu)
+{
+	if (!tdp_enabled && mmu->pae_root)
+		set_memory_encrypted((unsigned long)mmu->pae_root, 1);
+	free_page((unsigned long)mmu->pae_root);
+	free_page((unsigned long)mmu->pml4_root);
+	free_page((unsigned long)mmu->pml5_root);
+}
+
+static int __kvm_mmu_create(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_mmu *mmu)
+{
+	struct page *page;
+	int i;
+
+	mmu->root.hpa = INVALID_PAGE;
+	mmu->root.pgd = 0;
+	for (i = 0; i < KVM_MMU_NUM_PREV_ROOTS; i++)
+		mmu->prev_roots[i] = KVM_MMU_ROOT_INFO_INVALID;
+
+	/* vcpu->arch.guest_mmu isn't used when !tdp_enabled. */
+	if (!tdp_enabled && mmu == &vcpu->arch.guest_mmu)
+		return 0;
+
+	/*
+	 * When using PAE paging, the four PDPTEs are treated as 'root' pages,
+	 * while the PDP table is a per-vCPU construct that's allocated at MMU
+	 * creation.  When emulating 32-bit mode, cr3 is only 32 bits even on
+	 * x86_64.  Therefore we need to allocate the PDP table in the first
+	 * 4GB of memory, which happens to fit the DMA32 zone.  TDP paging
+	 * generally doesn't use PAE paging and can skip allocating the PDP
+	 * table.  The main exception, handled here, is SVM's 32-bit NPT.  The
+	 * other exception is for shadowing L1's 32-bit or PAE NPT on 64-bit
+	 * KVM; that horror is handled on-demand by mmu_alloc_special_roots().
+	 */
+	if (tdp_enabled && kvm_mmu_get_tdp_level(vcpu) > PT32E_ROOT_LEVEL)
+		return 0;
+
+	page = alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT | __GFP_DMA32);
+	if (!page)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	mmu->pae_root = page_address(page);
+
+	/*
+	 * CR3 is only 32 bits when PAE paging is used, thus it's impossible to
+	 * get the CPU to treat the PDPTEs as encrypted.  Decrypt the page so
+	 * that KVM's writes and the CPU's reads get along.  Note, this is
+	 * only necessary when using shadow paging, as 64-bit NPT can get at
+	 * the C-bit even when shadowing 32-bit NPT, and SME isn't supported
+	 * by 32-bit kernels (when KVM itself uses 32-bit NPT).
+	 */
+	if (!tdp_enabled)
+		set_memory_decrypted((unsigned long)mmu->pae_root, 1);
+	else
+		WARN_ON_ONCE(shadow_me_value);
+
+	for (i = 0; i < 4; ++i)
+		mmu->pae_root[i] = INVALID_PAE_ROOT;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int kvm_mmu_create(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	int ret;
+
+	vcpu->arch.mmu_pte_list_desc_cache.kmem_cache = pte_list_desc_cache;
+	vcpu->arch.mmu_pte_list_desc_cache.gfp_zero = __GFP_ZERO;
+
+	vcpu->arch.mmu_page_header_cache.kmem_cache = mmu_page_header_cache;
+	vcpu->arch.mmu_page_header_cache.gfp_zero = __GFP_ZERO;
+
+	vcpu->arch.mmu_shadow_page_cache.gfp_zero = __GFP_ZERO;
+
+	vcpu->arch.mmu = &vcpu->arch.root_mmu;
+	vcpu->arch.walk_mmu = &vcpu->arch.root_mmu;
+
+	ret = __kvm_mmu_create(vcpu, &vcpu->arch.guest_mmu);
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+
+	ret = __kvm_mmu_create(vcpu, &vcpu->arch.root_mmu);
+	if (ret)
+		goto fail_allocate_root;
+
+	return ret;
+ fail_allocate_root:
+	free_mmu_pages(&vcpu->arch.guest_mmu);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+#define BATCH_ZAP_PAGES	10
+static void kvm_zap_obsolete_pages(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+	struct kvm_mmu_page *sp, *node;
+	int nr_zapped, batch = 0;
+	bool unstable;
+
+restart:
+	list_for_each_entry_safe_reverse(sp, node,
+	      &kvm->arch.active_mmu_pages, link) {
+		/*
+		 * No obsolete valid page exists before a newly created page
+		 * since active_mmu_pages is a FIFO list.
+		 */
+		if (!is_obsolete_sp(kvm, sp))
+			break;
+
+		/*
+		 * Invalid pages should never land back on the list of active
+		 * pages.  Skip the bogus page, otherwise we'll get stuck in an
+		 * infinite loop if the page gets put back on the list (again).
+		 */
+		if (WARN_ON_ONCE(sp->role.invalid))
+			continue;
+
+		/*
+		 * No need to flush the TLB since we're only zapping shadow
+		 * pages with an obsolete generation number and all vCPUS have
+		 * loaded a new root, i.e. the shadow pages being zapped cannot
+		 * be in active use by the guest.
+		 */
+		if (batch >= BATCH_ZAP_PAGES &&
+		    cond_resched_rwlock_write(&kvm->mmu_lock)) {
+			batch = 0;
+			goto restart;
+		}
+
+		unstable = __kvm_mmu_prepare_zap_page(kvm, sp,
+				&kvm->arch.zapped_obsolete_pages, &nr_zapped);
+		batch += nr_zapped;
+
+		if (unstable)
+			goto restart;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Kick all vCPUs (via remote TLB flush) before freeing the page tables
+	 * to ensure KVM is not in the middle of a lockless shadow page table
+	 * walk, which may reference the pages.  The remote TLB flush itself is
+	 * not required and is simply a convenient way to kick vCPUs as needed.
+	 * KVM performs a local TLB flush when allocating a new root (see
+	 * kvm_mmu_load()), and the reload in the caller ensure no vCPUs are
+	 * running with an obsolete MMU.
+	 */
+	kvm_mmu_commit_zap_page(kvm, &kvm->arch.zapped_obsolete_pages);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Fast invalidate all shadow pages and use lock-break technique
+ * to zap obsolete pages.
+ *
+ * It's required when memslot is being deleted or VM is being
+ * destroyed, in these cases, we should ensure that KVM MMU does
+ * not use any resource of the being-deleted slot or all slots
+ * after calling the function.
+ */
+static void kvm_mmu_zap_all_fast(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+	lockdep_assert_held(&kvm->slots_lock);
+
+	write_lock(&kvm->mmu_lock);
+	trace_kvm_mmu_zap_all_fast(kvm);
+
+	/*
+	 * Toggle mmu_valid_gen between '0' and '1'.  Because slots_lock is
+	 * held for the entire duration of zapping obsolete pages, it's
+	 * impossible for there to be multiple invalid generations associated
+	 * with *valid* shadow pages at any given time, i.e. there is exactly
+	 * one valid generation and (at most) one invalid generation.
+	 */
+	kvm->arch.mmu_valid_gen = kvm->arch.mmu_valid_gen ? 0 : 1;
+
+	/*
+	 * In order to ensure all vCPUs drop their soon-to-be invalid roots,
+	 * invalidating TDP MMU roots must be done while holding mmu_lock for
+	 * write and in the same critical section as making the reload request,
+	 * e.g. before kvm_zap_obsolete_pages() could drop mmu_lock and yield.
+	 */
+	if (tdp_mmu_enabled)
+		kvm_tdp_mmu_invalidate_all_roots(kvm);
+
+	/*
+	 * Notify all vcpus to reload its shadow page table and flush TLB.
+	 * Then all vcpus will switch to new shadow page table with the new
+	 * mmu_valid_gen.
+	 *
+	 * Note: we need to do this under the protection of mmu_lock,
+	 * otherwise, vcpu would purge shadow page but miss tlb flush.
+	 */
+	kvm_make_all_cpus_request(kvm, KVM_REQ_MMU_FREE_OBSOLETE_ROOTS);
+
+	kvm_zap_obsolete_pages(kvm);
+
+	write_unlock(&kvm->mmu_lock);
+
+	/*
+	 * Zap the invalidated TDP MMU roots, all SPTEs must be dropped before
+	 * returning to the caller, e.g. if the zap is in response to a memslot
+	 * deletion, mmu_notifier callbacks will be unable to reach the SPTEs
+	 * associated with the deleted memslot once the update completes, and
+	 * Deferring the zap until the final reference to the root is put would
+	 * lead to use-after-free.
+	 */
+	if (tdp_mmu_enabled)
+		kvm_tdp_mmu_zap_invalidated_roots(kvm);
+}
+
+static bool kvm_has_zapped_obsolete_pages(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+	return unlikely(!list_empty_careful(&kvm->arch.zapped_obsolete_pages));
+}
+
+void kvm_mmu_init_vm(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&kvm->arch.active_mmu_pages);
+	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&kvm->arch.zapped_obsolete_pages);
+	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&kvm->arch.possible_nx_huge_pages);
+	spin_lock_init(&kvm->arch.mmu_unsync_pages_lock);
+
+	if (tdp_mmu_enabled)
+		kvm_mmu_init_tdp_mmu(kvm);
+
+	kvm->arch.split_page_header_cache.kmem_cache = mmu_page_header_cache;
+	kvm->arch.split_page_header_cache.gfp_zero = __GFP_ZERO;
+
+	kvm->arch.split_shadow_page_cache.gfp_zero = __GFP_ZERO;
+
+	kvm->arch.split_desc_cache.kmem_cache = pte_list_desc_cache;
+	kvm->arch.split_desc_cache.gfp_zero = __GFP_ZERO;
+}
+
+static void mmu_free_vm_memory_caches(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+	kvm_mmu_free_memory_cache(&kvm->arch.split_desc_cache);
+	kvm_mmu_free_memory_cache(&kvm->arch.split_page_header_cache);
+	kvm_mmu_free_memory_cache(&kvm->arch.split_shadow_page_cache);
+}
+
+void kvm_mmu_uninit_vm(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+	if (tdp_mmu_enabled)
+		kvm_mmu_uninit_tdp_mmu(kvm);
+
+	mmu_free_vm_memory_caches(kvm);
+}
+
+static bool kvm_rmap_zap_gfn_range(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t gfn_start, gfn_t gfn_end)
+{
+	const struct kvm_memory_slot *memslot;
+	struct kvm_memslots *slots;
+	struct kvm_memslot_iter iter;
+	bool flush = false;
+	gfn_t start, end;
+	int i;
+
+	if (!kvm_memslots_have_rmaps(kvm))
+		return flush;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < KVM_ADDRESS_SPACE_NUM; i++) {
+		slots = __kvm_memslots(kvm, i);
+
+		kvm_for_each_memslot_in_gfn_range(&iter, slots, gfn_start, gfn_end) {
+			memslot = iter.slot;
+			start = max(gfn_start, memslot->base_gfn);
+			end = min(gfn_end, memslot->base_gfn + memslot->npages);
+			if (WARN_ON_ONCE(start >= end))
+				continue;
+
+			flush = __walk_slot_rmaps(kvm, memslot, __kvm_zap_rmap,
+						  PG_LEVEL_4K, KVM_MAX_HUGEPAGE_LEVEL,
+						  start, end - 1, true, flush);
+		}
+	}
+
+	return flush;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Invalidate (zap) SPTEs that cover GFNs from gfn_start and up to gfn_end
+ * (not including it)
+ */
+void kvm_zap_gfn_range(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t gfn_start, gfn_t gfn_end)
+{
+	bool flush;
+
+	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(gfn_end <= gfn_start))
+		return;
+
+	write_lock(&kvm->mmu_lock);
+
+	kvm_mmu_invalidate_begin(kvm, 0, -1ul);
+
+	flush = kvm_rmap_zap_gfn_range(kvm, gfn_start, gfn_end);
+
+	if (tdp_mmu_enabled)
+		flush = kvm_tdp_mmu_zap_leafs(kvm, gfn_start, gfn_end, flush);
+
+	if (flush)
+		kvm_flush_remote_tlbs_range(kvm, gfn_start, gfn_end - gfn_start);
+
+	kvm_mmu_invalidate_end(kvm, 0, -1ul);
+
+	write_unlock(&kvm->mmu_lock);
+}
+
+static bool slot_rmap_write_protect(struct kvm *kvm,
+				    struct kvm_rmap_head *rmap_head,
+				    const struct kvm_memory_slot *slot)
+{
+	return rmap_write_protect(rmap_head, false);
+}
+
+void kvm_mmu_slot_remove_write_access(struct kvm *kvm,
+				      const struct kvm_memory_slot *memslot,
+				      int start_level)
+{
+	if (kvm_memslots_have_rmaps(kvm)) {
+		write_lock(&kvm->mmu_lock);
+		walk_slot_rmaps(kvm, memslot, slot_rmap_write_protect,
+				start_level, KVM_MAX_HUGEPAGE_LEVEL, false);
+		write_unlock(&kvm->mmu_lock);
+	}
+
+	if (tdp_mmu_enabled) {
+		read_lock(&kvm->mmu_lock);
+		kvm_tdp_mmu_wrprot_slot(kvm, memslot, start_level);
+		read_unlock(&kvm->mmu_lock);
+	}
+}
+
+static inline bool need_topup(struct kvm_mmu_memory_cache *cache, int min)
+{
+	return kvm_mmu_memory_cache_nr_free_objects(cache) < min;
+}
+
+static bool need_topup_split_caches_or_resched(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+	if (need_resched() || rwlock_needbreak(&kvm->mmu_lock))
+		return true;
+
+	/*
+	 * In the worst case, SPLIT_DESC_CACHE_MIN_NR_OBJECTS descriptors are needed
+	 * to split a single huge page. Calculating how many are actually needed
+	 * is possible but not worth the complexity.
+	 */
+	return need_topup(&kvm->arch.split_desc_cache, SPLIT_DESC_CACHE_MIN_NR_OBJECTS) ||
+	       need_topup(&kvm->arch.split_page_header_cache, 1) ||
+	       need_topup(&kvm->arch.split_shadow_page_cache, 1);
+}
+
+static int topup_split_caches(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+	/*
+	 * Allocating rmap list entries when splitting huge pages for nested
+	 * MMUs is uncommon as KVM needs to use a list if and only if there is
+	 * more than one rmap entry for a gfn, i.e. requires an L1 gfn to be
+	 * aliased by multiple L2 gfns and/or from multiple nested roots with
+	 * different roles.  Aliasing gfns when using TDP is atypical for VMMs;
+	 * a few gfns are often aliased during boot, e.g. when remapping BIOS,
+	 * but aliasing rarely occurs post-boot or for many gfns.  If there is
+	 * only one rmap entry, rmap->val points directly at that one entry and
+	 * doesn't need to allocate a list.  Buffer the cache by the default
+	 * capacity so that KVM doesn't have to drop mmu_lock to topup if KVM
+	 * encounters an aliased gfn or two.
+	 */
+	const int capacity = SPLIT_DESC_CACHE_MIN_NR_OBJECTS +
+			     KVM_ARCH_NR_OBJS_PER_MEMORY_CACHE;
+	int r;
+
+	lockdep_assert_held(&kvm->slots_lock);
+
+	r = __kvm_mmu_topup_memory_cache(&kvm->arch.split_desc_cache, capacity,
+					 SPLIT_DESC_CACHE_MIN_NR_OBJECTS);
+	if (r)
+		return r;
+
+	r = kvm_mmu_topup_memory_cache(&kvm->arch.split_page_header_cache, 1);
+	if (r)
+		return r;
+
+	return kvm_mmu_topup_memory_cache(&kvm->arch.split_shadow_page_cache, 1);
+}
+
+static struct kvm_mmu_page *shadow_mmu_get_sp_for_split(struct kvm *kvm, u64 *huge_sptep)
+{
+	struct kvm_mmu_page *huge_sp = sptep_to_sp(huge_sptep);
+	struct shadow_page_caches caches = {};
+	union kvm_mmu_page_role role;
+	unsigned int access;
+	gfn_t gfn;
+
+	gfn = kvm_mmu_page_get_gfn(huge_sp, spte_index(huge_sptep));
+	access = kvm_mmu_page_get_access(huge_sp, spte_index(huge_sptep));
+
+	/*
+	 * Note, huge page splitting always uses direct shadow pages, regardless
+	 * of whether the huge page itself is mapped by a direct or indirect
+	 * shadow page, since the huge page region itself is being directly
+	 * mapped with smaller pages.
+	 */
+	role = kvm_mmu_child_role(huge_sptep, /*direct=*/true, access);
+
+	/* Direct SPs do not require a shadowed_info_cache. */
+	caches.page_header_cache = &kvm->arch.split_page_header_cache;
+	caches.shadow_page_cache = &kvm->arch.split_shadow_page_cache;
+
+	/* Safe to pass NULL for vCPU since requesting a direct SP. */
+	return __kvm_mmu_get_shadow_page(kvm, NULL, &caches, gfn, role);
+}
+
+static void shadow_mmu_split_huge_page(struct kvm *kvm,
+				       const struct kvm_memory_slot *slot,
+				       u64 *huge_sptep)
+
+{
+	struct kvm_mmu_memory_cache *cache = &kvm->arch.split_desc_cache;
+	u64 huge_spte = READ_ONCE(*huge_sptep);
+	struct kvm_mmu_page *sp;
+	bool flush = false;
+	u64 *sptep, spte;
+	gfn_t gfn;
+	int index;
+
+	sp = shadow_mmu_get_sp_for_split(kvm, huge_sptep);
+
+	for (index = 0; index < SPTE_ENT_PER_PAGE; index++) {
+		sptep = &sp->spt[index];
+		gfn = kvm_mmu_page_get_gfn(sp, index);
+
+		/*
+		 * The SP may already have populated SPTEs, e.g. if this huge
+		 * page is aliased by multiple sptes with the same access
+		 * permissions. These entries are guaranteed to map the same
+		 * gfn-to-pfn translation since the SP is direct, so no need to
+		 * modify them.
+		 *
+		 * However, if a given SPTE points to a lower level page table,
+		 * that lower level page table may only be partially populated.
+		 * Installing such SPTEs would effectively unmap a potion of the
+		 * huge page. Unmapping guest memory always requires a TLB flush
+		 * since a subsequent operation on the unmapped regions would
+		 * fail to detect the need to flush.
+		 */
+		if (is_shadow_present_pte(*sptep)) {
+			flush |= !is_last_spte(*sptep, sp->role.level);
+			continue;
+		}
+
+		spte = make_huge_page_split_spte(kvm, huge_spte, sp->role, index);
+		mmu_spte_set(sptep, spte);
+		__rmap_add(kvm, cache, slot, sptep, gfn, sp->role.access);
+	}
+
+	__link_shadow_page(kvm, cache, huge_sptep, sp, flush);
+}
+
+static int shadow_mmu_try_split_huge_page(struct kvm *kvm,
+					  const struct kvm_memory_slot *slot,
+					  u64 *huge_sptep)
+{
+	struct kvm_mmu_page *huge_sp = sptep_to_sp(huge_sptep);
+	int level, r = 0;
+	gfn_t gfn;
+	u64 spte;
+
+	/* Grab information for the tracepoint before dropping the MMU lock. */
+	gfn = kvm_mmu_page_get_gfn(huge_sp, spte_index(huge_sptep));
+	level = huge_sp->role.level;
+	spte = *huge_sptep;
+
+	if (kvm_mmu_available_pages(kvm) <= KVM_MIN_FREE_MMU_PAGES) {
+		r = -ENOSPC;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if (need_topup_split_caches_or_resched(kvm)) {
+		write_unlock(&kvm->mmu_lock);
+		cond_resched();
+		/*
+		 * If the topup succeeds, return -EAGAIN to indicate that the
+		 * rmap iterator should be restarted because the MMU lock was
+		 * dropped.
+		 */
+		r = topup_split_caches(kvm) ?: -EAGAIN;
+		write_lock(&kvm->mmu_lock);
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	shadow_mmu_split_huge_page(kvm, slot, huge_sptep);
+
+out:
+	trace_kvm_mmu_split_huge_page(gfn, spte, level, r);
+	return r;
+}
+
+static bool shadow_mmu_try_split_huge_pages(struct kvm *kvm,
+					    struct kvm_rmap_head *rmap_head,
+					    const struct kvm_memory_slot *slot)
+{
+	struct rmap_iterator iter;
+	struct kvm_mmu_page *sp;
+	u64 *huge_sptep;
+	int r;
+
+restart:
+	for_each_rmap_spte(rmap_head, &iter, huge_sptep) {
+		sp = sptep_to_sp(huge_sptep);
+
+		/* TDP MMU is enabled, so rmap only contains nested MMU SPs. */
+		if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!sp->role.guest_mode))
+			continue;
+
+		/* The rmaps should never contain non-leaf SPTEs. */
+		if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!is_large_pte(*huge_sptep)))
+			continue;
+
+		/* SPs with level >PG_LEVEL_4K should never by unsync. */
+		if (WARN_ON_ONCE(sp->unsync))
+			continue;
+
+		/* Don't bother splitting huge pages on invalid SPs. */
+		if (sp->role.invalid)
+			continue;
+
+		r = shadow_mmu_try_split_huge_page(kvm, slot, huge_sptep);
+
+		/*
+		 * The split succeeded or needs to be retried because the MMU
+		 * lock was dropped. Either way, restart the iterator to get it
+		 * back into a consistent state.
+		 */
+		if (!r || r == -EAGAIN)
+			goto restart;
+
+		/* The split failed and shouldn't be retried (e.g. -ENOMEM). */
+		break;
+	}
+
+	return false;
+}
+
+static void kvm_shadow_mmu_try_split_huge_pages(struct kvm *kvm,
+						const struct kvm_memory_slot *slot,
+						gfn_t start, gfn_t end,
+						int target_level)
+{
+	int level;
+
+	/*
+	 * Split huge pages starting with KVM_MAX_HUGEPAGE_LEVEL and working
+	 * down to the target level. This ensures pages are recursively split
+	 * all the way to the target level. There's no need to split pages
+	 * already at the target level.
+	 */
+	for (level = KVM_MAX_HUGEPAGE_LEVEL; level > target_level; level--)
+		__walk_slot_rmaps(kvm, slot, shadow_mmu_try_split_huge_pages,
+				  level, level, start, end - 1, true, false);
+}
+
+/* Must be called with the mmu_lock held in write-mode. */
+void kvm_mmu_try_split_huge_pages(struct kvm *kvm,
+				   const struct kvm_memory_slot *memslot,
+				   u64 start, u64 end,
+				   int target_level)
+{
+	if (!tdp_mmu_enabled)
+		return;
+
+	if (kvm_memslots_have_rmaps(kvm))
+		kvm_shadow_mmu_try_split_huge_pages(kvm, memslot, start, end, target_level);
+
+	kvm_tdp_mmu_try_split_huge_pages(kvm, memslot, start, end, target_level, false);
+
+	/*
+	 * A TLB flush is unnecessary at this point for the same resons as in
+	 * kvm_mmu_slot_try_split_huge_pages().
+	 */
+}
+
+void kvm_mmu_slot_try_split_huge_pages(struct kvm *kvm,
+					const struct kvm_memory_slot *memslot,
+					int target_level)
+{
+	u64 start = memslot->base_gfn;
+	u64 end = start + memslot->npages;
+
+	if (!tdp_mmu_enabled)
+		return;
+
+	if (kvm_memslots_have_rmaps(kvm)) {
+		write_lock(&kvm->mmu_lock);
+		kvm_shadow_mmu_try_split_huge_pages(kvm, memslot, start, end, target_level);
+		write_unlock(&kvm->mmu_lock);
+	}
+
+	read_lock(&kvm->mmu_lock);
+	kvm_tdp_mmu_try_split_huge_pages(kvm, memslot, start, end, target_level, true);
+	read_unlock(&kvm->mmu_lock);
+
+	/*
+	 * No TLB flush is necessary here. KVM will flush TLBs after
+	 * write-protecting and/or clearing dirty on the newly split SPTEs to
+	 * ensure that guest writes are reflected in the dirty log before the
+	 * ioctl to enable dirty logging on this memslot completes. Since the
+	 * split SPTEs retain the write and dirty bits of the huge SPTE, it is
+	 * safe for KVM to decide if a TLB flush is necessary based on the split
+	 * SPTEs.
+	 */
+}
+
+static bool kvm_mmu_zap_collapsible_spte(struct kvm *kvm,
+					 struct kvm_rmap_head *rmap_head,
+					 const struct kvm_memory_slot *slot)
+{
+	u64 *sptep;
+	struct rmap_iterator iter;
+	int need_tlb_flush = 0;
+	struct kvm_mmu_page *sp;
+
+restart:
+	for_each_rmap_spte(rmap_head, &iter, sptep) {
+		sp = sptep_to_sp(sptep);
+
+		/*
+		 * We cannot do huge page mapping for indirect shadow pages,
+		 * which are found on the last rmap (level = 1) when not using
+		 * tdp; such shadow pages are synced with the page table in
+		 * the guest, and the guest page table is using 4K page size
+		 * mapping if the indirect sp has level = 1.
+		 */
+		if (sp->role.direct &&
+		    sp->role.level < kvm_mmu_max_mapping_level(kvm, slot, sp->gfn,
+							       PG_LEVEL_NUM)) {
+			kvm_zap_one_rmap_spte(kvm, rmap_head, sptep);
+
+			if (kvm_available_flush_remote_tlbs_range())
+				kvm_flush_remote_tlbs_sptep(kvm, sptep);
+			else
+				need_tlb_flush = 1;
+
+			goto restart;
+		}
+	}
+
+	return need_tlb_flush;
+}
+
+static void kvm_rmap_zap_collapsible_sptes(struct kvm *kvm,
+					   const struct kvm_memory_slot *slot)
+{
+	/*
+	 * Note, use KVM_MAX_HUGEPAGE_LEVEL - 1 since there's no need to zap
+	 * pages that are already mapped at the maximum hugepage level.
+	 */
+	if (walk_slot_rmaps(kvm, slot, kvm_mmu_zap_collapsible_spte,
+			    PG_LEVEL_4K, KVM_MAX_HUGEPAGE_LEVEL - 1, true))
+		kvm_flush_remote_tlbs_memslot(kvm, slot);
+}
+
+void kvm_mmu_zap_collapsible_sptes(struct kvm *kvm,
+				   const struct kvm_memory_slot *slot)
+{
+	if (kvm_memslots_have_rmaps(kvm)) {
+		write_lock(&kvm->mmu_lock);
+		kvm_rmap_zap_collapsible_sptes(kvm, slot);
+		write_unlock(&kvm->mmu_lock);
+	}
+
+	if (tdp_mmu_enabled) {
+		read_lock(&kvm->mmu_lock);
+		kvm_tdp_mmu_zap_collapsible_sptes(kvm, slot);
+		read_unlock(&kvm->mmu_lock);
+	}
+}
+
+void kvm_mmu_slot_leaf_clear_dirty(struct kvm *kvm,
+				   const struct kvm_memory_slot *memslot)
+{
+	if (kvm_memslots_have_rmaps(kvm)) {
+		write_lock(&kvm->mmu_lock);
+		/*
+		 * Clear dirty bits only on 4k SPTEs since the legacy MMU only
+		 * support dirty logging at a 4k granularity.
+		 */
+		walk_slot_rmaps_4k(kvm, memslot, __rmap_clear_dirty, false);
+		write_unlock(&kvm->mmu_lock);
+	}
+
+	if (tdp_mmu_enabled) {
+		read_lock(&kvm->mmu_lock);
+		kvm_tdp_mmu_clear_dirty_slot(kvm, memslot);
+		read_unlock(&kvm->mmu_lock);
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * The caller will flush the TLBs after this function returns.
+	 *
+	 * It's also safe to flush TLBs out of mmu lock here as currently this
+	 * function is only used for dirty logging, in which case flushing TLB
+	 * out of mmu lock also guarantees no dirty pages will be lost in
+	 * dirty_bitmap.
+	 */
+}
+
+static void kvm_mmu_zap_all(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+	struct kvm_mmu_page *sp, *node;
+	LIST_HEAD(invalid_list);
+	int ign;
+
+	write_lock(&kvm->mmu_lock);
+restart:
+	list_for_each_entry_safe(sp, node, &kvm->arch.active_mmu_pages, link) {
+		if (WARN_ON_ONCE(sp->role.invalid))
+			continue;
+		if (__kvm_mmu_prepare_zap_page(kvm, sp, &invalid_list, &ign))
+			goto restart;
+		if (cond_resched_rwlock_write(&kvm->mmu_lock))
+			goto restart;
+	}
+
+	kvm_mmu_commit_zap_page(kvm, &invalid_list);
+
+	if (tdp_mmu_enabled)
+		kvm_tdp_mmu_zap_all(kvm);
+
+	write_unlock(&kvm->mmu_lock);
+}
+
+void kvm_arch_flush_shadow_all(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+	kvm_mmu_zap_all(kvm);
+}
+
+void kvm_arch_flush_shadow_memslot(struct kvm *kvm,
+				   struct kvm_memory_slot *slot)
+{
+	kvm_mmu_zap_all_fast(kvm);
+}
+
+void kvm_mmu_invalidate_mmio_sptes(struct kvm *kvm, u64 gen)
+{
+	WARN_ON_ONCE(gen & KVM_MEMSLOT_GEN_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS);
+
+	gen &= MMIO_SPTE_GEN_MASK;
+
+	/*
+	 * Generation numbers are incremented in multiples of the number of
+	 * address spaces in order to provide unique generations across all
+	 * address spaces.  Strip what is effectively the address space
+	 * modifier prior to checking for a wrap of the MMIO generation so
+	 * that a wrap in any address space is detected.
+	 */
+	gen &= ~((u64)KVM_ADDRESS_SPACE_NUM - 1);
+
+	/*
+	 * The very rare case: if the MMIO generation number has wrapped,
+	 * zap all shadow pages.
+	 */
+	if (unlikely(gen == 0)) {
+		kvm_debug_ratelimited("zapping shadow pages for mmio generation wraparound\n");
+		kvm_mmu_zap_all_fast(kvm);
+	}
+}
+
+static unsigned long mmu_shrink_scan(struct shrinker *shrink,
+				     struct shrink_control *sc)
+{
+	struct kvm *kvm;
+	int nr_to_scan = sc->nr_to_scan;
+	unsigned long freed = 0;
+
+	mutex_lock(&kvm_lock);
+
+	list_for_each_entry(kvm, &vm_list, vm_list) {
+		int idx;
+		LIST_HEAD(invalid_list);
+
+		/*
+		 * Never scan more than sc->nr_to_scan VM instances.
+		 * Will not hit this condition practically since we do not try
+		 * to shrink more than one VM and it is very unlikely to see
+		 * !n_used_mmu_pages so many times.
+		 */
+		if (!nr_to_scan--)
+			break;
+		/*
+		 * n_used_mmu_pages is accessed without holding kvm->mmu_lock
+		 * here. We may skip a VM instance errorneosly, but we do not
+		 * want to shrink a VM that only started to populate its MMU
+		 * anyway.
+		 */
+		if (!kvm->arch.n_used_mmu_pages &&
+		    !kvm_has_zapped_obsolete_pages(kvm))
+			continue;
+
+		idx = srcu_read_lock(&kvm->srcu);
+		write_lock(&kvm->mmu_lock);
+
+		if (kvm_has_zapped_obsolete_pages(kvm)) {
+			kvm_mmu_commit_zap_page(kvm,
+			      &kvm->arch.zapped_obsolete_pages);
+			goto unlock;
+		}
+
+		freed = kvm_mmu_zap_oldest_mmu_pages(kvm, sc->nr_to_scan);
+
+unlock:
+		write_unlock(&kvm->mmu_lock);
+		srcu_read_unlock(&kvm->srcu, idx);
+
+		/*
+		 * unfair on small ones
+		 * per-vm shrinkers cry out
+		 * sadness comes quickly
+		 */
+		list_move_tail(&kvm->vm_list, &vm_list);
+		break;
+	}
+
+	mutex_unlock(&kvm_lock);
+	return freed;
+}
+
+static unsigned long mmu_shrink_count(struct shrinker *shrink,
+				      struct shrink_control *sc)
+{
+	return percpu_counter_read_positive(&kvm_total_used_mmu_pages);
+}
+
+static struct shrinker mmu_shrinker = {
+	.count_objects = mmu_shrink_count,
+	.scan_objects = mmu_shrink_scan,
+	.seeks = DEFAULT_SEEKS * 10,
+};
+
+static void mmu_destroy_caches(void)
+{
+	kmem_cache_destroy(pte_list_desc_cache);
+	kmem_cache_destroy(mmu_page_header_cache);
+}
+
+static int get_nx_huge_pages(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp)
+{
+	if (nx_hugepage_mitigation_hard_disabled)
+		return sysfs_emit(buffer, "never\n");
+
+	return param_get_bool(buffer, kp);
+}
+
+static bool get_nx_auto_mode(void)
+{
+	/* Return true when CPU has the bug, and mitigations are ON */
+	return boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_ITLB_MULTIHIT) && !cpu_mitigations_off();
+}
+
+static void __set_nx_huge_pages(bool val)
+{
+	nx_huge_pages = itlb_multihit_kvm_mitigation = val;
+}
+
+static int set_nx_huge_pages(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp)
+{
+	bool old_val = nx_huge_pages;
+	bool new_val;
+
+	if (nx_hugepage_mitigation_hard_disabled)
+		return -EPERM;
+
+	/* In "auto" mode deploy workaround only if CPU has the bug. */
+	if (sysfs_streq(val, "off")) {
+		new_val = 0;
+	} else if (sysfs_streq(val, "force")) {
+		new_val = 1;
+	} else if (sysfs_streq(val, "auto")) {
+		new_val = get_nx_auto_mode();
+	} else if (sysfs_streq(val, "never")) {
+		new_val = 0;
+
+		mutex_lock(&kvm_lock);
+		if (!list_empty(&vm_list)) {
+			mutex_unlock(&kvm_lock);
+			return -EBUSY;
+		}
+		nx_hugepage_mitigation_hard_disabled = true;
+		mutex_unlock(&kvm_lock);
+	} else if (kstrtobool(val, &new_val) < 0) {
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	__set_nx_huge_pages(new_val);
+
+	if (new_val != old_val) {
+		struct kvm *kvm;
+
+		mutex_lock(&kvm_lock);
+
+		list_for_each_entry(kvm, &vm_list, vm_list) {
+			mutex_lock(&kvm->slots_lock);
+			kvm_mmu_zap_all_fast(kvm);
+			mutex_unlock(&kvm->slots_lock);
+
+			wake_up_process(kvm->arch.nx_huge_page_recovery_thread);
+		}
+		mutex_unlock(&kvm_lock);
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * nx_huge_pages needs to be resolved to true/false when kvm.ko is loaded, as
+ * its default value of -1 is technically undefined behavior for a boolean.
+ * Forward the module init call to SPTE code so that it too can handle module
+ * params that need to be resolved/snapshot.
+ */
+void __init kvm_mmu_x86_module_init(void)
+{
+	if (nx_huge_pages == -1)
+		__set_nx_huge_pages(get_nx_auto_mode());
+
+	/*
+	 * Snapshot userspace's desire to enable the TDP MMU. Whether or not the
+	 * TDP MMU is actually enabled is determined in kvm_configure_mmu()
+	 * when the vendor module is loaded.
+	 */
+	tdp_mmu_allowed = tdp_mmu_enabled;
+
+	kvm_mmu_spte_module_init();
+}
+
+/*
+ * The bulk of the MMU initialization is deferred until the vendor module is
+ * loaded as many of the masks/values may be modified by VMX or SVM, i.e. need
+ * to be reset when a potentially different vendor module is loaded.
+ */
+int kvm_mmu_vendor_module_init(void)
+{
+	int ret = -ENOMEM;
+
+	/*
+	 * MMU roles use union aliasing which is, generally speaking, an
+	 * undefined behavior. However, we supposedly know how compilers behave
+	 * and the current status quo is unlikely to change. Guardians below are
+	 * supposed to let us know if the assumption becomes false.
+	 */
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(union kvm_mmu_page_role) != sizeof(u32));
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(union kvm_mmu_extended_role) != sizeof(u32));
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(union kvm_cpu_role) != sizeof(u64));
+
+	kvm_mmu_reset_all_pte_masks();
+
+	pte_list_desc_cache = kmem_cache_create("pte_list_desc",
+					    sizeof(struct pte_list_desc),
+					    0, SLAB_ACCOUNT, NULL);
+	if (!pte_list_desc_cache)
+		goto out;
+
+	mmu_page_header_cache = kmem_cache_create("kvm_mmu_page_header",
+						  sizeof(struct kvm_mmu_page),
+						  0, SLAB_ACCOUNT, NULL);
+	if (!mmu_page_header_cache)
+		goto out;
+
+	if (percpu_counter_init(&kvm_total_used_mmu_pages, 0, GFP_KERNEL))
+		goto out;
+
+	ret = register_shrinker(&mmu_shrinker, "x86-mmu");
+	if (ret)
+		goto out_shrinker;
+
+	return 0;
+
+out_shrinker:
+	percpu_counter_destroy(&kvm_total_used_mmu_pages);
+out:
+	mmu_destroy_caches();
+	return ret;
+}
+
+void kvm_mmu_destroy(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	kvm_mmu_unload(vcpu);
+	free_mmu_pages(&vcpu->arch.root_mmu);
+	free_mmu_pages(&vcpu->arch.guest_mmu);
+	mmu_free_memory_caches(vcpu);
+}
+
+void kvm_mmu_vendor_module_exit(void)
+{
+	mmu_destroy_caches();
+	percpu_counter_destroy(&kvm_total_used_mmu_pages);
+	unregister_shrinker(&mmu_shrinker);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Calculate the effective recovery period, accounting for '0' meaning "let KVM
+ * select a halving time of 1 hour".  Returns true if recovery is enabled.
+ */
+static bool calc_nx_huge_pages_recovery_period(uint *period)
+{
+	/*
+	 * Use READ_ONCE to get the params, this may be called outside of the
+	 * param setters, e.g. by the kthread to compute its next timeout.
+	 */
+	bool enabled = READ_ONCE(nx_huge_pages);
+	uint ratio = READ_ONCE(nx_huge_pages_recovery_ratio);
+
+	if (!enabled || !ratio)
+		return false;
+
+	*period = READ_ONCE(nx_huge_pages_recovery_period_ms);
+	if (!*period) {
+		/* Make sure the period is not less than one second.  */
+		ratio = min(ratio, 3600u);
+		*period = 60 * 60 * 1000 / ratio;
+	}
+	return true;
+}
+
+static int set_nx_huge_pages_recovery_param(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp)
+{
+	bool was_recovery_enabled, is_recovery_enabled;
+	uint old_period, new_period;
+	int err;
+
+	if (nx_hugepage_mitigation_hard_disabled)
+		return -EPERM;
+
+	was_recovery_enabled = calc_nx_huge_pages_recovery_period(&old_period);
+
+	err = param_set_uint(val, kp);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	is_recovery_enabled = calc_nx_huge_pages_recovery_period(&new_period);
+
+	if (is_recovery_enabled &&
+	    (!was_recovery_enabled || old_period > new_period)) {
+		struct kvm *kvm;
+
+		mutex_lock(&kvm_lock);
+
+		list_for_each_entry(kvm, &vm_list, vm_list)
+			wake_up_process(kvm->arch.nx_huge_page_recovery_thread);
+
+		mutex_unlock(&kvm_lock);
+	}
+
+	return err;
+}
+
+static void kvm_recover_nx_huge_pages(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+	unsigned long nx_lpage_splits = kvm->stat.nx_lpage_splits;
+	struct kvm_memory_slot *slot;
+	int rcu_idx;
+	struct kvm_mmu_page *sp;
+	unsigned int ratio;
+	LIST_HEAD(invalid_list);
+	bool flush = false;
+	ulong to_zap;
+
+	rcu_idx = srcu_read_lock(&kvm->srcu);
+	write_lock(&kvm->mmu_lock);
+
+	/*
+	 * Zapping TDP MMU shadow pages, including the remote TLB flush, must
+	 * be done under RCU protection, because the pages are freed via RCU
+	 * callback.
+	 */
+	rcu_read_lock();
+
+	ratio = READ_ONCE(nx_huge_pages_recovery_ratio);
+	to_zap = ratio ? DIV_ROUND_UP(nx_lpage_splits, ratio) : 0;
+	for ( ; to_zap; --to_zap) {
+		if (list_empty(&kvm->arch.possible_nx_huge_pages))
+			break;
+
+		/*
+		 * We use a separate list instead of just using active_mmu_pages
+		 * because the number of shadow pages that be replaced with an
+		 * NX huge page is expected to be relatively small compared to
+		 * the total number of shadow pages.  And because the TDP MMU
+		 * doesn't use active_mmu_pages.
+		 */
+		sp = list_first_entry(&kvm->arch.possible_nx_huge_pages,
+				      struct kvm_mmu_page,
+				      possible_nx_huge_page_link);
+		WARN_ON_ONCE(!sp->nx_huge_page_disallowed);
+		WARN_ON_ONCE(!sp->role.direct);
+
+		/*
+		 * Unaccount and do not attempt to recover any NX Huge Pages
+		 * that are being dirty tracked, as they would just be faulted
+		 * back in as 4KiB pages. The NX Huge Pages in this slot will be
+		 * recovered, along with all the other huge pages in the slot,
+		 * when dirty logging is disabled.
+		 *
+		 * Since gfn_to_memslot() is relatively expensive, it helps to
+		 * skip it if it the test cannot possibly return true.  On the
+		 * other hand, if any memslot has logging enabled, chances are
+		 * good that all of them do, in which case unaccount_nx_huge_page()
+		 * is much cheaper than zapping the page.
+		 *
+		 * If a memslot update is in progress, reading an incorrect value
+		 * of kvm->nr_memslots_dirty_logging is not a problem: if it is
+		 * becoming zero, gfn_to_memslot() will be done unnecessarily; if
+		 * it is becoming nonzero, the page will be zapped unnecessarily.
+		 * Either way, this only affects efficiency in racy situations,
+		 * and not correctness.
+		 */
+		slot = NULL;
+		if (atomic_read(&kvm->nr_memslots_dirty_logging)) {
+			struct kvm_memslots *slots;
+
+			slots = kvm_memslots_for_spte_role(kvm, sp->role);
+			slot = __gfn_to_memslot(slots, sp->gfn);
+			WARN_ON_ONCE(!slot);
+		}
+
+		if (slot && kvm_slot_dirty_track_enabled(slot))
+			unaccount_nx_huge_page(kvm, sp);
+		else if (is_tdp_mmu_page(sp))
+			flush |= kvm_tdp_mmu_zap_sp(kvm, sp);
+		else
+			kvm_mmu_prepare_zap_page(kvm, sp, &invalid_list);
+		WARN_ON_ONCE(sp->nx_huge_page_disallowed);
+
+		if (need_resched() || rwlock_needbreak(&kvm->mmu_lock)) {
+			kvm_mmu_remote_flush_or_zap(kvm, &invalid_list, flush);
+			rcu_read_unlock();
+
+			cond_resched_rwlock_write(&kvm->mmu_lock);
+			flush = false;
+
+			rcu_read_lock();
+		}
+	}
+	kvm_mmu_remote_flush_or_zap(kvm, &invalid_list, flush);
+
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+
+	write_unlock(&kvm->mmu_lock);
+	srcu_read_unlock(&kvm->srcu, rcu_idx);
+}
+
+static long get_nx_huge_page_recovery_timeout(u64 start_time)
+{
+	bool enabled;
+	uint period;
+
+	enabled = calc_nx_huge_pages_recovery_period(&period);
+
+	return enabled ? start_time + msecs_to_jiffies(period) - get_jiffies_64()
+		       : MAX_SCHEDULE_TIMEOUT;
+}
+
+static int kvm_nx_huge_page_recovery_worker(struct kvm *kvm, uintptr_t data)
+{
+	u64 start_time;
+	long remaining_time;
+
+	while (true) {
+		start_time = get_jiffies_64();
+		remaining_time = get_nx_huge_page_recovery_timeout(start_time);
+
+		set_current_state(TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE);
+		while (!kthread_should_stop() && remaining_time > 0) {
+			schedule_timeout(remaining_time);
+			remaining_time = get_nx_huge_page_recovery_timeout(start_time);
+			set_current_state(TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE);
+		}
+
+		set_current_state(TASK_RUNNING);
+
+		if (kthread_should_stop())
+			return 0;
+
+		kvm_recover_nx_huge_pages(kvm);
+	}
+}
+
+int kvm_mmu_post_init_vm(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+	int err;
+
+	if (nx_hugepage_mitigation_hard_disabled)
+		return 0;
+
+	err = kvm_vm_create_worker_thread(kvm, kvm_nx_huge_page_recovery_worker, 0,
+					  "kvm-nx-lpage-recovery",
+					  &kvm->arch.nx_huge_page_recovery_thread);
+	if (!err)
+		kthread_unpark(kvm->arch.nx_huge_page_recovery_thread);
+
+	return err;
+}
+
+void kvm_mmu_pre_destroy_vm(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+	if (kvm->arch.nx_huge_page_recovery_thread)
+		kthread_stop(kvm->arch.nx_huge_page_recovery_thread);
+}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu_internal.h b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu_internal.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..decc1f153
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu_internal.h
@@ -0,0 +1,350 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+#ifndef __KVM_X86_MMU_INTERNAL_H
+#define __KVM_X86_MMU_INTERNAL_H
+
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/kvm_host.h>
+#include <asm/kvm_host.h>
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_PROVE_MMU
+#define KVM_MMU_WARN_ON(x) WARN_ON_ONCE(x)
+#else
+#define KVM_MMU_WARN_ON(x) BUILD_BUG_ON_INVALID(x)
+#endif
+
+/* Page table builder macros common to shadow (host) PTEs and guest PTEs. */
+#define __PT_LEVEL_SHIFT(level, bits_per_level)	\
+	(PAGE_SHIFT + ((level) - 1) * (bits_per_level))
+#define __PT_INDEX(address, level, bits_per_level) \
+	(((address) >> __PT_LEVEL_SHIFT(level, bits_per_level)) & ((1 << (bits_per_level)) - 1))
+
+#define __PT_LVL_ADDR_MASK(base_addr_mask, level, bits_per_level) \
+	((base_addr_mask) & ~((1ULL << (PAGE_SHIFT + (((level) - 1) * (bits_per_level)))) - 1))
+
+#define __PT_LVL_OFFSET_MASK(base_addr_mask, level, bits_per_level) \
+	((base_addr_mask) & ((1ULL << (PAGE_SHIFT + (((level) - 1) * (bits_per_level)))) - 1))
+
+#define __PT_ENT_PER_PAGE(bits_per_level)  (1 << (bits_per_level))
+
+/*
+ * Unlike regular MMU roots, PAE "roots", a.k.a. PDPTEs/PDPTRs, have a PRESENT
+ * bit, and thus are guaranteed to be non-zero when valid.  And, when a guest
+ * PDPTR is !PRESENT, its corresponding PAE root cannot be set to INVALID_PAGE,
+ * as the CPU would treat that as PRESENT PDPTR with reserved bits set.  Use
+ * '0' instead of INVALID_PAGE to indicate an invalid PAE root.
+ */
+#define INVALID_PAE_ROOT	0
+#define IS_VALID_PAE_ROOT(x)	(!!(x))
+
+static inline hpa_t kvm_mmu_get_dummy_root(void)
+{
+	return my_zero_pfn(0) << PAGE_SHIFT;
+}
+
+static inline bool kvm_mmu_is_dummy_root(hpa_t shadow_page)
+{
+	return is_zero_pfn(shadow_page >> PAGE_SHIFT);
+}
+
+typedef u64 __rcu *tdp_ptep_t;
+
+struct kvm_mmu_page {
+	/*
+	 * Note, "link" through "spt" fit in a single 64 byte cache line on
+	 * 64-bit kernels, keep it that way unless there's a reason not to.
+	 */
+	struct list_head link;
+	struct hlist_node hash_link;
+
+	bool tdp_mmu_page;
+	bool unsync;
+	union {
+		u8 mmu_valid_gen;
+
+		/* Only accessed under slots_lock.  */
+		bool tdp_mmu_scheduled_root_to_zap;
+	};
+
+	 /*
+	  * The shadow page can't be replaced by an equivalent huge page
+	  * because it is being used to map an executable page in the guest
+	  * and the NX huge page mitigation is enabled.
+	  */
+	bool nx_huge_page_disallowed;
+
+	/*
+	 * The following two entries are used to key the shadow page in the
+	 * hash table.
+	 */
+	union kvm_mmu_page_role role;
+	gfn_t gfn;
+
+	u64 *spt;
+
+	/*
+	 * Stores the result of the guest translation being shadowed by each
+	 * SPTE.  KVM shadows two types of guest translations: nGPA -> GPA
+	 * (shadow EPT/NPT) and GVA -> GPA (traditional shadow paging). In both
+	 * cases the result of the translation is a GPA and a set of access
+	 * constraints.
+	 *
+	 * The GFN is stored in the upper bits (PAGE_SHIFT) and the shadowed
+	 * access permissions are stored in the lower bits. Note, for
+	 * convenience and uniformity across guests, the access permissions are
+	 * stored in KVM format (e.g.  ACC_EXEC_MASK) not the raw guest format.
+	 */
+	u64 *shadowed_translation;
+
+	/* Currently serving as active root */
+	union {
+		int root_count;
+		refcount_t tdp_mmu_root_count;
+	};
+	unsigned int unsync_children;
+	union {
+		struct kvm_rmap_head parent_ptes; /* rmap pointers to parent sptes */
+		tdp_ptep_t ptep;
+	};
+	DECLARE_BITMAP(unsync_child_bitmap, 512);
+
+	/*
+	 * Tracks shadow pages that, if zapped, would allow KVM to create an NX
+	 * huge page.  A shadow page will have nx_huge_page_disallowed set but
+	 * not be on the list if a huge page is disallowed for other reasons,
+	 * e.g. because KVM is shadowing a PTE at the same gfn, the memslot
+	 * isn't properly aligned, etc...
+	 */
+	struct list_head possible_nx_huge_page_link;
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
+	/*
+	 * Used out of the mmu-lock to avoid reading spte values while an
+	 * update is in progress; see the comments in __get_spte_lockless().
+	 */
+	int clear_spte_count;
+#endif
+
+	/* Number of writes since the last time traversal visited this page.  */
+	atomic_t write_flooding_count;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+	/* Used for freeing the page asynchronously if it is a TDP MMU page. */
+	struct rcu_head rcu_head;
+#endif
+};
+
+extern struct kmem_cache *mmu_page_header_cache;
+
+static inline int kvm_mmu_role_as_id(union kvm_mmu_page_role role)
+{
+	return role.smm ? 1 : 0;
+}
+
+static inline int kvm_mmu_page_as_id(struct kvm_mmu_page *sp)
+{
+	return kvm_mmu_role_as_id(sp->role);
+}
+
+static inline bool kvm_mmu_page_ad_need_write_protect(struct kvm_mmu_page *sp)
+{
+	/*
+	 * When using the EPT page-modification log, the GPAs in the CPU dirty
+	 * log would come from L2 rather than L1.  Therefore, we need to rely
+	 * on write protection to record dirty pages, which bypasses PML, since
+	 * writes now result in a vmexit.  Note, the check on CPU dirty logging
+	 * being enabled is mandatory as the bits used to denote WP-only SPTEs
+	 * are reserved for PAE paging (32-bit KVM).
+	 */
+	return kvm_x86_ops.cpu_dirty_log_size && sp->role.guest_mode;
+}
+
+static inline gfn_t gfn_round_for_level(gfn_t gfn, int level)
+{
+	return gfn & -KVM_PAGES_PER_HPAGE(level);
+}
+
+int mmu_try_to_unsync_pages(struct kvm *kvm, const struct kvm_memory_slot *slot,
+			    gfn_t gfn, bool can_unsync, bool prefetch);
+
+void kvm_mmu_gfn_disallow_lpage(const struct kvm_memory_slot *slot, gfn_t gfn);
+void kvm_mmu_gfn_allow_lpage(const struct kvm_memory_slot *slot, gfn_t gfn);
+bool kvm_mmu_slot_gfn_write_protect(struct kvm *kvm,
+				    struct kvm_memory_slot *slot, u64 gfn,
+				    int min_level);
+
+/* Flush the given page (huge or not) of guest memory. */
+static inline void kvm_flush_remote_tlbs_gfn(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t gfn, int level)
+{
+	kvm_flush_remote_tlbs_range(kvm, gfn_round_for_level(gfn, level),
+				    KVM_PAGES_PER_HPAGE(level));
+}
+
+unsigned int pte_list_count(struct kvm_rmap_head *rmap_head);
+
+extern int nx_huge_pages;
+static inline bool is_nx_huge_page_enabled(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+	return READ_ONCE(nx_huge_pages) && !kvm->arch.disable_nx_huge_pages;
+}
+
+struct kvm_page_fault {
+	/* arguments to kvm_mmu_do_page_fault.  */
+	const gpa_t addr;
+	const u32 error_code;
+	const bool prefetch;
+
+	/* Derived from error_code.  */
+	const bool exec;
+	const bool write;
+	const bool present;
+	const bool rsvd;
+	const bool user;
+
+	/* Derived from mmu and global state.  */
+	const bool is_tdp;
+	const bool nx_huge_page_workaround_enabled;
+
+	/*
+	 * Whether a >4KB mapping can be created or is forbidden due to NX
+	 * hugepages.
+	 */
+	bool huge_page_disallowed;
+
+	/*
+	 * Maximum page size that can be created for this fault; input to
+	 * FNAME(fetch), direct_map() and kvm_tdp_mmu_map().
+	 */
+	u8 max_level;
+
+	/*
+	 * Page size that can be created based on the max_level and the
+	 * page size used by the host mapping.
+	 */
+	u8 req_level;
+
+	/*
+	 * Page size that will be created based on the req_level and
+	 * huge_page_disallowed.
+	 */
+	u8 goal_level;
+
+	/* Shifted addr, or result of guest page table walk if addr is a gva.  */
+	gfn_t gfn;
+
+	/* The memslot containing gfn. May be NULL. */
+	struct kvm_memory_slot *slot;
+
+	/* Outputs of kvm_faultin_pfn.  */
+	unsigned long mmu_seq;
+	kvm_pfn_t pfn;
+	hva_t hva;
+	bool map_writable;
+
+	/*
+	 * Indicates the guest is trying to write a gfn that contains one or
+	 * more of the PTEs used to translate the write itself, i.e. the access
+	 * is changing its own translation in the guest page tables.
+	 */
+	bool write_fault_to_shadow_pgtable;
+};
+
+int kvm_tdp_page_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_page_fault *fault);
+
+/*
+ * Return values of handle_mmio_page_fault(), mmu.page_fault(), fast_page_fault(),
+ * and of course kvm_mmu_do_page_fault().
+ *
+ * RET_PF_CONTINUE: So far, so good, keep handling the page fault.
+ * RET_PF_RETRY: let CPU fault again on the address.
+ * RET_PF_EMULATE: mmio page fault, emulate the instruction directly.
+ * RET_PF_INVALID: the spte is invalid, let the real page fault path update it.
+ * RET_PF_FIXED: The faulting entry has been fixed.
+ * RET_PF_SPURIOUS: The faulting entry was already fixed, e.g. by another vCPU.
+ *
+ * Any names added to this enum should be exported to userspace for use in
+ * tracepoints via TRACE_DEFINE_ENUM() in mmutrace.h
+ *
+ * Note, all values must be greater than or equal to zero so as not to encroach
+ * on -errno return values.  Somewhat arbitrarily use '0' for CONTINUE, which
+ * will allow for efficient machine code when checking for CONTINUE, e.g.
+ * "TEST %rax, %rax, JNZ", as all "stop!" values are non-zero.
+ */
+enum {
+	RET_PF_CONTINUE = 0,
+	RET_PF_RETRY,
+	RET_PF_EMULATE,
+	RET_PF_INVALID,
+	RET_PF_FIXED,
+	RET_PF_SPURIOUS,
+};
+
+static inline int kvm_mmu_do_page_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t cr2_or_gpa,
+					u32 err, bool prefetch, int *emulation_type)
+{
+	struct kvm_page_fault fault = {
+		.addr = cr2_or_gpa,
+		.error_code = err,
+		.exec = err & PFERR_FETCH_MASK,
+		.write = err & PFERR_WRITE_MASK,
+		.present = err & PFERR_PRESENT_MASK,
+		.rsvd = err & PFERR_RSVD_MASK,
+		.user = err & PFERR_USER_MASK,
+		.prefetch = prefetch,
+		.is_tdp = likely(vcpu->arch.mmu->page_fault == kvm_tdp_page_fault),
+		.nx_huge_page_workaround_enabled =
+			is_nx_huge_page_enabled(vcpu->kvm),
+
+		.max_level = KVM_MAX_HUGEPAGE_LEVEL,
+		.req_level = PG_LEVEL_4K,
+		.goal_level = PG_LEVEL_4K,
+	};
+	int r;
+
+	if (vcpu->arch.mmu->root_role.direct) {
+		fault.gfn = fault.addr >> PAGE_SHIFT;
+		fault.slot = kvm_vcpu_gfn_to_memslot(vcpu, fault.gfn);
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Async #PF "faults", a.k.a. prefetch faults, are not faults from the
+	 * guest perspective and have already been counted at the time of the
+	 * original fault.
+	 */
+	if (!prefetch)
+		vcpu->stat.pf_taken++;
+
+	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE) && fault.is_tdp)
+		r = kvm_tdp_page_fault(vcpu, &fault);
+	else
+		r = vcpu->arch.mmu->page_fault(vcpu, &fault);
+
+	if (fault.write_fault_to_shadow_pgtable && emulation_type)
+		*emulation_type |= EMULTYPE_WRITE_PF_TO_SP;
+
+	/*
+	 * Similar to above, prefetch faults aren't truly spurious, and the
+	 * async #PF path doesn't do emulation.  Do count faults that are fixed
+	 * by the async #PF handler though, otherwise they'll never be counted.
+	 */
+	if (r == RET_PF_FIXED)
+		vcpu->stat.pf_fixed++;
+	else if (prefetch)
+		;
+	else if (r == RET_PF_EMULATE)
+		vcpu->stat.pf_emulate++;
+	else if (r == RET_PF_SPURIOUS)
+		vcpu->stat.pf_spurious++;
+	return r;
+}
+
+int kvm_mmu_max_mapping_level(struct kvm *kvm,
+			      const struct kvm_memory_slot *slot, gfn_t gfn,
+			      int max_level);
+void kvm_mmu_hugepage_adjust(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_page_fault *fault);
+void disallowed_hugepage_adjust(struct kvm_page_fault *fault, u64 spte, int cur_level);
+
+void *mmu_memory_cache_alloc(struct kvm_mmu_memory_cache *mc);
+
+void track_possible_nx_huge_page(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_mmu_page *sp);
+void untrack_possible_nx_huge_page(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_mmu_page *sp);
+
+#endif /* __KVM_X86_MMU_INTERNAL_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmutrace.h b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmutrace.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..ae86820ce
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmutrace.h
@@ -0,0 +1,451 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+#if !defined(_TRACE_KVMMMU_H) || defined(TRACE_HEADER_MULTI_READ)
+#define _TRACE_KVMMMU_H
+
+#include <linux/tracepoint.h>
+#include <linux/trace_events.h>
+
+#undef TRACE_SYSTEM
+#define TRACE_SYSTEM kvmmmu
+
+#define KVM_MMU_PAGE_FIELDS		\
+	__field(__u8, mmu_valid_gen)	\
+	__field(__u64, gfn)		\
+	__field(__u32, role)		\
+	__field(__u32, root_count)	\
+	__field(bool, unsync)
+
+#define KVM_MMU_PAGE_ASSIGN(sp)				\
+	__entry->mmu_valid_gen = sp->mmu_valid_gen;	\
+	__entry->gfn = sp->gfn;				\
+	__entry->role = sp->role.word;			\
+	__entry->root_count = sp->root_count;		\
+	__entry->unsync = sp->unsync;
+
+#define KVM_MMU_PAGE_PRINTK() ({				        \
+	const char *saved_ptr = trace_seq_buffer_ptr(p);		\
+	static const char *access_str[] = {			        \
+		"---", "--x", "w--", "w-x", "-u-", "-ux", "wu-", "wux"  \
+	};							        \
+	union kvm_mmu_page_role role;				        \
+								        \
+	role.word = __entry->role;					\
+									\
+	trace_seq_printf(p, "sp gen %u gfn %llx l%u %u-byte q%u%s %s%s"	\
+			 " %snxe %sad root %u %s%c",			\
+			 __entry->mmu_valid_gen,			\
+			 __entry->gfn, role.level,			\
+			 role.has_4_byte_gpte ? 4 : 8,			\
+			 role.quadrant,					\
+			 role.direct ? " direct" : "",			\
+			 access_str[role.access],			\
+			 role.invalid ? " invalid" : "",		\
+			 role.efer_nx ? "" : "!",			\
+			 role.ad_disabled ? "!" : "",			\
+			 __entry->root_count,				\
+			 __entry->unsync ? "unsync" : "sync", 0);	\
+	saved_ptr;							\
+		})
+
+#define kvm_mmu_trace_pferr_flags       \
+	{ PFERR_PRESENT_MASK, "P" },	\
+	{ PFERR_WRITE_MASK, "W" },	\
+	{ PFERR_USER_MASK, "U" },	\
+	{ PFERR_RSVD_MASK, "RSVD" },	\
+	{ PFERR_FETCH_MASK, "F" }
+
+TRACE_DEFINE_ENUM(RET_PF_CONTINUE);
+TRACE_DEFINE_ENUM(RET_PF_RETRY);
+TRACE_DEFINE_ENUM(RET_PF_EMULATE);
+TRACE_DEFINE_ENUM(RET_PF_INVALID);
+TRACE_DEFINE_ENUM(RET_PF_FIXED);
+TRACE_DEFINE_ENUM(RET_PF_SPURIOUS);
+
+/*
+ * A pagetable walk has started
+ */
+TRACE_EVENT(
+	kvm_mmu_pagetable_walk,
+	TP_PROTO(u64 addr, u32 pferr),
+	TP_ARGS(addr, pferr),
+
+	TP_STRUCT__entry(
+		__field(__u64, addr)
+		__field(__u32, pferr)
+	),
+
+	TP_fast_assign(
+		__entry->addr = addr;
+		__entry->pferr = pferr;
+	),
+
+	TP_printk("addr %llx pferr %x %s", __entry->addr, __entry->pferr,
+		  __print_flags(__entry->pferr, "|", kvm_mmu_trace_pferr_flags))
+);
+
+
+/* We just walked a paging element */
+TRACE_EVENT(
+	kvm_mmu_paging_element,
+	TP_PROTO(u64 pte, int level),
+	TP_ARGS(pte, level),
+
+	TP_STRUCT__entry(
+		__field(__u64, pte)
+		__field(__u32, level)
+		),
+
+	TP_fast_assign(
+		__entry->pte = pte;
+		__entry->level = level;
+		),
+
+	TP_printk("pte %llx level %u", __entry->pte, __entry->level)
+);
+
+DECLARE_EVENT_CLASS(kvm_mmu_set_bit_class,
+
+	TP_PROTO(unsigned long table_gfn, unsigned index, unsigned size),
+
+	TP_ARGS(table_gfn, index, size),
+
+	TP_STRUCT__entry(
+		__field(__u64, gpa)
+	),
+
+	TP_fast_assign(
+		__entry->gpa = ((u64)table_gfn << PAGE_SHIFT)
+				+ index * size;
+		),
+
+	TP_printk("gpa %llx", __entry->gpa)
+);
+
+/* We set a pte accessed bit */
+DEFINE_EVENT(kvm_mmu_set_bit_class, kvm_mmu_set_accessed_bit,
+
+	TP_PROTO(unsigned long table_gfn, unsigned index, unsigned size),
+
+	TP_ARGS(table_gfn, index, size)
+);
+
+/* We set a pte dirty bit */
+DEFINE_EVENT(kvm_mmu_set_bit_class, kvm_mmu_set_dirty_bit,
+
+	TP_PROTO(unsigned long table_gfn, unsigned index, unsigned size),
+
+	TP_ARGS(table_gfn, index, size)
+);
+
+TRACE_EVENT(
+	kvm_mmu_walker_error,
+	TP_PROTO(u32 pferr),
+	TP_ARGS(pferr),
+
+	TP_STRUCT__entry(
+		__field(__u32, pferr)
+		),
+
+	TP_fast_assign(
+		__entry->pferr = pferr;
+		),
+
+	TP_printk("pferr %x %s", __entry->pferr,
+		  __print_flags(__entry->pferr, "|", kvm_mmu_trace_pferr_flags))
+);
+
+TRACE_EVENT(
+	kvm_mmu_get_page,
+	TP_PROTO(struct kvm_mmu_page *sp, bool created),
+	TP_ARGS(sp, created),
+
+	TP_STRUCT__entry(
+		KVM_MMU_PAGE_FIELDS
+		__field(bool, created)
+		),
+
+	TP_fast_assign(
+		KVM_MMU_PAGE_ASSIGN(sp)
+		__entry->created = created;
+		),
+
+	TP_printk("%s %s", KVM_MMU_PAGE_PRINTK(),
+		  __entry->created ? "new" : "existing")
+);
+
+DECLARE_EVENT_CLASS(kvm_mmu_page_class,
+
+	TP_PROTO(struct kvm_mmu_page *sp),
+	TP_ARGS(sp),
+
+	TP_STRUCT__entry(
+		KVM_MMU_PAGE_FIELDS
+	),
+
+	TP_fast_assign(
+		KVM_MMU_PAGE_ASSIGN(sp)
+	),
+
+	TP_printk("%s", KVM_MMU_PAGE_PRINTK())
+);
+
+DEFINE_EVENT(kvm_mmu_page_class, kvm_mmu_sync_page,
+	TP_PROTO(struct kvm_mmu_page *sp),
+
+	TP_ARGS(sp)
+);
+
+DEFINE_EVENT(kvm_mmu_page_class, kvm_mmu_unsync_page,
+	TP_PROTO(struct kvm_mmu_page *sp),
+
+	TP_ARGS(sp)
+);
+
+DEFINE_EVENT(kvm_mmu_page_class, kvm_mmu_prepare_zap_page,
+	TP_PROTO(struct kvm_mmu_page *sp),
+
+	TP_ARGS(sp)
+);
+
+TRACE_EVENT(
+	mark_mmio_spte,
+	TP_PROTO(u64 *sptep, gfn_t gfn, u64 spte),
+	TP_ARGS(sptep, gfn, spte),
+
+	TP_STRUCT__entry(
+		__field(void *, sptep)
+		__field(gfn_t, gfn)
+		__field(unsigned, access)
+		__field(unsigned int, gen)
+	),
+
+	TP_fast_assign(
+		__entry->sptep = sptep;
+		__entry->gfn = gfn;
+		__entry->access = spte & ACC_ALL;
+		__entry->gen = get_mmio_spte_generation(spte);
+	),
+
+	TP_printk("sptep:%p gfn %llx access %x gen %x", __entry->sptep,
+		  __entry->gfn, __entry->access, __entry->gen)
+);
+
+TRACE_EVENT(
+	handle_mmio_page_fault,
+	TP_PROTO(u64 addr, gfn_t gfn, unsigned access),
+	TP_ARGS(addr, gfn, access),
+
+	TP_STRUCT__entry(
+		__field(u64, addr)
+		__field(gfn_t, gfn)
+		__field(unsigned, access)
+	),
+
+	TP_fast_assign(
+		__entry->addr = addr;
+		__entry->gfn = gfn;
+		__entry->access = access;
+	),
+
+	TP_printk("addr:%llx gfn %llx access %x", __entry->addr, __entry->gfn,
+		  __entry->access)
+);
+
+TRACE_EVENT(
+	fast_page_fault,
+	TP_PROTO(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_page_fault *fault,
+		 u64 *sptep, u64 old_spte, int ret),
+	TP_ARGS(vcpu, fault, sptep, old_spte, ret),
+
+	TP_STRUCT__entry(
+		__field(int, vcpu_id)
+		__field(gpa_t, cr2_or_gpa)
+		__field(u32, error_code)
+		__field(u64 *, sptep)
+		__field(u64, old_spte)
+		__field(u64, new_spte)
+		__field(int, ret)
+	),
+
+	TP_fast_assign(
+		__entry->vcpu_id = vcpu->vcpu_id;
+		__entry->cr2_or_gpa = fault->addr;
+		__entry->error_code = fault->error_code;
+		__entry->sptep = sptep;
+		__entry->old_spte = old_spte;
+		__entry->new_spte = *sptep;
+		__entry->ret = ret;
+	),
+
+	TP_printk("vcpu %d gva %llx error_code %s sptep %p old %#llx"
+		  " new %llx spurious %d fixed %d", __entry->vcpu_id,
+		  __entry->cr2_or_gpa, __print_flags(__entry->error_code, "|",
+		  kvm_mmu_trace_pferr_flags), __entry->sptep,
+		  __entry->old_spte, __entry->new_spte,
+		  __entry->ret == RET_PF_SPURIOUS, __entry->ret == RET_PF_FIXED
+	)
+);
+
+TRACE_EVENT(
+	kvm_mmu_zap_all_fast,
+	TP_PROTO(struct kvm *kvm),
+	TP_ARGS(kvm),
+
+	TP_STRUCT__entry(
+		__field(__u8, mmu_valid_gen)
+		__field(unsigned int, mmu_used_pages)
+	),
+
+	TP_fast_assign(
+		__entry->mmu_valid_gen = kvm->arch.mmu_valid_gen;
+		__entry->mmu_used_pages = kvm->arch.n_used_mmu_pages;
+	),
+
+	TP_printk("kvm-mmu-valid-gen %u used_pages %x",
+		  __entry->mmu_valid_gen, __entry->mmu_used_pages
+	)
+);
+
+
+TRACE_EVENT(
+	check_mmio_spte,
+	TP_PROTO(u64 spte, unsigned int kvm_gen, unsigned int spte_gen),
+	TP_ARGS(spte, kvm_gen, spte_gen),
+
+	TP_STRUCT__entry(
+		__field(unsigned int, kvm_gen)
+		__field(unsigned int, spte_gen)
+		__field(u64, spte)
+	),
+
+	TP_fast_assign(
+		__entry->kvm_gen = kvm_gen;
+		__entry->spte_gen = spte_gen;
+		__entry->spte = spte;
+	),
+
+	TP_printk("spte %llx kvm_gen %x spte-gen %x valid %d", __entry->spte,
+		  __entry->kvm_gen, __entry->spte_gen,
+		  __entry->kvm_gen == __entry->spte_gen
+	)
+);
+
+TRACE_EVENT(
+	kvm_mmu_set_spte,
+	TP_PROTO(int level, gfn_t gfn, u64 *sptep),
+	TP_ARGS(level, gfn, sptep),
+
+	TP_STRUCT__entry(
+		__field(u64, gfn)
+		__field(u64, spte)
+		__field(u64, sptep)
+		__field(u8, level)
+		/* These depend on page entry type, so compute them now.  */
+		__field(bool, r)
+		__field(bool, x)
+		__field(signed char, u)
+	),
+
+	TP_fast_assign(
+		__entry->gfn = gfn;
+		__entry->spte = *sptep;
+		__entry->sptep = virt_to_phys(sptep);
+		__entry->level = level;
+		__entry->r = shadow_present_mask || (__entry->spte & PT_PRESENT_MASK);
+		__entry->x = is_executable_pte(__entry->spte);
+		__entry->u = shadow_user_mask ? !!(__entry->spte & shadow_user_mask) : -1;
+	),
+
+	TP_printk("gfn %llx spte %llx (%s%s%s%s) level %d at %llx",
+		  __entry->gfn, __entry->spte,
+		  __entry->r ? "r" : "-",
+		  __entry->spte & PT_WRITABLE_MASK ? "w" : "-",
+		  __entry->x ? "x" : "-",
+		  __entry->u == -1 ? "" : (__entry->u ? "u" : "-"),
+		  __entry->level, __entry->sptep
+	)
+);
+
+TRACE_EVENT(
+	kvm_mmu_spte_requested,
+	TP_PROTO(struct kvm_page_fault *fault),
+	TP_ARGS(fault),
+
+	TP_STRUCT__entry(
+		__field(u64, gfn)
+		__field(u64, pfn)
+		__field(u8, level)
+	),
+
+	TP_fast_assign(
+		__entry->gfn = fault->gfn;
+		__entry->pfn = fault->pfn | (fault->gfn & (KVM_PAGES_PER_HPAGE(fault->goal_level) - 1));
+		__entry->level = fault->goal_level;
+	),
+
+	TP_printk("gfn %llx pfn %llx level %d",
+		  __entry->gfn, __entry->pfn, __entry->level
+	)
+);
+
+TRACE_EVENT(
+	kvm_tdp_mmu_spte_changed,
+	TP_PROTO(int as_id, gfn_t gfn, int level, u64 old_spte, u64 new_spte),
+	TP_ARGS(as_id, gfn, level, old_spte, new_spte),
+
+	TP_STRUCT__entry(
+		__field(u64, gfn)
+		__field(u64, old_spte)
+		__field(u64, new_spte)
+		/* Level cannot be larger than 5 on x86, so it fits in a u8. */
+		__field(u8, level)
+		/* as_id can only be 0 or 1 x86, so it fits in a u8. */
+		__field(u8, as_id)
+	),
+
+	TP_fast_assign(
+		__entry->gfn = gfn;
+		__entry->old_spte = old_spte;
+		__entry->new_spte = new_spte;
+		__entry->level = level;
+		__entry->as_id = as_id;
+	),
+
+	TP_printk("as id %d gfn %llx level %d old_spte %llx new_spte %llx",
+		  __entry->as_id, __entry->gfn, __entry->level,
+		  __entry->old_spte, __entry->new_spte
+	)
+);
+
+TRACE_EVENT(
+	kvm_mmu_split_huge_page,
+	TP_PROTO(u64 gfn, u64 spte, int level, int errno),
+	TP_ARGS(gfn, spte, level, errno),
+
+	TP_STRUCT__entry(
+		__field(u64, gfn)
+		__field(u64, spte)
+		__field(int, level)
+		__field(int, errno)
+	),
+
+	TP_fast_assign(
+		__entry->gfn = gfn;
+		__entry->spte = spte;
+		__entry->level = level;
+		__entry->errno = errno;
+	),
+
+	TP_printk("gfn %llx spte %llx level %d errno %d",
+		  __entry->gfn, __entry->spte, __entry->level, __entry->errno)
+);
+
+#endif /* _TRACE_KVMMMU_H */
+
+#undef TRACE_INCLUDE_PATH
+#define TRACE_INCLUDE_PATH mmu
+#undef TRACE_INCLUDE_FILE
+#define TRACE_INCLUDE_FILE mmutrace
+
+/* This part must be outside protection */
+#include <trace/define_trace.h>
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/page_track.c b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/page_track.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..c87da11f3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/page_track.c
@@ -0,0 +1,307 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * Support KVM gust page tracking
+ *
+ * This feature allows us to track page access in guest. Currently, only
+ * write access is tracked.
+ *
+ * Copyright(C) 2015 Intel Corporation.
+ *
+ * Author:
+ *   Xiao Guangrong <guangrong.xiao@linux.intel.com>
+ */
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
+
+#include <linux/lockdep.h>
+#include <linux/kvm_host.h>
+#include <linux/rculist.h>
+
+#include "mmu.h"
+#include "mmu_internal.h"
+#include "page_track.h"
+
+bool kvm_page_track_write_tracking_enabled(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+	return IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KVM_EXTERNAL_WRITE_TRACKING) ||
+	       !tdp_enabled || kvm_shadow_root_allocated(kvm);
+}
+
+void kvm_page_track_free_memslot(struct kvm_memory_slot *slot)
+{
+	kvfree(slot->arch.gfn_write_track);
+	slot->arch.gfn_write_track = NULL;
+}
+
+static int __kvm_page_track_write_tracking_alloc(struct kvm_memory_slot *slot,
+						 unsigned long npages)
+{
+	const size_t size = sizeof(*slot->arch.gfn_write_track);
+
+	if (!slot->arch.gfn_write_track)
+		slot->arch.gfn_write_track = __vcalloc(npages, size,
+						       GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
+
+	return slot->arch.gfn_write_track ? 0 : -ENOMEM;
+}
+
+int kvm_page_track_create_memslot(struct kvm *kvm,
+				  struct kvm_memory_slot *slot,
+				  unsigned long npages)
+{
+	if (!kvm_page_track_write_tracking_enabled(kvm))
+		return 0;
+
+	return __kvm_page_track_write_tracking_alloc(slot, npages);
+}
+
+int kvm_page_track_write_tracking_alloc(struct kvm_memory_slot *slot)
+{
+	return __kvm_page_track_write_tracking_alloc(slot, slot->npages);
+}
+
+static void update_gfn_write_track(struct kvm_memory_slot *slot, gfn_t gfn,
+				   short count)
+{
+	int index, val;
+
+	index = gfn_to_index(gfn, slot->base_gfn, PG_LEVEL_4K);
+
+	val = slot->arch.gfn_write_track[index];
+
+	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(val + count < 0 || val + count > USHRT_MAX))
+		return;
+
+	slot->arch.gfn_write_track[index] += count;
+}
+
+void __kvm_write_track_add_gfn(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_memory_slot *slot,
+			       gfn_t gfn)
+{
+	lockdep_assert_held_write(&kvm->mmu_lock);
+
+	lockdep_assert_once(lockdep_is_held(&kvm->slots_lock) ||
+			    srcu_read_lock_held(&kvm->srcu));
+
+	if (KVM_BUG_ON(!kvm_page_track_write_tracking_enabled(kvm), kvm))
+		return;
+
+	update_gfn_write_track(slot, gfn, 1);
+
+	/*
+	 * new track stops large page mapping for the
+	 * tracked page.
+	 */
+	kvm_mmu_gfn_disallow_lpage(slot, gfn);
+
+	if (kvm_mmu_slot_gfn_write_protect(kvm, slot, gfn, PG_LEVEL_4K))
+		kvm_flush_remote_tlbs(kvm);
+}
+
+void __kvm_write_track_remove_gfn(struct kvm *kvm,
+				  struct kvm_memory_slot *slot, gfn_t gfn)
+{
+	lockdep_assert_held_write(&kvm->mmu_lock);
+
+	lockdep_assert_once(lockdep_is_held(&kvm->slots_lock) ||
+			    srcu_read_lock_held(&kvm->srcu));
+
+	if (KVM_BUG_ON(!kvm_page_track_write_tracking_enabled(kvm), kvm))
+		return;
+
+	update_gfn_write_track(slot, gfn, -1);
+
+	/*
+	 * allow large page mapping for the tracked page
+	 * after the tracker is gone.
+	 */
+	kvm_mmu_gfn_allow_lpage(slot, gfn);
+}
+
+/*
+ * check if the corresponding access on the specified guest page is tracked.
+ */
+bool kvm_gfn_is_write_tracked(struct kvm *kvm,
+			      const struct kvm_memory_slot *slot, gfn_t gfn)
+{
+	int index;
+
+	if (!slot)
+		return false;
+
+	if (!kvm_page_track_write_tracking_enabled(kvm))
+		return false;
+
+	index = gfn_to_index(gfn, slot->base_gfn, PG_LEVEL_4K);
+	return !!READ_ONCE(slot->arch.gfn_write_track[index]);
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_EXTERNAL_WRITE_TRACKING
+void kvm_page_track_cleanup(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+	struct kvm_page_track_notifier_head *head;
+
+	head = &kvm->arch.track_notifier_head;
+	cleanup_srcu_struct(&head->track_srcu);
+}
+
+int kvm_page_track_init(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+	struct kvm_page_track_notifier_head *head;
+
+	head = &kvm->arch.track_notifier_head;
+	INIT_HLIST_HEAD(&head->track_notifier_list);
+	return init_srcu_struct(&head->track_srcu);
+}
+
+/*
+ * register the notifier so that event interception for the tracked guest
+ * pages can be received.
+ */
+int kvm_page_track_register_notifier(struct kvm *kvm,
+				     struct kvm_page_track_notifier_node *n)
+{
+	struct kvm_page_track_notifier_head *head;
+
+	if (!kvm || kvm->mm != current->mm)
+		return -ESRCH;
+
+	kvm_get_kvm(kvm);
+
+	head = &kvm->arch.track_notifier_head;
+
+	write_lock(&kvm->mmu_lock);
+	hlist_add_head_rcu(&n->node, &head->track_notifier_list);
+	write_unlock(&kvm->mmu_lock);
+	return 0;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_page_track_register_notifier);
+
+/*
+ * stop receiving the event interception. It is the opposed operation of
+ * kvm_page_track_register_notifier().
+ */
+void kvm_page_track_unregister_notifier(struct kvm *kvm,
+					struct kvm_page_track_notifier_node *n)
+{
+	struct kvm_page_track_notifier_head *head;
+
+	head = &kvm->arch.track_notifier_head;
+
+	write_lock(&kvm->mmu_lock);
+	hlist_del_rcu(&n->node);
+	write_unlock(&kvm->mmu_lock);
+	synchronize_srcu(&head->track_srcu);
+
+	kvm_put_kvm(kvm);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_page_track_unregister_notifier);
+
+/*
+ * Notify the node that write access is intercepted and write emulation is
+ * finished at this time.
+ *
+ * The node should figure out if the written page is the one that node is
+ * interested in by itself.
+ */
+void __kvm_page_track_write(struct kvm *kvm, gpa_t gpa, const u8 *new, int bytes)
+{
+	struct kvm_page_track_notifier_head *head;
+	struct kvm_page_track_notifier_node *n;
+	int idx;
+
+	head = &kvm->arch.track_notifier_head;
+
+	if (hlist_empty(&head->track_notifier_list))
+		return;
+
+	idx = srcu_read_lock(&head->track_srcu);
+	hlist_for_each_entry_srcu(n, &head->track_notifier_list, node,
+				  srcu_read_lock_held(&head->track_srcu))
+		if (n->track_write)
+			n->track_write(gpa, new, bytes, n);
+	srcu_read_unlock(&head->track_srcu, idx);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Notify external page track nodes that a memory region is being removed from
+ * the VM, e.g. so that users can free any associated metadata.
+ */
+void kvm_page_track_delete_slot(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_memory_slot *slot)
+{
+	struct kvm_page_track_notifier_head *head;
+	struct kvm_page_track_notifier_node *n;
+	int idx;
+
+	head = &kvm->arch.track_notifier_head;
+
+	if (hlist_empty(&head->track_notifier_list))
+		return;
+
+	idx = srcu_read_lock(&head->track_srcu);
+	hlist_for_each_entry_srcu(n, &head->track_notifier_list, node,
+				  srcu_read_lock_held(&head->track_srcu))
+		if (n->track_remove_region)
+			n->track_remove_region(slot->base_gfn, slot->npages, n);
+	srcu_read_unlock(&head->track_srcu, idx);
+}
+
+/*
+ * add guest page to the tracking pool so that corresponding access on that
+ * page will be intercepted.
+ *
+ * @kvm: the guest instance we are interested in.
+ * @gfn: the guest page.
+ */
+int kvm_write_track_add_gfn(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t gfn)
+{
+	struct kvm_memory_slot *slot;
+	int idx;
+
+	idx = srcu_read_lock(&kvm->srcu);
+
+	slot = gfn_to_memslot(kvm, gfn);
+	if (!slot) {
+		srcu_read_unlock(&kvm->srcu, idx);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	write_lock(&kvm->mmu_lock);
+	__kvm_write_track_add_gfn(kvm, slot, gfn);
+	write_unlock(&kvm->mmu_lock);
+
+	srcu_read_unlock(&kvm->srcu, idx);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_write_track_add_gfn);
+
+/*
+ * remove the guest page from the tracking pool which stops the interception
+ * of corresponding access on that page.
+ *
+ * @kvm: the guest instance we are interested in.
+ * @gfn: the guest page.
+ */
+int kvm_write_track_remove_gfn(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t gfn)
+{
+	struct kvm_memory_slot *slot;
+	int idx;
+
+	idx = srcu_read_lock(&kvm->srcu);
+
+	slot = gfn_to_memslot(kvm, gfn);
+	if (!slot) {
+		srcu_read_unlock(&kvm->srcu, idx);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	write_lock(&kvm->mmu_lock);
+	__kvm_write_track_remove_gfn(kvm, slot, gfn);
+	write_unlock(&kvm->mmu_lock);
+
+	srcu_read_unlock(&kvm->srcu, idx);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_write_track_remove_gfn);
+#endif
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/page_track.h b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/page_track.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..d4d72ed99
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/page_track.h
@@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+#ifndef __KVM_X86_PAGE_TRACK_H
+#define __KVM_X86_PAGE_TRACK_H
+
+#include <linux/kvm_host.h>
+
+#include <asm/kvm_page_track.h>
+
+
+bool kvm_page_track_write_tracking_enabled(struct kvm *kvm);
+int kvm_page_track_write_tracking_alloc(struct kvm_memory_slot *slot);
+
+void kvm_page_track_free_memslot(struct kvm_memory_slot *slot);
+int kvm_page_track_create_memslot(struct kvm *kvm,
+				  struct kvm_memory_slot *slot,
+				  unsigned long npages);
+
+void __kvm_write_track_add_gfn(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_memory_slot *slot,
+			       gfn_t gfn);
+void __kvm_write_track_remove_gfn(struct kvm *kvm,
+				  struct kvm_memory_slot *slot, gfn_t gfn);
+
+bool kvm_gfn_is_write_tracked(struct kvm *kvm,
+			      const struct kvm_memory_slot *slot, gfn_t gfn);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_EXTERNAL_WRITE_TRACKING
+int kvm_page_track_init(struct kvm *kvm);
+void kvm_page_track_cleanup(struct kvm *kvm);
+
+void __kvm_page_track_write(struct kvm *kvm, gpa_t gpa, const u8 *new, int bytes);
+void kvm_page_track_delete_slot(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_memory_slot *slot);
+
+static inline bool kvm_page_track_has_external_user(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+	return !hlist_empty(&kvm->arch.track_notifier_head.track_notifier_list);
+}
+#else
+static inline int kvm_page_track_init(struct kvm *kvm) { return 0; }
+static inline void kvm_page_track_cleanup(struct kvm *kvm) { }
+
+static inline void __kvm_page_track_write(struct kvm *kvm, gpa_t gpa,
+					  const u8 *new, int bytes) { }
+static inline void kvm_page_track_delete_slot(struct kvm *kvm,
+					      struct kvm_memory_slot *slot) { }
+
+static inline bool kvm_page_track_has_external_user(struct kvm *kvm) { return false; }
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_KVM_EXTERNAL_WRITE_TRACKING */
+
+static inline void kvm_page_track_write(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t gpa,
+					const u8 *new, int bytes)
+{
+	__kvm_page_track_write(vcpu->kvm, gpa, new, bytes);
+
+	kvm_mmu_track_write(vcpu, gpa, new, bytes);
+}
+
+#endif /* __KVM_X86_PAGE_TRACK_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/paging_tmpl.h b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/paging_tmpl.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..c85255073
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/paging_tmpl.h
@@ -0,0 +1,985 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */
+/*
+ * Kernel-based Virtual Machine driver for Linux
+ *
+ * This module enables machines with Intel VT-x extensions to run virtual
+ * machines without emulation or binary translation.
+ *
+ * MMU support
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2006 Qumranet, Inc.
+ * Copyright 2010 Red Hat, Inc. and/or its affiliates.
+ *
+ * Authors:
+ *   Yaniv Kamay  <yaniv@qumranet.com>
+ *   Avi Kivity   <avi@qumranet.com>
+ */
+
+/*
+ * The MMU needs to be able to access/walk 32-bit and 64-bit guest page tables,
+ * as well as guest EPT tables, so the code in this file is compiled thrice,
+ * once per guest PTE type.  The per-type defines are #undef'd at the end.
+ */
+
+#if PTTYPE == 64
+	#define pt_element_t u64
+	#define guest_walker guest_walker64
+	#define FNAME(name) paging##64_##name
+	#define PT_LEVEL_BITS 9
+	#define PT_GUEST_DIRTY_SHIFT PT_DIRTY_SHIFT
+	#define PT_GUEST_ACCESSED_SHIFT PT_ACCESSED_SHIFT
+	#define PT_HAVE_ACCESSED_DIRTY(mmu) true
+	#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+	#define PT_MAX_FULL_LEVELS PT64_ROOT_MAX_LEVEL
+	#else
+	#define PT_MAX_FULL_LEVELS 2
+	#endif
+#elif PTTYPE == 32
+	#define pt_element_t u32
+	#define guest_walker guest_walker32
+	#define FNAME(name) paging##32_##name
+	#define PT_LEVEL_BITS 10
+	#define PT_MAX_FULL_LEVELS 2
+	#define PT_GUEST_DIRTY_SHIFT PT_DIRTY_SHIFT
+	#define PT_GUEST_ACCESSED_SHIFT PT_ACCESSED_SHIFT
+	#define PT_HAVE_ACCESSED_DIRTY(mmu) true
+
+	#define PT32_DIR_PSE36_SIZE 4
+	#define PT32_DIR_PSE36_SHIFT 13
+	#define PT32_DIR_PSE36_MASK \
+		(((1ULL << PT32_DIR_PSE36_SIZE) - 1) << PT32_DIR_PSE36_SHIFT)
+#elif PTTYPE == PTTYPE_EPT
+	#define pt_element_t u64
+	#define guest_walker guest_walkerEPT
+	#define FNAME(name) ept_##name
+	#define PT_LEVEL_BITS 9
+	#define PT_GUEST_DIRTY_SHIFT 9
+	#define PT_GUEST_ACCESSED_SHIFT 8
+	#define PT_HAVE_ACCESSED_DIRTY(mmu) (!(mmu)->cpu_role.base.ad_disabled)
+	#define PT_MAX_FULL_LEVELS PT64_ROOT_MAX_LEVEL
+#else
+	#error Invalid PTTYPE value
+#endif
+
+/* Common logic, but per-type values.  These also need to be undefined. */
+#define PT_BASE_ADDR_MASK	((pt_element_t)(((1ULL << 52) - 1) & ~(u64)(PAGE_SIZE-1)))
+#define PT_LVL_ADDR_MASK(lvl)	__PT_LVL_ADDR_MASK(PT_BASE_ADDR_MASK, lvl, PT_LEVEL_BITS)
+#define PT_LVL_OFFSET_MASK(lvl)	__PT_LVL_OFFSET_MASK(PT_BASE_ADDR_MASK, lvl, PT_LEVEL_BITS)
+#define PT_INDEX(addr, lvl)	__PT_INDEX(addr, lvl, PT_LEVEL_BITS)
+
+#define PT_GUEST_DIRTY_MASK    (1 << PT_GUEST_DIRTY_SHIFT)
+#define PT_GUEST_ACCESSED_MASK (1 << PT_GUEST_ACCESSED_SHIFT)
+
+#define gpte_to_gfn_lvl FNAME(gpte_to_gfn_lvl)
+#define gpte_to_gfn(pte) gpte_to_gfn_lvl((pte), PG_LEVEL_4K)
+
+/*
+ * The guest_walker structure emulates the behavior of the hardware page
+ * table walker.
+ */
+struct guest_walker {
+	int level;
+	unsigned max_level;
+	gfn_t table_gfn[PT_MAX_FULL_LEVELS];
+	pt_element_t ptes[PT_MAX_FULL_LEVELS];
+	pt_element_t prefetch_ptes[PTE_PREFETCH_NUM];
+	gpa_t pte_gpa[PT_MAX_FULL_LEVELS];
+	pt_element_t __user *ptep_user[PT_MAX_FULL_LEVELS];
+	bool pte_writable[PT_MAX_FULL_LEVELS];
+	unsigned int pt_access[PT_MAX_FULL_LEVELS];
+	unsigned int pte_access;
+	gfn_t gfn;
+	struct x86_exception fault;
+};
+
+#if PTTYPE == 32
+static inline gfn_t pse36_gfn_delta(u32 gpte)
+{
+	int shift = 32 - PT32_DIR_PSE36_SHIFT - PAGE_SHIFT;
+
+	return (gpte & PT32_DIR_PSE36_MASK) << shift;
+}
+#endif
+
+static gfn_t gpte_to_gfn_lvl(pt_element_t gpte, int lvl)
+{
+	return (gpte & PT_LVL_ADDR_MASK(lvl)) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
+}
+
+static inline void FNAME(protect_clean_gpte)(struct kvm_mmu *mmu, unsigned *access,
+					     unsigned gpte)
+{
+	unsigned mask;
+
+	/* dirty bit is not supported, so no need to track it */
+	if (!PT_HAVE_ACCESSED_DIRTY(mmu))
+		return;
+
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(PT_WRITABLE_MASK != ACC_WRITE_MASK);
+
+	mask = (unsigned)~ACC_WRITE_MASK;
+	/* Allow write access to dirty gptes */
+	mask |= (gpte >> (PT_GUEST_DIRTY_SHIFT - PT_WRITABLE_SHIFT)) &
+		PT_WRITABLE_MASK;
+	*access &= mask;
+}
+
+static inline int FNAME(is_present_gpte)(unsigned long pte)
+{
+#if PTTYPE != PTTYPE_EPT
+	return pte & PT_PRESENT_MASK;
+#else
+	return pte & 7;
+#endif
+}
+
+static bool FNAME(is_bad_mt_xwr)(struct rsvd_bits_validate *rsvd_check, u64 gpte)
+{
+#if PTTYPE != PTTYPE_EPT
+	return false;
+#else
+	return __is_bad_mt_xwr(rsvd_check, gpte);
+#endif
+}
+
+static bool FNAME(is_rsvd_bits_set)(struct kvm_mmu *mmu, u64 gpte, int level)
+{
+	return __is_rsvd_bits_set(&mmu->guest_rsvd_check, gpte, level) ||
+	       FNAME(is_bad_mt_xwr)(&mmu->guest_rsvd_check, gpte);
+}
+
+static bool FNAME(prefetch_invalid_gpte)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+				  struct kvm_mmu_page *sp, u64 *spte,
+				  u64 gpte)
+{
+	if (!FNAME(is_present_gpte)(gpte))
+		goto no_present;
+
+	/* Prefetch only accessed entries (unless A/D bits are disabled). */
+	if (PT_HAVE_ACCESSED_DIRTY(vcpu->arch.mmu) &&
+	    !(gpte & PT_GUEST_ACCESSED_MASK))
+		goto no_present;
+
+	if (FNAME(is_rsvd_bits_set)(vcpu->arch.mmu, gpte, PG_LEVEL_4K))
+		goto no_present;
+
+	return false;
+
+no_present:
+	drop_spte(vcpu->kvm, spte);
+	return true;
+}
+
+/*
+ * For PTTYPE_EPT, a page table can be executable but not readable
+ * on supported processors. Therefore, set_spte does not automatically
+ * set bit 0 if execute only is supported. Here, we repurpose ACC_USER_MASK
+ * to signify readability since it isn't used in the EPT case
+ */
+static inline unsigned FNAME(gpte_access)(u64 gpte)
+{
+	unsigned access;
+#if PTTYPE == PTTYPE_EPT
+	access = ((gpte & VMX_EPT_WRITABLE_MASK) ? ACC_WRITE_MASK : 0) |
+		((gpte & VMX_EPT_EXECUTABLE_MASK) ? ACC_EXEC_MASK : 0) |
+		((gpte & VMX_EPT_READABLE_MASK) ? ACC_USER_MASK : 0);
+#else
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(ACC_EXEC_MASK != PT_PRESENT_MASK);
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(ACC_EXEC_MASK != 1);
+	access = gpte & (PT_WRITABLE_MASK | PT_USER_MASK | PT_PRESENT_MASK);
+	/* Combine NX with P (which is set here) to get ACC_EXEC_MASK.  */
+	access ^= (gpte >> PT64_NX_SHIFT);
+#endif
+
+	return access;
+}
+
+static int FNAME(update_accessed_dirty_bits)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+					     struct kvm_mmu *mmu,
+					     struct guest_walker *walker,
+					     gpa_t addr, int write_fault)
+{
+	unsigned level, index;
+	pt_element_t pte, orig_pte;
+	pt_element_t __user *ptep_user;
+	gfn_t table_gfn;
+	int ret;
+
+	/* dirty/accessed bits are not supported, so no need to update them */
+	if (!PT_HAVE_ACCESSED_DIRTY(mmu))
+		return 0;
+
+	for (level = walker->max_level; level >= walker->level; --level) {
+		pte = orig_pte = walker->ptes[level - 1];
+		table_gfn = walker->table_gfn[level - 1];
+		ptep_user = walker->ptep_user[level - 1];
+		index = offset_in_page(ptep_user) / sizeof(pt_element_t);
+		if (!(pte & PT_GUEST_ACCESSED_MASK)) {
+			trace_kvm_mmu_set_accessed_bit(table_gfn, index, sizeof(pte));
+			pte |= PT_GUEST_ACCESSED_MASK;
+		}
+		if (level == walker->level && write_fault &&
+				!(pte & PT_GUEST_DIRTY_MASK)) {
+			trace_kvm_mmu_set_dirty_bit(table_gfn, index, sizeof(pte));
+#if PTTYPE == PTTYPE_EPT
+			if (kvm_x86_ops.nested_ops->write_log_dirty(vcpu, addr))
+				return -EINVAL;
+#endif
+			pte |= PT_GUEST_DIRTY_MASK;
+		}
+		if (pte == orig_pte)
+			continue;
+
+		/*
+		 * If the slot is read-only, simply do not process the accessed
+		 * and dirty bits.  This is the correct thing to do if the slot
+		 * is ROM, and page tables in read-as-ROM/write-as-MMIO slots
+		 * are only supported if the accessed and dirty bits are already
+		 * set in the ROM (so that MMIO writes are never needed).
+		 *
+		 * Note that NPT does not allow this at all and faults, since
+		 * it always wants nested page table entries for the guest
+		 * page tables to be writable.  And EPT works but will simply
+		 * overwrite the read-only memory to set the accessed and dirty
+		 * bits.
+		 */
+		if (unlikely(!walker->pte_writable[level - 1]))
+			continue;
+
+		ret = __try_cmpxchg_user(ptep_user, &orig_pte, pte, fault);
+		if (ret)
+			return ret;
+
+		kvm_vcpu_mark_page_dirty(vcpu, table_gfn);
+		walker->ptes[level - 1] = pte;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static inline unsigned FNAME(gpte_pkeys)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 gpte)
+{
+	unsigned pkeys = 0;
+#if PTTYPE == 64
+	pte_t pte = {.pte = gpte};
+
+	pkeys = pte_flags_pkey(pte_flags(pte));
+#endif
+	return pkeys;
+}
+
+static inline bool FNAME(is_last_gpte)(struct kvm_mmu *mmu,
+				       unsigned int level, unsigned int gpte)
+{
+	/*
+	 * For EPT and PAE paging (both variants), bit 7 is either reserved at
+	 * all level or indicates a huge page (ignoring CR3/EPTP).  In either
+	 * case, bit 7 being set terminates the walk.
+	 */
+#if PTTYPE == 32
+	/*
+	 * 32-bit paging requires special handling because bit 7 is ignored if
+	 * CR4.PSE=0, not reserved.  Clear bit 7 in the gpte if the level is
+	 * greater than the last level for which bit 7 is the PAGE_SIZE bit.
+	 *
+	 * The RHS has bit 7 set iff level < (2 + PSE).  If it is clear, bit 7
+	 * is not reserved and does not indicate a large page at this level,
+	 * so clear PT_PAGE_SIZE_MASK in gpte if that is the case.
+	 */
+	gpte &= level - (PT32_ROOT_LEVEL + mmu->cpu_role.ext.cr4_pse);
+#endif
+	/*
+	 * PG_LEVEL_4K always terminates.  The RHS has bit 7 set
+	 * iff level <= PG_LEVEL_4K, which for our purpose means
+	 * level == PG_LEVEL_4K; set PT_PAGE_SIZE_MASK in gpte then.
+	 */
+	gpte |= level - PG_LEVEL_4K - 1;
+
+	return gpte & PT_PAGE_SIZE_MASK;
+}
+/*
+ * Fetch a guest pte for a guest virtual address, or for an L2's GPA.
+ */
+static int FNAME(walk_addr_generic)(struct guest_walker *walker,
+				    struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_mmu *mmu,
+				    gpa_t addr, u64 access)
+{
+	int ret;
+	pt_element_t pte;
+	pt_element_t __user *ptep_user;
+	gfn_t table_gfn;
+	u64 pt_access, pte_access;
+	unsigned index, accessed_dirty, pte_pkey;
+	u64 nested_access;
+	gpa_t pte_gpa;
+	bool have_ad;
+	int offset;
+	u64 walk_nx_mask = 0;
+	const int write_fault = access & PFERR_WRITE_MASK;
+	const int user_fault  = access & PFERR_USER_MASK;
+	const int fetch_fault = access & PFERR_FETCH_MASK;
+	u16 errcode = 0;
+	gpa_t real_gpa;
+	gfn_t gfn;
+
+	trace_kvm_mmu_pagetable_walk(addr, access);
+retry_walk:
+	walker->level = mmu->cpu_role.base.level;
+	pte           = kvm_mmu_get_guest_pgd(vcpu, mmu);
+	have_ad       = PT_HAVE_ACCESSED_DIRTY(mmu);
+
+#if PTTYPE == 64
+	walk_nx_mask = 1ULL << PT64_NX_SHIFT;
+	if (walker->level == PT32E_ROOT_LEVEL) {
+		pte = mmu->get_pdptr(vcpu, (addr >> 30) & 3);
+		trace_kvm_mmu_paging_element(pte, walker->level);
+		if (!FNAME(is_present_gpte)(pte))
+			goto error;
+		--walker->level;
+	}
+#endif
+	walker->max_level = walker->level;
+
+	/*
+	 * FIXME: on Intel processors, loads of the PDPTE registers for PAE paging
+	 * by the MOV to CR instruction are treated as reads and do not cause the
+	 * processor to set the dirty flag in any EPT paging-structure entry.
+	 */
+	nested_access = (have_ad ? PFERR_WRITE_MASK : 0) | PFERR_USER_MASK;
+
+	pte_access = ~0;
+
+	/*
+	 * Queue a page fault for injection if this assertion fails, as callers
+	 * assume that walker.fault contains sane info on a walk failure.  I.e.
+	 * avoid making the situation worse by inducing even worse badness
+	 * between when the assertion fails and when KVM kicks the vCPU out to
+	 * userspace (because the VM is bugged).
+	 */
+	if (KVM_BUG_ON(is_long_mode(vcpu) && !is_pae(vcpu), vcpu->kvm))
+		goto error;
+
+	++walker->level;
+
+	do {
+		struct kvm_memory_slot *slot;
+		unsigned long host_addr;
+
+		pt_access = pte_access;
+		--walker->level;
+
+		index = PT_INDEX(addr, walker->level);
+		table_gfn = gpte_to_gfn(pte);
+		offset    = index * sizeof(pt_element_t);
+		pte_gpa   = gfn_to_gpa(table_gfn) + offset;
+
+		BUG_ON(walker->level < 1);
+		walker->table_gfn[walker->level - 1] = table_gfn;
+		walker->pte_gpa[walker->level - 1] = pte_gpa;
+
+		real_gpa = kvm_translate_gpa(vcpu, mmu, gfn_to_gpa(table_gfn),
+					     nested_access, &walker->fault);
+
+		/*
+		 * FIXME: This can happen if emulation (for of an INS/OUTS
+		 * instruction) triggers a nested page fault.  The exit
+		 * qualification / exit info field will incorrectly have
+		 * "guest page access" as the nested page fault's cause,
+		 * instead of "guest page structure access".  To fix this,
+		 * the x86_exception struct should be augmented with enough
+		 * information to fix the exit_qualification or exit_info_1
+		 * fields.
+		 */
+		if (unlikely(real_gpa == INVALID_GPA))
+			return 0;
+
+		slot = kvm_vcpu_gfn_to_memslot(vcpu, gpa_to_gfn(real_gpa));
+		if (!kvm_is_visible_memslot(slot))
+			goto error;
+
+		host_addr = gfn_to_hva_memslot_prot(slot, gpa_to_gfn(real_gpa),
+					    &walker->pte_writable[walker->level - 1]);
+		if (unlikely(kvm_is_error_hva(host_addr)))
+			goto error;
+
+		ptep_user = (pt_element_t __user *)((void *)host_addr + offset);
+		if (unlikely(__get_user(pte, ptep_user)))
+			goto error;
+		walker->ptep_user[walker->level - 1] = ptep_user;
+
+		trace_kvm_mmu_paging_element(pte, walker->level);
+
+		/*
+		 * Inverting the NX it lets us AND it like other
+		 * permission bits.
+		 */
+		pte_access = pt_access & (pte ^ walk_nx_mask);
+
+		if (unlikely(!FNAME(is_present_gpte)(pte)))
+			goto error;
+
+		if (unlikely(FNAME(is_rsvd_bits_set)(mmu, pte, walker->level))) {
+			errcode = PFERR_RSVD_MASK | PFERR_PRESENT_MASK;
+			goto error;
+		}
+
+		walker->ptes[walker->level - 1] = pte;
+
+		/* Convert to ACC_*_MASK flags for struct guest_walker.  */
+		walker->pt_access[walker->level - 1] = FNAME(gpte_access)(pt_access ^ walk_nx_mask);
+	} while (!FNAME(is_last_gpte)(mmu, walker->level, pte));
+
+	pte_pkey = FNAME(gpte_pkeys)(vcpu, pte);
+	accessed_dirty = have_ad ? pte_access & PT_GUEST_ACCESSED_MASK : 0;
+
+	/* Convert to ACC_*_MASK flags for struct guest_walker.  */
+	walker->pte_access = FNAME(gpte_access)(pte_access ^ walk_nx_mask);
+	errcode = permission_fault(vcpu, mmu, walker->pte_access, pte_pkey, access);
+	if (unlikely(errcode))
+		goto error;
+
+	gfn = gpte_to_gfn_lvl(pte, walker->level);
+	gfn += (addr & PT_LVL_OFFSET_MASK(walker->level)) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
+
+#if PTTYPE == 32
+	if (walker->level > PG_LEVEL_4K && is_cpuid_PSE36())
+		gfn += pse36_gfn_delta(pte);
+#endif
+
+	real_gpa = kvm_translate_gpa(vcpu, mmu, gfn_to_gpa(gfn), access, &walker->fault);
+	if (real_gpa == INVALID_GPA)
+		return 0;
+
+	walker->gfn = real_gpa >> PAGE_SHIFT;
+
+	if (!write_fault)
+		FNAME(protect_clean_gpte)(mmu, &walker->pte_access, pte);
+	else
+		/*
+		 * On a write fault, fold the dirty bit into accessed_dirty.
+		 * For modes without A/D bits support accessed_dirty will be
+		 * always clear.
+		 */
+		accessed_dirty &= pte >>
+			(PT_GUEST_DIRTY_SHIFT - PT_GUEST_ACCESSED_SHIFT);
+
+	if (unlikely(!accessed_dirty)) {
+		ret = FNAME(update_accessed_dirty_bits)(vcpu, mmu, walker,
+							addr, write_fault);
+		if (unlikely(ret < 0))
+			goto error;
+		else if (ret)
+			goto retry_walk;
+	}
+
+	return 1;
+
+error:
+	errcode |= write_fault | user_fault;
+	if (fetch_fault && (is_efer_nx(mmu) || is_cr4_smep(mmu)))
+		errcode |= PFERR_FETCH_MASK;
+
+	walker->fault.vector = PF_VECTOR;
+	walker->fault.error_code_valid = true;
+	walker->fault.error_code = errcode;
+
+#if PTTYPE == PTTYPE_EPT
+	/*
+	 * Use PFERR_RSVD_MASK in error_code to tell if EPT
+	 * misconfiguration requires to be injected. The detection is
+	 * done by is_rsvd_bits_set() above.
+	 *
+	 * We set up the value of exit_qualification to inject:
+	 * [2:0] - Derive from the access bits. The exit_qualification might be
+	 *         out of date if it is serving an EPT misconfiguration.
+	 * [5:3] - Calculated by the page walk of the guest EPT page tables
+	 * [7:8] - Derived from [7:8] of real exit_qualification
+	 *
+	 * The other bits are set to 0.
+	 */
+	if (!(errcode & PFERR_RSVD_MASK)) {
+		vcpu->arch.exit_qualification &= (EPT_VIOLATION_GVA_IS_VALID |
+						  EPT_VIOLATION_GVA_TRANSLATED);
+		if (write_fault)
+			vcpu->arch.exit_qualification |= EPT_VIOLATION_ACC_WRITE;
+		if (user_fault)
+			vcpu->arch.exit_qualification |= EPT_VIOLATION_ACC_READ;
+		if (fetch_fault)
+			vcpu->arch.exit_qualification |= EPT_VIOLATION_ACC_INSTR;
+
+		/*
+		 * Note, pte_access holds the raw RWX bits from the EPTE, not
+		 * ACC_*_MASK flags!
+		 */
+		vcpu->arch.exit_qualification |= (pte_access & VMX_EPT_RWX_MASK) <<
+						 EPT_VIOLATION_RWX_SHIFT;
+	}
+#endif
+	walker->fault.address = addr;
+	walker->fault.nested_page_fault = mmu != vcpu->arch.walk_mmu;
+	walker->fault.async_page_fault = false;
+
+	trace_kvm_mmu_walker_error(walker->fault.error_code);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int FNAME(walk_addr)(struct guest_walker *walker,
+			    struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t addr, u64 access)
+{
+	return FNAME(walk_addr_generic)(walker, vcpu, vcpu->arch.mmu, addr,
+					access);
+}
+
+static bool
+FNAME(prefetch_gpte)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_mmu_page *sp,
+		     u64 *spte, pt_element_t gpte)
+{
+	struct kvm_memory_slot *slot;
+	unsigned pte_access;
+	gfn_t gfn;
+	kvm_pfn_t pfn;
+
+	if (FNAME(prefetch_invalid_gpte)(vcpu, sp, spte, gpte))
+		return false;
+
+	gfn = gpte_to_gfn(gpte);
+	pte_access = sp->role.access & FNAME(gpte_access)(gpte);
+	FNAME(protect_clean_gpte)(vcpu->arch.mmu, &pte_access, gpte);
+
+	slot = gfn_to_memslot_dirty_bitmap(vcpu, gfn, pte_access & ACC_WRITE_MASK);
+	if (!slot)
+		return false;
+
+	pfn = gfn_to_pfn_memslot_atomic(slot, gfn);
+	if (is_error_pfn(pfn))
+		return false;
+
+	mmu_set_spte(vcpu, slot, spte, pte_access, gfn, pfn, NULL);
+	kvm_release_pfn_clean(pfn);
+	return true;
+}
+
+static bool FNAME(gpte_changed)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+				struct guest_walker *gw, int level)
+{
+	pt_element_t curr_pte;
+	gpa_t base_gpa, pte_gpa = gw->pte_gpa[level - 1];
+	u64 mask;
+	int r, index;
+
+	if (level == PG_LEVEL_4K) {
+		mask = PTE_PREFETCH_NUM * sizeof(pt_element_t) - 1;
+		base_gpa = pte_gpa & ~mask;
+		index = (pte_gpa - base_gpa) / sizeof(pt_element_t);
+
+		r = kvm_vcpu_read_guest_atomic(vcpu, base_gpa,
+				gw->prefetch_ptes, sizeof(gw->prefetch_ptes));
+		curr_pte = gw->prefetch_ptes[index];
+	} else
+		r = kvm_vcpu_read_guest_atomic(vcpu, pte_gpa,
+				  &curr_pte, sizeof(curr_pte));
+
+	return r || curr_pte != gw->ptes[level - 1];
+}
+
+static void FNAME(pte_prefetch)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct guest_walker *gw,
+				u64 *sptep)
+{
+	struct kvm_mmu_page *sp;
+	pt_element_t *gptep = gw->prefetch_ptes;
+	u64 *spte;
+	int i;
+
+	sp = sptep_to_sp(sptep);
+
+	if (sp->role.level > PG_LEVEL_4K)
+		return;
+
+	/*
+	 * If addresses are being invalidated, skip prefetching to avoid
+	 * accidentally prefetching those addresses.
+	 */
+	if (unlikely(vcpu->kvm->mmu_invalidate_in_progress))
+		return;
+
+	if (sp->role.direct)
+		return __direct_pte_prefetch(vcpu, sp, sptep);
+
+	i = spte_index(sptep) & ~(PTE_PREFETCH_NUM - 1);
+	spte = sp->spt + i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < PTE_PREFETCH_NUM; i++, spte++) {
+		if (spte == sptep)
+			continue;
+
+		if (is_shadow_present_pte(*spte))
+			continue;
+
+		if (!FNAME(prefetch_gpte)(vcpu, sp, spte, gptep[i]))
+			break;
+	}
+}
+
+/*
+ * Fetch a shadow pte for a specific level in the paging hierarchy.
+ * If the guest tries to write a write-protected page, we need to
+ * emulate this operation, return 1 to indicate this case.
+ */
+static int FNAME(fetch)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_page_fault *fault,
+			 struct guest_walker *gw)
+{
+	struct kvm_mmu_page *sp = NULL;
+	struct kvm_shadow_walk_iterator it;
+	unsigned int direct_access, access;
+	int top_level, ret;
+	gfn_t base_gfn = fault->gfn;
+
+	WARN_ON_ONCE(gw->gfn != base_gfn);
+	direct_access = gw->pte_access;
+
+	top_level = vcpu->arch.mmu->cpu_role.base.level;
+	if (top_level == PT32E_ROOT_LEVEL)
+		top_level = PT32_ROOT_LEVEL;
+	/*
+	 * Verify that the top-level gpte is still there.  Since the page
+	 * is a root page, it is either write protected (and cannot be
+	 * changed from now on) or it is invalid (in which case, we don't
+	 * really care if it changes underneath us after this point).
+	 */
+	if (FNAME(gpte_changed)(vcpu, gw, top_level))
+		goto out_gpte_changed;
+
+	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!VALID_PAGE(vcpu->arch.mmu->root.hpa)))
+		goto out_gpte_changed;
+
+	/*
+	 * Load a new root and retry the faulting instruction in the extremely
+	 * unlikely scenario that the guest root gfn became visible between
+	 * loading a dummy root and handling the resulting page fault, e.g. if
+	 * userspace create a memslot in the interim.
+	 */
+	if (unlikely(kvm_mmu_is_dummy_root(vcpu->arch.mmu->root.hpa))) {
+		kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_MMU_FREE_OBSOLETE_ROOTS, vcpu);
+		goto out_gpte_changed;
+	}
+
+	for_each_shadow_entry(vcpu, fault->addr, it) {
+		gfn_t table_gfn;
+
+		clear_sp_write_flooding_count(it.sptep);
+		if (it.level == gw->level)
+			break;
+
+		table_gfn = gw->table_gfn[it.level - 2];
+		access = gw->pt_access[it.level - 2];
+		sp = kvm_mmu_get_child_sp(vcpu, it.sptep, table_gfn,
+					  false, access);
+
+		if (sp != ERR_PTR(-EEXIST)) {
+			/*
+			 * We must synchronize the pagetable before linking it
+			 * because the guest doesn't need to flush tlb when
+			 * the gpte is changed from non-present to present.
+			 * Otherwise, the guest may use the wrong mapping.
+			 *
+			 * For PG_LEVEL_4K, kvm_mmu_get_page() has already
+			 * synchronized it transiently via kvm_sync_page().
+			 *
+			 * For higher level pagetable, we synchronize it via
+			 * the slower mmu_sync_children().  If it needs to
+			 * break, some progress has been made; return
+			 * RET_PF_RETRY and retry on the next #PF.
+			 * KVM_REQ_MMU_SYNC is not necessary but it
+			 * expedites the process.
+			 */
+			if (sp->unsync_children &&
+			    mmu_sync_children(vcpu, sp, false))
+				return RET_PF_RETRY;
+		}
+
+		/*
+		 * Verify that the gpte in the page we've just write
+		 * protected is still there.
+		 */
+		if (FNAME(gpte_changed)(vcpu, gw, it.level - 1))
+			goto out_gpte_changed;
+
+		if (sp != ERR_PTR(-EEXIST))
+			link_shadow_page(vcpu, it.sptep, sp);
+
+		if (fault->write && table_gfn == fault->gfn)
+			fault->write_fault_to_shadow_pgtable = true;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Adjust the hugepage size _after_ resolving indirect shadow pages.
+	 * KVM doesn't support mapping hugepages into the guest for gfns that
+	 * are being shadowed by KVM, i.e. allocating a new shadow page may
+	 * affect the allowed hugepage size.
+	 */
+	kvm_mmu_hugepage_adjust(vcpu, fault);
+
+	trace_kvm_mmu_spte_requested(fault);
+
+	for (; shadow_walk_okay(&it); shadow_walk_next(&it)) {
+		/*
+		 * We cannot overwrite existing page tables with an NX
+		 * large page, as the leaf could be executable.
+		 */
+		if (fault->nx_huge_page_workaround_enabled)
+			disallowed_hugepage_adjust(fault, *it.sptep, it.level);
+
+		base_gfn = gfn_round_for_level(fault->gfn, it.level);
+		if (it.level == fault->goal_level)
+			break;
+
+		validate_direct_spte(vcpu, it.sptep, direct_access);
+
+		sp = kvm_mmu_get_child_sp(vcpu, it.sptep, base_gfn,
+					  true, direct_access);
+		if (sp == ERR_PTR(-EEXIST))
+			continue;
+
+		link_shadow_page(vcpu, it.sptep, sp);
+		if (fault->huge_page_disallowed)
+			account_nx_huge_page(vcpu->kvm, sp,
+					     fault->req_level >= it.level);
+	}
+
+	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(it.level != fault->goal_level))
+		return -EFAULT;
+
+	ret = mmu_set_spte(vcpu, fault->slot, it.sptep, gw->pte_access,
+			   base_gfn, fault->pfn, fault);
+	if (ret == RET_PF_SPURIOUS)
+		return ret;
+
+	FNAME(pte_prefetch)(vcpu, gw, it.sptep);
+	return ret;
+
+out_gpte_changed:
+	return RET_PF_RETRY;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Page fault handler.  There are several causes for a page fault:
+ *   - there is no shadow pte for the guest pte
+ *   - write access through a shadow pte marked read only so that we can set
+ *     the dirty bit
+ *   - write access to a shadow pte marked read only so we can update the page
+ *     dirty bitmap, when userspace requests it
+ *   - mmio access; in this case we will never install a present shadow pte
+ *   - normal guest page fault due to the guest pte marked not present, not
+ *     writable, or not executable
+ *
+ *  Returns: 1 if we need to emulate the instruction, 0 otherwise, or
+ *           a negative value on error.
+ */
+static int FNAME(page_fault)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_page_fault *fault)
+{
+	struct guest_walker walker;
+	int r;
+
+	WARN_ON_ONCE(fault->is_tdp);
+
+	/*
+	 * Look up the guest pte for the faulting address.
+	 * If PFEC.RSVD is set, this is a shadow page fault.
+	 * The bit needs to be cleared before walking guest page tables.
+	 */
+	r = FNAME(walk_addr)(&walker, vcpu, fault->addr,
+			     fault->error_code & ~PFERR_RSVD_MASK);
+
+	/*
+	 * The page is not mapped by the guest.  Let the guest handle it.
+	 */
+	if (!r) {
+		if (!fault->prefetch)
+			kvm_inject_emulated_page_fault(vcpu, &walker.fault);
+
+		return RET_PF_RETRY;
+	}
+
+	fault->gfn = walker.gfn;
+	fault->max_level = walker.level;
+	fault->slot = kvm_vcpu_gfn_to_memslot(vcpu, fault->gfn);
+
+	if (page_fault_handle_page_track(vcpu, fault)) {
+		shadow_page_table_clear_flood(vcpu, fault->addr);
+		return RET_PF_EMULATE;
+	}
+
+	r = mmu_topup_memory_caches(vcpu, true);
+	if (r)
+		return r;
+
+	r = kvm_faultin_pfn(vcpu, fault, walker.pte_access);
+	if (r != RET_PF_CONTINUE)
+		return r;
+
+	/*
+	 * Do not change pte_access if the pfn is a mmio page, otherwise
+	 * we will cache the incorrect access into mmio spte.
+	 */
+	if (fault->write && !(walker.pte_access & ACC_WRITE_MASK) &&
+	    !is_cr0_wp(vcpu->arch.mmu) && !fault->user && fault->slot) {
+		walker.pte_access |= ACC_WRITE_MASK;
+		walker.pte_access &= ~ACC_USER_MASK;
+
+		/*
+		 * If we converted a user page to a kernel page,
+		 * so that the kernel can write to it when cr0.wp=0,
+		 * then we should prevent the kernel from executing it
+		 * if SMEP is enabled.
+		 */
+		if (is_cr4_smep(vcpu->arch.mmu))
+			walker.pte_access &= ~ACC_EXEC_MASK;
+	}
+
+	r = RET_PF_RETRY;
+	write_lock(&vcpu->kvm->mmu_lock);
+
+	if (is_page_fault_stale(vcpu, fault))
+		goto out_unlock;
+
+	r = make_mmu_pages_available(vcpu);
+	if (r)
+		goto out_unlock;
+	r = FNAME(fetch)(vcpu, fault, &walker);
+
+out_unlock:
+	write_unlock(&vcpu->kvm->mmu_lock);
+	kvm_release_pfn_clean(fault->pfn);
+	return r;
+}
+
+static gpa_t FNAME(get_level1_sp_gpa)(struct kvm_mmu_page *sp)
+{
+	int offset = 0;
+
+	WARN_ON_ONCE(sp->role.level != PG_LEVEL_4K);
+
+	if (PTTYPE == 32)
+		offset = sp->role.quadrant << SPTE_LEVEL_BITS;
+
+	return gfn_to_gpa(sp->gfn) + offset * sizeof(pt_element_t);
+}
+
+/* Note, @addr is a GPA when gva_to_gpa() translates an L2 GPA to an L1 GPA. */
+static gpa_t FNAME(gva_to_gpa)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_mmu *mmu,
+			       gpa_t addr, u64 access,
+			       struct x86_exception *exception)
+{
+	struct guest_walker walker;
+	gpa_t gpa = INVALID_GPA;
+	int r;
+
+#ifndef CONFIG_X86_64
+	/* A 64-bit GVA should be impossible on 32-bit KVM. */
+	WARN_ON_ONCE((addr >> 32) && mmu == vcpu->arch.walk_mmu);
+#endif
+
+	r = FNAME(walk_addr_generic)(&walker, vcpu, mmu, addr, access);
+
+	if (r) {
+		gpa = gfn_to_gpa(walker.gfn);
+		gpa |= addr & ~PAGE_MASK;
+	} else if (exception)
+		*exception = walker.fault;
+
+	return gpa;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Using the information in sp->shadowed_translation (kvm_mmu_page_get_gfn()) is
+ * safe because:
+ * - The spte has a reference to the struct page, so the pfn for a given gfn
+ *   can't change unless all sptes pointing to it are nuked first.
+ *
+ * Returns
+ * < 0: failed to sync spte
+ *   0: the spte is synced and no tlb flushing is required
+ * > 0: the spte is synced and tlb flushing is required
+ */
+static int FNAME(sync_spte)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_mmu_page *sp, int i)
+{
+	bool host_writable;
+	gpa_t first_pte_gpa;
+	u64 *sptep, spte;
+	struct kvm_memory_slot *slot;
+	unsigned pte_access;
+	pt_element_t gpte;
+	gpa_t pte_gpa;
+	gfn_t gfn;
+
+	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!sp->spt[i]))
+		return 0;
+
+	first_pte_gpa = FNAME(get_level1_sp_gpa)(sp);
+	pte_gpa = first_pte_gpa + i * sizeof(pt_element_t);
+
+	if (kvm_vcpu_read_guest_atomic(vcpu, pte_gpa, &gpte,
+				       sizeof(pt_element_t)))
+		return -1;
+
+	if (FNAME(prefetch_invalid_gpte)(vcpu, sp, &sp->spt[i], gpte))
+		return 1;
+
+	gfn = gpte_to_gfn(gpte);
+	pte_access = sp->role.access;
+	pte_access &= FNAME(gpte_access)(gpte);
+	FNAME(protect_clean_gpte)(vcpu->arch.mmu, &pte_access, gpte);
+
+	if (sync_mmio_spte(vcpu, &sp->spt[i], gfn, pte_access))
+		return 0;
+
+	/*
+	 * Drop the SPTE if the new protections would result in a RWX=0
+	 * SPTE or if the gfn is changing.  The RWX=0 case only affects
+	 * EPT with execute-only support, i.e. EPT without an effective
+	 * "present" bit, as all other paging modes will create a
+	 * read-only SPTE if pte_access is zero.
+	 */
+	if ((!pte_access && !shadow_present_mask) ||
+	    gfn != kvm_mmu_page_get_gfn(sp, i)) {
+		drop_spte(vcpu->kvm, &sp->spt[i]);
+		return 1;
+	}
+	/*
+	 * Do nothing if the permissions are unchanged.  The existing SPTE is
+	 * still, and prefetch_invalid_gpte() has verified that the A/D bits
+	 * are set in the "new" gPTE, i.e. there is no danger of missing an A/D
+	 * update due to A/D bits being set in the SPTE but not the gPTE.
+	 */
+	if (kvm_mmu_page_get_access(sp, i) == pte_access)
+		return 0;
+
+	/* Update the shadowed access bits in case they changed. */
+	kvm_mmu_page_set_access(sp, i, pte_access);
+
+	sptep = &sp->spt[i];
+	spte = *sptep;
+	host_writable = spte & shadow_host_writable_mask;
+	slot = kvm_vcpu_gfn_to_memslot(vcpu, gfn);
+	make_spte(vcpu, sp, slot, pte_access, gfn,
+		  spte_to_pfn(spte), spte, true, false,
+		  host_writable, &spte);
+
+	return mmu_spte_update(sptep, spte);
+}
+
+#undef pt_element_t
+#undef guest_walker
+#undef FNAME
+#undef PT_BASE_ADDR_MASK
+#undef PT_INDEX
+#undef PT_LVL_ADDR_MASK
+#undef PT_LVL_OFFSET_MASK
+#undef PT_LEVEL_BITS
+#undef PT_MAX_FULL_LEVELS
+#undef gpte_to_gfn
+#undef gpte_to_gfn_lvl
+#undef PT_GUEST_ACCESSED_MASK
+#undef PT_GUEST_DIRTY_MASK
+#undef PT_GUEST_DIRTY_SHIFT
+#undef PT_GUEST_ACCESSED_SHIFT
+#undef PT_HAVE_ACCESSED_DIRTY
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.c b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..4a599130e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.c
@@ -0,0 +1,517 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * Kernel-based Virtual Machine driver for Linux
+ *
+ * Macros and functions to access KVM PTEs (also known as SPTEs)
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2006 Qumranet, Inc.
+ * Copyright 2020 Red Hat, Inc. and/or its affiliates.
+ */
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
+
+#include <linux/kvm_host.h>
+#include "mmu.h"
+#include "mmu_internal.h"
+#include "x86.h"
+#include "spte.h"
+
+#include <asm/e820/api.h>
+#include <asm/memtype.h>
+#include <asm/vmx.h>
+
+bool __read_mostly enable_mmio_caching = true;
+static bool __ro_after_init allow_mmio_caching;
+module_param_named(mmio_caching, enable_mmio_caching, bool, 0444);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(enable_mmio_caching);
+
+u64 __read_mostly shadow_host_writable_mask;
+u64 __read_mostly shadow_mmu_writable_mask;
+u64 __read_mostly shadow_nx_mask;
+u64 __read_mostly shadow_x_mask; /* mutual exclusive with nx_mask */
+u64 __read_mostly shadow_user_mask;
+u64 __read_mostly shadow_accessed_mask;
+u64 __read_mostly shadow_dirty_mask;
+u64 __read_mostly shadow_mmio_value;
+u64 __read_mostly shadow_mmio_mask;
+u64 __read_mostly shadow_mmio_access_mask;
+u64 __read_mostly shadow_present_mask;
+u64 __read_mostly shadow_memtype_mask;
+u64 __read_mostly shadow_me_value;
+u64 __read_mostly shadow_me_mask;
+u64 __read_mostly shadow_acc_track_mask;
+
+u64 __read_mostly shadow_nonpresent_or_rsvd_mask;
+u64 __read_mostly shadow_nonpresent_or_rsvd_lower_gfn_mask;
+
+u8 __read_mostly shadow_phys_bits;
+
+void __init kvm_mmu_spte_module_init(void)
+{
+	/*
+	 * Snapshot userspace's desire to allow MMIO caching.  Whether or not
+	 * KVM can actually enable MMIO caching depends on vendor-specific
+	 * hardware capabilities and other module params that can't be resolved
+	 * until the vendor module is loaded, i.e. enable_mmio_caching can and
+	 * will change when the vendor module is (re)loaded.
+	 */
+	allow_mmio_caching = enable_mmio_caching;
+}
+
+static u64 generation_mmio_spte_mask(u64 gen)
+{
+	u64 mask;
+
+	WARN_ON_ONCE(gen & ~MMIO_SPTE_GEN_MASK);
+
+	mask = (gen << MMIO_SPTE_GEN_LOW_SHIFT) & MMIO_SPTE_GEN_LOW_MASK;
+	mask |= (gen << MMIO_SPTE_GEN_HIGH_SHIFT) & MMIO_SPTE_GEN_HIGH_MASK;
+	return mask;
+}
+
+u64 make_mmio_spte(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 gfn, unsigned int access)
+{
+	u64 gen = kvm_vcpu_memslots(vcpu)->generation & MMIO_SPTE_GEN_MASK;
+	u64 spte = generation_mmio_spte_mask(gen);
+	u64 gpa = gfn << PAGE_SHIFT;
+
+	WARN_ON_ONCE(!shadow_mmio_value);
+
+	access &= shadow_mmio_access_mask;
+	spte |= shadow_mmio_value | access;
+	spte |= gpa | shadow_nonpresent_or_rsvd_mask;
+	spte |= (gpa & shadow_nonpresent_or_rsvd_mask)
+		<< SHADOW_NONPRESENT_OR_RSVD_MASK_LEN;
+
+	return spte;
+}
+
+static bool kvm_is_mmio_pfn(kvm_pfn_t pfn)
+{
+	if (pfn_valid(pfn))
+		return !is_zero_pfn(pfn) && PageReserved(pfn_to_page(pfn)) &&
+			/*
+			 * Some reserved pages, such as those from NVDIMM
+			 * DAX devices, are not for MMIO, and can be mapped
+			 * with cached memory type for better performance.
+			 * However, the above check misconceives those pages
+			 * as MMIO, and results in KVM mapping them with UC
+			 * memory type, which would hurt the performance.
+			 * Therefore, we check the host memory type in addition
+			 * and only treat UC/UC-/WC pages as MMIO.
+			 */
+			(!pat_enabled() || pat_pfn_immune_to_uc_mtrr(pfn));
+
+	return !e820__mapped_raw_any(pfn_to_hpa(pfn),
+				     pfn_to_hpa(pfn + 1) - 1,
+				     E820_TYPE_RAM);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Returns true if the SPTE has bits that may be set without holding mmu_lock.
+ * The caller is responsible for checking if the SPTE is shadow-present, and
+ * for determining whether or not the caller cares about non-leaf SPTEs.
+ */
+bool spte_has_volatile_bits(u64 spte)
+{
+	/*
+	 * Always atomically update spte if it can be updated
+	 * out of mmu-lock, it can ensure dirty bit is not lost,
+	 * also, it can help us to get a stable is_writable_pte()
+	 * to ensure tlb flush is not missed.
+	 */
+	if (!is_writable_pte(spte) && is_mmu_writable_spte(spte))
+		return true;
+
+	if (is_access_track_spte(spte))
+		return true;
+
+	if (spte_ad_enabled(spte)) {
+		if (!(spte & shadow_accessed_mask) ||
+		    (is_writable_pte(spte) && !(spte & shadow_dirty_mask)))
+			return true;
+	}
+
+	return false;
+}
+
+bool make_spte(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_mmu_page *sp,
+	       const struct kvm_memory_slot *slot,
+	       unsigned int pte_access, gfn_t gfn, kvm_pfn_t pfn,
+	       u64 old_spte, bool prefetch, bool can_unsync,
+	       bool host_writable, u64 *new_spte)
+{
+	int level = sp->role.level;
+	u64 spte = SPTE_MMU_PRESENT_MASK;
+	bool wrprot = false;
+
+	WARN_ON_ONCE(!pte_access && !shadow_present_mask);
+
+	if (sp->role.ad_disabled)
+		spte |= SPTE_TDP_AD_DISABLED;
+	else if (kvm_mmu_page_ad_need_write_protect(sp))
+		spte |= SPTE_TDP_AD_WRPROT_ONLY;
+
+	/*
+	 * For the EPT case, shadow_present_mask is 0 if hardware
+	 * supports exec-only page table entries.  In that case,
+	 * ACC_USER_MASK and shadow_user_mask are used to represent
+	 * read access.  See FNAME(gpte_access) in paging_tmpl.h.
+	 */
+	spte |= shadow_present_mask;
+	if (!prefetch)
+		spte |= spte_shadow_accessed_mask(spte);
+
+	/*
+	 * For simplicity, enforce the NX huge page mitigation even if not
+	 * strictly necessary.  KVM could ignore the mitigation if paging is
+	 * disabled in the guest, as the guest doesn't have any page tables to
+	 * abuse.  But to safely ignore the mitigation, KVM would have to
+	 * ensure a new MMU is loaded (or all shadow pages zapped) when CR0.PG
+	 * is toggled on, and that's a net negative for performance when TDP is
+	 * enabled.  When TDP is disabled, KVM will always switch to a new MMU
+	 * when CR0.PG is toggled, but leveraging that to ignore the mitigation
+	 * would tie make_spte() further to vCPU/MMU state, and add complexity
+	 * just to optimize a mode that is anything but performance critical.
+	 */
+	if (level > PG_LEVEL_4K && (pte_access & ACC_EXEC_MASK) &&
+	    is_nx_huge_page_enabled(vcpu->kvm)) {
+		pte_access &= ~ACC_EXEC_MASK;
+	}
+
+	if (pte_access & ACC_EXEC_MASK)
+		spte |= shadow_x_mask;
+	else
+		spte |= shadow_nx_mask;
+
+	if (pte_access & ACC_USER_MASK)
+		spte |= shadow_user_mask;
+
+	if (level > PG_LEVEL_4K)
+		spte |= PT_PAGE_SIZE_MASK;
+
+	if (shadow_memtype_mask)
+		spte |= static_call(kvm_x86_get_mt_mask)(vcpu, gfn,
+							 kvm_is_mmio_pfn(pfn));
+	if (host_writable)
+		spte |= shadow_host_writable_mask;
+	else
+		pte_access &= ~ACC_WRITE_MASK;
+
+	if (shadow_me_value && !kvm_is_mmio_pfn(pfn))
+		spte |= shadow_me_value;
+
+	spte |= (u64)pfn << PAGE_SHIFT;
+
+	if (pte_access & ACC_WRITE_MASK) {
+		spte |= PT_WRITABLE_MASK | shadow_mmu_writable_mask;
+
+		/*
+		 * Optimization: for pte sync, if spte was writable the hash
+		 * lookup is unnecessary (and expensive). Write protection
+		 * is responsibility of kvm_mmu_get_page / kvm_mmu_sync_roots.
+		 * Same reasoning can be applied to dirty page accounting.
+		 */
+		if (is_writable_pte(old_spte))
+			goto out;
+
+		/*
+		 * Unsync shadow pages that are reachable by the new, writable
+		 * SPTE.  Write-protect the SPTE if the page can't be unsync'd,
+		 * e.g. it's write-tracked (upper-level SPs) or has one or more
+		 * shadow pages and unsync'ing pages is not allowed.
+		 */
+		if (mmu_try_to_unsync_pages(vcpu->kvm, slot, gfn, can_unsync, prefetch)) {
+			wrprot = true;
+			pte_access &= ~ACC_WRITE_MASK;
+			spte &= ~(PT_WRITABLE_MASK | shadow_mmu_writable_mask);
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (pte_access & ACC_WRITE_MASK)
+		spte |= spte_shadow_dirty_mask(spte);
+
+out:
+	if (prefetch)
+		spte = mark_spte_for_access_track(spte);
+
+	WARN_ONCE(is_rsvd_spte(&vcpu->arch.mmu->shadow_zero_check, spte, level),
+		  "spte = 0x%llx, level = %d, rsvd bits = 0x%llx", spte, level,
+		  get_rsvd_bits(&vcpu->arch.mmu->shadow_zero_check, spte, level));
+
+	if ((spte & PT_WRITABLE_MASK) && kvm_slot_dirty_track_enabled(slot)) {
+		/* Enforced by kvm_mmu_hugepage_adjust. */
+		WARN_ON_ONCE(level > PG_LEVEL_4K);
+		mark_page_dirty_in_slot(vcpu->kvm, slot, gfn);
+	}
+
+	*new_spte = spte;
+	return wrprot;
+}
+
+static u64 make_spte_executable(u64 spte)
+{
+	bool is_access_track = is_access_track_spte(spte);
+
+	if (is_access_track)
+		spte = restore_acc_track_spte(spte);
+
+	spte &= ~shadow_nx_mask;
+	spte |= shadow_x_mask;
+
+	if (is_access_track)
+		spte = mark_spte_for_access_track(spte);
+
+	return spte;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Construct an SPTE that maps a sub-page of the given huge page SPTE where
+ * `index` identifies which sub-page.
+ *
+ * This is used during huge page splitting to build the SPTEs that make up the
+ * new page table.
+ */
+u64 make_huge_page_split_spte(struct kvm *kvm, u64 huge_spte, union kvm_mmu_page_role role,
+			      int index)
+{
+	u64 child_spte;
+
+	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!is_shadow_present_pte(huge_spte)))
+		return 0;
+
+	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!is_large_pte(huge_spte)))
+		return 0;
+
+	child_spte = huge_spte;
+
+	/*
+	 * The child_spte already has the base address of the huge page being
+	 * split. So we just have to OR in the offset to the page at the next
+	 * lower level for the given index.
+	 */
+	child_spte |= (index * KVM_PAGES_PER_HPAGE(role.level)) << PAGE_SHIFT;
+
+	if (role.level == PG_LEVEL_4K) {
+		child_spte &= ~PT_PAGE_SIZE_MASK;
+
+		/*
+		 * When splitting to a 4K page where execution is allowed, mark
+		 * the page executable as the NX hugepage mitigation no longer
+		 * applies.
+		 */
+		if ((role.access & ACC_EXEC_MASK) && is_nx_huge_page_enabled(kvm))
+			child_spte = make_spte_executable(child_spte);
+	}
+
+	return child_spte;
+}
+
+
+u64 make_nonleaf_spte(u64 *child_pt, bool ad_disabled)
+{
+	u64 spte = SPTE_MMU_PRESENT_MASK;
+
+	spte |= __pa(child_pt) | shadow_present_mask | PT_WRITABLE_MASK |
+		shadow_user_mask | shadow_x_mask | shadow_me_value;
+
+	if (ad_disabled)
+		spte |= SPTE_TDP_AD_DISABLED;
+	else
+		spte |= shadow_accessed_mask;
+
+	return spte;
+}
+
+u64 kvm_mmu_changed_pte_notifier_make_spte(u64 old_spte, kvm_pfn_t new_pfn)
+{
+	u64 new_spte;
+
+	new_spte = old_spte & ~SPTE_BASE_ADDR_MASK;
+	new_spte |= (u64)new_pfn << PAGE_SHIFT;
+
+	new_spte &= ~PT_WRITABLE_MASK;
+	new_spte &= ~shadow_host_writable_mask;
+	new_spte &= ~shadow_mmu_writable_mask;
+
+	new_spte = mark_spte_for_access_track(new_spte);
+
+	return new_spte;
+}
+
+u64 mark_spte_for_access_track(u64 spte)
+{
+	if (spte_ad_enabled(spte))
+		return spte & ~shadow_accessed_mask;
+
+	if (is_access_track_spte(spte))
+		return spte;
+
+	check_spte_writable_invariants(spte);
+
+	WARN_ONCE(spte & (SHADOW_ACC_TRACK_SAVED_BITS_MASK <<
+			  SHADOW_ACC_TRACK_SAVED_BITS_SHIFT),
+		  "Access Tracking saved bit locations are not zero\n");
+
+	spte |= (spte & SHADOW_ACC_TRACK_SAVED_BITS_MASK) <<
+		SHADOW_ACC_TRACK_SAVED_BITS_SHIFT;
+	spte &= ~shadow_acc_track_mask;
+
+	return spte;
+}
+
+void kvm_mmu_set_mmio_spte_mask(u64 mmio_value, u64 mmio_mask, u64 access_mask)
+{
+	BUG_ON((u64)(unsigned)access_mask != access_mask);
+	WARN_ON(mmio_value & shadow_nonpresent_or_rsvd_lower_gfn_mask);
+
+	/*
+	 * Reset to the original module param value to honor userspace's desire
+	 * to (dis)allow MMIO caching.  Update the param itself so that
+	 * userspace can see whether or not KVM is actually using MMIO caching.
+	 */
+	enable_mmio_caching = allow_mmio_caching;
+	if (!enable_mmio_caching)
+		mmio_value = 0;
+
+	/*
+	 * The mask must contain only bits that are carved out specifically for
+	 * the MMIO SPTE mask, e.g. to ensure there's no overlap with the MMIO
+	 * generation.
+	 */
+	if (WARN_ON(mmio_mask & ~SPTE_MMIO_ALLOWED_MASK))
+		mmio_value = 0;
+
+	/*
+	 * Disable MMIO caching if the MMIO value collides with the bits that
+	 * are used to hold the relocated GFN when the L1TF mitigation is
+	 * enabled.  This should never fire as there is no known hardware that
+	 * can trigger this condition, e.g. SME/SEV CPUs that require a custom
+	 * MMIO value are not susceptible to L1TF.
+	 */
+	if (WARN_ON(mmio_value & (shadow_nonpresent_or_rsvd_mask <<
+				  SHADOW_NONPRESENT_OR_RSVD_MASK_LEN)))
+		mmio_value = 0;
+
+	/*
+	 * The masked MMIO value must obviously match itself and a removed SPTE
+	 * must not get a false positive.  Removed SPTEs and MMIO SPTEs should
+	 * never collide as MMIO must set some RWX bits, and removed SPTEs must
+	 * not set any RWX bits.
+	 */
+	if (WARN_ON((mmio_value & mmio_mask) != mmio_value) ||
+	    WARN_ON(mmio_value && (REMOVED_SPTE & mmio_mask) == mmio_value))
+		mmio_value = 0;
+
+	if (!mmio_value)
+		enable_mmio_caching = false;
+
+	shadow_mmio_value = mmio_value;
+	shadow_mmio_mask  = mmio_mask;
+	shadow_mmio_access_mask = access_mask;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_mmu_set_mmio_spte_mask);
+
+void kvm_mmu_set_me_spte_mask(u64 me_value, u64 me_mask)
+{
+	/* shadow_me_value must be a subset of shadow_me_mask */
+	if (WARN_ON(me_value & ~me_mask))
+		me_value = me_mask = 0;
+
+	shadow_me_value = me_value;
+	shadow_me_mask = me_mask;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_mmu_set_me_spte_mask);
+
+void kvm_mmu_set_ept_masks(bool has_ad_bits, bool has_exec_only)
+{
+	shadow_user_mask	= VMX_EPT_READABLE_MASK;
+	shadow_accessed_mask	= has_ad_bits ? VMX_EPT_ACCESS_BIT : 0ull;
+	shadow_dirty_mask	= has_ad_bits ? VMX_EPT_DIRTY_BIT : 0ull;
+	shadow_nx_mask		= 0ull;
+	shadow_x_mask		= VMX_EPT_EXECUTABLE_MASK;
+	shadow_present_mask	= has_exec_only ? 0ull : VMX_EPT_READABLE_MASK;
+	/*
+	 * EPT overrides the host MTRRs, and so KVM must program the desired
+	 * memtype directly into the SPTEs.  Note, this mask is just the mask
+	 * of all bits that factor into the memtype, the actual memtype must be
+	 * dynamically calculated, e.g. to ensure host MMIO is mapped UC.
+	 */
+	shadow_memtype_mask	= VMX_EPT_MT_MASK | VMX_EPT_IPAT_BIT;
+	shadow_acc_track_mask	= VMX_EPT_RWX_MASK;
+	shadow_host_writable_mask = EPT_SPTE_HOST_WRITABLE;
+	shadow_mmu_writable_mask  = EPT_SPTE_MMU_WRITABLE;
+
+	/*
+	 * EPT Misconfigurations are generated if the value of bits 2:0
+	 * of an EPT paging-structure entry is 110b (write/execute).
+	 */
+	kvm_mmu_set_mmio_spte_mask(VMX_EPT_MISCONFIG_WX_VALUE,
+				   VMX_EPT_RWX_MASK, 0);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_mmu_set_ept_masks);
+
+void kvm_mmu_reset_all_pte_masks(void)
+{
+	u8 low_phys_bits;
+	u64 mask;
+
+	shadow_phys_bits = kvm_get_shadow_phys_bits();
+
+	/*
+	 * If the CPU has 46 or less physical address bits, then set an
+	 * appropriate mask to guard against L1TF attacks. Otherwise, it is
+	 * assumed that the CPU is not vulnerable to L1TF.
+	 *
+	 * Some Intel CPUs address the L1 cache using more PA bits than are
+	 * reported by CPUID. Use the PA width of the L1 cache when possible
+	 * to achieve more effective mitigation, e.g. if system RAM overlaps
+	 * the most significant bits of legal physical address space.
+	 */
+	shadow_nonpresent_or_rsvd_mask = 0;
+	low_phys_bits = boot_cpu_data.x86_phys_bits;
+	if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_L1TF) &&
+	    !WARN_ON_ONCE(boot_cpu_data.x86_cache_bits >=
+			  52 - SHADOW_NONPRESENT_OR_RSVD_MASK_LEN)) {
+		low_phys_bits = boot_cpu_data.x86_cache_bits
+			- SHADOW_NONPRESENT_OR_RSVD_MASK_LEN;
+		shadow_nonpresent_or_rsvd_mask =
+			rsvd_bits(low_phys_bits, boot_cpu_data.x86_cache_bits - 1);
+	}
+
+	shadow_nonpresent_or_rsvd_lower_gfn_mask =
+		GENMASK_ULL(low_phys_bits - 1, PAGE_SHIFT);
+
+	shadow_user_mask	= PT_USER_MASK;
+	shadow_accessed_mask	= PT_ACCESSED_MASK;
+	shadow_dirty_mask	= PT_DIRTY_MASK;
+	shadow_nx_mask		= PT64_NX_MASK;
+	shadow_x_mask		= 0;
+	shadow_present_mask	= PT_PRESENT_MASK;
+
+	/*
+	 * For shadow paging and NPT, KVM uses PAT entry '0' to encode WB
+	 * memtype in the SPTEs, i.e. relies on host MTRRs to provide the
+	 * correct memtype (WB is the "weakest" memtype).
+	 */
+	shadow_memtype_mask	= 0;
+	shadow_acc_track_mask	= 0;
+	shadow_me_mask		= 0;
+	shadow_me_value		= 0;
+
+	shadow_host_writable_mask = DEFAULT_SPTE_HOST_WRITABLE;
+	shadow_mmu_writable_mask  = DEFAULT_SPTE_MMU_WRITABLE;
+
+	/*
+	 * Set a reserved PA bit in MMIO SPTEs to generate page faults with
+	 * PFEC.RSVD=1 on MMIO accesses.  64-bit PTEs (PAE, x86-64, and EPT
+	 * paging) support a maximum of 52 bits of PA, i.e. if the CPU supports
+	 * 52-bit physical addresses then there are no reserved PA bits in the
+	 * PTEs and so the reserved PA approach must be disabled.
+	 */
+	if (shadow_phys_bits < 52)
+		mask = BIT_ULL(51) | PT_PRESENT_MASK;
+	else
+		mask = 0;
+
+	kvm_mmu_set_mmio_spte_mask(mask, mask, ACC_WRITE_MASK | ACC_USER_MASK);
+}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.h b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..a129951c9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.h
@@ -0,0 +1,504 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+
+#ifndef KVM_X86_MMU_SPTE_H
+#define KVM_X86_MMU_SPTE_H
+
+#include "mmu.h"
+#include "mmu_internal.h"
+
+/*
+ * A MMU present SPTE is backed by actual memory and may or may not be present
+ * in hardware.  E.g. MMIO SPTEs are not considered present.  Use bit 11, as it
+ * is ignored by all flavors of SPTEs and checking a low bit often generates
+ * better code than for a high bit, e.g. 56+.  MMU present checks are pervasive
+ * enough that the improved code generation is noticeable in KVM's footprint.
+ */
+#define SPTE_MMU_PRESENT_MASK		BIT_ULL(11)
+
+/*
+ * TDP SPTES (more specifically, EPT SPTEs) may not have A/D bits, and may also
+ * be restricted to using write-protection (for L2 when CPU dirty logging, i.e.
+ * PML, is enabled).  Use bits 52 and 53 to hold the type of A/D tracking that
+ * is must be employed for a given TDP SPTE.
+ *
+ * Note, the "enabled" mask must be '0', as bits 62:52 are _reserved_ for PAE
+ * paging, including NPT PAE.  This scheme works because legacy shadow paging
+ * is guaranteed to have A/D bits and write-protection is forced only for
+ * TDP with CPU dirty logging (PML).  If NPT ever gains PML-like support, it
+ * must be restricted to 64-bit KVM.
+ */
+#define SPTE_TDP_AD_SHIFT		52
+#define SPTE_TDP_AD_MASK		(3ULL << SPTE_TDP_AD_SHIFT)
+#define SPTE_TDP_AD_ENABLED		(0ULL << SPTE_TDP_AD_SHIFT)
+#define SPTE_TDP_AD_DISABLED		(1ULL << SPTE_TDP_AD_SHIFT)
+#define SPTE_TDP_AD_WRPROT_ONLY		(2ULL << SPTE_TDP_AD_SHIFT)
+static_assert(SPTE_TDP_AD_ENABLED == 0);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_DYNAMIC_PHYSICAL_MASK
+#define SPTE_BASE_ADDR_MASK (physical_mask & ~(u64)(PAGE_SIZE-1))
+#else
+#define SPTE_BASE_ADDR_MASK (((1ULL << 52) - 1) & ~(u64)(PAGE_SIZE-1))
+#endif
+
+#define SPTE_PERM_MASK (PT_PRESENT_MASK | PT_WRITABLE_MASK | shadow_user_mask \
+			| shadow_x_mask | shadow_nx_mask | shadow_me_mask)
+
+#define ACC_EXEC_MASK    1
+#define ACC_WRITE_MASK   PT_WRITABLE_MASK
+#define ACC_USER_MASK    PT_USER_MASK
+#define ACC_ALL          (ACC_EXEC_MASK | ACC_WRITE_MASK | ACC_USER_MASK)
+
+/* The mask for the R/X bits in EPT PTEs */
+#define SPTE_EPT_READABLE_MASK			0x1ull
+#define SPTE_EPT_EXECUTABLE_MASK		0x4ull
+
+#define SPTE_LEVEL_BITS			9
+#define SPTE_LEVEL_SHIFT(level)		__PT_LEVEL_SHIFT(level, SPTE_LEVEL_BITS)
+#define SPTE_INDEX(address, level)	__PT_INDEX(address, level, SPTE_LEVEL_BITS)
+#define SPTE_ENT_PER_PAGE		__PT_ENT_PER_PAGE(SPTE_LEVEL_BITS)
+
+/*
+ * The mask/shift to use for saving the original R/X bits when marking the PTE
+ * as not-present for access tracking purposes. We do not save the W bit as the
+ * PTEs being access tracked also need to be dirty tracked, so the W bit will be
+ * restored only when a write is attempted to the page.  This mask obviously
+ * must not overlap the A/D type mask.
+ */
+#define SHADOW_ACC_TRACK_SAVED_BITS_MASK (SPTE_EPT_READABLE_MASK | \
+					  SPTE_EPT_EXECUTABLE_MASK)
+#define SHADOW_ACC_TRACK_SAVED_BITS_SHIFT 54
+#define SHADOW_ACC_TRACK_SAVED_MASK	(SHADOW_ACC_TRACK_SAVED_BITS_MASK << \
+					 SHADOW_ACC_TRACK_SAVED_BITS_SHIFT)
+static_assert(!(SPTE_TDP_AD_MASK & SHADOW_ACC_TRACK_SAVED_MASK));
+
+/*
+ * {DEFAULT,EPT}_SPTE_{HOST,MMU}_WRITABLE are used to keep track of why a given
+ * SPTE is write-protected. See is_writable_pte() for details.
+ */
+
+/* Bits 9 and 10 are ignored by all non-EPT PTEs. */
+#define DEFAULT_SPTE_HOST_WRITABLE	BIT_ULL(9)
+#define DEFAULT_SPTE_MMU_WRITABLE	BIT_ULL(10)
+
+/*
+ * Low ignored bits are at a premium for EPT, use high ignored bits, taking care
+ * to not overlap the A/D type mask or the saved access bits of access-tracked
+ * SPTEs when A/D bits are disabled.
+ */
+#define EPT_SPTE_HOST_WRITABLE		BIT_ULL(57)
+#define EPT_SPTE_MMU_WRITABLE		BIT_ULL(58)
+
+static_assert(!(EPT_SPTE_HOST_WRITABLE & SPTE_TDP_AD_MASK));
+static_assert(!(EPT_SPTE_MMU_WRITABLE & SPTE_TDP_AD_MASK));
+static_assert(!(EPT_SPTE_HOST_WRITABLE & SHADOW_ACC_TRACK_SAVED_MASK));
+static_assert(!(EPT_SPTE_MMU_WRITABLE & SHADOW_ACC_TRACK_SAVED_MASK));
+
+/* Defined only to keep the above static asserts readable. */
+#undef SHADOW_ACC_TRACK_SAVED_MASK
+
+/*
+ * Due to limited space in PTEs, the MMIO generation is a 19 bit subset of
+ * the memslots generation and is derived as follows:
+ *
+ * Bits 0-7 of the MMIO generation are propagated to spte bits 3-10
+ * Bits 8-18 of the MMIO generation are propagated to spte bits 52-62
+ *
+ * The KVM_MEMSLOT_GEN_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS flag is intentionally not included in
+ * the MMIO generation number, as doing so would require stealing a bit from
+ * the "real" generation number and thus effectively halve the maximum number
+ * of MMIO generations that can be handled before encountering a wrap (which
+ * requires a full MMU zap).  The flag is instead explicitly queried when
+ * checking for MMIO spte cache hits.
+ */
+
+#define MMIO_SPTE_GEN_LOW_START		3
+#define MMIO_SPTE_GEN_LOW_END		10
+
+#define MMIO_SPTE_GEN_HIGH_START	52
+#define MMIO_SPTE_GEN_HIGH_END		62
+
+#define MMIO_SPTE_GEN_LOW_MASK		GENMASK_ULL(MMIO_SPTE_GEN_LOW_END, \
+						    MMIO_SPTE_GEN_LOW_START)
+#define MMIO_SPTE_GEN_HIGH_MASK		GENMASK_ULL(MMIO_SPTE_GEN_HIGH_END, \
+						    MMIO_SPTE_GEN_HIGH_START)
+static_assert(!(SPTE_MMU_PRESENT_MASK &
+		(MMIO_SPTE_GEN_LOW_MASK | MMIO_SPTE_GEN_HIGH_MASK)));
+
+/*
+ * The SPTE MMIO mask must NOT overlap the MMIO generation bits or the
+ * MMU-present bit.  The generation obviously co-exists with the magic MMIO
+ * mask/value, and MMIO SPTEs are considered !MMU-present.
+ *
+ * The SPTE MMIO mask is allowed to use hardware "present" bits (i.e. all EPT
+ * RWX bits), all physical address bits (legal PA bits are used for "fast" MMIO
+ * and so they're off-limits for generation; additional checks ensure the mask
+ * doesn't overlap legal PA bits), and bit 63 (carved out for future usage).
+ */
+#define SPTE_MMIO_ALLOWED_MASK (BIT_ULL(63) | GENMASK_ULL(51, 12) | GENMASK_ULL(2, 0))
+static_assert(!(SPTE_MMIO_ALLOWED_MASK &
+		(SPTE_MMU_PRESENT_MASK | MMIO_SPTE_GEN_LOW_MASK | MMIO_SPTE_GEN_HIGH_MASK)));
+
+#define MMIO_SPTE_GEN_LOW_BITS		(MMIO_SPTE_GEN_LOW_END - MMIO_SPTE_GEN_LOW_START + 1)
+#define MMIO_SPTE_GEN_HIGH_BITS		(MMIO_SPTE_GEN_HIGH_END - MMIO_SPTE_GEN_HIGH_START + 1)
+
+/* remember to adjust the comment above as well if you change these */
+static_assert(MMIO_SPTE_GEN_LOW_BITS == 8 && MMIO_SPTE_GEN_HIGH_BITS == 11);
+
+#define MMIO_SPTE_GEN_LOW_SHIFT		(MMIO_SPTE_GEN_LOW_START - 0)
+#define MMIO_SPTE_GEN_HIGH_SHIFT	(MMIO_SPTE_GEN_HIGH_START - MMIO_SPTE_GEN_LOW_BITS)
+
+#define MMIO_SPTE_GEN_MASK		GENMASK_ULL(MMIO_SPTE_GEN_LOW_BITS + MMIO_SPTE_GEN_HIGH_BITS - 1, 0)
+
+extern u64 __read_mostly shadow_host_writable_mask;
+extern u64 __read_mostly shadow_mmu_writable_mask;
+extern u64 __read_mostly shadow_nx_mask;
+extern u64 __read_mostly shadow_x_mask; /* mutual exclusive with nx_mask */
+extern u64 __read_mostly shadow_user_mask;
+extern u64 __read_mostly shadow_accessed_mask;
+extern u64 __read_mostly shadow_dirty_mask;
+extern u64 __read_mostly shadow_mmio_value;
+extern u64 __read_mostly shadow_mmio_mask;
+extern u64 __read_mostly shadow_mmio_access_mask;
+extern u64 __read_mostly shadow_present_mask;
+extern u64 __read_mostly shadow_memtype_mask;
+extern u64 __read_mostly shadow_me_value;
+extern u64 __read_mostly shadow_me_mask;
+
+/*
+ * SPTEs in MMUs without A/D bits are marked with SPTE_TDP_AD_DISABLED;
+ * shadow_acc_track_mask is the set of bits to be cleared in non-accessed
+ * pages.
+ */
+extern u64 __read_mostly shadow_acc_track_mask;
+
+/*
+ * This mask must be set on all non-zero Non-Present or Reserved SPTEs in order
+ * to guard against L1TF attacks.
+ */
+extern u64 __read_mostly shadow_nonpresent_or_rsvd_mask;
+
+/*
+ * The number of high-order 1 bits to use in the mask above.
+ */
+#define SHADOW_NONPRESENT_OR_RSVD_MASK_LEN 5
+
+/*
+ * If a thread running without exclusive control of the MMU lock must perform a
+ * multi-part operation on an SPTE, it can set the SPTE to REMOVED_SPTE as a
+ * non-present intermediate value. Other threads which encounter this value
+ * should not modify the SPTE.
+ *
+ * Use a semi-arbitrary value that doesn't set RWX bits, i.e. is not-present on
+ * both AMD and Intel CPUs, and doesn't set PFN bits, i.e. doesn't create a L1TF
+ * vulnerability.  Use only low bits to avoid 64-bit immediates.
+ *
+ * Only used by the TDP MMU.
+ */
+#define REMOVED_SPTE	0x5a0ULL
+
+/* Removed SPTEs must not be misconstrued as shadow present PTEs. */
+static_assert(!(REMOVED_SPTE & SPTE_MMU_PRESENT_MASK));
+
+static inline bool is_removed_spte(u64 spte)
+{
+	return spte == REMOVED_SPTE;
+}
+
+/* Get an SPTE's index into its parent's page table (and the spt array). */
+static inline int spte_index(u64 *sptep)
+{
+	return ((unsigned long)sptep / sizeof(*sptep)) & (SPTE_ENT_PER_PAGE - 1);
+}
+
+/*
+ * In some cases, we need to preserve the GFN of a non-present or reserved
+ * SPTE when we usurp the upper five bits of the physical address space to
+ * defend against L1TF, e.g. for MMIO SPTEs.  To preserve the GFN, we'll
+ * shift bits of the GFN that overlap with shadow_nonpresent_or_rsvd_mask
+ * left into the reserved bits, i.e. the GFN in the SPTE will be split into
+ * high and low parts.  This mask covers the lower bits of the GFN.
+ */
+extern u64 __read_mostly shadow_nonpresent_or_rsvd_lower_gfn_mask;
+
+static inline struct kvm_mmu_page *to_shadow_page(hpa_t shadow_page)
+{
+	struct page *page = pfn_to_page((shadow_page) >> PAGE_SHIFT);
+
+	return (struct kvm_mmu_page *)page_private(page);
+}
+
+static inline struct kvm_mmu_page *spte_to_child_sp(u64 spte)
+{
+	return to_shadow_page(spte & SPTE_BASE_ADDR_MASK);
+}
+
+static inline struct kvm_mmu_page *sptep_to_sp(u64 *sptep)
+{
+	return to_shadow_page(__pa(sptep));
+}
+
+static inline struct kvm_mmu_page *root_to_sp(hpa_t root)
+{
+	if (kvm_mmu_is_dummy_root(root))
+		return NULL;
+
+	/*
+	 * The "root" may be a special root, e.g. a PAE entry, treat it as a
+	 * SPTE to ensure any non-PA bits are dropped.
+	 */
+	return spte_to_child_sp(root);
+}
+
+static inline bool is_mmio_spte(u64 spte)
+{
+	return (spte & shadow_mmio_mask) == shadow_mmio_value &&
+	       likely(enable_mmio_caching);
+}
+
+static inline bool is_shadow_present_pte(u64 pte)
+{
+	return !!(pte & SPTE_MMU_PRESENT_MASK);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Returns true if A/D bits are supported in hardware and are enabled by KVM.
+ * When enabled, KVM uses A/D bits for all non-nested MMUs.  Because L1 can
+ * disable A/D bits in EPTP12, SP and SPTE variants are needed to handle the
+ * scenario where KVM is using A/D bits for L1, but not L2.
+ */
+static inline bool kvm_ad_enabled(void)
+{
+	return !!shadow_accessed_mask;
+}
+
+static inline bool sp_ad_disabled(struct kvm_mmu_page *sp)
+{
+	return sp->role.ad_disabled;
+}
+
+static inline bool spte_ad_enabled(u64 spte)
+{
+	KVM_MMU_WARN_ON(!is_shadow_present_pte(spte));
+	return (spte & SPTE_TDP_AD_MASK) != SPTE_TDP_AD_DISABLED;
+}
+
+static inline bool spte_ad_need_write_protect(u64 spte)
+{
+	KVM_MMU_WARN_ON(!is_shadow_present_pte(spte));
+	/*
+	 * This is benign for non-TDP SPTEs as SPTE_TDP_AD_ENABLED is '0',
+	 * and non-TDP SPTEs will never set these bits.  Optimize for 64-bit
+	 * TDP and do the A/D type check unconditionally.
+	 */
+	return (spte & SPTE_TDP_AD_MASK) != SPTE_TDP_AD_ENABLED;
+}
+
+static inline u64 spte_shadow_accessed_mask(u64 spte)
+{
+	KVM_MMU_WARN_ON(!is_shadow_present_pte(spte));
+	return spte_ad_enabled(spte) ? shadow_accessed_mask : 0;
+}
+
+static inline u64 spte_shadow_dirty_mask(u64 spte)
+{
+	KVM_MMU_WARN_ON(!is_shadow_present_pte(spte));
+	return spte_ad_enabled(spte) ? shadow_dirty_mask : 0;
+}
+
+static inline bool is_access_track_spte(u64 spte)
+{
+	return !spte_ad_enabled(spte) && (spte & shadow_acc_track_mask) == 0;
+}
+
+static inline bool is_large_pte(u64 pte)
+{
+	return pte & PT_PAGE_SIZE_MASK;
+}
+
+static inline bool is_last_spte(u64 pte, int level)
+{
+	return (level == PG_LEVEL_4K) || is_large_pte(pte);
+}
+
+static inline bool is_executable_pte(u64 spte)
+{
+	return (spte & (shadow_x_mask | shadow_nx_mask)) == shadow_x_mask;
+}
+
+static inline kvm_pfn_t spte_to_pfn(u64 pte)
+{
+	return (pte & SPTE_BASE_ADDR_MASK) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
+}
+
+static inline bool is_accessed_spte(u64 spte)
+{
+	u64 accessed_mask = spte_shadow_accessed_mask(spte);
+
+	return accessed_mask ? spte & accessed_mask
+			     : !is_access_track_spte(spte);
+}
+
+static inline bool is_dirty_spte(u64 spte)
+{
+	u64 dirty_mask = spte_shadow_dirty_mask(spte);
+
+	return dirty_mask ? spte & dirty_mask : spte & PT_WRITABLE_MASK;
+}
+
+static inline u64 get_rsvd_bits(struct rsvd_bits_validate *rsvd_check, u64 pte,
+				int level)
+{
+	int bit7 = (pte >> 7) & 1;
+
+	return rsvd_check->rsvd_bits_mask[bit7][level-1];
+}
+
+static inline bool __is_rsvd_bits_set(struct rsvd_bits_validate *rsvd_check,
+				      u64 pte, int level)
+{
+	return pte & get_rsvd_bits(rsvd_check, pte, level);
+}
+
+static inline bool __is_bad_mt_xwr(struct rsvd_bits_validate *rsvd_check,
+				   u64 pte)
+{
+	return rsvd_check->bad_mt_xwr & BIT_ULL(pte & 0x3f);
+}
+
+static __always_inline bool is_rsvd_spte(struct rsvd_bits_validate *rsvd_check,
+					 u64 spte, int level)
+{
+	return __is_bad_mt_xwr(rsvd_check, spte) ||
+	       __is_rsvd_bits_set(rsvd_check, spte, level);
+}
+
+/*
+ * A shadow-present leaf SPTE may be non-writable for 4 possible reasons:
+ *
+ *  1. To intercept writes for dirty logging. KVM write-protects huge pages
+ *     so that they can be split down into the dirty logging
+ *     granularity (4KiB) whenever the guest writes to them. KVM also
+ *     write-protects 4KiB pages so that writes can be recorded in the dirty log
+ *     (e.g. if not using PML). SPTEs are write-protected for dirty logging
+ *     during the VM-iotcls that enable dirty logging.
+ *
+ *  2. To intercept writes to guest page tables that KVM is shadowing. When a
+ *     guest writes to its page table the corresponding shadow page table will
+ *     be marked "unsync". That way KVM knows which shadow page tables need to
+ *     be updated on the next TLB flush, INVLPG, etc. and which do not.
+ *
+ *  3. To prevent guest writes to read-only memory, such as for memory in a
+ *     read-only memslot or guest memory backed by a read-only VMA. Writes to
+ *     such pages are disallowed entirely.
+ *
+ *  4. To emulate the Accessed bit for SPTEs without A/D bits.  Note, in this
+ *     case, the SPTE is access-protected, not just write-protected!
+ *
+ * For cases #1 and #4, KVM can safely make such SPTEs writable without taking
+ * mmu_lock as capturing the Accessed/Dirty state doesn't require taking it.
+ * To differentiate #1 and #4 from #2 and #3, KVM uses two software-only bits
+ * in the SPTE:
+ *
+ *  shadow_mmu_writable_mask, aka MMU-writable -
+ *    Cleared on SPTEs that KVM is currently write-protecting for shadow paging
+ *    purposes (case 2 above).
+ *
+ *  shadow_host_writable_mask, aka Host-writable -
+ *    Cleared on SPTEs that are not host-writable (case 3 above)
+ *
+ * Note, not all possible combinations of PT_WRITABLE_MASK,
+ * shadow_mmu_writable_mask, and shadow_host_writable_mask are valid. A given
+ * SPTE can be in only one of the following states, which map to the
+ * aforementioned 3 cases:
+ *
+ *   shadow_host_writable_mask | shadow_mmu_writable_mask | PT_WRITABLE_MASK
+ *   ------------------------- | ------------------------ | ----------------
+ *   1                         | 1                        | 1       (writable)
+ *   1                         | 1                        | 0       (case 1)
+ *   1                         | 0                        | 0       (case 2)
+ *   0                         | 0                        | 0       (case 3)
+ *
+ * The valid combinations of these bits are checked by
+ * check_spte_writable_invariants() whenever an SPTE is modified.
+ *
+ * Clearing the MMU-writable bit is always done under the MMU lock and always
+ * accompanied by a TLB flush before dropping the lock to avoid corrupting the
+ * shadow page tables between vCPUs. Write-protecting an SPTE for dirty logging
+ * (which does not clear the MMU-writable bit), does not flush TLBs before
+ * dropping the lock, as it only needs to synchronize guest writes with the
+ * dirty bitmap. Similarly, making the SPTE inaccessible (and non-writable) for
+ * access-tracking via the clear_young() MMU notifier also does not flush TLBs.
+ *
+ * So, there is the problem: clearing the MMU-writable bit can encounter a
+ * write-protected SPTE while CPUs still have writable mappings for that SPTE
+ * cached in their TLB. To address this, KVM always flushes TLBs when
+ * write-protecting SPTEs if the MMU-writable bit is set on the old SPTE.
+ *
+ * The Host-writable bit is not modified on present SPTEs, it is only set or
+ * cleared when an SPTE is first faulted in from non-present and then remains
+ * immutable.
+ */
+static inline bool is_writable_pte(unsigned long pte)
+{
+	return pte & PT_WRITABLE_MASK;
+}
+
+/* Note: spte must be a shadow-present leaf SPTE. */
+static inline void check_spte_writable_invariants(u64 spte)
+{
+	if (spte & shadow_mmu_writable_mask)
+		WARN_ONCE(!(spte & shadow_host_writable_mask),
+			  KBUILD_MODNAME ": MMU-writable SPTE is not Host-writable: %llx",
+			  spte);
+	else
+		WARN_ONCE(is_writable_pte(spte),
+			  KBUILD_MODNAME ": Writable SPTE is not MMU-writable: %llx", spte);
+}
+
+static inline bool is_mmu_writable_spte(u64 spte)
+{
+	return spte & shadow_mmu_writable_mask;
+}
+
+static inline u64 get_mmio_spte_generation(u64 spte)
+{
+	u64 gen;
+
+	gen = (spte & MMIO_SPTE_GEN_LOW_MASK) >> MMIO_SPTE_GEN_LOW_SHIFT;
+	gen |= (spte & MMIO_SPTE_GEN_HIGH_MASK) >> MMIO_SPTE_GEN_HIGH_SHIFT;
+	return gen;
+}
+
+bool spte_has_volatile_bits(u64 spte);
+
+bool make_spte(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_mmu_page *sp,
+	       const struct kvm_memory_slot *slot,
+	       unsigned int pte_access, gfn_t gfn, kvm_pfn_t pfn,
+	       u64 old_spte, bool prefetch, bool can_unsync,
+	       bool host_writable, u64 *new_spte);
+u64 make_huge_page_split_spte(struct kvm *kvm, u64 huge_spte,
+		      	      union kvm_mmu_page_role role, int index);
+u64 make_nonleaf_spte(u64 *child_pt, bool ad_disabled);
+u64 make_mmio_spte(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 gfn, unsigned int access);
+u64 mark_spte_for_access_track(u64 spte);
+
+/* Restore an acc-track PTE back to a regular PTE */
+static inline u64 restore_acc_track_spte(u64 spte)
+{
+	u64 saved_bits = (spte >> SHADOW_ACC_TRACK_SAVED_BITS_SHIFT)
+			 & SHADOW_ACC_TRACK_SAVED_BITS_MASK;
+
+	spte &= ~shadow_acc_track_mask;
+	spte &= ~(SHADOW_ACC_TRACK_SAVED_BITS_MASK <<
+		  SHADOW_ACC_TRACK_SAVED_BITS_SHIFT);
+	spte |= saved_bits;
+
+	return spte;
+}
+
+u64 kvm_mmu_changed_pte_notifier_make_spte(u64 old_spte, kvm_pfn_t new_pfn);
+
+void __init kvm_mmu_spte_module_init(void);
+void kvm_mmu_reset_all_pte_masks(void);
+
+#endif
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_iter.c b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_iter.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..bd30ebfb2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_iter.c
@@ -0,0 +1,177 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
+
+#include "mmu_internal.h"
+#include "tdp_iter.h"
+#include "spte.h"
+
+/*
+ * Recalculates the pointer to the SPTE for the current GFN and level and
+ * reread the SPTE.
+ */
+static void tdp_iter_refresh_sptep(struct tdp_iter *iter)
+{
+	iter->sptep = iter->pt_path[iter->level - 1] +
+		SPTE_INDEX(iter->gfn << PAGE_SHIFT, iter->level);
+	iter->old_spte = kvm_tdp_mmu_read_spte(iter->sptep);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Return the TDP iterator to the root PT and allow it to continue its
+ * traversal over the paging structure from there.
+ */
+void tdp_iter_restart(struct tdp_iter *iter)
+{
+	iter->yielded = false;
+	iter->yielded_gfn = iter->next_last_level_gfn;
+	iter->level = iter->root_level;
+
+	iter->gfn = gfn_round_for_level(iter->next_last_level_gfn, iter->level);
+	tdp_iter_refresh_sptep(iter);
+
+	iter->valid = true;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Sets a TDP iterator to walk a pre-order traversal of the paging structure
+ * rooted at root_pt, starting with the walk to translate next_last_level_gfn.
+ */
+void tdp_iter_start(struct tdp_iter *iter, struct kvm_mmu_page *root,
+		    int min_level, gfn_t next_last_level_gfn)
+{
+	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!root || (root->role.level < 1) ||
+			 (root->role.level > PT64_ROOT_MAX_LEVEL))) {
+		iter->valid = false;
+		return;
+	}
+
+	iter->next_last_level_gfn = next_last_level_gfn;
+	iter->root_level = root->role.level;
+	iter->min_level = min_level;
+	iter->pt_path[iter->root_level - 1] = (tdp_ptep_t)root->spt;
+	iter->as_id = kvm_mmu_page_as_id(root);
+
+	tdp_iter_restart(iter);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Given an SPTE and its level, returns a pointer containing the host virtual
+ * address of the child page table referenced by the SPTE. Returns null if
+ * there is no such entry.
+ */
+tdp_ptep_t spte_to_child_pt(u64 spte, int level)
+{
+	/*
+	 * There's no child entry if this entry isn't present or is a
+	 * last-level entry.
+	 */
+	if (!is_shadow_present_pte(spte) || is_last_spte(spte, level))
+		return NULL;
+
+	return (tdp_ptep_t)__va(spte_to_pfn(spte) << PAGE_SHIFT);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Steps down one level in the paging structure towards the goal GFN. Returns
+ * true if the iterator was able to step down a level, false otherwise.
+ */
+static bool try_step_down(struct tdp_iter *iter)
+{
+	tdp_ptep_t child_pt;
+
+	if (iter->level == iter->min_level)
+		return false;
+
+	/*
+	 * Reread the SPTE before stepping down to avoid traversing into page
+	 * tables that are no longer linked from this entry.
+	 */
+	iter->old_spte = kvm_tdp_mmu_read_spte(iter->sptep);
+
+	child_pt = spte_to_child_pt(iter->old_spte, iter->level);
+	if (!child_pt)
+		return false;
+
+	iter->level--;
+	iter->pt_path[iter->level - 1] = child_pt;
+	iter->gfn = gfn_round_for_level(iter->next_last_level_gfn, iter->level);
+	tdp_iter_refresh_sptep(iter);
+
+	return true;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Steps to the next entry in the current page table, at the current page table
+ * level. The next entry could point to a page backing guest memory or another
+ * page table, or it could be non-present. Returns true if the iterator was
+ * able to step to the next entry in the page table, false if the iterator was
+ * already at the end of the current page table.
+ */
+static bool try_step_side(struct tdp_iter *iter)
+{
+	/*
+	 * Check if the iterator is already at the end of the current page
+	 * table.
+	 */
+	if (SPTE_INDEX(iter->gfn << PAGE_SHIFT, iter->level) ==
+	    (SPTE_ENT_PER_PAGE - 1))
+		return false;
+
+	iter->gfn += KVM_PAGES_PER_HPAGE(iter->level);
+	iter->next_last_level_gfn = iter->gfn;
+	iter->sptep++;
+	iter->old_spte = kvm_tdp_mmu_read_spte(iter->sptep);
+
+	return true;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Tries to traverse back up a level in the paging structure so that the walk
+ * can continue from the next entry in the parent page table. Returns true on a
+ * successful step up, false if already in the root page.
+ */
+static bool try_step_up(struct tdp_iter *iter)
+{
+	if (iter->level == iter->root_level)
+		return false;
+
+	iter->level++;
+	iter->gfn = gfn_round_for_level(iter->gfn, iter->level);
+	tdp_iter_refresh_sptep(iter);
+
+	return true;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Step to the next SPTE in a pre-order traversal of the paging structure.
+ * To get to the next SPTE, the iterator either steps down towards the goal
+ * GFN, if at a present, non-last-level SPTE, or over to a SPTE mapping a
+ * highter GFN.
+ *
+ * The basic algorithm is as follows:
+ * 1. If the current SPTE is a non-last-level SPTE, step down into the page
+ *    table it points to.
+ * 2. If the iterator cannot step down, it will try to step to the next SPTE
+ *    in the current page of the paging structure.
+ * 3. If the iterator cannot step to the next entry in the current page, it will
+ *    try to step up to the parent paging structure page. In this case, that
+ *    SPTE will have already been visited, and so the iterator must also step
+ *    to the side again.
+ */
+void tdp_iter_next(struct tdp_iter *iter)
+{
+	if (iter->yielded) {
+		tdp_iter_restart(iter);
+		return;
+	}
+
+	if (try_step_down(iter))
+		return;
+
+	do {
+		if (try_step_side(iter))
+			return;
+	} while (try_step_up(iter));
+	iter->valid = false;
+}
+
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_iter.h b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_iter.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..fae559559
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_iter.h
@@ -0,0 +1,138 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+#ifndef __KVM_X86_MMU_TDP_ITER_H
+#define __KVM_X86_MMU_TDP_ITER_H
+
+#include <linux/kvm_host.h>
+
+#include "mmu.h"
+#include "spte.h"
+
+/*
+ * TDP MMU SPTEs are RCU protected to allow paging structures (non-leaf SPTEs)
+ * to be zapped while holding mmu_lock for read, and to allow TLB flushes to be
+ * batched without having to collect the list of zapped SPs.  Flows that can
+ * remove SPs must service pending TLB flushes prior to dropping RCU protection.
+ */
+static inline u64 kvm_tdp_mmu_read_spte(tdp_ptep_t sptep)
+{
+	return READ_ONCE(*rcu_dereference(sptep));
+}
+
+static inline u64 kvm_tdp_mmu_write_spte_atomic(tdp_ptep_t sptep, u64 new_spte)
+{
+	return xchg(rcu_dereference(sptep), new_spte);
+}
+
+static inline void __kvm_tdp_mmu_write_spte(tdp_ptep_t sptep, u64 new_spte)
+{
+	WRITE_ONCE(*rcu_dereference(sptep), new_spte);
+}
+
+/*
+ * SPTEs must be modified atomically if they are shadow-present, leaf
+ * SPTEs, and have volatile bits, i.e. has bits that can be set outside
+ * of mmu_lock.  The Writable bit can be set by KVM's fast page fault
+ * handler, and Accessed and Dirty bits can be set by the CPU.
+ *
+ * Note, non-leaf SPTEs do have Accessed bits and those bits are
+ * technically volatile, but KVM doesn't consume the Accessed bit of
+ * non-leaf SPTEs, i.e. KVM doesn't care if it clobbers the bit.  This
+ * logic needs to be reassessed if KVM were to use non-leaf Accessed
+ * bits, e.g. to skip stepping down into child SPTEs when aging SPTEs.
+ */
+static inline bool kvm_tdp_mmu_spte_need_atomic_write(u64 old_spte, int level)
+{
+	return is_shadow_present_pte(old_spte) &&
+	       is_last_spte(old_spte, level) &&
+	       spte_has_volatile_bits(old_spte);
+}
+
+static inline u64 kvm_tdp_mmu_write_spte(tdp_ptep_t sptep, u64 old_spte,
+					 u64 new_spte, int level)
+{
+	if (kvm_tdp_mmu_spte_need_atomic_write(old_spte, level))
+		return kvm_tdp_mmu_write_spte_atomic(sptep, new_spte);
+
+	__kvm_tdp_mmu_write_spte(sptep, new_spte);
+	return old_spte;
+}
+
+static inline u64 tdp_mmu_clear_spte_bits(tdp_ptep_t sptep, u64 old_spte,
+					  u64 mask, int level)
+{
+	atomic64_t *sptep_atomic;
+
+	if (kvm_tdp_mmu_spte_need_atomic_write(old_spte, level)) {
+		sptep_atomic = (atomic64_t *)rcu_dereference(sptep);
+		return (u64)atomic64_fetch_and(~mask, sptep_atomic);
+	}
+
+	__kvm_tdp_mmu_write_spte(sptep, old_spte & ~mask);
+	return old_spte;
+}
+
+/*
+ * A TDP iterator performs a pre-order walk over a TDP paging structure.
+ */
+struct tdp_iter {
+	/*
+	 * The iterator will traverse the paging structure towards the mapping
+	 * for this GFN.
+	 */
+	gfn_t next_last_level_gfn;
+	/*
+	 * The next_last_level_gfn at the time when the thread last
+	 * yielded. Only yielding when the next_last_level_gfn !=
+	 * yielded_gfn helps ensure forward progress.
+	 */
+	gfn_t yielded_gfn;
+	/* Pointers to the page tables traversed to reach the current SPTE */
+	tdp_ptep_t pt_path[PT64_ROOT_MAX_LEVEL];
+	/* A pointer to the current SPTE */
+	tdp_ptep_t sptep;
+	/* The lowest GFN mapped by the current SPTE */
+	gfn_t gfn;
+	/* The level of the root page given to the iterator */
+	int root_level;
+	/* The lowest level the iterator should traverse to */
+	int min_level;
+	/* The iterator's current level within the paging structure */
+	int level;
+	/* The address space ID, i.e. SMM vs. regular. */
+	int as_id;
+	/* A snapshot of the value at sptep */
+	u64 old_spte;
+	/*
+	 * Whether the iterator has a valid state. This will be false if the
+	 * iterator walks off the end of the paging structure.
+	 */
+	bool valid;
+	/*
+	 * True if KVM dropped mmu_lock and yielded in the middle of a walk, in
+	 * which case tdp_iter_next() needs to restart the walk at the root
+	 * level instead of advancing to the next entry.
+	 */
+	bool yielded;
+};
+
+/*
+ * Iterates over every SPTE mapping the GFN range [start, end) in a
+ * preorder traversal.
+ */
+#define for_each_tdp_pte_min_level(iter, root, min_level, start, end) \
+	for (tdp_iter_start(&iter, root, min_level, start); \
+	     iter.valid && iter.gfn < end;		     \
+	     tdp_iter_next(&iter))
+
+#define for_each_tdp_pte(iter, root, start, end) \
+	for_each_tdp_pte_min_level(iter, root, PG_LEVEL_4K, start, end)
+
+tdp_ptep_t spte_to_child_pt(u64 pte, int level);
+
+void tdp_iter_start(struct tdp_iter *iter, struct kvm_mmu_page *root,
+		    int min_level, gfn_t next_last_level_gfn);
+void tdp_iter_next(struct tdp_iter *iter);
+void tdp_iter_restart(struct tdp_iter *iter);
+
+#endif /* __KVM_X86_MMU_TDP_ITER_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..6cd4dd631
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1817 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
+
+#include "mmu.h"
+#include "mmu_internal.h"
+#include "mmutrace.h"
+#include "tdp_iter.h"
+#include "tdp_mmu.h"
+#include "spte.h"
+
+#include <asm/cmpxchg.h>
+#include <trace/events/kvm.h>
+
+/* Initializes the TDP MMU for the VM, if enabled. */
+void kvm_mmu_init_tdp_mmu(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&kvm->arch.tdp_mmu_roots);
+	spin_lock_init(&kvm->arch.tdp_mmu_pages_lock);
+}
+
+/* Arbitrarily returns true so that this may be used in if statements. */
+static __always_inline bool kvm_lockdep_assert_mmu_lock_held(struct kvm *kvm,
+							     bool shared)
+{
+	if (shared)
+		lockdep_assert_held_read(&kvm->mmu_lock);
+	else
+		lockdep_assert_held_write(&kvm->mmu_lock);
+
+	return true;
+}
+
+void kvm_mmu_uninit_tdp_mmu(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+	/*
+	 * Invalidate all roots, which besides the obvious, schedules all roots
+	 * for zapping and thus puts the TDP MMU's reference to each root, i.e.
+	 * ultimately frees all roots.
+	 */
+	kvm_tdp_mmu_invalidate_all_roots(kvm);
+	kvm_tdp_mmu_zap_invalidated_roots(kvm);
+
+	WARN_ON(atomic64_read(&kvm->arch.tdp_mmu_pages));
+	WARN_ON(!list_empty(&kvm->arch.tdp_mmu_roots));
+
+	/*
+	 * Ensure that all the outstanding RCU callbacks to free shadow pages
+	 * can run before the VM is torn down.  Putting the last reference to
+	 * zapped roots will create new callbacks.
+	 */
+	rcu_barrier();
+}
+
+static void tdp_mmu_free_sp(struct kvm_mmu_page *sp)
+{
+	free_page((unsigned long)sp->spt);
+	kmem_cache_free(mmu_page_header_cache, sp);
+}
+
+/*
+ * This is called through call_rcu in order to free TDP page table memory
+ * safely with respect to other kernel threads that may be operating on
+ * the memory.
+ * By only accessing TDP MMU page table memory in an RCU read critical
+ * section, and freeing it after a grace period, lockless access to that
+ * memory won't use it after it is freed.
+ */
+static void tdp_mmu_free_sp_rcu_callback(struct rcu_head *head)
+{
+	struct kvm_mmu_page *sp = container_of(head, struct kvm_mmu_page,
+					       rcu_head);
+
+	tdp_mmu_free_sp(sp);
+}
+
+void kvm_tdp_mmu_put_root(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_mmu_page *root,
+			  bool shared)
+{
+	kvm_lockdep_assert_mmu_lock_held(kvm, shared);
+
+	if (!refcount_dec_and_test(&root->tdp_mmu_root_count))
+		return;
+
+	/*
+	 * The TDP MMU itself holds a reference to each root until the root is
+	 * explicitly invalidated, i.e. the final reference should be never be
+	 * put for a valid root.
+	 */
+	KVM_BUG_ON(!is_tdp_mmu_page(root) || !root->role.invalid, kvm);
+
+	spin_lock(&kvm->arch.tdp_mmu_pages_lock);
+	list_del_rcu(&root->link);
+	spin_unlock(&kvm->arch.tdp_mmu_pages_lock);
+	call_rcu(&root->rcu_head, tdp_mmu_free_sp_rcu_callback);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Returns the next root after @prev_root (or the first root if @prev_root is
+ * NULL).  A reference to the returned root is acquired, and the reference to
+ * @prev_root is released (the caller obviously must hold a reference to
+ * @prev_root if it's non-NULL).
+ *
+ * If @only_valid is true, invalid roots are skipped.
+ *
+ * Returns NULL if the end of tdp_mmu_roots was reached.
+ */
+static struct kvm_mmu_page *tdp_mmu_next_root(struct kvm *kvm,
+					      struct kvm_mmu_page *prev_root,
+					      bool shared, bool only_valid)
+{
+	struct kvm_mmu_page *next_root;
+
+	rcu_read_lock();
+
+	if (prev_root)
+		next_root = list_next_or_null_rcu(&kvm->arch.tdp_mmu_roots,
+						  &prev_root->link,
+						  typeof(*prev_root), link);
+	else
+		next_root = list_first_or_null_rcu(&kvm->arch.tdp_mmu_roots,
+						   typeof(*next_root), link);
+
+	while (next_root) {
+		if ((!only_valid || !next_root->role.invalid) &&
+		    kvm_tdp_mmu_get_root(next_root))
+			break;
+
+		next_root = list_next_or_null_rcu(&kvm->arch.tdp_mmu_roots,
+				&next_root->link, typeof(*next_root), link);
+	}
+
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+
+	if (prev_root)
+		kvm_tdp_mmu_put_root(kvm, prev_root, shared);
+
+	return next_root;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Note: this iterator gets and puts references to the roots it iterates over.
+ * This makes it safe to release the MMU lock and yield within the loop, but
+ * if exiting the loop early, the caller must drop the reference to the most
+ * recent root. (Unless keeping a live reference is desirable.)
+ *
+ * If shared is set, this function is operating under the MMU lock in read
+ * mode. In the unlikely event that this thread must free a root, the lock
+ * will be temporarily dropped and reacquired in write mode.
+ */
+#define __for_each_tdp_mmu_root_yield_safe(_kvm, _root, _as_id, _shared, _only_valid)\
+	for (_root = tdp_mmu_next_root(_kvm, NULL, _shared, _only_valid);	\
+	     _root;								\
+	     _root = tdp_mmu_next_root(_kvm, _root, _shared, _only_valid))	\
+		if (kvm_lockdep_assert_mmu_lock_held(_kvm, _shared) &&		\
+		    kvm_mmu_page_as_id(_root) != _as_id) {			\
+		} else
+
+#define for_each_valid_tdp_mmu_root_yield_safe(_kvm, _root, _as_id, _shared)	\
+	__for_each_tdp_mmu_root_yield_safe(_kvm, _root, _as_id, _shared, true)
+
+#define for_each_tdp_mmu_root_yield_safe(_kvm, _root, _shared)			\
+	for (_root = tdp_mmu_next_root(_kvm, NULL, _shared, false);		\
+	     _root;								\
+	     _root = tdp_mmu_next_root(_kvm, _root, _shared, false))		\
+		if (!kvm_lockdep_assert_mmu_lock_held(_kvm, _shared)) {		\
+		} else
+
+/*
+ * Iterate over all TDP MMU roots.  Requires that mmu_lock be held for write,
+ * the implication being that any flow that holds mmu_lock for read is
+ * inherently yield-friendly and should use the yield-safe variant above.
+ * Holding mmu_lock for write obviates the need for RCU protection as the list
+ * is guaranteed to be stable.
+ */
+#define for_each_tdp_mmu_root(_kvm, _root, _as_id)			\
+	list_for_each_entry(_root, &_kvm->arch.tdp_mmu_roots, link)	\
+		if (kvm_lockdep_assert_mmu_lock_held(_kvm, false) &&	\
+		    kvm_mmu_page_as_id(_root) != _as_id) {		\
+		} else
+
+static struct kvm_mmu_page *tdp_mmu_alloc_sp(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct kvm_mmu_page *sp;
+
+	sp = kvm_mmu_memory_cache_alloc(&vcpu->arch.mmu_page_header_cache);
+	sp->spt = kvm_mmu_memory_cache_alloc(&vcpu->arch.mmu_shadow_page_cache);
+
+	return sp;
+}
+
+static void tdp_mmu_init_sp(struct kvm_mmu_page *sp, tdp_ptep_t sptep,
+			    gfn_t gfn, union kvm_mmu_page_role role)
+{
+	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sp->possible_nx_huge_page_link);
+
+	set_page_private(virt_to_page(sp->spt), (unsigned long)sp);
+
+	sp->role = role;
+	sp->gfn = gfn;
+	sp->ptep = sptep;
+	sp->tdp_mmu_page = true;
+
+	trace_kvm_mmu_get_page(sp, true);
+}
+
+static void tdp_mmu_init_child_sp(struct kvm_mmu_page *child_sp,
+				  struct tdp_iter *iter)
+{
+	struct kvm_mmu_page *parent_sp;
+	union kvm_mmu_page_role role;
+
+	parent_sp = sptep_to_sp(rcu_dereference(iter->sptep));
+
+	role = parent_sp->role;
+	role.level--;
+
+	tdp_mmu_init_sp(child_sp, iter->sptep, iter->gfn, role);
+}
+
+hpa_t kvm_tdp_mmu_get_vcpu_root_hpa(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	union kvm_mmu_page_role role = vcpu->arch.mmu->root_role;
+	struct kvm *kvm = vcpu->kvm;
+	struct kvm_mmu_page *root;
+
+	lockdep_assert_held_write(&kvm->mmu_lock);
+
+	/*
+	 * Check for an existing root before allocating a new one.  Note, the
+	 * role check prevents consuming an invalid root.
+	 */
+	for_each_tdp_mmu_root(kvm, root, kvm_mmu_role_as_id(role)) {
+		if (root->role.word == role.word &&
+		    kvm_tdp_mmu_get_root(root))
+			goto out;
+	}
+
+	root = tdp_mmu_alloc_sp(vcpu);
+	tdp_mmu_init_sp(root, NULL, 0, role);
+
+	/*
+	 * TDP MMU roots are kept until they are explicitly invalidated, either
+	 * by a memslot update or by the destruction of the VM.  Initialize the
+	 * refcount to two; one reference for the vCPU, and one reference for
+	 * the TDP MMU itself, which is held until the root is invalidated and
+	 * is ultimately put by kvm_tdp_mmu_zap_invalidated_roots().
+	 */
+	refcount_set(&root->tdp_mmu_root_count, 2);
+
+	spin_lock(&kvm->arch.tdp_mmu_pages_lock);
+	list_add_rcu(&root->link, &kvm->arch.tdp_mmu_roots);
+	spin_unlock(&kvm->arch.tdp_mmu_pages_lock);
+
+out:
+	return __pa(root->spt);
+}
+
+static void handle_changed_spte(struct kvm *kvm, int as_id, gfn_t gfn,
+				u64 old_spte, u64 new_spte, int level,
+				bool shared);
+
+static void tdp_account_mmu_page(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_mmu_page *sp)
+{
+	kvm_account_pgtable_pages((void *)sp->spt, +1);
+	atomic64_inc(&kvm->arch.tdp_mmu_pages);
+}
+
+static void tdp_unaccount_mmu_page(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_mmu_page *sp)
+{
+	kvm_account_pgtable_pages((void *)sp->spt, -1);
+	atomic64_dec(&kvm->arch.tdp_mmu_pages);
+}
+
+/**
+ * tdp_mmu_unlink_sp() - Remove a shadow page from the list of used pages
+ *
+ * @kvm: kvm instance
+ * @sp: the page to be removed
+ * @shared: This operation may not be running under the exclusive use of
+ *	    the MMU lock and the operation must synchronize with other
+ *	    threads that might be adding or removing pages.
+ */
+static void tdp_mmu_unlink_sp(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_mmu_page *sp,
+			      bool shared)
+{
+	tdp_unaccount_mmu_page(kvm, sp);
+
+	if (!sp->nx_huge_page_disallowed)
+		return;
+
+	if (shared)
+		spin_lock(&kvm->arch.tdp_mmu_pages_lock);
+	else
+		lockdep_assert_held_write(&kvm->mmu_lock);
+
+	sp->nx_huge_page_disallowed = false;
+	untrack_possible_nx_huge_page(kvm, sp);
+
+	if (shared)
+		spin_unlock(&kvm->arch.tdp_mmu_pages_lock);
+}
+
+/**
+ * handle_removed_pt() - handle a page table removed from the TDP structure
+ *
+ * @kvm: kvm instance
+ * @pt: the page removed from the paging structure
+ * @shared: This operation may not be running under the exclusive use
+ *	    of the MMU lock and the operation must synchronize with other
+ *	    threads that might be modifying SPTEs.
+ *
+ * Given a page table that has been removed from the TDP paging structure,
+ * iterates through the page table to clear SPTEs and free child page tables.
+ *
+ * Note that pt is passed in as a tdp_ptep_t, but it does not need RCU
+ * protection. Since this thread removed it from the paging structure,
+ * this thread will be responsible for ensuring the page is freed. Hence the
+ * early rcu_dereferences in the function.
+ */
+static void handle_removed_pt(struct kvm *kvm, tdp_ptep_t pt, bool shared)
+{
+	struct kvm_mmu_page *sp = sptep_to_sp(rcu_dereference(pt));
+	int level = sp->role.level;
+	gfn_t base_gfn = sp->gfn;
+	int i;
+
+	trace_kvm_mmu_prepare_zap_page(sp);
+
+	tdp_mmu_unlink_sp(kvm, sp, shared);
+
+	for (i = 0; i < SPTE_ENT_PER_PAGE; i++) {
+		tdp_ptep_t sptep = pt + i;
+		gfn_t gfn = base_gfn + i * KVM_PAGES_PER_HPAGE(level);
+		u64 old_spte;
+
+		if (shared) {
+			/*
+			 * Set the SPTE to a nonpresent value that other
+			 * threads will not overwrite. If the SPTE was
+			 * already marked as removed then another thread
+			 * handling a page fault could overwrite it, so
+			 * set the SPTE until it is set from some other
+			 * value to the removed SPTE value.
+			 */
+			for (;;) {
+				old_spte = kvm_tdp_mmu_write_spte_atomic(sptep, REMOVED_SPTE);
+				if (!is_removed_spte(old_spte))
+					break;
+				cpu_relax();
+			}
+		} else {
+			/*
+			 * If the SPTE is not MMU-present, there is no backing
+			 * page associated with the SPTE and so no side effects
+			 * that need to be recorded, and exclusive ownership of
+			 * mmu_lock ensures the SPTE can't be made present.
+			 * Note, zapping MMIO SPTEs is also unnecessary as they
+			 * are guarded by the memslots generation, not by being
+			 * unreachable.
+			 */
+			old_spte = kvm_tdp_mmu_read_spte(sptep);
+			if (!is_shadow_present_pte(old_spte))
+				continue;
+
+			/*
+			 * Use the common helper instead of a raw WRITE_ONCE as
+			 * the SPTE needs to be updated atomically if it can be
+			 * modified by a different vCPU outside of mmu_lock.
+			 * Even though the parent SPTE is !PRESENT, the TLB
+			 * hasn't yet been flushed, and both Intel and AMD
+			 * document that A/D assists can use upper-level PxE
+			 * entries that are cached in the TLB, i.e. the CPU can
+			 * still access the page and mark it dirty.
+			 *
+			 * No retry is needed in the atomic update path as the
+			 * sole concern is dropping a Dirty bit, i.e. no other
+			 * task can zap/remove the SPTE as mmu_lock is held for
+			 * write.  Marking the SPTE as a removed SPTE is not
+			 * strictly necessary for the same reason, but using
+			 * the remove SPTE value keeps the shared/exclusive
+			 * paths consistent and allows the handle_changed_spte()
+			 * call below to hardcode the new value to REMOVED_SPTE.
+			 *
+			 * Note, even though dropping a Dirty bit is the only
+			 * scenario where a non-atomic update could result in a
+			 * functional bug, simply checking the Dirty bit isn't
+			 * sufficient as a fast page fault could read the upper
+			 * level SPTE before it is zapped, and then make this
+			 * target SPTE writable, resume the guest, and set the
+			 * Dirty bit between reading the SPTE above and writing
+			 * it here.
+			 */
+			old_spte = kvm_tdp_mmu_write_spte(sptep, old_spte,
+							  REMOVED_SPTE, level);
+		}
+		handle_changed_spte(kvm, kvm_mmu_page_as_id(sp), gfn,
+				    old_spte, REMOVED_SPTE, level, shared);
+	}
+
+	call_rcu(&sp->rcu_head, tdp_mmu_free_sp_rcu_callback);
+}
+
+/**
+ * handle_changed_spte - handle bookkeeping associated with an SPTE change
+ * @kvm: kvm instance
+ * @as_id: the address space of the paging structure the SPTE was a part of
+ * @gfn: the base GFN that was mapped by the SPTE
+ * @old_spte: The value of the SPTE before the change
+ * @new_spte: The value of the SPTE after the change
+ * @level: the level of the PT the SPTE is part of in the paging structure
+ * @shared: This operation may not be running under the exclusive use of
+ *	    the MMU lock and the operation must synchronize with other
+ *	    threads that might be modifying SPTEs.
+ *
+ * Handle bookkeeping that might result from the modification of a SPTE.  Note,
+ * dirty logging updates are handled in common code, not here (see make_spte()
+ * and fast_pf_fix_direct_spte()).
+ */
+static void handle_changed_spte(struct kvm *kvm, int as_id, gfn_t gfn,
+				u64 old_spte, u64 new_spte, int level,
+				bool shared)
+{
+	bool was_present = is_shadow_present_pte(old_spte);
+	bool is_present = is_shadow_present_pte(new_spte);
+	bool was_leaf = was_present && is_last_spte(old_spte, level);
+	bool is_leaf = is_present && is_last_spte(new_spte, level);
+	bool pfn_changed = spte_to_pfn(old_spte) != spte_to_pfn(new_spte);
+
+	WARN_ON_ONCE(level > PT64_ROOT_MAX_LEVEL);
+	WARN_ON_ONCE(level < PG_LEVEL_4K);
+	WARN_ON_ONCE(gfn & (KVM_PAGES_PER_HPAGE(level) - 1));
+
+	/*
+	 * If this warning were to trigger it would indicate that there was a
+	 * missing MMU notifier or a race with some notifier handler.
+	 * A present, leaf SPTE should never be directly replaced with another
+	 * present leaf SPTE pointing to a different PFN. A notifier handler
+	 * should be zapping the SPTE before the main MM's page table is
+	 * changed, or the SPTE should be zeroed, and the TLBs flushed by the
+	 * thread before replacement.
+	 */
+	if (was_leaf && is_leaf && pfn_changed) {
+		pr_err("Invalid SPTE change: cannot replace a present leaf\n"
+		       "SPTE with another present leaf SPTE mapping a\n"
+		       "different PFN!\n"
+		       "as_id: %d gfn: %llx old_spte: %llx new_spte: %llx level: %d",
+		       as_id, gfn, old_spte, new_spte, level);
+
+		/*
+		 * Crash the host to prevent error propagation and guest data
+		 * corruption.
+		 */
+		BUG();
+	}
+
+	if (old_spte == new_spte)
+		return;
+
+	trace_kvm_tdp_mmu_spte_changed(as_id, gfn, level, old_spte, new_spte);
+
+	if (is_leaf)
+		check_spte_writable_invariants(new_spte);
+
+	/*
+	 * The only times a SPTE should be changed from a non-present to
+	 * non-present state is when an MMIO entry is installed/modified/
+	 * removed. In that case, there is nothing to do here.
+	 */
+	if (!was_present && !is_present) {
+		/*
+		 * If this change does not involve a MMIO SPTE or removed SPTE,
+		 * it is unexpected. Log the change, though it should not
+		 * impact the guest since both the former and current SPTEs
+		 * are nonpresent.
+		 */
+		if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!is_mmio_spte(old_spte) &&
+				 !is_mmio_spte(new_spte) &&
+				 !is_removed_spte(new_spte)))
+			pr_err("Unexpected SPTE change! Nonpresent SPTEs\n"
+			       "should not be replaced with another,\n"
+			       "different nonpresent SPTE, unless one or both\n"
+			       "are MMIO SPTEs, or the new SPTE is\n"
+			       "a temporary removed SPTE.\n"
+			       "as_id: %d gfn: %llx old_spte: %llx new_spte: %llx level: %d",
+			       as_id, gfn, old_spte, new_spte, level);
+		return;
+	}
+
+	if (is_leaf != was_leaf)
+		kvm_update_page_stats(kvm, level, is_leaf ? 1 : -1);
+
+	if (was_leaf && is_dirty_spte(old_spte) &&
+	    (!is_present || !is_dirty_spte(new_spte) || pfn_changed))
+		kvm_set_pfn_dirty(spte_to_pfn(old_spte));
+
+	/*
+	 * Recursively handle child PTs if the change removed a subtree from
+	 * the paging structure.  Note the WARN on the PFN changing without the
+	 * SPTE being converted to a hugepage (leaf) or being zapped.  Shadow
+	 * pages are kernel allocations and should never be migrated.
+	 */
+	if (was_present && !was_leaf &&
+	    (is_leaf || !is_present || WARN_ON_ONCE(pfn_changed)))
+		handle_removed_pt(kvm, spte_to_child_pt(old_spte, level), shared);
+
+	if (was_leaf && is_accessed_spte(old_spte) &&
+	    (!is_present || !is_accessed_spte(new_spte) || pfn_changed))
+		kvm_set_pfn_accessed(spte_to_pfn(old_spte));
+}
+
+/*
+ * tdp_mmu_set_spte_atomic - Set a TDP MMU SPTE atomically
+ * and handle the associated bookkeeping.  Do not mark the page dirty
+ * in KVM's dirty bitmaps.
+ *
+ * If setting the SPTE fails because it has changed, iter->old_spte will be
+ * refreshed to the current value of the spte.
+ *
+ * @kvm: kvm instance
+ * @iter: a tdp_iter instance currently on the SPTE that should be set
+ * @new_spte: The value the SPTE should be set to
+ * Return:
+ * * 0      - If the SPTE was set.
+ * * -EBUSY - If the SPTE cannot be set. In this case this function will have
+ *            no side-effects other than setting iter->old_spte to the last
+ *            known value of the spte.
+ */
+static inline int tdp_mmu_set_spte_atomic(struct kvm *kvm,
+					  struct tdp_iter *iter,
+					  u64 new_spte)
+{
+	u64 *sptep = rcu_dereference(iter->sptep);
+
+	/*
+	 * The caller is responsible for ensuring the old SPTE is not a REMOVED
+	 * SPTE.  KVM should never attempt to zap or manipulate a REMOVED SPTE,
+	 * and pre-checking before inserting a new SPTE is advantageous as it
+	 * avoids unnecessary work.
+	 */
+	WARN_ON_ONCE(iter->yielded || is_removed_spte(iter->old_spte));
+
+	lockdep_assert_held_read(&kvm->mmu_lock);
+
+	/*
+	 * Note, fast_pf_fix_direct_spte() can also modify TDP MMU SPTEs and
+	 * does not hold the mmu_lock.  On failure, i.e. if a different logical
+	 * CPU modified the SPTE, try_cmpxchg64() updates iter->old_spte with
+	 * the current value, so the caller operates on fresh data, e.g. if it
+	 * retries tdp_mmu_set_spte_atomic()
+	 */
+	if (!try_cmpxchg64(sptep, &iter->old_spte, new_spte))
+		return -EBUSY;
+
+	handle_changed_spte(kvm, iter->as_id, iter->gfn, iter->old_spte,
+			    new_spte, iter->level, true);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static inline int tdp_mmu_zap_spte_atomic(struct kvm *kvm,
+					  struct tdp_iter *iter)
+{
+	int ret;
+
+	/*
+	 * Freeze the SPTE by setting it to a special,
+	 * non-present value. This will stop other threads from
+	 * immediately installing a present entry in its place
+	 * before the TLBs are flushed.
+	 */
+	ret = tdp_mmu_set_spte_atomic(kvm, iter, REMOVED_SPTE);
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+
+	kvm_flush_remote_tlbs_gfn(kvm, iter->gfn, iter->level);
+
+	/*
+	 * No other thread can overwrite the removed SPTE as they must either
+	 * wait on the MMU lock or use tdp_mmu_set_spte_atomic() which will not
+	 * overwrite the special removed SPTE value. No bookkeeping is needed
+	 * here since the SPTE is going from non-present to non-present.  Use
+	 * the raw write helper to avoid an unnecessary check on volatile bits.
+	 */
+	__kvm_tdp_mmu_write_spte(iter->sptep, 0);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * tdp_mmu_set_spte - Set a TDP MMU SPTE and handle the associated bookkeeping
+ * @kvm:	      KVM instance
+ * @as_id:	      Address space ID, i.e. regular vs. SMM
+ * @sptep:	      Pointer to the SPTE
+ * @old_spte:	      The current value of the SPTE
+ * @new_spte:	      The new value that will be set for the SPTE
+ * @gfn:	      The base GFN that was (or will be) mapped by the SPTE
+ * @level:	      The level _containing_ the SPTE (its parent PT's level)
+ *
+ * Returns the old SPTE value, which _may_ be different than @old_spte if the
+ * SPTE had voldatile bits.
+ */
+static u64 tdp_mmu_set_spte(struct kvm *kvm, int as_id, tdp_ptep_t sptep,
+			    u64 old_spte, u64 new_spte, gfn_t gfn, int level)
+{
+	lockdep_assert_held_write(&kvm->mmu_lock);
+
+	/*
+	 * No thread should be using this function to set SPTEs to or from the
+	 * temporary removed SPTE value.
+	 * If operating under the MMU lock in read mode, tdp_mmu_set_spte_atomic
+	 * should be used. If operating under the MMU lock in write mode, the
+	 * use of the removed SPTE should not be necessary.
+	 */
+	WARN_ON_ONCE(is_removed_spte(old_spte) || is_removed_spte(new_spte));
+
+	old_spte = kvm_tdp_mmu_write_spte(sptep, old_spte, new_spte, level);
+
+	handle_changed_spte(kvm, as_id, gfn, old_spte, new_spte, level, false);
+	return old_spte;
+}
+
+static inline void tdp_mmu_iter_set_spte(struct kvm *kvm, struct tdp_iter *iter,
+					 u64 new_spte)
+{
+	WARN_ON_ONCE(iter->yielded);
+	iter->old_spte = tdp_mmu_set_spte(kvm, iter->as_id, iter->sptep,
+					  iter->old_spte, new_spte,
+					  iter->gfn, iter->level);
+}
+
+#define tdp_root_for_each_pte(_iter, _root, _start, _end) \
+	for_each_tdp_pte(_iter, _root, _start, _end)
+
+#define tdp_root_for_each_leaf_pte(_iter, _root, _start, _end)	\
+	tdp_root_for_each_pte(_iter, _root, _start, _end)		\
+		if (!is_shadow_present_pte(_iter.old_spte) ||		\
+		    !is_last_spte(_iter.old_spte, _iter.level))		\
+			continue;					\
+		else
+
+#define tdp_mmu_for_each_pte(_iter, _mmu, _start, _end)		\
+	for_each_tdp_pte(_iter, root_to_sp(_mmu->root.hpa), _start, _end)
+
+/*
+ * Yield if the MMU lock is contended or this thread needs to return control
+ * to the scheduler.
+ *
+ * If this function should yield and flush is set, it will perform a remote
+ * TLB flush before yielding.
+ *
+ * If this function yields, iter->yielded is set and the caller must skip to
+ * the next iteration, where tdp_iter_next() will reset the tdp_iter's walk
+ * over the paging structures to allow the iterator to continue its traversal
+ * from the paging structure root.
+ *
+ * Returns true if this function yielded.
+ */
+static inline bool __must_check tdp_mmu_iter_cond_resched(struct kvm *kvm,
+							  struct tdp_iter *iter,
+							  bool flush, bool shared)
+{
+	WARN_ON_ONCE(iter->yielded);
+
+	/* Ensure forward progress has been made before yielding. */
+	if (iter->next_last_level_gfn == iter->yielded_gfn)
+		return false;
+
+	if (need_resched() || rwlock_needbreak(&kvm->mmu_lock)) {
+		if (flush)
+			kvm_flush_remote_tlbs(kvm);
+
+		rcu_read_unlock();
+
+		if (shared)
+			cond_resched_rwlock_read(&kvm->mmu_lock);
+		else
+			cond_resched_rwlock_write(&kvm->mmu_lock);
+
+		rcu_read_lock();
+
+		WARN_ON_ONCE(iter->gfn > iter->next_last_level_gfn);
+
+		iter->yielded = true;
+	}
+
+	return iter->yielded;
+}
+
+static inline gfn_t tdp_mmu_max_gfn_exclusive(void)
+{
+	/*
+	 * Bound TDP MMU walks at host.MAXPHYADDR.  KVM disallows memslots with
+	 * a gpa range that would exceed the max gfn, and KVM does not create
+	 * MMIO SPTEs for "impossible" gfns, instead sending such accesses down
+	 * the slow emulation path every time.
+	 */
+	return kvm_mmu_max_gfn() + 1;
+}
+
+static void __tdp_mmu_zap_root(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_mmu_page *root,
+			       bool shared, int zap_level)
+{
+	struct tdp_iter iter;
+
+	gfn_t end = tdp_mmu_max_gfn_exclusive();
+	gfn_t start = 0;
+
+	for_each_tdp_pte_min_level(iter, root, zap_level, start, end) {
+retry:
+		if (tdp_mmu_iter_cond_resched(kvm, &iter, false, shared))
+			continue;
+
+		if (!is_shadow_present_pte(iter.old_spte))
+			continue;
+
+		if (iter.level > zap_level)
+			continue;
+
+		if (!shared)
+			tdp_mmu_iter_set_spte(kvm, &iter, 0);
+		else if (tdp_mmu_set_spte_atomic(kvm, &iter, 0))
+			goto retry;
+	}
+}
+
+static void tdp_mmu_zap_root(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_mmu_page *root,
+			     bool shared)
+{
+
+	/*
+	 * The root must have an elevated refcount so that it's reachable via
+	 * mmu_notifier callbacks, which allows this path to yield and drop
+	 * mmu_lock.  When handling an unmap/release mmu_notifier command, KVM
+	 * must drop all references to relevant pages prior to completing the
+	 * callback.  Dropping mmu_lock with an unreachable root would result
+	 * in zapping SPTEs after a relevant mmu_notifier callback completes
+	 * and lead to use-after-free as zapping a SPTE triggers "writeback" of
+	 * dirty accessed bits to the SPTE's associated struct page.
+	 */
+	WARN_ON_ONCE(!refcount_read(&root->tdp_mmu_root_count));
+
+	kvm_lockdep_assert_mmu_lock_held(kvm, shared);
+
+	rcu_read_lock();
+
+	/*
+	 * To avoid RCU stalls due to recursively removing huge swaths of SPs,
+	 * split the zap into two passes.  On the first pass, zap at the 1gb
+	 * level, and then zap top-level SPs on the second pass.  "1gb" is not
+	 * arbitrary, as KVM must be able to zap a 1gb shadow page without
+	 * inducing a stall to allow in-place replacement with a 1gb hugepage.
+	 *
+	 * Because zapping a SP recurses on its children, stepping down to
+	 * PG_LEVEL_4K in the iterator itself is unnecessary.
+	 */
+	__tdp_mmu_zap_root(kvm, root, shared, PG_LEVEL_1G);
+	__tdp_mmu_zap_root(kvm, root, shared, root->role.level);
+
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+}
+
+bool kvm_tdp_mmu_zap_sp(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_mmu_page *sp)
+{
+	u64 old_spte;
+
+	/*
+	 * This helper intentionally doesn't allow zapping a root shadow page,
+	 * which doesn't have a parent page table and thus no associated entry.
+	 */
+	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!sp->ptep))
+		return false;
+
+	old_spte = kvm_tdp_mmu_read_spte(sp->ptep);
+	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!is_shadow_present_pte(old_spte)))
+		return false;
+
+	tdp_mmu_set_spte(kvm, kvm_mmu_page_as_id(sp), sp->ptep, old_spte, 0,
+			 sp->gfn, sp->role.level + 1);
+
+	return true;
+}
+
+/*
+ * If can_yield is true, will release the MMU lock and reschedule if the
+ * scheduler needs the CPU or there is contention on the MMU lock. If this
+ * function cannot yield, it will not release the MMU lock or reschedule and
+ * the caller must ensure it does not supply too large a GFN range, or the
+ * operation can cause a soft lockup.
+ */
+static bool tdp_mmu_zap_leafs(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_mmu_page *root,
+			      gfn_t start, gfn_t end, bool can_yield, bool flush)
+{
+	struct tdp_iter iter;
+
+	end = min(end, tdp_mmu_max_gfn_exclusive());
+
+	lockdep_assert_held_write(&kvm->mmu_lock);
+
+	rcu_read_lock();
+
+	for_each_tdp_pte_min_level(iter, root, PG_LEVEL_4K, start, end) {
+		if (can_yield &&
+		    tdp_mmu_iter_cond_resched(kvm, &iter, flush, false)) {
+			flush = false;
+			continue;
+		}
+
+		if (!is_shadow_present_pte(iter.old_spte) ||
+		    !is_last_spte(iter.old_spte, iter.level))
+			continue;
+
+		tdp_mmu_iter_set_spte(kvm, &iter, 0);
+		flush = true;
+	}
+
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+
+	/*
+	 * Because this flow zaps _only_ leaf SPTEs, the caller doesn't need
+	 * to provide RCU protection as no 'struct kvm_mmu_page' will be freed.
+	 */
+	return flush;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Zap leaf SPTEs for the range of gfns, [start, end), for all roots. Returns
+ * true if a TLB flush is needed before releasing the MMU lock, i.e. if one or
+ * more SPTEs were zapped since the MMU lock was last acquired.
+ */
+bool kvm_tdp_mmu_zap_leafs(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t start, gfn_t end, bool flush)
+{
+	struct kvm_mmu_page *root;
+
+	for_each_tdp_mmu_root_yield_safe(kvm, root, false)
+		flush = tdp_mmu_zap_leafs(kvm, root, start, end, true, flush);
+
+	return flush;
+}
+
+void kvm_tdp_mmu_zap_all(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+	struct kvm_mmu_page *root;
+
+	/*
+	 * Zap all roots, including invalid roots, as all SPTEs must be dropped
+	 * before returning to the caller.  Zap directly even if the root is
+	 * also being zapped by a worker.  Walking zapped top-level SPTEs isn't
+	 * all that expensive and mmu_lock is already held, which means the
+	 * worker has yielded, i.e. flushing the work instead of zapping here
+	 * isn't guaranteed to be any faster.
+	 *
+	 * A TLB flush is unnecessary, KVM zaps everything if and only the VM
+	 * is being destroyed or the userspace VMM has exited.  In both cases,
+	 * KVM_RUN is unreachable, i.e. no vCPUs will ever service the request.
+	 */
+	for_each_tdp_mmu_root_yield_safe(kvm, root, false)
+		tdp_mmu_zap_root(kvm, root, false);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Zap all invalidated roots to ensure all SPTEs are dropped before the "fast
+ * zap" completes.
+ */
+void kvm_tdp_mmu_zap_invalidated_roots(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+	struct kvm_mmu_page *root;
+
+	read_lock(&kvm->mmu_lock);
+
+	for_each_tdp_mmu_root_yield_safe(kvm, root, true) {
+		if (!root->tdp_mmu_scheduled_root_to_zap)
+			continue;
+
+		root->tdp_mmu_scheduled_root_to_zap = false;
+		KVM_BUG_ON(!root->role.invalid, kvm);
+
+		/*
+		 * A TLB flush is not necessary as KVM performs a local TLB
+		 * flush when allocating a new root (see kvm_mmu_load()), and
+		 * when migrating a vCPU to a different pCPU.  Note, the local
+		 * TLB flush on reuse also invalidates paging-structure-cache
+		 * entries, i.e. TLB entries for intermediate paging structures,
+		 * that may be zapped, as such entries are associated with the
+		 * ASID on both VMX and SVM.
+		 */
+		tdp_mmu_zap_root(kvm, root, true);
+
+		/*
+		 * The referenced needs to be put *after* zapping the root, as
+		 * the root must be reachable by mmu_notifiers while it's being
+		 * zapped
+		 */
+		kvm_tdp_mmu_put_root(kvm, root, true);
+	}
+
+	read_unlock(&kvm->mmu_lock);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Mark each TDP MMU root as invalid to prevent vCPUs from reusing a root that
+ * is about to be zapped, e.g. in response to a memslots update.  The actual
+ * zapping is done separately so that it happens with mmu_lock with read,
+ * whereas invalidating roots must be done with mmu_lock held for write (unless
+ * the VM is being destroyed).
+ *
+ * Note, kvm_tdp_mmu_zap_invalidated_roots() is gifted the TDP MMU's reference.
+ * See kvm_tdp_mmu_get_vcpu_root_hpa().
+ */
+void kvm_tdp_mmu_invalidate_all_roots(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+	struct kvm_mmu_page *root;
+
+	/*
+	 * mmu_lock must be held for write to ensure that a root doesn't become
+	 * invalid while there are active readers (invalidating a root while
+	 * there are active readers may or may not be problematic in practice,
+	 * but it's uncharted territory and not supported).
+	 *
+	 * Waive the assertion if there are no users of @kvm, i.e. the VM is
+	 * being destroyed after all references have been put, or if no vCPUs
+	 * have been created (which means there are no roots), i.e. the VM is
+	 * being destroyed in an error path of KVM_CREATE_VM.
+	 */
+	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PROVE_LOCKING) &&
+	    refcount_read(&kvm->users_count) && kvm->created_vcpus)
+		lockdep_assert_held_write(&kvm->mmu_lock);
+
+	/*
+	 * As above, mmu_lock isn't held when destroying the VM!  There can't
+	 * be other references to @kvm, i.e. nothing else can invalidate roots
+	 * or get/put references to roots.
+	 */
+	list_for_each_entry(root, &kvm->arch.tdp_mmu_roots, link) {
+		/*
+		 * Note, invalid roots can outlive a memslot update!  Invalid
+		 * roots must be *zapped* before the memslot update completes,
+		 * but a different task can acquire a reference and keep the
+		 * root alive after its been zapped.
+		 */
+		if (!root->role.invalid) {
+			root->tdp_mmu_scheduled_root_to_zap = true;
+			root->role.invalid = true;
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+/*
+ * Installs a last-level SPTE to handle a TDP page fault.
+ * (NPT/EPT violation/misconfiguration)
+ */
+static int tdp_mmu_map_handle_target_level(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+					  struct kvm_page_fault *fault,
+					  struct tdp_iter *iter)
+{
+	struct kvm_mmu_page *sp = sptep_to_sp(rcu_dereference(iter->sptep));
+	u64 new_spte;
+	int ret = RET_PF_FIXED;
+	bool wrprot = false;
+
+	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(sp->role.level != fault->goal_level))
+		return RET_PF_RETRY;
+
+	if (unlikely(!fault->slot))
+		new_spte = make_mmio_spte(vcpu, iter->gfn, ACC_ALL);
+	else
+		wrprot = make_spte(vcpu, sp, fault->slot, ACC_ALL, iter->gfn,
+					 fault->pfn, iter->old_spte, fault->prefetch, true,
+					 fault->map_writable, &new_spte);
+
+	if (new_spte == iter->old_spte)
+		ret = RET_PF_SPURIOUS;
+	else if (tdp_mmu_set_spte_atomic(vcpu->kvm, iter, new_spte))
+		return RET_PF_RETRY;
+	else if (is_shadow_present_pte(iter->old_spte) &&
+		 !is_last_spte(iter->old_spte, iter->level))
+		kvm_flush_remote_tlbs_gfn(vcpu->kvm, iter->gfn, iter->level);
+
+	/*
+	 * If the page fault was caused by a write but the page is write
+	 * protected, emulation is needed. If the emulation was skipped,
+	 * the vCPU would have the same fault again.
+	 */
+	if (wrprot) {
+		if (fault->write)
+			ret = RET_PF_EMULATE;
+	}
+
+	/* If a MMIO SPTE is installed, the MMIO will need to be emulated. */
+	if (unlikely(is_mmio_spte(new_spte))) {
+		vcpu->stat.pf_mmio_spte_created++;
+		trace_mark_mmio_spte(rcu_dereference(iter->sptep), iter->gfn,
+				     new_spte);
+		ret = RET_PF_EMULATE;
+	} else {
+		trace_kvm_mmu_set_spte(iter->level, iter->gfn,
+				       rcu_dereference(iter->sptep));
+	}
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * tdp_mmu_link_sp - Replace the given spte with an spte pointing to the
+ * provided page table.
+ *
+ * @kvm: kvm instance
+ * @iter: a tdp_iter instance currently on the SPTE that should be set
+ * @sp: The new TDP page table to install.
+ * @shared: This operation is running under the MMU lock in read mode.
+ *
+ * Returns: 0 if the new page table was installed. Non-0 if the page table
+ *          could not be installed (e.g. the atomic compare-exchange failed).
+ */
+static int tdp_mmu_link_sp(struct kvm *kvm, struct tdp_iter *iter,
+			   struct kvm_mmu_page *sp, bool shared)
+{
+	u64 spte = make_nonleaf_spte(sp->spt, !kvm_ad_enabled());
+	int ret = 0;
+
+	if (shared) {
+		ret = tdp_mmu_set_spte_atomic(kvm, iter, spte);
+		if (ret)
+			return ret;
+	} else {
+		tdp_mmu_iter_set_spte(kvm, iter, spte);
+	}
+
+	tdp_account_mmu_page(kvm, sp);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int tdp_mmu_split_huge_page(struct kvm *kvm, struct tdp_iter *iter,
+				   struct kvm_mmu_page *sp, bool shared);
+
+/*
+ * Handle a TDP page fault (NPT/EPT violation/misconfiguration) by installing
+ * page tables and SPTEs to translate the faulting guest physical address.
+ */
+int kvm_tdp_mmu_map(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_page_fault *fault)
+{
+	struct kvm_mmu *mmu = vcpu->arch.mmu;
+	struct kvm *kvm = vcpu->kvm;
+	struct tdp_iter iter;
+	struct kvm_mmu_page *sp;
+	int ret = RET_PF_RETRY;
+
+	kvm_mmu_hugepage_adjust(vcpu, fault);
+
+	trace_kvm_mmu_spte_requested(fault);
+
+	rcu_read_lock();
+
+	tdp_mmu_for_each_pte(iter, mmu, fault->gfn, fault->gfn + 1) {
+		int r;
+
+		if (fault->nx_huge_page_workaround_enabled)
+			disallowed_hugepage_adjust(fault, iter.old_spte, iter.level);
+
+		/*
+		 * If SPTE has been frozen by another thread, just give up and
+		 * retry, avoiding unnecessary page table allocation and free.
+		 */
+		if (is_removed_spte(iter.old_spte))
+			goto retry;
+
+		if (iter.level == fault->goal_level)
+			goto map_target_level;
+
+		/* Step down into the lower level page table if it exists. */
+		if (is_shadow_present_pte(iter.old_spte) &&
+		    !is_large_pte(iter.old_spte))
+			continue;
+
+		/*
+		 * The SPTE is either non-present or points to a huge page that
+		 * needs to be split.
+		 */
+		sp = tdp_mmu_alloc_sp(vcpu);
+		tdp_mmu_init_child_sp(sp, &iter);
+
+		sp->nx_huge_page_disallowed = fault->huge_page_disallowed;
+
+		if (is_shadow_present_pte(iter.old_spte))
+			r = tdp_mmu_split_huge_page(kvm, &iter, sp, true);
+		else
+			r = tdp_mmu_link_sp(kvm, &iter, sp, true);
+
+		/*
+		 * Force the guest to retry if installing an upper level SPTE
+		 * failed, e.g. because a different task modified the SPTE.
+		 */
+		if (r) {
+			tdp_mmu_free_sp(sp);
+			goto retry;
+		}
+
+		if (fault->huge_page_disallowed &&
+		    fault->req_level >= iter.level) {
+			spin_lock(&kvm->arch.tdp_mmu_pages_lock);
+			if (sp->nx_huge_page_disallowed)
+				track_possible_nx_huge_page(kvm, sp);
+			spin_unlock(&kvm->arch.tdp_mmu_pages_lock);
+		}
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * The walk aborted before reaching the target level, e.g. because the
+	 * iterator detected an upper level SPTE was frozen during traversal.
+	 */
+	WARN_ON_ONCE(iter.level == fault->goal_level);
+	goto retry;
+
+map_target_level:
+	ret = tdp_mmu_map_handle_target_level(vcpu, fault, &iter);
+
+retry:
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+	return ret;
+}
+
+bool kvm_tdp_mmu_unmap_gfn_range(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_gfn_range *range,
+				 bool flush)
+{
+	struct kvm_mmu_page *root;
+
+	__for_each_tdp_mmu_root_yield_safe(kvm, root, range->slot->as_id, false, false)
+		flush = tdp_mmu_zap_leafs(kvm, root, range->start, range->end,
+					  range->may_block, flush);
+
+	return flush;
+}
+
+typedef bool (*tdp_handler_t)(struct kvm *kvm, struct tdp_iter *iter,
+			      struct kvm_gfn_range *range);
+
+static __always_inline bool kvm_tdp_mmu_handle_gfn(struct kvm *kvm,
+						   struct kvm_gfn_range *range,
+						   tdp_handler_t handler)
+{
+	struct kvm_mmu_page *root;
+	struct tdp_iter iter;
+	bool ret = false;
+
+	/*
+	 * Don't support rescheduling, none of the MMU notifiers that funnel
+	 * into this helper allow blocking; it'd be dead, wasteful code.
+	 */
+	for_each_tdp_mmu_root(kvm, root, range->slot->as_id) {
+		rcu_read_lock();
+
+		tdp_root_for_each_leaf_pte(iter, root, range->start, range->end)
+			ret |= handler(kvm, &iter, range);
+
+		rcu_read_unlock();
+	}
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Mark the SPTEs range of GFNs [start, end) unaccessed and return non-zero
+ * if any of the GFNs in the range have been accessed.
+ *
+ * No need to mark the corresponding PFN as accessed as this call is coming
+ * from the clear_young() or clear_flush_young() notifier, which uses the
+ * return value to determine if the page has been accessed.
+ */
+static bool age_gfn_range(struct kvm *kvm, struct tdp_iter *iter,
+			  struct kvm_gfn_range *range)
+{
+	u64 new_spte;
+
+	/* If we have a non-accessed entry we don't need to change the pte. */
+	if (!is_accessed_spte(iter->old_spte))
+		return false;
+
+	if (spte_ad_enabled(iter->old_spte)) {
+		iter->old_spte = tdp_mmu_clear_spte_bits(iter->sptep,
+							 iter->old_spte,
+							 shadow_accessed_mask,
+							 iter->level);
+		new_spte = iter->old_spte & ~shadow_accessed_mask;
+	} else {
+		/*
+		 * Capture the dirty status of the page, so that it doesn't get
+		 * lost when the SPTE is marked for access tracking.
+		 */
+		if (is_writable_pte(iter->old_spte))
+			kvm_set_pfn_dirty(spte_to_pfn(iter->old_spte));
+
+		new_spte = mark_spte_for_access_track(iter->old_spte);
+		iter->old_spte = kvm_tdp_mmu_write_spte(iter->sptep,
+							iter->old_spte, new_spte,
+							iter->level);
+	}
+
+	trace_kvm_tdp_mmu_spte_changed(iter->as_id, iter->gfn, iter->level,
+				       iter->old_spte, new_spte);
+	return true;
+}
+
+bool kvm_tdp_mmu_age_gfn_range(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_gfn_range *range)
+{
+	return kvm_tdp_mmu_handle_gfn(kvm, range, age_gfn_range);
+}
+
+static bool test_age_gfn(struct kvm *kvm, struct tdp_iter *iter,
+			 struct kvm_gfn_range *range)
+{
+	return is_accessed_spte(iter->old_spte);
+}
+
+bool kvm_tdp_mmu_test_age_gfn(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_gfn_range *range)
+{
+	return kvm_tdp_mmu_handle_gfn(kvm, range, test_age_gfn);
+}
+
+static bool set_spte_gfn(struct kvm *kvm, struct tdp_iter *iter,
+			 struct kvm_gfn_range *range)
+{
+	u64 new_spte;
+
+	/* Huge pages aren't expected to be modified without first being zapped. */
+	WARN_ON_ONCE(pte_huge(range->arg.pte) || range->start + 1 != range->end);
+
+	if (iter->level != PG_LEVEL_4K ||
+	    !is_shadow_present_pte(iter->old_spte))
+		return false;
+
+	/*
+	 * Note, when changing a read-only SPTE, it's not strictly necessary to
+	 * zero the SPTE before setting the new PFN, but doing so preserves the
+	 * invariant that the PFN of a present * leaf SPTE can never change.
+	 * See handle_changed_spte().
+	 */
+	tdp_mmu_iter_set_spte(kvm, iter, 0);
+
+	if (!pte_write(range->arg.pte)) {
+		new_spte = kvm_mmu_changed_pte_notifier_make_spte(iter->old_spte,
+								  pte_pfn(range->arg.pte));
+
+		tdp_mmu_iter_set_spte(kvm, iter, new_spte);
+	}
+
+	return true;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Handle the changed_pte MMU notifier for the TDP MMU.
+ * data is a pointer to the new pte_t mapping the HVA specified by the MMU
+ * notifier.
+ * Returns non-zero if a flush is needed before releasing the MMU lock.
+ */
+bool kvm_tdp_mmu_set_spte_gfn(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_gfn_range *range)
+{
+	/*
+	 * No need to handle the remote TLB flush under RCU protection, the
+	 * target SPTE _must_ be a leaf SPTE, i.e. cannot result in freeing a
+	 * shadow page. See the WARN on pfn_changed in handle_changed_spte().
+	 */
+	return kvm_tdp_mmu_handle_gfn(kvm, range, set_spte_gfn);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Remove write access from all SPTEs at or above min_level that map GFNs
+ * [start, end). Returns true if an SPTE has been changed and the TLBs need to
+ * be flushed.
+ */
+static bool wrprot_gfn_range(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_mmu_page *root,
+			     gfn_t start, gfn_t end, int min_level)
+{
+	struct tdp_iter iter;
+	u64 new_spte;
+	bool spte_set = false;
+
+	rcu_read_lock();
+
+	BUG_ON(min_level > KVM_MAX_HUGEPAGE_LEVEL);
+
+	for_each_tdp_pte_min_level(iter, root, min_level, start, end) {
+retry:
+		if (tdp_mmu_iter_cond_resched(kvm, &iter, false, true))
+			continue;
+
+		if (!is_shadow_present_pte(iter.old_spte) ||
+		    !is_last_spte(iter.old_spte, iter.level) ||
+		    !(iter.old_spte & PT_WRITABLE_MASK))
+			continue;
+
+		new_spte = iter.old_spte & ~PT_WRITABLE_MASK;
+
+		if (tdp_mmu_set_spte_atomic(kvm, &iter, new_spte))
+			goto retry;
+
+		spte_set = true;
+	}
+
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+	return spte_set;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Remove write access from all the SPTEs mapping GFNs in the memslot. Will
+ * only affect leaf SPTEs down to min_level.
+ * Returns true if an SPTE has been changed and the TLBs need to be flushed.
+ */
+bool kvm_tdp_mmu_wrprot_slot(struct kvm *kvm,
+			     const struct kvm_memory_slot *slot, int min_level)
+{
+	struct kvm_mmu_page *root;
+	bool spte_set = false;
+
+	lockdep_assert_held_read(&kvm->mmu_lock);
+
+	for_each_valid_tdp_mmu_root_yield_safe(kvm, root, slot->as_id, true)
+		spte_set |= wrprot_gfn_range(kvm, root, slot->base_gfn,
+			     slot->base_gfn + slot->npages, min_level);
+
+	return spte_set;
+}
+
+static struct kvm_mmu_page *__tdp_mmu_alloc_sp_for_split(gfp_t gfp)
+{
+	struct kvm_mmu_page *sp;
+
+	gfp |= __GFP_ZERO;
+
+	sp = kmem_cache_alloc(mmu_page_header_cache, gfp);
+	if (!sp)
+		return NULL;
+
+	sp->spt = (void *)__get_free_page(gfp);
+	if (!sp->spt) {
+		kmem_cache_free(mmu_page_header_cache, sp);
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	return sp;
+}
+
+static struct kvm_mmu_page *tdp_mmu_alloc_sp_for_split(struct kvm *kvm,
+						       struct tdp_iter *iter,
+						       bool shared)
+{
+	struct kvm_mmu_page *sp;
+
+	/*
+	 * Since we are allocating while under the MMU lock we have to be
+	 * careful about GFP flags. Use GFP_NOWAIT to avoid blocking on direct
+	 * reclaim and to avoid making any filesystem callbacks (which can end
+	 * up invoking KVM MMU notifiers, resulting in a deadlock).
+	 *
+	 * If this allocation fails we drop the lock and retry with reclaim
+	 * allowed.
+	 */
+	sp = __tdp_mmu_alloc_sp_for_split(GFP_NOWAIT | __GFP_ACCOUNT);
+	if (sp)
+		return sp;
+
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+
+	if (shared)
+		read_unlock(&kvm->mmu_lock);
+	else
+		write_unlock(&kvm->mmu_lock);
+
+	iter->yielded = true;
+	sp = __tdp_mmu_alloc_sp_for_split(GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
+
+	if (shared)
+		read_lock(&kvm->mmu_lock);
+	else
+		write_lock(&kvm->mmu_lock);
+
+	rcu_read_lock();
+
+	return sp;
+}
+
+/* Note, the caller is responsible for initializing @sp. */
+static int tdp_mmu_split_huge_page(struct kvm *kvm, struct tdp_iter *iter,
+				   struct kvm_mmu_page *sp, bool shared)
+{
+	const u64 huge_spte = iter->old_spte;
+	const int level = iter->level;
+	int ret, i;
+
+	/*
+	 * No need for atomics when writing to sp->spt since the page table has
+	 * not been linked in yet and thus is not reachable from any other CPU.
+	 */
+	for (i = 0; i < SPTE_ENT_PER_PAGE; i++)
+		sp->spt[i] = make_huge_page_split_spte(kvm, huge_spte, sp->role, i);
+
+	/*
+	 * Replace the huge spte with a pointer to the populated lower level
+	 * page table. Since we are making this change without a TLB flush vCPUs
+	 * will see a mix of the split mappings and the original huge mapping,
+	 * depending on what's currently in their TLB. This is fine from a
+	 * correctness standpoint since the translation will be the same either
+	 * way.
+	 */
+	ret = tdp_mmu_link_sp(kvm, iter, sp, shared);
+	if (ret)
+		goto out;
+
+	/*
+	 * tdp_mmu_link_sp_atomic() will handle subtracting the huge page we
+	 * are overwriting from the page stats. But we have to manually update
+	 * the page stats with the new present child pages.
+	 */
+	kvm_update_page_stats(kvm, level - 1, SPTE_ENT_PER_PAGE);
+
+out:
+	trace_kvm_mmu_split_huge_page(iter->gfn, huge_spte, level, ret);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int tdp_mmu_split_huge_pages_root(struct kvm *kvm,
+					 struct kvm_mmu_page *root,
+					 gfn_t start, gfn_t end,
+					 int target_level, bool shared)
+{
+	struct kvm_mmu_page *sp = NULL;
+	struct tdp_iter iter;
+	int ret = 0;
+
+	rcu_read_lock();
+
+	/*
+	 * Traverse the page table splitting all huge pages above the target
+	 * level into one lower level. For example, if we encounter a 1GB page
+	 * we split it into 512 2MB pages.
+	 *
+	 * Since the TDP iterator uses a pre-order traversal, we are guaranteed
+	 * to visit an SPTE before ever visiting its children, which means we
+	 * will correctly recursively split huge pages that are more than one
+	 * level above the target level (e.g. splitting a 1GB to 512 2MB pages,
+	 * and then splitting each of those to 512 4KB pages).
+	 */
+	for_each_tdp_pte_min_level(iter, root, target_level + 1, start, end) {
+retry:
+		if (tdp_mmu_iter_cond_resched(kvm, &iter, false, shared))
+			continue;
+
+		if (!is_shadow_present_pte(iter.old_spte) || !is_large_pte(iter.old_spte))
+			continue;
+
+		if (!sp) {
+			sp = tdp_mmu_alloc_sp_for_split(kvm, &iter, shared);
+			if (!sp) {
+				ret = -ENOMEM;
+				trace_kvm_mmu_split_huge_page(iter.gfn,
+							      iter.old_spte,
+							      iter.level, ret);
+				break;
+			}
+
+			if (iter.yielded)
+				continue;
+		}
+
+		tdp_mmu_init_child_sp(sp, &iter);
+
+		if (tdp_mmu_split_huge_page(kvm, &iter, sp, shared))
+			goto retry;
+
+		sp = NULL;
+	}
+
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+
+	/*
+	 * It's possible to exit the loop having never used the last sp if, for
+	 * example, a vCPU doing HugePage NX splitting wins the race and
+	 * installs its own sp in place of the last sp we tried to split.
+	 */
+	if (sp)
+		tdp_mmu_free_sp(sp);
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * Try to split all huge pages mapped by the TDP MMU down to the target level.
+ */
+void kvm_tdp_mmu_try_split_huge_pages(struct kvm *kvm,
+				      const struct kvm_memory_slot *slot,
+				      gfn_t start, gfn_t end,
+				      int target_level, bool shared)
+{
+	struct kvm_mmu_page *root;
+	int r = 0;
+
+	kvm_lockdep_assert_mmu_lock_held(kvm, shared);
+
+	for_each_valid_tdp_mmu_root_yield_safe(kvm, root, slot->as_id, shared) {
+		r = tdp_mmu_split_huge_pages_root(kvm, root, start, end, target_level, shared);
+		if (r) {
+			kvm_tdp_mmu_put_root(kvm, root, shared);
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+/*
+ * Clear the dirty status of all the SPTEs mapping GFNs in the memslot. If
+ * AD bits are enabled, this will involve clearing the dirty bit on each SPTE.
+ * If AD bits are not enabled, this will require clearing the writable bit on
+ * each SPTE. Returns true if an SPTE has been changed and the TLBs need to
+ * be flushed.
+ */
+static bool clear_dirty_gfn_range(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_mmu_page *root,
+			   gfn_t start, gfn_t end)
+{
+	u64 dbit = kvm_ad_enabled() ? shadow_dirty_mask : PT_WRITABLE_MASK;
+	struct tdp_iter iter;
+	bool spte_set = false;
+
+	rcu_read_lock();
+
+	tdp_root_for_each_leaf_pte(iter, root, start, end) {
+retry:
+		if (tdp_mmu_iter_cond_resched(kvm, &iter, false, true))
+			continue;
+
+		if (!is_shadow_present_pte(iter.old_spte))
+			continue;
+
+		KVM_MMU_WARN_ON(kvm_ad_enabled() &&
+				spte_ad_need_write_protect(iter.old_spte));
+
+		if (!(iter.old_spte & dbit))
+			continue;
+
+		if (tdp_mmu_set_spte_atomic(kvm, &iter, iter.old_spte & ~dbit))
+			goto retry;
+
+		spte_set = true;
+	}
+
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+	return spte_set;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Clear the dirty status of all the SPTEs mapping GFNs in the memslot. If
+ * AD bits are enabled, this will involve clearing the dirty bit on each SPTE.
+ * If AD bits are not enabled, this will require clearing the writable bit on
+ * each SPTE. Returns true if an SPTE has been changed and the TLBs need to
+ * be flushed.
+ */
+bool kvm_tdp_mmu_clear_dirty_slot(struct kvm *kvm,
+				  const struct kvm_memory_slot *slot)
+{
+	struct kvm_mmu_page *root;
+	bool spte_set = false;
+
+	lockdep_assert_held_read(&kvm->mmu_lock);
+
+	for_each_valid_tdp_mmu_root_yield_safe(kvm, root, slot->as_id, true)
+		spte_set |= clear_dirty_gfn_range(kvm, root, slot->base_gfn,
+				slot->base_gfn + slot->npages);
+
+	return spte_set;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Clears the dirty status of all the 4k SPTEs mapping GFNs for which a bit is
+ * set in mask, starting at gfn. The given memslot is expected to contain all
+ * the GFNs represented by set bits in the mask. If AD bits are enabled,
+ * clearing the dirty status will involve clearing the dirty bit on each SPTE
+ * or, if AD bits are not enabled, clearing the writable bit on each SPTE.
+ */
+static void clear_dirty_pt_masked(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_mmu_page *root,
+				  gfn_t gfn, unsigned long mask, bool wrprot)
+{
+	u64 dbit = (wrprot || !kvm_ad_enabled()) ? PT_WRITABLE_MASK :
+						   shadow_dirty_mask;
+	struct tdp_iter iter;
+
+	lockdep_assert_held_write(&kvm->mmu_lock);
+
+	rcu_read_lock();
+
+	tdp_root_for_each_leaf_pte(iter, root, gfn + __ffs(mask),
+				    gfn + BITS_PER_LONG) {
+		if (!mask)
+			break;
+
+		KVM_MMU_WARN_ON(kvm_ad_enabled() &&
+				spte_ad_need_write_protect(iter.old_spte));
+
+		if (iter.level > PG_LEVEL_4K ||
+		    !(mask & (1UL << (iter.gfn - gfn))))
+			continue;
+
+		mask &= ~(1UL << (iter.gfn - gfn));
+
+		if (!(iter.old_spte & dbit))
+			continue;
+
+		iter.old_spte = tdp_mmu_clear_spte_bits(iter.sptep,
+							iter.old_spte, dbit,
+							iter.level);
+
+		trace_kvm_tdp_mmu_spte_changed(iter.as_id, iter.gfn, iter.level,
+					       iter.old_spte,
+					       iter.old_spte & ~dbit);
+		kvm_set_pfn_dirty(spte_to_pfn(iter.old_spte));
+	}
+
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+}
+
+/*
+ * Clears the dirty status of all the 4k SPTEs mapping GFNs for which a bit is
+ * set in mask, starting at gfn. The given memslot is expected to contain all
+ * the GFNs represented by set bits in the mask. If AD bits are enabled,
+ * clearing the dirty status will involve clearing the dirty bit on each SPTE
+ * or, if AD bits are not enabled, clearing the writable bit on each SPTE.
+ */
+void kvm_tdp_mmu_clear_dirty_pt_masked(struct kvm *kvm,
+				       struct kvm_memory_slot *slot,
+				       gfn_t gfn, unsigned long mask,
+				       bool wrprot)
+{
+	struct kvm_mmu_page *root;
+
+	for_each_tdp_mmu_root(kvm, root, slot->as_id)
+		clear_dirty_pt_masked(kvm, root, gfn, mask, wrprot);
+}
+
+static void zap_collapsible_spte_range(struct kvm *kvm,
+				       struct kvm_mmu_page *root,
+				       const struct kvm_memory_slot *slot)
+{
+	gfn_t start = slot->base_gfn;
+	gfn_t end = start + slot->npages;
+	struct tdp_iter iter;
+	int max_mapping_level;
+
+	rcu_read_lock();
+
+	for_each_tdp_pte_min_level(iter, root, PG_LEVEL_2M, start, end) {
+retry:
+		if (tdp_mmu_iter_cond_resched(kvm, &iter, false, true))
+			continue;
+
+		if (iter.level > KVM_MAX_HUGEPAGE_LEVEL ||
+		    !is_shadow_present_pte(iter.old_spte))
+			continue;
+
+		/*
+		 * Don't zap leaf SPTEs, if a leaf SPTE could be replaced with
+		 * a large page size, then its parent would have been zapped
+		 * instead of stepping down.
+		 */
+		if (is_last_spte(iter.old_spte, iter.level))
+			continue;
+
+		/*
+		 * If iter.gfn resides outside of the slot, i.e. the page for
+		 * the current level overlaps but is not contained by the slot,
+		 * then the SPTE can't be made huge.  More importantly, trying
+		 * to query that info from slot->arch.lpage_info will cause an
+		 * out-of-bounds access.
+		 */
+		if (iter.gfn < start || iter.gfn >= end)
+			continue;
+
+		max_mapping_level = kvm_mmu_max_mapping_level(kvm, slot,
+							      iter.gfn, PG_LEVEL_NUM);
+		if (max_mapping_level < iter.level)
+			continue;
+
+		/* Note, a successful atomic zap also does a remote TLB flush. */
+		if (tdp_mmu_zap_spte_atomic(kvm, &iter))
+			goto retry;
+	}
+
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+}
+
+/*
+ * Zap non-leaf SPTEs (and free their associated page tables) which could
+ * be replaced by huge pages, for GFNs within the slot.
+ */
+void kvm_tdp_mmu_zap_collapsible_sptes(struct kvm *kvm,
+				       const struct kvm_memory_slot *slot)
+{
+	struct kvm_mmu_page *root;
+
+	lockdep_assert_held_read(&kvm->mmu_lock);
+
+	for_each_valid_tdp_mmu_root_yield_safe(kvm, root, slot->as_id, true)
+		zap_collapsible_spte_range(kvm, root, slot);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Removes write access on the last level SPTE mapping this GFN and unsets the
+ * MMU-writable bit to ensure future writes continue to be intercepted.
+ * Returns true if an SPTE was set and a TLB flush is needed.
+ */
+static bool write_protect_gfn(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_mmu_page *root,
+			      gfn_t gfn, int min_level)
+{
+	struct tdp_iter iter;
+	u64 new_spte;
+	bool spte_set = false;
+
+	BUG_ON(min_level > KVM_MAX_HUGEPAGE_LEVEL);
+
+	rcu_read_lock();
+
+	for_each_tdp_pte_min_level(iter, root, min_level, gfn, gfn + 1) {
+		if (!is_shadow_present_pte(iter.old_spte) ||
+		    !is_last_spte(iter.old_spte, iter.level))
+			continue;
+
+		new_spte = iter.old_spte &
+			~(PT_WRITABLE_MASK | shadow_mmu_writable_mask);
+
+		if (new_spte == iter.old_spte)
+			break;
+
+		tdp_mmu_iter_set_spte(kvm, &iter, new_spte);
+		spte_set = true;
+	}
+
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+
+	return spte_set;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Removes write access on the last level SPTE mapping this GFN and unsets the
+ * MMU-writable bit to ensure future writes continue to be intercepted.
+ * Returns true if an SPTE was set and a TLB flush is needed.
+ */
+bool kvm_tdp_mmu_write_protect_gfn(struct kvm *kvm,
+				   struct kvm_memory_slot *slot, gfn_t gfn,
+				   int min_level)
+{
+	struct kvm_mmu_page *root;
+	bool spte_set = false;
+
+	lockdep_assert_held_write(&kvm->mmu_lock);
+	for_each_tdp_mmu_root(kvm, root, slot->as_id)
+		spte_set |= write_protect_gfn(kvm, root, gfn, min_level);
+
+	return spte_set;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Return the level of the lowest level SPTE added to sptes.
+ * That SPTE may be non-present.
+ *
+ * Must be called between kvm_tdp_mmu_walk_lockless_{begin,end}.
+ */
+int kvm_tdp_mmu_get_walk(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 addr, u64 *sptes,
+			 int *root_level)
+{
+	struct tdp_iter iter;
+	struct kvm_mmu *mmu = vcpu->arch.mmu;
+	gfn_t gfn = addr >> PAGE_SHIFT;
+	int leaf = -1;
+
+	*root_level = vcpu->arch.mmu->root_role.level;
+
+	tdp_mmu_for_each_pte(iter, mmu, gfn, gfn + 1) {
+		leaf = iter.level;
+		sptes[leaf] = iter.old_spte;
+	}
+
+	return leaf;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Returns the last level spte pointer of the shadow page walk for the given
+ * gpa, and sets *spte to the spte value. This spte may be non-preset. If no
+ * walk could be performed, returns NULL and *spte does not contain valid data.
+ *
+ * Contract:
+ *  - Must be called between kvm_tdp_mmu_walk_lockless_{begin,end}.
+ *  - The returned sptep must not be used after kvm_tdp_mmu_walk_lockless_end.
+ *
+ * WARNING: This function is only intended to be called during fast_page_fault.
+ */
+u64 *kvm_tdp_mmu_fast_pf_get_last_sptep(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 addr,
+					u64 *spte)
+{
+	struct tdp_iter iter;
+	struct kvm_mmu *mmu = vcpu->arch.mmu;
+	gfn_t gfn = addr >> PAGE_SHIFT;
+	tdp_ptep_t sptep = NULL;
+
+	tdp_mmu_for_each_pte(iter, mmu, gfn, gfn + 1) {
+		*spte = iter.old_spte;
+		sptep = iter.sptep;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Perform the rcu_dereference to get the raw spte pointer value since
+	 * we are passing it up to fast_page_fault, which is shared with the
+	 * legacy MMU and thus does not retain the TDP MMU-specific __rcu
+	 * annotation.
+	 *
+	 * This is safe since fast_page_fault obeys the contracts of this
+	 * function as well as all TDP MMU contracts around modifying SPTEs
+	 * outside of mmu_lock.
+	 */
+	return rcu_dereference(sptep);
+}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.h b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..733a3aef3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.h
@@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+#ifndef __KVM_X86_MMU_TDP_MMU_H
+#define __KVM_X86_MMU_TDP_MMU_H
+
+#include <linux/kvm_host.h>
+
+#include "spte.h"
+
+void kvm_mmu_init_tdp_mmu(struct kvm *kvm);
+void kvm_mmu_uninit_tdp_mmu(struct kvm *kvm);
+
+hpa_t kvm_tdp_mmu_get_vcpu_root_hpa(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+
+__must_check static inline bool kvm_tdp_mmu_get_root(struct kvm_mmu_page *root)
+{
+	return refcount_inc_not_zero(&root->tdp_mmu_root_count);
+}
+
+void kvm_tdp_mmu_put_root(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_mmu_page *root,
+			  bool shared);
+
+bool kvm_tdp_mmu_zap_leafs(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t start, gfn_t end, bool flush);
+bool kvm_tdp_mmu_zap_sp(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_mmu_page *sp);
+void kvm_tdp_mmu_zap_all(struct kvm *kvm);
+void kvm_tdp_mmu_invalidate_all_roots(struct kvm *kvm);
+void kvm_tdp_mmu_zap_invalidated_roots(struct kvm *kvm);
+
+int kvm_tdp_mmu_map(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_page_fault *fault);
+
+bool kvm_tdp_mmu_unmap_gfn_range(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_gfn_range *range,
+				 bool flush);
+bool kvm_tdp_mmu_age_gfn_range(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_gfn_range *range);
+bool kvm_tdp_mmu_test_age_gfn(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_gfn_range *range);
+bool kvm_tdp_mmu_set_spte_gfn(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_gfn_range *range);
+
+bool kvm_tdp_mmu_wrprot_slot(struct kvm *kvm,
+			     const struct kvm_memory_slot *slot, int min_level);
+bool kvm_tdp_mmu_clear_dirty_slot(struct kvm *kvm,
+				  const struct kvm_memory_slot *slot);
+void kvm_tdp_mmu_clear_dirty_pt_masked(struct kvm *kvm,
+				       struct kvm_memory_slot *slot,
+				       gfn_t gfn, unsigned long mask,
+				       bool wrprot);
+void kvm_tdp_mmu_zap_collapsible_sptes(struct kvm *kvm,
+				       const struct kvm_memory_slot *slot);
+
+bool kvm_tdp_mmu_write_protect_gfn(struct kvm *kvm,
+				   struct kvm_memory_slot *slot, gfn_t gfn,
+				   int min_level);
+
+void kvm_tdp_mmu_try_split_huge_pages(struct kvm *kvm,
+				      const struct kvm_memory_slot *slot,
+				      gfn_t start, gfn_t end,
+				      int target_level, bool shared);
+
+static inline void kvm_tdp_mmu_walk_lockless_begin(void)
+{
+	rcu_read_lock();
+}
+
+static inline void kvm_tdp_mmu_walk_lockless_end(void)
+{
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+}
+
+int kvm_tdp_mmu_get_walk(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 addr, u64 *sptes,
+			 int *root_level);
+u64 *kvm_tdp_mmu_fast_pf_get_last_sptep(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 addr,
+					u64 *spte);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+static inline bool is_tdp_mmu_page(struct kvm_mmu_page *sp) { return sp->tdp_mmu_page; }
+#else
+static inline bool is_tdp_mmu_page(struct kvm_mmu_page *sp) { return false; }
+#endif
+
+#endif /* __KVM_X86_MMU_TDP_MMU_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mtrr.c b/arch/x86/kvm/mtrr.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..3eb6e7f47
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mtrr.c
@@ -0,0 +1,720 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * vMTRR implementation
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2006 Qumranet, Inc.
+ * Copyright 2010 Red Hat, Inc. and/or its affiliates.
+ * Copyright(C) 2015 Intel Corporation.
+ *
+ * Authors:
+ *   Yaniv Kamay  <yaniv@qumranet.com>
+ *   Avi Kivity   <avi@qumranet.com>
+ *   Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>
+ *   Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
+ *   Xiao Guangrong <guangrong.xiao@linux.intel.com>
+ */
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
+
+#include <linux/kvm_host.h>
+#include <asm/mtrr.h>
+
+#include "cpuid.h"
+#include "mmu.h"
+
+#define IA32_MTRR_DEF_TYPE_E		(1ULL << 11)
+#define IA32_MTRR_DEF_TYPE_FE		(1ULL << 10)
+#define IA32_MTRR_DEF_TYPE_TYPE_MASK	(0xff)
+
+static bool is_mtrr_base_msr(unsigned int msr)
+{
+	/* MTRR base MSRs use even numbers, masks use odd numbers. */
+	return !(msr & 0x1);
+}
+
+static struct kvm_mtrr_range *var_mtrr_msr_to_range(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+						    unsigned int msr)
+{
+	int index = (msr - MTRRphysBase_MSR(0)) / 2;
+
+	return &vcpu->arch.mtrr_state.var_ranges[index];
+}
+
+static bool msr_mtrr_valid(unsigned msr)
+{
+	switch (msr) {
+	case MTRRphysBase_MSR(0) ... MTRRphysMask_MSR(KVM_NR_VAR_MTRR - 1):
+	case MSR_MTRRfix64K_00000:
+	case MSR_MTRRfix16K_80000:
+	case MSR_MTRRfix16K_A0000:
+	case MSR_MTRRfix4K_C0000:
+	case MSR_MTRRfix4K_C8000:
+	case MSR_MTRRfix4K_D0000:
+	case MSR_MTRRfix4K_D8000:
+	case MSR_MTRRfix4K_E0000:
+	case MSR_MTRRfix4K_E8000:
+	case MSR_MTRRfix4K_F0000:
+	case MSR_MTRRfix4K_F8000:
+	case MSR_MTRRdefType:
+		return true;
+	}
+	return false;
+}
+
+static bool valid_mtrr_type(unsigned t)
+{
+	return t < 8 && (1 << t) & 0x73; /* 0, 1, 4, 5, 6 */
+}
+
+static bool kvm_mtrr_valid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 msr, u64 data)
+{
+	int i;
+	u64 mask;
+
+	if (!msr_mtrr_valid(msr))
+		return false;
+
+	if (msr == MSR_MTRRdefType) {
+		if (data & ~0xcff)
+			return false;
+		return valid_mtrr_type(data & 0xff);
+	} else if (msr >= MSR_MTRRfix64K_00000 && msr <= MSR_MTRRfix4K_F8000) {
+		for (i = 0; i < 8 ; i++)
+			if (!valid_mtrr_type((data >> (i * 8)) & 0xff))
+				return false;
+		return true;
+	}
+
+	/* variable MTRRs */
+	WARN_ON(!(msr >= MTRRphysBase_MSR(0) &&
+		  msr <= MTRRphysMask_MSR(KVM_NR_VAR_MTRR - 1)));
+
+	mask = kvm_vcpu_reserved_gpa_bits_raw(vcpu);
+	if ((msr & 1) == 0) {
+		/* MTRR base */
+		if (!valid_mtrr_type(data & 0xff))
+			return false;
+		mask |= 0xf00;
+	} else
+		/* MTRR mask */
+		mask |= 0x7ff;
+
+	return (data & mask) == 0;
+}
+
+static bool mtrr_is_enabled(struct kvm_mtrr *mtrr_state)
+{
+	return !!(mtrr_state->deftype & IA32_MTRR_DEF_TYPE_E);
+}
+
+static bool fixed_mtrr_is_enabled(struct kvm_mtrr *mtrr_state)
+{
+	return !!(mtrr_state->deftype & IA32_MTRR_DEF_TYPE_FE);
+}
+
+static u8 mtrr_default_type(struct kvm_mtrr *mtrr_state)
+{
+	return mtrr_state->deftype & IA32_MTRR_DEF_TYPE_TYPE_MASK;
+}
+
+static u8 mtrr_disabled_type(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	/*
+	 * Intel SDM 11.11.2.2: all MTRRs are disabled when
+	 * IA32_MTRR_DEF_TYPE.E bit is cleared, and the UC
+	 * memory type is applied to all of physical memory.
+	 *
+	 * However, virtual machines can be run with CPUID such that
+	 * there are no MTRRs.  In that case, the firmware will never
+	 * enable MTRRs and it is obviously undesirable to run the
+	 * guest entirely with UC memory and we use WB.
+	 */
+	if (guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_MTRR))
+		return MTRR_TYPE_UNCACHABLE;
+	else
+		return MTRR_TYPE_WRBACK;
+}
+
+/*
+* Three terms are used in the following code:
+* - segment, it indicates the address segments covered by fixed MTRRs.
+* - unit, it corresponds to the MSR entry in the segment.
+* - range, a range is covered in one memory cache type.
+*/
+struct fixed_mtrr_segment {
+	u64 start;
+	u64 end;
+
+	int range_shift;
+
+	/* the start position in kvm_mtrr.fixed_ranges[]. */
+	int range_start;
+};
+
+static struct fixed_mtrr_segment fixed_seg_table[] = {
+	/* MSR_MTRRfix64K_00000, 1 unit. 64K fixed mtrr. */
+	{
+		.start = 0x0,
+		.end = 0x80000,
+		.range_shift = 16, /* 64K */
+		.range_start = 0,
+	},
+
+	/*
+	 * MSR_MTRRfix16K_80000 ... MSR_MTRRfix16K_A0000, 2 units,
+	 * 16K fixed mtrr.
+	 */
+	{
+		.start = 0x80000,
+		.end = 0xc0000,
+		.range_shift = 14, /* 16K */
+		.range_start = 8,
+	},
+
+	/*
+	 * MSR_MTRRfix4K_C0000 ... MSR_MTRRfix4K_F8000, 8 units,
+	 * 4K fixed mtrr.
+	 */
+	{
+		.start = 0xc0000,
+		.end = 0x100000,
+		.range_shift = 12, /* 12K */
+		.range_start = 24,
+	}
+};
+
+/*
+ * The size of unit is covered in one MSR, one MSR entry contains
+ * 8 ranges so that unit size is always 8 * 2^range_shift.
+ */
+static u64 fixed_mtrr_seg_unit_size(int seg)
+{
+	return 8 << fixed_seg_table[seg].range_shift;
+}
+
+static bool fixed_msr_to_seg_unit(u32 msr, int *seg, int *unit)
+{
+	switch (msr) {
+	case MSR_MTRRfix64K_00000:
+		*seg = 0;
+		*unit = 0;
+		break;
+	case MSR_MTRRfix16K_80000 ... MSR_MTRRfix16K_A0000:
+		*seg = 1;
+		*unit = array_index_nospec(
+			msr - MSR_MTRRfix16K_80000,
+			MSR_MTRRfix16K_A0000 - MSR_MTRRfix16K_80000 + 1);
+		break;
+	case MSR_MTRRfix4K_C0000 ... MSR_MTRRfix4K_F8000:
+		*seg = 2;
+		*unit = array_index_nospec(
+			msr - MSR_MTRRfix4K_C0000,
+			MSR_MTRRfix4K_F8000 - MSR_MTRRfix4K_C0000 + 1);
+		break;
+	default:
+		return false;
+	}
+
+	return true;
+}
+
+static void fixed_mtrr_seg_unit_range(int seg, int unit, u64 *start, u64 *end)
+{
+	struct fixed_mtrr_segment *mtrr_seg = &fixed_seg_table[seg];
+	u64 unit_size = fixed_mtrr_seg_unit_size(seg);
+
+	*start = mtrr_seg->start + unit * unit_size;
+	*end = *start + unit_size;
+	WARN_ON(*end > mtrr_seg->end);
+}
+
+static int fixed_mtrr_seg_unit_range_index(int seg, int unit)
+{
+	struct fixed_mtrr_segment *mtrr_seg = &fixed_seg_table[seg];
+
+	WARN_ON(mtrr_seg->start + unit * fixed_mtrr_seg_unit_size(seg)
+		> mtrr_seg->end);
+
+	/* each unit has 8 ranges. */
+	return mtrr_seg->range_start + 8 * unit;
+}
+
+static int fixed_mtrr_seg_end_range_index(int seg)
+{
+	struct fixed_mtrr_segment *mtrr_seg = &fixed_seg_table[seg];
+	int n;
+
+	n = (mtrr_seg->end - mtrr_seg->start) >> mtrr_seg->range_shift;
+	return mtrr_seg->range_start + n - 1;
+}
+
+static bool fixed_msr_to_range(u32 msr, u64 *start, u64 *end)
+{
+	int seg, unit;
+
+	if (!fixed_msr_to_seg_unit(msr, &seg, &unit))
+		return false;
+
+	fixed_mtrr_seg_unit_range(seg, unit, start, end);
+	return true;
+}
+
+static int fixed_msr_to_range_index(u32 msr)
+{
+	int seg, unit;
+
+	if (!fixed_msr_to_seg_unit(msr, &seg, &unit))
+		return -1;
+
+	return fixed_mtrr_seg_unit_range_index(seg, unit);
+}
+
+static int fixed_mtrr_addr_to_seg(u64 addr)
+{
+	struct fixed_mtrr_segment *mtrr_seg;
+	int seg, seg_num = ARRAY_SIZE(fixed_seg_table);
+
+	for (seg = 0; seg < seg_num; seg++) {
+		mtrr_seg = &fixed_seg_table[seg];
+		if (mtrr_seg->start <= addr && addr < mtrr_seg->end)
+			return seg;
+	}
+
+	return -1;
+}
+
+static int fixed_mtrr_addr_seg_to_range_index(u64 addr, int seg)
+{
+	struct fixed_mtrr_segment *mtrr_seg;
+	int index;
+
+	mtrr_seg = &fixed_seg_table[seg];
+	index = mtrr_seg->range_start;
+	index += (addr - mtrr_seg->start) >> mtrr_seg->range_shift;
+	return index;
+}
+
+static u64 fixed_mtrr_range_end_addr(int seg, int index)
+{
+	struct fixed_mtrr_segment *mtrr_seg = &fixed_seg_table[seg];
+	int pos = index - mtrr_seg->range_start;
+
+	return mtrr_seg->start + ((pos + 1) << mtrr_seg->range_shift);
+}
+
+static void var_mtrr_range(struct kvm_mtrr_range *range, u64 *start, u64 *end)
+{
+	u64 mask;
+
+	*start = range->base & PAGE_MASK;
+
+	mask = range->mask & PAGE_MASK;
+
+	/* This cannot overflow because writing to the reserved bits of
+	 * variable MTRRs causes a #GP.
+	 */
+	*end = (*start | ~mask) + 1;
+}
+
+static void update_mtrr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 msr)
+{
+	struct kvm_mtrr *mtrr_state = &vcpu->arch.mtrr_state;
+	gfn_t start, end;
+
+	if (!tdp_enabled || !kvm_arch_has_noncoherent_dma(vcpu->kvm))
+		return;
+
+	if (!mtrr_is_enabled(mtrr_state) && msr != MSR_MTRRdefType)
+		return;
+
+	/* fixed MTRRs. */
+	if (fixed_msr_to_range(msr, &start, &end)) {
+		if (!fixed_mtrr_is_enabled(mtrr_state))
+			return;
+	} else if (msr == MSR_MTRRdefType) {
+		start = 0x0;
+		end = ~0ULL;
+	} else {
+		/* variable range MTRRs. */
+		var_mtrr_range(var_mtrr_msr_to_range(vcpu, msr), &start, &end);
+	}
+
+	kvm_zap_gfn_range(vcpu->kvm, gpa_to_gfn(start), gpa_to_gfn(end));
+}
+
+static bool var_mtrr_range_is_valid(struct kvm_mtrr_range *range)
+{
+	return (range->mask & (1 << 11)) != 0;
+}
+
+static void set_var_mtrr_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 msr, u64 data)
+{
+	struct kvm_mtrr *mtrr_state = &vcpu->arch.mtrr_state;
+	struct kvm_mtrr_range *tmp, *cur;
+
+	cur = var_mtrr_msr_to_range(vcpu, msr);
+
+	/* remove the entry if it's in the list. */
+	if (var_mtrr_range_is_valid(cur))
+		list_del(&cur->node);
+
+	/*
+	 * Set all illegal GPA bits in the mask, since those bits must
+	 * implicitly be 0.  The bits are then cleared when reading them.
+	 */
+	if (is_mtrr_base_msr(msr))
+		cur->base = data;
+	else
+		cur->mask = data | kvm_vcpu_reserved_gpa_bits_raw(vcpu);
+
+	/* add it to the list if it's enabled. */
+	if (var_mtrr_range_is_valid(cur)) {
+		list_for_each_entry(tmp, &mtrr_state->head, node)
+			if (cur->base >= tmp->base)
+				break;
+		list_add_tail(&cur->node, &tmp->node);
+	}
+}
+
+int kvm_mtrr_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 msr, u64 data)
+{
+	int index;
+
+	if (!kvm_mtrr_valid(vcpu, msr, data))
+		return 1;
+
+	index = fixed_msr_to_range_index(msr);
+	if (index >= 0)
+		*(u64 *)&vcpu->arch.mtrr_state.fixed_ranges[index] = data;
+	else if (msr == MSR_MTRRdefType)
+		vcpu->arch.mtrr_state.deftype = data;
+	else
+		set_var_mtrr_msr(vcpu, msr, data);
+
+	update_mtrr(vcpu, msr);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int kvm_mtrr_get_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 msr, u64 *pdata)
+{
+	int index;
+
+	/* MSR_MTRRcap is a readonly MSR. */
+	if (msr == MSR_MTRRcap) {
+		/*
+		 * SMRR = 0
+		 * WC = 1
+		 * FIX = 1
+		 * VCNT = KVM_NR_VAR_MTRR
+		 */
+		*pdata = 0x500 | KVM_NR_VAR_MTRR;
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	if (!msr_mtrr_valid(msr))
+		return 1;
+
+	index = fixed_msr_to_range_index(msr);
+	if (index >= 0) {
+		*pdata = *(u64 *)&vcpu->arch.mtrr_state.fixed_ranges[index];
+	} else if (msr == MSR_MTRRdefType) {
+		*pdata = vcpu->arch.mtrr_state.deftype;
+	} else {
+		/* Variable MTRRs */
+		if (is_mtrr_base_msr(msr))
+			*pdata = var_mtrr_msr_to_range(vcpu, msr)->base;
+		else
+			*pdata = var_mtrr_msr_to_range(vcpu, msr)->mask;
+
+		*pdata &= ~kvm_vcpu_reserved_gpa_bits_raw(vcpu);
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+void kvm_vcpu_mtrr_init(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&vcpu->arch.mtrr_state.head);
+}
+
+struct mtrr_iter {
+	/* input fields. */
+	struct kvm_mtrr *mtrr_state;
+	u64 start;
+	u64 end;
+
+	/* output fields. */
+	int mem_type;
+	/* mtrr is completely disabled? */
+	bool mtrr_disabled;
+	/* [start, end) is not fully covered in MTRRs? */
+	bool partial_map;
+
+	/* private fields. */
+	union {
+		/* used for fixed MTRRs. */
+		struct {
+			int index;
+			int seg;
+		};
+
+		/* used for var MTRRs. */
+		struct {
+			struct kvm_mtrr_range *range;
+			/* max address has been covered in var MTRRs. */
+			u64 start_max;
+		};
+	};
+
+	bool fixed;
+};
+
+static bool mtrr_lookup_fixed_start(struct mtrr_iter *iter)
+{
+	int seg, index;
+
+	if (!fixed_mtrr_is_enabled(iter->mtrr_state))
+		return false;
+
+	seg = fixed_mtrr_addr_to_seg(iter->start);
+	if (seg < 0)
+		return false;
+
+	iter->fixed = true;
+	index = fixed_mtrr_addr_seg_to_range_index(iter->start, seg);
+	iter->index = index;
+	iter->seg = seg;
+	return true;
+}
+
+static bool match_var_range(struct mtrr_iter *iter,
+			    struct kvm_mtrr_range *range)
+{
+	u64 start, end;
+
+	var_mtrr_range(range, &start, &end);
+	if (!(start >= iter->end || end <= iter->start)) {
+		iter->range = range;
+
+		/*
+		 * the function is called when we do kvm_mtrr.head walking.
+		 * Range has the minimum base address which interleaves
+		 * [looker->start_max, looker->end).
+		 */
+		iter->partial_map |= iter->start_max < start;
+
+		/* update the max address has been covered. */
+		iter->start_max = max(iter->start_max, end);
+		return true;
+	}
+
+	return false;
+}
+
+static void __mtrr_lookup_var_next(struct mtrr_iter *iter)
+{
+	struct kvm_mtrr *mtrr_state = iter->mtrr_state;
+
+	list_for_each_entry_continue(iter->range, &mtrr_state->head, node)
+		if (match_var_range(iter, iter->range))
+			return;
+
+	iter->range = NULL;
+	iter->partial_map |= iter->start_max < iter->end;
+}
+
+static void mtrr_lookup_var_start(struct mtrr_iter *iter)
+{
+	struct kvm_mtrr *mtrr_state = iter->mtrr_state;
+
+	iter->fixed = false;
+	iter->start_max = iter->start;
+	iter->range = NULL;
+	iter->range = list_prepare_entry(iter->range, &mtrr_state->head, node);
+
+	__mtrr_lookup_var_next(iter);
+}
+
+static void mtrr_lookup_fixed_next(struct mtrr_iter *iter)
+{
+	/* terminate the lookup. */
+	if (fixed_mtrr_range_end_addr(iter->seg, iter->index) >= iter->end) {
+		iter->fixed = false;
+		iter->range = NULL;
+		return;
+	}
+
+	iter->index++;
+
+	/* have looked up for all fixed MTRRs. */
+	if (iter->index >= ARRAY_SIZE(iter->mtrr_state->fixed_ranges))
+		return mtrr_lookup_var_start(iter);
+
+	/* switch to next segment. */
+	if (iter->index > fixed_mtrr_seg_end_range_index(iter->seg))
+		iter->seg++;
+}
+
+static void mtrr_lookup_var_next(struct mtrr_iter *iter)
+{
+	__mtrr_lookup_var_next(iter);
+}
+
+static void mtrr_lookup_start(struct mtrr_iter *iter)
+{
+	if (!mtrr_is_enabled(iter->mtrr_state)) {
+		iter->mtrr_disabled = true;
+		return;
+	}
+
+	if (!mtrr_lookup_fixed_start(iter))
+		mtrr_lookup_var_start(iter);
+}
+
+static void mtrr_lookup_init(struct mtrr_iter *iter,
+			     struct kvm_mtrr *mtrr_state, u64 start, u64 end)
+{
+	iter->mtrr_state = mtrr_state;
+	iter->start = start;
+	iter->end = end;
+	iter->mtrr_disabled = false;
+	iter->partial_map = false;
+	iter->fixed = false;
+	iter->range = NULL;
+
+	mtrr_lookup_start(iter);
+}
+
+static bool mtrr_lookup_okay(struct mtrr_iter *iter)
+{
+	if (iter->fixed) {
+		iter->mem_type = iter->mtrr_state->fixed_ranges[iter->index];
+		return true;
+	}
+
+	if (iter->range) {
+		iter->mem_type = iter->range->base & 0xff;
+		return true;
+	}
+
+	return false;
+}
+
+static void mtrr_lookup_next(struct mtrr_iter *iter)
+{
+	if (iter->fixed)
+		mtrr_lookup_fixed_next(iter);
+	else
+		mtrr_lookup_var_next(iter);
+}
+
+#define mtrr_for_each_mem_type(_iter_, _mtrr_, _gpa_start_, _gpa_end_) \
+	for (mtrr_lookup_init(_iter_, _mtrr_, _gpa_start_, _gpa_end_); \
+	     mtrr_lookup_okay(_iter_); mtrr_lookup_next(_iter_))
+
+u8 kvm_mtrr_get_guest_memory_type(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gfn_t gfn)
+{
+	struct kvm_mtrr *mtrr_state = &vcpu->arch.mtrr_state;
+	struct mtrr_iter iter;
+	u64 start, end;
+	int type = -1;
+	const int wt_wb_mask = (1 << MTRR_TYPE_WRBACK)
+			       | (1 << MTRR_TYPE_WRTHROUGH);
+
+	start = gfn_to_gpa(gfn);
+	end = start + PAGE_SIZE;
+
+	mtrr_for_each_mem_type(&iter, mtrr_state, start, end) {
+		int curr_type = iter.mem_type;
+
+		/*
+		 * Please refer to Intel SDM Volume 3: 11.11.4.1 MTRR
+		 * Precedences.
+		 */
+
+		if (type == -1) {
+			type = curr_type;
+			continue;
+		}
+
+		/*
+		 * If two or more variable memory ranges match and the
+		 * memory types are identical, then that memory type is
+		 * used.
+		 */
+		if (type == curr_type)
+			continue;
+
+		/*
+		 * If two or more variable memory ranges match and one of
+		 * the memory types is UC, the UC memory type used.
+		 */
+		if (curr_type == MTRR_TYPE_UNCACHABLE)
+			return MTRR_TYPE_UNCACHABLE;
+
+		/*
+		 * If two or more variable memory ranges match and the
+		 * memory types are WT and WB, the WT memory type is used.
+		 */
+		if (((1 << type) & wt_wb_mask) &&
+		      ((1 << curr_type) & wt_wb_mask)) {
+			type = MTRR_TYPE_WRTHROUGH;
+			continue;
+		}
+
+		/*
+		 * For overlaps not defined by the above rules, processor
+		 * behavior is undefined.
+		 */
+
+		/* We use WB for this undefined behavior. :( */
+		return MTRR_TYPE_WRBACK;
+	}
+
+	if (iter.mtrr_disabled)
+		return mtrr_disabled_type(vcpu);
+
+	/* not contained in any MTRRs. */
+	if (type == -1)
+		return mtrr_default_type(mtrr_state);
+
+	/*
+	 * We just check one page, partially covered by MTRRs is
+	 * impossible.
+	 */
+	WARN_ON(iter.partial_map);
+
+	return type;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_mtrr_get_guest_memory_type);
+
+bool kvm_mtrr_check_gfn_range_consistency(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gfn_t gfn,
+					  int page_num)
+{
+	struct kvm_mtrr *mtrr_state = &vcpu->arch.mtrr_state;
+	struct mtrr_iter iter;
+	u64 start, end;
+	int type = -1;
+
+	start = gfn_to_gpa(gfn);
+	end = gfn_to_gpa(gfn + page_num);
+	mtrr_for_each_mem_type(&iter, mtrr_state, start, end) {
+		if (type == -1) {
+			type = iter.mem_type;
+			continue;
+		}
+
+		if (type != iter.mem_type)
+			return false;
+	}
+
+	if (iter.mtrr_disabled)
+		return true;
+
+	if (!iter.partial_map)
+		return true;
+
+	if (type == -1)
+		return true;
+
+	return type == mtrr_default_type(mtrr_state);
+}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/pmu.c b/arch/x86/kvm/pmu.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..dc8e8e907
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/pmu.c
@@ -0,0 +1,941 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * Kernel-based Virtual Machine -- Performance Monitoring Unit support
+ *
+ * Copyright 2015 Red Hat, Inc. and/or its affiliates.
+ *
+ * Authors:
+ *   Avi Kivity   <avi@redhat.com>
+ *   Gleb Natapov <gleb@redhat.com>
+ *   Wei Huang    <wei@redhat.com>
+ */
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
+
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/kvm_host.h>
+#include <linux/perf_event.h>
+#include <linux/bsearch.h>
+#include <linux/sort.h>
+#include <asm/perf_event.h>
+#include <asm/cpu_device_id.h>
+#include "x86.h"
+#include "cpuid.h"
+#include "lapic.h"
+#include "pmu.h"
+
+/* This is enough to filter the vast majority of currently defined events. */
+#define KVM_PMU_EVENT_FILTER_MAX_EVENTS 300
+
+struct x86_pmu_capability __read_mostly kvm_pmu_cap;
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_pmu_cap);
+
+/* Precise Distribution of Instructions Retired (PDIR) */
+static const struct x86_cpu_id vmx_pebs_pdir_cpu[] = {
+	X86_MATCH_INTEL_FAM6_MODEL(ICELAKE_D, NULL),
+	X86_MATCH_INTEL_FAM6_MODEL(ICELAKE_X, NULL),
+	/* Instruction-Accurate PDIR (PDIR++) */
+	X86_MATCH_INTEL_FAM6_MODEL(SAPPHIRERAPIDS_X, NULL),
+	{}
+};
+
+/* Precise Distribution (PDist) */
+static const struct x86_cpu_id vmx_pebs_pdist_cpu[] = {
+	X86_MATCH_INTEL_FAM6_MODEL(SAPPHIRERAPIDS_X, NULL),
+	{}
+};
+
+/* NOTE:
+ * - Each perf counter is defined as "struct kvm_pmc";
+ * - There are two types of perf counters: general purpose (gp) and fixed.
+ *   gp counters are stored in gp_counters[] and fixed counters are stored
+ *   in fixed_counters[] respectively. Both of them are part of "struct
+ *   kvm_pmu";
+ * - pmu.c understands the difference between gp counters and fixed counters.
+ *   However AMD doesn't support fixed-counters;
+ * - There are three types of index to access perf counters (PMC):
+ *     1. MSR (named msr): For example Intel has MSR_IA32_PERFCTRn and AMD
+ *        has MSR_K7_PERFCTRn and, for families 15H and later,
+ *        MSR_F15H_PERF_CTRn, where MSR_F15H_PERF_CTR[0-3] are
+ *        aliased to MSR_K7_PERFCTRn.
+ *     2. MSR Index (named idx): This normally is used by RDPMC instruction.
+ *        For instance AMD RDPMC instruction uses 0000_0003h in ECX to access
+ *        C001_0007h (MSR_K7_PERCTR3). Intel has a similar mechanism, except
+ *        that it also supports fixed counters. idx can be used to as index to
+ *        gp and fixed counters.
+ *     3. Global PMC Index (named pmc): pmc is an index specific to PMU
+ *        code. Each pmc, stored in kvm_pmc.idx field, is unique across
+ *        all perf counters (both gp and fixed). The mapping relationship
+ *        between pmc and perf counters is as the following:
+ *        * Intel: [0 .. KVM_INTEL_PMC_MAX_GENERIC-1] <=> gp counters
+ *                 [INTEL_PMC_IDX_FIXED .. INTEL_PMC_IDX_FIXED + 2] <=> fixed
+ *        * AMD:   [0 .. AMD64_NUM_COUNTERS-1] and, for families 15H
+ *          and later, [0 .. AMD64_NUM_COUNTERS_CORE-1] <=> gp counters
+ */
+
+static struct kvm_pmu_ops kvm_pmu_ops __read_mostly;
+
+#define KVM_X86_PMU_OP(func)					     \
+	DEFINE_STATIC_CALL_NULL(kvm_x86_pmu_##func,			     \
+				*(((struct kvm_pmu_ops *)0)->func));
+#define KVM_X86_PMU_OP_OPTIONAL KVM_X86_PMU_OP
+#include <asm/kvm-x86-pmu-ops.h>
+
+void kvm_pmu_ops_update(const struct kvm_pmu_ops *pmu_ops)
+{
+	memcpy(&kvm_pmu_ops, pmu_ops, sizeof(kvm_pmu_ops));
+
+#define __KVM_X86_PMU_OP(func) \
+	static_call_update(kvm_x86_pmu_##func, kvm_pmu_ops.func);
+#define KVM_X86_PMU_OP(func) \
+	WARN_ON(!kvm_pmu_ops.func); __KVM_X86_PMU_OP(func)
+#define KVM_X86_PMU_OP_OPTIONAL __KVM_X86_PMU_OP
+#include <asm/kvm-x86-pmu-ops.h>
+#undef __KVM_X86_PMU_OP
+}
+
+static inline void __kvm_perf_overflow(struct kvm_pmc *pmc, bool in_pmi)
+{
+	struct kvm_pmu *pmu = pmc_to_pmu(pmc);
+	bool skip_pmi = false;
+
+	if (pmc->perf_event && pmc->perf_event->attr.precise_ip) {
+		if (!in_pmi) {
+			/*
+			 * TODO: KVM is currently _choosing_ to not generate records
+			 * for emulated instructions, avoiding BUFFER_OVF PMI when
+			 * there are no records. Strictly speaking, it should be done
+			 * as well in the right context to improve sampling accuracy.
+			 */
+			skip_pmi = true;
+		} else {
+			/* Indicate PEBS overflow PMI to guest. */
+			skip_pmi = __test_and_set_bit(GLOBAL_STATUS_BUFFER_OVF_BIT,
+						      (unsigned long *)&pmu->global_status);
+		}
+	} else {
+		__set_bit(pmc->idx, (unsigned long *)&pmu->global_status);
+	}
+
+	if (pmc->intr && !skip_pmi)
+		kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_PMI, pmc->vcpu);
+}
+
+static void kvm_perf_overflow(struct perf_event *perf_event,
+			      struct perf_sample_data *data,
+			      struct pt_regs *regs)
+{
+	struct kvm_pmc *pmc = perf_event->overflow_handler_context;
+
+	/*
+	 * Ignore overflow events for counters that are scheduled to be
+	 * reprogrammed, e.g. if a PMI for the previous event races with KVM's
+	 * handling of a related guest WRMSR.
+	 */
+	if (test_and_set_bit(pmc->idx, pmc_to_pmu(pmc)->reprogram_pmi))
+		return;
+
+	__kvm_perf_overflow(pmc, true);
+
+	kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_PMU, pmc->vcpu);
+}
+
+static u64 pmc_get_pebs_precise_level(struct kvm_pmc *pmc)
+{
+	/*
+	 * For some model specific pebs counters with special capabilities
+	 * (PDIR, PDIR++, PDIST), KVM needs to raise the event precise
+	 * level to the maximum value (currently 3, backwards compatible)
+	 * so that the perf subsystem would assign specific hardware counter
+	 * with that capability for vPMC.
+	 */
+	if ((pmc->idx == 0 && x86_match_cpu(vmx_pebs_pdist_cpu)) ||
+	    (pmc->idx == 32 && x86_match_cpu(vmx_pebs_pdir_cpu)))
+		return 3;
+
+	/*
+	 * The non-zero precision level of guest event makes the ordinary
+	 * guest event becomes a guest PEBS event and triggers the host
+	 * PEBS PMI handler to determine whether the PEBS overflow PMI
+	 * comes from the host counters or the guest.
+	 */
+	return 1;
+}
+
+static int pmc_reprogram_counter(struct kvm_pmc *pmc, u32 type, u64 config,
+				 bool exclude_user, bool exclude_kernel,
+				 bool intr)
+{
+	struct kvm_pmu *pmu = pmc_to_pmu(pmc);
+	struct perf_event *event;
+	struct perf_event_attr attr = {
+		.type = type,
+		.size = sizeof(attr),
+		.pinned = true,
+		.exclude_idle = true,
+		.exclude_host = 1,
+		.exclude_user = exclude_user,
+		.exclude_kernel = exclude_kernel,
+		.config = config,
+	};
+	bool pebs = test_bit(pmc->idx, (unsigned long *)&pmu->pebs_enable);
+
+	attr.sample_period = get_sample_period(pmc, pmc->counter);
+
+	if ((attr.config & HSW_IN_TX_CHECKPOINTED) &&
+	    guest_cpuid_is_intel(pmc->vcpu)) {
+		/*
+		 * HSW_IN_TX_CHECKPOINTED is not supported with nonzero
+		 * period. Just clear the sample period so at least
+		 * allocating the counter doesn't fail.
+		 */
+		attr.sample_period = 0;
+	}
+	if (pebs) {
+		/*
+		 * For most PEBS hardware events, the difference in the software
+		 * precision levels of guest and host PEBS events will not affect
+		 * the accuracy of the PEBS profiling result, because the "event IP"
+		 * in the PEBS record is calibrated on the guest side.
+		 */
+		attr.precise_ip = pmc_get_pebs_precise_level(pmc);
+	}
+
+	event = perf_event_create_kernel_counter(&attr, -1, current,
+						 kvm_perf_overflow, pmc);
+	if (IS_ERR(event)) {
+		pr_debug_ratelimited("kvm_pmu: event creation failed %ld for pmc->idx = %d\n",
+			    PTR_ERR(event), pmc->idx);
+		return PTR_ERR(event);
+	}
+
+	pmc->perf_event = event;
+	pmc_to_pmu(pmc)->event_count++;
+	pmc->is_paused = false;
+	pmc->intr = intr || pebs;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void pmc_pause_counter(struct kvm_pmc *pmc)
+{
+	u64 counter = pmc->counter;
+
+	if (!pmc->perf_event || pmc->is_paused)
+		return;
+
+	/* update counter, reset event value to avoid redundant accumulation */
+	counter += perf_event_pause(pmc->perf_event, true);
+	pmc->counter = counter & pmc_bitmask(pmc);
+	pmc->is_paused = true;
+}
+
+static bool pmc_resume_counter(struct kvm_pmc *pmc)
+{
+	if (!pmc->perf_event)
+		return false;
+
+	/* recalibrate sample period and check if it's accepted by perf core */
+	if (is_sampling_event(pmc->perf_event) &&
+	    perf_event_period(pmc->perf_event,
+			      get_sample_period(pmc, pmc->counter)))
+		return false;
+
+	if (test_bit(pmc->idx, (unsigned long *)&pmc_to_pmu(pmc)->pebs_enable) !=
+	    (!!pmc->perf_event->attr.precise_ip))
+		return false;
+
+	/* reuse perf_event to serve as pmc_reprogram_counter() does*/
+	perf_event_enable(pmc->perf_event);
+	pmc->is_paused = false;
+
+	return true;
+}
+
+static void pmc_release_perf_event(struct kvm_pmc *pmc)
+{
+	if (pmc->perf_event) {
+		perf_event_release_kernel(pmc->perf_event);
+		pmc->perf_event = NULL;
+		pmc->current_config = 0;
+		pmc_to_pmu(pmc)->event_count--;
+	}
+}
+
+static void pmc_stop_counter(struct kvm_pmc *pmc)
+{
+	if (pmc->perf_event) {
+		pmc->counter = pmc_read_counter(pmc);
+		pmc_release_perf_event(pmc);
+	}
+}
+
+static int filter_cmp(const void *pa, const void *pb, u64 mask)
+{
+	u64 a = *(u64 *)pa & mask;
+	u64 b = *(u64 *)pb & mask;
+
+	return (a > b) - (a < b);
+}
+
+
+static int filter_sort_cmp(const void *pa, const void *pb)
+{
+	return filter_cmp(pa, pb, (KVM_PMU_MASKED_ENTRY_EVENT_SELECT |
+				   KVM_PMU_MASKED_ENTRY_EXCLUDE));
+}
+
+/*
+ * For the event filter, searching is done on the 'includes' list and
+ * 'excludes' list separately rather than on the 'events' list (which
+ * has both).  As a result the exclude bit can be ignored.
+ */
+static int filter_event_cmp(const void *pa, const void *pb)
+{
+	return filter_cmp(pa, pb, (KVM_PMU_MASKED_ENTRY_EVENT_SELECT));
+}
+
+static int find_filter_index(u64 *events, u64 nevents, u64 key)
+{
+	u64 *fe = bsearch(&key, events, nevents, sizeof(events[0]),
+			  filter_event_cmp);
+
+	if (!fe)
+		return -1;
+
+	return fe - events;
+}
+
+static bool is_filter_entry_match(u64 filter_event, u64 umask)
+{
+	u64 mask = filter_event >> (KVM_PMU_MASKED_ENTRY_UMASK_MASK_SHIFT - 8);
+	u64 match = filter_event & KVM_PMU_MASKED_ENTRY_UMASK_MATCH;
+
+	BUILD_BUG_ON((KVM_PMU_ENCODE_MASKED_ENTRY(0, 0xff, 0, false) >>
+		     (KVM_PMU_MASKED_ENTRY_UMASK_MASK_SHIFT - 8)) !=
+		     ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL_UMASK);
+
+	return (umask & mask) == match;
+}
+
+static bool filter_contains_match(u64 *events, u64 nevents, u64 eventsel)
+{
+	u64 event_select = eventsel & kvm_pmu_ops.EVENTSEL_EVENT;
+	u64 umask = eventsel & ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL_UMASK;
+	int i, index;
+
+	index = find_filter_index(events, nevents, event_select);
+	if (index < 0)
+		return false;
+
+	/*
+	 * Entries are sorted by the event select.  Walk the list in both
+	 * directions to process all entries with the targeted event select.
+	 */
+	for (i = index; i < nevents; i++) {
+		if (filter_event_cmp(&events[i], &event_select))
+			break;
+
+		if (is_filter_entry_match(events[i], umask))
+			return true;
+	}
+
+	for (i = index - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
+		if (filter_event_cmp(&events[i], &event_select))
+			break;
+
+		if (is_filter_entry_match(events[i], umask))
+			return true;
+	}
+
+	return false;
+}
+
+static bool is_gp_event_allowed(struct kvm_x86_pmu_event_filter *f,
+				u64 eventsel)
+{
+	if (filter_contains_match(f->includes, f->nr_includes, eventsel) &&
+	    !filter_contains_match(f->excludes, f->nr_excludes, eventsel))
+		return f->action == KVM_PMU_EVENT_ALLOW;
+
+	return f->action == KVM_PMU_EVENT_DENY;
+}
+
+static bool is_fixed_event_allowed(struct kvm_x86_pmu_event_filter *filter,
+				   int idx)
+{
+	int fixed_idx = idx - INTEL_PMC_IDX_FIXED;
+
+	if (filter->action == KVM_PMU_EVENT_DENY &&
+	    test_bit(fixed_idx, (ulong *)&filter->fixed_counter_bitmap))
+		return false;
+	if (filter->action == KVM_PMU_EVENT_ALLOW &&
+	    !test_bit(fixed_idx, (ulong *)&filter->fixed_counter_bitmap))
+		return false;
+
+	return true;
+}
+
+static bool check_pmu_event_filter(struct kvm_pmc *pmc)
+{
+	struct kvm_x86_pmu_event_filter *filter;
+	struct kvm *kvm = pmc->vcpu->kvm;
+
+	filter = srcu_dereference(kvm->arch.pmu_event_filter, &kvm->srcu);
+	if (!filter)
+		return true;
+
+	if (pmc_is_gp(pmc))
+		return is_gp_event_allowed(filter, pmc->eventsel);
+
+	return is_fixed_event_allowed(filter, pmc->idx);
+}
+
+static bool pmc_event_is_allowed(struct kvm_pmc *pmc)
+{
+	return pmc_is_globally_enabled(pmc) && pmc_speculative_in_use(pmc) &&
+	       static_call(kvm_x86_pmu_hw_event_available)(pmc) &&
+	       check_pmu_event_filter(pmc);
+}
+
+static void reprogram_counter(struct kvm_pmc *pmc)
+{
+	struct kvm_pmu *pmu = pmc_to_pmu(pmc);
+	u64 eventsel = pmc->eventsel;
+	u64 new_config = eventsel;
+	u8 fixed_ctr_ctrl;
+
+	pmc_pause_counter(pmc);
+
+	if (!pmc_event_is_allowed(pmc))
+		goto reprogram_complete;
+
+	if (pmc->counter < pmc->prev_counter)
+		__kvm_perf_overflow(pmc, false);
+
+	if (eventsel & ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL_PIN_CONTROL)
+		printk_once("kvm pmu: pin control bit is ignored\n");
+
+	if (pmc_is_fixed(pmc)) {
+		fixed_ctr_ctrl = fixed_ctrl_field(pmu->fixed_ctr_ctrl,
+						  pmc->idx - INTEL_PMC_IDX_FIXED);
+		if (fixed_ctr_ctrl & 0x1)
+			eventsel |= ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL_OS;
+		if (fixed_ctr_ctrl & 0x2)
+			eventsel |= ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL_USR;
+		if (fixed_ctr_ctrl & 0x8)
+			eventsel |= ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL_INT;
+		new_config = (u64)fixed_ctr_ctrl;
+	}
+
+	if (pmc->current_config == new_config && pmc_resume_counter(pmc))
+		goto reprogram_complete;
+
+	pmc_release_perf_event(pmc);
+
+	pmc->current_config = new_config;
+
+	/*
+	 * If reprogramming fails, e.g. due to contention, leave the counter's
+	 * regprogram bit set, i.e. opportunistically try again on the next PMU
+	 * refresh.  Don't make a new request as doing so can stall the guest
+	 * if reprogramming repeatedly fails.
+	 */
+	if (pmc_reprogram_counter(pmc, PERF_TYPE_RAW,
+				  (eventsel & pmu->raw_event_mask),
+				  !(eventsel & ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL_USR),
+				  !(eventsel & ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL_OS),
+				  eventsel & ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL_INT))
+		return;
+
+reprogram_complete:
+	clear_bit(pmc->idx, (unsigned long *)&pmc_to_pmu(pmc)->reprogram_pmi);
+	pmc->prev_counter = 0;
+}
+
+void kvm_pmu_handle_event(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct kvm_pmu *pmu = vcpu_to_pmu(vcpu);
+	int bit;
+
+	for_each_set_bit(bit, pmu->reprogram_pmi, X86_PMC_IDX_MAX) {
+		struct kvm_pmc *pmc = static_call(kvm_x86_pmu_pmc_idx_to_pmc)(pmu, bit);
+
+		if (unlikely(!pmc)) {
+			clear_bit(bit, pmu->reprogram_pmi);
+			continue;
+		}
+
+		reprogram_counter(pmc);
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Unused perf_events are only released if the corresponding MSRs
+	 * weren't accessed during the last vCPU time slice. kvm_arch_sched_in
+	 * triggers KVM_REQ_PMU if cleanup is needed.
+	 */
+	if (unlikely(pmu->need_cleanup))
+		kvm_pmu_cleanup(vcpu);
+}
+
+/* check if idx is a valid index to access PMU */
+bool kvm_pmu_is_valid_rdpmc_ecx(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned int idx)
+{
+	return static_call(kvm_x86_pmu_is_valid_rdpmc_ecx)(vcpu, idx);
+}
+
+bool is_vmware_backdoor_pmc(u32 pmc_idx)
+{
+	switch (pmc_idx) {
+	case VMWARE_BACKDOOR_PMC_HOST_TSC:
+	case VMWARE_BACKDOOR_PMC_REAL_TIME:
+	case VMWARE_BACKDOOR_PMC_APPARENT_TIME:
+		return true;
+	}
+	return false;
+}
+
+static int kvm_pmu_rdpmc_vmware(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned idx, u64 *data)
+{
+	u64 ctr_val;
+
+	switch (idx) {
+	case VMWARE_BACKDOOR_PMC_HOST_TSC:
+		ctr_val = rdtsc();
+		break;
+	case VMWARE_BACKDOOR_PMC_REAL_TIME:
+		ctr_val = ktime_get_boottime_ns();
+		break;
+	case VMWARE_BACKDOOR_PMC_APPARENT_TIME:
+		ctr_val = ktime_get_boottime_ns() +
+			vcpu->kvm->arch.kvmclock_offset;
+		break;
+	default:
+		return 1;
+	}
+
+	*data = ctr_val;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int kvm_pmu_rdpmc(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned idx, u64 *data)
+{
+	bool fast_mode = idx & (1u << 31);
+	struct kvm_pmu *pmu = vcpu_to_pmu(vcpu);
+	struct kvm_pmc *pmc;
+	u64 mask = fast_mode ? ~0u : ~0ull;
+
+	if (!pmu->version)
+		return 1;
+
+	if (is_vmware_backdoor_pmc(idx))
+		return kvm_pmu_rdpmc_vmware(vcpu, idx, data);
+
+	pmc = static_call(kvm_x86_pmu_rdpmc_ecx_to_pmc)(vcpu, idx, &mask);
+	if (!pmc)
+		return 1;
+
+	if (!kvm_is_cr4_bit_set(vcpu, X86_CR4_PCE) &&
+	    (static_call(kvm_x86_get_cpl)(vcpu) != 0) &&
+	    kvm_is_cr0_bit_set(vcpu, X86_CR0_PE))
+		return 1;
+
+	*data = pmc_read_counter(pmc) & mask;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+void kvm_pmu_deliver_pmi(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	if (lapic_in_kernel(vcpu)) {
+		static_call_cond(kvm_x86_pmu_deliver_pmi)(vcpu);
+		kvm_apic_local_deliver(vcpu->arch.apic, APIC_LVTPC);
+	}
+}
+
+bool kvm_pmu_is_valid_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 msr)
+{
+	switch (msr) {
+	case MSR_CORE_PERF_GLOBAL_STATUS:
+	case MSR_CORE_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL:
+	case MSR_CORE_PERF_GLOBAL_OVF_CTRL:
+		return kvm_pmu_has_perf_global_ctrl(vcpu_to_pmu(vcpu));
+	default:
+		break;
+	}
+	return static_call(kvm_x86_pmu_msr_idx_to_pmc)(vcpu, msr) ||
+		static_call(kvm_x86_pmu_is_valid_msr)(vcpu, msr);
+}
+
+static void kvm_pmu_mark_pmc_in_use(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 msr)
+{
+	struct kvm_pmu *pmu = vcpu_to_pmu(vcpu);
+	struct kvm_pmc *pmc = static_call(kvm_x86_pmu_msr_idx_to_pmc)(vcpu, msr);
+
+	if (pmc)
+		__set_bit(pmc->idx, pmu->pmc_in_use);
+}
+
+int kvm_pmu_get_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
+{
+	struct kvm_pmu *pmu = vcpu_to_pmu(vcpu);
+	u32 msr = msr_info->index;
+
+	switch (msr) {
+	case MSR_CORE_PERF_GLOBAL_STATUS:
+	case MSR_AMD64_PERF_CNTR_GLOBAL_STATUS:
+		msr_info->data = pmu->global_status;
+		break;
+	case MSR_AMD64_PERF_CNTR_GLOBAL_CTL:
+	case MSR_CORE_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL:
+		msr_info->data = pmu->global_ctrl;
+		break;
+	case MSR_AMD64_PERF_CNTR_GLOBAL_STATUS_CLR:
+	case MSR_CORE_PERF_GLOBAL_OVF_CTRL:
+		msr_info->data = 0;
+		break;
+	default:
+		return static_call(kvm_x86_pmu_get_msr)(vcpu, msr_info);
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int kvm_pmu_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
+{
+	struct kvm_pmu *pmu = vcpu_to_pmu(vcpu);
+	u32 msr = msr_info->index;
+	u64 data = msr_info->data;
+	u64 diff;
+
+	/*
+	 * Note, AMD ignores writes to reserved bits and read-only PMU MSRs,
+	 * whereas Intel generates #GP on attempts to write reserved/RO MSRs.
+	 */
+	switch (msr) {
+	case MSR_CORE_PERF_GLOBAL_STATUS:
+		if (!msr_info->host_initiated)
+			return 1; /* RO MSR */
+		fallthrough;
+	case MSR_AMD64_PERF_CNTR_GLOBAL_STATUS:
+		/* Per PPR, Read-only MSR. Writes are ignored. */
+		if (!msr_info->host_initiated)
+			break;
+
+		if (data & pmu->global_status_mask)
+			return 1;
+
+		pmu->global_status = data;
+		break;
+	case MSR_AMD64_PERF_CNTR_GLOBAL_CTL:
+		data &= ~pmu->global_ctrl_mask;
+		fallthrough;
+	case MSR_CORE_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL:
+		if (!kvm_valid_perf_global_ctrl(pmu, data))
+			return 1;
+
+		if (pmu->global_ctrl != data) {
+			diff = pmu->global_ctrl ^ data;
+			pmu->global_ctrl = data;
+			reprogram_counters(pmu, diff);
+		}
+		break;
+	case MSR_CORE_PERF_GLOBAL_OVF_CTRL:
+		/*
+		 * GLOBAL_OVF_CTRL, a.k.a. GLOBAL STATUS_RESET, clears bits in
+		 * GLOBAL_STATUS, and so the set of reserved bits is the same.
+		 */
+		if (data & pmu->global_status_mask)
+			return 1;
+		fallthrough;
+	case MSR_AMD64_PERF_CNTR_GLOBAL_STATUS_CLR:
+		if (!msr_info->host_initiated)
+			pmu->global_status &= ~data;
+		break;
+	default:
+		kvm_pmu_mark_pmc_in_use(vcpu, msr_info->index);
+		return static_call(kvm_x86_pmu_set_msr)(vcpu, msr_info);
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+void kvm_pmu_reset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct kvm_pmu *pmu = vcpu_to_pmu(vcpu);
+	struct kvm_pmc *pmc;
+	int i;
+
+	pmu->need_cleanup = false;
+
+	bitmap_zero(pmu->reprogram_pmi, X86_PMC_IDX_MAX);
+
+	for_each_set_bit(i, pmu->all_valid_pmc_idx, X86_PMC_IDX_MAX) {
+		pmc = static_call(kvm_x86_pmu_pmc_idx_to_pmc)(pmu, i);
+		if (!pmc)
+			continue;
+
+		pmc_stop_counter(pmc);
+		pmc->counter = 0;
+
+		if (pmc_is_gp(pmc))
+			pmc->eventsel = 0;
+	}
+
+	pmu->fixed_ctr_ctrl = pmu->global_ctrl = pmu->global_status = 0;
+
+	static_call_cond(kvm_x86_pmu_reset)(vcpu);
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * Refresh the PMU configuration for the vCPU, e.g. if userspace changes CPUID
+ * and/or PERF_CAPABILITIES.
+ */
+void kvm_pmu_refresh(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	if (KVM_BUG_ON(kvm_vcpu_has_run(vcpu), vcpu->kvm))
+		return;
+
+	/*
+	 * Stop/release all existing counters/events before realizing the new
+	 * vPMU model.
+	 */
+	kvm_pmu_reset(vcpu);
+
+	bitmap_zero(vcpu_to_pmu(vcpu)->all_valid_pmc_idx, X86_PMC_IDX_MAX);
+	static_call(kvm_x86_pmu_refresh)(vcpu);
+}
+
+void kvm_pmu_init(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct kvm_pmu *pmu = vcpu_to_pmu(vcpu);
+
+	memset(pmu, 0, sizeof(*pmu));
+	static_call(kvm_x86_pmu_init)(vcpu);
+	pmu->event_count = 0;
+	pmu->need_cleanup = false;
+	kvm_pmu_refresh(vcpu);
+}
+
+/* Release perf_events for vPMCs that have been unused for a full time slice.  */
+void kvm_pmu_cleanup(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct kvm_pmu *pmu = vcpu_to_pmu(vcpu);
+	struct kvm_pmc *pmc = NULL;
+	DECLARE_BITMAP(bitmask, X86_PMC_IDX_MAX);
+	int i;
+
+	pmu->need_cleanup = false;
+
+	bitmap_andnot(bitmask, pmu->all_valid_pmc_idx,
+		      pmu->pmc_in_use, X86_PMC_IDX_MAX);
+
+	for_each_set_bit(i, bitmask, X86_PMC_IDX_MAX) {
+		pmc = static_call(kvm_x86_pmu_pmc_idx_to_pmc)(pmu, i);
+
+		if (pmc && pmc->perf_event && !pmc_speculative_in_use(pmc))
+			pmc_stop_counter(pmc);
+	}
+
+	static_call_cond(kvm_x86_pmu_cleanup)(vcpu);
+
+	bitmap_zero(pmu->pmc_in_use, X86_PMC_IDX_MAX);
+}
+
+void kvm_pmu_destroy(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	kvm_pmu_reset(vcpu);
+}
+
+static void kvm_pmu_incr_counter(struct kvm_pmc *pmc)
+{
+	pmc->prev_counter = pmc->counter;
+	pmc->counter = (pmc->counter + 1) & pmc_bitmask(pmc);
+	kvm_pmu_request_counter_reprogram(pmc);
+}
+
+static inline bool eventsel_match_perf_hw_id(struct kvm_pmc *pmc,
+	unsigned int perf_hw_id)
+{
+	return !((pmc->eventsel ^ perf_get_hw_event_config(perf_hw_id)) &
+		AMD64_RAW_EVENT_MASK_NB);
+}
+
+static inline bool cpl_is_matched(struct kvm_pmc *pmc)
+{
+	bool select_os, select_user;
+	u64 config;
+
+	if (pmc_is_gp(pmc)) {
+		config = pmc->eventsel;
+		select_os = config & ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL_OS;
+		select_user = config & ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL_USR;
+	} else {
+		config = fixed_ctrl_field(pmc_to_pmu(pmc)->fixed_ctr_ctrl,
+					  pmc->idx - INTEL_PMC_IDX_FIXED);
+		select_os = config & 0x1;
+		select_user = config & 0x2;
+	}
+
+	return (static_call(kvm_x86_get_cpl)(pmc->vcpu) == 0) ? select_os : select_user;
+}
+
+void kvm_pmu_trigger_event(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 perf_hw_id)
+{
+	struct kvm_pmu *pmu = vcpu_to_pmu(vcpu);
+	struct kvm_pmc *pmc;
+	int i;
+
+	for_each_set_bit(i, pmu->all_valid_pmc_idx, X86_PMC_IDX_MAX) {
+		pmc = static_call(kvm_x86_pmu_pmc_idx_to_pmc)(pmu, i);
+
+		if (!pmc || !pmc_event_is_allowed(pmc))
+			continue;
+
+		/* Ignore checks for edge detect, pin control, invert and CMASK bits */
+		if (eventsel_match_perf_hw_id(pmc, perf_hw_id) && cpl_is_matched(pmc))
+			kvm_pmu_incr_counter(pmc);
+	}
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_pmu_trigger_event);
+
+static bool is_masked_filter_valid(const struct kvm_x86_pmu_event_filter *filter)
+{
+	u64 mask = kvm_pmu_ops.EVENTSEL_EVENT |
+		   KVM_PMU_MASKED_ENTRY_UMASK_MASK |
+		   KVM_PMU_MASKED_ENTRY_UMASK_MATCH |
+		   KVM_PMU_MASKED_ENTRY_EXCLUDE;
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < filter->nevents; i++) {
+		if (filter->events[i] & ~mask)
+			return false;
+	}
+
+	return true;
+}
+
+static void convert_to_masked_filter(struct kvm_x86_pmu_event_filter *filter)
+{
+	int i, j;
+
+	for (i = 0, j = 0; i < filter->nevents; i++) {
+		/*
+		 * Skip events that are impossible to match against a guest
+		 * event.  When filtering, only the event select + unit mask
+		 * of the guest event is used.  To maintain backwards
+		 * compatibility, impossible filters can't be rejected :-(
+		 */
+		if (filter->events[i] & ~(kvm_pmu_ops.EVENTSEL_EVENT |
+					  ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL_UMASK))
+			continue;
+		/*
+		 * Convert userspace events to a common in-kernel event so
+		 * only one code path is needed to support both events.  For
+		 * the in-kernel events use masked events because they are
+		 * flexible enough to handle both cases.  To convert to masked
+		 * events all that's needed is to add an "all ones" umask_mask,
+		 * (unmasked filter events don't support EXCLUDE).
+		 */
+		filter->events[j++] = filter->events[i] |
+				      (0xFFULL << KVM_PMU_MASKED_ENTRY_UMASK_MASK_SHIFT);
+	}
+
+	filter->nevents = j;
+}
+
+static int prepare_filter_lists(struct kvm_x86_pmu_event_filter *filter)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	if (!(filter->flags & KVM_PMU_EVENT_FLAG_MASKED_EVENTS))
+		convert_to_masked_filter(filter);
+	else if (!is_masked_filter_valid(filter))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	/*
+	 * Sort entries by event select and includes vs. excludes so that all
+	 * entries for a given event select can be processed efficiently during
+	 * filtering.  The EXCLUDE flag uses a more significant bit than the
+	 * event select, and so the sorted list is also effectively split into
+	 * includes and excludes sub-lists.
+	 */
+	sort(&filter->events, filter->nevents, sizeof(filter->events[0]),
+	     filter_sort_cmp, NULL);
+
+	i = filter->nevents;
+	/* Find the first EXCLUDE event (only supported for masked events). */
+	if (filter->flags & KVM_PMU_EVENT_FLAG_MASKED_EVENTS) {
+		for (i = 0; i < filter->nevents; i++) {
+			if (filter->events[i] & KVM_PMU_MASKED_ENTRY_EXCLUDE)
+				break;
+		}
+	}
+
+	filter->nr_includes = i;
+	filter->nr_excludes = filter->nevents - filter->nr_includes;
+	filter->includes = filter->events;
+	filter->excludes = filter->events + filter->nr_includes;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int kvm_vm_ioctl_set_pmu_event_filter(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp)
+{
+	struct kvm_pmu_event_filter __user *user_filter = argp;
+	struct kvm_x86_pmu_event_filter *filter;
+	struct kvm_pmu_event_filter tmp;
+	struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu;
+	unsigned long i;
+	size_t size;
+	int r;
+
+	if (copy_from_user(&tmp, user_filter, sizeof(tmp)))
+		return -EFAULT;
+
+	if (tmp.action != KVM_PMU_EVENT_ALLOW &&
+	    tmp.action != KVM_PMU_EVENT_DENY)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (tmp.flags & ~KVM_PMU_EVENT_FLAGS_VALID_MASK)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (tmp.nevents > KVM_PMU_EVENT_FILTER_MAX_EVENTS)
+		return -E2BIG;
+
+	size = struct_size(filter, events, tmp.nevents);
+	filter = kzalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
+	if (!filter)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	filter->action = tmp.action;
+	filter->nevents = tmp.nevents;
+	filter->fixed_counter_bitmap = tmp.fixed_counter_bitmap;
+	filter->flags = tmp.flags;
+
+	r = -EFAULT;
+	if (copy_from_user(filter->events, user_filter->events,
+			   sizeof(filter->events[0]) * filter->nevents))
+		goto cleanup;
+
+	r = prepare_filter_lists(filter);
+	if (r)
+		goto cleanup;
+
+	mutex_lock(&kvm->lock);
+	filter = rcu_replace_pointer(kvm->arch.pmu_event_filter, filter,
+				     mutex_is_locked(&kvm->lock));
+	mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock);
+	synchronize_srcu_expedited(&kvm->srcu);
+
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(((struct kvm_pmu *)0)->reprogram_pmi) >
+		     sizeof(((struct kvm_pmu *)0)->__reprogram_pmi));
+
+	kvm_for_each_vcpu(i, vcpu, kvm)
+		atomic64_set(&vcpu_to_pmu(vcpu)->__reprogram_pmi, -1ull);
+
+	kvm_make_all_cpus_request(kvm, KVM_REQ_PMU);
+
+	r = 0;
+cleanup:
+	kfree(filter);
+	return r;
+}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/pmu.h b/arch/x86/kvm/pmu.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..a46aa9b25
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/pmu.h
@@ -0,0 +1,257 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+#ifndef __KVM_X86_PMU_H
+#define __KVM_X86_PMU_H
+
+#include <linux/nospec.h>
+
+#define vcpu_to_pmu(vcpu) (&(vcpu)->arch.pmu)
+#define pmu_to_vcpu(pmu)  (container_of((pmu), struct kvm_vcpu, arch.pmu))
+#define pmc_to_pmu(pmc)   (&(pmc)->vcpu->arch.pmu)
+
+#define MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE_PMU_RO_MASK (MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE_PEBS_UNAVAIL |	\
+					  MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE_BTS_UNAVAIL)
+
+/* retrieve the 4 bits for EN and PMI out of IA32_FIXED_CTR_CTRL */
+#define fixed_ctrl_field(ctrl_reg, idx) (((ctrl_reg) >> ((idx)*4)) & 0xf)
+
+#define VMWARE_BACKDOOR_PMC_HOST_TSC		0x10000
+#define VMWARE_BACKDOOR_PMC_REAL_TIME		0x10001
+#define VMWARE_BACKDOOR_PMC_APPARENT_TIME	0x10002
+
+struct kvm_pmu_ops {
+	bool (*hw_event_available)(struct kvm_pmc *pmc);
+	struct kvm_pmc *(*pmc_idx_to_pmc)(struct kvm_pmu *pmu, int pmc_idx);
+	struct kvm_pmc *(*rdpmc_ecx_to_pmc)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+		unsigned int idx, u64 *mask);
+	struct kvm_pmc *(*msr_idx_to_pmc)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 msr);
+	bool (*is_valid_rdpmc_ecx)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned int idx);
+	bool (*is_valid_msr)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 msr);
+	int (*get_msr)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info);
+	int (*set_msr)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info);
+	void (*refresh)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+	void (*init)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+	void (*reset)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+	void (*deliver_pmi)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+	void (*cleanup)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+
+	const u64 EVENTSEL_EVENT;
+	const int MAX_NR_GP_COUNTERS;
+	const int MIN_NR_GP_COUNTERS;
+};
+
+void kvm_pmu_ops_update(const struct kvm_pmu_ops *pmu_ops);
+
+static inline bool kvm_pmu_has_perf_global_ctrl(struct kvm_pmu *pmu)
+{
+	/*
+	 * Architecturally, Intel's SDM states that IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL is
+	 * supported if "CPUID.0AH: EAX[7:0] > 0", i.e. if the PMU version is
+	 * greater than zero.  However, KVM only exposes and emulates the MSR
+	 * to/for the guest if the guest PMU supports at least "Architectural
+	 * Performance Monitoring Version 2".
+	 *
+	 * AMD's version of PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL conveniently shows up with v2.
+	 */
+	return pmu->version > 1;
+}
+
+static inline u64 pmc_bitmask(struct kvm_pmc *pmc)
+{
+	struct kvm_pmu *pmu = pmc_to_pmu(pmc);
+
+	return pmu->counter_bitmask[pmc->type];
+}
+
+static inline u64 pmc_read_counter(struct kvm_pmc *pmc)
+{
+	u64 counter, enabled, running;
+
+	counter = pmc->counter;
+	if (pmc->perf_event && !pmc->is_paused)
+		counter += perf_event_read_value(pmc->perf_event,
+						 &enabled, &running);
+	/* FIXME: Scaling needed? */
+	return counter & pmc_bitmask(pmc);
+}
+
+static inline void pmc_write_counter(struct kvm_pmc *pmc, u64 val)
+{
+	pmc->counter += val - pmc_read_counter(pmc);
+	pmc->counter &= pmc_bitmask(pmc);
+}
+
+static inline bool pmc_is_gp(struct kvm_pmc *pmc)
+{
+	return pmc->type == KVM_PMC_GP;
+}
+
+static inline bool pmc_is_fixed(struct kvm_pmc *pmc)
+{
+	return pmc->type == KVM_PMC_FIXED;
+}
+
+static inline bool kvm_valid_perf_global_ctrl(struct kvm_pmu *pmu,
+						 u64 data)
+{
+	return !(pmu->global_ctrl_mask & data);
+}
+
+/* returns general purpose PMC with the specified MSR. Note that it can be
+ * used for both PERFCTRn and EVNTSELn; that is why it accepts base as a
+ * parameter to tell them apart.
+ */
+static inline struct kvm_pmc *get_gp_pmc(struct kvm_pmu *pmu, u32 msr,
+					 u32 base)
+{
+	if (msr >= base && msr < base + pmu->nr_arch_gp_counters) {
+		u32 index = array_index_nospec(msr - base,
+					       pmu->nr_arch_gp_counters);
+
+		return &pmu->gp_counters[index];
+	}
+
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+/* returns fixed PMC with the specified MSR */
+static inline struct kvm_pmc *get_fixed_pmc(struct kvm_pmu *pmu, u32 msr)
+{
+	int base = MSR_CORE_PERF_FIXED_CTR0;
+
+	if (msr >= base && msr < base + pmu->nr_arch_fixed_counters) {
+		u32 index = array_index_nospec(msr - base,
+					       pmu->nr_arch_fixed_counters);
+
+		return &pmu->fixed_counters[index];
+	}
+
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+static inline u64 get_sample_period(struct kvm_pmc *pmc, u64 counter_value)
+{
+	u64 sample_period = (-counter_value) & pmc_bitmask(pmc);
+
+	if (!sample_period)
+		sample_period = pmc_bitmask(pmc) + 1;
+	return sample_period;
+}
+
+static inline void pmc_update_sample_period(struct kvm_pmc *pmc)
+{
+	if (!pmc->perf_event || pmc->is_paused ||
+	    !is_sampling_event(pmc->perf_event))
+		return;
+
+	perf_event_period(pmc->perf_event,
+			  get_sample_period(pmc, pmc->counter));
+}
+
+static inline bool pmc_speculative_in_use(struct kvm_pmc *pmc)
+{
+	struct kvm_pmu *pmu = pmc_to_pmu(pmc);
+
+	if (pmc_is_fixed(pmc))
+		return fixed_ctrl_field(pmu->fixed_ctr_ctrl,
+					pmc->idx - INTEL_PMC_IDX_FIXED) & 0x3;
+
+	return pmc->eventsel & ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL_ENABLE;
+}
+
+extern struct x86_pmu_capability kvm_pmu_cap;
+
+static inline void kvm_init_pmu_capability(const struct kvm_pmu_ops *pmu_ops)
+{
+	bool is_intel = boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_INTEL;
+	int min_nr_gp_ctrs = pmu_ops->MIN_NR_GP_COUNTERS;
+
+	/*
+	 * Hybrid PMUs don't play nice with virtualization without careful
+	 * configuration by userspace, and KVM's APIs for reporting supported
+	 * vPMU features do not account for hybrid PMUs.  Disable vPMU support
+	 * for hybrid PMUs until KVM gains a way to let userspace opt-in.
+	 */
+	if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_HYBRID_CPU))
+		enable_pmu = false;
+
+	if (enable_pmu) {
+		perf_get_x86_pmu_capability(&kvm_pmu_cap);
+
+		/*
+		 * WARN if perf did NOT disable hardware PMU if the number of
+		 * architecturally required GP counters aren't present, i.e. if
+		 * there are a non-zero number of counters, but fewer than what
+		 * is architecturally required.
+		 */
+		if (!kvm_pmu_cap.num_counters_gp ||
+		    WARN_ON_ONCE(kvm_pmu_cap.num_counters_gp < min_nr_gp_ctrs))
+			enable_pmu = false;
+		else if (is_intel && !kvm_pmu_cap.version)
+			enable_pmu = false;
+	}
+
+	if (!enable_pmu) {
+		memset(&kvm_pmu_cap, 0, sizeof(kvm_pmu_cap));
+		return;
+	}
+
+	kvm_pmu_cap.version = min(kvm_pmu_cap.version, 2);
+	kvm_pmu_cap.num_counters_gp = min(kvm_pmu_cap.num_counters_gp,
+					  pmu_ops->MAX_NR_GP_COUNTERS);
+	kvm_pmu_cap.num_counters_fixed = min(kvm_pmu_cap.num_counters_fixed,
+					     KVM_PMC_MAX_FIXED);
+}
+
+static inline void kvm_pmu_request_counter_reprogram(struct kvm_pmc *pmc)
+{
+	set_bit(pmc->idx, pmc_to_pmu(pmc)->reprogram_pmi);
+	kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_PMU, pmc->vcpu);
+}
+
+static inline void reprogram_counters(struct kvm_pmu *pmu, u64 diff)
+{
+	int bit;
+
+	if (!diff)
+		return;
+
+	for_each_set_bit(bit, (unsigned long *)&diff, X86_PMC_IDX_MAX)
+		set_bit(bit, pmu->reprogram_pmi);
+	kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_PMU, pmu_to_vcpu(pmu));
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check if a PMC is enabled by comparing it against global_ctrl bits.
+ *
+ * If the vPMU doesn't have global_ctrl MSR, all vPMCs are enabled.
+ */
+static inline bool pmc_is_globally_enabled(struct kvm_pmc *pmc)
+{
+	struct kvm_pmu *pmu = pmc_to_pmu(pmc);
+
+	if (!kvm_pmu_has_perf_global_ctrl(pmu))
+		return true;
+
+	return test_bit(pmc->idx, (unsigned long *)&pmu->global_ctrl);
+}
+
+void kvm_pmu_deliver_pmi(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+void kvm_pmu_handle_event(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+int kvm_pmu_rdpmc(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned pmc, u64 *data);
+bool kvm_pmu_is_valid_rdpmc_ecx(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned int idx);
+bool kvm_pmu_is_valid_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 msr);
+int kvm_pmu_get_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info);
+int kvm_pmu_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info);
+void kvm_pmu_refresh(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+void kvm_pmu_reset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+void kvm_pmu_init(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+void kvm_pmu_cleanup(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+void kvm_pmu_destroy(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+int kvm_vm_ioctl_set_pmu_event_filter(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp);
+void kvm_pmu_trigger_event(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 perf_hw_id);
+
+bool is_vmware_backdoor_pmc(u32 pmc_idx);
+
+extern struct kvm_pmu_ops intel_pmu_ops;
+extern struct kvm_pmu_ops amd_pmu_ops;
+#endif /* __KVM_X86_PMU_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/reverse_cpuid.h b/arch/x86/kvm/reverse_cpuid.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..b81650678
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/reverse_cpuid.h
@@ -0,0 +1,224 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+#ifndef ARCH_X86_KVM_REVERSE_CPUID_H
+#define ARCH_X86_KVM_REVERSE_CPUID_H
+
+#include <uapi/asm/kvm.h>
+#include <asm/cpufeature.h>
+#include <asm/cpufeatures.h>
+
+/*
+ * Hardware-defined CPUID leafs that are either scattered by the kernel or are
+ * unknown to the kernel, but need to be directly used by KVM.  Note, these
+ * word values conflict with the kernel's "bug" caps, but KVM doesn't use those.
+ */
+enum kvm_only_cpuid_leafs {
+	CPUID_12_EAX	 = NCAPINTS,
+	CPUID_7_1_EDX,
+	CPUID_8000_0007_EDX,
+	CPUID_8000_0022_EAX,
+	NR_KVM_CPU_CAPS,
+
+	NKVMCAPINTS = NR_KVM_CPU_CAPS - NCAPINTS,
+};
+
+/*
+ * Define a KVM-only feature flag.
+ *
+ * For features that are scattered by cpufeatures.h, __feature_translate() also
+ * needs to be updated to translate the kernel-defined feature into the
+ * KVM-defined feature.
+ *
+ * For features that are 100% KVM-only, i.e. not defined by cpufeatures.h,
+ * forego the intermediate KVM_X86_FEATURE and directly define X86_FEATURE_* so
+ * that X86_FEATURE_* can be used in KVM.  No __feature_translate() handling is
+ * needed in this case.
+ */
+#define KVM_X86_FEATURE(w, f)		((w)*32 + (f))
+
+/* Intel-defined SGX sub-features, CPUID level 0x12 (EAX). */
+#define KVM_X86_FEATURE_SGX1		KVM_X86_FEATURE(CPUID_12_EAX, 0)
+#define KVM_X86_FEATURE_SGX2		KVM_X86_FEATURE(CPUID_12_EAX, 1)
+#define KVM_X86_FEATURE_SGX_EDECCSSA	KVM_X86_FEATURE(CPUID_12_EAX, 11)
+
+/* Intel-defined sub-features, CPUID level 0x00000007:1 (EDX) */
+#define X86_FEATURE_AVX_VNNI_INT8       KVM_X86_FEATURE(CPUID_7_1_EDX, 4)
+#define X86_FEATURE_AVX_NE_CONVERT      KVM_X86_FEATURE(CPUID_7_1_EDX, 5)
+#define X86_FEATURE_AMX_COMPLEX         KVM_X86_FEATURE(CPUID_7_1_EDX, 8)
+#define X86_FEATURE_PREFETCHITI         KVM_X86_FEATURE(CPUID_7_1_EDX, 14)
+
+/* CPUID level 0x80000007 (EDX). */
+#define KVM_X86_FEATURE_CONSTANT_TSC	KVM_X86_FEATURE(CPUID_8000_0007_EDX, 8)
+
+/* CPUID level 0x80000022 (EAX) */
+#define KVM_X86_FEATURE_PERFMON_V2	KVM_X86_FEATURE(CPUID_8000_0022_EAX, 0)
+
+struct cpuid_reg {
+	u32 function;
+	u32 index;
+	int reg;
+};
+
+static const struct cpuid_reg reverse_cpuid[] = {
+	[CPUID_1_EDX]         = {         1, 0, CPUID_EDX},
+	[CPUID_8000_0001_EDX] = {0x80000001, 0, CPUID_EDX},
+	[CPUID_8086_0001_EDX] = {0x80860001, 0, CPUID_EDX},
+	[CPUID_1_ECX]         = {         1, 0, CPUID_ECX},
+	[CPUID_C000_0001_EDX] = {0xc0000001, 0, CPUID_EDX},
+	[CPUID_8000_0001_ECX] = {0x80000001, 0, CPUID_ECX},
+	[CPUID_7_0_EBX]       = {         7, 0, CPUID_EBX},
+	[CPUID_D_1_EAX]       = {       0xd, 1, CPUID_EAX},
+	[CPUID_8000_0008_EBX] = {0x80000008, 0, CPUID_EBX},
+	[CPUID_6_EAX]         = {         6, 0, CPUID_EAX},
+	[CPUID_8000_000A_EDX] = {0x8000000a, 0, CPUID_EDX},
+	[CPUID_7_ECX]         = {         7, 0, CPUID_ECX},
+	[CPUID_8000_0007_EBX] = {0x80000007, 0, CPUID_EBX},
+	[CPUID_7_EDX]         = {         7, 0, CPUID_EDX},
+	[CPUID_7_1_EAX]       = {         7, 1, CPUID_EAX},
+	[CPUID_12_EAX]        = {0x00000012, 0, CPUID_EAX},
+	[CPUID_8000_001F_EAX] = {0x8000001f, 0, CPUID_EAX},
+	[CPUID_7_1_EDX]       = {         7, 1, CPUID_EDX},
+	[CPUID_8000_0007_EDX] = {0x80000007, 0, CPUID_EDX},
+	[CPUID_8000_0021_EAX] = {0x80000021, 0, CPUID_EAX},
+	[CPUID_8000_0022_EAX] = {0x80000022, 0, CPUID_EAX},
+};
+
+/*
+ * Reverse CPUID and its derivatives can only be used for hardware-defined
+ * feature words, i.e. words whose bits directly correspond to a CPUID leaf.
+ * Retrieving a feature bit or masking guest CPUID from a Linux-defined word
+ * is nonsensical as the bit number/mask is an arbitrary software-defined value
+ * and can't be used by KVM to query/control guest capabilities.  And obviously
+ * the leaf being queried must have an entry in the lookup table.
+ */
+static __always_inline void reverse_cpuid_check(unsigned int x86_leaf)
+{
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(x86_leaf == CPUID_LNX_1);
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(x86_leaf == CPUID_LNX_2);
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(x86_leaf == CPUID_LNX_3);
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(x86_leaf == CPUID_LNX_4);
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(x86_leaf >= ARRAY_SIZE(reverse_cpuid));
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(reverse_cpuid[x86_leaf].function == 0);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Translate feature bits that are scattered in the kernel's cpufeatures word
+ * into KVM feature words that align with hardware's definitions.
+ */
+static __always_inline u32 __feature_translate(int x86_feature)
+{
+	if (x86_feature == X86_FEATURE_SGX1)
+		return KVM_X86_FEATURE_SGX1;
+	else if (x86_feature == X86_FEATURE_SGX2)
+		return KVM_X86_FEATURE_SGX2;
+	else if (x86_feature == X86_FEATURE_SGX_EDECCSSA)
+		return KVM_X86_FEATURE_SGX_EDECCSSA;
+	else if (x86_feature == X86_FEATURE_CONSTANT_TSC)
+		return KVM_X86_FEATURE_CONSTANT_TSC;
+	else if (x86_feature == X86_FEATURE_PERFMON_V2)
+		return KVM_X86_FEATURE_PERFMON_V2;
+
+	return x86_feature;
+}
+
+static __always_inline u32 __feature_leaf(int x86_feature)
+{
+	return __feature_translate(x86_feature) / 32;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Retrieve the bit mask from an X86_FEATURE_* definition.  Features contain
+ * the hardware defined bit number (stored in bits 4:0) and a software defined
+ * "word" (stored in bits 31:5).  The word is used to index into arrays of
+ * bit masks that hold the per-cpu feature capabilities, e.g. this_cpu_has().
+ */
+static __always_inline u32 __feature_bit(int x86_feature)
+{
+	x86_feature = __feature_translate(x86_feature);
+
+	reverse_cpuid_check(x86_feature / 32);
+	return 1 << (x86_feature & 31);
+}
+
+#define feature_bit(name)  __feature_bit(X86_FEATURE_##name)
+
+static __always_inline struct cpuid_reg x86_feature_cpuid(unsigned int x86_feature)
+{
+	unsigned int x86_leaf = __feature_leaf(x86_feature);
+
+	reverse_cpuid_check(x86_leaf);
+	return reverse_cpuid[x86_leaf];
+}
+
+static __always_inline u32 *__cpuid_entry_get_reg(struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *entry,
+						  u32 reg)
+{
+	switch (reg) {
+	case CPUID_EAX:
+		return &entry->eax;
+	case CPUID_EBX:
+		return &entry->ebx;
+	case CPUID_ECX:
+		return &entry->ecx;
+	case CPUID_EDX:
+		return &entry->edx;
+	default:
+		BUILD_BUG();
+		return NULL;
+	}
+}
+
+static __always_inline u32 *cpuid_entry_get_reg(struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *entry,
+						unsigned int x86_feature)
+{
+	const struct cpuid_reg cpuid = x86_feature_cpuid(x86_feature);
+
+	return __cpuid_entry_get_reg(entry, cpuid.reg);
+}
+
+static __always_inline u32 cpuid_entry_get(struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *entry,
+					   unsigned int x86_feature)
+{
+	u32 *reg = cpuid_entry_get_reg(entry, x86_feature);
+
+	return *reg & __feature_bit(x86_feature);
+}
+
+static __always_inline bool cpuid_entry_has(struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *entry,
+					    unsigned int x86_feature)
+{
+	return cpuid_entry_get(entry, x86_feature);
+}
+
+static __always_inline void cpuid_entry_clear(struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *entry,
+					      unsigned int x86_feature)
+{
+	u32 *reg = cpuid_entry_get_reg(entry, x86_feature);
+
+	*reg &= ~__feature_bit(x86_feature);
+}
+
+static __always_inline void cpuid_entry_set(struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *entry,
+					    unsigned int x86_feature)
+{
+	u32 *reg = cpuid_entry_get_reg(entry, x86_feature);
+
+	*reg |= __feature_bit(x86_feature);
+}
+
+static __always_inline void cpuid_entry_change(struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *entry,
+					       unsigned int x86_feature,
+					       bool set)
+{
+	u32 *reg = cpuid_entry_get_reg(entry, x86_feature);
+
+	/*
+	 * Open coded instead of using cpuid_entry_{clear,set}() to coerce the
+	 * compiler into using CMOV instead of Jcc when possible.
+	 */
+	if (set)
+		*reg |= __feature_bit(x86_feature);
+	else
+		*reg &= ~__feature_bit(x86_feature);
+}
+
+#endif /* ARCH_X86_KVM_REVERSE_CPUID_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/smm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/smm.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..b42111a24
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/smm.c
@@ -0,0 +1,648 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
+
+#include <linux/kvm_host.h>
+#include "x86.h"
+#include "kvm_cache_regs.h"
+#include "kvm_emulate.h"
+#include "smm.h"
+#include "cpuid.h"
+#include "trace.h"
+
+#define CHECK_SMRAM32_OFFSET(field, offset) \
+	ASSERT_STRUCT_OFFSET(struct kvm_smram_state_32, field, offset - 0xFE00)
+
+#define CHECK_SMRAM64_OFFSET(field, offset) \
+	ASSERT_STRUCT_OFFSET(struct kvm_smram_state_64, field, offset - 0xFE00)
+
+static void check_smram_offsets(void)
+{
+	/* 32 bit SMRAM image */
+	CHECK_SMRAM32_OFFSET(reserved1,			0xFE00);
+	CHECK_SMRAM32_OFFSET(smbase,			0xFEF8);
+	CHECK_SMRAM32_OFFSET(smm_revision,		0xFEFC);
+	CHECK_SMRAM32_OFFSET(io_inst_restart,		0xFF00);
+	CHECK_SMRAM32_OFFSET(auto_hlt_restart,		0xFF02);
+	CHECK_SMRAM32_OFFSET(io_restart_rdi,		0xFF04);
+	CHECK_SMRAM32_OFFSET(io_restart_rcx,		0xFF08);
+	CHECK_SMRAM32_OFFSET(io_restart_rsi,		0xFF0C);
+	CHECK_SMRAM32_OFFSET(io_restart_rip,		0xFF10);
+	CHECK_SMRAM32_OFFSET(cr4,			0xFF14);
+	CHECK_SMRAM32_OFFSET(reserved2,			0xFF18);
+	CHECK_SMRAM32_OFFSET(int_shadow,		0xFF1A);
+	CHECK_SMRAM32_OFFSET(reserved3,			0xFF1B);
+	CHECK_SMRAM32_OFFSET(ds,			0xFF2C);
+	CHECK_SMRAM32_OFFSET(fs,			0xFF38);
+	CHECK_SMRAM32_OFFSET(gs,			0xFF44);
+	CHECK_SMRAM32_OFFSET(idtr,			0xFF50);
+	CHECK_SMRAM32_OFFSET(tr,			0xFF5C);
+	CHECK_SMRAM32_OFFSET(gdtr,			0xFF6C);
+	CHECK_SMRAM32_OFFSET(ldtr,			0xFF78);
+	CHECK_SMRAM32_OFFSET(es,			0xFF84);
+	CHECK_SMRAM32_OFFSET(cs,			0xFF90);
+	CHECK_SMRAM32_OFFSET(ss,			0xFF9C);
+	CHECK_SMRAM32_OFFSET(es_sel,			0xFFA8);
+	CHECK_SMRAM32_OFFSET(cs_sel,			0xFFAC);
+	CHECK_SMRAM32_OFFSET(ss_sel,			0xFFB0);
+	CHECK_SMRAM32_OFFSET(ds_sel,			0xFFB4);
+	CHECK_SMRAM32_OFFSET(fs_sel,			0xFFB8);
+	CHECK_SMRAM32_OFFSET(gs_sel,			0xFFBC);
+	CHECK_SMRAM32_OFFSET(ldtr_sel,			0xFFC0);
+	CHECK_SMRAM32_OFFSET(tr_sel,			0xFFC4);
+	CHECK_SMRAM32_OFFSET(dr7,			0xFFC8);
+	CHECK_SMRAM32_OFFSET(dr6,			0xFFCC);
+	CHECK_SMRAM32_OFFSET(gprs,			0xFFD0);
+	CHECK_SMRAM32_OFFSET(eip,			0xFFF0);
+	CHECK_SMRAM32_OFFSET(eflags,			0xFFF4);
+	CHECK_SMRAM32_OFFSET(cr3,			0xFFF8);
+	CHECK_SMRAM32_OFFSET(cr0,			0xFFFC);
+
+	/* 64 bit SMRAM image */
+	CHECK_SMRAM64_OFFSET(es,			0xFE00);
+	CHECK_SMRAM64_OFFSET(cs,			0xFE10);
+	CHECK_SMRAM64_OFFSET(ss,			0xFE20);
+	CHECK_SMRAM64_OFFSET(ds,			0xFE30);
+	CHECK_SMRAM64_OFFSET(fs,			0xFE40);
+	CHECK_SMRAM64_OFFSET(gs,			0xFE50);
+	CHECK_SMRAM64_OFFSET(gdtr,			0xFE60);
+	CHECK_SMRAM64_OFFSET(ldtr,			0xFE70);
+	CHECK_SMRAM64_OFFSET(idtr,			0xFE80);
+	CHECK_SMRAM64_OFFSET(tr,			0xFE90);
+	CHECK_SMRAM64_OFFSET(io_restart_rip,		0xFEA0);
+	CHECK_SMRAM64_OFFSET(io_restart_rcx,		0xFEA8);
+	CHECK_SMRAM64_OFFSET(io_restart_rsi,		0xFEB0);
+	CHECK_SMRAM64_OFFSET(io_restart_rdi,		0xFEB8);
+	CHECK_SMRAM64_OFFSET(io_restart_dword,		0xFEC0);
+	CHECK_SMRAM64_OFFSET(reserved1,			0xFEC4);
+	CHECK_SMRAM64_OFFSET(io_inst_restart,		0xFEC8);
+	CHECK_SMRAM64_OFFSET(auto_hlt_restart,		0xFEC9);
+	CHECK_SMRAM64_OFFSET(amd_nmi_mask,		0xFECA);
+	CHECK_SMRAM64_OFFSET(int_shadow,		0xFECB);
+	CHECK_SMRAM64_OFFSET(reserved2,			0xFECC);
+	CHECK_SMRAM64_OFFSET(efer,			0xFED0);
+	CHECK_SMRAM64_OFFSET(svm_guest_flag,		0xFED8);
+	CHECK_SMRAM64_OFFSET(svm_guest_vmcb_gpa,	0xFEE0);
+	CHECK_SMRAM64_OFFSET(svm_guest_virtual_int,	0xFEE8);
+	CHECK_SMRAM64_OFFSET(reserved3,			0xFEF0);
+	CHECK_SMRAM64_OFFSET(smm_revison,		0xFEFC);
+	CHECK_SMRAM64_OFFSET(smbase,			0xFF00);
+	CHECK_SMRAM64_OFFSET(reserved4,			0xFF04);
+	CHECK_SMRAM64_OFFSET(ssp,			0xFF18);
+	CHECK_SMRAM64_OFFSET(svm_guest_pat,		0xFF20);
+	CHECK_SMRAM64_OFFSET(svm_host_efer,		0xFF28);
+	CHECK_SMRAM64_OFFSET(svm_host_cr4,		0xFF30);
+	CHECK_SMRAM64_OFFSET(svm_host_cr3,		0xFF38);
+	CHECK_SMRAM64_OFFSET(svm_host_cr0,		0xFF40);
+	CHECK_SMRAM64_OFFSET(cr4,			0xFF48);
+	CHECK_SMRAM64_OFFSET(cr3,			0xFF50);
+	CHECK_SMRAM64_OFFSET(cr0,			0xFF58);
+	CHECK_SMRAM64_OFFSET(dr7,			0xFF60);
+	CHECK_SMRAM64_OFFSET(dr6,			0xFF68);
+	CHECK_SMRAM64_OFFSET(rflags,			0xFF70);
+	CHECK_SMRAM64_OFFSET(rip,			0xFF78);
+	CHECK_SMRAM64_OFFSET(gprs,			0xFF80);
+
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(union kvm_smram) != 512);
+}
+
+#undef CHECK_SMRAM64_OFFSET
+#undef CHECK_SMRAM32_OFFSET
+
+
+void kvm_smm_changed(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool entering_smm)
+{
+	trace_kvm_smm_transition(vcpu->vcpu_id, vcpu->arch.smbase, entering_smm);
+
+	if (entering_smm) {
+		vcpu->arch.hflags |= HF_SMM_MASK;
+	} else {
+		vcpu->arch.hflags &= ~(HF_SMM_MASK | HF_SMM_INSIDE_NMI_MASK);
+
+		/* Process a latched INIT or SMI, if any.  */
+		kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_EVENT, vcpu);
+
+		/*
+		 * Even if KVM_SET_SREGS2 loaded PDPTRs out of band,
+		 * on SMM exit we still need to reload them from
+		 * guest memory
+		 */
+		vcpu->arch.pdptrs_from_userspace = false;
+	}
+
+	kvm_mmu_reset_context(vcpu);
+}
+
+void process_smi(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	vcpu->arch.smi_pending = true;
+	kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_EVENT, vcpu);
+}
+
+static u32 enter_smm_get_segment_flags(struct kvm_segment *seg)
+{
+	u32 flags = 0;
+	flags |= seg->g       << 23;
+	flags |= seg->db      << 22;
+	flags |= seg->l       << 21;
+	flags |= seg->avl     << 20;
+	flags |= seg->present << 15;
+	flags |= seg->dpl     << 13;
+	flags |= seg->s       << 12;
+	flags |= seg->type    << 8;
+	return flags;
+}
+
+static void enter_smm_save_seg_32(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+				  struct kvm_smm_seg_state_32 *state,
+				  u32 *selector, int n)
+{
+	struct kvm_segment seg;
+
+	kvm_get_segment(vcpu, &seg, n);
+	*selector = seg.selector;
+	state->base = seg.base;
+	state->limit = seg.limit;
+	state->flags = enter_smm_get_segment_flags(&seg);
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+static void enter_smm_save_seg_64(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+				  struct kvm_smm_seg_state_64 *state,
+				  int n)
+{
+	struct kvm_segment seg;
+
+	kvm_get_segment(vcpu, &seg, n);
+	state->selector = seg.selector;
+	state->attributes = enter_smm_get_segment_flags(&seg) >> 8;
+	state->limit = seg.limit;
+	state->base = seg.base;
+}
+#endif
+
+static void enter_smm_save_state_32(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+				    struct kvm_smram_state_32 *smram)
+{
+	struct desc_ptr dt;
+	unsigned long val;
+	int i;
+
+	smram->cr0     = kvm_read_cr0(vcpu);
+	smram->cr3     = kvm_read_cr3(vcpu);
+	smram->eflags  = kvm_get_rflags(vcpu);
+	smram->eip     = kvm_rip_read(vcpu);
+
+	for (i = 0; i < 8; i++)
+		smram->gprs[i] = kvm_register_read_raw(vcpu, i);
+
+	kvm_get_dr(vcpu, 6, &val);
+	smram->dr6     = (u32)val;
+	kvm_get_dr(vcpu, 7, &val);
+	smram->dr7     = (u32)val;
+
+	enter_smm_save_seg_32(vcpu, &smram->tr, &smram->tr_sel, VCPU_SREG_TR);
+	enter_smm_save_seg_32(vcpu, &smram->ldtr, &smram->ldtr_sel, VCPU_SREG_LDTR);
+
+	static_call(kvm_x86_get_gdt)(vcpu, &dt);
+	smram->gdtr.base = dt.address;
+	smram->gdtr.limit = dt.size;
+
+	static_call(kvm_x86_get_idt)(vcpu, &dt);
+	smram->idtr.base = dt.address;
+	smram->idtr.limit = dt.size;
+
+	enter_smm_save_seg_32(vcpu, &smram->es, &smram->es_sel, VCPU_SREG_ES);
+	enter_smm_save_seg_32(vcpu, &smram->cs, &smram->cs_sel, VCPU_SREG_CS);
+	enter_smm_save_seg_32(vcpu, &smram->ss, &smram->ss_sel, VCPU_SREG_SS);
+
+	enter_smm_save_seg_32(vcpu, &smram->ds, &smram->ds_sel, VCPU_SREG_DS);
+	enter_smm_save_seg_32(vcpu, &smram->fs, &smram->fs_sel, VCPU_SREG_FS);
+	enter_smm_save_seg_32(vcpu, &smram->gs, &smram->gs_sel, VCPU_SREG_GS);
+
+	smram->cr4 = kvm_read_cr4(vcpu);
+	smram->smm_revision = 0x00020000;
+	smram->smbase = vcpu->arch.smbase;
+
+	smram->int_shadow = static_call(kvm_x86_get_interrupt_shadow)(vcpu);
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+static void enter_smm_save_state_64(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+				    struct kvm_smram_state_64 *smram)
+{
+	struct desc_ptr dt;
+	unsigned long val;
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
+		smram->gprs[15 - i] = kvm_register_read_raw(vcpu, i);
+
+	smram->rip    = kvm_rip_read(vcpu);
+	smram->rflags = kvm_get_rflags(vcpu);
+
+
+	kvm_get_dr(vcpu, 6, &val);
+	smram->dr6 = val;
+	kvm_get_dr(vcpu, 7, &val);
+	smram->dr7 = val;
+
+	smram->cr0 = kvm_read_cr0(vcpu);
+	smram->cr3 = kvm_read_cr3(vcpu);
+	smram->cr4 = kvm_read_cr4(vcpu);
+
+	smram->smbase = vcpu->arch.smbase;
+	smram->smm_revison = 0x00020064;
+
+	smram->efer = vcpu->arch.efer;
+
+	enter_smm_save_seg_64(vcpu, &smram->tr, VCPU_SREG_TR);
+
+	static_call(kvm_x86_get_idt)(vcpu, &dt);
+	smram->idtr.limit = dt.size;
+	smram->idtr.base = dt.address;
+
+	enter_smm_save_seg_64(vcpu, &smram->ldtr, VCPU_SREG_LDTR);
+
+	static_call(kvm_x86_get_gdt)(vcpu, &dt);
+	smram->gdtr.limit = dt.size;
+	smram->gdtr.base = dt.address;
+
+	enter_smm_save_seg_64(vcpu, &smram->es, VCPU_SREG_ES);
+	enter_smm_save_seg_64(vcpu, &smram->cs, VCPU_SREG_CS);
+	enter_smm_save_seg_64(vcpu, &smram->ss, VCPU_SREG_SS);
+	enter_smm_save_seg_64(vcpu, &smram->ds, VCPU_SREG_DS);
+	enter_smm_save_seg_64(vcpu, &smram->fs, VCPU_SREG_FS);
+	enter_smm_save_seg_64(vcpu, &smram->gs, VCPU_SREG_GS);
+
+	smram->int_shadow = static_call(kvm_x86_get_interrupt_shadow)(vcpu);
+}
+#endif
+
+void enter_smm(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct kvm_segment cs, ds;
+	struct desc_ptr dt;
+	unsigned long cr0;
+	union kvm_smram smram;
+
+	check_smram_offsets();
+
+	memset(smram.bytes, 0, sizeof(smram.bytes));
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+	if (guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_LM))
+		enter_smm_save_state_64(vcpu, &smram.smram64);
+	else
+#endif
+		enter_smm_save_state_32(vcpu, &smram.smram32);
+
+	/*
+	 * Give enter_smm() a chance to make ISA-specific changes to the vCPU
+	 * state (e.g. leave guest mode) after we've saved the state into the
+	 * SMM state-save area.
+	 *
+	 * Kill the VM in the unlikely case of failure, because the VM
+	 * can be in undefined state in this case.
+	 */
+	if (static_call(kvm_x86_enter_smm)(vcpu, &smram))
+		goto error;
+
+	kvm_smm_changed(vcpu, true);
+
+	if (kvm_vcpu_write_guest(vcpu, vcpu->arch.smbase + 0xfe00, &smram, sizeof(smram)))
+		goto error;
+
+	if (static_call(kvm_x86_get_nmi_mask)(vcpu))
+		vcpu->arch.hflags |= HF_SMM_INSIDE_NMI_MASK;
+	else
+		static_call(kvm_x86_set_nmi_mask)(vcpu, true);
+
+	kvm_set_rflags(vcpu, X86_EFLAGS_FIXED);
+	kvm_rip_write(vcpu, 0x8000);
+
+	static_call(kvm_x86_set_interrupt_shadow)(vcpu, 0);
+
+	cr0 = vcpu->arch.cr0 & ~(X86_CR0_PE | X86_CR0_EM | X86_CR0_TS | X86_CR0_PG);
+	static_call(kvm_x86_set_cr0)(vcpu, cr0);
+	vcpu->arch.cr0 = cr0;
+
+	static_call(kvm_x86_set_cr4)(vcpu, 0);
+
+	/* Undocumented: IDT limit is set to zero on entry to SMM.  */
+	dt.address = dt.size = 0;
+	static_call(kvm_x86_set_idt)(vcpu, &dt);
+
+	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(kvm_set_dr(vcpu, 7, DR7_FIXED_1)))
+		goto error;
+
+	cs.selector = (vcpu->arch.smbase >> 4) & 0xffff;
+	cs.base = vcpu->arch.smbase;
+
+	ds.selector = 0;
+	ds.base = 0;
+
+	cs.limit    = ds.limit = 0xffffffff;
+	cs.type     = ds.type = 0x3;
+	cs.dpl      = ds.dpl = 0;
+	cs.db       = ds.db = 0;
+	cs.s        = ds.s = 1;
+	cs.l        = ds.l = 0;
+	cs.g        = ds.g = 1;
+	cs.avl      = ds.avl = 0;
+	cs.present  = ds.present = 1;
+	cs.unusable = ds.unusable = 0;
+	cs.padding  = ds.padding = 0;
+
+	kvm_set_segment(vcpu, &cs, VCPU_SREG_CS);
+	kvm_set_segment(vcpu, &ds, VCPU_SREG_DS);
+	kvm_set_segment(vcpu, &ds, VCPU_SREG_ES);
+	kvm_set_segment(vcpu, &ds, VCPU_SREG_FS);
+	kvm_set_segment(vcpu, &ds, VCPU_SREG_GS);
+	kvm_set_segment(vcpu, &ds, VCPU_SREG_SS);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+	if (guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_LM))
+		if (static_call(kvm_x86_set_efer)(vcpu, 0))
+			goto error;
+#endif
+
+	kvm_update_cpuid_runtime(vcpu);
+	kvm_mmu_reset_context(vcpu);
+	return;
+error:
+	kvm_vm_dead(vcpu->kvm);
+}
+
+static void rsm_set_desc_flags(struct kvm_segment *desc, u32 flags)
+{
+	desc->g    = (flags >> 23) & 1;
+	desc->db   = (flags >> 22) & 1;
+	desc->l    = (flags >> 21) & 1;
+	desc->avl  = (flags >> 20) & 1;
+	desc->present = (flags >> 15) & 1;
+	desc->dpl  = (flags >> 13) & 3;
+	desc->s    = (flags >> 12) & 1;
+	desc->type = (flags >>  8) & 15;
+
+	desc->unusable = !desc->present;
+	desc->padding = 0;
+}
+
+static int rsm_load_seg_32(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+			   const struct kvm_smm_seg_state_32 *state,
+			   u16 selector, int n)
+{
+	struct kvm_segment desc;
+
+	desc.selector =           selector;
+	desc.base =               state->base;
+	desc.limit =              state->limit;
+	rsm_set_desc_flags(&desc, state->flags);
+	kvm_set_segment(vcpu, &desc, n);
+	return X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+
+static int rsm_load_seg_64(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+			   const struct kvm_smm_seg_state_64 *state,
+			   int n)
+{
+	struct kvm_segment desc;
+
+	desc.selector =           state->selector;
+	rsm_set_desc_flags(&desc, state->attributes << 8);
+	desc.limit =              state->limit;
+	desc.base =               state->base;
+	kvm_set_segment(vcpu, &desc, n);
+	return X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
+}
+#endif
+
+static int rsm_enter_protected_mode(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+				    u64 cr0, u64 cr3, u64 cr4)
+{
+	int bad;
+	u64 pcid;
+
+	/* In order to later set CR4.PCIDE, CR3[11:0] must be zero.  */
+	pcid = 0;
+	if (cr4 & X86_CR4_PCIDE) {
+		pcid = cr3 & 0xfff;
+		cr3 &= ~0xfff;
+	}
+
+	bad = kvm_set_cr3(vcpu, cr3);
+	if (bad)
+		return X86EMUL_UNHANDLEABLE;
+
+	/*
+	 * First enable PAE, long mode needs it before CR0.PG = 1 is set.
+	 * Then enable protected mode.	However, PCID cannot be enabled
+	 * if EFER.LMA=0, so set it separately.
+	 */
+	bad = kvm_set_cr4(vcpu, cr4 & ~X86_CR4_PCIDE);
+	if (bad)
+		return X86EMUL_UNHANDLEABLE;
+
+	bad = kvm_set_cr0(vcpu, cr0);
+	if (bad)
+		return X86EMUL_UNHANDLEABLE;
+
+	if (cr4 & X86_CR4_PCIDE) {
+		bad = kvm_set_cr4(vcpu, cr4);
+		if (bad)
+			return X86EMUL_UNHANDLEABLE;
+		if (pcid) {
+			bad = kvm_set_cr3(vcpu, cr3 | pcid);
+			if (bad)
+				return X86EMUL_UNHANDLEABLE;
+		}
+
+	}
+
+	return X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
+}
+
+static int rsm_load_state_32(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt,
+			     const struct kvm_smram_state_32 *smstate)
+{
+	struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = ctxt->vcpu;
+	struct desc_ptr dt;
+	int i, r;
+
+	ctxt->eflags =  smstate->eflags | X86_EFLAGS_FIXED;
+	ctxt->_eip =  smstate->eip;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < 8; i++)
+		*reg_write(ctxt, i) = smstate->gprs[i];
+
+	if (kvm_set_dr(vcpu, 6, smstate->dr6))
+		return X86EMUL_UNHANDLEABLE;
+	if (kvm_set_dr(vcpu, 7, smstate->dr7))
+		return X86EMUL_UNHANDLEABLE;
+
+	rsm_load_seg_32(vcpu, &smstate->tr, smstate->tr_sel, VCPU_SREG_TR);
+	rsm_load_seg_32(vcpu, &smstate->ldtr, smstate->ldtr_sel, VCPU_SREG_LDTR);
+
+	dt.address =               smstate->gdtr.base;
+	dt.size =                  smstate->gdtr.limit;
+	static_call(kvm_x86_set_gdt)(vcpu, &dt);
+
+	dt.address =               smstate->idtr.base;
+	dt.size =                  smstate->idtr.limit;
+	static_call(kvm_x86_set_idt)(vcpu, &dt);
+
+	rsm_load_seg_32(vcpu, &smstate->es, smstate->es_sel, VCPU_SREG_ES);
+	rsm_load_seg_32(vcpu, &smstate->cs, smstate->cs_sel, VCPU_SREG_CS);
+	rsm_load_seg_32(vcpu, &smstate->ss, smstate->ss_sel, VCPU_SREG_SS);
+
+	rsm_load_seg_32(vcpu, &smstate->ds, smstate->ds_sel, VCPU_SREG_DS);
+	rsm_load_seg_32(vcpu, &smstate->fs, smstate->fs_sel, VCPU_SREG_FS);
+	rsm_load_seg_32(vcpu, &smstate->gs, smstate->gs_sel, VCPU_SREG_GS);
+
+	vcpu->arch.smbase = smstate->smbase;
+
+	r = rsm_enter_protected_mode(vcpu, smstate->cr0,
+					smstate->cr3, smstate->cr4);
+
+	if (r != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
+		return r;
+
+	static_call(kvm_x86_set_interrupt_shadow)(vcpu, 0);
+	ctxt->interruptibility = (u8)smstate->int_shadow;
+
+	return r;
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+static int rsm_load_state_64(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt,
+			     const struct kvm_smram_state_64 *smstate)
+{
+	struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = ctxt->vcpu;
+	struct desc_ptr dt;
+	int i, r;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
+		*reg_write(ctxt, i) = smstate->gprs[15 - i];
+
+	ctxt->_eip   = smstate->rip;
+	ctxt->eflags = smstate->rflags | X86_EFLAGS_FIXED;
+
+	if (kvm_set_dr(vcpu, 6, smstate->dr6))
+		return X86EMUL_UNHANDLEABLE;
+	if (kvm_set_dr(vcpu, 7, smstate->dr7))
+		return X86EMUL_UNHANDLEABLE;
+
+	vcpu->arch.smbase =         smstate->smbase;
+
+	if (kvm_set_msr(vcpu, MSR_EFER, smstate->efer & ~EFER_LMA))
+		return X86EMUL_UNHANDLEABLE;
+
+	rsm_load_seg_64(vcpu, &smstate->tr, VCPU_SREG_TR);
+
+	dt.size =                   smstate->idtr.limit;
+	dt.address =                smstate->idtr.base;
+	static_call(kvm_x86_set_idt)(vcpu, &dt);
+
+	rsm_load_seg_64(vcpu, &smstate->ldtr, VCPU_SREG_LDTR);
+
+	dt.size =                   smstate->gdtr.limit;
+	dt.address =                smstate->gdtr.base;
+	static_call(kvm_x86_set_gdt)(vcpu, &dt);
+
+	r = rsm_enter_protected_mode(vcpu, smstate->cr0, smstate->cr3, smstate->cr4);
+	if (r != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
+		return r;
+
+	rsm_load_seg_64(vcpu, &smstate->es, VCPU_SREG_ES);
+	rsm_load_seg_64(vcpu, &smstate->cs, VCPU_SREG_CS);
+	rsm_load_seg_64(vcpu, &smstate->ss, VCPU_SREG_SS);
+	rsm_load_seg_64(vcpu, &smstate->ds, VCPU_SREG_DS);
+	rsm_load_seg_64(vcpu, &smstate->fs, VCPU_SREG_FS);
+	rsm_load_seg_64(vcpu, &smstate->gs, VCPU_SREG_GS);
+
+	static_call(kvm_x86_set_interrupt_shadow)(vcpu, 0);
+	ctxt->interruptibility = (u8)smstate->int_shadow;
+
+	return X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
+}
+#endif
+
+int emulator_leave_smm(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
+{
+	struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = ctxt->vcpu;
+	unsigned long cr0;
+	union kvm_smram smram;
+	u64 smbase;
+	int ret;
+
+	smbase = vcpu->arch.smbase;
+
+	ret = kvm_vcpu_read_guest(vcpu, smbase + 0xfe00, smram.bytes, sizeof(smram));
+	if (ret < 0)
+		return X86EMUL_UNHANDLEABLE;
+
+	if ((vcpu->arch.hflags & HF_SMM_INSIDE_NMI_MASK) == 0)
+		static_call(kvm_x86_set_nmi_mask)(vcpu, false);
+
+	kvm_smm_changed(vcpu, false);
+
+	/*
+	 * Get back to real mode, to prepare a safe state in which to load
+	 * CR0/CR3/CR4/EFER.  It's all a bit more complicated if the vCPU
+	 * supports long mode.
+	 */
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+	if (guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_LM)) {
+		struct kvm_segment cs_desc;
+		unsigned long cr4;
+
+		/* Zero CR4.PCIDE before CR0.PG.  */
+		cr4 = kvm_read_cr4(vcpu);
+		if (cr4 & X86_CR4_PCIDE)
+			kvm_set_cr4(vcpu, cr4 & ~X86_CR4_PCIDE);
+
+		/* A 32-bit code segment is required to clear EFER.LMA.  */
+		memset(&cs_desc, 0, sizeof(cs_desc));
+		cs_desc.type = 0xb;
+		cs_desc.s = cs_desc.g = cs_desc.present = 1;
+		kvm_set_segment(vcpu, &cs_desc, VCPU_SREG_CS);
+	}
+#endif
+
+	/* For the 64-bit case, this will clear EFER.LMA.  */
+	cr0 = kvm_read_cr0(vcpu);
+	if (cr0 & X86_CR0_PE)
+		kvm_set_cr0(vcpu, cr0 & ~(X86_CR0_PG | X86_CR0_PE));
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+	if (guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_LM)) {
+		unsigned long cr4, efer;
+
+		/* Clear CR4.PAE before clearing EFER.LME. */
+		cr4 = kvm_read_cr4(vcpu);
+		if (cr4 & X86_CR4_PAE)
+			kvm_set_cr4(vcpu, cr4 & ~X86_CR4_PAE);
+
+		/* And finally go back to 32-bit mode.  */
+		efer = 0;
+		kvm_set_msr(vcpu, MSR_EFER, efer);
+	}
+#endif
+
+	/*
+	 * Give leave_smm() a chance to make ISA-specific changes to the vCPU
+	 * state (e.g. enter guest mode) before loading state from the SMM
+	 * state-save area.
+	 */
+	if (static_call(kvm_x86_leave_smm)(vcpu, &smram))
+		return X86EMUL_UNHANDLEABLE;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+	if (guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_LM))
+		return rsm_load_state_64(ctxt, &smram.smram64);
+	else
+#endif
+		return rsm_load_state_32(ctxt, &smram.smram32);
+}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/smm.h b/arch/x86/kvm/smm.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..a1cf2ac5b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/smm.h
@@ -0,0 +1,168 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+#ifndef ASM_KVM_SMM_H
+#define ASM_KVM_SMM_H
+
+#include <linux/build_bug.h>
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_SMM
+
+
+/*
+ * 32 bit KVM's emulated SMM layout. Based on Intel P6 layout
+ * (https://www.sandpile.org/x86/smm.htm).
+ */
+
+struct kvm_smm_seg_state_32 {
+	u32 flags;
+	u32 limit;
+	u32 base;
+} __packed;
+
+struct kvm_smram_state_32 {
+	u32 reserved1[62];
+	u32 smbase;
+	u32 smm_revision;
+	u16 io_inst_restart;
+	u16 auto_hlt_restart;
+	u32 io_restart_rdi;
+	u32 io_restart_rcx;
+	u32 io_restart_rsi;
+	u32 io_restart_rip;
+	u32 cr4;
+
+	/* A20M#, CPL, shutdown and other reserved/undocumented fields */
+	u16 reserved2;
+	u8 int_shadow; /* KVM extension */
+	u8 reserved3[17];
+
+	struct kvm_smm_seg_state_32 ds;
+	struct kvm_smm_seg_state_32 fs;
+	struct kvm_smm_seg_state_32 gs;
+	struct kvm_smm_seg_state_32 idtr; /* IDTR has only base and limit */
+	struct kvm_smm_seg_state_32 tr;
+	u32 reserved;
+	struct kvm_smm_seg_state_32 gdtr; /* GDTR has only base and limit */
+	struct kvm_smm_seg_state_32 ldtr;
+	struct kvm_smm_seg_state_32 es;
+	struct kvm_smm_seg_state_32 cs;
+	struct kvm_smm_seg_state_32 ss;
+
+	u32 es_sel;
+	u32 cs_sel;
+	u32 ss_sel;
+	u32 ds_sel;
+	u32 fs_sel;
+	u32 gs_sel;
+	u32 ldtr_sel;
+	u32 tr_sel;
+
+	u32 dr7;
+	u32 dr6;
+	u32 gprs[8]; /* GPRS in the "natural" X86 order (EAX/ECX/EDX.../EDI) */
+	u32 eip;
+	u32 eflags;
+	u32 cr3;
+	u32 cr0;
+} __packed;
+
+
+/* 64 bit KVM's emulated SMM layout. Based on AMD64 layout */
+
+struct kvm_smm_seg_state_64 {
+	u16 selector;
+	u16 attributes;
+	u32 limit;
+	u64 base;
+};
+
+struct kvm_smram_state_64 {
+
+	struct kvm_smm_seg_state_64 es;
+	struct kvm_smm_seg_state_64 cs;
+	struct kvm_smm_seg_state_64 ss;
+	struct kvm_smm_seg_state_64 ds;
+	struct kvm_smm_seg_state_64 fs;
+	struct kvm_smm_seg_state_64 gs;
+	struct kvm_smm_seg_state_64 gdtr; /* GDTR has only base and limit*/
+	struct kvm_smm_seg_state_64 ldtr;
+	struct kvm_smm_seg_state_64 idtr; /* IDTR has only base and limit*/
+	struct kvm_smm_seg_state_64 tr;
+
+	/* I/O restart and auto halt restart are not implemented by KVM */
+	u64 io_restart_rip;
+	u64 io_restart_rcx;
+	u64 io_restart_rsi;
+	u64 io_restart_rdi;
+	u32 io_restart_dword;
+	u32 reserved1;
+	u8 io_inst_restart;
+	u8 auto_hlt_restart;
+	u8 amd_nmi_mask; /* Documented in AMD BKDG as NMI mask, not used by KVM */
+	u8 int_shadow;
+	u32 reserved2;
+
+	u64 efer;
+
+	/*
+	 * Two fields below are implemented on AMD only, to store
+	 * SVM guest vmcb address if the #SMI was received while in the guest mode.
+	 */
+	u64 svm_guest_flag;
+	u64 svm_guest_vmcb_gpa;
+	u64 svm_guest_virtual_int; /* unknown purpose, not implemented */
+
+	u32 reserved3[3];
+	u32 smm_revison;
+	u32 smbase;
+	u32 reserved4[5];
+
+	/* ssp and svm_* fields below are not implemented by KVM */
+	u64 ssp;
+	u64 svm_guest_pat;
+	u64 svm_host_efer;
+	u64 svm_host_cr4;
+	u64 svm_host_cr3;
+	u64 svm_host_cr0;
+
+	u64 cr4;
+	u64 cr3;
+	u64 cr0;
+	u64 dr7;
+	u64 dr6;
+	u64 rflags;
+	u64 rip;
+	u64 gprs[16]; /* GPRS in a reversed "natural" X86 order (R15/R14/../RCX/RAX.) */
+};
+
+union kvm_smram {
+	struct kvm_smram_state_64 smram64;
+	struct kvm_smram_state_32 smram32;
+	u8 bytes[512];
+};
+
+static inline int kvm_inject_smi(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_SMI, vcpu);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static inline bool is_smm(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	return vcpu->arch.hflags & HF_SMM_MASK;
+}
+
+void kvm_smm_changed(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool in_smm);
+void enter_smm(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+int emulator_leave_smm(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt);
+void process_smi(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+#else
+static inline int kvm_inject_smi(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) { return -ENOTTY; }
+static inline bool is_smm(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) { return false; }
+
+/*
+ * emulator_leave_smm is used as a function pointer, so the
+ * stub is defined in x86.c.
+ */
+#endif
+
+#endif
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/avic.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/avic.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..4b74ea91f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/avic.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1221 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * Kernel-based Virtual Machine driver for Linux
+ *
+ * AMD SVM support
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2006 Qumranet, Inc.
+ * Copyright 2010 Red Hat, Inc. and/or its affiliates.
+ *
+ * Authors:
+ *   Yaniv Kamay  <yaniv@qumranet.com>
+ *   Avi Kivity   <avi@qumranet.com>
+ */
+
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
+
+#include <linux/kvm_types.h>
+#include <linux/hashtable.h>
+#include <linux/amd-iommu.h>
+#include <linux/kvm_host.h>
+
+#include <asm/irq_remapping.h>
+
+#include "trace.h"
+#include "lapic.h"
+#include "x86.h"
+#include "irq.h"
+#include "svm.h"
+
+/*
+ * Encode the arbitrary VM ID and the vCPU's default APIC ID, i.e the vCPU ID,
+ * into the GATag so that KVM can retrieve the correct vCPU from a GALog entry
+ * if an interrupt can't be delivered, e.g. because the vCPU isn't running.
+ *
+ * For the vCPU ID, use however many bits are currently allowed for the max
+ * guest physical APIC ID (limited by the size of the physical ID table), and
+ * use whatever bits remain to assign arbitrary AVIC IDs to VMs.  Note, the
+ * size of the GATag is defined by hardware (32 bits), but is an opaque value
+ * as far as hardware is concerned.
+ */
+#define AVIC_VCPU_ID_MASK		AVIC_PHYSICAL_MAX_INDEX_MASK
+
+#define AVIC_VM_ID_SHIFT		HWEIGHT32(AVIC_PHYSICAL_MAX_INDEX_MASK)
+#define AVIC_VM_ID_MASK			(GENMASK(31, AVIC_VM_ID_SHIFT) >> AVIC_VM_ID_SHIFT)
+
+#define AVIC_GATAG_TO_VMID(x)		((x >> AVIC_VM_ID_SHIFT) & AVIC_VM_ID_MASK)
+#define AVIC_GATAG_TO_VCPUID(x)		(x & AVIC_VCPU_ID_MASK)
+
+#define __AVIC_GATAG(vm_id, vcpu_id)	((((vm_id) & AVIC_VM_ID_MASK) << AVIC_VM_ID_SHIFT) | \
+					 ((vcpu_id) & AVIC_VCPU_ID_MASK))
+#define AVIC_GATAG(vm_id, vcpu_id)					\
+({									\
+	u32 ga_tag = __AVIC_GATAG(vm_id, vcpu_id);			\
+									\
+	WARN_ON_ONCE(AVIC_GATAG_TO_VCPUID(ga_tag) != (vcpu_id));	\
+	WARN_ON_ONCE(AVIC_GATAG_TO_VMID(ga_tag) != (vm_id));		\
+	ga_tag;								\
+})
+
+static_assert(__AVIC_GATAG(AVIC_VM_ID_MASK, AVIC_VCPU_ID_MASK) == -1u);
+
+static bool force_avic;
+module_param_unsafe(force_avic, bool, 0444);
+
+/* Note:
+ * This hash table is used to map VM_ID to a struct kvm_svm,
+ * when handling AMD IOMMU GALOG notification to schedule in
+ * a particular vCPU.
+ */
+#define SVM_VM_DATA_HASH_BITS	8
+static DEFINE_HASHTABLE(svm_vm_data_hash, SVM_VM_DATA_HASH_BITS);
+static u32 next_vm_id = 0;
+static bool next_vm_id_wrapped = 0;
+static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(svm_vm_data_hash_lock);
+bool x2avic_enabled;
+
+/*
+ * This is a wrapper of struct amd_iommu_ir_data.
+ */
+struct amd_svm_iommu_ir {
+	struct list_head node;	/* Used by SVM for per-vcpu ir_list */
+	void *data;		/* Storing pointer to struct amd_ir_data */
+};
+
+static void avic_activate_vmcb(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
+{
+	struct vmcb *vmcb = svm->vmcb01.ptr;
+
+	vmcb->control.int_ctl &= ~(AVIC_ENABLE_MASK | X2APIC_MODE_MASK);
+	vmcb->control.avic_physical_id &= ~AVIC_PHYSICAL_MAX_INDEX_MASK;
+
+	vmcb->control.int_ctl |= AVIC_ENABLE_MASK;
+
+	/*
+	 * Note: KVM supports hybrid-AVIC mode, where KVM emulates x2APIC MSR
+	 * accesses, while interrupt injection to a running vCPU can be
+	 * achieved using AVIC doorbell.  KVM disables the APIC access page
+	 * (deletes the memslot) if any vCPU has x2APIC enabled, thus enabling
+	 * AVIC in hybrid mode activates only the doorbell mechanism.
+	 */
+	if (x2avic_enabled && apic_x2apic_mode(svm->vcpu.arch.apic)) {
+		vmcb->control.int_ctl |= X2APIC_MODE_MASK;
+		vmcb->control.avic_physical_id |= X2AVIC_MAX_PHYSICAL_ID;
+		/* Disabling MSR intercept for x2APIC registers */
+		svm_set_x2apic_msr_interception(svm, false);
+	} else {
+		/*
+		 * Flush the TLB, the guest may have inserted a non-APIC
+		 * mapping into the TLB while AVIC was disabled.
+		 */
+		kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_TLB_FLUSH_CURRENT, &svm->vcpu);
+
+		/* For xAVIC and hybrid-xAVIC modes */
+		vmcb->control.avic_physical_id |= AVIC_MAX_PHYSICAL_ID;
+		/* Enabling MSR intercept for x2APIC registers */
+		svm_set_x2apic_msr_interception(svm, true);
+	}
+}
+
+static void avic_deactivate_vmcb(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
+{
+	struct vmcb *vmcb = svm->vmcb01.ptr;
+
+	vmcb->control.int_ctl &= ~(AVIC_ENABLE_MASK | X2APIC_MODE_MASK);
+	vmcb->control.avic_physical_id &= ~AVIC_PHYSICAL_MAX_INDEX_MASK;
+
+	/*
+	 * If running nested and the guest uses its own MSR bitmap, there
+	 * is no need to update L0's msr bitmap
+	 */
+	if (is_guest_mode(&svm->vcpu) &&
+	    vmcb12_is_intercept(&svm->nested.ctl, INTERCEPT_MSR_PROT))
+		return;
+
+	/* Enabling MSR intercept for x2APIC registers */
+	svm_set_x2apic_msr_interception(svm, true);
+}
+
+/* Note:
+ * This function is called from IOMMU driver to notify
+ * SVM to schedule in a particular vCPU of a particular VM.
+ */
+int avic_ga_log_notifier(u32 ga_tag)
+{
+	unsigned long flags;
+	struct kvm_svm *kvm_svm;
+	struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = NULL;
+	u32 vm_id = AVIC_GATAG_TO_VMID(ga_tag);
+	u32 vcpu_id = AVIC_GATAG_TO_VCPUID(ga_tag);
+
+	pr_debug("SVM: %s: vm_id=%#x, vcpu_id=%#x\n", __func__, vm_id, vcpu_id);
+	trace_kvm_avic_ga_log(vm_id, vcpu_id);
+
+	spin_lock_irqsave(&svm_vm_data_hash_lock, flags);
+	hash_for_each_possible(svm_vm_data_hash, kvm_svm, hnode, vm_id) {
+		if (kvm_svm->avic_vm_id != vm_id)
+			continue;
+		vcpu = kvm_get_vcpu_by_id(&kvm_svm->kvm, vcpu_id);
+		break;
+	}
+	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&svm_vm_data_hash_lock, flags);
+
+	/* Note:
+	 * At this point, the IOMMU should have already set the pending
+	 * bit in the vAPIC backing page. So, we just need to schedule
+	 * in the vcpu.
+	 */
+	if (vcpu)
+		kvm_vcpu_wake_up(vcpu);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+void avic_vm_destroy(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+	unsigned long flags;
+	struct kvm_svm *kvm_svm = to_kvm_svm(kvm);
+
+	if (!enable_apicv)
+		return;
+
+	if (kvm_svm->avic_logical_id_table_page)
+		__free_page(kvm_svm->avic_logical_id_table_page);
+	if (kvm_svm->avic_physical_id_table_page)
+		__free_page(kvm_svm->avic_physical_id_table_page);
+
+	spin_lock_irqsave(&svm_vm_data_hash_lock, flags);
+	hash_del(&kvm_svm->hnode);
+	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&svm_vm_data_hash_lock, flags);
+}
+
+int avic_vm_init(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+	unsigned long flags;
+	int err = -ENOMEM;
+	struct kvm_svm *kvm_svm = to_kvm_svm(kvm);
+	struct kvm_svm *k2;
+	struct page *p_page;
+	struct page *l_page;
+	u32 vm_id;
+
+	if (!enable_apicv)
+		return 0;
+
+	/* Allocating physical APIC ID table (4KB) */
+	p_page = alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT | __GFP_ZERO);
+	if (!p_page)
+		goto free_avic;
+
+	kvm_svm->avic_physical_id_table_page = p_page;
+
+	/* Allocating logical APIC ID table (4KB) */
+	l_page = alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT | __GFP_ZERO);
+	if (!l_page)
+		goto free_avic;
+
+	kvm_svm->avic_logical_id_table_page = l_page;
+
+	spin_lock_irqsave(&svm_vm_data_hash_lock, flags);
+ again:
+	vm_id = next_vm_id = (next_vm_id + 1) & AVIC_VM_ID_MASK;
+	if (vm_id == 0) { /* id is 1-based, zero is not okay */
+		next_vm_id_wrapped = 1;
+		goto again;
+	}
+	/* Is it still in use? Only possible if wrapped at least once */
+	if (next_vm_id_wrapped) {
+		hash_for_each_possible(svm_vm_data_hash, k2, hnode, vm_id) {
+			if (k2->avic_vm_id == vm_id)
+				goto again;
+		}
+	}
+	kvm_svm->avic_vm_id = vm_id;
+	hash_add(svm_vm_data_hash, &kvm_svm->hnode, kvm_svm->avic_vm_id);
+	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&svm_vm_data_hash_lock, flags);
+
+	return 0;
+
+free_avic:
+	avic_vm_destroy(kvm);
+	return err;
+}
+
+void avic_init_vmcb(struct vcpu_svm *svm, struct vmcb *vmcb)
+{
+	struct kvm_svm *kvm_svm = to_kvm_svm(svm->vcpu.kvm);
+	phys_addr_t bpa = __sme_set(page_to_phys(svm->avic_backing_page));
+	phys_addr_t lpa = __sme_set(page_to_phys(kvm_svm->avic_logical_id_table_page));
+	phys_addr_t ppa = __sme_set(page_to_phys(kvm_svm->avic_physical_id_table_page));
+
+	vmcb->control.avic_backing_page = bpa & AVIC_HPA_MASK;
+	vmcb->control.avic_logical_id = lpa & AVIC_HPA_MASK;
+	vmcb->control.avic_physical_id = ppa & AVIC_HPA_MASK;
+	vmcb->control.avic_vapic_bar = APIC_DEFAULT_PHYS_BASE & VMCB_AVIC_APIC_BAR_MASK;
+
+	if (kvm_apicv_activated(svm->vcpu.kvm))
+		avic_activate_vmcb(svm);
+	else
+		avic_deactivate_vmcb(svm);
+}
+
+static u64 *avic_get_physical_id_entry(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+				       unsigned int index)
+{
+	u64 *avic_physical_id_table;
+	struct kvm_svm *kvm_svm = to_kvm_svm(vcpu->kvm);
+
+	if ((!x2avic_enabled && index > AVIC_MAX_PHYSICAL_ID) ||
+	    (index > X2AVIC_MAX_PHYSICAL_ID))
+		return NULL;
+
+	avic_physical_id_table = page_address(kvm_svm->avic_physical_id_table_page);
+
+	return &avic_physical_id_table[index];
+}
+
+static int avic_init_backing_page(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	u64 *entry, new_entry;
+	int id = vcpu->vcpu_id;
+	struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+
+	if ((!x2avic_enabled && id > AVIC_MAX_PHYSICAL_ID) ||
+	    (id > X2AVIC_MAX_PHYSICAL_ID))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (!vcpu->arch.apic->regs)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (kvm_apicv_activated(vcpu->kvm)) {
+		int ret;
+
+		/*
+		 * Note, AVIC hardware walks the nested page table to check
+		 * permissions, but does not use the SPA address specified in
+		 * the leaf SPTE since it uses address in the AVIC_BACKING_PAGE
+		 * pointer field of the VMCB.
+		 */
+		ret = kvm_alloc_apic_access_page(vcpu->kvm);
+		if (ret)
+			return ret;
+	}
+
+	svm->avic_backing_page = virt_to_page(vcpu->arch.apic->regs);
+
+	/* Setting AVIC backing page address in the phy APIC ID table */
+	entry = avic_get_physical_id_entry(vcpu, id);
+	if (!entry)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	new_entry = __sme_set((page_to_phys(svm->avic_backing_page) &
+			      AVIC_PHYSICAL_ID_ENTRY_BACKING_PAGE_MASK) |
+			      AVIC_PHYSICAL_ID_ENTRY_VALID_MASK);
+	WRITE_ONCE(*entry, new_entry);
+
+	svm->avic_physical_id_cache = entry;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+void avic_ring_doorbell(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	/*
+	 * Note, the vCPU could get migrated to a different pCPU at any point,
+	 * which could result in signalling the wrong/previous pCPU.  But if
+	 * that happens the vCPU is guaranteed to do a VMRUN (after being
+	 * migrated) and thus will process pending interrupts, i.e. a doorbell
+	 * is not needed (and the spurious one is harmless).
+	 */
+	int cpu = READ_ONCE(vcpu->cpu);
+
+	if (cpu != get_cpu()) {
+		wrmsrl(MSR_AMD64_SVM_AVIC_DOORBELL, kvm_cpu_get_apicid(cpu));
+		trace_kvm_avic_doorbell(vcpu->vcpu_id, kvm_cpu_get_apicid(cpu));
+	}
+	put_cpu();
+}
+
+
+static void avic_kick_vcpu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 icrl)
+{
+	vcpu->arch.apic->irr_pending = true;
+	svm_complete_interrupt_delivery(vcpu,
+					icrl & APIC_MODE_MASK,
+					icrl & APIC_INT_LEVELTRIG,
+					icrl & APIC_VECTOR_MASK);
+}
+
+static void avic_kick_vcpu_by_physical_id(struct kvm *kvm, u32 physical_id,
+					  u32 icrl)
+{
+	/*
+	 * KVM inhibits AVIC if any vCPU ID diverges from the vCPUs APIC ID,
+	 * i.e. APIC ID == vCPU ID.
+	 */
+	struct kvm_vcpu *target_vcpu = kvm_get_vcpu_by_id(kvm, physical_id);
+
+	/* Once again, nothing to do if the target vCPU doesn't exist. */
+	if (unlikely(!target_vcpu))
+		return;
+
+	avic_kick_vcpu(target_vcpu, icrl);
+}
+
+static void avic_kick_vcpu_by_logical_id(struct kvm *kvm, u32 *avic_logical_id_table,
+					 u32 logid_index, u32 icrl)
+{
+	u32 physical_id;
+
+	if (avic_logical_id_table) {
+		u32 logid_entry = avic_logical_id_table[logid_index];
+
+		/* Nothing to do if the logical destination is invalid. */
+		if (unlikely(!(logid_entry & AVIC_LOGICAL_ID_ENTRY_VALID_MASK)))
+			return;
+
+		physical_id = logid_entry &
+			      AVIC_LOGICAL_ID_ENTRY_GUEST_PHYSICAL_ID_MASK;
+	} else {
+		/*
+		 * For x2APIC, the logical APIC ID is a read-only value that is
+		 * derived from the x2APIC ID, thus the x2APIC ID can be found
+		 * by reversing the calculation (stored in logid_index).  Note,
+		 * bits 31:20 of the x2APIC ID aren't propagated to the logical
+		 * ID, but KVM limits the x2APIC ID limited to KVM_MAX_VCPU_IDS.
+		 */
+		physical_id = logid_index;
+	}
+
+	avic_kick_vcpu_by_physical_id(kvm, physical_id, icrl);
+}
+
+/*
+ * A fast-path version of avic_kick_target_vcpus(), which attempts to match
+ * destination APIC ID to vCPU without looping through all vCPUs.
+ */
+static int avic_kick_target_vcpus_fast(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_lapic *source,
+				       u32 icrl, u32 icrh, u32 index)
+{
+	int dest_mode = icrl & APIC_DEST_MASK;
+	int shorthand = icrl & APIC_SHORT_MASK;
+	struct kvm_svm *kvm_svm = to_kvm_svm(kvm);
+	u32 dest;
+
+	if (shorthand != APIC_DEST_NOSHORT)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (apic_x2apic_mode(source))
+		dest = icrh;
+	else
+		dest = GET_XAPIC_DEST_FIELD(icrh);
+
+	if (dest_mode == APIC_DEST_PHYSICAL) {
+		/* broadcast destination, use slow path */
+		if (apic_x2apic_mode(source) && dest == X2APIC_BROADCAST)
+			return -EINVAL;
+		if (!apic_x2apic_mode(source) && dest == APIC_BROADCAST)
+			return -EINVAL;
+
+		if (WARN_ON_ONCE(dest != index))
+			return -EINVAL;
+
+		avic_kick_vcpu_by_physical_id(kvm, dest, icrl);
+	} else {
+		u32 *avic_logical_id_table;
+		unsigned long bitmap, i;
+		u32 cluster;
+
+		if (apic_x2apic_mode(source)) {
+			/* 16 bit dest mask, 16 bit cluster id */
+			bitmap = dest & 0xFFFF;
+			cluster = (dest >> 16) << 4;
+		} else if (kvm_lapic_get_reg(source, APIC_DFR) == APIC_DFR_FLAT) {
+			/* 8 bit dest mask*/
+			bitmap = dest;
+			cluster = 0;
+		} else {
+			/* 4 bit desk mask, 4 bit cluster id */
+			bitmap = dest & 0xF;
+			cluster = (dest >> 4) << 2;
+		}
+
+		/* Nothing to do if there are no destinations in the cluster. */
+		if (unlikely(!bitmap))
+			return 0;
+
+		if (apic_x2apic_mode(source))
+			avic_logical_id_table = NULL;
+		else
+			avic_logical_id_table = page_address(kvm_svm->avic_logical_id_table_page);
+
+		/*
+		 * AVIC is inhibited if vCPUs aren't mapped 1:1 with logical
+		 * IDs, thus each bit in the destination is guaranteed to map
+		 * to at most one vCPU.
+		 */
+		for_each_set_bit(i, &bitmap, 16)
+			avic_kick_vcpu_by_logical_id(kvm, avic_logical_id_table,
+						     cluster + i, icrl);
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void avic_kick_target_vcpus(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_lapic *source,
+				   u32 icrl, u32 icrh, u32 index)
+{
+	u32 dest = apic_x2apic_mode(source) ? icrh : GET_XAPIC_DEST_FIELD(icrh);
+	unsigned long i;
+	struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu;
+
+	if (!avic_kick_target_vcpus_fast(kvm, source, icrl, icrh, index))
+		return;
+
+	trace_kvm_avic_kick_vcpu_slowpath(icrh, icrl, index);
+
+	/*
+	 * Wake any target vCPUs that are blocking, i.e. waiting for a wake
+	 * event.  There's no need to signal doorbells, as hardware has handled
+	 * vCPUs that were in guest at the time of the IPI, and vCPUs that have
+	 * since entered the guest will have processed pending IRQs at VMRUN.
+	 */
+	kvm_for_each_vcpu(i, vcpu, kvm) {
+		if (kvm_apic_match_dest(vcpu, source, icrl & APIC_SHORT_MASK,
+					dest, icrl & APIC_DEST_MASK))
+			avic_kick_vcpu(vcpu, icrl);
+	}
+}
+
+int avic_incomplete_ipi_interception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+	u32 icrh = svm->vmcb->control.exit_info_1 >> 32;
+	u32 icrl = svm->vmcb->control.exit_info_1;
+	u32 id = svm->vmcb->control.exit_info_2 >> 32;
+	u32 index = svm->vmcb->control.exit_info_2 & 0x1FF;
+	struct kvm_lapic *apic = vcpu->arch.apic;
+
+	trace_kvm_avic_incomplete_ipi(vcpu->vcpu_id, icrh, icrl, id, index);
+
+	switch (id) {
+	case AVIC_IPI_FAILURE_INVALID_TARGET:
+	case AVIC_IPI_FAILURE_INVALID_INT_TYPE:
+		/*
+		 * Emulate IPIs that are not handled by AVIC hardware, which
+		 * only virtualizes Fixed, Edge-Triggered INTRs, and falls over
+		 * if _any_ targets are invalid, e.g. if the logical mode mask
+		 * is a superset of running vCPUs.
+		 *
+		 * The exit is a trap, e.g. ICR holds the correct value and RIP
+		 * has been advanced, KVM is responsible only for emulating the
+		 * IPI.  Sadly, hardware may sometimes leave the BUSY flag set,
+		 * in which case KVM needs to emulate the ICR write as well in
+		 * order to clear the BUSY flag.
+		 */
+		if (icrl & APIC_ICR_BUSY)
+			kvm_apic_write_nodecode(vcpu, APIC_ICR);
+		else
+			kvm_apic_send_ipi(apic, icrl, icrh);
+		break;
+	case AVIC_IPI_FAILURE_TARGET_NOT_RUNNING:
+		/*
+		 * At this point, we expect that the AVIC HW has already
+		 * set the appropriate IRR bits on the valid target
+		 * vcpus. So, we just need to kick the appropriate vcpu.
+		 */
+		avic_kick_target_vcpus(vcpu->kvm, apic, icrl, icrh, index);
+		break;
+	case AVIC_IPI_FAILURE_INVALID_BACKING_PAGE:
+		WARN_ONCE(1, "Invalid backing page\n");
+		break;
+	case AVIC_IPI_FAILURE_INVALID_IPI_VECTOR:
+		/* Invalid IPI with vector < 16 */
+		break;
+	default:
+		vcpu_unimpl(vcpu, "Unknown avic incomplete IPI interception\n");
+	}
+
+	return 1;
+}
+
+unsigned long avic_vcpu_get_apicv_inhibit_reasons(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	if (is_guest_mode(vcpu))
+		return APICV_INHIBIT_REASON_NESTED;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static u32 *avic_get_logical_id_entry(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 ldr, bool flat)
+{
+	struct kvm_svm *kvm_svm = to_kvm_svm(vcpu->kvm);
+	u32 *logical_apic_id_table;
+	u32 cluster, index;
+
+	ldr = GET_APIC_LOGICAL_ID(ldr);
+
+	if (flat) {
+		cluster = 0;
+	} else {
+		cluster = (ldr >> 4);
+		if (cluster >= 0xf)
+			return NULL;
+		ldr &= 0xf;
+	}
+	if (!ldr || !is_power_of_2(ldr))
+		return NULL;
+
+	index = __ffs(ldr);
+	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(index > 7))
+		return NULL;
+	index += (cluster << 2);
+
+	logical_apic_id_table = (u32 *) page_address(kvm_svm->avic_logical_id_table_page);
+
+	return &logical_apic_id_table[index];
+}
+
+static void avic_ldr_write(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u8 g_physical_id, u32 ldr)
+{
+	bool flat;
+	u32 *entry, new_entry;
+
+	flat = kvm_lapic_get_reg(vcpu->arch.apic, APIC_DFR) == APIC_DFR_FLAT;
+	entry = avic_get_logical_id_entry(vcpu, ldr, flat);
+	if (!entry)
+		return;
+
+	new_entry = READ_ONCE(*entry);
+	new_entry &= ~AVIC_LOGICAL_ID_ENTRY_GUEST_PHYSICAL_ID_MASK;
+	new_entry |= (g_physical_id & AVIC_LOGICAL_ID_ENTRY_GUEST_PHYSICAL_ID_MASK);
+	new_entry |= AVIC_LOGICAL_ID_ENTRY_VALID_MASK;
+	WRITE_ONCE(*entry, new_entry);
+}
+
+static void avic_invalidate_logical_id_entry(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+	bool flat = svm->dfr_reg == APIC_DFR_FLAT;
+	u32 *entry;
+
+	/* Note: x2AVIC does not use logical APIC ID table */
+	if (apic_x2apic_mode(vcpu->arch.apic))
+		return;
+
+	entry = avic_get_logical_id_entry(vcpu, svm->ldr_reg, flat);
+	if (entry)
+		clear_bit(AVIC_LOGICAL_ID_ENTRY_VALID_BIT, (unsigned long *)entry);
+}
+
+static void avic_handle_ldr_update(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+	u32 ldr = kvm_lapic_get_reg(vcpu->arch.apic, APIC_LDR);
+	u32 id = kvm_xapic_id(vcpu->arch.apic);
+
+	/* AVIC does not support LDR update for x2APIC */
+	if (apic_x2apic_mode(vcpu->arch.apic))
+		return;
+
+	if (ldr == svm->ldr_reg)
+		return;
+
+	avic_invalidate_logical_id_entry(vcpu);
+
+	svm->ldr_reg = ldr;
+	avic_ldr_write(vcpu, id, ldr);
+}
+
+static void avic_handle_dfr_update(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+	u32 dfr = kvm_lapic_get_reg(vcpu->arch.apic, APIC_DFR);
+
+	if (svm->dfr_reg == dfr)
+		return;
+
+	avic_invalidate_logical_id_entry(vcpu);
+	svm->dfr_reg = dfr;
+}
+
+static int avic_unaccel_trap_write(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	u32 offset = to_svm(vcpu)->vmcb->control.exit_info_1 &
+				AVIC_UNACCEL_ACCESS_OFFSET_MASK;
+
+	switch (offset) {
+	case APIC_LDR:
+		avic_handle_ldr_update(vcpu);
+		break;
+	case APIC_DFR:
+		avic_handle_dfr_update(vcpu);
+		break;
+	case APIC_RRR:
+		/* Ignore writes to Read Remote Data, it's read-only. */
+		return 1;
+	default:
+		break;
+	}
+
+	kvm_apic_write_nodecode(vcpu, offset);
+	return 1;
+}
+
+static bool is_avic_unaccelerated_access_trap(u32 offset)
+{
+	bool ret = false;
+
+	switch (offset) {
+	case APIC_ID:
+	case APIC_EOI:
+	case APIC_RRR:
+	case APIC_LDR:
+	case APIC_DFR:
+	case APIC_SPIV:
+	case APIC_ESR:
+	case APIC_ICR:
+	case APIC_LVTT:
+	case APIC_LVTTHMR:
+	case APIC_LVTPC:
+	case APIC_LVT0:
+	case APIC_LVT1:
+	case APIC_LVTERR:
+	case APIC_TMICT:
+	case APIC_TDCR:
+		ret = true;
+		break;
+	default:
+		break;
+	}
+	return ret;
+}
+
+int avic_unaccelerated_access_interception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+	int ret = 0;
+	u32 offset = svm->vmcb->control.exit_info_1 &
+		     AVIC_UNACCEL_ACCESS_OFFSET_MASK;
+	u32 vector = svm->vmcb->control.exit_info_2 &
+		     AVIC_UNACCEL_ACCESS_VECTOR_MASK;
+	bool write = (svm->vmcb->control.exit_info_1 >> 32) &
+		     AVIC_UNACCEL_ACCESS_WRITE_MASK;
+	bool trap = is_avic_unaccelerated_access_trap(offset);
+
+	trace_kvm_avic_unaccelerated_access(vcpu->vcpu_id, offset,
+					    trap, write, vector);
+	if (trap) {
+		/* Handling Trap */
+		WARN_ONCE(!write, "svm: Handling trap read.\n");
+		ret = avic_unaccel_trap_write(vcpu);
+	} else {
+		/* Handling Fault */
+		ret = kvm_emulate_instruction(vcpu, 0);
+	}
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+int avic_init_vcpu(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
+{
+	int ret;
+	struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = &svm->vcpu;
+
+	if (!enable_apicv || !irqchip_in_kernel(vcpu->kvm))
+		return 0;
+
+	ret = avic_init_backing_page(vcpu);
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+
+	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&svm->ir_list);
+	spin_lock_init(&svm->ir_list_lock);
+	svm->dfr_reg = APIC_DFR_FLAT;
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+void avic_apicv_post_state_restore(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	avic_handle_dfr_update(vcpu);
+	avic_handle_ldr_update(vcpu);
+}
+
+static int avic_set_pi_irte_mode(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool activate)
+{
+	int ret = 0;
+	unsigned long flags;
+	struct amd_svm_iommu_ir *ir;
+	struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+
+	if (!kvm_arch_has_assigned_device(vcpu->kvm))
+		return 0;
+
+	/*
+	 * Here, we go through the per-vcpu ir_list to update all existing
+	 * interrupt remapping table entry targeting this vcpu.
+	 */
+	spin_lock_irqsave(&svm->ir_list_lock, flags);
+
+	if (list_empty(&svm->ir_list))
+		goto out;
+
+	list_for_each_entry(ir, &svm->ir_list, node) {
+		if (activate)
+			ret = amd_iommu_activate_guest_mode(ir->data);
+		else
+			ret = amd_iommu_deactivate_guest_mode(ir->data);
+		if (ret)
+			break;
+	}
+out:
+	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&svm->ir_list_lock, flags);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static void svm_ir_list_del(struct vcpu_svm *svm, struct amd_iommu_pi_data *pi)
+{
+	unsigned long flags;
+	struct amd_svm_iommu_ir *cur;
+
+	spin_lock_irqsave(&svm->ir_list_lock, flags);
+	list_for_each_entry(cur, &svm->ir_list, node) {
+		if (cur->data != pi->ir_data)
+			continue;
+		list_del(&cur->node);
+		kfree(cur);
+		break;
+	}
+	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&svm->ir_list_lock, flags);
+}
+
+static int svm_ir_list_add(struct vcpu_svm *svm, struct amd_iommu_pi_data *pi)
+{
+	int ret = 0;
+	unsigned long flags;
+	struct amd_svm_iommu_ir *ir;
+	u64 entry;
+
+	/**
+	 * In some cases, the existing irte is updated and re-set,
+	 * so we need to check here if it's already been * added
+	 * to the ir_list.
+	 */
+	if (pi->ir_data && (pi->prev_ga_tag != 0)) {
+		struct kvm *kvm = svm->vcpu.kvm;
+		u32 vcpu_id = AVIC_GATAG_TO_VCPUID(pi->prev_ga_tag);
+		struct kvm_vcpu *prev_vcpu = kvm_get_vcpu_by_id(kvm, vcpu_id);
+		struct vcpu_svm *prev_svm;
+
+		if (!prev_vcpu) {
+			ret = -EINVAL;
+			goto out;
+		}
+
+		prev_svm = to_svm(prev_vcpu);
+		svm_ir_list_del(prev_svm, pi);
+	}
+
+	/**
+	 * Allocating new amd_iommu_pi_data, which will get
+	 * add to the per-vcpu ir_list.
+	 */
+	ir = kzalloc(sizeof(struct amd_svm_iommu_ir), GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
+	if (!ir) {
+		ret = -ENOMEM;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	ir->data = pi->ir_data;
+
+	spin_lock_irqsave(&svm->ir_list_lock, flags);
+
+	/*
+	 * Update the target pCPU for IOMMU doorbells if the vCPU is running.
+	 * If the vCPU is NOT running, i.e. is blocking or scheduled out, KVM
+	 * will update the pCPU info when the vCPU awkened and/or scheduled in.
+	 * See also avic_vcpu_load().
+	 */
+	entry = READ_ONCE(*(svm->avic_physical_id_cache));
+	if (entry & AVIC_PHYSICAL_ID_ENTRY_IS_RUNNING_MASK)
+		amd_iommu_update_ga(entry & AVIC_PHYSICAL_ID_ENTRY_HOST_PHYSICAL_ID_MASK,
+				    true, pi->ir_data);
+
+	list_add(&ir->node, &svm->ir_list);
+	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&svm->ir_list_lock, flags);
+out:
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Note:
+ * The HW cannot support posting multicast/broadcast
+ * interrupts to a vCPU. So, we still use legacy interrupt
+ * remapping for these kind of interrupts.
+ *
+ * For lowest-priority interrupts, we only support
+ * those with single CPU as the destination, e.g. user
+ * configures the interrupts via /proc/irq or uses
+ * irqbalance to make the interrupts single-CPU.
+ */
+static int
+get_pi_vcpu_info(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_kernel_irq_routing_entry *e,
+		 struct vcpu_data *vcpu_info, struct vcpu_svm **svm)
+{
+	struct kvm_lapic_irq irq;
+	struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = NULL;
+
+	kvm_set_msi_irq(kvm, e, &irq);
+
+	if (!kvm_intr_is_single_vcpu(kvm, &irq, &vcpu) ||
+	    !kvm_irq_is_postable(&irq)) {
+		pr_debug("SVM: %s: use legacy intr remap mode for irq %u\n",
+			 __func__, irq.vector);
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	pr_debug("SVM: %s: use GA mode for irq %u\n", __func__,
+		 irq.vector);
+	*svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+	vcpu_info->pi_desc_addr = __sme_set(page_to_phys((*svm)->avic_backing_page));
+	vcpu_info->vector = irq.vector;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * avic_pi_update_irte - set IRTE for Posted-Interrupts
+ *
+ * @kvm: kvm
+ * @host_irq: host irq of the interrupt
+ * @guest_irq: gsi of the interrupt
+ * @set: set or unset PI
+ * returns 0 on success, < 0 on failure
+ */
+int avic_pi_update_irte(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned int host_irq,
+			uint32_t guest_irq, bool set)
+{
+	struct kvm_kernel_irq_routing_entry *e;
+	struct kvm_irq_routing_table *irq_rt;
+	int idx, ret = 0;
+
+	if (!kvm_arch_has_assigned_device(kvm) ||
+	    !irq_remapping_cap(IRQ_POSTING_CAP))
+		return 0;
+
+	pr_debug("SVM: %s: host_irq=%#x, guest_irq=%#x, set=%#x\n",
+		 __func__, host_irq, guest_irq, set);
+
+	idx = srcu_read_lock(&kvm->irq_srcu);
+	irq_rt = srcu_dereference(kvm->irq_routing, &kvm->irq_srcu);
+
+	if (guest_irq >= irq_rt->nr_rt_entries ||
+		hlist_empty(&irq_rt->map[guest_irq])) {
+		pr_warn_once("no route for guest_irq %u/%u (broken user space?)\n",
+			     guest_irq, irq_rt->nr_rt_entries);
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	hlist_for_each_entry(e, &irq_rt->map[guest_irq], link) {
+		struct vcpu_data vcpu_info;
+		struct vcpu_svm *svm = NULL;
+
+		if (e->type != KVM_IRQ_ROUTING_MSI)
+			continue;
+
+		/**
+		 * Here, we setup with legacy mode in the following cases:
+		 * 1. When cannot target interrupt to a specific vcpu.
+		 * 2. Unsetting posted interrupt.
+		 * 3. APIC virtualization is disabled for the vcpu.
+		 * 4. IRQ has incompatible delivery mode (SMI, INIT, etc)
+		 */
+		if (!get_pi_vcpu_info(kvm, e, &vcpu_info, &svm) && set &&
+		    kvm_vcpu_apicv_active(&svm->vcpu)) {
+			struct amd_iommu_pi_data pi;
+
+			/* Try to enable guest_mode in IRTE */
+			pi.base = __sme_set(page_to_phys(svm->avic_backing_page) &
+					    AVIC_HPA_MASK);
+			pi.ga_tag = AVIC_GATAG(to_kvm_svm(kvm)->avic_vm_id,
+						     svm->vcpu.vcpu_id);
+			pi.is_guest_mode = true;
+			pi.vcpu_data = &vcpu_info;
+			ret = irq_set_vcpu_affinity(host_irq, &pi);
+
+			/**
+			 * Here, we successfully setting up vcpu affinity in
+			 * IOMMU guest mode. Now, we need to store the posted
+			 * interrupt information in a per-vcpu ir_list so that
+			 * we can reference to them directly when we update vcpu
+			 * scheduling information in IOMMU irte.
+			 */
+			if (!ret && pi.is_guest_mode)
+				svm_ir_list_add(svm, &pi);
+		} else {
+			/* Use legacy mode in IRTE */
+			struct amd_iommu_pi_data pi;
+
+			/**
+			 * Here, pi is used to:
+			 * - Tell IOMMU to use legacy mode for this interrupt.
+			 * - Retrieve ga_tag of prior interrupt remapping data.
+			 */
+			pi.prev_ga_tag = 0;
+			pi.is_guest_mode = false;
+			ret = irq_set_vcpu_affinity(host_irq, &pi);
+
+			/**
+			 * Check if the posted interrupt was previously
+			 * setup with the guest_mode by checking if the ga_tag
+			 * was cached. If so, we need to clean up the per-vcpu
+			 * ir_list.
+			 */
+			if (!ret && pi.prev_ga_tag) {
+				int id = AVIC_GATAG_TO_VCPUID(pi.prev_ga_tag);
+				struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu;
+
+				vcpu = kvm_get_vcpu_by_id(kvm, id);
+				if (vcpu)
+					svm_ir_list_del(to_svm(vcpu), &pi);
+			}
+		}
+
+		if (!ret && svm) {
+			trace_kvm_pi_irte_update(host_irq, svm->vcpu.vcpu_id,
+						 e->gsi, vcpu_info.vector,
+						 vcpu_info.pi_desc_addr, set);
+		}
+
+		if (ret < 0) {
+			pr_err("%s: failed to update PI IRTE\n", __func__);
+			goto out;
+		}
+	}
+
+	ret = 0;
+out:
+	srcu_read_unlock(&kvm->irq_srcu, idx);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static inline int
+avic_update_iommu_vcpu_affinity(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int cpu, bool r)
+{
+	int ret = 0;
+	struct amd_svm_iommu_ir *ir;
+	struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+
+	lockdep_assert_held(&svm->ir_list_lock);
+
+	if (!kvm_arch_has_assigned_device(vcpu->kvm))
+		return 0;
+
+	/*
+	 * Here, we go through the per-vcpu ir_list to update all existing
+	 * interrupt remapping table entry targeting this vcpu.
+	 */
+	if (list_empty(&svm->ir_list))
+		return 0;
+
+	list_for_each_entry(ir, &svm->ir_list, node) {
+		ret = amd_iommu_update_ga(cpu, r, ir->data);
+		if (ret)
+			return ret;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+void avic_vcpu_load(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int cpu)
+{
+	u64 entry;
+	int h_physical_id = kvm_cpu_get_apicid(cpu);
+	struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+	unsigned long flags;
+
+	lockdep_assert_preemption_disabled();
+
+	if (WARN_ON(h_physical_id & ~AVIC_PHYSICAL_ID_ENTRY_HOST_PHYSICAL_ID_MASK))
+		return;
+
+	/*
+	 * No need to update anything if the vCPU is blocking, i.e. if the vCPU
+	 * is being scheduled in after being preempted.  The CPU entries in the
+	 * Physical APIC table and IRTE are consumed iff IsRun{ning} is '1'.
+	 * If the vCPU was migrated, its new CPU value will be stuffed when the
+	 * vCPU unblocks.
+	 */
+	if (kvm_vcpu_is_blocking(vcpu))
+		return;
+
+	/*
+	 * Grab the per-vCPU interrupt remapping lock even if the VM doesn't
+	 * _currently_ have assigned devices, as that can change.  Holding
+	 * ir_list_lock ensures that either svm_ir_list_add() will consume
+	 * up-to-date entry information, or that this task will wait until
+	 * svm_ir_list_add() completes to set the new target pCPU.
+	 */
+	spin_lock_irqsave(&svm->ir_list_lock, flags);
+
+	entry = READ_ONCE(*(svm->avic_physical_id_cache));
+	WARN_ON_ONCE(entry & AVIC_PHYSICAL_ID_ENTRY_IS_RUNNING_MASK);
+
+	entry &= ~AVIC_PHYSICAL_ID_ENTRY_HOST_PHYSICAL_ID_MASK;
+	entry |= (h_physical_id & AVIC_PHYSICAL_ID_ENTRY_HOST_PHYSICAL_ID_MASK);
+	entry |= AVIC_PHYSICAL_ID_ENTRY_IS_RUNNING_MASK;
+
+	WRITE_ONCE(*(svm->avic_physical_id_cache), entry);
+	avic_update_iommu_vcpu_affinity(vcpu, h_physical_id, true);
+
+	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&svm->ir_list_lock, flags);
+}
+
+void avic_vcpu_put(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	u64 entry;
+	struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+	unsigned long flags;
+
+	lockdep_assert_preemption_disabled();
+
+	/*
+	 * Note, reading the Physical ID entry outside of ir_list_lock is safe
+	 * as only the pCPU that has loaded (or is loading) the vCPU is allowed
+	 * to modify the entry, and preemption is disabled.  I.e. the vCPU
+	 * can't be scheduled out and thus avic_vcpu_{put,load}() can't run
+	 * recursively.
+	 */
+	entry = READ_ONCE(*(svm->avic_physical_id_cache));
+
+	/* Nothing to do if IsRunning == '0' due to vCPU blocking. */
+	if (!(entry & AVIC_PHYSICAL_ID_ENTRY_IS_RUNNING_MASK))
+		return;
+
+	/*
+	 * Take and hold the per-vCPU interrupt remapping lock while updating
+	 * the Physical ID entry even though the lock doesn't protect against
+	 * multiple writers (see above).  Holding ir_list_lock ensures that
+	 * either svm_ir_list_add() will consume up-to-date entry information,
+	 * or that this task will wait until svm_ir_list_add() completes to
+	 * mark the vCPU as not running.
+	 */
+	spin_lock_irqsave(&svm->ir_list_lock, flags);
+
+	avic_update_iommu_vcpu_affinity(vcpu, -1, 0);
+
+	entry &= ~AVIC_PHYSICAL_ID_ENTRY_IS_RUNNING_MASK;
+	WRITE_ONCE(*(svm->avic_physical_id_cache), entry);
+
+	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&svm->ir_list_lock, flags);
+
+}
+
+void avic_refresh_virtual_apic_mode(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+	struct vmcb *vmcb = svm->vmcb01.ptr;
+
+	if (!lapic_in_kernel(vcpu) || !enable_apicv)
+		return;
+
+	if (kvm_vcpu_apicv_active(vcpu)) {
+		/**
+		 * During AVIC temporary deactivation, guest could update
+		 * APIC ID, DFR and LDR registers, which would not be trapped
+		 * by avic_unaccelerated_access_interception(). In this case,
+		 * we need to check and update the AVIC logical APIC ID table
+		 * accordingly before re-activating.
+		 */
+		avic_apicv_post_state_restore(vcpu);
+		avic_activate_vmcb(svm);
+	} else {
+		avic_deactivate_vmcb(svm);
+	}
+	vmcb_mark_dirty(vmcb, VMCB_AVIC);
+}
+
+void avic_refresh_apicv_exec_ctrl(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	bool activated = kvm_vcpu_apicv_active(vcpu);
+
+	if (!enable_apicv)
+		return;
+
+	avic_refresh_virtual_apic_mode(vcpu);
+
+	if (activated)
+		avic_vcpu_load(vcpu, vcpu->cpu);
+	else
+		avic_vcpu_put(vcpu);
+
+	avic_set_pi_irte_mode(vcpu, activated);
+}
+
+void avic_vcpu_blocking(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	if (!kvm_vcpu_apicv_active(vcpu))
+		return;
+
+       /*
+        * Unload the AVIC when the vCPU is about to block, _before_
+        * the vCPU actually blocks.
+        *
+        * Any IRQs that arrive before IsRunning=0 will not cause an
+        * incomplete IPI vmexit on the source, therefore vIRR will also
+        * be checked by kvm_vcpu_check_block() before blocking.  The
+        * memory barrier implicit in set_current_state orders writing
+        * IsRunning=0 before reading the vIRR.  The processor needs a
+        * matching memory barrier on interrupt delivery between writing
+        * IRR and reading IsRunning; the lack of this barrier might be
+        * the cause of errata #1235).
+        */
+	avic_vcpu_put(vcpu);
+}
+
+void avic_vcpu_unblocking(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	if (!kvm_vcpu_apicv_active(vcpu))
+		return;
+
+	avic_vcpu_load(vcpu, vcpu->cpu);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Note:
+ * - The module param avic enable both xAPIC and x2APIC mode.
+ * - Hypervisor can support both xAVIC and x2AVIC in the same guest.
+ * - The mode can be switched at run-time.
+ */
+bool avic_hardware_setup(void)
+{
+	if (!npt_enabled)
+		return false;
+
+	/* AVIC is a prerequisite for x2AVIC. */
+	if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AVIC) && !force_avic) {
+		if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_X2AVIC)) {
+			pr_warn(FW_BUG "Cannot support x2AVIC due to AVIC is disabled");
+			pr_warn(FW_BUG "Try enable AVIC using force_avic option");
+		}
+		return false;
+	}
+
+	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AVIC)) {
+		pr_info("AVIC enabled\n");
+	} else if (force_avic) {
+		/*
+		 * Some older systems does not advertise AVIC support.
+		 * See Revision Guide for specific AMD processor for more detail.
+		 */
+		pr_warn("AVIC is not supported in CPUID but force enabled");
+		pr_warn("Your system might crash and burn");
+	}
+
+	/* AVIC is a prerequisite for x2AVIC. */
+	x2avic_enabled = boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_X2AVIC);
+	if (x2avic_enabled)
+		pr_info("x2AVIC enabled\n");
+
+	amd_iommu_register_ga_log_notifier(&avic_ga_log_notifier);
+
+	return true;
+}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/hyperv.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/hyperv.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..088f6429b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/hyperv.c
@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * AMD SVM specific code for Hyper-V on KVM.
+ *
+ * Copyright 2022 Red Hat, Inc. and/or its affiliates.
+ */
+#include "hyperv.h"
+
+void svm_hv_inject_synthetic_vmexit_post_tlb_flush(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+
+	svm->vmcb->control.exit_code = HV_SVM_EXITCODE_ENL;
+	svm->vmcb->control.exit_code_hi = 0;
+	svm->vmcb->control.exit_info_1 = HV_SVM_ENL_EXITCODE_TRAP_AFTER_FLUSH;
+	svm->vmcb->control.exit_info_2 = 0;
+	nested_svm_vmexit(svm);
+}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/hyperv.h b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/hyperv.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..02f4784b5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/hyperv.h
@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */
+/*
+ * Common Hyper-V on KVM and KVM on Hyper-V definitions (SVM).
+ */
+
+#ifndef __ARCH_X86_KVM_SVM_HYPERV_H__
+#define __ARCH_X86_KVM_SVM_HYPERV_H__
+
+#include <asm/mshyperv.h>
+
+#include "../hyperv.h"
+#include "svm.h"
+
+static inline void nested_svm_hv_update_vm_vp_ids(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+	struct hv_vmcb_enlightenments *hve = &svm->nested.ctl.hv_enlightenments;
+	struct kvm_vcpu_hv *hv_vcpu = to_hv_vcpu(vcpu);
+
+	if (!hv_vcpu)
+		return;
+
+	hv_vcpu->nested.pa_page_gpa = hve->partition_assist_page;
+	hv_vcpu->nested.vm_id = hve->hv_vm_id;
+	hv_vcpu->nested.vp_id = hve->hv_vp_id;
+}
+
+static inline bool nested_svm_l2_tlb_flush_enabled(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+	struct hv_vmcb_enlightenments *hve = &svm->nested.ctl.hv_enlightenments;
+	struct kvm_vcpu_hv *hv_vcpu = to_hv_vcpu(vcpu);
+
+	if (!hv_vcpu)
+		return false;
+
+	if (!hve->hv_enlightenments_control.nested_flush_hypercall)
+		return false;
+
+	return hv_vcpu->vp_assist_page.nested_control.features.directhypercall;
+}
+
+void svm_hv_inject_synthetic_vmexit_post_tlb_flush(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+
+#endif /* __ARCH_X86_KVM_SVM_HYPERV_H__ */
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..60891b9ce
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1818 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * Kernel-based Virtual Machine driver for Linux
+ *
+ * AMD SVM support
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2006 Qumranet, Inc.
+ * Copyright 2010 Red Hat, Inc. and/or its affiliates.
+ *
+ * Authors:
+ *   Yaniv Kamay  <yaniv@qumranet.com>
+ *   Avi Kivity   <avi@qumranet.com>
+ */
+
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
+
+#include <linux/kvm_types.h>
+#include <linux/kvm_host.h>
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+
+#include <asm/msr-index.h>
+#include <asm/debugreg.h>
+
+#include "kvm_emulate.h"
+#include "trace.h"
+#include "mmu.h"
+#include "x86.h"
+#include "smm.h"
+#include "cpuid.h"
+#include "lapic.h"
+#include "svm.h"
+#include "hyperv.h"
+
+#define CC KVM_NESTED_VMENTER_CONSISTENCY_CHECK
+
+static void nested_svm_inject_npf_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+				       struct x86_exception *fault)
+{
+	struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+	struct vmcb *vmcb = svm->vmcb;
+
+	if (vmcb->control.exit_code != SVM_EXIT_NPF) {
+		/*
+		 * TODO: track the cause of the nested page fault, and
+		 * correctly fill in the high bits of exit_info_1.
+		 */
+		vmcb->control.exit_code = SVM_EXIT_NPF;
+		vmcb->control.exit_code_hi = 0;
+		vmcb->control.exit_info_1 = (1ULL << 32);
+		vmcb->control.exit_info_2 = fault->address;
+	}
+
+	vmcb->control.exit_info_1 &= ~0xffffffffULL;
+	vmcb->control.exit_info_1 |= fault->error_code;
+
+	nested_svm_vmexit(svm);
+}
+
+static u64 nested_svm_get_tdp_pdptr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int index)
+{
+	struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+	u64 cr3 = svm->nested.ctl.nested_cr3;
+	u64 pdpte;
+	int ret;
+
+	ret = kvm_vcpu_read_guest_page(vcpu, gpa_to_gfn(cr3), &pdpte,
+				       offset_in_page(cr3) + index * 8, 8);
+	if (ret)
+		return 0;
+	return pdpte;
+}
+
+static unsigned long nested_svm_get_tdp_cr3(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+
+	return svm->nested.ctl.nested_cr3;
+}
+
+static void nested_svm_init_mmu_context(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+
+	WARN_ON(mmu_is_nested(vcpu));
+
+	vcpu->arch.mmu = &vcpu->arch.guest_mmu;
+
+	/*
+	 * The NPT format depends on L1's CR4 and EFER, which is in vmcb01.  Note,
+	 * when called via KVM_SET_NESTED_STATE, that state may _not_ match current
+	 * vCPU state.  CR0.WP is explicitly ignored, while CR0.PG is required.
+	 */
+	kvm_init_shadow_npt_mmu(vcpu, X86_CR0_PG, svm->vmcb01.ptr->save.cr4,
+				svm->vmcb01.ptr->save.efer,
+				svm->nested.ctl.nested_cr3);
+	vcpu->arch.mmu->get_guest_pgd     = nested_svm_get_tdp_cr3;
+	vcpu->arch.mmu->get_pdptr         = nested_svm_get_tdp_pdptr;
+	vcpu->arch.mmu->inject_page_fault = nested_svm_inject_npf_exit;
+	vcpu->arch.walk_mmu              = &vcpu->arch.nested_mmu;
+}
+
+static void nested_svm_uninit_mmu_context(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	vcpu->arch.mmu = &vcpu->arch.root_mmu;
+	vcpu->arch.walk_mmu = &vcpu->arch.root_mmu;
+}
+
+static bool nested_vmcb_needs_vls_intercept(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
+{
+	if (!guest_can_use(&svm->vcpu, X86_FEATURE_V_VMSAVE_VMLOAD))
+		return true;
+
+	if (!nested_npt_enabled(svm))
+		return true;
+
+	if (!(svm->nested.ctl.virt_ext & VIRTUAL_VMLOAD_VMSAVE_ENABLE_MASK))
+		return true;
+
+	return false;
+}
+
+void recalc_intercepts(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
+{
+	struct vmcb_control_area *c, *h;
+	struct vmcb_ctrl_area_cached *g;
+	unsigned int i;
+
+	vmcb_mark_dirty(svm->vmcb, VMCB_INTERCEPTS);
+
+	if (!is_guest_mode(&svm->vcpu))
+		return;
+
+	c = &svm->vmcb->control;
+	h = &svm->vmcb01.ptr->control;
+	g = &svm->nested.ctl;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < MAX_INTERCEPT; i++)
+		c->intercepts[i] = h->intercepts[i];
+
+	if (g->int_ctl & V_INTR_MASKING_MASK) {
+		/*
+		 * If L2 is active and V_INTR_MASKING is enabled in vmcb12,
+		 * disable intercept of CR8 writes as L2's CR8 does not affect
+		 * any interrupt KVM may want to inject.
+		 *
+		 * Similarly, disable intercept of virtual interrupts (used to
+		 * detect interrupt windows) if the saved RFLAGS.IF is '0', as
+		 * the effective RFLAGS.IF for L1 interrupts will never be set
+		 * while L2 is running (L2's RFLAGS.IF doesn't affect L1 IRQs).
+		 */
+		vmcb_clr_intercept(c, INTERCEPT_CR8_WRITE);
+		if (!(svm->vmcb01.ptr->save.rflags & X86_EFLAGS_IF))
+			vmcb_clr_intercept(c, INTERCEPT_VINTR);
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * We want to see VMMCALLs from a nested guest only when Hyper-V L2 TLB
+	 * flush feature is enabled.
+	 */
+	if (!nested_svm_l2_tlb_flush_enabled(&svm->vcpu))
+		vmcb_clr_intercept(c, INTERCEPT_VMMCALL);
+
+	for (i = 0; i < MAX_INTERCEPT; i++)
+		c->intercepts[i] |= g->intercepts[i];
+
+	/* If SMI is not intercepted, ignore guest SMI intercept as well  */
+	if (!intercept_smi)
+		vmcb_clr_intercept(c, INTERCEPT_SMI);
+
+	if (nested_vmcb_needs_vls_intercept(svm)) {
+		/*
+		 * If the virtual VMLOAD/VMSAVE is not enabled for the L2,
+		 * we must intercept these instructions to correctly
+		 * emulate them in case L1 doesn't intercept them.
+		 */
+		vmcb_set_intercept(c, INTERCEPT_VMLOAD);
+		vmcb_set_intercept(c, INTERCEPT_VMSAVE);
+	} else {
+		WARN_ON(!(c->virt_ext & VIRTUAL_VMLOAD_VMSAVE_ENABLE_MASK));
+	}
+}
+
+/*
+ * Merge L0's (KVM) and L1's (Nested VMCB) MSR permission bitmaps. The function
+ * is optimized in that it only merges the parts where KVM MSR permission bitmap
+ * may contain zero bits.
+ */
+static bool nested_svm_vmrun_msrpm(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
+{
+	struct hv_vmcb_enlightenments *hve = &svm->nested.ctl.hv_enlightenments;
+	int i;
+
+	/*
+	 * MSR bitmap update can be skipped when:
+	 * - MSR bitmap for L1 hasn't changed.
+	 * - Nested hypervisor (L1) is attempting to launch the same L2 as
+	 *   before.
+	 * - Nested hypervisor (L1) is using Hyper-V emulation interface and
+	 * tells KVM (L0) there were no changes in MSR bitmap for L2.
+	 */
+	if (!svm->nested.force_msr_bitmap_recalc &&
+	    kvm_hv_hypercall_enabled(&svm->vcpu) &&
+	    hve->hv_enlightenments_control.msr_bitmap &&
+	    (svm->nested.ctl.clean & BIT(HV_VMCB_NESTED_ENLIGHTENMENTS)))
+		goto set_msrpm_base_pa;
+
+	if (!(vmcb12_is_intercept(&svm->nested.ctl, INTERCEPT_MSR_PROT)))
+		return true;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < MSRPM_OFFSETS; i++) {
+		u32 value, p;
+		u64 offset;
+
+		if (msrpm_offsets[i] == 0xffffffff)
+			break;
+
+		p      = msrpm_offsets[i];
+
+		/* x2apic msrs are intercepted always for the nested guest */
+		if (is_x2apic_msrpm_offset(p))
+			continue;
+
+		offset = svm->nested.ctl.msrpm_base_pa + (p * 4);
+
+		if (kvm_vcpu_read_guest(&svm->vcpu, offset, &value, 4))
+			return false;
+
+		svm->nested.msrpm[p] = svm->msrpm[p] | value;
+	}
+
+	svm->nested.force_msr_bitmap_recalc = false;
+
+set_msrpm_base_pa:
+	svm->vmcb->control.msrpm_base_pa = __sme_set(__pa(svm->nested.msrpm));
+
+	return true;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Bits 11:0 of bitmap address are ignored by hardware
+ */
+static bool nested_svm_check_bitmap_pa(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 pa, u32 size)
+{
+	u64 addr = PAGE_ALIGN(pa);
+
+	return kvm_vcpu_is_legal_gpa(vcpu, addr) &&
+	    kvm_vcpu_is_legal_gpa(vcpu, addr + size - 1);
+}
+
+static bool __nested_vmcb_check_controls(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+					 struct vmcb_ctrl_area_cached *control)
+{
+	if (CC(!vmcb12_is_intercept(control, INTERCEPT_VMRUN)))
+		return false;
+
+	if (CC(control->asid == 0))
+		return false;
+
+	if (CC((control->nested_ctl & SVM_NESTED_CTL_NP_ENABLE) && !npt_enabled))
+		return false;
+
+	if (CC(!nested_svm_check_bitmap_pa(vcpu, control->msrpm_base_pa,
+					   MSRPM_SIZE)))
+		return false;
+	if (CC(!nested_svm_check_bitmap_pa(vcpu, control->iopm_base_pa,
+					   IOPM_SIZE)))
+		return false;
+
+	if (CC((control->int_ctl & V_NMI_ENABLE_MASK) &&
+	       !vmcb12_is_intercept(control, INTERCEPT_NMI))) {
+		return false;
+	}
+
+	return true;
+}
+
+/* Common checks that apply to both L1 and L2 state.  */
+static bool __nested_vmcb_check_save(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+				     struct vmcb_save_area_cached *save)
+{
+	if (CC(!(save->efer & EFER_SVME)))
+		return false;
+
+	if (CC((save->cr0 & X86_CR0_CD) == 0 && (save->cr0 & X86_CR0_NW)) ||
+	    CC(save->cr0 & ~0xffffffffULL))
+		return false;
+
+	if (CC(!kvm_dr6_valid(save->dr6)) || CC(!kvm_dr7_valid(save->dr7)))
+		return false;
+
+	/*
+	 * These checks are also performed by KVM_SET_SREGS,
+	 * except that EFER.LMA is not checked by SVM against
+	 * CR0.PG && EFER.LME.
+	 */
+	if ((save->efer & EFER_LME) && (save->cr0 & X86_CR0_PG)) {
+		if (CC(!(save->cr4 & X86_CR4_PAE)) ||
+		    CC(!(save->cr0 & X86_CR0_PE)) ||
+		    CC(kvm_vcpu_is_illegal_gpa(vcpu, save->cr3)))
+			return false;
+	}
+
+	/* Note, SVM doesn't have any additional restrictions on CR4. */
+	if (CC(!__kvm_is_valid_cr4(vcpu, save->cr4)))
+		return false;
+
+	if (CC(!kvm_valid_efer(vcpu, save->efer)))
+		return false;
+
+	return true;
+}
+
+static bool nested_vmcb_check_save(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+	struct vmcb_save_area_cached *save = &svm->nested.save;
+
+	return __nested_vmcb_check_save(vcpu, save);
+}
+
+static bool nested_vmcb_check_controls(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+	struct vmcb_ctrl_area_cached *ctl = &svm->nested.ctl;
+
+	return __nested_vmcb_check_controls(vcpu, ctl);
+}
+
+static
+void __nested_copy_vmcb_control_to_cache(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+					 struct vmcb_ctrl_area_cached *to,
+					 struct vmcb_control_area *from)
+{
+	unsigned int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < MAX_INTERCEPT; i++)
+		to->intercepts[i] = from->intercepts[i];
+
+	to->iopm_base_pa        = from->iopm_base_pa;
+	to->msrpm_base_pa       = from->msrpm_base_pa;
+	to->tsc_offset          = from->tsc_offset;
+	to->tlb_ctl             = from->tlb_ctl;
+	to->int_ctl             = from->int_ctl;
+	to->int_vector          = from->int_vector;
+	to->int_state           = from->int_state;
+	to->exit_code           = from->exit_code;
+	to->exit_code_hi        = from->exit_code_hi;
+	to->exit_info_1         = from->exit_info_1;
+	to->exit_info_2         = from->exit_info_2;
+	to->exit_int_info       = from->exit_int_info;
+	to->exit_int_info_err   = from->exit_int_info_err;
+	to->nested_ctl          = from->nested_ctl;
+	to->event_inj           = from->event_inj;
+	to->event_inj_err       = from->event_inj_err;
+	to->next_rip            = from->next_rip;
+	to->nested_cr3          = from->nested_cr3;
+	to->virt_ext            = from->virt_ext;
+	to->pause_filter_count  = from->pause_filter_count;
+	to->pause_filter_thresh = from->pause_filter_thresh;
+
+	/* Copy asid here because nested_vmcb_check_controls will check it.  */
+	to->asid           = from->asid;
+	to->msrpm_base_pa &= ~0x0fffULL;
+	to->iopm_base_pa  &= ~0x0fffULL;
+
+	/* Hyper-V extensions (Enlightened VMCB) */
+	if (kvm_hv_hypercall_enabled(vcpu)) {
+		to->clean = from->clean;
+		memcpy(&to->hv_enlightenments, &from->hv_enlightenments,
+		       sizeof(to->hv_enlightenments));
+	}
+}
+
+void nested_copy_vmcb_control_to_cache(struct vcpu_svm *svm,
+				       struct vmcb_control_area *control)
+{
+	__nested_copy_vmcb_control_to_cache(&svm->vcpu, &svm->nested.ctl, control);
+}
+
+static void __nested_copy_vmcb_save_to_cache(struct vmcb_save_area_cached *to,
+					     struct vmcb_save_area *from)
+{
+	/*
+	 * Copy only fields that are validated, as we need them
+	 * to avoid TOC/TOU races.
+	 */
+	to->efer = from->efer;
+	to->cr0 = from->cr0;
+	to->cr3 = from->cr3;
+	to->cr4 = from->cr4;
+
+	to->dr6 = from->dr6;
+	to->dr7 = from->dr7;
+}
+
+void nested_copy_vmcb_save_to_cache(struct vcpu_svm *svm,
+				    struct vmcb_save_area *save)
+{
+	__nested_copy_vmcb_save_to_cache(&svm->nested.save, save);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Synchronize fields that are written by the processor, so that
+ * they can be copied back into the vmcb12.
+ */
+void nested_sync_control_from_vmcb02(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
+{
+	u32 mask;
+	svm->nested.ctl.event_inj      = svm->vmcb->control.event_inj;
+	svm->nested.ctl.event_inj_err  = svm->vmcb->control.event_inj_err;
+
+	/* Only a few fields of int_ctl are written by the processor.  */
+	mask = V_IRQ_MASK | V_TPR_MASK;
+	/*
+	 * Don't sync vmcb02 V_IRQ back to vmcb12 if KVM (L0) is intercepting
+	 * virtual interrupts in order to request an interrupt window, as KVM
+	 * has usurped vmcb02's int_ctl.  If an interrupt window opens before
+	 * the next VM-Exit, svm_clear_vintr() will restore vmcb12's int_ctl.
+	 * If no window opens, V_IRQ will be correctly preserved in vmcb12's
+	 * int_ctl (because it was never recognized while L2 was running).
+	 */
+	if (svm_is_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_VINTR) &&
+	    !test_bit(INTERCEPT_VINTR, (unsigned long *)svm->nested.ctl.intercepts))
+		mask &= ~V_IRQ_MASK;
+
+	if (nested_vgif_enabled(svm))
+		mask |= V_GIF_MASK;
+
+	if (nested_vnmi_enabled(svm))
+		mask |= V_NMI_BLOCKING_MASK | V_NMI_PENDING_MASK;
+
+	svm->nested.ctl.int_ctl        &= ~mask;
+	svm->nested.ctl.int_ctl        |= svm->vmcb->control.int_ctl & mask;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Transfer any event that L0 or L1 wanted to inject into L2 to
+ * EXIT_INT_INFO.
+ */
+static void nested_save_pending_event_to_vmcb12(struct vcpu_svm *svm,
+						struct vmcb *vmcb12)
+{
+	struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = &svm->vcpu;
+	u32 exit_int_info = 0;
+	unsigned int nr;
+
+	if (vcpu->arch.exception.injected) {
+		nr = vcpu->arch.exception.vector;
+		exit_int_info = nr | SVM_EVTINJ_VALID | SVM_EVTINJ_TYPE_EXEPT;
+
+		if (vcpu->arch.exception.has_error_code) {
+			exit_int_info |= SVM_EVTINJ_VALID_ERR;
+			vmcb12->control.exit_int_info_err =
+				vcpu->arch.exception.error_code;
+		}
+
+	} else if (vcpu->arch.nmi_injected) {
+		exit_int_info = SVM_EVTINJ_VALID | SVM_EVTINJ_TYPE_NMI;
+
+	} else if (vcpu->arch.interrupt.injected) {
+		nr = vcpu->arch.interrupt.nr;
+		exit_int_info = nr | SVM_EVTINJ_VALID;
+
+		if (vcpu->arch.interrupt.soft)
+			exit_int_info |= SVM_EVTINJ_TYPE_SOFT;
+		else
+			exit_int_info |= SVM_EVTINJ_TYPE_INTR;
+	}
+
+	vmcb12->control.exit_int_info = exit_int_info;
+}
+
+static void nested_svm_transition_tlb_flush(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	/*
+	 * KVM_REQ_HV_TLB_FLUSH flushes entries from either L1's VP_ID or
+	 * L2's VP_ID upon request from the guest. Make sure we check for
+	 * pending entries in the right FIFO upon L1/L2 transition as these
+	 * requests are put by other vCPUs asynchronously.
+	 */
+	if (to_hv_vcpu(vcpu) && npt_enabled)
+		kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_HV_TLB_FLUSH, vcpu);
+
+	/*
+	 * TODO: optimize unconditional TLB flush/MMU sync.  A partial list of
+	 * things to fix before this can be conditional:
+	 *
+	 *  - Flush TLBs for both L1 and L2 remote TLB flush
+	 *  - Honor L1's request to flush an ASID on nested VMRUN
+	 *  - Sync nested NPT MMU on VMRUN that flushes L2's ASID[*]
+	 *  - Don't crush a pending TLB flush in vmcb02 on nested VMRUN
+	 *  - Flush L1's ASID on KVM_REQ_TLB_FLUSH_GUEST
+	 *
+	 * [*] Unlike nested EPT, SVM's ASID management can invalidate nested
+	 *     NPT guest-physical mappings on VMRUN.
+	 */
+	kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_MMU_SYNC, vcpu);
+	kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_TLB_FLUSH_CURRENT, vcpu);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Load guest's/host's cr3 on nested vmentry or vmexit. @nested_npt is true
+ * if we are emulating VM-Entry into a guest with NPT enabled.
+ */
+static int nested_svm_load_cr3(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long cr3,
+			       bool nested_npt, bool reload_pdptrs)
+{
+	if (CC(kvm_vcpu_is_illegal_gpa(vcpu, cr3)))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (reload_pdptrs && !nested_npt && is_pae_paging(vcpu) &&
+	    CC(!load_pdptrs(vcpu, cr3)))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	vcpu->arch.cr3 = cr3;
+
+	/* Re-initialize the MMU, e.g. to pick up CR4 MMU role changes. */
+	kvm_init_mmu(vcpu);
+
+	if (!nested_npt)
+		kvm_mmu_new_pgd(vcpu, cr3);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+void nested_vmcb02_compute_g_pat(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
+{
+	if (!svm->nested.vmcb02.ptr)
+		return;
+
+	/* FIXME: merge g_pat from vmcb01 and vmcb12.  */
+	svm->nested.vmcb02.ptr->save.g_pat = svm->vmcb01.ptr->save.g_pat;
+}
+
+static void nested_vmcb02_prepare_save(struct vcpu_svm *svm, struct vmcb *vmcb12)
+{
+	bool new_vmcb12 = false;
+	struct vmcb *vmcb01 = svm->vmcb01.ptr;
+	struct vmcb *vmcb02 = svm->nested.vmcb02.ptr;
+	struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = &svm->vcpu;
+
+	nested_vmcb02_compute_g_pat(svm);
+
+	/* Load the nested guest state */
+	if (svm->nested.vmcb12_gpa != svm->nested.last_vmcb12_gpa) {
+		new_vmcb12 = true;
+		svm->nested.last_vmcb12_gpa = svm->nested.vmcb12_gpa;
+		svm->nested.force_msr_bitmap_recalc = true;
+	}
+
+	if (unlikely(new_vmcb12 || vmcb_is_dirty(vmcb12, VMCB_SEG))) {
+		vmcb02->save.es = vmcb12->save.es;
+		vmcb02->save.cs = vmcb12->save.cs;
+		vmcb02->save.ss = vmcb12->save.ss;
+		vmcb02->save.ds = vmcb12->save.ds;
+		vmcb02->save.cpl = vmcb12->save.cpl;
+		vmcb_mark_dirty(vmcb02, VMCB_SEG);
+	}
+
+	if (unlikely(new_vmcb12 || vmcb_is_dirty(vmcb12, VMCB_DT))) {
+		vmcb02->save.gdtr = vmcb12->save.gdtr;
+		vmcb02->save.idtr = vmcb12->save.idtr;
+		vmcb_mark_dirty(vmcb02, VMCB_DT);
+	}
+
+	kvm_set_rflags(vcpu, vmcb12->save.rflags | X86_EFLAGS_FIXED);
+
+	svm_set_efer(vcpu, svm->nested.save.efer);
+
+	svm_set_cr0(vcpu, svm->nested.save.cr0);
+	svm_set_cr4(vcpu, svm->nested.save.cr4);
+
+	svm->vcpu.arch.cr2 = vmcb12->save.cr2;
+
+	kvm_rax_write(vcpu, vmcb12->save.rax);
+	kvm_rsp_write(vcpu, vmcb12->save.rsp);
+	kvm_rip_write(vcpu, vmcb12->save.rip);
+
+	/* In case we don't even reach vcpu_run, the fields are not updated */
+	vmcb02->save.rax = vmcb12->save.rax;
+	vmcb02->save.rsp = vmcb12->save.rsp;
+	vmcb02->save.rip = vmcb12->save.rip;
+
+	/* These bits will be set properly on the first execution when new_vmc12 is true */
+	if (unlikely(new_vmcb12 || vmcb_is_dirty(vmcb12, VMCB_DR))) {
+		vmcb02->save.dr7 = svm->nested.save.dr7 | DR7_FIXED_1;
+		svm->vcpu.arch.dr6  = svm->nested.save.dr6 | DR6_ACTIVE_LOW;
+		vmcb_mark_dirty(vmcb02, VMCB_DR);
+	}
+
+	if (unlikely(guest_can_use(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_LBRV) &&
+		     (svm->nested.ctl.virt_ext & LBR_CTL_ENABLE_MASK))) {
+		/*
+		 * Reserved bits of DEBUGCTL are ignored.  Be consistent with
+		 * svm_set_msr's definition of reserved bits.
+		 */
+		svm_copy_lbrs(vmcb02, vmcb12);
+		vmcb02->save.dbgctl &= ~DEBUGCTL_RESERVED_BITS;
+		svm_update_lbrv(&svm->vcpu);
+
+	} else if (unlikely(vmcb01->control.virt_ext & LBR_CTL_ENABLE_MASK)) {
+		svm_copy_lbrs(vmcb02, vmcb01);
+	}
+}
+
+static inline bool is_evtinj_soft(u32 evtinj)
+{
+	u32 type = evtinj & SVM_EVTINJ_TYPE_MASK;
+	u8 vector = evtinj & SVM_EVTINJ_VEC_MASK;
+
+	if (!(evtinj & SVM_EVTINJ_VALID))
+		return false;
+
+	if (type == SVM_EVTINJ_TYPE_SOFT)
+		return true;
+
+	return type == SVM_EVTINJ_TYPE_EXEPT && kvm_exception_is_soft(vector);
+}
+
+static bool is_evtinj_nmi(u32 evtinj)
+{
+	u32 type = evtinj & SVM_EVTINJ_TYPE_MASK;
+
+	if (!(evtinj & SVM_EVTINJ_VALID))
+		return false;
+
+	return type == SVM_EVTINJ_TYPE_NMI;
+}
+
+static void nested_vmcb02_prepare_control(struct vcpu_svm *svm,
+					  unsigned long vmcb12_rip,
+					  unsigned long vmcb12_csbase)
+{
+	u32 int_ctl_vmcb01_bits = V_INTR_MASKING_MASK;
+	u32 int_ctl_vmcb12_bits = V_TPR_MASK | V_IRQ_INJECTION_BITS_MASK;
+
+	struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = &svm->vcpu;
+	struct vmcb *vmcb01 = svm->vmcb01.ptr;
+	struct vmcb *vmcb02 = svm->nested.vmcb02.ptr;
+	u32 pause_count12;
+	u32 pause_thresh12;
+
+	/*
+	 * Filled at exit: exit_code, exit_code_hi, exit_info_1, exit_info_2,
+	 * exit_int_info, exit_int_info_err, next_rip, insn_len, insn_bytes.
+	 */
+
+	if (guest_can_use(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_VGIF) &&
+	    (svm->nested.ctl.int_ctl & V_GIF_ENABLE_MASK))
+		int_ctl_vmcb12_bits |= (V_GIF_MASK | V_GIF_ENABLE_MASK);
+	else
+		int_ctl_vmcb01_bits |= (V_GIF_MASK | V_GIF_ENABLE_MASK);
+
+	if (vnmi) {
+		if (vmcb01->control.int_ctl & V_NMI_PENDING_MASK) {
+			svm->vcpu.arch.nmi_pending++;
+			kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_EVENT, &svm->vcpu);
+		}
+		if (nested_vnmi_enabled(svm))
+			int_ctl_vmcb12_bits |= (V_NMI_PENDING_MASK |
+						V_NMI_ENABLE_MASK |
+						V_NMI_BLOCKING_MASK);
+	}
+
+	/* Copied from vmcb01.  msrpm_base can be overwritten later.  */
+	vmcb02->control.nested_ctl = vmcb01->control.nested_ctl;
+	vmcb02->control.iopm_base_pa = vmcb01->control.iopm_base_pa;
+	vmcb02->control.msrpm_base_pa = vmcb01->control.msrpm_base_pa;
+
+	/* Done at vmrun: asid.  */
+
+	/* Also overwritten later if necessary.  */
+	vmcb02->control.tlb_ctl = TLB_CONTROL_DO_NOTHING;
+
+	/* nested_cr3.  */
+	if (nested_npt_enabled(svm))
+		nested_svm_init_mmu_context(vcpu);
+
+	vcpu->arch.tsc_offset = kvm_calc_nested_tsc_offset(
+			vcpu->arch.l1_tsc_offset,
+			svm->nested.ctl.tsc_offset,
+			svm->tsc_ratio_msr);
+
+	vmcb02->control.tsc_offset = vcpu->arch.tsc_offset;
+
+	if (guest_can_use(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_TSCRATEMSR) &&
+	    svm->tsc_ratio_msr != kvm_caps.default_tsc_scaling_ratio)
+		nested_svm_update_tsc_ratio_msr(vcpu);
+
+	vmcb02->control.int_ctl             =
+		(svm->nested.ctl.int_ctl & int_ctl_vmcb12_bits) |
+		(vmcb01->control.int_ctl & int_ctl_vmcb01_bits);
+
+	vmcb02->control.int_vector          = svm->nested.ctl.int_vector;
+	vmcb02->control.int_state           = svm->nested.ctl.int_state;
+	vmcb02->control.event_inj           = svm->nested.ctl.event_inj;
+	vmcb02->control.event_inj_err       = svm->nested.ctl.event_inj_err;
+
+	/*
+	 * next_rip is consumed on VMRUN as the return address pushed on the
+	 * stack for injected soft exceptions/interrupts.  If nrips is exposed
+	 * to L1, take it verbatim from vmcb12.  If nrips is supported in
+	 * hardware but not exposed to L1, stuff the actual L2 RIP to emulate
+	 * what a nrips=0 CPU would do (L1 is responsible for advancing RIP
+	 * prior to injecting the event).
+	 */
+	if (guest_can_use(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_NRIPS))
+		vmcb02->control.next_rip    = svm->nested.ctl.next_rip;
+	else if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_NRIPS))
+		vmcb02->control.next_rip    = vmcb12_rip;
+
+	svm->nmi_l1_to_l2 = is_evtinj_nmi(vmcb02->control.event_inj);
+	if (is_evtinj_soft(vmcb02->control.event_inj)) {
+		svm->soft_int_injected = true;
+		svm->soft_int_csbase = vmcb12_csbase;
+		svm->soft_int_old_rip = vmcb12_rip;
+		if (guest_can_use(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_NRIPS))
+			svm->soft_int_next_rip = svm->nested.ctl.next_rip;
+		else
+			svm->soft_int_next_rip = vmcb12_rip;
+	}
+
+	vmcb02->control.virt_ext            = vmcb01->control.virt_ext &
+					      LBR_CTL_ENABLE_MASK;
+	if (guest_can_use(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_LBRV))
+		vmcb02->control.virt_ext  |=
+			(svm->nested.ctl.virt_ext & LBR_CTL_ENABLE_MASK);
+
+	if (!nested_vmcb_needs_vls_intercept(svm))
+		vmcb02->control.virt_ext |= VIRTUAL_VMLOAD_VMSAVE_ENABLE_MASK;
+
+	if (guest_can_use(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_PAUSEFILTER))
+		pause_count12 = svm->nested.ctl.pause_filter_count;
+	else
+		pause_count12 = 0;
+	if (guest_can_use(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_PFTHRESHOLD))
+		pause_thresh12 = svm->nested.ctl.pause_filter_thresh;
+	else
+		pause_thresh12 = 0;
+	if (kvm_pause_in_guest(svm->vcpu.kvm)) {
+		/* use guest values since host doesn't intercept PAUSE */
+		vmcb02->control.pause_filter_count = pause_count12;
+		vmcb02->control.pause_filter_thresh = pause_thresh12;
+
+	} else {
+		/* start from host values otherwise */
+		vmcb02->control.pause_filter_count = vmcb01->control.pause_filter_count;
+		vmcb02->control.pause_filter_thresh = vmcb01->control.pause_filter_thresh;
+
+		/* ... but ensure filtering is disabled if so requested.  */
+		if (vmcb12_is_intercept(&svm->nested.ctl, INTERCEPT_PAUSE)) {
+			if (!pause_count12)
+				vmcb02->control.pause_filter_count = 0;
+			if (!pause_thresh12)
+				vmcb02->control.pause_filter_thresh = 0;
+		}
+	}
+
+	nested_svm_transition_tlb_flush(vcpu);
+
+	/* Enter Guest-Mode */
+	enter_guest_mode(vcpu);
+
+	/*
+	 * Merge guest and host intercepts - must be called with vcpu in
+	 * guest-mode to take effect.
+	 */
+	recalc_intercepts(svm);
+}
+
+static void nested_svm_copy_common_state(struct vmcb *from_vmcb, struct vmcb *to_vmcb)
+{
+	/*
+	 * Some VMCB state is shared between L1 and L2 and thus has to be
+	 * moved at the time of nested vmrun and vmexit.
+	 *
+	 * VMLOAD/VMSAVE state would also belong in this category, but KVM
+	 * always performs VMLOAD and VMSAVE from the VMCB01.
+	 */
+	to_vmcb->save.spec_ctrl = from_vmcb->save.spec_ctrl;
+}
+
+int enter_svm_guest_mode(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 vmcb12_gpa,
+			 struct vmcb *vmcb12, bool from_vmrun)
+{
+	struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+	int ret;
+
+	trace_kvm_nested_vmenter(svm->vmcb->save.rip,
+				 vmcb12_gpa,
+				 vmcb12->save.rip,
+				 vmcb12->control.int_ctl,
+				 vmcb12->control.event_inj,
+				 vmcb12->control.nested_ctl,
+				 vmcb12->control.nested_cr3,
+				 vmcb12->save.cr3,
+				 KVM_ISA_SVM);
+
+	trace_kvm_nested_intercepts(vmcb12->control.intercepts[INTERCEPT_CR] & 0xffff,
+				    vmcb12->control.intercepts[INTERCEPT_CR] >> 16,
+				    vmcb12->control.intercepts[INTERCEPT_EXCEPTION],
+				    vmcb12->control.intercepts[INTERCEPT_WORD3],
+				    vmcb12->control.intercepts[INTERCEPT_WORD4],
+				    vmcb12->control.intercepts[INTERCEPT_WORD5]);
+
+
+	svm->nested.vmcb12_gpa = vmcb12_gpa;
+
+	WARN_ON(svm->vmcb == svm->nested.vmcb02.ptr);
+
+	nested_svm_copy_common_state(svm->vmcb01.ptr, svm->nested.vmcb02.ptr);
+
+	svm_switch_vmcb(svm, &svm->nested.vmcb02);
+	nested_vmcb02_prepare_control(svm, vmcb12->save.rip, vmcb12->save.cs.base);
+	nested_vmcb02_prepare_save(svm, vmcb12);
+
+	ret = nested_svm_load_cr3(&svm->vcpu, svm->nested.save.cr3,
+				  nested_npt_enabled(svm), from_vmrun);
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+
+	if (!from_vmrun)
+		kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_GET_NESTED_STATE_PAGES, vcpu);
+
+	svm_set_gif(svm, true);
+
+	if (kvm_vcpu_apicv_active(vcpu))
+		kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_APICV_UPDATE, vcpu);
+
+	nested_svm_hv_update_vm_vp_ids(vcpu);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int nested_svm_vmrun(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+	int ret;
+	struct vmcb *vmcb12;
+	struct kvm_host_map map;
+	u64 vmcb12_gpa;
+	struct vmcb *vmcb01 = svm->vmcb01.ptr;
+
+	if (!svm->nested.hsave_msr) {
+		kvm_inject_gp(vcpu, 0);
+		return 1;
+	}
+
+	if (is_smm(vcpu)) {
+		kvm_queue_exception(vcpu, UD_VECTOR);
+		return 1;
+	}
+
+	/* This fails when VP assist page is enabled but the supplied GPA is bogus */
+	ret = kvm_hv_verify_vp_assist(vcpu);
+	if (ret) {
+		kvm_inject_gp(vcpu, 0);
+		return ret;
+	}
+
+	vmcb12_gpa = svm->vmcb->save.rax;
+	ret = kvm_vcpu_map(vcpu, gpa_to_gfn(vmcb12_gpa), &map);
+	if (ret == -EINVAL) {
+		kvm_inject_gp(vcpu, 0);
+		return 1;
+	} else if (ret) {
+		return kvm_skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
+	}
+
+	ret = kvm_skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
+
+	vmcb12 = map.hva;
+
+	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!svm->nested.initialized))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	nested_copy_vmcb_control_to_cache(svm, &vmcb12->control);
+	nested_copy_vmcb_save_to_cache(svm, &vmcb12->save);
+
+	if (!nested_vmcb_check_save(vcpu) ||
+	    !nested_vmcb_check_controls(vcpu)) {
+		vmcb12->control.exit_code    = SVM_EXIT_ERR;
+		vmcb12->control.exit_code_hi = 0;
+		vmcb12->control.exit_info_1  = 0;
+		vmcb12->control.exit_info_2  = 0;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Since vmcb01 is not in use, we can use it to store some of the L1
+	 * state.
+	 */
+	vmcb01->save.efer   = vcpu->arch.efer;
+	vmcb01->save.cr0    = kvm_read_cr0(vcpu);
+	vmcb01->save.cr4    = vcpu->arch.cr4;
+	vmcb01->save.rflags = kvm_get_rflags(vcpu);
+	vmcb01->save.rip    = kvm_rip_read(vcpu);
+
+	if (!npt_enabled)
+		vmcb01->save.cr3 = kvm_read_cr3(vcpu);
+
+	svm->nested.nested_run_pending = 1;
+
+	if (enter_svm_guest_mode(vcpu, vmcb12_gpa, vmcb12, true))
+		goto out_exit_err;
+
+	if (nested_svm_vmrun_msrpm(svm))
+		goto out;
+
+out_exit_err:
+	svm->nested.nested_run_pending = 0;
+	svm->nmi_l1_to_l2 = false;
+	svm->soft_int_injected = false;
+
+	svm->vmcb->control.exit_code    = SVM_EXIT_ERR;
+	svm->vmcb->control.exit_code_hi = 0;
+	svm->vmcb->control.exit_info_1  = 0;
+	svm->vmcb->control.exit_info_2  = 0;
+
+	nested_svm_vmexit(svm);
+
+out:
+	kvm_vcpu_unmap(vcpu, &map, true);
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/* Copy state save area fields which are handled by VMRUN */
+void svm_copy_vmrun_state(struct vmcb_save_area *to_save,
+			  struct vmcb_save_area *from_save)
+{
+	to_save->es = from_save->es;
+	to_save->cs = from_save->cs;
+	to_save->ss = from_save->ss;
+	to_save->ds = from_save->ds;
+	to_save->gdtr = from_save->gdtr;
+	to_save->idtr = from_save->idtr;
+	to_save->rflags = from_save->rflags | X86_EFLAGS_FIXED;
+	to_save->efer = from_save->efer;
+	to_save->cr0 = from_save->cr0;
+	to_save->cr3 = from_save->cr3;
+	to_save->cr4 = from_save->cr4;
+	to_save->rax = from_save->rax;
+	to_save->rsp = from_save->rsp;
+	to_save->rip = from_save->rip;
+	to_save->cpl = 0;
+}
+
+void svm_copy_vmloadsave_state(struct vmcb *to_vmcb, struct vmcb *from_vmcb)
+{
+	to_vmcb->save.fs = from_vmcb->save.fs;
+	to_vmcb->save.gs = from_vmcb->save.gs;
+	to_vmcb->save.tr = from_vmcb->save.tr;
+	to_vmcb->save.ldtr = from_vmcb->save.ldtr;
+	to_vmcb->save.kernel_gs_base = from_vmcb->save.kernel_gs_base;
+	to_vmcb->save.star = from_vmcb->save.star;
+	to_vmcb->save.lstar = from_vmcb->save.lstar;
+	to_vmcb->save.cstar = from_vmcb->save.cstar;
+	to_vmcb->save.sfmask = from_vmcb->save.sfmask;
+	to_vmcb->save.sysenter_cs = from_vmcb->save.sysenter_cs;
+	to_vmcb->save.sysenter_esp = from_vmcb->save.sysenter_esp;
+	to_vmcb->save.sysenter_eip = from_vmcb->save.sysenter_eip;
+}
+
+int nested_svm_vmexit(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
+{
+	struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = &svm->vcpu;
+	struct vmcb *vmcb01 = svm->vmcb01.ptr;
+	struct vmcb *vmcb02 = svm->nested.vmcb02.ptr;
+	struct vmcb *vmcb12;
+	struct kvm_host_map map;
+	int rc;
+
+	rc = kvm_vcpu_map(vcpu, gpa_to_gfn(svm->nested.vmcb12_gpa), &map);
+	if (rc) {
+		if (rc == -EINVAL)
+			kvm_inject_gp(vcpu, 0);
+		return 1;
+	}
+
+	vmcb12 = map.hva;
+
+	/* Exit Guest-Mode */
+	leave_guest_mode(vcpu);
+	svm->nested.vmcb12_gpa = 0;
+	WARN_ON_ONCE(svm->nested.nested_run_pending);
+
+	kvm_clear_request(KVM_REQ_GET_NESTED_STATE_PAGES, vcpu);
+
+	/* in case we halted in L2 */
+	svm->vcpu.arch.mp_state = KVM_MP_STATE_RUNNABLE;
+
+	/* Give the current vmcb to the guest */
+
+	vmcb12->save.es     = vmcb02->save.es;
+	vmcb12->save.cs     = vmcb02->save.cs;
+	vmcb12->save.ss     = vmcb02->save.ss;
+	vmcb12->save.ds     = vmcb02->save.ds;
+	vmcb12->save.gdtr   = vmcb02->save.gdtr;
+	vmcb12->save.idtr   = vmcb02->save.idtr;
+	vmcb12->save.efer   = svm->vcpu.arch.efer;
+	vmcb12->save.cr0    = kvm_read_cr0(vcpu);
+	vmcb12->save.cr3    = kvm_read_cr3(vcpu);
+	vmcb12->save.cr2    = vmcb02->save.cr2;
+	vmcb12->save.cr4    = svm->vcpu.arch.cr4;
+	vmcb12->save.rflags = kvm_get_rflags(vcpu);
+	vmcb12->save.rip    = kvm_rip_read(vcpu);
+	vmcb12->save.rsp    = kvm_rsp_read(vcpu);
+	vmcb12->save.rax    = kvm_rax_read(vcpu);
+	vmcb12->save.dr7    = vmcb02->save.dr7;
+	vmcb12->save.dr6    = svm->vcpu.arch.dr6;
+	vmcb12->save.cpl    = vmcb02->save.cpl;
+
+	vmcb12->control.int_state         = vmcb02->control.int_state;
+	vmcb12->control.exit_code         = vmcb02->control.exit_code;
+	vmcb12->control.exit_code_hi      = vmcb02->control.exit_code_hi;
+	vmcb12->control.exit_info_1       = vmcb02->control.exit_info_1;
+	vmcb12->control.exit_info_2       = vmcb02->control.exit_info_2;
+
+	if (vmcb12->control.exit_code != SVM_EXIT_ERR)
+		nested_save_pending_event_to_vmcb12(svm, vmcb12);
+
+	if (guest_can_use(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_NRIPS))
+		vmcb12->control.next_rip  = vmcb02->control.next_rip;
+
+	vmcb12->control.int_ctl           = svm->nested.ctl.int_ctl;
+	vmcb12->control.event_inj         = svm->nested.ctl.event_inj;
+	vmcb12->control.event_inj_err     = svm->nested.ctl.event_inj_err;
+
+	if (!kvm_pause_in_guest(vcpu->kvm)) {
+		vmcb01->control.pause_filter_count = vmcb02->control.pause_filter_count;
+		vmcb_mark_dirty(vmcb01, VMCB_INTERCEPTS);
+
+	}
+
+	nested_svm_copy_common_state(svm->nested.vmcb02.ptr, svm->vmcb01.ptr);
+
+	svm_switch_vmcb(svm, &svm->vmcb01);
+
+	/*
+	 * Rules for synchronizing int_ctl bits from vmcb02 to vmcb01:
+	 *
+	 * V_IRQ, V_IRQ_VECTOR, V_INTR_PRIO_MASK, V_IGN_TPR:  If L1 doesn't
+	 * intercept interrupts, then KVM will use vmcb02's V_IRQ (and related
+	 * flags) to detect interrupt windows for L1 IRQs (even if L1 uses
+	 * virtual interrupt masking).  Raise KVM_REQ_EVENT to ensure that
+	 * KVM re-requests an interrupt window if necessary, which implicitly
+	 * copies this bits from vmcb02 to vmcb01.
+	 *
+	 * V_TPR: If L1 doesn't use virtual interrupt masking, then L1's vTPR
+	 * is stored in vmcb02, but its value doesn't need to be copied from/to
+	 * vmcb01 because it is copied from/to the virtual APIC's TPR register
+	 * on each VM entry/exit.
+	 *
+	 * V_GIF: If nested vGIF is not used, KVM uses vmcb02's V_GIF for L1's
+	 * V_GIF.  However, GIF is architecturally clear on each VM exit, thus
+	 * there is no need to copy V_GIF from vmcb02 to vmcb01.
+	 */
+	if (!nested_exit_on_intr(svm))
+		kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_EVENT, &svm->vcpu);
+
+	if (unlikely(guest_can_use(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_LBRV) &&
+		     (svm->nested.ctl.virt_ext & LBR_CTL_ENABLE_MASK))) {
+		svm_copy_lbrs(vmcb12, vmcb02);
+		svm_update_lbrv(vcpu);
+	} else if (unlikely(vmcb01->control.virt_ext & LBR_CTL_ENABLE_MASK)) {
+		svm_copy_lbrs(vmcb01, vmcb02);
+		svm_update_lbrv(vcpu);
+	}
+
+	if (vnmi) {
+		if (vmcb02->control.int_ctl & V_NMI_BLOCKING_MASK)
+			vmcb01->control.int_ctl |= V_NMI_BLOCKING_MASK;
+		else
+			vmcb01->control.int_ctl &= ~V_NMI_BLOCKING_MASK;
+
+		if (vcpu->arch.nmi_pending) {
+			vcpu->arch.nmi_pending--;
+			vmcb01->control.int_ctl |= V_NMI_PENDING_MASK;
+		} else {
+			vmcb01->control.int_ctl &= ~V_NMI_PENDING_MASK;
+		}
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * On vmexit the  GIF is set to false and
+	 * no event can be injected in L1.
+	 */
+	svm_set_gif(svm, false);
+	vmcb01->control.exit_int_info = 0;
+
+	svm->vcpu.arch.tsc_offset = svm->vcpu.arch.l1_tsc_offset;
+	if (vmcb01->control.tsc_offset != svm->vcpu.arch.tsc_offset) {
+		vmcb01->control.tsc_offset = svm->vcpu.arch.tsc_offset;
+		vmcb_mark_dirty(vmcb01, VMCB_INTERCEPTS);
+	}
+
+	if (kvm_caps.has_tsc_control &&
+	    vcpu->arch.tsc_scaling_ratio != vcpu->arch.l1_tsc_scaling_ratio) {
+		vcpu->arch.tsc_scaling_ratio = vcpu->arch.l1_tsc_scaling_ratio;
+		svm_write_tsc_multiplier(vcpu);
+	}
+
+	svm->nested.ctl.nested_cr3 = 0;
+
+	/*
+	 * Restore processor state that had been saved in vmcb01
+	 */
+	kvm_set_rflags(vcpu, vmcb01->save.rflags);
+	svm_set_efer(vcpu, vmcb01->save.efer);
+	svm_set_cr0(vcpu, vmcb01->save.cr0 | X86_CR0_PE);
+	svm_set_cr4(vcpu, vmcb01->save.cr4);
+	kvm_rax_write(vcpu, vmcb01->save.rax);
+	kvm_rsp_write(vcpu, vmcb01->save.rsp);
+	kvm_rip_write(vcpu, vmcb01->save.rip);
+
+	svm->vcpu.arch.dr7 = DR7_FIXED_1;
+	kvm_update_dr7(&svm->vcpu);
+
+	trace_kvm_nested_vmexit_inject(vmcb12->control.exit_code,
+				       vmcb12->control.exit_info_1,
+				       vmcb12->control.exit_info_2,
+				       vmcb12->control.exit_int_info,
+				       vmcb12->control.exit_int_info_err,
+				       KVM_ISA_SVM);
+
+	kvm_vcpu_unmap(vcpu, &map, true);
+
+	nested_svm_transition_tlb_flush(vcpu);
+
+	nested_svm_uninit_mmu_context(vcpu);
+
+	rc = nested_svm_load_cr3(vcpu, vmcb01->save.cr3, false, true);
+	if (rc)
+		return 1;
+
+	/*
+	 * Drop what we picked up for L2 via svm_complete_interrupts() so it
+	 * doesn't end up in L1.
+	 */
+	svm->vcpu.arch.nmi_injected = false;
+	kvm_clear_exception_queue(vcpu);
+	kvm_clear_interrupt_queue(vcpu);
+
+	/*
+	 * If we are here following the completion of a VMRUN that
+	 * is being single-stepped, queue the pending #DB intercept
+	 * right now so that it an be accounted for before we execute
+	 * L1's next instruction.
+	 */
+	if (unlikely(vmcb01->save.rflags & X86_EFLAGS_TF))
+		kvm_queue_exception(&(svm->vcpu), DB_VECTOR);
+
+	/*
+	 * Un-inhibit the AVIC right away, so that other vCPUs can start
+	 * to benefit from it right away.
+	 */
+	if (kvm_apicv_activated(vcpu->kvm))
+		__kvm_vcpu_update_apicv(vcpu);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void nested_svm_triple_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+
+	if (!vmcb12_is_intercept(&svm->nested.ctl, INTERCEPT_SHUTDOWN))
+		return;
+
+	kvm_clear_request(KVM_REQ_TRIPLE_FAULT, vcpu);
+	nested_svm_simple_vmexit(to_svm(vcpu), SVM_EXIT_SHUTDOWN);
+}
+
+int svm_allocate_nested(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
+{
+	struct page *vmcb02_page;
+
+	if (svm->nested.initialized)
+		return 0;
+
+	vmcb02_page = alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT | __GFP_ZERO);
+	if (!vmcb02_page)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	svm->nested.vmcb02.ptr = page_address(vmcb02_page);
+	svm->nested.vmcb02.pa = __sme_set(page_to_pfn(vmcb02_page) << PAGE_SHIFT);
+
+	svm->nested.msrpm = svm_vcpu_alloc_msrpm();
+	if (!svm->nested.msrpm)
+		goto err_free_vmcb02;
+	svm_vcpu_init_msrpm(&svm->vcpu, svm->nested.msrpm);
+
+	svm->nested.initialized = true;
+	return 0;
+
+err_free_vmcb02:
+	__free_page(vmcb02_page);
+	return -ENOMEM;
+}
+
+void svm_free_nested(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
+{
+	if (!svm->nested.initialized)
+		return;
+
+	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(svm->vmcb != svm->vmcb01.ptr))
+		svm_switch_vmcb(svm, &svm->vmcb01);
+
+	svm_vcpu_free_msrpm(svm->nested.msrpm);
+	svm->nested.msrpm = NULL;
+
+	__free_page(virt_to_page(svm->nested.vmcb02.ptr));
+	svm->nested.vmcb02.ptr = NULL;
+
+	/*
+	 * When last_vmcb12_gpa matches the current vmcb12 gpa,
+	 * some vmcb12 fields are not loaded if they are marked clean
+	 * in the vmcb12, since in this case they are up to date already.
+	 *
+	 * When the vmcb02 is freed, this optimization becomes invalid.
+	 */
+	svm->nested.last_vmcb12_gpa = INVALID_GPA;
+
+	svm->nested.initialized = false;
+}
+
+void svm_leave_nested(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+
+	if (is_guest_mode(vcpu)) {
+		svm->nested.nested_run_pending = 0;
+		svm->nested.vmcb12_gpa = INVALID_GPA;
+
+		leave_guest_mode(vcpu);
+
+		svm_switch_vmcb(svm, &svm->vmcb01);
+
+		nested_svm_uninit_mmu_context(vcpu);
+		vmcb_mark_all_dirty(svm->vmcb);
+
+		if (kvm_apicv_activated(vcpu->kvm))
+			kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_APICV_UPDATE, vcpu);
+	}
+
+	kvm_clear_request(KVM_REQ_GET_NESTED_STATE_PAGES, vcpu);
+}
+
+static int nested_svm_exit_handled_msr(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
+{
+	u32 offset, msr, value;
+	int write, mask;
+
+	if (!(vmcb12_is_intercept(&svm->nested.ctl, INTERCEPT_MSR_PROT)))
+		return NESTED_EXIT_HOST;
+
+	msr    = svm->vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RCX];
+	offset = svm_msrpm_offset(msr);
+	write  = svm->vmcb->control.exit_info_1 & 1;
+	mask   = 1 << ((2 * (msr & 0xf)) + write);
+
+	if (offset == MSR_INVALID)
+		return NESTED_EXIT_DONE;
+
+	/* Offset is in 32 bit units but need in 8 bit units */
+	offset *= 4;
+
+	if (kvm_vcpu_read_guest(&svm->vcpu, svm->nested.ctl.msrpm_base_pa + offset, &value, 4))
+		return NESTED_EXIT_DONE;
+
+	return (value & mask) ? NESTED_EXIT_DONE : NESTED_EXIT_HOST;
+}
+
+static int nested_svm_intercept_ioio(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
+{
+	unsigned port, size, iopm_len;
+	u16 val, mask;
+	u8 start_bit;
+	u64 gpa;
+
+	if (!(vmcb12_is_intercept(&svm->nested.ctl, INTERCEPT_IOIO_PROT)))
+		return NESTED_EXIT_HOST;
+
+	port = svm->vmcb->control.exit_info_1 >> 16;
+	size = (svm->vmcb->control.exit_info_1 & SVM_IOIO_SIZE_MASK) >>
+		SVM_IOIO_SIZE_SHIFT;
+	gpa  = svm->nested.ctl.iopm_base_pa + (port / 8);
+	start_bit = port % 8;
+	iopm_len = (start_bit + size > 8) ? 2 : 1;
+	mask = (0xf >> (4 - size)) << start_bit;
+	val = 0;
+
+	if (kvm_vcpu_read_guest(&svm->vcpu, gpa, &val, iopm_len))
+		return NESTED_EXIT_DONE;
+
+	return (val & mask) ? NESTED_EXIT_DONE : NESTED_EXIT_HOST;
+}
+
+static int nested_svm_intercept(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
+{
+	u32 exit_code = svm->vmcb->control.exit_code;
+	int vmexit = NESTED_EXIT_HOST;
+
+	switch (exit_code) {
+	case SVM_EXIT_MSR:
+		vmexit = nested_svm_exit_handled_msr(svm);
+		break;
+	case SVM_EXIT_IOIO:
+		vmexit = nested_svm_intercept_ioio(svm);
+		break;
+	case SVM_EXIT_READ_CR0 ... SVM_EXIT_WRITE_CR8: {
+		if (vmcb12_is_intercept(&svm->nested.ctl, exit_code))
+			vmexit = NESTED_EXIT_DONE;
+		break;
+	}
+	case SVM_EXIT_READ_DR0 ... SVM_EXIT_WRITE_DR7: {
+		if (vmcb12_is_intercept(&svm->nested.ctl, exit_code))
+			vmexit = NESTED_EXIT_DONE;
+		break;
+	}
+	case SVM_EXIT_EXCP_BASE ... SVM_EXIT_EXCP_BASE + 0x1f: {
+		/*
+		 * Host-intercepted exceptions have been checked already in
+		 * nested_svm_exit_special.  There is nothing to do here,
+		 * the vmexit is injected by svm_check_nested_events.
+		 */
+		vmexit = NESTED_EXIT_DONE;
+		break;
+	}
+	case SVM_EXIT_ERR: {
+		vmexit = NESTED_EXIT_DONE;
+		break;
+	}
+	default: {
+		if (vmcb12_is_intercept(&svm->nested.ctl, exit_code))
+			vmexit = NESTED_EXIT_DONE;
+	}
+	}
+
+	return vmexit;
+}
+
+int nested_svm_exit_handled(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
+{
+	int vmexit;
+
+	vmexit = nested_svm_intercept(svm);
+
+	if (vmexit == NESTED_EXIT_DONE)
+		nested_svm_vmexit(svm);
+
+	return vmexit;
+}
+
+int nested_svm_check_permissions(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	if (!(vcpu->arch.efer & EFER_SVME) || !is_paging(vcpu)) {
+		kvm_queue_exception(vcpu, UD_VECTOR);
+		return 1;
+	}
+
+	if (to_svm(vcpu)->vmcb->save.cpl) {
+		kvm_inject_gp(vcpu, 0);
+		return 1;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static bool nested_svm_is_exception_vmexit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u8 vector,
+					   u32 error_code)
+{
+	struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+
+	return (svm->nested.ctl.intercepts[INTERCEPT_EXCEPTION] & BIT(vector));
+}
+
+static void nested_svm_inject_exception_vmexit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct kvm_queued_exception *ex = &vcpu->arch.exception_vmexit;
+	struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+	struct vmcb *vmcb = svm->vmcb;
+
+	vmcb->control.exit_code = SVM_EXIT_EXCP_BASE + ex->vector;
+	vmcb->control.exit_code_hi = 0;
+
+	if (ex->has_error_code)
+		vmcb->control.exit_info_1 = ex->error_code;
+
+	/*
+	 * EXITINFO2 is undefined for all exception intercepts other
+	 * than #PF.
+	 */
+	if (ex->vector == PF_VECTOR) {
+		if (ex->has_payload)
+			vmcb->control.exit_info_2 = ex->payload;
+		else
+			vmcb->control.exit_info_2 = vcpu->arch.cr2;
+	} else if (ex->vector == DB_VECTOR) {
+		/* See kvm_check_and_inject_events().  */
+		kvm_deliver_exception_payload(vcpu, ex);
+
+		if (vcpu->arch.dr7 & DR7_GD) {
+			vcpu->arch.dr7 &= ~DR7_GD;
+			kvm_update_dr7(vcpu);
+		}
+	} else {
+		WARN_ON(ex->has_payload);
+	}
+
+	nested_svm_vmexit(svm);
+}
+
+static inline bool nested_exit_on_init(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
+{
+	return vmcb12_is_intercept(&svm->nested.ctl, INTERCEPT_INIT);
+}
+
+static int svm_check_nested_events(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct kvm_lapic *apic = vcpu->arch.apic;
+	struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+	/*
+	 * Only a pending nested run blocks a pending exception.  If there is a
+	 * previously injected event, the pending exception occurred while said
+	 * event was being delivered and thus needs to be handled.
+	 */
+	bool block_nested_exceptions = svm->nested.nested_run_pending;
+	/*
+	 * New events (not exceptions) are only recognized at instruction
+	 * boundaries.  If an event needs reinjection, then KVM is handling a
+	 * VM-Exit that occurred _during_ instruction execution; new events are
+	 * blocked until the instruction completes.
+	 */
+	bool block_nested_events = block_nested_exceptions ||
+				   kvm_event_needs_reinjection(vcpu);
+
+	if (lapic_in_kernel(vcpu) &&
+	    test_bit(KVM_APIC_INIT, &apic->pending_events)) {
+		if (block_nested_events)
+			return -EBUSY;
+		if (!nested_exit_on_init(svm))
+			return 0;
+		nested_svm_simple_vmexit(svm, SVM_EXIT_INIT);
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	if (vcpu->arch.exception_vmexit.pending) {
+		if (block_nested_exceptions)
+                        return -EBUSY;
+		nested_svm_inject_exception_vmexit(vcpu);
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	if (vcpu->arch.exception.pending) {
+		if (block_nested_exceptions)
+			return -EBUSY;
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_SMM
+	if (vcpu->arch.smi_pending && !svm_smi_blocked(vcpu)) {
+		if (block_nested_events)
+			return -EBUSY;
+		if (!nested_exit_on_smi(svm))
+			return 0;
+		nested_svm_simple_vmexit(svm, SVM_EXIT_SMI);
+		return 0;
+	}
+#endif
+
+	if (vcpu->arch.nmi_pending && !svm_nmi_blocked(vcpu)) {
+		if (block_nested_events)
+			return -EBUSY;
+		if (!nested_exit_on_nmi(svm))
+			return 0;
+		nested_svm_simple_vmexit(svm, SVM_EXIT_NMI);
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	if (kvm_cpu_has_interrupt(vcpu) && !svm_interrupt_blocked(vcpu)) {
+		if (block_nested_events)
+			return -EBUSY;
+		if (!nested_exit_on_intr(svm))
+			return 0;
+		trace_kvm_nested_intr_vmexit(svm->vmcb->save.rip);
+		nested_svm_simple_vmexit(svm, SVM_EXIT_INTR);
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int nested_svm_exit_special(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
+{
+	u32 exit_code = svm->vmcb->control.exit_code;
+	struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = &svm->vcpu;
+
+	switch (exit_code) {
+	case SVM_EXIT_INTR:
+	case SVM_EXIT_NMI:
+	case SVM_EXIT_NPF:
+		return NESTED_EXIT_HOST;
+	case SVM_EXIT_EXCP_BASE ... SVM_EXIT_EXCP_BASE + 0x1f: {
+		u32 excp_bits = 1 << (exit_code - SVM_EXIT_EXCP_BASE);
+
+		if (svm->vmcb01.ptr->control.intercepts[INTERCEPT_EXCEPTION] &
+		    excp_bits)
+			return NESTED_EXIT_HOST;
+		else if (exit_code == SVM_EXIT_EXCP_BASE + PF_VECTOR &&
+			 svm->vcpu.arch.apf.host_apf_flags)
+			/* Trap async PF even if not shadowing */
+			return NESTED_EXIT_HOST;
+		break;
+	}
+	case SVM_EXIT_VMMCALL:
+		/* Hyper-V L2 TLB flush hypercall is handled by L0 */
+		if (guest_hv_cpuid_has_l2_tlb_flush(vcpu) &&
+		    nested_svm_l2_tlb_flush_enabled(vcpu) &&
+		    kvm_hv_is_tlb_flush_hcall(vcpu))
+			return NESTED_EXIT_HOST;
+		break;
+	default:
+		break;
+	}
+
+	return NESTED_EXIT_CONTINUE;
+}
+
+void nested_svm_update_tsc_ratio_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+
+	vcpu->arch.tsc_scaling_ratio =
+		kvm_calc_nested_tsc_multiplier(vcpu->arch.l1_tsc_scaling_ratio,
+					       svm->tsc_ratio_msr);
+	svm_write_tsc_multiplier(vcpu);
+}
+
+/* Inverse operation of nested_copy_vmcb_control_to_cache(). asid is copied too. */
+static void nested_copy_vmcb_cache_to_control(struct vmcb_control_area *dst,
+					      struct vmcb_ctrl_area_cached *from)
+{
+	unsigned int i;
+
+	memset(dst, 0, sizeof(struct vmcb_control_area));
+
+	for (i = 0; i < MAX_INTERCEPT; i++)
+		dst->intercepts[i] = from->intercepts[i];
+
+	dst->iopm_base_pa         = from->iopm_base_pa;
+	dst->msrpm_base_pa        = from->msrpm_base_pa;
+	dst->tsc_offset           = from->tsc_offset;
+	dst->asid                 = from->asid;
+	dst->tlb_ctl              = from->tlb_ctl;
+	dst->int_ctl              = from->int_ctl;
+	dst->int_vector           = from->int_vector;
+	dst->int_state            = from->int_state;
+	dst->exit_code            = from->exit_code;
+	dst->exit_code_hi         = from->exit_code_hi;
+	dst->exit_info_1          = from->exit_info_1;
+	dst->exit_info_2          = from->exit_info_2;
+	dst->exit_int_info        = from->exit_int_info;
+	dst->exit_int_info_err    = from->exit_int_info_err;
+	dst->nested_ctl           = from->nested_ctl;
+	dst->event_inj            = from->event_inj;
+	dst->event_inj_err        = from->event_inj_err;
+	dst->next_rip             = from->next_rip;
+	dst->nested_cr3           = from->nested_cr3;
+	dst->virt_ext              = from->virt_ext;
+	dst->pause_filter_count   = from->pause_filter_count;
+	dst->pause_filter_thresh  = from->pause_filter_thresh;
+	/* 'clean' and 'hv_enlightenments' are not changed by KVM */
+}
+
+static int svm_get_nested_state(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+				struct kvm_nested_state __user *user_kvm_nested_state,
+				u32 user_data_size)
+{
+	struct vcpu_svm *svm;
+	struct vmcb_control_area *ctl;
+	unsigned long r;
+	struct kvm_nested_state kvm_state = {
+		.flags = 0,
+		.format = KVM_STATE_NESTED_FORMAT_SVM,
+		.size = sizeof(kvm_state),
+	};
+	struct vmcb __user *user_vmcb = (struct vmcb __user *)
+		&user_kvm_nested_state->data.svm[0];
+
+	if (!vcpu)
+		return kvm_state.size + KVM_STATE_NESTED_SVM_VMCB_SIZE;
+
+	svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+
+	if (user_data_size < kvm_state.size)
+		goto out;
+
+	/* First fill in the header and copy it out.  */
+	if (is_guest_mode(vcpu)) {
+		kvm_state.hdr.svm.vmcb_pa = svm->nested.vmcb12_gpa;
+		kvm_state.size += KVM_STATE_NESTED_SVM_VMCB_SIZE;
+		kvm_state.flags |= KVM_STATE_NESTED_GUEST_MODE;
+
+		if (svm->nested.nested_run_pending)
+			kvm_state.flags |= KVM_STATE_NESTED_RUN_PENDING;
+	}
+
+	if (gif_set(svm))
+		kvm_state.flags |= KVM_STATE_NESTED_GIF_SET;
+
+	if (copy_to_user(user_kvm_nested_state, &kvm_state, sizeof(kvm_state)))
+		return -EFAULT;
+
+	if (!is_guest_mode(vcpu))
+		goto out;
+
+	/*
+	 * Copy over the full size of the VMCB rather than just the size
+	 * of the structs.
+	 */
+	if (clear_user(user_vmcb, KVM_STATE_NESTED_SVM_VMCB_SIZE))
+		return -EFAULT;
+
+	ctl = kzalloc(sizeof(*ctl), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!ctl)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	nested_copy_vmcb_cache_to_control(ctl, &svm->nested.ctl);
+	r = copy_to_user(&user_vmcb->control, ctl,
+			 sizeof(user_vmcb->control));
+	kfree(ctl);
+	if (r)
+		return -EFAULT;
+
+	if (copy_to_user(&user_vmcb->save, &svm->vmcb01.ptr->save,
+			 sizeof(user_vmcb->save)))
+		return -EFAULT;
+out:
+	return kvm_state.size;
+}
+
+static int svm_set_nested_state(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+				struct kvm_nested_state __user *user_kvm_nested_state,
+				struct kvm_nested_state *kvm_state)
+{
+	struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+	struct vmcb __user *user_vmcb = (struct vmcb __user *)
+		&user_kvm_nested_state->data.svm[0];
+	struct vmcb_control_area *ctl;
+	struct vmcb_save_area *save;
+	struct vmcb_save_area_cached save_cached;
+	struct vmcb_ctrl_area_cached ctl_cached;
+	unsigned long cr0;
+	int ret;
+
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(struct vmcb_control_area) + sizeof(struct vmcb_save_area) >
+		     KVM_STATE_NESTED_SVM_VMCB_SIZE);
+
+	if (kvm_state->format != KVM_STATE_NESTED_FORMAT_SVM)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (kvm_state->flags & ~(KVM_STATE_NESTED_GUEST_MODE |
+				 KVM_STATE_NESTED_RUN_PENDING |
+				 KVM_STATE_NESTED_GIF_SET))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	/*
+	 * If in guest mode, vcpu->arch.efer actually refers to the L2 guest's
+	 * EFER.SVME, but EFER.SVME still has to be 1 for VMRUN to succeed.
+	 */
+	if (!(vcpu->arch.efer & EFER_SVME)) {
+		/* GIF=1 and no guest mode are required if SVME=0.  */
+		if (kvm_state->flags != KVM_STATE_NESTED_GIF_SET)
+			return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	/* SMM temporarily disables SVM, so we cannot be in guest mode.  */
+	if (is_smm(vcpu) && (kvm_state->flags & KVM_STATE_NESTED_GUEST_MODE))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (!(kvm_state->flags & KVM_STATE_NESTED_GUEST_MODE)) {
+		svm_leave_nested(vcpu);
+		svm_set_gif(svm, !!(kvm_state->flags & KVM_STATE_NESTED_GIF_SET));
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	if (!page_address_valid(vcpu, kvm_state->hdr.svm.vmcb_pa))
+		return -EINVAL;
+	if (kvm_state->size < sizeof(*kvm_state) + KVM_STATE_NESTED_SVM_VMCB_SIZE)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	ret  = -ENOMEM;
+	ctl  = kzalloc(sizeof(*ctl),  GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
+	save = kzalloc(sizeof(*save), GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
+	if (!ctl || !save)
+		goto out_free;
+
+	ret = -EFAULT;
+	if (copy_from_user(ctl, &user_vmcb->control, sizeof(*ctl)))
+		goto out_free;
+	if (copy_from_user(save, &user_vmcb->save, sizeof(*save)))
+		goto out_free;
+
+	ret = -EINVAL;
+	__nested_copy_vmcb_control_to_cache(vcpu, &ctl_cached, ctl);
+	if (!__nested_vmcb_check_controls(vcpu, &ctl_cached))
+		goto out_free;
+
+	/*
+	 * Processor state contains L2 state.  Check that it is
+	 * valid for guest mode (see nested_vmcb_check_save).
+	 */
+	cr0 = kvm_read_cr0(vcpu);
+        if (((cr0 & X86_CR0_CD) == 0) && (cr0 & X86_CR0_NW))
+		goto out_free;
+
+	/*
+	 * Validate host state saved from before VMRUN (see
+	 * nested_svm_check_permissions).
+	 */
+	__nested_copy_vmcb_save_to_cache(&save_cached, save);
+	if (!(save->cr0 & X86_CR0_PG) ||
+	    !(save->cr0 & X86_CR0_PE) ||
+	    (save->rflags & X86_EFLAGS_VM) ||
+	    !__nested_vmcb_check_save(vcpu, &save_cached))
+		goto out_free;
+
+
+	/*
+	 * All checks done, we can enter guest mode. Userspace provides
+	 * vmcb12.control, which will be combined with L1 and stored into
+	 * vmcb02, and the L1 save state which we store in vmcb01.
+	 * L2 registers if needed are moved from the current VMCB to VMCB02.
+	 */
+
+	if (is_guest_mode(vcpu))
+		svm_leave_nested(vcpu);
+	else
+		svm->nested.vmcb02.ptr->save = svm->vmcb01.ptr->save;
+
+	svm_set_gif(svm, !!(kvm_state->flags & KVM_STATE_NESTED_GIF_SET));
+
+	svm->nested.nested_run_pending =
+		!!(kvm_state->flags & KVM_STATE_NESTED_RUN_PENDING);
+
+	svm->nested.vmcb12_gpa = kvm_state->hdr.svm.vmcb_pa;
+
+	svm_copy_vmrun_state(&svm->vmcb01.ptr->save, save);
+	nested_copy_vmcb_control_to_cache(svm, ctl);
+
+	svm_switch_vmcb(svm, &svm->nested.vmcb02);
+	nested_vmcb02_prepare_control(svm, svm->vmcb->save.rip, svm->vmcb->save.cs.base);
+
+	/*
+	 * While the nested guest CR3 is already checked and set by
+	 * KVM_SET_SREGS, it was set when nested state was yet loaded,
+	 * thus MMU might not be initialized correctly.
+	 * Set it again to fix this.
+	 */
+
+	ret = nested_svm_load_cr3(&svm->vcpu, vcpu->arch.cr3,
+				  nested_npt_enabled(svm), false);
+	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(ret))
+		goto out_free;
+
+	svm->nested.force_msr_bitmap_recalc = true;
+
+	kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_GET_NESTED_STATE_PAGES, vcpu);
+	ret = 0;
+out_free:
+	kfree(save);
+	kfree(ctl);
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static bool svm_get_nested_state_pages(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+
+	if (WARN_ON(!is_guest_mode(vcpu)))
+		return true;
+
+	if (!vcpu->arch.pdptrs_from_userspace &&
+	    !nested_npt_enabled(svm) && is_pae_paging(vcpu))
+		/*
+		 * Reload the guest's PDPTRs since after a migration
+		 * the guest CR3 might be restored prior to setting the nested
+		 * state which can lead to a load of wrong PDPTRs.
+		 */
+		if (CC(!load_pdptrs(vcpu, vcpu->arch.cr3)))
+			return false;
+
+	if (!nested_svm_vmrun_msrpm(svm)) {
+		vcpu->run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+		vcpu->run->internal.suberror =
+			KVM_INTERNAL_ERROR_EMULATION;
+		vcpu->run->internal.ndata = 0;
+		return false;
+	}
+
+	if (kvm_hv_verify_vp_assist(vcpu))
+		return false;
+
+	return true;
+}
+
+struct kvm_x86_nested_ops svm_nested_ops = {
+	.leave_nested = svm_leave_nested,
+	.is_exception_vmexit = nested_svm_is_exception_vmexit,
+	.check_events = svm_check_nested_events,
+	.triple_fault = nested_svm_triple_fault,
+	.get_nested_state_pages = svm_get_nested_state_pages,
+	.get_state = svm_get_nested_state,
+	.set_state = svm_set_nested_state,
+	.hv_inject_synthetic_vmexit_post_tlb_flush = svm_hv_inject_synthetic_vmexit_post_tlb_flush,
+};
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/pmu.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/pmu.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..3fd47de14
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/pmu.c
@@ -0,0 +1,250 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * KVM PMU support for AMD
+ *
+ * Copyright 2015, Red Hat, Inc. and/or its affiliates.
+ *
+ * Author:
+ *   Wei Huang <wei@redhat.com>
+ *
+ * Implementation is based on pmu_intel.c file
+ */
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
+
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/kvm_host.h>
+#include <linux/perf_event.h>
+#include "x86.h"
+#include "cpuid.h"
+#include "lapic.h"
+#include "pmu.h"
+#include "svm.h"
+
+enum pmu_type {
+	PMU_TYPE_COUNTER = 0,
+	PMU_TYPE_EVNTSEL,
+};
+
+static struct kvm_pmc *amd_pmc_idx_to_pmc(struct kvm_pmu *pmu, int pmc_idx)
+{
+	unsigned int num_counters = pmu->nr_arch_gp_counters;
+
+	if (pmc_idx >= num_counters)
+		return NULL;
+
+	return &pmu->gp_counters[array_index_nospec(pmc_idx, num_counters)];
+}
+
+static inline struct kvm_pmc *get_gp_pmc_amd(struct kvm_pmu *pmu, u32 msr,
+					     enum pmu_type type)
+{
+	struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = pmu_to_vcpu(pmu);
+	unsigned int idx;
+
+	if (!vcpu->kvm->arch.enable_pmu)
+		return NULL;
+
+	switch (msr) {
+	case MSR_F15H_PERF_CTL0 ... MSR_F15H_PERF_CTR5:
+		if (!guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_PERFCTR_CORE))
+			return NULL;
+		/*
+		 * Each PMU counter has a pair of CTL and CTR MSRs. CTLn
+		 * MSRs (accessed via EVNTSEL) are even, CTRn MSRs are odd.
+		 */
+		idx = (unsigned int)((msr - MSR_F15H_PERF_CTL0) / 2);
+		if (!(msr & 0x1) != (type == PMU_TYPE_EVNTSEL))
+			return NULL;
+		break;
+	case MSR_K7_EVNTSEL0 ... MSR_K7_EVNTSEL3:
+		if (type != PMU_TYPE_EVNTSEL)
+			return NULL;
+		idx = msr - MSR_K7_EVNTSEL0;
+		break;
+	case MSR_K7_PERFCTR0 ... MSR_K7_PERFCTR3:
+		if (type != PMU_TYPE_COUNTER)
+			return NULL;
+		idx = msr - MSR_K7_PERFCTR0;
+		break;
+	default:
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	return amd_pmc_idx_to_pmc(pmu, idx);
+}
+
+static bool amd_hw_event_available(struct kvm_pmc *pmc)
+{
+	return true;
+}
+
+static bool amd_is_valid_rdpmc_ecx(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned int idx)
+{
+	struct kvm_pmu *pmu = vcpu_to_pmu(vcpu);
+
+	idx &= ~(3u << 30);
+
+	return idx < pmu->nr_arch_gp_counters;
+}
+
+/* idx is the ECX register of RDPMC instruction */
+static struct kvm_pmc *amd_rdpmc_ecx_to_pmc(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+	unsigned int idx, u64 *mask)
+{
+	return amd_pmc_idx_to_pmc(vcpu_to_pmu(vcpu), idx & ~(3u << 30));
+}
+
+static struct kvm_pmc *amd_msr_idx_to_pmc(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 msr)
+{
+	struct kvm_pmu *pmu = vcpu_to_pmu(vcpu);
+	struct kvm_pmc *pmc;
+
+	pmc = get_gp_pmc_amd(pmu, msr, PMU_TYPE_COUNTER);
+	pmc = pmc ? pmc : get_gp_pmc_amd(pmu, msr, PMU_TYPE_EVNTSEL);
+
+	return pmc;
+}
+
+static bool amd_is_valid_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 msr)
+{
+	struct kvm_pmu *pmu = vcpu_to_pmu(vcpu);
+
+	switch (msr) {
+	case MSR_K7_EVNTSEL0 ... MSR_K7_PERFCTR3:
+		return pmu->version > 0;
+	case MSR_F15H_PERF_CTL0 ... MSR_F15H_PERF_CTR5:
+		return guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_PERFCTR_CORE);
+	case MSR_AMD64_PERF_CNTR_GLOBAL_STATUS:
+	case MSR_AMD64_PERF_CNTR_GLOBAL_CTL:
+	case MSR_AMD64_PERF_CNTR_GLOBAL_STATUS_CLR:
+		return pmu->version > 1;
+	default:
+		if (msr > MSR_F15H_PERF_CTR5 &&
+		    msr < MSR_F15H_PERF_CTL0 + 2 * pmu->nr_arch_gp_counters)
+			return pmu->version > 1;
+		break;
+	}
+
+	return amd_msr_idx_to_pmc(vcpu, msr);
+}
+
+static int amd_pmu_get_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
+{
+	struct kvm_pmu *pmu = vcpu_to_pmu(vcpu);
+	struct kvm_pmc *pmc;
+	u32 msr = msr_info->index;
+
+	/* MSR_PERFCTRn */
+	pmc = get_gp_pmc_amd(pmu, msr, PMU_TYPE_COUNTER);
+	if (pmc) {
+		msr_info->data = pmc_read_counter(pmc);
+		return 0;
+	}
+	/* MSR_EVNTSELn */
+	pmc = get_gp_pmc_amd(pmu, msr, PMU_TYPE_EVNTSEL);
+	if (pmc) {
+		msr_info->data = pmc->eventsel;
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	return 1;
+}
+
+static int amd_pmu_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
+{
+	struct kvm_pmu *pmu = vcpu_to_pmu(vcpu);
+	struct kvm_pmc *pmc;
+	u32 msr = msr_info->index;
+	u64 data = msr_info->data;
+
+	/* MSR_PERFCTRn */
+	pmc = get_gp_pmc_amd(pmu, msr, PMU_TYPE_COUNTER);
+	if (pmc) {
+		pmc_write_counter(pmc, data);
+		pmc_update_sample_period(pmc);
+		return 0;
+	}
+	/* MSR_EVNTSELn */
+	pmc = get_gp_pmc_amd(pmu, msr, PMU_TYPE_EVNTSEL);
+	if (pmc) {
+		data &= ~pmu->reserved_bits;
+		if (data != pmc->eventsel) {
+			pmc->eventsel = data;
+			kvm_pmu_request_counter_reprogram(pmc);
+		}
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	return 1;
+}
+
+static void amd_pmu_refresh(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct kvm_pmu *pmu = vcpu_to_pmu(vcpu);
+	union cpuid_0x80000022_ebx ebx;
+
+	pmu->version = 1;
+	if (guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_PERFMON_V2)) {
+		pmu->version = 2;
+		/*
+		 * Note, PERFMON_V2 is also in 0x80000022.0x0, i.e. the guest
+		 * CPUID entry is guaranteed to be non-NULL.
+		 */
+		BUILD_BUG_ON(x86_feature_cpuid(X86_FEATURE_PERFMON_V2).function != 0x80000022 ||
+			     x86_feature_cpuid(X86_FEATURE_PERFMON_V2).index);
+		ebx.full = kvm_find_cpuid_entry_index(vcpu, 0x80000022, 0)->ebx;
+		pmu->nr_arch_gp_counters = ebx.split.num_core_pmc;
+	} else if (guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_PERFCTR_CORE)) {
+		pmu->nr_arch_gp_counters = AMD64_NUM_COUNTERS_CORE;
+	} else {
+		pmu->nr_arch_gp_counters = AMD64_NUM_COUNTERS;
+	}
+
+	pmu->nr_arch_gp_counters = min_t(unsigned int, pmu->nr_arch_gp_counters,
+					 kvm_pmu_cap.num_counters_gp);
+
+	if (pmu->version > 1) {
+		pmu->global_ctrl_mask = ~((1ull << pmu->nr_arch_gp_counters) - 1);
+		pmu->global_status_mask = pmu->global_ctrl_mask;
+	}
+
+	pmu->counter_bitmask[KVM_PMC_GP] = ((u64)1 << 48) - 1;
+	pmu->reserved_bits = 0xfffffff000280000ull;
+	pmu->raw_event_mask = AMD64_RAW_EVENT_MASK;
+	/* not applicable to AMD; but clean them to prevent any fall out */
+	pmu->counter_bitmask[KVM_PMC_FIXED] = 0;
+	pmu->nr_arch_fixed_counters = 0;
+	bitmap_set(pmu->all_valid_pmc_idx, 0, pmu->nr_arch_gp_counters);
+}
+
+static void amd_pmu_init(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct kvm_pmu *pmu = vcpu_to_pmu(vcpu);
+	int i;
+
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(KVM_AMD_PMC_MAX_GENERIC > AMD64_NUM_COUNTERS_CORE);
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(KVM_AMD_PMC_MAX_GENERIC > INTEL_PMC_MAX_GENERIC);
+
+	for (i = 0; i < KVM_AMD_PMC_MAX_GENERIC ; i++) {
+		pmu->gp_counters[i].type = KVM_PMC_GP;
+		pmu->gp_counters[i].vcpu = vcpu;
+		pmu->gp_counters[i].idx = i;
+		pmu->gp_counters[i].current_config = 0;
+	}
+}
+
+struct kvm_pmu_ops amd_pmu_ops __initdata = {
+	.hw_event_available = amd_hw_event_available,
+	.pmc_idx_to_pmc = amd_pmc_idx_to_pmc,
+	.rdpmc_ecx_to_pmc = amd_rdpmc_ecx_to_pmc,
+	.msr_idx_to_pmc = amd_msr_idx_to_pmc,
+	.is_valid_rdpmc_ecx = amd_is_valid_rdpmc_ecx,
+	.is_valid_msr = amd_is_valid_msr,
+	.get_msr = amd_pmu_get_msr,
+	.set_msr = amd_pmu_set_msr,
+	.refresh = amd_pmu_refresh,
+	.init = amd_pmu_init,
+	.EVENTSEL_EVENT = AMD64_EVENTSEL_EVENT,
+	.MAX_NR_GP_COUNTERS = KVM_AMD_PMC_MAX_GENERIC,
+	.MIN_NR_GP_COUNTERS = AMD64_NUM_COUNTERS,
+};
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..4900c0780
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
@@ -0,0 +1,3140 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * Kernel-based Virtual Machine driver for Linux
+ *
+ * AMD SVM-SEV support
+ *
+ * Copyright 2010 Red Hat, Inc. and/or its affiliates.
+ */
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
+
+#include <linux/kvm_types.h>
+#include <linux/kvm_host.h>
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/highmem.h>
+#include <linux/psp.h>
+#include <linux/psp-sev.h>
+#include <linux/pagemap.h>
+#include <linux/swap.h>
+#include <linux/misc_cgroup.h>
+#include <linux/processor.h>
+#include <linux/trace_events.h>
+
+#include <asm/pkru.h>
+#include <asm/trapnr.h>
+#include <asm/fpu/xcr.h>
+#include <asm/debugreg.h>
+
+#include "mmu.h"
+#include "x86.h"
+#include "svm.h"
+#include "svm_ops.h"
+#include "cpuid.h"
+#include "trace.h"
+
+#ifndef CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV
+/*
+ * When this config is not defined, SEV feature is not supported and APIs in
+ * this file are not used but this file still gets compiled into the KVM AMD
+ * module.
+ *
+ * We will not have MISC_CG_RES_SEV and MISC_CG_RES_SEV_ES entries in the enum
+ * misc_res_type {} defined in linux/misc_cgroup.h.
+ *
+ * Below macros allow compilation to succeed.
+ */
+#define MISC_CG_RES_SEV MISC_CG_RES_TYPES
+#define MISC_CG_RES_SEV_ES MISC_CG_RES_TYPES
+#endif
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV
+/* enable/disable SEV support */
+static bool sev_enabled = true;
+module_param_named(sev, sev_enabled, bool, 0444);
+
+/* enable/disable SEV-ES support */
+static bool sev_es_enabled = true;
+module_param_named(sev_es, sev_es_enabled, bool, 0444);
+
+/* enable/disable SEV-ES DebugSwap support */
+static bool sev_es_debug_swap_enabled = true;
+module_param_named(debug_swap, sev_es_debug_swap_enabled, bool, 0444);
+#else
+#define sev_enabled false
+#define sev_es_enabled false
+#define sev_es_debug_swap_enabled false
+#endif /* CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV */
+
+static u8 sev_enc_bit;
+static DECLARE_RWSEM(sev_deactivate_lock);
+static DEFINE_MUTEX(sev_bitmap_lock);
+unsigned int max_sev_asid;
+static unsigned int min_sev_asid;
+static unsigned long sev_me_mask;
+static unsigned int nr_asids;
+static unsigned long *sev_asid_bitmap;
+static unsigned long *sev_reclaim_asid_bitmap;
+
+struct enc_region {
+	struct list_head list;
+	unsigned long npages;
+	struct page **pages;
+	unsigned long uaddr;
+	unsigned long size;
+};
+
+/* Called with the sev_bitmap_lock held, or on shutdown  */
+static int sev_flush_asids(int min_asid, int max_asid)
+{
+	int ret, asid, error = 0;
+
+	/* Check if there are any ASIDs to reclaim before performing a flush */
+	asid = find_next_bit(sev_reclaim_asid_bitmap, nr_asids, min_asid);
+	if (asid > max_asid)
+		return -EBUSY;
+
+	/*
+	 * DEACTIVATE will clear the WBINVD indicator causing DF_FLUSH to fail,
+	 * so it must be guarded.
+	 */
+	down_write(&sev_deactivate_lock);
+
+	wbinvd_on_all_cpus();
+	ret = sev_guest_df_flush(&error);
+
+	up_write(&sev_deactivate_lock);
+
+	if (ret)
+		pr_err("SEV: DF_FLUSH failed, ret=%d, error=%#x\n", ret, error);
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static inline bool is_mirroring_enc_context(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+	return !!to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info.enc_context_owner;
+}
+
+/* Must be called with the sev_bitmap_lock held */
+static bool __sev_recycle_asids(int min_asid, int max_asid)
+{
+	if (sev_flush_asids(min_asid, max_asid))
+		return false;
+
+	/* The flush process will flush all reclaimable SEV and SEV-ES ASIDs */
+	bitmap_xor(sev_asid_bitmap, sev_asid_bitmap, sev_reclaim_asid_bitmap,
+		   nr_asids);
+	bitmap_zero(sev_reclaim_asid_bitmap, nr_asids);
+
+	return true;
+}
+
+static int sev_misc_cg_try_charge(struct kvm_sev_info *sev)
+{
+	enum misc_res_type type = sev->es_active ? MISC_CG_RES_SEV_ES : MISC_CG_RES_SEV;
+	return misc_cg_try_charge(type, sev->misc_cg, 1);
+}
+
+static void sev_misc_cg_uncharge(struct kvm_sev_info *sev)
+{
+	enum misc_res_type type = sev->es_active ? MISC_CG_RES_SEV_ES : MISC_CG_RES_SEV;
+	misc_cg_uncharge(type, sev->misc_cg, 1);
+}
+
+static int sev_asid_new(struct kvm_sev_info *sev)
+{
+	int asid, min_asid, max_asid, ret;
+	bool retry = true;
+
+	WARN_ON(sev->misc_cg);
+	sev->misc_cg = get_current_misc_cg();
+	ret = sev_misc_cg_try_charge(sev);
+	if (ret) {
+		put_misc_cg(sev->misc_cg);
+		sev->misc_cg = NULL;
+		return ret;
+	}
+
+	mutex_lock(&sev_bitmap_lock);
+
+	/*
+	 * SEV-enabled guests must use asid from min_sev_asid to max_sev_asid.
+	 * SEV-ES-enabled guest can use from 1 to min_sev_asid - 1.
+	 */
+	min_asid = sev->es_active ? 1 : min_sev_asid;
+	max_asid = sev->es_active ? min_sev_asid - 1 : max_sev_asid;
+again:
+	asid = find_next_zero_bit(sev_asid_bitmap, max_asid + 1, min_asid);
+	if (asid > max_asid) {
+		if (retry && __sev_recycle_asids(min_asid, max_asid)) {
+			retry = false;
+			goto again;
+		}
+		mutex_unlock(&sev_bitmap_lock);
+		ret = -EBUSY;
+		goto e_uncharge;
+	}
+
+	__set_bit(asid, sev_asid_bitmap);
+
+	mutex_unlock(&sev_bitmap_lock);
+
+	return asid;
+e_uncharge:
+	sev_misc_cg_uncharge(sev);
+	put_misc_cg(sev->misc_cg);
+	sev->misc_cg = NULL;
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int sev_get_asid(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+	struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
+
+	return sev->asid;
+}
+
+static void sev_asid_free(struct kvm_sev_info *sev)
+{
+	struct svm_cpu_data *sd;
+	int cpu;
+
+	mutex_lock(&sev_bitmap_lock);
+
+	__set_bit(sev->asid, sev_reclaim_asid_bitmap);
+
+	for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) {
+		sd = per_cpu_ptr(&svm_data, cpu);
+		sd->sev_vmcbs[sev->asid] = NULL;
+	}
+
+	mutex_unlock(&sev_bitmap_lock);
+
+	sev_misc_cg_uncharge(sev);
+	put_misc_cg(sev->misc_cg);
+	sev->misc_cg = NULL;
+}
+
+static void sev_decommission(unsigned int handle)
+{
+	struct sev_data_decommission decommission;
+
+	if (!handle)
+		return;
+
+	decommission.handle = handle;
+	sev_guest_decommission(&decommission, NULL);
+}
+
+static void sev_unbind_asid(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned int handle)
+{
+	struct sev_data_deactivate deactivate;
+
+	if (!handle)
+		return;
+
+	deactivate.handle = handle;
+
+	/* Guard DEACTIVATE against WBINVD/DF_FLUSH used in ASID recycling */
+	down_read(&sev_deactivate_lock);
+	sev_guest_deactivate(&deactivate, NULL);
+	up_read(&sev_deactivate_lock);
+
+	sev_decommission(handle);
+}
+
+static int sev_guest_init(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
+{
+	struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
+	int asid, ret;
+
+	if (kvm->created_vcpus)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	ret = -EBUSY;
+	if (unlikely(sev->active))
+		return ret;
+
+	sev->active = true;
+	sev->es_active = argp->id == KVM_SEV_ES_INIT;
+	asid = sev_asid_new(sev);
+	if (asid < 0)
+		goto e_no_asid;
+	sev->asid = asid;
+
+	ret = sev_platform_init(&argp->error);
+	if (ret)
+		goto e_free;
+
+	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sev->regions_list);
+	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sev->mirror_vms);
+
+	kvm_set_apicv_inhibit(kvm, APICV_INHIBIT_REASON_SEV);
+
+	return 0;
+
+e_free:
+	sev_asid_free(sev);
+	sev->asid = 0;
+e_no_asid:
+	sev->es_active = false;
+	sev->active = false;
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int sev_bind_asid(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned int handle, int *error)
+{
+	struct sev_data_activate activate;
+	int asid = sev_get_asid(kvm);
+	int ret;
+
+	/* activate ASID on the given handle */
+	activate.handle = handle;
+	activate.asid   = asid;
+	ret = sev_guest_activate(&activate, error);
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int __sev_issue_cmd(int fd, int id, void *data, int *error)
+{
+	struct fd f;
+	int ret;
+
+	f = fdget(fd);
+	if (!f.file)
+		return -EBADF;
+
+	ret = sev_issue_cmd_external_user(f.file, id, data, error);
+
+	fdput(f);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int sev_issue_cmd(struct kvm *kvm, int id, void *data, int *error)
+{
+	struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
+
+	return __sev_issue_cmd(sev->fd, id, data, error);
+}
+
+static int sev_launch_start(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
+{
+	struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
+	struct sev_data_launch_start start;
+	struct kvm_sev_launch_start params;
+	void *dh_blob, *session_blob;
+	int *error = &argp->error;
+	int ret;
+
+	if (!sev_guest(kvm))
+		return -ENOTTY;
+
+	if (copy_from_user(&params, (void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data, sizeof(params)))
+		return -EFAULT;
+
+	memset(&start, 0, sizeof(start));
+
+	dh_blob = NULL;
+	if (params.dh_uaddr) {
+		dh_blob = psp_copy_user_blob(params.dh_uaddr, params.dh_len);
+		if (IS_ERR(dh_blob))
+			return PTR_ERR(dh_blob);
+
+		start.dh_cert_address = __sme_set(__pa(dh_blob));
+		start.dh_cert_len = params.dh_len;
+	}
+
+	session_blob = NULL;
+	if (params.session_uaddr) {
+		session_blob = psp_copy_user_blob(params.session_uaddr, params.session_len);
+		if (IS_ERR(session_blob)) {
+			ret = PTR_ERR(session_blob);
+			goto e_free_dh;
+		}
+
+		start.session_address = __sme_set(__pa(session_blob));
+		start.session_len = params.session_len;
+	}
+
+	start.handle = params.handle;
+	start.policy = params.policy;
+
+	/* create memory encryption context */
+	ret = __sev_issue_cmd(argp->sev_fd, SEV_CMD_LAUNCH_START, &start, error);
+	if (ret)
+		goto e_free_session;
+
+	/* Bind ASID to this guest */
+	ret = sev_bind_asid(kvm, start.handle, error);
+	if (ret) {
+		sev_decommission(start.handle);
+		goto e_free_session;
+	}
+
+	/* return handle to userspace */
+	params.handle = start.handle;
+	if (copy_to_user((void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data, &params, sizeof(params))) {
+		sev_unbind_asid(kvm, start.handle);
+		ret = -EFAULT;
+		goto e_free_session;
+	}
+
+	sev->handle = start.handle;
+	sev->fd = argp->sev_fd;
+
+e_free_session:
+	kfree(session_blob);
+e_free_dh:
+	kfree(dh_blob);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static struct page **sev_pin_memory(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long uaddr,
+				    unsigned long ulen, unsigned long *n,
+				    int write)
+{
+	struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
+	unsigned long npages, size;
+	int npinned;
+	unsigned long locked, lock_limit;
+	struct page **pages;
+	unsigned long first, last;
+	int ret;
+
+	lockdep_assert_held(&kvm->lock);
+
+	if (ulen == 0 || uaddr + ulen < uaddr)
+		return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+
+	/* Calculate number of pages. */
+	first = (uaddr & PAGE_MASK) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
+	last = ((uaddr + ulen - 1) & PAGE_MASK) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
+	npages = (last - first + 1);
+
+	locked = sev->pages_locked + npages;
+	lock_limit = rlimit(RLIMIT_MEMLOCK) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
+	if (locked > lock_limit && !capable(CAP_IPC_LOCK)) {
+		pr_err("SEV: %lu locked pages exceed the lock limit of %lu.\n", locked, lock_limit);
+		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+	}
+
+	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(npages > INT_MAX))
+		return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+
+	/* Avoid using vmalloc for smaller buffers. */
+	size = npages * sizeof(struct page *);
+	if (size > PAGE_SIZE)
+		pages = __vmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT | __GFP_ZERO);
+	else
+		pages = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
+
+	if (!pages)
+		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+
+	/* Pin the user virtual address. */
+	npinned = pin_user_pages_fast(uaddr, npages, write ? FOLL_WRITE : 0, pages);
+	if (npinned != npages) {
+		pr_err("SEV: Failure locking %lu pages.\n", npages);
+		ret = -ENOMEM;
+		goto err;
+	}
+
+	*n = npages;
+	sev->pages_locked = locked;
+
+	return pages;
+
+err:
+	if (npinned > 0)
+		unpin_user_pages(pages, npinned);
+
+	kvfree(pages);
+	return ERR_PTR(ret);
+}
+
+static void sev_unpin_memory(struct kvm *kvm, struct page **pages,
+			     unsigned long npages)
+{
+	struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
+
+	unpin_user_pages(pages, npages);
+	kvfree(pages);
+	sev->pages_locked -= npages;
+}
+
+static void sev_clflush_pages(struct page *pages[], unsigned long npages)
+{
+	uint8_t *page_virtual;
+	unsigned long i;
+
+	if (this_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SME_COHERENT) || npages == 0 ||
+	    pages == NULL)
+		return;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < npages; i++) {
+		page_virtual = kmap_local_page(pages[i]);
+		clflush_cache_range(page_virtual, PAGE_SIZE);
+		kunmap_local(page_virtual);
+		cond_resched();
+	}
+}
+
+static unsigned long get_num_contig_pages(unsigned long idx,
+				struct page **inpages, unsigned long npages)
+{
+	unsigned long paddr, next_paddr;
+	unsigned long i = idx + 1, pages = 1;
+
+	/* find the number of contiguous pages starting from idx */
+	paddr = __sme_page_pa(inpages[idx]);
+	while (i < npages) {
+		next_paddr = __sme_page_pa(inpages[i++]);
+		if ((paddr + PAGE_SIZE) == next_paddr) {
+			pages++;
+			paddr = next_paddr;
+			continue;
+		}
+		break;
+	}
+
+	return pages;
+}
+
+static int sev_launch_update_data(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
+{
+	unsigned long vaddr, vaddr_end, next_vaddr, npages, pages, size, i;
+	struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
+	struct kvm_sev_launch_update_data params;
+	struct sev_data_launch_update_data data;
+	struct page **inpages;
+	int ret;
+
+	if (!sev_guest(kvm))
+		return -ENOTTY;
+
+	if (copy_from_user(&params, (void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data, sizeof(params)))
+		return -EFAULT;
+
+	vaddr = params.uaddr;
+	size = params.len;
+	vaddr_end = vaddr + size;
+
+	/* Lock the user memory. */
+	inpages = sev_pin_memory(kvm, vaddr, size, &npages, 1);
+	if (IS_ERR(inpages))
+		return PTR_ERR(inpages);
+
+	/*
+	 * Flush (on non-coherent CPUs) before LAUNCH_UPDATE encrypts pages in
+	 * place; the cache may contain the data that was written unencrypted.
+	 */
+	sev_clflush_pages(inpages, npages);
+
+	data.reserved = 0;
+	data.handle = sev->handle;
+
+	for (i = 0; vaddr < vaddr_end; vaddr = next_vaddr, i += pages) {
+		int offset, len;
+
+		/*
+		 * If the user buffer is not page-aligned, calculate the offset
+		 * within the page.
+		 */
+		offset = vaddr & (PAGE_SIZE - 1);
+
+		/* Calculate the number of pages that can be encrypted in one go. */
+		pages = get_num_contig_pages(i, inpages, npages);
+
+		len = min_t(size_t, ((pages * PAGE_SIZE) - offset), size);
+
+		data.len = len;
+		data.address = __sme_page_pa(inpages[i]) + offset;
+		ret = sev_issue_cmd(kvm, SEV_CMD_LAUNCH_UPDATE_DATA, &data, &argp->error);
+		if (ret)
+			goto e_unpin;
+
+		size -= len;
+		next_vaddr = vaddr + len;
+	}
+
+e_unpin:
+	/* content of memory is updated, mark pages dirty */
+	for (i = 0; i < npages; i++) {
+		set_page_dirty_lock(inpages[i]);
+		mark_page_accessed(inpages[i]);
+	}
+	/* unlock the user pages */
+	sev_unpin_memory(kvm, inpages, npages);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int sev_es_sync_vmsa(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
+{
+	struct sev_es_save_area *save = svm->sev_es.vmsa;
+
+	/* Check some debug related fields before encrypting the VMSA */
+	if (svm->vcpu.guest_debug || (svm->vmcb->save.dr7 & ~DR7_FIXED_1))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	/*
+	 * SEV-ES will use a VMSA that is pointed to by the VMCB, not
+	 * the traditional VMSA that is part of the VMCB. Copy the
+	 * traditional VMSA as it has been built so far (in prep
+	 * for LAUNCH_UPDATE_VMSA) to be the initial SEV-ES state.
+	 */
+	memcpy(save, &svm->vmcb->save, sizeof(svm->vmcb->save));
+
+	/* Sync registgers */
+	save->rax = svm->vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RAX];
+	save->rbx = svm->vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RBX];
+	save->rcx = svm->vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RCX];
+	save->rdx = svm->vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RDX];
+	save->rsp = svm->vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RSP];
+	save->rbp = svm->vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RBP];
+	save->rsi = svm->vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RSI];
+	save->rdi = svm->vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RDI];
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+	save->r8  = svm->vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_R8];
+	save->r9  = svm->vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_R9];
+	save->r10 = svm->vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_R10];
+	save->r11 = svm->vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_R11];
+	save->r12 = svm->vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_R12];
+	save->r13 = svm->vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_R13];
+	save->r14 = svm->vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_R14];
+	save->r15 = svm->vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_R15];
+#endif
+	save->rip = svm->vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RIP];
+
+	/* Sync some non-GPR registers before encrypting */
+	save->xcr0 = svm->vcpu.arch.xcr0;
+	save->pkru = svm->vcpu.arch.pkru;
+	save->xss  = svm->vcpu.arch.ia32_xss;
+	save->dr6  = svm->vcpu.arch.dr6;
+
+	if (sev_es_debug_swap_enabled)
+		save->sev_features |= SVM_SEV_FEAT_DEBUG_SWAP;
+
+	pr_debug("Virtual Machine Save Area (VMSA):\n");
+	print_hex_dump_debug("", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, 16, 1, save, sizeof(*save), false);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int __sev_launch_update_vmsa(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+				    int *error)
+{
+	struct sev_data_launch_update_vmsa vmsa;
+	struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+	int ret;
+
+	if (vcpu->guest_debug) {
+		pr_warn_once("KVM_SET_GUEST_DEBUG for SEV-ES guest is not supported");
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	/* Perform some pre-encryption checks against the VMSA */
+	ret = sev_es_sync_vmsa(svm);
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+
+	/*
+	 * The LAUNCH_UPDATE_VMSA command will perform in-place encryption of
+	 * the VMSA memory content (i.e it will write the same memory region
+	 * with the guest's key), so invalidate it first.
+	 */
+	clflush_cache_range(svm->sev_es.vmsa, PAGE_SIZE);
+
+	vmsa.reserved = 0;
+	vmsa.handle = to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info.handle;
+	vmsa.address = __sme_pa(svm->sev_es.vmsa);
+	vmsa.len = PAGE_SIZE;
+	ret = sev_issue_cmd(kvm, SEV_CMD_LAUNCH_UPDATE_VMSA, &vmsa, error);
+	if (ret)
+	  return ret;
+
+	vcpu->arch.guest_state_protected = true;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int sev_launch_update_vmsa(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
+{
+	struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu;
+	unsigned long i;
+	int ret;
+
+	if (!sev_es_guest(kvm))
+		return -ENOTTY;
+
+	kvm_for_each_vcpu(i, vcpu, kvm) {
+		ret = mutex_lock_killable(&vcpu->mutex);
+		if (ret)
+			return ret;
+
+		ret = __sev_launch_update_vmsa(kvm, vcpu, &argp->error);
+
+		mutex_unlock(&vcpu->mutex);
+		if (ret)
+			return ret;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int sev_launch_measure(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
+{
+	void __user *measure = (void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data;
+	struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
+	struct sev_data_launch_measure data;
+	struct kvm_sev_launch_measure params;
+	void __user *p = NULL;
+	void *blob = NULL;
+	int ret;
+
+	if (!sev_guest(kvm))
+		return -ENOTTY;
+
+	if (copy_from_user(&params, measure, sizeof(params)))
+		return -EFAULT;
+
+	memset(&data, 0, sizeof(data));
+
+	/* User wants to query the blob length */
+	if (!params.len)
+		goto cmd;
+
+	p = (void __user *)(uintptr_t)params.uaddr;
+	if (p) {
+		if (params.len > SEV_FW_BLOB_MAX_SIZE)
+			return -EINVAL;
+
+		blob = kzalloc(params.len, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
+		if (!blob)
+			return -ENOMEM;
+
+		data.address = __psp_pa(blob);
+		data.len = params.len;
+	}
+
+cmd:
+	data.handle = sev->handle;
+	ret = sev_issue_cmd(kvm, SEV_CMD_LAUNCH_MEASURE, &data, &argp->error);
+
+	/*
+	 * If we query the session length, FW responded with expected data.
+	 */
+	if (!params.len)
+		goto done;
+
+	if (ret)
+		goto e_free_blob;
+
+	if (blob) {
+		if (copy_to_user(p, blob, params.len))
+			ret = -EFAULT;
+	}
+
+done:
+	params.len = data.len;
+	if (copy_to_user(measure, &params, sizeof(params)))
+		ret = -EFAULT;
+e_free_blob:
+	kfree(blob);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int sev_launch_finish(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
+{
+	struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
+	struct sev_data_launch_finish data;
+
+	if (!sev_guest(kvm))
+		return -ENOTTY;
+
+	data.handle = sev->handle;
+	return sev_issue_cmd(kvm, SEV_CMD_LAUNCH_FINISH, &data, &argp->error);
+}
+
+static int sev_guest_status(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
+{
+	struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
+	struct kvm_sev_guest_status params;
+	struct sev_data_guest_status data;
+	int ret;
+
+	if (!sev_guest(kvm))
+		return -ENOTTY;
+
+	memset(&data, 0, sizeof(data));
+
+	data.handle = sev->handle;
+	ret = sev_issue_cmd(kvm, SEV_CMD_GUEST_STATUS, &data, &argp->error);
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+
+	params.policy = data.policy;
+	params.state = data.state;
+	params.handle = data.handle;
+
+	if (copy_to_user((void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data, &params, sizeof(params)))
+		ret = -EFAULT;
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int __sev_issue_dbg_cmd(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long src,
+			       unsigned long dst, int size,
+			       int *error, bool enc)
+{
+	struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
+	struct sev_data_dbg data;
+
+	data.reserved = 0;
+	data.handle = sev->handle;
+	data.dst_addr = dst;
+	data.src_addr = src;
+	data.len = size;
+
+	return sev_issue_cmd(kvm,
+			     enc ? SEV_CMD_DBG_ENCRYPT : SEV_CMD_DBG_DECRYPT,
+			     &data, error);
+}
+
+static int __sev_dbg_decrypt(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long src_paddr,
+			     unsigned long dst_paddr, int sz, int *err)
+{
+	int offset;
+
+	/*
+	 * Its safe to read more than we are asked, caller should ensure that
+	 * destination has enough space.
+	 */
+	offset = src_paddr & 15;
+	src_paddr = round_down(src_paddr, 16);
+	sz = round_up(sz + offset, 16);
+
+	return __sev_issue_dbg_cmd(kvm, src_paddr, dst_paddr, sz, err, false);
+}
+
+static int __sev_dbg_decrypt_user(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long paddr,
+				  void __user *dst_uaddr,
+				  unsigned long dst_paddr,
+				  int size, int *err)
+{
+	struct page *tpage = NULL;
+	int ret, offset;
+
+	/* if inputs are not 16-byte then use intermediate buffer */
+	if (!IS_ALIGNED(dst_paddr, 16) ||
+	    !IS_ALIGNED(paddr,     16) ||
+	    !IS_ALIGNED(size,      16)) {
+		tpage = (void *)alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT | __GFP_ZERO);
+		if (!tpage)
+			return -ENOMEM;
+
+		dst_paddr = __sme_page_pa(tpage);
+	}
+
+	ret = __sev_dbg_decrypt(kvm, paddr, dst_paddr, size, err);
+	if (ret)
+		goto e_free;
+
+	if (tpage) {
+		offset = paddr & 15;
+		if (copy_to_user(dst_uaddr, page_address(tpage) + offset, size))
+			ret = -EFAULT;
+	}
+
+e_free:
+	if (tpage)
+		__free_page(tpage);
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int __sev_dbg_encrypt_user(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long paddr,
+				  void __user *vaddr,
+				  unsigned long dst_paddr,
+				  void __user *dst_vaddr,
+				  int size, int *error)
+{
+	struct page *src_tpage = NULL;
+	struct page *dst_tpage = NULL;
+	int ret, len = size;
+
+	/* If source buffer is not aligned then use an intermediate buffer */
+	if (!IS_ALIGNED((unsigned long)vaddr, 16)) {
+		src_tpage = alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
+		if (!src_tpage)
+			return -ENOMEM;
+
+		if (copy_from_user(page_address(src_tpage), vaddr, size)) {
+			__free_page(src_tpage);
+			return -EFAULT;
+		}
+
+		paddr = __sme_page_pa(src_tpage);
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 *  If destination buffer or length is not aligned then do read-modify-write:
+	 *   - decrypt destination in an intermediate buffer
+	 *   - copy the source buffer in an intermediate buffer
+	 *   - use the intermediate buffer as source buffer
+	 */
+	if (!IS_ALIGNED((unsigned long)dst_vaddr, 16) || !IS_ALIGNED(size, 16)) {
+		int dst_offset;
+
+		dst_tpage = alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
+		if (!dst_tpage) {
+			ret = -ENOMEM;
+			goto e_free;
+		}
+
+		ret = __sev_dbg_decrypt(kvm, dst_paddr,
+					__sme_page_pa(dst_tpage), size, error);
+		if (ret)
+			goto e_free;
+
+		/*
+		 *  If source is kernel buffer then use memcpy() otherwise
+		 *  copy_from_user().
+		 */
+		dst_offset = dst_paddr & 15;
+
+		if (src_tpage)
+			memcpy(page_address(dst_tpage) + dst_offset,
+			       page_address(src_tpage), size);
+		else {
+			if (copy_from_user(page_address(dst_tpage) + dst_offset,
+					   vaddr, size)) {
+				ret = -EFAULT;
+				goto e_free;
+			}
+		}
+
+		paddr = __sme_page_pa(dst_tpage);
+		dst_paddr = round_down(dst_paddr, 16);
+		len = round_up(size, 16);
+	}
+
+	ret = __sev_issue_dbg_cmd(kvm, paddr, dst_paddr, len, error, true);
+
+e_free:
+	if (src_tpage)
+		__free_page(src_tpage);
+	if (dst_tpage)
+		__free_page(dst_tpage);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int sev_dbg_crypt(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp, bool dec)
+{
+	unsigned long vaddr, vaddr_end, next_vaddr;
+	unsigned long dst_vaddr;
+	struct page **src_p, **dst_p;
+	struct kvm_sev_dbg debug;
+	unsigned long n;
+	unsigned int size;
+	int ret;
+
+	if (!sev_guest(kvm))
+		return -ENOTTY;
+
+	if (copy_from_user(&debug, (void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data, sizeof(debug)))
+		return -EFAULT;
+
+	if (!debug.len || debug.src_uaddr + debug.len < debug.src_uaddr)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	if (!debug.dst_uaddr)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	vaddr = debug.src_uaddr;
+	size = debug.len;
+	vaddr_end = vaddr + size;
+	dst_vaddr = debug.dst_uaddr;
+
+	for (; vaddr < vaddr_end; vaddr = next_vaddr) {
+		int len, s_off, d_off;
+
+		/* lock userspace source and destination page */
+		src_p = sev_pin_memory(kvm, vaddr & PAGE_MASK, PAGE_SIZE, &n, 0);
+		if (IS_ERR(src_p))
+			return PTR_ERR(src_p);
+
+		dst_p = sev_pin_memory(kvm, dst_vaddr & PAGE_MASK, PAGE_SIZE, &n, 1);
+		if (IS_ERR(dst_p)) {
+			sev_unpin_memory(kvm, src_p, n);
+			return PTR_ERR(dst_p);
+		}
+
+		/*
+		 * Flush (on non-coherent CPUs) before DBG_{DE,EN}CRYPT read or modify
+		 * the pages; flush the destination too so that future accesses do not
+		 * see stale data.
+		 */
+		sev_clflush_pages(src_p, 1);
+		sev_clflush_pages(dst_p, 1);
+
+		/*
+		 * Since user buffer may not be page aligned, calculate the
+		 * offset within the page.
+		 */
+		s_off = vaddr & ~PAGE_MASK;
+		d_off = dst_vaddr & ~PAGE_MASK;
+		len = min_t(size_t, (PAGE_SIZE - s_off), size);
+
+		if (dec)
+			ret = __sev_dbg_decrypt_user(kvm,
+						     __sme_page_pa(src_p[0]) + s_off,
+						     (void __user *)dst_vaddr,
+						     __sme_page_pa(dst_p[0]) + d_off,
+						     len, &argp->error);
+		else
+			ret = __sev_dbg_encrypt_user(kvm,
+						     __sme_page_pa(src_p[0]) + s_off,
+						     (void __user *)vaddr,
+						     __sme_page_pa(dst_p[0]) + d_off,
+						     (void __user *)dst_vaddr,
+						     len, &argp->error);
+
+		sev_unpin_memory(kvm, src_p, n);
+		sev_unpin_memory(kvm, dst_p, n);
+
+		if (ret)
+			goto err;
+
+		next_vaddr = vaddr + len;
+		dst_vaddr = dst_vaddr + len;
+		size -= len;
+	}
+err:
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int sev_launch_secret(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
+{
+	struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
+	struct sev_data_launch_secret data;
+	struct kvm_sev_launch_secret params;
+	struct page **pages;
+	void *blob, *hdr;
+	unsigned long n, i;
+	int ret, offset;
+
+	if (!sev_guest(kvm))
+		return -ENOTTY;
+
+	if (copy_from_user(&params, (void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data, sizeof(params)))
+		return -EFAULT;
+
+	pages = sev_pin_memory(kvm, params.guest_uaddr, params.guest_len, &n, 1);
+	if (IS_ERR(pages))
+		return PTR_ERR(pages);
+
+	/*
+	 * Flush (on non-coherent CPUs) before LAUNCH_SECRET encrypts pages in
+	 * place; the cache may contain the data that was written unencrypted.
+	 */
+	sev_clflush_pages(pages, n);
+
+	/*
+	 * The secret must be copied into contiguous memory region, lets verify
+	 * that userspace memory pages are contiguous before we issue command.
+	 */
+	if (get_num_contig_pages(0, pages, n) != n) {
+		ret = -EINVAL;
+		goto e_unpin_memory;
+	}
+
+	memset(&data, 0, sizeof(data));
+
+	offset = params.guest_uaddr & (PAGE_SIZE - 1);
+	data.guest_address = __sme_page_pa(pages[0]) + offset;
+	data.guest_len = params.guest_len;
+
+	blob = psp_copy_user_blob(params.trans_uaddr, params.trans_len);
+	if (IS_ERR(blob)) {
+		ret = PTR_ERR(blob);
+		goto e_unpin_memory;
+	}
+
+	data.trans_address = __psp_pa(blob);
+	data.trans_len = params.trans_len;
+
+	hdr = psp_copy_user_blob(params.hdr_uaddr, params.hdr_len);
+	if (IS_ERR(hdr)) {
+		ret = PTR_ERR(hdr);
+		goto e_free_blob;
+	}
+	data.hdr_address = __psp_pa(hdr);
+	data.hdr_len = params.hdr_len;
+
+	data.handle = sev->handle;
+	ret = sev_issue_cmd(kvm, SEV_CMD_LAUNCH_UPDATE_SECRET, &data, &argp->error);
+
+	kfree(hdr);
+
+e_free_blob:
+	kfree(blob);
+e_unpin_memory:
+	/* content of memory is updated, mark pages dirty */
+	for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
+		set_page_dirty_lock(pages[i]);
+		mark_page_accessed(pages[i]);
+	}
+	sev_unpin_memory(kvm, pages, n);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int sev_get_attestation_report(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
+{
+	void __user *report = (void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data;
+	struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
+	struct sev_data_attestation_report data;
+	struct kvm_sev_attestation_report params;
+	void __user *p;
+	void *blob = NULL;
+	int ret;
+
+	if (!sev_guest(kvm))
+		return -ENOTTY;
+
+	if (copy_from_user(&params, (void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data, sizeof(params)))
+		return -EFAULT;
+
+	memset(&data, 0, sizeof(data));
+
+	/* User wants to query the blob length */
+	if (!params.len)
+		goto cmd;
+
+	p = (void __user *)(uintptr_t)params.uaddr;
+	if (p) {
+		if (params.len > SEV_FW_BLOB_MAX_SIZE)
+			return -EINVAL;
+
+		blob = kzalloc(params.len, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
+		if (!blob)
+			return -ENOMEM;
+
+		data.address = __psp_pa(blob);
+		data.len = params.len;
+		memcpy(data.mnonce, params.mnonce, sizeof(params.mnonce));
+	}
+cmd:
+	data.handle = sev->handle;
+	ret = sev_issue_cmd(kvm, SEV_CMD_ATTESTATION_REPORT, &data, &argp->error);
+	/*
+	 * If we query the session length, FW responded with expected data.
+	 */
+	if (!params.len)
+		goto done;
+
+	if (ret)
+		goto e_free_blob;
+
+	if (blob) {
+		if (copy_to_user(p, blob, params.len))
+			ret = -EFAULT;
+	}
+
+done:
+	params.len = data.len;
+	if (copy_to_user(report, &params, sizeof(params)))
+		ret = -EFAULT;
+e_free_blob:
+	kfree(blob);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/* Userspace wants to query session length. */
+static int
+__sev_send_start_query_session_length(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp,
+				      struct kvm_sev_send_start *params)
+{
+	struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
+	struct sev_data_send_start data;
+	int ret;
+
+	memset(&data, 0, sizeof(data));
+	data.handle = sev->handle;
+	ret = sev_issue_cmd(kvm, SEV_CMD_SEND_START, &data, &argp->error);
+
+	params->session_len = data.session_len;
+	if (copy_to_user((void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data, params,
+				sizeof(struct kvm_sev_send_start)))
+		ret = -EFAULT;
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int sev_send_start(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
+{
+	struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
+	struct sev_data_send_start data;
+	struct kvm_sev_send_start params;
+	void *amd_certs, *session_data;
+	void *pdh_cert, *plat_certs;
+	int ret;
+
+	if (!sev_guest(kvm))
+		return -ENOTTY;
+
+	if (copy_from_user(&params, (void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data,
+				sizeof(struct kvm_sev_send_start)))
+		return -EFAULT;
+
+	/* if session_len is zero, userspace wants to query the session length */
+	if (!params.session_len)
+		return __sev_send_start_query_session_length(kvm, argp,
+				&params);
+
+	/* some sanity checks */
+	if (!params.pdh_cert_uaddr || !params.pdh_cert_len ||
+	    !params.session_uaddr || params.session_len > SEV_FW_BLOB_MAX_SIZE)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	/* allocate the memory to hold the session data blob */
+	session_data = kzalloc(params.session_len, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
+	if (!session_data)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	/* copy the certificate blobs from userspace */
+	pdh_cert = psp_copy_user_blob(params.pdh_cert_uaddr,
+				params.pdh_cert_len);
+	if (IS_ERR(pdh_cert)) {
+		ret = PTR_ERR(pdh_cert);
+		goto e_free_session;
+	}
+
+	plat_certs = psp_copy_user_blob(params.plat_certs_uaddr,
+				params.plat_certs_len);
+	if (IS_ERR(plat_certs)) {
+		ret = PTR_ERR(plat_certs);
+		goto e_free_pdh;
+	}
+
+	amd_certs = psp_copy_user_blob(params.amd_certs_uaddr,
+				params.amd_certs_len);
+	if (IS_ERR(amd_certs)) {
+		ret = PTR_ERR(amd_certs);
+		goto e_free_plat_cert;
+	}
+
+	/* populate the FW SEND_START field with system physical address */
+	memset(&data, 0, sizeof(data));
+	data.pdh_cert_address = __psp_pa(pdh_cert);
+	data.pdh_cert_len = params.pdh_cert_len;
+	data.plat_certs_address = __psp_pa(plat_certs);
+	data.plat_certs_len = params.plat_certs_len;
+	data.amd_certs_address = __psp_pa(amd_certs);
+	data.amd_certs_len = params.amd_certs_len;
+	data.session_address = __psp_pa(session_data);
+	data.session_len = params.session_len;
+	data.handle = sev->handle;
+
+	ret = sev_issue_cmd(kvm, SEV_CMD_SEND_START, &data, &argp->error);
+
+	if (!ret && copy_to_user((void __user *)(uintptr_t)params.session_uaddr,
+			session_data, params.session_len)) {
+		ret = -EFAULT;
+		goto e_free_amd_cert;
+	}
+
+	params.policy = data.policy;
+	params.session_len = data.session_len;
+	if (copy_to_user((void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data, &params,
+				sizeof(struct kvm_sev_send_start)))
+		ret = -EFAULT;
+
+e_free_amd_cert:
+	kfree(amd_certs);
+e_free_plat_cert:
+	kfree(plat_certs);
+e_free_pdh:
+	kfree(pdh_cert);
+e_free_session:
+	kfree(session_data);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/* Userspace wants to query either header or trans length. */
+static int
+__sev_send_update_data_query_lengths(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp,
+				     struct kvm_sev_send_update_data *params)
+{
+	struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
+	struct sev_data_send_update_data data;
+	int ret;
+
+	memset(&data, 0, sizeof(data));
+	data.handle = sev->handle;
+	ret = sev_issue_cmd(kvm, SEV_CMD_SEND_UPDATE_DATA, &data, &argp->error);
+
+	params->hdr_len = data.hdr_len;
+	params->trans_len = data.trans_len;
+
+	if (copy_to_user((void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data, params,
+			 sizeof(struct kvm_sev_send_update_data)))
+		ret = -EFAULT;
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int sev_send_update_data(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
+{
+	struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
+	struct sev_data_send_update_data data;
+	struct kvm_sev_send_update_data params;
+	void *hdr, *trans_data;
+	struct page **guest_page;
+	unsigned long n;
+	int ret, offset;
+
+	if (!sev_guest(kvm))
+		return -ENOTTY;
+
+	if (copy_from_user(&params, (void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data,
+			sizeof(struct kvm_sev_send_update_data)))
+		return -EFAULT;
+
+	/* userspace wants to query either header or trans length */
+	if (!params.trans_len || !params.hdr_len)
+		return __sev_send_update_data_query_lengths(kvm, argp, &params);
+
+	if (!params.trans_uaddr || !params.guest_uaddr ||
+	    !params.guest_len || !params.hdr_uaddr)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	/* Check if we are crossing the page boundary */
+	offset = params.guest_uaddr & (PAGE_SIZE - 1);
+	if (params.guest_len > PAGE_SIZE || (params.guest_len + offset) > PAGE_SIZE)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	/* Pin guest memory */
+	guest_page = sev_pin_memory(kvm, params.guest_uaddr & PAGE_MASK,
+				    PAGE_SIZE, &n, 0);
+	if (IS_ERR(guest_page))
+		return PTR_ERR(guest_page);
+
+	/* allocate memory for header and transport buffer */
+	ret = -ENOMEM;
+	hdr = kzalloc(params.hdr_len, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
+	if (!hdr)
+		goto e_unpin;
+
+	trans_data = kzalloc(params.trans_len, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
+	if (!trans_data)
+		goto e_free_hdr;
+
+	memset(&data, 0, sizeof(data));
+	data.hdr_address = __psp_pa(hdr);
+	data.hdr_len = params.hdr_len;
+	data.trans_address = __psp_pa(trans_data);
+	data.trans_len = params.trans_len;
+
+	/* The SEND_UPDATE_DATA command requires C-bit to be always set. */
+	data.guest_address = (page_to_pfn(guest_page[0]) << PAGE_SHIFT) + offset;
+	data.guest_address |= sev_me_mask;
+	data.guest_len = params.guest_len;
+	data.handle = sev->handle;
+
+	ret = sev_issue_cmd(kvm, SEV_CMD_SEND_UPDATE_DATA, &data, &argp->error);
+
+	if (ret)
+		goto e_free_trans_data;
+
+	/* copy transport buffer to user space */
+	if (copy_to_user((void __user *)(uintptr_t)params.trans_uaddr,
+			 trans_data, params.trans_len)) {
+		ret = -EFAULT;
+		goto e_free_trans_data;
+	}
+
+	/* Copy packet header to userspace. */
+	if (copy_to_user((void __user *)(uintptr_t)params.hdr_uaddr, hdr,
+			 params.hdr_len))
+		ret = -EFAULT;
+
+e_free_trans_data:
+	kfree(trans_data);
+e_free_hdr:
+	kfree(hdr);
+e_unpin:
+	sev_unpin_memory(kvm, guest_page, n);
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int sev_send_finish(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
+{
+	struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
+	struct sev_data_send_finish data;
+
+	if (!sev_guest(kvm))
+		return -ENOTTY;
+
+	data.handle = sev->handle;
+	return sev_issue_cmd(kvm, SEV_CMD_SEND_FINISH, &data, &argp->error);
+}
+
+static int sev_send_cancel(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
+{
+	struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
+	struct sev_data_send_cancel data;
+
+	if (!sev_guest(kvm))
+		return -ENOTTY;
+
+	data.handle = sev->handle;
+	return sev_issue_cmd(kvm, SEV_CMD_SEND_CANCEL, &data, &argp->error);
+}
+
+static int sev_receive_start(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
+{
+	struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
+	struct sev_data_receive_start start;
+	struct kvm_sev_receive_start params;
+	int *error = &argp->error;
+	void *session_data;
+	void *pdh_data;
+	int ret;
+
+	if (!sev_guest(kvm))
+		return -ENOTTY;
+
+	/* Get parameter from the userspace */
+	if (copy_from_user(&params, (void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data,
+			sizeof(struct kvm_sev_receive_start)))
+		return -EFAULT;
+
+	/* some sanity checks */
+	if (!params.pdh_uaddr || !params.pdh_len ||
+	    !params.session_uaddr || !params.session_len)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	pdh_data = psp_copy_user_blob(params.pdh_uaddr, params.pdh_len);
+	if (IS_ERR(pdh_data))
+		return PTR_ERR(pdh_data);
+
+	session_data = psp_copy_user_blob(params.session_uaddr,
+			params.session_len);
+	if (IS_ERR(session_data)) {
+		ret = PTR_ERR(session_data);
+		goto e_free_pdh;
+	}
+
+	memset(&start, 0, sizeof(start));
+	start.handle = params.handle;
+	start.policy = params.policy;
+	start.pdh_cert_address = __psp_pa(pdh_data);
+	start.pdh_cert_len = params.pdh_len;
+	start.session_address = __psp_pa(session_data);
+	start.session_len = params.session_len;
+
+	/* create memory encryption context */
+	ret = __sev_issue_cmd(argp->sev_fd, SEV_CMD_RECEIVE_START, &start,
+				error);
+	if (ret)
+		goto e_free_session;
+
+	/* Bind ASID to this guest */
+	ret = sev_bind_asid(kvm, start.handle, error);
+	if (ret) {
+		sev_decommission(start.handle);
+		goto e_free_session;
+	}
+
+	params.handle = start.handle;
+	if (copy_to_user((void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data,
+			 &params, sizeof(struct kvm_sev_receive_start))) {
+		ret = -EFAULT;
+		sev_unbind_asid(kvm, start.handle);
+		goto e_free_session;
+	}
+
+    	sev->handle = start.handle;
+	sev->fd = argp->sev_fd;
+
+e_free_session:
+	kfree(session_data);
+e_free_pdh:
+	kfree(pdh_data);
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int sev_receive_update_data(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
+{
+	struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
+	struct kvm_sev_receive_update_data params;
+	struct sev_data_receive_update_data data;
+	void *hdr = NULL, *trans = NULL;
+	struct page **guest_page;
+	unsigned long n;
+	int ret, offset;
+
+	if (!sev_guest(kvm))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (copy_from_user(&params, (void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data,
+			sizeof(struct kvm_sev_receive_update_data)))
+		return -EFAULT;
+
+	if (!params.hdr_uaddr || !params.hdr_len ||
+	    !params.guest_uaddr || !params.guest_len ||
+	    !params.trans_uaddr || !params.trans_len)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	/* Check if we are crossing the page boundary */
+	offset = params.guest_uaddr & (PAGE_SIZE - 1);
+	if (params.guest_len > PAGE_SIZE || (params.guest_len + offset) > PAGE_SIZE)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	hdr = psp_copy_user_blob(params.hdr_uaddr, params.hdr_len);
+	if (IS_ERR(hdr))
+		return PTR_ERR(hdr);
+
+	trans = psp_copy_user_blob(params.trans_uaddr, params.trans_len);
+	if (IS_ERR(trans)) {
+		ret = PTR_ERR(trans);
+		goto e_free_hdr;
+	}
+
+	memset(&data, 0, sizeof(data));
+	data.hdr_address = __psp_pa(hdr);
+	data.hdr_len = params.hdr_len;
+	data.trans_address = __psp_pa(trans);
+	data.trans_len = params.trans_len;
+
+	/* Pin guest memory */
+	guest_page = sev_pin_memory(kvm, params.guest_uaddr & PAGE_MASK,
+				    PAGE_SIZE, &n, 1);
+	if (IS_ERR(guest_page)) {
+		ret = PTR_ERR(guest_page);
+		goto e_free_trans;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Flush (on non-coherent CPUs) before RECEIVE_UPDATE_DATA, the PSP
+	 * encrypts the written data with the guest's key, and the cache may
+	 * contain dirty, unencrypted data.
+	 */
+	sev_clflush_pages(guest_page, n);
+
+	/* The RECEIVE_UPDATE_DATA command requires C-bit to be always set. */
+	data.guest_address = (page_to_pfn(guest_page[0]) << PAGE_SHIFT) + offset;
+	data.guest_address |= sev_me_mask;
+	data.guest_len = params.guest_len;
+	data.handle = sev->handle;
+
+	ret = sev_issue_cmd(kvm, SEV_CMD_RECEIVE_UPDATE_DATA, &data,
+				&argp->error);
+
+	sev_unpin_memory(kvm, guest_page, n);
+
+e_free_trans:
+	kfree(trans);
+e_free_hdr:
+	kfree(hdr);
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int sev_receive_finish(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
+{
+	struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
+	struct sev_data_receive_finish data;
+
+	if (!sev_guest(kvm))
+		return -ENOTTY;
+
+	data.handle = sev->handle;
+	return sev_issue_cmd(kvm, SEV_CMD_RECEIVE_FINISH, &data, &argp->error);
+}
+
+static bool is_cmd_allowed_from_mirror(u32 cmd_id)
+{
+	/*
+	 * Allow mirrors VM to call KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_UPDATE_VMSA to enable SEV-ES
+	 * active mirror VMs. Also allow the debugging and status commands.
+	 */
+	if (cmd_id == KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_UPDATE_VMSA ||
+	    cmd_id == KVM_SEV_GUEST_STATUS || cmd_id == KVM_SEV_DBG_DECRYPT ||
+	    cmd_id == KVM_SEV_DBG_ENCRYPT)
+		return true;
+
+	return false;
+}
+
+static int sev_lock_two_vms(struct kvm *dst_kvm, struct kvm *src_kvm)
+{
+	struct kvm_sev_info *dst_sev = &to_kvm_svm(dst_kvm)->sev_info;
+	struct kvm_sev_info *src_sev = &to_kvm_svm(src_kvm)->sev_info;
+	int r = -EBUSY;
+
+	if (dst_kvm == src_kvm)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	/*
+	 * Bail if these VMs are already involved in a migration to avoid
+	 * deadlock between two VMs trying to migrate to/from each other.
+	 */
+	if (atomic_cmpxchg_acquire(&dst_sev->migration_in_progress, 0, 1))
+		return -EBUSY;
+
+	if (atomic_cmpxchg_acquire(&src_sev->migration_in_progress, 0, 1))
+		goto release_dst;
+
+	r = -EINTR;
+	if (mutex_lock_killable(&dst_kvm->lock))
+		goto release_src;
+	if (mutex_lock_killable_nested(&src_kvm->lock, SINGLE_DEPTH_NESTING))
+		goto unlock_dst;
+	return 0;
+
+unlock_dst:
+	mutex_unlock(&dst_kvm->lock);
+release_src:
+	atomic_set_release(&src_sev->migration_in_progress, 0);
+release_dst:
+	atomic_set_release(&dst_sev->migration_in_progress, 0);
+	return r;
+}
+
+static void sev_unlock_two_vms(struct kvm *dst_kvm, struct kvm *src_kvm)
+{
+	struct kvm_sev_info *dst_sev = &to_kvm_svm(dst_kvm)->sev_info;
+	struct kvm_sev_info *src_sev = &to_kvm_svm(src_kvm)->sev_info;
+
+	mutex_unlock(&dst_kvm->lock);
+	mutex_unlock(&src_kvm->lock);
+	atomic_set_release(&dst_sev->migration_in_progress, 0);
+	atomic_set_release(&src_sev->migration_in_progress, 0);
+}
+
+/* vCPU mutex subclasses.  */
+enum sev_migration_role {
+	SEV_MIGRATION_SOURCE = 0,
+	SEV_MIGRATION_TARGET,
+	SEV_NR_MIGRATION_ROLES,
+};
+
+static int sev_lock_vcpus_for_migration(struct kvm *kvm,
+					enum sev_migration_role role)
+{
+	struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu;
+	unsigned long i, j;
+
+	kvm_for_each_vcpu(i, vcpu, kvm) {
+		if (mutex_lock_killable_nested(&vcpu->mutex, role))
+			goto out_unlock;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_PROVE_LOCKING
+		if (!i)
+			/*
+			 * Reset the role to one that avoids colliding with
+			 * the role used for the first vcpu mutex.
+			 */
+			role = SEV_NR_MIGRATION_ROLES;
+		else
+			mutex_release(&vcpu->mutex.dep_map, _THIS_IP_);
+#endif
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+
+out_unlock:
+
+	kvm_for_each_vcpu(j, vcpu, kvm) {
+		if (i == j)
+			break;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_PROVE_LOCKING
+		if (j)
+			mutex_acquire(&vcpu->mutex.dep_map, role, 0, _THIS_IP_);
+#endif
+
+		mutex_unlock(&vcpu->mutex);
+	}
+	return -EINTR;
+}
+
+static void sev_unlock_vcpus_for_migration(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+	struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu;
+	unsigned long i;
+	bool first = true;
+
+	kvm_for_each_vcpu(i, vcpu, kvm) {
+		if (first)
+			first = false;
+		else
+			mutex_acquire(&vcpu->mutex.dep_map,
+				      SEV_NR_MIGRATION_ROLES, 0, _THIS_IP_);
+
+		mutex_unlock(&vcpu->mutex);
+	}
+}
+
+static void sev_migrate_from(struct kvm *dst_kvm, struct kvm *src_kvm)
+{
+	struct kvm_sev_info *dst = &to_kvm_svm(dst_kvm)->sev_info;
+	struct kvm_sev_info *src = &to_kvm_svm(src_kvm)->sev_info;
+	struct kvm_vcpu *dst_vcpu, *src_vcpu;
+	struct vcpu_svm *dst_svm, *src_svm;
+	struct kvm_sev_info *mirror;
+	unsigned long i;
+
+	dst->active = true;
+	dst->asid = src->asid;
+	dst->handle = src->handle;
+	dst->pages_locked = src->pages_locked;
+	dst->enc_context_owner = src->enc_context_owner;
+	dst->es_active = src->es_active;
+
+	src->asid = 0;
+	src->active = false;
+	src->handle = 0;
+	src->pages_locked = 0;
+	src->enc_context_owner = NULL;
+	src->es_active = false;
+
+	list_cut_before(&dst->regions_list, &src->regions_list, &src->regions_list);
+
+	/*
+	 * If this VM has mirrors, "transfer" each mirror's refcount of the
+	 * source to the destination (this KVM).  The caller holds a reference
+	 * to the source, so there's no danger of use-after-free.
+	 */
+	list_cut_before(&dst->mirror_vms, &src->mirror_vms, &src->mirror_vms);
+	list_for_each_entry(mirror, &dst->mirror_vms, mirror_entry) {
+		kvm_get_kvm(dst_kvm);
+		kvm_put_kvm(src_kvm);
+		mirror->enc_context_owner = dst_kvm;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * If this VM is a mirror, remove the old mirror from the owners list
+	 * and add the new mirror to the list.
+	 */
+	if (is_mirroring_enc_context(dst_kvm)) {
+		struct kvm_sev_info *owner_sev_info =
+			&to_kvm_svm(dst->enc_context_owner)->sev_info;
+
+		list_del(&src->mirror_entry);
+		list_add_tail(&dst->mirror_entry, &owner_sev_info->mirror_vms);
+	}
+
+	kvm_for_each_vcpu(i, dst_vcpu, dst_kvm) {
+		dst_svm = to_svm(dst_vcpu);
+
+		sev_init_vmcb(dst_svm);
+
+		if (!dst->es_active)
+			continue;
+
+		/*
+		 * Note, the source is not required to have the same number of
+		 * vCPUs as the destination when migrating a vanilla SEV VM.
+		 */
+		src_vcpu = kvm_get_vcpu(src_kvm, i);
+		src_svm = to_svm(src_vcpu);
+
+		/*
+		 * Transfer VMSA and GHCB state to the destination.  Nullify and
+		 * clear source fields as appropriate, the state now belongs to
+		 * the destination.
+		 */
+		memcpy(&dst_svm->sev_es, &src_svm->sev_es, sizeof(src_svm->sev_es));
+		dst_svm->vmcb->control.ghcb_gpa = src_svm->vmcb->control.ghcb_gpa;
+		dst_svm->vmcb->control.vmsa_pa = src_svm->vmcb->control.vmsa_pa;
+		dst_vcpu->arch.guest_state_protected = true;
+
+		memset(&src_svm->sev_es, 0, sizeof(src_svm->sev_es));
+		src_svm->vmcb->control.ghcb_gpa = INVALID_PAGE;
+		src_svm->vmcb->control.vmsa_pa = INVALID_PAGE;
+		src_vcpu->arch.guest_state_protected = false;
+	}
+}
+
+static int sev_check_source_vcpus(struct kvm *dst, struct kvm *src)
+{
+	struct kvm_vcpu *src_vcpu;
+	unsigned long i;
+
+	if (!sev_es_guest(src))
+		return 0;
+
+	if (atomic_read(&src->online_vcpus) != atomic_read(&dst->online_vcpus))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	kvm_for_each_vcpu(i, src_vcpu, src) {
+		if (!src_vcpu->arch.guest_state_protected)
+			return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int sev_vm_move_enc_context_from(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned int source_fd)
+{
+	struct kvm_sev_info *dst_sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
+	struct kvm_sev_info *src_sev, *cg_cleanup_sev;
+	struct fd f = fdget(source_fd);
+	struct kvm *source_kvm;
+	bool charged = false;
+	int ret;
+
+	if (!f.file)
+		return -EBADF;
+
+	if (!file_is_kvm(f.file)) {
+		ret = -EBADF;
+		goto out_fput;
+	}
+
+	source_kvm = f.file->private_data;
+	ret = sev_lock_two_vms(kvm, source_kvm);
+	if (ret)
+		goto out_fput;
+
+	if (sev_guest(kvm) || !sev_guest(source_kvm)) {
+		ret = -EINVAL;
+		goto out_unlock;
+	}
+
+	src_sev = &to_kvm_svm(source_kvm)->sev_info;
+
+	dst_sev->misc_cg = get_current_misc_cg();
+	cg_cleanup_sev = dst_sev;
+	if (dst_sev->misc_cg != src_sev->misc_cg) {
+		ret = sev_misc_cg_try_charge(dst_sev);
+		if (ret)
+			goto out_dst_cgroup;
+		charged = true;
+	}
+
+	ret = sev_lock_vcpus_for_migration(kvm, SEV_MIGRATION_SOURCE);
+	if (ret)
+		goto out_dst_cgroup;
+	ret = sev_lock_vcpus_for_migration(source_kvm, SEV_MIGRATION_TARGET);
+	if (ret)
+		goto out_dst_vcpu;
+
+	ret = sev_check_source_vcpus(kvm, source_kvm);
+	if (ret)
+		goto out_source_vcpu;
+
+	sev_migrate_from(kvm, source_kvm);
+	kvm_vm_dead(source_kvm);
+	cg_cleanup_sev = src_sev;
+	ret = 0;
+
+out_source_vcpu:
+	sev_unlock_vcpus_for_migration(source_kvm);
+out_dst_vcpu:
+	sev_unlock_vcpus_for_migration(kvm);
+out_dst_cgroup:
+	/* Operates on the source on success, on the destination on failure.  */
+	if (charged)
+		sev_misc_cg_uncharge(cg_cleanup_sev);
+	put_misc_cg(cg_cleanup_sev->misc_cg);
+	cg_cleanup_sev->misc_cg = NULL;
+out_unlock:
+	sev_unlock_two_vms(kvm, source_kvm);
+out_fput:
+	fdput(f);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+int sev_mem_enc_ioctl(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp)
+{
+	struct kvm_sev_cmd sev_cmd;
+	int r;
+
+	if (!sev_enabled)
+		return -ENOTTY;
+
+	if (!argp)
+		return 0;
+
+	if (copy_from_user(&sev_cmd, argp, sizeof(struct kvm_sev_cmd)))
+		return -EFAULT;
+
+	mutex_lock(&kvm->lock);
+
+	/* Only the enc_context_owner handles some memory enc operations. */
+	if (is_mirroring_enc_context(kvm) &&
+	    !is_cmd_allowed_from_mirror(sev_cmd.id)) {
+		r = -EINVAL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	switch (sev_cmd.id) {
+	case KVM_SEV_ES_INIT:
+		if (!sev_es_enabled) {
+			r = -ENOTTY;
+			goto out;
+		}
+		fallthrough;
+	case KVM_SEV_INIT:
+		r = sev_guest_init(kvm, &sev_cmd);
+		break;
+	case KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_START:
+		r = sev_launch_start(kvm, &sev_cmd);
+		break;
+	case KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_UPDATE_DATA:
+		r = sev_launch_update_data(kvm, &sev_cmd);
+		break;
+	case KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_UPDATE_VMSA:
+		r = sev_launch_update_vmsa(kvm, &sev_cmd);
+		break;
+	case KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_MEASURE:
+		r = sev_launch_measure(kvm, &sev_cmd);
+		break;
+	case KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_FINISH:
+		r = sev_launch_finish(kvm, &sev_cmd);
+		break;
+	case KVM_SEV_GUEST_STATUS:
+		r = sev_guest_status(kvm, &sev_cmd);
+		break;
+	case KVM_SEV_DBG_DECRYPT:
+		r = sev_dbg_crypt(kvm, &sev_cmd, true);
+		break;
+	case KVM_SEV_DBG_ENCRYPT:
+		r = sev_dbg_crypt(kvm, &sev_cmd, false);
+		break;
+	case KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_SECRET:
+		r = sev_launch_secret(kvm, &sev_cmd);
+		break;
+	case KVM_SEV_GET_ATTESTATION_REPORT:
+		r = sev_get_attestation_report(kvm, &sev_cmd);
+		break;
+	case KVM_SEV_SEND_START:
+		r = sev_send_start(kvm, &sev_cmd);
+		break;
+	case KVM_SEV_SEND_UPDATE_DATA:
+		r = sev_send_update_data(kvm, &sev_cmd);
+		break;
+	case KVM_SEV_SEND_FINISH:
+		r = sev_send_finish(kvm, &sev_cmd);
+		break;
+	case KVM_SEV_SEND_CANCEL:
+		r = sev_send_cancel(kvm, &sev_cmd);
+		break;
+	case KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_START:
+		r = sev_receive_start(kvm, &sev_cmd);
+		break;
+	case KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_UPDATE_DATA:
+		r = sev_receive_update_data(kvm, &sev_cmd);
+		break;
+	case KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_FINISH:
+		r = sev_receive_finish(kvm, &sev_cmd);
+		break;
+	default:
+		r = -EINVAL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if (copy_to_user(argp, &sev_cmd, sizeof(struct kvm_sev_cmd)))
+		r = -EFAULT;
+
+out:
+	mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock);
+	return r;
+}
+
+int sev_mem_enc_register_region(struct kvm *kvm,
+				struct kvm_enc_region *range)
+{
+	struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
+	struct enc_region *region;
+	int ret = 0;
+
+	if (!sev_guest(kvm))
+		return -ENOTTY;
+
+	/* If kvm is mirroring encryption context it isn't responsible for it */
+	if (is_mirroring_enc_context(kvm))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (range->addr > ULONG_MAX || range->size > ULONG_MAX)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	region = kzalloc(sizeof(*region), GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
+	if (!region)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	mutex_lock(&kvm->lock);
+	region->pages = sev_pin_memory(kvm, range->addr, range->size, &region->npages, 1);
+	if (IS_ERR(region->pages)) {
+		ret = PTR_ERR(region->pages);
+		mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock);
+		goto e_free;
+	}
+
+	region->uaddr = range->addr;
+	region->size = range->size;
+
+	list_add_tail(&region->list, &sev->regions_list);
+	mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock);
+
+	/*
+	 * The guest may change the memory encryption attribute from C=0 -> C=1
+	 * or vice versa for this memory range. Lets make sure caches are
+	 * flushed to ensure that guest data gets written into memory with
+	 * correct C-bit.
+	 */
+	sev_clflush_pages(region->pages, region->npages);
+
+	return ret;
+
+e_free:
+	kfree(region);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static struct enc_region *
+find_enc_region(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_enc_region *range)
+{
+	struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
+	struct list_head *head = &sev->regions_list;
+	struct enc_region *i;
+
+	list_for_each_entry(i, head, list) {
+		if (i->uaddr == range->addr &&
+		    i->size == range->size)
+			return i;
+	}
+
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+static void __unregister_enc_region_locked(struct kvm *kvm,
+					   struct enc_region *region)
+{
+	sev_unpin_memory(kvm, region->pages, region->npages);
+	list_del(&region->list);
+	kfree(region);
+}
+
+int sev_mem_enc_unregister_region(struct kvm *kvm,
+				  struct kvm_enc_region *range)
+{
+	struct enc_region *region;
+	int ret;
+
+	/* If kvm is mirroring encryption context it isn't responsible for it */
+	if (is_mirroring_enc_context(kvm))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	mutex_lock(&kvm->lock);
+
+	if (!sev_guest(kvm)) {
+		ret = -ENOTTY;
+		goto failed;
+	}
+
+	region = find_enc_region(kvm, range);
+	if (!region) {
+		ret = -EINVAL;
+		goto failed;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Ensure that all guest tagged cache entries are flushed before
+	 * releasing the pages back to the system for use. CLFLUSH will
+	 * not do this, so issue a WBINVD.
+	 */
+	wbinvd_on_all_cpus();
+
+	__unregister_enc_region_locked(kvm, region);
+
+	mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock);
+	return 0;
+
+failed:
+	mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+int sev_vm_copy_enc_context_from(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned int source_fd)
+{
+	struct fd f = fdget(source_fd);
+	struct kvm *source_kvm;
+	struct kvm_sev_info *source_sev, *mirror_sev;
+	int ret;
+
+	if (!f.file)
+		return -EBADF;
+
+	if (!file_is_kvm(f.file)) {
+		ret = -EBADF;
+		goto e_source_fput;
+	}
+
+	source_kvm = f.file->private_data;
+	ret = sev_lock_two_vms(kvm, source_kvm);
+	if (ret)
+		goto e_source_fput;
+
+	/*
+	 * Mirrors of mirrors should work, but let's not get silly.  Also
+	 * disallow out-of-band SEV/SEV-ES init if the target is already an
+	 * SEV guest, or if vCPUs have been created.  KVM relies on vCPUs being
+	 * created after SEV/SEV-ES initialization, e.g. to init intercepts.
+	 */
+	if (sev_guest(kvm) || !sev_guest(source_kvm) ||
+	    is_mirroring_enc_context(source_kvm) || kvm->created_vcpus) {
+		ret = -EINVAL;
+		goto e_unlock;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * The mirror kvm holds an enc_context_owner ref so its asid can't
+	 * disappear until we're done with it
+	 */
+	source_sev = &to_kvm_svm(source_kvm)->sev_info;
+	kvm_get_kvm(source_kvm);
+	mirror_sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
+	list_add_tail(&mirror_sev->mirror_entry, &source_sev->mirror_vms);
+
+	/* Set enc_context_owner and copy its encryption context over */
+	mirror_sev->enc_context_owner = source_kvm;
+	mirror_sev->active = true;
+	mirror_sev->asid = source_sev->asid;
+	mirror_sev->fd = source_sev->fd;
+	mirror_sev->es_active = source_sev->es_active;
+	mirror_sev->handle = source_sev->handle;
+	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&mirror_sev->regions_list);
+	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&mirror_sev->mirror_vms);
+	ret = 0;
+
+	/*
+	 * Do not copy ap_jump_table. Since the mirror does not share the same
+	 * KVM contexts as the original, and they may have different
+	 * memory-views.
+	 */
+
+e_unlock:
+	sev_unlock_two_vms(kvm, source_kvm);
+e_source_fput:
+	fdput(f);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+void sev_vm_destroy(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+	struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
+	struct list_head *head = &sev->regions_list;
+	struct list_head *pos, *q;
+
+	if (!sev_guest(kvm))
+		return;
+
+	WARN_ON(!list_empty(&sev->mirror_vms));
+
+	/* If this is a mirror_kvm release the enc_context_owner and skip sev cleanup */
+	if (is_mirroring_enc_context(kvm)) {
+		struct kvm *owner_kvm = sev->enc_context_owner;
+
+		mutex_lock(&owner_kvm->lock);
+		list_del(&sev->mirror_entry);
+		mutex_unlock(&owner_kvm->lock);
+		kvm_put_kvm(owner_kvm);
+		return;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Ensure that all guest tagged cache entries are flushed before
+	 * releasing the pages back to the system for use. CLFLUSH will
+	 * not do this, so issue a WBINVD.
+	 */
+	wbinvd_on_all_cpus();
+
+	/*
+	 * if userspace was terminated before unregistering the memory regions
+	 * then lets unpin all the registered memory.
+	 */
+	if (!list_empty(head)) {
+		list_for_each_safe(pos, q, head) {
+			__unregister_enc_region_locked(kvm,
+				list_entry(pos, struct enc_region, list));
+			cond_resched();
+		}
+	}
+
+	sev_unbind_asid(kvm, sev->handle);
+	sev_asid_free(sev);
+}
+
+void __init sev_set_cpu_caps(void)
+{
+	if (!sev_enabled)
+		kvm_cpu_cap_clear(X86_FEATURE_SEV);
+	if (!sev_es_enabled)
+		kvm_cpu_cap_clear(X86_FEATURE_SEV_ES);
+}
+
+void __init sev_hardware_setup(void)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV
+	unsigned int eax, ebx, ecx, edx, sev_asid_count, sev_es_asid_count;
+	bool sev_es_supported = false;
+	bool sev_supported = false;
+
+	if (!sev_enabled || !npt_enabled || !nrips)
+		goto out;
+
+	/*
+	 * SEV must obviously be supported in hardware.  Sanity check that the
+	 * CPU supports decode assists, which is mandatory for SEV guests to
+	 * support instruction emulation.
+	 */
+	if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SEV) ||
+	    WARN_ON_ONCE(!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_DECODEASSISTS)))
+		goto out;
+
+	/* Retrieve SEV CPUID information */
+	cpuid(0x8000001f, &eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx);
+
+	/* Set encryption bit location for SEV-ES guests */
+	sev_enc_bit = ebx & 0x3f;
+
+	/* Maximum number of encrypted guests supported simultaneously */
+	max_sev_asid = ecx;
+	if (!max_sev_asid)
+		goto out;
+
+	/* Minimum ASID value that should be used for SEV guest */
+	min_sev_asid = edx;
+	sev_me_mask = 1UL << (ebx & 0x3f);
+
+	/*
+	 * Initialize SEV ASID bitmaps. Allocate space for ASID 0 in the bitmap,
+	 * even though it's never used, so that the bitmap is indexed by the
+	 * actual ASID.
+	 */
+	nr_asids = max_sev_asid + 1;
+	sev_asid_bitmap = bitmap_zalloc(nr_asids, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!sev_asid_bitmap)
+		goto out;
+
+	sev_reclaim_asid_bitmap = bitmap_zalloc(nr_asids, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!sev_reclaim_asid_bitmap) {
+		bitmap_free(sev_asid_bitmap);
+		sev_asid_bitmap = NULL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	sev_asid_count = max_sev_asid - min_sev_asid + 1;
+	WARN_ON_ONCE(misc_cg_set_capacity(MISC_CG_RES_SEV, sev_asid_count));
+	sev_supported = true;
+
+	/* SEV-ES support requested? */
+	if (!sev_es_enabled)
+		goto out;
+
+	/*
+	 * SEV-ES requires MMIO caching as KVM doesn't have access to the guest
+	 * instruction stream, i.e. can't emulate in response to a #NPF and
+	 * instead relies on #NPF(RSVD) being reflected into the guest as #VC
+	 * (the guest can then do a #VMGEXIT to request MMIO emulation).
+	 */
+	if (!enable_mmio_caching)
+		goto out;
+
+	/* Does the CPU support SEV-ES? */
+	if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SEV_ES))
+		goto out;
+
+	/* Has the system been allocated ASIDs for SEV-ES? */
+	if (min_sev_asid == 1)
+		goto out;
+
+	sev_es_asid_count = min_sev_asid - 1;
+	WARN_ON_ONCE(misc_cg_set_capacity(MISC_CG_RES_SEV_ES, sev_es_asid_count));
+	sev_es_supported = true;
+
+out:
+	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SEV))
+		pr_info("SEV %s (ASIDs %u - %u)\n",
+			sev_supported ? "enabled" : "disabled",
+			min_sev_asid, max_sev_asid);
+	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SEV_ES))
+		pr_info("SEV-ES %s (ASIDs %u - %u)\n",
+			sev_es_supported ? "enabled" : "disabled",
+			min_sev_asid > 1 ? 1 : 0, min_sev_asid - 1);
+
+	sev_enabled = sev_supported;
+	sev_es_enabled = sev_es_supported;
+	if (!sev_es_enabled || !cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_DEBUG_SWAP) ||
+	    !cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_NO_NESTED_DATA_BP))
+		sev_es_debug_swap_enabled = false;
+#endif
+}
+
+void sev_hardware_unsetup(void)
+{
+	if (!sev_enabled)
+		return;
+
+	/* No need to take sev_bitmap_lock, all VMs have been destroyed. */
+	sev_flush_asids(1, max_sev_asid);
+
+	bitmap_free(sev_asid_bitmap);
+	bitmap_free(sev_reclaim_asid_bitmap);
+
+	misc_cg_set_capacity(MISC_CG_RES_SEV, 0);
+	misc_cg_set_capacity(MISC_CG_RES_SEV_ES, 0);
+}
+
+int sev_cpu_init(struct svm_cpu_data *sd)
+{
+	if (!sev_enabled)
+		return 0;
+
+	sd->sev_vmcbs = kcalloc(nr_asids, sizeof(void *), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!sd->sev_vmcbs)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Pages used by hardware to hold guest encrypted state must be flushed before
+ * returning them to the system.
+ */
+static void sev_flush_encrypted_page(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, void *va)
+{
+	int asid = to_kvm_svm(vcpu->kvm)->sev_info.asid;
+
+	/*
+	 * Note!  The address must be a kernel address, as regular page walk
+	 * checks are performed by VM_PAGE_FLUSH, i.e. operating on a user
+	 * address is non-deterministic and unsafe.  This function deliberately
+	 * takes a pointer to deter passing in a user address.
+	 */
+	unsigned long addr = (unsigned long)va;
+
+	/*
+	 * If CPU enforced cache coherency for encrypted mappings of the
+	 * same physical page is supported, use CLFLUSHOPT instead. NOTE: cache
+	 * flush is still needed in order to work properly with DMA devices.
+	 */
+	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SME_COHERENT)) {
+		clflush_cache_range(va, PAGE_SIZE);
+		return;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * VM Page Flush takes a host virtual address and a guest ASID.  Fall
+	 * back to WBINVD if this faults so as not to make any problems worse
+	 * by leaving stale encrypted data in the cache.
+	 */
+	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(wrmsrl_safe(MSR_AMD64_VM_PAGE_FLUSH, addr | asid)))
+		goto do_wbinvd;
+
+	return;
+
+do_wbinvd:
+	wbinvd_on_all_cpus();
+}
+
+void sev_guest_memory_reclaimed(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+	if (!sev_guest(kvm))
+		return;
+
+	wbinvd_on_all_cpus();
+}
+
+void sev_free_vcpu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct vcpu_svm *svm;
+
+	if (!sev_es_guest(vcpu->kvm))
+		return;
+
+	svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+
+	if (vcpu->arch.guest_state_protected)
+		sev_flush_encrypted_page(vcpu, svm->sev_es.vmsa);
+
+	__free_page(virt_to_page(svm->sev_es.vmsa));
+
+	if (svm->sev_es.ghcb_sa_free)
+		kvfree(svm->sev_es.ghcb_sa);
+}
+
+static void dump_ghcb(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
+{
+	struct ghcb *ghcb = svm->sev_es.ghcb;
+	unsigned int nbits;
+
+	/* Re-use the dump_invalid_vmcb module parameter */
+	if (!dump_invalid_vmcb) {
+		pr_warn_ratelimited("set kvm_amd.dump_invalid_vmcb=1 to dump internal KVM state.\n");
+		return;
+	}
+
+	nbits = sizeof(ghcb->save.valid_bitmap) * 8;
+
+	pr_err("GHCB (GPA=%016llx):\n", svm->vmcb->control.ghcb_gpa);
+	pr_err("%-20s%016llx is_valid: %u\n", "sw_exit_code",
+	       ghcb->save.sw_exit_code, ghcb_sw_exit_code_is_valid(ghcb));
+	pr_err("%-20s%016llx is_valid: %u\n", "sw_exit_info_1",
+	       ghcb->save.sw_exit_info_1, ghcb_sw_exit_info_1_is_valid(ghcb));
+	pr_err("%-20s%016llx is_valid: %u\n", "sw_exit_info_2",
+	       ghcb->save.sw_exit_info_2, ghcb_sw_exit_info_2_is_valid(ghcb));
+	pr_err("%-20s%016llx is_valid: %u\n", "sw_scratch",
+	       ghcb->save.sw_scratch, ghcb_sw_scratch_is_valid(ghcb));
+	pr_err("%-20s%*pb\n", "valid_bitmap", nbits, ghcb->save.valid_bitmap);
+}
+
+static void sev_es_sync_to_ghcb(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
+{
+	struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = &svm->vcpu;
+	struct ghcb *ghcb = svm->sev_es.ghcb;
+
+	/*
+	 * The GHCB protocol so far allows for the following data
+	 * to be returned:
+	 *   GPRs RAX, RBX, RCX, RDX
+	 *
+	 * Copy their values, even if they may not have been written during the
+	 * VM-Exit.  It's the guest's responsibility to not consume random data.
+	 */
+	ghcb_set_rax(ghcb, vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RAX]);
+	ghcb_set_rbx(ghcb, vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RBX]);
+	ghcb_set_rcx(ghcb, vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RCX]);
+	ghcb_set_rdx(ghcb, vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RDX]);
+}
+
+static void sev_es_sync_from_ghcb(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
+{
+	struct vmcb_control_area *control = &svm->vmcb->control;
+	struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = &svm->vcpu;
+	struct ghcb *ghcb = svm->sev_es.ghcb;
+	u64 exit_code;
+
+	/*
+	 * The GHCB protocol so far allows for the following data
+	 * to be supplied:
+	 *   GPRs RAX, RBX, RCX, RDX
+	 *   XCR0
+	 *   CPL
+	 *
+	 * VMMCALL allows the guest to provide extra registers. KVM also
+	 * expects RSI for hypercalls, so include that, too.
+	 *
+	 * Copy their values to the appropriate location if supplied.
+	 */
+	memset(vcpu->arch.regs, 0, sizeof(vcpu->arch.regs));
+
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(svm->sev_es.valid_bitmap) != sizeof(ghcb->save.valid_bitmap));
+	memcpy(&svm->sev_es.valid_bitmap, &ghcb->save.valid_bitmap, sizeof(ghcb->save.valid_bitmap));
+
+	vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RAX] = kvm_ghcb_get_rax_if_valid(svm, ghcb);
+	vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RBX] = kvm_ghcb_get_rbx_if_valid(svm, ghcb);
+	vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RCX] = kvm_ghcb_get_rcx_if_valid(svm, ghcb);
+	vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RDX] = kvm_ghcb_get_rdx_if_valid(svm, ghcb);
+	vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RSI] = kvm_ghcb_get_rsi_if_valid(svm, ghcb);
+
+	svm->vmcb->save.cpl = kvm_ghcb_get_cpl_if_valid(svm, ghcb);
+
+	if (kvm_ghcb_xcr0_is_valid(svm)) {
+		vcpu->arch.xcr0 = ghcb_get_xcr0(ghcb);
+		kvm_update_cpuid_runtime(vcpu);
+	}
+
+	/* Copy the GHCB exit information into the VMCB fields */
+	exit_code = ghcb_get_sw_exit_code(ghcb);
+	control->exit_code = lower_32_bits(exit_code);
+	control->exit_code_hi = upper_32_bits(exit_code);
+	control->exit_info_1 = ghcb_get_sw_exit_info_1(ghcb);
+	control->exit_info_2 = ghcb_get_sw_exit_info_2(ghcb);
+	svm->sev_es.sw_scratch = kvm_ghcb_get_sw_scratch_if_valid(svm, ghcb);
+
+	/* Clear the valid entries fields */
+	memset(ghcb->save.valid_bitmap, 0, sizeof(ghcb->save.valid_bitmap));
+}
+
+static u64 kvm_ghcb_get_sw_exit_code(struct vmcb_control_area *control)
+{
+	return (((u64)control->exit_code_hi) << 32) | control->exit_code;
+}
+
+static int sev_es_validate_vmgexit(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
+{
+	struct vmcb_control_area *control = &svm->vmcb->control;
+	struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = &svm->vcpu;
+	u64 exit_code;
+	u64 reason;
+
+	/*
+	 * Retrieve the exit code now even though it may not be marked valid
+	 * as it could help with debugging.
+	 */
+	exit_code = kvm_ghcb_get_sw_exit_code(control);
+
+	/* Only GHCB Usage code 0 is supported */
+	if (svm->sev_es.ghcb->ghcb_usage) {
+		reason = GHCB_ERR_INVALID_USAGE;
+		goto vmgexit_err;
+	}
+
+	reason = GHCB_ERR_MISSING_INPUT;
+
+	if (!kvm_ghcb_sw_exit_code_is_valid(svm) ||
+	    !kvm_ghcb_sw_exit_info_1_is_valid(svm) ||
+	    !kvm_ghcb_sw_exit_info_2_is_valid(svm))
+		goto vmgexit_err;
+
+	switch (exit_code) {
+	case SVM_EXIT_READ_DR7:
+		break;
+	case SVM_EXIT_WRITE_DR7:
+		if (!kvm_ghcb_rax_is_valid(svm))
+			goto vmgexit_err;
+		break;
+	case SVM_EXIT_RDTSC:
+		break;
+	case SVM_EXIT_RDPMC:
+		if (!kvm_ghcb_rcx_is_valid(svm))
+			goto vmgexit_err;
+		break;
+	case SVM_EXIT_CPUID:
+		if (!kvm_ghcb_rax_is_valid(svm) ||
+		    !kvm_ghcb_rcx_is_valid(svm))
+			goto vmgexit_err;
+		if (vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RAX] == 0xd)
+			if (!kvm_ghcb_xcr0_is_valid(svm))
+				goto vmgexit_err;
+		break;
+	case SVM_EXIT_INVD:
+		break;
+	case SVM_EXIT_IOIO:
+		if (control->exit_info_1 & SVM_IOIO_STR_MASK) {
+			if (!kvm_ghcb_sw_scratch_is_valid(svm))
+				goto vmgexit_err;
+		} else {
+			if (!(control->exit_info_1 & SVM_IOIO_TYPE_MASK))
+				if (!kvm_ghcb_rax_is_valid(svm))
+					goto vmgexit_err;
+		}
+		break;
+	case SVM_EXIT_MSR:
+		if (!kvm_ghcb_rcx_is_valid(svm))
+			goto vmgexit_err;
+		if (control->exit_info_1) {
+			if (!kvm_ghcb_rax_is_valid(svm) ||
+			    !kvm_ghcb_rdx_is_valid(svm))
+				goto vmgexit_err;
+		}
+		break;
+	case SVM_EXIT_VMMCALL:
+		if (!kvm_ghcb_rax_is_valid(svm) ||
+		    !kvm_ghcb_cpl_is_valid(svm))
+			goto vmgexit_err;
+		break;
+	case SVM_EXIT_RDTSCP:
+		break;
+	case SVM_EXIT_WBINVD:
+		break;
+	case SVM_EXIT_MONITOR:
+		if (!kvm_ghcb_rax_is_valid(svm) ||
+		    !kvm_ghcb_rcx_is_valid(svm) ||
+		    !kvm_ghcb_rdx_is_valid(svm))
+			goto vmgexit_err;
+		break;
+	case SVM_EXIT_MWAIT:
+		if (!kvm_ghcb_rax_is_valid(svm) ||
+		    !kvm_ghcb_rcx_is_valid(svm))
+			goto vmgexit_err;
+		break;
+	case SVM_VMGEXIT_MMIO_READ:
+	case SVM_VMGEXIT_MMIO_WRITE:
+		if (!kvm_ghcb_sw_scratch_is_valid(svm))
+			goto vmgexit_err;
+		break;
+	case SVM_VMGEXIT_NMI_COMPLETE:
+	case SVM_VMGEXIT_AP_HLT_LOOP:
+	case SVM_VMGEXIT_AP_JUMP_TABLE:
+	case SVM_VMGEXIT_UNSUPPORTED_EVENT:
+		break;
+	default:
+		reason = GHCB_ERR_INVALID_EVENT;
+		goto vmgexit_err;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+
+vmgexit_err:
+	if (reason == GHCB_ERR_INVALID_USAGE) {
+		vcpu_unimpl(vcpu, "vmgexit: ghcb usage %#x is not valid\n",
+			    svm->sev_es.ghcb->ghcb_usage);
+	} else if (reason == GHCB_ERR_INVALID_EVENT) {
+		vcpu_unimpl(vcpu, "vmgexit: exit code %#llx is not valid\n",
+			    exit_code);
+	} else {
+		vcpu_unimpl(vcpu, "vmgexit: exit code %#llx input is not valid\n",
+			    exit_code);
+		dump_ghcb(svm);
+	}
+
+	ghcb_set_sw_exit_info_1(svm->sev_es.ghcb, 2);
+	ghcb_set_sw_exit_info_2(svm->sev_es.ghcb, reason);
+
+	/* Resume the guest to "return" the error code. */
+	return 1;
+}
+
+void sev_es_unmap_ghcb(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
+{
+	if (!svm->sev_es.ghcb)
+		return;
+
+	if (svm->sev_es.ghcb_sa_free) {
+		/*
+		 * The scratch area lives outside the GHCB, so there is a
+		 * buffer that, depending on the operation performed, may
+		 * need to be synced, then freed.
+		 */
+		if (svm->sev_es.ghcb_sa_sync) {
+			kvm_write_guest(svm->vcpu.kvm,
+					svm->sev_es.sw_scratch,
+					svm->sev_es.ghcb_sa,
+					svm->sev_es.ghcb_sa_len);
+			svm->sev_es.ghcb_sa_sync = false;
+		}
+
+		kvfree(svm->sev_es.ghcb_sa);
+		svm->sev_es.ghcb_sa = NULL;
+		svm->sev_es.ghcb_sa_free = false;
+	}
+
+	trace_kvm_vmgexit_exit(svm->vcpu.vcpu_id, svm->sev_es.ghcb);
+
+	sev_es_sync_to_ghcb(svm);
+
+	kvm_vcpu_unmap(&svm->vcpu, &svm->sev_es.ghcb_map, true);
+	svm->sev_es.ghcb = NULL;
+}
+
+void pre_sev_run(struct vcpu_svm *svm, int cpu)
+{
+	struct svm_cpu_data *sd = per_cpu_ptr(&svm_data, cpu);
+	int asid = sev_get_asid(svm->vcpu.kvm);
+
+	/* Assign the asid allocated with this SEV guest */
+	svm->asid = asid;
+
+	/*
+	 * Flush guest TLB:
+	 *
+	 * 1) when different VMCB for the same ASID is to be run on the same host CPU.
+	 * 2) or this VMCB was executed on different host CPU in previous VMRUNs.
+	 */
+	if (sd->sev_vmcbs[asid] == svm->vmcb &&
+	    svm->vcpu.arch.last_vmentry_cpu == cpu)
+		return;
+
+	sd->sev_vmcbs[asid] = svm->vmcb;
+	svm->vmcb->control.tlb_ctl = TLB_CONTROL_FLUSH_ASID;
+	vmcb_mark_dirty(svm->vmcb, VMCB_ASID);
+}
+
+#define GHCB_SCRATCH_AREA_LIMIT		(16ULL * PAGE_SIZE)
+static int setup_vmgexit_scratch(struct vcpu_svm *svm, bool sync, u64 len)
+{
+	struct vmcb_control_area *control = &svm->vmcb->control;
+	u64 ghcb_scratch_beg, ghcb_scratch_end;
+	u64 scratch_gpa_beg, scratch_gpa_end;
+	void *scratch_va;
+
+	scratch_gpa_beg = svm->sev_es.sw_scratch;
+	if (!scratch_gpa_beg) {
+		pr_err("vmgexit: scratch gpa not provided\n");
+		goto e_scratch;
+	}
+
+	scratch_gpa_end = scratch_gpa_beg + len;
+	if (scratch_gpa_end < scratch_gpa_beg) {
+		pr_err("vmgexit: scratch length (%#llx) not valid for scratch address (%#llx)\n",
+		       len, scratch_gpa_beg);
+		goto e_scratch;
+	}
+
+	if ((scratch_gpa_beg & PAGE_MASK) == control->ghcb_gpa) {
+		/* Scratch area begins within GHCB */
+		ghcb_scratch_beg = control->ghcb_gpa +
+				   offsetof(struct ghcb, shared_buffer);
+		ghcb_scratch_end = control->ghcb_gpa +
+				   offsetof(struct ghcb, reserved_0xff0);
+
+		/*
+		 * If the scratch area begins within the GHCB, it must be
+		 * completely contained in the GHCB shared buffer area.
+		 */
+		if (scratch_gpa_beg < ghcb_scratch_beg ||
+		    scratch_gpa_end > ghcb_scratch_end) {
+			pr_err("vmgexit: scratch area is outside of GHCB shared buffer area (%#llx - %#llx)\n",
+			       scratch_gpa_beg, scratch_gpa_end);
+			goto e_scratch;
+		}
+
+		scratch_va = (void *)svm->sev_es.ghcb;
+		scratch_va += (scratch_gpa_beg - control->ghcb_gpa);
+	} else {
+		/*
+		 * The guest memory must be read into a kernel buffer, so
+		 * limit the size
+		 */
+		if (len > GHCB_SCRATCH_AREA_LIMIT) {
+			pr_err("vmgexit: scratch area exceeds KVM limits (%#llx requested, %#llx limit)\n",
+			       len, GHCB_SCRATCH_AREA_LIMIT);
+			goto e_scratch;
+		}
+		scratch_va = kvzalloc(len, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
+		if (!scratch_va)
+			return -ENOMEM;
+
+		if (kvm_read_guest(svm->vcpu.kvm, scratch_gpa_beg, scratch_va, len)) {
+			/* Unable to copy scratch area from guest */
+			pr_err("vmgexit: kvm_read_guest for scratch area failed\n");
+
+			kvfree(scratch_va);
+			return -EFAULT;
+		}
+
+		/*
+		 * The scratch area is outside the GHCB. The operation will
+		 * dictate whether the buffer needs to be synced before running
+		 * the vCPU next time (i.e. a read was requested so the data
+		 * must be written back to the guest memory).
+		 */
+		svm->sev_es.ghcb_sa_sync = sync;
+		svm->sev_es.ghcb_sa_free = true;
+	}
+
+	svm->sev_es.ghcb_sa = scratch_va;
+	svm->sev_es.ghcb_sa_len = len;
+
+	return 0;
+
+e_scratch:
+	ghcb_set_sw_exit_info_1(svm->sev_es.ghcb, 2);
+	ghcb_set_sw_exit_info_2(svm->sev_es.ghcb, GHCB_ERR_INVALID_SCRATCH_AREA);
+
+	return 1;
+}
+
+static void set_ghcb_msr_bits(struct vcpu_svm *svm, u64 value, u64 mask,
+			      unsigned int pos)
+{
+	svm->vmcb->control.ghcb_gpa &= ~(mask << pos);
+	svm->vmcb->control.ghcb_gpa |= (value & mask) << pos;
+}
+
+static u64 get_ghcb_msr_bits(struct vcpu_svm *svm, u64 mask, unsigned int pos)
+{
+	return (svm->vmcb->control.ghcb_gpa >> pos) & mask;
+}
+
+static void set_ghcb_msr(struct vcpu_svm *svm, u64 value)
+{
+	svm->vmcb->control.ghcb_gpa = value;
+}
+
+static int sev_handle_vmgexit_msr_protocol(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
+{
+	struct vmcb_control_area *control = &svm->vmcb->control;
+	struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = &svm->vcpu;
+	u64 ghcb_info;
+	int ret = 1;
+
+	ghcb_info = control->ghcb_gpa & GHCB_MSR_INFO_MASK;
+
+	trace_kvm_vmgexit_msr_protocol_enter(svm->vcpu.vcpu_id,
+					     control->ghcb_gpa);
+
+	switch (ghcb_info) {
+	case GHCB_MSR_SEV_INFO_REQ:
+		set_ghcb_msr(svm, GHCB_MSR_SEV_INFO(GHCB_VERSION_MAX,
+						    GHCB_VERSION_MIN,
+						    sev_enc_bit));
+		break;
+	case GHCB_MSR_CPUID_REQ: {
+		u64 cpuid_fn, cpuid_reg, cpuid_value;
+
+		cpuid_fn = get_ghcb_msr_bits(svm,
+					     GHCB_MSR_CPUID_FUNC_MASK,
+					     GHCB_MSR_CPUID_FUNC_POS);
+
+		/* Initialize the registers needed by the CPUID intercept */
+		vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RAX] = cpuid_fn;
+		vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RCX] = 0;
+
+		ret = svm_invoke_exit_handler(vcpu, SVM_EXIT_CPUID);
+		if (!ret) {
+			/* Error, keep GHCB MSR value as-is */
+			break;
+		}
+
+		cpuid_reg = get_ghcb_msr_bits(svm,
+					      GHCB_MSR_CPUID_REG_MASK,
+					      GHCB_MSR_CPUID_REG_POS);
+		if (cpuid_reg == 0)
+			cpuid_value = vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RAX];
+		else if (cpuid_reg == 1)
+			cpuid_value = vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RBX];
+		else if (cpuid_reg == 2)
+			cpuid_value = vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RCX];
+		else
+			cpuid_value = vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RDX];
+
+		set_ghcb_msr_bits(svm, cpuid_value,
+				  GHCB_MSR_CPUID_VALUE_MASK,
+				  GHCB_MSR_CPUID_VALUE_POS);
+
+		set_ghcb_msr_bits(svm, GHCB_MSR_CPUID_RESP,
+				  GHCB_MSR_INFO_MASK,
+				  GHCB_MSR_INFO_POS);
+		break;
+	}
+	case GHCB_MSR_TERM_REQ: {
+		u64 reason_set, reason_code;
+
+		reason_set = get_ghcb_msr_bits(svm,
+					       GHCB_MSR_TERM_REASON_SET_MASK,
+					       GHCB_MSR_TERM_REASON_SET_POS);
+		reason_code = get_ghcb_msr_bits(svm,
+						GHCB_MSR_TERM_REASON_MASK,
+						GHCB_MSR_TERM_REASON_POS);
+		pr_info("SEV-ES guest requested termination: %#llx:%#llx\n",
+			reason_set, reason_code);
+
+		vcpu->run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_SYSTEM_EVENT;
+		vcpu->run->system_event.type = KVM_SYSTEM_EVENT_SEV_TERM;
+		vcpu->run->system_event.ndata = 1;
+		vcpu->run->system_event.data[0] = control->ghcb_gpa;
+
+		return 0;
+	}
+	default:
+		/* Error, keep GHCB MSR value as-is */
+		break;
+	}
+
+	trace_kvm_vmgexit_msr_protocol_exit(svm->vcpu.vcpu_id,
+					    control->ghcb_gpa, ret);
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+int sev_handle_vmgexit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+	struct vmcb_control_area *control = &svm->vmcb->control;
+	u64 ghcb_gpa, exit_code;
+	int ret;
+
+	/* Validate the GHCB */
+	ghcb_gpa = control->ghcb_gpa;
+	if (ghcb_gpa & GHCB_MSR_INFO_MASK)
+		return sev_handle_vmgexit_msr_protocol(svm);
+
+	if (!ghcb_gpa) {
+		vcpu_unimpl(vcpu, "vmgexit: GHCB gpa is not set\n");
+
+		/* Without a GHCB, just return right back to the guest */
+		return 1;
+	}
+
+	if (kvm_vcpu_map(vcpu, ghcb_gpa >> PAGE_SHIFT, &svm->sev_es.ghcb_map)) {
+		/* Unable to map GHCB from guest */
+		vcpu_unimpl(vcpu, "vmgexit: error mapping GHCB [%#llx] from guest\n",
+			    ghcb_gpa);
+
+		/* Without a GHCB, just return right back to the guest */
+		return 1;
+	}
+
+	svm->sev_es.ghcb = svm->sev_es.ghcb_map.hva;
+
+	trace_kvm_vmgexit_enter(vcpu->vcpu_id, svm->sev_es.ghcb);
+
+	sev_es_sync_from_ghcb(svm);
+	ret = sev_es_validate_vmgexit(svm);
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+
+	ghcb_set_sw_exit_info_1(svm->sev_es.ghcb, 0);
+	ghcb_set_sw_exit_info_2(svm->sev_es.ghcb, 0);
+
+	exit_code = kvm_ghcb_get_sw_exit_code(control);
+	switch (exit_code) {
+	case SVM_VMGEXIT_MMIO_READ:
+		ret = setup_vmgexit_scratch(svm, true, control->exit_info_2);
+		if (ret)
+			break;
+
+		ret = kvm_sev_es_mmio_read(vcpu,
+					   control->exit_info_1,
+					   control->exit_info_2,
+					   svm->sev_es.ghcb_sa);
+		break;
+	case SVM_VMGEXIT_MMIO_WRITE:
+		ret = setup_vmgexit_scratch(svm, false, control->exit_info_2);
+		if (ret)
+			break;
+
+		ret = kvm_sev_es_mmio_write(vcpu,
+					    control->exit_info_1,
+					    control->exit_info_2,
+					    svm->sev_es.ghcb_sa);
+		break;
+	case SVM_VMGEXIT_NMI_COMPLETE:
+		++vcpu->stat.nmi_window_exits;
+		svm->nmi_masked = false;
+		kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_EVENT, vcpu);
+		ret = 1;
+		break;
+	case SVM_VMGEXIT_AP_HLT_LOOP:
+		ret = kvm_emulate_ap_reset_hold(vcpu);
+		break;
+	case SVM_VMGEXIT_AP_JUMP_TABLE: {
+		struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(vcpu->kvm)->sev_info;
+
+		switch (control->exit_info_1) {
+		case 0:
+			/* Set AP jump table address */
+			sev->ap_jump_table = control->exit_info_2;
+			break;
+		case 1:
+			/* Get AP jump table address */
+			ghcb_set_sw_exit_info_2(svm->sev_es.ghcb, sev->ap_jump_table);
+			break;
+		default:
+			pr_err("svm: vmgexit: unsupported AP jump table request - exit_info_1=%#llx\n",
+			       control->exit_info_1);
+			ghcb_set_sw_exit_info_1(svm->sev_es.ghcb, 2);
+			ghcb_set_sw_exit_info_2(svm->sev_es.ghcb, GHCB_ERR_INVALID_INPUT);
+		}
+
+		ret = 1;
+		break;
+	}
+	case SVM_VMGEXIT_UNSUPPORTED_EVENT:
+		vcpu_unimpl(vcpu,
+			    "vmgexit: unsupported event - exit_info_1=%#llx, exit_info_2=%#llx\n",
+			    control->exit_info_1, control->exit_info_2);
+		ret = -EINVAL;
+		break;
+	default:
+		ret = svm_invoke_exit_handler(vcpu, exit_code);
+	}
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+int sev_es_string_io(struct vcpu_svm *svm, int size, unsigned int port, int in)
+{
+	int count;
+	int bytes;
+	int r;
+
+	if (svm->vmcb->control.exit_info_2 > INT_MAX)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	count = svm->vmcb->control.exit_info_2;
+	if (unlikely(check_mul_overflow(count, size, &bytes)))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	r = setup_vmgexit_scratch(svm, in, bytes);
+	if (r)
+		return r;
+
+	return kvm_sev_es_string_io(&svm->vcpu, size, port, svm->sev_es.ghcb_sa,
+				    count, in);
+}
+
+static void sev_es_vcpu_after_set_cpuid(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
+{
+	struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = &svm->vcpu;
+
+	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_V_TSC_AUX)) {
+		bool v_tsc_aux = guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_RDTSCP) ||
+				 guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_RDPID);
+
+		set_msr_interception(vcpu, svm->msrpm, MSR_TSC_AUX, v_tsc_aux, v_tsc_aux);
+	}
+}
+
+void sev_vcpu_after_set_cpuid(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
+{
+	struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = &svm->vcpu;
+	struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *best;
+
+	/* For sev guests, the memory encryption bit is not reserved in CR3.  */
+	best = kvm_find_cpuid_entry(vcpu, 0x8000001F);
+	if (best)
+		vcpu->arch.reserved_gpa_bits &= ~(1UL << (best->ebx & 0x3f));
+
+	if (sev_es_guest(svm->vcpu.kvm))
+		sev_es_vcpu_after_set_cpuid(svm);
+}
+
+static void sev_es_init_vmcb(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
+{
+	struct vmcb *vmcb = svm->vmcb01.ptr;
+	struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = &svm->vcpu;
+
+	svm->vmcb->control.nested_ctl |= SVM_NESTED_CTL_SEV_ES_ENABLE;
+	svm->vmcb->control.virt_ext |= LBR_CTL_ENABLE_MASK;
+
+	/*
+	 * An SEV-ES guest requires a VMSA area that is a separate from the
+	 * VMCB page. Do not include the encryption mask on the VMSA physical
+	 * address since hardware will access it using the guest key.  Note,
+	 * the VMSA will be NULL if this vCPU is the destination for intrahost
+	 * migration, and will be copied later.
+	 */
+	if (svm->sev_es.vmsa)
+		svm->vmcb->control.vmsa_pa = __pa(svm->sev_es.vmsa);
+
+	/* Can't intercept CR register access, HV can't modify CR registers */
+	svm_clr_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_CR0_READ);
+	svm_clr_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_CR4_READ);
+	svm_clr_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_CR8_READ);
+	svm_clr_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_CR0_WRITE);
+	svm_clr_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_CR4_WRITE);
+	svm_clr_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_CR8_WRITE);
+
+	svm_clr_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_SELECTIVE_CR0);
+
+	/* Track EFER/CR register changes */
+	svm_set_intercept(svm, TRAP_EFER_WRITE);
+	svm_set_intercept(svm, TRAP_CR0_WRITE);
+	svm_set_intercept(svm, TRAP_CR4_WRITE);
+	svm_set_intercept(svm, TRAP_CR8_WRITE);
+
+	vmcb->control.intercepts[INTERCEPT_DR] = 0;
+	if (!sev_es_debug_swap_enabled) {
+		vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR7_READ);
+		vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR7_WRITE);
+		recalc_intercepts(svm);
+	} else {
+		/*
+		 * Disable #DB intercept iff DebugSwap is enabled.  KVM doesn't
+		 * allow debugging SEV-ES guests, and enables DebugSwap iff
+		 * NO_NESTED_DATA_BP is supported, so there's no reason to
+		 * intercept #DB when DebugSwap is enabled.  For simplicity
+		 * with respect to guest debug, intercept #DB for other VMs
+		 * even if NO_NESTED_DATA_BP is supported, i.e. even if the
+		 * guest can't DoS the CPU with infinite #DB vectoring.
+		 */
+		clr_exception_intercept(svm, DB_VECTOR);
+	}
+
+	/* Can't intercept XSETBV, HV can't modify XCR0 directly */
+	svm_clr_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_XSETBV);
+
+	/* Clear intercepts on selected MSRs */
+	set_msr_interception(vcpu, svm->msrpm, MSR_EFER, 1, 1);
+	set_msr_interception(vcpu, svm->msrpm, MSR_IA32_CR_PAT, 1, 1);
+	set_msr_interception(vcpu, svm->msrpm, MSR_IA32_LASTBRANCHFROMIP, 1, 1);
+	set_msr_interception(vcpu, svm->msrpm, MSR_IA32_LASTBRANCHTOIP, 1, 1);
+	set_msr_interception(vcpu, svm->msrpm, MSR_IA32_LASTINTFROMIP, 1, 1);
+	set_msr_interception(vcpu, svm->msrpm, MSR_IA32_LASTINTTOIP, 1, 1);
+}
+
+void sev_init_vmcb(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
+{
+	svm->vmcb->control.nested_ctl |= SVM_NESTED_CTL_SEV_ENABLE;
+	clr_exception_intercept(svm, UD_VECTOR);
+
+	/*
+	 * Don't intercept #GP for SEV guests, e.g. for the VMware backdoor, as
+	 * KVM can't decrypt guest memory to decode the faulting instruction.
+	 */
+	clr_exception_intercept(svm, GP_VECTOR);
+
+	if (sev_es_guest(svm->vcpu.kvm))
+		sev_es_init_vmcb(svm);
+}
+
+void sev_es_vcpu_reset(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
+{
+	/*
+	 * Set the GHCB MSR value as per the GHCB specification when emulating
+	 * vCPU RESET for an SEV-ES guest.
+	 */
+	set_ghcb_msr(svm, GHCB_MSR_SEV_INFO(GHCB_VERSION_MAX,
+					    GHCB_VERSION_MIN,
+					    sev_enc_bit));
+}
+
+void sev_es_prepare_switch_to_guest(struct sev_es_save_area *hostsa)
+{
+	/*
+	 * All host state for SEV-ES guests is categorized into three swap types
+	 * based on how it is handled by hardware during a world switch:
+	 *
+	 * A: VMRUN:   Host state saved in host save area
+	 *    VMEXIT:  Host state loaded from host save area
+	 *
+	 * B: VMRUN:   Host state _NOT_ saved in host save area
+	 *    VMEXIT:  Host state loaded from host save area
+	 *
+	 * C: VMRUN:   Host state _NOT_ saved in host save area
+	 *    VMEXIT:  Host state initialized to default(reset) values
+	 *
+	 * Manually save type-B state, i.e. state that is loaded by VMEXIT but
+	 * isn't saved by VMRUN, that isn't already saved by VMSAVE (performed
+	 * by common SVM code).
+	 */
+	hostsa->xcr0 = xgetbv(XCR_XFEATURE_ENABLED_MASK);
+	hostsa->pkru = read_pkru();
+	hostsa->xss = host_xss;
+
+	/*
+	 * If DebugSwap is enabled, debug registers are loaded but NOT saved by
+	 * the CPU (Type-B). If DebugSwap is disabled/unsupported, the CPU both
+	 * saves and loads debug registers (Type-A).
+	 */
+	if (sev_es_debug_swap_enabled) {
+		hostsa->dr0 = native_get_debugreg(0);
+		hostsa->dr1 = native_get_debugreg(1);
+		hostsa->dr2 = native_get_debugreg(2);
+		hostsa->dr3 = native_get_debugreg(3);
+		hostsa->dr0_addr_mask = amd_get_dr_addr_mask(0);
+		hostsa->dr1_addr_mask = amd_get_dr_addr_mask(1);
+		hostsa->dr2_addr_mask = amd_get_dr_addr_mask(2);
+		hostsa->dr3_addr_mask = amd_get_dr_addr_mask(3);
+	}
+}
+
+void sev_vcpu_deliver_sipi_vector(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u8 vector)
+{
+	struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+
+	/* First SIPI: Use the values as initially set by the VMM */
+	if (!svm->sev_es.received_first_sipi) {
+		svm->sev_es.received_first_sipi = true;
+		return;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Subsequent SIPI: Return from an AP Reset Hold VMGEXIT, where
+	 * the guest will set the CS and RIP. Set SW_EXIT_INFO_2 to a
+	 * non-zero value.
+	 */
+	if (!svm->sev_es.ghcb)
+		return;
+
+	ghcb_set_sw_exit_info_2(svm->sev_es.ghcb, 1);
+}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..77f1eeefc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
@@ -0,0 +1,5381 @@
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
+
+#include <linux/kvm_host.h>
+
+#include "irq.h"
+#include "mmu.h"
+#include "kvm_cache_regs.h"
+#include "x86.h"
+#include "smm.h"
+#include "cpuid.h"
+#include "pmu.h"
+
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/mod_devicetable.h>
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/vmalloc.h>
+#include <linux/highmem.h>
+#include <linux/amd-iommu.h>
+#include <linux/sched.h>
+#include <linux/trace_events.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/hashtable.h>
+#include <linux/objtool.h>
+#include <linux/psp-sev.h>
+#include <linux/file.h>
+#include <linux/pagemap.h>
+#include <linux/swap.h>
+#include <linux/rwsem.h>
+#include <linux/cc_platform.h>
+#include <linux/smp.h>
+
+#include <asm/apic.h>
+#include <asm/perf_event.h>
+#include <asm/tlbflush.h>
+#include <asm/desc.h>
+#include <asm/debugreg.h>
+#include <asm/kvm_para.h>
+#include <asm/irq_remapping.h>
+#include <asm/spec-ctrl.h>
+#include <asm/cpu_device_id.h>
+#include <asm/traps.h>
+#include <asm/reboot.h>
+#include <asm/fpu/api.h>
+
+#include <trace/events/ipi.h>
+
+#include "trace.h"
+
+#include "svm.h"
+#include "svm_ops.h"
+
+#include "kvm_onhyperv.h"
+#include "svm_onhyperv.h"
+
+MODULE_AUTHOR("Qumranet");
+MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
+
+#ifdef MODULE
+static const struct x86_cpu_id svm_cpu_id[] = {
+	X86_MATCH_FEATURE(X86_FEATURE_SVM, NULL),
+	{}
+};
+MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE(x86cpu, svm_cpu_id);
+#endif
+
+#define SEG_TYPE_LDT 2
+#define SEG_TYPE_BUSY_TSS16 3
+
+static bool erratum_383_found __read_mostly;
+
+u32 msrpm_offsets[MSRPM_OFFSETS] __read_mostly;
+
+/*
+ * Set osvw_len to higher value when updated Revision Guides
+ * are published and we know what the new status bits are
+ */
+static uint64_t osvw_len = 4, osvw_status;
+
+static DEFINE_PER_CPU(u64, current_tsc_ratio);
+
+#define X2APIC_MSR(x)	(APIC_BASE_MSR + (x >> 4))
+
+static const struct svm_direct_access_msrs {
+	u32 index;   /* Index of the MSR */
+	bool always; /* True if intercept is initially cleared */
+} direct_access_msrs[MAX_DIRECT_ACCESS_MSRS] = {
+	{ .index = MSR_STAR,				.always = true  },
+	{ .index = MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_CS,		.always = true  },
+	{ .index = MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_EIP,		.always = false },
+	{ .index = MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_ESP,		.always = false },
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+	{ .index = MSR_GS_BASE,				.always = true  },
+	{ .index = MSR_FS_BASE,				.always = true  },
+	{ .index = MSR_KERNEL_GS_BASE,			.always = true  },
+	{ .index = MSR_LSTAR,				.always = true  },
+	{ .index = MSR_CSTAR,				.always = true  },
+	{ .index = MSR_SYSCALL_MASK,			.always = true  },
+#endif
+	{ .index = MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL,			.always = false },
+	{ .index = MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD,			.always = false },
+	{ .index = MSR_IA32_FLUSH_CMD,			.always = false },
+	{ .index = MSR_IA32_LASTBRANCHFROMIP,		.always = false },
+	{ .index = MSR_IA32_LASTBRANCHTOIP,		.always = false },
+	{ .index = MSR_IA32_LASTINTFROMIP,		.always = false },
+	{ .index = MSR_IA32_LASTINTTOIP,		.always = false },
+	{ .index = MSR_EFER,				.always = false },
+	{ .index = MSR_IA32_CR_PAT,			.always = false },
+	{ .index = MSR_AMD64_SEV_ES_GHCB,		.always = true  },
+	{ .index = MSR_TSC_AUX,				.always = false },
+	{ .index = X2APIC_MSR(APIC_ID),			.always = false },
+	{ .index = X2APIC_MSR(APIC_LVR),		.always = false },
+	{ .index = X2APIC_MSR(APIC_TASKPRI),		.always = false },
+	{ .index = X2APIC_MSR(APIC_ARBPRI),		.always = false },
+	{ .index = X2APIC_MSR(APIC_PROCPRI),		.always = false },
+	{ .index = X2APIC_MSR(APIC_EOI),		.always = false },
+	{ .index = X2APIC_MSR(APIC_RRR),		.always = false },
+	{ .index = X2APIC_MSR(APIC_LDR),		.always = false },
+	{ .index = X2APIC_MSR(APIC_DFR),		.always = false },
+	{ .index = X2APIC_MSR(APIC_SPIV),		.always = false },
+	{ .index = X2APIC_MSR(APIC_ISR),		.always = false },
+	{ .index = X2APIC_MSR(APIC_TMR),		.always = false },
+	{ .index = X2APIC_MSR(APIC_IRR),		.always = false },
+	{ .index = X2APIC_MSR(APIC_ESR),		.always = false },
+	{ .index = X2APIC_MSR(APIC_ICR),		.always = false },
+	{ .index = X2APIC_MSR(APIC_ICR2),		.always = false },
+
+	/*
+	 * Note:
+	 * AMD does not virtualize APIC TSC-deadline timer mode, but it is
+	 * emulated by KVM. When setting APIC LVTT (0x832) register bit 18,
+	 * the AVIC hardware would generate GP fault. Therefore, always
+	 * intercept the MSR 0x832, and do not setup direct_access_msr.
+	 */
+	{ .index = X2APIC_MSR(APIC_LVTTHMR),		.always = false },
+	{ .index = X2APIC_MSR(APIC_LVTPC),		.always = false },
+	{ .index = X2APIC_MSR(APIC_LVT0),		.always = false },
+	{ .index = X2APIC_MSR(APIC_LVT1),		.always = false },
+	{ .index = X2APIC_MSR(APIC_LVTERR),		.always = false },
+	{ .index = X2APIC_MSR(APIC_TMICT),		.always = false },
+	{ .index = X2APIC_MSR(APIC_TMCCT),		.always = false },
+	{ .index = X2APIC_MSR(APIC_TDCR),		.always = false },
+	{ .index = MSR_INVALID,				.always = false },
+};
+
+/*
+ * These 2 parameters are used to config the controls for Pause-Loop Exiting:
+ * pause_filter_count: On processors that support Pause filtering(indicated
+ *	by CPUID Fn8000_000A_EDX), the VMCB provides a 16 bit pause filter
+ *	count value. On VMRUN this value is loaded into an internal counter.
+ *	Each time a pause instruction is executed, this counter is decremented
+ *	until it reaches zero at which time a #VMEXIT is generated if pause
+ *	intercept is enabled. Refer to  AMD APM Vol 2 Section 15.14.4 Pause
+ *	Intercept Filtering for more details.
+ *	This also indicate if ple logic enabled.
+ *
+ * pause_filter_thresh: In addition, some processor families support advanced
+ *	pause filtering (indicated by CPUID Fn8000_000A_EDX) upper bound on
+ *	the amount of time a guest is allowed to execute in a pause loop.
+ *	In this mode, a 16-bit pause filter threshold field is added in the
+ *	VMCB. The threshold value is a cycle count that is used to reset the
+ *	pause counter. As with simple pause filtering, VMRUN loads the pause
+ *	count value from VMCB into an internal counter. Then, on each pause
+ *	instruction the hardware checks the elapsed number of cycles since
+ *	the most recent pause instruction against the pause filter threshold.
+ *	If the elapsed cycle count is greater than the pause filter threshold,
+ *	then the internal pause count is reloaded from the VMCB and execution
+ *	continues. If the elapsed cycle count is less than the pause filter
+ *	threshold, then the internal pause count is decremented. If the count
+ *	value is less than zero and PAUSE intercept is enabled, a #VMEXIT is
+ *	triggered. If advanced pause filtering is supported and pause filter
+ *	threshold field is set to zero, the filter will operate in the simpler,
+ *	count only mode.
+ */
+
+static unsigned short pause_filter_thresh = KVM_DEFAULT_PLE_GAP;
+module_param(pause_filter_thresh, ushort, 0444);
+
+static unsigned short pause_filter_count = KVM_SVM_DEFAULT_PLE_WINDOW;
+module_param(pause_filter_count, ushort, 0444);
+
+/* Default doubles per-vcpu window every exit. */
+static unsigned short pause_filter_count_grow = KVM_DEFAULT_PLE_WINDOW_GROW;
+module_param(pause_filter_count_grow, ushort, 0444);
+
+/* Default resets per-vcpu window every exit to pause_filter_count. */
+static unsigned short pause_filter_count_shrink = KVM_DEFAULT_PLE_WINDOW_SHRINK;
+module_param(pause_filter_count_shrink, ushort, 0444);
+
+/* Default is to compute the maximum so we can never overflow. */
+static unsigned short pause_filter_count_max = KVM_SVM_DEFAULT_PLE_WINDOW_MAX;
+module_param(pause_filter_count_max, ushort, 0444);
+
+/*
+ * Use nested page tables by default.  Note, NPT may get forced off by
+ * svm_hardware_setup() if it's unsupported by hardware or the host kernel.
+ */
+bool npt_enabled = true;
+module_param_named(npt, npt_enabled, bool, 0444);
+
+/* allow nested virtualization in KVM/SVM */
+static int nested = true;
+module_param(nested, int, S_IRUGO);
+
+/* enable/disable Next RIP Save */
+int nrips = true;
+module_param(nrips, int, 0444);
+
+/* enable/disable Virtual VMLOAD VMSAVE */
+static int vls = true;
+module_param(vls, int, 0444);
+
+/* enable/disable Virtual GIF */
+int vgif = true;
+module_param(vgif, int, 0444);
+
+/* enable/disable LBR virtualization */
+static int lbrv = true;
+module_param(lbrv, int, 0444);
+
+static int tsc_scaling = true;
+module_param(tsc_scaling, int, 0444);
+
+/*
+ * enable / disable AVIC.  Because the defaults differ for APICv
+ * support between VMX and SVM we cannot use module_param_named.
+ */
+static bool avic;
+module_param(avic, bool, 0444);
+
+bool __read_mostly dump_invalid_vmcb;
+module_param(dump_invalid_vmcb, bool, 0644);
+
+
+bool intercept_smi = true;
+module_param(intercept_smi, bool, 0444);
+
+bool vnmi = true;
+module_param(vnmi, bool, 0444);
+
+static bool svm_gp_erratum_intercept = true;
+
+static u8 rsm_ins_bytes[] = "\x0f\xaa";
+
+static unsigned long iopm_base;
+
+DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct svm_cpu_data, svm_data);
+
+/*
+ * Only MSR_TSC_AUX is switched via the user return hook.  EFER is switched via
+ * the VMCB, and the SYSCALL/SYSENTER MSRs are handled by VMLOAD/VMSAVE.
+ *
+ * RDTSCP and RDPID are not used in the kernel, specifically to allow KVM to
+ * defer the restoration of TSC_AUX until the CPU returns to userspace.
+ */
+static int tsc_aux_uret_slot __read_mostly = -1;
+
+static const u32 msrpm_ranges[] = {0, 0xc0000000, 0xc0010000};
+
+#define NUM_MSR_MAPS ARRAY_SIZE(msrpm_ranges)
+#define MSRS_RANGE_SIZE 2048
+#define MSRS_IN_RANGE (MSRS_RANGE_SIZE * 8 / 2)
+
+u32 svm_msrpm_offset(u32 msr)
+{
+	u32 offset;
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < NUM_MSR_MAPS; i++) {
+		if (msr < msrpm_ranges[i] ||
+		    msr >= msrpm_ranges[i] + MSRS_IN_RANGE)
+			continue;
+
+		offset  = (msr - msrpm_ranges[i]) / 4; /* 4 msrs per u8 */
+		offset += (i * MSRS_RANGE_SIZE);       /* add range offset */
+
+		/* Now we have the u8 offset - but need the u32 offset */
+		return offset / 4;
+	}
+
+	/* MSR not in any range */
+	return MSR_INVALID;
+}
+
+static void svm_flush_tlb_current(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+
+static int get_npt_level(void)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+	return pgtable_l5_enabled() ? PT64_ROOT_5LEVEL : PT64_ROOT_4LEVEL;
+#else
+	return PT32E_ROOT_LEVEL;
+#endif
+}
+
+int svm_set_efer(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 efer)
+{
+	struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+	u64 old_efer = vcpu->arch.efer;
+	vcpu->arch.efer = efer;
+
+	if (!npt_enabled) {
+		/* Shadow paging assumes NX to be available.  */
+		efer |= EFER_NX;
+
+		if (!(efer & EFER_LMA))
+			efer &= ~EFER_LME;
+	}
+
+	if ((old_efer & EFER_SVME) != (efer & EFER_SVME)) {
+		if (!(efer & EFER_SVME)) {
+			svm_leave_nested(vcpu);
+			svm_set_gif(svm, true);
+			/* #GP intercept is still needed for vmware backdoor */
+			if (!enable_vmware_backdoor)
+				clr_exception_intercept(svm, GP_VECTOR);
+
+			/*
+			 * Free the nested guest state, unless we are in SMM.
+			 * In this case we will return to the nested guest
+			 * as soon as we leave SMM.
+			 */
+			if (!is_smm(vcpu))
+				svm_free_nested(svm);
+
+		} else {
+			int ret = svm_allocate_nested(svm);
+
+			if (ret) {
+				vcpu->arch.efer = old_efer;
+				return ret;
+			}
+
+			/*
+			 * Never intercept #GP for SEV guests, KVM can't
+			 * decrypt guest memory to workaround the erratum.
+			 */
+			if (svm_gp_erratum_intercept && !sev_guest(vcpu->kvm))
+				set_exception_intercept(svm, GP_VECTOR);
+		}
+	}
+
+	svm->vmcb->save.efer = efer | EFER_SVME;
+	vmcb_mark_dirty(svm->vmcb, VMCB_CR);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static u32 svm_get_interrupt_shadow(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+	u32 ret = 0;
+
+	if (svm->vmcb->control.int_state & SVM_INTERRUPT_SHADOW_MASK)
+		ret = KVM_X86_SHADOW_INT_STI | KVM_X86_SHADOW_INT_MOV_SS;
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static void svm_set_interrupt_shadow(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int mask)
+{
+	struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+
+	if (mask == 0)
+		svm->vmcb->control.int_state &= ~SVM_INTERRUPT_SHADOW_MASK;
+	else
+		svm->vmcb->control.int_state |= SVM_INTERRUPT_SHADOW_MASK;
+
+}
+static bool svm_can_emulate_instruction(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int emul_type,
+					void *insn, int insn_len);
+
+static int __svm_skip_emulated_instruction(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+					   bool commit_side_effects)
+{
+	struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+	unsigned long old_rflags;
+
+	/*
+	 * SEV-ES does not expose the next RIP. The RIP update is controlled by
+	 * the type of exit and the #VC handler in the guest.
+	 */
+	if (sev_es_guest(vcpu->kvm))
+		goto done;
+
+	if (nrips && svm->vmcb->control.next_rip != 0) {
+		WARN_ON_ONCE(!static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_NRIPS));
+		svm->next_rip = svm->vmcb->control.next_rip;
+	}
+
+	if (!svm->next_rip) {
+		/*
+		 * FIXME: Drop this when kvm_emulate_instruction() does the
+		 * right thing and treats "can't emulate" as outright failure
+		 * for EMULTYPE_SKIP.
+		 */
+		if (!svm_can_emulate_instruction(vcpu, EMULTYPE_SKIP, NULL, 0))
+			return 0;
+
+		if (unlikely(!commit_side_effects))
+			old_rflags = svm->vmcb->save.rflags;
+
+		if (!kvm_emulate_instruction(vcpu, EMULTYPE_SKIP))
+			return 0;
+
+		if (unlikely(!commit_side_effects))
+			svm->vmcb->save.rflags = old_rflags;
+	} else {
+		kvm_rip_write(vcpu, svm->next_rip);
+	}
+
+done:
+	if (likely(commit_side_effects))
+		svm_set_interrupt_shadow(vcpu, 0);
+
+	return 1;
+}
+
+static int svm_skip_emulated_instruction(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	return __svm_skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu, true);
+}
+
+static int svm_update_soft_interrupt_rip(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	unsigned long rip, old_rip = kvm_rip_read(vcpu);
+	struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+
+	/*
+	 * Due to architectural shortcomings, the CPU doesn't always provide
+	 * NextRIP, e.g. if KVM intercepted an exception that occurred while
+	 * the CPU was vectoring an INTO/INT3 in the guest.  Temporarily skip
+	 * the instruction even if NextRIP is supported to acquire the next
+	 * RIP so that it can be shoved into the NextRIP field, otherwise
+	 * hardware will fail to advance guest RIP during event injection.
+	 * Drop the exception/interrupt if emulation fails and effectively
+	 * retry the instruction, it's the least awful option.  If NRIPS is
+	 * in use, the skip must not commit any side effects such as clearing
+	 * the interrupt shadow or RFLAGS.RF.
+	 */
+	if (!__svm_skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu, !nrips))
+		return -EIO;
+
+	rip = kvm_rip_read(vcpu);
+
+	/*
+	 * Save the injection information, even when using next_rip, as the
+	 * VMCB's next_rip will be lost (cleared on VM-Exit) if the injection
+	 * doesn't complete due to a VM-Exit occurring while the CPU is
+	 * vectoring the event.   Decoding the instruction isn't guaranteed to
+	 * work as there may be no backing instruction, e.g. if the event is
+	 * being injected by L1 for L2, or if the guest is patching INT3 into
+	 * a different instruction.
+	 */
+	svm->soft_int_injected = true;
+	svm->soft_int_csbase = svm->vmcb->save.cs.base;
+	svm->soft_int_old_rip = old_rip;
+	svm->soft_int_next_rip = rip;
+
+	if (nrips)
+		kvm_rip_write(vcpu, old_rip);
+
+	if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_NRIPS))
+		svm->vmcb->control.next_rip = rip;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void svm_inject_exception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct kvm_queued_exception *ex = &vcpu->arch.exception;
+	struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+
+	kvm_deliver_exception_payload(vcpu, ex);
+
+	if (kvm_exception_is_soft(ex->vector) &&
+	    svm_update_soft_interrupt_rip(vcpu))
+		return;
+
+	svm->vmcb->control.event_inj = ex->vector
+		| SVM_EVTINJ_VALID
+		| (ex->has_error_code ? SVM_EVTINJ_VALID_ERR : 0)
+		| SVM_EVTINJ_TYPE_EXEPT;
+	svm->vmcb->control.event_inj_err = ex->error_code;
+}
+
+static void svm_init_erratum_383(void)
+{
+	u32 low, high;
+	int err;
+	u64 val;
+
+	if (!static_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_AMD_TLB_MMATCH))
+		return;
+
+	/* Use _safe variants to not break nested virtualization */
+	val = native_read_msr_safe(MSR_AMD64_DC_CFG, &err);
+	if (err)
+		return;
+
+	val |= (1ULL << 47);
+
+	low  = lower_32_bits(val);
+	high = upper_32_bits(val);
+
+	native_write_msr_safe(MSR_AMD64_DC_CFG, low, high);
+
+	erratum_383_found = true;
+}
+
+static void svm_init_osvw(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	/*
+	 * Guests should see errata 400 and 415 as fixed (assuming that
+	 * HLT and IO instructions are intercepted).
+	 */
+	vcpu->arch.osvw.length = (osvw_len >= 3) ? (osvw_len) : 3;
+	vcpu->arch.osvw.status = osvw_status & ~(6ULL);
+
+	/*
+	 * By increasing VCPU's osvw.length to 3 we are telling the guest that
+	 * all osvw.status bits inside that length, including bit 0 (which is
+	 * reserved for erratum 298), are valid. However, if host processor's
+	 * osvw_len is 0 then osvw_status[0] carries no information. We need to
+	 * be conservative here and therefore we tell the guest that erratum 298
+	 * is present (because we really don't know).
+	 */
+	if (osvw_len == 0 && boot_cpu_data.x86 == 0x10)
+		vcpu->arch.osvw.status |= 1;
+}
+
+static bool __kvm_is_svm_supported(void)
+{
+	int cpu = smp_processor_id();
+	struct cpuinfo_x86 *c = &cpu_data(cpu);
+
+	u64 vm_cr;
+
+	if (c->x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_AMD &&
+	    c->x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_HYGON) {
+		pr_err("CPU %d isn't AMD or Hygon\n", cpu);
+		return false;
+	}
+
+	if (!cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_SVM)) {
+		pr_err("SVM not supported by CPU %d\n", cpu);
+		return false;
+	}
+
+	if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT)) {
+		pr_info("KVM is unsupported when running as an SEV guest\n");
+		return false;
+	}
+
+	rdmsrl(MSR_VM_CR, vm_cr);
+	if (vm_cr & (1 << SVM_VM_CR_SVM_DISABLE)) {
+		pr_err("SVM disabled (by BIOS) in MSR_VM_CR on CPU %d\n", cpu);
+		return false;
+	}
+
+	return true;
+}
+
+static bool kvm_is_svm_supported(void)
+{
+	bool supported;
+
+	migrate_disable();
+	supported = __kvm_is_svm_supported();
+	migrate_enable();
+
+	return supported;
+}
+
+static int svm_check_processor_compat(void)
+{
+	if (!__kvm_is_svm_supported())
+		return -EIO;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void __svm_write_tsc_multiplier(u64 multiplier)
+{
+	if (multiplier == __this_cpu_read(current_tsc_ratio))
+		return;
+
+	wrmsrl(MSR_AMD64_TSC_RATIO, multiplier);
+	__this_cpu_write(current_tsc_ratio, multiplier);
+}
+
+static inline void kvm_cpu_svm_disable(void)
+{
+	uint64_t efer;
+
+	wrmsrl(MSR_VM_HSAVE_PA, 0);
+	rdmsrl(MSR_EFER, efer);
+	if (efer & EFER_SVME) {
+		/*
+		 * Force GIF=1 prior to disabling SVM, e.g. to ensure INIT and
+		 * NMI aren't blocked.
+		 */
+		stgi();
+		wrmsrl(MSR_EFER, efer & ~EFER_SVME);
+	}
+}
+
+static void svm_emergency_disable(void)
+{
+	kvm_rebooting = true;
+
+	kvm_cpu_svm_disable();
+}
+
+static void svm_hardware_disable(void)
+{
+	/* Make sure we clean up behind us */
+	if (tsc_scaling)
+		__svm_write_tsc_multiplier(SVM_TSC_RATIO_DEFAULT);
+
+	kvm_cpu_svm_disable();
+
+	amd_pmu_disable_virt();
+}
+
+static int svm_hardware_enable(void)
+{
+
+	struct svm_cpu_data *sd;
+	uint64_t efer;
+	int me = raw_smp_processor_id();
+
+	rdmsrl(MSR_EFER, efer);
+	if (efer & EFER_SVME)
+		return -EBUSY;
+
+	sd = per_cpu_ptr(&svm_data, me);
+	sd->asid_generation = 1;
+	sd->max_asid = cpuid_ebx(SVM_CPUID_FUNC) - 1;
+	sd->next_asid = sd->max_asid + 1;
+	sd->min_asid = max_sev_asid + 1;
+
+	wrmsrl(MSR_EFER, efer | EFER_SVME);
+
+	wrmsrl(MSR_VM_HSAVE_PA, sd->save_area_pa);
+
+	if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_TSCRATEMSR)) {
+		/*
+		 * Set the default value, even if we don't use TSC scaling
+		 * to avoid having stale value in the msr
+		 */
+		__svm_write_tsc_multiplier(SVM_TSC_RATIO_DEFAULT);
+	}
+
+
+	/*
+	 * Get OSVW bits.
+	 *
+	 * Note that it is possible to have a system with mixed processor
+	 * revisions and therefore different OSVW bits. If bits are not the same
+	 * on different processors then choose the worst case (i.e. if erratum
+	 * is present on one processor and not on another then assume that the
+	 * erratum is present everywhere).
+	 */
+	if (cpu_has(&boot_cpu_data, X86_FEATURE_OSVW)) {
+		uint64_t len, status = 0;
+		int err;
+
+		len = native_read_msr_safe(MSR_AMD64_OSVW_ID_LENGTH, &err);
+		if (!err)
+			status = native_read_msr_safe(MSR_AMD64_OSVW_STATUS,
+						      &err);
+
+		if (err)
+			osvw_status = osvw_len = 0;
+		else {
+			if (len < osvw_len)
+				osvw_len = len;
+			osvw_status |= status;
+			osvw_status &= (1ULL << osvw_len) - 1;
+		}
+	} else
+		osvw_status = osvw_len = 0;
+
+	svm_init_erratum_383();
+
+	amd_pmu_enable_virt();
+
+	/*
+	 * If TSC_AUX virtualization is supported, TSC_AUX becomes a swap type
+	 * "B" field (see sev_es_prepare_switch_to_guest()) for SEV-ES guests.
+	 * Since Linux does not change the value of TSC_AUX once set, prime the
+	 * TSC_AUX field now to avoid a RDMSR on every vCPU run.
+	 */
+	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_V_TSC_AUX)) {
+		struct sev_es_save_area *hostsa;
+		u32 __maybe_unused msr_hi;
+
+		hostsa = (struct sev_es_save_area *)(page_address(sd->save_area) + 0x400);
+
+		rdmsr(MSR_TSC_AUX, hostsa->tsc_aux, msr_hi);
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void svm_cpu_uninit(int cpu)
+{
+	struct svm_cpu_data *sd = per_cpu_ptr(&svm_data, cpu);
+
+	if (!sd->save_area)
+		return;
+
+	kfree(sd->sev_vmcbs);
+	__free_page(sd->save_area);
+	sd->save_area_pa = 0;
+	sd->save_area = NULL;
+}
+
+static int svm_cpu_init(int cpu)
+{
+	struct svm_cpu_data *sd = per_cpu_ptr(&svm_data, cpu);
+	int ret = -ENOMEM;
+
+	memset(sd, 0, sizeof(struct svm_cpu_data));
+	sd->save_area = alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO);
+	if (!sd->save_area)
+		return ret;
+
+	ret = sev_cpu_init(sd);
+	if (ret)
+		goto free_save_area;
+
+	sd->save_area_pa = __sme_page_pa(sd->save_area);
+	return 0;
+
+free_save_area:
+	__free_page(sd->save_area);
+	sd->save_area = NULL;
+	return ret;
+
+}
+
+static void set_dr_intercepts(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
+{
+	struct vmcb *vmcb = svm->vmcb01.ptr;
+
+	vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR0_READ);
+	vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR1_READ);
+	vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR2_READ);
+	vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR3_READ);
+	vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR4_READ);
+	vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR5_READ);
+	vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR6_READ);
+	vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR0_WRITE);
+	vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR1_WRITE);
+	vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR2_WRITE);
+	vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR3_WRITE);
+	vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR4_WRITE);
+	vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR5_WRITE);
+	vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR6_WRITE);
+	vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR7_READ);
+	vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR7_WRITE);
+
+	recalc_intercepts(svm);
+}
+
+static void clr_dr_intercepts(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
+{
+	struct vmcb *vmcb = svm->vmcb01.ptr;
+
+	vmcb->control.intercepts[INTERCEPT_DR] = 0;
+
+	recalc_intercepts(svm);
+}
+
+static int direct_access_msr_slot(u32 msr)
+{
+	u32 i;
+
+	for (i = 0; direct_access_msrs[i].index != MSR_INVALID; i++)
+		if (direct_access_msrs[i].index == msr)
+			return i;
+
+	return -ENOENT;
+}
+
+static void set_shadow_msr_intercept(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 msr, int read,
+				     int write)
+{
+	struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+	int slot = direct_access_msr_slot(msr);
+
+	if (slot == -ENOENT)
+		return;
+
+	/* Set the shadow bitmaps to the desired intercept states */
+	if (read)
+		set_bit(slot, svm->shadow_msr_intercept.read);
+	else
+		clear_bit(slot, svm->shadow_msr_intercept.read);
+
+	if (write)
+		set_bit(slot, svm->shadow_msr_intercept.write);
+	else
+		clear_bit(slot, svm->shadow_msr_intercept.write);
+}
+
+static bool valid_msr_intercept(u32 index)
+{
+	return direct_access_msr_slot(index) != -ENOENT;
+}
+
+static bool msr_write_intercepted(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 msr)
+{
+	u8 bit_write;
+	unsigned long tmp;
+	u32 offset;
+	u32 *msrpm;
+
+	/*
+	 * For non-nested case:
+	 * If the L01 MSR bitmap does not intercept the MSR, then we need to
+	 * save it.
+	 *
+	 * For nested case:
+	 * If the L02 MSR bitmap does not intercept the MSR, then we need to
+	 * save it.
+	 */
+	msrpm = is_guest_mode(vcpu) ? to_svm(vcpu)->nested.msrpm:
+				      to_svm(vcpu)->msrpm;
+
+	offset    = svm_msrpm_offset(msr);
+	bit_write = 2 * (msr & 0x0f) + 1;
+	tmp       = msrpm[offset];
+
+	BUG_ON(offset == MSR_INVALID);
+
+	return test_bit(bit_write, &tmp);
+}
+
+static void set_msr_interception_bitmap(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 *msrpm,
+					u32 msr, int read, int write)
+{
+	struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+	u8 bit_read, bit_write;
+	unsigned long tmp;
+	u32 offset;
+
+	/*
+	 * If this warning triggers extend the direct_access_msrs list at the
+	 * beginning of the file
+	 */
+	WARN_ON(!valid_msr_intercept(msr));
+
+	/* Enforce non allowed MSRs to trap */
+	if (read && !kvm_msr_allowed(vcpu, msr, KVM_MSR_FILTER_READ))
+		read = 0;
+
+	if (write && !kvm_msr_allowed(vcpu, msr, KVM_MSR_FILTER_WRITE))
+		write = 0;
+
+	offset    = svm_msrpm_offset(msr);
+	bit_read  = 2 * (msr & 0x0f);
+	bit_write = 2 * (msr & 0x0f) + 1;
+	tmp       = msrpm[offset];
+
+	BUG_ON(offset == MSR_INVALID);
+
+	read  ? clear_bit(bit_read,  &tmp) : set_bit(bit_read,  &tmp);
+	write ? clear_bit(bit_write, &tmp) : set_bit(bit_write, &tmp);
+
+	msrpm[offset] = tmp;
+
+	svm_hv_vmcb_dirty_nested_enlightenments(vcpu);
+	svm->nested.force_msr_bitmap_recalc = true;
+}
+
+void set_msr_interception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 *msrpm, u32 msr,
+			  int read, int write)
+{
+	set_shadow_msr_intercept(vcpu, msr, read, write);
+	set_msr_interception_bitmap(vcpu, msrpm, msr, read, write);
+}
+
+u32 *svm_vcpu_alloc_msrpm(void)
+{
+	unsigned int order = get_order(MSRPM_SIZE);
+	struct page *pages = alloc_pages(GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT, order);
+	u32 *msrpm;
+
+	if (!pages)
+		return NULL;
+
+	msrpm = page_address(pages);
+	memset(msrpm, 0xff, PAGE_SIZE * (1 << order));
+
+	return msrpm;
+}
+
+void svm_vcpu_init_msrpm(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 *msrpm)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; direct_access_msrs[i].index != MSR_INVALID; i++) {
+		if (!direct_access_msrs[i].always)
+			continue;
+		set_msr_interception(vcpu, msrpm, direct_access_msrs[i].index, 1, 1);
+	}
+}
+
+void svm_set_x2apic_msr_interception(struct vcpu_svm *svm, bool intercept)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	if (intercept == svm->x2avic_msrs_intercepted)
+		return;
+
+	if (!x2avic_enabled)
+		return;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < MAX_DIRECT_ACCESS_MSRS; i++) {
+		int index = direct_access_msrs[i].index;
+
+		if ((index < APIC_BASE_MSR) ||
+		    (index > APIC_BASE_MSR + 0xff))
+			continue;
+		set_msr_interception(&svm->vcpu, svm->msrpm, index,
+				     !intercept, !intercept);
+	}
+
+	svm->x2avic_msrs_intercepted = intercept;
+}
+
+void svm_vcpu_free_msrpm(u32 *msrpm)
+{
+	__free_pages(virt_to_page(msrpm), get_order(MSRPM_SIZE));
+}
+
+static void svm_msr_filter_changed(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+	u32 i;
+
+	/*
+	 * Set intercept permissions for all direct access MSRs again. They
+	 * will automatically get filtered through the MSR filter, so we are
+	 * back in sync after this.
+	 */
+	for (i = 0; direct_access_msrs[i].index != MSR_INVALID; i++) {
+		u32 msr = direct_access_msrs[i].index;
+		u32 read = test_bit(i, svm->shadow_msr_intercept.read);
+		u32 write = test_bit(i, svm->shadow_msr_intercept.write);
+
+		set_msr_interception_bitmap(vcpu, svm->msrpm, msr, read, write);
+	}
+}
+
+static void add_msr_offset(u32 offset)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < MSRPM_OFFSETS; ++i) {
+
+		/* Offset already in list? */
+		if (msrpm_offsets[i] == offset)
+			return;
+
+		/* Slot used by another offset? */
+		if (msrpm_offsets[i] != MSR_INVALID)
+			continue;
+
+		/* Add offset to list */
+		msrpm_offsets[i] = offset;
+
+		return;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * If this BUG triggers the msrpm_offsets table has an overflow. Just
+	 * increase MSRPM_OFFSETS in this case.
+	 */
+	BUG();
+}
+
+static void init_msrpm_offsets(void)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	memset(msrpm_offsets, 0xff, sizeof(msrpm_offsets));
+
+	for (i = 0; direct_access_msrs[i].index != MSR_INVALID; i++) {
+		u32 offset;
+
+		offset = svm_msrpm_offset(direct_access_msrs[i].index);
+		BUG_ON(offset == MSR_INVALID);
+
+		add_msr_offset(offset);
+	}
+}
+
+void svm_copy_lbrs(struct vmcb *to_vmcb, struct vmcb *from_vmcb)
+{
+	to_vmcb->save.dbgctl		= from_vmcb->save.dbgctl;
+	to_vmcb->save.br_from		= from_vmcb->save.br_from;
+	to_vmcb->save.br_to		= from_vmcb->save.br_to;
+	to_vmcb->save.last_excp_from	= from_vmcb->save.last_excp_from;
+	to_vmcb->save.last_excp_to	= from_vmcb->save.last_excp_to;
+
+	vmcb_mark_dirty(to_vmcb, VMCB_LBR);
+}
+
+static void svm_enable_lbrv(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+
+	svm->vmcb->control.virt_ext |= LBR_CTL_ENABLE_MASK;
+	set_msr_interception(vcpu, svm->msrpm, MSR_IA32_LASTBRANCHFROMIP, 1, 1);
+	set_msr_interception(vcpu, svm->msrpm, MSR_IA32_LASTBRANCHTOIP, 1, 1);
+	set_msr_interception(vcpu, svm->msrpm, MSR_IA32_LASTINTFROMIP, 1, 1);
+	set_msr_interception(vcpu, svm->msrpm, MSR_IA32_LASTINTTOIP, 1, 1);
+
+	/* Move the LBR msrs to the vmcb02 so that the guest can see them. */
+	if (is_guest_mode(vcpu))
+		svm_copy_lbrs(svm->vmcb, svm->vmcb01.ptr);
+}
+
+static void svm_disable_lbrv(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+
+	svm->vmcb->control.virt_ext &= ~LBR_CTL_ENABLE_MASK;
+	set_msr_interception(vcpu, svm->msrpm, MSR_IA32_LASTBRANCHFROMIP, 0, 0);
+	set_msr_interception(vcpu, svm->msrpm, MSR_IA32_LASTBRANCHTOIP, 0, 0);
+	set_msr_interception(vcpu, svm->msrpm, MSR_IA32_LASTINTFROMIP, 0, 0);
+	set_msr_interception(vcpu, svm->msrpm, MSR_IA32_LASTINTTOIP, 0, 0);
+
+	/*
+	 * Move the LBR msrs back to the vmcb01 to avoid copying them
+	 * on nested guest entries.
+	 */
+	if (is_guest_mode(vcpu))
+		svm_copy_lbrs(svm->vmcb01.ptr, svm->vmcb);
+}
+
+static struct vmcb *svm_get_lbr_vmcb(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
+{
+	/*
+	 * If LBR virtualization is disabled, the LBR MSRs are always kept in
+	 * vmcb01.  If LBR virtualization is enabled and L1 is running VMs of
+	 * its own, the MSRs are moved between vmcb01 and vmcb02 as needed.
+	 */
+	return svm->vmcb->control.virt_ext & LBR_CTL_ENABLE_MASK ? svm->vmcb :
+								   svm->vmcb01.ptr;
+}
+
+void svm_update_lbrv(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+	bool current_enable_lbrv = svm->vmcb->control.virt_ext & LBR_CTL_ENABLE_MASK;
+	bool enable_lbrv = (svm_get_lbr_vmcb(svm)->save.dbgctl & DEBUGCTLMSR_LBR) ||
+			    (is_guest_mode(vcpu) && guest_can_use(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_LBRV) &&
+			    (svm->nested.ctl.virt_ext & LBR_CTL_ENABLE_MASK));
+
+	if (enable_lbrv == current_enable_lbrv)
+		return;
+
+	if (enable_lbrv)
+		svm_enable_lbrv(vcpu);
+	else
+		svm_disable_lbrv(vcpu);
+}
+
+void disable_nmi_singlestep(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
+{
+	svm->nmi_singlestep = false;
+
+	if (!(svm->vcpu.guest_debug & KVM_GUESTDBG_SINGLESTEP)) {
+		/* Clear our flags if they were not set by the guest */
+		if (!(svm->nmi_singlestep_guest_rflags & X86_EFLAGS_TF))
+			svm->vmcb->save.rflags &= ~X86_EFLAGS_TF;
+		if (!(svm->nmi_singlestep_guest_rflags & X86_EFLAGS_RF))
+			svm->vmcb->save.rflags &= ~X86_EFLAGS_RF;
+	}
+}
+
+static void grow_ple_window(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+	struct vmcb_control_area *control = &svm->vmcb->control;
+	int old = control->pause_filter_count;
+
+	if (kvm_pause_in_guest(vcpu->kvm))
+		return;
+
+	control->pause_filter_count = __grow_ple_window(old,
+							pause_filter_count,
+							pause_filter_count_grow,
+							pause_filter_count_max);
+
+	if (control->pause_filter_count != old) {
+		vmcb_mark_dirty(svm->vmcb, VMCB_INTERCEPTS);
+		trace_kvm_ple_window_update(vcpu->vcpu_id,
+					    control->pause_filter_count, old);
+	}
+}
+
+static void shrink_ple_window(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+	struct vmcb_control_area *control = &svm->vmcb->control;
+	int old = control->pause_filter_count;
+
+	if (kvm_pause_in_guest(vcpu->kvm))
+		return;
+
+	control->pause_filter_count =
+				__shrink_ple_window(old,
+						    pause_filter_count,
+						    pause_filter_count_shrink,
+						    pause_filter_count);
+	if (control->pause_filter_count != old) {
+		vmcb_mark_dirty(svm->vmcb, VMCB_INTERCEPTS);
+		trace_kvm_ple_window_update(vcpu->vcpu_id,
+					    control->pause_filter_count, old);
+	}
+}
+
+static void svm_hardware_unsetup(void)
+{
+	int cpu;
+
+	sev_hardware_unsetup();
+
+	for_each_possible_cpu(cpu)
+		svm_cpu_uninit(cpu);
+
+	__free_pages(pfn_to_page(iopm_base >> PAGE_SHIFT),
+	get_order(IOPM_SIZE));
+	iopm_base = 0;
+}
+
+static void init_seg(struct vmcb_seg *seg)
+{
+	seg->selector = 0;
+	seg->attrib = SVM_SELECTOR_P_MASK | SVM_SELECTOR_S_MASK |
+		      SVM_SELECTOR_WRITE_MASK; /* Read/Write Data Segment */
+	seg->limit = 0xffff;
+	seg->base = 0;
+}
+
+static void init_sys_seg(struct vmcb_seg *seg, uint32_t type)
+{
+	seg->selector = 0;
+	seg->attrib = SVM_SELECTOR_P_MASK | type;
+	seg->limit = 0xffff;
+	seg->base = 0;
+}
+
+static u64 svm_get_l2_tsc_offset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+
+	return svm->nested.ctl.tsc_offset;
+}
+
+static u64 svm_get_l2_tsc_multiplier(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+
+	return svm->tsc_ratio_msr;
+}
+
+static void svm_write_tsc_offset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+
+	svm->vmcb01.ptr->control.tsc_offset = vcpu->arch.l1_tsc_offset;
+	svm->vmcb->control.tsc_offset = vcpu->arch.tsc_offset;
+	vmcb_mark_dirty(svm->vmcb, VMCB_INTERCEPTS);
+}
+
+void svm_write_tsc_multiplier(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	preempt_disable();
+	if (to_svm(vcpu)->guest_state_loaded)
+		__svm_write_tsc_multiplier(vcpu->arch.tsc_scaling_ratio);
+	preempt_enable();
+}
+
+/* Evaluate instruction intercepts that depend on guest CPUID features. */
+static void svm_recalc_instruction_intercepts(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+					      struct vcpu_svm *svm)
+{
+	/*
+	 * Intercept INVPCID if shadow paging is enabled to sync/free shadow
+	 * roots, or if INVPCID is disabled in the guest to inject #UD.
+	 */
+	if (kvm_cpu_cap_has(X86_FEATURE_INVPCID)) {
+		if (!npt_enabled ||
+		    !guest_cpuid_has(&svm->vcpu, X86_FEATURE_INVPCID))
+			svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_INVPCID);
+		else
+			svm_clr_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_INVPCID);
+	}
+
+	if (kvm_cpu_cap_has(X86_FEATURE_RDTSCP)) {
+		if (guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_RDTSCP))
+			svm_clr_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_RDTSCP);
+		else
+			svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_RDTSCP);
+	}
+}
+
+static inline void init_vmcb_after_set_cpuid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+
+	if (guest_cpuid_is_intel(vcpu)) {
+		/*
+		 * We must intercept SYSENTER_EIP and SYSENTER_ESP
+		 * accesses because the processor only stores 32 bits.
+		 * For the same reason we cannot use virtual VMLOAD/VMSAVE.
+		 */
+		svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_VMLOAD);
+		svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_VMSAVE);
+		svm->vmcb->control.virt_ext &= ~VIRTUAL_VMLOAD_VMSAVE_ENABLE_MASK;
+
+		set_msr_interception(vcpu, svm->msrpm, MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_EIP, 0, 0);
+		set_msr_interception(vcpu, svm->msrpm, MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_ESP, 0, 0);
+	} else {
+		/*
+		 * If hardware supports Virtual VMLOAD VMSAVE then enable it
+		 * in VMCB and clear intercepts to avoid #VMEXIT.
+		 */
+		if (vls) {
+			svm_clr_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_VMLOAD);
+			svm_clr_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_VMSAVE);
+			svm->vmcb->control.virt_ext |= VIRTUAL_VMLOAD_VMSAVE_ENABLE_MASK;
+		}
+		/* No need to intercept these MSRs */
+		set_msr_interception(vcpu, svm->msrpm, MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_EIP, 1, 1);
+		set_msr_interception(vcpu, svm->msrpm, MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_ESP, 1, 1);
+	}
+}
+
+static void init_vmcb(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+	struct vmcb *vmcb = svm->vmcb01.ptr;
+	struct vmcb_control_area *control = &vmcb->control;
+	struct vmcb_save_area *save = &vmcb->save;
+
+	svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_CR0_READ);
+	svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_CR3_READ);
+	svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_CR4_READ);
+	svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_CR0_WRITE);
+	svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_CR3_WRITE);
+	svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_CR4_WRITE);
+	if (!kvm_vcpu_apicv_active(vcpu))
+		svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_CR8_WRITE);
+
+	set_dr_intercepts(svm);
+
+	set_exception_intercept(svm, PF_VECTOR);
+	set_exception_intercept(svm, UD_VECTOR);
+	set_exception_intercept(svm, MC_VECTOR);
+	set_exception_intercept(svm, AC_VECTOR);
+	set_exception_intercept(svm, DB_VECTOR);
+	/*
+	 * Guest access to VMware backdoor ports could legitimately
+	 * trigger #GP because of TSS I/O permission bitmap.
+	 * We intercept those #GP and allow access to them anyway
+	 * as VMware does.
+	 */
+	if (enable_vmware_backdoor)
+		set_exception_intercept(svm, GP_VECTOR);
+
+	svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_INTR);
+	svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_NMI);
+
+	if (intercept_smi)
+		svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_SMI);
+
+	svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_SELECTIVE_CR0);
+	svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_RDPMC);
+	svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_CPUID);
+	svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_INVD);
+	svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_INVLPG);
+	svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_INVLPGA);
+	svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_IOIO_PROT);
+	svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_MSR_PROT);
+	svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_TASK_SWITCH);
+	svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_SHUTDOWN);
+	svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_VMRUN);
+	svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_VMMCALL);
+	svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_VMLOAD);
+	svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_VMSAVE);
+	svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_STGI);
+	svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_CLGI);
+	svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_SKINIT);
+	svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_WBINVD);
+	svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_XSETBV);
+	svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_RDPRU);
+	svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_RSM);
+
+	if (!kvm_mwait_in_guest(vcpu->kvm)) {
+		svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_MONITOR);
+		svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_MWAIT);
+	}
+
+	if (!kvm_hlt_in_guest(vcpu->kvm))
+		svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_HLT);
+
+	control->iopm_base_pa = __sme_set(iopm_base);
+	control->msrpm_base_pa = __sme_set(__pa(svm->msrpm));
+	control->int_ctl = V_INTR_MASKING_MASK;
+
+	init_seg(&save->es);
+	init_seg(&save->ss);
+	init_seg(&save->ds);
+	init_seg(&save->fs);
+	init_seg(&save->gs);
+
+	save->cs.selector = 0xf000;
+	save->cs.base = 0xffff0000;
+	/* Executable/Readable Code Segment */
+	save->cs.attrib = SVM_SELECTOR_READ_MASK | SVM_SELECTOR_P_MASK |
+		SVM_SELECTOR_S_MASK | SVM_SELECTOR_CODE_MASK;
+	save->cs.limit = 0xffff;
+
+	save->gdtr.base = 0;
+	save->gdtr.limit = 0xffff;
+	save->idtr.base = 0;
+	save->idtr.limit = 0xffff;
+
+	init_sys_seg(&save->ldtr, SEG_TYPE_LDT);
+	init_sys_seg(&save->tr, SEG_TYPE_BUSY_TSS16);
+
+	if (npt_enabled) {
+		/* Setup VMCB for Nested Paging */
+		control->nested_ctl |= SVM_NESTED_CTL_NP_ENABLE;
+		svm_clr_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_INVLPG);
+		clr_exception_intercept(svm, PF_VECTOR);
+		svm_clr_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_CR3_READ);
+		svm_clr_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_CR3_WRITE);
+		save->g_pat = vcpu->arch.pat;
+		save->cr3 = 0;
+	}
+	svm->current_vmcb->asid_generation = 0;
+	svm->asid = 0;
+
+	svm->nested.vmcb12_gpa = INVALID_GPA;
+	svm->nested.last_vmcb12_gpa = INVALID_GPA;
+
+	if (!kvm_pause_in_guest(vcpu->kvm)) {
+		control->pause_filter_count = pause_filter_count;
+		if (pause_filter_thresh)
+			control->pause_filter_thresh = pause_filter_thresh;
+		svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_PAUSE);
+	} else {
+		svm_clr_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_PAUSE);
+	}
+
+	svm_recalc_instruction_intercepts(vcpu, svm);
+
+	/*
+	 * If the host supports V_SPEC_CTRL then disable the interception
+	 * of MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL.
+	 */
+	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_V_SPEC_CTRL))
+		set_msr_interception(vcpu, svm->msrpm, MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, 1, 1);
+
+	if (kvm_vcpu_apicv_active(vcpu))
+		avic_init_vmcb(svm, vmcb);
+
+	if (vnmi)
+		svm->vmcb->control.int_ctl |= V_NMI_ENABLE_MASK;
+
+	if (vgif) {
+		svm_clr_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_STGI);
+		svm_clr_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_CLGI);
+		svm->vmcb->control.int_ctl |= V_GIF_ENABLE_MASK;
+	}
+
+	if (sev_guest(vcpu->kvm))
+		sev_init_vmcb(svm);
+
+	svm_hv_init_vmcb(vmcb);
+	init_vmcb_after_set_cpuid(vcpu);
+
+	vmcb_mark_all_dirty(vmcb);
+
+	enable_gif(svm);
+}
+
+static void __svm_vcpu_reset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+
+	svm_vcpu_init_msrpm(vcpu, svm->msrpm);
+
+	svm_init_osvw(vcpu);
+	vcpu->arch.microcode_version = 0x01000065;
+	svm->tsc_ratio_msr = kvm_caps.default_tsc_scaling_ratio;
+
+	svm->nmi_masked = false;
+	svm->awaiting_iret_completion = false;
+
+	if (sev_es_guest(vcpu->kvm))
+		sev_es_vcpu_reset(svm);
+}
+
+static void svm_vcpu_reset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool init_event)
+{
+	struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+
+	svm->spec_ctrl = 0;
+	svm->virt_spec_ctrl = 0;
+
+	init_vmcb(vcpu);
+
+	if (!init_event)
+		__svm_vcpu_reset(vcpu);
+}
+
+void svm_switch_vmcb(struct vcpu_svm *svm, struct kvm_vmcb_info *target_vmcb)
+{
+	svm->current_vmcb = target_vmcb;
+	svm->vmcb = target_vmcb->ptr;
+}
+
+static int svm_vcpu_create(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct vcpu_svm *svm;
+	struct page *vmcb01_page;
+	struct page *vmsa_page = NULL;
+	int err;
+
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(offsetof(struct vcpu_svm, vcpu) != 0);
+	svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+
+	err = -ENOMEM;
+	vmcb01_page = alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT | __GFP_ZERO);
+	if (!vmcb01_page)
+		goto out;
+
+	if (sev_es_guest(vcpu->kvm)) {
+		/*
+		 * SEV-ES guests require a separate VMSA page used to contain
+		 * the encrypted register state of the guest.
+		 */
+		vmsa_page = alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT | __GFP_ZERO);
+		if (!vmsa_page)
+			goto error_free_vmcb_page;
+
+		/*
+		 * SEV-ES guests maintain an encrypted version of their FPU
+		 * state which is restored and saved on VMRUN and VMEXIT.
+		 * Mark vcpu->arch.guest_fpu->fpstate as scratch so it won't
+		 * do xsave/xrstor on it.
+		 */
+		fpstate_set_confidential(&vcpu->arch.guest_fpu);
+	}
+
+	err = avic_init_vcpu(svm);
+	if (err)
+		goto error_free_vmsa_page;
+
+	svm->msrpm = svm_vcpu_alloc_msrpm();
+	if (!svm->msrpm) {
+		err = -ENOMEM;
+		goto error_free_vmsa_page;
+	}
+
+	svm->x2avic_msrs_intercepted = true;
+
+	svm->vmcb01.ptr = page_address(vmcb01_page);
+	svm->vmcb01.pa = __sme_set(page_to_pfn(vmcb01_page) << PAGE_SHIFT);
+	svm_switch_vmcb(svm, &svm->vmcb01);
+
+	if (vmsa_page)
+		svm->sev_es.vmsa = page_address(vmsa_page);
+
+	svm->guest_state_loaded = false;
+
+	return 0;
+
+error_free_vmsa_page:
+	if (vmsa_page)
+		__free_page(vmsa_page);
+error_free_vmcb_page:
+	__free_page(vmcb01_page);
+out:
+	return err;
+}
+
+static void svm_clear_current_vmcb(struct vmcb *vmcb)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	for_each_online_cpu(i)
+		cmpxchg(per_cpu_ptr(&svm_data.current_vmcb, i), vmcb, NULL);
+}
+
+static void svm_vcpu_free(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+
+	/*
+	 * The vmcb page can be recycled, causing a false negative in
+	 * svm_vcpu_load(). So, ensure that no logical CPU has this
+	 * vmcb page recorded as its current vmcb.
+	 */
+	svm_clear_current_vmcb(svm->vmcb);
+
+	svm_leave_nested(vcpu);
+	svm_free_nested(svm);
+
+	sev_free_vcpu(vcpu);
+
+	__free_page(pfn_to_page(__sme_clr(svm->vmcb01.pa) >> PAGE_SHIFT));
+	__free_pages(virt_to_page(svm->msrpm), get_order(MSRPM_SIZE));
+}
+
+static void svm_prepare_switch_to_guest(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+	struct svm_cpu_data *sd = per_cpu_ptr(&svm_data, vcpu->cpu);
+
+	if (sev_es_guest(vcpu->kvm))
+		sev_es_unmap_ghcb(svm);
+
+	if (svm->guest_state_loaded)
+		return;
+
+	/*
+	 * Save additional host state that will be restored on VMEXIT (sev-es)
+	 * or subsequent vmload of host save area.
+	 */
+	vmsave(sd->save_area_pa);
+	if (sev_es_guest(vcpu->kvm)) {
+		struct sev_es_save_area *hostsa;
+		hostsa = (struct sev_es_save_area *)(page_address(sd->save_area) + 0x400);
+
+		sev_es_prepare_switch_to_guest(hostsa);
+	}
+
+	if (tsc_scaling)
+		__svm_write_tsc_multiplier(vcpu->arch.tsc_scaling_ratio);
+
+	/*
+	 * TSC_AUX is always virtualized for SEV-ES guests when the feature is
+	 * available. The user return MSR support is not required in this case
+	 * because TSC_AUX is restored on #VMEXIT from the host save area
+	 * (which has been initialized in svm_hardware_enable()).
+	 */
+	if (likely(tsc_aux_uret_slot >= 0) &&
+	    (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_V_TSC_AUX) || !sev_es_guest(vcpu->kvm)))
+		kvm_set_user_return_msr(tsc_aux_uret_slot, svm->tsc_aux, -1ull);
+
+	svm->guest_state_loaded = true;
+}
+
+static void svm_prepare_host_switch(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	to_svm(vcpu)->guest_state_loaded = false;
+}
+
+static void svm_vcpu_load(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int cpu)
+{
+	struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+	struct svm_cpu_data *sd = per_cpu_ptr(&svm_data, cpu);
+
+	if (sd->current_vmcb != svm->vmcb) {
+		sd->current_vmcb = svm->vmcb;
+
+		if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT))
+			indirect_branch_prediction_barrier();
+	}
+	if (kvm_vcpu_apicv_active(vcpu))
+		avic_vcpu_load(vcpu, cpu);
+}
+
+static void svm_vcpu_put(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	if (kvm_vcpu_apicv_active(vcpu))
+		avic_vcpu_put(vcpu);
+
+	svm_prepare_host_switch(vcpu);
+
+	++vcpu->stat.host_state_reload;
+}
+
+static unsigned long svm_get_rflags(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+	unsigned long rflags = svm->vmcb->save.rflags;
+
+	if (svm->nmi_singlestep) {
+		/* Hide our flags if they were not set by the guest */
+		if (!(svm->nmi_singlestep_guest_rflags & X86_EFLAGS_TF))
+			rflags &= ~X86_EFLAGS_TF;
+		if (!(svm->nmi_singlestep_guest_rflags & X86_EFLAGS_RF))
+			rflags &= ~X86_EFLAGS_RF;
+	}
+	return rflags;
+}
+
+static void svm_set_rflags(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long rflags)
+{
+	if (to_svm(vcpu)->nmi_singlestep)
+		rflags |= (X86_EFLAGS_TF | X86_EFLAGS_RF);
+
+       /*
+        * Any change of EFLAGS.VM is accompanied by a reload of SS
+        * (caused by either a task switch or an inter-privilege IRET),
+        * so we do not need to update the CPL here.
+        */
+	to_svm(vcpu)->vmcb->save.rflags = rflags;
+}
+
+static bool svm_get_if_flag(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct vmcb *vmcb = to_svm(vcpu)->vmcb;
+
+	return sev_es_guest(vcpu->kvm)
+		? vmcb->control.int_state & SVM_GUEST_INTERRUPT_MASK
+		: kvm_get_rflags(vcpu) & X86_EFLAGS_IF;
+}
+
+static void svm_cache_reg(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, enum kvm_reg reg)
+{
+	kvm_register_mark_available(vcpu, reg);
+
+	switch (reg) {
+	case VCPU_EXREG_PDPTR:
+		/*
+		 * When !npt_enabled, mmu->pdptrs[] is already available since
+		 * it is always updated per SDM when moving to CRs.
+		 */
+		if (npt_enabled)
+			load_pdptrs(vcpu, kvm_read_cr3(vcpu));
+		break;
+	default:
+		KVM_BUG_ON(1, vcpu->kvm);
+	}
+}
+
+static void svm_set_vintr(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
+{
+	struct vmcb_control_area *control;
+
+	/*
+	 * The following fields are ignored when AVIC is enabled
+	 */
+	WARN_ON(kvm_vcpu_apicv_activated(&svm->vcpu));
+
+	svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_VINTR);
+
+	/*
+	 * Recalculating intercepts may have cleared the VINTR intercept.  If
+	 * V_INTR_MASKING is enabled in vmcb12, then the effective RFLAGS.IF
+	 * for L1 physical interrupts is L1's RFLAGS.IF at the time of VMRUN.
+	 * Requesting an interrupt window if save.RFLAGS.IF=0 is pointless as
+	 * interrupts will never be unblocked while L2 is running.
+	 */
+	if (!svm_is_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_VINTR))
+		return;
+
+	/*
+	 * This is just a dummy VINTR to actually cause a vmexit to happen.
+	 * Actual injection of virtual interrupts happens through EVENTINJ.
+	 */
+	control = &svm->vmcb->control;
+	control->int_vector = 0x0;
+	control->int_ctl &= ~V_INTR_PRIO_MASK;
+	control->int_ctl |= V_IRQ_MASK |
+		((/*control->int_vector >> 4*/ 0xf) << V_INTR_PRIO_SHIFT);
+	vmcb_mark_dirty(svm->vmcb, VMCB_INTR);
+}
+
+static void svm_clear_vintr(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
+{
+	svm_clr_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_VINTR);
+
+	/* Drop int_ctl fields related to VINTR injection.  */
+	svm->vmcb->control.int_ctl &= ~V_IRQ_INJECTION_BITS_MASK;
+	if (is_guest_mode(&svm->vcpu)) {
+		svm->vmcb01.ptr->control.int_ctl &= ~V_IRQ_INJECTION_BITS_MASK;
+
+		WARN_ON((svm->vmcb->control.int_ctl & V_TPR_MASK) !=
+			(svm->nested.ctl.int_ctl & V_TPR_MASK));
+
+		svm->vmcb->control.int_ctl |= svm->nested.ctl.int_ctl &
+			V_IRQ_INJECTION_BITS_MASK;
+
+		svm->vmcb->control.int_vector = svm->nested.ctl.int_vector;
+	}
+
+	vmcb_mark_dirty(svm->vmcb, VMCB_INTR);
+}
+
+static struct vmcb_seg *svm_seg(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int seg)
+{
+	struct vmcb_save_area *save = &to_svm(vcpu)->vmcb->save;
+	struct vmcb_save_area *save01 = &to_svm(vcpu)->vmcb01.ptr->save;
+
+	switch (seg) {
+	case VCPU_SREG_CS: return &save->cs;
+	case VCPU_SREG_DS: return &save->ds;
+	case VCPU_SREG_ES: return &save->es;
+	case VCPU_SREG_FS: return &save01->fs;
+	case VCPU_SREG_GS: return &save01->gs;
+	case VCPU_SREG_SS: return &save->ss;
+	case VCPU_SREG_TR: return &save01->tr;
+	case VCPU_SREG_LDTR: return &save01->ldtr;
+	}
+	BUG();
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+static u64 svm_get_segment_base(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int seg)
+{
+	struct vmcb_seg *s = svm_seg(vcpu, seg);
+
+	return s->base;
+}
+
+static void svm_get_segment(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+			    struct kvm_segment *var, int seg)
+{
+	struct vmcb_seg *s = svm_seg(vcpu, seg);
+
+	var->base = s->base;
+	var->limit = s->limit;
+	var->selector = s->selector;
+	var->type = s->attrib & SVM_SELECTOR_TYPE_MASK;
+	var->s = (s->attrib >> SVM_SELECTOR_S_SHIFT) & 1;
+	var->dpl = (s->attrib >> SVM_SELECTOR_DPL_SHIFT) & 3;
+	var->present = (s->attrib >> SVM_SELECTOR_P_SHIFT) & 1;
+	var->avl = (s->attrib >> SVM_SELECTOR_AVL_SHIFT) & 1;
+	var->l = (s->attrib >> SVM_SELECTOR_L_SHIFT) & 1;
+	var->db = (s->attrib >> SVM_SELECTOR_DB_SHIFT) & 1;
+
+	/*
+	 * AMD CPUs circa 2014 track the G bit for all segments except CS.
+	 * However, the SVM spec states that the G bit is not observed by the
+	 * CPU, and some VMware virtual CPUs drop the G bit for all segments.
+	 * So let's synthesize a legal G bit for all segments, this helps
+	 * running KVM nested. It also helps cross-vendor migration, because
+	 * Intel's vmentry has a check on the 'G' bit.
+	 */
+	var->g = s->limit > 0xfffff;
+
+	/*
+	 * AMD's VMCB does not have an explicit unusable field, so emulate it
+	 * for cross vendor migration purposes by "not present"
+	 */
+	var->unusable = !var->present;
+
+	switch (seg) {
+	case VCPU_SREG_TR:
+		/*
+		 * Work around a bug where the busy flag in the tr selector
+		 * isn't exposed
+		 */
+		var->type |= 0x2;
+		break;
+	case VCPU_SREG_DS:
+	case VCPU_SREG_ES:
+	case VCPU_SREG_FS:
+	case VCPU_SREG_GS:
+		/*
+		 * The accessed bit must always be set in the segment
+		 * descriptor cache, although it can be cleared in the
+		 * descriptor, the cached bit always remains at 1. Since
+		 * Intel has a check on this, set it here to support
+		 * cross-vendor migration.
+		 */
+		if (!var->unusable)
+			var->type |= 0x1;
+		break;
+	case VCPU_SREG_SS:
+		/*
+		 * On AMD CPUs sometimes the DB bit in the segment
+		 * descriptor is left as 1, although the whole segment has
+		 * been made unusable. Clear it here to pass an Intel VMX
+		 * entry check when cross vendor migrating.
+		 */
+		if (var->unusable)
+			var->db = 0;
+		/* This is symmetric with svm_set_segment() */
+		var->dpl = to_svm(vcpu)->vmcb->save.cpl;
+		break;
+	}
+}
+
+static int svm_get_cpl(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct vmcb_save_area *save = &to_svm(vcpu)->vmcb->save;
+
+	return save->cpl;
+}
+
+static void svm_get_cs_db_l_bits(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int *db, int *l)
+{
+	struct kvm_segment cs;
+
+	svm_get_segment(vcpu, &cs, VCPU_SREG_CS);
+	*db = cs.db;
+	*l = cs.l;
+}
+
+static void svm_get_idt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct desc_ptr *dt)
+{
+	struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+
+	dt->size = svm->vmcb->save.idtr.limit;
+	dt->address = svm->vmcb->save.idtr.base;
+}
+
+static void svm_set_idt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct desc_ptr *dt)
+{
+	struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+
+	svm->vmcb->save.idtr.limit = dt->size;
+	svm->vmcb->save.idtr.base = dt->address ;
+	vmcb_mark_dirty(svm->vmcb, VMCB_DT);
+}
+
+static void svm_get_gdt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct desc_ptr *dt)
+{
+	struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+
+	dt->size = svm->vmcb->save.gdtr.limit;
+	dt->address = svm->vmcb->save.gdtr.base;
+}
+
+static void svm_set_gdt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct desc_ptr *dt)
+{
+	struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+
+	svm->vmcb->save.gdtr.limit = dt->size;
+	svm->vmcb->save.gdtr.base = dt->address ;
+	vmcb_mark_dirty(svm->vmcb, VMCB_DT);
+}
+
+static void sev_post_set_cr3(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long cr3)
+{
+	struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+
+	/*
+	 * For guests that don't set guest_state_protected, the cr3 update is
+	 * handled via kvm_mmu_load() while entering the guest. For guests
+	 * that do (SEV-ES/SEV-SNP), the cr3 update needs to be written to
+	 * VMCB save area now, since the save area will become the initial
+	 * contents of the VMSA, and future VMCB save area updates won't be
+	 * seen.
+	 */
+	if (sev_es_guest(vcpu->kvm)) {
+		svm->vmcb->save.cr3 = cr3;
+		vmcb_mark_dirty(svm->vmcb, VMCB_CR);
+	}
+}
+
+static bool svm_is_valid_cr0(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long cr0)
+{
+	return true;
+}
+
+void svm_set_cr0(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long cr0)
+{
+	struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+	u64 hcr0 = cr0;
+	bool old_paging = is_paging(vcpu);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+	if (vcpu->arch.efer & EFER_LME) {
+		if (!is_paging(vcpu) && (cr0 & X86_CR0_PG)) {
+			vcpu->arch.efer |= EFER_LMA;
+			if (!vcpu->arch.guest_state_protected)
+				svm->vmcb->save.efer |= EFER_LMA | EFER_LME;
+		}
+
+		if (is_paging(vcpu) && !(cr0 & X86_CR0_PG)) {
+			vcpu->arch.efer &= ~EFER_LMA;
+			if (!vcpu->arch.guest_state_protected)
+				svm->vmcb->save.efer &= ~(EFER_LMA | EFER_LME);
+		}
+	}
+#endif
+	vcpu->arch.cr0 = cr0;
+
+	if (!npt_enabled) {
+		hcr0 |= X86_CR0_PG | X86_CR0_WP;
+		if (old_paging != is_paging(vcpu))
+			svm_set_cr4(vcpu, kvm_read_cr4(vcpu));
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * re-enable caching here because the QEMU bios
+	 * does not do it - this results in some delay at
+	 * reboot
+	 */
+	if (kvm_check_has_quirk(vcpu->kvm, KVM_X86_QUIRK_CD_NW_CLEARED))
+		hcr0 &= ~(X86_CR0_CD | X86_CR0_NW);
+
+	svm->vmcb->save.cr0 = hcr0;
+	vmcb_mark_dirty(svm->vmcb, VMCB_CR);
+
+	/*
+	 * SEV-ES guests must always keep the CR intercepts cleared. CR
+	 * tracking is done using the CR write traps.
+	 */
+	if (sev_es_guest(vcpu->kvm))
+		return;
+
+	if (hcr0 == cr0) {
+		/* Selective CR0 write remains on.  */
+		svm_clr_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_CR0_READ);
+		svm_clr_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_CR0_WRITE);
+	} else {
+		svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_CR0_READ);
+		svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_CR0_WRITE);
+	}
+}
+
+static bool svm_is_valid_cr4(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long cr4)
+{
+	return true;
+}
+
+void svm_set_cr4(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long cr4)
+{
+	unsigned long host_cr4_mce = cr4_read_shadow() & X86_CR4_MCE;
+	unsigned long old_cr4 = vcpu->arch.cr4;
+
+	if (npt_enabled && ((old_cr4 ^ cr4) & X86_CR4_PGE))
+		svm_flush_tlb_current(vcpu);
+
+	vcpu->arch.cr4 = cr4;
+	if (!npt_enabled) {
+		cr4 |= X86_CR4_PAE;
+
+		if (!is_paging(vcpu))
+			cr4 &= ~(X86_CR4_SMEP | X86_CR4_SMAP | X86_CR4_PKE);
+	}
+	cr4 |= host_cr4_mce;
+	to_svm(vcpu)->vmcb->save.cr4 = cr4;
+	vmcb_mark_dirty(to_svm(vcpu)->vmcb, VMCB_CR);
+
+	if ((cr4 ^ old_cr4) & (X86_CR4_OSXSAVE | X86_CR4_PKE))
+		kvm_update_cpuid_runtime(vcpu);
+}
+
+static void svm_set_segment(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+			    struct kvm_segment *var, int seg)
+{
+	struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+	struct vmcb_seg *s = svm_seg(vcpu, seg);
+
+	s->base = var->base;
+	s->limit = var->limit;
+	s->selector = var->selector;
+	s->attrib = (var->type & SVM_SELECTOR_TYPE_MASK);
+	s->attrib |= (var->s & 1) << SVM_SELECTOR_S_SHIFT;
+	s->attrib |= (var->dpl & 3) << SVM_SELECTOR_DPL_SHIFT;
+	s->attrib |= ((var->present & 1) && !var->unusable) << SVM_SELECTOR_P_SHIFT;
+	s->attrib |= (var->avl & 1) << SVM_SELECTOR_AVL_SHIFT;
+	s->attrib |= (var->l & 1) << SVM_SELECTOR_L_SHIFT;
+	s->attrib |= (var->db & 1) << SVM_SELECTOR_DB_SHIFT;
+	s->attrib |= (var->g & 1) << SVM_SELECTOR_G_SHIFT;
+
+	/*
+	 * This is always accurate, except if SYSRET returned to a segment
+	 * with SS.DPL != 3.  Intel does not have this quirk, and always
+	 * forces SS.DPL to 3 on sysret, so we ignore that case; fixing it
+	 * would entail passing the CPL to userspace and back.
+	 */
+	if (seg == VCPU_SREG_SS)
+		/* This is symmetric with svm_get_segment() */
+		svm->vmcb->save.cpl = (var->dpl & 3);
+
+	vmcb_mark_dirty(svm->vmcb, VMCB_SEG);
+}
+
+static void svm_update_exception_bitmap(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+
+	clr_exception_intercept(svm, BP_VECTOR);
+
+	if (vcpu->guest_debug & KVM_GUESTDBG_ENABLE) {
+		if (vcpu->guest_debug & KVM_GUESTDBG_USE_SW_BP)
+			set_exception_intercept(svm, BP_VECTOR);
+	}
+}
+
+static void new_asid(struct vcpu_svm *svm, struct svm_cpu_data *sd)
+{
+	if (sd->next_asid > sd->max_asid) {
+		++sd->asid_generation;
+		sd->next_asid = sd->min_asid;
+		svm->vmcb->control.tlb_ctl = TLB_CONTROL_FLUSH_ALL_ASID;
+		vmcb_mark_dirty(svm->vmcb, VMCB_ASID);
+	}
+
+	svm->current_vmcb->asid_generation = sd->asid_generation;
+	svm->asid = sd->next_asid++;
+}
+
+static void svm_set_dr6(struct vcpu_svm *svm, unsigned long value)
+{
+	struct vmcb *vmcb = svm->vmcb;
+
+	if (svm->vcpu.arch.guest_state_protected)
+		return;
+
+	if (unlikely(value != vmcb->save.dr6)) {
+		vmcb->save.dr6 = value;
+		vmcb_mark_dirty(vmcb, VMCB_DR);
+	}
+}
+
+static void svm_sync_dirty_debug_regs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+
+	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(sev_es_guest(vcpu->kvm)))
+		return;
+
+	get_debugreg(vcpu->arch.db[0], 0);
+	get_debugreg(vcpu->arch.db[1], 1);
+	get_debugreg(vcpu->arch.db[2], 2);
+	get_debugreg(vcpu->arch.db[3], 3);
+	/*
+	 * We cannot reset svm->vmcb->save.dr6 to DR6_ACTIVE_LOW here,
+	 * because db_interception might need it.  We can do it before vmentry.
+	 */
+	vcpu->arch.dr6 = svm->vmcb->save.dr6;
+	vcpu->arch.dr7 = svm->vmcb->save.dr7;
+	vcpu->arch.switch_db_regs &= ~KVM_DEBUGREG_WONT_EXIT;
+	set_dr_intercepts(svm);
+}
+
+static void svm_set_dr7(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long value)
+{
+	struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+
+	if (vcpu->arch.guest_state_protected)
+		return;
+
+	svm->vmcb->save.dr7 = value;
+	vmcb_mark_dirty(svm->vmcb, VMCB_DR);
+}
+
+static int pf_interception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+
+	u64 fault_address = svm->vmcb->control.exit_info_2;
+	u64 error_code = svm->vmcb->control.exit_info_1;
+
+	return kvm_handle_page_fault(vcpu, error_code, fault_address,
+			static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_DECODEASSISTS) ?
+			svm->vmcb->control.insn_bytes : NULL,
+			svm->vmcb->control.insn_len);
+}
+
+static int npf_interception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+
+	u64 fault_address = svm->vmcb->control.exit_info_2;
+	u64 error_code = svm->vmcb->control.exit_info_1;
+
+	trace_kvm_page_fault(vcpu, fault_address, error_code);
+	return kvm_mmu_page_fault(vcpu, fault_address, error_code,
+			static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_DECODEASSISTS) ?
+			svm->vmcb->control.insn_bytes : NULL,
+			svm->vmcb->control.insn_len);
+}
+
+static int db_interception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct kvm_run *kvm_run = vcpu->run;
+	struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+
+	if (!(vcpu->guest_debug &
+	      (KVM_GUESTDBG_SINGLESTEP | KVM_GUESTDBG_USE_HW_BP)) &&
+		!svm->nmi_singlestep) {
+		u32 payload = svm->vmcb->save.dr6 ^ DR6_ACTIVE_LOW;
+		kvm_queue_exception_p(vcpu, DB_VECTOR, payload);
+		return 1;
+	}
+
+	if (svm->nmi_singlestep) {
+		disable_nmi_singlestep(svm);
+		/* Make sure we check for pending NMIs upon entry */
+		kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_EVENT, vcpu);
+	}
+
+	if (vcpu->guest_debug &
+	    (KVM_GUESTDBG_SINGLESTEP | KVM_GUESTDBG_USE_HW_BP)) {
+		kvm_run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_DEBUG;
+		kvm_run->debug.arch.dr6 = svm->vmcb->save.dr6;
+		kvm_run->debug.arch.dr7 = svm->vmcb->save.dr7;
+		kvm_run->debug.arch.pc =
+			svm->vmcb->save.cs.base + svm->vmcb->save.rip;
+		kvm_run->debug.arch.exception = DB_VECTOR;
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	return 1;
+}
+
+static int bp_interception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+	struct kvm_run *kvm_run = vcpu->run;
+
+	kvm_run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_DEBUG;
+	kvm_run->debug.arch.pc = svm->vmcb->save.cs.base + svm->vmcb->save.rip;
+	kvm_run->debug.arch.exception = BP_VECTOR;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int ud_interception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	return handle_ud(vcpu);
+}
+
+static int ac_interception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	kvm_queue_exception_e(vcpu, AC_VECTOR, 0);
+	return 1;
+}
+
+static bool is_erratum_383(void)
+{
+	int err, i;
+	u64 value;
+
+	if (!erratum_383_found)
+		return false;
+
+	value = native_read_msr_safe(MSR_IA32_MC0_STATUS, &err);
+	if (err)
+		return false;
+
+	/* Bit 62 may or may not be set for this mce */
+	value &= ~(1ULL << 62);
+
+	if (value != 0xb600000000010015ULL)
+		return false;
+
+	/* Clear MCi_STATUS registers */
+	for (i = 0; i < 6; ++i)
+		native_write_msr_safe(MSR_IA32_MCx_STATUS(i), 0, 0);
+
+	value = native_read_msr_safe(MSR_IA32_MCG_STATUS, &err);
+	if (!err) {
+		u32 low, high;
+
+		value &= ~(1ULL << 2);
+		low    = lower_32_bits(value);
+		high   = upper_32_bits(value);
+
+		native_write_msr_safe(MSR_IA32_MCG_STATUS, low, high);
+	}
+
+	/* Flush tlb to evict multi-match entries */
+	__flush_tlb_all();
+
+	return true;
+}
+
+static void svm_handle_mce(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	if (is_erratum_383()) {
+		/*
+		 * Erratum 383 triggered. Guest state is corrupt so kill the
+		 * guest.
+		 */
+		pr_err("Guest triggered AMD Erratum 383\n");
+
+		kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_TRIPLE_FAULT, vcpu);
+
+		return;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * On an #MC intercept the MCE handler is not called automatically in
+	 * the host. So do it by hand here.
+	 */
+	kvm_machine_check();
+}
+
+static int mc_interception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	return 1;
+}
+
+static int shutdown_interception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct kvm_run *kvm_run = vcpu->run;
+	struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+
+	/*
+	 * The VM save area has already been encrypted so it
+	 * cannot be reinitialized - just terminate.
+	 */
+	if (sev_es_guest(vcpu->kvm))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	/*
+	 * VMCB is undefined after a SHUTDOWN intercept.  INIT the vCPU to put
+	 * the VMCB in a known good state.  Unfortuately, KVM doesn't have
+	 * KVM_MP_STATE_SHUTDOWN and can't add it without potentially breaking
+	 * userspace.  At a platform view, INIT is acceptable behavior as
+	 * there exist bare metal platforms that automatically INIT the CPU
+	 * in response to shutdown.
+	 */
+	clear_page(svm->vmcb);
+	kvm_vcpu_reset(vcpu, true);
+
+	kvm_run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_SHUTDOWN;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int io_interception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+	u32 io_info = svm->vmcb->control.exit_info_1; /* address size bug? */
+	int size, in, string;
+	unsigned port;
+
+	++vcpu->stat.io_exits;
+	string = (io_info & SVM_IOIO_STR_MASK) != 0;
+	in = (io_info & SVM_IOIO_TYPE_MASK) != 0;
+	port = io_info >> 16;
+	size = (io_info & SVM_IOIO_SIZE_MASK) >> SVM_IOIO_SIZE_SHIFT;
+
+	if (string) {
+		if (sev_es_guest(vcpu->kvm))
+			return sev_es_string_io(svm, size, port, in);
+		else
+			return kvm_emulate_instruction(vcpu, 0);
+	}
+
+	svm->next_rip = svm->vmcb->control.exit_info_2;
+
+	return kvm_fast_pio(vcpu, size, port, in);
+}
+
+static int nmi_interception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	return 1;
+}
+
+static int smi_interception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	return 1;
+}
+
+static int intr_interception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	++vcpu->stat.irq_exits;
+	return 1;
+}
+
+static int vmload_vmsave_interception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool vmload)
+{
+	struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+	struct vmcb *vmcb12;
+	struct kvm_host_map map;
+	int ret;
+
+	if (nested_svm_check_permissions(vcpu))
+		return 1;
+
+	ret = kvm_vcpu_map(vcpu, gpa_to_gfn(svm->vmcb->save.rax), &map);
+	if (ret) {
+		if (ret == -EINVAL)
+			kvm_inject_gp(vcpu, 0);
+		return 1;
+	}
+
+	vmcb12 = map.hva;
+
+	ret = kvm_skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
+
+	if (vmload) {
+		svm_copy_vmloadsave_state(svm->vmcb, vmcb12);
+		svm->sysenter_eip_hi = 0;
+		svm->sysenter_esp_hi = 0;
+	} else {
+		svm_copy_vmloadsave_state(vmcb12, svm->vmcb);
+	}
+
+	kvm_vcpu_unmap(vcpu, &map, true);
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int vmload_interception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	return vmload_vmsave_interception(vcpu, true);
+}
+
+static int vmsave_interception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	return vmload_vmsave_interception(vcpu, false);
+}
+
+static int vmrun_interception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	if (nested_svm_check_permissions(vcpu))
+		return 1;
+
+	return nested_svm_vmrun(vcpu);
+}
+
+enum {
+	NONE_SVM_INSTR,
+	SVM_INSTR_VMRUN,
+	SVM_INSTR_VMLOAD,
+	SVM_INSTR_VMSAVE,
+};
+
+/* Return NONE_SVM_INSTR if not SVM instrs, otherwise return decode result */
+static int svm_instr_opcode(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt = vcpu->arch.emulate_ctxt;
+
+	if (ctxt->b != 0x1 || ctxt->opcode_len != 2)
+		return NONE_SVM_INSTR;
+
+	switch (ctxt->modrm) {
+	case 0xd8: /* VMRUN */
+		return SVM_INSTR_VMRUN;
+	case 0xda: /* VMLOAD */
+		return SVM_INSTR_VMLOAD;
+	case 0xdb: /* VMSAVE */
+		return SVM_INSTR_VMSAVE;
+	default:
+		break;
+	}
+
+	return NONE_SVM_INSTR;
+}
+
+static int emulate_svm_instr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int opcode)
+{
+	const int guest_mode_exit_codes[] = {
+		[SVM_INSTR_VMRUN] = SVM_EXIT_VMRUN,
+		[SVM_INSTR_VMLOAD] = SVM_EXIT_VMLOAD,
+		[SVM_INSTR_VMSAVE] = SVM_EXIT_VMSAVE,
+	};
+	int (*const svm_instr_handlers[])(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) = {
+		[SVM_INSTR_VMRUN] = vmrun_interception,
+		[SVM_INSTR_VMLOAD] = vmload_interception,
+		[SVM_INSTR_VMSAVE] = vmsave_interception,
+	};
+	struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+	int ret;
+
+	if (is_guest_mode(vcpu)) {
+		/* Returns '1' or -errno on failure, '0' on success. */
+		ret = nested_svm_simple_vmexit(svm, guest_mode_exit_codes[opcode]);
+		if (ret)
+			return ret;
+		return 1;
+	}
+	return svm_instr_handlers[opcode](vcpu);
+}
+
+/*
+ * #GP handling code. Note that #GP can be triggered under the following two
+ * cases:
+ *   1) SVM VM-related instructions (VMRUN/VMSAVE/VMLOAD) that trigger #GP on
+ *      some AMD CPUs when EAX of these instructions are in the reserved memory
+ *      regions (e.g. SMM memory on host).
+ *   2) VMware backdoor
+ */
+static int gp_interception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+	u32 error_code = svm->vmcb->control.exit_info_1;
+	int opcode;
+
+	/* Both #GP cases have zero error_code */
+	if (error_code)
+		goto reinject;
+
+	/* Decode the instruction for usage later */
+	if (x86_decode_emulated_instruction(vcpu, 0, NULL, 0) != EMULATION_OK)
+		goto reinject;
+
+	opcode = svm_instr_opcode(vcpu);
+
+	if (opcode == NONE_SVM_INSTR) {
+		if (!enable_vmware_backdoor)
+			goto reinject;
+
+		/*
+		 * VMware backdoor emulation on #GP interception only handles
+		 * IN{S}, OUT{S}, and RDPMC.
+		 */
+		if (!is_guest_mode(vcpu))
+			return kvm_emulate_instruction(vcpu,
+				EMULTYPE_VMWARE_GP | EMULTYPE_NO_DECODE);
+	} else {
+		/* All SVM instructions expect page aligned RAX */
+		if (svm->vmcb->save.rax & ~PAGE_MASK)
+			goto reinject;
+
+		return emulate_svm_instr(vcpu, opcode);
+	}
+
+reinject:
+	kvm_queue_exception_e(vcpu, GP_VECTOR, error_code);
+	return 1;
+}
+
+void svm_set_gif(struct vcpu_svm *svm, bool value)
+{
+	if (value) {
+		/*
+		 * If VGIF is enabled, the STGI intercept is only added to
+		 * detect the opening of the SMI/NMI window; remove it now.
+		 * Likewise, clear the VINTR intercept, we will set it
+		 * again while processing KVM_REQ_EVENT if needed.
+		 */
+		if (vgif)
+			svm_clr_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_STGI);
+		if (svm_is_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_VINTR))
+			svm_clear_vintr(svm);
+
+		enable_gif(svm);
+		if (svm->vcpu.arch.smi_pending ||
+		    svm->vcpu.arch.nmi_pending ||
+		    kvm_cpu_has_injectable_intr(&svm->vcpu) ||
+		    kvm_apic_has_pending_init_or_sipi(&svm->vcpu))
+			kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_EVENT, &svm->vcpu);
+	} else {
+		disable_gif(svm);
+
+		/*
+		 * After a CLGI no interrupts should come.  But if vGIF is
+		 * in use, we still rely on the VINTR intercept (rather than
+		 * STGI) to detect an open interrupt window.
+		*/
+		if (!vgif)
+			svm_clear_vintr(svm);
+	}
+}
+
+static int stgi_interception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	int ret;
+
+	if (nested_svm_check_permissions(vcpu))
+		return 1;
+
+	ret = kvm_skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
+	svm_set_gif(to_svm(vcpu), true);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int clgi_interception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	int ret;
+
+	if (nested_svm_check_permissions(vcpu))
+		return 1;
+
+	ret = kvm_skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
+	svm_set_gif(to_svm(vcpu), false);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int invlpga_interception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	gva_t gva = kvm_rax_read(vcpu);
+	u32 asid = kvm_rcx_read(vcpu);
+
+	/* FIXME: Handle an address size prefix. */
+	if (!is_long_mode(vcpu))
+		gva = (u32)gva;
+
+	trace_kvm_invlpga(to_svm(vcpu)->vmcb->save.rip, asid, gva);
+
+	/* Let's treat INVLPGA the same as INVLPG (can be optimized!) */
+	kvm_mmu_invlpg(vcpu, gva);
+
+	return kvm_skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
+}
+
+static int skinit_interception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	trace_kvm_skinit(to_svm(vcpu)->vmcb->save.rip, kvm_rax_read(vcpu));
+
+	kvm_queue_exception(vcpu, UD_VECTOR);
+	return 1;
+}
+
+static int task_switch_interception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+	u16 tss_selector;
+	int reason;
+	int int_type = svm->vmcb->control.exit_int_info &
+		SVM_EXITINTINFO_TYPE_MASK;
+	int int_vec = svm->vmcb->control.exit_int_info & SVM_EVTINJ_VEC_MASK;
+	uint32_t type =
+		svm->vmcb->control.exit_int_info & SVM_EXITINTINFO_TYPE_MASK;
+	uint32_t idt_v =
+		svm->vmcb->control.exit_int_info & SVM_EXITINTINFO_VALID;
+	bool has_error_code = false;
+	u32 error_code = 0;
+
+	tss_selector = (u16)svm->vmcb->control.exit_info_1;
+
+	if (svm->vmcb->control.exit_info_2 &
+	    (1ULL << SVM_EXITINFOSHIFT_TS_REASON_IRET))
+		reason = TASK_SWITCH_IRET;
+	else if (svm->vmcb->control.exit_info_2 &
+		 (1ULL << SVM_EXITINFOSHIFT_TS_REASON_JMP))
+		reason = TASK_SWITCH_JMP;
+	else if (idt_v)
+		reason = TASK_SWITCH_GATE;
+	else
+		reason = TASK_SWITCH_CALL;
+
+	if (reason == TASK_SWITCH_GATE) {
+		switch (type) {
+		case SVM_EXITINTINFO_TYPE_NMI:
+			vcpu->arch.nmi_injected = false;
+			break;
+		case SVM_EXITINTINFO_TYPE_EXEPT:
+			if (svm->vmcb->control.exit_info_2 &
+			    (1ULL << SVM_EXITINFOSHIFT_TS_HAS_ERROR_CODE)) {
+				has_error_code = true;
+				error_code =
+					(u32)svm->vmcb->control.exit_info_2;
+			}
+			kvm_clear_exception_queue(vcpu);
+			break;
+		case SVM_EXITINTINFO_TYPE_INTR:
+		case SVM_EXITINTINFO_TYPE_SOFT:
+			kvm_clear_interrupt_queue(vcpu);
+			break;
+		default:
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (reason != TASK_SWITCH_GATE ||
+	    int_type == SVM_EXITINTINFO_TYPE_SOFT ||
+	    (int_type == SVM_EXITINTINFO_TYPE_EXEPT &&
+	     (int_vec == OF_VECTOR || int_vec == BP_VECTOR))) {
+		if (!svm_skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu))
+			return 0;
+	}
+
+	if (int_type != SVM_EXITINTINFO_TYPE_SOFT)
+		int_vec = -1;
+
+	return kvm_task_switch(vcpu, tss_selector, int_vec, reason,
+			       has_error_code, error_code);
+}
+
+static void svm_clr_iret_intercept(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
+{
+	if (!sev_es_guest(svm->vcpu.kvm))
+		svm_clr_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_IRET);
+}
+
+static void svm_set_iret_intercept(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
+{
+	if (!sev_es_guest(svm->vcpu.kvm))
+		svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_IRET);
+}
+
+static int iret_interception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+
+	WARN_ON_ONCE(sev_es_guest(vcpu->kvm));
+
+	++vcpu->stat.nmi_window_exits;
+	svm->awaiting_iret_completion = true;
+
+	svm_clr_iret_intercept(svm);
+	svm->nmi_iret_rip = kvm_rip_read(vcpu);
+
+	kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_EVENT, vcpu);
+	return 1;
+}
+
+static int invlpg_interception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	if (!static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_DECODEASSISTS))
+		return kvm_emulate_instruction(vcpu, 0);
+
+	kvm_mmu_invlpg(vcpu, to_svm(vcpu)->vmcb->control.exit_info_1);
+	return kvm_skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
+}
+
+static int emulate_on_interception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	return kvm_emulate_instruction(vcpu, 0);
+}
+
+static int rsm_interception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	return kvm_emulate_instruction_from_buffer(vcpu, rsm_ins_bytes, 2);
+}
+
+static bool check_selective_cr0_intercepted(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+					    unsigned long val)
+{
+	struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+	unsigned long cr0 = vcpu->arch.cr0;
+	bool ret = false;
+
+	if (!is_guest_mode(vcpu) ||
+	    (!(vmcb12_is_intercept(&svm->nested.ctl, INTERCEPT_SELECTIVE_CR0))))
+		return false;
+
+	cr0 &= ~SVM_CR0_SELECTIVE_MASK;
+	val &= ~SVM_CR0_SELECTIVE_MASK;
+
+	if (cr0 ^ val) {
+		svm->vmcb->control.exit_code = SVM_EXIT_CR0_SEL_WRITE;
+		ret = (nested_svm_exit_handled(svm) == NESTED_EXIT_DONE);
+	}
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+#define CR_VALID (1ULL << 63)
+
+static int cr_interception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+	int reg, cr;
+	unsigned long val;
+	int err;
+
+	if (!static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_DECODEASSISTS))
+		return emulate_on_interception(vcpu);
+
+	if (unlikely((svm->vmcb->control.exit_info_1 & CR_VALID) == 0))
+		return emulate_on_interception(vcpu);
+
+	reg = svm->vmcb->control.exit_info_1 & SVM_EXITINFO_REG_MASK;
+	if (svm->vmcb->control.exit_code == SVM_EXIT_CR0_SEL_WRITE)
+		cr = SVM_EXIT_WRITE_CR0 - SVM_EXIT_READ_CR0;
+	else
+		cr = svm->vmcb->control.exit_code - SVM_EXIT_READ_CR0;
+
+	err = 0;
+	if (cr >= 16) { /* mov to cr */
+		cr -= 16;
+		val = kvm_register_read(vcpu, reg);
+		trace_kvm_cr_write(cr, val);
+		switch (cr) {
+		case 0:
+			if (!check_selective_cr0_intercepted(vcpu, val))
+				err = kvm_set_cr0(vcpu, val);
+			else
+				return 1;
+
+			break;
+		case 3:
+			err = kvm_set_cr3(vcpu, val);
+			break;
+		case 4:
+			err = kvm_set_cr4(vcpu, val);
+			break;
+		case 8:
+			err = kvm_set_cr8(vcpu, val);
+			break;
+		default:
+			WARN(1, "unhandled write to CR%d", cr);
+			kvm_queue_exception(vcpu, UD_VECTOR);
+			return 1;
+		}
+	} else { /* mov from cr */
+		switch (cr) {
+		case 0:
+			val = kvm_read_cr0(vcpu);
+			break;
+		case 2:
+			val = vcpu->arch.cr2;
+			break;
+		case 3:
+			val = kvm_read_cr3(vcpu);
+			break;
+		case 4:
+			val = kvm_read_cr4(vcpu);
+			break;
+		case 8:
+			val = kvm_get_cr8(vcpu);
+			break;
+		default:
+			WARN(1, "unhandled read from CR%d", cr);
+			kvm_queue_exception(vcpu, UD_VECTOR);
+			return 1;
+		}
+		kvm_register_write(vcpu, reg, val);
+		trace_kvm_cr_read(cr, val);
+	}
+	return kvm_complete_insn_gp(vcpu, err);
+}
+
+static int cr_trap(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+	unsigned long old_value, new_value;
+	unsigned int cr;
+	int ret = 0;
+
+	new_value = (unsigned long)svm->vmcb->control.exit_info_1;
+
+	cr = svm->vmcb->control.exit_code - SVM_EXIT_CR0_WRITE_TRAP;
+	switch (cr) {
+	case 0:
+		old_value = kvm_read_cr0(vcpu);
+		svm_set_cr0(vcpu, new_value);
+
+		kvm_post_set_cr0(vcpu, old_value, new_value);
+		break;
+	case 4:
+		old_value = kvm_read_cr4(vcpu);
+		svm_set_cr4(vcpu, new_value);
+
+		kvm_post_set_cr4(vcpu, old_value, new_value);
+		break;
+	case 8:
+		ret = kvm_set_cr8(vcpu, new_value);
+		break;
+	default:
+		WARN(1, "unhandled CR%d write trap", cr);
+		kvm_queue_exception(vcpu, UD_VECTOR);
+		return 1;
+	}
+
+	return kvm_complete_insn_gp(vcpu, ret);
+}
+
+static int dr_interception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+	int reg, dr;
+	unsigned long val;
+	int err = 0;
+
+	/*
+	 * SEV-ES intercepts DR7 only to disable guest debugging and the guest issues a VMGEXIT
+	 * for DR7 write only. KVM cannot change DR7 (always swapped as type 'A') so return early.
+	 */
+	if (sev_es_guest(vcpu->kvm))
+		return 1;
+
+	if (vcpu->guest_debug == 0) {
+		/*
+		 * No more DR vmexits; force a reload of the debug registers
+		 * and reenter on this instruction.  The next vmexit will
+		 * retrieve the full state of the debug registers.
+		 */
+		clr_dr_intercepts(svm);
+		vcpu->arch.switch_db_regs |= KVM_DEBUGREG_WONT_EXIT;
+		return 1;
+	}
+
+	if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_DECODEASSISTS))
+		return emulate_on_interception(vcpu);
+
+	reg = svm->vmcb->control.exit_info_1 & SVM_EXITINFO_REG_MASK;
+	dr = svm->vmcb->control.exit_code - SVM_EXIT_READ_DR0;
+	if (dr >= 16) { /* mov to DRn  */
+		dr -= 16;
+		val = kvm_register_read(vcpu, reg);
+		err = kvm_set_dr(vcpu, dr, val);
+	} else {
+		kvm_get_dr(vcpu, dr, &val);
+		kvm_register_write(vcpu, reg, val);
+	}
+
+	return kvm_complete_insn_gp(vcpu, err);
+}
+
+static int cr8_write_interception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	int r;
+
+	u8 cr8_prev = kvm_get_cr8(vcpu);
+	/* instruction emulation calls kvm_set_cr8() */
+	r = cr_interception(vcpu);
+	if (lapic_in_kernel(vcpu))
+		return r;
+	if (cr8_prev <= kvm_get_cr8(vcpu))
+		return r;
+	vcpu->run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_SET_TPR;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int efer_trap(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct msr_data msr_info;
+	int ret;
+
+	/*
+	 * Clear the EFER_SVME bit from EFER. The SVM code always sets this
+	 * bit in svm_set_efer(), but __kvm_valid_efer() checks it against
+	 * whether the guest has X86_FEATURE_SVM - this avoids a failure if
+	 * the guest doesn't have X86_FEATURE_SVM.
+	 */
+	msr_info.host_initiated = false;
+	msr_info.index = MSR_EFER;
+	msr_info.data = to_svm(vcpu)->vmcb->control.exit_info_1 & ~EFER_SVME;
+	ret = kvm_set_msr_common(vcpu, &msr_info);
+
+	return kvm_complete_insn_gp(vcpu, ret);
+}
+
+static int svm_get_msr_feature(struct kvm_msr_entry *msr)
+{
+	msr->data = 0;
+
+	switch (msr->index) {
+	case MSR_AMD64_DE_CFG:
+		if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_LFENCE_RDTSC))
+			msr->data |= MSR_AMD64_DE_CFG_LFENCE_SERIALIZE;
+		break;
+	default:
+		return KVM_MSR_RET_INVALID;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int svm_get_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
+{
+	struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+
+	switch (msr_info->index) {
+	case MSR_AMD64_TSC_RATIO:
+		if (!msr_info->host_initiated &&
+		    !guest_can_use(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_TSCRATEMSR))
+			return 1;
+		msr_info->data = svm->tsc_ratio_msr;
+		break;
+	case MSR_STAR:
+		msr_info->data = svm->vmcb01.ptr->save.star;
+		break;
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+	case MSR_LSTAR:
+		msr_info->data = svm->vmcb01.ptr->save.lstar;
+		break;
+	case MSR_CSTAR:
+		msr_info->data = svm->vmcb01.ptr->save.cstar;
+		break;
+	case MSR_KERNEL_GS_BASE:
+		msr_info->data = svm->vmcb01.ptr->save.kernel_gs_base;
+		break;
+	case MSR_SYSCALL_MASK:
+		msr_info->data = svm->vmcb01.ptr->save.sfmask;
+		break;
+#endif
+	case MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_CS:
+		msr_info->data = svm->vmcb01.ptr->save.sysenter_cs;
+		break;
+	case MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_EIP:
+		msr_info->data = (u32)svm->vmcb01.ptr->save.sysenter_eip;
+		if (guest_cpuid_is_intel(vcpu))
+			msr_info->data |= (u64)svm->sysenter_eip_hi << 32;
+		break;
+	case MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_ESP:
+		msr_info->data = svm->vmcb01.ptr->save.sysenter_esp;
+		if (guest_cpuid_is_intel(vcpu))
+			msr_info->data |= (u64)svm->sysenter_esp_hi << 32;
+		break;
+	case MSR_TSC_AUX:
+		msr_info->data = svm->tsc_aux;
+		break;
+	case MSR_IA32_DEBUGCTLMSR:
+		msr_info->data = svm_get_lbr_vmcb(svm)->save.dbgctl;
+		break;
+	case MSR_IA32_LASTBRANCHFROMIP:
+		msr_info->data = svm_get_lbr_vmcb(svm)->save.br_from;
+		break;
+	case MSR_IA32_LASTBRANCHTOIP:
+		msr_info->data = svm_get_lbr_vmcb(svm)->save.br_to;
+		break;
+	case MSR_IA32_LASTINTFROMIP:
+		msr_info->data = svm_get_lbr_vmcb(svm)->save.last_excp_from;
+		break;
+	case MSR_IA32_LASTINTTOIP:
+		msr_info->data = svm_get_lbr_vmcb(svm)->save.last_excp_to;
+		break;
+	case MSR_VM_HSAVE_PA:
+		msr_info->data = svm->nested.hsave_msr;
+		break;
+	case MSR_VM_CR:
+		msr_info->data = svm->nested.vm_cr_msr;
+		break;
+	case MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL:
+		if (!msr_info->host_initiated &&
+		    !guest_has_spec_ctrl_msr(vcpu))
+			return 1;
+
+		if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_V_SPEC_CTRL))
+			msr_info->data = svm->vmcb->save.spec_ctrl;
+		else
+			msr_info->data = svm->spec_ctrl;
+		break;
+	case MSR_AMD64_VIRT_SPEC_CTRL:
+		if (!msr_info->host_initiated &&
+		    !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_VIRT_SSBD))
+			return 1;
+
+		msr_info->data = svm->virt_spec_ctrl;
+		break;
+	case MSR_F15H_IC_CFG: {
+
+		int family, model;
+
+		family = guest_cpuid_family(vcpu);
+		model  = guest_cpuid_model(vcpu);
+
+		if (family < 0 || model < 0)
+			return kvm_get_msr_common(vcpu, msr_info);
+
+		msr_info->data = 0;
+
+		if (family == 0x15 &&
+		    (model >= 0x2 && model < 0x20))
+			msr_info->data = 0x1E;
+		}
+		break;
+	case MSR_AMD64_DE_CFG:
+		msr_info->data = svm->msr_decfg;
+		break;
+	default:
+		return kvm_get_msr_common(vcpu, msr_info);
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int svm_complete_emulated_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int err)
+{
+	struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+	if (!err || !sev_es_guest(vcpu->kvm) || WARN_ON_ONCE(!svm->sev_es.ghcb))
+		return kvm_complete_insn_gp(vcpu, err);
+
+	ghcb_set_sw_exit_info_1(svm->sev_es.ghcb, 1);
+	ghcb_set_sw_exit_info_2(svm->sev_es.ghcb,
+				X86_TRAP_GP |
+				SVM_EVTINJ_TYPE_EXEPT |
+				SVM_EVTINJ_VALID);
+	return 1;
+}
+
+static int svm_set_vm_cr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 data)
+{
+	struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+	int svm_dis, chg_mask;
+
+	if (data & ~SVM_VM_CR_VALID_MASK)
+		return 1;
+
+	chg_mask = SVM_VM_CR_VALID_MASK;
+
+	if (svm->nested.vm_cr_msr & SVM_VM_CR_SVM_DIS_MASK)
+		chg_mask &= ~(SVM_VM_CR_SVM_LOCK_MASK | SVM_VM_CR_SVM_DIS_MASK);
+
+	svm->nested.vm_cr_msr &= ~chg_mask;
+	svm->nested.vm_cr_msr |= (data & chg_mask);
+
+	svm_dis = svm->nested.vm_cr_msr & SVM_VM_CR_SVM_DIS_MASK;
+
+	/* check for svm_disable while efer.svme is set */
+	if (svm_dis && (vcpu->arch.efer & EFER_SVME))
+		return 1;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int svm_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr)
+{
+	struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+	int ret = 0;
+
+	u32 ecx = msr->index;
+	u64 data = msr->data;
+	switch (ecx) {
+	case MSR_AMD64_TSC_RATIO:
+
+		if (!guest_can_use(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_TSCRATEMSR)) {
+
+			if (!msr->host_initiated)
+				return 1;
+			/*
+			 * In case TSC scaling is not enabled, always
+			 * leave this MSR at the default value.
+			 *
+			 * Due to bug in qemu 6.2.0, it would try to set
+			 * this msr to 0 if tsc scaling is not enabled.
+			 * Ignore this value as well.
+			 */
+			if (data != 0 && data != svm->tsc_ratio_msr)
+				return 1;
+			break;
+		}
+
+		if (data & SVM_TSC_RATIO_RSVD)
+			return 1;
+
+		svm->tsc_ratio_msr = data;
+
+		if (guest_can_use(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_TSCRATEMSR) &&
+		    is_guest_mode(vcpu))
+			nested_svm_update_tsc_ratio_msr(vcpu);
+
+		break;
+	case MSR_IA32_CR_PAT:
+		ret = kvm_set_msr_common(vcpu, msr);
+		if (ret)
+			break;
+
+		svm->vmcb01.ptr->save.g_pat = data;
+		if (is_guest_mode(vcpu))
+			nested_vmcb02_compute_g_pat(svm);
+		vmcb_mark_dirty(svm->vmcb, VMCB_NPT);
+		break;
+	case MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL:
+		if (!msr->host_initiated &&
+		    !guest_has_spec_ctrl_msr(vcpu))
+			return 1;
+
+		if (kvm_spec_ctrl_test_value(data))
+			return 1;
+
+		if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_V_SPEC_CTRL))
+			svm->vmcb->save.spec_ctrl = data;
+		else
+			svm->spec_ctrl = data;
+		if (!data)
+			break;
+
+		/*
+		 * For non-nested:
+		 * When it's written (to non-zero) for the first time, pass
+		 * it through.
+		 *
+		 * For nested:
+		 * The handling of the MSR bitmap for L2 guests is done in
+		 * nested_svm_vmrun_msrpm.
+		 * We update the L1 MSR bit as well since it will end up
+		 * touching the MSR anyway now.
+		 */
+		set_msr_interception(vcpu, svm->msrpm, MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, 1, 1);
+		break;
+	case MSR_AMD64_VIRT_SPEC_CTRL:
+		if (!msr->host_initiated &&
+		    !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_VIRT_SSBD))
+			return 1;
+
+		if (data & ~SPEC_CTRL_SSBD)
+			return 1;
+
+		svm->virt_spec_ctrl = data;
+		break;
+	case MSR_STAR:
+		svm->vmcb01.ptr->save.star = data;
+		break;
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+	case MSR_LSTAR:
+		svm->vmcb01.ptr->save.lstar = data;
+		break;
+	case MSR_CSTAR:
+		svm->vmcb01.ptr->save.cstar = data;
+		break;
+	case MSR_KERNEL_GS_BASE:
+		svm->vmcb01.ptr->save.kernel_gs_base = data;
+		break;
+	case MSR_SYSCALL_MASK:
+		svm->vmcb01.ptr->save.sfmask = data;
+		break;
+#endif
+	case MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_CS:
+		svm->vmcb01.ptr->save.sysenter_cs = data;
+		break;
+	case MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_EIP:
+		svm->vmcb01.ptr->save.sysenter_eip = (u32)data;
+		/*
+		 * We only intercept the MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_{EIP|ESP} msrs
+		 * when we spoof an Intel vendor ID (for cross vendor migration).
+		 * In this case we use this intercept to track the high
+		 * 32 bit part of these msrs to support Intel's
+		 * implementation of SYSENTER/SYSEXIT.
+		 */
+		svm->sysenter_eip_hi = guest_cpuid_is_intel(vcpu) ? (data >> 32) : 0;
+		break;
+	case MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_ESP:
+		svm->vmcb01.ptr->save.sysenter_esp = (u32)data;
+		svm->sysenter_esp_hi = guest_cpuid_is_intel(vcpu) ? (data >> 32) : 0;
+		break;
+	case MSR_TSC_AUX:
+		/*
+		 * TSC_AUX is always virtualized for SEV-ES guests when the
+		 * feature is available. The user return MSR support is not
+		 * required in this case because TSC_AUX is restored on #VMEXIT
+		 * from the host save area (which has been initialized in
+		 * svm_hardware_enable()).
+		 */
+		if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_V_TSC_AUX) && sev_es_guest(vcpu->kvm))
+			break;
+
+		/*
+		 * TSC_AUX is usually changed only during boot and never read
+		 * directly.  Intercept TSC_AUX instead of exposing it to the
+		 * guest via direct_access_msrs, and switch it via user return.
+		 */
+		preempt_disable();
+		ret = kvm_set_user_return_msr(tsc_aux_uret_slot, data, -1ull);
+		preempt_enable();
+		if (ret)
+			break;
+
+		svm->tsc_aux = data;
+		break;
+	case MSR_IA32_DEBUGCTLMSR:
+		if (!lbrv) {
+			kvm_pr_unimpl_wrmsr(vcpu, ecx, data);
+			break;
+		}
+		if (data & DEBUGCTL_RESERVED_BITS)
+			return 1;
+
+		svm_get_lbr_vmcb(svm)->save.dbgctl = data;
+		svm_update_lbrv(vcpu);
+		break;
+	case MSR_VM_HSAVE_PA:
+		/*
+		 * Old kernels did not validate the value written to
+		 * MSR_VM_HSAVE_PA.  Allow KVM_SET_MSR to set an invalid
+		 * value to allow live migrating buggy or malicious guests
+		 * originating from those kernels.
+		 */
+		if (!msr->host_initiated && !page_address_valid(vcpu, data))
+			return 1;
+
+		svm->nested.hsave_msr = data & PAGE_MASK;
+		break;
+	case MSR_VM_CR:
+		return svm_set_vm_cr(vcpu, data);
+	case MSR_VM_IGNNE:
+		kvm_pr_unimpl_wrmsr(vcpu, ecx, data);
+		break;
+	case MSR_AMD64_DE_CFG: {
+		struct kvm_msr_entry msr_entry;
+
+		msr_entry.index = msr->index;
+		if (svm_get_msr_feature(&msr_entry))
+			return 1;
+
+		/* Check the supported bits */
+		if (data & ~msr_entry.data)
+			return 1;
+
+		/* Don't allow the guest to change a bit, #GP */
+		if (!msr->host_initiated && (data ^ msr_entry.data))
+			return 1;
+
+		svm->msr_decfg = data;
+		break;
+	}
+	default:
+		return kvm_set_msr_common(vcpu, msr);
+	}
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int msr_interception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	if (to_svm(vcpu)->vmcb->control.exit_info_1)
+		return kvm_emulate_wrmsr(vcpu);
+	else
+		return kvm_emulate_rdmsr(vcpu);
+}
+
+static int interrupt_window_interception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_EVENT, vcpu);
+	svm_clear_vintr(to_svm(vcpu));
+
+	/*
+	 * If not running nested, for AVIC, the only reason to end up here is ExtINTs.
+	 * In this case AVIC was temporarily disabled for
+	 * requesting the IRQ window and we have to re-enable it.
+	 *
+	 * If running nested, still remove the VM wide AVIC inhibit to
+	 * support case in which the interrupt window was requested when the
+	 * vCPU was not running nested.
+
+	 * All vCPUs which run still run nested, will remain to have their
+	 * AVIC still inhibited due to per-cpu AVIC inhibition.
+	 */
+	kvm_clear_apicv_inhibit(vcpu->kvm, APICV_INHIBIT_REASON_IRQWIN);
+
+	++vcpu->stat.irq_window_exits;
+	return 1;
+}
+
+static int pause_interception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	bool in_kernel;
+	/*
+	 * CPL is not made available for an SEV-ES guest, therefore
+	 * vcpu->arch.preempted_in_kernel can never be true.  Just
+	 * set in_kernel to false as well.
+	 */
+	in_kernel = !sev_es_guest(vcpu->kvm) && svm_get_cpl(vcpu) == 0;
+
+	grow_ple_window(vcpu);
+
+	kvm_vcpu_on_spin(vcpu, in_kernel);
+	return kvm_skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
+}
+
+static int invpcid_interception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+	unsigned long type;
+	gva_t gva;
+
+	if (!guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_INVPCID)) {
+		kvm_queue_exception(vcpu, UD_VECTOR);
+		return 1;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * For an INVPCID intercept:
+	 * EXITINFO1 provides the linear address of the memory operand.
+	 * EXITINFO2 provides the contents of the register operand.
+	 */
+	type = svm->vmcb->control.exit_info_2;
+	gva = svm->vmcb->control.exit_info_1;
+
+	return kvm_handle_invpcid(vcpu, type, gva);
+}
+
+static int (*const svm_exit_handlers[])(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) = {
+	[SVM_EXIT_READ_CR0]			= cr_interception,
+	[SVM_EXIT_READ_CR3]			= cr_interception,
+	[SVM_EXIT_READ_CR4]			= cr_interception,
+	[SVM_EXIT_READ_CR8]			= cr_interception,
+	[SVM_EXIT_CR0_SEL_WRITE]		= cr_interception,
+	[SVM_EXIT_WRITE_CR0]			= cr_interception,
+	[SVM_EXIT_WRITE_CR3]			= cr_interception,
+	[SVM_EXIT_WRITE_CR4]			= cr_interception,
+	[SVM_EXIT_WRITE_CR8]			= cr8_write_interception,
+	[SVM_EXIT_READ_DR0]			= dr_interception,
+	[SVM_EXIT_READ_DR1]			= dr_interception,
+	[SVM_EXIT_READ_DR2]			= dr_interception,
+	[SVM_EXIT_READ_DR3]			= dr_interception,
+	[SVM_EXIT_READ_DR4]			= dr_interception,
+	[SVM_EXIT_READ_DR5]			= dr_interception,
+	[SVM_EXIT_READ_DR6]			= dr_interception,
+	[SVM_EXIT_READ_DR7]			= dr_interception,
+	[SVM_EXIT_WRITE_DR0]			= dr_interception,
+	[SVM_EXIT_WRITE_DR1]			= dr_interception,
+	[SVM_EXIT_WRITE_DR2]			= dr_interception,
+	[SVM_EXIT_WRITE_DR3]			= dr_interception,
+	[SVM_EXIT_WRITE_DR4]			= dr_interception,
+	[SVM_EXIT_WRITE_DR5]			= dr_interception,
+	[SVM_EXIT_WRITE_DR6]			= dr_interception,
+	[SVM_EXIT_WRITE_DR7]			= dr_interception,
+	[SVM_EXIT_EXCP_BASE + DB_VECTOR]	= db_interception,
+	[SVM_EXIT_EXCP_BASE + BP_VECTOR]	= bp_interception,
+	[SVM_EXIT_EXCP_BASE + UD_VECTOR]	= ud_interception,
+	[SVM_EXIT_EXCP_BASE + PF_VECTOR]	= pf_interception,
+	[SVM_EXIT_EXCP_BASE + MC_VECTOR]	= mc_interception,
+	[SVM_EXIT_EXCP_BASE + AC_VECTOR]	= ac_interception,
+	[SVM_EXIT_EXCP_BASE + GP_VECTOR]	= gp_interception,
+	[SVM_EXIT_INTR]				= intr_interception,
+	[SVM_EXIT_NMI]				= nmi_interception,
+	[SVM_EXIT_SMI]				= smi_interception,
+	[SVM_EXIT_VINTR]			= interrupt_window_interception,
+	[SVM_EXIT_RDPMC]			= kvm_emulate_rdpmc,
+	[SVM_EXIT_CPUID]			= kvm_emulate_cpuid,
+	[SVM_EXIT_IRET]                         = iret_interception,
+	[SVM_EXIT_INVD]                         = kvm_emulate_invd,
+	[SVM_EXIT_PAUSE]			= pause_interception,
+	[SVM_EXIT_HLT]				= kvm_emulate_halt,
+	[SVM_EXIT_INVLPG]			= invlpg_interception,
+	[SVM_EXIT_INVLPGA]			= invlpga_interception,
+	[SVM_EXIT_IOIO]				= io_interception,
+	[SVM_EXIT_MSR]				= msr_interception,
+	[SVM_EXIT_TASK_SWITCH]			= task_switch_interception,
+	[SVM_EXIT_SHUTDOWN]			= shutdown_interception,
+	[SVM_EXIT_VMRUN]			= vmrun_interception,
+	[SVM_EXIT_VMMCALL]			= kvm_emulate_hypercall,
+	[SVM_EXIT_VMLOAD]			= vmload_interception,
+	[SVM_EXIT_VMSAVE]			= vmsave_interception,
+	[SVM_EXIT_STGI]				= stgi_interception,
+	[SVM_EXIT_CLGI]				= clgi_interception,
+	[SVM_EXIT_SKINIT]			= skinit_interception,
+	[SVM_EXIT_RDTSCP]			= kvm_handle_invalid_op,
+	[SVM_EXIT_WBINVD]                       = kvm_emulate_wbinvd,
+	[SVM_EXIT_MONITOR]			= kvm_emulate_monitor,
+	[SVM_EXIT_MWAIT]			= kvm_emulate_mwait,
+	[SVM_EXIT_XSETBV]			= kvm_emulate_xsetbv,
+	[SVM_EXIT_RDPRU]			= kvm_handle_invalid_op,
+	[SVM_EXIT_EFER_WRITE_TRAP]		= efer_trap,
+	[SVM_EXIT_CR0_WRITE_TRAP]		= cr_trap,
+	[SVM_EXIT_CR4_WRITE_TRAP]		= cr_trap,
+	[SVM_EXIT_CR8_WRITE_TRAP]		= cr_trap,
+	[SVM_EXIT_INVPCID]                      = invpcid_interception,
+	[SVM_EXIT_NPF]				= npf_interception,
+	[SVM_EXIT_RSM]                          = rsm_interception,
+	[SVM_EXIT_AVIC_INCOMPLETE_IPI]		= avic_incomplete_ipi_interception,
+	[SVM_EXIT_AVIC_UNACCELERATED_ACCESS]	= avic_unaccelerated_access_interception,
+	[SVM_EXIT_VMGEXIT]			= sev_handle_vmgexit,
+};
+
+static void dump_vmcb(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+	struct vmcb_control_area *control = &svm->vmcb->control;
+	struct vmcb_save_area *save = &svm->vmcb->save;
+	struct vmcb_save_area *save01 = &svm->vmcb01.ptr->save;
+
+	if (!dump_invalid_vmcb) {
+		pr_warn_ratelimited("set kvm_amd.dump_invalid_vmcb=1 to dump internal KVM state.\n");
+		return;
+	}
+
+	pr_err("VMCB %p, last attempted VMRUN on CPU %d\n",
+	       svm->current_vmcb->ptr, vcpu->arch.last_vmentry_cpu);
+	pr_err("VMCB Control Area:\n");
+	pr_err("%-20s%04x\n", "cr_read:", control->intercepts[INTERCEPT_CR] & 0xffff);
+	pr_err("%-20s%04x\n", "cr_write:", control->intercepts[INTERCEPT_CR] >> 16);
+	pr_err("%-20s%04x\n", "dr_read:", control->intercepts[INTERCEPT_DR] & 0xffff);
+	pr_err("%-20s%04x\n", "dr_write:", control->intercepts[INTERCEPT_DR] >> 16);
+	pr_err("%-20s%08x\n", "exceptions:", control->intercepts[INTERCEPT_EXCEPTION]);
+	pr_err("%-20s%08x %08x\n", "intercepts:",
+              control->intercepts[INTERCEPT_WORD3],
+	       control->intercepts[INTERCEPT_WORD4]);
+	pr_err("%-20s%d\n", "pause filter count:", control->pause_filter_count);
+	pr_err("%-20s%d\n", "pause filter threshold:",
+	       control->pause_filter_thresh);
+	pr_err("%-20s%016llx\n", "iopm_base_pa:", control->iopm_base_pa);
+	pr_err("%-20s%016llx\n", "msrpm_base_pa:", control->msrpm_base_pa);
+	pr_err("%-20s%016llx\n", "tsc_offset:", control->tsc_offset);
+	pr_err("%-20s%d\n", "asid:", control->asid);
+	pr_err("%-20s%d\n", "tlb_ctl:", control->tlb_ctl);
+	pr_err("%-20s%08x\n", "int_ctl:", control->int_ctl);
+	pr_err("%-20s%08x\n", "int_vector:", control->int_vector);
+	pr_err("%-20s%08x\n", "int_state:", control->int_state);
+	pr_err("%-20s%08x\n", "exit_code:", control->exit_code);
+	pr_err("%-20s%016llx\n", "exit_info1:", control->exit_info_1);
+	pr_err("%-20s%016llx\n", "exit_info2:", control->exit_info_2);
+	pr_err("%-20s%08x\n", "exit_int_info:", control->exit_int_info);
+	pr_err("%-20s%08x\n", "exit_int_info_err:", control->exit_int_info_err);
+	pr_err("%-20s%lld\n", "nested_ctl:", control->nested_ctl);
+	pr_err("%-20s%016llx\n", "nested_cr3:", control->nested_cr3);
+	pr_err("%-20s%016llx\n", "avic_vapic_bar:", control->avic_vapic_bar);
+	pr_err("%-20s%016llx\n", "ghcb:", control->ghcb_gpa);
+	pr_err("%-20s%08x\n", "event_inj:", control->event_inj);
+	pr_err("%-20s%08x\n", "event_inj_err:", control->event_inj_err);
+	pr_err("%-20s%lld\n", "virt_ext:", control->virt_ext);
+	pr_err("%-20s%016llx\n", "next_rip:", control->next_rip);
+	pr_err("%-20s%016llx\n", "avic_backing_page:", control->avic_backing_page);
+	pr_err("%-20s%016llx\n", "avic_logical_id:", control->avic_logical_id);
+	pr_err("%-20s%016llx\n", "avic_physical_id:", control->avic_physical_id);
+	pr_err("%-20s%016llx\n", "vmsa_pa:", control->vmsa_pa);
+	pr_err("VMCB State Save Area:\n");
+	pr_err("%-5s s: %04x a: %04x l: %08x b: %016llx\n",
+	       "es:",
+	       save->es.selector, save->es.attrib,
+	       save->es.limit, save->es.base);
+	pr_err("%-5s s: %04x a: %04x l: %08x b: %016llx\n",
+	       "cs:",
+	       save->cs.selector, save->cs.attrib,
+	       save->cs.limit, save->cs.base);
+	pr_err("%-5s s: %04x a: %04x l: %08x b: %016llx\n",
+	       "ss:",
+	       save->ss.selector, save->ss.attrib,
+	       save->ss.limit, save->ss.base);
+	pr_err("%-5s s: %04x a: %04x l: %08x b: %016llx\n",
+	       "ds:",
+	       save->ds.selector, save->ds.attrib,
+	       save->ds.limit, save->ds.base);
+	pr_err("%-5s s: %04x a: %04x l: %08x b: %016llx\n",
+	       "fs:",
+	       save01->fs.selector, save01->fs.attrib,
+	       save01->fs.limit, save01->fs.base);
+	pr_err("%-5s s: %04x a: %04x l: %08x b: %016llx\n",
+	       "gs:",
+	       save01->gs.selector, save01->gs.attrib,
+	       save01->gs.limit, save01->gs.base);
+	pr_err("%-5s s: %04x a: %04x l: %08x b: %016llx\n",
+	       "gdtr:",
+	       save->gdtr.selector, save->gdtr.attrib,
+	       save->gdtr.limit, save->gdtr.base);
+	pr_err("%-5s s: %04x a: %04x l: %08x b: %016llx\n",
+	       "ldtr:",
+	       save01->ldtr.selector, save01->ldtr.attrib,
+	       save01->ldtr.limit, save01->ldtr.base);
+	pr_err("%-5s s: %04x a: %04x l: %08x b: %016llx\n",
+	       "idtr:",
+	       save->idtr.selector, save->idtr.attrib,
+	       save->idtr.limit, save->idtr.base);
+	pr_err("%-5s s: %04x a: %04x l: %08x b: %016llx\n",
+	       "tr:",
+	       save01->tr.selector, save01->tr.attrib,
+	       save01->tr.limit, save01->tr.base);
+	pr_err("vmpl: %d   cpl:  %d               efer:          %016llx\n",
+	       save->vmpl, save->cpl, save->efer);
+	pr_err("%-15s %016llx %-13s %016llx\n",
+	       "cr0:", save->cr0, "cr2:", save->cr2);
+	pr_err("%-15s %016llx %-13s %016llx\n",
+	       "cr3:", save->cr3, "cr4:", save->cr4);
+	pr_err("%-15s %016llx %-13s %016llx\n",
+	       "dr6:", save->dr6, "dr7:", save->dr7);
+	pr_err("%-15s %016llx %-13s %016llx\n",
+	       "rip:", save->rip, "rflags:", save->rflags);
+	pr_err("%-15s %016llx %-13s %016llx\n",
+	       "rsp:", save->rsp, "rax:", save->rax);
+	pr_err("%-15s %016llx %-13s %016llx\n",
+	       "star:", save01->star, "lstar:", save01->lstar);
+	pr_err("%-15s %016llx %-13s %016llx\n",
+	       "cstar:", save01->cstar, "sfmask:", save01->sfmask);
+	pr_err("%-15s %016llx %-13s %016llx\n",
+	       "kernel_gs_base:", save01->kernel_gs_base,
+	       "sysenter_cs:", save01->sysenter_cs);
+	pr_err("%-15s %016llx %-13s %016llx\n",
+	       "sysenter_esp:", save01->sysenter_esp,
+	       "sysenter_eip:", save01->sysenter_eip);
+	pr_err("%-15s %016llx %-13s %016llx\n",
+	       "gpat:", save->g_pat, "dbgctl:", save->dbgctl);
+	pr_err("%-15s %016llx %-13s %016llx\n",
+	       "br_from:", save->br_from, "br_to:", save->br_to);
+	pr_err("%-15s %016llx %-13s %016llx\n",
+	       "excp_from:", save->last_excp_from,
+	       "excp_to:", save->last_excp_to);
+}
+
+static bool svm_check_exit_valid(u64 exit_code)
+{
+	return (exit_code < ARRAY_SIZE(svm_exit_handlers) &&
+		svm_exit_handlers[exit_code]);
+}
+
+static int svm_handle_invalid_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 exit_code)
+{
+	vcpu_unimpl(vcpu, "svm: unexpected exit reason 0x%llx\n", exit_code);
+	dump_vmcb(vcpu);
+	vcpu->run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+	vcpu->run->internal.suberror = KVM_INTERNAL_ERROR_UNEXPECTED_EXIT_REASON;
+	vcpu->run->internal.ndata = 2;
+	vcpu->run->internal.data[0] = exit_code;
+	vcpu->run->internal.data[1] = vcpu->arch.last_vmentry_cpu;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int svm_invoke_exit_handler(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 exit_code)
+{
+	if (!svm_check_exit_valid(exit_code))
+		return svm_handle_invalid_exit(vcpu, exit_code);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
+	if (exit_code == SVM_EXIT_MSR)
+		return msr_interception(vcpu);
+	else if (exit_code == SVM_EXIT_VINTR)
+		return interrupt_window_interception(vcpu);
+	else if (exit_code == SVM_EXIT_INTR)
+		return intr_interception(vcpu);
+	else if (exit_code == SVM_EXIT_HLT)
+		return kvm_emulate_halt(vcpu);
+	else if (exit_code == SVM_EXIT_NPF)
+		return npf_interception(vcpu);
+#endif
+	return svm_exit_handlers[exit_code](vcpu);
+}
+
+static void svm_get_exit_info(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 *reason,
+			      u64 *info1, u64 *info2,
+			      u32 *intr_info, u32 *error_code)
+{
+	struct vmcb_control_area *control = &to_svm(vcpu)->vmcb->control;
+
+	*reason = control->exit_code;
+	*info1 = control->exit_info_1;
+	*info2 = control->exit_info_2;
+	*intr_info = control->exit_int_info;
+	if ((*intr_info & SVM_EXITINTINFO_VALID) &&
+	    (*intr_info & SVM_EXITINTINFO_VALID_ERR))
+		*error_code = control->exit_int_info_err;
+	else
+		*error_code = 0;
+}
+
+static int svm_handle_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, fastpath_t exit_fastpath)
+{
+	struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+	struct kvm_run *kvm_run = vcpu->run;
+	u32 exit_code = svm->vmcb->control.exit_code;
+
+	/* SEV-ES guests must use the CR write traps to track CR registers. */
+	if (!sev_es_guest(vcpu->kvm)) {
+		if (!svm_is_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_CR0_WRITE))
+			vcpu->arch.cr0 = svm->vmcb->save.cr0;
+		if (npt_enabled)
+			vcpu->arch.cr3 = svm->vmcb->save.cr3;
+	}
+
+	if (is_guest_mode(vcpu)) {
+		int vmexit;
+
+		trace_kvm_nested_vmexit(vcpu, KVM_ISA_SVM);
+
+		vmexit = nested_svm_exit_special(svm);
+
+		if (vmexit == NESTED_EXIT_CONTINUE)
+			vmexit = nested_svm_exit_handled(svm);
+
+		if (vmexit == NESTED_EXIT_DONE)
+			return 1;
+	}
+
+	if (svm->vmcb->control.exit_code == SVM_EXIT_ERR) {
+		kvm_run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_FAIL_ENTRY;
+		kvm_run->fail_entry.hardware_entry_failure_reason
+			= svm->vmcb->control.exit_code;
+		kvm_run->fail_entry.cpu = vcpu->arch.last_vmentry_cpu;
+		dump_vmcb(vcpu);
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	if (exit_fastpath != EXIT_FASTPATH_NONE)
+		return 1;
+
+	return svm_invoke_exit_handler(vcpu, exit_code);
+}
+
+static void pre_svm_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct svm_cpu_data *sd = per_cpu_ptr(&svm_data, vcpu->cpu);
+	struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+
+	/*
+	 * If the previous vmrun of the vmcb occurred on a different physical
+	 * cpu, then mark the vmcb dirty and assign a new asid.  Hardware's
+	 * vmcb clean bits are per logical CPU, as are KVM's asid assignments.
+	 */
+	if (unlikely(svm->current_vmcb->cpu != vcpu->cpu)) {
+		svm->current_vmcb->asid_generation = 0;
+		vmcb_mark_all_dirty(svm->vmcb);
+		svm->current_vmcb->cpu = vcpu->cpu;
+        }
+
+	if (sev_guest(vcpu->kvm))
+		return pre_sev_run(svm, vcpu->cpu);
+
+	/* FIXME: handle wraparound of asid_generation */
+	if (svm->current_vmcb->asid_generation != sd->asid_generation)
+		new_asid(svm, sd);
+}
+
+static void svm_inject_nmi(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+
+	svm->vmcb->control.event_inj = SVM_EVTINJ_VALID | SVM_EVTINJ_TYPE_NMI;
+
+	if (svm->nmi_l1_to_l2)
+		return;
+
+	svm->nmi_masked = true;
+	svm_set_iret_intercept(svm);
+	++vcpu->stat.nmi_injections;
+}
+
+static bool svm_is_vnmi_pending(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+
+	if (!is_vnmi_enabled(svm))
+		return false;
+
+	return !!(svm->vmcb->control.int_ctl & V_NMI_PENDING_MASK);
+}
+
+static bool svm_set_vnmi_pending(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+
+	if (!is_vnmi_enabled(svm))
+		return false;
+
+	if (svm->vmcb->control.int_ctl & V_NMI_PENDING_MASK)
+		return false;
+
+	svm->vmcb->control.int_ctl |= V_NMI_PENDING_MASK;
+	vmcb_mark_dirty(svm->vmcb, VMCB_INTR);
+
+	/*
+	 * Because the pending NMI is serviced by hardware, KVM can't know when
+	 * the NMI is "injected", but for all intents and purposes, passing the
+	 * NMI off to hardware counts as injection.
+	 */
+	++vcpu->stat.nmi_injections;
+
+	return true;
+}
+
+static void svm_inject_irq(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool reinjected)
+{
+	struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+	u32 type;
+
+	if (vcpu->arch.interrupt.soft) {
+		if (svm_update_soft_interrupt_rip(vcpu))
+			return;
+
+		type = SVM_EVTINJ_TYPE_SOFT;
+	} else {
+		type = SVM_EVTINJ_TYPE_INTR;
+	}
+
+	trace_kvm_inj_virq(vcpu->arch.interrupt.nr,
+			   vcpu->arch.interrupt.soft, reinjected);
+	++vcpu->stat.irq_injections;
+
+	svm->vmcb->control.event_inj = vcpu->arch.interrupt.nr |
+				       SVM_EVTINJ_VALID | type;
+}
+
+void svm_complete_interrupt_delivery(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int delivery_mode,
+				     int trig_mode, int vector)
+{
+	/*
+	 * apic->apicv_active must be read after vcpu->mode.
+	 * Pairs with smp_store_release in vcpu_enter_guest.
+	 */
+	bool in_guest_mode = (smp_load_acquire(&vcpu->mode) == IN_GUEST_MODE);
+
+	/* Note, this is called iff the local APIC is in-kernel. */
+	if (!READ_ONCE(vcpu->arch.apic->apicv_active)) {
+		/* Process the interrupt via kvm_check_and_inject_events(). */
+		kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_EVENT, vcpu);
+		kvm_vcpu_kick(vcpu);
+		return;
+	}
+
+	trace_kvm_apicv_accept_irq(vcpu->vcpu_id, delivery_mode, trig_mode, vector);
+	if (in_guest_mode) {
+		/*
+		 * Signal the doorbell to tell hardware to inject the IRQ.  If
+		 * the vCPU exits the guest before the doorbell chimes, hardware
+		 * will automatically process AVIC interrupts at the next VMRUN.
+		 */
+		avic_ring_doorbell(vcpu);
+	} else {
+		/*
+		 * Wake the vCPU if it was blocking.  KVM will then detect the
+		 * pending IRQ when checking if the vCPU has a wake event.
+		 */
+		kvm_vcpu_wake_up(vcpu);
+	}
+}
+
+static void svm_deliver_interrupt(struct kvm_lapic *apic,  int delivery_mode,
+				  int trig_mode, int vector)
+{
+	kvm_lapic_set_irr(vector, apic);
+
+	/*
+	 * Pairs with the smp_mb_*() after setting vcpu->guest_mode in
+	 * vcpu_enter_guest() to ensure the write to the vIRR is ordered before
+	 * the read of guest_mode.  This guarantees that either VMRUN will see
+	 * and process the new vIRR entry, or that svm_complete_interrupt_delivery
+	 * will signal the doorbell if the CPU has already entered the guest.
+	 */
+	smp_mb__after_atomic();
+	svm_complete_interrupt_delivery(apic->vcpu, delivery_mode, trig_mode, vector);
+}
+
+static void svm_update_cr8_intercept(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int tpr, int irr)
+{
+	struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+
+	/*
+	 * SEV-ES guests must always keep the CR intercepts cleared. CR
+	 * tracking is done using the CR write traps.
+	 */
+	if (sev_es_guest(vcpu->kvm))
+		return;
+
+	if (nested_svm_virtualize_tpr(vcpu))
+		return;
+
+	svm_clr_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_CR8_WRITE);
+
+	if (irr == -1)
+		return;
+
+	if (tpr >= irr)
+		svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_CR8_WRITE);
+}
+
+static bool svm_get_nmi_mask(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+
+	if (is_vnmi_enabled(svm))
+		return svm->vmcb->control.int_ctl & V_NMI_BLOCKING_MASK;
+	else
+		return svm->nmi_masked;
+}
+
+static void svm_set_nmi_mask(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool masked)
+{
+	struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+
+	if (is_vnmi_enabled(svm)) {
+		if (masked)
+			svm->vmcb->control.int_ctl |= V_NMI_BLOCKING_MASK;
+		else
+			svm->vmcb->control.int_ctl &= ~V_NMI_BLOCKING_MASK;
+
+	} else {
+		svm->nmi_masked = masked;
+		if (masked)
+			svm_set_iret_intercept(svm);
+		else
+			svm_clr_iret_intercept(svm);
+	}
+}
+
+bool svm_nmi_blocked(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+	struct vmcb *vmcb = svm->vmcb;
+
+	if (!gif_set(svm))
+		return true;
+
+	if (is_guest_mode(vcpu) && nested_exit_on_nmi(svm))
+		return false;
+
+	if (svm_get_nmi_mask(vcpu))
+		return true;
+
+	return vmcb->control.int_state & SVM_INTERRUPT_SHADOW_MASK;
+}
+
+static int svm_nmi_allowed(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool for_injection)
+{
+	struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+	if (svm->nested.nested_run_pending)
+		return -EBUSY;
+
+	if (svm_nmi_blocked(vcpu))
+		return 0;
+
+	/* An NMI must not be injected into L2 if it's supposed to VM-Exit.  */
+	if (for_injection && is_guest_mode(vcpu) && nested_exit_on_nmi(svm))
+		return -EBUSY;
+	return 1;
+}
+
+bool svm_interrupt_blocked(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+	struct vmcb *vmcb = svm->vmcb;
+
+	if (!gif_set(svm))
+		return true;
+
+	if (is_guest_mode(vcpu)) {
+		/* As long as interrupts are being delivered...  */
+		if ((svm->nested.ctl.int_ctl & V_INTR_MASKING_MASK)
+		    ? !(svm->vmcb01.ptr->save.rflags & X86_EFLAGS_IF)
+		    : !(kvm_get_rflags(vcpu) & X86_EFLAGS_IF))
+			return true;
+
+		/* ... vmexits aren't blocked by the interrupt shadow  */
+		if (nested_exit_on_intr(svm))
+			return false;
+	} else {
+		if (!svm_get_if_flag(vcpu))
+			return true;
+	}
+
+	return (vmcb->control.int_state & SVM_INTERRUPT_SHADOW_MASK);
+}
+
+static int svm_interrupt_allowed(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool for_injection)
+{
+	struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+
+	if (svm->nested.nested_run_pending)
+		return -EBUSY;
+
+	if (svm_interrupt_blocked(vcpu))
+		return 0;
+
+	/*
+	 * An IRQ must not be injected into L2 if it's supposed to VM-Exit,
+	 * e.g. if the IRQ arrived asynchronously after checking nested events.
+	 */
+	if (for_injection && is_guest_mode(vcpu) && nested_exit_on_intr(svm))
+		return -EBUSY;
+
+	return 1;
+}
+
+static void svm_enable_irq_window(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+
+	/*
+	 * In case GIF=0 we can't rely on the CPU to tell us when GIF becomes
+	 * 1, because that's a separate STGI/VMRUN intercept.  The next time we
+	 * get that intercept, this function will be called again though and
+	 * we'll get the vintr intercept. However, if the vGIF feature is
+	 * enabled, the STGI interception will not occur. Enable the irq
+	 * window under the assumption that the hardware will set the GIF.
+	 */
+	if (vgif || gif_set(svm)) {
+		/*
+		 * IRQ window is not needed when AVIC is enabled,
+		 * unless we have pending ExtINT since it cannot be injected
+		 * via AVIC. In such case, KVM needs to temporarily disable AVIC,
+		 * and fallback to injecting IRQ via V_IRQ.
+		 *
+		 * If running nested, AVIC is already locally inhibited
+		 * on this vCPU, therefore there is no need to request
+		 * the VM wide AVIC inhibition.
+		 */
+		if (!is_guest_mode(vcpu))
+			kvm_set_apicv_inhibit(vcpu->kvm, APICV_INHIBIT_REASON_IRQWIN);
+
+		svm_set_vintr(svm);
+	}
+}
+
+static void svm_enable_nmi_window(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+
+	/*
+	 * KVM should never request an NMI window when vNMI is enabled, as KVM
+	 * allows at most one to-be-injected NMI and one pending NMI, i.e. if
+	 * two NMIs arrive simultaneously, KVM will inject one and set
+	 * V_NMI_PENDING for the other.  WARN, but continue with the standard
+	 * single-step approach to try and salvage the pending NMI.
+	 */
+	WARN_ON_ONCE(is_vnmi_enabled(svm));
+
+	if (svm_get_nmi_mask(vcpu) && !svm->awaiting_iret_completion)
+		return; /* IRET will cause a vm exit */
+
+	/*
+	 * SEV-ES guests are responsible for signaling when a vCPU is ready to
+	 * receive a new NMI, as SEV-ES guests can't be single-stepped, i.e.
+	 * KVM can't intercept and single-step IRET to detect when NMIs are
+	 * unblocked (architecturally speaking).  See SVM_VMGEXIT_NMI_COMPLETE.
+	 *
+	 * Note, GIF is guaranteed to be '1' for SEV-ES guests as hardware
+	 * ignores SEV-ES guest writes to EFER.SVME *and* CLGI/STGI are not
+	 * supported NAEs in the GHCB protocol.
+	 */
+	if (sev_es_guest(vcpu->kvm))
+		return;
+
+	if (!gif_set(svm)) {
+		if (vgif)
+			svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_STGI);
+		return; /* STGI will cause a vm exit */
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Something prevents NMI from been injected. Single step over possible
+	 * problem (IRET or exception injection or interrupt shadow)
+	 */
+	svm->nmi_singlestep_guest_rflags = svm_get_rflags(vcpu);
+	svm->nmi_singlestep = true;
+	svm->vmcb->save.rflags |= (X86_EFLAGS_TF | X86_EFLAGS_RF);
+}
+
+static void svm_flush_tlb_asid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+
+	/*
+	 * Unlike VMX, SVM doesn't provide a way to flush only NPT TLB entries.
+	 * A TLB flush for the current ASID flushes both "host" and "guest" TLB
+	 * entries, and thus is a superset of Hyper-V's fine grained flushing.
+	 */
+	kvm_hv_vcpu_purge_flush_tlb(vcpu);
+
+	/*
+	 * Flush only the current ASID even if the TLB flush was invoked via
+	 * kvm_flush_remote_tlbs().  Although flushing remote TLBs requires all
+	 * ASIDs to be flushed, KVM uses a single ASID for L1 and L2, and
+	 * unconditionally does a TLB flush on both nested VM-Enter and nested
+	 * VM-Exit (via kvm_mmu_reset_context()).
+	 */
+	if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_FLUSHBYASID))
+		svm->vmcb->control.tlb_ctl = TLB_CONTROL_FLUSH_ASID;
+	else
+		svm->current_vmcb->asid_generation--;
+}
+
+static void svm_flush_tlb_current(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	hpa_t root_tdp = vcpu->arch.mmu->root.hpa;
+
+	/*
+	 * When running on Hyper-V with EnlightenedNptTlb enabled, explicitly
+	 * flush the NPT mappings via hypercall as flushing the ASID only
+	 * affects virtual to physical mappings, it does not invalidate guest
+	 * physical to host physical mappings.
+	 */
+	if (svm_hv_is_enlightened_tlb_enabled(vcpu) && VALID_PAGE(root_tdp))
+		hyperv_flush_guest_mapping(root_tdp);
+
+	svm_flush_tlb_asid(vcpu);
+}
+
+static void svm_flush_tlb_all(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	/*
+	 * When running on Hyper-V with EnlightenedNptTlb enabled, remote TLB
+	 * flushes should be routed to hv_flush_remote_tlbs() without requesting
+	 * a "regular" remote flush.  Reaching this point means either there's
+	 * a KVM bug or a prior hv_flush_remote_tlbs() call failed, both of
+	 * which might be fatal to the guest.  Yell, but try to recover.
+	 */
+	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(svm_hv_is_enlightened_tlb_enabled(vcpu)))
+		hv_flush_remote_tlbs(vcpu->kvm);
+
+	svm_flush_tlb_asid(vcpu);
+}
+
+static void svm_flush_tlb_gva(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gva_t gva)
+{
+	struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+
+	invlpga(gva, svm->vmcb->control.asid);
+}
+
+static inline void sync_cr8_to_lapic(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+
+	if (nested_svm_virtualize_tpr(vcpu))
+		return;
+
+	if (!svm_is_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_CR8_WRITE)) {
+		int cr8 = svm->vmcb->control.int_ctl & V_TPR_MASK;
+		kvm_set_cr8(vcpu, cr8);
+	}
+}
+
+static inline void sync_lapic_to_cr8(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+	u64 cr8;
+
+	if (nested_svm_virtualize_tpr(vcpu) ||
+	    kvm_vcpu_apicv_active(vcpu))
+		return;
+
+	cr8 = kvm_get_cr8(vcpu);
+	svm->vmcb->control.int_ctl &= ~V_TPR_MASK;
+	svm->vmcb->control.int_ctl |= cr8 & V_TPR_MASK;
+}
+
+static void svm_complete_soft_interrupt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u8 vector,
+					int type)
+{
+	bool is_exception = (type == SVM_EXITINTINFO_TYPE_EXEPT);
+	bool is_soft = (type == SVM_EXITINTINFO_TYPE_SOFT);
+	struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+
+	/*
+	 * If NRIPS is enabled, KVM must snapshot the pre-VMRUN next_rip that's
+	 * associated with the original soft exception/interrupt.  next_rip is
+	 * cleared on all exits that can occur while vectoring an event, so KVM
+	 * needs to manually set next_rip for re-injection.  Unlike the !nrips
+	 * case below, this needs to be done if and only if KVM is re-injecting
+	 * the same event, i.e. if the event is a soft exception/interrupt,
+	 * otherwise next_rip is unused on VMRUN.
+	 */
+	if (nrips && (is_soft || (is_exception && kvm_exception_is_soft(vector))) &&
+	    kvm_is_linear_rip(vcpu, svm->soft_int_old_rip + svm->soft_int_csbase))
+		svm->vmcb->control.next_rip = svm->soft_int_next_rip;
+	/*
+	 * If NRIPS isn't enabled, KVM must manually advance RIP prior to
+	 * injecting the soft exception/interrupt.  That advancement needs to
+	 * be unwound if vectoring didn't complete.  Note, the new event may
+	 * not be the injected event, e.g. if KVM injected an INTn, the INTn
+	 * hit a #NP in the guest, and the #NP encountered a #PF, the #NP will
+	 * be the reported vectored event, but RIP still needs to be unwound.
+	 */
+	else if (!nrips && (is_soft || is_exception) &&
+		 kvm_is_linear_rip(vcpu, svm->soft_int_next_rip + svm->soft_int_csbase))
+		kvm_rip_write(vcpu, svm->soft_int_old_rip);
+}
+
+static void svm_complete_interrupts(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+	u8 vector;
+	int type;
+	u32 exitintinfo = svm->vmcb->control.exit_int_info;
+	bool nmi_l1_to_l2 = svm->nmi_l1_to_l2;
+	bool soft_int_injected = svm->soft_int_injected;
+
+	svm->nmi_l1_to_l2 = false;
+	svm->soft_int_injected = false;
+
+	/*
+	 * If we've made progress since setting awaiting_iret_completion, we've
+	 * executed an IRET and can allow NMI injection.
+	 */
+	if (svm->awaiting_iret_completion &&
+	    kvm_rip_read(vcpu) != svm->nmi_iret_rip) {
+		svm->awaiting_iret_completion = false;
+		svm->nmi_masked = false;
+		kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_EVENT, vcpu);
+	}
+
+	vcpu->arch.nmi_injected = false;
+	kvm_clear_exception_queue(vcpu);
+	kvm_clear_interrupt_queue(vcpu);
+
+	if (!(exitintinfo & SVM_EXITINTINFO_VALID))
+		return;
+
+	kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_EVENT, vcpu);
+
+	vector = exitintinfo & SVM_EXITINTINFO_VEC_MASK;
+	type = exitintinfo & SVM_EXITINTINFO_TYPE_MASK;
+
+	if (soft_int_injected)
+		svm_complete_soft_interrupt(vcpu, vector, type);
+
+	switch (type) {
+	case SVM_EXITINTINFO_TYPE_NMI:
+		vcpu->arch.nmi_injected = true;
+		svm->nmi_l1_to_l2 = nmi_l1_to_l2;
+		break;
+	case SVM_EXITINTINFO_TYPE_EXEPT:
+		/*
+		 * Never re-inject a #VC exception.
+		 */
+		if (vector == X86_TRAP_VC)
+			break;
+
+		if (exitintinfo & SVM_EXITINTINFO_VALID_ERR) {
+			u32 err = svm->vmcb->control.exit_int_info_err;
+			kvm_requeue_exception_e(vcpu, vector, err);
+
+		} else
+			kvm_requeue_exception(vcpu, vector);
+		break;
+	case SVM_EXITINTINFO_TYPE_INTR:
+		kvm_queue_interrupt(vcpu, vector, false);
+		break;
+	case SVM_EXITINTINFO_TYPE_SOFT:
+		kvm_queue_interrupt(vcpu, vector, true);
+		break;
+	default:
+		break;
+	}
+
+}
+
+static void svm_cancel_injection(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+	struct vmcb_control_area *control = &svm->vmcb->control;
+
+	control->exit_int_info = control->event_inj;
+	control->exit_int_info_err = control->event_inj_err;
+	control->event_inj = 0;
+	svm_complete_interrupts(vcpu);
+}
+
+static int svm_vcpu_pre_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	return 1;
+}
+
+static fastpath_t svm_exit_handlers_fastpath(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	if (to_svm(vcpu)->vmcb->control.exit_code == SVM_EXIT_MSR &&
+	    to_svm(vcpu)->vmcb->control.exit_info_1)
+		return handle_fastpath_set_msr_irqoff(vcpu);
+
+	return EXIT_FASTPATH_NONE;
+}
+
+static noinstr void svm_vcpu_enter_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool spec_ctrl_intercepted)
+{
+	struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+
+	guest_state_enter_irqoff();
+
+	amd_clear_divider();
+
+	if (sev_es_guest(vcpu->kvm))
+		__svm_sev_es_vcpu_run(svm, spec_ctrl_intercepted);
+	else
+		__svm_vcpu_run(svm, spec_ctrl_intercepted);
+
+	guest_state_exit_irqoff();
+}
+
+static __no_kcsan fastpath_t svm_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+	bool spec_ctrl_intercepted = msr_write_intercepted(vcpu, MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL);
+
+	trace_kvm_entry(vcpu);
+
+	svm->vmcb->save.rax = vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RAX];
+	svm->vmcb->save.rsp = vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RSP];
+	svm->vmcb->save.rip = vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RIP];
+
+	/*
+	 * Disable singlestep if we're injecting an interrupt/exception.
+	 * We don't want our modified rflags to be pushed on the stack where
+	 * we might not be able to easily reset them if we disabled NMI
+	 * singlestep later.
+	 */
+	if (svm->nmi_singlestep && svm->vmcb->control.event_inj) {
+		/*
+		 * Event injection happens before external interrupts cause a
+		 * vmexit and interrupts are disabled here, so smp_send_reschedule
+		 * is enough to force an immediate vmexit.
+		 */
+		disable_nmi_singlestep(svm);
+		smp_send_reschedule(vcpu->cpu);
+	}
+
+	pre_svm_run(vcpu);
+
+	sync_lapic_to_cr8(vcpu);
+
+	if (unlikely(svm->asid != svm->vmcb->control.asid)) {
+		svm->vmcb->control.asid = svm->asid;
+		vmcb_mark_dirty(svm->vmcb, VMCB_ASID);
+	}
+	svm->vmcb->save.cr2 = vcpu->arch.cr2;
+
+	svm_hv_update_vp_id(svm->vmcb, vcpu);
+
+	/*
+	 * Run with all-zero DR6 unless needed, so that we can get the exact cause
+	 * of a #DB.
+	 */
+	if (unlikely(vcpu->arch.switch_db_regs & KVM_DEBUGREG_WONT_EXIT))
+		svm_set_dr6(svm, vcpu->arch.dr6);
+	else
+		svm_set_dr6(svm, DR6_ACTIVE_LOW);
+
+	clgi();
+	kvm_load_guest_xsave_state(vcpu);
+
+	kvm_wait_lapic_expire(vcpu);
+
+	/*
+	 * If this vCPU has touched SPEC_CTRL, restore the guest's value if
+	 * it's non-zero. Since vmentry is serialising on affected CPUs, there
+	 * is no need to worry about the conditional branch over the wrmsr
+	 * being speculatively taken.
+	 */
+	if (!static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_V_SPEC_CTRL))
+		x86_spec_ctrl_set_guest(svm->virt_spec_ctrl);
+
+	svm_vcpu_enter_exit(vcpu, spec_ctrl_intercepted);
+
+	if (!static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_V_SPEC_CTRL))
+		x86_spec_ctrl_restore_host(svm->virt_spec_ctrl);
+
+	if (!sev_es_guest(vcpu->kvm)) {
+		vcpu->arch.cr2 = svm->vmcb->save.cr2;
+		vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RAX] = svm->vmcb->save.rax;
+		vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RSP] = svm->vmcb->save.rsp;
+		vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RIP] = svm->vmcb->save.rip;
+	}
+	vcpu->arch.regs_dirty = 0;
+
+	if (unlikely(svm->vmcb->control.exit_code == SVM_EXIT_NMI))
+		kvm_before_interrupt(vcpu, KVM_HANDLING_NMI);
+
+	kvm_load_host_xsave_state(vcpu);
+	stgi();
+
+	/* Any pending NMI will happen here */
+
+	if (unlikely(svm->vmcb->control.exit_code == SVM_EXIT_NMI))
+		kvm_after_interrupt(vcpu);
+
+	sync_cr8_to_lapic(vcpu);
+
+	svm->next_rip = 0;
+	if (is_guest_mode(vcpu)) {
+		nested_sync_control_from_vmcb02(svm);
+
+		/* Track VMRUNs that have made past consistency checking */
+		if (svm->nested.nested_run_pending &&
+		    svm->vmcb->control.exit_code != SVM_EXIT_ERR)
+                        ++vcpu->stat.nested_run;
+
+		svm->nested.nested_run_pending = 0;
+	}
+
+	svm->vmcb->control.tlb_ctl = TLB_CONTROL_DO_NOTHING;
+	vmcb_mark_all_clean(svm->vmcb);
+
+	/* if exit due to PF check for async PF */
+	if (svm->vmcb->control.exit_code == SVM_EXIT_EXCP_BASE + PF_VECTOR)
+		vcpu->arch.apf.host_apf_flags =
+			kvm_read_and_reset_apf_flags();
+
+	vcpu->arch.regs_avail &= ~SVM_REGS_LAZY_LOAD_SET;
+
+	/*
+	 * We need to handle MC intercepts here before the vcpu has a chance to
+	 * change the physical cpu
+	 */
+	if (unlikely(svm->vmcb->control.exit_code ==
+		     SVM_EXIT_EXCP_BASE + MC_VECTOR))
+		svm_handle_mce(vcpu);
+
+	trace_kvm_exit(vcpu, KVM_ISA_SVM);
+
+	svm_complete_interrupts(vcpu);
+
+	if (is_guest_mode(vcpu))
+		return EXIT_FASTPATH_NONE;
+
+	return svm_exit_handlers_fastpath(vcpu);
+}
+
+static void svm_load_mmu_pgd(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, hpa_t root_hpa,
+			     int root_level)
+{
+	struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+	unsigned long cr3;
+
+	if (npt_enabled) {
+		svm->vmcb->control.nested_cr3 = __sme_set(root_hpa);
+		vmcb_mark_dirty(svm->vmcb, VMCB_NPT);
+
+		hv_track_root_tdp(vcpu, root_hpa);
+
+		cr3 = vcpu->arch.cr3;
+	} else if (root_level >= PT64_ROOT_4LEVEL) {
+		cr3 = __sme_set(root_hpa) | kvm_get_active_pcid(vcpu);
+	} else {
+		/* PCID in the guest should be impossible with a 32-bit MMU. */
+		WARN_ON_ONCE(kvm_get_active_pcid(vcpu));
+		cr3 = root_hpa;
+	}
+
+	svm->vmcb->save.cr3 = cr3;
+	vmcb_mark_dirty(svm->vmcb, VMCB_CR);
+}
+
+static void
+svm_patch_hypercall(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned char *hypercall)
+{
+	/*
+	 * Patch in the VMMCALL instruction:
+	 */
+	hypercall[0] = 0x0f;
+	hypercall[1] = 0x01;
+	hypercall[2] = 0xd9;
+}
+
+/*
+ * The kvm parameter can be NULL (module initialization, or invocation before
+ * VM creation). Be sure to check the kvm parameter before using it.
+ */
+static bool svm_has_emulated_msr(struct kvm *kvm, u32 index)
+{
+	switch (index) {
+	case MSR_IA32_MCG_EXT_CTL:
+	case KVM_FIRST_EMULATED_VMX_MSR ... KVM_LAST_EMULATED_VMX_MSR:
+		return false;
+	case MSR_IA32_SMBASE:
+		if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KVM_SMM))
+			return false;
+		/* SEV-ES guests do not support SMM, so report false */
+		if (kvm && sev_es_guest(kvm))
+			return false;
+		break;
+	default:
+		break;
+	}
+
+	return true;
+}
+
+static void svm_vcpu_after_set_cpuid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+
+	/*
+	 * SVM doesn't provide a way to disable just XSAVES in the guest, KVM
+	 * can only disable all variants of by disallowing CR4.OSXSAVE from
+	 * being set.  As a result, if the host has XSAVE and XSAVES, and the
+	 * guest has XSAVE enabled, the guest can execute XSAVES without
+	 * faulting.  Treat XSAVES as enabled in this case regardless of
+	 * whether it's advertised to the guest so that KVM context switches
+	 * XSS on VM-Enter/VM-Exit.  Failure to do so would effectively give
+	 * the guest read/write access to the host's XSS.
+	 */
+	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_XSAVE) &&
+	    boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_XSAVES) &&
+	    guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_XSAVE))
+		kvm_governed_feature_set(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_XSAVES);
+
+	kvm_governed_feature_check_and_set(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_NRIPS);
+	kvm_governed_feature_check_and_set(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_TSCRATEMSR);
+	kvm_governed_feature_check_and_set(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_LBRV);
+
+	/*
+	 * Intercept VMLOAD if the vCPU mode is Intel in order to emulate that
+	 * VMLOAD drops bits 63:32 of SYSENTER (ignoring the fact that exposing
+	 * SVM on Intel is bonkers and extremely unlikely to work).
+	 */
+	if (!guest_cpuid_is_intel(vcpu))
+		kvm_governed_feature_check_and_set(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_V_VMSAVE_VMLOAD);
+
+	kvm_governed_feature_check_and_set(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_PAUSEFILTER);
+	kvm_governed_feature_check_and_set(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_PFTHRESHOLD);
+	kvm_governed_feature_check_and_set(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_VGIF);
+	kvm_governed_feature_check_and_set(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_VNMI);
+
+	svm_recalc_instruction_intercepts(vcpu, svm);
+
+	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB))
+		set_msr_interception(vcpu, svm->msrpm, MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD, 0,
+				     !!guest_has_pred_cmd_msr(vcpu));
+
+	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_FLUSH_L1D))
+		set_msr_interception(vcpu, svm->msrpm, MSR_IA32_FLUSH_CMD, 0,
+				     !!guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_FLUSH_L1D));
+
+	if (sev_guest(vcpu->kvm))
+		sev_vcpu_after_set_cpuid(svm);
+
+	init_vmcb_after_set_cpuid(vcpu);
+}
+
+static bool svm_has_wbinvd_exit(void)
+{
+	return true;
+}
+
+#define PRE_EX(exit)  { .exit_code = (exit), \
+			.stage = X86_ICPT_PRE_EXCEPT, }
+#define POST_EX(exit) { .exit_code = (exit), \
+			.stage = X86_ICPT_POST_EXCEPT, }
+#define POST_MEM(exit) { .exit_code = (exit), \
+			.stage = X86_ICPT_POST_MEMACCESS, }
+
+static const struct __x86_intercept {
+	u32 exit_code;
+	enum x86_intercept_stage stage;
+} x86_intercept_map[] = {
+	[x86_intercept_cr_read]		= POST_EX(SVM_EXIT_READ_CR0),
+	[x86_intercept_cr_write]	= POST_EX(SVM_EXIT_WRITE_CR0),
+	[x86_intercept_clts]		= POST_EX(SVM_EXIT_WRITE_CR0),
+	[x86_intercept_lmsw]		= POST_EX(SVM_EXIT_WRITE_CR0),
+	[x86_intercept_smsw]		= POST_EX(SVM_EXIT_READ_CR0),
+	[x86_intercept_dr_read]		= POST_EX(SVM_EXIT_READ_DR0),
+	[x86_intercept_dr_write]	= POST_EX(SVM_EXIT_WRITE_DR0),
+	[x86_intercept_sldt]		= POST_EX(SVM_EXIT_LDTR_READ),
+	[x86_intercept_str]		= POST_EX(SVM_EXIT_TR_READ),
+	[x86_intercept_lldt]		= POST_EX(SVM_EXIT_LDTR_WRITE),
+	[x86_intercept_ltr]		= POST_EX(SVM_EXIT_TR_WRITE),
+	[x86_intercept_sgdt]		= POST_EX(SVM_EXIT_GDTR_READ),
+	[x86_intercept_sidt]		= POST_EX(SVM_EXIT_IDTR_READ),
+	[x86_intercept_lgdt]		= POST_EX(SVM_EXIT_GDTR_WRITE),
+	[x86_intercept_lidt]		= POST_EX(SVM_EXIT_IDTR_WRITE),
+	[x86_intercept_vmrun]		= POST_EX(SVM_EXIT_VMRUN),
+	[x86_intercept_vmmcall]		= POST_EX(SVM_EXIT_VMMCALL),
+	[x86_intercept_vmload]		= POST_EX(SVM_EXIT_VMLOAD),
+	[x86_intercept_vmsave]		= POST_EX(SVM_EXIT_VMSAVE),
+	[x86_intercept_stgi]		= POST_EX(SVM_EXIT_STGI),
+	[x86_intercept_clgi]		= POST_EX(SVM_EXIT_CLGI),
+	[x86_intercept_skinit]		= POST_EX(SVM_EXIT_SKINIT),
+	[x86_intercept_invlpga]		= POST_EX(SVM_EXIT_INVLPGA),
+	[x86_intercept_rdtscp]		= POST_EX(SVM_EXIT_RDTSCP),
+	[x86_intercept_monitor]		= POST_MEM(SVM_EXIT_MONITOR),
+	[x86_intercept_mwait]		= POST_EX(SVM_EXIT_MWAIT),
+	[x86_intercept_invlpg]		= POST_EX(SVM_EXIT_INVLPG),
+	[x86_intercept_invd]		= POST_EX(SVM_EXIT_INVD),
+	[x86_intercept_wbinvd]		= POST_EX(SVM_EXIT_WBINVD),
+	[x86_intercept_wrmsr]		= POST_EX(SVM_EXIT_MSR),
+	[x86_intercept_rdtsc]		= POST_EX(SVM_EXIT_RDTSC),
+	[x86_intercept_rdmsr]		= POST_EX(SVM_EXIT_MSR),
+	[x86_intercept_rdpmc]		= POST_EX(SVM_EXIT_RDPMC),
+	[x86_intercept_cpuid]		= PRE_EX(SVM_EXIT_CPUID),
+	[x86_intercept_rsm]		= PRE_EX(SVM_EXIT_RSM),
+	[x86_intercept_pause]		= PRE_EX(SVM_EXIT_PAUSE),
+	[x86_intercept_pushf]		= PRE_EX(SVM_EXIT_PUSHF),
+	[x86_intercept_popf]		= PRE_EX(SVM_EXIT_POPF),
+	[x86_intercept_intn]		= PRE_EX(SVM_EXIT_SWINT),
+	[x86_intercept_iret]		= PRE_EX(SVM_EXIT_IRET),
+	[x86_intercept_icebp]		= PRE_EX(SVM_EXIT_ICEBP),
+	[x86_intercept_hlt]		= POST_EX(SVM_EXIT_HLT),
+	[x86_intercept_in]		= POST_EX(SVM_EXIT_IOIO),
+	[x86_intercept_ins]		= POST_EX(SVM_EXIT_IOIO),
+	[x86_intercept_out]		= POST_EX(SVM_EXIT_IOIO),
+	[x86_intercept_outs]		= POST_EX(SVM_EXIT_IOIO),
+	[x86_intercept_xsetbv]		= PRE_EX(SVM_EXIT_XSETBV),
+};
+
+#undef PRE_EX
+#undef POST_EX
+#undef POST_MEM
+
+static int svm_check_intercept(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+			       struct x86_instruction_info *info,
+			       enum x86_intercept_stage stage,
+			       struct x86_exception *exception)
+{
+	struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+	int vmexit, ret = X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
+	struct __x86_intercept icpt_info;
+	struct vmcb *vmcb = svm->vmcb;
+
+	if (info->intercept >= ARRAY_SIZE(x86_intercept_map))
+		goto out;
+
+	icpt_info = x86_intercept_map[info->intercept];
+
+	if (stage != icpt_info.stage)
+		goto out;
+
+	switch (icpt_info.exit_code) {
+	case SVM_EXIT_READ_CR0:
+		if (info->intercept == x86_intercept_cr_read)
+			icpt_info.exit_code += info->modrm_reg;
+		break;
+	case SVM_EXIT_WRITE_CR0: {
+		unsigned long cr0, val;
+
+		if (info->intercept == x86_intercept_cr_write)
+			icpt_info.exit_code += info->modrm_reg;
+
+		if (icpt_info.exit_code != SVM_EXIT_WRITE_CR0 ||
+		    info->intercept == x86_intercept_clts)
+			break;
+
+		if (!(vmcb12_is_intercept(&svm->nested.ctl,
+					INTERCEPT_SELECTIVE_CR0)))
+			break;
+
+		cr0 = vcpu->arch.cr0 & ~SVM_CR0_SELECTIVE_MASK;
+		val = info->src_val  & ~SVM_CR0_SELECTIVE_MASK;
+
+		if (info->intercept == x86_intercept_lmsw) {
+			cr0 &= 0xfUL;
+			val &= 0xfUL;
+			/* lmsw can't clear PE - catch this here */
+			if (cr0 & X86_CR0_PE)
+				val |= X86_CR0_PE;
+		}
+
+		if (cr0 ^ val)
+			icpt_info.exit_code = SVM_EXIT_CR0_SEL_WRITE;
+
+		break;
+	}
+	case SVM_EXIT_READ_DR0:
+	case SVM_EXIT_WRITE_DR0:
+		icpt_info.exit_code += info->modrm_reg;
+		break;
+	case SVM_EXIT_MSR:
+		if (info->intercept == x86_intercept_wrmsr)
+			vmcb->control.exit_info_1 = 1;
+		else
+			vmcb->control.exit_info_1 = 0;
+		break;
+	case SVM_EXIT_PAUSE:
+		/*
+		 * We get this for NOP only, but pause
+		 * is rep not, check this here
+		 */
+		if (info->rep_prefix != REPE_PREFIX)
+			goto out;
+		break;
+	case SVM_EXIT_IOIO: {
+		u64 exit_info;
+		u32 bytes;
+
+		if (info->intercept == x86_intercept_in ||
+		    info->intercept == x86_intercept_ins) {
+			exit_info = ((info->src_val & 0xffff) << 16) |
+				SVM_IOIO_TYPE_MASK;
+			bytes = info->dst_bytes;
+		} else {
+			exit_info = (info->dst_val & 0xffff) << 16;
+			bytes = info->src_bytes;
+		}
+
+		if (info->intercept == x86_intercept_outs ||
+		    info->intercept == x86_intercept_ins)
+			exit_info |= SVM_IOIO_STR_MASK;
+
+		if (info->rep_prefix)
+			exit_info |= SVM_IOIO_REP_MASK;
+
+		bytes = min(bytes, 4u);
+
+		exit_info |= bytes << SVM_IOIO_SIZE_SHIFT;
+
+		exit_info |= (u32)info->ad_bytes << (SVM_IOIO_ASIZE_SHIFT - 1);
+
+		vmcb->control.exit_info_1 = exit_info;
+		vmcb->control.exit_info_2 = info->next_rip;
+
+		break;
+	}
+	default:
+		break;
+	}
+
+	/* TODO: Advertise NRIPS to guest hypervisor unconditionally */
+	if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_NRIPS))
+		vmcb->control.next_rip  = info->next_rip;
+	vmcb->control.exit_code = icpt_info.exit_code;
+	vmexit = nested_svm_exit_handled(svm);
+
+	ret = (vmexit == NESTED_EXIT_DONE) ? X86EMUL_INTERCEPTED
+					   : X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
+
+out:
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static void svm_handle_exit_irqoff(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	if (to_svm(vcpu)->vmcb->control.exit_code == SVM_EXIT_INTR)
+		vcpu->arch.at_instruction_boundary = true;
+}
+
+static void svm_sched_in(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int cpu)
+{
+	if (!kvm_pause_in_guest(vcpu->kvm))
+		shrink_ple_window(vcpu);
+}
+
+static void svm_setup_mce(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	/* [63:9] are reserved. */
+	vcpu->arch.mcg_cap &= 0x1ff;
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_SMM
+bool svm_smi_blocked(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+
+	/* Per APM Vol.2 15.22.2 "Response to SMI" */
+	if (!gif_set(svm))
+		return true;
+
+	return is_smm(vcpu);
+}
+
+static int svm_smi_allowed(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool for_injection)
+{
+	struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+	if (svm->nested.nested_run_pending)
+		return -EBUSY;
+
+	if (svm_smi_blocked(vcpu))
+		return 0;
+
+	/* An SMI must not be injected into L2 if it's supposed to VM-Exit.  */
+	if (for_injection && is_guest_mode(vcpu) && nested_exit_on_smi(svm))
+		return -EBUSY;
+
+	return 1;
+}
+
+static int svm_enter_smm(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, union kvm_smram *smram)
+{
+	struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+	struct kvm_host_map map_save;
+	int ret;
+
+	if (!is_guest_mode(vcpu))
+		return 0;
+
+	/*
+	 * 32-bit SMRAM format doesn't preserve EFER and SVM state.  Userspace is
+	 * responsible for ensuring nested SVM and SMIs are mutually exclusive.
+	 */
+
+	if (!guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_LM))
+		return 1;
+
+	smram->smram64.svm_guest_flag = 1;
+	smram->smram64.svm_guest_vmcb_gpa = svm->nested.vmcb12_gpa;
+
+	svm->vmcb->save.rax = vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RAX];
+	svm->vmcb->save.rsp = vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RSP];
+	svm->vmcb->save.rip = vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RIP];
+
+	ret = nested_svm_simple_vmexit(svm, SVM_EXIT_SW);
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+
+	/*
+	 * KVM uses VMCB01 to store L1 host state while L2 runs but
+	 * VMCB01 is going to be used during SMM and thus the state will
+	 * be lost. Temporary save non-VMLOAD/VMSAVE state to the host save
+	 * area pointed to by MSR_VM_HSAVE_PA. APM guarantees that the
+	 * format of the area is identical to guest save area offsetted
+	 * by 0x400 (matches the offset of 'struct vmcb_save_area'
+	 * within 'struct vmcb'). Note: HSAVE area may also be used by
+	 * L1 hypervisor to save additional host context (e.g. KVM does
+	 * that, see svm_prepare_switch_to_guest()) which must be
+	 * preserved.
+	 */
+	if (kvm_vcpu_map(vcpu, gpa_to_gfn(svm->nested.hsave_msr), &map_save))
+		return 1;
+
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(offsetof(struct vmcb, save) != 0x400);
+
+	svm_copy_vmrun_state(map_save.hva + 0x400,
+			     &svm->vmcb01.ptr->save);
+
+	kvm_vcpu_unmap(vcpu, &map_save, true);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int svm_leave_smm(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, const union kvm_smram *smram)
+{
+	struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+	struct kvm_host_map map, map_save;
+	struct vmcb *vmcb12;
+	int ret;
+
+	const struct kvm_smram_state_64 *smram64 = &smram->smram64;
+
+	if (!guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_LM))
+		return 0;
+
+	/* Non-zero if SMI arrived while vCPU was in guest mode. */
+	if (!smram64->svm_guest_flag)
+		return 0;
+
+	if (!guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_SVM))
+		return 1;
+
+	if (!(smram64->efer & EFER_SVME))
+		return 1;
+
+	if (kvm_vcpu_map(vcpu, gpa_to_gfn(smram64->svm_guest_vmcb_gpa), &map))
+		return 1;
+
+	ret = 1;
+	if (kvm_vcpu_map(vcpu, gpa_to_gfn(svm->nested.hsave_msr), &map_save))
+		goto unmap_map;
+
+	if (svm_allocate_nested(svm))
+		goto unmap_save;
+
+	/*
+	 * Restore L1 host state from L1 HSAVE area as VMCB01 was
+	 * used during SMM (see svm_enter_smm())
+	 */
+
+	svm_copy_vmrun_state(&svm->vmcb01.ptr->save, map_save.hva + 0x400);
+
+	/*
+	 * Enter the nested guest now
+	 */
+
+	vmcb_mark_all_dirty(svm->vmcb01.ptr);
+
+	vmcb12 = map.hva;
+	nested_copy_vmcb_control_to_cache(svm, &vmcb12->control);
+	nested_copy_vmcb_save_to_cache(svm, &vmcb12->save);
+	ret = enter_svm_guest_mode(vcpu, smram64->svm_guest_vmcb_gpa, vmcb12, false);
+
+	if (ret)
+		goto unmap_save;
+
+	svm->nested.nested_run_pending = 1;
+
+unmap_save:
+	kvm_vcpu_unmap(vcpu, &map_save, true);
+unmap_map:
+	kvm_vcpu_unmap(vcpu, &map, true);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static void svm_enable_smi_window(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+
+	if (!gif_set(svm)) {
+		if (vgif)
+			svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_STGI);
+		/* STGI will cause a vm exit */
+	} else {
+		/* We must be in SMM; RSM will cause a vmexit anyway.  */
+	}
+}
+#endif
+
+static bool svm_can_emulate_instruction(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int emul_type,
+					void *insn, int insn_len)
+{
+	bool smep, smap, is_user;
+	u64 error_code;
+
+	/* Emulation is always possible when KVM has access to all guest state. */
+	if (!sev_guest(vcpu->kvm))
+		return true;
+
+	/* #UD and #GP should never be intercepted for SEV guests. */
+	WARN_ON_ONCE(emul_type & (EMULTYPE_TRAP_UD |
+				  EMULTYPE_TRAP_UD_FORCED |
+				  EMULTYPE_VMWARE_GP));
+
+	/*
+	 * Emulation is impossible for SEV-ES guests as KVM doesn't have access
+	 * to guest register state.
+	 */
+	if (sev_es_guest(vcpu->kvm))
+		return false;
+
+	/*
+	 * Emulation is possible if the instruction is already decoded, e.g.
+	 * when completing I/O after returning from userspace.
+	 */
+	if (emul_type & EMULTYPE_NO_DECODE)
+		return true;
+
+	/*
+	 * Emulation is possible for SEV guests if and only if a prefilled
+	 * buffer containing the bytes of the intercepted instruction is
+	 * available. SEV guest memory is encrypted with a guest specific key
+	 * and cannot be decrypted by KVM, i.e. KVM would read cyphertext and
+	 * decode garbage.
+	 *
+	 * If KVM is NOT trying to simply skip an instruction, inject #UD if
+	 * KVM reached this point without an instruction buffer.  In practice,
+	 * this path should never be hit by a well-behaved guest, e.g. KVM
+	 * doesn't intercept #UD or #GP for SEV guests, but this path is still
+	 * theoretically reachable, e.g. via unaccelerated fault-like AVIC
+	 * access, and needs to be handled by KVM to avoid putting the guest
+	 * into an infinite loop.   Injecting #UD is somewhat arbitrary, but
+	 * its the least awful option given lack of insight into the guest.
+	 *
+	 * If KVM is trying to skip an instruction, simply resume the guest.
+	 * If a #NPF occurs while the guest is vectoring an INT3/INTO, then KVM
+	 * will attempt to re-inject the INT3/INTO and skip the instruction.
+	 * In that scenario, retrying the INT3/INTO and hoping the guest will
+	 * make forward progress is the only option that has a chance of
+	 * success (and in practice it will work the vast majority of the time).
+	 */
+	if (unlikely(!insn)) {
+		if (!(emul_type & EMULTYPE_SKIP))
+			kvm_queue_exception(vcpu, UD_VECTOR);
+		return false;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Emulate for SEV guests if the insn buffer is not empty.  The buffer
+	 * will be empty if the DecodeAssist microcode cannot fetch bytes for
+	 * the faulting instruction because the code fetch itself faulted, e.g.
+	 * the guest attempted to fetch from emulated MMIO or a guest page
+	 * table used to translate CS:RIP resides in emulated MMIO.
+	 */
+	if (likely(insn_len))
+		return true;
+
+	/*
+	 * Detect and workaround Errata 1096 Fam_17h_00_0Fh.
+	 *
+	 * Errata:
+	 * When CPU raises #NPF on guest data access and vCPU CR4.SMAP=1, it is
+	 * possible that CPU microcode implementing DecodeAssist will fail to
+	 * read guest memory at CS:RIP and vmcb.GuestIntrBytes will incorrectly
+	 * be '0'.  This happens because microcode reads CS:RIP using a _data_
+	 * loap uop with CPL=0 privileges.  If the load hits a SMAP #PF, ucode
+	 * gives up and does not fill the instruction bytes buffer.
+	 *
+	 * As above, KVM reaches this point iff the VM is an SEV guest, the CPU
+	 * supports DecodeAssist, a #NPF was raised, KVM's page fault handler
+	 * triggered emulation (e.g. for MMIO), and the CPU returned 0 in the
+	 * GuestIntrBytes field of the VMCB.
+	 *
+	 * This does _not_ mean that the erratum has been encountered, as the
+	 * DecodeAssist will also fail if the load for CS:RIP hits a legitimate
+	 * #PF, e.g. if the guest attempt to execute from emulated MMIO and
+	 * encountered a reserved/not-present #PF.
+	 *
+	 * To hit the erratum, the following conditions must be true:
+	 *    1. CR4.SMAP=1 (obviously).
+	 *    2. CR4.SMEP=0 || CPL=3.  If SMEP=1 and CPL<3, the erratum cannot
+	 *       have been hit as the guest would have encountered a SMEP
+	 *       violation #PF, not a #NPF.
+	 *    3. The #NPF is not due to a code fetch, in which case failure to
+	 *       retrieve the instruction bytes is legitimate (see abvoe).
+	 *
+	 * In addition, don't apply the erratum workaround if the #NPF occurred
+	 * while translating guest page tables (see below).
+	 */
+	error_code = to_svm(vcpu)->vmcb->control.exit_info_1;
+	if (error_code & (PFERR_GUEST_PAGE_MASK | PFERR_FETCH_MASK))
+		goto resume_guest;
+
+	smep = kvm_is_cr4_bit_set(vcpu, X86_CR4_SMEP);
+	smap = kvm_is_cr4_bit_set(vcpu, X86_CR4_SMAP);
+	is_user = svm_get_cpl(vcpu) == 3;
+	if (smap && (!smep || is_user)) {
+		pr_err_ratelimited("SEV Guest triggered AMD Erratum 1096\n");
+
+		/*
+		 * If the fault occurred in userspace, arbitrarily inject #GP
+		 * to avoid killing the guest and to hopefully avoid confusing
+		 * the guest kernel too much, e.g. injecting #PF would not be
+		 * coherent with respect to the guest's page tables.  Request
+		 * triple fault if the fault occurred in the kernel as there's
+		 * no fault that KVM can inject without confusing the guest.
+		 * In practice, the triple fault is moot as no sane SEV kernel
+		 * will execute from user memory while also running with SMAP=1.
+		 */
+		if (is_user)
+			kvm_inject_gp(vcpu, 0);
+		else
+			kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_TRIPLE_FAULT, vcpu);
+	}
+
+resume_guest:
+	/*
+	 * If the erratum was not hit, simply resume the guest and let it fault
+	 * again.  While awful, e.g. the vCPU may get stuck in an infinite loop
+	 * if the fault is at CPL=0, it's the lesser of all evils.  Exiting to
+	 * userspace will kill the guest, and letting the emulator read garbage
+	 * will yield random behavior and potentially corrupt the guest.
+	 *
+	 * Simply resuming the guest is technically not a violation of the SEV
+	 * architecture.  AMD's APM states that all code fetches and page table
+	 * accesses for SEV guest are encrypted, regardless of the C-Bit.  The
+	 * APM also states that encrypted accesses to MMIO are "ignored", but
+	 * doesn't explicitly define "ignored", i.e. doing nothing and letting
+	 * the guest spin is technically "ignoring" the access.
+	 */
+	return false;
+}
+
+static bool svm_apic_init_signal_blocked(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+
+	return !gif_set(svm);
+}
+
+static void svm_vcpu_deliver_sipi_vector(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u8 vector)
+{
+	if (!sev_es_guest(vcpu->kvm))
+		return kvm_vcpu_deliver_sipi_vector(vcpu, vector);
+
+	sev_vcpu_deliver_sipi_vector(vcpu, vector);
+}
+
+static void svm_vm_destroy(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+	avic_vm_destroy(kvm);
+	sev_vm_destroy(kvm);
+}
+
+static int svm_vm_init(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+	if (!pause_filter_count || !pause_filter_thresh)
+		kvm->arch.pause_in_guest = true;
+
+	if (enable_apicv) {
+		int ret = avic_vm_init(kvm);
+		if (ret)
+			return ret;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static struct kvm_x86_ops svm_x86_ops __initdata = {
+	.name = KBUILD_MODNAME,
+
+	.check_processor_compatibility = svm_check_processor_compat,
+
+	.hardware_unsetup = svm_hardware_unsetup,
+	.hardware_enable = svm_hardware_enable,
+	.hardware_disable = svm_hardware_disable,
+	.has_emulated_msr = svm_has_emulated_msr,
+
+	.vcpu_create = svm_vcpu_create,
+	.vcpu_free = svm_vcpu_free,
+	.vcpu_reset = svm_vcpu_reset,
+
+	.vm_size = sizeof(struct kvm_svm),
+	.vm_init = svm_vm_init,
+	.vm_destroy = svm_vm_destroy,
+
+	.prepare_switch_to_guest = svm_prepare_switch_to_guest,
+	.vcpu_load = svm_vcpu_load,
+	.vcpu_put = svm_vcpu_put,
+	.vcpu_blocking = avic_vcpu_blocking,
+	.vcpu_unblocking = avic_vcpu_unblocking,
+
+	.update_exception_bitmap = svm_update_exception_bitmap,
+	.get_msr_feature = svm_get_msr_feature,
+	.get_msr = svm_get_msr,
+	.set_msr = svm_set_msr,
+	.get_segment_base = svm_get_segment_base,
+	.get_segment = svm_get_segment,
+	.set_segment = svm_set_segment,
+	.get_cpl = svm_get_cpl,
+	.get_cs_db_l_bits = svm_get_cs_db_l_bits,
+	.is_valid_cr0 = svm_is_valid_cr0,
+	.set_cr0 = svm_set_cr0,
+	.post_set_cr3 = sev_post_set_cr3,
+	.is_valid_cr4 = svm_is_valid_cr4,
+	.set_cr4 = svm_set_cr4,
+	.set_efer = svm_set_efer,
+	.get_idt = svm_get_idt,
+	.set_idt = svm_set_idt,
+	.get_gdt = svm_get_gdt,
+	.set_gdt = svm_set_gdt,
+	.set_dr7 = svm_set_dr7,
+	.sync_dirty_debug_regs = svm_sync_dirty_debug_regs,
+	.cache_reg = svm_cache_reg,
+	.get_rflags = svm_get_rflags,
+	.set_rflags = svm_set_rflags,
+	.get_if_flag = svm_get_if_flag,
+
+	.flush_tlb_all = svm_flush_tlb_all,
+	.flush_tlb_current = svm_flush_tlb_current,
+	.flush_tlb_gva = svm_flush_tlb_gva,
+	.flush_tlb_guest = svm_flush_tlb_asid,
+
+	.vcpu_pre_run = svm_vcpu_pre_run,
+	.vcpu_run = svm_vcpu_run,
+	.handle_exit = svm_handle_exit,
+	.skip_emulated_instruction = svm_skip_emulated_instruction,
+	.update_emulated_instruction = NULL,
+	.set_interrupt_shadow = svm_set_interrupt_shadow,
+	.get_interrupt_shadow = svm_get_interrupt_shadow,
+	.patch_hypercall = svm_patch_hypercall,
+	.inject_irq = svm_inject_irq,
+	.inject_nmi = svm_inject_nmi,
+	.is_vnmi_pending = svm_is_vnmi_pending,
+	.set_vnmi_pending = svm_set_vnmi_pending,
+	.inject_exception = svm_inject_exception,
+	.cancel_injection = svm_cancel_injection,
+	.interrupt_allowed = svm_interrupt_allowed,
+	.nmi_allowed = svm_nmi_allowed,
+	.get_nmi_mask = svm_get_nmi_mask,
+	.set_nmi_mask = svm_set_nmi_mask,
+	.enable_nmi_window = svm_enable_nmi_window,
+	.enable_irq_window = svm_enable_irq_window,
+	.update_cr8_intercept = svm_update_cr8_intercept,
+	.set_virtual_apic_mode = avic_refresh_virtual_apic_mode,
+	.refresh_apicv_exec_ctrl = avic_refresh_apicv_exec_ctrl,
+	.apicv_post_state_restore = avic_apicv_post_state_restore,
+	.required_apicv_inhibits = AVIC_REQUIRED_APICV_INHIBITS,
+
+	.get_exit_info = svm_get_exit_info,
+
+	.vcpu_after_set_cpuid = svm_vcpu_after_set_cpuid,
+
+	.has_wbinvd_exit = svm_has_wbinvd_exit,
+
+	.get_l2_tsc_offset = svm_get_l2_tsc_offset,
+	.get_l2_tsc_multiplier = svm_get_l2_tsc_multiplier,
+	.write_tsc_offset = svm_write_tsc_offset,
+	.write_tsc_multiplier = svm_write_tsc_multiplier,
+
+	.load_mmu_pgd = svm_load_mmu_pgd,
+
+	.check_intercept = svm_check_intercept,
+	.handle_exit_irqoff = svm_handle_exit_irqoff,
+
+	.request_immediate_exit = __kvm_request_immediate_exit,
+
+	.sched_in = svm_sched_in,
+
+	.nested_ops = &svm_nested_ops,
+
+	.deliver_interrupt = svm_deliver_interrupt,
+	.pi_update_irte = avic_pi_update_irte,
+	.setup_mce = svm_setup_mce,
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_SMM
+	.smi_allowed = svm_smi_allowed,
+	.enter_smm = svm_enter_smm,
+	.leave_smm = svm_leave_smm,
+	.enable_smi_window = svm_enable_smi_window,
+#endif
+
+	.mem_enc_ioctl = sev_mem_enc_ioctl,
+	.mem_enc_register_region = sev_mem_enc_register_region,
+	.mem_enc_unregister_region = sev_mem_enc_unregister_region,
+	.guest_memory_reclaimed = sev_guest_memory_reclaimed,
+
+	.vm_copy_enc_context_from = sev_vm_copy_enc_context_from,
+	.vm_move_enc_context_from = sev_vm_move_enc_context_from,
+
+	.can_emulate_instruction = svm_can_emulate_instruction,
+
+	.apic_init_signal_blocked = svm_apic_init_signal_blocked,
+
+	.msr_filter_changed = svm_msr_filter_changed,
+	.complete_emulated_msr = svm_complete_emulated_msr,
+
+	.vcpu_deliver_sipi_vector = svm_vcpu_deliver_sipi_vector,
+	.vcpu_get_apicv_inhibit_reasons = avic_vcpu_get_apicv_inhibit_reasons,
+};
+
+/*
+ * The default MMIO mask is a single bit (excluding the present bit),
+ * which could conflict with the memory encryption bit. Check for
+ * memory encryption support and override the default MMIO mask if
+ * memory encryption is enabled.
+ */
+static __init void svm_adjust_mmio_mask(void)
+{
+	unsigned int enc_bit, mask_bit;
+	u64 msr, mask;
+
+	/* If there is no memory encryption support, use existing mask */
+	if (cpuid_eax(0x80000000) < 0x8000001f)
+		return;
+
+	/* If memory encryption is not enabled, use existing mask */
+	rdmsrl(MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG, msr);
+	if (!(msr & MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG_MEM_ENCRYPT))
+		return;
+
+	enc_bit = cpuid_ebx(0x8000001f) & 0x3f;
+	mask_bit = boot_cpu_data.x86_phys_bits;
+
+	/* Increment the mask bit if it is the same as the encryption bit */
+	if (enc_bit == mask_bit)
+		mask_bit++;
+
+	/*
+	 * If the mask bit location is below 52, then some bits above the
+	 * physical addressing limit will always be reserved, so use the
+	 * rsvd_bits() function to generate the mask. This mask, along with
+	 * the present bit, will be used to generate a page fault with
+	 * PFER.RSV = 1.
+	 *
+	 * If the mask bit location is 52 (or above), then clear the mask.
+	 */
+	mask = (mask_bit < 52) ? rsvd_bits(mask_bit, 51) | PT_PRESENT_MASK : 0;
+
+	kvm_mmu_set_mmio_spte_mask(mask, mask, PT_WRITABLE_MASK | PT_USER_MASK);
+}
+
+static __init void svm_set_cpu_caps(void)
+{
+	kvm_set_cpu_caps();
+
+	kvm_caps.supported_perf_cap = 0;
+	kvm_caps.supported_xss = 0;
+
+	/* CPUID 0x80000001 and 0x8000000A (SVM features) */
+	if (nested) {
+		kvm_cpu_cap_set(X86_FEATURE_SVM);
+		kvm_cpu_cap_set(X86_FEATURE_VMCBCLEAN);
+
+		if (nrips)
+			kvm_cpu_cap_set(X86_FEATURE_NRIPS);
+
+		if (npt_enabled)
+			kvm_cpu_cap_set(X86_FEATURE_NPT);
+
+		if (tsc_scaling)
+			kvm_cpu_cap_set(X86_FEATURE_TSCRATEMSR);
+
+		if (vls)
+			kvm_cpu_cap_set(X86_FEATURE_V_VMSAVE_VMLOAD);
+		if (lbrv)
+			kvm_cpu_cap_set(X86_FEATURE_LBRV);
+
+		if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PAUSEFILTER))
+			kvm_cpu_cap_set(X86_FEATURE_PAUSEFILTER);
+
+		if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PFTHRESHOLD))
+			kvm_cpu_cap_set(X86_FEATURE_PFTHRESHOLD);
+
+		if (vgif)
+			kvm_cpu_cap_set(X86_FEATURE_VGIF);
+
+		if (vnmi)
+			kvm_cpu_cap_set(X86_FEATURE_VNMI);
+
+		/* Nested VM can receive #VMEXIT instead of triggering #GP */
+		kvm_cpu_cap_set(X86_FEATURE_SVME_ADDR_CHK);
+	}
+
+	/* CPUID 0x80000008 */
+	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_LS_CFG_SSBD) ||
+	    boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSBD))
+		kvm_cpu_cap_set(X86_FEATURE_VIRT_SSBD);
+
+	if (enable_pmu) {
+		/*
+		 * Enumerate support for PERFCTR_CORE if and only if KVM has
+		 * access to enough counters to virtualize "core" support,
+		 * otherwise limit vPMU support to the legacy number of counters.
+		 */
+		if (kvm_pmu_cap.num_counters_gp < AMD64_NUM_COUNTERS_CORE)
+			kvm_pmu_cap.num_counters_gp = min(AMD64_NUM_COUNTERS,
+							  kvm_pmu_cap.num_counters_gp);
+		else
+			kvm_cpu_cap_check_and_set(X86_FEATURE_PERFCTR_CORE);
+
+		if (kvm_pmu_cap.version != 2 ||
+		    !kvm_cpu_cap_has(X86_FEATURE_PERFCTR_CORE))
+			kvm_cpu_cap_clear(X86_FEATURE_PERFMON_V2);
+	}
+
+	/* CPUID 0x8000001F (SME/SEV features) */
+	sev_set_cpu_caps();
+}
+
+static __init int svm_hardware_setup(void)
+{
+	int cpu;
+	struct page *iopm_pages;
+	void *iopm_va;
+	int r;
+	unsigned int order = get_order(IOPM_SIZE);
+
+	/*
+	 * NX is required for shadow paging and for NPT if the NX huge pages
+	 * mitigation is enabled.
+	 */
+	if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_NX)) {
+		pr_err_ratelimited("NX (Execute Disable) not supported\n");
+		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+	}
+	kvm_enable_efer_bits(EFER_NX);
+
+	iopm_pages = alloc_pages(GFP_KERNEL, order);
+
+	if (!iopm_pages)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	iopm_va = page_address(iopm_pages);
+	memset(iopm_va, 0xff, PAGE_SIZE * (1 << order));
+	iopm_base = page_to_pfn(iopm_pages) << PAGE_SHIFT;
+
+	init_msrpm_offsets();
+
+	kvm_caps.supported_xcr0 &= ~(XFEATURE_MASK_BNDREGS |
+				     XFEATURE_MASK_BNDCSR);
+
+	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_FXSR_OPT))
+		kvm_enable_efer_bits(EFER_FFXSR);
+
+	if (tsc_scaling) {
+		if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_TSCRATEMSR)) {
+			tsc_scaling = false;
+		} else {
+			pr_info("TSC scaling supported\n");
+			kvm_caps.has_tsc_control = true;
+		}
+	}
+	kvm_caps.max_tsc_scaling_ratio = SVM_TSC_RATIO_MAX;
+	kvm_caps.tsc_scaling_ratio_frac_bits = 32;
+
+	tsc_aux_uret_slot = kvm_add_user_return_msr(MSR_TSC_AUX);
+
+	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AUTOIBRS))
+		kvm_enable_efer_bits(EFER_AUTOIBRS);
+
+	/* Check for pause filtering support */
+	if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PAUSEFILTER)) {
+		pause_filter_count = 0;
+		pause_filter_thresh = 0;
+	} else if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PFTHRESHOLD)) {
+		pause_filter_thresh = 0;
+	}
+
+	if (nested) {
+		pr_info("Nested Virtualization enabled\n");
+		kvm_enable_efer_bits(EFER_SVME | EFER_LMSLE);
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * KVM's MMU doesn't support using 2-level paging for itself, and thus
+	 * NPT isn't supported if the host is using 2-level paging since host
+	 * CR4 is unchanged on VMRUN.
+	 */
+	if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_64) && !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_PAE))
+		npt_enabled = false;
+
+	if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_NPT))
+		npt_enabled = false;
+
+	/* Force VM NPT level equal to the host's paging level */
+	kvm_configure_mmu(npt_enabled, get_npt_level(),
+			  get_npt_level(), PG_LEVEL_1G);
+	pr_info("Nested Paging %sabled\n", npt_enabled ? "en" : "dis");
+
+	/* Setup shadow_me_value and shadow_me_mask */
+	kvm_mmu_set_me_spte_mask(sme_me_mask, sme_me_mask);
+
+	svm_adjust_mmio_mask();
+
+	nrips = nrips && boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_NRIPS);
+
+	/*
+	 * Note, SEV setup consumes npt_enabled and enable_mmio_caching (which
+	 * may be modified by svm_adjust_mmio_mask()), as well as nrips.
+	 */
+	sev_hardware_setup();
+
+	svm_hv_hardware_setup();
+
+	for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) {
+		r = svm_cpu_init(cpu);
+		if (r)
+			goto err;
+	}
+
+	enable_apicv = avic = avic && avic_hardware_setup();
+
+	if (!enable_apicv) {
+		svm_x86_ops.vcpu_blocking = NULL;
+		svm_x86_ops.vcpu_unblocking = NULL;
+		svm_x86_ops.vcpu_get_apicv_inhibit_reasons = NULL;
+	} else if (!x2avic_enabled) {
+		svm_x86_ops.allow_apicv_in_x2apic_without_x2apic_virtualization = true;
+	}
+
+	if (vls) {
+		if (!npt_enabled ||
+		    !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_V_VMSAVE_VMLOAD) ||
+		    !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_64)) {
+			vls = false;
+		} else {
+			pr_info("Virtual VMLOAD VMSAVE supported\n");
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SVME_ADDR_CHK))
+		svm_gp_erratum_intercept = false;
+
+	if (vgif) {
+		if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_VGIF))
+			vgif = false;
+		else
+			pr_info("Virtual GIF supported\n");
+	}
+
+	vnmi = vgif && vnmi && boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_VNMI);
+	if (vnmi)
+		pr_info("Virtual NMI enabled\n");
+
+	if (!vnmi) {
+		svm_x86_ops.is_vnmi_pending = NULL;
+		svm_x86_ops.set_vnmi_pending = NULL;
+	}
+
+
+	if (lbrv) {
+		if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_LBRV))
+			lbrv = false;
+		else
+			pr_info("LBR virtualization supported\n");
+	}
+
+	if (!enable_pmu)
+		pr_info("PMU virtualization is disabled\n");
+
+	svm_set_cpu_caps();
+
+	/*
+	 * It seems that on AMD processors PTE's accessed bit is
+	 * being set by the CPU hardware before the NPF vmexit.
+	 * This is not expected behaviour and our tests fail because
+	 * of it.
+	 * A workaround here is to disable support for
+	 * GUEST_MAXPHYADDR < HOST_MAXPHYADDR if NPT is enabled.
+	 * In this case userspace can know if there is support using
+	 * KVM_CAP_SMALLER_MAXPHYADDR extension and decide how to handle
+	 * it
+	 * If future AMD CPU models change the behaviour described above,
+	 * this variable can be changed accordingly
+	 */
+	allow_smaller_maxphyaddr = !npt_enabled;
+
+	return 0;
+
+err:
+	svm_hardware_unsetup();
+	return r;
+}
+
+
+static struct kvm_x86_init_ops svm_init_ops __initdata = {
+	.hardware_setup = svm_hardware_setup,
+
+	.runtime_ops = &svm_x86_ops,
+	.pmu_ops = &amd_pmu_ops,
+};
+
+static void __svm_exit(void)
+{
+	kvm_x86_vendor_exit();
+
+	cpu_emergency_unregister_virt_callback(svm_emergency_disable);
+}
+
+static int __init svm_init(void)
+{
+	int r;
+
+	__unused_size_checks();
+
+	if (!kvm_is_svm_supported())
+		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+	r = kvm_x86_vendor_init(&svm_init_ops);
+	if (r)
+		return r;
+
+	cpu_emergency_register_virt_callback(svm_emergency_disable);
+
+	/*
+	 * Common KVM initialization _must_ come last, after this, /dev/kvm is
+	 * exposed to userspace!
+	 */
+	r = kvm_init(sizeof(struct vcpu_svm), __alignof__(struct vcpu_svm),
+		     THIS_MODULE);
+	if (r)
+		goto err_kvm_init;
+
+	return 0;
+
+err_kvm_init:
+	__svm_exit();
+	return r;
+}
+
+static void __exit svm_exit(void)
+{
+	kvm_exit();
+	__svm_exit();
+}
+
+module_init(svm_init)
+module_exit(svm_exit)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..be67ab7fd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h
@@ -0,0 +1,725 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * Kernel-based Virtual Machine driver for Linux
+ *
+ * AMD SVM support
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2006 Qumranet, Inc.
+ * Copyright 2010 Red Hat, Inc. and/or its affiliates.
+ *
+ * Authors:
+ *   Yaniv Kamay  <yaniv@qumranet.com>
+ *   Avi Kivity   <avi@qumranet.com>
+ */
+
+#ifndef __SVM_SVM_H
+#define __SVM_SVM_H
+
+#include <linux/kvm_types.h>
+#include <linux/kvm_host.h>
+#include <linux/bits.h>
+
+#include <asm/svm.h>
+#include <asm/sev-common.h>
+
+#include "cpuid.h"
+#include "kvm_cache_regs.h"
+
+#define __sme_page_pa(x) __sme_set(page_to_pfn(x) << PAGE_SHIFT)
+
+#define	IOPM_SIZE PAGE_SIZE * 3
+#define	MSRPM_SIZE PAGE_SIZE * 2
+
+#define MAX_DIRECT_ACCESS_MSRS	46
+#define MSRPM_OFFSETS	32
+extern u32 msrpm_offsets[MSRPM_OFFSETS] __read_mostly;
+extern bool npt_enabled;
+extern int nrips;
+extern int vgif;
+extern bool intercept_smi;
+extern bool x2avic_enabled;
+extern bool vnmi;
+
+/*
+ * Clean bits in VMCB.
+ * VMCB_ALL_CLEAN_MASK might also need to
+ * be updated if this enum is modified.
+ */
+enum {
+	VMCB_INTERCEPTS, /* Intercept vectors, TSC offset,
+			    pause filter count */
+	VMCB_PERM_MAP,   /* IOPM Base and MSRPM Base */
+	VMCB_ASID,	 /* ASID */
+	VMCB_INTR,	 /* int_ctl, int_vector */
+	VMCB_NPT,        /* npt_en, nCR3, gPAT */
+	VMCB_CR,	 /* CR0, CR3, CR4, EFER */
+	VMCB_DR,         /* DR6, DR7 */
+	VMCB_DT,         /* GDT, IDT */
+	VMCB_SEG,        /* CS, DS, SS, ES, CPL */
+	VMCB_CR2,        /* CR2 only */
+	VMCB_LBR,        /* DBGCTL, BR_FROM, BR_TO, LAST_EX_FROM, LAST_EX_TO */
+	VMCB_AVIC,       /* AVIC APIC_BAR, AVIC APIC_BACKING_PAGE,
+			  * AVIC PHYSICAL_TABLE pointer,
+			  * AVIC LOGICAL_TABLE pointer
+			  */
+	VMCB_SW = 31,    /* Reserved for hypervisor/software use */
+};
+
+#define VMCB_ALL_CLEAN_MASK (					\
+	(1U << VMCB_INTERCEPTS) | (1U << VMCB_PERM_MAP) |	\
+	(1U << VMCB_ASID) | (1U << VMCB_INTR) |			\
+	(1U << VMCB_NPT) | (1U << VMCB_CR) | (1U << VMCB_DR) |	\
+	(1U << VMCB_DT) | (1U << VMCB_SEG) | (1U << VMCB_CR2) |	\
+	(1U << VMCB_LBR) | (1U << VMCB_AVIC) |			\
+	(1U << VMCB_SW))
+
+/* TPR and CR2 are always written before VMRUN */
+#define VMCB_ALWAYS_DIRTY_MASK	((1U << VMCB_INTR) | (1U << VMCB_CR2))
+
+struct kvm_sev_info {
+	bool active;		/* SEV enabled guest */
+	bool es_active;		/* SEV-ES enabled guest */
+	unsigned int asid;	/* ASID used for this guest */
+	unsigned int handle;	/* SEV firmware handle */
+	int fd;			/* SEV device fd */
+	unsigned long pages_locked; /* Number of pages locked */
+	struct list_head regions_list;  /* List of registered regions */
+	u64 ap_jump_table;	/* SEV-ES AP Jump Table address */
+	struct kvm *enc_context_owner; /* Owner of copied encryption context */
+	struct list_head mirror_vms; /* List of VMs mirroring */
+	struct list_head mirror_entry; /* Use as a list entry of mirrors */
+	struct misc_cg *misc_cg; /* For misc cgroup accounting */
+	atomic_t migration_in_progress;
+};
+
+struct kvm_svm {
+	struct kvm kvm;
+
+	/* Struct members for AVIC */
+	u32 avic_vm_id;
+	struct page *avic_logical_id_table_page;
+	struct page *avic_physical_id_table_page;
+	struct hlist_node hnode;
+
+	struct kvm_sev_info sev_info;
+};
+
+struct kvm_vcpu;
+
+struct kvm_vmcb_info {
+	struct vmcb *ptr;
+	unsigned long pa;
+	int cpu;
+	uint64_t asid_generation;
+};
+
+struct vmcb_save_area_cached {
+	u64 efer;
+	u64 cr4;
+	u64 cr3;
+	u64 cr0;
+	u64 dr7;
+	u64 dr6;
+};
+
+struct vmcb_ctrl_area_cached {
+	u32 intercepts[MAX_INTERCEPT];
+	u16 pause_filter_thresh;
+	u16 pause_filter_count;
+	u64 iopm_base_pa;
+	u64 msrpm_base_pa;
+	u64 tsc_offset;
+	u32 asid;
+	u8 tlb_ctl;
+	u32 int_ctl;
+	u32 int_vector;
+	u32 int_state;
+	u32 exit_code;
+	u32 exit_code_hi;
+	u64 exit_info_1;
+	u64 exit_info_2;
+	u32 exit_int_info;
+	u32 exit_int_info_err;
+	u64 nested_ctl;
+	u32 event_inj;
+	u32 event_inj_err;
+	u64 next_rip;
+	u64 nested_cr3;
+	u64 virt_ext;
+	u32 clean;
+	union {
+		struct hv_vmcb_enlightenments hv_enlightenments;
+		u8 reserved_sw[32];
+	};
+};
+
+struct svm_nested_state {
+	struct kvm_vmcb_info vmcb02;
+	u64 hsave_msr;
+	u64 vm_cr_msr;
+	u64 vmcb12_gpa;
+	u64 last_vmcb12_gpa;
+
+	/* These are the merged vectors */
+	u32 *msrpm;
+
+	/* A VMRUN has started but has not yet been performed, so
+	 * we cannot inject a nested vmexit yet.  */
+	bool nested_run_pending;
+
+	/* cache for control fields of the guest */
+	struct vmcb_ctrl_area_cached ctl;
+
+	/*
+	 * Note: this struct is not kept up-to-date while L2 runs; it is only
+	 * valid within nested_svm_vmrun.
+	 */
+	struct vmcb_save_area_cached save;
+
+	bool initialized;
+
+	/*
+	 * Indicates whether MSR bitmap for L2 needs to be rebuilt due to
+	 * changes in MSR bitmap for L1 or switching to a different L2. Note,
+	 * this flag can only be used reliably in conjunction with a paravirt L1
+	 * which informs L0 whether any changes to MSR bitmap for L2 were done
+	 * on its side.
+	 */
+	bool force_msr_bitmap_recalc;
+};
+
+struct vcpu_sev_es_state {
+	/* SEV-ES support */
+	struct sev_es_save_area *vmsa;
+	struct ghcb *ghcb;
+	u8 valid_bitmap[16];
+	struct kvm_host_map ghcb_map;
+	bool received_first_sipi;
+
+	/* SEV-ES scratch area support */
+	u64 sw_scratch;
+	void *ghcb_sa;
+	u32 ghcb_sa_len;
+	bool ghcb_sa_sync;
+	bool ghcb_sa_free;
+};
+
+struct vcpu_svm {
+	struct kvm_vcpu vcpu;
+	/* vmcb always points at current_vmcb->ptr, it's purely a shorthand. */
+	struct vmcb *vmcb;
+	struct kvm_vmcb_info vmcb01;
+	struct kvm_vmcb_info *current_vmcb;
+	u32 asid;
+	u32 sysenter_esp_hi;
+	u32 sysenter_eip_hi;
+	uint64_t tsc_aux;
+
+	u64 msr_decfg;
+
+	u64 next_rip;
+
+	u64 spec_ctrl;
+
+	u64 tsc_ratio_msr;
+	/*
+	 * Contains guest-controlled bits of VIRT_SPEC_CTRL, which will be
+	 * translated into the appropriate L2_CFG bits on the host to
+	 * perform speculative control.
+	 */
+	u64 virt_spec_ctrl;
+
+	u32 *msrpm;
+
+	ulong nmi_iret_rip;
+
+	struct svm_nested_state nested;
+
+	/* NMI mask value, used when vNMI is not enabled */
+	bool nmi_masked;
+
+	/*
+	 * True when NMIs are still masked but guest IRET was just intercepted
+	 * and KVM is waiting for RIP to change, which will signal that the
+	 * intercepted IRET was retired and thus NMI can be unmasked.
+	 */
+	bool awaiting_iret_completion;
+
+	/*
+	 * Set when KVM is awaiting IRET completion and needs to inject NMIs as
+	 * soon as the IRET completes (e.g. NMI is pending injection).  KVM
+	 * temporarily steals RFLAGS.TF to single-step the guest in this case
+	 * in order to regain control as soon as the NMI-blocking condition
+	 * goes away.
+	 */
+	bool nmi_singlestep;
+	u64 nmi_singlestep_guest_rflags;
+
+	bool nmi_l1_to_l2;
+
+	unsigned long soft_int_csbase;
+	unsigned long soft_int_old_rip;
+	unsigned long soft_int_next_rip;
+	bool soft_int_injected;
+
+	u32 ldr_reg;
+	u32 dfr_reg;
+	struct page *avic_backing_page;
+	u64 *avic_physical_id_cache;
+
+	/*
+	 * Per-vcpu list of struct amd_svm_iommu_ir:
+	 * This is used mainly to store interrupt remapping information used
+	 * when update the vcpu affinity. This avoids the need to scan for
+	 * IRTE and try to match ga_tag in the IOMMU driver.
+	 */
+	struct list_head ir_list;
+	spinlock_t ir_list_lock;
+
+	/* Save desired MSR intercept (read: pass-through) state */
+	struct {
+		DECLARE_BITMAP(read, MAX_DIRECT_ACCESS_MSRS);
+		DECLARE_BITMAP(write, MAX_DIRECT_ACCESS_MSRS);
+	} shadow_msr_intercept;
+
+	struct vcpu_sev_es_state sev_es;
+
+	bool guest_state_loaded;
+
+	bool x2avic_msrs_intercepted;
+
+	/* Guest GIF value, used when vGIF is not enabled */
+	bool guest_gif;
+};
+
+struct svm_cpu_data {
+	u64 asid_generation;
+	u32 max_asid;
+	u32 next_asid;
+	u32 min_asid;
+
+	struct page *save_area;
+	unsigned long save_area_pa;
+
+	struct vmcb *current_vmcb;
+
+	/* index = sev_asid, value = vmcb pointer */
+	struct vmcb **sev_vmcbs;
+};
+
+DECLARE_PER_CPU(struct svm_cpu_data, svm_data);
+
+void recalc_intercepts(struct vcpu_svm *svm);
+
+static __always_inline struct kvm_svm *to_kvm_svm(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+	return container_of(kvm, struct kvm_svm, kvm);
+}
+
+static __always_inline bool sev_guest(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV
+	struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
+
+	return sev->active;
+#else
+	return false;
+#endif
+}
+
+static __always_inline bool sev_es_guest(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV
+	struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
+
+	return sev->es_active && !WARN_ON_ONCE(!sev->active);
+#else
+	return false;
+#endif
+}
+
+static inline void vmcb_mark_all_dirty(struct vmcb *vmcb)
+{
+	vmcb->control.clean = 0;
+}
+
+static inline void vmcb_mark_all_clean(struct vmcb *vmcb)
+{
+	vmcb->control.clean = VMCB_ALL_CLEAN_MASK
+			       & ~VMCB_ALWAYS_DIRTY_MASK;
+}
+
+static inline void vmcb_mark_dirty(struct vmcb *vmcb, int bit)
+{
+	vmcb->control.clean &= ~(1 << bit);
+}
+
+static inline bool vmcb_is_dirty(struct vmcb *vmcb, int bit)
+{
+        return !test_bit(bit, (unsigned long *)&vmcb->control.clean);
+}
+
+static __always_inline struct vcpu_svm *to_svm(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	return container_of(vcpu, struct vcpu_svm, vcpu);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Only the PDPTRs are loaded on demand into the shadow MMU.  All other
+ * fields are synchronized on VM-Exit, because accessing the VMCB is cheap.
+ *
+ * CR3 might be out of date in the VMCB but it is not marked dirty; instead,
+ * KVM_REQ_LOAD_MMU_PGD is always requested when the cached vcpu->arch.cr3
+ * is changed.  svm_load_mmu_pgd() then syncs the new CR3 value into the VMCB.
+ */
+#define SVM_REGS_LAZY_LOAD_SET	(1 << VCPU_EXREG_PDPTR)
+
+static inline void vmcb_set_intercept(struct vmcb_control_area *control, u32 bit)
+{
+	WARN_ON_ONCE(bit >= 32 * MAX_INTERCEPT);
+	__set_bit(bit, (unsigned long *)&control->intercepts);
+}
+
+static inline void vmcb_clr_intercept(struct vmcb_control_area *control, u32 bit)
+{
+	WARN_ON_ONCE(bit >= 32 * MAX_INTERCEPT);
+	__clear_bit(bit, (unsigned long *)&control->intercepts);
+}
+
+static inline bool vmcb_is_intercept(struct vmcb_control_area *control, u32 bit)
+{
+	WARN_ON_ONCE(bit >= 32 * MAX_INTERCEPT);
+	return test_bit(bit, (unsigned long *)&control->intercepts);
+}
+
+static inline bool vmcb12_is_intercept(struct vmcb_ctrl_area_cached *control, u32 bit)
+{
+	WARN_ON_ONCE(bit >= 32 * MAX_INTERCEPT);
+	return test_bit(bit, (unsigned long *)&control->intercepts);
+}
+
+static inline void set_exception_intercept(struct vcpu_svm *svm, u32 bit)
+{
+	struct vmcb *vmcb = svm->vmcb01.ptr;
+
+	WARN_ON_ONCE(bit >= 32);
+	vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_EXCEPTION_OFFSET + bit);
+
+	recalc_intercepts(svm);
+}
+
+static inline void clr_exception_intercept(struct vcpu_svm *svm, u32 bit)
+{
+	struct vmcb *vmcb = svm->vmcb01.ptr;
+
+	WARN_ON_ONCE(bit >= 32);
+	vmcb_clr_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_EXCEPTION_OFFSET + bit);
+
+	recalc_intercepts(svm);
+}
+
+static inline void svm_set_intercept(struct vcpu_svm *svm, int bit)
+{
+	struct vmcb *vmcb = svm->vmcb01.ptr;
+
+	vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, bit);
+
+	recalc_intercepts(svm);
+}
+
+static inline void svm_clr_intercept(struct vcpu_svm *svm, int bit)
+{
+	struct vmcb *vmcb = svm->vmcb01.ptr;
+
+	vmcb_clr_intercept(&vmcb->control, bit);
+
+	recalc_intercepts(svm);
+}
+
+static inline bool svm_is_intercept(struct vcpu_svm *svm, int bit)
+{
+	return vmcb_is_intercept(&svm->vmcb->control, bit);
+}
+
+static inline bool nested_vgif_enabled(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
+{
+	return guest_can_use(&svm->vcpu, X86_FEATURE_VGIF) &&
+	       (svm->nested.ctl.int_ctl & V_GIF_ENABLE_MASK);
+}
+
+static inline struct vmcb *get_vgif_vmcb(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
+{
+	if (!vgif)
+		return NULL;
+
+	if (is_guest_mode(&svm->vcpu) && !nested_vgif_enabled(svm))
+		return svm->nested.vmcb02.ptr;
+	else
+		return svm->vmcb01.ptr;
+}
+
+static inline void enable_gif(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
+{
+	struct vmcb *vmcb = get_vgif_vmcb(svm);
+
+	if (vmcb)
+		vmcb->control.int_ctl |= V_GIF_MASK;
+	else
+		svm->guest_gif = true;
+}
+
+static inline void disable_gif(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
+{
+	struct vmcb *vmcb = get_vgif_vmcb(svm);
+
+	if (vmcb)
+		vmcb->control.int_ctl &= ~V_GIF_MASK;
+	else
+		svm->guest_gif = false;
+}
+
+static inline bool gif_set(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
+{
+	struct vmcb *vmcb = get_vgif_vmcb(svm);
+
+	if (vmcb)
+		return !!(vmcb->control.int_ctl & V_GIF_MASK);
+	else
+		return svm->guest_gif;
+}
+
+static inline bool nested_npt_enabled(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
+{
+	return svm->nested.ctl.nested_ctl & SVM_NESTED_CTL_NP_ENABLE;
+}
+
+static inline bool nested_vnmi_enabled(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
+{
+	return guest_can_use(&svm->vcpu, X86_FEATURE_VNMI) &&
+	       (svm->nested.ctl.int_ctl & V_NMI_ENABLE_MASK);
+}
+
+static inline bool is_x2apic_msrpm_offset(u32 offset)
+{
+	/* 4 msrs per u8, and 4 u8 in u32 */
+	u32 msr = offset * 16;
+
+	return (msr >= APIC_BASE_MSR) &&
+	       (msr < (APIC_BASE_MSR + 0x100));
+}
+
+static inline struct vmcb *get_vnmi_vmcb_l1(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
+{
+	if (!vnmi)
+		return NULL;
+
+	if (is_guest_mode(&svm->vcpu))
+		return NULL;
+	else
+		return svm->vmcb01.ptr;
+}
+
+static inline bool is_vnmi_enabled(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
+{
+	struct vmcb *vmcb = get_vnmi_vmcb_l1(svm);
+
+	if (vmcb)
+		return !!(vmcb->control.int_ctl & V_NMI_ENABLE_MASK);
+	else
+		return false;
+}
+
+/* svm.c */
+#define MSR_INVALID				0xffffffffU
+
+#define DEBUGCTL_RESERVED_BITS (~(0x3fULL))
+
+extern bool dump_invalid_vmcb;
+
+u32 svm_msrpm_offset(u32 msr);
+u32 *svm_vcpu_alloc_msrpm(void);
+void svm_vcpu_init_msrpm(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 *msrpm);
+void svm_vcpu_free_msrpm(u32 *msrpm);
+void svm_copy_lbrs(struct vmcb *to_vmcb, struct vmcb *from_vmcb);
+void svm_update_lbrv(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+
+int svm_set_efer(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 efer);
+void svm_set_cr0(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long cr0);
+void svm_set_cr4(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long cr4);
+void disable_nmi_singlestep(struct vcpu_svm *svm);
+bool svm_smi_blocked(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+bool svm_nmi_blocked(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+bool svm_interrupt_blocked(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+void svm_set_gif(struct vcpu_svm *svm, bool value);
+int svm_invoke_exit_handler(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 exit_code);
+void set_msr_interception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 *msrpm, u32 msr,
+			  int read, int write);
+void svm_set_x2apic_msr_interception(struct vcpu_svm *svm, bool disable);
+void svm_complete_interrupt_delivery(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int delivery_mode,
+				     int trig_mode, int vec);
+
+/* nested.c */
+
+#define NESTED_EXIT_HOST	0	/* Exit handled on host level */
+#define NESTED_EXIT_DONE	1	/* Exit caused nested vmexit  */
+#define NESTED_EXIT_CONTINUE	2	/* Further checks needed      */
+
+static inline bool nested_svm_virtualize_tpr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+
+	return is_guest_mode(vcpu) && (svm->nested.ctl.int_ctl & V_INTR_MASKING_MASK);
+}
+
+static inline bool nested_exit_on_smi(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
+{
+	return vmcb12_is_intercept(&svm->nested.ctl, INTERCEPT_SMI);
+}
+
+static inline bool nested_exit_on_intr(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
+{
+	return vmcb12_is_intercept(&svm->nested.ctl, INTERCEPT_INTR);
+}
+
+static inline bool nested_exit_on_nmi(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
+{
+	return vmcb12_is_intercept(&svm->nested.ctl, INTERCEPT_NMI);
+}
+
+int enter_svm_guest_mode(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+			 u64 vmcb_gpa, struct vmcb *vmcb12, bool from_vmrun);
+void svm_leave_nested(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+void svm_free_nested(struct vcpu_svm *svm);
+int svm_allocate_nested(struct vcpu_svm *svm);
+int nested_svm_vmrun(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+void svm_copy_vmrun_state(struct vmcb_save_area *to_save,
+			  struct vmcb_save_area *from_save);
+void svm_copy_vmloadsave_state(struct vmcb *to_vmcb, struct vmcb *from_vmcb);
+int nested_svm_vmexit(struct vcpu_svm *svm);
+
+static inline int nested_svm_simple_vmexit(struct vcpu_svm *svm, u32 exit_code)
+{
+	svm->vmcb->control.exit_code   = exit_code;
+	svm->vmcb->control.exit_info_1 = 0;
+	svm->vmcb->control.exit_info_2 = 0;
+	return nested_svm_vmexit(svm);
+}
+
+int nested_svm_exit_handled(struct vcpu_svm *svm);
+int nested_svm_check_permissions(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+int nested_svm_check_exception(struct vcpu_svm *svm, unsigned nr,
+			       bool has_error_code, u32 error_code);
+int nested_svm_exit_special(struct vcpu_svm *svm);
+void nested_svm_update_tsc_ratio_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+void svm_write_tsc_multiplier(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+void nested_copy_vmcb_control_to_cache(struct vcpu_svm *svm,
+				       struct vmcb_control_area *control);
+void nested_copy_vmcb_save_to_cache(struct vcpu_svm *svm,
+				    struct vmcb_save_area *save);
+void nested_sync_control_from_vmcb02(struct vcpu_svm *svm);
+void nested_vmcb02_compute_g_pat(struct vcpu_svm *svm);
+void svm_switch_vmcb(struct vcpu_svm *svm, struct kvm_vmcb_info *target_vmcb);
+
+extern struct kvm_x86_nested_ops svm_nested_ops;
+
+/* avic.c */
+#define AVIC_REQUIRED_APICV_INHIBITS			\
+(							\
+	BIT(APICV_INHIBIT_REASON_DISABLE) |		\
+	BIT(APICV_INHIBIT_REASON_ABSENT) |		\
+	BIT(APICV_INHIBIT_REASON_HYPERV) |		\
+	BIT(APICV_INHIBIT_REASON_NESTED) |		\
+	BIT(APICV_INHIBIT_REASON_IRQWIN) |		\
+	BIT(APICV_INHIBIT_REASON_PIT_REINJ) |		\
+	BIT(APICV_INHIBIT_REASON_BLOCKIRQ) |		\
+	BIT(APICV_INHIBIT_REASON_SEV)      |		\
+	BIT(APICV_INHIBIT_REASON_PHYSICAL_ID_ALIASED) |	\
+	BIT(APICV_INHIBIT_REASON_APIC_ID_MODIFIED) |	\
+	BIT(APICV_INHIBIT_REASON_APIC_BASE_MODIFIED) |	\
+	BIT(APICV_INHIBIT_REASON_LOGICAL_ID_ALIASED)	\
+)
+
+bool avic_hardware_setup(void);
+int avic_ga_log_notifier(u32 ga_tag);
+void avic_vm_destroy(struct kvm *kvm);
+int avic_vm_init(struct kvm *kvm);
+void avic_init_vmcb(struct vcpu_svm *svm, struct vmcb *vmcb);
+int avic_incomplete_ipi_interception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+int avic_unaccelerated_access_interception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+int avic_init_vcpu(struct vcpu_svm *svm);
+void avic_vcpu_load(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int cpu);
+void avic_vcpu_put(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+void avic_apicv_post_state_restore(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+void avic_refresh_apicv_exec_ctrl(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+int avic_pi_update_irte(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned int host_irq,
+			uint32_t guest_irq, bool set);
+void avic_vcpu_blocking(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+void avic_vcpu_unblocking(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+void avic_ring_doorbell(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+unsigned long avic_vcpu_get_apicv_inhibit_reasons(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+void avic_refresh_virtual_apic_mode(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+
+
+/* sev.c */
+
+#define GHCB_VERSION_MAX	1ULL
+#define GHCB_VERSION_MIN	1ULL
+
+
+extern unsigned int max_sev_asid;
+
+void sev_vm_destroy(struct kvm *kvm);
+int sev_mem_enc_ioctl(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp);
+int sev_mem_enc_register_region(struct kvm *kvm,
+				struct kvm_enc_region *range);
+int sev_mem_enc_unregister_region(struct kvm *kvm,
+				  struct kvm_enc_region *range);
+int sev_vm_copy_enc_context_from(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned int source_fd);
+int sev_vm_move_enc_context_from(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned int source_fd);
+void sev_guest_memory_reclaimed(struct kvm *kvm);
+
+void pre_sev_run(struct vcpu_svm *svm, int cpu);
+void __init sev_set_cpu_caps(void);
+void __init sev_hardware_setup(void);
+void sev_hardware_unsetup(void);
+int sev_cpu_init(struct svm_cpu_data *sd);
+void sev_init_vmcb(struct vcpu_svm *svm);
+void sev_vcpu_after_set_cpuid(struct vcpu_svm *svm);
+void sev_free_vcpu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+int sev_handle_vmgexit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+int sev_es_string_io(struct vcpu_svm *svm, int size, unsigned int port, int in);
+void sev_es_vcpu_reset(struct vcpu_svm *svm);
+void sev_vcpu_deliver_sipi_vector(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u8 vector);
+void sev_es_prepare_switch_to_guest(struct sev_es_save_area *hostsa);
+void sev_es_unmap_ghcb(struct vcpu_svm *svm);
+
+/* vmenter.S */
+
+void __svm_sev_es_vcpu_run(struct vcpu_svm *svm, bool spec_ctrl_intercepted);
+void __svm_vcpu_run(struct vcpu_svm *svm, bool spec_ctrl_intercepted);
+
+#define DEFINE_KVM_GHCB_ACCESSORS(field)						\
+	static __always_inline bool kvm_ghcb_##field##_is_valid(const struct vcpu_svm *svm) \
+	{									\
+		return test_bit(GHCB_BITMAP_IDX(field),				\
+				(unsigned long *)&svm->sev_es.valid_bitmap);	\
+	}									\
+										\
+	static __always_inline u64 kvm_ghcb_get_##field##_if_valid(struct vcpu_svm *svm, struct ghcb *ghcb) \
+	{									\
+		return kvm_ghcb_##field##_is_valid(svm) ? ghcb->save.field : 0;	\
+	}									\
+
+DEFINE_KVM_GHCB_ACCESSORS(cpl)
+DEFINE_KVM_GHCB_ACCESSORS(rax)
+DEFINE_KVM_GHCB_ACCESSORS(rcx)
+DEFINE_KVM_GHCB_ACCESSORS(rdx)
+DEFINE_KVM_GHCB_ACCESSORS(rbx)
+DEFINE_KVM_GHCB_ACCESSORS(rsi)
+DEFINE_KVM_GHCB_ACCESSORS(sw_exit_code)
+DEFINE_KVM_GHCB_ACCESSORS(sw_exit_info_1)
+DEFINE_KVM_GHCB_ACCESSORS(sw_exit_info_2)
+DEFINE_KVM_GHCB_ACCESSORS(sw_scratch)
+DEFINE_KVM_GHCB_ACCESSORS(xcr0)
+
+#endif
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm_onhyperv.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm_onhyperv.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..7af8422d3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm_onhyperv.c
@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * KVM L1 hypervisor optimizations on Hyper-V for SVM.
+ */
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
+
+#include <linux/kvm_host.h>
+
+#include <asm/mshyperv.h>
+
+#include "svm.h"
+#include "svm_ops.h"
+
+#include "hyperv.h"
+#include "kvm_onhyperv.h"
+#include "svm_onhyperv.h"
+
+int svm_hv_enable_l2_tlb_flush(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct hv_vmcb_enlightenments *hve;
+	struct hv_partition_assist_pg **p_hv_pa_pg =
+			&to_kvm_hv(vcpu->kvm)->hv_pa_pg;
+
+	if (!*p_hv_pa_pg)
+		*p_hv_pa_pg = kzalloc(PAGE_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
+
+	if (!*p_hv_pa_pg)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	hve = &to_svm(vcpu)->vmcb->control.hv_enlightenments;
+
+	hve->partition_assist_page = __pa(*p_hv_pa_pg);
+	hve->hv_vm_id = (unsigned long)vcpu->kvm;
+	if (!hve->hv_enlightenments_control.nested_flush_hypercall) {
+		hve->hv_enlightenments_control.nested_flush_hypercall = 1;
+		vmcb_mark_dirty(to_svm(vcpu)->vmcb, HV_VMCB_NESTED_ENLIGHTENMENTS);
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm_onhyperv.h b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm_onhyperv.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..f85bc617f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm_onhyperv.h
@@ -0,0 +1,116 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */
+/*
+ * KVM L1 hypervisor optimizations on Hyper-V for SVM.
+ */
+
+#ifndef __ARCH_X86_KVM_SVM_ONHYPERV_H__
+#define __ARCH_X86_KVM_SVM_ONHYPERV_H__
+
+#include <asm/mshyperv.h>
+
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HYPERV)
+
+#include "kvm_onhyperv.h"
+#include "svm/hyperv.h"
+
+static struct kvm_x86_ops svm_x86_ops;
+
+int svm_hv_enable_l2_tlb_flush(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+
+static inline bool svm_hv_is_enlightened_tlb_enabled(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct hv_vmcb_enlightenments *hve = &to_svm(vcpu)->vmcb->control.hv_enlightenments;
+
+	return ms_hyperv.nested_features & HV_X64_NESTED_ENLIGHTENED_TLB &&
+	       !!hve->hv_enlightenments_control.enlightened_npt_tlb;
+}
+
+static inline void svm_hv_init_vmcb(struct vmcb *vmcb)
+{
+	struct hv_vmcb_enlightenments *hve = &vmcb->control.hv_enlightenments;
+
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(vmcb->control.hv_enlightenments) !=
+		     sizeof(vmcb->control.reserved_sw));
+
+	if (npt_enabled &&
+	    ms_hyperv.nested_features & HV_X64_NESTED_ENLIGHTENED_TLB)
+		hve->hv_enlightenments_control.enlightened_npt_tlb = 1;
+
+	if (ms_hyperv.nested_features & HV_X64_NESTED_MSR_BITMAP)
+		hve->hv_enlightenments_control.msr_bitmap = 1;
+}
+
+static inline __init void svm_hv_hardware_setup(void)
+{
+	if (npt_enabled &&
+	    ms_hyperv.nested_features & HV_X64_NESTED_ENLIGHTENED_TLB) {
+		pr_info(KBUILD_MODNAME ": Hyper-V enlightened NPT TLB flush enabled\n");
+		svm_x86_ops.flush_remote_tlbs = hv_flush_remote_tlbs;
+		svm_x86_ops.flush_remote_tlbs_range = hv_flush_remote_tlbs_range;
+	}
+
+	if (ms_hyperv.nested_features & HV_X64_NESTED_DIRECT_FLUSH) {
+		int cpu;
+
+		pr_info(KBUILD_MODNAME ": Hyper-V Direct TLB Flush enabled\n");
+		for_each_online_cpu(cpu) {
+			struct hv_vp_assist_page *vp_ap =
+				hv_get_vp_assist_page(cpu);
+
+			if (!vp_ap)
+				continue;
+
+			vp_ap->nested_control.features.directhypercall = 1;
+		}
+		svm_x86_ops.enable_l2_tlb_flush =
+				svm_hv_enable_l2_tlb_flush;
+	}
+}
+
+static inline void svm_hv_vmcb_dirty_nested_enlightenments(
+		struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct vmcb *vmcb = to_svm(vcpu)->vmcb;
+	struct hv_vmcb_enlightenments *hve = &vmcb->control.hv_enlightenments;
+
+	if (hve->hv_enlightenments_control.msr_bitmap)
+		vmcb_mark_dirty(vmcb, HV_VMCB_NESTED_ENLIGHTENMENTS);
+}
+
+static inline void svm_hv_update_vp_id(struct vmcb *vmcb, struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct hv_vmcb_enlightenments *hve = &vmcb->control.hv_enlightenments;
+	u32 vp_index = kvm_hv_get_vpindex(vcpu);
+
+	if (hve->hv_vp_id != vp_index) {
+		hve->hv_vp_id = vp_index;
+		vmcb_mark_dirty(vmcb, HV_VMCB_NESTED_ENLIGHTENMENTS);
+	}
+}
+#else
+
+static inline bool svm_hv_is_enlightened_tlb_enabled(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	return false;
+}
+
+static inline void svm_hv_init_vmcb(struct vmcb *vmcb)
+{
+}
+
+static inline __init void svm_hv_hardware_setup(void)
+{
+}
+
+static inline void svm_hv_vmcb_dirty_nested_enlightenments(
+		struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+}
+
+static inline void svm_hv_update_vp_id(struct vmcb *vmcb,
+		struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_HYPERV */
+
+#endif /* __ARCH_X86_KVM_SVM_ONHYPERV_H__ */
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm_ops.h b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm_ops.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..36c8af87a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm_ops.h
@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+#ifndef __KVM_X86_SVM_OPS_H
+#define __KVM_X86_SVM_OPS_H
+
+#include <linux/compiler_types.h>
+
+#include "x86.h"
+
+#define svm_asm(insn, clobber...)				\
+do {								\
+	asm_volatile_goto("1: " __stringify(insn) "\n\t"	\
+			  _ASM_EXTABLE(1b, %l[fault])		\
+			  ::: clobber : fault);			\
+	return;							\
+fault:								\
+	kvm_spurious_fault();					\
+} while (0)
+
+#define svm_asm1(insn, op1, clobber...)				\
+do {								\
+	asm_volatile_goto("1: "  __stringify(insn) " %0\n\t"	\
+			  _ASM_EXTABLE(1b, %l[fault])		\
+			  :: op1 : clobber : fault);		\
+	return;							\
+fault:								\
+	kvm_spurious_fault();					\
+} while (0)
+
+#define svm_asm2(insn, op1, op2, clobber...)				\
+do {									\
+	asm_volatile_goto("1: "  __stringify(insn) " %1, %0\n\t"	\
+			  _ASM_EXTABLE(1b, %l[fault])			\
+			  :: op1, op2 : clobber : fault);		\
+	return;								\
+fault:									\
+	kvm_spurious_fault();						\
+} while (0)
+
+static inline void clgi(void)
+{
+	svm_asm(clgi);
+}
+
+static inline void stgi(void)
+{
+	svm_asm(stgi);
+}
+
+static inline void invlpga(unsigned long addr, u32 asid)
+{
+	svm_asm2(invlpga, "c"(asid), "a"(addr));
+}
+
+/*
+ * Despite being a physical address, the portion of rAX that is consumed by
+ * VMSAVE, VMLOAD, etc... is still controlled by the effective address size,
+ * hence 'unsigned long' instead of 'hpa_t'.
+ */
+static __always_inline void vmsave(unsigned long pa)
+{
+	svm_asm1(vmsave, "a" (pa), "memory");
+}
+
+#endif /* __KVM_X86_SVM_OPS_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/vmenter.S b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/vmenter.S
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..ef2ebabb0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/vmenter.S
@@ -0,0 +1,390 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+#include <linux/linkage.h>
+#include <asm/asm.h>
+#include <asm/asm-offsets.h>
+#include <asm/bitsperlong.h>
+#include <asm/kvm_vcpu_regs.h>
+#include <asm/nospec-branch.h>
+#include "kvm-asm-offsets.h"
+
+#define WORD_SIZE (BITS_PER_LONG / 8)
+
+/* Intentionally omit RAX as it's context switched by hardware */
+#define VCPU_RCX	(SVM_vcpu_arch_regs + __VCPU_REGS_RCX * WORD_SIZE)
+#define VCPU_RDX	(SVM_vcpu_arch_regs + __VCPU_REGS_RDX * WORD_SIZE)
+#define VCPU_RBX	(SVM_vcpu_arch_regs + __VCPU_REGS_RBX * WORD_SIZE)
+/* Intentionally omit RSP as it's context switched by hardware */
+#define VCPU_RBP	(SVM_vcpu_arch_regs + __VCPU_REGS_RBP * WORD_SIZE)
+#define VCPU_RSI	(SVM_vcpu_arch_regs + __VCPU_REGS_RSI * WORD_SIZE)
+#define VCPU_RDI	(SVM_vcpu_arch_regs + __VCPU_REGS_RDI * WORD_SIZE)
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+#define VCPU_R8		(SVM_vcpu_arch_regs + __VCPU_REGS_R8  * WORD_SIZE)
+#define VCPU_R9		(SVM_vcpu_arch_regs + __VCPU_REGS_R9  * WORD_SIZE)
+#define VCPU_R10	(SVM_vcpu_arch_regs + __VCPU_REGS_R10 * WORD_SIZE)
+#define VCPU_R11	(SVM_vcpu_arch_regs + __VCPU_REGS_R11 * WORD_SIZE)
+#define VCPU_R12	(SVM_vcpu_arch_regs + __VCPU_REGS_R12 * WORD_SIZE)
+#define VCPU_R13	(SVM_vcpu_arch_regs + __VCPU_REGS_R13 * WORD_SIZE)
+#define VCPU_R14	(SVM_vcpu_arch_regs + __VCPU_REGS_R14 * WORD_SIZE)
+#define VCPU_R15	(SVM_vcpu_arch_regs + __VCPU_REGS_R15 * WORD_SIZE)
+#endif
+
+#define SVM_vmcb01_pa	(SVM_vmcb01 + KVM_VMCB_pa)
+
+.section .noinstr.text, "ax"
+
+.macro RESTORE_GUEST_SPEC_CTRL
+	/* No need to do anything if SPEC_CTRL is unset or V_SPEC_CTRL is set */
+	ALTERNATIVE_2 "", \
+		"jmp 800f", X86_FEATURE_MSR_SPEC_CTRL, \
+		"", X86_FEATURE_V_SPEC_CTRL
+801:
+.endm
+.macro RESTORE_GUEST_SPEC_CTRL_BODY
+800:
+	/*
+	 * SPEC_CTRL handling: if the guest's SPEC_CTRL value differs from the
+	 * host's, write the MSR.  This is kept out-of-line so that the common
+	 * case does not have to jump.
+	 *
+	 * IMPORTANT: To avoid RSB underflow attacks and any other nastiness,
+	 * there must not be any returns or indirect branches between this code
+	 * and vmentry.
+	 */
+	movl SVM_spec_ctrl(%_ASM_DI), %eax
+	cmp PER_CPU_VAR(x86_spec_ctrl_current), %eax
+	je 801b
+	mov $MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, %ecx
+	xor %edx, %edx
+	wrmsr
+	jmp 801b
+.endm
+
+.macro RESTORE_HOST_SPEC_CTRL
+	/* No need to do anything if SPEC_CTRL is unset or V_SPEC_CTRL is set */
+	ALTERNATIVE_2 "", \
+		"jmp 900f", X86_FEATURE_MSR_SPEC_CTRL, \
+		"", X86_FEATURE_V_SPEC_CTRL
+901:
+.endm
+.macro RESTORE_HOST_SPEC_CTRL_BODY
+900:
+	/* Same for after vmexit.  */
+	mov $MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, %ecx
+
+	/*
+	 * Load the value that the guest had written into MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL,
+	 * if it was not intercepted during guest execution.
+	 */
+	cmpb $0, (%_ASM_SP)
+	jnz 998f
+	rdmsr
+	movl %eax, SVM_spec_ctrl(%_ASM_DI)
+998:
+
+	/* Now restore the host value of the MSR if different from the guest's.  */
+	movl PER_CPU_VAR(x86_spec_ctrl_current), %eax
+	cmp SVM_spec_ctrl(%_ASM_DI), %eax
+	je 901b
+	xor %edx, %edx
+	wrmsr
+	jmp 901b
+.endm
+
+
+/**
+ * __svm_vcpu_run - Run a vCPU via a transition to SVM guest mode
+ * @svm:	struct vcpu_svm *
+ * @spec_ctrl_intercepted: bool
+ */
+SYM_FUNC_START(__svm_vcpu_run)
+	push %_ASM_BP
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+	push %r15
+	push %r14
+	push %r13
+	push %r12
+#else
+	push %edi
+	push %esi
+#endif
+	push %_ASM_BX
+
+	/*
+	 * Save variables needed after vmexit on the stack, in inverse
+	 * order compared to when they are needed.
+	 */
+
+	/* Accessed directly from the stack in RESTORE_HOST_SPEC_CTRL.  */
+	push %_ASM_ARG2
+
+	/* Needed to restore access to percpu variables.  */
+	__ASM_SIZE(push) PER_CPU_VAR(svm_data + SD_save_area_pa)
+
+	/* Finally save @svm. */
+	push %_ASM_ARG1
+
+.ifnc _ASM_ARG1, _ASM_DI
+	/*
+	 * Stash @svm in RDI early. On 32-bit, arguments are in RAX, RCX
+	 * and RDX which are clobbered by RESTORE_GUEST_SPEC_CTRL.
+	 */
+	mov %_ASM_ARG1, %_ASM_DI
+.endif
+
+	/* Clobbers RAX, RCX, RDX.  */
+	RESTORE_GUEST_SPEC_CTRL
+
+	/*
+	 * Use a single vmcb (vmcb01 because it's always valid) for
+	 * context switching guest state via VMLOAD/VMSAVE, that way
+	 * the state doesn't need to be copied between vmcb01 and
+	 * vmcb02 when switching vmcbs for nested virtualization.
+	 */
+	mov SVM_vmcb01_pa(%_ASM_DI), %_ASM_AX
+1:	vmload %_ASM_AX
+2:
+
+	/* Get svm->current_vmcb->pa into RAX. */
+	mov SVM_current_vmcb(%_ASM_DI), %_ASM_AX
+	mov KVM_VMCB_pa(%_ASM_AX), %_ASM_AX
+
+	/* Load guest registers. */
+	mov VCPU_RCX(%_ASM_DI), %_ASM_CX
+	mov VCPU_RDX(%_ASM_DI), %_ASM_DX
+	mov VCPU_RBX(%_ASM_DI), %_ASM_BX
+	mov VCPU_RBP(%_ASM_DI), %_ASM_BP
+	mov VCPU_RSI(%_ASM_DI), %_ASM_SI
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+	mov VCPU_R8 (%_ASM_DI),  %r8
+	mov VCPU_R9 (%_ASM_DI),  %r9
+	mov VCPU_R10(%_ASM_DI), %r10
+	mov VCPU_R11(%_ASM_DI), %r11
+	mov VCPU_R12(%_ASM_DI), %r12
+	mov VCPU_R13(%_ASM_DI), %r13
+	mov VCPU_R14(%_ASM_DI), %r14
+	mov VCPU_R15(%_ASM_DI), %r15
+#endif
+	mov VCPU_RDI(%_ASM_DI), %_ASM_DI
+
+	/* Enter guest mode */
+	sti
+
+3:	vmrun %_ASM_AX
+4:
+	cli
+
+	/* Pop @svm to RAX while it's the only available register. */
+	pop %_ASM_AX
+
+	/* Save all guest registers.  */
+	mov %_ASM_CX,   VCPU_RCX(%_ASM_AX)
+	mov %_ASM_DX,   VCPU_RDX(%_ASM_AX)
+	mov %_ASM_BX,   VCPU_RBX(%_ASM_AX)
+	mov %_ASM_BP,   VCPU_RBP(%_ASM_AX)
+	mov %_ASM_SI,   VCPU_RSI(%_ASM_AX)
+	mov %_ASM_DI,   VCPU_RDI(%_ASM_AX)
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+	mov %r8,  VCPU_R8 (%_ASM_AX)
+	mov %r9,  VCPU_R9 (%_ASM_AX)
+	mov %r10, VCPU_R10(%_ASM_AX)
+	mov %r11, VCPU_R11(%_ASM_AX)
+	mov %r12, VCPU_R12(%_ASM_AX)
+	mov %r13, VCPU_R13(%_ASM_AX)
+	mov %r14, VCPU_R14(%_ASM_AX)
+	mov %r15, VCPU_R15(%_ASM_AX)
+#endif
+
+	/* @svm can stay in RDI from now on.  */
+	mov %_ASM_AX, %_ASM_DI
+
+	mov SVM_vmcb01_pa(%_ASM_DI), %_ASM_AX
+5:	vmsave %_ASM_AX
+6:
+
+	/* Restores GSBASE among other things, allowing access to percpu data.  */
+	pop %_ASM_AX
+7:	vmload %_ASM_AX
+8:
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
+	/* IMPORTANT: Stuff the RSB immediately after VM-Exit, before RET! */
+	FILL_RETURN_BUFFER %_ASM_AX, RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS, X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE
+#endif
+
+	/* Clobbers RAX, RCX, RDX.  */
+	RESTORE_HOST_SPEC_CTRL
+
+	/*
+	 * Mitigate RETBleed for AMD/Hygon Zen uarch. RET should be
+	 * untrained as soon as we exit the VM and are back to the
+	 * kernel. This should be done before re-enabling interrupts
+	 * because interrupt handlers won't sanitize 'ret' if the return is
+	 * from the kernel.
+	 */
+	UNTRAIN_RET_VM
+
+	/*
+	 * Clear all general purpose registers except RSP and RAX to prevent
+	 * speculative use of the guest's values, even those that are reloaded
+	 * via the stack.  In theory, an L1 cache miss when restoring registers
+	 * could lead to speculative execution with the guest's values.
+	 * Zeroing XORs are dirt cheap, i.e. the extra paranoia is essentially
+	 * free.  RSP and RAX are exempt as they are restored by hardware
+	 * during VM-Exit.
+	 */
+	xor %ecx, %ecx
+	xor %edx, %edx
+	xor %ebx, %ebx
+	xor %ebp, %ebp
+	xor %esi, %esi
+	xor %edi, %edi
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+	xor %r8d,  %r8d
+	xor %r9d,  %r9d
+	xor %r10d, %r10d
+	xor %r11d, %r11d
+	xor %r12d, %r12d
+	xor %r13d, %r13d
+	xor %r14d, %r14d
+	xor %r15d, %r15d
+#endif
+
+	/* "Pop" @spec_ctrl_intercepted.  */
+	pop %_ASM_BX
+
+	pop %_ASM_BX
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+	pop %r12
+	pop %r13
+	pop %r14
+	pop %r15
+#else
+	pop %esi
+	pop %edi
+#endif
+	pop %_ASM_BP
+	RET
+
+	RESTORE_GUEST_SPEC_CTRL_BODY
+	RESTORE_HOST_SPEC_CTRL_BODY
+
+10:	cmpb $0, kvm_rebooting
+	jne 2b
+	ud2
+30:	cmpb $0, kvm_rebooting
+	jne 4b
+	ud2
+50:	cmpb $0, kvm_rebooting
+	jne 6b
+	ud2
+70:	cmpb $0, kvm_rebooting
+	jne 8b
+	ud2
+
+	_ASM_EXTABLE(1b, 10b)
+	_ASM_EXTABLE(3b, 30b)
+	_ASM_EXTABLE(5b, 50b)
+	_ASM_EXTABLE(7b, 70b)
+
+SYM_FUNC_END(__svm_vcpu_run)
+
+/**
+ * __svm_sev_es_vcpu_run - Run a SEV-ES vCPU via a transition to SVM guest mode
+ * @svm:	struct vcpu_svm *
+ * @spec_ctrl_intercepted: bool
+ */
+SYM_FUNC_START(__svm_sev_es_vcpu_run)
+	push %_ASM_BP
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+	push %r15
+	push %r14
+	push %r13
+	push %r12
+#else
+	push %edi
+	push %esi
+#endif
+	push %_ASM_BX
+
+	/*
+	 * Save variables needed after vmexit on the stack, in inverse
+	 * order compared to when they are needed.
+	 */
+
+	/* Accessed directly from the stack in RESTORE_HOST_SPEC_CTRL.  */
+	push %_ASM_ARG2
+
+	/* Save @svm. */
+	push %_ASM_ARG1
+
+.ifnc _ASM_ARG1, _ASM_DI
+	/*
+	 * Stash @svm in RDI early. On 32-bit, arguments are in RAX, RCX
+	 * and RDX which are clobbered by RESTORE_GUEST_SPEC_CTRL.
+	 */
+	mov %_ASM_ARG1, %_ASM_DI
+.endif
+
+	/* Clobbers RAX, RCX, RDX.  */
+	RESTORE_GUEST_SPEC_CTRL
+
+	/* Get svm->current_vmcb->pa into RAX. */
+	mov SVM_current_vmcb(%_ASM_DI), %_ASM_AX
+	mov KVM_VMCB_pa(%_ASM_AX), %_ASM_AX
+
+	/* Enter guest mode */
+	sti
+
+1:	vmrun %_ASM_AX
+
+2:	cli
+
+	/* Pop @svm to RDI, guest registers have been saved already. */
+	pop %_ASM_DI
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
+	/* IMPORTANT: Stuff the RSB immediately after VM-Exit, before RET! */
+	FILL_RETURN_BUFFER %_ASM_AX, RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS, X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE
+#endif
+
+	/* Clobbers RAX, RCX, RDX.  */
+	RESTORE_HOST_SPEC_CTRL
+
+	/*
+	 * Mitigate RETBleed for AMD/Hygon Zen uarch. RET should be
+	 * untrained as soon as we exit the VM and are back to the
+	 * kernel. This should be done before re-enabling interrupts
+	 * because interrupt handlers won't sanitize RET if the return is
+	 * from the kernel.
+	 */
+	UNTRAIN_RET_VM
+
+	/* "Pop" @spec_ctrl_intercepted.  */
+	pop %_ASM_BX
+
+	pop %_ASM_BX
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+	pop %r12
+	pop %r13
+	pop %r14
+	pop %r15
+#else
+	pop %esi
+	pop %edi
+#endif
+	pop %_ASM_BP
+	RET
+
+	RESTORE_GUEST_SPEC_CTRL_BODY
+	RESTORE_HOST_SPEC_CTRL_BODY
+
+3:	cmpb $0, kvm_rebooting
+	jne 2b
+	ud2
+
+	_ASM_EXTABLE(1b, 3b)
+
+SYM_FUNC_END(__svm_sev_es_vcpu_run)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/trace.h b/arch/x86/kvm/trace.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..838433798
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/trace.h
@@ -0,0 +1,1842 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+#if !defined(_TRACE_KVM_H) || defined(TRACE_HEADER_MULTI_READ)
+#define _TRACE_KVM_H
+
+#include <linux/tracepoint.h>
+#include <asm/vmx.h>
+#include <asm/svm.h>
+#include <asm/clocksource.h>
+#include <asm/pvclock-abi.h>
+
+#undef TRACE_SYSTEM
+#define TRACE_SYSTEM kvm
+
+/*
+ * Tracepoint for guest mode entry.
+ */
+TRACE_EVENT(kvm_entry,
+	TP_PROTO(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu),
+	TP_ARGS(vcpu),
+
+	TP_STRUCT__entry(
+		__field(	unsigned int,	vcpu_id		)
+		__field(	unsigned long,	rip		)
+	),
+
+	TP_fast_assign(
+		__entry->vcpu_id        = vcpu->vcpu_id;
+		__entry->rip		= kvm_rip_read(vcpu);
+	),
+
+	TP_printk("vcpu %u, rip 0x%lx", __entry->vcpu_id, __entry->rip)
+);
+
+/*
+ * Tracepoint for hypercall.
+ */
+TRACE_EVENT(kvm_hypercall,
+	TP_PROTO(unsigned long nr, unsigned long a0, unsigned long a1,
+		 unsigned long a2, unsigned long a3),
+	TP_ARGS(nr, a0, a1, a2, a3),
+
+	TP_STRUCT__entry(
+		__field(	unsigned long, 	nr		)
+		__field(	unsigned long,	a0		)
+		__field(	unsigned long,	a1		)
+		__field(	unsigned long,	a2		)
+		__field(	unsigned long,	a3		)
+	),
+
+	TP_fast_assign(
+		__entry->nr		= nr;
+		__entry->a0		= a0;
+		__entry->a1		= a1;
+		__entry->a2		= a2;
+		__entry->a3		= a3;
+	),
+
+	TP_printk("nr 0x%lx a0 0x%lx a1 0x%lx a2 0x%lx a3 0x%lx",
+		 __entry->nr, __entry->a0, __entry->a1,  __entry->a2,
+		 __entry->a3)
+);
+
+/*
+ * Tracepoint for hypercall.
+ */
+TRACE_EVENT(kvm_hv_hypercall,
+	TP_PROTO(__u16 code, bool fast,  __u16 var_cnt, __u16 rep_cnt,
+		 __u16 rep_idx, __u64 ingpa, __u64 outgpa),
+	TP_ARGS(code, fast, var_cnt, rep_cnt, rep_idx, ingpa, outgpa),
+
+	TP_STRUCT__entry(
+		__field(	__u16,		rep_cnt		)
+		__field(	__u16,		rep_idx		)
+		__field(	__u64,		ingpa		)
+		__field(	__u64,		outgpa		)
+		__field(	__u16, 		code		)
+		__field(	__u16,		var_cnt		)
+		__field(	bool,		fast		)
+	),
+
+	TP_fast_assign(
+		__entry->rep_cnt	= rep_cnt;
+		__entry->rep_idx	= rep_idx;
+		__entry->ingpa		= ingpa;
+		__entry->outgpa		= outgpa;
+		__entry->code		= code;
+		__entry->var_cnt	= var_cnt;
+		__entry->fast		= fast;
+	),
+
+	TP_printk("code 0x%x %s var_cnt 0x%x rep_cnt 0x%x idx 0x%x in 0x%llx out 0x%llx",
+		  __entry->code, __entry->fast ? "fast" : "slow",
+		  __entry->var_cnt, __entry->rep_cnt, __entry->rep_idx,
+		  __entry->ingpa, __entry->outgpa)
+);
+
+TRACE_EVENT(kvm_hv_hypercall_done,
+	TP_PROTO(u64 result),
+	TP_ARGS(result),
+
+	TP_STRUCT__entry(
+		__field(__u64, result)
+	),
+
+	TP_fast_assign(
+		__entry->result	= result;
+	),
+
+	TP_printk("result 0x%llx", __entry->result)
+);
+
+/*
+ * Tracepoint for Xen hypercall.
+ */
+TRACE_EVENT(kvm_xen_hypercall,
+	    TP_PROTO(u8 cpl, unsigned long nr,
+		     unsigned long a0, unsigned long a1, unsigned long a2,
+		     unsigned long a3, unsigned long a4, unsigned long a5),
+	    TP_ARGS(cpl, nr, a0, a1, a2, a3, a4, a5),
+
+	TP_STRUCT__entry(
+		__field(u8, cpl)
+		__field(unsigned long, nr)
+		__field(unsigned long, a0)
+		__field(unsigned long, a1)
+		__field(unsigned long, a2)
+		__field(unsigned long, a3)
+		__field(unsigned long, a4)
+		__field(unsigned long, a5)
+	),
+
+	TP_fast_assign(
+		__entry->cpl = cpl;
+		__entry->nr = nr;
+		__entry->a0 = a0;
+		__entry->a1 = a1;
+		__entry->a2 = a2;
+		__entry->a3 = a3;
+		__entry->a4 = a4;
+		__entry->a4 = a5;
+	),
+
+	TP_printk("cpl %d nr 0x%lx a0 0x%lx a1 0x%lx a2 0x%lx a3 0x%lx a4 0x%lx a5 %lx",
+		  __entry->cpl, __entry->nr,
+		  __entry->a0, __entry->a1, __entry->a2,
+		  __entry->a3, __entry->a4, __entry->a5)
+);
+
+
+
+/*
+ * Tracepoint for PIO.
+ */
+
+#define KVM_PIO_IN   0
+#define KVM_PIO_OUT  1
+
+TRACE_EVENT(kvm_pio,
+	TP_PROTO(unsigned int rw, unsigned int port, unsigned int size,
+		 unsigned int count, const void *data),
+	TP_ARGS(rw, port, size, count, data),
+
+	TP_STRUCT__entry(
+		__field(	unsigned int, 	rw		)
+		__field(	unsigned int, 	port		)
+		__field(	unsigned int, 	size		)
+		__field(	unsigned int,	count		)
+		__field(	unsigned int,	val		)
+	),
+
+	TP_fast_assign(
+		__entry->rw		= rw;
+		__entry->port		= port;
+		__entry->size		= size;
+		__entry->count		= count;
+		if (size == 1)
+			__entry->val	= *(unsigned char *)data;
+		else if (size == 2)
+			__entry->val	= *(unsigned short *)data;
+		else
+			__entry->val	= *(unsigned int *)data;
+	),
+
+	TP_printk("pio_%s at 0x%x size %d count %d val 0x%x %s",
+		  __entry->rw ? "write" : "read",
+		  __entry->port, __entry->size, __entry->count, __entry->val,
+		  __entry->count > 1 ? "(...)" : "")
+);
+
+/*
+ * Tracepoint for fast mmio.
+ */
+TRACE_EVENT(kvm_fast_mmio,
+	TP_PROTO(u64 gpa),
+	TP_ARGS(gpa),
+
+	TP_STRUCT__entry(
+		__field(u64,	gpa)
+	),
+
+	TP_fast_assign(
+		__entry->gpa		= gpa;
+	),
+
+	TP_printk("fast mmio at gpa 0x%llx", __entry->gpa)
+);
+
+/*
+ * Tracepoint for cpuid.
+ */
+TRACE_EVENT(kvm_cpuid,
+	TP_PROTO(unsigned int function, unsigned int index, unsigned long rax,
+		 unsigned long rbx, unsigned long rcx, unsigned long rdx,
+		 bool found, bool used_max_basic),
+	TP_ARGS(function, index, rax, rbx, rcx, rdx, found, used_max_basic),
+
+	TP_STRUCT__entry(
+		__field(	unsigned int,	function	)
+		__field(	unsigned int,	index		)
+		__field(	unsigned long,	rax		)
+		__field(	unsigned long,	rbx		)
+		__field(	unsigned long,	rcx		)
+		__field(	unsigned long,	rdx		)
+		__field(	bool,		found		)
+		__field(	bool,		used_max_basic	)
+	),
+
+	TP_fast_assign(
+		__entry->function	= function;
+		__entry->index		= index;
+		__entry->rax		= rax;
+		__entry->rbx		= rbx;
+		__entry->rcx		= rcx;
+		__entry->rdx		= rdx;
+		__entry->found		= found;
+		__entry->used_max_basic	= used_max_basic;
+	),
+
+	TP_printk("func %x idx %x rax %lx rbx %lx rcx %lx rdx %lx, cpuid entry %s%s",
+		  __entry->function, __entry->index, __entry->rax,
+		  __entry->rbx, __entry->rcx, __entry->rdx,
+		  __entry->found ? "found" : "not found",
+		  __entry->used_max_basic ? ", used max basic" : "")
+);
+
+#define AREG(x) { APIC_##x, "APIC_" #x }
+
+#define kvm_trace_symbol_apic						    \
+	AREG(ID), AREG(LVR), AREG(TASKPRI), AREG(ARBPRI), AREG(PROCPRI),    \
+	AREG(EOI), AREG(RRR), AREG(LDR), AREG(DFR), AREG(SPIV), AREG(ISR),  \
+	AREG(TMR), AREG(IRR), AREG(ESR), AREG(ICR), AREG(ICR2), AREG(LVTT), \
+	AREG(LVTTHMR), AREG(LVTPC), AREG(LVT0), AREG(LVT1), AREG(LVTERR),   \
+	AREG(TMICT), AREG(TMCCT), AREG(TDCR), AREG(SELF_IPI), AREG(EFEAT),  \
+	AREG(ECTRL)
+/*
+ * Tracepoint for apic access.
+ */
+TRACE_EVENT(kvm_apic,
+	TP_PROTO(unsigned int rw, unsigned int reg, u64 val),
+	TP_ARGS(rw, reg, val),
+
+	TP_STRUCT__entry(
+		__field(	unsigned int,	rw		)
+		__field(	unsigned int,	reg		)
+		__field(	u64,		val		)
+	),
+
+	TP_fast_assign(
+		__entry->rw		= rw;
+		__entry->reg		= reg;
+		__entry->val		= val;
+	),
+
+	TP_printk("apic_%s %s = 0x%llx",
+		  __entry->rw ? "write" : "read",
+		  __print_symbolic(__entry->reg, kvm_trace_symbol_apic),
+		  __entry->val)
+);
+
+#define trace_kvm_apic_read(reg, val)		trace_kvm_apic(0, reg, val)
+#define trace_kvm_apic_write(reg, val)		trace_kvm_apic(1, reg, val)
+
+#define KVM_ISA_VMX   1
+#define KVM_ISA_SVM   2
+
+#define kvm_print_exit_reason(exit_reason, isa)				\
+	(isa == KVM_ISA_VMX) ?						\
+	__print_symbolic(exit_reason & 0xffff, VMX_EXIT_REASONS) :	\
+	__print_symbolic(exit_reason, SVM_EXIT_REASONS),		\
+	(isa == KVM_ISA_VMX && exit_reason & ~0xffff) ? " " : "",	\
+	(isa == KVM_ISA_VMX) ?						\
+	__print_flags(exit_reason & ~0xffff, " ", VMX_EXIT_REASON_FLAGS) : ""
+
+#define TRACE_EVENT_KVM_EXIT(name)					     \
+TRACE_EVENT(name,							     \
+	TP_PROTO(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 isa),			     \
+	TP_ARGS(vcpu, isa),						     \
+									     \
+	TP_STRUCT__entry(						     \
+		__field(	unsigned int,	exit_reason	)	     \
+		__field(	unsigned long,	guest_rip	)	     \
+		__field(	u32,	        isa             )	     \
+		__field(	u64,	        info1           )	     \
+		__field(	u64,	        info2           )	     \
+		__field(	u32,	        intr_info	)	     \
+		__field(	u32,	        error_code	)	     \
+		__field(	unsigned int,	vcpu_id         )	     \
+	),								     \
+									     \
+	TP_fast_assign(							     \
+		__entry->guest_rip	= kvm_rip_read(vcpu);		     \
+		__entry->isa            = isa;				     \
+		__entry->vcpu_id        = vcpu->vcpu_id;		     \
+		static_call(kvm_x86_get_exit_info)(vcpu,		     \
+					  &__entry->exit_reason,	     \
+					  &__entry->info1,		     \
+					  &__entry->info2,		     \
+					  &__entry->intr_info,		     \
+					  &__entry->error_code);	     \
+	),								     \
+									     \
+	TP_printk("vcpu %u reason %s%s%s rip 0x%lx info1 0x%016llx "	     \
+		  "info2 0x%016llx intr_info 0x%08x error_code 0x%08x",	     \
+		  __entry->vcpu_id,					     \
+		  kvm_print_exit_reason(__entry->exit_reason, __entry->isa), \
+		  __entry->guest_rip, __entry->info1, __entry->info2,	     \
+		  __entry->intr_info, __entry->error_code)		     \
+)
+
+/*
+ * Tracepoint for kvm guest exit:
+ */
+TRACE_EVENT_KVM_EXIT(kvm_exit);
+
+/*
+ * Tracepoint for kvm interrupt injection:
+ */
+TRACE_EVENT(kvm_inj_virq,
+	TP_PROTO(unsigned int vector, bool soft, bool reinjected),
+	TP_ARGS(vector, soft, reinjected),
+
+	TP_STRUCT__entry(
+		__field(	unsigned int,	vector		)
+		__field(	bool,		soft		)
+		__field(	bool,		reinjected	)
+	),
+
+	TP_fast_assign(
+		__entry->vector		= vector;
+		__entry->soft		= soft;
+		__entry->reinjected	= reinjected;
+	),
+
+	TP_printk("%s 0x%x%s",
+		  __entry->soft ? "Soft/INTn" : "IRQ", __entry->vector,
+		  __entry->reinjected ? " [reinjected]" : "")
+);
+
+#define EXS(x) { x##_VECTOR, "#" #x }
+
+#define kvm_trace_sym_exc						\
+	EXS(DE), EXS(DB), EXS(BP), EXS(OF), EXS(BR), EXS(UD), EXS(NM),	\
+	EXS(DF), EXS(TS), EXS(NP), EXS(SS), EXS(GP), EXS(PF),		\
+	EXS(MF), EXS(AC), EXS(MC)
+
+/*
+ * Tracepoint for kvm interrupt injection:
+ */
+TRACE_EVENT(kvm_inj_exception,
+	TP_PROTO(unsigned exception, bool has_error, unsigned error_code,
+		 bool reinjected),
+	TP_ARGS(exception, has_error, error_code, reinjected),
+
+	TP_STRUCT__entry(
+		__field(	u8,	exception	)
+		__field(	u8,	has_error	)
+		__field(	u32,	error_code	)
+		__field(	bool,	reinjected	)
+	),
+
+	TP_fast_assign(
+		__entry->exception	= exception;
+		__entry->has_error	= has_error;
+		__entry->error_code	= error_code;
+		__entry->reinjected	= reinjected;
+	),
+
+	TP_printk("%s%s%s%s%s",
+		  __print_symbolic(__entry->exception, kvm_trace_sym_exc),
+		  !__entry->has_error ? "" : " (",
+		  !__entry->has_error ? "" : __print_symbolic(__entry->error_code, { }),
+		  !__entry->has_error ? "" : ")",
+		  __entry->reinjected ? " [reinjected]" : "")
+);
+
+/*
+ * Tracepoint for page fault.
+ */
+TRACE_EVENT(kvm_page_fault,
+	TP_PROTO(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 fault_address, u64 error_code),
+	TP_ARGS(vcpu, fault_address, error_code),
+
+	TP_STRUCT__entry(
+		__field(	unsigned int,	vcpu_id		)
+		__field(	unsigned long,	guest_rip	)
+		__field(	u64,		fault_address	)
+		__field(	u64,		error_code	)
+	),
+
+	TP_fast_assign(
+		__entry->vcpu_id	= vcpu->vcpu_id;
+		__entry->guest_rip	= kvm_rip_read(vcpu);
+		__entry->fault_address	= fault_address;
+		__entry->error_code	= error_code;
+	),
+
+	TP_printk("vcpu %u rip 0x%lx address 0x%016llx error_code 0x%llx",
+		  __entry->vcpu_id, __entry->guest_rip,
+		  __entry->fault_address, __entry->error_code)
+);
+
+/*
+ * Tracepoint for guest MSR access.
+ */
+TRACE_EVENT(kvm_msr,
+	TP_PROTO(unsigned write, u32 ecx, u64 data, bool exception),
+	TP_ARGS(write, ecx, data, exception),
+
+	TP_STRUCT__entry(
+		__field(	unsigned,	write		)
+		__field(	u32,		ecx		)
+		__field(	u64,		data		)
+		__field(	u8,		exception	)
+	),
+
+	TP_fast_assign(
+		__entry->write		= write;
+		__entry->ecx		= ecx;
+		__entry->data		= data;
+		__entry->exception	= exception;
+	),
+
+	TP_printk("msr_%s %x = 0x%llx%s",
+		  __entry->write ? "write" : "read",
+		  __entry->ecx, __entry->data,
+		  __entry->exception ? " (#GP)" : "")
+);
+
+#define trace_kvm_msr_read(ecx, data)      trace_kvm_msr(0, ecx, data, false)
+#define trace_kvm_msr_write(ecx, data)     trace_kvm_msr(1, ecx, data, false)
+#define trace_kvm_msr_read_ex(ecx)         trace_kvm_msr(0, ecx, 0, true)
+#define trace_kvm_msr_write_ex(ecx, data)  trace_kvm_msr(1, ecx, data, true)
+
+/*
+ * Tracepoint for guest CR access.
+ */
+TRACE_EVENT(kvm_cr,
+	TP_PROTO(unsigned int rw, unsigned int cr, unsigned long val),
+	TP_ARGS(rw, cr, val),
+
+	TP_STRUCT__entry(
+		__field(	unsigned int,	rw		)
+		__field(	unsigned int,	cr		)
+		__field(	unsigned long,	val		)
+	),
+
+	TP_fast_assign(
+		__entry->rw		= rw;
+		__entry->cr		= cr;
+		__entry->val		= val;
+	),
+
+	TP_printk("cr_%s %x = 0x%lx",
+		  __entry->rw ? "write" : "read",
+		  __entry->cr, __entry->val)
+);
+
+#define trace_kvm_cr_read(cr, val)		trace_kvm_cr(0, cr, val)
+#define trace_kvm_cr_write(cr, val)		trace_kvm_cr(1, cr, val)
+
+TRACE_EVENT(kvm_pic_set_irq,
+	    TP_PROTO(__u8 chip, __u8 pin, __u8 elcr, __u8 imr, bool coalesced),
+	    TP_ARGS(chip, pin, elcr, imr, coalesced),
+
+	TP_STRUCT__entry(
+		__field(	__u8,		chip		)
+		__field(	__u8,		pin		)
+		__field(	__u8,		elcr		)
+		__field(	__u8,		imr		)
+		__field(	bool,		coalesced	)
+	),
+
+	TP_fast_assign(
+		__entry->chip		= chip;
+		__entry->pin		= pin;
+		__entry->elcr		= elcr;
+		__entry->imr		= imr;
+		__entry->coalesced	= coalesced;
+	),
+
+	TP_printk("chip %u pin %u (%s%s)%s",
+		  __entry->chip, __entry->pin,
+		  (__entry->elcr & (1 << __entry->pin)) ? "level":"edge",
+		  (__entry->imr & (1 << __entry->pin)) ? "|masked":"",
+		  __entry->coalesced ? " (coalesced)" : "")
+);
+
+#define kvm_apic_dst_shorthand		\
+	{0x0, "dst"},			\
+	{0x1, "self"},			\
+	{0x2, "all"},			\
+	{0x3, "all-but-self"}
+
+TRACE_EVENT(kvm_apic_ipi,
+	    TP_PROTO(__u32 icr_low, __u32 dest_id),
+	    TP_ARGS(icr_low, dest_id),
+
+	TP_STRUCT__entry(
+		__field(	__u32,		icr_low		)
+		__field(	__u32,		dest_id		)
+	),
+
+	TP_fast_assign(
+		__entry->icr_low	= icr_low;
+		__entry->dest_id	= dest_id;
+	),
+
+	TP_printk("dst %x vec %u (%s|%s|%s|%s|%s)",
+		  __entry->dest_id, (u8)__entry->icr_low,
+		  __print_symbolic((__entry->icr_low >> 8 & 0x7),
+				   kvm_deliver_mode),
+		  (__entry->icr_low & (1<<11)) ? "logical" : "physical",
+		  (__entry->icr_low & (1<<14)) ? "assert" : "de-assert",
+		  (__entry->icr_low & (1<<15)) ? "level" : "edge",
+		  __print_symbolic((__entry->icr_low >> 18 & 0x3),
+				   kvm_apic_dst_shorthand))
+);
+
+TRACE_EVENT(kvm_apic_accept_irq,
+	    TP_PROTO(__u32 apicid, __u16 dm, __u16 tm, __u8 vec),
+	    TP_ARGS(apicid, dm, tm, vec),
+
+	TP_STRUCT__entry(
+		__field(	__u32,		apicid		)
+		__field(	__u16,		dm		)
+		__field(	__u16,		tm		)
+		__field(	__u8,		vec		)
+	),
+
+	TP_fast_assign(
+		__entry->apicid		= apicid;
+		__entry->dm		= dm;
+		__entry->tm		= tm;
+		__entry->vec		= vec;
+	),
+
+	TP_printk("apicid %x vec %u (%s|%s)",
+		  __entry->apicid, __entry->vec,
+		  __print_symbolic((__entry->dm >> 8 & 0x7), kvm_deliver_mode),
+		  __entry->tm ? "level" : "edge")
+);
+
+TRACE_EVENT(kvm_eoi,
+	    TP_PROTO(struct kvm_lapic *apic, int vector),
+	    TP_ARGS(apic, vector),
+
+	TP_STRUCT__entry(
+		__field(	__u32,		apicid		)
+		__field(	int,		vector		)
+	),
+
+	TP_fast_assign(
+		__entry->apicid		= apic->vcpu->vcpu_id;
+		__entry->vector		= vector;
+	),
+
+	TP_printk("apicid %x vector %d", __entry->apicid, __entry->vector)
+);
+
+TRACE_EVENT(kvm_pv_eoi,
+	    TP_PROTO(struct kvm_lapic *apic, int vector),
+	    TP_ARGS(apic, vector),
+
+	TP_STRUCT__entry(
+		__field(	__u32,		apicid		)
+		__field(	int,		vector		)
+	),
+
+	TP_fast_assign(
+		__entry->apicid		= apic->vcpu->vcpu_id;
+		__entry->vector		= vector;
+	),
+
+	TP_printk("apicid %x vector %d", __entry->apicid, __entry->vector)
+);
+
+/*
+ * Tracepoint for nested VMRUN
+ */
+TRACE_EVENT(kvm_nested_vmenter,
+	    TP_PROTO(__u64 rip, __u64 vmcb, __u64 nested_rip, __u32 int_ctl,
+		     __u32 event_inj, bool tdp_enabled, __u64 guest_tdp_pgd,
+		     __u64 guest_cr3, __u32 isa),
+	    TP_ARGS(rip, vmcb, nested_rip, int_ctl, event_inj, tdp_enabled,
+		    guest_tdp_pgd, guest_cr3, isa),
+
+	TP_STRUCT__entry(
+		__field(	__u64,		rip		)
+		__field(	__u64,		vmcb		)
+		__field(	__u64,		nested_rip	)
+		__field(	__u32,		int_ctl		)
+		__field(	__u32,		event_inj	)
+		__field(	bool,		tdp_enabled	)
+		__field(	__u64,		guest_pgd	)
+		__field(	__u32,		isa		)
+	),
+
+	TP_fast_assign(
+		__entry->rip		= rip;
+		__entry->vmcb		= vmcb;
+		__entry->nested_rip	= nested_rip;
+		__entry->int_ctl	= int_ctl;
+		__entry->event_inj	= event_inj;
+		__entry->tdp_enabled	= tdp_enabled;
+		__entry->guest_pgd	= tdp_enabled ? guest_tdp_pgd : guest_cr3;
+		__entry->isa		= isa;
+	),
+
+	TP_printk("rip: 0x%016llx %s: 0x%016llx nested_rip: 0x%016llx "
+		  "int_ctl: 0x%08x event_inj: 0x%08x nested_%s=%s %s: 0x%016llx",
+		  __entry->rip,
+		  __entry->isa == KVM_ISA_VMX ? "vmcs" : "vmcb",
+		  __entry->vmcb,
+		  __entry->nested_rip,
+		  __entry->int_ctl,
+		  __entry->event_inj,
+		  __entry->isa == KVM_ISA_VMX ? "ept" : "npt",
+		  __entry->tdp_enabled ? "y" : "n",
+		  !__entry->tdp_enabled ? "guest_cr3" :
+		  __entry->isa == KVM_ISA_VMX ? "nested_eptp" : "nested_cr3",
+		  __entry->guest_pgd)
+);
+
+TRACE_EVENT(kvm_nested_intercepts,
+	    TP_PROTO(__u16 cr_read, __u16 cr_write, __u32 exceptions,
+		     __u32 intercept1, __u32 intercept2, __u32 intercept3),
+	    TP_ARGS(cr_read, cr_write, exceptions, intercept1,
+		    intercept2, intercept3),
+
+	TP_STRUCT__entry(
+		__field(	__u16,		cr_read		)
+		__field(	__u16,		cr_write	)
+		__field(	__u32,		exceptions	)
+		__field(	__u32,		intercept1	)
+		__field(	__u32,		intercept2	)
+		__field(	__u32,		intercept3	)
+	),
+
+	TP_fast_assign(
+		__entry->cr_read	= cr_read;
+		__entry->cr_write	= cr_write;
+		__entry->exceptions	= exceptions;
+		__entry->intercept1	= intercept1;
+		__entry->intercept2	= intercept2;
+		__entry->intercept3	= intercept3;
+	),
+
+	TP_printk("cr_read: %04x cr_write: %04x excp: %08x "
+		  "intercepts: %08x %08x %08x",
+		  __entry->cr_read, __entry->cr_write, __entry->exceptions,
+		  __entry->intercept1, __entry->intercept2, __entry->intercept3)
+);
+/*
+ * Tracepoint for #VMEXIT while nested
+ */
+TRACE_EVENT_KVM_EXIT(kvm_nested_vmexit);
+
+/*
+ * Tracepoint for #VMEXIT reinjected to the guest
+ */
+TRACE_EVENT(kvm_nested_vmexit_inject,
+	    TP_PROTO(__u32 exit_code,
+		     __u64 exit_info1, __u64 exit_info2,
+		     __u32 exit_int_info, __u32 exit_int_info_err, __u32 isa),
+	    TP_ARGS(exit_code, exit_info1, exit_info2,
+		    exit_int_info, exit_int_info_err, isa),
+
+	TP_STRUCT__entry(
+		__field(	__u32,		exit_code		)
+		__field(	__u64,		exit_info1		)
+		__field(	__u64,		exit_info2		)
+		__field(	__u32,		exit_int_info		)
+		__field(	__u32,		exit_int_info_err	)
+		__field(	__u32,		isa			)
+	),
+
+	TP_fast_assign(
+		__entry->exit_code		= exit_code;
+		__entry->exit_info1		= exit_info1;
+		__entry->exit_info2		= exit_info2;
+		__entry->exit_int_info		= exit_int_info;
+		__entry->exit_int_info_err	= exit_int_info_err;
+		__entry->isa			= isa;
+	),
+
+	TP_printk("reason: %s%s%s ext_inf1: 0x%016llx "
+		  "ext_inf2: 0x%016llx ext_int: 0x%08x ext_int_err: 0x%08x",
+		  kvm_print_exit_reason(__entry->exit_code, __entry->isa),
+		  __entry->exit_info1, __entry->exit_info2,
+		  __entry->exit_int_info, __entry->exit_int_info_err)
+);
+
+/*
+ * Tracepoint for nested #vmexit because of interrupt pending
+ */
+TRACE_EVENT(kvm_nested_intr_vmexit,
+	    TP_PROTO(__u64 rip),
+	    TP_ARGS(rip),
+
+	TP_STRUCT__entry(
+		__field(	__u64,	rip	)
+	),
+
+	TP_fast_assign(
+		__entry->rip	=	rip
+	),
+
+	TP_printk("rip: 0x%016llx", __entry->rip)
+);
+
+/*
+ * Tracepoint for nested #vmexit because of interrupt pending
+ */
+TRACE_EVENT(kvm_invlpga,
+	    TP_PROTO(__u64 rip, int asid, u64 address),
+	    TP_ARGS(rip, asid, address),
+
+	TP_STRUCT__entry(
+		__field(	__u64,	rip	)
+		__field(	int,	asid	)
+		__field(	__u64,	address	)
+	),
+
+	TP_fast_assign(
+		__entry->rip		=	rip;
+		__entry->asid		=	asid;
+		__entry->address	=	address;
+	),
+
+	TP_printk("rip: 0x%016llx asid: %d address: 0x%016llx",
+		  __entry->rip, __entry->asid, __entry->address)
+);
+
+/*
+ * Tracepoint for nested #vmexit because of interrupt pending
+ */
+TRACE_EVENT(kvm_skinit,
+	    TP_PROTO(__u64 rip, __u32 slb),
+	    TP_ARGS(rip, slb),
+
+	TP_STRUCT__entry(
+		__field(	__u64,	rip	)
+		__field(	__u32,	slb	)
+	),
+
+	TP_fast_assign(
+		__entry->rip		=	rip;
+		__entry->slb		=	slb;
+	),
+
+	TP_printk("rip: 0x%016llx slb: 0x%08x",
+		  __entry->rip, __entry->slb)
+);
+
+#define KVM_EMUL_INSN_F_CR0_PE (1 << 0)
+#define KVM_EMUL_INSN_F_EFL_VM (1 << 1)
+#define KVM_EMUL_INSN_F_CS_D   (1 << 2)
+#define KVM_EMUL_INSN_F_CS_L   (1 << 3)
+
+#define kvm_trace_symbol_emul_flags	                  \
+	{ 0,   			    "real" },		  \
+	{ KVM_EMUL_INSN_F_CR0_PE			  \
+	  | KVM_EMUL_INSN_F_EFL_VM, "vm16" },		  \
+	{ KVM_EMUL_INSN_F_CR0_PE,   "prot16" },		  \
+	{ KVM_EMUL_INSN_F_CR0_PE			  \
+	  | KVM_EMUL_INSN_F_CS_D,   "prot32" },		  \
+	{ KVM_EMUL_INSN_F_CR0_PE			  \
+	  | KVM_EMUL_INSN_F_CS_L,   "prot64" }
+
+#define kei_decode_mode(mode) ({			\
+	u8 flags = 0xff;				\
+	switch (mode) {					\
+	case X86EMUL_MODE_REAL:				\
+		flags = 0;				\
+		break;					\
+	case X86EMUL_MODE_VM86:				\
+		flags = KVM_EMUL_INSN_F_EFL_VM;		\
+		break;					\
+	case X86EMUL_MODE_PROT16:			\
+		flags = KVM_EMUL_INSN_F_CR0_PE;		\
+		break;					\
+	case X86EMUL_MODE_PROT32:			\
+		flags = KVM_EMUL_INSN_F_CR0_PE		\
+			| KVM_EMUL_INSN_F_CS_D;		\
+		break;					\
+	case X86EMUL_MODE_PROT64:			\
+		flags = KVM_EMUL_INSN_F_CR0_PE		\
+			| KVM_EMUL_INSN_F_CS_L;		\
+		break;					\
+	}						\
+	flags;						\
+	})
+
+TRACE_EVENT(kvm_emulate_insn,
+	TP_PROTO(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, __u8 failed),
+	TP_ARGS(vcpu, failed),
+
+	TP_STRUCT__entry(
+		__field(    __u64, rip                       )
+		__field(    __u32, csbase                    )
+		__field(    __u8,  len                       )
+		__array(    __u8,  insn,    15	             )
+		__field(    __u8,  flags       	   	     )
+		__field(    __u8,  failed                    )
+		),
+
+	TP_fast_assign(
+		__entry->csbase = static_call(kvm_x86_get_segment_base)(vcpu, VCPU_SREG_CS);
+		__entry->len = vcpu->arch.emulate_ctxt->fetch.ptr
+			       - vcpu->arch.emulate_ctxt->fetch.data;
+		__entry->rip = vcpu->arch.emulate_ctxt->_eip - __entry->len;
+		memcpy(__entry->insn,
+		       vcpu->arch.emulate_ctxt->fetch.data,
+		       15);
+		__entry->flags = kei_decode_mode(vcpu->arch.emulate_ctxt->mode);
+		__entry->failed = failed;
+		),
+
+	TP_printk("%x:%llx:%s (%s)%s",
+		  __entry->csbase, __entry->rip,
+		  __print_hex(__entry->insn, __entry->len),
+		  __print_symbolic(__entry->flags,
+				   kvm_trace_symbol_emul_flags),
+		  __entry->failed ? " failed" : ""
+		)
+	);
+
+#define trace_kvm_emulate_insn_start(vcpu) trace_kvm_emulate_insn(vcpu, 0)
+#define trace_kvm_emulate_insn_failed(vcpu) trace_kvm_emulate_insn(vcpu, 1)
+
+TRACE_EVENT(
+	vcpu_match_mmio,
+	TP_PROTO(gva_t gva, gpa_t gpa, bool write, bool gpa_match),
+	TP_ARGS(gva, gpa, write, gpa_match),
+
+	TP_STRUCT__entry(
+		__field(gva_t, gva)
+		__field(gpa_t, gpa)
+		__field(bool, write)
+		__field(bool, gpa_match)
+		),
+
+	TP_fast_assign(
+		__entry->gva = gva;
+		__entry->gpa = gpa;
+		__entry->write = write;
+		__entry->gpa_match = gpa_match
+		),
+
+	TP_printk("gva %#lx gpa %#llx %s %s", __entry->gva, __entry->gpa,
+		  __entry->write ? "Write" : "Read",
+		  __entry->gpa_match ? "GPA" : "GVA")
+);
+
+TRACE_EVENT(kvm_write_tsc_offset,
+	TP_PROTO(unsigned int vcpu_id, __u64 previous_tsc_offset,
+		 __u64 next_tsc_offset),
+	TP_ARGS(vcpu_id, previous_tsc_offset, next_tsc_offset),
+
+	TP_STRUCT__entry(
+		__field( unsigned int,	vcpu_id				)
+		__field(	__u64,	previous_tsc_offset		)
+		__field(	__u64,	next_tsc_offset			)
+	),
+
+	TP_fast_assign(
+		__entry->vcpu_id		= vcpu_id;
+		__entry->previous_tsc_offset	= previous_tsc_offset;
+		__entry->next_tsc_offset	= next_tsc_offset;
+	),
+
+	TP_printk("vcpu=%u prev=%llu next=%llu", __entry->vcpu_id,
+		  __entry->previous_tsc_offset, __entry->next_tsc_offset)
+);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+
+#define host_clocks					\
+	{VDSO_CLOCKMODE_NONE, "none"},			\
+	{VDSO_CLOCKMODE_TSC,  "tsc"}			\
+
+TRACE_EVENT(kvm_update_master_clock,
+	TP_PROTO(bool use_master_clock, unsigned int host_clock, bool offset_matched),
+	TP_ARGS(use_master_clock, host_clock, offset_matched),
+
+	TP_STRUCT__entry(
+		__field(		bool,	use_master_clock	)
+		__field(	unsigned int,	host_clock		)
+		__field(		bool,	offset_matched		)
+	),
+
+	TP_fast_assign(
+		__entry->use_master_clock	= use_master_clock;
+		__entry->host_clock		= host_clock;
+		__entry->offset_matched		= offset_matched;
+	),
+
+	TP_printk("masterclock %d hostclock %s offsetmatched %u",
+		  __entry->use_master_clock,
+		  __print_symbolic(__entry->host_clock, host_clocks),
+		  __entry->offset_matched)
+);
+
+TRACE_EVENT(kvm_track_tsc,
+	TP_PROTO(unsigned int vcpu_id, unsigned int nr_matched,
+		 unsigned int online_vcpus, bool use_master_clock,
+		 unsigned int host_clock),
+	TP_ARGS(vcpu_id, nr_matched, online_vcpus, use_master_clock,
+		host_clock),
+
+	TP_STRUCT__entry(
+		__field(	unsigned int,	vcpu_id			)
+		__field(	unsigned int,	nr_vcpus_matched_tsc	)
+		__field(	unsigned int,	online_vcpus		)
+		__field(	bool,		use_master_clock	)
+		__field(	unsigned int,	host_clock		)
+	),
+
+	TP_fast_assign(
+		__entry->vcpu_id		= vcpu_id;
+		__entry->nr_vcpus_matched_tsc	= nr_matched;
+		__entry->online_vcpus		= online_vcpus;
+		__entry->use_master_clock	= use_master_clock;
+		__entry->host_clock		= host_clock;
+	),
+
+	TP_printk("vcpu_id %u masterclock %u offsetmatched %u nr_online %u"
+		  " hostclock %s",
+		  __entry->vcpu_id, __entry->use_master_clock,
+		  __entry->nr_vcpus_matched_tsc, __entry->online_vcpus,
+		  __print_symbolic(__entry->host_clock, host_clocks))
+);
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_X86_64 */
+
+/*
+ * Tracepoint for PML full VMEXIT.
+ */
+TRACE_EVENT(kvm_pml_full,
+	TP_PROTO(unsigned int vcpu_id),
+	TP_ARGS(vcpu_id),
+
+	TP_STRUCT__entry(
+		__field(	unsigned int,	vcpu_id			)
+	),
+
+	TP_fast_assign(
+		__entry->vcpu_id		= vcpu_id;
+	),
+
+	TP_printk("vcpu %d: PML full", __entry->vcpu_id)
+);
+
+TRACE_EVENT(kvm_ple_window_update,
+	TP_PROTO(unsigned int vcpu_id, unsigned int new, unsigned int old),
+	TP_ARGS(vcpu_id, new, old),
+
+	TP_STRUCT__entry(
+		__field(        unsigned int,   vcpu_id         )
+		__field(        unsigned int,       new         )
+		__field(        unsigned int,       old         )
+	),
+
+	TP_fast_assign(
+		__entry->vcpu_id        = vcpu_id;
+		__entry->new            = new;
+		__entry->old            = old;
+	),
+
+	TP_printk("vcpu %u old %u new %u (%s)",
+	          __entry->vcpu_id, __entry->old, __entry->new,
+		  __entry->old < __entry->new ? "growed" : "shrinked")
+);
+
+TRACE_EVENT(kvm_pvclock_update,
+	TP_PROTO(unsigned int vcpu_id, struct pvclock_vcpu_time_info *pvclock),
+	TP_ARGS(vcpu_id, pvclock),
+
+	TP_STRUCT__entry(
+		__field(	unsigned int,	vcpu_id			)
+		__field(	__u32,		version			)
+		__field(	__u64,		tsc_timestamp		)
+		__field(	__u64,		system_time		)
+		__field(	__u32,		tsc_to_system_mul	)
+		__field(	__s8,		tsc_shift		)
+		__field(	__u8,		flags			)
+	),
+
+	TP_fast_assign(
+		__entry->vcpu_id	   = vcpu_id;
+		__entry->version	   = pvclock->version;
+		__entry->tsc_timestamp	   = pvclock->tsc_timestamp;
+		__entry->system_time	   = pvclock->system_time;
+		__entry->tsc_to_system_mul = pvclock->tsc_to_system_mul;
+		__entry->tsc_shift	   = pvclock->tsc_shift;
+		__entry->flags		   = pvclock->flags;
+	),
+
+	TP_printk("vcpu_id %u, pvclock { version %u, tsc_timestamp 0x%llx, "
+		  "system_time 0x%llx, tsc_to_system_mul 0x%x, tsc_shift %d, "
+		  "flags 0x%x }",
+		  __entry->vcpu_id,
+		  __entry->version,
+		  __entry->tsc_timestamp,
+		  __entry->system_time,
+		  __entry->tsc_to_system_mul,
+		  __entry->tsc_shift,
+		  __entry->flags)
+);
+
+TRACE_EVENT(kvm_wait_lapic_expire,
+	TP_PROTO(unsigned int vcpu_id, s64 delta),
+	TP_ARGS(vcpu_id, delta),
+
+	TP_STRUCT__entry(
+		__field(	unsigned int,	vcpu_id		)
+		__field(	s64,		delta		)
+	),
+
+	TP_fast_assign(
+		__entry->vcpu_id	   = vcpu_id;
+		__entry->delta             = delta;
+	),
+
+	TP_printk("vcpu %u: delta %lld (%s)",
+		  __entry->vcpu_id,
+		  __entry->delta,
+		  __entry->delta < 0 ? "early" : "late")
+);
+
+TRACE_EVENT(kvm_smm_transition,
+	TP_PROTO(unsigned int vcpu_id, u64 smbase, bool entering),
+	TP_ARGS(vcpu_id, smbase, entering),
+
+	TP_STRUCT__entry(
+		__field(	unsigned int,	vcpu_id		)
+		__field(	u64,		smbase		)
+		__field(	bool,		entering	)
+	),
+
+	TP_fast_assign(
+		__entry->vcpu_id	= vcpu_id;
+		__entry->smbase		= smbase;
+		__entry->entering	= entering;
+	),
+
+	TP_printk("vcpu %u: %s SMM, smbase 0x%llx",
+		  __entry->vcpu_id,
+		  __entry->entering ? "entering" : "leaving",
+		  __entry->smbase)
+);
+
+/*
+ * Tracepoint for VT-d posted-interrupts.
+ */
+TRACE_EVENT(kvm_pi_irte_update,
+	TP_PROTO(unsigned int host_irq, unsigned int vcpu_id,
+		 unsigned int gsi, unsigned int gvec,
+		 u64 pi_desc_addr, bool set),
+	TP_ARGS(host_irq, vcpu_id, gsi, gvec, pi_desc_addr, set),
+
+	TP_STRUCT__entry(
+		__field(	unsigned int,	host_irq	)
+		__field(	unsigned int,	vcpu_id		)
+		__field(	unsigned int,	gsi		)
+		__field(	unsigned int,	gvec		)
+		__field(	u64,		pi_desc_addr	)
+		__field(	bool,		set		)
+	),
+
+	TP_fast_assign(
+		__entry->host_irq	= host_irq;
+		__entry->vcpu_id	= vcpu_id;
+		__entry->gsi		= gsi;
+		__entry->gvec		= gvec;
+		__entry->pi_desc_addr	= pi_desc_addr;
+		__entry->set		= set;
+	),
+
+	TP_printk("VT-d PI is %s for irq %u, vcpu %u, gsi: 0x%x, "
+		  "gvec: 0x%x, pi_desc_addr: 0x%llx",
+		  __entry->set ? "enabled and being updated" : "disabled",
+		  __entry->host_irq,
+		  __entry->vcpu_id,
+		  __entry->gsi,
+		  __entry->gvec,
+		  __entry->pi_desc_addr)
+);
+
+/*
+ * Tracepoint for kvm_hv_notify_acked_sint.
+ */
+TRACE_EVENT(kvm_hv_notify_acked_sint,
+	TP_PROTO(int vcpu_id, u32 sint),
+	TP_ARGS(vcpu_id, sint),
+
+	TP_STRUCT__entry(
+		__field(int, vcpu_id)
+		__field(u32, sint)
+	),
+
+	TP_fast_assign(
+		__entry->vcpu_id = vcpu_id;
+		__entry->sint = sint;
+	),
+
+	TP_printk("vcpu_id %d sint %u", __entry->vcpu_id, __entry->sint)
+);
+
+/*
+ * Tracepoint for synic_set_irq.
+ */
+TRACE_EVENT(kvm_hv_synic_set_irq,
+	TP_PROTO(int vcpu_id, u32 sint, int vector, int ret),
+	TP_ARGS(vcpu_id, sint, vector, ret),
+
+	TP_STRUCT__entry(
+		__field(int, vcpu_id)
+		__field(u32, sint)
+		__field(int, vector)
+		__field(int, ret)
+	),
+
+	TP_fast_assign(
+		__entry->vcpu_id = vcpu_id;
+		__entry->sint = sint;
+		__entry->vector = vector;
+		__entry->ret = ret;
+	),
+
+	TP_printk("vcpu_id %d sint %u vector %d ret %d",
+		  __entry->vcpu_id, __entry->sint, __entry->vector,
+		  __entry->ret)
+);
+
+/*
+ * Tracepoint for kvm_hv_synic_send_eoi.
+ */
+TRACE_EVENT(kvm_hv_synic_send_eoi,
+	TP_PROTO(int vcpu_id, int vector),
+	TP_ARGS(vcpu_id, vector),
+
+	TP_STRUCT__entry(
+		__field(int, vcpu_id)
+		__field(u32, sint)
+		__field(int, vector)
+		__field(int, ret)
+	),
+
+	TP_fast_assign(
+		__entry->vcpu_id = vcpu_id;
+		__entry->vector	= vector;
+	),
+
+	TP_printk("vcpu_id %d vector %d", __entry->vcpu_id, __entry->vector)
+);
+
+/*
+ * Tracepoint for synic_set_msr.
+ */
+TRACE_EVENT(kvm_hv_synic_set_msr,
+	TP_PROTO(int vcpu_id, u32 msr, u64 data, bool host),
+	TP_ARGS(vcpu_id, msr, data, host),
+
+	TP_STRUCT__entry(
+		__field(int, vcpu_id)
+		__field(u32, msr)
+		__field(u64, data)
+		__field(bool, host)
+	),
+
+	TP_fast_assign(
+		__entry->vcpu_id = vcpu_id;
+		__entry->msr = msr;
+		__entry->data = data;
+		__entry->host = host
+	),
+
+	TP_printk("vcpu_id %d msr 0x%x data 0x%llx host %d",
+		  __entry->vcpu_id, __entry->msr, __entry->data, __entry->host)
+);
+
+/*
+ * Tracepoint for stimer_set_config.
+ */
+TRACE_EVENT(kvm_hv_stimer_set_config,
+	TP_PROTO(int vcpu_id, int timer_index, u64 config, bool host),
+	TP_ARGS(vcpu_id, timer_index, config, host),
+
+	TP_STRUCT__entry(
+		__field(int, vcpu_id)
+		__field(int, timer_index)
+		__field(u64, config)
+		__field(bool, host)
+	),
+
+	TP_fast_assign(
+		__entry->vcpu_id = vcpu_id;
+		__entry->timer_index = timer_index;
+		__entry->config = config;
+		__entry->host = host;
+	),
+
+	TP_printk("vcpu_id %d timer %d config 0x%llx host %d",
+		  __entry->vcpu_id, __entry->timer_index, __entry->config,
+		  __entry->host)
+);
+
+/*
+ * Tracepoint for stimer_set_count.
+ */
+TRACE_EVENT(kvm_hv_stimer_set_count,
+	TP_PROTO(int vcpu_id, int timer_index, u64 count, bool host),
+	TP_ARGS(vcpu_id, timer_index, count, host),
+
+	TP_STRUCT__entry(
+		__field(int, vcpu_id)
+		__field(int, timer_index)
+		__field(u64, count)
+		__field(bool, host)
+	),
+
+	TP_fast_assign(
+		__entry->vcpu_id = vcpu_id;
+		__entry->timer_index = timer_index;
+		__entry->count = count;
+		__entry->host = host;
+	),
+
+	TP_printk("vcpu_id %d timer %d count %llu host %d",
+		  __entry->vcpu_id, __entry->timer_index, __entry->count,
+		  __entry->host)
+);
+
+/*
+ * Tracepoint for stimer_start(periodic timer case).
+ */
+TRACE_EVENT(kvm_hv_stimer_start_periodic,
+	TP_PROTO(int vcpu_id, int timer_index, u64 time_now, u64 exp_time),
+	TP_ARGS(vcpu_id, timer_index, time_now, exp_time),
+
+	TP_STRUCT__entry(
+		__field(int, vcpu_id)
+		__field(int, timer_index)
+		__field(u64, time_now)
+		__field(u64, exp_time)
+	),
+
+	TP_fast_assign(
+		__entry->vcpu_id = vcpu_id;
+		__entry->timer_index = timer_index;
+		__entry->time_now = time_now;
+		__entry->exp_time = exp_time;
+	),
+
+	TP_printk("vcpu_id %d timer %d time_now %llu exp_time %llu",
+		  __entry->vcpu_id, __entry->timer_index, __entry->time_now,
+		  __entry->exp_time)
+);
+
+/*
+ * Tracepoint for stimer_start(one-shot timer case).
+ */
+TRACE_EVENT(kvm_hv_stimer_start_one_shot,
+	TP_PROTO(int vcpu_id, int timer_index, u64 time_now, u64 count),
+	TP_ARGS(vcpu_id, timer_index, time_now, count),
+
+	TP_STRUCT__entry(
+		__field(int, vcpu_id)
+		__field(int, timer_index)
+		__field(u64, time_now)
+		__field(u64, count)
+	),
+
+	TP_fast_assign(
+		__entry->vcpu_id = vcpu_id;
+		__entry->timer_index = timer_index;
+		__entry->time_now = time_now;
+		__entry->count = count;
+	),
+
+	TP_printk("vcpu_id %d timer %d time_now %llu count %llu",
+		  __entry->vcpu_id, __entry->timer_index, __entry->time_now,
+		  __entry->count)
+);
+
+/*
+ * Tracepoint for stimer_timer_callback.
+ */
+TRACE_EVENT(kvm_hv_stimer_callback,
+	TP_PROTO(int vcpu_id, int timer_index),
+	TP_ARGS(vcpu_id, timer_index),
+
+	TP_STRUCT__entry(
+		__field(int, vcpu_id)
+		__field(int, timer_index)
+	),
+
+	TP_fast_assign(
+		__entry->vcpu_id = vcpu_id;
+		__entry->timer_index = timer_index;
+	),
+
+	TP_printk("vcpu_id %d timer %d",
+		  __entry->vcpu_id, __entry->timer_index)
+);
+
+/*
+ * Tracepoint for stimer_expiration.
+ */
+TRACE_EVENT(kvm_hv_stimer_expiration,
+	TP_PROTO(int vcpu_id, int timer_index, int direct, int msg_send_result),
+	TP_ARGS(vcpu_id, timer_index, direct, msg_send_result),
+
+	TP_STRUCT__entry(
+		__field(int, vcpu_id)
+		__field(int, timer_index)
+		__field(int, direct)
+		__field(int, msg_send_result)
+	),
+
+	TP_fast_assign(
+		__entry->vcpu_id = vcpu_id;
+		__entry->timer_index = timer_index;
+		__entry->direct = direct;
+		__entry->msg_send_result = msg_send_result;
+	),
+
+	TP_printk("vcpu_id %d timer %d direct %d send result %d",
+		  __entry->vcpu_id, __entry->timer_index,
+		  __entry->direct, __entry->msg_send_result)
+);
+
+/*
+ * Tracepoint for stimer_cleanup.
+ */
+TRACE_EVENT(kvm_hv_stimer_cleanup,
+	TP_PROTO(int vcpu_id, int timer_index),
+	TP_ARGS(vcpu_id, timer_index),
+
+	TP_STRUCT__entry(
+		__field(int, vcpu_id)
+		__field(int, timer_index)
+	),
+
+	TP_fast_assign(
+		__entry->vcpu_id = vcpu_id;
+		__entry->timer_index = timer_index;
+	),
+
+	TP_printk("vcpu_id %d timer %d",
+		  __entry->vcpu_id, __entry->timer_index)
+);
+
+TRACE_EVENT(kvm_apicv_inhibit_changed,
+	    TP_PROTO(int reason, bool set, unsigned long inhibits),
+	    TP_ARGS(reason, set, inhibits),
+
+	TP_STRUCT__entry(
+		__field(int, reason)
+		__field(bool, set)
+		__field(unsigned long, inhibits)
+	),
+
+	TP_fast_assign(
+		__entry->reason = reason;
+		__entry->set = set;
+		__entry->inhibits = inhibits;
+	),
+
+	TP_printk("%s reason=%u, inhibits=0x%lx",
+		  __entry->set ? "set" : "cleared",
+		  __entry->reason, __entry->inhibits)
+);
+
+TRACE_EVENT(kvm_apicv_accept_irq,
+	    TP_PROTO(__u32 apicid, __u16 dm, __u16 tm, __u8 vec),
+	    TP_ARGS(apicid, dm, tm, vec),
+
+	TP_STRUCT__entry(
+		__field(	__u32,		apicid		)
+		__field(	__u16,		dm		)
+		__field(	__u16,		tm		)
+		__field(	__u8,		vec		)
+	),
+
+	TP_fast_assign(
+		__entry->apicid		= apicid;
+		__entry->dm		= dm;
+		__entry->tm		= tm;
+		__entry->vec		= vec;
+	),
+
+	TP_printk("apicid %x vec %u (%s|%s)",
+		  __entry->apicid, __entry->vec,
+		  __print_symbolic((__entry->dm >> 8 & 0x7), kvm_deliver_mode),
+		  __entry->tm ? "level" : "edge")
+);
+
+/*
+ * Tracepoint for AMD AVIC
+ */
+TRACE_EVENT(kvm_avic_incomplete_ipi,
+	    TP_PROTO(u32 vcpu, u32 icrh, u32 icrl, u32 id, u32 index),
+	    TP_ARGS(vcpu, icrh, icrl, id, index),
+
+	TP_STRUCT__entry(
+		__field(u32, vcpu)
+		__field(u32, icrh)
+		__field(u32, icrl)
+		__field(u32, id)
+		__field(u32, index)
+	),
+
+	TP_fast_assign(
+		__entry->vcpu = vcpu;
+		__entry->icrh = icrh;
+		__entry->icrl = icrl;
+		__entry->id = id;
+		__entry->index = index;
+	),
+
+	TP_printk("vcpu=%u, icrh:icrl=%#010x:%08x, id=%u, index=%u",
+		  __entry->vcpu, __entry->icrh, __entry->icrl,
+		  __entry->id, __entry->index)
+);
+
+TRACE_EVENT(kvm_avic_unaccelerated_access,
+	    TP_PROTO(u32 vcpu, u32 offset, bool ft, bool rw, u32 vec),
+	    TP_ARGS(vcpu, offset, ft, rw, vec),
+
+	TP_STRUCT__entry(
+		__field(u32, vcpu)
+		__field(u32, offset)
+		__field(bool, ft)
+		__field(bool, rw)
+		__field(u32, vec)
+	),
+
+	TP_fast_assign(
+		__entry->vcpu = vcpu;
+		__entry->offset = offset;
+		__entry->ft = ft;
+		__entry->rw = rw;
+		__entry->vec = vec;
+	),
+
+	TP_printk("vcpu=%u, offset=%#x(%s), %s, %s, vec=%#x",
+		  __entry->vcpu,
+		  __entry->offset,
+		  __print_symbolic(__entry->offset, kvm_trace_symbol_apic),
+		  __entry->ft ? "trap" : "fault",
+		  __entry->rw ? "write" : "read",
+		  __entry->vec)
+);
+
+TRACE_EVENT(kvm_avic_ga_log,
+	    TP_PROTO(u32 vmid, u32 vcpuid),
+	    TP_ARGS(vmid, vcpuid),
+
+	TP_STRUCT__entry(
+		__field(u32, vmid)
+		__field(u32, vcpuid)
+	),
+
+	TP_fast_assign(
+		__entry->vmid = vmid;
+		__entry->vcpuid = vcpuid;
+	),
+
+	TP_printk("vmid=%u, vcpuid=%u",
+		  __entry->vmid, __entry->vcpuid)
+);
+
+TRACE_EVENT(kvm_avic_kick_vcpu_slowpath,
+	    TP_PROTO(u32 icrh, u32 icrl, u32 index),
+	    TP_ARGS(icrh, icrl, index),
+
+	TP_STRUCT__entry(
+		__field(u32, icrh)
+		__field(u32, icrl)
+		__field(u32, index)
+	),
+
+	TP_fast_assign(
+		__entry->icrh = icrh;
+		__entry->icrl = icrl;
+		__entry->index = index;
+	),
+
+	TP_printk("icrh:icrl=%#08x:%08x, index=%u",
+		  __entry->icrh, __entry->icrl, __entry->index)
+);
+
+TRACE_EVENT(kvm_avic_doorbell,
+	    TP_PROTO(u32 vcpuid, u32 apicid),
+	    TP_ARGS(vcpuid, apicid),
+
+	TP_STRUCT__entry(
+		__field(u32, vcpuid)
+		__field(u32, apicid)
+	),
+
+	TP_fast_assign(
+		__entry->vcpuid = vcpuid;
+		__entry->apicid = apicid;
+	),
+
+	TP_printk("vcpuid=%u, apicid=%u",
+		  __entry->vcpuid, __entry->apicid)
+);
+
+TRACE_EVENT(kvm_hv_timer_state,
+		TP_PROTO(unsigned int vcpu_id, unsigned int hv_timer_in_use),
+		TP_ARGS(vcpu_id, hv_timer_in_use),
+		TP_STRUCT__entry(
+			__field(unsigned int, vcpu_id)
+			__field(unsigned int, hv_timer_in_use)
+			),
+		TP_fast_assign(
+			__entry->vcpu_id = vcpu_id;
+			__entry->hv_timer_in_use = hv_timer_in_use;
+			),
+		TP_printk("vcpu_id %x hv_timer %x",
+			__entry->vcpu_id,
+			__entry->hv_timer_in_use)
+);
+
+/*
+ * Tracepoint for kvm_hv_flush_tlb.
+ */
+TRACE_EVENT(kvm_hv_flush_tlb,
+	TP_PROTO(u64 processor_mask, u64 address_space, u64 flags, bool guest_mode),
+	TP_ARGS(processor_mask, address_space, flags, guest_mode),
+
+	TP_STRUCT__entry(
+		__field(u64, processor_mask)
+		__field(u64, address_space)
+		__field(u64, flags)
+		__field(bool, guest_mode)
+	),
+
+	TP_fast_assign(
+		__entry->processor_mask = processor_mask;
+		__entry->address_space = address_space;
+		__entry->flags = flags;
+		__entry->guest_mode = guest_mode;
+	),
+
+	TP_printk("processor_mask 0x%llx address_space 0x%llx flags 0x%llx %s",
+		  __entry->processor_mask, __entry->address_space,
+		  __entry->flags, __entry->guest_mode ? "(L2)" : "")
+);
+
+/*
+ * Tracepoint for kvm_hv_flush_tlb_ex.
+ */
+TRACE_EVENT(kvm_hv_flush_tlb_ex,
+	TP_PROTO(u64 valid_bank_mask, u64 format, u64 address_space, u64 flags, bool guest_mode),
+	TP_ARGS(valid_bank_mask, format, address_space, flags, guest_mode),
+
+	TP_STRUCT__entry(
+		__field(u64, valid_bank_mask)
+		__field(u64, format)
+		__field(u64, address_space)
+		__field(u64, flags)
+		__field(bool, guest_mode)
+	),
+
+	TP_fast_assign(
+		__entry->valid_bank_mask = valid_bank_mask;
+		__entry->format = format;
+		__entry->address_space = address_space;
+		__entry->flags = flags;
+		__entry->guest_mode = guest_mode;
+	),
+
+	TP_printk("valid_bank_mask 0x%llx format 0x%llx "
+		  "address_space 0x%llx flags 0x%llx %s",
+		  __entry->valid_bank_mask, __entry->format,
+		  __entry->address_space, __entry->flags,
+		  __entry->guest_mode ? "(L2)" : "")
+);
+
+/*
+ * Tracepoints for kvm_hv_send_ipi.
+ */
+TRACE_EVENT(kvm_hv_send_ipi,
+	TP_PROTO(u32 vector, u64 processor_mask),
+	TP_ARGS(vector, processor_mask),
+
+	TP_STRUCT__entry(
+		__field(u32, vector)
+		__field(u64, processor_mask)
+	),
+
+	TP_fast_assign(
+		__entry->vector = vector;
+		__entry->processor_mask = processor_mask;
+	),
+
+	TP_printk("vector %x processor_mask 0x%llx",
+		  __entry->vector, __entry->processor_mask)
+);
+
+TRACE_EVENT(kvm_hv_send_ipi_ex,
+	TP_PROTO(u32 vector, u64 format, u64 valid_bank_mask),
+	TP_ARGS(vector, format, valid_bank_mask),
+
+	TP_STRUCT__entry(
+		__field(u32, vector)
+		__field(u64, format)
+		__field(u64, valid_bank_mask)
+	),
+
+	TP_fast_assign(
+		__entry->vector = vector;
+		__entry->format = format;
+		__entry->valid_bank_mask = valid_bank_mask;
+	),
+
+	TP_printk("vector %x format %llx valid_bank_mask 0x%llx",
+		  __entry->vector, __entry->format,
+		  __entry->valid_bank_mask)
+);
+
+TRACE_EVENT(kvm_pv_tlb_flush,
+	TP_PROTO(unsigned int vcpu_id, bool need_flush_tlb),
+	TP_ARGS(vcpu_id, need_flush_tlb),
+
+	TP_STRUCT__entry(
+		__field(	unsigned int,	vcpu_id		)
+		__field(	bool,	need_flush_tlb		)
+	),
+
+	TP_fast_assign(
+		__entry->vcpu_id	= vcpu_id;
+		__entry->need_flush_tlb = need_flush_tlb;
+	),
+
+	TP_printk("vcpu %u need_flush_tlb %s", __entry->vcpu_id,
+		__entry->need_flush_tlb ? "true" : "false")
+);
+
+/*
+ * Tracepoint for failed nested VMX VM-Enter.
+ */
+TRACE_EVENT(kvm_nested_vmenter_failed,
+	TP_PROTO(const char *msg, u32 err),
+	TP_ARGS(msg, err),
+
+	TP_STRUCT__entry(
+		__string(msg, msg)
+		__field(u32, err)
+	),
+
+	TP_fast_assign(
+		__assign_str(msg, msg);
+		__entry->err = err;
+	),
+
+	TP_printk("%s%s", __get_str(msg), !__entry->err ? "" :
+		__print_symbolic(__entry->err, VMX_VMENTER_INSTRUCTION_ERRORS))
+);
+
+/*
+ * Tracepoint for syndbg_set_msr.
+ */
+TRACE_EVENT(kvm_hv_syndbg_set_msr,
+	TP_PROTO(int vcpu_id, u32 vp_index, u32 msr, u64 data),
+	TP_ARGS(vcpu_id, vp_index, msr, data),
+
+	TP_STRUCT__entry(
+		__field(int, vcpu_id)
+		__field(u32, vp_index)
+		__field(u32, msr)
+		__field(u64, data)
+	),
+
+	TP_fast_assign(
+		__entry->vcpu_id = vcpu_id;
+		__entry->vp_index = vp_index;
+		__entry->msr = msr;
+		__entry->data = data;
+	),
+
+	TP_printk("vcpu_id %d vp_index %u msr 0x%x data 0x%llx",
+		  __entry->vcpu_id, __entry->vp_index, __entry->msr,
+		  __entry->data)
+);
+
+/*
+ * Tracepoint for syndbg_get_msr.
+ */
+TRACE_EVENT(kvm_hv_syndbg_get_msr,
+	TP_PROTO(int vcpu_id, u32 vp_index, u32 msr, u64 data),
+	TP_ARGS(vcpu_id, vp_index, msr, data),
+
+	TP_STRUCT__entry(
+		__field(int, vcpu_id)
+		__field(u32, vp_index)
+		__field(u32, msr)
+		__field(u64, data)
+	),
+
+	TP_fast_assign(
+		__entry->vcpu_id = vcpu_id;
+		__entry->vp_index = vp_index;
+		__entry->msr = msr;
+		__entry->data = data;
+	),
+
+	TP_printk("vcpu_id %d vp_index %u msr 0x%x data 0x%llx",
+		  __entry->vcpu_id, __entry->vp_index, __entry->msr,
+		  __entry->data)
+);
+
+/*
+ * Tracepoint for the start of VMGEXIT processing
+ */
+TRACE_EVENT(kvm_vmgexit_enter,
+	TP_PROTO(unsigned int vcpu_id, struct ghcb *ghcb),
+	TP_ARGS(vcpu_id, ghcb),
+
+	TP_STRUCT__entry(
+		__field(unsigned int, vcpu_id)
+		__field(u64, exit_reason)
+		__field(u64, info1)
+		__field(u64, info2)
+	),
+
+	TP_fast_assign(
+		__entry->vcpu_id     = vcpu_id;
+		__entry->exit_reason = ghcb->save.sw_exit_code;
+		__entry->info1       = ghcb->save.sw_exit_info_1;
+		__entry->info2       = ghcb->save.sw_exit_info_2;
+	),
+
+	TP_printk("vcpu %u, exit_reason %llx, exit_info1 %llx, exit_info2 %llx",
+		  __entry->vcpu_id, __entry->exit_reason,
+		  __entry->info1, __entry->info2)
+);
+
+/*
+ * Tracepoint for the end of VMGEXIT processing
+ */
+TRACE_EVENT(kvm_vmgexit_exit,
+	TP_PROTO(unsigned int vcpu_id, struct ghcb *ghcb),
+	TP_ARGS(vcpu_id, ghcb),
+
+	TP_STRUCT__entry(
+		__field(unsigned int, vcpu_id)
+		__field(u64, exit_reason)
+		__field(u64, info1)
+		__field(u64, info2)
+	),
+
+	TP_fast_assign(
+		__entry->vcpu_id     = vcpu_id;
+		__entry->exit_reason = ghcb->save.sw_exit_code;
+		__entry->info1       = ghcb->save.sw_exit_info_1;
+		__entry->info2       = ghcb->save.sw_exit_info_2;
+	),
+
+	TP_printk("vcpu %u, exit_reason %llx, exit_info1 %llx, exit_info2 %llx",
+		  __entry->vcpu_id, __entry->exit_reason,
+		  __entry->info1, __entry->info2)
+);
+
+/*
+ * Tracepoint for the start of VMGEXIT MSR procotol processing
+ */
+TRACE_EVENT(kvm_vmgexit_msr_protocol_enter,
+	TP_PROTO(unsigned int vcpu_id, u64 ghcb_gpa),
+	TP_ARGS(vcpu_id, ghcb_gpa),
+
+	TP_STRUCT__entry(
+		__field(unsigned int, vcpu_id)
+		__field(u64, ghcb_gpa)
+	),
+
+	TP_fast_assign(
+		__entry->vcpu_id  = vcpu_id;
+		__entry->ghcb_gpa = ghcb_gpa;
+	),
+
+	TP_printk("vcpu %u, ghcb_gpa %016llx",
+		  __entry->vcpu_id, __entry->ghcb_gpa)
+);
+
+/*
+ * Tracepoint for the end of VMGEXIT MSR procotol processing
+ */
+TRACE_EVENT(kvm_vmgexit_msr_protocol_exit,
+	TP_PROTO(unsigned int vcpu_id, u64 ghcb_gpa, int result),
+	TP_ARGS(vcpu_id, ghcb_gpa, result),
+
+	TP_STRUCT__entry(
+		__field(unsigned int, vcpu_id)
+		__field(u64, ghcb_gpa)
+		__field(int, result)
+	),
+
+	TP_fast_assign(
+		__entry->vcpu_id  = vcpu_id;
+		__entry->ghcb_gpa = ghcb_gpa;
+		__entry->result   = result;
+	),
+
+	TP_printk("vcpu %u, ghcb_gpa %016llx, result %d",
+		  __entry->vcpu_id, __entry->ghcb_gpa, __entry->result)
+);
+
+#endif /* _TRACE_KVM_H */
+
+#undef TRACE_INCLUDE_PATH
+#define TRACE_INCLUDE_PATH ../../arch/x86/kvm
+#undef TRACE_INCLUDE_FILE
+#define TRACE_INCLUDE_FILE trace
+
+/* This part must be outside protection */
+#include <trace/define_trace.h>
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/tss.h b/arch/x86/kvm/tss.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..3f9150125
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/tss.h
@@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+#ifndef __TSS_SEGMENT_H
+#define __TSS_SEGMENT_H
+
+struct tss_segment_32 {
+	u32 prev_task_link;
+	u32 esp0;
+	u32 ss0;
+	u32 esp1;
+	u32 ss1;
+	u32 esp2;
+	u32 ss2;
+	u32 cr3;
+	u32 eip;
+	u32 eflags;
+	u32 eax;
+	u32 ecx;
+	u32 edx;
+	u32 ebx;
+	u32 esp;
+	u32 ebp;
+	u32 esi;
+	u32 edi;
+	u32 es;
+	u32 cs;
+	u32 ss;
+	u32 ds;
+	u32 fs;
+	u32 gs;
+	u32 ldt_selector;
+	u16 t;
+	u16 io_map;
+};
+
+struct tss_segment_16 {
+	u16 prev_task_link;
+	u16 sp0;
+	u16 ss0;
+	u16 sp1;
+	u16 ss1;
+	u16 sp2;
+	u16 ss2;
+	u16 ip;
+	u16 flag;
+	u16 ax;
+	u16 cx;
+	u16 dx;
+	u16 bx;
+	u16 sp;
+	u16 bp;
+	u16 si;
+	u16 di;
+	u16 es;
+	u16 cs;
+	u16 ss;
+	u16 ds;
+	u16 ldt;
+};
+
+#endif
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/capabilities.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/capabilities.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..41a4533f9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/capabilities.h
@@ -0,0 +1,404 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+#ifndef __KVM_X86_VMX_CAPS_H
+#define __KVM_X86_VMX_CAPS_H
+
+#include <asm/vmx.h>
+
+#include "../lapic.h"
+#include "../x86.h"
+#include "../pmu.h"
+#include "../cpuid.h"
+
+extern bool __read_mostly enable_vpid;
+extern bool __read_mostly flexpriority_enabled;
+extern bool __read_mostly enable_ept;
+extern bool __read_mostly enable_unrestricted_guest;
+extern bool __read_mostly enable_ept_ad_bits;
+extern bool __read_mostly enable_pml;
+extern bool __read_mostly enable_ipiv;
+extern int __read_mostly pt_mode;
+
+#define PT_MODE_SYSTEM		0
+#define PT_MODE_HOST_GUEST	1
+
+#define PMU_CAP_FW_WRITES	(1ULL << 13)
+#define PMU_CAP_LBR_FMT		0x3f
+
+struct nested_vmx_msrs {
+	/*
+	 * We only store the "true" versions of the VMX capability MSRs. We
+	 * generate the "non-true" versions by setting the must-be-1 bits
+	 * according to the SDM.
+	 */
+	u32 procbased_ctls_low;
+	u32 procbased_ctls_high;
+	u32 secondary_ctls_low;
+	u32 secondary_ctls_high;
+	u32 pinbased_ctls_low;
+	u32 pinbased_ctls_high;
+	u32 exit_ctls_low;
+	u32 exit_ctls_high;
+	u32 entry_ctls_low;
+	u32 entry_ctls_high;
+	u32 misc_low;
+	u32 misc_high;
+	u32 ept_caps;
+	u32 vpid_caps;
+	u64 basic;
+	u64 cr0_fixed0;
+	u64 cr0_fixed1;
+	u64 cr4_fixed0;
+	u64 cr4_fixed1;
+	u64 vmcs_enum;
+	u64 vmfunc_controls;
+};
+
+struct vmcs_config {
+	int size;
+	u32 basic_cap;
+	u32 revision_id;
+	u32 pin_based_exec_ctrl;
+	u32 cpu_based_exec_ctrl;
+	u32 cpu_based_2nd_exec_ctrl;
+	u64 cpu_based_3rd_exec_ctrl;
+	u32 vmexit_ctrl;
+	u32 vmentry_ctrl;
+	u64 misc;
+	struct nested_vmx_msrs nested;
+};
+extern struct vmcs_config vmcs_config __ro_after_init;
+
+struct vmx_capability {
+	u32 ept;
+	u32 vpid;
+};
+extern struct vmx_capability vmx_capability __ro_after_init;
+
+static inline bool cpu_has_vmx_basic_inout(void)
+{
+	return	(((u64)vmcs_config.basic_cap << 32) & VMX_BASIC_INOUT);
+}
+
+static inline bool cpu_has_virtual_nmis(void)
+{
+	return vmcs_config.pin_based_exec_ctrl & PIN_BASED_VIRTUAL_NMIS &&
+	       vmcs_config.cpu_based_exec_ctrl & CPU_BASED_NMI_WINDOW_EXITING;
+}
+
+static inline bool cpu_has_vmx_preemption_timer(void)
+{
+	return vmcs_config.pin_based_exec_ctrl &
+		PIN_BASED_VMX_PREEMPTION_TIMER;
+}
+
+static inline bool cpu_has_vmx_posted_intr(void)
+{
+	return vmcs_config.pin_based_exec_ctrl & PIN_BASED_POSTED_INTR;
+}
+
+static inline bool cpu_has_load_ia32_efer(void)
+{
+	return vmcs_config.vmentry_ctrl & VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_EFER;
+}
+
+static inline bool cpu_has_load_perf_global_ctrl(void)
+{
+	return vmcs_config.vmentry_ctrl & VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL;
+}
+
+static inline bool cpu_has_vmx_mpx(void)
+{
+	return vmcs_config.vmentry_ctrl & VM_ENTRY_LOAD_BNDCFGS;
+}
+
+static inline bool cpu_has_vmx_tpr_shadow(void)
+{
+	return vmcs_config.cpu_based_exec_ctrl & CPU_BASED_TPR_SHADOW;
+}
+
+static inline bool cpu_need_tpr_shadow(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	return cpu_has_vmx_tpr_shadow() && lapic_in_kernel(vcpu);
+}
+
+static inline bool cpu_has_vmx_msr_bitmap(void)
+{
+	return vmcs_config.cpu_based_exec_ctrl & CPU_BASED_USE_MSR_BITMAPS;
+}
+
+static inline bool cpu_has_secondary_exec_ctrls(void)
+{
+	return vmcs_config.cpu_based_exec_ctrl &
+		CPU_BASED_ACTIVATE_SECONDARY_CONTROLS;
+}
+
+static inline bool cpu_has_tertiary_exec_ctrls(void)
+{
+	return vmcs_config.cpu_based_exec_ctrl &
+		CPU_BASED_ACTIVATE_TERTIARY_CONTROLS;
+}
+
+static inline bool cpu_has_vmx_virtualize_apic_accesses(void)
+{
+	return vmcs_config.cpu_based_2nd_exec_ctrl &
+		SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_APIC_ACCESSES;
+}
+
+static inline bool cpu_has_vmx_ept(void)
+{
+	return vmcs_config.cpu_based_2nd_exec_ctrl &
+		SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_EPT;
+}
+
+static inline bool vmx_umip_emulated(void)
+{
+	return !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_UMIP) &&
+	       (vmcs_config.cpu_based_2nd_exec_ctrl & SECONDARY_EXEC_DESC);
+}
+
+static inline bool cpu_has_vmx_rdtscp(void)
+{
+	return vmcs_config.cpu_based_2nd_exec_ctrl &
+		SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_RDTSCP;
+}
+
+static inline bool cpu_has_vmx_virtualize_x2apic_mode(void)
+{
+	return vmcs_config.cpu_based_2nd_exec_ctrl &
+		SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_X2APIC_MODE;
+}
+
+static inline bool cpu_has_vmx_vpid(void)
+{
+	return vmcs_config.cpu_based_2nd_exec_ctrl &
+		SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_VPID;
+}
+
+static inline bool cpu_has_vmx_wbinvd_exit(void)
+{
+	return vmcs_config.cpu_based_2nd_exec_ctrl &
+		SECONDARY_EXEC_WBINVD_EXITING;
+}
+
+static inline bool cpu_has_vmx_unrestricted_guest(void)
+{
+	return vmcs_config.cpu_based_2nd_exec_ctrl &
+		SECONDARY_EXEC_UNRESTRICTED_GUEST;
+}
+
+static inline bool cpu_has_vmx_apic_register_virt(void)
+{
+	return vmcs_config.cpu_based_2nd_exec_ctrl &
+		SECONDARY_EXEC_APIC_REGISTER_VIRT;
+}
+
+static inline bool cpu_has_vmx_virtual_intr_delivery(void)
+{
+	return vmcs_config.cpu_based_2nd_exec_ctrl &
+		SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUAL_INTR_DELIVERY;
+}
+
+static inline bool cpu_has_vmx_ple(void)
+{
+	return vmcs_config.cpu_based_2nd_exec_ctrl &
+		SECONDARY_EXEC_PAUSE_LOOP_EXITING;
+}
+
+static inline bool cpu_has_vmx_rdrand(void)
+{
+	return vmcs_config.cpu_based_2nd_exec_ctrl &
+		SECONDARY_EXEC_RDRAND_EXITING;
+}
+
+static inline bool cpu_has_vmx_invpcid(void)
+{
+	return vmcs_config.cpu_based_2nd_exec_ctrl &
+		SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_INVPCID;
+}
+
+static inline bool cpu_has_vmx_vmfunc(void)
+{
+	return vmcs_config.cpu_based_2nd_exec_ctrl &
+		SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_VMFUNC;
+}
+
+static inline bool cpu_has_vmx_shadow_vmcs(void)
+{
+	/* check if the cpu supports writing r/o exit information fields */
+	if (!(vmcs_config.misc & MSR_IA32_VMX_MISC_VMWRITE_SHADOW_RO_FIELDS))
+		return false;
+
+	return vmcs_config.cpu_based_2nd_exec_ctrl &
+		SECONDARY_EXEC_SHADOW_VMCS;
+}
+
+static inline bool cpu_has_vmx_encls_vmexit(void)
+{
+	return vmcs_config.cpu_based_2nd_exec_ctrl &
+		SECONDARY_EXEC_ENCLS_EXITING;
+}
+
+static inline bool cpu_has_vmx_rdseed(void)
+{
+	return vmcs_config.cpu_based_2nd_exec_ctrl &
+		SECONDARY_EXEC_RDSEED_EXITING;
+}
+
+static inline bool cpu_has_vmx_pml(void)
+{
+	return vmcs_config.cpu_based_2nd_exec_ctrl & SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_PML;
+}
+
+static inline bool cpu_has_vmx_xsaves(void)
+{
+	return vmcs_config.cpu_based_2nd_exec_ctrl &
+		SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_XSAVES;
+}
+
+static inline bool cpu_has_vmx_waitpkg(void)
+{
+	return vmcs_config.cpu_based_2nd_exec_ctrl &
+		SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_USR_WAIT_PAUSE;
+}
+
+static inline bool cpu_has_vmx_tsc_scaling(void)
+{
+	return vmcs_config.cpu_based_2nd_exec_ctrl &
+		SECONDARY_EXEC_TSC_SCALING;
+}
+
+static inline bool cpu_has_vmx_bus_lock_detection(void)
+{
+	return vmcs_config.cpu_based_2nd_exec_ctrl &
+	    SECONDARY_EXEC_BUS_LOCK_DETECTION;
+}
+
+static inline bool cpu_has_vmx_apicv(void)
+{
+	return cpu_has_vmx_apic_register_virt() &&
+		cpu_has_vmx_virtual_intr_delivery() &&
+		cpu_has_vmx_posted_intr();
+}
+
+static inline bool cpu_has_vmx_ipiv(void)
+{
+	return vmcs_config.cpu_based_3rd_exec_ctrl & TERTIARY_EXEC_IPI_VIRT;
+}
+
+static inline bool cpu_has_vmx_flexpriority(void)
+{
+	return cpu_has_vmx_tpr_shadow() &&
+		cpu_has_vmx_virtualize_apic_accesses();
+}
+
+static inline bool cpu_has_vmx_ept_execute_only(void)
+{
+	return vmx_capability.ept & VMX_EPT_EXECUTE_ONLY_BIT;
+}
+
+static inline bool cpu_has_vmx_ept_4levels(void)
+{
+	return vmx_capability.ept & VMX_EPT_PAGE_WALK_4_BIT;
+}
+
+static inline bool cpu_has_vmx_ept_5levels(void)
+{
+	return vmx_capability.ept & VMX_EPT_PAGE_WALK_5_BIT;
+}
+
+static inline bool cpu_has_vmx_ept_mt_wb(void)
+{
+	return vmx_capability.ept & VMX_EPTP_WB_BIT;
+}
+
+static inline bool cpu_has_vmx_ept_2m_page(void)
+{
+	return vmx_capability.ept & VMX_EPT_2MB_PAGE_BIT;
+}
+
+static inline bool cpu_has_vmx_ept_1g_page(void)
+{
+	return vmx_capability.ept & VMX_EPT_1GB_PAGE_BIT;
+}
+
+static inline int ept_caps_to_lpage_level(u32 ept_caps)
+{
+	if (ept_caps & VMX_EPT_1GB_PAGE_BIT)
+		return PG_LEVEL_1G;
+	if (ept_caps & VMX_EPT_2MB_PAGE_BIT)
+		return PG_LEVEL_2M;
+	return PG_LEVEL_4K;
+}
+
+static inline bool cpu_has_vmx_ept_ad_bits(void)
+{
+	return vmx_capability.ept & VMX_EPT_AD_BIT;
+}
+
+static inline bool cpu_has_vmx_invept_context(void)
+{
+	return vmx_capability.ept & VMX_EPT_EXTENT_CONTEXT_BIT;
+}
+
+static inline bool cpu_has_vmx_invept_global(void)
+{
+	return vmx_capability.ept & VMX_EPT_EXTENT_GLOBAL_BIT;
+}
+
+static inline bool cpu_has_vmx_invvpid(void)
+{
+	return vmx_capability.vpid & VMX_VPID_INVVPID_BIT;
+}
+
+static inline bool cpu_has_vmx_invvpid_individual_addr(void)
+{
+	return vmx_capability.vpid & VMX_VPID_EXTENT_INDIVIDUAL_ADDR_BIT;
+}
+
+static inline bool cpu_has_vmx_invvpid_single(void)
+{
+	return vmx_capability.vpid & VMX_VPID_EXTENT_SINGLE_CONTEXT_BIT;
+}
+
+static inline bool cpu_has_vmx_invvpid_global(void)
+{
+	return vmx_capability.vpid & VMX_VPID_EXTENT_GLOBAL_CONTEXT_BIT;
+}
+
+static inline bool cpu_has_vmx_intel_pt(void)
+{
+	return (vmcs_config.misc & MSR_IA32_VMX_MISC_INTEL_PT) &&
+		(vmcs_config.cpu_based_2nd_exec_ctrl & SECONDARY_EXEC_PT_USE_GPA) &&
+		(vmcs_config.vmentry_ctrl & VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_RTIT_CTL);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Processor Trace can operate in one of three modes:
+ *  a. system-wide: trace both host/guest and output to host buffer
+ *  b. host-only:   only trace host and output to host buffer
+ *  c. host-guest:  trace host and guest simultaneously and output to their
+ *                  respective buffer
+ *
+ * KVM currently only supports (a) and (c).
+ */
+static inline bool vmx_pt_mode_is_system(void)
+{
+	return pt_mode == PT_MODE_SYSTEM;
+}
+static inline bool vmx_pt_mode_is_host_guest(void)
+{
+	return pt_mode == PT_MODE_HOST_GUEST;
+}
+
+static inline bool vmx_pebs_supported(void)
+{
+	return boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PEBS) && kvm_pmu_cap.pebs_ept;
+}
+
+static inline bool cpu_has_notify_vmexit(void)
+{
+	return vmcs_config.cpu_based_2nd_exec_ctrl &
+		SECONDARY_EXEC_NOTIFY_VM_EXITING;
+}
+
+#endif /* __KVM_X86_VMX_CAPS_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/hyperv.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/hyperv.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..313b8bb5b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/hyperv.c
@@ -0,0 +1,676 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
+
+#include <linux/errno.h>
+#include <linux/smp.h>
+
+#include "../cpuid.h"
+#include "hyperv.h"
+#include "nested.h"
+#include "vmcs.h"
+#include "vmx.h"
+#include "trace.h"
+
+#define CC KVM_NESTED_VMENTER_CONSISTENCY_CHECK
+
+/*
+ * Enlightened VMCSv1 doesn't support these:
+ *
+ *	POSTED_INTR_NV                  = 0x00000002,
+ *	GUEST_INTR_STATUS               = 0x00000810,
+ *	APIC_ACCESS_ADDR		= 0x00002014,
+ *	POSTED_INTR_DESC_ADDR           = 0x00002016,
+ *	EOI_EXIT_BITMAP0                = 0x0000201c,
+ *	EOI_EXIT_BITMAP1                = 0x0000201e,
+ *	EOI_EXIT_BITMAP2                = 0x00002020,
+ *	EOI_EXIT_BITMAP3                = 0x00002022,
+ *	GUEST_PML_INDEX			= 0x00000812,
+ *	PML_ADDRESS			= 0x0000200e,
+ *	VM_FUNCTION_CONTROL             = 0x00002018,
+ *	EPTP_LIST_ADDRESS               = 0x00002024,
+ *	VMREAD_BITMAP                   = 0x00002026,
+ *	VMWRITE_BITMAP                  = 0x00002028,
+ *
+ *	TSC_MULTIPLIER                  = 0x00002032,
+ *	PLE_GAP                         = 0x00004020,
+ *	PLE_WINDOW                      = 0x00004022,
+ *	VMX_PREEMPTION_TIMER_VALUE      = 0x0000482E,
+ *
+ * Currently unsupported in KVM:
+ *	GUEST_IA32_RTIT_CTL		= 0x00002814,
+ */
+#define EVMCS1_SUPPORTED_PINCTRL					\
+	(PIN_BASED_ALWAYSON_WITHOUT_TRUE_MSR |				\
+	 PIN_BASED_EXT_INTR_MASK |					\
+	 PIN_BASED_NMI_EXITING |					\
+	 PIN_BASED_VIRTUAL_NMIS)
+
+#define EVMCS1_SUPPORTED_EXEC_CTRL					\
+	(CPU_BASED_ALWAYSON_WITHOUT_TRUE_MSR |				\
+	 CPU_BASED_HLT_EXITING |					\
+	 CPU_BASED_CR3_LOAD_EXITING |					\
+	 CPU_BASED_CR3_STORE_EXITING |					\
+	 CPU_BASED_UNCOND_IO_EXITING |					\
+	 CPU_BASED_MOV_DR_EXITING |					\
+	 CPU_BASED_USE_TSC_OFFSETTING |					\
+	 CPU_BASED_MWAIT_EXITING |					\
+	 CPU_BASED_MONITOR_EXITING |					\
+	 CPU_BASED_INVLPG_EXITING |					\
+	 CPU_BASED_RDPMC_EXITING |					\
+	 CPU_BASED_INTR_WINDOW_EXITING |				\
+	 CPU_BASED_CR8_LOAD_EXITING |					\
+	 CPU_BASED_CR8_STORE_EXITING |					\
+	 CPU_BASED_RDTSC_EXITING |					\
+	 CPU_BASED_TPR_SHADOW |						\
+	 CPU_BASED_USE_IO_BITMAPS |					\
+	 CPU_BASED_MONITOR_TRAP_FLAG |					\
+	 CPU_BASED_USE_MSR_BITMAPS |					\
+	 CPU_BASED_NMI_WINDOW_EXITING |					\
+	 CPU_BASED_PAUSE_EXITING |					\
+	 CPU_BASED_ACTIVATE_SECONDARY_CONTROLS)
+
+#define EVMCS1_SUPPORTED_2NDEXEC					\
+	(SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_X2APIC_MODE |			\
+	 SECONDARY_EXEC_WBINVD_EXITING |				\
+	 SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_VPID |					\
+	 SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_EPT |					\
+	 SECONDARY_EXEC_UNRESTRICTED_GUEST |				\
+	 SECONDARY_EXEC_DESC |						\
+	 SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_RDTSCP |					\
+	 SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_INVPCID |				\
+	 SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_XSAVES |					\
+	 SECONDARY_EXEC_RDSEED_EXITING |				\
+	 SECONDARY_EXEC_RDRAND_EXITING |				\
+	 SECONDARY_EXEC_TSC_SCALING |					\
+	 SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_USR_WAIT_PAUSE |				\
+	 SECONDARY_EXEC_PT_USE_GPA |					\
+	 SECONDARY_EXEC_PT_CONCEAL_VMX |				\
+	 SECONDARY_EXEC_BUS_LOCK_DETECTION |				\
+	 SECONDARY_EXEC_NOTIFY_VM_EXITING |				\
+	 SECONDARY_EXEC_ENCLS_EXITING)
+
+#define EVMCS1_SUPPORTED_3RDEXEC (0ULL)
+
+#define EVMCS1_SUPPORTED_VMEXIT_CTRL					\
+	(VM_EXIT_ALWAYSON_WITHOUT_TRUE_MSR |				\
+	 VM_EXIT_SAVE_DEBUG_CONTROLS |					\
+	 VM_EXIT_ACK_INTR_ON_EXIT |					\
+	 VM_EXIT_HOST_ADDR_SPACE_SIZE |					\
+	 VM_EXIT_LOAD_IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL |				\
+	 VM_EXIT_SAVE_IA32_PAT |					\
+	 VM_EXIT_LOAD_IA32_PAT |					\
+	 VM_EXIT_SAVE_IA32_EFER |					\
+	 VM_EXIT_LOAD_IA32_EFER |					\
+	 VM_EXIT_CLEAR_BNDCFGS |					\
+	 VM_EXIT_PT_CONCEAL_PIP |					\
+	 VM_EXIT_CLEAR_IA32_RTIT_CTL)
+
+#define EVMCS1_SUPPORTED_VMENTRY_CTRL					\
+	(VM_ENTRY_ALWAYSON_WITHOUT_TRUE_MSR |				\
+	 VM_ENTRY_LOAD_DEBUG_CONTROLS |					\
+	 VM_ENTRY_IA32E_MODE |						\
+	 VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL |				\
+	 VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_PAT |					\
+	 VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_EFER |					\
+	 VM_ENTRY_LOAD_BNDCFGS |					\
+	 VM_ENTRY_PT_CONCEAL_PIP |					\
+	 VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_RTIT_CTL)
+
+#define EVMCS1_SUPPORTED_VMFUNC (0)
+
+#define EVMCS1_OFFSET(x) offsetof(struct hv_enlightened_vmcs, x)
+#define EVMCS1_FIELD(number, name, clean_field)[ROL16(number, 6)] = \
+		{EVMCS1_OFFSET(name), clean_field}
+
+const struct evmcs_field vmcs_field_to_evmcs_1[] = {
+	/* 64 bit rw */
+	EVMCS1_FIELD(GUEST_RIP, guest_rip,
+		     HV_VMX_ENLIGHTENED_CLEAN_FIELD_NONE),
+	EVMCS1_FIELD(GUEST_RSP, guest_rsp,
+		     HV_VMX_ENLIGHTENED_CLEAN_FIELD_GUEST_BASIC),
+	EVMCS1_FIELD(GUEST_RFLAGS, guest_rflags,
+		     HV_VMX_ENLIGHTENED_CLEAN_FIELD_GUEST_BASIC),
+	EVMCS1_FIELD(HOST_IA32_PAT, host_ia32_pat,
+		     HV_VMX_ENLIGHTENED_CLEAN_FIELD_HOST_GRP1),
+	EVMCS1_FIELD(HOST_IA32_EFER, host_ia32_efer,
+		     HV_VMX_ENLIGHTENED_CLEAN_FIELD_HOST_GRP1),
+	EVMCS1_FIELD(HOST_IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL, host_ia32_perf_global_ctrl,
+		     HV_VMX_ENLIGHTENED_CLEAN_FIELD_HOST_GRP1),
+	EVMCS1_FIELD(HOST_CR0, host_cr0,
+		     HV_VMX_ENLIGHTENED_CLEAN_FIELD_HOST_GRP1),
+	EVMCS1_FIELD(HOST_CR3, host_cr3,
+		     HV_VMX_ENLIGHTENED_CLEAN_FIELD_HOST_GRP1),
+	EVMCS1_FIELD(HOST_CR4, host_cr4,
+		     HV_VMX_ENLIGHTENED_CLEAN_FIELD_HOST_GRP1),
+	EVMCS1_FIELD(HOST_IA32_SYSENTER_ESP, host_ia32_sysenter_esp,
+		     HV_VMX_ENLIGHTENED_CLEAN_FIELD_HOST_GRP1),
+	EVMCS1_FIELD(HOST_IA32_SYSENTER_EIP, host_ia32_sysenter_eip,
+		     HV_VMX_ENLIGHTENED_CLEAN_FIELD_HOST_GRP1),
+	EVMCS1_FIELD(HOST_RIP, host_rip,
+		     HV_VMX_ENLIGHTENED_CLEAN_FIELD_HOST_GRP1),
+	EVMCS1_FIELD(IO_BITMAP_A, io_bitmap_a,
+		     HV_VMX_ENLIGHTENED_CLEAN_FIELD_IO_BITMAP),
+	EVMCS1_FIELD(IO_BITMAP_B, io_bitmap_b,
+		     HV_VMX_ENLIGHTENED_CLEAN_FIELD_IO_BITMAP),
+	EVMCS1_FIELD(MSR_BITMAP, msr_bitmap,
+		     HV_VMX_ENLIGHTENED_CLEAN_FIELD_MSR_BITMAP),
+	EVMCS1_FIELD(GUEST_ES_BASE, guest_es_base,
+		     HV_VMX_ENLIGHTENED_CLEAN_FIELD_GUEST_GRP2),
+	EVMCS1_FIELD(GUEST_CS_BASE, guest_cs_base,
+		     HV_VMX_ENLIGHTENED_CLEAN_FIELD_GUEST_GRP2),
+	EVMCS1_FIELD(GUEST_SS_BASE, guest_ss_base,
+		     HV_VMX_ENLIGHTENED_CLEAN_FIELD_GUEST_GRP2),
+	EVMCS1_FIELD(GUEST_DS_BASE, guest_ds_base,
+		     HV_VMX_ENLIGHTENED_CLEAN_FIELD_GUEST_GRP2),
+	EVMCS1_FIELD(GUEST_FS_BASE, guest_fs_base,
+		     HV_VMX_ENLIGHTENED_CLEAN_FIELD_GUEST_GRP2),
+	EVMCS1_FIELD(GUEST_GS_BASE, guest_gs_base,
+		     HV_VMX_ENLIGHTENED_CLEAN_FIELD_GUEST_GRP2),
+	EVMCS1_FIELD(GUEST_LDTR_BASE, guest_ldtr_base,
+		     HV_VMX_ENLIGHTENED_CLEAN_FIELD_GUEST_GRP2),
+	EVMCS1_FIELD(GUEST_TR_BASE, guest_tr_base,
+		     HV_VMX_ENLIGHTENED_CLEAN_FIELD_GUEST_GRP2),
+	EVMCS1_FIELD(GUEST_GDTR_BASE, guest_gdtr_base,
+		     HV_VMX_ENLIGHTENED_CLEAN_FIELD_GUEST_GRP2),
+	EVMCS1_FIELD(GUEST_IDTR_BASE, guest_idtr_base,
+		     HV_VMX_ENLIGHTENED_CLEAN_FIELD_GUEST_GRP2),
+	EVMCS1_FIELD(TSC_OFFSET, tsc_offset,
+		     HV_VMX_ENLIGHTENED_CLEAN_FIELD_CONTROL_GRP2),
+	EVMCS1_FIELD(VIRTUAL_APIC_PAGE_ADDR, virtual_apic_page_addr,
+		     HV_VMX_ENLIGHTENED_CLEAN_FIELD_CONTROL_GRP2),
+	EVMCS1_FIELD(VMCS_LINK_POINTER, vmcs_link_pointer,
+		     HV_VMX_ENLIGHTENED_CLEAN_FIELD_GUEST_GRP1),
+	EVMCS1_FIELD(GUEST_IA32_DEBUGCTL, guest_ia32_debugctl,
+		     HV_VMX_ENLIGHTENED_CLEAN_FIELD_GUEST_GRP1),
+	EVMCS1_FIELD(GUEST_IA32_PAT, guest_ia32_pat,
+		     HV_VMX_ENLIGHTENED_CLEAN_FIELD_GUEST_GRP1),
+	EVMCS1_FIELD(GUEST_IA32_EFER, guest_ia32_efer,
+		     HV_VMX_ENLIGHTENED_CLEAN_FIELD_GUEST_GRP1),
+	EVMCS1_FIELD(GUEST_IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL, guest_ia32_perf_global_ctrl,
+		     HV_VMX_ENLIGHTENED_CLEAN_FIELD_GUEST_GRP1),
+	EVMCS1_FIELD(GUEST_PDPTR0, guest_pdptr0,
+		     HV_VMX_ENLIGHTENED_CLEAN_FIELD_GUEST_GRP1),
+	EVMCS1_FIELD(GUEST_PDPTR1, guest_pdptr1,
+		     HV_VMX_ENLIGHTENED_CLEAN_FIELD_GUEST_GRP1),
+	EVMCS1_FIELD(GUEST_PDPTR2, guest_pdptr2,
+		     HV_VMX_ENLIGHTENED_CLEAN_FIELD_GUEST_GRP1),
+	EVMCS1_FIELD(GUEST_PDPTR3, guest_pdptr3,
+		     HV_VMX_ENLIGHTENED_CLEAN_FIELD_GUEST_GRP1),
+	EVMCS1_FIELD(GUEST_PENDING_DBG_EXCEPTIONS, guest_pending_dbg_exceptions,
+		     HV_VMX_ENLIGHTENED_CLEAN_FIELD_GUEST_GRP1),
+	EVMCS1_FIELD(GUEST_SYSENTER_ESP, guest_sysenter_esp,
+		     HV_VMX_ENLIGHTENED_CLEAN_FIELD_GUEST_GRP1),
+	EVMCS1_FIELD(GUEST_SYSENTER_EIP, guest_sysenter_eip,
+		     HV_VMX_ENLIGHTENED_CLEAN_FIELD_GUEST_GRP1),
+	EVMCS1_FIELD(CR0_GUEST_HOST_MASK, cr0_guest_host_mask,
+		     HV_VMX_ENLIGHTENED_CLEAN_FIELD_CRDR),
+	EVMCS1_FIELD(CR4_GUEST_HOST_MASK, cr4_guest_host_mask,
+		     HV_VMX_ENLIGHTENED_CLEAN_FIELD_CRDR),
+	EVMCS1_FIELD(CR0_READ_SHADOW, cr0_read_shadow,
+		     HV_VMX_ENLIGHTENED_CLEAN_FIELD_CRDR),
+	EVMCS1_FIELD(CR4_READ_SHADOW, cr4_read_shadow,
+		     HV_VMX_ENLIGHTENED_CLEAN_FIELD_CRDR),
+	EVMCS1_FIELD(GUEST_CR0, guest_cr0,
+		     HV_VMX_ENLIGHTENED_CLEAN_FIELD_CRDR),
+	EVMCS1_FIELD(GUEST_CR3, guest_cr3,
+		     HV_VMX_ENLIGHTENED_CLEAN_FIELD_CRDR),
+	EVMCS1_FIELD(GUEST_CR4, guest_cr4,
+		     HV_VMX_ENLIGHTENED_CLEAN_FIELD_CRDR),
+	EVMCS1_FIELD(GUEST_DR7, guest_dr7,
+		     HV_VMX_ENLIGHTENED_CLEAN_FIELD_CRDR),
+	EVMCS1_FIELD(HOST_FS_BASE, host_fs_base,
+		     HV_VMX_ENLIGHTENED_CLEAN_FIELD_HOST_POINTER),
+	EVMCS1_FIELD(HOST_GS_BASE, host_gs_base,
+		     HV_VMX_ENLIGHTENED_CLEAN_FIELD_HOST_POINTER),
+	EVMCS1_FIELD(HOST_TR_BASE, host_tr_base,
+		     HV_VMX_ENLIGHTENED_CLEAN_FIELD_HOST_POINTER),
+	EVMCS1_FIELD(HOST_GDTR_BASE, host_gdtr_base,
+		     HV_VMX_ENLIGHTENED_CLEAN_FIELD_HOST_POINTER),
+	EVMCS1_FIELD(HOST_IDTR_BASE, host_idtr_base,
+		     HV_VMX_ENLIGHTENED_CLEAN_FIELD_HOST_POINTER),
+	EVMCS1_FIELD(HOST_RSP, host_rsp,
+		     HV_VMX_ENLIGHTENED_CLEAN_FIELD_HOST_POINTER),
+	EVMCS1_FIELD(EPT_POINTER, ept_pointer,
+		     HV_VMX_ENLIGHTENED_CLEAN_FIELD_CONTROL_XLAT),
+	EVMCS1_FIELD(GUEST_BNDCFGS, guest_bndcfgs,
+		     HV_VMX_ENLIGHTENED_CLEAN_FIELD_GUEST_GRP1),
+	EVMCS1_FIELD(XSS_EXIT_BITMAP, xss_exit_bitmap,
+		     HV_VMX_ENLIGHTENED_CLEAN_FIELD_CONTROL_GRP2),
+	EVMCS1_FIELD(ENCLS_EXITING_BITMAP, encls_exiting_bitmap,
+		     HV_VMX_ENLIGHTENED_CLEAN_FIELD_CONTROL_GRP2),
+	EVMCS1_FIELD(TSC_MULTIPLIER, tsc_multiplier,
+		     HV_VMX_ENLIGHTENED_CLEAN_FIELD_CONTROL_GRP2),
+	/*
+	 * Not used by KVM:
+	 *
+	 * EVMCS1_FIELD(0x00006828, guest_ia32_s_cet,
+	 *	     HV_VMX_ENLIGHTENED_CLEAN_FIELD_GUEST_GRP1),
+	 * EVMCS1_FIELD(0x0000682A, guest_ssp,
+	 *	     HV_VMX_ENLIGHTENED_CLEAN_FIELD_GUEST_BASIC),
+	 * EVMCS1_FIELD(0x0000682C, guest_ia32_int_ssp_table_addr,
+	 *	     HV_VMX_ENLIGHTENED_CLEAN_FIELD_GUEST_GRP1),
+	 * EVMCS1_FIELD(0x00002816, guest_ia32_lbr_ctl,
+	 *	     HV_VMX_ENLIGHTENED_CLEAN_FIELD_GUEST_GRP1),
+	 * EVMCS1_FIELD(0x00006C18, host_ia32_s_cet,
+	 *	     HV_VMX_ENLIGHTENED_CLEAN_FIELD_HOST_GRP1),
+	 * EVMCS1_FIELD(0x00006C1A, host_ssp,
+	 *	     HV_VMX_ENLIGHTENED_CLEAN_FIELD_HOST_GRP1),
+	 * EVMCS1_FIELD(0x00006C1C, host_ia32_int_ssp_table_addr,
+	 *	     HV_VMX_ENLIGHTENED_CLEAN_FIELD_HOST_GRP1),
+	 */
+
+	/* 64 bit read only */
+	EVMCS1_FIELD(GUEST_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS, guest_physical_address,
+		     HV_VMX_ENLIGHTENED_CLEAN_FIELD_NONE),
+	EVMCS1_FIELD(EXIT_QUALIFICATION, exit_qualification,
+		     HV_VMX_ENLIGHTENED_CLEAN_FIELD_NONE),
+	/*
+	 * Not defined in KVM:
+	 *
+	 * EVMCS1_FIELD(0x00006402, exit_io_instruction_ecx,
+	 *		HV_VMX_ENLIGHTENED_CLEAN_FIELD_NONE);
+	 * EVMCS1_FIELD(0x00006404, exit_io_instruction_esi,
+	 *		HV_VMX_ENLIGHTENED_CLEAN_FIELD_NONE);
+	 * EVMCS1_FIELD(0x00006406, exit_io_instruction_esi,
+	 *		HV_VMX_ENLIGHTENED_CLEAN_FIELD_NONE);
+	 * EVMCS1_FIELD(0x00006408, exit_io_instruction_eip,
+	 *		HV_VMX_ENLIGHTENED_CLEAN_FIELD_NONE);
+	 */
+	EVMCS1_FIELD(GUEST_LINEAR_ADDRESS, guest_linear_address,
+		     HV_VMX_ENLIGHTENED_CLEAN_FIELD_NONE),
+
+	/*
+	 * No mask defined in the spec as Hyper-V doesn't currently support
+	 * these. Future proof by resetting the whole clean field mask on
+	 * access.
+	 */
+	EVMCS1_FIELD(VM_EXIT_MSR_STORE_ADDR, vm_exit_msr_store_addr,
+		     HV_VMX_ENLIGHTENED_CLEAN_FIELD_ALL),
+	EVMCS1_FIELD(VM_EXIT_MSR_LOAD_ADDR, vm_exit_msr_load_addr,
+		     HV_VMX_ENLIGHTENED_CLEAN_FIELD_ALL),
+	EVMCS1_FIELD(VM_ENTRY_MSR_LOAD_ADDR, vm_entry_msr_load_addr,
+		     HV_VMX_ENLIGHTENED_CLEAN_FIELD_ALL),
+
+	/* 32 bit rw */
+	EVMCS1_FIELD(TPR_THRESHOLD, tpr_threshold,
+		     HV_VMX_ENLIGHTENED_CLEAN_FIELD_NONE),
+	EVMCS1_FIELD(GUEST_INTERRUPTIBILITY_INFO, guest_interruptibility_info,
+		     HV_VMX_ENLIGHTENED_CLEAN_FIELD_GUEST_BASIC),
+	EVMCS1_FIELD(CPU_BASED_VM_EXEC_CONTROL, cpu_based_vm_exec_control,
+		     HV_VMX_ENLIGHTENED_CLEAN_FIELD_CONTROL_PROC),
+	EVMCS1_FIELD(EXCEPTION_BITMAP, exception_bitmap,
+		     HV_VMX_ENLIGHTENED_CLEAN_FIELD_CONTROL_EXCPN),
+	EVMCS1_FIELD(VM_ENTRY_CONTROLS, vm_entry_controls,
+		     HV_VMX_ENLIGHTENED_CLEAN_FIELD_CONTROL_ENTRY),
+	EVMCS1_FIELD(VM_ENTRY_INTR_INFO_FIELD, vm_entry_intr_info_field,
+		     HV_VMX_ENLIGHTENED_CLEAN_FIELD_CONTROL_EVENT),
+	EVMCS1_FIELD(VM_ENTRY_EXCEPTION_ERROR_CODE,
+		     vm_entry_exception_error_code,
+		     HV_VMX_ENLIGHTENED_CLEAN_FIELD_CONTROL_EVENT),
+	EVMCS1_FIELD(VM_ENTRY_INSTRUCTION_LEN, vm_entry_instruction_len,
+		     HV_VMX_ENLIGHTENED_CLEAN_FIELD_CONTROL_EVENT),
+	EVMCS1_FIELD(HOST_IA32_SYSENTER_CS, host_ia32_sysenter_cs,
+		     HV_VMX_ENLIGHTENED_CLEAN_FIELD_HOST_GRP1),
+	EVMCS1_FIELD(PIN_BASED_VM_EXEC_CONTROL, pin_based_vm_exec_control,
+		     HV_VMX_ENLIGHTENED_CLEAN_FIELD_CONTROL_GRP1),
+	EVMCS1_FIELD(VM_EXIT_CONTROLS, vm_exit_controls,
+		     HV_VMX_ENLIGHTENED_CLEAN_FIELD_CONTROL_GRP1),
+	EVMCS1_FIELD(SECONDARY_VM_EXEC_CONTROL, secondary_vm_exec_control,
+		     HV_VMX_ENLIGHTENED_CLEAN_FIELD_CONTROL_GRP1),
+	EVMCS1_FIELD(GUEST_ES_LIMIT, guest_es_limit,
+		     HV_VMX_ENLIGHTENED_CLEAN_FIELD_GUEST_GRP2),
+	EVMCS1_FIELD(GUEST_CS_LIMIT, guest_cs_limit,
+		     HV_VMX_ENLIGHTENED_CLEAN_FIELD_GUEST_GRP2),
+	EVMCS1_FIELD(GUEST_SS_LIMIT, guest_ss_limit,
+		     HV_VMX_ENLIGHTENED_CLEAN_FIELD_GUEST_GRP2),
+	EVMCS1_FIELD(GUEST_DS_LIMIT, guest_ds_limit,
+		     HV_VMX_ENLIGHTENED_CLEAN_FIELD_GUEST_GRP2),
+	EVMCS1_FIELD(GUEST_FS_LIMIT, guest_fs_limit,
+		     HV_VMX_ENLIGHTENED_CLEAN_FIELD_GUEST_GRP2),
+	EVMCS1_FIELD(GUEST_GS_LIMIT, guest_gs_limit,
+		     HV_VMX_ENLIGHTENED_CLEAN_FIELD_GUEST_GRP2),
+	EVMCS1_FIELD(GUEST_LDTR_LIMIT, guest_ldtr_limit,
+		     HV_VMX_ENLIGHTENED_CLEAN_FIELD_GUEST_GRP2),
+	EVMCS1_FIELD(GUEST_TR_LIMIT, guest_tr_limit,
+		     HV_VMX_ENLIGHTENED_CLEAN_FIELD_GUEST_GRP2),
+	EVMCS1_FIELD(GUEST_GDTR_LIMIT, guest_gdtr_limit,
+		     HV_VMX_ENLIGHTENED_CLEAN_FIELD_GUEST_GRP2),
+	EVMCS1_FIELD(GUEST_IDTR_LIMIT, guest_idtr_limit,
+		     HV_VMX_ENLIGHTENED_CLEAN_FIELD_GUEST_GRP2),
+	EVMCS1_FIELD(GUEST_ES_AR_BYTES, guest_es_ar_bytes,
+		     HV_VMX_ENLIGHTENED_CLEAN_FIELD_GUEST_GRP2),
+	EVMCS1_FIELD(GUEST_CS_AR_BYTES, guest_cs_ar_bytes,
+		     HV_VMX_ENLIGHTENED_CLEAN_FIELD_GUEST_GRP2),
+	EVMCS1_FIELD(GUEST_SS_AR_BYTES, guest_ss_ar_bytes,
+		     HV_VMX_ENLIGHTENED_CLEAN_FIELD_GUEST_GRP2),
+	EVMCS1_FIELD(GUEST_DS_AR_BYTES, guest_ds_ar_bytes,
+		     HV_VMX_ENLIGHTENED_CLEAN_FIELD_GUEST_GRP2),
+	EVMCS1_FIELD(GUEST_FS_AR_BYTES, guest_fs_ar_bytes,
+		     HV_VMX_ENLIGHTENED_CLEAN_FIELD_GUEST_GRP2),
+	EVMCS1_FIELD(GUEST_GS_AR_BYTES, guest_gs_ar_bytes,
+		     HV_VMX_ENLIGHTENED_CLEAN_FIELD_GUEST_GRP2),
+	EVMCS1_FIELD(GUEST_LDTR_AR_BYTES, guest_ldtr_ar_bytes,
+		     HV_VMX_ENLIGHTENED_CLEAN_FIELD_GUEST_GRP2),
+	EVMCS1_FIELD(GUEST_TR_AR_BYTES, guest_tr_ar_bytes,
+		     HV_VMX_ENLIGHTENED_CLEAN_FIELD_GUEST_GRP2),
+	EVMCS1_FIELD(GUEST_ACTIVITY_STATE, guest_activity_state,
+		     HV_VMX_ENLIGHTENED_CLEAN_FIELD_GUEST_GRP1),
+	EVMCS1_FIELD(GUEST_SYSENTER_CS, guest_sysenter_cs,
+		     HV_VMX_ENLIGHTENED_CLEAN_FIELD_GUEST_GRP1),
+
+	/* 32 bit read only */
+	EVMCS1_FIELD(VM_INSTRUCTION_ERROR, vm_instruction_error,
+		     HV_VMX_ENLIGHTENED_CLEAN_FIELD_NONE),
+	EVMCS1_FIELD(VM_EXIT_REASON, vm_exit_reason,
+		     HV_VMX_ENLIGHTENED_CLEAN_FIELD_NONE),
+	EVMCS1_FIELD(VM_EXIT_INTR_INFO, vm_exit_intr_info,
+		     HV_VMX_ENLIGHTENED_CLEAN_FIELD_NONE),
+	EVMCS1_FIELD(VM_EXIT_INTR_ERROR_CODE, vm_exit_intr_error_code,
+		     HV_VMX_ENLIGHTENED_CLEAN_FIELD_NONE),
+	EVMCS1_FIELD(IDT_VECTORING_INFO_FIELD, idt_vectoring_info_field,
+		     HV_VMX_ENLIGHTENED_CLEAN_FIELD_NONE),
+	EVMCS1_FIELD(IDT_VECTORING_ERROR_CODE, idt_vectoring_error_code,
+		     HV_VMX_ENLIGHTENED_CLEAN_FIELD_NONE),
+	EVMCS1_FIELD(VM_EXIT_INSTRUCTION_LEN, vm_exit_instruction_len,
+		     HV_VMX_ENLIGHTENED_CLEAN_FIELD_NONE),
+	EVMCS1_FIELD(VMX_INSTRUCTION_INFO, vmx_instruction_info,
+		     HV_VMX_ENLIGHTENED_CLEAN_FIELD_NONE),
+
+	/* No mask defined in the spec (not used) */
+	EVMCS1_FIELD(PAGE_FAULT_ERROR_CODE_MASK, page_fault_error_code_mask,
+		     HV_VMX_ENLIGHTENED_CLEAN_FIELD_ALL),
+	EVMCS1_FIELD(PAGE_FAULT_ERROR_CODE_MATCH, page_fault_error_code_match,
+		     HV_VMX_ENLIGHTENED_CLEAN_FIELD_ALL),
+	EVMCS1_FIELD(CR3_TARGET_COUNT, cr3_target_count,
+		     HV_VMX_ENLIGHTENED_CLEAN_FIELD_ALL),
+	EVMCS1_FIELD(VM_EXIT_MSR_STORE_COUNT, vm_exit_msr_store_count,
+		     HV_VMX_ENLIGHTENED_CLEAN_FIELD_ALL),
+	EVMCS1_FIELD(VM_EXIT_MSR_LOAD_COUNT, vm_exit_msr_load_count,
+		     HV_VMX_ENLIGHTENED_CLEAN_FIELD_ALL),
+	EVMCS1_FIELD(VM_ENTRY_MSR_LOAD_COUNT, vm_entry_msr_load_count,
+		     HV_VMX_ENLIGHTENED_CLEAN_FIELD_ALL),
+
+	/* 16 bit rw */
+	EVMCS1_FIELD(HOST_ES_SELECTOR, host_es_selector,
+		     HV_VMX_ENLIGHTENED_CLEAN_FIELD_HOST_GRP1),
+	EVMCS1_FIELD(HOST_CS_SELECTOR, host_cs_selector,
+		     HV_VMX_ENLIGHTENED_CLEAN_FIELD_HOST_GRP1),
+	EVMCS1_FIELD(HOST_SS_SELECTOR, host_ss_selector,
+		     HV_VMX_ENLIGHTENED_CLEAN_FIELD_HOST_GRP1),
+	EVMCS1_FIELD(HOST_DS_SELECTOR, host_ds_selector,
+		     HV_VMX_ENLIGHTENED_CLEAN_FIELD_HOST_GRP1),
+	EVMCS1_FIELD(HOST_FS_SELECTOR, host_fs_selector,
+		     HV_VMX_ENLIGHTENED_CLEAN_FIELD_HOST_GRP1),
+	EVMCS1_FIELD(HOST_GS_SELECTOR, host_gs_selector,
+		     HV_VMX_ENLIGHTENED_CLEAN_FIELD_HOST_GRP1),
+	EVMCS1_FIELD(HOST_TR_SELECTOR, host_tr_selector,
+		     HV_VMX_ENLIGHTENED_CLEAN_FIELD_HOST_GRP1),
+	EVMCS1_FIELD(GUEST_ES_SELECTOR, guest_es_selector,
+		     HV_VMX_ENLIGHTENED_CLEAN_FIELD_GUEST_GRP2),
+	EVMCS1_FIELD(GUEST_CS_SELECTOR, guest_cs_selector,
+		     HV_VMX_ENLIGHTENED_CLEAN_FIELD_GUEST_GRP2),
+	EVMCS1_FIELD(GUEST_SS_SELECTOR, guest_ss_selector,
+		     HV_VMX_ENLIGHTENED_CLEAN_FIELD_GUEST_GRP2),
+	EVMCS1_FIELD(GUEST_DS_SELECTOR, guest_ds_selector,
+		     HV_VMX_ENLIGHTENED_CLEAN_FIELD_GUEST_GRP2),
+	EVMCS1_FIELD(GUEST_FS_SELECTOR, guest_fs_selector,
+		     HV_VMX_ENLIGHTENED_CLEAN_FIELD_GUEST_GRP2),
+	EVMCS1_FIELD(GUEST_GS_SELECTOR, guest_gs_selector,
+		     HV_VMX_ENLIGHTENED_CLEAN_FIELD_GUEST_GRP2),
+	EVMCS1_FIELD(GUEST_LDTR_SELECTOR, guest_ldtr_selector,
+		     HV_VMX_ENLIGHTENED_CLEAN_FIELD_GUEST_GRP2),
+	EVMCS1_FIELD(GUEST_TR_SELECTOR, guest_tr_selector,
+		     HV_VMX_ENLIGHTENED_CLEAN_FIELD_GUEST_GRP2),
+	EVMCS1_FIELD(VIRTUAL_PROCESSOR_ID, virtual_processor_id,
+		     HV_VMX_ENLIGHTENED_CLEAN_FIELD_CONTROL_XLAT),
+};
+const unsigned int nr_evmcs_1_fields = ARRAY_SIZE(vmcs_field_to_evmcs_1);
+
+u64 nested_get_evmptr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct kvm_vcpu_hv *hv_vcpu = to_hv_vcpu(vcpu);
+
+	if (unlikely(kvm_hv_get_assist_page(vcpu)))
+		return EVMPTR_INVALID;
+
+	if (unlikely(!hv_vcpu->vp_assist_page.enlighten_vmentry))
+		return EVMPTR_INVALID;
+
+	return hv_vcpu->vp_assist_page.current_nested_vmcs;
+}
+
+uint16_t nested_get_evmcs_version(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	/*
+	 * vmcs_version represents the range of supported Enlightened VMCS
+	 * versions: lower 8 bits is the minimal version, higher 8 bits is the
+	 * maximum supported version. KVM supports versions from 1 to
+	 * KVM_EVMCS_VERSION.
+	 *
+	 * Note, do not check the Hyper-V is fully enabled in guest CPUID, this
+	 * helper is used to _get_ the vCPU's supported CPUID.
+	 */
+	if (kvm_cpu_cap_get(X86_FEATURE_VMX) &&
+	    (!vcpu || to_vmx(vcpu)->nested.enlightened_vmcs_enabled))
+		return (KVM_EVMCS_VERSION << 8) | 1;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+enum evmcs_revision {
+	EVMCSv1_LEGACY,
+	NR_EVMCS_REVISIONS,
+};
+
+enum evmcs_ctrl_type {
+	EVMCS_EXIT_CTRLS,
+	EVMCS_ENTRY_CTRLS,
+	EVMCS_EXEC_CTRL,
+	EVMCS_2NDEXEC,
+	EVMCS_3RDEXEC,
+	EVMCS_PINCTRL,
+	EVMCS_VMFUNC,
+	NR_EVMCS_CTRLS,
+};
+
+static const u32 evmcs_supported_ctrls[NR_EVMCS_CTRLS][NR_EVMCS_REVISIONS] = {
+	[EVMCS_EXIT_CTRLS] = {
+		[EVMCSv1_LEGACY] = EVMCS1_SUPPORTED_VMEXIT_CTRL,
+	},
+	[EVMCS_ENTRY_CTRLS] = {
+		[EVMCSv1_LEGACY] = EVMCS1_SUPPORTED_VMENTRY_CTRL,
+	},
+	[EVMCS_EXEC_CTRL] = {
+		[EVMCSv1_LEGACY] = EVMCS1_SUPPORTED_EXEC_CTRL,
+	},
+	[EVMCS_2NDEXEC] = {
+		[EVMCSv1_LEGACY] = EVMCS1_SUPPORTED_2NDEXEC & ~SECONDARY_EXEC_TSC_SCALING,
+	},
+	[EVMCS_3RDEXEC] = {
+		[EVMCSv1_LEGACY] = EVMCS1_SUPPORTED_3RDEXEC,
+	},
+	[EVMCS_PINCTRL] = {
+		[EVMCSv1_LEGACY] = EVMCS1_SUPPORTED_PINCTRL,
+	},
+	[EVMCS_VMFUNC] = {
+		[EVMCSv1_LEGACY] = EVMCS1_SUPPORTED_VMFUNC,
+	},
+};
+
+static u32 evmcs_get_supported_ctls(enum evmcs_ctrl_type ctrl_type)
+{
+	enum evmcs_revision evmcs_rev = EVMCSv1_LEGACY;
+
+	return evmcs_supported_ctrls[ctrl_type][evmcs_rev];
+}
+
+static bool evmcs_has_perf_global_ctrl(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct kvm_vcpu_hv *hv_vcpu = to_hv_vcpu(vcpu);
+
+	/*
+	 * PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL has a quirk where some Windows guests may fail to
+	 * boot if a PV CPUID feature flag is not also set.  Treat the fields
+	 * as unsupported if the flag is not set in guest CPUID.  This should
+	 * be called only for guest accesses, and all guest accesses should be
+	 * gated on Hyper-V being enabled and initialized.
+	 */
+	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!hv_vcpu))
+		return false;
+
+	return hv_vcpu->cpuid_cache.nested_ebx & HV_X64_NESTED_EVMCS1_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL;
+}
+
+void nested_evmcs_filter_control_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 msr_index, u64 *pdata)
+{
+	u32 ctl_low = (u32)*pdata;
+	u32 ctl_high = (u32)(*pdata >> 32);
+	u32 supported_ctrls;
+
+	/*
+	 * Hyper-V 2016 and 2019 try using these features even when eVMCS
+	 * is enabled but there are no corresponding fields.
+	 */
+	switch (msr_index) {
+	case MSR_IA32_VMX_EXIT_CTLS:
+	case MSR_IA32_VMX_TRUE_EXIT_CTLS:
+		supported_ctrls = evmcs_get_supported_ctls(EVMCS_EXIT_CTRLS);
+		if (!evmcs_has_perf_global_ctrl(vcpu))
+			supported_ctrls &= ~VM_EXIT_LOAD_IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL;
+		ctl_high &= supported_ctrls;
+		break;
+	case MSR_IA32_VMX_ENTRY_CTLS:
+	case MSR_IA32_VMX_TRUE_ENTRY_CTLS:
+		supported_ctrls = evmcs_get_supported_ctls(EVMCS_ENTRY_CTRLS);
+		if (!evmcs_has_perf_global_ctrl(vcpu))
+			supported_ctrls &= ~VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL;
+		ctl_high &= supported_ctrls;
+		break;
+	case MSR_IA32_VMX_PROCBASED_CTLS:
+	case MSR_IA32_VMX_TRUE_PROCBASED_CTLS:
+		ctl_high &= evmcs_get_supported_ctls(EVMCS_EXEC_CTRL);
+		break;
+	case MSR_IA32_VMX_PROCBASED_CTLS2:
+		ctl_high &= evmcs_get_supported_ctls(EVMCS_2NDEXEC);
+		break;
+	case MSR_IA32_VMX_TRUE_PINBASED_CTLS:
+	case MSR_IA32_VMX_PINBASED_CTLS:
+		ctl_high &= evmcs_get_supported_ctls(EVMCS_PINCTRL);
+		break;
+	case MSR_IA32_VMX_VMFUNC:
+		ctl_low &= evmcs_get_supported_ctls(EVMCS_VMFUNC);
+		break;
+	}
+
+	*pdata = ctl_low | ((u64)ctl_high << 32);
+}
+
+static bool nested_evmcs_is_valid_controls(enum evmcs_ctrl_type ctrl_type,
+					   u32 val)
+{
+	return !(val & ~evmcs_get_supported_ctls(ctrl_type));
+}
+
+int nested_evmcs_check_controls(struct vmcs12 *vmcs12)
+{
+	if (CC(!nested_evmcs_is_valid_controls(EVMCS_PINCTRL,
+					       vmcs12->pin_based_vm_exec_control)))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (CC(!nested_evmcs_is_valid_controls(EVMCS_EXEC_CTRL,
+					       vmcs12->cpu_based_vm_exec_control)))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (CC(!nested_evmcs_is_valid_controls(EVMCS_2NDEXEC,
+					       vmcs12->secondary_vm_exec_control)))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (CC(!nested_evmcs_is_valid_controls(EVMCS_EXIT_CTRLS,
+					       vmcs12->vm_exit_controls)))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (CC(!nested_evmcs_is_valid_controls(EVMCS_ENTRY_CTRLS,
+					       vmcs12->vm_entry_controls)))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	/*
+	 * VM-Func controls are 64-bit, but KVM currently doesn't support any
+	 * controls in bits 63:32, i.e. dropping those bits on the consistency
+	 * check is intentional.
+	 */
+	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(vmcs12->vm_function_control >> 32))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (CC(!nested_evmcs_is_valid_controls(EVMCS_VMFUNC,
+					       vmcs12->vm_function_control)))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HYPERV)
+DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(__kvm_is_using_evmcs);
+
+/*
+ * KVM on Hyper-V always uses the latest known eVMCSv1 revision, the assumption
+ * is: in case a feature has corresponding fields in eVMCS described and it was
+ * exposed in VMX feature MSRs, KVM is free to use it. Warn if KVM meets a
+ * feature which has no corresponding eVMCS field, this likely means that KVM
+ * needs to be updated.
+ */
+#define evmcs_check_vmcs_conf(field, ctrl)					\
+	do {									\
+		typeof(vmcs_conf->field) unsupported;				\
+										\
+		unsupported = vmcs_conf->field & ~EVMCS1_SUPPORTED_ ## ctrl;	\
+		if (unsupported) {						\
+			pr_warn_once(#field " unsupported with eVMCS: 0x%llx\n",\
+				     (u64)unsupported);				\
+			vmcs_conf->field &= EVMCS1_SUPPORTED_ ## ctrl;		\
+		}								\
+	}									\
+	while (0)
+
+void evmcs_sanitize_exec_ctrls(struct vmcs_config *vmcs_conf)
+{
+	evmcs_check_vmcs_conf(cpu_based_exec_ctrl, EXEC_CTRL);
+	evmcs_check_vmcs_conf(pin_based_exec_ctrl, PINCTRL);
+	evmcs_check_vmcs_conf(cpu_based_2nd_exec_ctrl, 2NDEXEC);
+	evmcs_check_vmcs_conf(cpu_based_3rd_exec_ctrl, 3RDEXEC);
+	evmcs_check_vmcs_conf(vmentry_ctrl, VMENTRY_CTRL);
+	evmcs_check_vmcs_conf(vmexit_ctrl, VMEXIT_CTRL);
+}
+#endif
+
+int nested_enable_evmcs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+			uint16_t *vmcs_version)
+{
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+
+	vmx->nested.enlightened_vmcs_enabled = true;
+
+	if (vmcs_version)
+		*vmcs_version = nested_get_evmcs_version(vcpu);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+bool nested_evmcs_l2_tlb_flush_enabled(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct kvm_vcpu_hv *hv_vcpu = to_hv_vcpu(vcpu);
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+	struct hv_enlightened_vmcs *evmcs = vmx->nested.hv_evmcs;
+
+	if (!hv_vcpu || !evmcs)
+		return false;
+
+	if (!evmcs->hv_enlightenments_control.nested_flush_hypercall)
+		return false;
+
+	return hv_vcpu->vp_assist_page.nested_control.features.directhypercall;
+}
+
+void vmx_hv_inject_synthetic_vmexit_post_tlb_flush(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	nested_vmx_vmexit(vcpu, HV_VMX_SYNTHETIC_EXIT_REASON_TRAP_AFTER_FLUSH, 0, 0);
+}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/hyperv.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/hyperv.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..9623fe165
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/hyperv.h
@@ -0,0 +1,200 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+#ifndef __KVM_X86_VMX_HYPERV_H
+#define __KVM_X86_VMX_HYPERV_H
+
+#include <linux/jump_label.h>
+
+#include <asm/hyperv-tlfs.h>
+#include <asm/mshyperv.h>
+#include <asm/vmx.h>
+
+#include "../hyperv.h"
+
+#include "capabilities.h"
+#include "vmcs.h"
+#include "vmcs12.h"
+
+struct vmcs_config;
+
+#define current_evmcs ((struct hv_enlightened_vmcs *)this_cpu_read(current_vmcs))
+
+#define KVM_EVMCS_VERSION 1
+
+struct evmcs_field {
+	u16 offset;
+	u16 clean_field;
+};
+
+extern const struct evmcs_field vmcs_field_to_evmcs_1[];
+extern const unsigned int nr_evmcs_1_fields;
+
+static __always_inline int evmcs_field_offset(unsigned long field,
+					      u16 *clean_field)
+{
+	unsigned int index = ROL16(field, 6);
+	const struct evmcs_field *evmcs_field;
+
+	if (unlikely(index >= nr_evmcs_1_fields))
+		return -ENOENT;
+
+	evmcs_field = &vmcs_field_to_evmcs_1[index];
+
+	/*
+	 * Use offset=0 to detect holes in eVMCS. This offset belongs to
+	 * 'revision_id' but this field has no encoding and is supposed to
+	 * be accessed directly.
+	 */
+	if (unlikely(!evmcs_field->offset))
+		return -ENOENT;
+
+	if (clean_field)
+		*clean_field = evmcs_field->clean_field;
+
+	return evmcs_field->offset;
+}
+
+static inline u64 evmcs_read_any(struct hv_enlightened_vmcs *evmcs,
+				 unsigned long field, u16 offset)
+{
+	/*
+	 * vmcs12_read_any() doesn't care whether the supplied structure
+	 * is 'struct vmcs12' or 'struct hv_enlightened_vmcs' as it takes
+	 * the exact offset of the required field, use it for convenience
+	 * here.
+	 */
+	return vmcs12_read_any((void *)evmcs, field, offset);
+}
+
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HYPERV)
+
+DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(__kvm_is_using_evmcs);
+
+static __always_inline bool kvm_is_using_evmcs(void)
+{
+	return static_branch_unlikely(&__kvm_is_using_evmcs);
+}
+
+static __always_inline int get_evmcs_offset(unsigned long field,
+					    u16 *clean_field)
+{
+	int offset = evmcs_field_offset(field, clean_field);
+
+	WARN_ONCE(offset < 0, "accessing unsupported EVMCS field %lx\n", field);
+	return offset;
+}
+
+static __always_inline void evmcs_write64(unsigned long field, u64 value)
+{
+	u16 clean_field;
+	int offset = get_evmcs_offset(field, &clean_field);
+
+	if (offset < 0)
+		return;
+
+	*(u64 *)((char *)current_evmcs + offset) = value;
+
+	current_evmcs->hv_clean_fields &= ~clean_field;
+}
+
+static __always_inline void evmcs_write32(unsigned long field, u32 value)
+{
+	u16 clean_field;
+	int offset = get_evmcs_offset(field, &clean_field);
+
+	if (offset < 0)
+		return;
+
+	*(u32 *)((char *)current_evmcs + offset) = value;
+	current_evmcs->hv_clean_fields &= ~clean_field;
+}
+
+static __always_inline void evmcs_write16(unsigned long field, u16 value)
+{
+	u16 clean_field;
+	int offset = get_evmcs_offset(field, &clean_field);
+
+	if (offset < 0)
+		return;
+
+	*(u16 *)((char *)current_evmcs + offset) = value;
+	current_evmcs->hv_clean_fields &= ~clean_field;
+}
+
+static __always_inline u64 evmcs_read64(unsigned long field)
+{
+	int offset = get_evmcs_offset(field, NULL);
+
+	if (offset < 0)
+		return 0;
+
+	return *(u64 *)((char *)current_evmcs + offset);
+}
+
+static __always_inline u32 evmcs_read32(unsigned long field)
+{
+	int offset = get_evmcs_offset(field, NULL);
+
+	if (offset < 0)
+		return 0;
+
+	return *(u32 *)((char *)current_evmcs + offset);
+}
+
+static __always_inline u16 evmcs_read16(unsigned long field)
+{
+	int offset = get_evmcs_offset(field, NULL);
+
+	if (offset < 0)
+		return 0;
+
+	return *(u16 *)((char *)current_evmcs + offset);
+}
+
+static inline void evmcs_load(u64 phys_addr)
+{
+	struct hv_vp_assist_page *vp_ap =
+		hv_get_vp_assist_page(smp_processor_id());
+
+	if (current_evmcs->hv_enlightenments_control.nested_flush_hypercall)
+		vp_ap->nested_control.features.directhypercall = 1;
+	vp_ap->current_nested_vmcs = phys_addr;
+	vp_ap->enlighten_vmentry = 1;
+}
+
+void evmcs_sanitize_exec_ctrls(struct vmcs_config *vmcs_conf);
+#else /* !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HYPERV) */
+static __always_inline bool kvm_is_using_evmcs(void) { return false; }
+static __always_inline void evmcs_write64(unsigned long field, u64 value) {}
+static __always_inline void evmcs_write32(unsigned long field, u32 value) {}
+static __always_inline void evmcs_write16(unsigned long field, u16 value) {}
+static __always_inline u64 evmcs_read64(unsigned long field) { return 0; }
+static __always_inline u32 evmcs_read32(unsigned long field) { return 0; }
+static __always_inline u16 evmcs_read16(unsigned long field) { return 0; }
+static inline void evmcs_load(u64 phys_addr) {}
+#endif /* IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HYPERV) */
+
+#define EVMPTR_INVALID (-1ULL)
+#define EVMPTR_MAP_PENDING (-2ULL)
+
+static inline bool evmptr_is_valid(u64 evmptr)
+{
+	return evmptr != EVMPTR_INVALID && evmptr != EVMPTR_MAP_PENDING;
+}
+
+enum nested_evmptrld_status {
+	EVMPTRLD_DISABLED,
+	EVMPTRLD_SUCCEEDED,
+	EVMPTRLD_VMFAIL,
+	EVMPTRLD_ERROR,
+};
+
+u64 nested_get_evmptr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+uint16_t nested_get_evmcs_version(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+int nested_enable_evmcs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+			uint16_t *vmcs_version);
+void nested_evmcs_filter_control_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 msr_index, u64 *pdata);
+int nested_evmcs_check_controls(struct vmcs12 *vmcs12);
+bool nested_evmcs_l2_tlb_flush_enabled(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+void vmx_hv_inject_synthetic_vmexit_post_tlb_flush(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+
+#endif /* __KVM_X86_VMX_HYPERV_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..c5ec0ef51
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c
@@ -0,0 +1,7102 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
+
+#include <linux/objtool.h>
+#include <linux/percpu.h>
+
+#include <asm/debugreg.h>
+#include <asm/mmu_context.h>
+
+#include "cpuid.h"
+#include "hyperv.h"
+#include "mmu.h"
+#include "nested.h"
+#include "pmu.h"
+#include "sgx.h"
+#include "trace.h"
+#include "vmx.h"
+#include "x86.h"
+#include "smm.h"
+
+static bool __read_mostly enable_shadow_vmcs = 1;
+module_param_named(enable_shadow_vmcs, enable_shadow_vmcs, bool, S_IRUGO);
+
+static bool __read_mostly nested_early_check = 0;
+module_param(nested_early_check, bool, S_IRUGO);
+
+#define CC KVM_NESTED_VMENTER_CONSISTENCY_CHECK
+
+/*
+ * Hyper-V requires all of these, so mark them as supported even though
+ * they are just treated the same as all-context.
+ */
+#define VMX_VPID_EXTENT_SUPPORTED_MASK		\
+	(VMX_VPID_EXTENT_INDIVIDUAL_ADDR_BIT |	\
+	VMX_VPID_EXTENT_SINGLE_CONTEXT_BIT |	\
+	VMX_VPID_EXTENT_GLOBAL_CONTEXT_BIT |	\
+	VMX_VPID_EXTENT_SINGLE_NON_GLOBAL_BIT)
+
+#define VMX_MISC_EMULATED_PREEMPTION_TIMER_RATE 5
+
+enum {
+	VMX_VMREAD_BITMAP,
+	VMX_VMWRITE_BITMAP,
+	VMX_BITMAP_NR
+};
+static unsigned long *vmx_bitmap[VMX_BITMAP_NR];
+
+#define vmx_vmread_bitmap                    (vmx_bitmap[VMX_VMREAD_BITMAP])
+#define vmx_vmwrite_bitmap                   (vmx_bitmap[VMX_VMWRITE_BITMAP])
+
+struct shadow_vmcs_field {
+	u16	encoding;
+	u16	offset;
+};
+static struct shadow_vmcs_field shadow_read_only_fields[] = {
+#define SHADOW_FIELD_RO(x, y) { x, offsetof(struct vmcs12, y) },
+#include "vmcs_shadow_fields.h"
+};
+static int max_shadow_read_only_fields =
+	ARRAY_SIZE(shadow_read_only_fields);
+
+static struct shadow_vmcs_field shadow_read_write_fields[] = {
+#define SHADOW_FIELD_RW(x, y) { x, offsetof(struct vmcs12, y) },
+#include "vmcs_shadow_fields.h"
+};
+static int max_shadow_read_write_fields =
+	ARRAY_SIZE(shadow_read_write_fields);
+
+static void init_vmcs_shadow_fields(void)
+{
+	int i, j;
+
+	memset(vmx_vmread_bitmap, 0xff, PAGE_SIZE);
+	memset(vmx_vmwrite_bitmap, 0xff, PAGE_SIZE);
+
+	for (i = j = 0; i < max_shadow_read_only_fields; i++) {
+		struct shadow_vmcs_field entry = shadow_read_only_fields[i];
+		u16 field = entry.encoding;
+
+		if (vmcs_field_width(field) == VMCS_FIELD_WIDTH_U64 &&
+		    (i + 1 == max_shadow_read_only_fields ||
+		     shadow_read_only_fields[i + 1].encoding != field + 1))
+			pr_err("Missing field from shadow_read_only_field %x\n",
+			       field + 1);
+
+		clear_bit(field, vmx_vmread_bitmap);
+		if (field & 1)
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+			continue;
+#else
+			entry.offset += sizeof(u32);
+#endif
+		shadow_read_only_fields[j++] = entry;
+	}
+	max_shadow_read_only_fields = j;
+
+	for (i = j = 0; i < max_shadow_read_write_fields; i++) {
+		struct shadow_vmcs_field entry = shadow_read_write_fields[i];
+		u16 field = entry.encoding;
+
+		if (vmcs_field_width(field) == VMCS_FIELD_WIDTH_U64 &&
+		    (i + 1 == max_shadow_read_write_fields ||
+		     shadow_read_write_fields[i + 1].encoding != field + 1))
+			pr_err("Missing field from shadow_read_write_field %x\n",
+			       field + 1);
+
+		WARN_ONCE(field >= GUEST_ES_AR_BYTES &&
+			  field <= GUEST_TR_AR_BYTES,
+			  "Update vmcs12_write_any() to drop reserved bits from AR_BYTES");
+
+		/*
+		 * PML and the preemption timer can be emulated, but the
+		 * processor cannot vmwrite to fields that don't exist
+		 * on bare metal.
+		 */
+		switch (field) {
+		case GUEST_PML_INDEX:
+			if (!cpu_has_vmx_pml())
+				continue;
+			break;
+		case VMX_PREEMPTION_TIMER_VALUE:
+			if (!cpu_has_vmx_preemption_timer())
+				continue;
+			break;
+		case GUEST_INTR_STATUS:
+			if (!cpu_has_vmx_apicv())
+				continue;
+			break;
+		default:
+			break;
+		}
+
+		clear_bit(field, vmx_vmwrite_bitmap);
+		clear_bit(field, vmx_vmread_bitmap);
+		if (field & 1)
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+			continue;
+#else
+			entry.offset += sizeof(u32);
+#endif
+		shadow_read_write_fields[j++] = entry;
+	}
+	max_shadow_read_write_fields = j;
+}
+
+/*
+ * The following 3 functions, nested_vmx_succeed()/failValid()/failInvalid(),
+ * set the success or error code of an emulated VMX instruction (as specified
+ * by Vol 2B, VMX Instruction Reference, "Conventions"), and skip the emulated
+ * instruction.
+ */
+static int nested_vmx_succeed(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	vmx_set_rflags(vcpu, vmx_get_rflags(vcpu)
+			& ~(X86_EFLAGS_CF | X86_EFLAGS_PF | X86_EFLAGS_AF |
+			    X86_EFLAGS_ZF | X86_EFLAGS_SF | X86_EFLAGS_OF));
+	return kvm_skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
+}
+
+static int nested_vmx_failInvalid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	vmx_set_rflags(vcpu, (vmx_get_rflags(vcpu)
+			& ~(X86_EFLAGS_PF | X86_EFLAGS_AF | X86_EFLAGS_ZF |
+			    X86_EFLAGS_SF | X86_EFLAGS_OF))
+			| X86_EFLAGS_CF);
+	return kvm_skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
+}
+
+static int nested_vmx_failValid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+				u32 vm_instruction_error)
+{
+	vmx_set_rflags(vcpu, (vmx_get_rflags(vcpu)
+			& ~(X86_EFLAGS_CF | X86_EFLAGS_PF | X86_EFLAGS_AF |
+			    X86_EFLAGS_SF | X86_EFLAGS_OF))
+			| X86_EFLAGS_ZF);
+	get_vmcs12(vcpu)->vm_instruction_error = vm_instruction_error;
+	/*
+	 * We don't need to force sync to shadow VMCS because
+	 * VM_INSTRUCTION_ERROR is not shadowed. Enlightened VMCS 'shadows' all
+	 * fields and thus must be synced.
+	 */
+	if (to_vmx(vcpu)->nested.hv_evmcs_vmptr != EVMPTR_INVALID)
+		to_vmx(vcpu)->nested.need_vmcs12_to_shadow_sync = true;
+
+	return kvm_skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
+}
+
+static int nested_vmx_fail(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 vm_instruction_error)
+{
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+
+	/*
+	 * failValid writes the error number to the current VMCS, which
+	 * can't be done if there isn't a current VMCS.
+	 */
+	if (vmx->nested.current_vmptr == INVALID_GPA &&
+	    !evmptr_is_valid(vmx->nested.hv_evmcs_vmptr))
+		return nested_vmx_failInvalid(vcpu);
+
+	return nested_vmx_failValid(vcpu, vm_instruction_error);
+}
+
+static void nested_vmx_abort(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 indicator)
+{
+	/* TODO: not to reset guest simply here. */
+	kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_TRIPLE_FAULT, vcpu);
+	pr_debug_ratelimited("nested vmx abort, indicator %d\n", indicator);
+}
+
+static inline bool vmx_control_verify(u32 control, u32 low, u32 high)
+{
+	return fixed_bits_valid(control, low, high);
+}
+
+static inline u64 vmx_control_msr(u32 low, u32 high)
+{
+	return low | ((u64)high << 32);
+}
+
+static void vmx_disable_shadow_vmcs(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
+{
+	secondary_exec_controls_clearbit(vmx, SECONDARY_EXEC_SHADOW_VMCS);
+	vmcs_write64(VMCS_LINK_POINTER, INVALID_GPA);
+	vmx->nested.need_vmcs12_to_shadow_sync = false;
+}
+
+static inline void nested_release_evmcs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct kvm_vcpu_hv *hv_vcpu = to_hv_vcpu(vcpu);
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+
+	if (evmptr_is_valid(vmx->nested.hv_evmcs_vmptr)) {
+		kvm_vcpu_unmap(vcpu, &vmx->nested.hv_evmcs_map, true);
+		vmx->nested.hv_evmcs = NULL;
+	}
+
+	vmx->nested.hv_evmcs_vmptr = EVMPTR_INVALID;
+
+	if (hv_vcpu) {
+		hv_vcpu->nested.pa_page_gpa = INVALID_GPA;
+		hv_vcpu->nested.vm_id = 0;
+		hv_vcpu->nested.vp_id = 0;
+	}
+}
+
+static void vmx_sync_vmcs_host_state(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx,
+				     struct loaded_vmcs *prev)
+{
+	struct vmcs_host_state *dest, *src;
+
+	if (unlikely(!vmx->guest_state_loaded))
+		return;
+
+	src = &prev->host_state;
+	dest = &vmx->loaded_vmcs->host_state;
+
+	vmx_set_host_fs_gs(dest, src->fs_sel, src->gs_sel, src->fs_base, src->gs_base);
+	dest->ldt_sel = src->ldt_sel;
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+	dest->ds_sel = src->ds_sel;
+	dest->es_sel = src->es_sel;
+#endif
+}
+
+static void vmx_switch_vmcs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct loaded_vmcs *vmcs)
+{
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+	struct loaded_vmcs *prev;
+	int cpu;
+
+	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(vmx->loaded_vmcs == vmcs))
+		return;
+
+	cpu = get_cpu();
+	prev = vmx->loaded_vmcs;
+	vmx->loaded_vmcs = vmcs;
+	vmx_vcpu_load_vmcs(vcpu, cpu, prev);
+	vmx_sync_vmcs_host_state(vmx, prev);
+	put_cpu();
+
+	vcpu->arch.regs_avail = ~VMX_REGS_LAZY_LOAD_SET;
+
+	/*
+	 * All lazily updated registers will be reloaded from VMCS12 on both
+	 * vmentry and vmexit.
+	 */
+	vcpu->arch.regs_dirty = 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Free whatever needs to be freed from vmx->nested when L1 goes down, or
+ * just stops using VMX.
+ */
+static void free_nested(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+
+	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(vmx->loaded_vmcs != &vmx->vmcs01))
+		vmx_switch_vmcs(vcpu, &vmx->vmcs01);
+
+	if (!vmx->nested.vmxon && !vmx->nested.smm.vmxon)
+		return;
+
+	kvm_clear_request(KVM_REQ_GET_NESTED_STATE_PAGES, vcpu);
+
+	vmx->nested.vmxon = false;
+	vmx->nested.smm.vmxon = false;
+	vmx->nested.vmxon_ptr = INVALID_GPA;
+	free_vpid(vmx->nested.vpid02);
+	vmx->nested.posted_intr_nv = -1;
+	vmx->nested.current_vmptr = INVALID_GPA;
+	if (enable_shadow_vmcs) {
+		vmx_disable_shadow_vmcs(vmx);
+		vmcs_clear(vmx->vmcs01.shadow_vmcs);
+		free_vmcs(vmx->vmcs01.shadow_vmcs);
+		vmx->vmcs01.shadow_vmcs = NULL;
+	}
+	kfree(vmx->nested.cached_vmcs12);
+	vmx->nested.cached_vmcs12 = NULL;
+	kfree(vmx->nested.cached_shadow_vmcs12);
+	vmx->nested.cached_shadow_vmcs12 = NULL;
+	/*
+	 * Unpin physical memory we referred to in the vmcs02.  The APIC access
+	 * page's backing page (yeah, confusing) shouldn't actually be accessed,
+	 * and if it is written, the contents are irrelevant.
+	 */
+	kvm_vcpu_unmap(vcpu, &vmx->nested.apic_access_page_map, false);
+	kvm_vcpu_unmap(vcpu, &vmx->nested.virtual_apic_map, true);
+	kvm_vcpu_unmap(vcpu, &vmx->nested.pi_desc_map, true);
+	vmx->nested.pi_desc = NULL;
+
+	kvm_mmu_free_roots(vcpu->kvm, &vcpu->arch.guest_mmu, KVM_MMU_ROOTS_ALL);
+
+	nested_release_evmcs(vcpu);
+
+	free_loaded_vmcs(&vmx->nested.vmcs02);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Ensure that the current vmcs of the logical processor is the
+ * vmcs01 of the vcpu before calling free_nested().
+ */
+void nested_vmx_free_vcpu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	vcpu_load(vcpu);
+	vmx_leave_nested(vcpu);
+	vcpu_put(vcpu);
+}
+
+#define EPTP_PA_MASK   GENMASK_ULL(51, 12)
+
+static bool nested_ept_root_matches(hpa_t root_hpa, u64 root_eptp, u64 eptp)
+{
+	return VALID_PAGE(root_hpa) &&
+	       ((root_eptp & EPTP_PA_MASK) == (eptp & EPTP_PA_MASK));
+}
+
+static void nested_ept_invalidate_addr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t eptp,
+				       gpa_t addr)
+{
+	unsigned long roots = 0;
+	uint i;
+	struct kvm_mmu_root_info *cached_root;
+
+	WARN_ON_ONCE(!mmu_is_nested(vcpu));
+
+	for (i = 0; i < KVM_MMU_NUM_PREV_ROOTS; i++) {
+		cached_root = &vcpu->arch.mmu->prev_roots[i];
+
+		if (nested_ept_root_matches(cached_root->hpa, cached_root->pgd,
+					    eptp))
+			roots |= KVM_MMU_ROOT_PREVIOUS(i);
+	}
+	if (roots)
+		kvm_mmu_invalidate_addr(vcpu, vcpu->arch.mmu, addr, roots);
+}
+
+static void nested_ept_inject_page_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+		struct x86_exception *fault)
+{
+	struct vmcs12 *vmcs12 = get_vmcs12(vcpu);
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+	u32 vm_exit_reason;
+	unsigned long exit_qualification = vcpu->arch.exit_qualification;
+
+	if (vmx->nested.pml_full) {
+		vm_exit_reason = EXIT_REASON_PML_FULL;
+		vmx->nested.pml_full = false;
+		exit_qualification &= INTR_INFO_UNBLOCK_NMI;
+	} else {
+		if (fault->error_code & PFERR_RSVD_MASK)
+			vm_exit_reason = EXIT_REASON_EPT_MISCONFIG;
+		else
+			vm_exit_reason = EXIT_REASON_EPT_VIOLATION;
+
+		/*
+		 * Although the caller (kvm_inject_emulated_page_fault) would
+		 * have already synced the faulting address in the shadow EPT
+		 * tables for the current EPTP12, we also need to sync it for
+		 * any other cached EPTP02s based on the same EP4TA, since the
+		 * TLB associates mappings to the EP4TA rather than the full EPTP.
+		 */
+		nested_ept_invalidate_addr(vcpu, vmcs12->ept_pointer,
+					   fault->address);
+	}
+
+	nested_vmx_vmexit(vcpu, vm_exit_reason, 0, exit_qualification);
+	vmcs12->guest_physical_address = fault->address;
+}
+
+static void nested_ept_new_eptp(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+	bool execonly = vmx->nested.msrs.ept_caps & VMX_EPT_EXECUTE_ONLY_BIT;
+	int ept_lpage_level = ept_caps_to_lpage_level(vmx->nested.msrs.ept_caps);
+
+	kvm_init_shadow_ept_mmu(vcpu, execonly, ept_lpage_level,
+				nested_ept_ad_enabled(vcpu),
+				nested_ept_get_eptp(vcpu));
+}
+
+static void nested_ept_init_mmu_context(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	WARN_ON(mmu_is_nested(vcpu));
+
+	vcpu->arch.mmu = &vcpu->arch.guest_mmu;
+	nested_ept_new_eptp(vcpu);
+	vcpu->arch.mmu->get_guest_pgd     = nested_ept_get_eptp;
+	vcpu->arch.mmu->inject_page_fault = nested_ept_inject_page_fault;
+	vcpu->arch.mmu->get_pdptr         = kvm_pdptr_read;
+
+	vcpu->arch.walk_mmu              = &vcpu->arch.nested_mmu;
+}
+
+static void nested_ept_uninit_mmu_context(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	vcpu->arch.mmu = &vcpu->arch.root_mmu;
+	vcpu->arch.walk_mmu = &vcpu->arch.root_mmu;
+}
+
+static bool nested_vmx_is_page_fault_vmexit(struct vmcs12 *vmcs12,
+					    u16 error_code)
+{
+	bool inequality, bit;
+
+	bit = (vmcs12->exception_bitmap & (1u << PF_VECTOR)) != 0;
+	inequality =
+		(error_code & vmcs12->page_fault_error_code_mask) !=
+		 vmcs12->page_fault_error_code_match;
+	return inequality ^ bit;
+}
+
+static bool nested_vmx_is_exception_vmexit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u8 vector,
+					   u32 error_code)
+{
+	struct vmcs12 *vmcs12 = get_vmcs12(vcpu);
+
+	/*
+	 * Drop bits 31:16 of the error code when performing the #PF mask+match
+	 * check.  All VMCS fields involved are 32 bits, but Intel CPUs never
+	 * set bits 31:16 and VMX disallows setting bits 31:16 in the injected
+	 * error code.  Including the to-be-dropped bits in the check might
+	 * result in an "impossible" or missed exit from L1's perspective.
+	 */
+	if (vector == PF_VECTOR)
+		return nested_vmx_is_page_fault_vmexit(vmcs12, (u16)error_code);
+
+	return (vmcs12->exception_bitmap & (1u << vector));
+}
+
+static int nested_vmx_check_io_bitmap_controls(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+					       struct vmcs12 *vmcs12)
+{
+	if (!nested_cpu_has(vmcs12, CPU_BASED_USE_IO_BITMAPS))
+		return 0;
+
+	if (CC(!page_address_valid(vcpu, vmcs12->io_bitmap_a)) ||
+	    CC(!page_address_valid(vcpu, vmcs12->io_bitmap_b)))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int nested_vmx_check_msr_bitmap_controls(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+						struct vmcs12 *vmcs12)
+{
+	if (!nested_cpu_has(vmcs12, CPU_BASED_USE_MSR_BITMAPS))
+		return 0;
+
+	if (CC(!page_address_valid(vcpu, vmcs12->msr_bitmap)))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int nested_vmx_check_tpr_shadow_controls(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+						struct vmcs12 *vmcs12)
+{
+	if (!nested_cpu_has(vmcs12, CPU_BASED_TPR_SHADOW))
+		return 0;
+
+	if (CC(!page_address_valid(vcpu, vmcs12->virtual_apic_page_addr)))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * For x2APIC MSRs, ignore the vmcs01 bitmap.  L1 can enable x2APIC without L1
+ * itself utilizing x2APIC.  All MSRs were previously set to be intercepted,
+ * only the "disable intercept" case needs to be handled.
+ */
+static void nested_vmx_disable_intercept_for_x2apic_msr(unsigned long *msr_bitmap_l1,
+							unsigned long *msr_bitmap_l0,
+							u32 msr, int type)
+{
+	if (type & MSR_TYPE_R && !vmx_test_msr_bitmap_read(msr_bitmap_l1, msr))
+		vmx_clear_msr_bitmap_read(msr_bitmap_l0, msr);
+
+	if (type & MSR_TYPE_W && !vmx_test_msr_bitmap_write(msr_bitmap_l1, msr))
+		vmx_clear_msr_bitmap_write(msr_bitmap_l0, msr);
+}
+
+static inline void enable_x2apic_msr_intercepts(unsigned long *msr_bitmap)
+{
+	int msr;
+
+	for (msr = 0x800; msr <= 0x8ff; msr += BITS_PER_LONG) {
+		unsigned word = msr / BITS_PER_LONG;
+
+		msr_bitmap[word] = ~0;
+		msr_bitmap[word + (0x800 / sizeof(long))] = ~0;
+	}
+}
+
+#define BUILD_NVMX_MSR_INTERCEPT_HELPER(rw)					\
+static inline									\
+void nested_vmx_set_msr_##rw##_intercept(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx,			\
+					 unsigned long *msr_bitmap_l1,		\
+					 unsigned long *msr_bitmap_l0, u32 msr)	\
+{										\
+	if (vmx_test_msr_bitmap_##rw(vmx->vmcs01.msr_bitmap, msr) ||		\
+	    vmx_test_msr_bitmap_##rw(msr_bitmap_l1, msr))			\
+		vmx_set_msr_bitmap_##rw(msr_bitmap_l0, msr);			\
+	else									\
+		vmx_clear_msr_bitmap_##rw(msr_bitmap_l0, msr);			\
+}
+BUILD_NVMX_MSR_INTERCEPT_HELPER(read)
+BUILD_NVMX_MSR_INTERCEPT_HELPER(write)
+
+static inline void nested_vmx_set_intercept_for_msr(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx,
+						    unsigned long *msr_bitmap_l1,
+						    unsigned long *msr_bitmap_l0,
+						    u32 msr, int types)
+{
+	if (types & MSR_TYPE_R)
+		nested_vmx_set_msr_read_intercept(vmx, msr_bitmap_l1,
+						  msr_bitmap_l0, msr);
+	if (types & MSR_TYPE_W)
+		nested_vmx_set_msr_write_intercept(vmx, msr_bitmap_l1,
+						   msr_bitmap_l0, msr);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Merge L0's and L1's MSR bitmap, return false to indicate that
+ * we do not use the hardware.
+ */
+static inline bool nested_vmx_prepare_msr_bitmap(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+						 struct vmcs12 *vmcs12)
+{
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+	int msr;
+	unsigned long *msr_bitmap_l1;
+	unsigned long *msr_bitmap_l0 = vmx->nested.vmcs02.msr_bitmap;
+	struct hv_enlightened_vmcs *evmcs = vmx->nested.hv_evmcs;
+	struct kvm_host_map *map = &vmx->nested.msr_bitmap_map;
+
+	/* Nothing to do if the MSR bitmap is not in use.  */
+	if (!cpu_has_vmx_msr_bitmap() ||
+	    !nested_cpu_has(vmcs12, CPU_BASED_USE_MSR_BITMAPS))
+		return false;
+
+	/*
+	 * MSR bitmap update can be skipped when:
+	 * - MSR bitmap for L1 hasn't changed.
+	 * - Nested hypervisor (L1) is attempting to launch the same L2 as
+	 *   before.
+	 * - Nested hypervisor (L1) has enabled 'Enlightened MSR Bitmap' feature
+	 *   and tells KVM (L0) there were no changes in MSR bitmap for L2.
+	 */
+	if (!vmx->nested.force_msr_bitmap_recalc && evmcs &&
+	    evmcs->hv_enlightenments_control.msr_bitmap &&
+	    evmcs->hv_clean_fields & HV_VMX_ENLIGHTENED_CLEAN_FIELD_MSR_BITMAP)
+		return true;
+
+	if (kvm_vcpu_map(vcpu, gpa_to_gfn(vmcs12->msr_bitmap), map))
+		return false;
+
+	msr_bitmap_l1 = (unsigned long *)map->hva;
+
+	/*
+	 * To keep the control flow simple, pay eight 8-byte writes (sixteen
+	 * 4-byte writes on 32-bit systems) up front to enable intercepts for
+	 * the x2APIC MSR range and selectively toggle those relevant to L2.
+	 */
+	enable_x2apic_msr_intercepts(msr_bitmap_l0);
+
+	if (nested_cpu_has_virt_x2apic_mode(vmcs12)) {
+		if (nested_cpu_has_apic_reg_virt(vmcs12)) {
+			/*
+			 * L0 need not intercept reads for MSRs between 0x800
+			 * and 0x8ff, it just lets the processor take the value
+			 * from the virtual-APIC page; take those 256 bits
+			 * directly from the L1 bitmap.
+			 */
+			for (msr = 0x800; msr <= 0x8ff; msr += BITS_PER_LONG) {
+				unsigned word = msr / BITS_PER_LONG;
+
+				msr_bitmap_l0[word] = msr_bitmap_l1[word];
+			}
+		}
+
+		nested_vmx_disable_intercept_for_x2apic_msr(
+			msr_bitmap_l1, msr_bitmap_l0,
+			X2APIC_MSR(APIC_TASKPRI),
+			MSR_TYPE_R | MSR_TYPE_W);
+
+		if (nested_cpu_has_vid(vmcs12)) {
+			nested_vmx_disable_intercept_for_x2apic_msr(
+				msr_bitmap_l1, msr_bitmap_l0,
+				X2APIC_MSR(APIC_EOI),
+				MSR_TYPE_W);
+			nested_vmx_disable_intercept_for_x2apic_msr(
+				msr_bitmap_l1, msr_bitmap_l0,
+				X2APIC_MSR(APIC_SELF_IPI),
+				MSR_TYPE_W);
+		}
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Always check vmcs01's bitmap to honor userspace MSR filters and any
+	 * other runtime changes to vmcs01's bitmap, e.g. dynamic pass-through.
+	 */
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+	nested_vmx_set_intercept_for_msr(vmx, msr_bitmap_l1, msr_bitmap_l0,
+					 MSR_FS_BASE, MSR_TYPE_RW);
+
+	nested_vmx_set_intercept_for_msr(vmx, msr_bitmap_l1, msr_bitmap_l0,
+					 MSR_GS_BASE, MSR_TYPE_RW);
+
+	nested_vmx_set_intercept_for_msr(vmx, msr_bitmap_l1, msr_bitmap_l0,
+					 MSR_KERNEL_GS_BASE, MSR_TYPE_RW);
+#endif
+	nested_vmx_set_intercept_for_msr(vmx, msr_bitmap_l1, msr_bitmap_l0,
+					 MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, MSR_TYPE_RW);
+
+	nested_vmx_set_intercept_for_msr(vmx, msr_bitmap_l1, msr_bitmap_l0,
+					 MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD, MSR_TYPE_W);
+
+	nested_vmx_set_intercept_for_msr(vmx, msr_bitmap_l1, msr_bitmap_l0,
+					 MSR_IA32_FLUSH_CMD, MSR_TYPE_W);
+
+	kvm_vcpu_unmap(vcpu, &vmx->nested.msr_bitmap_map, false);
+
+	vmx->nested.force_msr_bitmap_recalc = false;
+
+	return true;
+}
+
+static void nested_cache_shadow_vmcs12(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+				       struct vmcs12 *vmcs12)
+{
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+	struct gfn_to_hva_cache *ghc = &vmx->nested.shadow_vmcs12_cache;
+
+	if (!nested_cpu_has_shadow_vmcs(vmcs12) ||
+	    vmcs12->vmcs_link_pointer == INVALID_GPA)
+		return;
+
+	if (ghc->gpa != vmcs12->vmcs_link_pointer &&
+	    kvm_gfn_to_hva_cache_init(vcpu->kvm, ghc,
+				      vmcs12->vmcs_link_pointer, VMCS12_SIZE))
+		return;
+
+	kvm_read_guest_cached(vmx->vcpu.kvm, ghc, get_shadow_vmcs12(vcpu),
+			      VMCS12_SIZE);
+}
+
+static void nested_flush_cached_shadow_vmcs12(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+					      struct vmcs12 *vmcs12)
+{
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+	struct gfn_to_hva_cache *ghc = &vmx->nested.shadow_vmcs12_cache;
+
+	if (!nested_cpu_has_shadow_vmcs(vmcs12) ||
+	    vmcs12->vmcs_link_pointer == INVALID_GPA)
+		return;
+
+	if (ghc->gpa != vmcs12->vmcs_link_pointer &&
+	    kvm_gfn_to_hva_cache_init(vcpu->kvm, ghc,
+				      vmcs12->vmcs_link_pointer, VMCS12_SIZE))
+		return;
+
+	kvm_write_guest_cached(vmx->vcpu.kvm, ghc, get_shadow_vmcs12(vcpu),
+			       VMCS12_SIZE);
+}
+
+/*
+ * In nested virtualization, check if L1 has set
+ * VM_EXIT_ACK_INTR_ON_EXIT
+ */
+static bool nested_exit_intr_ack_set(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	return get_vmcs12(vcpu)->vm_exit_controls &
+		VM_EXIT_ACK_INTR_ON_EXIT;
+}
+
+static int nested_vmx_check_apic_access_controls(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+					  struct vmcs12 *vmcs12)
+{
+	if (nested_cpu_has2(vmcs12, SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_APIC_ACCESSES) &&
+	    CC(!page_address_valid(vcpu, vmcs12->apic_access_addr)))
+		return -EINVAL;
+	else
+		return 0;
+}
+
+static int nested_vmx_check_apicv_controls(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+					   struct vmcs12 *vmcs12)
+{
+	if (!nested_cpu_has_virt_x2apic_mode(vmcs12) &&
+	    !nested_cpu_has_apic_reg_virt(vmcs12) &&
+	    !nested_cpu_has_vid(vmcs12) &&
+	    !nested_cpu_has_posted_intr(vmcs12))
+		return 0;
+
+	/*
+	 * If virtualize x2apic mode is enabled,
+	 * virtualize apic access must be disabled.
+	 */
+	if (CC(nested_cpu_has_virt_x2apic_mode(vmcs12) &&
+	       nested_cpu_has2(vmcs12, SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_APIC_ACCESSES)))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	/*
+	 * If virtual interrupt delivery is enabled,
+	 * we must exit on external interrupts.
+	 */
+	if (CC(nested_cpu_has_vid(vmcs12) && !nested_exit_on_intr(vcpu)))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	/*
+	 * bits 15:8 should be zero in posted_intr_nv,
+	 * the descriptor address has been already checked
+	 * in nested_get_vmcs12_pages.
+	 *
+	 * bits 5:0 of posted_intr_desc_addr should be zero.
+	 */
+	if (nested_cpu_has_posted_intr(vmcs12) &&
+	   (CC(!nested_cpu_has_vid(vmcs12)) ||
+	    CC(!nested_exit_intr_ack_set(vcpu)) ||
+	    CC((vmcs12->posted_intr_nv & 0xff00)) ||
+	    CC(!kvm_vcpu_is_legal_aligned_gpa(vcpu, vmcs12->posted_intr_desc_addr, 64))))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	/* tpr shadow is needed by all apicv features. */
+	if (CC(!nested_cpu_has(vmcs12, CPU_BASED_TPR_SHADOW)))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int nested_vmx_check_msr_switch(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+				       u32 count, u64 addr)
+{
+	if (count == 0)
+		return 0;
+
+	if (!kvm_vcpu_is_legal_aligned_gpa(vcpu, addr, 16) ||
+	    !kvm_vcpu_is_legal_gpa(vcpu, (addr + count * sizeof(struct vmx_msr_entry) - 1)))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int nested_vmx_check_exit_msr_switch_controls(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+						     struct vmcs12 *vmcs12)
+{
+	if (CC(nested_vmx_check_msr_switch(vcpu,
+					   vmcs12->vm_exit_msr_load_count,
+					   vmcs12->vm_exit_msr_load_addr)) ||
+	    CC(nested_vmx_check_msr_switch(vcpu,
+					   vmcs12->vm_exit_msr_store_count,
+					   vmcs12->vm_exit_msr_store_addr)))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int nested_vmx_check_entry_msr_switch_controls(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+                                                      struct vmcs12 *vmcs12)
+{
+	if (CC(nested_vmx_check_msr_switch(vcpu,
+					   vmcs12->vm_entry_msr_load_count,
+					   vmcs12->vm_entry_msr_load_addr)))
+                return -EINVAL;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int nested_vmx_check_pml_controls(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+					 struct vmcs12 *vmcs12)
+{
+	if (!nested_cpu_has_pml(vmcs12))
+		return 0;
+
+	if (CC(!nested_cpu_has_ept(vmcs12)) ||
+	    CC(!page_address_valid(vcpu, vmcs12->pml_address)))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int nested_vmx_check_unrestricted_guest_controls(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+							struct vmcs12 *vmcs12)
+{
+	if (CC(nested_cpu_has2(vmcs12, SECONDARY_EXEC_UNRESTRICTED_GUEST) &&
+	       !nested_cpu_has_ept(vmcs12)))
+		return -EINVAL;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int nested_vmx_check_mode_based_ept_exec_controls(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+							 struct vmcs12 *vmcs12)
+{
+	if (CC(nested_cpu_has2(vmcs12, SECONDARY_EXEC_MODE_BASED_EPT_EXEC) &&
+	       !nested_cpu_has_ept(vmcs12)))
+		return -EINVAL;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int nested_vmx_check_shadow_vmcs_controls(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+						 struct vmcs12 *vmcs12)
+{
+	if (!nested_cpu_has_shadow_vmcs(vmcs12))
+		return 0;
+
+	if (CC(!page_address_valid(vcpu, vmcs12->vmread_bitmap)) ||
+	    CC(!page_address_valid(vcpu, vmcs12->vmwrite_bitmap)))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int nested_vmx_msr_check_common(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+				       struct vmx_msr_entry *e)
+{
+	/* x2APIC MSR accesses are not allowed */
+	if (CC(vcpu->arch.apic_base & X2APIC_ENABLE && e->index >> 8 == 0x8))
+		return -EINVAL;
+	if (CC(e->index == MSR_IA32_UCODE_WRITE) || /* SDM Table 35-2 */
+	    CC(e->index == MSR_IA32_UCODE_REV))
+		return -EINVAL;
+	if (CC(e->reserved != 0))
+		return -EINVAL;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int nested_vmx_load_msr_check(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+				     struct vmx_msr_entry *e)
+{
+	if (CC(e->index == MSR_FS_BASE) ||
+	    CC(e->index == MSR_GS_BASE) ||
+	    CC(e->index == MSR_IA32_SMM_MONITOR_CTL) || /* SMM is not supported */
+	    nested_vmx_msr_check_common(vcpu, e))
+		return -EINVAL;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int nested_vmx_store_msr_check(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+				      struct vmx_msr_entry *e)
+{
+	if (CC(e->index == MSR_IA32_SMBASE) || /* SMM is not supported */
+	    nested_vmx_msr_check_common(vcpu, e))
+		return -EINVAL;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static u32 nested_vmx_max_atomic_switch_msrs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+	u64 vmx_misc = vmx_control_msr(vmx->nested.msrs.misc_low,
+				       vmx->nested.msrs.misc_high);
+
+	return (vmx_misc_max_msr(vmx_misc) + 1) * VMX_MISC_MSR_LIST_MULTIPLIER;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Load guest's/host's msr at nested entry/exit.
+ * return 0 for success, entry index for failure.
+ *
+ * One of the failure modes for MSR load/store is when a list exceeds the
+ * virtual hardware's capacity. To maintain compatibility with hardware inasmuch
+ * as possible, process all valid entries before failing rather than precheck
+ * for a capacity violation.
+ */
+static u32 nested_vmx_load_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 gpa, u32 count)
+{
+	u32 i;
+	struct vmx_msr_entry e;
+	u32 max_msr_list_size = nested_vmx_max_atomic_switch_msrs(vcpu);
+
+	for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
+		if (unlikely(i >= max_msr_list_size))
+			goto fail;
+
+		if (kvm_vcpu_read_guest(vcpu, gpa + i * sizeof(e),
+					&e, sizeof(e))) {
+			pr_debug_ratelimited(
+				"%s cannot read MSR entry (%u, 0x%08llx)\n",
+				__func__, i, gpa + i * sizeof(e));
+			goto fail;
+		}
+		if (nested_vmx_load_msr_check(vcpu, &e)) {
+			pr_debug_ratelimited(
+				"%s check failed (%u, 0x%x, 0x%x)\n",
+				__func__, i, e.index, e.reserved);
+			goto fail;
+		}
+		if (kvm_set_msr(vcpu, e.index, e.value)) {
+			pr_debug_ratelimited(
+				"%s cannot write MSR (%u, 0x%x, 0x%llx)\n",
+				__func__, i, e.index, e.value);
+			goto fail;
+		}
+	}
+	return 0;
+fail:
+	/* Note, max_msr_list_size is at most 4096, i.e. this can't wrap. */
+	return i + 1;
+}
+
+static bool nested_vmx_get_vmexit_msr_value(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+					    u32 msr_index,
+					    u64 *data)
+{
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+
+	/*
+	 * If the L0 hypervisor stored a more accurate value for the TSC that
+	 * does not include the time taken for emulation of the L2->L1
+	 * VM-exit in L0, use the more accurate value.
+	 */
+	if (msr_index == MSR_IA32_TSC) {
+		int i = vmx_find_loadstore_msr_slot(&vmx->msr_autostore.guest,
+						    MSR_IA32_TSC);
+
+		if (i >= 0) {
+			u64 val = vmx->msr_autostore.guest.val[i].value;
+
+			*data = kvm_read_l1_tsc(vcpu, val);
+			return true;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (kvm_get_msr(vcpu, msr_index, data)) {
+		pr_debug_ratelimited("%s cannot read MSR (0x%x)\n", __func__,
+			msr_index);
+		return false;
+	}
+	return true;
+}
+
+static bool read_and_check_msr_entry(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 gpa, int i,
+				     struct vmx_msr_entry *e)
+{
+	if (kvm_vcpu_read_guest(vcpu,
+				gpa + i * sizeof(*e),
+				e, 2 * sizeof(u32))) {
+		pr_debug_ratelimited(
+			"%s cannot read MSR entry (%u, 0x%08llx)\n",
+			__func__, i, gpa + i * sizeof(*e));
+		return false;
+	}
+	if (nested_vmx_store_msr_check(vcpu, e)) {
+		pr_debug_ratelimited(
+			"%s check failed (%u, 0x%x, 0x%x)\n",
+			__func__, i, e->index, e->reserved);
+		return false;
+	}
+	return true;
+}
+
+static int nested_vmx_store_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 gpa, u32 count)
+{
+	u64 data;
+	u32 i;
+	struct vmx_msr_entry e;
+	u32 max_msr_list_size = nested_vmx_max_atomic_switch_msrs(vcpu);
+
+	for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
+		if (unlikely(i >= max_msr_list_size))
+			return -EINVAL;
+
+		if (!read_and_check_msr_entry(vcpu, gpa, i, &e))
+			return -EINVAL;
+
+		if (!nested_vmx_get_vmexit_msr_value(vcpu, e.index, &data))
+			return -EINVAL;
+
+		if (kvm_vcpu_write_guest(vcpu,
+					 gpa + i * sizeof(e) +
+					     offsetof(struct vmx_msr_entry, value),
+					 &data, sizeof(data))) {
+			pr_debug_ratelimited(
+				"%s cannot write MSR (%u, 0x%x, 0x%llx)\n",
+				__func__, i, e.index, data);
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static bool nested_msr_store_list_has_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 msr_index)
+{
+	struct vmcs12 *vmcs12 = get_vmcs12(vcpu);
+	u32 count = vmcs12->vm_exit_msr_store_count;
+	u64 gpa = vmcs12->vm_exit_msr_store_addr;
+	struct vmx_msr_entry e;
+	u32 i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
+		if (!read_and_check_msr_entry(vcpu, gpa, i, &e))
+			return false;
+
+		if (e.index == msr_index)
+			return true;
+	}
+	return false;
+}
+
+static void prepare_vmx_msr_autostore_list(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+					   u32 msr_index)
+{
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+	struct vmx_msrs *autostore = &vmx->msr_autostore.guest;
+	bool in_vmcs12_store_list;
+	int msr_autostore_slot;
+	bool in_autostore_list;
+	int last;
+
+	msr_autostore_slot = vmx_find_loadstore_msr_slot(autostore, msr_index);
+	in_autostore_list = msr_autostore_slot >= 0;
+	in_vmcs12_store_list = nested_msr_store_list_has_msr(vcpu, msr_index);
+
+	if (in_vmcs12_store_list && !in_autostore_list) {
+		if (autostore->nr == MAX_NR_LOADSTORE_MSRS) {
+			/*
+			 * Emulated VMEntry does not fail here.  Instead a less
+			 * accurate value will be returned by
+			 * nested_vmx_get_vmexit_msr_value() using kvm_get_msr()
+			 * instead of reading the value from the vmcs02 VMExit
+			 * MSR-store area.
+			 */
+			pr_warn_ratelimited(
+				"Not enough msr entries in msr_autostore.  Can't add msr %x\n",
+				msr_index);
+			return;
+		}
+		last = autostore->nr++;
+		autostore->val[last].index = msr_index;
+	} else if (!in_vmcs12_store_list && in_autostore_list) {
+		last = --autostore->nr;
+		autostore->val[msr_autostore_slot] = autostore->val[last];
+	}
+}
+
+/*
+ * Load guest's/host's cr3 at nested entry/exit.  @nested_ept is true if we are
+ * emulating VM-Entry into a guest with EPT enabled.  On failure, the expected
+ * Exit Qualification (for a VM-Entry consistency check VM-Exit) is assigned to
+ * @entry_failure_code.
+ */
+static int nested_vmx_load_cr3(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long cr3,
+			       bool nested_ept, bool reload_pdptrs,
+			       enum vm_entry_failure_code *entry_failure_code)
+{
+	if (CC(kvm_vcpu_is_illegal_gpa(vcpu, cr3))) {
+		*entry_failure_code = ENTRY_FAIL_DEFAULT;
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * If PAE paging and EPT are both on, CR3 is not used by the CPU and
+	 * must not be dereferenced.
+	 */
+	if (reload_pdptrs && !nested_ept && is_pae_paging(vcpu) &&
+	    CC(!load_pdptrs(vcpu, cr3))) {
+		*entry_failure_code = ENTRY_FAIL_PDPTE;
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	vcpu->arch.cr3 = cr3;
+	kvm_register_mark_dirty(vcpu, VCPU_EXREG_CR3);
+
+	/* Re-initialize the MMU, e.g. to pick up CR4 MMU role changes. */
+	kvm_init_mmu(vcpu);
+
+	if (!nested_ept)
+		kvm_mmu_new_pgd(vcpu, cr3);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Returns if KVM is able to config CPU to tag TLB entries
+ * populated by L2 differently than TLB entries populated
+ * by L1.
+ *
+ * If L0 uses EPT, L1 and L2 run with different EPTP because
+ * guest_mode is part of kvm_mmu_page_role. Thus, TLB entries
+ * are tagged with different EPTP.
+ *
+ * If L1 uses VPID and we allocated a vpid02, TLB entries are tagged
+ * with different VPID (L1 entries are tagged with vmx->vpid
+ * while L2 entries are tagged with vmx->nested.vpid02).
+ */
+static bool nested_has_guest_tlb_tag(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct vmcs12 *vmcs12 = get_vmcs12(vcpu);
+
+	return enable_ept ||
+	       (nested_cpu_has_vpid(vmcs12) && to_vmx(vcpu)->nested.vpid02);
+}
+
+static void nested_vmx_transition_tlb_flush(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+					    struct vmcs12 *vmcs12,
+					    bool is_vmenter)
+{
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+
+	/*
+	 * KVM_REQ_HV_TLB_FLUSH flushes entries from either L1's VP_ID or
+	 * L2's VP_ID upon request from the guest. Make sure we check for
+	 * pending entries in the right FIFO upon L1/L2 transition as these
+	 * requests are put by other vCPUs asynchronously.
+	 */
+	if (to_hv_vcpu(vcpu) && enable_ept)
+		kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_HV_TLB_FLUSH, vcpu);
+
+	/*
+	 * If vmcs12 doesn't use VPID, L1 expects linear and combined mappings
+	 * for *all* contexts to be flushed on VM-Enter/VM-Exit, i.e. it's a
+	 * full TLB flush from the guest's perspective.  This is required even
+	 * if VPID is disabled in the host as KVM may need to synchronize the
+	 * MMU in response to the guest TLB flush.
+	 *
+	 * Note, using TLB_FLUSH_GUEST is correct even if nested EPT is in use.
+	 * EPT is a special snowflake, as guest-physical mappings aren't
+	 * flushed on VPID invalidations, including VM-Enter or VM-Exit with
+	 * VPID disabled.  As a result, KVM _never_ needs to sync nEPT
+	 * entries on VM-Enter because L1 can't rely on VM-Enter to flush
+	 * those mappings.
+	 */
+	if (!nested_cpu_has_vpid(vmcs12)) {
+		kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_TLB_FLUSH_GUEST, vcpu);
+		return;
+	}
+
+	/* L2 should never have a VPID if VPID is disabled. */
+	WARN_ON(!enable_vpid);
+
+	/*
+	 * VPID is enabled and in use by vmcs12.  If vpid12 is changing, then
+	 * emulate a guest TLB flush as KVM does not track vpid12 history nor
+	 * is the VPID incorporated into the MMU context.  I.e. KVM must assume
+	 * that the new vpid12 has never been used and thus represents a new
+	 * guest ASID that cannot have entries in the TLB.
+	 */
+	if (is_vmenter && vmcs12->virtual_processor_id != vmx->nested.last_vpid) {
+		vmx->nested.last_vpid = vmcs12->virtual_processor_id;
+		kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_TLB_FLUSH_GUEST, vcpu);
+		return;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * If VPID is enabled, used by vmc12, and vpid12 is not changing but
+	 * does not have a unique TLB tag (ASID), i.e. EPT is disabled and
+	 * KVM was unable to allocate a VPID for L2, flush the current context
+	 * as the effective ASID is common to both L1 and L2.
+	 */
+	if (!nested_has_guest_tlb_tag(vcpu))
+		kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_TLB_FLUSH_CURRENT, vcpu);
+}
+
+static bool is_bitwise_subset(u64 superset, u64 subset, u64 mask)
+{
+	superset &= mask;
+	subset &= mask;
+
+	return (superset | subset) == superset;
+}
+
+static int vmx_restore_vmx_basic(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, u64 data)
+{
+	const u64 feature_and_reserved =
+		/* feature (except bit 48; see below) */
+		BIT_ULL(49) | BIT_ULL(54) | BIT_ULL(55) |
+		/* reserved */
+		BIT_ULL(31) | GENMASK_ULL(47, 45) | GENMASK_ULL(63, 56);
+	u64 vmx_basic = vmcs_config.nested.basic;
+
+	if (!is_bitwise_subset(vmx_basic, data, feature_and_reserved))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	/*
+	 * KVM does not emulate a version of VMX that constrains physical
+	 * addresses of VMX structures (e.g. VMCS) to 32-bits.
+	 */
+	if (data & BIT_ULL(48))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (vmx_basic_vmcs_revision_id(vmx_basic) !=
+	    vmx_basic_vmcs_revision_id(data))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (vmx_basic_vmcs_size(vmx_basic) > vmx_basic_vmcs_size(data))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	vmx->nested.msrs.basic = data;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void vmx_get_control_msr(struct nested_vmx_msrs *msrs, u32 msr_index,
+				u32 **low, u32 **high)
+{
+	switch (msr_index) {
+	case MSR_IA32_VMX_TRUE_PINBASED_CTLS:
+		*low = &msrs->pinbased_ctls_low;
+		*high = &msrs->pinbased_ctls_high;
+		break;
+	case MSR_IA32_VMX_TRUE_PROCBASED_CTLS:
+		*low = &msrs->procbased_ctls_low;
+		*high = &msrs->procbased_ctls_high;
+		break;
+	case MSR_IA32_VMX_TRUE_EXIT_CTLS:
+		*low = &msrs->exit_ctls_low;
+		*high = &msrs->exit_ctls_high;
+		break;
+	case MSR_IA32_VMX_TRUE_ENTRY_CTLS:
+		*low = &msrs->entry_ctls_low;
+		*high = &msrs->entry_ctls_high;
+		break;
+	case MSR_IA32_VMX_PROCBASED_CTLS2:
+		*low = &msrs->secondary_ctls_low;
+		*high = &msrs->secondary_ctls_high;
+		break;
+	default:
+		BUG();
+	}
+}
+
+static int
+vmx_restore_control_msr(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, u32 msr_index, u64 data)
+{
+	u32 *lowp, *highp;
+	u64 supported;
+
+	vmx_get_control_msr(&vmcs_config.nested, msr_index, &lowp, &highp);
+
+	supported = vmx_control_msr(*lowp, *highp);
+
+	/* Check must-be-1 bits are still 1. */
+	if (!is_bitwise_subset(data, supported, GENMASK_ULL(31, 0)))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	/* Check must-be-0 bits are still 0. */
+	if (!is_bitwise_subset(supported, data, GENMASK_ULL(63, 32)))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	vmx_get_control_msr(&vmx->nested.msrs, msr_index, &lowp, &highp);
+	*lowp = data;
+	*highp = data >> 32;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int vmx_restore_vmx_misc(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, u64 data)
+{
+	const u64 feature_and_reserved_bits =
+		/* feature */
+		BIT_ULL(5) | GENMASK_ULL(8, 6) | BIT_ULL(14) | BIT_ULL(15) |
+		BIT_ULL(28) | BIT_ULL(29) | BIT_ULL(30) |
+		/* reserved */
+		GENMASK_ULL(13, 9) | BIT_ULL(31);
+	u64 vmx_misc = vmx_control_msr(vmcs_config.nested.misc_low,
+				       vmcs_config.nested.misc_high);
+
+	if (!is_bitwise_subset(vmx_misc, data, feature_and_reserved_bits))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if ((vmx->nested.msrs.pinbased_ctls_high &
+	     PIN_BASED_VMX_PREEMPTION_TIMER) &&
+	    vmx_misc_preemption_timer_rate(data) !=
+	    vmx_misc_preemption_timer_rate(vmx_misc))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (vmx_misc_cr3_count(data) > vmx_misc_cr3_count(vmx_misc))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (vmx_misc_max_msr(data) > vmx_misc_max_msr(vmx_misc))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (vmx_misc_mseg_revid(data) != vmx_misc_mseg_revid(vmx_misc))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	vmx->nested.msrs.misc_low = data;
+	vmx->nested.msrs.misc_high = data >> 32;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int vmx_restore_vmx_ept_vpid_cap(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, u64 data)
+{
+	u64 vmx_ept_vpid_cap = vmx_control_msr(vmcs_config.nested.ept_caps,
+					       vmcs_config.nested.vpid_caps);
+
+	/* Every bit is either reserved or a feature bit. */
+	if (!is_bitwise_subset(vmx_ept_vpid_cap, data, -1ULL))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	vmx->nested.msrs.ept_caps = data;
+	vmx->nested.msrs.vpid_caps = data >> 32;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static u64 *vmx_get_fixed0_msr(struct nested_vmx_msrs *msrs, u32 msr_index)
+{
+	switch (msr_index) {
+	case MSR_IA32_VMX_CR0_FIXED0:
+		return &msrs->cr0_fixed0;
+	case MSR_IA32_VMX_CR4_FIXED0:
+		return &msrs->cr4_fixed0;
+	default:
+		BUG();
+	}
+}
+
+static int vmx_restore_fixed0_msr(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, u32 msr_index, u64 data)
+{
+	const u64 *msr = vmx_get_fixed0_msr(&vmcs_config.nested, msr_index);
+
+	/*
+	 * 1 bits (which indicates bits which "must-be-1" during VMX operation)
+	 * must be 1 in the restored value.
+	 */
+	if (!is_bitwise_subset(data, *msr, -1ULL))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	*vmx_get_fixed0_msr(&vmx->nested.msrs, msr_index) = data;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Called when userspace is restoring VMX MSRs.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, non-0 otherwise.
+ */
+int vmx_set_vmx_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 msr_index, u64 data)
+{
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+
+	/*
+	 * Don't allow changes to the VMX capability MSRs while the vCPU
+	 * is in VMX operation.
+	 */
+	if (vmx->nested.vmxon)
+		return -EBUSY;
+
+	switch (msr_index) {
+	case MSR_IA32_VMX_BASIC:
+		return vmx_restore_vmx_basic(vmx, data);
+	case MSR_IA32_VMX_PINBASED_CTLS:
+	case MSR_IA32_VMX_PROCBASED_CTLS:
+	case MSR_IA32_VMX_EXIT_CTLS:
+	case MSR_IA32_VMX_ENTRY_CTLS:
+		/*
+		 * The "non-true" VMX capability MSRs are generated from the
+		 * "true" MSRs, so we do not support restoring them directly.
+		 *
+		 * If userspace wants to emulate VMX_BASIC[55]=0, userspace
+		 * should restore the "true" MSRs with the must-be-1 bits
+		 * set according to the SDM Vol 3. A.2 "RESERVED CONTROLS AND
+		 * DEFAULT SETTINGS".
+		 */
+		return -EINVAL;
+	case MSR_IA32_VMX_TRUE_PINBASED_CTLS:
+	case MSR_IA32_VMX_TRUE_PROCBASED_CTLS:
+	case MSR_IA32_VMX_TRUE_EXIT_CTLS:
+	case MSR_IA32_VMX_TRUE_ENTRY_CTLS:
+	case MSR_IA32_VMX_PROCBASED_CTLS2:
+		return vmx_restore_control_msr(vmx, msr_index, data);
+	case MSR_IA32_VMX_MISC:
+		return vmx_restore_vmx_misc(vmx, data);
+	case MSR_IA32_VMX_CR0_FIXED0:
+	case MSR_IA32_VMX_CR4_FIXED0:
+		return vmx_restore_fixed0_msr(vmx, msr_index, data);
+	case MSR_IA32_VMX_CR0_FIXED1:
+	case MSR_IA32_VMX_CR4_FIXED1:
+		/*
+		 * These MSRs are generated based on the vCPU's CPUID, so we
+		 * do not support restoring them directly.
+		 */
+		return -EINVAL;
+	case MSR_IA32_VMX_EPT_VPID_CAP:
+		return vmx_restore_vmx_ept_vpid_cap(vmx, data);
+	case MSR_IA32_VMX_VMCS_ENUM:
+		vmx->nested.msrs.vmcs_enum = data;
+		return 0;
+	case MSR_IA32_VMX_VMFUNC:
+		if (data & ~vmcs_config.nested.vmfunc_controls)
+			return -EINVAL;
+		vmx->nested.msrs.vmfunc_controls = data;
+		return 0;
+	default:
+		/*
+		 * The rest of the VMX capability MSRs do not support restore.
+		 */
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+}
+
+/* Returns 0 on success, non-0 otherwise. */
+int vmx_get_vmx_msr(struct nested_vmx_msrs *msrs, u32 msr_index, u64 *pdata)
+{
+	switch (msr_index) {
+	case MSR_IA32_VMX_BASIC:
+		*pdata = msrs->basic;
+		break;
+	case MSR_IA32_VMX_TRUE_PINBASED_CTLS:
+	case MSR_IA32_VMX_PINBASED_CTLS:
+		*pdata = vmx_control_msr(
+			msrs->pinbased_ctls_low,
+			msrs->pinbased_ctls_high);
+		if (msr_index == MSR_IA32_VMX_PINBASED_CTLS)
+			*pdata |= PIN_BASED_ALWAYSON_WITHOUT_TRUE_MSR;
+		break;
+	case MSR_IA32_VMX_TRUE_PROCBASED_CTLS:
+	case MSR_IA32_VMX_PROCBASED_CTLS:
+		*pdata = vmx_control_msr(
+			msrs->procbased_ctls_low,
+			msrs->procbased_ctls_high);
+		if (msr_index == MSR_IA32_VMX_PROCBASED_CTLS)
+			*pdata |= CPU_BASED_ALWAYSON_WITHOUT_TRUE_MSR;
+		break;
+	case MSR_IA32_VMX_TRUE_EXIT_CTLS:
+	case MSR_IA32_VMX_EXIT_CTLS:
+		*pdata = vmx_control_msr(
+			msrs->exit_ctls_low,
+			msrs->exit_ctls_high);
+		if (msr_index == MSR_IA32_VMX_EXIT_CTLS)
+			*pdata |= VM_EXIT_ALWAYSON_WITHOUT_TRUE_MSR;
+		break;
+	case MSR_IA32_VMX_TRUE_ENTRY_CTLS:
+	case MSR_IA32_VMX_ENTRY_CTLS:
+		*pdata = vmx_control_msr(
+			msrs->entry_ctls_low,
+			msrs->entry_ctls_high);
+		if (msr_index == MSR_IA32_VMX_ENTRY_CTLS)
+			*pdata |= VM_ENTRY_ALWAYSON_WITHOUT_TRUE_MSR;
+		break;
+	case MSR_IA32_VMX_MISC:
+		*pdata = vmx_control_msr(
+			msrs->misc_low,
+			msrs->misc_high);
+		break;
+	case MSR_IA32_VMX_CR0_FIXED0:
+		*pdata = msrs->cr0_fixed0;
+		break;
+	case MSR_IA32_VMX_CR0_FIXED1:
+		*pdata = msrs->cr0_fixed1;
+		break;
+	case MSR_IA32_VMX_CR4_FIXED0:
+		*pdata = msrs->cr4_fixed0;
+		break;
+	case MSR_IA32_VMX_CR4_FIXED1:
+		*pdata = msrs->cr4_fixed1;
+		break;
+	case MSR_IA32_VMX_VMCS_ENUM:
+		*pdata = msrs->vmcs_enum;
+		break;
+	case MSR_IA32_VMX_PROCBASED_CTLS2:
+		*pdata = vmx_control_msr(
+			msrs->secondary_ctls_low,
+			msrs->secondary_ctls_high);
+		break;
+	case MSR_IA32_VMX_EPT_VPID_CAP:
+		*pdata = msrs->ept_caps |
+			((u64)msrs->vpid_caps << 32);
+		break;
+	case MSR_IA32_VMX_VMFUNC:
+		*pdata = msrs->vmfunc_controls;
+		break;
+	default:
+		return 1;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Copy the writable VMCS shadow fields back to the VMCS12, in case they have
+ * been modified by the L1 guest.  Note, "writable" in this context means
+ * "writable by the guest", i.e. tagged SHADOW_FIELD_RW; the set of
+ * fields tagged SHADOW_FIELD_RO may or may not align with the "read-only"
+ * VM-exit information fields (which are actually writable if the vCPU is
+ * configured to support "VMWRITE to any supported field in the VMCS").
+ */
+static void copy_shadow_to_vmcs12(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
+{
+	struct vmcs *shadow_vmcs = vmx->vmcs01.shadow_vmcs;
+	struct vmcs12 *vmcs12 = get_vmcs12(&vmx->vcpu);
+	struct shadow_vmcs_field field;
+	unsigned long val;
+	int i;
+
+	if (WARN_ON(!shadow_vmcs))
+		return;
+
+	preempt_disable();
+
+	vmcs_load(shadow_vmcs);
+
+	for (i = 0; i < max_shadow_read_write_fields; i++) {
+		field = shadow_read_write_fields[i];
+		val = __vmcs_readl(field.encoding);
+		vmcs12_write_any(vmcs12, field.encoding, field.offset, val);
+	}
+
+	vmcs_clear(shadow_vmcs);
+	vmcs_load(vmx->loaded_vmcs->vmcs);
+
+	preempt_enable();
+}
+
+static void copy_vmcs12_to_shadow(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
+{
+	const struct shadow_vmcs_field *fields[] = {
+		shadow_read_write_fields,
+		shadow_read_only_fields
+	};
+	const int max_fields[] = {
+		max_shadow_read_write_fields,
+		max_shadow_read_only_fields
+	};
+	struct vmcs *shadow_vmcs = vmx->vmcs01.shadow_vmcs;
+	struct vmcs12 *vmcs12 = get_vmcs12(&vmx->vcpu);
+	struct shadow_vmcs_field field;
+	unsigned long val;
+	int i, q;
+
+	if (WARN_ON(!shadow_vmcs))
+		return;
+
+	vmcs_load(shadow_vmcs);
+
+	for (q = 0; q < ARRAY_SIZE(fields); q++) {
+		for (i = 0; i < max_fields[q]; i++) {
+			field = fields[q][i];
+			val = vmcs12_read_any(vmcs12, field.encoding,
+					      field.offset);
+			__vmcs_writel(field.encoding, val);
+		}
+	}
+
+	vmcs_clear(shadow_vmcs);
+	vmcs_load(vmx->loaded_vmcs->vmcs);
+}
+
+static void copy_enlightened_to_vmcs12(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, u32 hv_clean_fields)
+{
+	struct vmcs12 *vmcs12 = vmx->nested.cached_vmcs12;
+	struct hv_enlightened_vmcs *evmcs = vmx->nested.hv_evmcs;
+	struct kvm_vcpu_hv *hv_vcpu = to_hv_vcpu(&vmx->vcpu);
+
+	/* HV_VMX_ENLIGHTENED_CLEAN_FIELD_NONE */
+	vmcs12->tpr_threshold = evmcs->tpr_threshold;
+	vmcs12->guest_rip = evmcs->guest_rip;
+
+	if (unlikely(!(hv_clean_fields &
+		       HV_VMX_ENLIGHTENED_CLEAN_FIELD_ENLIGHTENMENTSCONTROL))) {
+		hv_vcpu->nested.pa_page_gpa = evmcs->partition_assist_page;
+		hv_vcpu->nested.vm_id = evmcs->hv_vm_id;
+		hv_vcpu->nested.vp_id = evmcs->hv_vp_id;
+	}
+
+	if (unlikely(!(hv_clean_fields &
+		       HV_VMX_ENLIGHTENED_CLEAN_FIELD_GUEST_BASIC))) {
+		vmcs12->guest_rsp = evmcs->guest_rsp;
+		vmcs12->guest_rflags = evmcs->guest_rflags;
+		vmcs12->guest_interruptibility_info =
+			evmcs->guest_interruptibility_info;
+		/*
+		 * Not present in struct vmcs12:
+		 * vmcs12->guest_ssp = evmcs->guest_ssp;
+		 */
+	}
+
+	if (unlikely(!(hv_clean_fields &
+		       HV_VMX_ENLIGHTENED_CLEAN_FIELD_CONTROL_PROC))) {
+		vmcs12->cpu_based_vm_exec_control =
+			evmcs->cpu_based_vm_exec_control;
+	}
+
+	if (unlikely(!(hv_clean_fields &
+		       HV_VMX_ENLIGHTENED_CLEAN_FIELD_CONTROL_EXCPN))) {
+		vmcs12->exception_bitmap = evmcs->exception_bitmap;
+	}
+
+	if (unlikely(!(hv_clean_fields &
+		       HV_VMX_ENLIGHTENED_CLEAN_FIELD_CONTROL_ENTRY))) {
+		vmcs12->vm_entry_controls = evmcs->vm_entry_controls;
+	}
+
+	if (unlikely(!(hv_clean_fields &
+		       HV_VMX_ENLIGHTENED_CLEAN_FIELD_CONTROL_EVENT))) {
+		vmcs12->vm_entry_intr_info_field =
+			evmcs->vm_entry_intr_info_field;
+		vmcs12->vm_entry_exception_error_code =
+			evmcs->vm_entry_exception_error_code;
+		vmcs12->vm_entry_instruction_len =
+			evmcs->vm_entry_instruction_len;
+	}
+
+	if (unlikely(!(hv_clean_fields &
+		       HV_VMX_ENLIGHTENED_CLEAN_FIELD_HOST_GRP1))) {
+		vmcs12->host_ia32_pat = evmcs->host_ia32_pat;
+		vmcs12->host_ia32_efer = evmcs->host_ia32_efer;
+		vmcs12->host_cr0 = evmcs->host_cr0;
+		vmcs12->host_cr3 = evmcs->host_cr3;
+		vmcs12->host_cr4 = evmcs->host_cr4;
+		vmcs12->host_ia32_sysenter_esp = evmcs->host_ia32_sysenter_esp;
+		vmcs12->host_ia32_sysenter_eip = evmcs->host_ia32_sysenter_eip;
+		vmcs12->host_rip = evmcs->host_rip;
+		vmcs12->host_ia32_sysenter_cs = evmcs->host_ia32_sysenter_cs;
+		vmcs12->host_es_selector = evmcs->host_es_selector;
+		vmcs12->host_cs_selector = evmcs->host_cs_selector;
+		vmcs12->host_ss_selector = evmcs->host_ss_selector;
+		vmcs12->host_ds_selector = evmcs->host_ds_selector;
+		vmcs12->host_fs_selector = evmcs->host_fs_selector;
+		vmcs12->host_gs_selector = evmcs->host_gs_selector;
+		vmcs12->host_tr_selector = evmcs->host_tr_selector;
+		vmcs12->host_ia32_perf_global_ctrl = evmcs->host_ia32_perf_global_ctrl;
+		/*
+		 * Not present in struct vmcs12:
+		 * vmcs12->host_ia32_s_cet = evmcs->host_ia32_s_cet;
+		 * vmcs12->host_ssp = evmcs->host_ssp;
+		 * vmcs12->host_ia32_int_ssp_table_addr = evmcs->host_ia32_int_ssp_table_addr;
+		 */
+	}
+
+	if (unlikely(!(hv_clean_fields &
+		       HV_VMX_ENLIGHTENED_CLEAN_FIELD_CONTROL_GRP1))) {
+		vmcs12->pin_based_vm_exec_control =
+			evmcs->pin_based_vm_exec_control;
+		vmcs12->vm_exit_controls = evmcs->vm_exit_controls;
+		vmcs12->secondary_vm_exec_control =
+			evmcs->secondary_vm_exec_control;
+	}
+
+	if (unlikely(!(hv_clean_fields &
+		       HV_VMX_ENLIGHTENED_CLEAN_FIELD_IO_BITMAP))) {
+		vmcs12->io_bitmap_a = evmcs->io_bitmap_a;
+		vmcs12->io_bitmap_b = evmcs->io_bitmap_b;
+	}
+
+	if (unlikely(!(hv_clean_fields &
+		       HV_VMX_ENLIGHTENED_CLEAN_FIELD_MSR_BITMAP))) {
+		vmcs12->msr_bitmap = evmcs->msr_bitmap;
+	}
+
+	if (unlikely(!(hv_clean_fields &
+		       HV_VMX_ENLIGHTENED_CLEAN_FIELD_GUEST_GRP2))) {
+		vmcs12->guest_es_base = evmcs->guest_es_base;
+		vmcs12->guest_cs_base = evmcs->guest_cs_base;
+		vmcs12->guest_ss_base = evmcs->guest_ss_base;
+		vmcs12->guest_ds_base = evmcs->guest_ds_base;
+		vmcs12->guest_fs_base = evmcs->guest_fs_base;
+		vmcs12->guest_gs_base = evmcs->guest_gs_base;
+		vmcs12->guest_ldtr_base = evmcs->guest_ldtr_base;
+		vmcs12->guest_tr_base = evmcs->guest_tr_base;
+		vmcs12->guest_gdtr_base = evmcs->guest_gdtr_base;
+		vmcs12->guest_idtr_base = evmcs->guest_idtr_base;
+		vmcs12->guest_es_limit = evmcs->guest_es_limit;
+		vmcs12->guest_cs_limit = evmcs->guest_cs_limit;
+		vmcs12->guest_ss_limit = evmcs->guest_ss_limit;
+		vmcs12->guest_ds_limit = evmcs->guest_ds_limit;
+		vmcs12->guest_fs_limit = evmcs->guest_fs_limit;
+		vmcs12->guest_gs_limit = evmcs->guest_gs_limit;
+		vmcs12->guest_ldtr_limit = evmcs->guest_ldtr_limit;
+		vmcs12->guest_tr_limit = evmcs->guest_tr_limit;
+		vmcs12->guest_gdtr_limit = evmcs->guest_gdtr_limit;
+		vmcs12->guest_idtr_limit = evmcs->guest_idtr_limit;
+		vmcs12->guest_es_ar_bytes = evmcs->guest_es_ar_bytes;
+		vmcs12->guest_cs_ar_bytes = evmcs->guest_cs_ar_bytes;
+		vmcs12->guest_ss_ar_bytes = evmcs->guest_ss_ar_bytes;
+		vmcs12->guest_ds_ar_bytes = evmcs->guest_ds_ar_bytes;
+		vmcs12->guest_fs_ar_bytes = evmcs->guest_fs_ar_bytes;
+		vmcs12->guest_gs_ar_bytes = evmcs->guest_gs_ar_bytes;
+		vmcs12->guest_ldtr_ar_bytes = evmcs->guest_ldtr_ar_bytes;
+		vmcs12->guest_tr_ar_bytes = evmcs->guest_tr_ar_bytes;
+		vmcs12->guest_es_selector = evmcs->guest_es_selector;
+		vmcs12->guest_cs_selector = evmcs->guest_cs_selector;
+		vmcs12->guest_ss_selector = evmcs->guest_ss_selector;
+		vmcs12->guest_ds_selector = evmcs->guest_ds_selector;
+		vmcs12->guest_fs_selector = evmcs->guest_fs_selector;
+		vmcs12->guest_gs_selector = evmcs->guest_gs_selector;
+		vmcs12->guest_ldtr_selector = evmcs->guest_ldtr_selector;
+		vmcs12->guest_tr_selector = evmcs->guest_tr_selector;
+	}
+
+	if (unlikely(!(hv_clean_fields &
+		       HV_VMX_ENLIGHTENED_CLEAN_FIELD_CONTROL_GRP2))) {
+		vmcs12->tsc_offset = evmcs->tsc_offset;
+		vmcs12->virtual_apic_page_addr = evmcs->virtual_apic_page_addr;
+		vmcs12->xss_exit_bitmap = evmcs->xss_exit_bitmap;
+		vmcs12->encls_exiting_bitmap = evmcs->encls_exiting_bitmap;
+		vmcs12->tsc_multiplier = evmcs->tsc_multiplier;
+	}
+
+	if (unlikely(!(hv_clean_fields &
+		       HV_VMX_ENLIGHTENED_CLEAN_FIELD_CRDR))) {
+		vmcs12->cr0_guest_host_mask = evmcs->cr0_guest_host_mask;
+		vmcs12->cr4_guest_host_mask = evmcs->cr4_guest_host_mask;
+		vmcs12->cr0_read_shadow = evmcs->cr0_read_shadow;
+		vmcs12->cr4_read_shadow = evmcs->cr4_read_shadow;
+		vmcs12->guest_cr0 = evmcs->guest_cr0;
+		vmcs12->guest_cr3 = evmcs->guest_cr3;
+		vmcs12->guest_cr4 = evmcs->guest_cr4;
+		vmcs12->guest_dr7 = evmcs->guest_dr7;
+	}
+
+	if (unlikely(!(hv_clean_fields &
+		       HV_VMX_ENLIGHTENED_CLEAN_FIELD_HOST_POINTER))) {
+		vmcs12->host_fs_base = evmcs->host_fs_base;
+		vmcs12->host_gs_base = evmcs->host_gs_base;
+		vmcs12->host_tr_base = evmcs->host_tr_base;
+		vmcs12->host_gdtr_base = evmcs->host_gdtr_base;
+		vmcs12->host_idtr_base = evmcs->host_idtr_base;
+		vmcs12->host_rsp = evmcs->host_rsp;
+	}
+
+	if (unlikely(!(hv_clean_fields &
+		       HV_VMX_ENLIGHTENED_CLEAN_FIELD_CONTROL_XLAT))) {
+		vmcs12->ept_pointer = evmcs->ept_pointer;
+		vmcs12->virtual_processor_id = evmcs->virtual_processor_id;
+	}
+
+	if (unlikely(!(hv_clean_fields &
+		       HV_VMX_ENLIGHTENED_CLEAN_FIELD_GUEST_GRP1))) {
+		vmcs12->vmcs_link_pointer = evmcs->vmcs_link_pointer;
+		vmcs12->guest_ia32_debugctl = evmcs->guest_ia32_debugctl;
+		vmcs12->guest_ia32_pat = evmcs->guest_ia32_pat;
+		vmcs12->guest_ia32_efer = evmcs->guest_ia32_efer;
+		vmcs12->guest_pdptr0 = evmcs->guest_pdptr0;
+		vmcs12->guest_pdptr1 = evmcs->guest_pdptr1;
+		vmcs12->guest_pdptr2 = evmcs->guest_pdptr2;
+		vmcs12->guest_pdptr3 = evmcs->guest_pdptr3;
+		vmcs12->guest_pending_dbg_exceptions =
+			evmcs->guest_pending_dbg_exceptions;
+		vmcs12->guest_sysenter_esp = evmcs->guest_sysenter_esp;
+		vmcs12->guest_sysenter_eip = evmcs->guest_sysenter_eip;
+		vmcs12->guest_bndcfgs = evmcs->guest_bndcfgs;
+		vmcs12->guest_activity_state = evmcs->guest_activity_state;
+		vmcs12->guest_sysenter_cs = evmcs->guest_sysenter_cs;
+		vmcs12->guest_ia32_perf_global_ctrl = evmcs->guest_ia32_perf_global_ctrl;
+		/*
+		 * Not present in struct vmcs12:
+		 * vmcs12->guest_ia32_s_cet = evmcs->guest_ia32_s_cet;
+		 * vmcs12->guest_ia32_lbr_ctl = evmcs->guest_ia32_lbr_ctl;
+		 * vmcs12->guest_ia32_int_ssp_table_addr = evmcs->guest_ia32_int_ssp_table_addr;
+		 */
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Not used?
+	 * vmcs12->vm_exit_msr_store_addr = evmcs->vm_exit_msr_store_addr;
+	 * vmcs12->vm_exit_msr_load_addr = evmcs->vm_exit_msr_load_addr;
+	 * vmcs12->vm_entry_msr_load_addr = evmcs->vm_entry_msr_load_addr;
+	 * vmcs12->page_fault_error_code_mask =
+	 *		evmcs->page_fault_error_code_mask;
+	 * vmcs12->page_fault_error_code_match =
+	 *		evmcs->page_fault_error_code_match;
+	 * vmcs12->cr3_target_count = evmcs->cr3_target_count;
+	 * vmcs12->vm_exit_msr_store_count = evmcs->vm_exit_msr_store_count;
+	 * vmcs12->vm_exit_msr_load_count = evmcs->vm_exit_msr_load_count;
+	 * vmcs12->vm_entry_msr_load_count = evmcs->vm_entry_msr_load_count;
+	 */
+
+	/*
+	 * Read only fields:
+	 * vmcs12->guest_physical_address = evmcs->guest_physical_address;
+	 * vmcs12->vm_instruction_error = evmcs->vm_instruction_error;
+	 * vmcs12->vm_exit_reason = evmcs->vm_exit_reason;
+	 * vmcs12->vm_exit_intr_info = evmcs->vm_exit_intr_info;
+	 * vmcs12->vm_exit_intr_error_code = evmcs->vm_exit_intr_error_code;
+	 * vmcs12->idt_vectoring_info_field = evmcs->idt_vectoring_info_field;
+	 * vmcs12->idt_vectoring_error_code = evmcs->idt_vectoring_error_code;
+	 * vmcs12->vm_exit_instruction_len = evmcs->vm_exit_instruction_len;
+	 * vmcs12->vmx_instruction_info = evmcs->vmx_instruction_info;
+	 * vmcs12->exit_qualification = evmcs->exit_qualification;
+	 * vmcs12->guest_linear_address = evmcs->guest_linear_address;
+	 *
+	 * Not present in struct vmcs12:
+	 * vmcs12->exit_io_instruction_ecx = evmcs->exit_io_instruction_ecx;
+	 * vmcs12->exit_io_instruction_esi = evmcs->exit_io_instruction_esi;
+	 * vmcs12->exit_io_instruction_edi = evmcs->exit_io_instruction_edi;
+	 * vmcs12->exit_io_instruction_eip = evmcs->exit_io_instruction_eip;
+	 */
+
+	return;
+}
+
+static void copy_vmcs12_to_enlightened(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
+{
+	struct vmcs12 *vmcs12 = vmx->nested.cached_vmcs12;
+	struct hv_enlightened_vmcs *evmcs = vmx->nested.hv_evmcs;
+
+	/*
+	 * Should not be changed by KVM:
+	 *
+	 * evmcs->host_es_selector = vmcs12->host_es_selector;
+	 * evmcs->host_cs_selector = vmcs12->host_cs_selector;
+	 * evmcs->host_ss_selector = vmcs12->host_ss_selector;
+	 * evmcs->host_ds_selector = vmcs12->host_ds_selector;
+	 * evmcs->host_fs_selector = vmcs12->host_fs_selector;
+	 * evmcs->host_gs_selector = vmcs12->host_gs_selector;
+	 * evmcs->host_tr_selector = vmcs12->host_tr_selector;
+	 * evmcs->host_ia32_pat = vmcs12->host_ia32_pat;
+	 * evmcs->host_ia32_efer = vmcs12->host_ia32_efer;
+	 * evmcs->host_cr0 = vmcs12->host_cr0;
+	 * evmcs->host_cr3 = vmcs12->host_cr3;
+	 * evmcs->host_cr4 = vmcs12->host_cr4;
+	 * evmcs->host_ia32_sysenter_esp = vmcs12->host_ia32_sysenter_esp;
+	 * evmcs->host_ia32_sysenter_eip = vmcs12->host_ia32_sysenter_eip;
+	 * evmcs->host_rip = vmcs12->host_rip;
+	 * evmcs->host_ia32_sysenter_cs = vmcs12->host_ia32_sysenter_cs;
+	 * evmcs->host_fs_base = vmcs12->host_fs_base;
+	 * evmcs->host_gs_base = vmcs12->host_gs_base;
+	 * evmcs->host_tr_base = vmcs12->host_tr_base;
+	 * evmcs->host_gdtr_base = vmcs12->host_gdtr_base;
+	 * evmcs->host_idtr_base = vmcs12->host_idtr_base;
+	 * evmcs->host_rsp = vmcs12->host_rsp;
+	 * sync_vmcs02_to_vmcs12() doesn't read these:
+	 * evmcs->io_bitmap_a = vmcs12->io_bitmap_a;
+	 * evmcs->io_bitmap_b = vmcs12->io_bitmap_b;
+	 * evmcs->msr_bitmap = vmcs12->msr_bitmap;
+	 * evmcs->ept_pointer = vmcs12->ept_pointer;
+	 * evmcs->xss_exit_bitmap = vmcs12->xss_exit_bitmap;
+	 * evmcs->vm_exit_msr_store_addr = vmcs12->vm_exit_msr_store_addr;
+	 * evmcs->vm_exit_msr_load_addr = vmcs12->vm_exit_msr_load_addr;
+	 * evmcs->vm_entry_msr_load_addr = vmcs12->vm_entry_msr_load_addr;
+	 * evmcs->tpr_threshold = vmcs12->tpr_threshold;
+	 * evmcs->virtual_processor_id = vmcs12->virtual_processor_id;
+	 * evmcs->exception_bitmap = vmcs12->exception_bitmap;
+	 * evmcs->vmcs_link_pointer = vmcs12->vmcs_link_pointer;
+	 * evmcs->pin_based_vm_exec_control = vmcs12->pin_based_vm_exec_control;
+	 * evmcs->vm_exit_controls = vmcs12->vm_exit_controls;
+	 * evmcs->secondary_vm_exec_control = vmcs12->secondary_vm_exec_control;
+	 * evmcs->page_fault_error_code_mask =
+	 *		vmcs12->page_fault_error_code_mask;
+	 * evmcs->page_fault_error_code_match =
+	 *		vmcs12->page_fault_error_code_match;
+	 * evmcs->cr3_target_count = vmcs12->cr3_target_count;
+	 * evmcs->virtual_apic_page_addr = vmcs12->virtual_apic_page_addr;
+	 * evmcs->tsc_offset = vmcs12->tsc_offset;
+	 * evmcs->guest_ia32_debugctl = vmcs12->guest_ia32_debugctl;
+	 * evmcs->cr0_guest_host_mask = vmcs12->cr0_guest_host_mask;
+	 * evmcs->cr4_guest_host_mask = vmcs12->cr4_guest_host_mask;
+	 * evmcs->cr0_read_shadow = vmcs12->cr0_read_shadow;
+	 * evmcs->cr4_read_shadow = vmcs12->cr4_read_shadow;
+	 * evmcs->vm_exit_msr_store_count = vmcs12->vm_exit_msr_store_count;
+	 * evmcs->vm_exit_msr_load_count = vmcs12->vm_exit_msr_load_count;
+	 * evmcs->vm_entry_msr_load_count = vmcs12->vm_entry_msr_load_count;
+	 * evmcs->guest_ia32_perf_global_ctrl = vmcs12->guest_ia32_perf_global_ctrl;
+	 * evmcs->host_ia32_perf_global_ctrl = vmcs12->host_ia32_perf_global_ctrl;
+	 * evmcs->encls_exiting_bitmap = vmcs12->encls_exiting_bitmap;
+	 * evmcs->tsc_multiplier = vmcs12->tsc_multiplier;
+	 *
+	 * Not present in struct vmcs12:
+	 * evmcs->exit_io_instruction_ecx = vmcs12->exit_io_instruction_ecx;
+	 * evmcs->exit_io_instruction_esi = vmcs12->exit_io_instruction_esi;
+	 * evmcs->exit_io_instruction_edi = vmcs12->exit_io_instruction_edi;
+	 * evmcs->exit_io_instruction_eip = vmcs12->exit_io_instruction_eip;
+	 * evmcs->host_ia32_s_cet = vmcs12->host_ia32_s_cet;
+	 * evmcs->host_ssp = vmcs12->host_ssp;
+	 * evmcs->host_ia32_int_ssp_table_addr = vmcs12->host_ia32_int_ssp_table_addr;
+	 * evmcs->guest_ia32_s_cet = vmcs12->guest_ia32_s_cet;
+	 * evmcs->guest_ia32_lbr_ctl = vmcs12->guest_ia32_lbr_ctl;
+	 * evmcs->guest_ia32_int_ssp_table_addr = vmcs12->guest_ia32_int_ssp_table_addr;
+	 * evmcs->guest_ssp = vmcs12->guest_ssp;
+	 */
+
+	evmcs->guest_es_selector = vmcs12->guest_es_selector;
+	evmcs->guest_cs_selector = vmcs12->guest_cs_selector;
+	evmcs->guest_ss_selector = vmcs12->guest_ss_selector;
+	evmcs->guest_ds_selector = vmcs12->guest_ds_selector;
+	evmcs->guest_fs_selector = vmcs12->guest_fs_selector;
+	evmcs->guest_gs_selector = vmcs12->guest_gs_selector;
+	evmcs->guest_ldtr_selector = vmcs12->guest_ldtr_selector;
+	evmcs->guest_tr_selector = vmcs12->guest_tr_selector;
+
+	evmcs->guest_es_limit = vmcs12->guest_es_limit;
+	evmcs->guest_cs_limit = vmcs12->guest_cs_limit;
+	evmcs->guest_ss_limit = vmcs12->guest_ss_limit;
+	evmcs->guest_ds_limit = vmcs12->guest_ds_limit;
+	evmcs->guest_fs_limit = vmcs12->guest_fs_limit;
+	evmcs->guest_gs_limit = vmcs12->guest_gs_limit;
+	evmcs->guest_ldtr_limit = vmcs12->guest_ldtr_limit;
+	evmcs->guest_tr_limit = vmcs12->guest_tr_limit;
+	evmcs->guest_gdtr_limit = vmcs12->guest_gdtr_limit;
+	evmcs->guest_idtr_limit = vmcs12->guest_idtr_limit;
+
+	evmcs->guest_es_ar_bytes = vmcs12->guest_es_ar_bytes;
+	evmcs->guest_cs_ar_bytes = vmcs12->guest_cs_ar_bytes;
+	evmcs->guest_ss_ar_bytes = vmcs12->guest_ss_ar_bytes;
+	evmcs->guest_ds_ar_bytes = vmcs12->guest_ds_ar_bytes;
+	evmcs->guest_fs_ar_bytes = vmcs12->guest_fs_ar_bytes;
+	evmcs->guest_gs_ar_bytes = vmcs12->guest_gs_ar_bytes;
+	evmcs->guest_ldtr_ar_bytes = vmcs12->guest_ldtr_ar_bytes;
+	evmcs->guest_tr_ar_bytes = vmcs12->guest_tr_ar_bytes;
+
+	evmcs->guest_es_base = vmcs12->guest_es_base;
+	evmcs->guest_cs_base = vmcs12->guest_cs_base;
+	evmcs->guest_ss_base = vmcs12->guest_ss_base;
+	evmcs->guest_ds_base = vmcs12->guest_ds_base;
+	evmcs->guest_fs_base = vmcs12->guest_fs_base;
+	evmcs->guest_gs_base = vmcs12->guest_gs_base;
+	evmcs->guest_ldtr_base = vmcs12->guest_ldtr_base;
+	evmcs->guest_tr_base = vmcs12->guest_tr_base;
+	evmcs->guest_gdtr_base = vmcs12->guest_gdtr_base;
+	evmcs->guest_idtr_base = vmcs12->guest_idtr_base;
+
+	evmcs->guest_ia32_pat = vmcs12->guest_ia32_pat;
+	evmcs->guest_ia32_efer = vmcs12->guest_ia32_efer;
+
+	evmcs->guest_pdptr0 = vmcs12->guest_pdptr0;
+	evmcs->guest_pdptr1 = vmcs12->guest_pdptr1;
+	evmcs->guest_pdptr2 = vmcs12->guest_pdptr2;
+	evmcs->guest_pdptr3 = vmcs12->guest_pdptr3;
+
+	evmcs->guest_pending_dbg_exceptions =
+		vmcs12->guest_pending_dbg_exceptions;
+	evmcs->guest_sysenter_esp = vmcs12->guest_sysenter_esp;
+	evmcs->guest_sysenter_eip = vmcs12->guest_sysenter_eip;
+
+	evmcs->guest_activity_state = vmcs12->guest_activity_state;
+	evmcs->guest_sysenter_cs = vmcs12->guest_sysenter_cs;
+
+	evmcs->guest_cr0 = vmcs12->guest_cr0;
+	evmcs->guest_cr3 = vmcs12->guest_cr3;
+	evmcs->guest_cr4 = vmcs12->guest_cr4;
+	evmcs->guest_dr7 = vmcs12->guest_dr7;
+
+	evmcs->guest_physical_address = vmcs12->guest_physical_address;
+
+	evmcs->vm_instruction_error = vmcs12->vm_instruction_error;
+	evmcs->vm_exit_reason = vmcs12->vm_exit_reason;
+	evmcs->vm_exit_intr_info = vmcs12->vm_exit_intr_info;
+	evmcs->vm_exit_intr_error_code = vmcs12->vm_exit_intr_error_code;
+	evmcs->idt_vectoring_info_field = vmcs12->idt_vectoring_info_field;
+	evmcs->idt_vectoring_error_code = vmcs12->idt_vectoring_error_code;
+	evmcs->vm_exit_instruction_len = vmcs12->vm_exit_instruction_len;
+	evmcs->vmx_instruction_info = vmcs12->vmx_instruction_info;
+
+	evmcs->exit_qualification = vmcs12->exit_qualification;
+
+	evmcs->guest_linear_address = vmcs12->guest_linear_address;
+	evmcs->guest_rsp = vmcs12->guest_rsp;
+	evmcs->guest_rflags = vmcs12->guest_rflags;
+
+	evmcs->guest_interruptibility_info =
+		vmcs12->guest_interruptibility_info;
+	evmcs->cpu_based_vm_exec_control = vmcs12->cpu_based_vm_exec_control;
+	evmcs->vm_entry_controls = vmcs12->vm_entry_controls;
+	evmcs->vm_entry_intr_info_field = vmcs12->vm_entry_intr_info_field;
+	evmcs->vm_entry_exception_error_code =
+		vmcs12->vm_entry_exception_error_code;
+	evmcs->vm_entry_instruction_len = vmcs12->vm_entry_instruction_len;
+
+	evmcs->guest_rip = vmcs12->guest_rip;
+
+	evmcs->guest_bndcfgs = vmcs12->guest_bndcfgs;
+
+	return;
+}
+
+/*
+ * This is an equivalent of the nested hypervisor executing the vmptrld
+ * instruction.
+ */
+static enum nested_evmptrld_status nested_vmx_handle_enlightened_vmptrld(
+	struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool from_launch)
+{
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+	bool evmcs_gpa_changed = false;
+	u64 evmcs_gpa;
+
+	if (likely(!guest_cpuid_has_evmcs(vcpu)))
+		return EVMPTRLD_DISABLED;
+
+	evmcs_gpa = nested_get_evmptr(vcpu);
+	if (!evmptr_is_valid(evmcs_gpa)) {
+		nested_release_evmcs(vcpu);
+		return EVMPTRLD_DISABLED;
+	}
+
+	if (unlikely(evmcs_gpa != vmx->nested.hv_evmcs_vmptr)) {
+		vmx->nested.current_vmptr = INVALID_GPA;
+
+		nested_release_evmcs(vcpu);
+
+		if (kvm_vcpu_map(vcpu, gpa_to_gfn(evmcs_gpa),
+				 &vmx->nested.hv_evmcs_map))
+			return EVMPTRLD_ERROR;
+
+		vmx->nested.hv_evmcs = vmx->nested.hv_evmcs_map.hva;
+
+		/*
+		 * Currently, KVM only supports eVMCS version 1
+		 * (== KVM_EVMCS_VERSION) and thus we expect guest to set this
+		 * value to first u32 field of eVMCS which should specify eVMCS
+		 * VersionNumber.
+		 *
+		 * Guest should be aware of supported eVMCS versions by host by
+		 * examining CPUID.0x4000000A.EAX[0:15]. Host userspace VMM is
+		 * expected to set this CPUID leaf according to the value
+		 * returned in vmcs_version from nested_enable_evmcs().
+		 *
+		 * However, it turns out that Microsoft Hyper-V fails to comply
+		 * to their own invented interface: When Hyper-V use eVMCS, it
+		 * just sets first u32 field of eVMCS to revision_id specified
+		 * in MSR_IA32_VMX_BASIC. Instead of used eVMCS version number
+		 * which is one of the supported versions specified in
+		 * CPUID.0x4000000A.EAX[0:15].
+		 *
+		 * To overcome Hyper-V bug, we accept here either a supported
+		 * eVMCS version or VMCS12 revision_id as valid values for first
+		 * u32 field of eVMCS.
+		 */
+		if ((vmx->nested.hv_evmcs->revision_id != KVM_EVMCS_VERSION) &&
+		    (vmx->nested.hv_evmcs->revision_id != VMCS12_REVISION)) {
+			nested_release_evmcs(vcpu);
+			return EVMPTRLD_VMFAIL;
+		}
+
+		vmx->nested.hv_evmcs_vmptr = evmcs_gpa;
+
+		evmcs_gpa_changed = true;
+		/*
+		 * Unlike normal vmcs12, enlightened vmcs12 is not fully
+		 * reloaded from guest's memory (read only fields, fields not
+		 * present in struct hv_enlightened_vmcs, ...). Make sure there
+		 * are no leftovers.
+		 */
+		if (from_launch) {
+			struct vmcs12 *vmcs12 = get_vmcs12(vcpu);
+			memset(vmcs12, 0, sizeof(*vmcs12));
+			vmcs12->hdr.revision_id = VMCS12_REVISION;
+		}
+
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Clean fields data can't be used on VMLAUNCH and when we switch
+	 * between different L2 guests as KVM keeps a single VMCS12 per L1.
+	 */
+	if (from_launch || evmcs_gpa_changed) {
+		vmx->nested.hv_evmcs->hv_clean_fields &=
+			~HV_VMX_ENLIGHTENED_CLEAN_FIELD_ALL;
+
+		vmx->nested.force_msr_bitmap_recalc = true;
+	}
+
+	return EVMPTRLD_SUCCEEDED;
+}
+
+void nested_sync_vmcs12_to_shadow(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+
+	if (evmptr_is_valid(vmx->nested.hv_evmcs_vmptr))
+		copy_vmcs12_to_enlightened(vmx);
+	else
+		copy_vmcs12_to_shadow(vmx);
+
+	vmx->nested.need_vmcs12_to_shadow_sync = false;
+}
+
+static enum hrtimer_restart vmx_preemption_timer_fn(struct hrtimer *timer)
+{
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx =
+		container_of(timer, struct vcpu_vmx, nested.preemption_timer);
+
+	vmx->nested.preemption_timer_expired = true;
+	kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_EVENT, &vmx->vcpu);
+	kvm_vcpu_kick(&vmx->vcpu);
+
+	return HRTIMER_NORESTART;
+}
+
+static u64 vmx_calc_preemption_timer_value(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+	struct vmcs12 *vmcs12 = get_vmcs12(vcpu);
+
+	u64 l1_scaled_tsc = kvm_read_l1_tsc(vcpu, rdtsc()) >>
+			    VMX_MISC_EMULATED_PREEMPTION_TIMER_RATE;
+
+	if (!vmx->nested.has_preemption_timer_deadline) {
+		vmx->nested.preemption_timer_deadline =
+			vmcs12->vmx_preemption_timer_value + l1_scaled_tsc;
+		vmx->nested.has_preemption_timer_deadline = true;
+	}
+	return vmx->nested.preemption_timer_deadline - l1_scaled_tsc;
+}
+
+static void vmx_start_preemption_timer(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+					u64 preemption_timeout)
+{
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+
+	/*
+	 * A timer value of zero is architecturally guaranteed to cause
+	 * a VMExit prior to executing any instructions in the guest.
+	 */
+	if (preemption_timeout == 0) {
+		vmx_preemption_timer_fn(&vmx->nested.preemption_timer);
+		return;
+	}
+
+	if (vcpu->arch.virtual_tsc_khz == 0)
+		return;
+
+	preemption_timeout <<= VMX_MISC_EMULATED_PREEMPTION_TIMER_RATE;
+	preemption_timeout *= 1000000;
+	do_div(preemption_timeout, vcpu->arch.virtual_tsc_khz);
+	hrtimer_start(&vmx->nested.preemption_timer,
+		      ktime_add_ns(ktime_get(), preemption_timeout),
+		      HRTIMER_MODE_ABS_PINNED);
+}
+
+static u64 nested_vmx_calc_efer(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, struct vmcs12 *vmcs12)
+{
+	if (vmx->nested.nested_run_pending &&
+	    (vmcs12->vm_entry_controls & VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_EFER))
+		return vmcs12->guest_ia32_efer;
+	else if (vmcs12->vm_entry_controls & VM_ENTRY_IA32E_MODE)
+		return vmx->vcpu.arch.efer | (EFER_LMA | EFER_LME);
+	else
+		return vmx->vcpu.arch.efer & ~(EFER_LMA | EFER_LME);
+}
+
+static void prepare_vmcs02_constant_state(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
+{
+	struct kvm *kvm = vmx->vcpu.kvm;
+
+	/*
+	 * If vmcs02 hasn't been initialized, set the constant vmcs02 state
+	 * according to L0's settings (vmcs12 is irrelevant here).  Host
+	 * fields that come from L0 and are not constant, e.g. HOST_CR3,
+	 * will be set as needed prior to VMLAUNCH/VMRESUME.
+	 */
+	if (vmx->nested.vmcs02_initialized)
+		return;
+	vmx->nested.vmcs02_initialized = true;
+
+	/*
+	 * We don't care what the EPTP value is we just need to guarantee
+	 * it's valid so we don't get a false positive when doing early
+	 * consistency checks.
+	 */
+	if (enable_ept && nested_early_check)
+		vmcs_write64(EPT_POINTER,
+			     construct_eptp(&vmx->vcpu, 0, PT64_ROOT_4LEVEL));
+
+	/* All VMFUNCs are currently emulated through L0 vmexits.  */
+	if (cpu_has_vmx_vmfunc())
+		vmcs_write64(VM_FUNCTION_CONTROL, 0);
+
+	if (cpu_has_vmx_posted_intr())
+		vmcs_write16(POSTED_INTR_NV, POSTED_INTR_NESTED_VECTOR);
+
+	if (cpu_has_vmx_msr_bitmap())
+		vmcs_write64(MSR_BITMAP, __pa(vmx->nested.vmcs02.msr_bitmap));
+
+	/*
+	 * PML is emulated for L2, but never enabled in hardware as the MMU
+	 * handles A/D emulation.  Disabling PML for L2 also avoids having to
+	 * deal with filtering out L2 GPAs from the buffer.
+	 */
+	if (enable_pml) {
+		vmcs_write64(PML_ADDRESS, 0);
+		vmcs_write16(GUEST_PML_INDEX, -1);
+	}
+
+	if (cpu_has_vmx_encls_vmexit())
+		vmcs_write64(ENCLS_EXITING_BITMAP, INVALID_GPA);
+
+	if (kvm_notify_vmexit_enabled(kvm))
+		vmcs_write32(NOTIFY_WINDOW, kvm->arch.notify_window);
+
+	/*
+	 * Set the MSR load/store lists to match L0's settings.  Only the
+	 * addresses are constant (for vmcs02), the counts can change based
+	 * on L2's behavior, e.g. switching to/from long mode.
+	 */
+	vmcs_write64(VM_EXIT_MSR_STORE_ADDR, __pa(vmx->msr_autostore.guest.val));
+	vmcs_write64(VM_EXIT_MSR_LOAD_ADDR, __pa(vmx->msr_autoload.host.val));
+	vmcs_write64(VM_ENTRY_MSR_LOAD_ADDR, __pa(vmx->msr_autoload.guest.val));
+
+	vmx_set_constant_host_state(vmx);
+}
+
+static void prepare_vmcs02_early_rare(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx,
+				      struct vmcs12 *vmcs12)
+{
+	prepare_vmcs02_constant_state(vmx);
+
+	vmcs_write64(VMCS_LINK_POINTER, INVALID_GPA);
+
+	if (enable_vpid) {
+		if (nested_cpu_has_vpid(vmcs12) && vmx->nested.vpid02)
+			vmcs_write16(VIRTUAL_PROCESSOR_ID, vmx->nested.vpid02);
+		else
+			vmcs_write16(VIRTUAL_PROCESSOR_ID, vmx->vpid);
+	}
+}
+
+static void prepare_vmcs02_early(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, struct loaded_vmcs *vmcs01,
+				 struct vmcs12 *vmcs12)
+{
+	u32 exec_control;
+	u64 guest_efer = nested_vmx_calc_efer(vmx, vmcs12);
+
+	if (vmx->nested.dirty_vmcs12 || evmptr_is_valid(vmx->nested.hv_evmcs_vmptr))
+		prepare_vmcs02_early_rare(vmx, vmcs12);
+
+	/*
+	 * PIN CONTROLS
+	 */
+	exec_control = __pin_controls_get(vmcs01);
+	exec_control |= (vmcs12->pin_based_vm_exec_control &
+			 ~PIN_BASED_VMX_PREEMPTION_TIMER);
+
+	/* Posted interrupts setting is only taken from vmcs12.  */
+	vmx->nested.pi_pending = false;
+	if (nested_cpu_has_posted_intr(vmcs12))
+		vmx->nested.posted_intr_nv = vmcs12->posted_intr_nv;
+	else
+		exec_control &= ~PIN_BASED_POSTED_INTR;
+	pin_controls_set(vmx, exec_control);
+
+	/*
+	 * EXEC CONTROLS
+	 */
+	exec_control = __exec_controls_get(vmcs01); /* L0's desires */
+	exec_control &= ~CPU_BASED_INTR_WINDOW_EXITING;
+	exec_control &= ~CPU_BASED_NMI_WINDOW_EXITING;
+	exec_control &= ~CPU_BASED_TPR_SHADOW;
+	exec_control |= vmcs12->cpu_based_vm_exec_control;
+
+	vmx->nested.l1_tpr_threshold = -1;
+	if (exec_control & CPU_BASED_TPR_SHADOW)
+		vmcs_write32(TPR_THRESHOLD, vmcs12->tpr_threshold);
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+	else
+		exec_control |= CPU_BASED_CR8_LOAD_EXITING |
+				CPU_BASED_CR8_STORE_EXITING;
+#endif
+
+	/*
+	 * A vmexit (to either L1 hypervisor or L0 userspace) is always needed
+	 * for I/O port accesses.
+	 */
+	exec_control |= CPU_BASED_UNCOND_IO_EXITING;
+	exec_control &= ~CPU_BASED_USE_IO_BITMAPS;
+
+	/*
+	 * This bit will be computed in nested_get_vmcs12_pages, because
+	 * we do not have access to L1's MSR bitmap yet.  For now, keep
+	 * the same bit as before, hoping to avoid multiple VMWRITEs that
+	 * only set/clear this bit.
+	 */
+	exec_control &= ~CPU_BASED_USE_MSR_BITMAPS;
+	exec_control |= exec_controls_get(vmx) & CPU_BASED_USE_MSR_BITMAPS;
+
+	exec_controls_set(vmx, exec_control);
+
+	/*
+	 * SECONDARY EXEC CONTROLS
+	 */
+	if (cpu_has_secondary_exec_ctrls()) {
+		exec_control = __secondary_exec_controls_get(vmcs01);
+
+		/* Take the following fields only from vmcs12 */
+		exec_control &= ~(SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_APIC_ACCESSES |
+				  SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_X2APIC_MODE |
+				  SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_INVPCID |
+				  SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_RDTSCP |
+				  SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_XSAVES |
+				  SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_USR_WAIT_PAUSE |
+				  SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUAL_INTR_DELIVERY |
+				  SECONDARY_EXEC_APIC_REGISTER_VIRT |
+				  SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_VMFUNC |
+				  SECONDARY_EXEC_DESC);
+
+		if (nested_cpu_has(vmcs12,
+				   CPU_BASED_ACTIVATE_SECONDARY_CONTROLS))
+			exec_control |= vmcs12->secondary_vm_exec_control;
+
+		/* PML is emulated and never enabled in hardware for L2. */
+		exec_control &= ~SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_PML;
+
+		/* VMCS shadowing for L2 is emulated for now */
+		exec_control &= ~SECONDARY_EXEC_SHADOW_VMCS;
+
+		/*
+		 * Preset *DT exiting when emulating UMIP, so that vmx_set_cr4()
+		 * will not have to rewrite the controls just for this bit.
+		 */
+		if (vmx_umip_emulated() && (vmcs12->guest_cr4 & X86_CR4_UMIP))
+			exec_control |= SECONDARY_EXEC_DESC;
+
+		if (exec_control & SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUAL_INTR_DELIVERY)
+			vmcs_write16(GUEST_INTR_STATUS,
+				vmcs12->guest_intr_status);
+
+		if (!nested_cpu_has2(vmcs12, SECONDARY_EXEC_UNRESTRICTED_GUEST))
+		    exec_control &= ~SECONDARY_EXEC_UNRESTRICTED_GUEST;
+
+		if (exec_control & SECONDARY_EXEC_ENCLS_EXITING)
+			vmx_write_encls_bitmap(&vmx->vcpu, vmcs12);
+
+		secondary_exec_controls_set(vmx, exec_control);
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * ENTRY CONTROLS
+	 *
+	 * vmcs12's VM_{ENTRY,EXIT}_LOAD_IA32_EFER and VM_ENTRY_IA32E_MODE
+	 * are emulated by vmx_set_efer() in prepare_vmcs02(), but speculate
+	 * on the related bits (if supported by the CPU) in the hope that
+	 * we can avoid VMWrites during vmx_set_efer().
+	 *
+	 * Similarly, take vmcs01's PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL in the hope that if KVM is
+	 * loading PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL via the VMCS for L1, then KVM will want to
+	 * do the same for L2.
+	 */
+	exec_control = __vm_entry_controls_get(vmcs01);
+	exec_control |= (vmcs12->vm_entry_controls &
+			 ~VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL);
+	exec_control &= ~(VM_ENTRY_IA32E_MODE | VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_EFER);
+	if (cpu_has_load_ia32_efer()) {
+		if (guest_efer & EFER_LMA)
+			exec_control |= VM_ENTRY_IA32E_MODE;
+		if (guest_efer != host_efer)
+			exec_control |= VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_EFER;
+	}
+	vm_entry_controls_set(vmx, exec_control);
+
+	/*
+	 * EXIT CONTROLS
+	 *
+	 * L2->L1 exit controls are emulated - the hardware exit is to L0 so
+	 * we should use its exit controls. Note that VM_EXIT_LOAD_IA32_EFER
+	 * bits may be modified by vmx_set_efer() in prepare_vmcs02().
+	 */
+	exec_control = __vm_exit_controls_get(vmcs01);
+	if (cpu_has_load_ia32_efer() && guest_efer != host_efer)
+		exec_control |= VM_EXIT_LOAD_IA32_EFER;
+	else
+		exec_control &= ~VM_EXIT_LOAD_IA32_EFER;
+	vm_exit_controls_set(vmx, exec_control);
+
+	/*
+	 * Interrupt/Exception Fields
+	 */
+	if (vmx->nested.nested_run_pending) {
+		vmcs_write32(VM_ENTRY_INTR_INFO_FIELD,
+			     vmcs12->vm_entry_intr_info_field);
+		vmcs_write32(VM_ENTRY_EXCEPTION_ERROR_CODE,
+			     vmcs12->vm_entry_exception_error_code);
+		vmcs_write32(VM_ENTRY_INSTRUCTION_LEN,
+			     vmcs12->vm_entry_instruction_len);
+		vmcs_write32(GUEST_INTERRUPTIBILITY_INFO,
+			     vmcs12->guest_interruptibility_info);
+		vmx->loaded_vmcs->nmi_known_unmasked =
+			!(vmcs12->guest_interruptibility_info & GUEST_INTR_STATE_NMI);
+	} else {
+		vmcs_write32(VM_ENTRY_INTR_INFO_FIELD, 0);
+	}
+}
+
+static void prepare_vmcs02_rare(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, struct vmcs12 *vmcs12)
+{
+	struct hv_enlightened_vmcs *hv_evmcs = vmx->nested.hv_evmcs;
+
+	if (!hv_evmcs || !(hv_evmcs->hv_clean_fields &
+			   HV_VMX_ENLIGHTENED_CLEAN_FIELD_GUEST_GRP2)) {
+		vmcs_write16(GUEST_ES_SELECTOR, vmcs12->guest_es_selector);
+		vmcs_write16(GUEST_CS_SELECTOR, vmcs12->guest_cs_selector);
+		vmcs_write16(GUEST_SS_SELECTOR, vmcs12->guest_ss_selector);
+		vmcs_write16(GUEST_DS_SELECTOR, vmcs12->guest_ds_selector);
+		vmcs_write16(GUEST_FS_SELECTOR, vmcs12->guest_fs_selector);
+		vmcs_write16(GUEST_GS_SELECTOR, vmcs12->guest_gs_selector);
+		vmcs_write16(GUEST_LDTR_SELECTOR, vmcs12->guest_ldtr_selector);
+		vmcs_write16(GUEST_TR_SELECTOR, vmcs12->guest_tr_selector);
+		vmcs_write32(GUEST_ES_LIMIT, vmcs12->guest_es_limit);
+		vmcs_write32(GUEST_CS_LIMIT, vmcs12->guest_cs_limit);
+		vmcs_write32(GUEST_SS_LIMIT, vmcs12->guest_ss_limit);
+		vmcs_write32(GUEST_DS_LIMIT, vmcs12->guest_ds_limit);
+		vmcs_write32(GUEST_FS_LIMIT, vmcs12->guest_fs_limit);
+		vmcs_write32(GUEST_GS_LIMIT, vmcs12->guest_gs_limit);
+		vmcs_write32(GUEST_LDTR_LIMIT, vmcs12->guest_ldtr_limit);
+		vmcs_write32(GUEST_TR_LIMIT, vmcs12->guest_tr_limit);
+		vmcs_write32(GUEST_GDTR_LIMIT, vmcs12->guest_gdtr_limit);
+		vmcs_write32(GUEST_IDTR_LIMIT, vmcs12->guest_idtr_limit);
+		vmcs_write32(GUEST_CS_AR_BYTES, vmcs12->guest_cs_ar_bytes);
+		vmcs_write32(GUEST_SS_AR_BYTES, vmcs12->guest_ss_ar_bytes);
+		vmcs_write32(GUEST_ES_AR_BYTES, vmcs12->guest_es_ar_bytes);
+		vmcs_write32(GUEST_DS_AR_BYTES, vmcs12->guest_ds_ar_bytes);
+		vmcs_write32(GUEST_FS_AR_BYTES, vmcs12->guest_fs_ar_bytes);
+		vmcs_write32(GUEST_GS_AR_BYTES, vmcs12->guest_gs_ar_bytes);
+		vmcs_write32(GUEST_LDTR_AR_BYTES, vmcs12->guest_ldtr_ar_bytes);
+		vmcs_write32(GUEST_TR_AR_BYTES, vmcs12->guest_tr_ar_bytes);
+		vmcs_writel(GUEST_ES_BASE, vmcs12->guest_es_base);
+		vmcs_writel(GUEST_CS_BASE, vmcs12->guest_cs_base);
+		vmcs_writel(GUEST_SS_BASE, vmcs12->guest_ss_base);
+		vmcs_writel(GUEST_DS_BASE, vmcs12->guest_ds_base);
+		vmcs_writel(GUEST_FS_BASE, vmcs12->guest_fs_base);
+		vmcs_writel(GUEST_GS_BASE, vmcs12->guest_gs_base);
+		vmcs_writel(GUEST_LDTR_BASE, vmcs12->guest_ldtr_base);
+		vmcs_writel(GUEST_TR_BASE, vmcs12->guest_tr_base);
+		vmcs_writel(GUEST_GDTR_BASE, vmcs12->guest_gdtr_base);
+		vmcs_writel(GUEST_IDTR_BASE, vmcs12->guest_idtr_base);
+
+		vmx->segment_cache.bitmask = 0;
+	}
+
+	if (!hv_evmcs || !(hv_evmcs->hv_clean_fields &
+			   HV_VMX_ENLIGHTENED_CLEAN_FIELD_GUEST_GRP1)) {
+		vmcs_write32(GUEST_SYSENTER_CS, vmcs12->guest_sysenter_cs);
+		vmcs_writel(GUEST_PENDING_DBG_EXCEPTIONS,
+			    vmcs12->guest_pending_dbg_exceptions);
+		vmcs_writel(GUEST_SYSENTER_ESP, vmcs12->guest_sysenter_esp);
+		vmcs_writel(GUEST_SYSENTER_EIP, vmcs12->guest_sysenter_eip);
+
+		/*
+		 * L1 may access the L2's PDPTR, so save them to construct
+		 * vmcs12
+		 */
+		if (enable_ept) {
+			vmcs_write64(GUEST_PDPTR0, vmcs12->guest_pdptr0);
+			vmcs_write64(GUEST_PDPTR1, vmcs12->guest_pdptr1);
+			vmcs_write64(GUEST_PDPTR2, vmcs12->guest_pdptr2);
+			vmcs_write64(GUEST_PDPTR3, vmcs12->guest_pdptr3);
+		}
+
+		if (kvm_mpx_supported() && vmx->nested.nested_run_pending &&
+		    (vmcs12->vm_entry_controls & VM_ENTRY_LOAD_BNDCFGS))
+			vmcs_write64(GUEST_BNDCFGS, vmcs12->guest_bndcfgs);
+	}
+
+	if (nested_cpu_has_xsaves(vmcs12))
+		vmcs_write64(XSS_EXIT_BITMAP, vmcs12->xss_exit_bitmap);
+
+	/*
+	 * Whether page-faults are trapped is determined by a combination of
+	 * 3 settings: PFEC_MASK, PFEC_MATCH and EXCEPTION_BITMAP.PF.  If L0
+	 * doesn't care about page faults then we should set all of these to
+	 * L1's desires. However, if L0 does care about (some) page faults, it
+	 * is not easy (if at all possible?) to merge L0 and L1's desires, we
+	 * simply ask to exit on each and every L2 page fault. This is done by
+	 * setting MASK=MATCH=0 and (see below) EB.PF=1.
+	 * Note that below we don't need special code to set EB.PF beyond the
+	 * "or"ing of the EB of vmcs01 and vmcs12, because when enable_ept,
+	 * vmcs01's EB.PF is 0 so the "or" will take vmcs12's value, and when
+	 * !enable_ept, EB.PF is 1, so the "or" will always be 1.
+	 */
+	if (vmx_need_pf_intercept(&vmx->vcpu)) {
+		/*
+		 * TODO: if both L0 and L1 need the same MASK and MATCH,
+		 * go ahead and use it?
+		 */
+		vmcs_write32(PAGE_FAULT_ERROR_CODE_MASK, 0);
+		vmcs_write32(PAGE_FAULT_ERROR_CODE_MATCH, 0);
+	} else {
+		vmcs_write32(PAGE_FAULT_ERROR_CODE_MASK, vmcs12->page_fault_error_code_mask);
+		vmcs_write32(PAGE_FAULT_ERROR_CODE_MATCH, vmcs12->page_fault_error_code_match);
+	}
+
+	if (cpu_has_vmx_apicv()) {
+		vmcs_write64(EOI_EXIT_BITMAP0, vmcs12->eoi_exit_bitmap0);
+		vmcs_write64(EOI_EXIT_BITMAP1, vmcs12->eoi_exit_bitmap1);
+		vmcs_write64(EOI_EXIT_BITMAP2, vmcs12->eoi_exit_bitmap2);
+		vmcs_write64(EOI_EXIT_BITMAP3, vmcs12->eoi_exit_bitmap3);
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Make sure the msr_autostore list is up to date before we set the
+	 * count in the vmcs02.
+	 */
+	prepare_vmx_msr_autostore_list(&vmx->vcpu, MSR_IA32_TSC);
+
+	vmcs_write32(VM_EXIT_MSR_STORE_COUNT, vmx->msr_autostore.guest.nr);
+	vmcs_write32(VM_EXIT_MSR_LOAD_COUNT, vmx->msr_autoload.host.nr);
+	vmcs_write32(VM_ENTRY_MSR_LOAD_COUNT, vmx->msr_autoload.guest.nr);
+
+	set_cr4_guest_host_mask(vmx);
+}
+
+/*
+ * prepare_vmcs02 is called when the L1 guest hypervisor runs its nested
+ * L2 guest. L1 has a vmcs for L2 (vmcs12), and this function "merges" it
+ * with L0's requirements for its guest (a.k.a. vmcs01), so we can run the L2
+ * guest in a way that will both be appropriate to L1's requests, and our
+ * needs. In addition to modifying the active vmcs (which is vmcs02), this
+ * function also has additional necessary side-effects, like setting various
+ * vcpu->arch fields.
+ * Returns 0 on success, 1 on failure. Invalid state exit qualification code
+ * is assigned to entry_failure_code on failure.
+ */
+static int prepare_vmcs02(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct vmcs12 *vmcs12,
+			  bool from_vmentry,
+			  enum vm_entry_failure_code *entry_failure_code)
+{
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+	bool load_guest_pdptrs_vmcs12 = false;
+
+	if (vmx->nested.dirty_vmcs12 || evmptr_is_valid(vmx->nested.hv_evmcs_vmptr)) {
+		prepare_vmcs02_rare(vmx, vmcs12);
+		vmx->nested.dirty_vmcs12 = false;
+
+		load_guest_pdptrs_vmcs12 = !evmptr_is_valid(vmx->nested.hv_evmcs_vmptr) ||
+			!(vmx->nested.hv_evmcs->hv_clean_fields &
+			  HV_VMX_ENLIGHTENED_CLEAN_FIELD_GUEST_GRP1);
+	}
+
+	if (vmx->nested.nested_run_pending &&
+	    (vmcs12->vm_entry_controls & VM_ENTRY_LOAD_DEBUG_CONTROLS)) {
+		kvm_set_dr(vcpu, 7, vmcs12->guest_dr7);
+		vmcs_write64(GUEST_IA32_DEBUGCTL, vmcs12->guest_ia32_debugctl);
+	} else {
+		kvm_set_dr(vcpu, 7, vcpu->arch.dr7);
+		vmcs_write64(GUEST_IA32_DEBUGCTL, vmx->nested.pre_vmenter_debugctl);
+	}
+	if (kvm_mpx_supported() && (!vmx->nested.nested_run_pending ||
+	    !(vmcs12->vm_entry_controls & VM_ENTRY_LOAD_BNDCFGS)))
+		vmcs_write64(GUEST_BNDCFGS, vmx->nested.pre_vmenter_bndcfgs);
+	vmx_set_rflags(vcpu, vmcs12->guest_rflags);
+
+	/* EXCEPTION_BITMAP and CR0_GUEST_HOST_MASK should basically be the
+	 * bitwise-or of what L1 wants to trap for L2, and what we want to
+	 * trap. Note that CR0.TS also needs updating - we do this later.
+	 */
+	vmx_update_exception_bitmap(vcpu);
+	vcpu->arch.cr0_guest_owned_bits &= ~vmcs12->cr0_guest_host_mask;
+	vmcs_writel(CR0_GUEST_HOST_MASK, ~vcpu->arch.cr0_guest_owned_bits);
+
+	if (vmx->nested.nested_run_pending &&
+	    (vmcs12->vm_entry_controls & VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_PAT)) {
+		vmcs_write64(GUEST_IA32_PAT, vmcs12->guest_ia32_pat);
+		vcpu->arch.pat = vmcs12->guest_ia32_pat;
+	} else if (vmcs_config.vmentry_ctrl & VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_PAT) {
+		vmcs_write64(GUEST_IA32_PAT, vmx->vcpu.arch.pat);
+	}
+
+	vcpu->arch.tsc_offset = kvm_calc_nested_tsc_offset(
+			vcpu->arch.l1_tsc_offset,
+			vmx_get_l2_tsc_offset(vcpu),
+			vmx_get_l2_tsc_multiplier(vcpu));
+
+	vcpu->arch.tsc_scaling_ratio = kvm_calc_nested_tsc_multiplier(
+			vcpu->arch.l1_tsc_scaling_ratio,
+			vmx_get_l2_tsc_multiplier(vcpu));
+
+	vmcs_write64(TSC_OFFSET, vcpu->arch.tsc_offset);
+	if (kvm_caps.has_tsc_control)
+		vmcs_write64(TSC_MULTIPLIER, vcpu->arch.tsc_scaling_ratio);
+
+	nested_vmx_transition_tlb_flush(vcpu, vmcs12, true);
+
+	if (nested_cpu_has_ept(vmcs12))
+		nested_ept_init_mmu_context(vcpu);
+
+	/*
+	 * Override the CR0/CR4 read shadows after setting the effective guest
+	 * CR0/CR4.  The common helpers also set the shadows, but they don't
+	 * account for vmcs12's cr0/4_guest_host_mask.
+	 */
+	vmx_set_cr0(vcpu, vmcs12->guest_cr0);
+	vmcs_writel(CR0_READ_SHADOW, nested_read_cr0(vmcs12));
+
+	vmx_set_cr4(vcpu, vmcs12->guest_cr4);
+	vmcs_writel(CR4_READ_SHADOW, nested_read_cr4(vmcs12));
+
+	vcpu->arch.efer = nested_vmx_calc_efer(vmx, vmcs12);
+	/* Note: may modify VM_ENTRY/EXIT_CONTROLS and GUEST/HOST_IA32_EFER */
+	vmx_set_efer(vcpu, vcpu->arch.efer);
+
+	/*
+	 * Guest state is invalid and unrestricted guest is disabled,
+	 * which means L1 attempted VMEntry to L2 with invalid state.
+	 * Fail the VMEntry.
+	 *
+	 * However when force loading the guest state (SMM exit or
+	 * loading nested state after migration, it is possible to
+	 * have invalid guest state now, which will be later fixed by
+	 * restoring L2 register state
+	 */
+	if (CC(from_vmentry && !vmx_guest_state_valid(vcpu))) {
+		*entry_failure_code = ENTRY_FAIL_DEFAULT;
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	/* Shadow page tables on either EPT or shadow page tables. */
+	if (nested_vmx_load_cr3(vcpu, vmcs12->guest_cr3, nested_cpu_has_ept(vmcs12),
+				from_vmentry, entry_failure_code))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	/*
+	 * Immediately write vmcs02.GUEST_CR3.  It will be propagated to vmcs12
+	 * on nested VM-Exit, which can occur without actually running L2 and
+	 * thus without hitting vmx_load_mmu_pgd(), e.g. if L1 is entering L2 with
+	 * vmcs12.GUEST_ACTIVITYSTATE=HLT, in which case KVM will intercept the
+	 * transition to HLT instead of running L2.
+	 */
+	if (enable_ept)
+		vmcs_writel(GUEST_CR3, vmcs12->guest_cr3);
+
+	/* Late preparation of GUEST_PDPTRs now that EFER and CRs are set. */
+	if (load_guest_pdptrs_vmcs12 && nested_cpu_has_ept(vmcs12) &&
+	    is_pae_paging(vcpu)) {
+		vmcs_write64(GUEST_PDPTR0, vmcs12->guest_pdptr0);
+		vmcs_write64(GUEST_PDPTR1, vmcs12->guest_pdptr1);
+		vmcs_write64(GUEST_PDPTR2, vmcs12->guest_pdptr2);
+		vmcs_write64(GUEST_PDPTR3, vmcs12->guest_pdptr3);
+	}
+
+	if ((vmcs12->vm_entry_controls & VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL) &&
+	    kvm_pmu_has_perf_global_ctrl(vcpu_to_pmu(vcpu)) &&
+	    WARN_ON_ONCE(kvm_set_msr(vcpu, MSR_CORE_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL,
+				     vmcs12->guest_ia32_perf_global_ctrl))) {
+		*entry_failure_code = ENTRY_FAIL_DEFAULT;
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	kvm_rsp_write(vcpu, vmcs12->guest_rsp);
+	kvm_rip_write(vcpu, vmcs12->guest_rip);
+
+	/*
+	 * It was observed that genuine Hyper-V running in L1 doesn't reset
+	 * 'hv_clean_fields' by itself, it only sets the corresponding dirty
+	 * bits when it changes a field in eVMCS. Mark all fields as clean
+	 * here.
+	 */
+	if (evmptr_is_valid(vmx->nested.hv_evmcs_vmptr))
+		vmx->nested.hv_evmcs->hv_clean_fields |=
+			HV_VMX_ENLIGHTENED_CLEAN_FIELD_ALL;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int nested_vmx_check_nmi_controls(struct vmcs12 *vmcs12)
+{
+	if (CC(!nested_cpu_has_nmi_exiting(vmcs12) &&
+	       nested_cpu_has_virtual_nmis(vmcs12)))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (CC(!nested_cpu_has_virtual_nmis(vmcs12) &&
+	       nested_cpu_has(vmcs12, CPU_BASED_NMI_WINDOW_EXITING)))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static bool nested_vmx_check_eptp(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 new_eptp)
+{
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+
+	/* Check for memory type validity */
+	switch (new_eptp & VMX_EPTP_MT_MASK) {
+	case VMX_EPTP_MT_UC:
+		if (CC(!(vmx->nested.msrs.ept_caps & VMX_EPTP_UC_BIT)))
+			return false;
+		break;
+	case VMX_EPTP_MT_WB:
+		if (CC(!(vmx->nested.msrs.ept_caps & VMX_EPTP_WB_BIT)))
+			return false;
+		break;
+	default:
+		return false;
+	}
+
+	/* Page-walk levels validity. */
+	switch (new_eptp & VMX_EPTP_PWL_MASK) {
+	case VMX_EPTP_PWL_5:
+		if (CC(!(vmx->nested.msrs.ept_caps & VMX_EPT_PAGE_WALK_5_BIT)))
+			return false;
+		break;
+	case VMX_EPTP_PWL_4:
+		if (CC(!(vmx->nested.msrs.ept_caps & VMX_EPT_PAGE_WALK_4_BIT)))
+			return false;
+		break;
+	default:
+		return false;
+	}
+
+	/* Reserved bits should not be set */
+	if (CC(kvm_vcpu_is_illegal_gpa(vcpu, new_eptp) || ((new_eptp >> 7) & 0x1f)))
+		return false;
+
+	/* AD, if set, should be supported */
+	if (new_eptp & VMX_EPTP_AD_ENABLE_BIT) {
+		if (CC(!(vmx->nested.msrs.ept_caps & VMX_EPT_AD_BIT)))
+			return false;
+	}
+
+	return true;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Checks related to VM-Execution Control Fields
+ */
+static int nested_check_vm_execution_controls(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+                                              struct vmcs12 *vmcs12)
+{
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+
+	if (CC(!vmx_control_verify(vmcs12->pin_based_vm_exec_control,
+				   vmx->nested.msrs.pinbased_ctls_low,
+				   vmx->nested.msrs.pinbased_ctls_high)) ||
+	    CC(!vmx_control_verify(vmcs12->cpu_based_vm_exec_control,
+				   vmx->nested.msrs.procbased_ctls_low,
+				   vmx->nested.msrs.procbased_ctls_high)))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (nested_cpu_has(vmcs12, CPU_BASED_ACTIVATE_SECONDARY_CONTROLS) &&
+	    CC(!vmx_control_verify(vmcs12->secondary_vm_exec_control,
+				   vmx->nested.msrs.secondary_ctls_low,
+				   vmx->nested.msrs.secondary_ctls_high)))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (CC(vmcs12->cr3_target_count > nested_cpu_vmx_misc_cr3_count(vcpu)) ||
+	    nested_vmx_check_io_bitmap_controls(vcpu, vmcs12) ||
+	    nested_vmx_check_msr_bitmap_controls(vcpu, vmcs12) ||
+	    nested_vmx_check_tpr_shadow_controls(vcpu, vmcs12) ||
+	    nested_vmx_check_apic_access_controls(vcpu, vmcs12) ||
+	    nested_vmx_check_apicv_controls(vcpu, vmcs12) ||
+	    nested_vmx_check_nmi_controls(vmcs12) ||
+	    nested_vmx_check_pml_controls(vcpu, vmcs12) ||
+	    nested_vmx_check_unrestricted_guest_controls(vcpu, vmcs12) ||
+	    nested_vmx_check_mode_based_ept_exec_controls(vcpu, vmcs12) ||
+	    nested_vmx_check_shadow_vmcs_controls(vcpu, vmcs12) ||
+	    CC(nested_cpu_has_vpid(vmcs12) && !vmcs12->virtual_processor_id))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (!nested_cpu_has_preemption_timer(vmcs12) &&
+	    nested_cpu_has_save_preemption_timer(vmcs12))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (nested_cpu_has_ept(vmcs12) &&
+	    CC(!nested_vmx_check_eptp(vcpu, vmcs12->ept_pointer)))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (nested_cpu_has_vmfunc(vmcs12)) {
+		if (CC(vmcs12->vm_function_control &
+		       ~vmx->nested.msrs.vmfunc_controls))
+			return -EINVAL;
+
+		if (nested_cpu_has_eptp_switching(vmcs12)) {
+			if (CC(!nested_cpu_has_ept(vmcs12)) ||
+			    CC(!page_address_valid(vcpu, vmcs12->eptp_list_address)))
+				return -EINVAL;
+		}
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Checks related to VM-Exit Control Fields
+ */
+static int nested_check_vm_exit_controls(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+                                         struct vmcs12 *vmcs12)
+{
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+
+	if (CC(!vmx_control_verify(vmcs12->vm_exit_controls,
+				    vmx->nested.msrs.exit_ctls_low,
+				    vmx->nested.msrs.exit_ctls_high)) ||
+	    CC(nested_vmx_check_exit_msr_switch_controls(vcpu, vmcs12)))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Checks related to VM-Entry Control Fields
+ */
+static int nested_check_vm_entry_controls(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+					  struct vmcs12 *vmcs12)
+{
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+
+	if (CC(!vmx_control_verify(vmcs12->vm_entry_controls,
+				    vmx->nested.msrs.entry_ctls_low,
+				    vmx->nested.msrs.entry_ctls_high)))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	/*
+	 * From the Intel SDM, volume 3:
+	 * Fields relevant to VM-entry event injection must be set properly.
+	 * These fields are the VM-entry interruption-information field, the
+	 * VM-entry exception error code, and the VM-entry instruction length.
+	 */
+	if (vmcs12->vm_entry_intr_info_field & INTR_INFO_VALID_MASK) {
+		u32 intr_info = vmcs12->vm_entry_intr_info_field;
+		u8 vector = intr_info & INTR_INFO_VECTOR_MASK;
+		u32 intr_type = intr_info & INTR_INFO_INTR_TYPE_MASK;
+		bool has_error_code = intr_info & INTR_INFO_DELIVER_CODE_MASK;
+		bool should_have_error_code;
+		bool urg = nested_cpu_has2(vmcs12,
+					   SECONDARY_EXEC_UNRESTRICTED_GUEST);
+		bool prot_mode = !urg || vmcs12->guest_cr0 & X86_CR0_PE;
+
+		/* VM-entry interruption-info field: interruption type */
+		if (CC(intr_type == INTR_TYPE_RESERVED) ||
+		    CC(intr_type == INTR_TYPE_OTHER_EVENT &&
+		       !nested_cpu_supports_monitor_trap_flag(vcpu)))
+			return -EINVAL;
+
+		/* VM-entry interruption-info field: vector */
+		if (CC(intr_type == INTR_TYPE_NMI_INTR && vector != NMI_VECTOR) ||
+		    CC(intr_type == INTR_TYPE_HARD_EXCEPTION && vector > 31) ||
+		    CC(intr_type == INTR_TYPE_OTHER_EVENT && vector != 0))
+			return -EINVAL;
+
+		/* VM-entry interruption-info field: deliver error code */
+		should_have_error_code =
+			intr_type == INTR_TYPE_HARD_EXCEPTION && prot_mode &&
+			x86_exception_has_error_code(vector);
+		if (CC(has_error_code != should_have_error_code))
+			return -EINVAL;
+
+		/* VM-entry exception error code */
+		if (CC(has_error_code &&
+		       vmcs12->vm_entry_exception_error_code & GENMASK(31, 16)))
+			return -EINVAL;
+
+		/* VM-entry interruption-info field: reserved bits */
+		if (CC(intr_info & INTR_INFO_RESVD_BITS_MASK))
+			return -EINVAL;
+
+		/* VM-entry instruction length */
+		switch (intr_type) {
+		case INTR_TYPE_SOFT_EXCEPTION:
+		case INTR_TYPE_SOFT_INTR:
+		case INTR_TYPE_PRIV_SW_EXCEPTION:
+			if (CC(vmcs12->vm_entry_instruction_len > 15) ||
+			    CC(vmcs12->vm_entry_instruction_len == 0 &&
+			    CC(!nested_cpu_has_zero_length_injection(vcpu))))
+				return -EINVAL;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (nested_vmx_check_entry_msr_switch_controls(vcpu, vmcs12))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int nested_vmx_check_controls(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+				     struct vmcs12 *vmcs12)
+{
+	if (nested_check_vm_execution_controls(vcpu, vmcs12) ||
+	    nested_check_vm_exit_controls(vcpu, vmcs12) ||
+	    nested_check_vm_entry_controls(vcpu, vmcs12))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (guest_cpuid_has_evmcs(vcpu))
+		return nested_evmcs_check_controls(vmcs12);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int nested_vmx_check_address_space_size(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+				       struct vmcs12 *vmcs12)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+	if (CC(!!(vmcs12->vm_exit_controls & VM_EXIT_HOST_ADDR_SPACE_SIZE) !=
+		!!(vcpu->arch.efer & EFER_LMA)))
+		return -EINVAL;
+#endif
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int nested_vmx_check_host_state(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+				       struct vmcs12 *vmcs12)
+{
+	bool ia32e = !!(vmcs12->vm_exit_controls & VM_EXIT_HOST_ADDR_SPACE_SIZE);
+
+	if (CC(!nested_host_cr0_valid(vcpu, vmcs12->host_cr0)) ||
+	    CC(!nested_host_cr4_valid(vcpu, vmcs12->host_cr4)) ||
+	    CC(kvm_vcpu_is_illegal_gpa(vcpu, vmcs12->host_cr3)))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (CC(is_noncanonical_address(vmcs12->host_ia32_sysenter_esp, vcpu)) ||
+	    CC(is_noncanonical_address(vmcs12->host_ia32_sysenter_eip, vcpu)))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if ((vmcs12->vm_exit_controls & VM_EXIT_LOAD_IA32_PAT) &&
+	    CC(!kvm_pat_valid(vmcs12->host_ia32_pat)))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if ((vmcs12->vm_exit_controls & VM_EXIT_LOAD_IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL) &&
+	    CC(!kvm_valid_perf_global_ctrl(vcpu_to_pmu(vcpu),
+					   vmcs12->host_ia32_perf_global_ctrl)))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (ia32e) {
+		if (CC(!(vmcs12->host_cr4 & X86_CR4_PAE)))
+			return -EINVAL;
+	} else {
+		if (CC(vmcs12->vm_entry_controls & VM_ENTRY_IA32E_MODE) ||
+		    CC(vmcs12->host_cr4 & X86_CR4_PCIDE) ||
+		    CC((vmcs12->host_rip) >> 32))
+			return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	if (CC(vmcs12->host_cs_selector & (SEGMENT_RPL_MASK | SEGMENT_TI_MASK)) ||
+	    CC(vmcs12->host_ss_selector & (SEGMENT_RPL_MASK | SEGMENT_TI_MASK)) ||
+	    CC(vmcs12->host_ds_selector & (SEGMENT_RPL_MASK | SEGMENT_TI_MASK)) ||
+	    CC(vmcs12->host_es_selector & (SEGMENT_RPL_MASK | SEGMENT_TI_MASK)) ||
+	    CC(vmcs12->host_fs_selector & (SEGMENT_RPL_MASK | SEGMENT_TI_MASK)) ||
+	    CC(vmcs12->host_gs_selector & (SEGMENT_RPL_MASK | SEGMENT_TI_MASK)) ||
+	    CC(vmcs12->host_tr_selector & (SEGMENT_RPL_MASK | SEGMENT_TI_MASK)) ||
+	    CC(vmcs12->host_cs_selector == 0) ||
+	    CC(vmcs12->host_tr_selector == 0) ||
+	    CC(vmcs12->host_ss_selector == 0 && !ia32e))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (CC(is_noncanonical_address(vmcs12->host_fs_base, vcpu)) ||
+	    CC(is_noncanonical_address(vmcs12->host_gs_base, vcpu)) ||
+	    CC(is_noncanonical_address(vmcs12->host_gdtr_base, vcpu)) ||
+	    CC(is_noncanonical_address(vmcs12->host_idtr_base, vcpu)) ||
+	    CC(is_noncanonical_address(vmcs12->host_tr_base, vcpu)) ||
+	    CC(is_noncanonical_address(vmcs12->host_rip, vcpu)))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	/*
+	 * If the load IA32_EFER VM-exit control is 1, bits reserved in the
+	 * IA32_EFER MSR must be 0 in the field for that register. In addition,
+	 * the values of the LMA and LME bits in the field must each be that of
+	 * the host address-space size VM-exit control.
+	 */
+	if (vmcs12->vm_exit_controls & VM_EXIT_LOAD_IA32_EFER) {
+		if (CC(!kvm_valid_efer(vcpu, vmcs12->host_ia32_efer)) ||
+		    CC(ia32e != !!(vmcs12->host_ia32_efer & EFER_LMA)) ||
+		    CC(ia32e != !!(vmcs12->host_ia32_efer & EFER_LME)))
+			return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int nested_vmx_check_vmcs_link_ptr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+					  struct vmcs12 *vmcs12)
+{
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+	struct gfn_to_hva_cache *ghc = &vmx->nested.shadow_vmcs12_cache;
+	struct vmcs_hdr hdr;
+
+	if (vmcs12->vmcs_link_pointer == INVALID_GPA)
+		return 0;
+
+	if (CC(!page_address_valid(vcpu, vmcs12->vmcs_link_pointer)))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (ghc->gpa != vmcs12->vmcs_link_pointer &&
+	    CC(kvm_gfn_to_hva_cache_init(vcpu->kvm, ghc,
+					 vmcs12->vmcs_link_pointer, VMCS12_SIZE)))
+                return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (CC(kvm_read_guest_offset_cached(vcpu->kvm, ghc, &hdr,
+					    offsetof(struct vmcs12, hdr),
+					    sizeof(hdr))))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (CC(hdr.revision_id != VMCS12_REVISION) ||
+	    CC(hdr.shadow_vmcs != nested_cpu_has_shadow_vmcs(vmcs12)))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Checks related to Guest Non-register State
+ */
+static int nested_check_guest_non_reg_state(struct vmcs12 *vmcs12)
+{
+	if (CC(vmcs12->guest_activity_state != GUEST_ACTIVITY_ACTIVE &&
+	       vmcs12->guest_activity_state != GUEST_ACTIVITY_HLT &&
+	       vmcs12->guest_activity_state != GUEST_ACTIVITY_WAIT_SIPI))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int nested_vmx_check_guest_state(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+					struct vmcs12 *vmcs12,
+					enum vm_entry_failure_code *entry_failure_code)
+{
+	bool ia32e = !!(vmcs12->vm_entry_controls & VM_ENTRY_IA32E_MODE);
+
+	*entry_failure_code = ENTRY_FAIL_DEFAULT;
+
+	if (CC(!nested_guest_cr0_valid(vcpu, vmcs12->guest_cr0)) ||
+	    CC(!nested_guest_cr4_valid(vcpu, vmcs12->guest_cr4)))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if ((vmcs12->vm_entry_controls & VM_ENTRY_LOAD_DEBUG_CONTROLS) &&
+	    CC(!kvm_dr7_valid(vmcs12->guest_dr7)))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if ((vmcs12->vm_entry_controls & VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_PAT) &&
+	    CC(!kvm_pat_valid(vmcs12->guest_ia32_pat)))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (nested_vmx_check_vmcs_link_ptr(vcpu, vmcs12)) {
+		*entry_failure_code = ENTRY_FAIL_VMCS_LINK_PTR;
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	if ((vmcs12->vm_entry_controls & VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL) &&
+	    CC(!kvm_valid_perf_global_ctrl(vcpu_to_pmu(vcpu),
+					   vmcs12->guest_ia32_perf_global_ctrl)))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (CC((vmcs12->guest_cr0 & (X86_CR0_PG | X86_CR0_PE)) == X86_CR0_PG))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (CC(ia32e && !(vmcs12->guest_cr4 & X86_CR4_PAE)) ||
+	    CC(ia32e && !(vmcs12->guest_cr0 & X86_CR0_PG)))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	/*
+	 * If the load IA32_EFER VM-entry control is 1, the following checks
+	 * are performed on the field for the IA32_EFER MSR:
+	 * - Bits reserved in the IA32_EFER MSR must be 0.
+	 * - Bit 10 (corresponding to IA32_EFER.LMA) must equal the value of
+	 *   the IA-32e mode guest VM-exit control. It must also be identical
+	 *   to bit 8 (LME) if bit 31 in the CR0 field (corresponding to
+	 *   CR0.PG) is 1.
+	 */
+	if (to_vmx(vcpu)->nested.nested_run_pending &&
+	    (vmcs12->vm_entry_controls & VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_EFER)) {
+		if (CC(!kvm_valid_efer(vcpu, vmcs12->guest_ia32_efer)) ||
+		    CC(ia32e != !!(vmcs12->guest_ia32_efer & EFER_LMA)) ||
+		    CC(((vmcs12->guest_cr0 & X86_CR0_PG) &&
+		     ia32e != !!(vmcs12->guest_ia32_efer & EFER_LME))))
+			return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	if ((vmcs12->vm_entry_controls & VM_ENTRY_LOAD_BNDCFGS) &&
+	    (CC(is_noncanonical_address(vmcs12->guest_bndcfgs & PAGE_MASK, vcpu)) ||
+	     CC((vmcs12->guest_bndcfgs & MSR_IA32_BNDCFGS_RSVD))))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (nested_check_guest_non_reg_state(vmcs12))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int nested_vmx_check_vmentry_hw(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+	unsigned long cr3, cr4;
+	bool vm_fail;
+
+	if (!nested_early_check)
+		return 0;
+
+	if (vmx->msr_autoload.host.nr)
+		vmcs_write32(VM_EXIT_MSR_LOAD_COUNT, 0);
+	if (vmx->msr_autoload.guest.nr)
+		vmcs_write32(VM_ENTRY_MSR_LOAD_COUNT, 0);
+
+	preempt_disable();
+
+	vmx_prepare_switch_to_guest(vcpu);
+
+	/*
+	 * Induce a consistency check VMExit by clearing bit 1 in GUEST_RFLAGS,
+	 * which is reserved to '1' by hardware.  GUEST_RFLAGS is guaranteed to
+	 * be written (by prepare_vmcs02()) before the "real" VMEnter, i.e.
+	 * there is no need to preserve other bits or save/restore the field.
+	 */
+	vmcs_writel(GUEST_RFLAGS, 0);
+
+	cr3 = __get_current_cr3_fast();
+	if (unlikely(cr3 != vmx->loaded_vmcs->host_state.cr3)) {
+		vmcs_writel(HOST_CR3, cr3);
+		vmx->loaded_vmcs->host_state.cr3 = cr3;
+	}
+
+	cr4 = cr4_read_shadow();
+	if (unlikely(cr4 != vmx->loaded_vmcs->host_state.cr4)) {
+		vmcs_writel(HOST_CR4, cr4);
+		vmx->loaded_vmcs->host_state.cr4 = cr4;
+	}
+
+	vm_fail = __vmx_vcpu_run(vmx, (unsigned long *)&vcpu->arch.regs,
+				 __vmx_vcpu_run_flags(vmx));
+
+	if (vmx->msr_autoload.host.nr)
+		vmcs_write32(VM_EXIT_MSR_LOAD_COUNT, vmx->msr_autoload.host.nr);
+	if (vmx->msr_autoload.guest.nr)
+		vmcs_write32(VM_ENTRY_MSR_LOAD_COUNT, vmx->msr_autoload.guest.nr);
+
+	if (vm_fail) {
+		u32 error = vmcs_read32(VM_INSTRUCTION_ERROR);
+
+		preempt_enable();
+
+		trace_kvm_nested_vmenter_failed(
+			"early hardware check VM-instruction error: ", error);
+		WARN_ON_ONCE(error != VMXERR_ENTRY_INVALID_CONTROL_FIELD);
+		return 1;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * VMExit clears RFLAGS.IF and DR7, even on a consistency check.
+	 */
+	if (hw_breakpoint_active())
+		set_debugreg(__this_cpu_read(cpu_dr7), 7);
+	local_irq_enable();
+	preempt_enable();
+
+	/*
+	 * A non-failing VMEntry means we somehow entered guest mode with
+	 * an illegal RIP, and that's just the tip of the iceberg.  There
+	 * is no telling what memory has been modified or what state has
+	 * been exposed to unknown code.  Hitting this all but guarantees
+	 * a (very critical) hardware issue.
+	 */
+	WARN_ON(!(vmcs_read32(VM_EXIT_REASON) &
+		VMX_EXIT_REASONS_FAILED_VMENTRY));
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static bool nested_get_evmcs_page(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+
+	/*
+	 * hv_evmcs may end up being not mapped after migration (when
+	 * L2 was running), map it here to make sure vmcs12 changes are
+	 * properly reflected.
+	 */
+	if (guest_cpuid_has_evmcs(vcpu) &&
+	    vmx->nested.hv_evmcs_vmptr == EVMPTR_MAP_PENDING) {
+		enum nested_evmptrld_status evmptrld_status =
+			nested_vmx_handle_enlightened_vmptrld(vcpu, false);
+
+		if (evmptrld_status == EVMPTRLD_VMFAIL ||
+		    evmptrld_status == EVMPTRLD_ERROR)
+			return false;
+
+		/*
+		 * Post migration VMCS12 always provides the most actual
+		 * information, copy it to eVMCS upon entry.
+		 */
+		vmx->nested.need_vmcs12_to_shadow_sync = true;
+	}
+
+	return true;
+}
+
+static bool nested_get_vmcs12_pages(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct vmcs12 *vmcs12 = get_vmcs12(vcpu);
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+	struct kvm_host_map *map;
+
+	if (!vcpu->arch.pdptrs_from_userspace &&
+	    !nested_cpu_has_ept(vmcs12) && is_pae_paging(vcpu)) {
+		/*
+		 * Reload the guest's PDPTRs since after a migration
+		 * the guest CR3 might be restored prior to setting the nested
+		 * state which can lead to a load of wrong PDPTRs.
+		 */
+		if (CC(!load_pdptrs(vcpu, vcpu->arch.cr3)))
+			return false;
+	}
+
+
+	if (nested_cpu_has2(vmcs12, SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_APIC_ACCESSES)) {
+		map = &vmx->nested.apic_access_page_map;
+
+		if (!kvm_vcpu_map(vcpu, gpa_to_gfn(vmcs12->apic_access_addr), map)) {
+			vmcs_write64(APIC_ACCESS_ADDR, pfn_to_hpa(map->pfn));
+		} else {
+			pr_debug_ratelimited("%s: no backing for APIC-access address in vmcs12\n",
+					     __func__);
+			vcpu->run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+			vcpu->run->internal.suberror =
+				KVM_INTERNAL_ERROR_EMULATION;
+			vcpu->run->internal.ndata = 0;
+			return false;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (nested_cpu_has(vmcs12, CPU_BASED_TPR_SHADOW)) {
+		map = &vmx->nested.virtual_apic_map;
+
+		if (!kvm_vcpu_map(vcpu, gpa_to_gfn(vmcs12->virtual_apic_page_addr), map)) {
+			vmcs_write64(VIRTUAL_APIC_PAGE_ADDR, pfn_to_hpa(map->pfn));
+		} else if (nested_cpu_has(vmcs12, CPU_BASED_CR8_LOAD_EXITING) &&
+		           nested_cpu_has(vmcs12, CPU_BASED_CR8_STORE_EXITING) &&
+			   !nested_cpu_has2(vmcs12, SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_APIC_ACCESSES)) {
+			/*
+			 * The processor will never use the TPR shadow, simply
+			 * clear the bit from the execution control.  Such a
+			 * configuration is useless, but it happens in tests.
+			 * For any other configuration, failing the vm entry is
+			 * _not_ what the processor does but it's basically the
+			 * only possibility we have.
+			 */
+			exec_controls_clearbit(vmx, CPU_BASED_TPR_SHADOW);
+		} else {
+			/*
+			 * Write an illegal value to VIRTUAL_APIC_PAGE_ADDR to
+			 * force VM-Entry to fail.
+			 */
+			vmcs_write64(VIRTUAL_APIC_PAGE_ADDR, INVALID_GPA);
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (nested_cpu_has_posted_intr(vmcs12)) {
+		map = &vmx->nested.pi_desc_map;
+
+		if (!kvm_vcpu_map(vcpu, gpa_to_gfn(vmcs12->posted_intr_desc_addr), map)) {
+			vmx->nested.pi_desc =
+				(struct pi_desc *)(((void *)map->hva) +
+				offset_in_page(vmcs12->posted_intr_desc_addr));
+			vmcs_write64(POSTED_INTR_DESC_ADDR,
+				     pfn_to_hpa(map->pfn) + offset_in_page(vmcs12->posted_intr_desc_addr));
+		} else {
+			/*
+			 * Defer the KVM_INTERNAL_EXIT until KVM tries to
+			 * access the contents of the VMCS12 posted interrupt
+			 * descriptor. (Note that KVM may do this when it
+			 * should not, per the architectural specification.)
+			 */
+			vmx->nested.pi_desc = NULL;
+			pin_controls_clearbit(vmx, PIN_BASED_POSTED_INTR);
+		}
+	}
+	if (nested_vmx_prepare_msr_bitmap(vcpu, vmcs12))
+		exec_controls_setbit(vmx, CPU_BASED_USE_MSR_BITMAPS);
+	else
+		exec_controls_clearbit(vmx, CPU_BASED_USE_MSR_BITMAPS);
+
+	return true;
+}
+
+static bool vmx_get_nested_state_pages(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	/*
+	 * Note: nested_get_evmcs_page() also updates 'vp_assist_page' copy
+	 * in 'struct kvm_vcpu_hv' in case eVMCS is in use, this is mandatory
+	 * to make nested_evmcs_l2_tlb_flush_enabled() work correctly post
+	 * migration.
+	 */
+	if (!nested_get_evmcs_page(vcpu)) {
+		pr_debug_ratelimited("%s: enlightened vmptrld failed\n",
+				     __func__);
+		vcpu->run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+		vcpu->run->internal.suberror =
+			KVM_INTERNAL_ERROR_EMULATION;
+		vcpu->run->internal.ndata = 0;
+
+		return false;
+	}
+
+	if (is_guest_mode(vcpu) && !nested_get_vmcs12_pages(vcpu))
+		return false;
+
+	return true;
+}
+
+static int nested_vmx_write_pml_buffer(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t gpa)
+{
+	struct vmcs12 *vmcs12;
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+	gpa_t dst;
+
+	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!is_guest_mode(vcpu)))
+		return 0;
+
+	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(vmx->nested.pml_full))
+		return 1;
+
+	/*
+	 * Check if PML is enabled for the nested guest. Whether eptp bit 6 is
+	 * set is already checked as part of A/D emulation.
+	 */
+	vmcs12 = get_vmcs12(vcpu);
+	if (!nested_cpu_has_pml(vmcs12))
+		return 0;
+
+	if (vmcs12->guest_pml_index >= PML_ENTITY_NUM) {
+		vmx->nested.pml_full = true;
+		return 1;
+	}
+
+	gpa &= ~0xFFFull;
+	dst = vmcs12->pml_address + sizeof(u64) * vmcs12->guest_pml_index;
+
+	if (kvm_write_guest_page(vcpu->kvm, gpa_to_gfn(dst), &gpa,
+				 offset_in_page(dst), sizeof(gpa)))
+		return 0;
+
+	vmcs12->guest_pml_index--;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Intel's VMX Instruction Reference specifies a common set of prerequisites
+ * for running VMX instructions (except VMXON, whose prerequisites are
+ * slightly different). It also specifies what exception to inject otherwise.
+ * Note that many of these exceptions have priority over VM exits, so they
+ * don't have to be checked again here.
+ */
+static int nested_vmx_check_permission(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	if (!to_vmx(vcpu)->nested.vmxon) {
+		kvm_queue_exception(vcpu, UD_VECTOR);
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	if (vmx_get_cpl(vcpu)) {
+		kvm_inject_gp(vcpu, 0);
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	return 1;
+}
+
+static u8 vmx_has_apicv_interrupt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	u8 rvi = vmx_get_rvi();
+	u8 vppr = kvm_lapic_get_reg(vcpu->arch.apic, APIC_PROCPRI);
+
+	return ((rvi & 0xf0) > (vppr & 0xf0));
+}
+
+static void load_vmcs12_host_state(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+				   struct vmcs12 *vmcs12);
+
+/*
+ * If from_vmentry is false, this is being called from state restore (either RSM
+ * or KVM_SET_NESTED_STATE).  Otherwise it's called from vmlaunch/vmresume.
+ *
+ * Returns:
+ *	NVMX_VMENTRY_SUCCESS: Entered VMX non-root mode
+ *	NVMX_VMENTRY_VMFAIL:  Consistency check VMFail
+ *	NVMX_VMENTRY_VMEXIT:  Consistency check VMExit
+ *	NVMX_VMENTRY_KVM_INTERNAL_ERROR: KVM internal error
+ */
+enum nvmx_vmentry_status nested_vmx_enter_non_root_mode(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+							bool from_vmentry)
+{
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+	struct vmcs12 *vmcs12 = get_vmcs12(vcpu);
+	enum vm_entry_failure_code entry_failure_code;
+	bool evaluate_pending_interrupts;
+	union vmx_exit_reason exit_reason = {
+		.basic = EXIT_REASON_INVALID_STATE,
+		.failed_vmentry = 1,
+	};
+	u32 failed_index;
+
+	trace_kvm_nested_vmenter(kvm_rip_read(vcpu),
+				 vmx->nested.current_vmptr,
+				 vmcs12->guest_rip,
+				 vmcs12->guest_intr_status,
+				 vmcs12->vm_entry_intr_info_field,
+				 vmcs12->secondary_vm_exec_control & SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_EPT,
+				 vmcs12->ept_pointer,
+				 vmcs12->guest_cr3,
+				 KVM_ISA_VMX);
+
+	kvm_service_local_tlb_flush_requests(vcpu);
+
+	evaluate_pending_interrupts = exec_controls_get(vmx) &
+		(CPU_BASED_INTR_WINDOW_EXITING | CPU_BASED_NMI_WINDOW_EXITING);
+	if (likely(!evaluate_pending_interrupts) && kvm_vcpu_apicv_active(vcpu))
+		evaluate_pending_interrupts |= vmx_has_apicv_interrupt(vcpu);
+	if (!evaluate_pending_interrupts)
+		evaluate_pending_interrupts |= kvm_apic_has_pending_init_or_sipi(vcpu);
+
+	if (!vmx->nested.nested_run_pending ||
+	    !(vmcs12->vm_entry_controls & VM_ENTRY_LOAD_DEBUG_CONTROLS))
+		vmx->nested.pre_vmenter_debugctl = vmcs_read64(GUEST_IA32_DEBUGCTL);
+	if (kvm_mpx_supported() &&
+	    (!vmx->nested.nested_run_pending ||
+	     !(vmcs12->vm_entry_controls & VM_ENTRY_LOAD_BNDCFGS)))
+		vmx->nested.pre_vmenter_bndcfgs = vmcs_read64(GUEST_BNDCFGS);
+
+	/*
+	 * Overwrite vmcs01.GUEST_CR3 with L1's CR3 if EPT is disabled *and*
+	 * nested early checks are disabled.  In the event of a "late" VM-Fail,
+	 * i.e. a VM-Fail detected by hardware but not KVM, KVM must unwind its
+	 * software model to the pre-VMEntry host state.  When EPT is disabled,
+	 * GUEST_CR3 holds KVM's shadow CR3, not L1's "real" CR3, which causes
+	 * nested_vmx_restore_host_state() to corrupt vcpu->arch.cr3.  Stuffing
+	 * vmcs01.GUEST_CR3 results in the unwind naturally setting arch.cr3 to
+	 * the correct value.  Smashing vmcs01.GUEST_CR3 is safe because nested
+	 * VM-Exits, and the unwind, reset KVM's MMU, i.e. vmcs01.GUEST_CR3 is
+	 * guaranteed to be overwritten with a shadow CR3 prior to re-entering
+	 * L1.  Don't stuff vmcs01.GUEST_CR3 when using nested early checks as
+	 * KVM modifies vcpu->arch.cr3 if and only if the early hardware checks
+	 * pass, and early VM-Fails do not reset KVM's MMU, i.e. the VM-Fail
+	 * path would need to manually save/restore vmcs01.GUEST_CR3.
+	 */
+	if (!enable_ept && !nested_early_check)
+		vmcs_writel(GUEST_CR3, vcpu->arch.cr3);
+
+	vmx_switch_vmcs(vcpu, &vmx->nested.vmcs02);
+
+	prepare_vmcs02_early(vmx, &vmx->vmcs01, vmcs12);
+
+	if (from_vmentry) {
+		if (unlikely(!nested_get_vmcs12_pages(vcpu))) {
+			vmx_switch_vmcs(vcpu, &vmx->vmcs01);
+			return NVMX_VMENTRY_KVM_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+		}
+
+		if (nested_vmx_check_vmentry_hw(vcpu)) {
+			vmx_switch_vmcs(vcpu, &vmx->vmcs01);
+			return NVMX_VMENTRY_VMFAIL;
+		}
+
+		if (nested_vmx_check_guest_state(vcpu, vmcs12,
+						 &entry_failure_code)) {
+			exit_reason.basic = EXIT_REASON_INVALID_STATE;
+			vmcs12->exit_qualification = entry_failure_code;
+			goto vmentry_fail_vmexit;
+		}
+	}
+
+	enter_guest_mode(vcpu);
+
+	if (prepare_vmcs02(vcpu, vmcs12, from_vmentry, &entry_failure_code)) {
+		exit_reason.basic = EXIT_REASON_INVALID_STATE;
+		vmcs12->exit_qualification = entry_failure_code;
+		goto vmentry_fail_vmexit_guest_mode;
+	}
+
+	if (from_vmentry) {
+		failed_index = nested_vmx_load_msr(vcpu,
+						   vmcs12->vm_entry_msr_load_addr,
+						   vmcs12->vm_entry_msr_load_count);
+		if (failed_index) {
+			exit_reason.basic = EXIT_REASON_MSR_LOAD_FAIL;
+			vmcs12->exit_qualification = failed_index;
+			goto vmentry_fail_vmexit_guest_mode;
+		}
+	} else {
+		/*
+		 * The MMU is not initialized to point at the right entities yet and
+		 * "get pages" would need to read data from the guest (i.e. we will
+		 * need to perform gpa to hpa translation). Request a call
+		 * to nested_get_vmcs12_pages before the next VM-entry.  The MSRs
+		 * have already been set at vmentry time and should not be reset.
+		 */
+		kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_GET_NESTED_STATE_PAGES, vcpu);
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Re-evaluate pending events if L1 had a pending IRQ/NMI/INIT/SIPI
+	 * when it executed VMLAUNCH/VMRESUME, as entering non-root mode can
+	 * effectively unblock various events, e.g. INIT/SIPI cause VM-Exit
+	 * unconditionally.
+	 */
+	if (unlikely(evaluate_pending_interrupts))
+		kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_EVENT, vcpu);
+
+	/*
+	 * Do not start the preemption timer hrtimer until after we know
+	 * we are successful, so that only nested_vmx_vmexit needs to cancel
+	 * the timer.
+	 */
+	vmx->nested.preemption_timer_expired = false;
+	if (nested_cpu_has_preemption_timer(vmcs12)) {
+		u64 timer_value = vmx_calc_preemption_timer_value(vcpu);
+		vmx_start_preemption_timer(vcpu, timer_value);
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Note no nested_vmx_succeed or nested_vmx_fail here. At this point
+	 * we are no longer running L1, and VMLAUNCH/VMRESUME has not yet
+	 * returned as far as L1 is concerned. It will only return (and set
+	 * the success flag) when L2 exits (see nested_vmx_vmexit()).
+	 */
+	return NVMX_VMENTRY_SUCCESS;
+
+	/*
+	 * A failed consistency check that leads to a VMExit during L1's
+	 * VMEnter to L2 is a variation of a normal VMexit, as explained in
+	 * 26.7 "VM-entry failures during or after loading guest state".
+	 */
+vmentry_fail_vmexit_guest_mode:
+	if (vmcs12->cpu_based_vm_exec_control & CPU_BASED_USE_TSC_OFFSETTING)
+		vcpu->arch.tsc_offset -= vmcs12->tsc_offset;
+	leave_guest_mode(vcpu);
+
+vmentry_fail_vmexit:
+	vmx_switch_vmcs(vcpu, &vmx->vmcs01);
+
+	if (!from_vmentry)
+		return NVMX_VMENTRY_VMEXIT;
+
+	load_vmcs12_host_state(vcpu, vmcs12);
+	vmcs12->vm_exit_reason = exit_reason.full;
+	if (enable_shadow_vmcs || evmptr_is_valid(vmx->nested.hv_evmcs_vmptr))
+		vmx->nested.need_vmcs12_to_shadow_sync = true;
+	return NVMX_VMENTRY_VMEXIT;
+}
+
+/*
+ * nested_vmx_run() handles a nested entry, i.e., a VMLAUNCH or VMRESUME on L1
+ * for running an L2 nested guest.
+ */
+static int nested_vmx_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool launch)
+{
+	struct vmcs12 *vmcs12;
+	enum nvmx_vmentry_status status;
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+	u32 interrupt_shadow = vmx_get_interrupt_shadow(vcpu);
+	enum nested_evmptrld_status evmptrld_status;
+
+	if (!nested_vmx_check_permission(vcpu))
+		return 1;
+
+	evmptrld_status = nested_vmx_handle_enlightened_vmptrld(vcpu, launch);
+	if (evmptrld_status == EVMPTRLD_ERROR) {
+		kvm_queue_exception(vcpu, UD_VECTOR);
+		return 1;
+	}
+
+	kvm_pmu_trigger_event(vcpu, PERF_COUNT_HW_BRANCH_INSTRUCTIONS);
+
+	if (CC(evmptrld_status == EVMPTRLD_VMFAIL))
+		return nested_vmx_failInvalid(vcpu);
+
+	if (CC(!evmptr_is_valid(vmx->nested.hv_evmcs_vmptr) &&
+	       vmx->nested.current_vmptr == INVALID_GPA))
+		return nested_vmx_failInvalid(vcpu);
+
+	vmcs12 = get_vmcs12(vcpu);
+
+	/*
+	 * Can't VMLAUNCH or VMRESUME a shadow VMCS. Despite the fact
+	 * that there *is* a valid VMCS pointer, RFLAGS.CF is set
+	 * rather than RFLAGS.ZF, and no error number is stored to the
+	 * VM-instruction error field.
+	 */
+	if (CC(vmcs12->hdr.shadow_vmcs))
+		return nested_vmx_failInvalid(vcpu);
+
+	if (evmptr_is_valid(vmx->nested.hv_evmcs_vmptr)) {
+		copy_enlightened_to_vmcs12(vmx, vmx->nested.hv_evmcs->hv_clean_fields);
+		/* Enlightened VMCS doesn't have launch state */
+		vmcs12->launch_state = !launch;
+	} else if (enable_shadow_vmcs) {
+		copy_shadow_to_vmcs12(vmx);
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * The nested entry process starts with enforcing various prerequisites
+	 * on vmcs12 as required by the Intel SDM, and act appropriately when
+	 * they fail: As the SDM explains, some conditions should cause the
+	 * instruction to fail, while others will cause the instruction to seem
+	 * to succeed, but return an EXIT_REASON_INVALID_STATE.
+	 * To speed up the normal (success) code path, we should avoid checking
+	 * for misconfigurations which will anyway be caught by the processor
+	 * when using the merged vmcs02.
+	 */
+	if (CC(interrupt_shadow & KVM_X86_SHADOW_INT_MOV_SS))
+		return nested_vmx_fail(vcpu, VMXERR_ENTRY_EVENTS_BLOCKED_BY_MOV_SS);
+
+	if (CC(vmcs12->launch_state == launch))
+		return nested_vmx_fail(vcpu,
+			launch ? VMXERR_VMLAUNCH_NONCLEAR_VMCS
+			       : VMXERR_VMRESUME_NONLAUNCHED_VMCS);
+
+	if (nested_vmx_check_controls(vcpu, vmcs12))
+		return nested_vmx_fail(vcpu, VMXERR_ENTRY_INVALID_CONTROL_FIELD);
+
+	if (nested_vmx_check_address_space_size(vcpu, vmcs12))
+		return nested_vmx_fail(vcpu, VMXERR_ENTRY_INVALID_HOST_STATE_FIELD);
+
+	if (nested_vmx_check_host_state(vcpu, vmcs12))
+		return nested_vmx_fail(vcpu, VMXERR_ENTRY_INVALID_HOST_STATE_FIELD);
+
+	/*
+	 * We're finally done with prerequisite checking, and can start with
+	 * the nested entry.
+	 */
+	vmx->nested.nested_run_pending = 1;
+	vmx->nested.has_preemption_timer_deadline = false;
+	status = nested_vmx_enter_non_root_mode(vcpu, true);
+	if (unlikely(status != NVMX_VMENTRY_SUCCESS))
+		goto vmentry_failed;
+
+	/* Emulate processing of posted interrupts on VM-Enter. */
+	if (nested_cpu_has_posted_intr(vmcs12) &&
+	    kvm_apic_has_interrupt(vcpu) == vmx->nested.posted_intr_nv) {
+		vmx->nested.pi_pending = true;
+		kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_EVENT, vcpu);
+		kvm_apic_clear_irr(vcpu, vmx->nested.posted_intr_nv);
+	}
+
+	/* Hide L1D cache contents from the nested guest.  */
+	vmx->vcpu.arch.l1tf_flush_l1d = true;
+
+	/*
+	 * Must happen outside of nested_vmx_enter_non_root_mode() as it will
+	 * also be used as part of restoring nVMX state for
+	 * snapshot restore (migration).
+	 *
+	 * In this flow, it is assumed that vmcs12 cache was
+	 * transferred as part of captured nVMX state and should
+	 * therefore not be read from guest memory (which may not
+	 * exist on destination host yet).
+	 */
+	nested_cache_shadow_vmcs12(vcpu, vmcs12);
+
+	switch (vmcs12->guest_activity_state) {
+	case GUEST_ACTIVITY_HLT:
+		/*
+		 * If we're entering a halted L2 vcpu and the L2 vcpu won't be
+		 * awakened by event injection or by an NMI-window VM-exit or
+		 * by an interrupt-window VM-exit, halt the vcpu.
+		 */
+		if (!(vmcs12->vm_entry_intr_info_field & INTR_INFO_VALID_MASK) &&
+		    !nested_cpu_has(vmcs12, CPU_BASED_NMI_WINDOW_EXITING) &&
+		    !(nested_cpu_has(vmcs12, CPU_BASED_INTR_WINDOW_EXITING) &&
+		      (vmcs12->guest_rflags & X86_EFLAGS_IF))) {
+			vmx->nested.nested_run_pending = 0;
+			return kvm_emulate_halt_noskip(vcpu);
+		}
+		break;
+	case GUEST_ACTIVITY_WAIT_SIPI:
+		vmx->nested.nested_run_pending = 0;
+		vcpu->arch.mp_state = KVM_MP_STATE_INIT_RECEIVED;
+		break;
+	default:
+		break;
+	}
+
+	return 1;
+
+vmentry_failed:
+	vmx->nested.nested_run_pending = 0;
+	if (status == NVMX_VMENTRY_KVM_INTERNAL_ERROR)
+		return 0;
+	if (status == NVMX_VMENTRY_VMEXIT)
+		return 1;
+	WARN_ON_ONCE(status != NVMX_VMENTRY_VMFAIL);
+	return nested_vmx_fail(vcpu, VMXERR_ENTRY_INVALID_CONTROL_FIELD);
+}
+
+/*
+ * On a nested exit from L2 to L1, vmcs12.guest_cr0 might not be up-to-date
+ * because L2 may have changed some cr0 bits directly (CR0_GUEST_HOST_MASK).
+ * This function returns the new value we should put in vmcs12.guest_cr0.
+ * It's not enough to just return the vmcs02 GUEST_CR0. Rather,
+ *  1. Bits that neither L0 nor L1 trapped, were set directly by L2 and are now
+ *     available in vmcs02 GUEST_CR0. (Note: It's enough to check that L0
+ *     didn't trap the bit, because if L1 did, so would L0).
+ *  2. Bits that L1 asked to trap (and therefore L0 also did) could not have
+ *     been modified by L2, and L1 knows it. So just leave the old value of
+ *     the bit from vmcs12.guest_cr0. Note that the bit from vmcs02 GUEST_CR0
+ *     isn't relevant, because if L0 traps this bit it can set it to anything.
+ *  3. Bits that L1 didn't trap, but L0 did. L1 believes the guest could have
+ *     changed these bits, and therefore they need to be updated, but L0
+ *     didn't necessarily allow them to be changed in GUEST_CR0 - and rather
+ *     put them in vmcs02 CR0_READ_SHADOW. So take these bits from there.
+ */
+static inline unsigned long
+vmcs12_guest_cr0(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct vmcs12 *vmcs12)
+{
+	return
+	/*1*/	(vmcs_readl(GUEST_CR0) & vcpu->arch.cr0_guest_owned_bits) |
+	/*2*/	(vmcs12->guest_cr0 & vmcs12->cr0_guest_host_mask) |
+	/*3*/	(vmcs_readl(CR0_READ_SHADOW) & ~(vmcs12->cr0_guest_host_mask |
+			vcpu->arch.cr0_guest_owned_bits));
+}
+
+static inline unsigned long
+vmcs12_guest_cr4(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct vmcs12 *vmcs12)
+{
+	return
+	/*1*/	(vmcs_readl(GUEST_CR4) & vcpu->arch.cr4_guest_owned_bits) |
+	/*2*/	(vmcs12->guest_cr4 & vmcs12->cr4_guest_host_mask) |
+	/*3*/	(vmcs_readl(CR4_READ_SHADOW) & ~(vmcs12->cr4_guest_host_mask |
+			vcpu->arch.cr4_guest_owned_bits));
+}
+
+static void vmcs12_save_pending_event(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+				      struct vmcs12 *vmcs12,
+				      u32 vm_exit_reason, u32 exit_intr_info)
+{
+	u32 idt_vectoring;
+	unsigned int nr;
+
+	/*
+	 * Per the SDM, VM-Exits due to double and triple faults are never
+	 * considered to occur during event delivery, even if the double/triple
+	 * fault is the result of an escalating vectoring issue.
+	 *
+	 * Note, the SDM qualifies the double fault behavior with "The original
+	 * event results in a double-fault exception".  It's unclear why the
+	 * qualification exists since exits due to double fault can occur only
+	 * while vectoring a different exception (injected events are never
+	 * subject to interception), i.e. there's _always_ an original event.
+	 *
+	 * The SDM also uses NMI as a confusing example for the "original event
+	 * causes the VM exit directly" clause.  NMI isn't special in any way,
+	 * the same rule applies to all events that cause an exit directly.
+	 * NMI is an odd choice for the example because NMIs can only occur on
+	 * instruction boundaries, i.e. they _can't_ occur during vectoring.
+	 */
+	if ((u16)vm_exit_reason == EXIT_REASON_TRIPLE_FAULT ||
+	    ((u16)vm_exit_reason == EXIT_REASON_EXCEPTION_NMI &&
+	     is_double_fault(exit_intr_info))) {
+		vmcs12->idt_vectoring_info_field = 0;
+	} else if (vcpu->arch.exception.injected) {
+		nr = vcpu->arch.exception.vector;
+		idt_vectoring = nr | VECTORING_INFO_VALID_MASK;
+
+		if (kvm_exception_is_soft(nr)) {
+			vmcs12->vm_exit_instruction_len =
+				vcpu->arch.event_exit_inst_len;
+			idt_vectoring |= INTR_TYPE_SOFT_EXCEPTION;
+		} else
+			idt_vectoring |= INTR_TYPE_HARD_EXCEPTION;
+
+		if (vcpu->arch.exception.has_error_code) {
+			idt_vectoring |= VECTORING_INFO_DELIVER_CODE_MASK;
+			vmcs12->idt_vectoring_error_code =
+				vcpu->arch.exception.error_code;
+		}
+
+		vmcs12->idt_vectoring_info_field = idt_vectoring;
+	} else if (vcpu->arch.nmi_injected) {
+		vmcs12->idt_vectoring_info_field =
+			INTR_TYPE_NMI_INTR | INTR_INFO_VALID_MASK | NMI_VECTOR;
+	} else if (vcpu->arch.interrupt.injected) {
+		nr = vcpu->arch.interrupt.nr;
+		idt_vectoring = nr | VECTORING_INFO_VALID_MASK;
+
+		if (vcpu->arch.interrupt.soft) {
+			idt_vectoring |= INTR_TYPE_SOFT_INTR;
+			vmcs12->vm_entry_instruction_len =
+				vcpu->arch.event_exit_inst_len;
+		} else
+			idt_vectoring |= INTR_TYPE_EXT_INTR;
+
+		vmcs12->idt_vectoring_info_field = idt_vectoring;
+	} else {
+		vmcs12->idt_vectoring_info_field = 0;
+	}
+}
+
+
+void nested_mark_vmcs12_pages_dirty(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct vmcs12 *vmcs12 = get_vmcs12(vcpu);
+	gfn_t gfn;
+
+	/*
+	 * Don't need to mark the APIC access page dirty; it is never
+	 * written to by the CPU during APIC virtualization.
+	 */
+
+	if (nested_cpu_has(vmcs12, CPU_BASED_TPR_SHADOW)) {
+		gfn = vmcs12->virtual_apic_page_addr >> PAGE_SHIFT;
+		kvm_vcpu_mark_page_dirty(vcpu, gfn);
+	}
+
+	if (nested_cpu_has_posted_intr(vmcs12)) {
+		gfn = vmcs12->posted_intr_desc_addr >> PAGE_SHIFT;
+		kvm_vcpu_mark_page_dirty(vcpu, gfn);
+	}
+}
+
+static int vmx_complete_nested_posted_interrupt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+	int max_irr;
+	void *vapic_page;
+	u16 status;
+
+	if (!vmx->nested.pi_pending)
+		return 0;
+
+	if (!vmx->nested.pi_desc)
+		goto mmio_needed;
+
+	vmx->nested.pi_pending = false;
+
+	if (!pi_test_and_clear_on(vmx->nested.pi_desc))
+		return 0;
+
+	max_irr = find_last_bit((unsigned long *)vmx->nested.pi_desc->pir, 256);
+	if (max_irr != 256) {
+		vapic_page = vmx->nested.virtual_apic_map.hva;
+		if (!vapic_page)
+			goto mmio_needed;
+
+		__kvm_apic_update_irr(vmx->nested.pi_desc->pir,
+			vapic_page, &max_irr);
+		status = vmcs_read16(GUEST_INTR_STATUS);
+		if ((u8)max_irr > ((u8)status & 0xff)) {
+			status &= ~0xff;
+			status |= (u8)max_irr;
+			vmcs_write16(GUEST_INTR_STATUS, status);
+		}
+	}
+
+	nested_mark_vmcs12_pages_dirty(vcpu);
+	return 0;
+
+mmio_needed:
+	kvm_handle_memory_failure(vcpu, X86EMUL_IO_NEEDED, NULL);
+	return -ENXIO;
+}
+
+static void nested_vmx_inject_exception_vmexit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct kvm_queued_exception *ex = &vcpu->arch.exception_vmexit;
+	u32 intr_info = ex->vector | INTR_INFO_VALID_MASK;
+	struct vmcs12 *vmcs12 = get_vmcs12(vcpu);
+	unsigned long exit_qual;
+
+	if (ex->has_payload) {
+		exit_qual = ex->payload;
+	} else if (ex->vector == PF_VECTOR) {
+		exit_qual = vcpu->arch.cr2;
+	} else if (ex->vector == DB_VECTOR) {
+		exit_qual = vcpu->arch.dr6;
+		exit_qual &= ~DR6_BT;
+		exit_qual ^= DR6_ACTIVE_LOW;
+	} else {
+		exit_qual = 0;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Unlike AMD's Paged Real Mode, which reports an error code on #PF
+	 * VM-Exits even if the CPU is in Real Mode, Intel VMX never sets the
+	 * "has error code" flags on VM-Exit if the CPU is in Real Mode.
+	 */
+	if (ex->has_error_code && is_protmode(vcpu)) {
+		/*
+		 * Intel CPUs do not generate error codes with bits 31:16 set,
+		 * and more importantly VMX disallows setting bits 31:16 in the
+		 * injected error code for VM-Entry.  Drop the bits to mimic
+		 * hardware and avoid inducing failure on nested VM-Entry if L1
+		 * chooses to inject the exception back to L2.  AMD CPUs _do_
+		 * generate "full" 32-bit error codes, so KVM allows userspace
+		 * to inject exception error codes with bits 31:16 set.
+		 */
+		vmcs12->vm_exit_intr_error_code = (u16)ex->error_code;
+		intr_info |= INTR_INFO_DELIVER_CODE_MASK;
+	}
+
+	if (kvm_exception_is_soft(ex->vector))
+		intr_info |= INTR_TYPE_SOFT_EXCEPTION;
+	else
+		intr_info |= INTR_TYPE_HARD_EXCEPTION;
+
+	if (!(vmcs12->idt_vectoring_info_field & VECTORING_INFO_VALID_MASK) &&
+	    vmx_get_nmi_mask(vcpu))
+		intr_info |= INTR_INFO_UNBLOCK_NMI;
+
+	nested_vmx_vmexit(vcpu, EXIT_REASON_EXCEPTION_NMI, intr_info, exit_qual);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Returns true if a debug trap is (likely) pending delivery.  Infer the class
+ * of a #DB (trap-like vs. fault-like) from the exception payload (to-be-DR6).
+ * Using the payload is flawed because code breakpoints (fault-like) and data
+ * breakpoints (trap-like) set the same bits in DR6 (breakpoint detected), i.e.
+ * this will return false positives if a to-be-injected code breakpoint #DB is
+ * pending (from KVM's perspective, but not "pending" across an instruction
+ * boundary).  ICEBP, a.k.a. INT1, is also not reflected here even though it
+ * too is trap-like.
+ *
+ * KVM "works" despite these flaws as ICEBP isn't currently supported by the
+ * emulator, Monitor Trap Flag is not marked pending on intercepted #DBs (the
+ * #DB has already happened), and MTF isn't marked pending on code breakpoints
+ * from the emulator (because such #DBs are fault-like and thus don't trigger
+ * actions that fire on instruction retire).
+ */
+static unsigned long vmx_get_pending_dbg_trap(struct kvm_queued_exception *ex)
+{
+	if (!ex->pending || ex->vector != DB_VECTOR)
+		return 0;
+
+	/* General Detect #DBs are always fault-like. */
+	return ex->payload & ~DR6_BD;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Returns true if there's a pending #DB exception that is lower priority than
+ * a pending Monitor Trap Flag VM-Exit.  TSS T-flag #DBs are not emulated by
+ * KVM, but could theoretically be injected by userspace.  Note, this code is
+ * imperfect, see above.
+ */
+static bool vmx_is_low_priority_db_trap(struct kvm_queued_exception *ex)
+{
+	return vmx_get_pending_dbg_trap(ex) & ~DR6_BT;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Certain VM-exits set the 'pending debug exceptions' field to indicate a
+ * recognized #DB (data or single-step) that has yet to be delivered. Since KVM
+ * represents these debug traps with a payload that is said to be compatible
+ * with the 'pending debug exceptions' field, write the payload to the VMCS
+ * field if a VM-exit is delivered before the debug trap.
+ */
+static void nested_vmx_update_pending_dbg(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	unsigned long pending_dbg;
+
+	pending_dbg = vmx_get_pending_dbg_trap(&vcpu->arch.exception);
+	if (pending_dbg)
+		vmcs_writel(GUEST_PENDING_DBG_EXCEPTIONS, pending_dbg);
+}
+
+static bool nested_vmx_preemption_timer_pending(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	return nested_cpu_has_preemption_timer(get_vmcs12(vcpu)) &&
+	       to_vmx(vcpu)->nested.preemption_timer_expired;
+}
+
+static bool vmx_has_nested_events(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	return nested_vmx_preemption_timer_pending(vcpu) ||
+	       to_vmx(vcpu)->nested.mtf_pending;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Per the Intel SDM's table "Priority Among Concurrent Events", with minor
+ * edits to fill in missing examples, e.g. #DB due to split-lock accesses,
+ * and less minor edits to splice in the priority of VMX Non-Root specific
+ * events, e.g. MTF and NMI/INTR-window exiting.
+ *
+ * 1 Hardware Reset and Machine Checks
+ *	- RESET
+ *	- Machine Check
+ *
+ * 2 Trap on Task Switch
+ *	- T flag in TSS is set (on task switch)
+ *
+ * 3 External Hardware Interventions
+ *	- FLUSH
+ *	- STOPCLK
+ *	- SMI
+ *	- INIT
+ *
+ * 3.5 Monitor Trap Flag (MTF) VM-exit[1]
+ *
+ * 4 Traps on Previous Instruction
+ *	- Breakpoints
+ *	- Trap-class Debug Exceptions (#DB due to TF flag set, data/I-O
+ *	  breakpoint, or #DB due to a split-lock access)
+ *
+ * 4.3	VMX-preemption timer expired VM-exit
+ *
+ * 4.6	NMI-window exiting VM-exit[2]
+ *
+ * 5 Nonmaskable Interrupts (NMI)
+ *
+ * 5.5 Interrupt-window exiting VM-exit and Virtual-interrupt delivery
+ *
+ * 6 Maskable Hardware Interrupts
+ *
+ * 7 Code Breakpoint Fault
+ *
+ * 8 Faults from Fetching Next Instruction
+ *	- Code-Segment Limit Violation
+ *	- Code Page Fault
+ *	- Control protection exception (missing ENDBRANCH at target of indirect
+ *					call or jump)
+ *
+ * 9 Faults from Decoding Next Instruction
+ *	- Instruction length > 15 bytes
+ *	- Invalid Opcode
+ *	- Coprocessor Not Available
+ *
+ *10 Faults on Executing Instruction
+ *	- Overflow
+ *	- Bound error
+ *	- Invalid TSS
+ *	- Segment Not Present
+ *	- Stack fault
+ *	- General Protection
+ *	- Data Page Fault
+ *	- Alignment Check
+ *	- x86 FPU Floating-point exception
+ *	- SIMD floating-point exception
+ *	- Virtualization exception
+ *	- Control protection exception
+ *
+ * [1] Per the "Monitor Trap Flag" section: System-management interrupts (SMIs),
+ *     INIT signals, and higher priority events take priority over MTF VM exits.
+ *     MTF VM exits take priority over debug-trap exceptions and lower priority
+ *     events.
+ *
+ * [2] Debug-trap exceptions and higher priority events take priority over VM exits
+ *     caused by the VMX-preemption timer.  VM exits caused by the VMX-preemption
+ *     timer take priority over VM exits caused by the "NMI-window exiting"
+ *     VM-execution control and lower priority events.
+ *
+ * [3] Debug-trap exceptions and higher priority events take priority over VM exits
+ *     caused by "NMI-window exiting".  VM exits caused by this control take
+ *     priority over non-maskable interrupts (NMIs) and lower priority events.
+ *
+ * [4] Virtual-interrupt delivery has the same priority as that of VM exits due to
+ *     the 1-setting of the "interrupt-window exiting" VM-execution control.  Thus,
+ *     non-maskable interrupts (NMIs) and higher priority events take priority over
+ *     delivery of a virtual interrupt; delivery of a virtual interrupt takes
+ *     priority over external interrupts and lower priority events.
+ */
+static int vmx_check_nested_events(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct kvm_lapic *apic = vcpu->arch.apic;
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+	/*
+	 * Only a pending nested run blocks a pending exception.  If there is a
+	 * previously injected event, the pending exception occurred while said
+	 * event was being delivered and thus needs to be handled.
+	 */
+	bool block_nested_exceptions = vmx->nested.nested_run_pending;
+	/*
+	 * New events (not exceptions) are only recognized at instruction
+	 * boundaries.  If an event needs reinjection, then KVM is handling a
+	 * VM-Exit that occurred _during_ instruction execution; new events are
+	 * blocked until the instruction completes.
+	 */
+	bool block_nested_events = block_nested_exceptions ||
+				   kvm_event_needs_reinjection(vcpu);
+
+	if (lapic_in_kernel(vcpu) &&
+		test_bit(KVM_APIC_INIT, &apic->pending_events)) {
+		if (block_nested_events)
+			return -EBUSY;
+		nested_vmx_update_pending_dbg(vcpu);
+		clear_bit(KVM_APIC_INIT, &apic->pending_events);
+		if (vcpu->arch.mp_state != KVM_MP_STATE_INIT_RECEIVED)
+			nested_vmx_vmexit(vcpu, EXIT_REASON_INIT_SIGNAL, 0, 0);
+
+		/* MTF is discarded if the vCPU is in WFS. */
+		vmx->nested.mtf_pending = false;
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	if (lapic_in_kernel(vcpu) &&
+	    test_bit(KVM_APIC_SIPI, &apic->pending_events)) {
+		if (block_nested_events)
+			return -EBUSY;
+
+		clear_bit(KVM_APIC_SIPI, &apic->pending_events);
+		if (vcpu->arch.mp_state == KVM_MP_STATE_INIT_RECEIVED) {
+			nested_vmx_vmexit(vcpu, EXIT_REASON_SIPI_SIGNAL, 0,
+						apic->sipi_vector & 0xFFUL);
+			return 0;
+		}
+		/* Fallthrough, the SIPI is completely ignored. */
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Process exceptions that are higher priority than Monitor Trap Flag:
+	 * fault-like exceptions, TSS T flag #DB (not emulated by KVM, but
+	 * could theoretically come in from userspace), and ICEBP (INT1).
+	 *
+	 * TODO: SMIs have higher priority than MTF and trap-like #DBs (except
+	 * for TSS T flag #DBs).  KVM also doesn't save/restore pending MTF
+	 * across SMI/RSM as it should; that needs to be addressed in order to
+	 * prioritize SMI over MTF and trap-like #DBs.
+	 */
+	if (vcpu->arch.exception_vmexit.pending &&
+	    !vmx_is_low_priority_db_trap(&vcpu->arch.exception_vmexit)) {
+		if (block_nested_exceptions)
+			return -EBUSY;
+
+		nested_vmx_inject_exception_vmexit(vcpu);
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	if (vcpu->arch.exception.pending &&
+	    !vmx_is_low_priority_db_trap(&vcpu->arch.exception)) {
+		if (block_nested_exceptions)
+			return -EBUSY;
+		goto no_vmexit;
+	}
+
+	if (vmx->nested.mtf_pending) {
+		if (block_nested_events)
+			return -EBUSY;
+		nested_vmx_update_pending_dbg(vcpu);
+		nested_vmx_vmexit(vcpu, EXIT_REASON_MONITOR_TRAP_FLAG, 0, 0);
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	if (vcpu->arch.exception_vmexit.pending) {
+		if (block_nested_exceptions)
+			return -EBUSY;
+
+		nested_vmx_inject_exception_vmexit(vcpu);
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	if (vcpu->arch.exception.pending) {
+		if (block_nested_exceptions)
+			return -EBUSY;
+		goto no_vmexit;
+	}
+
+	if (nested_vmx_preemption_timer_pending(vcpu)) {
+		if (block_nested_events)
+			return -EBUSY;
+		nested_vmx_vmexit(vcpu, EXIT_REASON_PREEMPTION_TIMER, 0, 0);
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	if (vcpu->arch.smi_pending && !is_smm(vcpu)) {
+		if (block_nested_events)
+			return -EBUSY;
+		goto no_vmexit;
+	}
+
+	if (vcpu->arch.nmi_pending && !vmx_nmi_blocked(vcpu)) {
+		if (block_nested_events)
+			return -EBUSY;
+		if (!nested_exit_on_nmi(vcpu))
+			goto no_vmexit;
+
+		nested_vmx_vmexit(vcpu, EXIT_REASON_EXCEPTION_NMI,
+				  NMI_VECTOR | INTR_TYPE_NMI_INTR |
+				  INTR_INFO_VALID_MASK, 0);
+		/*
+		 * The NMI-triggered VM exit counts as injection:
+		 * clear this one and block further NMIs.
+		 */
+		vcpu->arch.nmi_pending = 0;
+		vmx_set_nmi_mask(vcpu, true);
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	if (kvm_cpu_has_interrupt(vcpu) && !vmx_interrupt_blocked(vcpu)) {
+		if (block_nested_events)
+			return -EBUSY;
+		if (!nested_exit_on_intr(vcpu))
+			goto no_vmexit;
+		nested_vmx_vmexit(vcpu, EXIT_REASON_EXTERNAL_INTERRUPT, 0, 0);
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+no_vmexit:
+	return vmx_complete_nested_posted_interrupt(vcpu);
+}
+
+static u32 vmx_get_preemption_timer_value(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	ktime_t remaining =
+		hrtimer_get_remaining(&to_vmx(vcpu)->nested.preemption_timer);
+	u64 value;
+
+	if (ktime_to_ns(remaining) <= 0)
+		return 0;
+
+	value = ktime_to_ns(remaining) * vcpu->arch.virtual_tsc_khz;
+	do_div(value, 1000000);
+	return value >> VMX_MISC_EMULATED_PREEMPTION_TIMER_RATE;
+}
+
+static bool is_vmcs12_ext_field(unsigned long field)
+{
+	switch (field) {
+	case GUEST_ES_SELECTOR:
+	case GUEST_CS_SELECTOR:
+	case GUEST_SS_SELECTOR:
+	case GUEST_DS_SELECTOR:
+	case GUEST_FS_SELECTOR:
+	case GUEST_GS_SELECTOR:
+	case GUEST_LDTR_SELECTOR:
+	case GUEST_TR_SELECTOR:
+	case GUEST_ES_LIMIT:
+	case GUEST_CS_LIMIT:
+	case GUEST_SS_LIMIT:
+	case GUEST_DS_LIMIT:
+	case GUEST_FS_LIMIT:
+	case GUEST_GS_LIMIT:
+	case GUEST_LDTR_LIMIT:
+	case GUEST_TR_LIMIT:
+	case GUEST_GDTR_LIMIT:
+	case GUEST_IDTR_LIMIT:
+	case GUEST_ES_AR_BYTES:
+	case GUEST_DS_AR_BYTES:
+	case GUEST_FS_AR_BYTES:
+	case GUEST_GS_AR_BYTES:
+	case GUEST_LDTR_AR_BYTES:
+	case GUEST_TR_AR_BYTES:
+	case GUEST_ES_BASE:
+	case GUEST_CS_BASE:
+	case GUEST_SS_BASE:
+	case GUEST_DS_BASE:
+	case GUEST_FS_BASE:
+	case GUEST_GS_BASE:
+	case GUEST_LDTR_BASE:
+	case GUEST_TR_BASE:
+	case GUEST_GDTR_BASE:
+	case GUEST_IDTR_BASE:
+	case GUEST_PENDING_DBG_EXCEPTIONS:
+	case GUEST_BNDCFGS:
+		return true;
+	default:
+		break;
+	}
+
+	return false;
+}
+
+static void sync_vmcs02_to_vmcs12_rare(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+				       struct vmcs12 *vmcs12)
+{
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+
+	vmcs12->guest_es_selector = vmcs_read16(GUEST_ES_SELECTOR);
+	vmcs12->guest_cs_selector = vmcs_read16(GUEST_CS_SELECTOR);
+	vmcs12->guest_ss_selector = vmcs_read16(GUEST_SS_SELECTOR);
+	vmcs12->guest_ds_selector = vmcs_read16(GUEST_DS_SELECTOR);
+	vmcs12->guest_fs_selector = vmcs_read16(GUEST_FS_SELECTOR);
+	vmcs12->guest_gs_selector = vmcs_read16(GUEST_GS_SELECTOR);
+	vmcs12->guest_ldtr_selector = vmcs_read16(GUEST_LDTR_SELECTOR);
+	vmcs12->guest_tr_selector = vmcs_read16(GUEST_TR_SELECTOR);
+	vmcs12->guest_es_limit = vmcs_read32(GUEST_ES_LIMIT);
+	vmcs12->guest_cs_limit = vmcs_read32(GUEST_CS_LIMIT);
+	vmcs12->guest_ss_limit = vmcs_read32(GUEST_SS_LIMIT);
+	vmcs12->guest_ds_limit = vmcs_read32(GUEST_DS_LIMIT);
+	vmcs12->guest_fs_limit = vmcs_read32(GUEST_FS_LIMIT);
+	vmcs12->guest_gs_limit = vmcs_read32(GUEST_GS_LIMIT);
+	vmcs12->guest_ldtr_limit = vmcs_read32(GUEST_LDTR_LIMIT);
+	vmcs12->guest_tr_limit = vmcs_read32(GUEST_TR_LIMIT);
+	vmcs12->guest_gdtr_limit = vmcs_read32(GUEST_GDTR_LIMIT);
+	vmcs12->guest_idtr_limit = vmcs_read32(GUEST_IDTR_LIMIT);
+	vmcs12->guest_es_ar_bytes = vmcs_read32(GUEST_ES_AR_BYTES);
+	vmcs12->guest_ds_ar_bytes = vmcs_read32(GUEST_DS_AR_BYTES);
+	vmcs12->guest_fs_ar_bytes = vmcs_read32(GUEST_FS_AR_BYTES);
+	vmcs12->guest_gs_ar_bytes = vmcs_read32(GUEST_GS_AR_BYTES);
+	vmcs12->guest_ldtr_ar_bytes = vmcs_read32(GUEST_LDTR_AR_BYTES);
+	vmcs12->guest_tr_ar_bytes = vmcs_read32(GUEST_TR_AR_BYTES);
+	vmcs12->guest_es_base = vmcs_readl(GUEST_ES_BASE);
+	vmcs12->guest_cs_base = vmcs_readl(GUEST_CS_BASE);
+	vmcs12->guest_ss_base = vmcs_readl(GUEST_SS_BASE);
+	vmcs12->guest_ds_base = vmcs_readl(GUEST_DS_BASE);
+	vmcs12->guest_fs_base = vmcs_readl(GUEST_FS_BASE);
+	vmcs12->guest_gs_base = vmcs_readl(GUEST_GS_BASE);
+	vmcs12->guest_ldtr_base = vmcs_readl(GUEST_LDTR_BASE);
+	vmcs12->guest_tr_base = vmcs_readl(GUEST_TR_BASE);
+	vmcs12->guest_gdtr_base = vmcs_readl(GUEST_GDTR_BASE);
+	vmcs12->guest_idtr_base = vmcs_readl(GUEST_IDTR_BASE);
+	vmcs12->guest_pending_dbg_exceptions =
+		vmcs_readl(GUEST_PENDING_DBG_EXCEPTIONS);
+
+	vmx->nested.need_sync_vmcs02_to_vmcs12_rare = false;
+}
+
+static void copy_vmcs02_to_vmcs12_rare(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+				       struct vmcs12 *vmcs12)
+{
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+	int cpu;
+
+	if (!vmx->nested.need_sync_vmcs02_to_vmcs12_rare)
+		return;
+
+
+	WARN_ON_ONCE(vmx->loaded_vmcs != &vmx->vmcs01);
+
+	cpu = get_cpu();
+	vmx->loaded_vmcs = &vmx->nested.vmcs02;
+	vmx_vcpu_load_vmcs(vcpu, cpu, &vmx->vmcs01);
+
+	sync_vmcs02_to_vmcs12_rare(vcpu, vmcs12);
+
+	vmx->loaded_vmcs = &vmx->vmcs01;
+	vmx_vcpu_load_vmcs(vcpu, cpu, &vmx->nested.vmcs02);
+	put_cpu();
+}
+
+/*
+ * Update the guest state fields of vmcs12 to reflect changes that
+ * occurred while L2 was running. (The "IA-32e mode guest" bit of the
+ * VM-entry controls is also updated, since this is really a guest
+ * state bit.)
+ */
+static void sync_vmcs02_to_vmcs12(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct vmcs12 *vmcs12)
+{
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+
+	if (evmptr_is_valid(vmx->nested.hv_evmcs_vmptr))
+		sync_vmcs02_to_vmcs12_rare(vcpu, vmcs12);
+
+	vmx->nested.need_sync_vmcs02_to_vmcs12_rare =
+		!evmptr_is_valid(vmx->nested.hv_evmcs_vmptr);
+
+	vmcs12->guest_cr0 = vmcs12_guest_cr0(vcpu, vmcs12);
+	vmcs12->guest_cr4 = vmcs12_guest_cr4(vcpu, vmcs12);
+
+	vmcs12->guest_rsp = kvm_rsp_read(vcpu);
+	vmcs12->guest_rip = kvm_rip_read(vcpu);
+	vmcs12->guest_rflags = vmcs_readl(GUEST_RFLAGS);
+
+	vmcs12->guest_cs_ar_bytes = vmcs_read32(GUEST_CS_AR_BYTES);
+	vmcs12->guest_ss_ar_bytes = vmcs_read32(GUEST_SS_AR_BYTES);
+
+	vmcs12->guest_interruptibility_info =
+		vmcs_read32(GUEST_INTERRUPTIBILITY_INFO);
+
+	if (vcpu->arch.mp_state == KVM_MP_STATE_HALTED)
+		vmcs12->guest_activity_state = GUEST_ACTIVITY_HLT;
+	else if (vcpu->arch.mp_state == KVM_MP_STATE_INIT_RECEIVED)
+		vmcs12->guest_activity_state = GUEST_ACTIVITY_WAIT_SIPI;
+	else
+		vmcs12->guest_activity_state = GUEST_ACTIVITY_ACTIVE;
+
+	if (nested_cpu_has_preemption_timer(vmcs12) &&
+	    vmcs12->vm_exit_controls & VM_EXIT_SAVE_VMX_PREEMPTION_TIMER &&
+	    !vmx->nested.nested_run_pending)
+		vmcs12->vmx_preemption_timer_value =
+			vmx_get_preemption_timer_value(vcpu);
+
+	/*
+	 * In some cases (usually, nested EPT), L2 is allowed to change its
+	 * own CR3 without exiting. If it has changed it, we must keep it.
+	 * Of course, if L0 is using shadow page tables, GUEST_CR3 was defined
+	 * by L0, not L1 or L2, so we mustn't unconditionally copy it to vmcs12.
+	 *
+	 * Additionally, restore L2's PDPTR to vmcs12.
+	 */
+	if (enable_ept) {
+		vmcs12->guest_cr3 = vmcs_readl(GUEST_CR3);
+		if (nested_cpu_has_ept(vmcs12) && is_pae_paging(vcpu)) {
+			vmcs12->guest_pdptr0 = vmcs_read64(GUEST_PDPTR0);
+			vmcs12->guest_pdptr1 = vmcs_read64(GUEST_PDPTR1);
+			vmcs12->guest_pdptr2 = vmcs_read64(GUEST_PDPTR2);
+			vmcs12->guest_pdptr3 = vmcs_read64(GUEST_PDPTR3);
+		}
+	}
+
+	vmcs12->guest_linear_address = vmcs_readl(GUEST_LINEAR_ADDRESS);
+
+	if (nested_cpu_has_vid(vmcs12))
+		vmcs12->guest_intr_status = vmcs_read16(GUEST_INTR_STATUS);
+
+	vmcs12->vm_entry_controls =
+		(vmcs12->vm_entry_controls & ~VM_ENTRY_IA32E_MODE) |
+		(vm_entry_controls_get(to_vmx(vcpu)) & VM_ENTRY_IA32E_MODE);
+
+	if (vmcs12->vm_exit_controls & VM_EXIT_SAVE_DEBUG_CONTROLS)
+		kvm_get_dr(vcpu, 7, (unsigned long *)&vmcs12->guest_dr7);
+
+	if (vmcs12->vm_exit_controls & VM_EXIT_SAVE_IA32_EFER)
+		vmcs12->guest_ia32_efer = vcpu->arch.efer;
+}
+
+/*
+ * prepare_vmcs12 is part of what we need to do when the nested L2 guest exits
+ * and we want to prepare to run its L1 parent. L1 keeps a vmcs for L2 (vmcs12),
+ * and this function updates it to reflect the changes to the guest state while
+ * L2 was running (and perhaps made some exits which were handled directly by L0
+ * without going back to L1), and to reflect the exit reason.
+ * Note that we do not have to copy here all VMCS fields, just those that
+ * could have changed by the L2 guest or the exit - i.e., the guest-state and
+ * exit-information fields only. Other fields are modified by L1 with VMWRITE,
+ * which already writes to vmcs12 directly.
+ */
+static void prepare_vmcs12(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct vmcs12 *vmcs12,
+			   u32 vm_exit_reason, u32 exit_intr_info,
+			   unsigned long exit_qualification)
+{
+	/* update exit information fields: */
+	vmcs12->vm_exit_reason = vm_exit_reason;
+	if (to_vmx(vcpu)->exit_reason.enclave_mode)
+		vmcs12->vm_exit_reason |= VMX_EXIT_REASONS_SGX_ENCLAVE_MODE;
+	vmcs12->exit_qualification = exit_qualification;
+
+	/*
+	 * On VM-Exit due to a failed VM-Entry, the VMCS isn't marked launched
+	 * and only EXIT_REASON and EXIT_QUALIFICATION are updated, all other
+	 * exit info fields are unmodified.
+	 */
+	if (!(vmcs12->vm_exit_reason & VMX_EXIT_REASONS_FAILED_VMENTRY)) {
+		vmcs12->launch_state = 1;
+
+		/* vm_entry_intr_info_field is cleared on exit. Emulate this
+		 * instead of reading the real value. */
+		vmcs12->vm_entry_intr_info_field &= ~INTR_INFO_VALID_MASK;
+
+		/*
+		 * Transfer the event that L0 or L1 may wanted to inject into
+		 * L2 to IDT_VECTORING_INFO_FIELD.
+		 */
+		vmcs12_save_pending_event(vcpu, vmcs12,
+					  vm_exit_reason, exit_intr_info);
+
+		vmcs12->vm_exit_intr_info = exit_intr_info;
+		vmcs12->vm_exit_instruction_len = vmcs_read32(VM_EXIT_INSTRUCTION_LEN);
+		vmcs12->vmx_instruction_info = vmcs_read32(VMX_INSTRUCTION_INFO);
+
+		/*
+		 * According to spec, there's no need to store the guest's
+		 * MSRs if the exit is due to a VM-entry failure that occurs
+		 * during or after loading the guest state. Since this exit
+		 * does not fall in that category, we need to save the MSRs.
+		 */
+		if (nested_vmx_store_msr(vcpu,
+					 vmcs12->vm_exit_msr_store_addr,
+					 vmcs12->vm_exit_msr_store_count))
+			nested_vmx_abort(vcpu,
+					 VMX_ABORT_SAVE_GUEST_MSR_FAIL);
+	}
+}
+
+/*
+ * A part of what we need to when the nested L2 guest exits and we want to
+ * run its L1 parent, is to reset L1's guest state to the host state specified
+ * in vmcs12.
+ * This function is to be called not only on normal nested exit, but also on
+ * a nested entry failure, as explained in Intel's spec, 3B.23.7 ("VM-Entry
+ * Failures During or After Loading Guest State").
+ * This function should be called when the active VMCS is L1's (vmcs01).
+ */
+static void load_vmcs12_host_state(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+				   struct vmcs12 *vmcs12)
+{
+	enum vm_entry_failure_code ignored;
+	struct kvm_segment seg;
+
+	if (vmcs12->vm_exit_controls & VM_EXIT_LOAD_IA32_EFER)
+		vcpu->arch.efer = vmcs12->host_ia32_efer;
+	else if (vmcs12->vm_exit_controls & VM_EXIT_HOST_ADDR_SPACE_SIZE)
+		vcpu->arch.efer |= (EFER_LMA | EFER_LME);
+	else
+		vcpu->arch.efer &= ~(EFER_LMA | EFER_LME);
+	vmx_set_efer(vcpu, vcpu->arch.efer);
+
+	kvm_rsp_write(vcpu, vmcs12->host_rsp);
+	kvm_rip_write(vcpu, vmcs12->host_rip);
+	vmx_set_rflags(vcpu, X86_EFLAGS_FIXED);
+	vmx_set_interrupt_shadow(vcpu, 0);
+
+	/*
+	 * Note that calling vmx_set_cr0 is important, even if cr0 hasn't
+	 * actually changed, because vmx_set_cr0 refers to efer set above.
+	 *
+	 * CR0_GUEST_HOST_MASK is already set in the original vmcs01
+	 * (KVM doesn't change it);
+	 */
+	vcpu->arch.cr0_guest_owned_bits = vmx_l1_guest_owned_cr0_bits();
+	vmx_set_cr0(vcpu, vmcs12->host_cr0);
+
+	/* Same as above - no reason to call set_cr4_guest_host_mask().  */
+	vcpu->arch.cr4_guest_owned_bits = ~vmcs_readl(CR4_GUEST_HOST_MASK);
+	vmx_set_cr4(vcpu, vmcs12->host_cr4);
+
+	nested_ept_uninit_mmu_context(vcpu);
+
+	/*
+	 * Only PDPTE load can fail as the value of cr3 was checked on entry and
+	 * couldn't have changed.
+	 */
+	if (nested_vmx_load_cr3(vcpu, vmcs12->host_cr3, false, true, &ignored))
+		nested_vmx_abort(vcpu, VMX_ABORT_LOAD_HOST_PDPTE_FAIL);
+
+	nested_vmx_transition_tlb_flush(vcpu, vmcs12, false);
+
+	vmcs_write32(GUEST_SYSENTER_CS, vmcs12->host_ia32_sysenter_cs);
+	vmcs_writel(GUEST_SYSENTER_ESP, vmcs12->host_ia32_sysenter_esp);
+	vmcs_writel(GUEST_SYSENTER_EIP, vmcs12->host_ia32_sysenter_eip);
+	vmcs_writel(GUEST_IDTR_BASE, vmcs12->host_idtr_base);
+	vmcs_writel(GUEST_GDTR_BASE, vmcs12->host_gdtr_base);
+	vmcs_write32(GUEST_IDTR_LIMIT, 0xFFFF);
+	vmcs_write32(GUEST_GDTR_LIMIT, 0xFFFF);
+
+	/* If not VM_EXIT_CLEAR_BNDCFGS, the L2 value propagates to L1.  */
+	if (vmcs12->vm_exit_controls & VM_EXIT_CLEAR_BNDCFGS)
+		vmcs_write64(GUEST_BNDCFGS, 0);
+
+	if (vmcs12->vm_exit_controls & VM_EXIT_LOAD_IA32_PAT) {
+		vmcs_write64(GUEST_IA32_PAT, vmcs12->host_ia32_pat);
+		vcpu->arch.pat = vmcs12->host_ia32_pat;
+	}
+	if ((vmcs12->vm_exit_controls & VM_EXIT_LOAD_IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL) &&
+	    kvm_pmu_has_perf_global_ctrl(vcpu_to_pmu(vcpu)))
+		WARN_ON_ONCE(kvm_set_msr(vcpu, MSR_CORE_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL,
+					 vmcs12->host_ia32_perf_global_ctrl));
+
+	/* Set L1 segment info according to Intel SDM
+	    27.5.2 Loading Host Segment and Descriptor-Table Registers */
+	seg = (struct kvm_segment) {
+		.base = 0,
+		.limit = 0xFFFFFFFF,
+		.selector = vmcs12->host_cs_selector,
+		.type = 11,
+		.present = 1,
+		.s = 1,
+		.g = 1
+	};
+	if (vmcs12->vm_exit_controls & VM_EXIT_HOST_ADDR_SPACE_SIZE)
+		seg.l = 1;
+	else
+		seg.db = 1;
+	__vmx_set_segment(vcpu, &seg, VCPU_SREG_CS);
+	seg = (struct kvm_segment) {
+		.base = 0,
+		.limit = 0xFFFFFFFF,
+		.type = 3,
+		.present = 1,
+		.s = 1,
+		.db = 1,
+		.g = 1
+	};
+	seg.selector = vmcs12->host_ds_selector;
+	__vmx_set_segment(vcpu, &seg, VCPU_SREG_DS);
+	seg.selector = vmcs12->host_es_selector;
+	__vmx_set_segment(vcpu, &seg, VCPU_SREG_ES);
+	seg.selector = vmcs12->host_ss_selector;
+	__vmx_set_segment(vcpu, &seg, VCPU_SREG_SS);
+	seg.selector = vmcs12->host_fs_selector;
+	seg.base = vmcs12->host_fs_base;
+	__vmx_set_segment(vcpu, &seg, VCPU_SREG_FS);
+	seg.selector = vmcs12->host_gs_selector;
+	seg.base = vmcs12->host_gs_base;
+	__vmx_set_segment(vcpu, &seg, VCPU_SREG_GS);
+	seg = (struct kvm_segment) {
+		.base = vmcs12->host_tr_base,
+		.limit = 0x67,
+		.selector = vmcs12->host_tr_selector,
+		.type = 11,
+		.present = 1
+	};
+	__vmx_set_segment(vcpu, &seg, VCPU_SREG_TR);
+
+	memset(&seg, 0, sizeof(seg));
+	seg.unusable = 1;
+	__vmx_set_segment(vcpu, &seg, VCPU_SREG_LDTR);
+
+	kvm_set_dr(vcpu, 7, 0x400);
+	vmcs_write64(GUEST_IA32_DEBUGCTL, 0);
+
+	if (nested_vmx_load_msr(vcpu, vmcs12->vm_exit_msr_load_addr,
+				vmcs12->vm_exit_msr_load_count))
+		nested_vmx_abort(vcpu, VMX_ABORT_LOAD_HOST_MSR_FAIL);
+
+	to_vmx(vcpu)->emulation_required = vmx_emulation_required(vcpu);
+}
+
+static inline u64 nested_vmx_get_vmcs01_guest_efer(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
+{
+	struct vmx_uret_msr *efer_msr;
+	unsigned int i;
+
+	if (vm_entry_controls_get(vmx) & VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_EFER)
+		return vmcs_read64(GUEST_IA32_EFER);
+
+	if (cpu_has_load_ia32_efer())
+		return host_efer;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < vmx->msr_autoload.guest.nr; ++i) {
+		if (vmx->msr_autoload.guest.val[i].index == MSR_EFER)
+			return vmx->msr_autoload.guest.val[i].value;
+	}
+
+	efer_msr = vmx_find_uret_msr(vmx, MSR_EFER);
+	if (efer_msr)
+		return efer_msr->data;
+
+	return host_efer;
+}
+
+static void nested_vmx_restore_host_state(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct vmcs12 *vmcs12 = get_vmcs12(vcpu);
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+	struct vmx_msr_entry g, h;
+	gpa_t gpa;
+	u32 i, j;
+
+	vcpu->arch.pat = vmcs_read64(GUEST_IA32_PAT);
+
+	if (vmcs12->vm_entry_controls & VM_ENTRY_LOAD_DEBUG_CONTROLS) {
+		/*
+		 * L1's host DR7 is lost if KVM_GUESTDBG_USE_HW_BP is set
+		 * as vmcs01.GUEST_DR7 contains a userspace defined value
+		 * and vcpu->arch.dr7 is not squirreled away before the
+		 * nested VMENTER (not worth adding a variable in nested_vmx).
+		 */
+		if (vcpu->guest_debug & KVM_GUESTDBG_USE_HW_BP)
+			kvm_set_dr(vcpu, 7, DR7_FIXED_1);
+		else
+			WARN_ON(kvm_set_dr(vcpu, 7, vmcs_readl(GUEST_DR7)));
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Note that calling vmx_set_{efer,cr0,cr4} is important as they
+	 * handle a variety of side effects to KVM's software model.
+	 */
+	vmx_set_efer(vcpu, nested_vmx_get_vmcs01_guest_efer(vmx));
+
+	vcpu->arch.cr0_guest_owned_bits = vmx_l1_guest_owned_cr0_bits();
+	vmx_set_cr0(vcpu, vmcs_readl(CR0_READ_SHADOW));
+
+	vcpu->arch.cr4_guest_owned_bits = ~vmcs_readl(CR4_GUEST_HOST_MASK);
+	vmx_set_cr4(vcpu, vmcs_readl(CR4_READ_SHADOW));
+
+	nested_ept_uninit_mmu_context(vcpu);
+	vcpu->arch.cr3 = vmcs_readl(GUEST_CR3);
+	kvm_register_mark_available(vcpu, VCPU_EXREG_CR3);
+
+	/*
+	 * Use ept_save_pdptrs(vcpu) to load the MMU's cached PDPTRs
+	 * from vmcs01 (if necessary).  The PDPTRs are not loaded on
+	 * VMFail, like everything else we just need to ensure our
+	 * software model is up-to-date.
+	 */
+	if (enable_ept && is_pae_paging(vcpu))
+		ept_save_pdptrs(vcpu);
+
+	kvm_mmu_reset_context(vcpu);
+
+	/*
+	 * This nasty bit of open coding is a compromise between blindly
+	 * loading L1's MSRs using the exit load lists (incorrect emulation
+	 * of VMFail), leaving the nested VM's MSRs in the software model
+	 * (incorrect behavior) and snapshotting the modified MSRs (too
+	 * expensive since the lists are unbound by hardware).  For each
+	 * MSR that was (prematurely) loaded from the nested VMEntry load
+	 * list, reload it from the exit load list if it exists and differs
+	 * from the guest value.  The intent is to stuff host state as
+	 * silently as possible, not to fully process the exit load list.
+	 */
+	for (i = 0; i < vmcs12->vm_entry_msr_load_count; i++) {
+		gpa = vmcs12->vm_entry_msr_load_addr + (i * sizeof(g));
+		if (kvm_vcpu_read_guest(vcpu, gpa, &g, sizeof(g))) {
+			pr_debug_ratelimited(
+				"%s read MSR index failed (%u, 0x%08llx)\n",
+				__func__, i, gpa);
+			goto vmabort;
+		}
+
+		for (j = 0; j < vmcs12->vm_exit_msr_load_count; j++) {
+			gpa = vmcs12->vm_exit_msr_load_addr + (j * sizeof(h));
+			if (kvm_vcpu_read_guest(vcpu, gpa, &h, sizeof(h))) {
+				pr_debug_ratelimited(
+					"%s read MSR failed (%u, 0x%08llx)\n",
+					__func__, j, gpa);
+				goto vmabort;
+			}
+			if (h.index != g.index)
+				continue;
+			if (h.value == g.value)
+				break;
+
+			if (nested_vmx_load_msr_check(vcpu, &h)) {
+				pr_debug_ratelimited(
+					"%s check failed (%u, 0x%x, 0x%x)\n",
+					__func__, j, h.index, h.reserved);
+				goto vmabort;
+			}
+
+			if (kvm_set_msr(vcpu, h.index, h.value)) {
+				pr_debug_ratelimited(
+					"%s WRMSR failed (%u, 0x%x, 0x%llx)\n",
+					__func__, j, h.index, h.value);
+				goto vmabort;
+			}
+		}
+	}
+
+	return;
+
+vmabort:
+	nested_vmx_abort(vcpu, VMX_ABORT_LOAD_HOST_MSR_FAIL);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Emulate an exit from nested guest (L2) to L1, i.e., prepare to run L1
+ * and modify vmcs12 to make it see what it would expect to see there if
+ * L2 was its real guest. Must only be called when in L2 (is_guest_mode())
+ */
+void nested_vmx_vmexit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 vm_exit_reason,
+		       u32 exit_intr_info, unsigned long exit_qualification)
+{
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+	struct vmcs12 *vmcs12 = get_vmcs12(vcpu);
+
+	/* Pending MTF traps are discarded on VM-Exit. */
+	vmx->nested.mtf_pending = false;
+
+	/* trying to cancel vmlaunch/vmresume is a bug */
+	WARN_ON_ONCE(vmx->nested.nested_run_pending);
+
+	if (kvm_check_request(KVM_REQ_GET_NESTED_STATE_PAGES, vcpu)) {
+		/*
+		 * KVM_REQ_GET_NESTED_STATE_PAGES is also used to map
+		 * Enlightened VMCS after migration and we still need to
+		 * do that when something is forcing L2->L1 exit prior to
+		 * the first L2 run.
+		 */
+		(void)nested_get_evmcs_page(vcpu);
+	}
+
+	/* Service pending TLB flush requests for L2 before switching to L1. */
+	kvm_service_local_tlb_flush_requests(vcpu);
+
+	/*
+	 * VCPU_EXREG_PDPTR will be clobbered in arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h between
+	 * now and the new vmentry.  Ensure that the VMCS02 PDPTR fields are
+	 * up-to-date before switching to L1.
+	 */
+	if (enable_ept && is_pae_paging(vcpu))
+		vmx_ept_load_pdptrs(vcpu);
+
+	leave_guest_mode(vcpu);
+
+	if (nested_cpu_has_preemption_timer(vmcs12))
+		hrtimer_cancel(&to_vmx(vcpu)->nested.preemption_timer);
+
+	if (nested_cpu_has(vmcs12, CPU_BASED_USE_TSC_OFFSETTING)) {
+		vcpu->arch.tsc_offset = vcpu->arch.l1_tsc_offset;
+		if (nested_cpu_has2(vmcs12, SECONDARY_EXEC_TSC_SCALING))
+			vcpu->arch.tsc_scaling_ratio = vcpu->arch.l1_tsc_scaling_ratio;
+	}
+
+	if (likely(!vmx->fail)) {
+		sync_vmcs02_to_vmcs12(vcpu, vmcs12);
+
+		if (vm_exit_reason != -1)
+			prepare_vmcs12(vcpu, vmcs12, vm_exit_reason,
+				       exit_intr_info, exit_qualification);
+
+		/*
+		 * Must happen outside of sync_vmcs02_to_vmcs12() as it will
+		 * also be used to capture vmcs12 cache as part of
+		 * capturing nVMX state for snapshot (migration).
+		 *
+		 * Otherwise, this flush will dirty guest memory at a
+		 * point it is already assumed by user-space to be
+		 * immutable.
+		 */
+		nested_flush_cached_shadow_vmcs12(vcpu, vmcs12);
+	} else {
+		/*
+		 * The only expected VM-instruction error is "VM entry with
+		 * invalid control field(s)." Anything else indicates a
+		 * problem with L0.  And we should never get here with a
+		 * VMFail of any type if early consistency checks are enabled.
+		 */
+		WARN_ON_ONCE(vmcs_read32(VM_INSTRUCTION_ERROR) !=
+			     VMXERR_ENTRY_INVALID_CONTROL_FIELD);
+		WARN_ON_ONCE(nested_early_check);
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Drop events/exceptions that were queued for re-injection to L2
+	 * (picked up via vmx_complete_interrupts()), as well as exceptions
+	 * that were pending for L2.  Note, this must NOT be hoisted above
+	 * prepare_vmcs12(), events/exceptions queued for re-injection need to
+	 * be captured in vmcs12 (see vmcs12_save_pending_event()).
+	 */
+	vcpu->arch.nmi_injected = false;
+	kvm_clear_exception_queue(vcpu);
+	kvm_clear_interrupt_queue(vcpu);
+
+	vmx_switch_vmcs(vcpu, &vmx->vmcs01);
+
+	/*
+	 * If IBRS is advertised to the vCPU, KVM must flush the indirect
+	 * branch predictors when transitioning from L2 to L1, as L1 expects
+	 * hardware (KVM in this case) to provide separate predictor modes.
+	 * Bare metal isolates VMX root (host) from VMX non-root (guest), but
+	 * doesn't isolate different VMCSs, i.e. in this case, doesn't provide
+	 * separate modes for L2 vs L1.
+	 */
+	if (guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL))
+		indirect_branch_prediction_barrier();
+
+	/* Update any VMCS fields that might have changed while L2 ran */
+	vmcs_write32(VM_EXIT_MSR_LOAD_COUNT, vmx->msr_autoload.host.nr);
+	vmcs_write32(VM_ENTRY_MSR_LOAD_COUNT, vmx->msr_autoload.guest.nr);
+	vmcs_write64(TSC_OFFSET, vcpu->arch.tsc_offset);
+	if (kvm_caps.has_tsc_control)
+		vmcs_write64(TSC_MULTIPLIER, vcpu->arch.tsc_scaling_ratio);
+
+	if (vmx->nested.l1_tpr_threshold != -1)
+		vmcs_write32(TPR_THRESHOLD, vmx->nested.l1_tpr_threshold);
+
+	if (vmx->nested.change_vmcs01_virtual_apic_mode) {
+		vmx->nested.change_vmcs01_virtual_apic_mode = false;
+		vmx_set_virtual_apic_mode(vcpu);
+	}
+
+	if (vmx->nested.update_vmcs01_cpu_dirty_logging) {
+		vmx->nested.update_vmcs01_cpu_dirty_logging = false;
+		vmx_update_cpu_dirty_logging(vcpu);
+	}
+
+	/* Unpin physical memory we referred to in vmcs02 */
+	kvm_vcpu_unmap(vcpu, &vmx->nested.apic_access_page_map, false);
+	kvm_vcpu_unmap(vcpu, &vmx->nested.virtual_apic_map, true);
+	kvm_vcpu_unmap(vcpu, &vmx->nested.pi_desc_map, true);
+	vmx->nested.pi_desc = NULL;
+
+	if (vmx->nested.reload_vmcs01_apic_access_page) {
+		vmx->nested.reload_vmcs01_apic_access_page = false;
+		kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_APIC_PAGE_RELOAD, vcpu);
+	}
+
+	if (vmx->nested.update_vmcs01_apicv_status) {
+		vmx->nested.update_vmcs01_apicv_status = false;
+		kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_APICV_UPDATE, vcpu);
+	}
+
+	if ((vm_exit_reason != -1) &&
+	    (enable_shadow_vmcs || evmptr_is_valid(vmx->nested.hv_evmcs_vmptr)))
+		vmx->nested.need_vmcs12_to_shadow_sync = true;
+
+	/* in case we halted in L2 */
+	vcpu->arch.mp_state = KVM_MP_STATE_RUNNABLE;
+
+	if (likely(!vmx->fail)) {
+		if ((u16)vm_exit_reason == EXIT_REASON_EXTERNAL_INTERRUPT &&
+		    nested_exit_intr_ack_set(vcpu)) {
+			int irq = kvm_cpu_get_interrupt(vcpu);
+			WARN_ON(irq < 0);
+			vmcs12->vm_exit_intr_info = irq |
+				INTR_INFO_VALID_MASK | INTR_TYPE_EXT_INTR;
+		}
+
+		if (vm_exit_reason != -1)
+			trace_kvm_nested_vmexit_inject(vmcs12->vm_exit_reason,
+						       vmcs12->exit_qualification,
+						       vmcs12->idt_vectoring_info_field,
+						       vmcs12->vm_exit_intr_info,
+						       vmcs12->vm_exit_intr_error_code,
+						       KVM_ISA_VMX);
+
+		load_vmcs12_host_state(vcpu, vmcs12);
+
+		return;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * After an early L2 VM-entry failure, we're now back
+	 * in L1 which thinks it just finished a VMLAUNCH or
+	 * VMRESUME instruction, so we need to set the failure
+	 * flag and the VM-instruction error field of the VMCS
+	 * accordingly, and skip the emulated instruction.
+	 */
+	(void)nested_vmx_fail(vcpu, VMXERR_ENTRY_INVALID_CONTROL_FIELD);
+
+	/*
+	 * Restore L1's host state to KVM's software model.  We're here
+	 * because a consistency check was caught by hardware, which
+	 * means some amount of guest state has been propagated to KVM's
+	 * model and needs to be unwound to the host's state.
+	 */
+	nested_vmx_restore_host_state(vcpu);
+
+	vmx->fail = 0;
+}
+
+static void nested_vmx_triple_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	kvm_clear_request(KVM_REQ_TRIPLE_FAULT, vcpu);
+	nested_vmx_vmexit(vcpu, EXIT_REASON_TRIPLE_FAULT, 0, 0);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Decode the memory-address operand of a vmx instruction, as recorded on an
+ * exit caused by such an instruction (run by a guest hypervisor).
+ * On success, returns 0. When the operand is invalid, returns 1 and throws
+ * #UD, #GP, or #SS.
+ */
+int get_vmx_mem_address(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long exit_qualification,
+			u32 vmx_instruction_info, bool wr, int len, gva_t *ret)
+{
+	gva_t off;
+	bool exn;
+	struct kvm_segment s;
+
+	/*
+	 * According to Vol. 3B, "Information for VM Exits Due to Instruction
+	 * Execution", on an exit, vmx_instruction_info holds most of the
+	 * addressing components of the operand. Only the displacement part
+	 * is put in exit_qualification (see 3B, "Basic VM-Exit Information").
+	 * For how an actual address is calculated from all these components,
+	 * refer to Vol. 1, "Operand Addressing".
+	 */
+	int  scaling = vmx_instruction_info & 3;
+	int  addr_size = (vmx_instruction_info >> 7) & 7;
+	bool is_reg = vmx_instruction_info & (1u << 10);
+	int  seg_reg = (vmx_instruction_info >> 15) & 7;
+	int  index_reg = (vmx_instruction_info >> 18) & 0xf;
+	bool index_is_valid = !(vmx_instruction_info & (1u << 22));
+	int  base_reg       = (vmx_instruction_info >> 23) & 0xf;
+	bool base_is_valid  = !(vmx_instruction_info & (1u << 27));
+
+	if (is_reg) {
+		kvm_queue_exception(vcpu, UD_VECTOR);
+		return 1;
+	}
+
+	/* Addr = segment_base + offset */
+	/* offset = base + [index * scale] + displacement */
+	off = exit_qualification; /* holds the displacement */
+	if (addr_size == 1)
+		off = (gva_t)sign_extend64(off, 31);
+	else if (addr_size == 0)
+		off = (gva_t)sign_extend64(off, 15);
+	if (base_is_valid)
+		off += kvm_register_read(vcpu, base_reg);
+	if (index_is_valid)
+		off += kvm_register_read(vcpu, index_reg) << scaling;
+	vmx_get_segment(vcpu, &s, seg_reg);
+
+	/*
+	 * The effective address, i.e. @off, of a memory operand is truncated
+	 * based on the address size of the instruction.  Note that this is
+	 * the *effective address*, i.e. the address prior to accounting for
+	 * the segment's base.
+	 */
+	if (addr_size == 1) /* 32 bit */
+		off &= 0xffffffff;
+	else if (addr_size == 0) /* 16 bit */
+		off &= 0xffff;
+
+	/* Checks for #GP/#SS exceptions. */
+	exn = false;
+	if (is_long_mode(vcpu)) {
+		/*
+		 * The virtual/linear address is never truncated in 64-bit
+		 * mode, e.g. a 32-bit address size can yield a 64-bit virtual
+		 * address when using FS/GS with a non-zero base.
+		 */
+		if (seg_reg == VCPU_SREG_FS || seg_reg == VCPU_SREG_GS)
+			*ret = s.base + off;
+		else
+			*ret = off;
+
+		/* Long mode: #GP(0)/#SS(0) if the memory address is in a
+		 * non-canonical form. This is the only check on the memory
+		 * destination for long mode!
+		 */
+		exn = is_noncanonical_address(*ret, vcpu);
+	} else {
+		/*
+		 * When not in long mode, the virtual/linear address is
+		 * unconditionally truncated to 32 bits regardless of the
+		 * address size.
+		 */
+		*ret = (s.base + off) & 0xffffffff;
+
+		/* Protected mode: apply checks for segment validity in the
+		 * following order:
+		 * - segment type check (#GP(0) may be thrown)
+		 * - usability check (#GP(0)/#SS(0))
+		 * - limit check (#GP(0)/#SS(0))
+		 */
+		if (wr)
+			/* #GP(0) if the destination operand is located in a
+			 * read-only data segment or any code segment.
+			 */
+			exn = ((s.type & 0xa) == 0 || (s.type & 8));
+		else
+			/* #GP(0) if the source operand is located in an
+			 * execute-only code segment
+			 */
+			exn = ((s.type & 0xa) == 8);
+		if (exn) {
+			kvm_queue_exception_e(vcpu, GP_VECTOR, 0);
+			return 1;
+		}
+		/* Protected mode: #GP(0)/#SS(0) if the segment is unusable.
+		 */
+		exn = (s.unusable != 0);
+
+		/*
+		 * Protected mode: #GP(0)/#SS(0) if the memory operand is
+		 * outside the segment limit.  All CPUs that support VMX ignore
+		 * limit checks for flat segments, i.e. segments with base==0,
+		 * limit==0xffffffff and of type expand-up data or code.
+		 */
+		if (!(s.base == 0 && s.limit == 0xffffffff &&
+		     ((s.type & 8) || !(s.type & 4))))
+			exn = exn || ((u64)off + len - 1 > s.limit);
+	}
+	if (exn) {
+		kvm_queue_exception_e(vcpu,
+				      seg_reg == VCPU_SREG_SS ?
+						SS_VECTOR : GP_VECTOR,
+				      0);
+		return 1;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int nested_vmx_get_vmptr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t *vmpointer,
+				int *ret)
+{
+	gva_t gva;
+	struct x86_exception e;
+	int r;
+
+	if (get_vmx_mem_address(vcpu, vmx_get_exit_qual(vcpu),
+				vmcs_read32(VMX_INSTRUCTION_INFO), false,
+				sizeof(*vmpointer), &gva)) {
+		*ret = 1;
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	r = kvm_read_guest_virt(vcpu, gva, vmpointer, sizeof(*vmpointer), &e);
+	if (r != X86EMUL_CONTINUE) {
+		*ret = kvm_handle_memory_failure(vcpu, r, &e);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Allocate a shadow VMCS and associate it with the currently loaded
+ * VMCS, unless such a shadow VMCS already exists. The newly allocated
+ * VMCS is also VMCLEARed, so that it is ready for use.
+ */
+static struct vmcs *alloc_shadow_vmcs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+	struct loaded_vmcs *loaded_vmcs = vmx->loaded_vmcs;
+
+	/*
+	 * KVM allocates a shadow VMCS only when L1 executes VMXON and frees it
+	 * when L1 executes VMXOFF or the vCPU is forced out of nested
+	 * operation.  VMXON faults if the CPU is already post-VMXON, so it
+	 * should be impossible to already have an allocated shadow VMCS.  KVM
+	 * doesn't support virtualization of VMCS shadowing, so vmcs01 should
+	 * always be the loaded VMCS.
+	 */
+	if (WARN_ON(loaded_vmcs != &vmx->vmcs01 || loaded_vmcs->shadow_vmcs))
+		return loaded_vmcs->shadow_vmcs;
+
+	loaded_vmcs->shadow_vmcs = alloc_vmcs(true);
+	if (loaded_vmcs->shadow_vmcs)
+		vmcs_clear(loaded_vmcs->shadow_vmcs);
+
+	return loaded_vmcs->shadow_vmcs;
+}
+
+static int enter_vmx_operation(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+	int r;
+
+	r = alloc_loaded_vmcs(&vmx->nested.vmcs02);
+	if (r < 0)
+		goto out_vmcs02;
+
+	vmx->nested.cached_vmcs12 = kzalloc(VMCS12_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
+	if (!vmx->nested.cached_vmcs12)
+		goto out_cached_vmcs12;
+
+	vmx->nested.shadow_vmcs12_cache.gpa = INVALID_GPA;
+	vmx->nested.cached_shadow_vmcs12 = kzalloc(VMCS12_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
+	if (!vmx->nested.cached_shadow_vmcs12)
+		goto out_cached_shadow_vmcs12;
+
+	if (enable_shadow_vmcs && !alloc_shadow_vmcs(vcpu))
+		goto out_shadow_vmcs;
+
+	hrtimer_init(&vmx->nested.preemption_timer, CLOCK_MONOTONIC,
+		     HRTIMER_MODE_ABS_PINNED);
+	vmx->nested.preemption_timer.function = vmx_preemption_timer_fn;
+
+	vmx->nested.vpid02 = allocate_vpid();
+
+	vmx->nested.vmcs02_initialized = false;
+	vmx->nested.vmxon = true;
+
+	if (vmx_pt_mode_is_host_guest()) {
+		vmx->pt_desc.guest.ctl = 0;
+		pt_update_intercept_for_msr(vcpu);
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+
+out_shadow_vmcs:
+	kfree(vmx->nested.cached_shadow_vmcs12);
+
+out_cached_shadow_vmcs12:
+	kfree(vmx->nested.cached_vmcs12);
+
+out_cached_vmcs12:
+	free_loaded_vmcs(&vmx->nested.vmcs02);
+
+out_vmcs02:
+	return -ENOMEM;
+}
+
+/* Emulate the VMXON instruction. */
+static int handle_vmxon(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	int ret;
+	gpa_t vmptr;
+	uint32_t revision;
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+	const u64 VMXON_NEEDED_FEATURES = FEAT_CTL_LOCKED
+		| FEAT_CTL_VMX_ENABLED_OUTSIDE_SMX;
+
+	/*
+	 * Manually check CR4.VMXE checks, KVM must force CR4.VMXE=1 to enter
+	 * the guest and so cannot rely on hardware to perform the check,
+	 * which has higher priority than VM-Exit (see Intel SDM's pseudocode
+	 * for VMXON).
+	 *
+	 * Rely on hardware for the other pre-VM-Exit checks, CR0.PE=1, !VM86
+	 * and !COMPATIBILITY modes.  For an unrestricted guest, KVM doesn't
+	 * force any of the relevant guest state.  For a restricted guest, KVM
+	 * does force CR0.PE=1, but only to also force VM86 in order to emulate
+	 * Real Mode, and so there's no need to check CR0.PE manually.
+	 */
+	if (!kvm_is_cr4_bit_set(vcpu, X86_CR4_VMXE)) {
+		kvm_queue_exception(vcpu, UD_VECTOR);
+		return 1;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * The CPL is checked for "not in VMX operation" and for "in VMX root",
+	 * and has higher priority than the VM-Fail due to being post-VMXON,
+	 * i.e. VMXON #GPs outside of VMX non-root if CPL!=0.  In VMX non-root,
+	 * VMXON causes VM-Exit and KVM unconditionally forwards VMXON VM-Exits
+	 * from L2 to L1, i.e. there's no need to check for the vCPU being in
+	 * VMX non-root.
+	 *
+	 * Forwarding the VM-Exit unconditionally, i.e. without performing the
+	 * #UD checks (see above), is functionally ok because KVM doesn't allow
+	 * L1 to run L2 without CR4.VMXE=0, and because KVM never modifies L2's
+	 * CR0 or CR4, i.e. it's L2's responsibility to emulate #UDs that are
+	 * missed by hardware due to shadowing CR0 and/or CR4.
+	 */
+	if (vmx_get_cpl(vcpu)) {
+		kvm_inject_gp(vcpu, 0);
+		return 1;
+	}
+
+	if (vmx->nested.vmxon)
+		return nested_vmx_fail(vcpu, VMXERR_VMXON_IN_VMX_ROOT_OPERATION);
+
+	/*
+	 * Invalid CR0/CR4 generates #GP.  These checks are performed if and
+	 * only if the vCPU isn't already in VMX operation, i.e. effectively
+	 * have lower priority than the VM-Fail above.
+	 */
+	if (!nested_host_cr0_valid(vcpu, kvm_read_cr0(vcpu)) ||
+	    !nested_host_cr4_valid(vcpu, kvm_read_cr4(vcpu))) {
+		kvm_inject_gp(vcpu, 0);
+		return 1;
+	}
+
+	if ((vmx->msr_ia32_feature_control & VMXON_NEEDED_FEATURES)
+			!= VMXON_NEEDED_FEATURES) {
+		kvm_inject_gp(vcpu, 0);
+		return 1;
+	}
+
+	if (nested_vmx_get_vmptr(vcpu, &vmptr, &ret))
+		return ret;
+
+	/*
+	 * SDM 3: 24.11.5
+	 * The first 4 bytes of VMXON region contain the supported
+	 * VMCS revision identifier
+	 *
+	 * Note - IA32_VMX_BASIC[48] will never be 1 for the nested case;
+	 * which replaces physical address width with 32
+	 */
+	if (!page_address_valid(vcpu, vmptr))
+		return nested_vmx_failInvalid(vcpu);
+
+	if (kvm_read_guest(vcpu->kvm, vmptr, &revision, sizeof(revision)) ||
+	    revision != VMCS12_REVISION)
+		return nested_vmx_failInvalid(vcpu);
+
+	vmx->nested.vmxon_ptr = vmptr;
+	ret = enter_vmx_operation(vcpu);
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+
+	return nested_vmx_succeed(vcpu);
+}
+
+static inline void nested_release_vmcs12(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+
+	if (vmx->nested.current_vmptr == INVALID_GPA)
+		return;
+
+	copy_vmcs02_to_vmcs12_rare(vcpu, get_vmcs12(vcpu));
+
+	if (enable_shadow_vmcs) {
+		/* copy to memory all shadowed fields in case
+		   they were modified */
+		copy_shadow_to_vmcs12(vmx);
+		vmx_disable_shadow_vmcs(vmx);
+	}
+	vmx->nested.posted_intr_nv = -1;
+
+	/* Flush VMCS12 to guest memory */
+	kvm_vcpu_write_guest_page(vcpu,
+				  vmx->nested.current_vmptr >> PAGE_SHIFT,
+				  vmx->nested.cached_vmcs12, 0, VMCS12_SIZE);
+
+	kvm_mmu_free_roots(vcpu->kvm, &vcpu->arch.guest_mmu, KVM_MMU_ROOTS_ALL);
+
+	vmx->nested.current_vmptr = INVALID_GPA;
+}
+
+/* Emulate the VMXOFF instruction */
+static int handle_vmxoff(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	if (!nested_vmx_check_permission(vcpu))
+		return 1;
+
+	free_nested(vcpu);
+
+	if (kvm_apic_has_pending_init_or_sipi(vcpu))
+		kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_EVENT, vcpu);
+
+	return nested_vmx_succeed(vcpu);
+}
+
+/* Emulate the VMCLEAR instruction */
+static int handle_vmclear(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+	u32 zero = 0;
+	gpa_t vmptr;
+	int r;
+
+	if (!nested_vmx_check_permission(vcpu))
+		return 1;
+
+	if (nested_vmx_get_vmptr(vcpu, &vmptr, &r))
+		return r;
+
+	if (!page_address_valid(vcpu, vmptr))
+		return nested_vmx_fail(vcpu, VMXERR_VMCLEAR_INVALID_ADDRESS);
+
+	if (vmptr == vmx->nested.vmxon_ptr)
+		return nested_vmx_fail(vcpu, VMXERR_VMCLEAR_VMXON_POINTER);
+
+	/*
+	 * When Enlightened VMEntry is enabled on the calling CPU we treat
+	 * memory area pointer by vmptr as Enlightened VMCS (as there's no good
+	 * way to distinguish it from VMCS12) and we must not corrupt it by
+	 * writing to the non-existent 'launch_state' field. The area doesn't
+	 * have to be the currently active EVMCS on the calling CPU and there's
+	 * nothing KVM has to do to transition it from 'active' to 'non-active'
+	 * state. It is possible that the area will stay mapped as
+	 * vmx->nested.hv_evmcs but this shouldn't be a problem.
+	 */
+	if (likely(!guest_cpuid_has_evmcs(vcpu) ||
+		   !evmptr_is_valid(nested_get_evmptr(vcpu)))) {
+		if (vmptr == vmx->nested.current_vmptr)
+			nested_release_vmcs12(vcpu);
+
+		/*
+		 * Silently ignore memory errors on VMCLEAR, Intel's pseudocode
+		 * for VMCLEAR includes a "ensure that data for VMCS referenced
+		 * by the operand is in memory" clause that guards writes to
+		 * memory, i.e. doing nothing for I/O is architecturally valid.
+		 *
+		 * FIXME: Suppress failures if and only if no memslot is found,
+		 * i.e. exit to userspace if __copy_to_user() fails.
+		 */
+		(void)kvm_vcpu_write_guest(vcpu,
+					   vmptr + offsetof(struct vmcs12,
+							    launch_state),
+					   &zero, sizeof(zero));
+	} else if (vmx->nested.hv_evmcs && vmptr == vmx->nested.hv_evmcs_vmptr) {
+		nested_release_evmcs(vcpu);
+	}
+
+	return nested_vmx_succeed(vcpu);
+}
+
+/* Emulate the VMLAUNCH instruction */
+static int handle_vmlaunch(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	return nested_vmx_run(vcpu, true);
+}
+
+/* Emulate the VMRESUME instruction */
+static int handle_vmresume(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+
+	return nested_vmx_run(vcpu, false);
+}
+
+static int handle_vmread(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct vmcs12 *vmcs12 = is_guest_mode(vcpu) ? get_shadow_vmcs12(vcpu)
+						    : get_vmcs12(vcpu);
+	unsigned long exit_qualification = vmx_get_exit_qual(vcpu);
+	u32 instr_info = vmcs_read32(VMX_INSTRUCTION_INFO);
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+	struct x86_exception e;
+	unsigned long field;
+	u64 value;
+	gva_t gva = 0;
+	short offset;
+	int len, r;
+
+	if (!nested_vmx_check_permission(vcpu))
+		return 1;
+
+	/* Decode instruction info and find the field to read */
+	field = kvm_register_read(vcpu, (((instr_info) >> 28) & 0xf));
+
+	if (!evmptr_is_valid(vmx->nested.hv_evmcs_vmptr)) {
+		/*
+		 * In VMX non-root operation, when the VMCS-link pointer is INVALID_GPA,
+		 * any VMREAD sets the ALU flags for VMfailInvalid.
+		 */
+		if (vmx->nested.current_vmptr == INVALID_GPA ||
+		    (is_guest_mode(vcpu) &&
+		     get_vmcs12(vcpu)->vmcs_link_pointer == INVALID_GPA))
+			return nested_vmx_failInvalid(vcpu);
+
+		offset = get_vmcs12_field_offset(field);
+		if (offset < 0)
+			return nested_vmx_fail(vcpu, VMXERR_UNSUPPORTED_VMCS_COMPONENT);
+
+		if (!is_guest_mode(vcpu) && is_vmcs12_ext_field(field))
+			copy_vmcs02_to_vmcs12_rare(vcpu, vmcs12);
+
+		/* Read the field, zero-extended to a u64 value */
+		value = vmcs12_read_any(vmcs12, field, offset);
+	} else {
+		/*
+		 * Hyper-V TLFS (as of 6.0b) explicitly states, that while an
+		 * enlightened VMCS is active VMREAD/VMWRITE instructions are
+		 * unsupported. Unfortunately, certain versions of Windows 11
+		 * don't comply with this requirement which is not enforced in
+		 * genuine Hyper-V. Allow VMREAD from an enlightened VMCS as a
+		 * workaround, as misbehaving guests will panic on VM-Fail.
+		 * Note, enlightened VMCS is incompatible with shadow VMCS so
+		 * all VMREADs from L2 should go to L1.
+		 */
+		if (WARN_ON_ONCE(is_guest_mode(vcpu)))
+			return nested_vmx_failInvalid(vcpu);
+
+		offset = evmcs_field_offset(field, NULL);
+		if (offset < 0)
+			return nested_vmx_fail(vcpu, VMXERR_UNSUPPORTED_VMCS_COMPONENT);
+
+		/* Read the field, zero-extended to a u64 value */
+		value = evmcs_read_any(vmx->nested.hv_evmcs, field, offset);
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Now copy part of this value to register or memory, as requested.
+	 * Note that the number of bits actually copied is 32 or 64 depending
+	 * on the guest's mode (32 or 64 bit), not on the given field's length.
+	 */
+	if (instr_info & BIT(10)) {
+		kvm_register_write(vcpu, (((instr_info) >> 3) & 0xf), value);
+	} else {
+		len = is_64_bit_mode(vcpu) ? 8 : 4;
+		if (get_vmx_mem_address(vcpu, exit_qualification,
+					instr_info, true, len, &gva))
+			return 1;
+		/* _system ok, nested_vmx_check_permission has verified cpl=0 */
+		r = kvm_write_guest_virt_system(vcpu, gva, &value, len, &e);
+		if (r != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
+			return kvm_handle_memory_failure(vcpu, r, &e);
+	}
+
+	return nested_vmx_succeed(vcpu);
+}
+
+static bool is_shadow_field_rw(unsigned long field)
+{
+	switch (field) {
+#define SHADOW_FIELD_RW(x, y) case x:
+#include "vmcs_shadow_fields.h"
+		return true;
+	default:
+		break;
+	}
+	return false;
+}
+
+static bool is_shadow_field_ro(unsigned long field)
+{
+	switch (field) {
+#define SHADOW_FIELD_RO(x, y) case x:
+#include "vmcs_shadow_fields.h"
+		return true;
+	default:
+		break;
+	}
+	return false;
+}
+
+static int handle_vmwrite(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct vmcs12 *vmcs12 = is_guest_mode(vcpu) ? get_shadow_vmcs12(vcpu)
+						    : get_vmcs12(vcpu);
+	unsigned long exit_qualification = vmx_get_exit_qual(vcpu);
+	u32 instr_info = vmcs_read32(VMX_INSTRUCTION_INFO);
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+	struct x86_exception e;
+	unsigned long field;
+	short offset;
+	gva_t gva;
+	int len, r;
+
+	/*
+	 * The value to write might be 32 or 64 bits, depending on L1's long
+	 * mode, and eventually we need to write that into a field of several
+	 * possible lengths. The code below first zero-extends the value to 64
+	 * bit (value), and then copies only the appropriate number of
+	 * bits into the vmcs12 field.
+	 */
+	u64 value = 0;
+
+	if (!nested_vmx_check_permission(vcpu))
+		return 1;
+
+	/*
+	 * In VMX non-root operation, when the VMCS-link pointer is INVALID_GPA,
+	 * any VMWRITE sets the ALU flags for VMfailInvalid.
+	 */
+	if (vmx->nested.current_vmptr == INVALID_GPA ||
+	    (is_guest_mode(vcpu) &&
+	     get_vmcs12(vcpu)->vmcs_link_pointer == INVALID_GPA))
+		return nested_vmx_failInvalid(vcpu);
+
+	if (instr_info & BIT(10))
+		value = kvm_register_read(vcpu, (((instr_info) >> 3) & 0xf));
+	else {
+		len = is_64_bit_mode(vcpu) ? 8 : 4;
+		if (get_vmx_mem_address(vcpu, exit_qualification,
+					instr_info, false, len, &gva))
+			return 1;
+		r = kvm_read_guest_virt(vcpu, gva, &value, len, &e);
+		if (r != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
+			return kvm_handle_memory_failure(vcpu, r, &e);
+	}
+
+	field = kvm_register_read(vcpu, (((instr_info) >> 28) & 0xf));
+
+	offset = get_vmcs12_field_offset(field);
+	if (offset < 0)
+		return nested_vmx_fail(vcpu, VMXERR_UNSUPPORTED_VMCS_COMPONENT);
+
+	/*
+	 * If the vCPU supports "VMWRITE to any supported field in the
+	 * VMCS," then the "read-only" fields are actually read/write.
+	 */
+	if (vmcs_field_readonly(field) &&
+	    !nested_cpu_has_vmwrite_any_field(vcpu))
+		return nested_vmx_fail(vcpu, VMXERR_VMWRITE_READ_ONLY_VMCS_COMPONENT);
+
+	/*
+	 * Ensure vmcs12 is up-to-date before any VMWRITE that dirties
+	 * vmcs12, else we may crush a field or consume a stale value.
+	 */
+	if (!is_guest_mode(vcpu) && !is_shadow_field_rw(field))
+		copy_vmcs02_to_vmcs12_rare(vcpu, vmcs12);
+
+	/*
+	 * Some Intel CPUs intentionally drop the reserved bits of the AR byte
+	 * fields on VMWRITE.  Emulate this behavior to ensure consistent KVM
+	 * behavior regardless of the underlying hardware, e.g. if an AR_BYTE
+	 * field is intercepted for VMWRITE but not VMREAD (in L1), then VMREAD
+	 * from L1 will return a different value than VMREAD from L2 (L1 sees
+	 * the stripped down value, L2 sees the full value as stored by KVM).
+	 */
+	if (field >= GUEST_ES_AR_BYTES && field <= GUEST_TR_AR_BYTES)
+		value &= 0x1f0ff;
+
+	vmcs12_write_any(vmcs12, field, offset, value);
+
+	/*
+	 * Do not track vmcs12 dirty-state if in guest-mode as we actually
+	 * dirty shadow vmcs12 instead of vmcs12.  Fields that can be updated
+	 * by L1 without a vmexit are always updated in the vmcs02, i.e. don't
+	 * "dirty" vmcs12, all others go down the prepare_vmcs02() slow path.
+	 */
+	if (!is_guest_mode(vcpu) && !is_shadow_field_rw(field)) {
+		/*
+		 * L1 can read these fields without exiting, ensure the
+		 * shadow VMCS is up-to-date.
+		 */
+		if (enable_shadow_vmcs && is_shadow_field_ro(field)) {
+			preempt_disable();
+			vmcs_load(vmx->vmcs01.shadow_vmcs);
+
+			__vmcs_writel(field, value);
+
+			vmcs_clear(vmx->vmcs01.shadow_vmcs);
+			vmcs_load(vmx->loaded_vmcs->vmcs);
+			preempt_enable();
+		}
+		vmx->nested.dirty_vmcs12 = true;
+	}
+
+	return nested_vmx_succeed(vcpu);
+}
+
+static void set_current_vmptr(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, gpa_t vmptr)
+{
+	vmx->nested.current_vmptr = vmptr;
+	if (enable_shadow_vmcs) {
+		secondary_exec_controls_setbit(vmx, SECONDARY_EXEC_SHADOW_VMCS);
+		vmcs_write64(VMCS_LINK_POINTER,
+			     __pa(vmx->vmcs01.shadow_vmcs));
+		vmx->nested.need_vmcs12_to_shadow_sync = true;
+	}
+	vmx->nested.dirty_vmcs12 = true;
+	vmx->nested.force_msr_bitmap_recalc = true;
+}
+
+/* Emulate the VMPTRLD instruction */
+static int handle_vmptrld(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+	gpa_t vmptr;
+	int r;
+
+	if (!nested_vmx_check_permission(vcpu))
+		return 1;
+
+	if (nested_vmx_get_vmptr(vcpu, &vmptr, &r))
+		return r;
+
+	if (!page_address_valid(vcpu, vmptr))
+		return nested_vmx_fail(vcpu, VMXERR_VMPTRLD_INVALID_ADDRESS);
+
+	if (vmptr == vmx->nested.vmxon_ptr)
+		return nested_vmx_fail(vcpu, VMXERR_VMPTRLD_VMXON_POINTER);
+
+	/* Forbid normal VMPTRLD if Enlightened version was used */
+	if (evmptr_is_valid(vmx->nested.hv_evmcs_vmptr))
+		return 1;
+
+	if (vmx->nested.current_vmptr != vmptr) {
+		struct gfn_to_hva_cache *ghc = &vmx->nested.vmcs12_cache;
+		struct vmcs_hdr hdr;
+
+		if (kvm_gfn_to_hva_cache_init(vcpu->kvm, ghc, vmptr, VMCS12_SIZE)) {
+			/*
+			 * Reads from an unbacked page return all 1s,
+			 * which means that the 32 bits located at the
+			 * given physical address won't match the required
+			 * VMCS12_REVISION identifier.
+			 */
+			return nested_vmx_fail(vcpu,
+				VMXERR_VMPTRLD_INCORRECT_VMCS_REVISION_ID);
+		}
+
+		if (kvm_read_guest_offset_cached(vcpu->kvm, ghc, &hdr,
+						 offsetof(struct vmcs12, hdr),
+						 sizeof(hdr))) {
+			return nested_vmx_fail(vcpu,
+				VMXERR_VMPTRLD_INCORRECT_VMCS_REVISION_ID);
+		}
+
+		if (hdr.revision_id != VMCS12_REVISION ||
+		    (hdr.shadow_vmcs &&
+		     !nested_cpu_has_vmx_shadow_vmcs(vcpu))) {
+			return nested_vmx_fail(vcpu,
+				VMXERR_VMPTRLD_INCORRECT_VMCS_REVISION_ID);
+		}
+
+		nested_release_vmcs12(vcpu);
+
+		/*
+		 * Load VMCS12 from guest memory since it is not already
+		 * cached.
+		 */
+		if (kvm_read_guest_cached(vcpu->kvm, ghc, vmx->nested.cached_vmcs12,
+					  VMCS12_SIZE)) {
+			return nested_vmx_fail(vcpu,
+				VMXERR_VMPTRLD_INCORRECT_VMCS_REVISION_ID);
+		}
+
+		set_current_vmptr(vmx, vmptr);
+	}
+
+	return nested_vmx_succeed(vcpu);
+}
+
+/* Emulate the VMPTRST instruction */
+static int handle_vmptrst(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	unsigned long exit_qual = vmx_get_exit_qual(vcpu);
+	u32 instr_info = vmcs_read32(VMX_INSTRUCTION_INFO);
+	gpa_t current_vmptr = to_vmx(vcpu)->nested.current_vmptr;
+	struct x86_exception e;
+	gva_t gva;
+	int r;
+
+	if (!nested_vmx_check_permission(vcpu))
+		return 1;
+
+	if (unlikely(evmptr_is_valid(to_vmx(vcpu)->nested.hv_evmcs_vmptr)))
+		return 1;
+
+	if (get_vmx_mem_address(vcpu, exit_qual, instr_info,
+				true, sizeof(gpa_t), &gva))
+		return 1;
+	/* *_system ok, nested_vmx_check_permission has verified cpl=0 */
+	r = kvm_write_guest_virt_system(vcpu, gva, (void *)&current_vmptr,
+					sizeof(gpa_t), &e);
+	if (r != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
+		return kvm_handle_memory_failure(vcpu, r, &e);
+
+	return nested_vmx_succeed(vcpu);
+}
+
+/* Emulate the INVEPT instruction */
+static int handle_invept(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+	u32 vmx_instruction_info, types;
+	unsigned long type, roots_to_free;
+	struct kvm_mmu *mmu;
+	gva_t gva;
+	struct x86_exception e;
+	struct {
+		u64 eptp, gpa;
+	} operand;
+	int i, r, gpr_index;
+
+	if (!(vmx->nested.msrs.secondary_ctls_high &
+	      SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_EPT) ||
+	    !(vmx->nested.msrs.ept_caps & VMX_EPT_INVEPT_BIT)) {
+		kvm_queue_exception(vcpu, UD_VECTOR);
+		return 1;
+	}
+
+	if (!nested_vmx_check_permission(vcpu))
+		return 1;
+
+	vmx_instruction_info = vmcs_read32(VMX_INSTRUCTION_INFO);
+	gpr_index = vmx_get_instr_info_reg2(vmx_instruction_info);
+	type = kvm_register_read(vcpu, gpr_index);
+
+	types = (vmx->nested.msrs.ept_caps >> VMX_EPT_EXTENT_SHIFT) & 6;
+
+	if (type >= 32 || !(types & (1 << type)))
+		return nested_vmx_fail(vcpu, VMXERR_INVALID_OPERAND_TO_INVEPT_INVVPID);
+
+	/* According to the Intel VMX instruction reference, the memory
+	 * operand is read even if it isn't needed (e.g., for type==global)
+	 */
+	if (get_vmx_mem_address(vcpu, vmx_get_exit_qual(vcpu),
+			vmx_instruction_info, false, sizeof(operand), &gva))
+		return 1;
+	r = kvm_read_guest_virt(vcpu, gva, &operand, sizeof(operand), &e);
+	if (r != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
+		return kvm_handle_memory_failure(vcpu, r, &e);
+
+	/*
+	 * Nested EPT roots are always held through guest_mmu,
+	 * not root_mmu.
+	 */
+	mmu = &vcpu->arch.guest_mmu;
+
+	switch (type) {
+	case VMX_EPT_EXTENT_CONTEXT:
+		if (!nested_vmx_check_eptp(vcpu, operand.eptp))
+			return nested_vmx_fail(vcpu,
+				VMXERR_INVALID_OPERAND_TO_INVEPT_INVVPID);
+
+		roots_to_free = 0;
+		if (nested_ept_root_matches(mmu->root.hpa, mmu->root.pgd,
+					    operand.eptp))
+			roots_to_free |= KVM_MMU_ROOT_CURRENT;
+
+		for (i = 0; i < KVM_MMU_NUM_PREV_ROOTS; i++) {
+			if (nested_ept_root_matches(mmu->prev_roots[i].hpa,
+						    mmu->prev_roots[i].pgd,
+						    operand.eptp))
+				roots_to_free |= KVM_MMU_ROOT_PREVIOUS(i);
+		}
+		break;
+	case VMX_EPT_EXTENT_GLOBAL:
+		roots_to_free = KVM_MMU_ROOTS_ALL;
+		break;
+	default:
+		BUG();
+		break;
+	}
+
+	if (roots_to_free)
+		kvm_mmu_free_roots(vcpu->kvm, mmu, roots_to_free);
+
+	return nested_vmx_succeed(vcpu);
+}
+
+static int handle_invvpid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+	u32 vmx_instruction_info;
+	unsigned long type, types;
+	gva_t gva;
+	struct x86_exception e;
+	struct {
+		u64 vpid;
+		u64 gla;
+	} operand;
+	u16 vpid02;
+	int r, gpr_index;
+
+	if (!(vmx->nested.msrs.secondary_ctls_high &
+	      SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_VPID) ||
+			!(vmx->nested.msrs.vpid_caps & VMX_VPID_INVVPID_BIT)) {
+		kvm_queue_exception(vcpu, UD_VECTOR);
+		return 1;
+	}
+
+	if (!nested_vmx_check_permission(vcpu))
+		return 1;
+
+	vmx_instruction_info = vmcs_read32(VMX_INSTRUCTION_INFO);
+	gpr_index = vmx_get_instr_info_reg2(vmx_instruction_info);
+	type = kvm_register_read(vcpu, gpr_index);
+
+	types = (vmx->nested.msrs.vpid_caps &
+			VMX_VPID_EXTENT_SUPPORTED_MASK) >> 8;
+
+	if (type >= 32 || !(types & (1 << type)))
+		return nested_vmx_fail(vcpu,
+			VMXERR_INVALID_OPERAND_TO_INVEPT_INVVPID);
+
+	/* according to the intel vmx instruction reference, the memory
+	 * operand is read even if it isn't needed (e.g., for type==global)
+	 */
+	if (get_vmx_mem_address(vcpu, vmx_get_exit_qual(vcpu),
+			vmx_instruction_info, false, sizeof(operand), &gva))
+		return 1;
+	r = kvm_read_guest_virt(vcpu, gva, &operand, sizeof(operand), &e);
+	if (r != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
+		return kvm_handle_memory_failure(vcpu, r, &e);
+
+	if (operand.vpid >> 16)
+		return nested_vmx_fail(vcpu,
+			VMXERR_INVALID_OPERAND_TO_INVEPT_INVVPID);
+
+	vpid02 = nested_get_vpid02(vcpu);
+	switch (type) {
+	case VMX_VPID_EXTENT_INDIVIDUAL_ADDR:
+		if (!operand.vpid ||
+		    is_noncanonical_address(operand.gla, vcpu))
+			return nested_vmx_fail(vcpu,
+				VMXERR_INVALID_OPERAND_TO_INVEPT_INVVPID);
+		vpid_sync_vcpu_addr(vpid02, operand.gla);
+		break;
+	case VMX_VPID_EXTENT_SINGLE_CONTEXT:
+	case VMX_VPID_EXTENT_SINGLE_NON_GLOBAL:
+		if (!operand.vpid)
+			return nested_vmx_fail(vcpu,
+				VMXERR_INVALID_OPERAND_TO_INVEPT_INVVPID);
+		vpid_sync_context(vpid02);
+		break;
+	case VMX_VPID_EXTENT_ALL_CONTEXT:
+		vpid_sync_context(vpid02);
+		break;
+	default:
+		WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
+		return kvm_skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Sync the shadow page tables if EPT is disabled, L1 is invalidating
+	 * linear mappings for L2 (tagged with L2's VPID).  Free all guest
+	 * roots as VPIDs are not tracked in the MMU role.
+	 *
+	 * Note, this operates on root_mmu, not guest_mmu, as L1 and L2 share
+	 * an MMU when EPT is disabled.
+	 *
+	 * TODO: sync only the affected SPTEs for INVDIVIDUAL_ADDR.
+	 */
+	if (!enable_ept)
+		kvm_mmu_free_guest_mode_roots(vcpu->kvm, &vcpu->arch.root_mmu);
+
+	return nested_vmx_succeed(vcpu);
+}
+
+static int nested_vmx_eptp_switching(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+				     struct vmcs12 *vmcs12)
+{
+	u32 index = kvm_rcx_read(vcpu);
+	u64 new_eptp;
+
+	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!nested_cpu_has_ept(vmcs12)))
+		return 1;
+	if (index >= VMFUNC_EPTP_ENTRIES)
+		return 1;
+
+	if (kvm_vcpu_read_guest_page(vcpu, vmcs12->eptp_list_address >> PAGE_SHIFT,
+				     &new_eptp, index * 8, 8))
+		return 1;
+
+	/*
+	 * If the (L2) guest does a vmfunc to the currently
+	 * active ept pointer, we don't have to do anything else
+	 */
+	if (vmcs12->ept_pointer != new_eptp) {
+		if (!nested_vmx_check_eptp(vcpu, new_eptp))
+			return 1;
+
+		vmcs12->ept_pointer = new_eptp;
+		nested_ept_new_eptp(vcpu);
+
+		if (!nested_cpu_has_vpid(vmcs12))
+			kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_TLB_FLUSH_GUEST, vcpu);
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int handle_vmfunc(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+	struct vmcs12 *vmcs12;
+	u32 function = kvm_rax_read(vcpu);
+
+	/*
+	 * VMFUNC should never execute cleanly while L1 is active; KVM supports
+	 * VMFUNC for nested VMs, but not for L1.
+	 */
+	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!is_guest_mode(vcpu))) {
+		kvm_queue_exception(vcpu, UD_VECTOR);
+		return 1;
+	}
+
+	vmcs12 = get_vmcs12(vcpu);
+
+	/*
+	 * #UD on out-of-bounds function has priority over VM-Exit, and VMFUNC
+	 * is enabled in vmcs02 if and only if it's enabled in vmcs12.
+	 */
+	if (WARN_ON_ONCE((function > 63) || !nested_cpu_has_vmfunc(vmcs12))) {
+		kvm_queue_exception(vcpu, UD_VECTOR);
+		return 1;
+	}
+
+	if (!(vmcs12->vm_function_control & BIT_ULL(function)))
+		goto fail;
+
+	switch (function) {
+	case 0:
+		if (nested_vmx_eptp_switching(vcpu, vmcs12))
+			goto fail;
+		break;
+	default:
+		goto fail;
+	}
+	return kvm_skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
+
+fail:
+	/*
+	 * This is effectively a reflected VM-Exit, as opposed to a synthesized
+	 * nested VM-Exit.  Pass the original exit reason, i.e. don't hardcode
+	 * EXIT_REASON_VMFUNC as the exit reason.
+	 */
+	nested_vmx_vmexit(vcpu, vmx->exit_reason.full,
+			  vmx_get_intr_info(vcpu),
+			  vmx_get_exit_qual(vcpu));
+	return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Return true if an IO instruction with the specified port and size should cause
+ * a VM-exit into L1.
+ */
+bool nested_vmx_check_io_bitmaps(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned int port,
+				 int size)
+{
+	struct vmcs12 *vmcs12 = get_vmcs12(vcpu);
+	gpa_t bitmap, last_bitmap;
+	u8 b;
+
+	last_bitmap = INVALID_GPA;
+	b = -1;
+
+	while (size > 0) {
+		if (port < 0x8000)
+			bitmap = vmcs12->io_bitmap_a;
+		else if (port < 0x10000)
+			bitmap = vmcs12->io_bitmap_b;
+		else
+			return true;
+		bitmap += (port & 0x7fff) / 8;
+
+		if (last_bitmap != bitmap)
+			if (kvm_vcpu_read_guest(vcpu, bitmap, &b, 1))
+				return true;
+		if (b & (1 << (port & 7)))
+			return true;
+
+		port++;
+		size--;
+		last_bitmap = bitmap;
+	}
+
+	return false;
+}
+
+static bool nested_vmx_exit_handled_io(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+				       struct vmcs12 *vmcs12)
+{
+	unsigned long exit_qualification;
+	unsigned short port;
+	int size;
+
+	if (!nested_cpu_has(vmcs12, CPU_BASED_USE_IO_BITMAPS))
+		return nested_cpu_has(vmcs12, CPU_BASED_UNCOND_IO_EXITING);
+
+	exit_qualification = vmx_get_exit_qual(vcpu);
+
+	port = exit_qualification >> 16;
+	size = (exit_qualification & 7) + 1;
+
+	return nested_vmx_check_io_bitmaps(vcpu, port, size);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Return 1 if we should exit from L2 to L1 to handle an MSR access,
+ * rather than handle it ourselves in L0. I.e., check whether L1 expressed
+ * disinterest in the current event (read or write a specific MSR) by using an
+ * MSR bitmap. This may be the case even when L0 doesn't use MSR bitmaps.
+ */
+static bool nested_vmx_exit_handled_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+					struct vmcs12 *vmcs12,
+					union vmx_exit_reason exit_reason)
+{
+	u32 msr_index = kvm_rcx_read(vcpu);
+	gpa_t bitmap;
+
+	if (!nested_cpu_has(vmcs12, CPU_BASED_USE_MSR_BITMAPS))
+		return true;
+
+	/*
+	 * The MSR_BITMAP page is divided into four 1024-byte bitmaps,
+	 * for the four combinations of read/write and low/high MSR numbers.
+	 * First we need to figure out which of the four to use:
+	 */
+	bitmap = vmcs12->msr_bitmap;
+	if (exit_reason.basic == EXIT_REASON_MSR_WRITE)
+		bitmap += 2048;
+	if (msr_index >= 0xc0000000) {
+		msr_index -= 0xc0000000;
+		bitmap += 1024;
+	}
+
+	/* Then read the msr_index'th bit from this bitmap: */
+	if (msr_index < 1024*8) {
+		unsigned char b;
+		if (kvm_vcpu_read_guest(vcpu, bitmap + msr_index/8, &b, 1))
+			return true;
+		return 1 & (b >> (msr_index & 7));
+	} else
+		return true; /* let L1 handle the wrong parameter */
+}
+
+/*
+ * Return 1 if we should exit from L2 to L1 to handle a CR access exit,
+ * rather than handle it ourselves in L0. I.e., check if L1 wanted to
+ * intercept (via guest_host_mask etc.) the current event.
+ */
+static bool nested_vmx_exit_handled_cr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+	struct vmcs12 *vmcs12)
+{
+	unsigned long exit_qualification = vmx_get_exit_qual(vcpu);
+	int cr = exit_qualification & 15;
+	int reg;
+	unsigned long val;
+
+	switch ((exit_qualification >> 4) & 3) {
+	case 0: /* mov to cr */
+		reg = (exit_qualification >> 8) & 15;
+		val = kvm_register_read(vcpu, reg);
+		switch (cr) {
+		case 0:
+			if (vmcs12->cr0_guest_host_mask &
+			    (val ^ vmcs12->cr0_read_shadow))
+				return true;
+			break;
+		case 3:
+			if (nested_cpu_has(vmcs12, CPU_BASED_CR3_LOAD_EXITING))
+				return true;
+			break;
+		case 4:
+			if (vmcs12->cr4_guest_host_mask &
+			    (vmcs12->cr4_read_shadow ^ val))
+				return true;
+			break;
+		case 8:
+			if (nested_cpu_has(vmcs12, CPU_BASED_CR8_LOAD_EXITING))
+				return true;
+			break;
+		}
+		break;
+	case 2: /* clts */
+		if ((vmcs12->cr0_guest_host_mask & X86_CR0_TS) &&
+		    (vmcs12->cr0_read_shadow & X86_CR0_TS))
+			return true;
+		break;
+	case 1: /* mov from cr */
+		switch (cr) {
+		case 3:
+			if (vmcs12->cpu_based_vm_exec_control &
+			    CPU_BASED_CR3_STORE_EXITING)
+				return true;
+			break;
+		case 8:
+			if (vmcs12->cpu_based_vm_exec_control &
+			    CPU_BASED_CR8_STORE_EXITING)
+				return true;
+			break;
+		}
+		break;
+	case 3: /* lmsw */
+		/*
+		 * lmsw can change bits 1..3 of cr0, and only set bit 0 of
+		 * cr0. Other attempted changes are ignored, with no exit.
+		 */
+		val = (exit_qualification >> LMSW_SOURCE_DATA_SHIFT) & 0x0f;
+		if (vmcs12->cr0_guest_host_mask & 0xe &
+		    (val ^ vmcs12->cr0_read_shadow))
+			return true;
+		if ((vmcs12->cr0_guest_host_mask & 0x1) &&
+		    !(vmcs12->cr0_read_shadow & 0x1) &&
+		    (val & 0x1))
+			return true;
+		break;
+	}
+	return false;
+}
+
+static bool nested_vmx_exit_handled_encls(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+					  struct vmcs12 *vmcs12)
+{
+	u32 encls_leaf;
+
+	if (!guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_SGX) ||
+	    !nested_cpu_has2(vmcs12, SECONDARY_EXEC_ENCLS_EXITING))
+		return false;
+
+	encls_leaf = kvm_rax_read(vcpu);
+	if (encls_leaf > 62)
+		encls_leaf = 63;
+	return vmcs12->encls_exiting_bitmap & BIT_ULL(encls_leaf);
+}
+
+static bool nested_vmx_exit_handled_vmcs_access(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+	struct vmcs12 *vmcs12, gpa_t bitmap)
+{
+	u32 vmx_instruction_info;
+	unsigned long field;
+	u8 b;
+
+	if (!nested_cpu_has_shadow_vmcs(vmcs12))
+		return true;
+
+	/* Decode instruction info and find the field to access */
+	vmx_instruction_info = vmcs_read32(VMX_INSTRUCTION_INFO);
+	field = kvm_register_read(vcpu, (((vmx_instruction_info) >> 28) & 0xf));
+
+	/* Out-of-range fields always cause a VM exit from L2 to L1 */
+	if (field >> 15)
+		return true;
+
+	if (kvm_vcpu_read_guest(vcpu, bitmap + field/8, &b, 1))
+		return true;
+
+	return 1 & (b >> (field & 7));
+}
+
+static bool nested_vmx_exit_handled_mtf(struct vmcs12 *vmcs12)
+{
+	u32 entry_intr_info = vmcs12->vm_entry_intr_info_field;
+
+	if (nested_cpu_has_mtf(vmcs12))
+		return true;
+
+	/*
+	 * An MTF VM-exit may be injected into the guest by setting the
+	 * interruption-type to 7 (other event) and the vector field to 0. Such
+	 * is the case regardless of the 'monitor trap flag' VM-execution
+	 * control.
+	 */
+	return entry_intr_info == (INTR_INFO_VALID_MASK
+				   | INTR_TYPE_OTHER_EVENT);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Return true if L0 wants to handle an exit from L2 regardless of whether or not
+ * L1 wants the exit.  Only call this when in is_guest_mode (L2).
+ */
+static bool nested_vmx_l0_wants_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+				     union vmx_exit_reason exit_reason)
+{
+	u32 intr_info;
+
+	switch ((u16)exit_reason.basic) {
+	case EXIT_REASON_EXCEPTION_NMI:
+		intr_info = vmx_get_intr_info(vcpu);
+		if (is_nmi(intr_info))
+			return true;
+		else if (is_page_fault(intr_info))
+			return vcpu->arch.apf.host_apf_flags ||
+			       vmx_need_pf_intercept(vcpu);
+		else if (is_debug(intr_info) &&
+			 vcpu->guest_debug &
+			 (KVM_GUESTDBG_SINGLESTEP | KVM_GUESTDBG_USE_HW_BP))
+			return true;
+		else if (is_breakpoint(intr_info) &&
+			 vcpu->guest_debug & KVM_GUESTDBG_USE_SW_BP)
+			return true;
+		else if (is_alignment_check(intr_info) &&
+			 !vmx_guest_inject_ac(vcpu))
+			return true;
+		return false;
+	case EXIT_REASON_EXTERNAL_INTERRUPT:
+		return true;
+	case EXIT_REASON_MCE_DURING_VMENTRY:
+		return true;
+	case EXIT_REASON_EPT_VIOLATION:
+		/*
+		 * L0 always deals with the EPT violation. If nested EPT is
+		 * used, and the nested mmu code discovers that the address is
+		 * missing in the guest EPT table (EPT12), the EPT violation
+		 * will be injected with nested_ept_inject_page_fault()
+		 */
+		return true;
+	case EXIT_REASON_EPT_MISCONFIG:
+		/*
+		 * L2 never uses directly L1's EPT, but rather L0's own EPT
+		 * table (shadow on EPT) or a merged EPT table that L0 built
+		 * (EPT on EPT). So any problems with the structure of the
+		 * table is L0's fault.
+		 */
+		return true;
+	case EXIT_REASON_PREEMPTION_TIMER:
+		return true;
+	case EXIT_REASON_PML_FULL:
+		/*
+		 * PML is emulated for an L1 VMM and should never be enabled in
+		 * vmcs02, always "handle" PML_FULL by exiting to userspace.
+		 */
+		return true;
+	case EXIT_REASON_VMFUNC:
+		/* VM functions are emulated through L2->L0 vmexits. */
+		return true;
+	case EXIT_REASON_BUS_LOCK:
+		/*
+		 * At present, bus lock VM exit is never exposed to L1.
+		 * Handle L2's bus locks in L0 directly.
+		 */
+		return true;
+	case EXIT_REASON_VMCALL:
+		/* Hyper-V L2 TLB flush hypercall is handled by L0 */
+		return guest_hv_cpuid_has_l2_tlb_flush(vcpu) &&
+			nested_evmcs_l2_tlb_flush_enabled(vcpu) &&
+			kvm_hv_is_tlb_flush_hcall(vcpu);
+	default:
+		break;
+	}
+	return false;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Return 1 if L1 wants to intercept an exit from L2.  Only call this when in
+ * is_guest_mode (L2).
+ */
+static bool nested_vmx_l1_wants_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+				     union vmx_exit_reason exit_reason)
+{
+	struct vmcs12 *vmcs12 = get_vmcs12(vcpu);
+	u32 intr_info;
+
+	switch ((u16)exit_reason.basic) {
+	case EXIT_REASON_EXCEPTION_NMI:
+		intr_info = vmx_get_intr_info(vcpu);
+		if (is_nmi(intr_info))
+			return true;
+		else if (is_page_fault(intr_info))
+			return true;
+		return vmcs12->exception_bitmap &
+				(1u << (intr_info & INTR_INFO_VECTOR_MASK));
+	case EXIT_REASON_EXTERNAL_INTERRUPT:
+		return nested_exit_on_intr(vcpu);
+	case EXIT_REASON_TRIPLE_FAULT:
+		return true;
+	case EXIT_REASON_INTERRUPT_WINDOW:
+		return nested_cpu_has(vmcs12, CPU_BASED_INTR_WINDOW_EXITING);
+	case EXIT_REASON_NMI_WINDOW:
+		return nested_cpu_has(vmcs12, CPU_BASED_NMI_WINDOW_EXITING);
+	case EXIT_REASON_TASK_SWITCH:
+		return true;
+	case EXIT_REASON_CPUID:
+		return true;
+	case EXIT_REASON_HLT:
+		return nested_cpu_has(vmcs12, CPU_BASED_HLT_EXITING);
+	case EXIT_REASON_INVD:
+		return true;
+	case EXIT_REASON_INVLPG:
+		return nested_cpu_has(vmcs12, CPU_BASED_INVLPG_EXITING);
+	case EXIT_REASON_RDPMC:
+		return nested_cpu_has(vmcs12, CPU_BASED_RDPMC_EXITING);
+	case EXIT_REASON_RDRAND:
+		return nested_cpu_has2(vmcs12, SECONDARY_EXEC_RDRAND_EXITING);
+	case EXIT_REASON_RDSEED:
+		return nested_cpu_has2(vmcs12, SECONDARY_EXEC_RDSEED_EXITING);
+	case EXIT_REASON_RDTSC: case EXIT_REASON_RDTSCP:
+		return nested_cpu_has(vmcs12, CPU_BASED_RDTSC_EXITING);
+	case EXIT_REASON_VMREAD:
+		return nested_vmx_exit_handled_vmcs_access(vcpu, vmcs12,
+			vmcs12->vmread_bitmap);
+	case EXIT_REASON_VMWRITE:
+		return nested_vmx_exit_handled_vmcs_access(vcpu, vmcs12,
+			vmcs12->vmwrite_bitmap);
+	case EXIT_REASON_VMCALL: case EXIT_REASON_VMCLEAR:
+	case EXIT_REASON_VMLAUNCH: case EXIT_REASON_VMPTRLD:
+	case EXIT_REASON_VMPTRST: case EXIT_REASON_VMRESUME:
+	case EXIT_REASON_VMOFF: case EXIT_REASON_VMON:
+	case EXIT_REASON_INVEPT: case EXIT_REASON_INVVPID:
+		/*
+		 * VMX instructions trap unconditionally. This allows L1 to
+		 * emulate them for its L2 guest, i.e., allows 3-level nesting!
+		 */
+		return true;
+	case EXIT_REASON_CR_ACCESS:
+		return nested_vmx_exit_handled_cr(vcpu, vmcs12);
+	case EXIT_REASON_DR_ACCESS:
+		return nested_cpu_has(vmcs12, CPU_BASED_MOV_DR_EXITING);
+	case EXIT_REASON_IO_INSTRUCTION:
+		return nested_vmx_exit_handled_io(vcpu, vmcs12);
+	case EXIT_REASON_GDTR_IDTR: case EXIT_REASON_LDTR_TR:
+		return nested_cpu_has2(vmcs12, SECONDARY_EXEC_DESC);
+	case EXIT_REASON_MSR_READ:
+	case EXIT_REASON_MSR_WRITE:
+		return nested_vmx_exit_handled_msr(vcpu, vmcs12, exit_reason);
+	case EXIT_REASON_INVALID_STATE:
+		return true;
+	case EXIT_REASON_MWAIT_INSTRUCTION:
+		return nested_cpu_has(vmcs12, CPU_BASED_MWAIT_EXITING);
+	case EXIT_REASON_MONITOR_TRAP_FLAG:
+		return nested_vmx_exit_handled_mtf(vmcs12);
+	case EXIT_REASON_MONITOR_INSTRUCTION:
+		return nested_cpu_has(vmcs12, CPU_BASED_MONITOR_EXITING);
+	case EXIT_REASON_PAUSE_INSTRUCTION:
+		return nested_cpu_has(vmcs12, CPU_BASED_PAUSE_EXITING) ||
+			nested_cpu_has2(vmcs12,
+				SECONDARY_EXEC_PAUSE_LOOP_EXITING);
+	case EXIT_REASON_MCE_DURING_VMENTRY:
+		return true;
+	case EXIT_REASON_TPR_BELOW_THRESHOLD:
+		return nested_cpu_has(vmcs12, CPU_BASED_TPR_SHADOW);
+	case EXIT_REASON_APIC_ACCESS:
+	case EXIT_REASON_APIC_WRITE:
+	case EXIT_REASON_EOI_INDUCED:
+		/*
+		 * The controls for "virtualize APIC accesses," "APIC-
+		 * register virtualization," and "virtual-interrupt
+		 * delivery" only come from vmcs12.
+		 */
+		return true;
+	case EXIT_REASON_INVPCID:
+		return
+			nested_cpu_has2(vmcs12, SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_INVPCID) &&
+			nested_cpu_has(vmcs12, CPU_BASED_INVLPG_EXITING);
+	case EXIT_REASON_WBINVD:
+		return nested_cpu_has2(vmcs12, SECONDARY_EXEC_WBINVD_EXITING);
+	case EXIT_REASON_XSETBV:
+		return true;
+	case EXIT_REASON_XSAVES: case EXIT_REASON_XRSTORS:
+		/*
+		 * This should never happen, since it is not possible to
+		 * set XSS to a non-zero value---neither in L1 nor in L2.
+		 * If if it were, XSS would have to be checked against
+		 * the XSS exit bitmap in vmcs12.
+		 */
+		return nested_cpu_has2(vmcs12, SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_XSAVES);
+	case EXIT_REASON_UMWAIT:
+	case EXIT_REASON_TPAUSE:
+		return nested_cpu_has2(vmcs12,
+			SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_USR_WAIT_PAUSE);
+	case EXIT_REASON_ENCLS:
+		return nested_vmx_exit_handled_encls(vcpu, vmcs12);
+	case EXIT_REASON_NOTIFY:
+		/* Notify VM exit is not exposed to L1 */
+		return false;
+	default:
+		return true;
+	}
+}
+
+/*
+ * Conditionally reflect a VM-Exit into L1.  Returns %true if the VM-Exit was
+ * reflected into L1.
+ */
+bool nested_vmx_reflect_vmexit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+	union vmx_exit_reason exit_reason = vmx->exit_reason;
+	unsigned long exit_qual;
+	u32 exit_intr_info;
+
+	WARN_ON_ONCE(vmx->nested.nested_run_pending);
+
+	/*
+	 * Late nested VM-Fail shares the same flow as nested VM-Exit since KVM
+	 * has already loaded L2's state.
+	 */
+	if (unlikely(vmx->fail)) {
+		trace_kvm_nested_vmenter_failed(
+			"hardware VM-instruction error: ",
+			vmcs_read32(VM_INSTRUCTION_ERROR));
+		exit_intr_info = 0;
+		exit_qual = 0;
+		goto reflect_vmexit;
+	}
+
+	trace_kvm_nested_vmexit(vcpu, KVM_ISA_VMX);
+
+	/* If L0 (KVM) wants the exit, it trumps L1's desires. */
+	if (nested_vmx_l0_wants_exit(vcpu, exit_reason))
+		return false;
+
+	/* If L1 doesn't want the exit, handle it in L0. */
+	if (!nested_vmx_l1_wants_exit(vcpu, exit_reason))
+		return false;
+
+	/*
+	 * vmcs.VM_EXIT_INTR_INFO is only valid for EXCEPTION_NMI exits.  For
+	 * EXTERNAL_INTERRUPT, the value for vmcs12->vm_exit_intr_info would
+	 * need to be synthesized by querying the in-kernel LAPIC, but external
+	 * interrupts are never reflected to L1 so it's a non-issue.
+	 */
+	exit_intr_info = vmx_get_intr_info(vcpu);
+	if (is_exception_with_error_code(exit_intr_info)) {
+		struct vmcs12 *vmcs12 = get_vmcs12(vcpu);
+
+		vmcs12->vm_exit_intr_error_code =
+			vmcs_read32(VM_EXIT_INTR_ERROR_CODE);
+	}
+	exit_qual = vmx_get_exit_qual(vcpu);
+
+reflect_vmexit:
+	nested_vmx_vmexit(vcpu, exit_reason.full, exit_intr_info, exit_qual);
+	return true;
+}
+
+static int vmx_get_nested_state(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+				struct kvm_nested_state __user *user_kvm_nested_state,
+				u32 user_data_size)
+{
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx;
+	struct vmcs12 *vmcs12;
+	struct kvm_nested_state kvm_state = {
+		.flags = 0,
+		.format = KVM_STATE_NESTED_FORMAT_VMX,
+		.size = sizeof(kvm_state),
+		.hdr.vmx.flags = 0,
+		.hdr.vmx.vmxon_pa = INVALID_GPA,
+		.hdr.vmx.vmcs12_pa = INVALID_GPA,
+		.hdr.vmx.preemption_timer_deadline = 0,
+	};
+	struct kvm_vmx_nested_state_data __user *user_vmx_nested_state =
+		&user_kvm_nested_state->data.vmx[0];
+
+	if (!vcpu)
+		return kvm_state.size + sizeof(*user_vmx_nested_state);
+
+	vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+	vmcs12 = get_vmcs12(vcpu);
+
+	if (guest_can_use(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_VMX) &&
+	    (vmx->nested.vmxon || vmx->nested.smm.vmxon)) {
+		kvm_state.hdr.vmx.vmxon_pa = vmx->nested.vmxon_ptr;
+		kvm_state.hdr.vmx.vmcs12_pa = vmx->nested.current_vmptr;
+
+		if (vmx_has_valid_vmcs12(vcpu)) {
+			kvm_state.size += sizeof(user_vmx_nested_state->vmcs12);
+
+			/* 'hv_evmcs_vmptr' can also be EVMPTR_MAP_PENDING here */
+			if (vmx->nested.hv_evmcs_vmptr != EVMPTR_INVALID)
+				kvm_state.flags |= KVM_STATE_NESTED_EVMCS;
+
+			if (is_guest_mode(vcpu) &&
+			    nested_cpu_has_shadow_vmcs(vmcs12) &&
+			    vmcs12->vmcs_link_pointer != INVALID_GPA)
+				kvm_state.size += sizeof(user_vmx_nested_state->shadow_vmcs12);
+		}
+
+		if (vmx->nested.smm.vmxon)
+			kvm_state.hdr.vmx.smm.flags |= KVM_STATE_NESTED_SMM_VMXON;
+
+		if (vmx->nested.smm.guest_mode)
+			kvm_state.hdr.vmx.smm.flags |= KVM_STATE_NESTED_SMM_GUEST_MODE;
+
+		if (is_guest_mode(vcpu)) {
+			kvm_state.flags |= KVM_STATE_NESTED_GUEST_MODE;
+
+			if (vmx->nested.nested_run_pending)
+				kvm_state.flags |= KVM_STATE_NESTED_RUN_PENDING;
+
+			if (vmx->nested.mtf_pending)
+				kvm_state.flags |= KVM_STATE_NESTED_MTF_PENDING;
+
+			if (nested_cpu_has_preemption_timer(vmcs12) &&
+			    vmx->nested.has_preemption_timer_deadline) {
+				kvm_state.hdr.vmx.flags |=
+					KVM_STATE_VMX_PREEMPTION_TIMER_DEADLINE;
+				kvm_state.hdr.vmx.preemption_timer_deadline =
+					vmx->nested.preemption_timer_deadline;
+			}
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (user_data_size < kvm_state.size)
+		goto out;
+
+	if (copy_to_user(user_kvm_nested_state, &kvm_state, sizeof(kvm_state)))
+		return -EFAULT;
+
+	if (!vmx_has_valid_vmcs12(vcpu))
+		goto out;
+
+	/*
+	 * When running L2, the authoritative vmcs12 state is in the
+	 * vmcs02. When running L1, the authoritative vmcs12 state is
+	 * in the shadow or enlightened vmcs linked to vmcs01, unless
+	 * need_vmcs12_to_shadow_sync is set, in which case, the authoritative
+	 * vmcs12 state is in the vmcs12 already.
+	 */
+	if (is_guest_mode(vcpu)) {
+		sync_vmcs02_to_vmcs12(vcpu, vmcs12);
+		sync_vmcs02_to_vmcs12_rare(vcpu, vmcs12);
+	} else  {
+		copy_vmcs02_to_vmcs12_rare(vcpu, get_vmcs12(vcpu));
+		if (!vmx->nested.need_vmcs12_to_shadow_sync) {
+			if (evmptr_is_valid(vmx->nested.hv_evmcs_vmptr))
+				/*
+				 * L1 hypervisor is not obliged to keep eVMCS
+				 * clean fields data always up-to-date while
+				 * not in guest mode, 'hv_clean_fields' is only
+				 * supposed to be actual upon vmentry so we need
+				 * to ignore it here and do full copy.
+				 */
+				copy_enlightened_to_vmcs12(vmx, 0);
+			else if (enable_shadow_vmcs)
+				copy_shadow_to_vmcs12(vmx);
+		}
+	}
+
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(user_vmx_nested_state->vmcs12) < VMCS12_SIZE);
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(user_vmx_nested_state->shadow_vmcs12) < VMCS12_SIZE);
+
+	/*
+	 * Copy over the full allocated size of vmcs12 rather than just the size
+	 * of the struct.
+	 */
+	if (copy_to_user(user_vmx_nested_state->vmcs12, vmcs12, VMCS12_SIZE))
+		return -EFAULT;
+
+	if (nested_cpu_has_shadow_vmcs(vmcs12) &&
+	    vmcs12->vmcs_link_pointer != INVALID_GPA) {
+		if (copy_to_user(user_vmx_nested_state->shadow_vmcs12,
+				 get_shadow_vmcs12(vcpu), VMCS12_SIZE))
+			return -EFAULT;
+	}
+out:
+	return kvm_state.size;
+}
+
+void vmx_leave_nested(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	if (is_guest_mode(vcpu)) {
+		to_vmx(vcpu)->nested.nested_run_pending = 0;
+		nested_vmx_vmexit(vcpu, -1, 0, 0);
+	}
+	free_nested(vcpu);
+}
+
+static int vmx_set_nested_state(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+				struct kvm_nested_state __user *user_kvm_nested_state,
+				struct kvm_nested_state *kvm_state)
+{
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+	struct vmcs12 *vmcs12;
+	enum vm_entry_failure_code ignored;
+	struct kvm_vmx_nested_state_data __user *user_vmx_nested_state =
+		&user_kvm_nested_state->data.vmx[0];
+	int ret;
+
+	if (kvm_state->format != KVM_STATE_NESTED_FORMAT_VMX)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (kvm_state->hdr.vmx.vmxon_pa == INVALID_GPA) {
+		if (kvm_state->hdr.vmx.smm.flags)
+			return -EINVAL;
+
+		if (kvm_state->hdr.vmx.vmcs12_pa != INVALID_GPA)
+			return -EINVAL;
+
+		/*
+		 * KVM_STATE_NESTED_EVMCS used to signal that KVM should
+		 * enable eVMCS capability on vCPU. However, since then
+		 * code was changed such that flag signals vmcs12 should
+		 * be copied into eVMCS in guest memory.
+		 *
+		 * To preserve backwards compatability, allow user
+		 * to set this flag even when there is no VMXON region.
+		 */
+		if (kvm_state->flags & ~KVM_STATE_NESTED_EVMCS)
+			return -EINVAL;
+	} else {
+		if (!guest_can_use(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_VMX))
+			return -EINVAL;
+
+		if (!page_address_valid(vcpu, kvm_state->hdr.vmx.vmxon_pa))
+			return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	if ((kvm_state->hdr.vmx.smm.flags & KVM_STATE_NESTED_SMM_GUEST_MODE) &&
+	    (kvm_state->flags & KVM_STATE_NESTED_GUEST_MODE))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (kvm_state->hdr.vmx.smm.flags &
+	    ~(KVM_STATE_NESTED_SMM_GUEST_MODE | KVM_STATE_NESTED_SMM_VMXON))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (kvm_state->hdr.vmx.flags & ~KVM_STATE_VMX_PREEMPTION_TIMER_DEADLINE)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	/*
+	 * SMM temporarily disables VMX, so we cannot be in guest mode,
+	 * nor can VMLAUNCH/VMRESUME be pending.  Outside SMM, SMM flags
+	 * must be zero.
+	 */
+	if (is_smm(vcpu) ?
+		(kvm_state->flags &
+		 (KVM_STATE_NESTED_GUEST_MODE | KVM_STATE_NESTED_RUN_PENDING))
+		: kvm_state->hdr.vmx.smm.flags)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if ((kvm_state->hdr.vmx.smm.flags & KVM_STATE_NESTED_SMM_GUEST_MODE) &&
+	    !(kvm_state->hdr.vmx.smm.flags & KVM_STATE_NESTED_SMM_VMXON))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if ((kvm_state->flags & KVM_STATE_NESTED_EVMCS) &&
+	    (!guest_can_use(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_VMX) ||
+	     !vmx->nested.enlightened_vmcs_enabled))
+			return -EINVAL;
+
+	vmx_leave_nested(vcpu);
+
+	if (kvm_state->hdr.vmx.vmxon_pa == INVALID_GPA)
+		return 0;
+
+	vmx->nested.vmxon_ptr = kvm_state->hdr.vmx.vmxon_pa;
+	ret = enter_vmx_operation(vcpu);
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+
+	/* Empty 'VMXON' state is permitted if no VMCS loaded */
+	if (kvm_state->size < sizeof(*kvm_state) + sizeof(*vmcs12)) {
+		/* See vmx_has_valid_vmcs12.  */
+		if ((kvm_state->flags & KVM_STATE_NESTED_GUEST_MODE) ||
+		    (kvm_state->flags & KVM_STATE_NESTED_EVMCS) ||
+		    (kvm_state->hdr.vmx.vmcs12_pa != INVALID_GPA))
+			return -EINVAL;
+		else
+			return 0;
+	}
+
+	if (kvm_state->hdr.vmx.vmcs12_pa != INVALID_GPA) {
+		if (kvm_state->hdr.vmx.vmcs12_pa == kvm_state->hdr.vmx.vmxon_pa ||
+		    !page_address_valid(vcpu, kvm_state->hdr.vmx.vmcs12_pa))
+			return -EINVAL;
+
+		set_current_vmptr(vmx, kvm_state->hdr.vmx.vmcs12_pa);
+	} else if (kvm_state->flags & KVM_STATE_NESTED_EVMCS) {
+		/*
+		 * nested_vmx_handle_enlightened_vmptrld() cannot be called
+		 * directly from here as HV_X64_MSR_VP_ASSIST_PAGE may not be
+		 * restored yet. EVMCS will be mapped from
+		 * nested_get_vmcs12_pages().
+		 */
+		vmx->nested.hv_evmcs_vmptr = EVMPTR_MAP_PENDING;
+		kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_GET_NESTED_STATE_PAGES, vcpu);
+	} else {
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	if (kvm_state->hdr.vmx.smm.flags & KVM_STATE_NESTED_SMM_VMXON) {
+		vmx->nested.smm.vmxon = true;
+		vmx->nested.vmxon = false;
+
+		if (kvm_state->hdr.vmx.smm.flags & KVM_STATE_NESTED_SMM_GUEST_MODE)
+			vmx->nested.smm.guest_mode = true;
+	}
+
+	vmcs12 = get_vmcs12(vcpu);
+	if (copy_from_user(vmcs12, user_vmx_nested_state->vmcs12, sizeof(*vmcs12)))
+		return -EFAULT;
+
+	if (vmcs12->hdr.revision_id != VMCS12_REVISION)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (!(kvm_state->flags & KVM_STATE_NESTED_GUEST_MODE))
+		return 0;
+
+	vmx->nested.nested_run_pending =
+		!!(kvm_state->flags & KVM_STATE_NESTED_RUN_PENDING);
+
+	vmx->nested.mtf_pending =
+		!!(kvm_state->flags & KVM_STATE_NESTED_MTF_PENDING);
+
+	ret = -EINVAL;
+	if (nested_cpu_has_shadow_vmcs(vmcs12) &&
+	    vmcs12->vmcs_link_pointer != INVALID_GPA) {
+		struct vmcs12 *shadow_vmcs12 = get_shadow_vmcs12(vcpu);
+
+		if (kvm_state->size <
+		    sizeof(*kvm_state) +
+		    sizeof(user_vmx_nested_state->vmcs12) + sizeof(*shadow_vmcs12))
+			goto error_guest_mode;
+
+		if (copy_from_user(shadow_vmcs12,
+				   user_vmx_nested_state->shadow_vmcs12,
+				   sizeof(*shadow_vmcs12))) {
+			ret = -EFAULT;
+			goto error_guest_mode;
+		}
+
+		if (shadow_vmcs12->hdr.revision_id != VMCS12_REVISION ||
+		    !shadow_vmcs12->hdr.shadow_vmcs)
+			goto error_guest_mode;
+	}
+
+	vmx->nested.has_preemption_timer_deadline = false;
+	if (kvm_state->hdr.vmx.flags & KVM_STATE_VMX_PREEMPTION_TIMER_DEADLINE) {
+		vmx->nested.has_preemption_timer_deadline = true;
+		vmx->nested.preemption_timer_deadline =
+			kvm_state->hdr.vmx.preemption_timer_deadline;
+	}
+
+	if (nested_vmx_check_controls(vcpu, vmcs12) ||
+	    nested_vmx_check_host_state(vcpu, vmcs12) ||
+	    nested_vmx_check_guest_state(vcpu, vmcs12, &ignored))
+		goto error_guest_mode;
+
+	vmx->nested.dirty_vmcs12 = true;
+	vmx->nested.force_msr_bitmap_recalc = true;
+	ret = nested_vmx_enter_non_root_mode(vcpu, false);
+	if (ret)
+		goto error_guest_mode;
+
+	if (vmx->nested.mtf_pending)
+		kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_EVENT, vcpu);
+
+	return 0;
+
+error_guest_mode:
+	vmx->nested.nested_run_pending = 0;
+	return ret;
+}
+
+void nested_vmx_set_vmcs_shadowing_bitmap(void)
+{
+	if (enable_shadow_vmcs) {
+		vmcs_write64(VMREAD_BITMAP, __pa(vmx_vmread_bitmap));
+		vmcs_write64(VMWRITE_BITMAP, __pa(vmx_vmwrite_bitmap));
+	}
+}
+
+/*
+ * Indexing into the vmcs12 uses the VMCS encoding rotated left by 6.  Undo
+ * that madness to get the encoding for comparison.
+ */
+#define VMCS12_IDX_TO_ENC(idx) ((u16)(((u16)(idx) >> 6) | ((u16)(idx) << 10)))
+
+static u64 nested_vmx_calc_vmcs_enum_msr(void)
+{
+	/*
+	 * Note these are the so called "index" of the VMCS field encoding, not
+	 * the index into vmcs12.
+	 */
+	unsigned int max_idx, idx;
+	int i;
+
+	/*
+	 * For better or worse, KVM allows VMREAD/VMWRITE to all fields in
+	 * vmcs12, regardless of whether or not the associated feature is
+	 * exposed to L1.  Simply find the field with the highest index.
+	 */
+	max_idx = 0;
+	for (i = 0; i < nr_vmcs12_fields; i++) {
+		/* The vmcs12 table is very, very sparsely populated. */
+		if (!vmcs12_field_offsets[i])
+			continue;
+
+		idx = vmcs_field_index(VMCS12_IDX_TO_ENC(i));
+		if (idx > max_idx)
+			max_idx = idx;
+	}
+
+	return (u64)max_idx << VMCS_FIELD_INDEX_SHIFT;
+}
+
+static void nested_vmx_setup_pinbased_ctls(struct vmcs_config *vmcs_conf,
+					   struct nested_vmx_msrs *msrs)
+{
+	msrs->pinbased_ctls_low =
+		PIN_BASED_ALWAYSON_WITHOUT_TRUE_MSR;
+
+	msrs->pinbased_ctls_high = vmcs_conf->pin_based_exec_ctrl;
+	msrs->pinbased_ctls_high &=
+		PIN_BASED_EXT_INTR_MASK |
+		PIN_BASED_NMI_EXITING |
+		PIN_BASED_VIRTUAL_NMIS |
+		(enable_apicv ? PIN_BASED_POSTED_INTR : 0);
+	msrs->pinbased_ctls_high |=
+		PIN_BASED_ALWAYSON_WITHOUT_TRUE_MSR |
+		PIN_BASED_VMX_PREEMPTION_TIMER;
+}
+
+static void nested_vmx_setup_exit_ctls(struct vmcs_config *vmcs_conf,
+				       struct nested_vmx_msrs *msrs)
+{
+	msrs->exit_ctls_low =
+		VM_EXIT_ALWAYSON_WITHOUT_TRUE_MSR;
+
+	msrs->exit_ctls_high = vmcs_conf->vmexit_ctrl;
+	msrs->exit_ctls_high &=
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+		VM_EXIT_HOST_ADDR_SPACE_SIZE |
+#endif
+		VM_EXIT_LOAD_IA32_PAT | VM_EXIT_SAVE_IA32_PAT |
+		VM_EXIT_CLEAR_BNDCFGS;
+	msrs->exit_ctls_high |=
+		VM_EXIT_ALWAYSON_WITHOUT_TRUE_MSR |
+		VM_EXIT_LOAD_IA32_EFER | VM_EXIT_SAVE_IA32_EFER |
+		VM_EXIT_SAVE_VMX_PREEMPTION_TIMER | VM_EXIT_ACK_INTR_ON_EXIT |
+		VM_EXIT_LOAD_IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL;
+
+	/* We support free control of debug control saving. */
+	msrs->exit_ctls_low &= ~VM_EXIT_SAVE_DEBUG_CONTROLS;
+}
+
+static void nested_vmx_setup_entry_ctls(struct vmcs_config *vmcs_conf,
+					struct nested_vmx_msrs *msrs)
+{
+	msrs->entry_ctls_low =
+		VM_ENTRY_ALWAYSON_WITHOUT_TRUE_MSR;
+
+	msrs->entry_ctls_high = vmcs_conf->vmentry_ctrl;
+	msrs->entry_ctls_high &=
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+		VM_ENTRY_IA32E_MODE |
+#endif
+		VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_PAT | VM_ENTRY_LOAD_BNDCFGS;
+	msrs->entry_ctls_high |=
+		(VM_ENTRY_ALWAYSON_WITHOUT_TRUE_MSR | VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_EFER |
+		 VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL);
+
+	/* We support free control of debug control loading. */
+	msrs->entry_ctls_low &= ~VM_ENTRY_LOAD_DEBUG_CONTROLS;
+}
+
+static void nested_vmx_setup_cpubased_ctls(struct vmcs_config *vmcs_conf,
+					   struct nested_vmx_msrs *msrs)
+{
+	msrs->procbased_ctls_low =
+		CPU_BASED_ALWAYSON_WITHOUT_TRUE_MSR;
+
+	msrs->procbased_ctls_high = vmcs_conf->cpu_based_exec_ctrl;
+	msrs->procbased_ctls_high &=
+		CPU_BASED_INTR_WINDOW_EXITING |
+		CPU_BASED_NMI_WINDOW_EXITING | CPU_BASED_USE_TSC_OFFSETTING |
+		CPU_BASED_HLT_EXITING | CPU_BASED_INVLPG_EXITING |
+		CPU_BASED_MWAIT_EXITING | CPU_BASED_CR3_LOAD_EXITING |
+		CPU_BASED_CR3_STORE_EXITING |
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+		CPU_BASED_CR8_LOAD_EXITING | CPU_BASED_CR8_STORE_EXITING |
+#endif
+		CPU_BASED_MOV_DR_EXITING | CPU_BASED_UNCOND_IO_EXITING |
+		CPU_BASED_USE_IO_BITMAPS | CPU_BASED_MONITOR_TRAP_FLAG |
+		CPU_BASED_MONITOR_EXITING | CPU_BASED_RDPMC_EXITING |
+		CPU_BASED_RDTSC_EXITING | CPU_BASED_PAUSE_EXITING |
+		CPU_BASED_TPR_SHADOW | CPU_BASED_ACTIVATE_SECONDARY_CONTROLS;
+	/*
+	 * We can allow some features even when not supported by the
+	 * hardware. For example, L1 can specify an MSR bitmap - and we
+	 * can use it to avoid exits to L1 - even when L0 runs L2
+	 * without MSR bitmaps.
+	 */
+	msrs->procbased_ctls_high |=
+		CPU_BASED_ALWAYSON_WITHOUT_TRUE_MSR |
+		CPU_BASED_USE_MSR_BITMAPS;
+
+	/* We support free control of CR3 access interception. */
+	msrs->procbased_ctls_low &=
+		~(CPU_BASED_CR3_LOAD_EXITING | CPU_BASED_CR3_STORE_EXITING);
+}
+
+static void nested_vmx_setup_secondary_ctls(u32 ept_caps,
+					    struct vmcs_config *vmcs_conf,
+					    struct nested_vmx_msrs *msrs)
+{
+	msrs->secondary_ctls_low = 0;
+
+	msrs->secondary_ctls_high = vmcs_conf->cpu_based_2nd_exec_ctrl;
+	msrs->secondary_ctls_high &=
+		SECONDARY_EXEC_DESC |
+		SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_RDTSCP |
+		SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_X2APIC_MODE |
+		SECONDARY_EXEC_WBINVD_EXITING |
+		SECONDARY_EXEC_APIC_REGISTER_VIRT |
+		SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUAL_INTR_DELIVERY |
+		SECONDARY_EXEC_RDRAND_EXITING |
+		SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_INVPCID |
+		SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_VMFUNC |
+		SECONDARY_EXEC_RDSEED_EXITING |
+		SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_XSAVES |
+		SECONDARY_EXEC_TSC_SCALING |
+		SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_USR_WAIT_PAUSE;
+
+	/*
+	 * We can emulate "VMCS shadowing," even if the hardware
+	 * doesn't support it.
+	 */
+	msrs->secondary_ctls_high |=
+		SECONDARY_EXEC_SHADOW_VMCS;
+
+	if (enable_ept) {
+		/* nested EPT: emulate EPT also to L1 */
+		msrs->secondary_ctls_high |=
+			SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_EPT;
+		msrs->ept_caps =
+			VMX_EPT_PAGE_WALK_4_BIT |
+			VMX_EPT_PAGE_WALK_5_BIT |
+			VMX_EPTP_WB_BIT |
+			VMX_EPT_INVEPT_BIT |
+			VMX_EPT_EXECUTE_ONLY_BIT;
+
+		msrs->ept_caps &= ept_caps;
+		msrs->ept_caps |= VMX_EPT_EXTENT_GLOBAL_BIT |
+			VMX_EPT_EXTENT_CONTEXT_BIT | VMX_EPT_2MB_PAGE_BIT |
+			VMX_EPT_1GB_PAGE_BIT;
+		if (enable_ept_ad_bits) {
+			msrs->secondary_ctls_high |=
+				SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_PML;
+			msrs->ept_caps |= VMX_EPT_AD_BIT;
+		}
+
+		/*
+		 * Advertise EPTP switching irrespective of hardware support,
+		 * KVM emulates it in software so long as VMFUNC is supported.
+		 */
+		if (cpu_has_vmx_vmfunc())
+			msrs->vmfunc_controls = VMX_VMFUNC_EPTP_SWITCHING;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Old versions of KVM use the single-context version without
+	 * checking for support, so declare that it is supported even
+	 * though it is treated as global context.  The alternative is
+	 * not failing the single-context invvpid, and it is worse.
+	 */
+	if (enable_vpid) {
+		msrs->secondary_ctls_high |=
+			SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_VPID;
+		msrs->vpid_caps = VMX_VPID_INVVPID_BIT |
+			VMX_VPID_EXTENT_SUPPORTED_MASK;
+	}
+
+	if (enable_unrestricted_guest)
+		msrs->secondary_ctls_high |=
+			SECONDARY_EXEC_UNRESTRICTED_GUEST;
+
+	if (flexpriority_enabled)
+		msrs->secondary_ctls_high |=
+			SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_APIC_ACCESSES;
+
+	if (enable_sgx)
+		msrs->secondary_ctls_high |= SECONDARY_EXEC_ENCLS_EXITING;
+}
+
+static void nested_vmx_setup_misc_data(struct vmcs_config *vmcs_conf,
+				       struct nested_vmx_msrs *msrs)
+{
+	msrs->misc_low = (u32)vmcs_conf->misc & VMX_MISC_SAVE_EFER_LMA;
+	msrs->misc_low |=
+		MSR_IA32_VMX_MISC_VMWRITE_SHADOW_RO_FIELDS |
+		VMX_MISC_EMULATED_PREEMPTION_TIMER_RATE |
+		VMX_MISC_ACTIVITY_HLT |
+		VMX_MISC_ACTIVITY_WAIT_SIPI;
+	msrs->misc_high = 0;
+}
+
+static void nested_vmx_setup_basic(struct nested_vmx_msrs *msrs)
+{
+	/*
+	 * This MSR reports some information about VMX support. We
+	 * should return information about the VMX we emulate for the
+	 * guest, and the VMCS structure we give it - not about the
+	 * VMX support of the underlying hardware.
+	 */
+	msrs->basic =
+		VMCS12_REVISION |
+		VMX_BASIC_TRUE_CTLS |
+		((u64)VMCS12_SIZE << VMX_BASIC_VMCS_SIZE_SHIFT) |
+		(VMX_BASIC_MEM_TYPE_WB << VMX_BASIC_MEM_TYPE_SHIFT);
+
+	if (cpu_has_vmx_basic_inout())
+		msrs->basic |= VMX_BASIC_INOUT;
+}
+
+static void nested_vmx_setup_cr_fixed(struct nested_vmx_msrs *msrs)
+{
+	/*
+	 * These MSRs specify bits which the guest must keep fixed on
+	 * while L1 is in VMXON mode (in L1's root mode, or running an L2).
+	 * We picked the standard core2 setting.
+	 */
+#define VMXON_CR0_ALWAYSON     (X86_CR0_PE | X86_CR0_PG | X86_CR0_NE)
+#define VMXON_CR4_ALWAYSON     X86_CR4_VMXE
+	msrs->cr0_fixed0 = VMXON_CR0_ALWAYSON;
+	msrs->cr4_fixed0 = VMXON_CR4_ALWAYSON;
+
+	/* These MSRs specify bits which the guest must keep fixed off. */
+	rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_VMX_CR0_FIXED1, msrs->cr0_fixed1);
+	rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_VMX_CR4_FIXED1, msrs->cr4_fixed1);
+
+	if (vmx_umip_emulated())
+		msrs->cr4_fixed1 |= X86_CR4_UMIP;
+}
+
+/*
+ * nested_vmx_setup_ctls_msrs() sets up variables containing the values to be
+ * returned for the various VMX controls MSRs when nested VMX is enabled.
+ * The same values should also be used to verify that vmcs12 control fields are
+ * valid during nested entry from L1 to L2.
+ * Each of these control msrs has a low and high 32-bit half: A low bit is on
+ * if the corresponding bit in the (32-bit) control field *must* be on, and a
+ * bit in the high half is on if the corresponding bit in the control field
+ * may be on. See also vmx_control_verify().
+ */
+void nested_vmx_setup_ctls_msrs(struct vmcs_config *vmcs_conf, u32 ept_caps)
+{
+	struct nested_vmx_msrs *msrs = &vmcs_conf->nested;
+
+	/*
+	 * Note that as a general rule, the high half of the MSRs (bits in
+	 * the control fields which may be 1) should be initialized by the
+	 * intersection of the underlying hardware's MSR (i.e., features which
+	 * can be supported) and the list of features we want to expose -
+	 * because they are known to be properly supported in our code.
+	 * Also, usually, the low half of the MSRs (bits which must be 1) can
+	 * be set to 0, meaning that L1 may turn off any of these bits. The
+	 * reason is that if one of these bits is necessary, it will appear
+	 * in vmcs01 and prepare_vmcs02, when it bitwise-or's the control
+	 * fields of vmcs01 and vmcs02, will turn these bits off - and
+	 * nested_vmx_l1_wants_exit() will not pass related exits to L1.
+	 * These rules have exceptions below.
+	 */
+	nested_vmx_setup_pinbased_ctls(vmcs_conf, msrs);
+
+	nested_vmx_setup_exit_ctls(vmcs_conf, msrs);
+
+	nested_vmx_setup_entry_ctls(vmcs_conf, msrs);
+
+	nested_vmx_setup_cpubased_ctls(vmcs_conf, msrs);
+
+	nested_vmx_setup_secondary_ctls(ept_caps, vmcs_conf, msrs);
+
+	nested_vmx_setup_misc_data(vmcs_conf, msrs);
+
+	nested_vmx_setup_basic(msrs);
+
+	nested_vmx_setup_cr_fixed(msrs);
+
+	msrs->vmcs_enum = nested_vmx_calc_vmcs_enum_msr();
+}
+
+void nested_vmx_hardware_unsetup(void)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	if (enable_shadow_vmcs) {
+		for (i = 0; i < VMX_BITMAP_NR; i++)
+			free_page((unsigned long)vmx_bitmap[i]);
+	}
+}
+
+__init int nested_vmx_hardware_setup(int (*exit_handlers[])(struct kvm_vcpu *))
+{
+	int i;
+
+	if (!cpu_has_vmx_shadow_vmcs())
+		enable_shadow_vmcs = 0;
+	if (enable_shadow_vmcs) {
+		for (i = 0; i < VMX_BITMAP_NR; i++) {
+			/*
+			 * The vmx_bitmap is not tied to a VM and so should
+			 * not be charged to a memcg.
+			 */
+			vmx_bitmap[i] = (unsigned long *)
+				__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
+			if (!vmx_bitmap[i]) {
+				nested_vmx_hardware_unsetup();
+				return -ENOMEM;
+			}
+		}
+
+		init_vmcs_shadow_fields();
+	}
+
+	exit_handlers[EXIT_REASON_VMCLEAR]	= handle_vmclear;
+	exit_handlers[EXIT_REASON_VMLAUNCH]	= handle_vmlaunch;
+	exit_handlers[EXIT_REASON_VMPTRLD]	= handle_vmptrld;
+	exit_handlers[EXIT_REASON_VMPTRST]	= handle_vmptrst;
+	exit_handlers[EXIT_REASON_VMREAD]	= handle_vmread;
+	exit_handlers[EXIT_REASON_VMRESUME]	= handle_vmresume;
+	exit_handlers[EXIT_REASON_VMWRITE]	= handle_vmwrite;
+	exit_handlers[EXIT_REASON_VMOFF]	= handle_vmxoff;
+	exit_handlers[EXIT_REASON_VMON]		= handle_vmxon;
+	exit_handlers[EXIT_REASON_INVEPT]	= handle_invept;
+	exit_handlers[EXIT_REASON_INVVPID]	= handle_invvpid;
+	exit_handlers[EXIT_REASON_VMFUNC]	= handle_vmfunc;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+struct kvm_x86_nested_ops vmx_nested_ops = {
+	.leave_nested = vmx_leave_nested,
+	.is_exception_vmexit = nested_vmx_is_exception_vmexit,
+	.check_events = vmx_check_nested_events,
+	.has_events = vmx_has_nested_events,
+	.triple_fault = nested_vmx_triple_fault,
+	.get_state = vmx_get_nested_state,
+	.set_state = vmx_set_nested_state,
+	.get_nested_state_pages = vmx_get_nested_state_pages,
+	.write_log_dirty = nested_vmx_write_pml_buffer,
+	.enable_evmcs = nested_enable_evmcs,
+	.get_evmcs_version = nested_get_evmcs_version,
+	.hv_inject_synthetic_vmexit_post_tlb_flush = vmx_hv_inject_synthetic_vmexit_post_tlb_flush,
+};
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..b4b9d5143
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.h
@@ -0,0 +1,293 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+#ifndef __KVM_X86_VMX_NESTED_H
+#define __KVM_X86_VMX_NESTED_H
+
+#include "kvm_cache_regs.h"
+#include "vmcs12.h"
+#include "vmx.h"
+
+/*
+ * Status returned by nested_vmx_enter_non_root_mode():
+ */
+enum nvmx_vmentry_status {
+	NVMX_VMENTRY_SUCCESS,		/* Entered VMX non-root mode */
+	NVMX_VMENTRY_VMFAIL,		/* Consistency check VMFail */
+	NVMX_VMENTRY_VMEXIT,		/* Consistency check VMExit */
+	NVMX_VMENTRY_KVM_INTERNAL_ERROR,/* KVM internal error */
+};
+
+void vmx_leave_nested(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+void nested_vmx_setup_ctls_msrs(struct vmcs_config *vmcs_conf, u32 ept_caps);
+void nested_vmx_hardware_unsetup(void);
+__init int nested_vmx_hardware_setup(int (*exit_handlers[])(struct kvm_vcpu *));
+void nested_vmx_set_vmcs_shadowing_bitmap(void);
+void nested_vmx_free_vcpu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+enum nvmx_vmentry_status nested_vmx_enter_non_root_mode(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+						     bool from_vmentry);
+bool nested_vmx_reflect_vmexit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+void nested_vmx_vmexit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 vm_exit_reason,
+		       u32 exit_intr_info, unsigned long exit_qualification);
+void nested_sync_vmcs12_to_shadow(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+int vmx_set_vmx_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 msr_index, u64 data);
+int vmx_get_vmx_msr(struct nested_vmx_msrs *msrs, u32 msr_index, u64 *pdata);
+int get_vmx_mem_address(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long exit_qualification,
+			u32 vmx_instruction_info, bool wr, int len, gva_t *ret);
+void nested_mark_vmcs12_pages_dirty(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+bool nested_vmx_check_io_bitmaps(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned int port,
+				 int size);
+
+static inline struct vmcs12 *get_vmcs12(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	return to_vmx(vcpu)->nested.cached_vmcs12;
+}
+
+static inline struct vmcs12 *get_shadow_vmcs12(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	return to_vmx(vcpu)->nested.cached_shadow_vmcs12;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Note: the same condition is checked against the state provided by userspace
+ * in vmx_set_nested_state; if it is satisfied, the nested state must include
+ * the VMCS12.
+ */
+static inline int vmx_has_valid_vmcs12(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+
+	/* 'hv_evmcs_vmptr' can also be EVMPTR_MAP_PENDING here */
+	return vmx->nested.current_vmptr != -1ull ||
+		vmx->nested.hv_evmcs_vmptr != EVMPTR_INVALID;
+}
+
+static inline u16 nested_get_vpid02(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+
+	return vmx->nested.vpid02 ? vmx->nested.vpid02 : vmx->vpid;
+}
+
+static inline unsigned long nested_ept_get_eptp(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	/* return the page table to be shadowed - in our case, EPT12 */
+	return get_vmcs12(vcpu)->ept_pointer;
+}
+
+static inline bool nested_ept_ad_enabled(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	return nested_ept_get_eptp(vcpu) & VMX_EPTP_AD_ENABLE_BIT;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Return the cr0/4 value that a nested guest would read. This is a combination
+ * of L1's "real" cr0 used to run the guest (guest_cr0), and the bits shadowed
+ * by the L1 hypervisor (cr0_read_shadow).  KVM must emulate CPU behavior as
+ * the value+mask loaded into vmcs02 may not match the vmcs12 fields.
+ */
+static inline unsigned long nested_read_cr0(struct vmcs12 *fields)
+{
+	return (fields->guest_cr0 & ~fields->cr0_guest_host_mask) |
+		(fields->cr0_read_shadow & fields->cr0_guest_host_mask);
+}
+static inline unsigned long nested_read_cr4(struct vmcs12 *fields)
+{
+	return (fields->guest_cr4 & ~fields->cr4_guest_host_mask) |
+		(fields->cr4_read_shadow & fields->cr4_guest_host_mask);
+}
+
+static inline unsigned nested_cpu_vmx_misc_cr3_count(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	return vmx_misc_cr3_count(to_vmx(vcpu)->nested.msrs.misc_low);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Do the virtual VMX capability MSRs specify that L1 can use VMWRITE
+ * to modify any valid field of the VMCS, or are the VM-exit
+ * information fields read-only?
+ */
+static inline bool nested_cpu_has_vmwrite_any_field(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	return to_vmx(vcpu)->nested.msrs.misc_low &
+		MSR_IA32_VMX_MISC_VMWRITE_SHADOW_RO_FIELDS;
+}
+
+static inline bool nested_cpu_has_zero_length_injection(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	return to_vmx(vcpu)->nested.msrs.misc_low & VMX_MISC_ZERO_LEN_INS;
+}
+
+static inline bool nested_cpu_supports_monitor_trap_flag(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	return to_vmx(vcpu)->nested.msrs.procbased_ctls_high &
+			CPU_BASED_MONITOR_TRAP_FLAG;
+}
+
+static inline bool nested_cpu_has_vmx_shadow_vmcs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	return to_vmx(vcpu)->nested.msrs.secondary_ctls_high &
+		SECONDARY_EXEC_SHADOW_VMCS;
+}
+
+static inline bool nested_cpu_has(struct vmcs12 *vmcs12, u32 bit)
+{
+	return vmcs12->cpu_based_vm_exec_control & bit;
+}
+
+static inline bool nested_cpu_has2(struct vmcs12 *vmcs12, u32 bit)
+{
+	return (vmcs12->cpu_based_vm_exec_control &
+			CPU_BASED_ACTIVATE_SECONDARY_CONTROLS) &&
+		(vmcs12->secondary_vm_exec_control & bit);
+}
+
+static inline bool nested_cpu_has_preemption_timer(struct vmcs12 *vmcs12)
+{
+	return vmcs12->pin_based_vm_exec_control &
+		PIN_BASED_VMX_PREEMPTION_TIMER;
+}
+
+static inline bool nested_cpu_has_nmi_exiting(struct vmcs12 *vmcs12)
+{
+	return vmcs12->pin_based_vm_exec_control & PIN_BASED_NMI_EXITING;
+}
+
+static inline bool nested_cpu_has_virtual_nmis(struct vmcs12 *vmcs12)
+{
+	return vmcs12->pin_based_vm_exec_control & PIN_BASED_VIRTUAL_NMIS;
+}
+
+static inline int nested_cpu_has_mtf(struct vmcs12 *vmcs12)
+{
+	return nested_cpu_has(vmcs12, CPU_BASED_MONITOR_TRAP_FLAG);
+}
+
+static inline int nested_cpu_has_ept(struct vmcs12 *vmcs12)
+{
+	return nested_cpu_has2(vmcs12, SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_EPT);
+}
+
+static inline bool nested_cpu_has_xsaves(struct vmcs12 *vmcs12)
+{
+	return nested_cpu_has2(vmcs12, SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_XSAVES);
+}
+
+static inline bool nested_cpu_has_pml(struct vmcs12 *vmcs12)
+{
+	return nested_cpu_has2(vmcs12, SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_PML);
+}
+
+static inline bool nested_cpu_has_virt_x2apic_mode(struct vmcs12 *vmcs12)
+{
+	return nested_cpu_has2(vmcs12, SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_X2APIC_MODE);
+}
+
+static inline bool nested_cpu_has_vpid(struct vmcs12 *vmcs12)
+{
+	return nested_cpu_has2(vmcs12, SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_VPID);
+}
+
+static inline bool nested_cpu_has_apic_reg_virt(struct vmcs12 *vmcs12)
+{
+	return nested_cpu_has2(vmcs12, SECONDARY_EXEC_APIC_REGISTER_VIRT);
+}
+
+static inline bool nested_cpu_has_vid(struct vmcs12 *vmcs12)
+{
+	return nested_cpu_has2(vmcs12, SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUAL_INTR_DELIVERY);
+}
+
+static inline bool nested_cpu_has_posted_intr(struct vmcs12 *vmcs12)
+{
+	return vmcs12->pin_based_vm_exec_control & PIN_BASED_POSTED_INTR;
+}
+
+static inline bool nested_cpu_has_vmfunc(struct vmcs12 *vmcs12)
+{
+	return nested_cpu_has2(vmcs12, SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_VMFUNC);
+}
+
+static inline bool nested_cpu_has_eptp_switching(struct vmcs12 *vmcs12)
+{
+	return nested_cpu_has_vmfunc(vmcs12) &&
+		(vmcs12->vm_function_control &
+		 VMX_VMFUNC_EPTP_SWITCHING);
+}
+
+static inline bool nested_cpu_has_shadow_vmcs(struct vmcs12 *vmcs12)
+{
+	return nested_cpu_has2(vmcs12, SECONDARY_EXEC_SHADOW_VMCS);
+}
+
+static inline bool nested_cpu_has_save_preemption_timer(struct vmcs12 *vmcs12)
+{
+	return vmcs12->vm_exit_controls &
+	    VM_EXIT_SAVE_VMX_PREEMPTION_TIMER;
+}
+
+static inline bool nested_exit_on_nmi(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	return nested_cpu_has_nmi_exiting(get_vmcs12(vcpu));
+}
+
+/*
+ * In nested virtualization, check if L1 asked to exit on external interrupts.
+ * For most existing hypervisors, this will always return true.
+ */
+static inline bool nested_exit_on_intr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	return get_vmcs12(vcpu)->pin_based_vm_exec_control &
+		PIN_BASED_EXT_INTR_MASK;
+}
+
+static inline bool nested_cpu_has_encls_exit(struct vmcs12 *vmcs12)
+{
+	return nested_cpu_has2(vmcs12, SECONDARY_EXEC_ENCLS_EXITING);
+}
+
+/*
+ * if fixed0[i] == 1: val[i] must be 1
+ * if fixed1[i] == 0: val[i] must be 0
+ */
+static inline bool fixed_bits_valid(u64 val, u64 fixed0, u64 fixed1)
+{
+	return ((val & fixed1) | fixed0) == val;
+}
+
+static inline bool nested_guest_cr0_valid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long val)
+{
+	u64 fixed0 = to_vmx(vcpu)->nested.msrs.cr0_fixed0;
+	u64 fixed1 = to_vmx(vcpu)->nested.msrs.cr0_fixed1;
+	struct vmcs12 *vmcs12 = get_vmcs12(vcpu);
+
+	if (to_vmx(vcpu)->nested.msrs.secondary_ctls_high &
+		SECONDARY_EXEC_UNRESTRICTED_GUEST &&
+	    nested_cpu_has2(vmcs12, SECONDARY_EXEC_UNRESTRICTED_GUEST))
+		fixed0 &= ~(X86_CR0_PE | X86_CR0_PG);
+
+	return fixed_bits_valid(val, fixed0, fixed1);
+}
+
+static inline bool nested_host_cr0_valid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long val)
+{
+	u64 fixed0 = to_vmx(vcpu)->nested.msrs.cr0_fixed0;
+	u64 fixed1 = to_vmx(vcpu)->nested.msrs.cr0_fixed1;
+
+	return fixed_bits_valid(val, fixed0, fixed1);
+}
+
+static inline bool nested_cr4_valid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long val)
+{
+	u64 fixed0 = to_vmx(vcpu)->nested.msrs.cr4_fixed0;
+	u64 fixed1 = to_vmx(vcpu)->nested.msrs.cr4_fixed1;
+
+	return fixed_bits_valid(val, fixed0, fixed1) &&
+	       __kvm_is_valid_cr4(vcpu, val);
+}
+
+/* No difference in the restrictions on guest and host CR4 in VMX operation. */
+#define nested_guest_cr4_valid	nested_cr4_valid
+#define nested_host_cr4_valid	nested_cr4_valid
+
+extern struct kvm_x86_nested_ops vmx_nested_ops;
+
+#endif /* __KVM_X86_VMX_NESTED_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/pmu_intel.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/pmu_intel.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..90c1f7f07
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/pmu_intel.c
@@ -0,0 +1,788 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * KVM PMU support for Intel CPUs
+ *
+ * Copyright 2011 Red Hat, Inc. and/or its affiliates.
+ *
+ * Authors:
+ *   Avi Kivity   <avi@redhat.com>
+ *   Gleb Natapov <gleb@redhat.com>
+ */
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
+
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/kvm_host.h>
+#include <linux/perf_event.h>
+#include <asm/perf_event.h>
+#include "x86.h"
+#include "cpuid.h"
+#include "lapic.h"
+#include "nested.h"
+#include "pmu.h"
+
+#define MSR_PMC_FULL_WIDTH_BIT      (MSR_IA32_PMC0 - MSR_IA32_PERFCTR0)
+
+enum intel_pmu_architectural_events {
+	/*
+	 * The order of the architectural events matters as support for each
+	 * event is enumerated via CPUID using the index of the event.
+	 */
+	INTEL_ARCH_CPU_CYCLES,
+	INTEL_ARCH_INSTRUCTIONS_RETIRED,
+	INTEL_ARCH_REFERENCE_CYCLES,
+	INTEL_ARCH_LLC_REFERENCES,
+	INTEL_ARCH_LLC_MISSES,
+	INTEL_ARCH_BRANCHES_RETIRED,
+	INTEL_ARCH_BRANCHES_MISPREDICTED,
+
+	NR_REAL_INTEL_ARCH_EVENTS,
+
+	/*
+	 * Pseudo-architectural event used to implement IA32_FIXED_CTR2, a.k.a.
+	 * TSC reference cycles.  The architectural reference cycles event may
+	 * or may not actually use the TSC as the reference, e.g. might use the
+	 * core crystal clock or the bus clock (yeah, "architectural").
+	 */
+	PSEUDO_ARCH_REFERENCE_CYCLES = NR_REAL_INTEL_ARCH_EVENTS,
+	NR_INTEL_ARCH_EVENTS,
+};
+
+static struct {
+	u8 eventsel;
+	u8 unit_mask;
+} const intel_arch_events[] = {
+	[INTEL_ARCH_CPU_CYCLES]			= { 0x3c, 0x00 },
+	[INTEL_ARCH_INSTRUCTIONS_RETIRED]	= { 0xc0, 0x00 },
+	[INTEL_ARCH_REFERENCE_CYCLES]		= { 0x3c, 0x01 },
+	[INTEL_ARCH_LLC_REFERENCES]		= { 0x2e, 0x4f },
+	[INTEL_ARCH_LLC_MISSES]			= { 0x2e, 0x41 },
+	[INTEL_ARCH_BRANCHES_RETIRED]		= { 0xc4, 0x00 },
+	[INTEL_ARCH_BRANCHES_MISPREDICTED]	= { 0xc5, 0x00 },
+	[PSEUDO_ARCH_REFERENCE_CYCLES]		= { 0x00, 0x03 },
+};
+
+/* mapping between fixed pmc index and intel_arch_events array */
+static int fixed_pmc_events[] = {
+	[0] = INTEL_ARCH_INSTRUCTIONS_RETIRED,
+	[1] = INTEL_ARCH_CPU_CYCLES,
+	[2] = PSEUDO_ARCH_REFERENCE_CYCLES,
+};
+
+static void reprogram_fixed_counters(struct kvm_pmu *pmu, u64 data)
+{
+	struct kvm_pmc *pmc;
+	u8 old_fixed_ctr_ctrl = pmu->fixed_ctr_ctrl;
+	int i;
+
+	pmu->fixed_ctr_ctrl = data;
+	for (i = 0; i < pmu->nr_arch_fixed_counters; i++) {
+		u8 new_ctrl = fixed_ctrl_field(data, i);
+		u8 old_ctrl = fixed_ctrl_field(old_fixed_ctr_ctrl, i);
+
+		if (old_ctrl == new_ctrl)
+			continue;
+
+		pmc = get_fixed_pmc(pmu, MSR_CORE_PERF_FIXED_CTR0 + i);
+
+		__set_bit(INTEL_PMC_IDX_FIXED + i, pmu->pmc_in_use);
+		kvm_pmu_request_counter_reprogram(pmc);
+	}
+}
+
+static struct kvm_pmc *intel_pmc_idx_to_pmc(struct kvm_pmu *pmu, int pmc_idx)
+{
+	if (pmc_idx < INTEL_PMC_IDX_FIXED) {
+		return get_gp_pmc(pmu, MSR_P6_EVNTSEL0 + pmc_idx,
+				  MSR_P6_EVNTSEL0);
+	} else {
+		u32 idx = pmc_idx - INTEL_PMC_IDX_FIXED;
+
+		return get_fixed_pmc(pmu, idx + MSR_CORE_PERF_FIXED_CTR0);
+	}
+}
+
+static bool intel_hw_event_available(struct kvm_pmc *pmc)
+{
+	struct kvm_pmu *pmu = pmc_to_pmu(pmc);
+	u8 event_select = pmc->eventsel & ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL_EVENT;
+	u8 unit_mask = (pmc->eventsel & ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL_UMASK) >> 8;
+	int i;
+
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(ARRAY_SIZE(intel_arch_events) != NR_INTEL_ARCH_EVENTS);
+
+	/*
+	 * Disallow events reported as unavailable in guest CPUID.  Note, this
+	 * doesn't apply to pseudo-architectural events.
+	 */
+	for (i = 0; i < NR_REAL_INTEL_ARCH_EVENTS; i++) {
+		if (intel_arch_events[i].eventsel != event_select ||
+		    intel_arch_events[i].unit_mask != unit_mask)
+			continue;
+
+		return pmu->available_event_types & BIT(i);
+	}
+
+	return true;
+}
+
+static bool intel_is_valid_rdpmc_ecx(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned int idx)
+{
+	struct kvm_pmu *pmu = vcpu_to_pmu(vcpu);
+	bool fixed = idx & (1u << 30);
+
+	idx &= ~(3u << 30);
+
+	return fixed ? idx < pmu->nr_arch_fixed_counters
+		     : idx < pmu->nr_arch_gp_counters;
+}
+
+static struct kvm_pmc *intel_rdpmc_ecx_to_pmc(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+					    unsigned int idx, u64 *mask)
+{
+	struct kvm_pmu *pmu = vcpu_to_pmu(vcpu);
+	bool fixed = idx & (1u << 30);
+	struct kvm_pmc *counters;
+	unsigned int num_counters;
+
+	idx &= ~(3u << 30);
+	if (fixed) {
+		counters = pmu->fixed_counters;
+		num_counters = pmu->nr_arch_fixed_counters;
+	} else {
+		counters = pmu->gp_counters;
+		num_counters = pmu->nr_arch_gp_counters;
+	}
+	if (idx >= num_counters)
+		return NULL;
+	*mask &= pmu->counter_bitmask[fixed ? KVM_PMC_FIXED : KVM_PMC_GP];
+	return &counters[array_index_nospec(idx, num_counters)];
+}
+
+static inline u64 vcpu_get_perf_capabilities(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	if (!guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_PDCM))
+		return 0;
+
+	return vcpu->arch.perf_capabilities;
+}
+
+static inline bool fw_writes_is_enabled(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	return (vcpu_get_perf_capabilities(vcpu) & PMU_CAP_FW_WRITES) != 0;
+}
+
+static inline struct kvm_pmc *get_fw_gp_pmc(struct kvm_pmu *pmu, u32 msr)
+{
+	if (!fw_writes_is_enabled(pmu_to_vcpu(pmu)))
+		return NULL;
+
+	return get_gp_pmc(pmu, msr, MSR_IA32_PMC0);
+}
+
+static bool intel_pmu_is_valid_lbr_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 index)
+{
+	struct x86_pmu_lbr *records = vcpu_to_lbr_records(vcpu);
+	bool ret = false;
+
+	if (!intel_pmu_lbr_is_enabled(vcpu))
+		return ret;
+
+	ret = (index == MSR_LBR_SELECT) || (index == MSR_LBR_TOS) ||
+		(index >= records->from && index < records->from + records->nr) ||
+		(index >= records->to && index < records->to + records->nr);
+
+	if (!ret && records->info)
+		ret = (index >= records->info && index < records->info + records->nr);
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static bool intel_is_valid_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 msr)
+{
+	struct kvm_pmu *pmu = vcpu_to_pmu(vcpu);
+	u64 perf_capabilities;
+	int ret;
+
+	switch (msr) {
+	case MSR_CORE_PERF_FIXED_CTR_CTRL:
+		return kvm_pmu_has_perf_global_ctrl(pmu);
+	case MSR_IA32_PEBS_ENABLE:
+		ret = vcpu_get_perf_capabilities(vcpu) & PERF_CAP_PEBS_FORMAT;
+		break;
+	case MSR_IA32_DS_AREA:
+		ret = guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_DS);
+		break;
+	case MSR_PEBS_DATA_CFG:
+		perf_capabilities = vcpu_get_perf_capabilities(vcpu);
+		ret = (perf_capabilities & PERF_CAP_PEBS_BASELINE) &&
+			((perf_capabilities & PERF_CAP_PEBS_FORMAT) > 3);
+		break;
+	default:
+		ret = get_gp_pmc(pmu, msr, MSR_IA32_PERFCTR0) ||
+			get_gp_pmc(pmu, msr, MSR_P6_EVNTSEL0) ||
+			get_fixed_pmc(pmu, msr) || get_fw_gp_pmc(pmu, msr) ||
+			intel_pmu_is_valid_lbr_msr(vcpu, msr);
+		break;
+	}
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static struct kvm_pmc *intel_msr_idx_to_pmc(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 msr)
+{
+	struct kvm_pmu *pmu = vcpu_to_pmu(vcpu);
+	struct kvm_pmc *pmc;
+
+	pmc = get_fixed_pmc(pmu, msr);
+	pmc = pmc ? pmc : get_gp_pmc(pmu, msr, MSR_P6_EVNTSEL0);
+	pmc = pmc ? pmc : get_gp_pmc(pmu, msr, MSR_IA32_PERFCTR0);
+
+	return pmc;
+}
+
+static inline void intel_pmu_release_guest_lbr_event(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct lbr_desc *lbr_desc = vcpu_to_lbr_desc(vcpu);
+
+	if (lbr_desc->event) {
+		perf_event_release_kernel(lbr_desc->event);
+		lbr_desc->event = NULL;
+		vcpu_to_pmu(vcpu)->event_count--;
+	}
+}
+
+int intel_pmu_create_guest_lbr_event(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct lbr_desc *lbr_desc = vcpu_to_lbr_desc(vcpu);
+	struct kvm_pmu *pmu = vcpu_to_pmu(vcpu);
+	struct perf_event *event;
+
+	/*
+	 * The perf_event_attr is constructed in the minimum efficient way:
+	 * - set 'pinned = true' to make it task pinned so that if another
+	 *   cpu pinned event reclaims LBR, the event->oncpu will be set to -1;
+	 * - set '.exclude_host = true' to record guest branches behavior;
+	 *
+	 * - set '.config = INTEL_FIXED_VLBR_EVENT' to indicates host perf
+	 *   schedule the event without a real HW counter but a fake one;
+	 *   check is_guest_lbr_event() and __intel_get_event_constraints();
+	 *
+	 * - set 'sample_type = PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_STACK' and
+	 *   'branch_sample_type = PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_CALL_STACK |
+	 *   PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_USER' to configure it as a LBR callstack
+	 *   event, which helps KVM to save/restore guest LBR records
+	 *   during host context switches and reduces quite a lot overhead,
+	 *   check branch_user_callstack() and intel_pmu_lbr_sched_task();
+	 */
+	struct perf_event_attr attr = {
+		.type = PERF_TYPE_RAW,
+		.size = sizeof(attr),
+		.config = INTEL_FIXED_VLBR_EVENT,
+		.sample_type = PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_STACK,
+		.pinned = true,
+		.exclude_host = true,
+		.branch_sample_type = PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_CALL_STACK |
+					PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_USER,
+	};
+
+	if (unlikely(lbr_desc->event)) {
+		__set_bit(INTEL_PMC_IDX_FIXED_VLBR, pmu->pmc_in_use);
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	event = perf_event_create_kernel_counter(&attr, -1,
+						current, NULL, NULL);
+	if (IS_ERR(event)) {
+		pr_debug_ratelimited("%s: failed %ld\n",
+					__func__, PTR_ERR(event));
+		return PTR_ERR(event);
+	}
+	lbr_desc->event = event;
+	pmu->event_count++;
+	__set_bit(INTEL_PMC_IDX_FIXED_VLBR, pmu->pmc_in_use);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * It's safe to access LBR msrs from guest when they have not
+ * been passthrough since the host would help restore or reset
+ * the LBR msrs records when the guest LBR event is scheduled in.
+ */
+static bool intel_pmu_handle_lbr_msrs_access(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+				     struct msr_data *msr_info, bool read)
+{
+	struct lbr_desc *lbr_desc = vcpu_to_lbr_desc(vcpu);
+	u32 index = msr_info->index;
+
+	if (!intel_pmu_is_valid_lbr_msr(vcpu, index))
+		return false;
+
+	if (!lbr_desc->event && intel_pmu_create_guest_lbr_event(vcpu) < 0)
+		goto dummy;
+
+	/*
+	 * Disable irq to ensure the LBR feature doesn't get reclaimed by the
+	 * host at the time the value is read from the msr, and this avoids the
+	 * host LBR value to be leaked to the guest. If LBR has been reclaimed,
+	 * return 0 on guest reads.
+	 */
+	local_irq_disable();
+	if (lbr_desc->event->state == PERF_EVENT_STATE_ACTIVE) {
+		if (read)
+			rdmsrl(index, msr_info->data);
+		else
+			wrmsrl(index, msr_info->data);
+		__set_bit(INTEL_PMC_IDX_FIXED_VLBR, vcpu_to_pmu(vcpu)->pmc_in_use);
+		local_irq_enable();
+		return true;
+	}
+	clear_bit(INTEL_PMC_IDX_FIXED_VLBR, vcpu_to_pmu(vcpu)->pmc_in_use);
+	local_irq_enable();
+
+dummy:
+	if (read)
+		msr_info->data = 0;
+	return true;
+}
+
+static int intel_pmu_get_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
+{
+	struct kvm_pmu *pmu = vcpu_to_pmu(vcpu);
+	struct kvm_pmc *pmc;
+	u32 msr = msr_info->index;
+
+	switch (msr) {
+	case MSR_CORE_PERF_FIXED_CTR_CTRL:
+		msr_info->data = pmu->fixed_ctr_ctrl;
+		break;
+	case MSR_IA32_PEBS_ENABLE:
+		msr_info->data = pmu->pebs_enable;
+		break;
+	case MSR_IA32_DS_AREA:
+		msr_info->data = pmu->ds_area;
+		break;
+	case MSR_PEBS_DATA_CFG:
+		msr_info->data = pmu->pebs_data_cfg;
+		break;
+	default:
+		if ((pmc = get_gp_pmc(pmu, msr, MSR_IA32_PERFCTR0)) ||
+		    (pmc = get_gp_pmc(pmu, msr, MSR_IA32_PMC0))) {
+			u64 val = pmc_read_counter(pmc);
+			msr_info->data =
+				val & pmu->counter_bitmask[KVM_PMC_GP];
+			break;
+		} else if ((pmc = get_fixed_pmc(pmu, msr))) {
+			u64 val = pmc_read_counter(pmc);
+			msr_info->data =
+				val & pmu->counter_bitmask[KVM_PMC_FIXED];
+			break;
+		} else if ((pmc = get_gp_pmc(pmu, msr, MSR_P6_EVNTSEL0))) {
+			msr_info->data = pmc->eventsel;
+			break;
+		} else if (intel_pmu_handle_lbr_msrs_access(vcpu, msr_info, true)) {
+			break;
+		}
+		return 1;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int intel_pmu_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
+{
+	struct kvm_pmu *pmu = vcpu_to_pmu(vcpu);
+	struct kvm_pmc *pmc;
+	u32 msr = msr_info->index;
+	u64 data = msr_info->data;
+	u64 reserved_bits, diff;
+
+	switch (msr) {
+	case MSR_CORE_PERF_FIXED_CTR_CTRL:
+		if (data & pmu->fixed_ctr_ctrl_mask)
+			return 1;
+
+		if (pmu->fixed_ctr_ctrl != data)
+			reprogram_fixed_counters(pmu, data);
+		break;
+	case MSR_IA32_PEBS_ENABLE:
+		if (data & pmu->pebs_enable_mask)
+			return 1;
+
+		if (pmu->pebs_enable != data) {
+			diff = pmu->pebs_enable ^ data;
+			pmu->pebs_enable = data;
+			reprogram_counters(pmu, diff);
+		}
+		break;
+	case MSR_IA32_DS_AREA:
+		if (is_noncanonical_address(data, vcpu))
+			return 1;
+
+		pmu->ds_area = data;
+		break;
+	case MSR_PEBS_DATA_CFG:
+		if (data & pmu->pebs_data_cfg_mask)
+			return 1;
+
+		pmu->pebs_data_cfg = data;
+		break;
+	default:
+		if ((pmc = get_gp_pmc(pmu, msr, MSR_IA32_PERFCTR0)) ||
+		    (pmc = get_gp_pmc(pmu, msr, MSR_IA32_PMC0))) {
+			if ((msr & MSR_PMC_FULL_WIDTH_BIT) &&
+			    (data & ~pmu->counter_bitmask[KVM_PMC_GP]))
+				return 1;
+
+			if (!msr_info->host_initiated &&
+			    !(msr & MSR_PMC_FULL_WIDTH_BIT))
+				data = (s64)(s32)data;
+			pmc_write_counter(pmc, data);
+			pmc_update_sample_period(pmc);
+			break;
+		} else if ((pmc = get_fixed_pmc(pmu, msr))) {
+			pmc_write_counter(pmc, data);
+			pmc_update_sample_period(pmc);
+			break;
+		} else if ((pmc = get_gp_pmc(pmu, msr, MSR_P6_EVNTSEL0))) {
+			reserved_bits = pmu->reserved_bits;
+			if ((pmc->idx == 2) &&
+			    (pmu->raw_event_mask & HSW_IN_TX_CHECKPOINTED))
+				reserved_bits ^= HSW_IN_TX_CHECKPOINTED;
+			if (data & reserved_bits)
+				return 1;
+
+			if (data != pmc->eventsel) {
+				pmc->eventsel = data;
+				kvm_pmu_request_counter_reprogram(pmc);
+			}
+			break;
+		} else if (intel_pmu_handle_lbr_msrs_access(vcpu, msr_info, false)) {
+			break;
+		}
+		/* Not a known PMU MSR. */
+		return 1;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void setup_fixed_pmc_eventsel(struct kvm_pmu *pmu)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(ARRAY_SIZE(fixed_pmc_events) != KVM_PMC_MAX_FIXED);
+
+	for (i = 0; i < pmu->nr_arch_fixed_counters; i++) {
+		int index = array_index_nospec(i, KVM_PMC_MAX_FIXED);
+		struct kvm_pmc *pmc = &pmu->fixed_counters[index];
+		u32 event = fixed_pmc_events[index];
+
+		pmc->eventsel = (intel_arch_events[event].unit_mask << 8) |
+				 intel_arch_events[event].eventsel;
+	}
+}
+
+static void intel_pmu_refresh(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct kvm_pmu *pmu = vcpu_to_pmu(vcpu);
+	struct lbr_desc *lbr_desc = vcpu_to_lbr_desc(vcpu);
+	struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *entry;
+	union cpuid10_eax eax;
+	union cpuid10_edx edx;
+	u64 perf_capabilities;
+	u64 counter_mask;
+	int i;
+
+	pmu->nr_arch_gp_counters = 0;
+	pmu->nr_arch_fixed_counters = 0;
+	pmu->counter_bitmask[KVM_PMC_GP] = 0;
+	pmu->counter_bitmask[KVM_PMC_FIXED] = 0;
+	pmu->version = 0;
+	pmu->reserved_bits = 0xffffffff00200000ull;
+	pmu->raw_event_mask = X86_RAW_EVENT_MASK;
+	pmu->global_ctrl_mask = ~0ull;
+	pmu->global_status_mask = ~0ull;
+	pmu->fixed_ctr_ctrl_mask = ~0ull;
+	pmu->pebs_enable_mask = ~0ull;
+	pmu->pebs_data_cfg_mask = ~0ull;
+
+	memset(&lbr_desc->records, 0, sizeof(lbr_desc->records));
+
+	/*
+	 * Setting passthrough of LBR MSRs is done only in the VM-Entry loop,
+	 * and PMU refresh is disallowed after the vCPU has run, i.e. this code
+	 * should never be reached while KVM is passing through MSRs.
+	 */
+	if (KVM_BUG_ON(lbr_desc->msr_passthrough, vcpu->kvm))
+		return;
+
+	entry = kvm_find_cpuid_entry(vcpu, 0xa);
+	if (!entry || !vcpu->kvm->arch.enable_pmu)
+		return;
+	eax.full = entry->eax;
+	edx.full = entry->edx;
+
+	pmu->version = eax.split.version_id;
+	if (!pmu->version)
+		return;
+
+	pmu->nr_arch_gp_counters = min_t(int, eax.split.num_counters,
+					 kvm_pmu_cap.num_counters_gp);
+	eax.split.bit_width = min_t(int, eax.split.bit_width,
+				    kvm_pmu_cap.bit_width_gp);
+	pmu->counter_bitmask[KVM_PMC_GP] = ((u64)1 << eax.split.bit_width) - 1;
+	eax.split.mask_length = min_t(int, eax.split.mask_length,
+				      kvm_pmu_cap.events_mask_len);
+	pmu->available_event_types = ~entry->ebx &
+					((1ull << eax.split.mask_length) - 1);
+
+	if (pmu->version == 1) {
+		pmu->nr_arch_fixed_counters = 0;
+	} else {
+		pmu->nr_arch_fixed_counters = min_t(int, edx.split.num_counters_fixed,
+						    kvm_pmu_cap.num_counters_fixed);
+		edx.split.bit_width_fixed = min_t(int, edx.split.bit_width_fixed,
+						  kvm_pmu_cap.bit_width_fixed);
+		pmu->counter_bitmask[KVM_PMC_FIXED] =
+			((u64)1 << edx.split.bit_width_fixed) - 1;
+		setup_fixed_pmc_eventsel(pmu);
+	}
+
+	for (i = 0; i < pmu->nr_arch_fixed_counters; i++)
+		pmu->fixed_ctr_ctrl_mask &= ~(0xbull << (i * 4));
+	counter_mask = ~(((1ull << pmu->nr_arch_gp_counters) - 1) |
+		(((1ull << pmu->nr_arch_fixed_counters) - 1) << INTEL_PMC_IDX_FIXED));
+	pmu->global_ctrl_mask = counter_mask;
+
+	/*
+	 * GLOBAL_STATUS and GLOBAL_OVF_CONTROL (a.k.a. GLOBAL_STATUS_RESET)
+	 * share reserved bit definitions.  The kernel just happens to use
+	 * OVF_CTRL for the names.
+	 */
+	pmu->global_status_mask = pmu->global_ctrl_mask
+			& ~(MSR_CORE_PERF_GLOBAL_OVF_CTRL_OVF_BUF |
+			    MSR_CORE_PERF_GLOBAL_OVF_CTRL_COND_CHGD);
+	if (vmx_pt_mode_is_host_guest())
+		pmu->global_status_mask &=
+				~MSR_CORE_PERF_GLOBAL_OVF_CTRL_TRACE_TOPA_PMI;
+
+	entry = kvm_find_cpuid_entry_index(vcpu, 7, 0);
+	if (entry &&
+	    (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_HLE) || boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RTM)) &&
+	    (entry->ebx & (X86_FEATURE_HLE|X86_FEATURE_RTM))) {
+		pmu->reserved_bits ^= HSW_IN_TX;
+		pmu->raw_event_mask |= (HSW_IN_TX|HSW_IN_TX_CHECKPOINTED);
+	}
+
+	bitmap_set(pmu->all_valid_pmc_idx,
+		0, pmu->nr_arch_gp_counters);
+	bitmap_set(pmu->all_valid_pmc_idx,
+		INTEL_PMC_MAX_GENERIC, pmu->nr_arch_fixed_counters);
+
+	perf_capabilities = vcpu_get_perf_capabilities(vcpu);
+	if (cpuid_model_is_consistent(vcpu) &&
+	    (perf_capabilities & PMU_CAP_LBR_FMT))
+		x86_perf_get_lbr(&lbr_desc->records);
+	else
+		lbr_desc->records.nr = 0;
+
+	if (lbr_desc->records.nr)
+		bitmap_set(pmu->all_valid_pmc_idx, INTEL_PMC_IDX_FIXED_VLBR, 1);
+
+	if (perf_capabilities & PERF_CAP_PEBS_FORMAT) {
+		if (perf_capabilities & PERF_CAP_PEBS_BASELINE) {
+			pmu->pebs_enable_mask = counter_mask;
+			pmu->reserved_bits &= ~ICL_EVENTSEL_ADAPTIVE;
+			for (i = 0; i < pmu->nr_arch_fixed_counters; i++) {
+				pmu->fixed_ctr_ctrl_mask &=
+					~(1ULL << (INTEL_PMC_IDX_FIXED + i * 4));
+			}
+			pmu->pebs_data_cfg_mask = ~0xff00000full;
+		} else {
+			pmu->pebs_enable_mask =
+				~((1ull << pmu->nr_arch_gp_counters) - 1);
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+static void intel_pmu_init(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	int i;
+	struct kvm_pmu *pmu = vcpu_to_pmu(vcpu);
+	struct lbr_desc *lbr_desc = vcpu_to_lbr_desc(vcpu);
+
+	for (i = 0; i < KVM_INTEL_PMC_MAX_GENERIC; i++) {
+		pmu->gp_counters[i].type = KVM_PMC_GP;
+		pmu->gp_counters[i].vcpu = vcpu;
+		pmu->gp_counters[i].idx = i;
+		pmu->gp_counters[i].current_config = 0;
+	}
+
+	for (i = 0; i < KVM_PMC_MAX_FIXED; i++) {
+		pmu->fixed_counters[i].type = KVM_PMC_FIXED;
+		pmu->fixed_counters[i].vcpu = vcpu;
+		pmu->fixed_counters[i].idx = i + INTEL_PMC_IDX_FIXED;
+		pmu->fixed_counters[i].current_config = 0;
+	}
+
+	lbr_desc->records.nr = 0;
+	lbr_desc->event = NULL;
+	lbr_desc->msr_passthrough = false;
+}
+
+static void intel_pmu_reset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	intel_pmu_release_guest_lbr_event(vcpu);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Emulate LBR_On_PMI behavior for 1 < pmu.version < 4.
+ *
+ * If Freeze_LBR_On_PMI = 1, the LBR is frozen on PMI and
+ * the KVM emulates to clear the LBR bit (bit 0) in IA32_DEBUGCTL.
+ *
+ * Guest needs to re-enable LBR to resume branches recording.
+ */
+static void intel_pmu_legacy_freezing_lbrs_on_pmi(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	u64 data = vmcs_read64(GUEST_IA32_DEBUGCTL);
+
+	if (data & DEBUGCTLMSR_FREEZE_LBRS_ON_PMI) {
+		data &= ~DEBUGCTLMSR_LBR;
+		vmcs_write64(GUEST_IA32_DEBUGCTL, data);
+	}
+}
+
+static void intel_pmu_deliver_pmi(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	u8 version = vcpu_to_pmu(vcpu)->version;
+
+	if (!intel_pmu_lbr_is_enabled(vcpu))
+		return;
+
+	if (version > 1 && version < 4)
+		intel_pmu_legacy_freezing_lbrs_on_pmi(vcpu);
+}
+
+static void vmx_update_intercept_for_lbr_msrs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool set)
+{
+	struct x86_pmu_lbr *lbr = vcpu_to_lbr_records(vcpu);
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < lbr->nr; i++) {
+		vmx_set_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, lbr->from + i, MSR_TYPE_RW, set);
+		vmx_set_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, lbr->to + i, MSR_TYPE_RW, set);
+		if (lbr->info)
+			vmx_set_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, lbr->info + i, MSR_TYPE_RW, set);
+	}
+
+	vmx_set_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, MSR_LBR_SELECT, MSR_TYPE_RW, set);
+	vmx_set_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, MSR_LBR_TOS, MSR_TYPE_RW, set);
+}
+
+static inline void vmx_disable_lbr_msrs_passthrough(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct lbr_desc *lbr_desc = vcpu_to_lbr_desc(vcpu);
+
+	if (!lbr_desc->msr_passthrough)
+		return;
+
+	vmx_update_intercept_for_lbr_msrs(vcpu, true);
+	lbr_desc->msr_passthrough = false;
+}
+
+static inline void vmx_enable_lbr_msrs_passthrough(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct lbr_desc *lbr_desc = vcpu_to_lbr_desc(vcpu);
+
+	if (lbr_desc->msr_passthrough)
+		return;
+
+	vmx_update_intercept_for_lbr_msrs(vcpu, false);
+	lbr_desc->msr_passthrough = true;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Higher priority host perf events (e.g. cpu pinned) could reclaim the
+ * pmu resources (e.g. LBR) that were assigned to the guest. This is
+ * usually done via ipi calls (more details in perf_install_in_context).
+ *
+ * Before entering the non-root mode (with irq disabled here), double
+ * confirm that the pmu features enabled to the guest are not reclaimed
+ * by higher priority host events. Otherwise, disallow vcpu's access to
+ * the reclaimed features.
+ */
+void vmx_passthrough_lbr_msrs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct kvm_pmu *pmu = vcpu_to_pmu(vcpu);
+	struct lbr_desc *lbr_desc = vcpu_to_lbr_desc(vcpu);
+
+	if (!lbr_desc->event) {
+		vmx_disable_lbr_msrs_passthrough(vcpu);
+		if (vmcs_read64(GUEST_IA32_DEBUGCTL) & DEBUGCTLMSR_LBR)
+			goto warn;
+		if (test_bit(INTEL_PMC_IDX_FIXED_VLBR, pmu->pmc_in_use))
+			goto warn;
+		return;
+	}
+
+	if (lbr_desc->event->state < PERF_EVENT_STATE_ACTIVE) {
+		vmx_disable_lbr_msrs_passthrough(vcpu);
+		__clear_bit(INTEL_PMC_IDX_FIXED_VLBR, pmu->pmc_in_use);
+		goto warn;
+	} else
+		vmx_enable_lbr_msrs_passthrough(vcpu);
+
+	return;
+
+warn:
+	pr_warn_ratelimited("vcpu-%d: fail to passthrough LBR.\n", vcpu->vcpu_id);
+}
+
+static void intel_pmu_cleanup(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	if (!(vmcs_read64(GUEST_IA32_DEBUGCTL) & DEBUGCTLMSR_LBR))
+		intel_pmu_release_guest_lbr_event(vcpu);
+}
+
+void intel_pmu_cross_mapped_check(struct kvm_pmu *pmu)
+{
+	struct kvm_pmc *pmc = NULL;
+	int bit, hw_idx;
+
+	for_each_set_bit(bit, (unsigned long *)&pmu->global_ctrl,
+			 X86_PMC_IDX_MAX) {
+		pmc = intel_pmc_idx_to_pmc(pmu, bit);
+
+		if (!pmc || !pmc_speculative_in_use(pmc) ||
+		    !pmc_is_globally_enabled(pmc) || !pmc->perf_event)
+			continue;
+
+		/*
+		 * A negative index indicates the event isn't mapped to a
+		 * physical counter in the host, e.g. due to contention.
+		 */
+		hw_idx = pmc->perf_event->hw.idx;
+		if (hw_idx != pmc->idx && hw_idx > -1)
+			pmu->host_cross_mapped_mask |= BIT_ULL(hw_idx);
+	}
+}
+
+struct kvm_pmu_ops intel_pmu_ops __initdata = {
+	.hw_event_available = intel_hw_event_available,
+	.pmc_idx_to_pmc = intel_pmc_idx_to_pmc,
+	.rdpmc_ecx_to_pmc = intel_rdpmc_ecx_to_pmc,
+	.msr_idx_to_pmc = intel_msr_idx_to_pmc,
+	.is_valid_rdpmc_ecx = intel_is_valid_rdpmc_ecx,
+	.is_valid_msr = intel_is_valid_msr,
+	.get_msr = intel_pmu_get_msr,
+	.set_msr = intel_pmu_set_msr,
+	.refresh = intel_pmu_refresh,
+	.init = intel_pmu_init,
+	.reset = intel_pmu_reset,
+	.deliver_pmi = intel_pmu_deliver_pmi,
+	.cleanup = intel_pmu_cleanup,
+	.EVENTSEL_EVENT = ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL_EVENT,
+	.MAX_NR_GP_COUNTERS = KVM_INTEL_PMC_MAX_GENERIC,
+	.MIN_NR_GP_COUNTERS = 1,
+};
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/posted_intr.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/posted_intr.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..af662312f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/posted_intr.c
@@ -0,0 +1,353 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
+
+#include <linux/kvm_host.h>
+
+#include <asm/irq_remapping.h>
+#include <asm/cpu.h>
+
+#include "lapic.h"
+#include "irq.h"
+#include "posted_intr.h"
+#include "trace.h"
+#include "vmx.h"
+
+/*
+ * Maintain a per-CPU list of vCPUs that need to be awakened by wakeup_handler()
+ * when a WAKEUP_VECTOR interrupted is posted.  vCPUs are added to the list when
+ * the vCPU is scheduled out and is blocking (e.g. in HLT) with IRQs enabled.
+ * The vCPUs posted interrupt descriptor is updated at the same time to set its
+ * notification vector to WAKEUP_VECTOR, so that posted interrupt from devices
+ * wake the target vCPUs.  vCPUs are removed from the list and the notification
+ * vector is reset when the vCPU is scheduled in.
+ */
+static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct list_head, wakeup_vcpus_on_cpu);
+/*
+ * Protect the per-CPU list with a per-CPU spinlock to handle task migration.
+ * When a blocking vCPU is awakened _and_ migrated to a different pCPU, the
+ * ->sched_in() path will need to take the vCPU off the list of the _previous_
+ * CPU.  IRQs must be disabled when taking this lock, otherwise deadlock will
+ * occur if a wakeup IRQ arrives and attempts to acquire the lock.
+ */
+static DEFINE_PER_CPU(raw_spinlock_t, wakeup_vcpus_on_cpu_lock);
+
+static inline struct pi_desc *vcpu_to_pi_desc(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	return &(to_vmx(vcpu)->pi_desc);
+}
+
+static int pi_try_set_control(struct pi_desc *pi_desc, u64 *pold, u64 new)
+{
+	/*
+	 * PID.ON can be set at any time by a different vCPU or by hardware,
+	 * e.g. a device.  PID.control must be written atomically, and the
+	 * update must be retried with a fresh snapshot an ON change causes
+	 * the cmpxchg to fail.
+	 */
+	if (!try_cmpxchg64(&pi_desc->control, pold, new))
+		return -EBUSY;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+void vmx_vcpu_pi_load(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int cpu)
+{
+	struct pi_desc *pi_desc = vcpu_to_pi_desc(vcpu);
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+	struct pi_desc old, new;
+	unsigned long flags;
+	unsigned int dest;
+
+	/*
+	 * To simplify hot-plug and dynamic toggling of APICv, keep PI.NDST and
+	 * PI.SN up-to-date even if there is no assigned device or if APICv is
+	 * deactivated due to a dynamic inhibit bit, e.g. for Hyper-V's SyncIC.
+	 */
+	if (!enable_apicv || !lapic_in_kernel(vcpu))
+		return;
+
+	/*
+	 * If the vCPU wasn't on the wakeup list and wasn't migrated, then the
+	 * full update can be skipped as neither the vector nor the destination
+	 * needs to be changed.
+	 */
+	if (pi_desc->nv != POSTED_INTR_WAKEUP_VECTOR && vcpu->cpu == cpu) {
+		/*
+		 * Clear SN if it was set due to being preempted.  Again, do
+		 * this even if there is no assigned device for simplicity.
+		 */
+		if (pi_test_and_clear_sn(pi_desc))
+			goto after_clear_sn;
+		return;
+	}
+
+	local_irq_save(flags);
+
+	/*
+	 * If the vCPU was waiting for wakeup, remove the vCPU from the wakeup
+	 * list of the _previous_ pCPU, which will not be the same as the
+	 * current pCPU if the task was migrated.
+	 */
+	if (pi_desc->nv == POSTED_INTR_WAKEUP_VECTOR) {
+		raw_spin_lock(&per_cpu(wakeup_vcpus_on_cpu_lock, vcpu->cpu));
+		list_del(&vmx->pi_wakeup_list);
+		raw_spin_unlock(&per_cpu(wakeup_vcpus_on_cpu_lock, vcpu->cpu));
+	}
+
+	dest = cpu_physical_id(cpu);
+	if (!x2apic_mode)
+		dest = (dest << 8) & 0xFF00;
+
+	old.control = READ_ONCE(pi_desc->control);
+	do {
+		new.control = old.control;
+
+		/*
+		 * Clear SN (as above) and refresh the destination APIC ID to
+		 * handle task migration (@cpu != vcpu->cpu).
+		 */
+		new.ndst = dest;
+		new.sn = 0;
+
+		/*
+		 * Restore the notification vector; in the blocking case, the
+		 * descriptor was modified on "put" to use the wakeup vector.
+		 */
+		new.nv = POSTED_INTR_VECTOR;
+	} while (pi_try_set_control(pi_desc, &old.control, new.control));
+
+	local_irq_restore(flags);
+
+after_clear_sn:
+
+	/*
+	 * Clear SN before reading the bitmap.  The VT-d firmware
+	 * writes the bitmap and reads SN atomically (5.2.3 in the
+	 * spec), so it doesn't really have a memory barrier that
+	 * pairs with this, but we cannot do that and we need one.
+	 */
+	smp_mb__after_atomic();
+
+	if (!pi_is_pir_empty(pi_desc))
+		pi_set_on(pi_desc);
+}
+
+static bool vmx_can_use_vtd_pi(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+	return irqchip_in_kernel(kvm) && enable_apicv &&
+		kvm_arch_has_assigned_device(kvm) &&
+		irq_remapping_cap(IRQ_POSTING_CAP);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Put the vCPU on this pCPU's list of vCPUs that needs to be awakened and set
+ * WAKEUP as the notification vector in the PI descriptor.
+ */
+static void pi_enable_wakeup_handler(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct pi_desc *pi_desc = vcpu_to_pi_desc(vcpu);
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+	struct pi_desc old, new;
+	unsigned long flags;
+
+	local_irq_save(flags);
+
+	raw_spin_lock(&per_cpu(wakeup_vcpus_on_cpu_lock, vcpu->cpu));
+	list_add_tail(&vmx->pi_wakeup_list,
+		      &per_cpu(wakeup_vcpus_on_cpu, vcpu->cpu));
+	raw_spin_unlock(&per_cpu(wakeup_vcpus_on_cpu_lock, vcpu->cpu));
+
+	WARN(pi_desc->sn, "PI descriptor SN field set before blocking");
+
+	old.control = READ_ONCE(pi_desc->control);
+	do {
+		/* set 'NV' to 'wakeup vector' */
+		new.control = old.control;
+		new.nv = POSTED_INTR_WAKEUP_VECTOR;
+	} while (pi_try_set_control(pi_desc, &old.control, new.control));
+
+	/*
+	 * Send a wakeup IPI to this CPU if an interrupt may have been posted
+	 * before the notification vector was updated, in which case the IRQ
+	 * will arrive on the non-wakeup vector.  An IPI is needed as calling
+	 * try_to_wake_up() from ->sched_out() isn't allowed (IRQs are not
+	 * enabled until it is safe to call try_to_wake_up() on the task being
+	 * scheduled out).
+	 */
+	if (pi_test_on(&new))
+		__apic_send_IPI_self(POSTED_INTR_WAKEUP_VECTOR);
+
+	local_irq_restore(flags);
+}
+
+static bool vmx_needs_pi_wakeup(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	/*
+	 * The default posted interrupt vector does nothing when
+	 * invoked outside guest mode.   Return whether a blocked vCPU
+	 * can be the target of posted interrupts, as is the case when
+	 * using either IPI virtualization or VT-d PI, so that the
+	 * notification vector is switched to the one that calls
+	 * back to the pi_wakeup_handler() function.
+	 */
+	return vmx_can_use_ipiv(vcpu) || vmx_can_use_vtd_pi(vcpu->kvm);
+}
+
+void vmx_vcpu_pi_put(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct pi_desc *pi_desc = vcpu_to_pi_desc(vcpu);
+
+	if (!vmx_needs_pi_wakeup(vcpu))
+		return;
+
+	if (kvm_vcpu_is_blocking(vcpu) && !vmx_interrupt_blocked(vcpu))
+		pi_enable_wakeup_handler(vcpu);
+
+	/*
+	 * Set SN when the vCPU is preempted.  Note, the vCPU can both be seen
+	 * as blocking and preempted, e.g. if it's preempted between setting
+	 * its wait state and manually scheduling out.
+	 */
+	if (vcpu->preempted)
+		pi_set_sn(pi_desc);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Handler for POSTED_INTERRUPT_WAKEUP_VECTOR.
+ */
+void pi_wakeup_handler(void)
+{
+	int cpu = smp_processor_id();
+	struct list_head *wakeup_list = &per_cpu(wakeup_vcpus_on_cpu, cpu);
+	raw_spinlock_t *spinlock = &per_cpu(wakeup_vcpus_on_cpu_lock, cpu);
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx;
+
+	raw_spin_lock(spinlock);
+	list_for_each_entry(vmx, wakeup_list, pi_wakeup_list) {
+
+		if (pi_test_on(&vmx->pi_desc))
+			kvm_vcpu_wake_up(&vmx->vcpu);
+	}
+	raw_spin_unlock(spinlock);
+}
+
+void __init pi_init_cpu(int cpu)
+{
+	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&per_cpu(wakeup_vcpus_on_cpu, cpu));
+	raw_spin_lock_init(&per_cpu(wakeup_vcpus_on_cpu_lock, cpu));
+}
+
+bool pi_has_pending_interrupt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct pi_desc *pi_desc = vcpu_to_pi_desc(vcpu);
+
+	return pi_test_on(pi_desc) ||
+		(pi_test_sn(pi_desc) && !pi_is_pir_empty(pi_desc));
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * Bail out of the block loop if the VM has an assigned
+ * device, but the blocking vCPU didn't reconfigure the
+ * PI.NV to the wakeup vector, i.e. the assigned device
+ * came along after the initial check in vmx_vcpu_pi_put().
+ */
+void vmx_pi_start_assignment(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+	if (!irq_remapping_cap(IRQ_POSTING_CAP))
+		return;
+
+	kvm_make_all_cpus_request(kvm, KVM_REQ_UNBLOCK);
+}
+
+/*
+ * vmx_pi_update_irte - set IRTE for Posted-Interrupts
+ *
+ * @kvm: kvm
+ * @host_irq: host irq of the interrupt
+ * @guest_irq: gsi of the interrupt
+ * @set: set or unset PI
+ * returns 0 on success, < 0 on failure
+ */
+int vmx_pi_update_irte(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned int host_irq,
+		       uint32_t guest_irq, bool set)
+{
+	struct kvm_kernel_irq_routing_entry *e;
+	struct kvm_irq_routing_table *irq_rt;
+	struct kvm_lapic_irq irq;
+	struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu;
+	struct vcpu_data vcpu_info;
+	int idx, ret = 0;
+
+	if (!vmx_can_use_vtd_pi(kvm))
+		return 0;
+
+	idx = srcu_read_lock(&kvm->irq_srcu);
+	irq_rt = srcu_dereference(kvm->irq_routing, &kvm->irq_srcu);
+	if (guest_irq >= irq_rt->nr_rt_entries ||
+	    hlist_empty(&irq_rt->map[guest_irq])) {
+		pr_warn_once("no route for guest_irq %u/%u (broken user space?)\n",
+			     guest_irq, irq_rt->nr_rt_entries);
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	hlist_for_each_entry(e, &irq_rt->map[guest_irq], link) {
+		if (e->type != KVM_IRQ_ROUTING_MSI)
+			continue;
+		/*
+		 * VT-d PI cannot support posting multicast/broadcast
+		 * interrupts to a vCPU, we still use interrupt remapping
+		 * for these kind of interrupts.
+		 *
+		 * For lowest-priority interrupts, we only support
+		 * those with single CPU as the destination, e.g. user
+		 * configures the interrupts via /proc/irq or uses
+		 * irqbalance to make the interrupts single-CPU.
+		 *
+		 * We will support full lowest-priority interrupt later.
+		 *
+		 * In addition, we can only inject generic interrupts using
+		 * the PI mechanism, refuse to route others through it.
+		 */
+
+		kvm_set_msi_irq(kvm, e, &irq);
+		if (!kvm_intr_is_single_vcpu(kvm, &irq, &vcpu) ||
+		    !kvm_irq_is_postable(&irq)) {
+			/*
+			 * Make sure the IRTE is in remapped mode if
+			 * we don't handle it in posted mode.
+			 */
+			ret = irq_set_vcpu_affinity(host_irq, NULL);
+			if (ret < 0) {
+				printk(KERN_INFO
+				   "failed to back to remapped mode, irq: %u\n",
+				   host_irq);
+				goto out;
+			}
+
+			continue;
+		}
+
+		vcpu_info.pi_desc_addr = __pa(vcpu_to_pi_desc(vcpu));
+		vcpu_info.vector = irq.vector;
+
+		trace_kvm_pi_irte_update(host_irq, vcpu->vcpu_id, e->gsi,
+				vcpu_info.vector, vcpu_info.pi_desc_addr, set);
+
+		if (set)
+			ret = irq_set_vcpu_affinity(host_irq, &vcpu_info);
+		else
+			ret = irq_set_vcpu_affinity(host_irq, NULL);
+
+		if (ret < 0) {
+			printk(KERN_INFO "%s: failed to update PI IRTE\n",
+					__func__);
+			goto out;
+		}
+	}
+
+	ret = 0;
+out:
+	srcu_read_unlock(&kvm->irq_srcu, idx);
+	return ret;
+}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/posted_intr.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/posted_intr.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..269920765
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/posted_intr.h
@@ -0,0 +1,106 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+#ifndef __KVM_X86_VMX_POSTED_INTR_H
+#define __KVM_X86_VMX_POSTED_INTR_H
+
+#define POSTED_INTR_ON  0
+#define POSTED_INTR_SN  1
+
+#define PID_TABLE_ENTRY_VALID 1
+
+/* Posted-Interrupt Descriptor */
+struct pi_desc {
+	u32 pir[8];     /* Posted interrupt requested */
+	union {
+		struct {
+				/* bit 256 - Outstanding Notification */
+			u16	on	: 1,
+				/* bit 257 - Suppress Notification */
+				sn	: 1,
+				/* bit 271:258 - Reserved */
+				rsvd_1	: 14;
+				/* bit 279:272 - Notification Vector */
+			u8	nv;
+				/* bit 287:280 - Reserved */
+			u8	rsvd_2;
+				/* bit 319:288 - Notification Destination */
+			u32	ndst;
+		};
+		u64 control;
+	};
+	u32 rsvd[6];
+} __aligned(64);
+
+static inline bool pi_test_and_set_on(struct pi_desc *pi_desc)
+{
+	return test_and_set_bit(POSTED_INTR_ON,
+			(unsigned long *)&pi_desc->control);
+}
+
+static inline bool pi_test_and_clear_on(struct pi_desc *pi_desc)
+{
+	return test_and_clear_bit(POSTED_INTR_ON,
+			(unsigned long *)&pi_desc->control);
+}
+
+static inline bool pi_test_and_clear_sn(struct pi_desc *pi_desc)
+{
+	return test_and_clear_bit(POSTED_INTR_SN,
+			(unsigned long *)&pi_desc->control);
+}
+
+static inline bool pi_test_and_set_pir(int vector, struct pi_desc *pi_desc)
+{
+	return test_and_set_bit(vector, (unsigned long *)pi_desc->pir);
+}
+
+static inline bool pi_is_pir_empty(struct pi_desc *pi_desc)
+{
+	return bitmap_empty((unsigned long *)pi_desc->pir, NR_VECTORS);
+}
+
+static inline void pi_set_sn(struct pi_desc *pi_desc)
+{
+	set_bit(POSTED_INTR_SN,
+		(unsigned long *)&pi_desc->control);
+}
+
+static inline void pi_set_on(struct pi_desc *pi_desc)
+{
+	set_bit(POSTED_INTR_ON,
+		(unsigned long *)&pi_desc->control);
+}
+
+static inline void pi_clear_on(struct pi_desc *pi_desc)
+{
+	clear_bit(POSTED_INTR_ON,
+		(unsigned long *)&pi_desc->control);
+}
+
+static inline void pi_clear_sn(struct pi_desc *pi_desc)
+{
+	clear_bit(POSTED_INTR_SN,
+		(unsigned long *)&pi_desc->control);
+}
+
+static inline bool pi_test_on(struct pi_desc *pi_desc)
+{
+	return test_bit(POSTED_INTR_ON,
+			(unsigned long *)&pi_desc->control);
+}
+
+static inline bool pi_test_sn(struct pi_desc *pi_desc)
+{
+	return test_bit(POSTED_INTR_SN,
+			(unsigned long *)&pi_desc->control);
+}
+
+void vmx_vcpu_pi_load(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int cpu);
+void vmx_vcpu_pi_put(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+void pi_wakeup_handler(void);
+void __init pi_init_cpu(int cpu);
+bool pi_has_pending_interrupt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+int vmx_pi_update_irte(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned int host_irq,
+		       uint32_t guest_irq, bool set);
+void vmx_pi_start_assignment(struct kvm *kvm);
+
+#endif /* __KVM_X86_VMX_POSTED_INTR_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/run_flags.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/run_flags.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..edc3f16cc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/run_flags.h
@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+#ifndef __KVM_X86_VMX_RUN_FLAGS_H
+#define __KVM_X86_VMX_RUN_FLAGS_H
+
+#define VMX_RUN_VMRESUME	(1 << 0)
+#define VMX_RUN_SAVE_SPEC_CTRL	(1 << 1)
+
+#endif /* __KVM_X86_VMX_RUN_FLAGS_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/sgx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/sgx.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..3e822e582
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/sgx.c
@@ -0,0 +1,509 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*  Copyright(c) 2021 Intel Corporation. */
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
+
+#include <asm/sgx.h>
+
+#include "cpuid.h"
+#include "kvm_cache_regs.h"
+#include "nested.h"
+#include "sgx.h"
+#include "vmx.h"
+#include "x86.h"
+
+bool __read_mostly enable_sgx = 1;
+module_param_named(sgx, enable_sgx, bool, 0444);
+
+/* Initial value of guest's virtual SGX_LEPUBKEYHASHn MSRs */
+static u64 sgx_pubkey_hash[4] __ro_after_init;
+
+/*
+ * ENCLS's memory operands use a fixed segment (DS) and a fixed
+ * address size based on the mode.  Related prefixes are ignored.
+ */
+static int sgx_get_encls_gva(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long offset,
+			     int size, int alignment, gva_t *gva)
+{
+	struct kvm_segment s;
+	bool fault;
+
+	/* Skip vmcs.GUEST_DS retrieval for 64-bit mode to avoid VMREADs. */
+	*gva = offset;
+	if (!is_64_bit_mode(vcpu)) {
+		vmx_get_segment(vcpu, &s, VCPU_SREG_DS);
+		*gva += s.base;
+	}
+
+	if (!IS_ALIGNED(*gva, alignment)) {
+		fault = true;
+	} else if (likely(is_64_bit_mode(vcpu))) {
+		fault = is_noncanonical_address(*gva, vcpu);
+	} else {
+		*gva &= 0xffffffff;
+		fault = (s.unusable) ||
+			(s.type != 2 && s.type != 3) ||
+			(*gva > s.limit) ||
+			((s.base != 0 || s.limit != 0xffffffff) &&
+			(((u64)*gva + size - 1) > s.limit + 1));
+	}
+	if (fault)
+		kvm_inject_gp(vcpu, 0);
+	return fault ? -EINVAL : 0;
+}
+
+static void sgx_handle_emulation_failure(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 addr,
+					 unsigned int size)
+{
+	uint64_t data[2] = { addr, size };
+
+	__kvm_prepare_emulation_failure_exit(vcpu, data, ARRAY_SIZE(data));
+}
+
+static int sgx_read_hva(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long hva, void *data,
+			unsigned int size)
+{
+	if (__copy_from_user(data, (void __user *)hva, size)) {
+		sgx_handle_emulation_failure(vcpu, hva, size);
+		return -EFAULT;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int sgx_gva_to_gpa(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gva_t gva, bool write,
+			  gpa_t *gpa)
+{
+	struct x86_exception ex;
+
+	if (write)
+		*gpa = kvm_mmu_gva_to_gpa_write(vcpu, gva, &ex);
+	else
+		*gpa = kvm_mmu_gva_to_gpa_read(vcpu, gva, &ex);
+
+	if (*gpa == INVALID_GPA) {
+		kvm_inject_emulated_page_fault(vcpu, &ex);
+		return -EFAULT;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int sgx_gpa_to_hva(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t gpa, unsigned long *hva)
+{
+	*hva = kvm_vcpu_gfn_to_hva(vcpu, PFN_DOWN(gpa));
+	if (kvm_is_error_hva(*hva)) {
+		sgx_handle_emulation_failure(vcpu, gpa, 1);
+		return -EFAULT;
+	}
+
+	*hva |= gpa & ~PAGE_MASK;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int sgx_inject_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gva_t gva, int trapnr)
+{
+	struct x86_exception ex;
+
+	/*
+	 * A non-EPCM #PF indicates a bad userspace HVA.  This *should* check
+	 * for PFEC.SGX and not assume any #PF on SGX2 originated in the EPC,
+	 * but the error code isn't (yet) plumbed through the ENCLS helpers.
+	 */
+	if (trapnr == PF_VECTOR && !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SGX2)) {
+		kvm_prepare_emulation_failure_exit(vcpu);
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * If the guest thinks it's running on SGX2 hardware, inject an SGX
+	 * #PF if the fault matches an EPCM fault signature (#GP on SGX1,
+	 * #PF on SGX2).  The assumption is that EPCM faults are much more
+	 * likely than a bad userspace address.
+	 */
+	if ((trapnr == PF_VECTOR || !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SGX2)) &&
+	    guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_SGX2)) {
+		memset(&ex, 0, sizeof(ex));
+		ex.vector = PF_VECTOR;
+		ex.error_code = PFERR_PRESENT_MASK | PFERR_WRITE_MASK |
+				PFERR_SGX_MASK;
+		ex.address = gva;
+		ex.error_code_valid = true;
+		ex.nested_page_fault = false;
+		kvm_inject_emulated_page_fault(vcpu, &ex);
+	} else {
+		kvm_inject_gp(vcpu, 0);
+	}
+	return 1;
+}
+
+static int __handle_encls_ecreate(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+				  struct sgx_pageinfo *pageinfo,
+				  unsigned long secs_hva,
+				  gva_t secs_gva)
+{
+	struct sgx_secs *contents = (struct sgx_secs *)pageinfo->contents;
+	struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *sgx_12_0, *sgx_12_1;
+	u64 attributes, xfrm, size;
+	u32 miscselect;
+	u8 max_size_log2;
+	int trapnr, ret;
+
+	sgx_12_0 = kvm_find_cpuid_entry_index(vcpu, 0x12, 0);
+	sgx_12_1 = kvm_find_cpuid_entry_index(vcpu, 0x12, 1);
+	if (!sgx_12_0 || !sgx_12_1) {
+		kvm_prepare_emulation_failure_exit(vcpu);
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	miscselect = contents->miscselect;
+	attributes = contents->attributes;
+	xfrm = contents->xfrm;
+	size = contents->size;
+
+	/* Enforce restriction of access to the PROVISIONKEY. */
+	if (!vcpu->kvm->arch.sgx_provisioning_allowed &&
+	    (attributes & SGX_ATTR_PROVISIONKEY)) {
+		if (sgx_12_1->eax & SGX_ATTR_PROVISIONKEY)
+			pr_warn_once("SGX PROVISIONKEY advertised but not allowed\n");
+		kvm_inject_gp(vcpu, 0);
+		return 1;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Enforce CPUID restrictions on MISCSELECT, ATTRIBUTES and XFRM.  Note
+	 * that the allowed XFRM (XFeature Request Mask) isn't strictly bound
+	 * by the supported XCR0.  FP+SSE *must* be set in XFRM, even if XSAVE
+	 * is unsupported, i.e. even if XCR0 itself is completely unsupported.
+	 */
+	if ((u32)miscselect & ~sgx_12_0->ebx ||
+	    (u32)attributes & ~sgx_12_1->eax ||
+	    (u32)(attributes >> 32) & ~sgx_12_1->ebx ||
+	    (u32)xfrm & ~sgx_12_1->ecx ||
+	    (u32)(xfrm >> 32) & ~sgx_12_1->edx ||
+	    xfrm & ~(vcpu->arch.guest_supported_xcr0 | XFEATURE_MASK_FPSSE) ||
+	    (xfrm & XFEATURE_MASK_FPSSE) != XFEATURE_MASK_FPSSE) {
+		kvm_inject_gp(vcpu, 0);
+		return 1;
+	}
+
+	/* Enforce CPUID restriction on max enclave size. */
+	max_size_log2 = (attributes & SGX_ATTR_MODE64BIT) ? sgx_12_0->edx >> 8 :
+							    sgx_12_0->edx;
+	if (size >= BIT_ULL(max_size_log2)) {
+		kvm_inject_gp(vcpu, 0);
+		return 1;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * sgx_virt_ecreate() returns:
+	 *  1) 0:	ECREATE was successful
+	 *  2) -EFAULT:	ECREATE was run but faulted, and trapnr was set to the
+	 *		exception number.
+	 *  3) -EINVAL:	access_ok() on @secs_hva failed. This should never
+	 *		happen as KVM checks host addresses at memslot creation.
+	 *		sgx_virt_ecreate() has already warned in this case.
+	 */
+	ret = sgx_virt_ecreate(pageinfo, (void __user *)secs_hva, &trapnr);
+	if (!ret)
+		return kvm_skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
+	if (ret == -EFAULT)
+		return sgx_inject_fault(vcpu, secs_gva, trapnr);
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int handle_encls_ecreate(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	gva_t pageinfo_gva, secs_gva;
+	gva_t metadata_gva, contents_gva;
+	gpa_t metadata_gpa, contents_gpa, secs_gpa;
+	unsigned long metadata_hva, contents_hva, secs_hva;
+	struct sgx_pageinfo pageinfo;
+	struct sgx_secs *contents;
+	struct x86_exception ex;
+	int r;
+
+	if (sgx_get_encls_gva(vcpu, kvm_rbx_read(vcpu), 32, 32, &pageinfo_gva) ||
+	    sgx_get_encls_gva(vcpu, kvm_rcx_read(vcpu), 4096, 4096, &secs_gva))
+		return 1;
+
+	/*
+	 * Copy the PAGEINFO to local memory, its pointers need to be
+	 * translated, i.e. we need to do a deep copy/translate.
+	 */
+	r = kvm_read_guest_virt(vcpu, pageinfo_gva, &pageinfo,
+				sizeof(pageinfo), &ex);
+	if (r == X86EMUL_PROPAGATE_FAULT) {
+		kvm_inject_emulated_page_fault(vcpu, &ex);
+		return 1;
+	} else if (r != X86EMUL_CONTINUE) {
+		sgx_handle_emulation_failure(vcpu, pageinfo_gva,
+					     sizeof(pageinfo));
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	if (sgx_get_encls_gva(vcpu, pageinfo.metadata, 64, 64, &metadata_gva) ||
+	    sgx_get_encls_gva(vcpu, pageinfo.contents, 4096, 4096,
+			      &contents_gva))
+		return 1;
+
+	/*
+	 * Translate the SECINFO, SOURCE and SECS pointers from GVA to GPA.
+	 * Resume the guest on failure to inject a #PF.
+	 */
+	if (sgx_gva_to_gpa(vcpu, metadata_gva, false, &metadata_gpa) ||
+	    sgx_gva_to_gpa(vcpu, contents_gva, false, &contents_gpa) ||
+	    sgx_gva_to_gpa(vcpu, secs_gva, true, &secs_gpa))
+		return 1;
+
+	/*
+	 * ...and then to HVA.  The order of accesses isn't architectural, i.e.
+	 * KVM doesn't have to fully process one address at a time.  Exit to
+	 * userspace if a GPA is invalid.
+	 */
+	if (sgx_gpa_to_hva(vcpu, metadata_gpa, &metadata_hva) ||
+	    sgx_gpa_to_hva(vcpu, contents_gpa, &contents_hva) ||
+	    sgx_gpa_to_hva(vcpu, secs_gpa, &secs_hva))
+		return 0;
+
+	/*
+	 * Copy contents into kernel memory to prevent TOCTOU attack. E.g. the
+	 * guest could do ECREATE w/ SECS.SGX_ATTR_PROVISIONKEY=0, and
+	 * simultaneously set SGX_ATTR_PROVISIONKEY to bypass the check to
+	 * enforce restriction of access to the PROVISIONKEY.
+	 */
+	contents = (struct sgx_secs *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
+	if (!contents)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	/* Exit to userspace if copying from a host userspace address fails. */
+	if (sgx_read_hva(vcpu, contents_hva, (void *)contents, PAGE_SIZE)) {
+		free_page((unsigned long)contents);
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	pageinfo.metadata = metadata_hva;
+	pageinfo.contents = (u64)contents;
+
+	r = __handle_encls_ecreate(vcpu, &pageinfo, secs_hva, secs_gva);
+
+	free_page((unsigned long)contents);
+
+	return r;
+}
+
+static int handle_encls_einit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	unsigned long sig_hva, secs_hva, token_hva, rflags;
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+	gva_t sig_gva, secs_gva, token_gva;
+	gpa_t sig_gpa, secs_gpa, token_gpa;
+	int ret, trapnr;
+
+	if (sgx_get_encls_gva(vcpu, kvm_rbx_read(vcpu), 1808, 4096, &sig_gva) ||
+	    sgx_get_encls_gva(vcpu, kvm_rcx_read(vcpu), 4096, 4096, &secs_gva) ||
+	    sgx_get_encls_gva(vcpu, kvm_rdx_read(vcpu), 304, 512, &token_gva))
+		return 1;
+
+	/*
+	 * Translate the SIGSTRUCT, SECS and TOKEN pointers from GVA to GPA.
+	 * Resume the guest on failure to inject a #PF.
+	 */
+	if (sgx_gva_to_gpa(vcpu, sig_gva, false, &sig_gpa) ||
+	    sgx_gva_to_gpa(vcpu, secs_gva, true, &secs_gpa) ||
+	    sgx_gva_to_gpa(vcpu, token_gva, false, &token_gpa))
+		return 1;
+
+	/*
+	 * ...and then to HVA.  The order of accesses isn't architectural, i.e.
+	 * KVM doesn't have to fully process one address at a time.  Exit to
+	 * userspace if a GPA is invalid.  Note, all structures are aligned and
+	 * cannot split pages.
+	 */
+	if (sgx_gpa_to_hva(vcpu, sig_gpa, &sig_hva) ||
+	    sgx_gpa_to_hva(vcpu, secs_gpa, &secs_hva) ||
+	    sgx_gpa_to_hva(vcpu, token_gpa, &token_hva))
+		return 0;
+
+	ret = sgx_virt_einit((void __user *)sig_hva, (void __user *)token_hva,
+			     (void __user *)secs_hva,
+			     vmx->msr_ia32_sgxlepubkeyhash, &trapnr);
+
+	if (ret == -EFAULT)
+		return sgx_inject_fault(vcpu, secs_gva, trapnr);
+
+	/*
+	 * sgx_virt_einit() returns -EINVAL when access_ok() fails on @sig_hva,
+	 * @token_hva or @secs_hva. This should never happen as KVM checks host
+	 * addresses at memslot creation. sgx_virt_einit() has already warned
+	 * in this case, so just return.
+	 */
+	if (ret < 0)
+		return ret;
+
+	rflags = vmx_get_rflags(vcpu) & ~(X86_EFLAGS_CF | X86_EFLAGS_PF |
+					  X86_EFLAGS_AF | X86_EFLAGS_SF |
+					  X86_EFLAGS_OF);
+	if (ret)
+		rflags |= X86_EFLAGS_ZF;
+	else
+		rflags &= ~X86_EFLAGS_ZF;
+	vmx_set_rflags(vcpu, rflags);
+
+	kvm_rax_write(vcpu, ret);
+	return kvm_skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
+}
+
+static inline bool encls_leaf_enabled_in_guest(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 leaf)
+{
+	/*
+	 * ENCLS generates a #UD if SGX1 isn't supported, i.e. this point will
+	 * be reached if and only if the SGX1 leafs are enabled.
+	 */
+	if (leaf >= ECREATE && leaf <= ETRACK)
+		return true;
+
+	if (leaf >= EAUG && leaf <= EMODT)
+		return guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_SGX2);
+
+	return false;
+}
+
+static inline bool sgx_enabled_in_guest_bios(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	const u64 bits = FEAT_CTL_SGX_ENABLED | FEAT_CTL_LOCKED;
+
+	return (to_vmx(vcpu)->msr_ia32_feature_control & bits) == bits;
+}
+
+int handle_encls(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	u32 leaf = (u32)kvm_rax_read(vcpu);
+
+	if (!enable_sgx || !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_SGX) ||
+	    !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_SGX1)) {
+		kvm_queue_exception(vcpu, UD_VECTOR);
+	} else if (!encls_leaf_enabled_in_guest(vcpu, leaf) ||
+		   !sgx_enabled_in_guest_bios(vcpu) || !is_paging(vcpu)) {
+		kvm_inject_gp(vcpu, 0);
+	} else {
+		if (leaf == ECREATE)
+			return handle_encls_ecreate(vcpu);
+		if (leaf == EINIT)
+			return handle_encls_einit(vcpu);
+		WARN_ONCE(1, "unexpected exit on ENCLS[%u]", leaf);
+		vcpu->run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_UNKNOWN;
+		vcpu->run->hw.hardware_exit_reason = EXIT_REASON_ENCLS;
+		return 0;
+	}
+	return 1;
+}
+
+void setup_default_sgx_lepubkeyhash(void)
+{
+	/*
+	 * Use Intel's default value for Skylake hardware if Launch Control is
+	 * not supported, i.e. Intel's hash is hardcoded into silicon, or if
+	 * Launch Control is supported and enabled, i.e. mimic the reset value
+	 * and let the guest write the MSRs at will.  If Launch Control is
+	 * supported but disabled, then use the current MSR values as the hash
+	 * MSRs exist but are read-only (locked and not writable).
+	 */
+	if (!enable_sgx || boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SGX_LC) ||
+	    rdmsrl_safe(MSR_IA32_SGXLEPUBKEYHASH0, &sgx_pubkey_hash[0])) {
+		sgx_pubkey_hash[0] = 0xa6053e051270b7acULL;
+		sgx_pubkey_hash[1] = 0x6cfbe8ba8b3b413dULL;
+		sgx_pubkey_hash[2] = 0xc4916d99f2b3735dULL;
+		sgx_pubkey_hash[3] = 0xd4f8c05909f9bb3bULL;
+	} else {
+		/* MSR_IA32_SGXLEPUBKEYHASH0 is read above */
+		rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_SGXLEPUBKEYHASH1, sgx_pubkey_hash[1]);
+		rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_SGXLEPUBKEYHASH2, sgx_pubkey_hash[2]);
+		rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_SGXLEPUBKEYHASH3, sgx_pubkey_hash[3]);
+	}
+}
+
+void vcpu_setup_sgx_lepubkeyhash(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+
+	memcpy(vmx->msr_ia32_sgxlepubkeyhash, sgx_pubkey_hash,
+	       sizeof(sgx_pubkey_hash));
+}
+
+/*
+ * ECREATE must be intercepted to enforce MISCSELECT, ATTRIBUTES and XFRM
+ * restrictions if the guest's allowed-1 settings diverge from hardware.
+ */
+static bool sgx_intercept_encls_ecreate(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *guest_cpuid;
+	u32 eax, ebx, ecx, edx;
+
+	if (!vcpu->kvm->arch.sgx_provisioning_allowed)
+		return true;
+
+	guest_cpuid = kvm_find_cpuid_entry_index(vcpu, 0x12, 0);
+	if (!guest_cpuid)
+		return true;
+
+	cpuid_count(0x12, 0, &eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx);
+	if (guest_cpuid->ebx != ebx || guest_cpuid->edx != edx)
+		return true;
+
+	guest_cpuid = kvm_find_cpuid_entry_index(vcpu, 0x12, 1);
+	if (!guest_cpuid)
+		return true;
+
+	cpuid_count(0x12, 1, &eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx);
+	if (guest_cpuid->eax != eax || guest_cpuid->ebx != ebx ||
+	    guest_cpuid->ecx != ecx || guest_cpuid->edx != edx)
+		return true;
+
+	return false;
+}
+
+void vmx_write_encls_bitmap(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct vmcs12 *vmcs12)
+{
+	/*
+	 * There is no software enable bit for SGX that is virtualized by
+	 * hardware, e.g. there's no CR4.SGXE, so when SGX is disabled in the
+	 * guest (either by the host or by the guest's BIOS) but enabled in the
+	 * host, trap all ENCLS leafs and inject #UD/#GP as needed to emulate
+	 * the expected system behavior for ENCLS.
+	 */
+	u64 bitmap = -1ull;
+
+	/* Nothing to do if hardware doesn't support SGX */
+	if (!cpu_has_vmx_encls_vmexit())
+		return;
+
+	if (guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_SGX) &&
+	    sgx_enabled_in_guest_bios(vcpu)) {
+		if (guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_SGX1)) {
+			bitmap &= ~GENMASK_ULL(ETRACK, ECREATE);
+			if (sgx_intercept_encls_ecreate(vcpu))
+				bitmap |= (1 << ECREATE);
+		}
+
+		if (guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_SGX2))
+			bitmap &= ~GENMASK_ULL(EMODT, EAUG);
+
+		/*
+		 * Trap and execute EINIT if launch control is enabled in the
+		 * host using the guest's values for launch control MSRs, even
+		 * if the guest's values are fixed to hardware default values.
+		 * The MSRs are not loaded/saved on VM-Enter/VM-Exit as writing
+		 * the MSRs is extraordinarily expensive.
+		 */
+		if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SGX_LC))
+			bitmap |= (1 << EINIT);
+
+		if (!vmcs12 && is_guest_mode(vcpu))
+			vmcs12 = get_vmcs12(vcpu);
+		if (vmcs12 && nested_cpu_has_encls_exit(vmcs12))
+			bitmap |= vmcs12->encls_exiting_bitmap;
+	}
+	vmcs_write64(ENCLS_EXITING_BITMAP, bitmap);
+}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/sgx.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/sgx.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..a400888b3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/sgx.h
@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+#ifndef __KVM_X86_SGX_H
+#define __KVM_X86_SGX_H
+
+#include <linux/kvm_host.h>
+
+#include "capabilities.h"
+#include "vmx_ops.h"
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_SGX_KVM
+extern bool __read_mostly enable_sgx;
+
+int handle_encls(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+
+void setup_default_sgx_lepubkeyhash(void);
+void vcpu_setup_sgx_lepubkeyhash(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+
+void vmx_write_encls_bitmap(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct vmcs12 *vmcs12);
+#else
+#define enable_sgx 0
+
+static inline void setup_default_sgx_lepubkeyhash(void) { }
+static inline void vcpu_setup_sgx_lepubkeyhash(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) { }
+
+static inline void vmx_write_encls_bitmap(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+					  struct vmcs12 *vmcs12)
+{
+	/* Nothing to do if hardware doesn't support SGX */
+	if (cpu_has_vmx_encls_vmexit())
+		vmcs_write64(ENCLS_EXITING_BITMAP, -1ull);
+}
+#endif
+
+#endif /* __KVM_X86_SGX_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmcs.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmcs.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..7c1996b43
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmcs.h
@@ -0,0 +1,193 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+#ifndef __KVM_X86_VMX_VMCS_H
+#define __KVM_X86_VMX_VMCS_H
+
+#include <linux/ktime.h>
+#include <linux/list.h>
+#include <linux/nospec.h>
+
+#include <asm/kvm.h>
+#include <asm/vmx.h>
+
+#include "capabilities.h"
+
+#define ROL16(val, n) ((u16)(((u16)(val) << (n)) | ((u16)(val) >> (16 - (n)))))
+
+struct vmcs_hdr {
+	u32 revision_id:31;
+	u32 shadow_vmcs:1;
+};
+
+struct vmcs {
+	struct vmcs_hdr hdr;
+	u32 abort;
+	char data[];
+};
+
+DECLARE_PER_CPU(struct vmcs *, current_vmcs);
+
+/*
+ * vmcs_host_state tracks registers that are loaded from the VMCS on VMEXIT
+ * and whose values change infrequently, but are not constant.  I.e. this is
+ * used as a write-through cache of the corresponding VMCS fields.
+ */
+struct vmcs_host_state {
+	unsigned long cr3;	/* May not match real cr3 */
+	unsigned long cr4;	/* May not match real cr4 */
+	unsigned long gs_base;
+	unsigned long fs_base;
+	unsigned long rsp;
+
+	u16           fs_sel, gs_sel, ldt_sel;
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+	u16           ds_sel, es_sel;
+#endif
+};
+
+struct vmcs_controls_shadow {
+	u32 vm_entry;
+	u32 vm_exit;
+	u32 pin;
+	u32 exec;
+	u32 secondary_exec;
+	u64 tertiary_exec;
+};
+
+/*
+ * Track a VMCS that may be loaded on a certain CPU. If it is (cpu!=-1), also
+ * remember whether it was VMLAUNCHed, and maintain a linked list of all VMCSs
+ * loaded on this CPU (so we can clear them if the CPU goes down).
+ */
+struct loaded_vmcs {
+	struct vmcs *vmcs;
+	struct vmcs *shadow_vmcs;
+	int cpu;
+	bool launched;
+	bool nmi_known_unmasked;
+	bool hv_timer_soft_disabled;
+	/* Support for vnmi-less CPUs */
+	int soft_vnmi_blocked;
+	ktime_t entry_time;
+	s64 vnmi_blocked_time;
+	unsigned long *msr_bitmap;
+	struct list_head loaded_vmcss_on_cpu_link;
+	struct vmcs_host_state host_state;
+	struct vmcs_controls_shadow controls_shadow;
+};
+
+static __always_inline bool is_intr_type(u32 intr_info, u32 type)
+{
+	const u32 mask = INTR_INFO_VALID_MASK | INTR_INFO_INTR_TYPE_MASK;
+
+	return (intr_info & mask) == (INTR_INFO_VALID_MASK | type);
+}
+
+static inline bool is_intr_type_n(u32 intr_info, u32 type, u8 vector)
+{
+	const u32 mask = INTR_INFO_VALID_MASK | INTR_INFO_INTR_TYPE_MASK |
+			 INTR_INFO_VECTOR_MASK;
+
+	return (intr_info & mask) == (INTR_INFO_VALID_MASK | type | vector);
+}
+
+static inline bool is_exception_n(u32 intr_info, u8 vector)
+{
+	return is_intr_type_n(intr_info, INTR_TYPE_HARD_EXCEPTION, vector);
+}
+
+static inline bool is_debug(u32 intr_info)
+{
+	return is_exception_n(intr_info, DB_VECTOR);
+}
+
+static inline bool is_breakpoint(u32 intr_info)
+{
+	return is_exception_n(intr_info, BP_VECTOR);
+}
+
+static inline bool is_double_fault(u32 intr_info)
+{
+	return is_exception_n(intr_info, DF_VECTOR);
+}
+
+static inline bool is_page_fault(u32 intr_info)
+{
+	return is_exception_n(intr_info, PF_VECTOR);
+}
+
+static inline bool is_invalid_opcode(u32 intr_info)
+{
+	return is_exception_n(intr_info, UD_VECTOR);
+}
+
+static inline bool is_gp_fault(u32 intr_info)
+{
+	return is_exception_n(intr_info, GP_VECTOR);
+}
+
+static inline bool is_alignment_check(u32 intr_info)
+{
+	return is_exception_n(intr_info, AC_VECTOR);
+}
+
+static inline bool is_machine_check(u32 intr_info)
+{
+	return is_exception_n(intr_info, MC_VECTOR);
+}
+
+static inline bool is_nm_fault(u32 intr_info)
+{
+	return is_exception_n(intr_info, NM_VECTOR);
+}
+
+/* Undocumented: icebp/int1 */
+static inline bool is_icebp(u32 intr_info)
+{
+	return is_intr_type(intr_info, INTR_TYPE_PRIV_SW_EXCEPTION);
+}
+
+static __always_inline bool is_nmi(u32 intr_info)
+{
+	return is_intr_type(intr_info, INTR_TYPE_NMI_INTR);
+}
+
+static inline bool is_external_intr(u32 intr_info)
+{
+	return is_intr_type(intr_info, INTR_TYPE_EXT_INTR);
+}
+
+static inline bool is_exception_with_error_code(u32 intr_info)
+{
+	const u32 mask = INTR_INFO_VALID_MASK | INTR_INFO_DELIVER_CODE_MASK;
+
+	return (intr_info & mask) == mask;
+}
+
+enum vmcs_field_width {
+	VMCS_FIELD_WIDTH_U16 = 0,
+	VMCS_FIELD_WIDTH_U64 = 1,
+	VMCS_FIELD_WIDTH_U32 = 2,
+	VMCS_FIELD_WIDTH_NATURAL_WIDTH = 3
+};
+
+static inline int vmcs_field_width(unsigned long field)
+{
+	if (0x1 & field)	/* the *_HIGH fields are all 32 bit */
+		return VMCS_FIELD_WIDTH_U32;
+	return (field >> 13) & 0x3;
+}
+
+static inline int vmcs_field_readonly(unsigned long field)
+{
+	return (((field >> 10) & 0x3) == 1);
+}
+
+#define VMCS_FIELD_INDEX_SHIFT		(1)
+#define VMCS_FIELD_INDEX_MASK		GENMASK(9, 1)
+
+static inline unsigned int vmcs_field_index(unsigned long field)
+{
+	return (field & VMCS_FIELD_INDEX_MASK) >> VMCS_FIELD_INDEX_SHIFT;
+}
+
+#endif /* __KVM_X86_VMX_VMCS_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmcs12.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmcs12.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..106a72c92
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmcs12.c
@@ -0,0 +1,155 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
+
+#include "vmcs12.h"
+
+#define VMCS12_OFFSET(x) offsetof(struct vmcs12, x)
+#define FIELD(number, name)	[ROL16(number, 6)] = VMCS12_OFFSET(name)
+#define FIELD64(number, name)						\
+	FIELD(number, name),						\
+	[ROL16(number##_HIGH, 6)] = VMCS12_OFFSET(name) + sizeof(u32)
+
+const unsigned short vmcs12_field_offsets[] = {
+	FIELD(VIRTUAL_PROCESSOR_ID, virtual_processor_id),
+	FIELD(POSTED_INTR_NV, posted_intr_nv),
+	FIELD(GUEST_ES_SELECTOR, guest_es_selector),
+	FIELD(GUEST_CS_SELECTOR, guest_cs_selector),
+	FIELD(GUEST_SS_SELECTOR, guest_ss_selector),
+	FIELD(GUEST_DS_SELECTOR, guest_ds_selector),
+	FIELD(GUEST_FS_SELECTOR, guest_fs_selector),
+	FIELD(GUEST_GS_SELECTOR, guest_gs_selector),
+	FIELD(GUEST_LDTR_SELECTOR, guest_ldtr_selector),
+	FIELD(GUEST_TR_SELECTOR, guest_tr_selector),
+	FIELD(GUEST_INTR_STATUS, guest_intr_status),
+	FIELD(GUEST_PML_INDEX, guest_pml_index),
+	FIELD(HOST_ES_SELECTOR, host_es_selector),
+	FIELD(HOST_CS_SELECTOR, host_cs_selector),
+	FIELD(HOST_SS_SELECTOR, host_ss_selector),
+	FIELD(HOST_DS_SELECTOR, host_ds_selector),
+	FIELD(HOST_FS_SELECTOR, host_fs_selector),
+	FIELD(HOST_GS_SELECTOR, host_gs_selector),
+	FIELD(HOST_TR_SELECTOR, host_tr_selector),
+	FIELD64(IO_BITMAP_A, io_bitmap_a),
+	FIELD64(IO_BITMAP_B, io_bitmap_b),
+	FIELD64(MSR_BITMAP, msr_bitmap),
+	FIELD64(VM_EXIT_MSR_STORE_ADDR, vm_exit_msr_store_addr),
+	FIELD64(VM_EXIT_MSR_LOAD_ADDR, vm_exit_msr_load_addr),
+	FIELD64(VM_ENTRY_MSR_LOAD_ADDR, vm_entry_msr_load_addr),
+	FIELD64(PML_ADDRESS, pml_address),
+	FIELD64(TSC_OFFSET, tsc_offset),
+	FIELD64(TSC_MULTIPLIER, tsc_multiplier),
+	FIELD64(VIRTUAL_APIC_PAGE_ADDR, virtual_apic_page_addr),
+	FIELD64(APIC_ACCESS_ADDR, apic_access_addr),
+	FIELD64(POSTED_INTR_DESC_ADDR, posted_intr_desc_addr),
+	FIELD64(VM_FUNCTION_CONTROL, vm_function_control),
+	FIELD64(EPT_POINTER, ept_pointer),
+	FIELD64(EOI_EXIT_BITMAP0, eoi_exit_bitmap0),
+	FIELD64(EOI_EXIT_BITMAP1, eoi_exit_bitmap1),
+	FIELD64(EOI_EXIT_BITMAP2, eoi_exit_bitmap2),
+	FIELD64(EOI_EXIT_BITMAP3, eoi_exit_bitmap3),
+	FIELD64(EPTP_LIST_ADDRESS, eptp_list_address),
+	FIELD64(VMREAD_BITMAP, vmread_bitmap),
+	FIELD64(VMWRITE_BITMAP, vmwrite_bitmap),
+	FIELD64(XSS_EXIT_BITMAP, xss_exit_bitmap),
+	FIELD64(ENCLS_EXITING_BITMAP, encls_exiting_bitmap),
+	FIELD64(GUEST_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS, guest_physical_address),
+	FIELD64(VMCS_LINK_POINTER, vmcs_link_pointer),
+	FIELD64(GUEST_IA32_DEBUGCTL, guest_ia32_debugctl),
+	FIELD64(GUEST_IA32_PAT, guest_ia32_pat),
+	FIELD64(GUEST_IA32_EFER, guest_ia32_efer),
+	FIELD64(GUEST_IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL, guest_ia32_perf_global_ctrl),
+	FIELD64(GUEST_PDPTR0, guest_pdptr0),
+	FIELD64(GUEST_PDPTR1, guest_pdptr1),
+	FIELD64(GUEST_PDPTR2, guest_pdptr2),
+	FIELD64(GUEST_PDPTR3, guest_pdptr3),
+	FIELD64(GUEST_BNDCFGS, guest_bndcfgs),
+	FIELD64(HOST_IA32_PAT, host_ia32_pat),
+	FIELD64(HOST_IA32_EFER, host_ia32_efer),
+	FIELD64(HOST_IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL, host_ia32_perf_global_ctrl),
+	FIELD(PIN_BASED_VM_EXEC_CONTROL, pin_based_vm_exec_control),
+	FIELD(CPU_BASED_VM_EXEC_CONTROL, cpu_based_vm_exec_control),
+	FIELD(EXCEPTION_BITMAP, exception_bitmap),
+	FIELD(PAGE_FAULT_ERROR_CODE_MASK, page_fault_error_code_mask),
+	FIELD(PAGE_FAULT_ERROR_CODE_MATCH, page_fault_error_code_match),
+	FIELD(CR3_TARGET_COUNT, cr3_target_count),
+	FIELD(VM_EXIT_CONTROLS, vm_exit_controls),
+	FIELD(VM_EXIT_MSR_STORE_COUNT, vm_exit_msr_store_count),
+	FIELD(VM_EXIT_MSR_LOAD_COUNT, vm_exit_msr_load_count),
+	FIELD(VM_ENTRY_CONTROLS, vm_entry_controls),
+	FIELD(VM_ENTRY_MSR_LOAD_COUNT, vm_entry_msr_load_count),
+	FIELD(VM_ENTRY_INTR_INFO_FIELD, vm_entry_intr_info_field),
+	FIELD(VM_ENTRY_EXCEPTION_ERROR_CODE, vm_entry_exception_error_code),
+	FIELD(VM_ENTRY_INSTRUCTION_LEN, vm_entry_instruction_len),
+	FIELD(TPR_THRESHOLD, tpr_threshold),
+	FIELD(SECONDARY_VM_EXEC_CONTROL, secondary_vm_exec_control),
+	FIELD(VM_INSTRUCTION_ERROR, vm_instruction_error),
+	FIELD(VM_EXIT_REASON, vm_exit_reason),
+	FIELD(VM_EXIT_INTR_INFO, vm_exit_intr_info),
+	FIELD(VM_EXIT_INTR_ERROR_CODE, vm_exit_intr_error_code),
+	FIELD(IDT_VECTORING_INFO_FIELD, idt_vectoring_info_field),
+	FIELD(IDT_VECTORING_ERROR_CODE, idt_vectoring_error_code),
+	FIELD(VM_EXIT_INSTRUCTION_LEN, vm_exit_instruction_len),
+	FIELD(VMX_INSTRUCTION_INFO, vmx_instruction_info),
+	FIELD(GUEST_ES_LIMIT, guest_es_limit),
+	FIELD(GUEST_CS_LIMIT, guest_cs_limit),
+	FIELD(GUEST_SS_LIMIT, guest_ss_limit),
+	FIELD(GUEST_DS_LIMIT, guest_ds_limit),
+	FIELD(GUEST_FS_LIMIT, guest_fs_limit),
+	FIELD(GUEST_GS_LIMIT, guest_gs_limit),
+	FIELD(GUEST_LDTR_LIMIT, guest_ldtr_limit),
+	FIELD(GUEST_TR_LIMIT, guest_tr_limit),
+	FIELD(GUEST_GDTR_LIMIT, guest_gdtr_limit),
+	FIELD(GUEST_IDTR_LIMIT, guest_idtr_limit),
+	FIELD(GUEST_ES_AR_BYTES, guest_es_ar_bytes),
+	FIELD(GUEST_CS_AR_BYTES, guest_cs_ar_bytes),
+	FIELD(GUEST_SS_AR_BYTES, guest_ss_ar_bytes),
+	FIELD(GUEST_DS_AR_BYTES, guest_ds_ar_bytes),
+	FIELD(GUEST_FS_AR_BYTES, guest_fs_ar_bytes),
+	FIELD(GUEST_GS_AR_BYTES, guest_gs_ar_bytes),
+	FIELD(GUEST_LDTR_AR_BYTES, guest_ldtr_ar_bytes),
+	FIELD(GUEST_TR_AR_BYTES, guest_tr_ar_bytes),
+	FIELD(GUEST_INTERRUPTIBILITY_INFO, guest_interruptibility_info),
+	FIELD(GUEST_ACTIVITY_STATE, guest_activity_state),
+	FIELD(GUEST_SYSENTER_CS, guest_sysenter_cs),
+	FIELD(HOST_IA32_SYSENTER_CS, host_ia32_sysenter_cs),
+	FIELD(VMX_PREEMPTION_TIMER_VALUE, vmx_preemption_timer_value),
+	FIELD(CR0_GUEST_HOST_MASK, cr0_guest_host_mask),
+	FIELD(CR4_GUEST_HOST_MASK, cr4_guest_host_mask),
+	FIELD(CR0_READ_SHADOW, cr0_read_shadow),
+	FIELD(CR4_READ_SHADOW, cr4_read_shadow),
+	FIELD(EXIT_QUALIFICATION, exit_qualification),
+	FIELD(GUEST_LINEAR_ADDRESS, guest_linear_address),
+	FIELD(GUEST_CR0, guest_cr0),
+	FIELD(GUEST_CR3, guest_cr3),
+	FIELD(GUEST_CR4, guest_cr4),
+	FIELD(GUEST_ES_BASE, guest_es_base),
+	FIELD(GUEST_CS_BASE, guest_cs_base),
+	FIELD(GUEST_SS_BASE, guest_ss_base),
+	FIELD(GUEST_DS_BASE, guest_ds_base),
+	FIELD(GUEST_FS_BASE, guest_fs_base),
+	FIELD(GUEST_GS_BASE, guest_gs_base),
+	FIELD(GUEST_LDTR_BASE, guest_ldtr_base),
+	FIELD(GUEST_TR_BASE, guest_tr_base),
+	FIELD(GUEST_GDTR_BASE, guest_gdtr_base),
+	FIELD(GUEST_IDTR_BASE, guest_idtr_base),
+	FIELD(GUEST_DR7, guest_dr7),
+	FIELD(GUEST_RSP, guest_rsp),
+	FIELD(GUEST_RIP, guest_rip),
+	FIELD(GUEST_RFLAGS, guest_rflags),
+	FIELD(GUEST_PENDING_DBG_EXCEPTIONS, guest_pending_dbg_exceptions),
+	FIELD(GUEST_SYSENTER_ESP, guest_sysenter_esp),
+	FIELD(GUEST_SYSENTER_EIP, guest_sysenter_eip),
+	FIELD(HOST_CR0, host_cr0),
+	FIELD(HOST_CR3, host_cr3),
+	FIELD(HOST_CR4, host_cr4),
+	FIELD(HOST_FS_BASE, host_fs_base),
+	FIELD(HOST_GS_BASE, host_gs_base),
+	FIELD(HOST_TR_BASE, host_tr_base),
+	FIELD(HOST_GDTR_BASE, host_gdtr_base),
+	FIELD(HOST_IDTR_BASE, host_idtr_base),
+	FIELD(HOST_IA32_SYSENTER_ESP, host_ia32_sysenter_esp),
+	FIELD(HOST_IA32_SYSENTER_EIP, host_ia32_sysenter_eip),
+	FIELD(HOST_RSP, host_rsp),
+	FIELD(HOST_RIP, host_rip),
+};
+const unsigned int nr_vmcs12_fields = ARRAY_SIZE(vmcs12_field_offsets);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmcs12.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmcs12.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..019360134
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmcs12.h
@@ -0,0 +1,429 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+#ifndef __KVM_X86_VMX_VMCS12_H
+#define __KVM_X86_VMX_VMCS12_H
+
+#include <linux/build_bug.h>
+
+#include "vmcs.h"
+
+/*
+ * struct vmcs12 describes the state that our guest hypervisor (L1) keeps for a
+ * single nested guest (L2), hence the name vmcs12. Any VMX implementation has
+ * a VMCS structure, and vmcs12 is our emulated VMX's VMCS. This structure is
+ * stored in guest memory specified by VMPTRLD, but is opaque to the guest,
+ * which must access it using VMREAD/VMWRITE/VMCLEAR instructions.
+ * More than one of these structures may exist, if L1 runs multiple L2 guests.
+ * nested_vmx_run() will use the data here to build the vmcs02: a VMCS for the
+ * underlying hardware which will be used to run L2.
+ * This structure is packed to ensure that its layout is identical across
+ * machines (necessary for live migration).
+ *
+ * IMPORTANT: Changing the layout of existing fields in this structure
+ * will break save/restore compatibility with older kvm releases. When
+ * adding new fields, either use space in the reserved padding* arrays
+ * or add the new fields to the end of the structure.
+ */
+typedef u64 natural_width;
+struct __packed vmcs12 {
+	/* According to the Intel spec, a VMCS region must start with the
+	 * following two fields. Then follow implementation-specific data.
+	 */
+	struct vmcs_hdr hdr;
+	u32 abort;
+
+	u32 launch_state; /* set to 0 by VMCLEAR, to 1 by VMLAUNCH */
+	u32 padding[7]; /* room for future expansion */
+
+	u64 io_bitmap_a;
+	u64 io_bitmap_b;
+	u64 msr_bitmap;
+	u64 vm_exit_msr_store_addr;
+	u64 vm_exit_msr_load_addr;
+	u64 vm_entry_msr_load_addr;
+	u64 tsc_offset;
+	u64 virtual_apic_page_addr;
+	u64 apic_access_addr;
+	u64 posted_intr_desc_addr;
+	u64 ept_pointer;
+	u64 eoi_exit_bitmap0;
+	u64 eoi_exit_bitmap1;
+	u64 eoi_exit_bitmap2;
+	u64 eoi_exit_bitmap3;
+	u64 xss_exit_bitmap;
+	u64 guest_physical_address;
+	u64 vmcs_link_pointer;
+	u64 guest_ia32_debugctl;
+	u64 guest_ia32_pat;
+	u64 guest_ia32_efer;
+	u64 guest_ia32_perf_global_ctrl;
+	u64 guest_pdptr0;
+	u64 guest_pdptr1;
+	u64 guest_pdptr2;
+	u64 guest_pdptr3;
+	u64 guest_bndcfgs;
+	u64 host_ia32_pat;
+	u64 host_ia32_efer;
+	u64 host_ia32_perf_global_ctrl;
+	u64 vmread_bitmap;
+	u64 vmwrite_bitmap;
+	u64 vm_function_control;
+	u64 eptp_list_address;
+	u64 pml_address;
+	u64 encls_exiting_bitmap;
+	u64 tsc_multiplier;
+	u64 padding64[1]; /* room for future expansion */
+	/*
+	 * To allow migration of L1 (complete with its L2 guests) between
+	 * machines of different natural widths (32 or 64 bit), we cannot have
+	 * unsigned long fields with no explicit size. We use u64 (aliased
+	 * natural_width) instead. Luckily, x86 is little-endian.
+	 */
+	natural_width cr0_guest_host_mask;
+	natural_width cr4_guest_host_mask;
+	natural_width cr0_read_shadow;
+	natural_width cr4_read_shadow;
+	natural_width dead_space[4]; /* Last remnants of cr3_target_value[0-3]. */
+	natural_width exit_qualification;
+	natural_width guest_linear_address;
+	natural_width guest_cr0;
+	natural_width guest_cr3;
+	natural_width guest_cr4;
+	natural_width guest_es_base;
+	natural_width guest_cs_base;
+	natural_width guest_ss_base;
+	natural_width guest_ds_base;
+	natural_width guest_fs_base;
+	natural_width guest_gs_base;
+	natural_width guest_ldtr_base;
+	natural_width guest_tr_base;
+	natural_width guest_gdtr_base;
+	natural_width guest_idtr_base;
+	natural_width guest_dr7;
+	natural_width guest_rsp;
+	natural_width guest_rip;
+	natural_width guest_rflags;
+	natural_width guest_pending_dbg_exceptions;
+	natural_width guest_sysenter_esp;
+	natural_width guest_sysenter_eip;
+	natural_width host_cr0;
+	natural_width host_cr3;
+	natural_width host_cr4;
+	natural_width host_fs_base;
+	natural_width host_gs_base;
+	natural_width host_tr_base;
+	natural_width host_gdtr_base;
+	natural_width host_idtr_base;
+	natural_width host_ia32_sysenter_esp;
+	natural_width host_ia32_sysenter_eip;
+	natural_width host_rsp;
+	natural_width host_rip;
+	natural_width paddingl[8]; /* room for future expansion */
+	u32 pin_based_vm_exec_control;
+	u32 cpu_based_vm_exec_control;
+	u32 exception_bitmap;
+	u32 page_fault_error_code_mask;
+	u32 page_fault_error_code_match;
+	u32 cr3_target_count;
+	u32 vm_exit_controls;
+	u32 vm_exit_msr_store_count;
+	u32 vm_exit_msr_load_count;
+	u32 vm_entry_controls;
+	u32 vm_entry_msr_load_count;
+	u32 vm_entry_intr_info_field;
+	u32 vm_entry_exception_error_code;
+	u32 vm_entry_instruction_len;
+	u32 tpr_threshold;
+	u32 secondary_vm_exec_control;
+	u32 vm_instruction_error;
+	u32 vm_exit_reason;
+	u32 vm_exit_intr_info;
+	u32 vm_exit_intr_error_code;
+	u32 idt_vectoring_info_field;
+	u32 idt_vectoring_error_code;
+	u32 vm_exit_instruction_len;
+	u32 vmx_instruction_info;
+	u32 guest_es_limit;
+	u32 guest_cs_limit;
+	u32 guest_ss_limit;
+	u32 guest_ds_limit;
+	u32 guest_fs_limit;
+	u32 guest_gs_limit;
+	u32 guest_ldtr_limit;
+	u32 guest_tr_limit;
+	u32 guest_gdtr_limit;
+	u32 guest_idtr_limit;
+	u32 guest_es_ar_bytes;
+	u32 guest_cs_ar_bytes;
+	u32 guest_ss_ar_bytes;
+	u32 guest_ds_ar_bytes;
+	u32 guest_fs_ar_bytes;
+	u32 guest_gs_ar_bytes;
+	u32 guest_ldtr_ar_bytes;
+	u32 guest_tr_ar_bytes;
+	u32 guest_interruptibility_info;
+	u32 guest_activity_state;
+	u32 guest_sysenter_cs;
+	u32 host_ia32_sysenter_cs;
+	u32 vmx_preemption_timer_value;
+	u32 padding32[7]; /* room for future expansion */
+	u16 virtual_processor_id;
+	u16 posted_intr_nv;
+	u16 guest_es_selector;
+	u16 guest_cs_selector;
+	u16 guest_ss_selector;
+	u16 guest_ds_selector;
+	u16 guest_fs_selector;
+	u16 guest_gs_selector;
+	u16 guest_ldtr_selector;
+	u16 guest_tr_selector;
+	u16 guest_intr_status;
+	u16 host_es_selector;
+	u16 host_cs_selector;
+	u16 host_ss_selector;
+	u16 host_ds_selector;
+	u16 host_fs_selector;
+	u16 host_gs_selector;
+	u16 host_tr_selector;
+	u16 guest_pml_index;
+};
+
+/*
+ * VMCS12_REVISION is an arbitrary id that should be changed if the content or
+ * layout of struct vmcs12 is changed. MSR_IA32_VMX_BASIC returns this id, and
+ * VMPTRLD verifies that the VMCS region that L1 is loading contains this id.
+ *
+ * IMPORTANT: Changing this value will break save/restore compatibility with
+ * older kvm releases.
+ */
+#define VMCS12_REVISION 0x11e57ed0
+
+/*
+ * VMCS12_SIZE is the number of bytes L1 should allocate for the VMXON region
+ * and any VMCS region. Although only sizeof(struct vmcs12) are used by the
+ * current implementation, 4K are reserved to avoid future complications and
+ * to preserve userspace ABI.
+ */
+#define VMCS12_SIZE		KVM_STATE_NESTED_VMX_VMCS_SIZE
+
+/*
+ * For save/restore compatibility, the vmcs12 field offsets must not change.
+ */
+#define CHECK_OFFSET(field, loc) \
+	ASSERT_STRUCT_OFFSET(struct vmcs12, field, loc)
+
+static inline void vmx_check_vmcs12_offsets(void)
+{
+	CHECK_OFFSET(hdr, 0);
+	CHECK_OFFSET(abort, 4);
+	CHECK_OFFSET(launch_state, 8);
+	CHECK_OFFSET(io_bitmap_a, 40);
+	CHECK_OFFSET(io_bitmap_b, 48);
+	CHECK_OFFSET(msr_bitmap, 56);
+	CHECK_OFFSET(vm_exit_msr_store_addr, 64);
+	CHECK_OFFSET(vm_exit_msr_load_addr, 72);
+	CHECK_OFFSET(vm_entry_msr_load_addr, 80);
+	CHECK_OFFSET(tsc_offset, 88);
+	CHECK_OFFSET(virtual_apic_page_addr, 96);
+	CHECK_OFFSET(apic_access_addr, 104);
+	CHECK_OFFSET(posted_intr_desc_addr, 112);
+	CHECK_OFFSET(ept_pointer, 120);
+	CHECK_OFFSET(eoi_exit_bitmap0, 128);
+	CHECK_OFFSET(eoi_exit_bitmap1, 136);
+	CHECK_OFFSET(eoi_exit_bitmap2, 144);
+	CHECK_OFFSET(eoi_exit_bitmap3, 152);
+	CHECK_OFFSET(xss_exit_bitmap, 160);
+	CHECK_OFFSET(guest_physical_address, 168);
+	CHECK_OFFSET(vmcs_link_pointer, 176);
+	CHECK_OFFSET(guest_ia32_debugctl, 184);
+	CHECK_OFFSET(guest_ia32_pat, 192);
+	CHECK_OFFSET(guest_ia32_efer, 200);
+	CHECK_OFFSET(guest_ia32_perf_global_ctrl, 208);
+	CHECK_OFFSET(guest_pdptr0, 216);
+	CHECK_OFFSET(guest_pdptr1, 224);
+	CHECK_OFFSET(guest_pdptr2, 232);
+	CHECK_OFFSET(guest_pdptr3, 240);
+	CHECK_OFFSET(guest_bndcfgs, 248);
+	CHECK_OFFSET(host_ia32_pat, 256);
+	CHECK_OFFSET(host_ia32_efer, 264);
+	CHECK_OFFSET(host_ia32_perf_global_ctrl, 272);
+	CHECK_OFFSET(vmread_bitmap, 280);
+	CHECK_OFFSET(vmwrite_bitmap, 288);
+	CHECK_OFFSET(vm_function_control, 296);
+	CHECK_OFFSET(eptp_list_address, 304);
+	CHECK_OFFSET(pml_address, 312);
+	CHECK_OFFSET(encls_exiting_bitmap, 320);
+	CHECK_OFFSET(tsc_multiplier, 328);
+	CHECK_OFFSET(cr0_guest_host_mask, 344);
+	CHECK_OFFSET(cr4_guest_host_mask, 352);
+	CHECK_OFFSET(cr0_read_shadow, 360);
+	CHECK_OFFSET(cr4_read_shadow, 368);
+	CHECK_OFFSET(dead_space, 376);
+	CHECK_OFFSET(exit_qualification, 408);
+	CHECK_OFFSET(guest_linear_address, 416);
+	CHECK_OFFSET(guest_cr0, 424);
+	CHECK_OFFSET(guest_cr3, 432);
+	CHECK_OFFSET(guest_cr4, 440);
+	CHECK_OFFSET(guest_es_base, 448);
+	CHECK_OFFSET(guest_cs_base, 456);
+	CHECK_OFFSET(guest_ss_base, 464);
+	CHECK_OFFSET(guest_ds_base, 472);
+	CHECK_OFFSET(guest_fs_base, 480);
+	CHECK_OFFSET(guest_gs_base, 488);
+	CHECK_OFFSET(guest_ldtr_base, 496);
+	CHECK_OFFSET(guest_tr_base, 504);
+	CHECK_OFFSET(guest_gdtr_base, 512);
+	CHECK_OFFSET(guest_idtr_base, 520);
+	CHECK_OFFSET(guest_dr7, 528);
+	CHECK_OFFSET(guest_rsp, 536);
+	CHECK_OFFSET(guest_rip, 544);
+	CHECK_OFFSET(guest_rflags, 552);
+	CHECK_OFFSET(guest_pending_dbg_exceptions, 560);
+	CHECK_OFFSET(guest_sysenter_esp, 568);
+	CHECK_OFFSET(guest_sysenter_eip, 576);
+	CHECK_OFFSET(host_cr0, 584);
+	CHECK_OFFSET(host_cr3, 592);
+	CHECK_OFFSET(host_cr4, 600);
+	CHECK_OFFSET(host_fs_base, 608);
+	CHECK_OFFSET(host_gs_base, 616);
+	CHECK_OFFSET(host_tr_base, 624);
+	CHECK_OFFSET(host_gdtr_base, 632);
+	CHECK_OFFSET(host_idtr_base, 640);
+	CHECK_OFFSET(host_ia32_sysenter_esp, 648);
+	CHECK_OFFSET(host_ia32_sysenter_eip, 656);
+	CHECK_OFFSET(host_rsp, 664);
+	CHECK_OFFSET(host_rip, 672);
+	CHECK_OFFSET(pin_based_vm_exec_control, 744);
+	CHECK_OFFSET(cpu_based_vm_exec_control, 748);
+	CHECK_OFFSET(exception_bitmap, 752);
+	CHECK_OFFSET(page_fault_error_code_mask, 756);
+	CHECK_OFFSET(page_fault_error_code_match, 760);
+	CHECK_OFFSET(cr3_target_count, 764);
+	CHECK_OFFSET(vm_exit_controls, 768);
+	CHECK_OFFSET(vm_exit_msr_store_count, 772);
+	CHECK_OFFSET(vm_exit_msr_load_count, 776);
+	CHECK_OFFSET(vm_entry_controls, 780);
+	CHECK_OFFSET(vm_entry_msr_load_count, 784);
+	CHECK_OFFSET(vm_entry_intr_info_field, 788);
+	CHECK_OFFSET(vm_entry_exception_error_code, 792);
+	CHECK_OFFSET(vm_entry_instruction_len, 796);
+	CHECK_OFFSET(tpr_threshold, 800);
+	CHECK_OFFSET(secondary_vm_exec_control, 804);
+	CHECK_OFFSET(vm_instruction_error, 808);
+	CHECK_OFFSET(vm_exit_reason, 812);
+	CHECK_OFFSET(vm_exit_intr_info, 816);
+	CHECK_OFFSET(vm_exit_intr_error_code, 820);
+	CHECK_OFFSET(idt_vectoring_info_field, 824);
+	CHECK_OFFSET(idt_vectoring_error_code, 828);
+	CHECK_OFFSET(vm_exit_instruction_len, 832);
+	CHECK_OFFSET(vmx_instruction_info, 836);
+	CHECK_OFFSET(guest_es_limit, 840);
+	CHECK_OFFSET(guest_cs_limit, 844);
+	CHECK_OFFSET(guest_ss_limit, 848);
+	CHECK_OFFSET(guest_ds_limit, 852);
+	CHECK_OFFSET(guest_fs_limit, 856);
+	CHECK_OFFSET(guest_gs_limit, 860);
+	CHECK_OFFSET(guest_ldtr_limit, 864);
+	CHECK_OFFSET(guest_tr_limit, 868);
+	CHECK_OFFSET(guest_gdtr_limit, 872);
+	CHECK_OFFSET(guest_idtr_limit, 876);
+	CHECK_OFFSET(guest_es_ar_bytes, 880);
+	CHECK_OFFSET(guest_cs_ar_bytes, 884);
+	CHECK_OFFSET(guest_ss_ar_bytes, 888);
+	CHECK_OFFSET(guest_ds_ar_bytes, 892);
+	CHECK_OFFSET(guest_fs_ar_bytes, 896);
+	CHECK_OFFSET(guest_gs_ar_bytes, 900);
+	CHECK_OFFSET(guest_ldtr_ar_bytes, 904);
+	CHECK_OFFSET(guest_tr_ar_bytes, 908);
+	CHECK_OFFSET(guest_interruptibility_info, 912);
+	CHECK_OFFSET(guest_activity_state, 916);
+	CHECK_OFFSET(guest_sysenter_cs, 920);
+	CHECK_OFFSET(host_ia32_sysenter_cs, 924);
+	CHECK_OFFSET(vmx_preemption_timer_value, 928);
+	CHECK_OFFSET(virtual_processor_id, 960);
+	CHECK_OFFSET(posted_intr_nv, 962);
+	CHECK_OFFSET(guest_es_selector, 964);
+	CHECK_OFFSET(guest_cs_selector, 966);
+	CHECK_OFFSET(guest_ss_selector, 968);
+	CHECK_OFFSET(guest_ds_selector, 970);
+	CHECK_OFFSET(guest_fs_selector, 972);
+	CHECK_OFFSET(guest_gs_selector, 974);
+	CHECK_OFFSET(guest_ldtr_selector, 976);
+	CHECK_OFFSET(guest_tr_selector, 978);
+	CHECK_OFFSET(guest_intr_status, 980);
+	CHECK_OFFSET(host_es_selector, 982);
+	CHECK_OFFSET(host_cs_selector, 984);
+	CHECK_OFFSET(host_ss_selector, 986);
+	CHECK_OFFSET(host_ds_selector, 988);
+	CHECK_OFFSET(host_fs_selector, 990);
+	CHECK_OFFSET(host_gs_selector, 992);
+	CHECK_OFFSET(host_tr_selector, 994);
+	CHECK_OFFSET(guest_pml_index, 996);
+}
+
+extern const unsigned short vmcs12_field_offsets[];
+extern const unsigned int nr_vmcs12_fields;
+
+static inline short get_vmcs12_field_offset(unsigned long field)
+{
+	unsigned short offset;
+	unsigned int index;
+
+	if (field >> 15)
+		return -ENOENT;
+
+	index = ROL16(field, 6);
+	if (index >= nr_vmcs12_fields)
+		return -ENOENT;
+
+	index = array_index_nospec(index, nr_vmcs12_fields);
+	offset = vmcs12_field_offsets[index];
+	if (offset == 0)
+		return -ENOENT;
+	return offset;
+}
+
+static inline u64 vmcs12_read_any(struct vmcs12 *vmcs12, unsigned long field,
+				  u16 offset)
+{
+	char *p = (char *)vmcs12 + offset;
+
+	switch (vmcs_field_width(field)) {
+	case VMCS_FIELD_WIDTH_NATURAL_WIDTH:
+		return *((natural_width *)p);
+	case VMCS_FIELD_WIDTH_U16:
+		return *((u16 *)p);
+	case VMCS_FIELD_WIDTH_U32:
+		return *((u32 *)p);
+	case VMCS_FIELD_WIDTH_U64:
+		return *((u64 *)p);
+	default:
+		WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
+		return -1;
+	}
+}
+
+static inline void vmcs12_write_any(struct vmcs12 *vmcs12, unsigned long field,
+				    u16 offset, u64 field_value)
+{
+	char *p = (char *)vmcs12 + offset;
+
+	switch (vmcs_field_width(field)) {
+	case VMCS_FIELD_WIDTH_U16:
+		*(u16 *)p = field_value;
+		break;
+	case VMCS_FIELD_WIDTH_U32:
+		*(u32 *)p = field_value;
+		break;
+	case VMCS_FIELD_WIDTH_U64:
+		*(u64 *)p = field_value;
+		break;
+	case VMCS_FIELD_WIDTH_NATURAL_WIDTH:
+		*(natural_width *)p = field_value;
+		break;
+	default:
+		WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
+		break;
+	}
+}
+
+#endif /* __KVM_X86_VMX_VMCS12_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmcs_shadow_fields.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmcs_shadow_fields.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..cad128d16
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmcs_shadow_fields.h
@@ -0,0 +1,79 @@
+#if !defined(SHADOW_FIELD_RO) && !defined(SHADOW_FIELD_RW)
+BUILD_BUG_ON(1)
+#endif
+
+#ifndef SHADOW_FIELD_RO
+#define SHADOW_FIELD_RO(x, y)
+#endif
+#ifndef SHADOW_FIELD_RW
+#define SHADOW_FIELD_RW(x, y)
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * We do NOT shadow fields that are modified when L0
+ * traps and emulates any vmx instruction (e.g. VMPTRLD,
+ * VMXON...) executed by L1.
+ * For example, VM_INSTRUCTION_ERROR is read
+ * by L1 if a vmx instruction fails (part of the error path).
+ * Note the code assumes this logic. If for some reason
+ * we start shadowing these fields then we need to
+ * force a shadow sync when L0 emulates vmx instructions
+ * (e.g. force a sync if VM_INSTRUCTION_ERROR is modified
+ * by nested_vmx_failValid)
+ *
+ * When adding or removing fields here, note that shadowed
+ * fields must always be synced by prepare_vmcs02, not just
+ * prepare_vmcs02_rare.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Keeping the fields ordered by size is an attempt at improving
+ * branch prediction in vmcs12_read_any and vmcs12_write_any.
+ */
+
+/* 16-bits */
+SHADOW_FIELD_RW(GUEST_INTR_STATUS, guest_intr_status)
+SHADOW_FIELD_RW(GUEST_PML_INDEX, guest_pml_index)
+SHADOW_FIELD_RW(HOST_FS_SELECTOR, host_fs_selector)
+SHADOW_FIELD_RW(HOST_GS_SELECTOR, host_gs_selector)
+
+/* 32-bits */
+SHADOW_FIELD_RO(VM_EXIT_REASON, vm_exit_reason)
+SHADOW_FIELD_RO(VM_EXIT_INTR_INFO, vm_exit_intr_info)
+SHADOW_FIELD_RO(VM_EXIT_INSTRUCTION_LEN, vm_exit_instruction_len)
+SHADOW_FIELD_RO(IDT_VECTORING_INFO_FIELD, idt_vectoring_info_field)
+SHADOW_FIELD_RO(IDT_VECTORING_ERROR_CODE, idt_vectoring_error_code)
+SHADOW_FIELD_RO(VM_EXIT_INTR_ERROR_CODE, vm_exit_intr_error_code)
+SHADOW_FIELD_RO(GUEST_CS_AR_BYTES, guest_cs_ar_bytes)
+SHADOW_FIELD_RO(GUEST_SS_AR_BYTES, guest_ss_ar_bytes)
+SHADOW_FIELD_RW(CPU_BASED_VM_EXEC_CONTROL, cpu_based_vm_exec_control)
+SHADOW_FIELD_RW(PIN_BASED_VM_EXEC_CONTROL, pin_based_vm_exec_control)
+SHADOW_FIELD_RW(EXCEPTION_BITMAP, exception_bitmap)
+SHADOW_FIELD_RW(VM_ENTRY_EXCEPTION_ERROR_CODE, vm_entry_exception_error_code)
+SHADOW_FIELD_RW(VM_ENTRY_INTR_INFO_FIELD, vm_entry_intr_info_field)
+SHADOW_FIELD_RW(VM_ENTRY_INSTRUCTION_LEN, vm_entry_instruction_len)
+SHADOW_FIELD_RW(TPR_THRESHOLD, tpr_threshold)
+SHADOW_FIELD_RW(GUEST_INTERRUPTIBILITY_INFO, guest_interruptibility_info)
+SHADOW_FIELD_RW(VMX_PREEMPTION_TIMER_VALUE, vmx_preemption_timer_value)
+
+/* Natural width */
+SHADOW_FIELD_RO(EXIT_QUALIFICATION, exit_qualification)
+SHADOW_FIELD_RO(GUEST_LINEAR_ADDRESS, guest_linear_address)
+SHADOW_FIELD_RW(GUEST_RIP, guest_rip)
+SHADOW_FIELD_RW(GUEST_RSP, guest_rsp)
+SHADOW_FIELD_RW(GUEST_CR0, guest_cr0)
+SHADOW_FIELD_RW(GUEST_CR3, guest_cr3)
+SHADOW_FIELD_RW(GUEST_CR4, guest_cr4)
+SHADOW_FIELD_RW(GUEST_RFLAGS, guest_rflags)
+SHADOW_FIELD_RW(CR0_GUEST_HOST_MASK, cr0_guest_host_mask)
+SHADOW_FIELD_RW(CR0_READ_SHADOW, cr0_read_shadow)
+SHADOW_FIELD_RW(CR4_READ_SHADOW, cr4_read_shadow)
+SHADOW_FIELD_RW(HOST_FS_BASE, host_fs_base)
+SHADOW_FIELD_RW(HOST_GS_BASE, host_gs_base)
+
+/* 64-bit */
+SHADOW_FIELD_RO(GUEST_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS, guest_physical_address)
+SHADOW_FIELD_RO(GUEST_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS_HIGH, guest_physical_address)
+
+#undef SHADOW_FIELD_RO
+#undef SHADOW_FIELD_RW
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..be275a041
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S
@@ -0,0 +1,362 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+#include <linux/linkage.h>
+#include <asm/asm.h>
+#include <asm/bitsperlong.h>
+#include <asm/kvm_vcpu_regs.h>
+#include <asm/nospec-branch.h>
+#include <asm/percpu.h>
+#include <asm/segment.h>
+#include "kvm-asm-offsets.h"
+#include "run_flags.h"
+
+#define WORD_SIZE (BITS_PER_LONG / 8)
+
+#define VCPU_RAX	__VCPU_REGS_RAX * WORD_SIZE
+#define VCPU_RCX	__VCPU_REGS_RCX * WORD_SIZE
+#define VCPU_RDX	__VCPU_REGS_RDX * WORD_SIZE
+#define VCPU_RBX	__VCPU_REGS_RBX * WORD_SIZE
+/* Intentionally omit RSP as it's context switched by hardware */
+#define VCPU_RBP	__VCPU_REGS_RBP * WORD_SIZE
+#define VCPU_RSI	__VCPU_REGS_RSI * WORD_SIZE
+#define VCPU_RDI	__VCPU_REGS_RDI * WORD_SIZE
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+#define VCPU_R8		__VCPU_REGS_R8  * WORD_SIZE
+#define VCPU_R9		__VCPU_REGS_R9  * WORD_SIZE
+#define VCPU_R10	__VCPU_REGS_R10 * WORD_SIZE
+#define VCPU_R11	__VCPU_REGS_R11 * WORD_SIZE
+#define VCPU_R12	__VCPU_REGS_R12 * WORD_SIZE
+#define VCPU_R13	__VCPU_REGS_R13 * WORD_SIZE
+#define VCPU_R14	__VCPU_REGS_R14 * WORD_SIZE
+#define VCPU_R15	__VCPU_REGS_R15 * WORD_SIZE
+#endif
+
+.macro VMX_DO_EVENT_IRQOFF call_insn call_target
+	/*
+	 * Unconditionally create a stack frame, getting the correct RSP on the
+	 * stack (for x86-64) would take two instructions anyways, and RBP can
+	 * be used to restore RSP to make objtool happy (see below).
+	 */
+	push %_ASM_BP
+	mov %_ASM_SP, %_ASM_BP
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+	/*
+	 * Align RSP to a 16-byte boundary (to emulate CPU behavior) before
+	 * creating the synthetic interrupt stack frame for the IRQ/NMI.
+	 */
+	and  $-16, %rsp
+	push $__KERNEL_DS
+	push %rbp
+#endif
+	pushf
+	push $__KERNEL_CS
+	\call_insn \call_target
+
+	/*
+	 * "Restore" RSP from RBP, even though IRET has already unwound RSP to
+	 * the correct value.  objtool doesn't know the callee will IRET and,
+	 * without the explicit restore, thinks the stack is getting walloped.
+	 * Using an unwind hint is problematic due to x86-64's dynamic alignment.
+	 */
+	mov %_ASM_BP, %_ASM_SP
+	pop %_ASM_BP
+	RET
+.endm
+
+.section .noinstr.text, "ax"
+
+/**
+ * __vmx_vcpu_run - Run a vCPU via a transition to VMX guest mode
+ * @vmx:	struct vcpu_vmx *
+ * @regs:	unsigned long * (to guest registers)
+ * @flags:	VMX_RUN_VMRESUME:	use VMRESUME instead of VMLAUNCH
+ *		VMX_RUN_SAVE_SPEC_CTRL: save guest SPEC_CTRL into vmx->spec_ctrl
+ *
+ * Returns:
+ *	0 on VM-Exit, 1 on VM-Fail
+ */
+SYM_FUNC_START(__vmx_vcpu_run)
+	push %_ASM_BP
+	mov  %_ASM_SP, %_ASM_BP
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+	push %r15
+	push %r14
+	push %r13
+	push %r12
+#else
+	push %edi
+	push %esi
+#endif
+	push %_ASM_BX
+
+	/* Save @vmx for SPEC_CTRL handling */
+	push %_ASM_ARG1
+
+	/* Save @flags for SPEC_CTRL handling */
+	push %_ASM_ARG3
+
+	/*
+	 * Save @regs, _ASM_ARG2 may be modified by vmx_update_host_rsp() and
+	 * @regs is needed after VM-Exit to save the guest's register values.
+	 */
+	push %_ASM_ARG2
+
+	/* Copy @flags to EBX, _ASM_ARG3 is volatile. */
+	mov %_ASM_ARG3L, %ebx
+
+	lea (%_ASM_SP), %_ASM_ARG2
+	call vmx_update_host_rsp
+
+	ALTERNATIVE "jmp .Lspec_ctrl_done", "", X86_FEATURE_MSR_SPEC_CTRL
+
+	/*
+	 * SPEC_CTRL handling: if the guest's SPEC_CTRL value differs from the
+	 * host's, write the MSR.
+	 *
+	 * IMPORTANT: To avoid RSB underflow attacks and any other nastiness,
+	 * there must not be any returns or indirect branches between this code
+	 * and vmentry.
+	 */
+	mov 2*WORD_SIZE(%_ASM_SP), %_ASM_DI
+	movl VMX_spec_ctrl(%_ASM_DI), %edi
+	movl PER_CPU_VAR(x86_spec_ctrl_current), %esi
+	cmp %edi, %esi
+	je .Lspec_ctrl_done
+	mov $MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, %ecx
+	xor %edx, %edx
+	mov %edi, %eax
+	wrmsr
+
+.Lspec_ctrl_done:
+
+	/*
+	 * Since vmentry is serializing on affected CPUs, there's no need for
+	 * an LFENCE to stop speculation from skipping the wrmsr.
+	 */
+
+	/* Load @regs to RAX. */
+	mov (%_ASM_SP), %_ASM_AX
+
+	/* Check if vmlaunch or vmresume is needed */
+	test $VMX_RUN_VMRESUME, %ebx
+
+	/* Load guest registers.  Don't clobber flags. */
+	mov VCPU_RCX(%_ASM_AX), %_ASM_CX
+	mov VCPU_RDX(%_ASM_AX), %_ASM_DX
+	mov VCPU_RBX(%_ASM_AX), %_ASM_BX
+	mov VCPU_RBP(%_ASM_AX), %_ASM_BP
+	mov VCPU_RSI(%_ASM_AX), %_ASM_SI
+	mov VCPU_RDI(%_ASM_AX), %_ASM_DI
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+	mov VCPU_R8 (%_ASM_AX),  %r8
+	mov VCPU_R9 (%_ASM_AX),  %r9
+	mov VCPU_R10(%_ASM_AX), %r10
+	mov VCPU_R11(%_ASM_AX), %r11
+	mov VCPU_R12(%_ASM_AX), %r12
+	mov VCPU_R13(%_ASM_AX), %r13
+	mov VCPU_R14(%_ASM_AX), %r14
+	mov VCPU_R15(%_ASM_AX), %r15
+#endif
+	/* Load guest RAX.  This kills the @regs pointer! */
+	mov VCPU_RAX(%_ASM_AX), %_ASM_AX
+
+	/* Check EFLAGS.ZF from 'test VMX_RUN_VMRESUME' above */
+	jz .Lvmlaunch
+
+	/*
+	 * After a successful VMRESUME/VMLAUNCH, control flow "magically"
+	 * resumes below at 'vmx_vmexit' due to the VMCS HOST_RIP setting.
+	 * So this isn't a typical function and objtool needs to be told to
+	 * save the unwind state here and restore it below.
+	 */
+	UNWIND_HINT_SAVE
+
+/*
+ * If VMRESUME/VMLAUNCH and corresponding vmexit succeed, execution resumes at
+ * the 'vmx_vmexit' label below.
+ */
+.Lvmresume:
+	vmresume
+	jmp .Lvmfail
+
+.Lvmlaunch:
+	vmlaunch
+	jmp .Lvmfail
+
+	_ASM_EXTABLE(.Lvmresume, .Lfixup)
+	_ASM_EXTABLE(.Lvmlaunch, .Lfixup)
+
+SYM_INNER_LABEL_ALIGN(vmx_vmexit, SYM_L_GLOBAL)
+
+	/* Restore unwind state from before the VMRESUME/VMLAUNCH. */
+	UNWIND_HINT_RESTORE
+	ENDBR
+
+	/* Temporarily save guest's RAX. */
+	push %_ASM_AX
+
+	/* Reload @regs to RAX. */
+	mov WORD_SIZE(%_ASM_SP), %_ASM_AX
+
+	/* Save all guest registers, including RAX from the stack */
+	pop           VCPU_RAX(%_ASM_AX)
+	mov %_ASM_CX, VCPU_RCX(%_ASM_AX)
+	mov %_ASM_DX, VCPU_RDX(%_ASM_AX)
+	mov %_ASM_BX, VCPU_RBX(%_ASM_AX)
+	mov %_ASM_BP, VCPU_RBP(%_ASM_AX)
+	mov %_ASM_SI, VCPU_RSI(%_ASM_AX)
+	mov %_ASM_DI, VCPU_RDI(%_ASM_AX)
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+	mov %r8,  VCPU_R8 (%_ASM_AX)
+	mov %r9,  VCPU_R9 (%_ASM_AX)
+	mov %r10, VCPU_R10(%_ASM_AX)
+	mov %r11, VCPU_R11(%_ASM_AX)
+	mov %r12, VCPU_R12(%_ASM_AX)
+	mov %r13, VCPU_R13(%_ASM_AX)
+	mov %r14, VCPU_R14(%_ASM_AX)
+	mov %r15, VCPU_R15(%_ASM_AX)
+#endif
+
+	/* Clear return value to indicate VM-Exit (as opposed to VM-Fail). */
+	xor %ebx, %ebx
+
+.Lclear_regs:
+	/* Discard @regs.  The register is irrelevant, it just can't be RBX. */
+	pop %_ASM_AX
+
+	/*
+	 * Clear all general purpose registers except RSP and RBX to prevent
+	 * speculative use of the guest's values, even those that are reloaded
+	 * via the stack.  In theory, an L1 cache miss when restoring registers
+	 * could lead to speculative execution with the guest's values.
+	 * Zeroing XORs are dirt cheap, i.e. the extra paranoia is essentially
+	 * free.  RSP and RBX are exempt as RSP is restored by hardware during
+	 * VM-Exit and RBX is explicitly loaded with 0 or 1 to hold the return
+	 * value.
+	 */
+	xor %eax, %eax
+	xor %ecx, %ecx
+	xor %edx, %edx
+	xor %ebp, %ebp
+	xor %esi, %esi
+	xor %edi, %edi
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+	xor %r8d,  %r8d
+	xor %r9d,  %r9d
+	xor %r10d, %r10d
+	xor %r11d, %r11d
+	xor %r12d, %r12d
+	xor %r13d, %r13d
+	xor %r14d, %r14d
+	xor %r15d, %r15d
+#endif
+
+	/*
+	 * IMPORTANT: RSB filling and SPEC_CTRL handling must be done before
+	 * the first unbalanced RET after vmexit!
+	 *
+	 * For retpoline or IBRS, RSB filling is needed to prevent poisoned RSB
+	 * entries and (in some cases) RSB underflow.
+	 *
+	 * eIBRS has its own protection against poisoned RSB, so it doesn't
+	 * need the RSB filling sequence.  But it does need to be enabled, and a
+	 * single call to retire, before the first unbalanced RET.
+	 */
+
+	FILL_RETURN_BUFFER %_ASM_CX, RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS, X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT,\
+			   X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT_LITE
+
+	pop %_ASM_ARG2	/* @flags */
+	pop %_ASM_ARG1	/* @vmx */
+
+	call vmx_spec_ctrl_restore_host
+
+	/* Put return value in AX */
+	mov %_ASM_BX, %_ASM_AX
+
+	pop %_ASM_BX
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+	pop %r12
+	pop %r13
+	pop %r14
+	pop %r15
+#else
+	pop %esi
+	pop %edi
+#endif
+	pop %_ASM_BP
+	RET
+
+.Lfixup:
+	cmpb $0, kvm_rebooting
+	jne .Lvmfail
+	ud2
+.Lvmfail:
+	/* VM-Fail: set return value to 1 */
+	mov $1, %_ASM_BX
+	jmp .Lclear_regs
+
+SYM_FUNC_END(__vmx_vcpu_run)
+
+SYM_FUNC_START(vmx_do_nmi_irqoff)
+	VMX_DO_EVENT_IRQOFF call asm_exc_nmi_kvm_vmx
+SYM_FUNC_END(vmx_do_nmi_irqoff)
+
+#ifndef CONFIG_CC_HAS_ASM_GOTO_OUTPUT
+
+/**
+ * vmread_error_trampoline - Trampoline from inline asm to vmread_error()
+ * @field:	VMCS field encoding that failed
+ * @fault:	%true if the VMREAD faulted, %false if it failed
+ *
+ * Save and restore volatile registers across a call to vmread_error().  Note,
+ * all parameters are passed on the stack.
+ */
+SYM_FUNC_START(vmread_error_trampoline)
+	push %_ASM_BP
+	mov  %_ASM_SP, %_ASM_BP
+
+	push %_ASM_AX
+	push %_ASM_CX
+	push %_ASM_DX
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+	push %rdi
+	push %rsi
+	push %r8
+	push %r9
+	push %r10
+	push %r11
+#endif
+
+	/* Load @field and @fault to arg1 and arg2 respectively. */
+	mov 3*WORD_SIZE(%_ASM_BP), %_ASM_ARG2
+	mov 2*WORD_SIZE(%_ASM_BP), %_ASM_ARG1
+
+	call vmread_error_trampoline2
+
+	/* Zero out @fault, which will be popped into the result register. */
+	_ASM_MOV $0, 3*WORD_SIZE(%_ASM_BP)
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+	pop %r11
+	pop %r10
+	pop %r9
+	pop %r8
+	pop %rsi
+	pop %rdi
+#endif
+	pop %_ASM_DX
+	pop %_ASM_CX
+	pop %_ASM_AX
+	pop %_ASM_BP
+
+	RET
+SYM_FUNC_END(vmread_error_trampoline)
+#endif
+
+.section .text, "ax"
+
+SYM_FUNC_START(vmx_do_interrupt_irqoff)
+	VMX_DO_EVENT_IRQOFF CALL_NOSPEC _ASM_ARG1
+SYM_FUNC_END(vmx_do_interrupt_irqoff)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..9bba53525
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
@@ -0,0 +1,8712 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * Kernel-based Virtual Machine driver for Linux
+ *
+ * This module enables machines with Intel VT-x extensions to run virtual
+ * machines without emulation or binary translation.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2006 Qumranet, Inc.
+ * Copyright 2010 Red Hat, Inc. and/or its affiliates.
+ *
+ * Authors:
+ *   Avi Kivity   <avi@qumranet.com>
+ *   Yaniv Kamay  <yaniv@qumranet.com>
+ */
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
+
+#include <linux/highmem.h>
+#include <linux/hrtimer.h>
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/kvm_host.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/moduleparam.h>
+#include <linux/mod_devicetable.h>
+#include <linux/mm.h>
+#include <linux/objtool.h>
+#include <linux/sched.h>
+#include <linux/sched/smt.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/tboot.h>
+#include <linux/trace_events.h>
+#include <linux/entry-kvm.h>
+
+#include <asm/apic.h>
+#include <asm/asm.h>
+#include <asm/cpu.h>
+#include <asm/cpu_device_id.h>
+#include <asm/debugreg.h>
+#include <asm/desc.h>
+#include <asm/fpu/api.h>
+#include <asm/fpu/xstate.h>
+#include <asm/idtentry.h>
+#include <asm/io.h>
+#include <asm/irq_remapping.h>
+#include <asm/reboot.h>
+#include <asm/perf_event.h>
+#include <asm/mmu_context.h>
+#include <asm/mshyperv.h>
+#include <asm/mwait.h>
+#include <asm/spec-ctrl.h>
+#include <asm/vmx.h>
+
+#include "capabilities.h"
+#include "cpuid.h"
+#include "hyperv.h"
+#include "kvm_onhyperv.h"
+#include "irq.h"
+#include "kvm_cache_regs.h"
+#include "lapic.h"
+#include "mmu.h"
+#include "nested.h"
+#include "pmu.h"
+#include "sgx.h"
+#include "trace.h"
+#include "vmcs.h"
+#include "vmcs12.h"
+#include "vmx.h"
+#include "x86.h"
+#include "smm.h"
+
+MODULE_AUTHOR("Qumranet");
+MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
+
+#ifdef MODULE
+static const struct x86_cpu_id vmx_cpu_id[] = {
+	X86_MATCH_FEATURE(X86_FEATURE_VMX, NULL),
+	{}
+};
+MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE(x86cpu, vmx_cpu_id);
+#endif
+
+bool __read_mostly enable_vpid = 1;
+module_param_named(vpid, enable_vpid, bool, 0444);
+
+static bool __read_mostly enable_vnmi = 1;
+module_param_named(vnmi, enable_vnmi, bool, S_IRUGO);
+
+bool __read_mostly flexpriority_enabled = 1;
+module_param_named(flexpriority, flexpriority_enabled, bool, S_IRUGO);
+
+bool __read_mostly enable_ept = 1;
+module_param_named(ept, enable_ept, bool, S_IRUGO);
+
+bool __read_mostly enable_unrestricted_guest = 1;
+module_param_named(unrestricted_guest,
+			enable_unrestricted_guest, bool, S_IRUGO);
+
+bool __read_mostly enable_ept_ad_bits = 1;
+module_param_named(eptad, enable_ept_ad_bits, bool, S_IRUGO);
+
+static bool __read_mostly emulate_invalid_guest_state = true;
+module_param(emulate_invalid_guest_state, bool, S_IRUGO);
+
+static bool __read_mostly fasteoi = 1;
+module_param(fasteoi, bool, S_IRUGO);
+
+module_param(enable_apicv, bool, S_IRUGO);
+
+bool __read_mostly enable_ipiv = true;
+module_param(enable_ipiv, bool, 0444);
+
+/*
+ * If nested=1, nested virtualization is supported, i.e., guests may use
+ * VMX and be a hypervisor for its own guests. If nested=0, guests may not
+ * use VMX instructions.
+ */
+static bool __read_mostly nested = 1;
+module_param(nested, bool, S_IRUGO);
+
+bool __read_mostly enable_pml = 1;
+module_param_named(pml, enable_pml, bool, S_IRUGO);
+
+static bool __read_mostly error_on_inconsistent_vmcs_config = true;
+module_param(error_on_inconsistent_vmcs_config, bool, 0444);
+
+static bool __read_mostly dump_invalid_vmcs = 0;
+module_param(dump_invalid_vmcs, bool, 0644);
+
+#define MSR_BITMAP_MODE_X2APIC		1
+#define MSR_BITMAP_MODE_X2APIC_APICV	2
+
+#define KVM_VMX_TSC_MULTIPLIER_MAX     0xffffffffffffffffULL
+
+/* Guest_tsc -> host_tsc conversion requires 64-bit division.  */
+static int __read_mostly cpu_preemption_timer_multi;
+static bool __read_mostly enable_preemption_timer = 1;
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+module_param_named(preemption_timer, enable_preemption_timer, bool, S_IRUGO);
+#endif
+
+extern bool __read_mostly allow_smaller_maxphyaddr;
+module_param(allow_smaller_maxphyaddr, bool, S_IRUGO);
+
+#define KVM_VM_CR0_ALWAYS_OFF (X86_CR0_NW | X86_CR0_CD)
+#define KVM_VM_CR0_ALWAYS_ON_UNRESTRICTED_GUEST X86_CR0_NE
+#define KVM_VM_CR0_ALWAYS_ON				\
+	(KVM_VM_CR0_ALWAYS_ON_UNRESTRICTED_GUEST | X86_CR0_PG | X86_CR0_PE)
+
+#define KVM_VM_CR4_ALWAYS_ON_UNRESTRICTED_GUEST X86_CR4_VMXE
+#define KVM_PMODE_VM_CR4_ALWAYS_ON (X86_CR4_PAE | X86_CR4_VMXE)
+#define KVM_RMODE_VM_CR4_ALWAYS_ON (X86_CR4_VME | X86_CR4_PAE | X86_CR4_VMXE)
+
+#define RMODE_GUEST_OWNED_EFLAGS_BITS (~(X86_EFLAGS_IOPL | X86_EFLAGS_VM))
+
+#define MSR_IA32_RTIT_STATUS_MASK (~(RTIT_STATUS_FILTEREN | \
+	RTIT_STATUS_CONTEXTEN | RTIT_STATUS_TRIGGEREN | \
+	RTIT_STATUS_ERROR | RTIT_STATUS_STOPPED | \
+	RTIT_STATUS_BYTECNT))
+
+/*
+ * List of MSRs that can be directly passed to the guest.
+ * In addition to these x2apic and PT MSRs are handled specially.
+ */
+static u32 vmx_possible_passthrough_msrs[MAX_POSSIBLE_PASSTHROUGH_MSRS] = {
+	MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL,
+	MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD,
+	MSR_IA32_FLUSH_CMD,
+	MSR_IA32_TSC,
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+	MSR_FS_BASE,
+	MSR_GS_BASE,
+	MSR_KERNEL_GS_BASE,
+	MSR_IA32_XFD,
+	MSR_IA32_XFD_ERR,
+#endif
+	MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_CS,
+	MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_ESP,
+	MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_EIP,
+	MSR_CORE_C1_RES,
+	MSR_CORE_C3_RESIDENCY,
+	MSR_CORE_C6_RESIDENCY,
+	MSR_CORE_C7_RESIDENCY,
+};
+
+/*
+ * These 2 parameters are used to config the controls for Pause-Loop Exiting:
+ * ple_gap:    upper bound on the amount of time between two successive
+ *             executions of PAUSE in a loop. Also indicate if ple enabled.
+ *             According to test, this time is usually smaller than 128 cycles.
+ * ple_window: upper bound on the amount of time a guest is allowed to execute
+ *             in a PAUSE loop. Tests indicate that most spinlocks are held for
+ *             less than 2^12 cycles
+ * Time is measured based on a counter that runs at the same rate as the TSC,
+ * refer SDM volume 3b section 21.6.13 & 22.1.3.
+ */
+static unsigned int ple_gap = KVM_DEFAULT_PLE_GAP;
+module_param(ple_gap, uint, 0444);
+
+static unsigned int ple_window = KVM_VMX_DEFAULT_PLE_WINDOW;
+module_param(ple_window, uint, 0444);
+
+/* Default doubles per-vcpu window every exit. */
+static unsigned int ple_window_grow = KVM_DEFAULT_PLE_WINDOW_GROW;
+module_param(ple_window_grow, uint, 0444);
+
+/* Default resets per-vcpu window every exit to ple_window. */
+static unsigned int ple_window_shrink = KVM_DEFAULT_PLE_WINDOW_SHRINK;
+module_param(ple_window_shrink, uint, 0444);
+
+/* Default is to compute the maximum so we can never overflow. */
+static unsigned int ple_window_max        = KVM_VMX_DEFAULT_PLE_WINDOW_MAX;
+module_param(ple_window_max, uint, 0444);
+
+/* Default is SYSTEM mode, 1 for host-guest mode */
+int __read_mostly pt_mode = PT_MODE_SYSTEM;
+module_param(pt_mode, int, S_IRUGO);
+
+static DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(vmx_l1d_should_flush);
+static DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(vmx_l1d_flush_cond);
+static DEFINE_MUTEX(vmx_l1d_flush_mutex);
+
+/* Storage for pre module init parameter parsing */
+static enum vmx_l1d_flush_state __read_mostly vmentry_l1d_flush_param = VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_AUTO;
+
+static const struct {
+	const char *option;
+	bool for_parse;
+} vmentry_l1d_param[] = {
+	[VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_AUTO]	 = {"auto", true},
+	[VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_NEVER]	 = {"never", true},
+	[VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_COND]	 = {"cond", true},
+	[VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_ALWAYS]	 = {"always", true},
+	[VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_EPT_DISABLED] = {"EPT disabled", false},
+	[VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_NOT_REQUIRED] = {"not required", false},
+};
+
+#define L1D_CACHE_ORDER 4
+static void *vmx_l1d_flush_pages;
+
+static int vmx_setup_l1d_flush(enum vmx_l1d_flush_state l1tf)
+{
+	struct page *page;
+	unsigned int i;
+
+	if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_L1TF)) {
+		l1tf_vmx_mitigation = VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_NOT_REQUIRED;
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	if (!enable_ept) {
+		l1tf_vmx_mitigation = VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_EPT_DISABLED;
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	if (host_arch_capabilities & ARCH_CAP_SKIP_VMENTRY_L1DFLUSH) {
+		l1tf_vmx_mitigation = VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_NOT_REQUIRED;
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	/* If set to auto use the default l1tf mitigation method */
+	if (l1tf == VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_AUTO) {
+		switch (l1tf_mitigation) {
+		case L1TF_MITIGATION_OFF:
+			l1tf = VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_NEVER;
+			break;
+		case L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH_NOWARN:
+		case L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH:
+		case L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH_NOSMT:
+			l1tf = VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_COND;
+			break;
+		case L1TF_MITIGATION_FULL:
+		case L1TF_MITIGATION_FULL_FORCE:
+			l1tf = VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_ALWAYS;
+			break;
+		}
+	} else if (l1tf_mitigation == L1TF_MITIGATION_FULL_FORCE) {
+		l1tf = VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_ALWAYS;
+	}
+
+	if (l1tf != VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_NEVER && !vmx_l1d_flush_pages &&
+	    !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_FLUSH_L1D)) {
+		/*
+		 * This allocation for vmx_l1d_flush_pages is not tied to a VM
+		 * lifetime and so should not be charged to a memcg.
+		 */
+		page = alloc_pages(GFP_KERNEL, L1D_CACHE_ORDER);
+		if (!page)
+			return -ENOMEM;
+		vmx_l1d_flush_pages = page_address(page);
+
+		/*
+		 * Initialize each page with a different pattern in
+		 * order to protect against KSM in the nested
+		 * virtualization case.
+		 */
+		for (i = 0; i < 1u << L1D_CACHE_ORDER; ++i) {
+			memset(vmx_l1d_flush_pages + i * PAGE_SIZE, i + 1,
+			       PAGE_SIZE);
+		}
+	}
+
+	l1tf_vmx_mitigation = l1tf;
+
+	if (l1tf != VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_NEVER)
+		static_branch_enable(&vmx_l1d_should_flush);
+	else
+		static_branch_disable(&vmx_l1d_should_flush);
+
+	if (l1tf == VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_COND)
+		static_branch_enable(&vmx_l1d_flush_cond);
+	else
+		static_branch_disable(&vmx_l1d_flush_cond);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int vmentry_l1d_flush_parse(const char *s)
+{
+	unsigned int i;
+
+	if (s) {
+		for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(vmentry_l1d_param); i++) {
+			if (vmentry_l1d_param[i].for_parse &&
+			    sysfs_streq(s, vmentry_l1d_param[i].option))
+				return i;
+		}
+	}
+	return -EINVAL;
+}
+
+static int vmentry_l1d_flush_set(const char *s, const struct kernel_param *kp)
+{
+	int l1tf, ret;
+
+	l1tf = vmentry_l1d_flush_parse(s);
+	if (l1tf < 0)
+		return l1tf;
+
+	if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_BUG_L1TF))
+		return 0;
+
+	/*
+	 * Has vmx_init() run already? If not then this is the pre init
+	 * parameter parsing. In that case just store the value and let
+	 * vmx_init() do the proper setup after enable_ept has been
+	 * established.
+	 */
+	if (l1tf_vmx_mitigation == VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_AUTO) {
+		vmentry_l1d_flush_param = l1tf;
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	mutex_lock(&vmx_l1d_flush_mutex);
+	ret = vmx_setup_l1d_flush(l1tf);
+	mutex_unlock(&vmx_l1d_flush_mutex);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int vmentry_l1d_flush_get(char *s, const struct kernel_param *kp)
+{
+	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(l1tf_vmx_mitigation >= ARRAY_SIZE(vmentry_l1d_param)))
+		return sysfs_emit(s, "???\n");
+
+	return sysfs_emit(s, "%s\n", vmentry_l1d_param[l1tf_vmx_mitigation].option);
+}
+
+static __always_inline void vmx_disable_fb_clear(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
+{
+	u64 msr;
+
+	if (!vmx->disable_fb_clear)
+		return;
+
+	msr = __rdmsr(MSR_IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL);
+	msr |= FB_CLEAR_DIS;
+	native_wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL, msr);
+	/* Cache the MSR value to avoid reading it later */
+	vmx->msr_ia32_mcu_opt_ctrl = msr;
+}
+
+static __always_inline void vmx_enable_fb_clear(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
+{
+	if (!vmx->disable_fb_clear)
+		return;
+
+	vmx->msr_ia32_mcu_opt_ctrl &= ~FB_CLEAR_DIS;
+	native_wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL, vmx->msr_ia32_mcu_opt_ctrl);
+}
+
+static void vmx_update_fb_clear_dis(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
+{
+	vmx->disable_fb_clear = (host_arch_capabilities & ARCH_CAP_FB_CLEAR_CTRL) &&
+				!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MDS) &&
+				!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_TAA);
+
+	/*
+	 * If guest will not execute VERW, there is no need to set FB_CLEAR_DIS
+	 * at VMEntry. Skip the MSR read/write when a guest has no use case to
+	 * execute VERW.
+	 */
+	if ((vcpu->arch.arch_capabilities & ARCH_CAP_FB_CLEAR) ||
+	   ((vcpu->arch.arch_capabilities & ARCH_CAP_MDS_NO) &&
+	    (vcpu->arch.arch_capabilities & ARCH_CAP_TAA_NO) &&
+	    (vcpu->arch.arch_capabilities & ARCH_CAP_PSDP_NO) &&
+	    (vcpu->arch.arch_capabilities & ARCH_CAP_FBSDP_NO) &&
+	    (vcpu->arch.arch_capabilities & ARCH_CAP_SBDR_SSDP_NO)))
+		vmx->disable_fb_clear = false;
+}
+
+static const struct kernel_param_ops vmentry_l1d_flush_ops = {
+	.set = vmentry_l1d_flush_set,
+	.get = vmentry_l1d_flush_get,
+};
+module_param_cb(vmentry_l1d_flush, &vmentry_l1d_flush_ops, NULL, 0644);
+
+static u32 vmx_segment_access_rights(struct kvm_segment *var);
+
+void vmx_vmexit(void);
+
+#define vmx_insn_failed(fmt...)		\
+do {					\
+	WARN_ONCE(1, fmt);		\
+	pr_warn_ratelimited(fmt);	\
+} while (0)
+
+noinline void vmread_error(unsigned long field)
+{
+	vmx_insn_failed("vmread failed: field=%lx\n", field);
+}
+
+#ifndef CONFIG_CC_HAS_ASM_GOTO_OUTPUT
+noinstr void vmread_error_trampoline2(unsigned long field, bool fault)
+{
+	if (fault) {
+		kvm_spurious_fault();
+	} else {
+		instrumentation_begin();
+		vmread_error(field);
+		instrumentation_end();
+	}
+}
+#endif
+
+noinline void vmwrite_error(unsigned long field, unsigned long value)
+{
+	vmx_insn_failed("vmwrite failed: field=%lx val=%lx err=%u\n",
+			field, value, vmcs_read32(VM_INSTRUCTION_ERROR));
+}
+
+noinline void vmclear_error(struct vmcs *vmcs, u64 phys_addr)
+{
+	vmx_insn_failed("vmclear failed: %p/%llx err=%u\n",
+			vmcs, phys_addr, vmcs_read32(VM_INSTRUCTION_ERROR));
+}
+
+noinline void vmptrld_error(struct vmcs *vmcs, u64 phys_addr)
+{
+	vmx_insn_failed("vmptrld failed: %p/%llx err=%u\n",
+			vmcs, phys_addr, vmcs_read32(VM_INSTRUCTION_ERROR));
+}
+
+noinline void invvpid_error(unsigned long ext, u16 vpid, gva_t gva)
+{
+	vmx_insn_failed("invvpid failed: ext=0x%lx vpid=%u gva=0x%lx\n",
+			ext, vpid, gva);
+}
+
+noinline void invept_error(unsigned long ext, u64 eptp, gpa_t gpa)
+{
+	vmx_insn_failed("invept failed: ext=0x%lx eptp=%llx gpa=0x%llx\n",
+			ext, eptp, gpa);
+}
+
+static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct vmcs *, vmxarea);
+DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct vmcs *, current_vmcs);
+/*
+ * We maintain a per-CPU linked-list of VMCS loaded on that CPU. This is needed
+ * when a CPU is brought down, and we need to VMCLEAR all VMCSs loaded on it.
+ */
+static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct list_head, loaded_vmcss_on_cpu);
+
+static DECLARE_BITMAP(vmx_vpid_bitmap, VMX_NR_VPIDS);
+static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(vmx_vpid_lock);
+
+struct vmcs_config vmcs_config __ro_after_init;
+struct vmx_capability vmx_capability __ro_after_init;
+
+#define VMX_SEGMENT_FIELD(seg)					\
+	[VCPU_SREG_##seg] = {                                   \
+		.selector = GUEST_##seg##_SELECTOR,		\
+		.base = GUEST_##seg##_BASE,		   	\
+		.limit = GUEST_##seg##_LIMIT,		   	\
+		.ar_bytes = GUEST_##seg##_AR_BYTES,	   	\
+	}
+
+static const struct kvm_vmx_segment_field {
+	unsigned selector;
+	unsigned base;
+	unsigned limit;
+	unsigned ar_bytes;
+} kvm_vmx_segment_fields[] = {
+	VMX_SEGMENT_FIELD(CS),
+	VMX_SEGMENT_FIELD(DS),
+	VMX_SEGMENT_FIELD(ES),
+	VMX_SEGMENT_FIELD(FS),
+	VMX_SEGMENT_FIELD(GS),
+	VMX_SEGMENT_FIELD(SS),
+	VMX_SEGMENT_FIELD(TR),
+	VMX_SEGMENT_FIELD(LDTR),
+};
+
+static inline void vmx_segment_cache_clear(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
+{
+	vmx->segment_cache.bitmask = 0;
+}
+
+static unsigned long host_idt_base;
+
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HYPERV)
+static struct kvm_x86_ops vmx_x86_ops __initdata;
+
+static bool __read_mostly enlightened_vmcs = true;
+module_param(enlightened_vmcs, bool, 0444);
+
+static int hv_enable_l2_tlb_flush(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct hv_enlightened_vmcs *evmcs;
+	struct hv_partition_assist_pg **p_hv_pa_pg =
+			&to_kvm_hv(vcpu->kvm)->hv_pa_pg;
+	/*
+	 * Synthetic VM-Exit is not enabled in current code and so All
+	 * evmcs in singe VM shares same assist page.
+	 */
+	if (!*p_hv_pa_pg)
+		*p_hv_pa_pg = kzalloc(PAGE_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
+
+	if (!*p_hv_pa_pg)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	evmcs = (struct hv_enlightened_vmcs *)to_vmx(vcpu)->loaded_vmcs->vmcs;
+
+	evmcs->partition_assist_page =
+		__pa(*p_hv_pa_pg);
+	evmcs->hv_vm_id = (unsigned long)vcpu->kvm;
+	evmcs->hv_enlightenments_control.nested_flush_hypercall = 1;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static __init void hv_init_evmcs(void)
+{
+	int cpu;
+
+	if (!enlightened_vmcs)
+		return;
+
+	/*
+	 * Enlightened VMCS usage should be recommended and the host needs
+	 * to support eVMCS v1 or above.
+	 */
+	if (ms_hyperv.hints & HV_X64_ENLIGHTENED_VMCS_RECOMMENDED &&
+	    (ms_hyperv.nested_features & HV_X64_ENLIGHTENED_VMCS_VERSION) >=
+	     KVM_EVMCS_VERSION) {
+
+		/* Check that we have assist pages on all online CPUs */
+		for_each_online_cpu(cpu) {
+			if (!hv_get_vp_assist_page(cpu)) {
+				enlightened_vmcs = false;
+				break;
+			}
+		}
+
+		if (enlightened_vmcs) {
+			pr_info("Using Hyper-V Enlightened VMCS\n");
+			static_branch_enable(&__kvm_is_using_evmcs);
+		}
+
+		if (ms_hyperv.nested_features & HV_X64_NESTED_DIRECT_FLUSH)
+			vmx_x86_ops.enable_l2_tlb_flush
+				= hv_enable_l2_tlb_flush;
+
+	} else {
+		enlightened_vmcs = false;
+	}
+}
+
+static void hv_reset_evmcs(void)
+{
+	struct hv_vp_assist_page *vp_ap;
+
+	if (!kvm_is_using_evmcs())
+		return;
+
+	/*
+	 * KVM should enable eVMCS if and only if all CPUs have a VP assist
+	 * page, and should reject CPU onlining if eVMCS is enabled the CPU
+	 * doesn't have a VP assist page allocated.
+	 */
+	vp_ap = hv_get_vp_assist_page(smp_processor_id());
+	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!vp_ap))
+		return;
+
+	/*
+	 * Reset everything to support using non-enlightened VMCS access later
+	 * (e.g. when we reload the module with enlightened_vmcs=0)
+	 */
+	vp_ap->nested_control.features.directhypercall = 0;
+	vp_ap->current_nested_vmcs = 0;
+	vp_ap->enlighten_vmentry = 0;
+}
+
+#else /* IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HYPERV) */
+static void hv_init_evmcs(void) {}
+static void hv_reset_evmcs(void) {}
+#endif /* IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HYPERV) */
+
+/*
+ * Comment's format: document - errata name - stepping - processor name.
+ * Refer from
+ * https://www.virtualbox.org/svn/vbox/trunk/src/VBox/VMM/VMMR0/HMR0.cpp
+ */
+static u32 vmx_preemption_cpu_tfms[] = {
+/* 323344.pdf - BA86   - D0 - Xeon 7500 Series */
+0x000206E6,
+/* 323056.pdf - AAX65  - C2 - Xeon L3406 */
+/* 322814.pdf - AAT59  - C2 - i7-600, i5-500, i5-400 and i3-300 Mobile */
+/* 322911.pdf - AAU65  - C2 - i5-600, i3-500 Desktop and Pentium G6950 */
+0x00020652,
+/* 322911.pdf - AAU65  - K0 - i5-600, i3-500 Desktop and Pentium G6950 */
+0x00020655,
+/* 322373.pdf - AAO95  - B1 - Xeon 3400 Series */
+/* 322166.pdf - AAN92  - B1 - i7-800 and i5-700 Desktop */
+/*
+ * 320767.pdf - AAP86  - B1 -
+ * i7-900 Mobile Extreme, i7-800 and i7-700 Mobile
+ */
+0x000106E5,
+/* 321333.pdf - AAM126 - C0 - Xeon 3500 */
+0x000106A0,
+/* 321333.pdf - AAM126 - C1 - Xeon 3500 */
+0x000106A1,
+/* 320836.pdf - AAJ124 - C0 - i7-900 Desktop Extreme and i7-900 Desktop */
+0x000106A4,
+ /* 321333.pdf - AAM126 - D0 - Xeon 3500 */
+ /* 321324.pdf - AAK139 - D0 - Xeon 5500 */
+ /* 320836.pdf - AAJ124 - D0 - i7-900 Extreme and i7-900 Desktop */
+0x000106A5,
+ /* Xeon E3-1220 V2 */
+0x000306A8,
+};
+
+static inline bool cpu_has_broken_vmx_preemption_timer(void)
+{
+	u32 eax = cpuid_eax(0x00000001), i;
+
+	/* Clear the reserved bits */
+	eax &= ~(0x3U << 14 | 0xfU << 28);
+	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(vmx_preemption_cpu_tfms); i++)
+		if (eax == vmx_preemption_cpu_tfms[i])
+			return true;
+
+	return false;
+}
+
+static inline bool cpu_need_virtualize_apic_accesses(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	return flexpriority_enabled && lapic_in_kernel(vcpu);
+}
+
+static int possible_passthrough_msr_slot(u32 msr)
+{
+	u32 i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(vmx_possible_passthrough_msrs); i++)
+		if (vmx_possible_passthrough_msrs[i] == msr)
+			return i;
+
+	return -ENOENT;
+}
+
+static bool is_valid_passthrough_msr(u32 msr)
+{
+	bool r;
+
+	switch (msr) {
+	case 0x800 ... 0x8ff:
+		/* x2APIC MSRs. These are handled in vmx_update_msr_bitmap_x2apic() */
+		return true;
+	case MSR_IA32_RTIT_STATUS:
+	case MSR_IA32_RTIT_OUTPUT_BASE:
+	case MSR_IA32_RTIT_OUTPUT_MASK:
+	case MSR_IA32_RTIT_CR3_MATCH:
+	case MSR_IA32_RTIT_ADDR0_A ... MSR_IA32_RTIT_ADDR3_B:
+		/* PT MSRs. These are handled in pt_update_intercept_for_msr() */
+	case MSR_LBR_SELECT:
+	case MSR_LBR_TOS:
+	case MSR_LBR_INFO_0 ... MSR_LBR_INFO_0 + 31:
+	case MSR_LBR_NHM_FROM ... MSR_LBR_NHM_FROM + 31:
+	case MSR_LBR_NHM_TO ... MSR_LBR_NHM_TO + 31:
+	case MSR_LBR_CORE_FROM ... MSR_LBR_CORE_FROM + 8:
+	case MSR_LBR_CORE_TO ... MSR_LBR_CORE_TO + 8:
+		/* LBR MSRs. These are handled in vmx_update_intercept_for_lbr_msrs() */
+		return true;
+	}
+
+	r = possible_passthrough_msr_slot(msr) != -ENOENT;
+
+	WARN(!r, "Invalid MSR %x, please adapt vmx_possible_passthrough_msrs[]", msr);
+
+	return r;
+}
+
+struct vmx_uret_msr *vmx_find_uret_msr(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, u32 msr)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	i = kvm_find_user_return_msr(msr);
+	if (i >= 0)
+		return &vmx->guest_uret_msrs[i];
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+static int vmx_set_guest_uret_msr(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx,
+				  struct vmx_uret_msr *msr, u64 data)
+{
+	unsigned int slot = msr - vmx->guest_uret_msrs;
+	int ret = 0;
+
+	if (msr->load_into_hardware) {
+		preempt_disable();
+		ret = kvm_set_user_return_msr(slot, data, msr->mask);
+		preempt_enable();
+	}
+	if (!ret)
+		msr->data = data;
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Disable VMX and clear CR4.VMXE (even if VMXOFF faults)
+ *
+ * Note, VMXOFF causes a #UD if the CPU is !post-VMXON, but it's impossible to
+ * atomically track post-VMXON state, e.g. this may be called in NMI context.
+ * Eat all faults as all other faults on VMXOFF faults are mode related, i.e.
+ * faults are guaranteed to be due to the !post-VMXON check unless the CPU is
+ * magically in RM, VM86, compat mode, or at CPL>0.
+ */
+static int kvm_cpu_vmxoff(void)
+{
+	asm_volatile_goto("1: vmxoff\n\t"
+			  _ASM_EXTABLE(1b, %l[fault])
+			  ::: "cc", "memory" : fault);
+
+	cr4_clear_bits(X86_CR4_VMXE);
+	return 0;
+
+fault:
+	cr4_clear_bits(X86_CR4_VMXE);
+	return -EIO;
+}
+
+static void vmx_emergency_disable(void)
+{
+	int cpu = raw_smp_processor_id();
+	struct loaded_vmcs *v;
+
+	kvm_rebooting = true;
+
+	/*
+	 * Note, CR4.VMXE can be _cleared_ in NMI context, but it can only be
+	 * set in task context.  If this races with VMX is disabled by an NMI,
+	 * VMCLEAR and VMXOFF may #UD, but KVM will eat those faults due to
+	 * kvm_rebooting set.
+	 */
+	if (!(__read_cr4() & X86_CR4_VMXE))
+		return;
+
+	list_for_each_entry(v, &per_cpu(loaded_vmcss_on_cpu, cpu),
+			    loaded_vmcss_on_cpu_link)
+		vmcs_clear(v->vmcs);
+
+	kvm_cpu_vmxoff();
+}
+
+static void __loaded_vmcs_clear(void *arg)
+{
+	struct loaded_vmcs *loaded_vmcs = arg;
+	int cpu = raw_smp_processor_id();
+
+	if (loaded_vmcs->cpu != cpu)
+		return; /* vcpu migration can race with cpu offline */
+	if (per_cpu(current_vmcs, cpu) == loaded_vmcs->vmcs)
+		per_cpu(current_vmcs, cpu) = NULL;
+
+	vmcs_clear(loaded_vmcs->vmcs);
+	if (loaded_vmcs->shadow_vmcs && loaded_vmcs->launched)
+		vmcs_clear(loaded_vmcs->shadow_vmcs);
+
+	list_del(&loaded_vmcs->loaded_vmcss_on_cpu_link);
+
+	/*
+	 * Ensure all writes to loaded_vmcs, including deleting it from its
+	 * current percpu list, complete before setting loaded_vmcs->cpu to
+	 * -1, otherwise a different cpu can see loaded_vmcs->cpu == -1 first
+	 * and add loaded_vmcs to its percpu list before it's deleted from this
+	 * cpu's list. Pairs with the smp_rmb() in vmx_vcpu_load_vmcs().
+	 */
+	smp_wmb();
+
+	loaded_vmcs->cpu = -1;
+	loaded_vmcs->launched = 0;
+}
+
+void loaded_vmcs_clear(struct loaded_vmcs *loaded_vmcs)
+{
+	int cpu = loaded_vmcs->cpu;
+
+	if (cpu != -1)
+		smp_call_function_single(cpu,
+			 __loaded_vmcs_clear, loaded_vmcs, 1);
+}
+
+static bool vmx_segment_cache_test_set(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, unsigned seg,
+				       unsigned field)
+{
+	bool ret;
+	u32 mask = 1 << (seg * SEG_FIELD_NR + field);
+
+	if (!kvm_register_is_available(&vmx->vcpu, VCPU_EXREG_SEGMENTS)) {
+		kvm_register_mark_available(&vmx->vcpu, VCPU_EXREG_SEGMENTS);
+		vmx->segment_cache.bitmask = 0;
+	}
+	ret = vmx->segment_cache.bitmask & mask;
+	vmx->segment_cache.bitmask |= mask;
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static u16 vmx_read_guest_seg_selector(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, unsigned seg)
+{
+	u16 *p = &vmx->segment_cache.seg[seg].selector;
+
+	if (!vmx_segment_cache_test_set(vmx, seg, SEG_FIELD_SEL))
+		*p = vmcs_read16(kvm_vmx_segment_fields[seg].selector);
+	return *p;
+}
+
+static ulong vmx_read_guest_seg_base(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, unsigned seg)
+{
+	ulong *p = &vmx->segment_cache.seg[seg].base;
+
+	if (!vmx_segment_cache_test_set(vmx, seg, SEG_FIELD_BASE))
+		*p = vmcs_readl(kvm_vmx_segment_fields[seg].base);
+	return *p;
+}
+
+static u32 vmx_read_guest_seg_limit(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, unsigned seg)
+{
+	u32 *p = &vmx->segment_cache.seg[seg].limit;
+
+	if (!vmx_segment_cache_test_set(vmx, seg, SEG_FIELD_LIMIT))
+		*p = vmcs_read32(kvm_vmx_segment_fields[seg].limit);
+	return *p;
+}
+
+static u32 vmx_read_guest_seg_ar(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, unsigned seg)
+{
+	u32 *p = &vmx->segment_cache.seg[seg].ar;
+
+	if (!vmx_segment_cache_test_set(vmx, seg, SEG_FIELD_AR))
+		*p = vmcs_read32(kvm_vmx_segment_fields[seg].ar_bytes);
+	return *p;
+}
+
+void vmx_update_exception_bitmap(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	u32 eb;
+
+	eb = (1u << PF_VECTOR) | (1u << UD_VECTOR) | (1u << MC_VECTOR) |
+	     (1u << DB_VECTOR) | (1u << AC_VECTOR);
+	/*
+	 * Guest access to VMware backdoor ports could legitimately
+	 * trigger #GP because of TSS I/O permission bitmap.
+	 * We intercept those #GP and allow access to them anyway
+	 * as VMware does.
+	 */
+	if (enable_vmware_backdoor)
+		eb |= (1u << GP_VECTOR);
+	if ((vcpu->guest_debug &
+	     (KVM_GUESTDBG_ENABLE | KVM_GUESTDBG_USE_SW_BP)) ==
+	    (KVM_GUESTDBG_ENABLE | KVM_GUESTDBG_USE_SW_BP))
+		eb |= 1u << BP_VECTOR;
+	if (to_vmx(vcpu)->rmode.vm86_active)
+		eb = ~0;
+	if (!vmx_need_pf_intercept(vcpu))
+		eb &= ~(1u << PF_VECTOR);
+
+	/* When we are running a nested L2 guest and L1 specified for it a
+	 * certain exception bitmap, we must trap the same exceptions and pass
+	 * them to L1. When running L2, we will only handle the exceptions
+	 * specified above if L1 did not want them.
+	 */
+	if (is_guest_mode(vcpu))
+		eb |= get_vmcs12(vcpu)->exception_bitmap;
+	else {
+		int mask = 0, match = 0;
+
+		if (enable_ept && (eb & (1u << PF_VECTOR))) {
+			/*
+			 * If EPT is enabled, #PF is currently only intercepted
+			 * if MAXPHYADDR is smaller on the guest than on the
+			 * host.  In that case we only care about present,
+			 * non-reserved faults.  For vmcs02, however, PFEC_MASK
+			 * and PFEC_MATCH are set in prepare_vmcs02_rare.
+			 */
+			mask = PFERR_PRESENT_MASK | PFERR_RSVD_MASK;
+			match = PFERR_PRESENT_MASK;
+		}
+		vmcs_write32(PAGE_FAULT_ERROR_CODE_MASK, mask);
+		vmcs_write32(PAGE_FAULT_ERROR_CODE_MATCH, match);
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Disabling xfd interception indicates that dynamic xfeatures
+	 * might be used in the guest. Always trap #NM in this case
+	 * to save guest xfd_err timely.
+	 */
+	if (vcpu->arch.xfd_no_write_intercept)
+		eb |= (1u << NM_VECTOR);
+
+	vmcs_write32(EXCEPTION_BITMAP, eb);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check if MSR is intercepted for currently loaded MSR bitmap.
+ */
+static bool msr_write_intercepted(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, u32 msr)
+{
+	if (!(exec_controls_get(vmx) & CPU_BASED_USE_MSR_BITMAPS))
+		return true;
+
+	return vmx_test_msr_bitmap_write(vmx->loaded_vmcs->msr_bitmap, msr);
+}
+
+unsigned int __vmx_vcpu_run_flags(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
+{
+	unsigned int flags = 0;
+
+	if (vmx->loaded_vmcs->launched)
+		flags |= VMX_RUN_VMRESUME;
+
+	/*
+	 * If writes to the SPEC_CTRL MSR aren't intercepted, the guest is free
+	 * to change it directly without causing a vmexit.  In that case read
+	 * it after vmexit and store it in vmx->spec_ctrl.
+	 */
+	if (!msr_write_intercepted(vmx, MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL))
+		flags |= VMX_RUN_SAVE_SPEC_CTRL;
+
+	return flags;
+}
+
+static __always_inline void clear_atomic_switch_msr_special(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx,
+		unsigned long entry, unsigned long exit)
+{
+	vm_entry_controls_clearbit(vmx, entry);
+	vm_exit_controls_clearbit(vmx, exit);
+}
+
+int vmx_find_loadstore_msr_slot(struct vmx_msrs *m, u32 msr)
+{
+	unsigned int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < m->nr; ++i) {
+		if (m->val[i].index == msr)
+			return i;
+	}
+	return -ENOENT;
+}
+
+static void clear_atomic_switch_msr(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, unsigned msr)
+{
+	int i;
+	struct msr_autoload *m = &vmx->msr_autoload;
+
+	switch (msr) {
+	case MSR_EFER:
+		if (cpu_has_load_ia32_efer()) {
+			clear_atomic_switch_msr_special(vmx,
+					VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_EFER,
+					VM_EXIT_LOAD_IA32_EFER);
+			return;
+		}
+		break;
+	case MSR_CORE_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL:
+		if (cpu_has_load_perf_global_ctrl()) {
+			clear_atomic_switch_msr_special(vmx,
+					VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL,
+					VM_EXIT_LOAD_IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL);
+			return;
+		}
+		break;
+	}
+	i = vmx_find_loadstore_msr_slot(&m->guest, msr);
+	if (i < 0)
+		goto skip_guest;
+	--m->guest.nr;
+	m->guest.val[i] = m->guest.val[m->guest.nr];
+	vmcs_write32(VM_ENTRY_MSR_LOAD_COUNT, m->guest.nr);
+
+skip_guest:
+	i = vmx_find_loadstore_msr_slot(&m->host, msr);
+	if (i < 0)
+		return;
+
+	--m->host.nr;
+	m->host.val[i] = m->host.val[m->host.nr];
+	vmcs_write32(VM_EXIT_MSR_LOAD_COUNT, m->host.nr);
+}
+
+static __always_inline void add_atomic_switch_msr_special(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx,
+		unsigned long entry, unsigned long exit,
+		unsigned long guest_val_vmcs, unsigned long host_val_vmcs,
+		u64 guest_val, u64 host_val)
+{
+	vmcs_write64(guest_val_vmcs, guest_val);
+	if (host_val_vmcs != HOST_IA32_EFER)
+		vmcs_write64(host_val_vmcs, host_val);
+	vm_entry_controls_setbit(vmx, entry);
+	vm_exit_controls_setbit(vmx, exit);
+}
+
+static void add_atomic_switch_msr(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, unsigned msr,
+				  u64 guest_val, u64 host_val, bool entry_only)
+{
+	int i, j = 0;
+	struct msr_autoload *m = &vmx->msr_autoload;
+
+	switch (msr) {
+	case MSR_EFER:
+		if (cpu_has_load_ia32_efer()) {
+			add_atomic_switch_msr_special(vmx,
+					VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_EFER,
+					VM_EXIT_LOAD_IA32_EFER,
+					GUEST_IA32_EFER,
+					HOST_IA32_EFER,
+					guest_val, host_val);
+			return;
+		}
+		break;
+	case MSR_CORE_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL:
+		if (cpu_has_load_perf_global_ctrl()) {
+			add_atomic_switch_msr_special(vmx,
+					VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL,
+					VM_EXIT_LOAD_IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL,
+					GUEST_IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL,
+					HOST_IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL,
+					guest_val, host_val);
+			return;
+		}
+		break;
+	case MSR_IA32_PEBS_ENABLE:
+		/* PEBS needs a quiescent period after being disabled (to write
+		 * a record).  Disabling PEBS through VMX MSR swapping doesn't
+		 * provide that period, so a CPU could write host's record into
+		 * guest's memory.
+		 */
+		wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_PEBS_ENABLE, 0);
+	}
+
+	i = vmx_find_loadstore_msr_slot(&m->guest, msr);
+	if (!entry_only)
+		j = vmx_find_loadstore_msr_slot(&m->host, msr);
+
+	if ((i < 0 && m->guest.nr == MAX_NR_LOADSTORE_MSRS) ||
+	    (j < 0 &&  m->host.nr == MAX_NR_LOADSTORE_MSRS)) {
+		printk_once(KERN_WARNING "Not enough msr switch entries. "
+				"Can't add msr %x\n", msr);
+		return;
+	}
+	if (i < 0) {
+		i = m->guest.nr++;
+		vmcs_write32(VM_ENTRY_MSR_LOAD_COUNT, m->guest.nr);
+	}
+	m->guest.val[i].index = msr;
+	m->guest.val[i].value = guest_val;
+
+	if (entry_only)
+		return;
+
+	if (j < 0) {
+		j = m->host.nr++;
+		vmcs_write32(VM_EXIT_MSR_LOAD_COUNT, m->host.nr);
+	}
+	m->host.val[j].index = msr;
+	m->host.val[j].value = host_val;
+}
+
+static bool update_transition_efer(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
+{
+	u64 guest_efer = vmx->vcpu.arch.efer;
+	u64 ignore_bits = 0;
+	int i;
+
+	/* Shadow paging assumes NX to be available.  */
+	if (!enable_ept)
+		guest_efer |= EFER_NX;
+
+	/*
+	 * LMA and LME handled by hardware; SCE meaningless outside long mode.
+	 */
+	ignore_bits |= EFER_SCE;
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+	ignore_bits |= EFER_LMA | EFER_LME;
+	/* SCE is meaningful only in long mode on Intel */
+	if (guest_efer & EFER_LMA)
+		ignore_bits &= ~(u64)EFER_SCE;
+#endif
+
+	/*
+	 * On EPT, we can't emulate NX, so we must switch EFER atomically.
+	 * On CPUs that support "load IA32_EFER", always switch EFER
+	 * atomically, since it's faster than switching it manually.
+	 */
+	if (cpu_has_load_ia32_efer() ||
+	    (enable_ept && ((vmx->vcpu.arch.efer ^ host_efer) & EFER_NX))) {
+		if (!(guest_efer & EFER_LMA))
+			guest_efer &= ~EFER_LME;
+		if (guest_efer != host_efer)
+			add_atomic_switch_msr(vmx, MSR_EFER,
+					      guest_efer, host_efer, false);
+		else
+			clear_atomic_switch_msr(vmx, MSR_EFER);
+		return false;
+	}
+
+	i = kvm_find_user_return_msr(MSR_EFER);
+	if (i < 0)
+		return false;
+
+	clear_atomic_switch_msr(vmx, MSR_EFER);
+
+	guest_efer &= ~ignore_bits;
+	guest_efer |= host_efer & ignore_bits;
+
+	vmx->guest_uret_msrs[i].data = guest_efer;
+	vmx->guest_uret_msrs[i].mask = ~ignore_bits;
+
+	return true;
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
+/*
+ * On 32-bit kernels, VM exits still load the FS and GS bases from the
+ * VMCS rather than the segment table.  KVM uses this helper to figure
+ * out the current bases to poke them into the VMCS before entry.
+ */
+static unsigned long segment_base(u16 selector)
+{
+	struct desc_struct *table;
+	unsigned long v;
+
+	if (!(selector & ~SEGMENT_RPL_MASK))
+		return 0;
+
+	table = get_current_gdt_ro();
+
+	if ((selector & SEGMENT_TI_MASK) == SEGMENT_LDT) {
+		u16 ldt_selector = kvm_read_ldt();
+
+		if (!(ldt_selector & ~SEGMENT_RPL_MASK))
+			return 0;
+
+		table = (struct desc_struct *)segment_base(ldt_selector);
+	}
+	v = get_desc_base(&table[selector >> 3]);
+	return v;
+}
+#endif
+
+static inline bool pt_can_write_msr(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
+{
+	return vmx_pt_mode_is_host_guest() &&
+	       !(vmx->pt_desc.guest.ctl & RTIT_CTL_TRACEEN);
+}
+
+static inline bool pt_output_base_valid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 base)
+{
+	/* The base must be 128-byte aligned and a legal physical address. */
+	return kvm_vcpu_is_legal_aligned_gpa(vcpu, base, 128);
+}
+
+static inline void pt_load_msr(struct pt_ctx *ctx, u32 addr_range)
+{
+	u32 i;
+
+	wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_RTIT_STATUS, ctx->status);
+	wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_RTIT_OUTPUT_BASE, ctx->output_base);
+	wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_RTIT_OUTPUT_MASK, ctx->output_mask);
+	wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_RTIT_CR3_MATCH, ctx->cr3_match);
+	for (i = 0; i < addr_range; i++) {
+		wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_RTIT_ADDR0_A + i * 2, ctx->addr_a[i]);
+		wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_RTIT_ADDR0_B + i * 2, ctx->addr_b[i]);
+	}
+}
+
+static inline void pt_save_msr(struct pt_ctx *ctx, u32 addr_range)
+{
+	u32 i;
+
+	rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_RTIT_STATUS, ctx->status);
+	rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_RTIT_OUTPUT_BASE, ctx->output_base);
+	rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_RTIT_OUTPUT_MASK, ctx->output_mask);
+	rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_RTIT_CR3_MATCH, ctx->cr3_match);
+	for (i = 0; i < addr_range; i++) {
+		rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_RTIT_ADDR0_A + i * 2, ctx->addr_a[i]);
+		rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_RTIT_ADDR0_B + i * 2, ctx->addr_b[i]);
+	}
+}
+
+static void pt_guest_enter(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
+{
+	if (vmx_pt_mode_is_system())
+		return;
+
+	/*
+	 * GUEST_IA32_RTIT_CTL is already set in the VMCS.
+	 * Save host state before VM entry.
+	 */
+	rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_RTIT_CTL, vmx->pt_desc.host.ctl);
+	if (vmx->pt_desc.guest.ctl & RTIT_CTL_TRACEEN) {
+		wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_RTIT_CTL, 0);
+		pt_save_msr(&vmx->pt_desc.host, vmx->pt_desc.num_address_ranges);
+		pt_load_msr(&vmx->pt_desc.guest, vmx->pt_desc.num_address_ranges);
+	}
+}
+
+static void pt_guest_exit(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
+{
+	if (vmx_pt_mode_is_system())
+		return;
+
+	if (vmx->pt_desc.guest.ctl & RTIT_CTL_TRACEEN) {
+		pt_save_msr(&vmx->pt_desc.guest, vmx->pt_desc.num_address_ranges);
+		pt_load_msr(&vmx->pt_desc.host, vmx->pt_desc.num_address_ranges);
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * KVM requires VM_EXIT_CLEAR_IA32_RTIT_CTL to expose PT to the guest,
+	 * i.e. RTIT_CTL is always cleared on VM-Exit.  Restore it if necessary.
+	 */
+	if (vmx->pt_desc.host.ctl)
+		wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_RTIT_CTL, vmx->pt_desc.host.ctl);
+}
+
+void vmx_set_host_fs_gs(struct vmcs_host_state *host, u16 fs_sel, u16 gs_sel,
+			unsigned long fs_base, unsigned long gs_base)
+{
+	if (unlikely(fs_sel != host->fs_sel)) {
+		if (!(fs_sel & 7))
+			vmcs_write16(HOST_FS_SELECTOR, fs_sel);
+		else
+			vmcs_write16(HOST_FS_SELECTOR, 0);
+		host->fs_sel = fs_sel;
+	}
+	if (unlikely(gs_sel != host->gs_sel)) {
+		if (!(gs_sel & 7))
+			vmcs_write16(HOST_GS_SELECTOR, gs_sel);
+		else
+			vmcs_write16(HOST_GS_SELECTOR, 0);
+		host->gs_sel = gs_sel;
+	}
+	if (unlikely(fs_base != host->fs_base)) {
+		vmcs_writel(HOST_FS_BASE, fs_base);
+		host->fs_base = fs_base;
+	}
+	if (unlikely(gs_base != host->gs_base)) {
+		vmcs_writel(HOST_GS_BASE, gs_base);
+		host->gs_base = gs_base;
+	}
+}
+
+void vmx_prepare_switch_to_guest(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+	struct vmcs_host_state *host_state;
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+	int cpu = raw_smp_processor_id();
+#endif
+	unsigned long fs_base, gs_base;
+	u16 fs_sel, gs_sel;
+	int i;
+
+	vmx->req_immediate_exit = false;
+
+	/*
+	 * Note that guest MSRs to be saved/restored can also be changed
+	 * when guest state is loaded. This happens when guest transitions
+	 * to/from long-mode by setting MSR_EFER.LMA.
+	 */
+	if (!vmx->guest_uret_msrs_loaded) {
+		vmx->guest_uret_msrs_loaded = true;
+		for (i = 0; i < kvm_nr_uret_msrs; ++i) {
+			if (!vmx->guest_uret_msrs[i].load_into_hardware)
+				continue;
+
+			kvm_set_user_return_msr(i,
+						vmx->guest_uret_msrs[i].data,
+						vmx->guest_uret_msrs[i].mask);
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (vmx->nested.need_vmcs12_to_shadow_sync)
+		nested_sync_vmcs12_to_shadow(vcpu);
+
+	if (vmx->guest_state_loaded)
+		return;
+
+	host_state = &vmx->loaded_vmcs->host_state;
+
+	/*
+	 * Set host fs and gs selectors.  Unfortunately, 22.2.3 does not
+	 * allow segment selectors with cpl > 0 or ti == 1.
+	 */
+	host_state->ldt_sel = kvm_read_ldt();
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+	savesegment(ds, host_state->ds_sel);
+	savesegment(es, host_state->es_sel);
+
+	gs_base = cpu_kernelmode_gs_base(cpu);
+	if (likely(is_64bit_mm(current->mm))) {
+		current_save_fsgs();
+		fs_sel = current->thread.fsindex;
+		gs_sel = current->thread.gsindex;
+		fs_base = current->thread.fsbase;
+		vmx->msr_host_kernel_gs_base = current->thread.gsbase;
+	} else {
+		savesegment(fs, fs_sel);
+		savesegment(gs, gs_sel);
+		fs_base = read_msr(MSR_FS_BASE);
+		vmx->msr_host_kernel_gs_base = read_msr(MSR_KERNEL_GS_BASE);
+	}
+
+	wrmsrl(MSR_KERNEL_GS_BASE, vmx->msr_guest_kernel_gs_base);
+#else
+	savesegment(fs, fs_sel);
+	savesegment(gs, gs_sel);
+	fs_base = segment_base(fs_sel);
+	gs_base = segment_base(gs_sel);
+#endif
+
+	vmx_set_host_fs_gs(host_state, fs_sel, gs_sel, fs_base, gs_base);
+	vmx->guest_state_loaded = true;
+}
+
+static void vmx_prepare_switch_to_host(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
+{
+	struct vmcs_host_state *host_state;
+
+	if (!vmx->guest_state_loaded)
+		return;
+
+	host_state = &vmx->loaded_vmcs->host_state;
+
+	++vmx->vcpu.stat.host_state_reload;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+	rdmsrl(MSR_KERNEL_GS_BASE, vmx->msr_guest_kernel_gs_base);
+#endif
+	if (host_state->ldt_sel || (host_state->gs_sel & 7)) {
+		kvm_load_ldt(host_state->ldt_sel);
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+		load_gs_index(host_state->gs_sel);
+#else
+		loadsegment(gs, host_state->gs_sel);
+#endif
+	}
+	if (host_state->fs_sel & 7)
+		loadsegment(fs, host_state->fs_sel);
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+	if (unlikely(host_state->ds_sel | host_state->es_sel)) {
+		loadsegment(ds, host_state->ds_sel);
+		loadsegment(es, host_state->es_sel);
+	}
+#endif
+	invalidate_tss_limit();
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+	wrmsrl(MSR_KERNEL_GS_BASE, vmx->msr_host_kernel_gs_base);
+#endif
+	load_fixmap_gdt(raw_smp_processor_id());
+	vmx->guest_state_loaded = false;
+	vmx->guest_uret_msrs_loaded = false;
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+static u64 vmx_read_guest_kernel_gs_base(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
+{
+	preempt_disable();
+	if (vmx->guest_state_loaded)
+		rdmsrl(MSR_KERNEL_GS_BASE, vmx->msr_guest_kernel_gs_base);
+	preempt_enable();
+	return vmx->msr_guest_kernel_gs_base;
+}
+
+static void vmx_write_guest_kernel_gs_base(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, u64 data)
+{
+	preempt_disable();
+	if (vmx->guest_state_loaded)
+		wrmsrl(MSR_KERNEL_GS_BASE, data);
+	preempt_enable();
+	vmx->msr_guest_kernel_gs_base = data;
+}
+#endif
+
+void vmx_vcpu_load_vmcs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int cpu,
+			struct loaded_vmcs *buddy)
+{
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+	bool already_loaded = vmx->loaded_vmcs->cpu == cpu;
+	struct vmcs *prev;
+
+	if (!already_loaded) {
+		loaded_vmcs_clear(vmx->loaded_vmcs);
+		local_irq_disable();
+
+		/*
+		 * Ensure loaded_vmcs->cpu is read before adding loaded_vmcs to
+		 * this cpu's percpu list, otherwise it may not yet be deleted
+		 * from its previous cpu's percpu list.  Pairs with the
+		 * smb_wmb() in __loaded_vmcs_clear().
+		 */
+		smp_rmb();
+
+		list_add(&vmx->loaded_vmcs->loaded_vmcss_on_cpu_link,
+			 &per_cpu(loaded_vmcss_on_cpu, cpu));
+		local_irq_enable();
+	}
+
+	prev = per_cpu(current_vmcs, cpu);
+	if (prev != vmx->loaded_vmcs->vmcs) {
+		per_cpu(current_vmcs, cpu) = vmx->loaded_vmcs->vmcs;
+		vmcs_load(vmx->loaded_vmcs->vmcs);
+
+		/*
+		 * No indirect branch prediction barrier needed when switching
+		 * the active VMCS within a vCPU, unless IBRS is advertised to
+		 * the vCPU.  To minimize the number of IBPBs executed, KVM
+		 * performs IBPB on nested VM-Exit (a single nested transition
+		 * may switch the active VMCS multiple times).
+		 */
+		if (!buddy || WARN_ON_ONCE(buddy->vmcs != prev))
+			indirect_branch_prediction_barrier();
+	}
+
+	if (!already_loaded) {
+		void *gdt = get_current_gdt_ro();
+
+		/*
+		 * Flush all EPTP/VPID contexts, the new pCPU may have stale
+		 * TLB entries from its previous association with the vCPU.
+		 */
+		kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_TLB_FLUSH, vcpu);
+
+		/*
+		 * Linux uses per-cpu TSS and GDT, so set these when switching
+		 * processors.  See 22.2.4.
+		 */
+		vmcs_writel(HOST_TR_BASE,
+			    (unsigned long)&get_cpu_entry_area(cpu)->tss.x86_tss);
+		vmcs_writel(HOST_GDTR_BASE, (unsigned long)gdt);   /* 22.2.4 */
+
+		if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IA32_EMULATION) || IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_32)) {
+			/* 22.2.3 */
+			vmcs_writel(HOST_IA32_SYSENTER_ESP,
+				    (unsigned long)(cpu_entry_stack(cpu) + 1));
+		}
+
+		vmx->loaded_vmcs->cpu = cpu;
+	}
+}
+
+/*
+ * Switches to specified vcpu, until a matching vcpu_put(), but assumes
+ * vcpu mutex is already taken.
+ */
+static void vmx_vcpu_load(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int cpu)
+{
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+
+	vmx_vcpu_load_vmcs(vcpu, cpu, NULL);
+
+	vmx_vcpu_pi_load(vcpu, cpu);
+
+	vmx->host_debugctlmsr = get_debugctlmsr();
+}
+
+static void vmx_vcpu_put(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	vmx_vcpu_pi_put(vcpu);
+
+	vmx_prepare_switch_to_host(to_vmx(vcpu));
+}
+
+bool vmx_emulation_required(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	return emulate_invalid_guest_state && !vmx_guest_state_valid(vcpu);
+}
+
+unsigned long vmx_get_rflags(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+	unsigned long rflags, save_rflags;
+
+	if (!kvm_register_is_available(vcpu, VCPU_EXREG_RFLAGS)) {
+		kvm_register_mark_available(vcpu, VCPU_EXREG_RFLAGS);
+		rflags = vmcs_readl(GUEST_RFLAGS);
+		if (vmx->rmode.vm86_active) {
+			rflags &= RMODE_GUEST_OWNED_EFLAGS_BITS;
+			save_rflags = vmx->rmode.save_rflags;
+			rflags |= save_rflags & ~RMODE_GUEST_OWNED_EFLAGS_BITS;
+		}
+		vmx->rflags = rflags;
+	}
+	return vmx->rflags;
+}
+
+void vmx_set_rflags(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long rflags)
+{
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+	unsigned long old_rflags;
+
+	/*
+	 * Unlike CR0 and CR4, RFLAGS handling requires checking if the vCPU
+	 * is an unrestricted guest in order to mark L2 as needing emulation
+	 * if L1 runs L2 as a restricted guest.
+	 */
+	if (is_unrestricted_guest(vcpu)) {
+		kvm_register_mark_available(vcpu, VCPU_EXREG_RFLAGS);
+		vmx->rflags = rflags;
+		vmcs_writel(GUEST_RFLAGS, rflags);
+		return;
+	}
+
+	old_rflags = vmx_get_rflags(vcpu);
+	vmx->rflags = rflags;
+	if (vmx->rmode.vm86_active) {
+		vmx->rmode.save_rflags = rflags;
+		rflags |= X86_EFLAGS_IOPL | X86_EFLAGS_VM;
+	}
+	vmcs_writel(GUEST_RFLAGS, rflags);
+
+	if ((old_rflags ^ vmx->rflags) & X86_EFLAGS_VM)
+		vmx->emulation_required = vmx_emulation_required(vcpu);
+}
+
+static bool vmx_get_if_flag(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	return vmx_get_rflags(vcpu) & X86_EFLAGS_IF;
+}
+
+u32 vmx_get_interrupt_shadow(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	u32 interruptibility = vmcs_read32(GUEST_INTERRUPTIBILITY_INFO);
+	int ret = 0;
+
+	if (interruptibility & GUEST_INTR_STATE_STI)
+		ret |= KVM_X86_SHADOW_INT_STI;
+	if (interruptibility & GUEST_INTR_STATE_MOV_SS)
+		ret |= KVM_X86_SHADOW_INT_MOV_SS;
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+void vmx_set_interrupt_shadow(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int mask)
+{
+	u32 interruptibility_old = vmcs_read32(GUEST_INTERRUPTIBILITY_INFO);
+	u32 interruptibility = interruptibility_old;
+
+	interruptibility &= ~(GUEST_INTR_STATE_STI | GUEST_INTR_STATE_MOV_SS);
+
+	if (mask & KVM_X86_SHADOW_INT_MOV_SS)
+		interruptibility |= GUEST_INTR_STATE_MOV_SS;
+	else if (mask & KVM_X86_SHADOW_INT_STI)
+		interruptibility |= GUEST_INTR_STATE_STI;
+
+	if ((interruptibility != interruptibility_old))
+		vmcs_write32(GUEST_INTERRUPTIBILITY_INFO, interruptibility);
+}
+
+static int vmx_rtit_ctl_check(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 data)
+{
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+	unsigned long value;
+
+	/*
+	 * Any MSR write that attempts to change bits marked reserved will
+	 * case a #GP fault.
+	 */
+	if (data & vmx->pt_desc.ctl_bitmask)
+		return 1;
+
+	/*
+	 * Any attempt to modify IA32_RTIT_CTL while TraceEn is set will
+	 * result in a #GP unless the same write also clears TraceEn.
+	 */
+	if ((vmx->pt_desc.guest.ctl & RTIT_CTL_TRACEEN) &&
+		((vmx->pt_desc.guest.ctl ^ data) & ~RTIT_CTL_TRACEEN))
+		return 1;
+
+	/*
+	 * WRMSR to IA32_RTIT_CTL that sets TraceEn but clears this bit
+	 * and FabricEn would cause #GP, if
+	 * CPUID.(EAX=14H, ECX=0):ECX.SNGLRGNOUT[bit 2] = 0
+	 */
+	if ((data & RTIT_CTL_TRACEEN) && !(data & RTIT_CTL_TOPA) &&
+		!(data & RTIT_CTL_FABRIC_EN) &&
+		!intel_pt_validate_cap(vmx->pt_desc.caps,
+					PT_CAP_single_range_output))
+		return 1;
+
+	/*
+	 * MTCFreq, CycThresh and PSBFreq encodings check, any MSR write that
+	 * utilize encodings marked reserved will cause a #GP fault.
+	 */
+	value = intel_pt_validate_cap(vmx->pt_desc.caps, PT_CAP_mtc_periods);
+	if (intel_pt_validate_cap(vmx->pt_desc.caps, PT_CAP_mtc) &&
+			!test_bit((data & RTIT_CTL_MTC_RANGE) >>
+			RTIT_CTL_MTC_RANGE_OFFSET, &value))
+		return 1;
+	value = intel_pt_validate_cap(vmx->pt_desc.caps,
+						PT_CAP_cycle_thresholds);
+	if (intel_pt_validate_cap(vmx->pt_desc.caps, PT_CAP_psb_cyc) &&
+			!test_bit((data & RTIT_CTL_CYC_THRESH) >>
+			RTIT_CTL_CYC_THRESH_OFFSET, &value))
+		return 1;
+	value = intel_pt_validate_cap(vmx->pt_desc.caps, PT_CAP_psb_periods);
+	if (intel_pt_validate_cap(vmx->pt_desc.caps, PT_CAP_psb_cyc) &&
+			!test_bit((data & RTIT_CTL_PSB_FREQ) >>
+			RTIT_CTL_PSB_FREQ_OFFSET, &value))
+		return 1;
+
+	/*
+	 * If ADDRx_CFG is reserved or the encodings is >2 will
+	 * cause a #GP fault.
+	 */
+	value = (data & RTIT_CTL_ADDR0) >> RTIT_CTL_ADDR0_OFFSET;
+	if ((value && (vmx->pt_desc.num_address_ranges < 1)) || (value > 2))
+		return 1;
+	value = (data & RTIT_CTL_ADDR1) >> RTIT_CTL_ADDR1_OFFSET;
+	if ((value && (vmx->pt_desc.num_address_ranges < 2)) || (value > 2))
+		return 1;
+	value = (data & RTIT_CTL_ADDR2) >> RTIT_CTL_ADDR2_OFFSET;
+	if ((value && (vmx->pt_desc.num_address_ranges < 3)) || (value > 2))
+		return 1;
+	value = (data & RTIT_CTL_ADDR3) >> RTIT_CTL_ADDR3_OFFSET;
+	if ((value && (vmx->pt_desc.num_address_ranges < 4)) || (value > 2))
+		return 1;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static bool vmx_can_emulate_instruction(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int emul_type,
+					void *insn, int insn_len)
+{
+	/*
+	 * Emulation of instructions in SGX enclaves is impossible as RIP does
+	 * not point at the failing instruction, and even if it did, the code
+	 * stream is inaccessible.  Inject #UD instead of exiting to userspace
+	 * so that guest userspace can't DoS the guest simply by triggering
+	 * emulation (enclaves are CPL3 only).
+	 */
+	if (to_vmx(vcpu)->exit_reason.enclave_mode) {
+		kvm_queue_exception(vcpu, UD_VECTOR);
+		return false;
+	}
+	return true;
+}
+
+static int skip_emulated_instruction(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	union vmx_exit_reason exit_reason = to_vmx(vcpu)->exit_reason;
+	unsigned long rip, orig_rip;
+	u32 instr_len;
+
+	/*
+	 * Using VMCS.VM_EXIT_INSTRUCTION_LEN on EPT misconfig depends on
+	 * undefined behavior: Intel's SDM doesn't mandate the VMCS field be
+	 * set when EPT misconfig occurs.  In practice, real hardware updates
+	 * VM_EXIT_INSTRUCTION_LEN on EPT misconfig, but other hypervisors
+	 * (namely Hyper-V) don't set it due to it being undefined behavior,
+	 * i.e. we end up advancing IP with some random value.
+	 */
+	if (!static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR) ||
+	    exit_reason.basic != EXIT_REASON_EPT_MISCONFIG) {
+		instr_len = vmcs_read32(VM_EXIT_INSTRUCTION_LEN);
+
+		/*
+		 * Emulating an enclave's instructions isn't supported as KVM
+		 * cannot access the enclave's memory or its true RIP, e.g. the
+		 * vmcs.GUEST_RIP points at the exit point of the enclave, not
+		 * the RIP that actually triggered the VM-Exit.  But, because
+		 * most instructions that cause VM-Exit will #UD in an enclave,
+		 * most instruction-based VM-Exits simply do not occur.
+		 *
+		 * There are a few exceptions, notably the debug instructions
+		 * INT1ICEBRK and INT3, as they are allowed in debug enclaves
+		 * and generate #DB/#BP as expected, which KVM might intercept.
+		 * But again, the CPU does the dirty work and saves an instr
+		 * length of zero so VMMs don't shoot themselves in the foot.
+		 * WARN if KVM tries to skip a non-zero length instruction on
+		 * a VM-Exit from an enclave.
+		 */
+		if (!instr_len)
+			goto rip_updated;
+
+		WARN_ONCE(exit_reason.enclave_mode,
+			  "skipping instruction after SGX enclave VM-Exit");
+
+		orig_rip = kvm_rip_read(vcpu);
+		rip = orig_rip + instr_len;
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+		/*
+		 * We need to mask out the high 32 bits of RIP if not in 64-bit
+		 * mode, but just finding out that we are in 64-bit mode is
+		 * quite expensive.  Only do it if there was a carry.
+		 */
+		if (unlikely(((rip ^ orig_rip) >> 31) == 3) && !is_64_bit_mode(vcpu))
+			rip = (u32)rip;
+#endif
+		kvm_rip_write(vcpu, rip);
+	} else {
+		if (!kvm_emulate_instruction(vcpu, EMULTYPE_SKIP))
+			return 0;
+	}
+
+rip_updated:
+	/* skipping an emulated instruction also counts */
+	vmx_set_interrupt_shadow(vcpu, 0);
+
+	return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Recognizes a pending MTF VM-exit and records the nested state for later
+ * delivery.
+ */
+static void vmx_update_emulated_instruction(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct vmcs12 *vmcs12 = get_vmcs12(vcpu);
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+
+	if (!is_guest_mode(vcpu))
+		return;
+
+	/*
+	 * Per the SDM, MTF takes priority over debug-trap exceptions besides
+	 * TSS T-bit traps and ICEBP (INT1).  KVM doesn't emulate T-bit traps
+	 * or ICEBP (in the emulator proper), and skipping of ICEBP after an
+	 * intercepted #DB deliberately avoids single-step #DB and MTF updates
+	 * as ICEBP is higher priority than both.  As instruction emulation is
+	 * completed at this point (i.e. KVM is at the instruction boundary),
+	 * any #DB exception pending delivery must be a debug-trap of lower
+	 * priority than MTF.  Record the pending MTF state to be delivered in
+	 * vmx_check_nested_events().
+	 */
+	if (nested_cpu_has_mtf(vmcs12) &&
+	    (!vcpu->arch.exception.pending ||
+	     vcpu->arch.exception.vector == DB_VECTOR) &&
+	    (!vcpu->arch.exception_vmexit.pending ||
+	     vcpu->arch.exception_vmexit.vector == DB_VECTOR)) {
+		vmx->nested.mtf_pending = true;
+		kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_EVENT, vcpu);
+	} else {
+		vmx->nested.mtf_pending = false;
+	}
+}
+
+static int vmx_skip_emulated_instruction(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	vmx_update_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
+	return skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
+}
+
+static void vmx_clear_hlt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	/*
+	 * Ensure that we clear the HLT state in the VMCS.  We don't need to
+	 * explicitly skip the instruction because if the HLT state is set,
+	 * then the instruction is already executing and RIP has already been
+	 * advanced.
+	 */
+	if (kvm_hlt_in_guest(vcpu->kvm) &&
+			vmcs_read32(GUEST_ACTIVITY_STATE) == GUEST_ACTIVITY_HLT)
+		vmcs_write32(GUEST_ACTIVITY_STATE, GUEST_ACTIVITY_ACTIVE);
+}
+
+static void vmx_inject_exception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct kvm_queued_exception *ex = &vcpu->arch.exception;
+	u32 intr_info = ex->vector | INTR_INFO_VALID_MASK;
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+
+	kvm_deliver_exception_payload(vcpu, ex);
+
+	if (ex->has_error_code) {
+		/*
+		 * Despite the error code being architecturally defined as 32
+		 * bits, and the VMCS field being 32 bits, Intel CPUs and thus
+		 * VMX don't actually supporting setting bits 31:16.  Hardware
+		 * will (should) never provide a bogus error code, but AMD CPUs
+		 * do generate error codes with bits 31:16 set, and so KVM's
+		 * ABI lets userspace shove in arbitrary 32-bit values.  Drop
+		 * the upper bits to avoid VM-Fail, losing information that
+		 * does't really exist is preferable to killing the VM.
+		 */
+		vmcs_write32(VM_ENTRY_EXCEPTION_ERROR_CODE, (u16)ex->error_code);
+		intr_info |= INTR_INFO_DELIVER_CODE_MASK;
+	}
+
+	if (vmx->rmode.vm86_active) {
+		int inc_eip = 0;
+		if (kvm_exception_is_soft(ex->vector))
+			inc_eip = vcpu->arch.event_exit_inst_len;
+		kvm_inject_realmode_interrupt(vcpu, ex->vector, inc_eip);
+		return;
+	}
+
+	WARN_ON_ONCE(vmx->emulation_required);
+
+	if (kvm_exception_is_soft(ex->vector)) {
+		vmcs_write32(VM_ENTRY_INSTRUCTION_LEN,
+			     vmx->vcpu.arch.event_exit_inst_len);
+		intr_info |= INTR_TYPE_SOFT_EXCEPTION;
+	} else
+		intr_info |= INTR_TYPE_HARD_EXCEPTION;
+
+	vmcs_write32(VM_ENTRY_INTR_INFO_FIELD, intr_info);
+
+	vmx_clear_hlt(vcpu);
+}
+
+static void vmx_setup_uret_msr(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, unsigned int msr,
+			       bool load_into_hardware)
+{
+	struct vmx_uret_msr *uret_msr;
+
+	uret_msr = vmx_find_uret_msr(vmx, msr);
+	if (!uret_msr)
+		return;
+
+	uret_msr->load_into_hardware = load_into_hardware;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Configuring user return MSRs to automatically save, load, and restore MSRs
+ * that need to be shoved into hardware when running the guest.  Note, omitting
+ * an MSR here does _NOT_ mean it's not emulated, only that it will not be
+ * loaded into hardware when running the guest.
+ */
+static void vmx_setup_uret_msrs(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+	bool load_syscall_msrs;
+
+	/*
+	 * The SYSCALL MSRs are only needed on long mode guests, and only
+	 * when EFER.SCE is set.
+	 */
+	load_syscall_msrs = is_long_mode(&vmx->vcpu) &&
+			    (vmx->vcpu.arch.efer & EFER_SCE);
+
+	vmx_setup_uret_msr(vmx, MSR_STAR, load_syscall_msrs);
+	vmx_setup_uret_msr(vmx, MSR_LSTAR, load_syscall_msrs);
+	vmx_setup_uret_msr(vmx, MSR_SYSCALL_MASK, load_syscall_msrs);
+#endif
+	vmx_setup_uret_msr(vmx, MSR_EFER, update_transition_efer(vmx));
+
+	vmx_setup_uret_msr(vmx, MSR_TSC_AUX,
+			   guest_cpuid_has(&vmx->vcpu, X86_FEATURE_RDTSCP) ||
+			   guest_cpuid_has(&vmx->vcpu, X86_FEATURE_RDPID));
+
+	/*
+	 * hle=0, rtm=0, tsx_ctrl=1 can be found with some combinations of new
+	 * kernel and old userspace.  If those guests run on a tsx=off host, do
+	 * allow guests to use TSX_CTRL, but don't change the value in hardware
+	 * so that TSX remains always disabled.
+	 */
+	vmx_setup_uret_msr(vmx, MSR_IA32_TSX_CTRL, boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RTM));
+
+	/*
+	 * The set of MSRs to load may have changed, reload MSRs before the
+	 * next VM-Enter.
+	 */
+	vmx->guest_uret_msrs_loaded = false;
+}
+
+u64 vmx_get_l2_tsc_offset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct vmcs12 *vmcs12 = get_vmcs12(vcpu);
+
+	if (nested_cpu_has(vmcs12, CPU_BASED_USE_TSC_OFFSETTING))
+		return vmcs12->tsc_offset;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+u64 vmx_get_l2_tsc_multiplier(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct vmcs12 *vmcs12 = get_vmcs12(vcpu);
+
+	if (nested_cpu_has(vmcs12, CPU_BASED_USE_TSC_OFFSETTING) &&
+	    nested_cpu_has2(vmcs12, SECONDARY_EXEC_TSC_SCALING))
+		return vmcs12->tsc_multiplier;
+
+	return kvm_caps.default_tsc_scaling_ratio;
+}
+
+static void vmx_write_tsc_offset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	vmcs_write64(TSC_OFFSET, vcpu->arch.tsc_offset);
+}
+
+static void vmx_write_tsc_multiplier(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	vmcs_write64(TSC_MULTIPLIER, vcpu->arch.tsc_scaling_ratio);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Userspace is allowed to set any supported IA32_FEATURE_CONTROL regardless of
+ * guest CPUID.  Note, KVM allows userspace to set "VMX in SMX" to maintain
+ * backwards compatibility even though KVM doesn't support emulating SMX.  And
+ * because userspace set "VMX in SMX", the guest must also be allowed to set it,
+ * e.g. if the MSR is left unlocked and the guest does a RMW operation.
+ */
+#define KVM_SUPPORTED_FEATURE_CONTROL  (FEAT_CTL_LOCKED			 | \
+					FEAT_CTL_VMX_ENABLED_INSIDE_SMX	 | \
+					FEAT_CTL_VMX_ENABLED_OUTSIDE_SMX | \
+					FEAT_CTL_SGX_LC_ENABLED		 | \
+					FEAT_CTL_SGX_ENABLED		 | \
+					FEAT_CTL_LMCE_ENABLED)
+
+static inline bool is_vmx_feature_control_msr_valid(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx,
+						    struct msr_data *msr)
+{
+	uint64_t valid_bits;
+
+	/*
+	 * Ensure KVM_SUPPORTED_FEATURE_CONTROL is updated when new bits are
+	 * exposed to the guest.
+	 */
+	WARN_ON_ONCE(vmx->msr_ia32_feature_control_valid_bits &
+		     ~KVM_SUPPORTED_FEATURE_CONTROL);
+
+	if (!msr->host_initiated &&
+	    (vmx->msr_ia32_feature_control & FEAT_CTL_LOCKED))
+		return false;
+
+	if (msr->host_initiated)
+		valid_bits = KVM_SUPPORTED_FEATURE_CONTROL;
+	else
+		valid_bits = vmx->msr_ia32_feature_control_valid_bits;
+
+	return !(msr->data & ~valid_bits);
+}
+
+static int vmx_get_msr_feature(struct kvm_msr_entry *msr)
+{
+	switch (msr->index) {
+	case KVM_FIRST_EMULATED_VMX_MSR ... KVM_LAST_EMULATED_VMX_MSR:
+		if (!nested)
+			return 1;
+		return vmx_get_vmx_msr(&vmcs_config.nested, msr->index, &msr->data);
+	default:
+		return KVM_MSR_RET_INVALID;
+	}
+}
+
+/*
+ * Reads an msr value (of 'msr_info->index') into 'msr_info->data'.
+ * Returns 0 on success, non-0 otherwise.
+ * Assumes vcpu_load() was already called.
+ */
+static int vmx_get_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
+{
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+	struct vmx_uret_msr *msr;
+	u32 index;
+
+	switch (msr_info->index) {
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+	case MSR_FS_BASE:
+		msr_info->data = vmcs_readl(GUEST_FS_BASE);
+		break;
+	case MSR_GS_BASE:
+		msr_info->data = vmcs_readl(GUEST_GS_BASE);
+		break;
+	case MSR_KERNEL_GS_BASE:
+		msr_info->data = vmx_read_guest_kernel_gs_base(vmx);
+		break;
+#endif
+	case MSR_EFER:
+		return kvm_get_msr_common(vcpu, msr_info);
+	case MSR_IA32_TSX_CTRL:
+		if (!msr_info->host_initiated &&
+		    !(vcpu->arch.arch_capabilities & ARCH_CAP_TSX_CTRL_MSR))
+			return 1;
+		goto find_uret_msr;
+	case MSR_IA32_UMWAIT_CONTROL:
+		if (!msr_info->host_initiated && !vmx_has_waitpkg(vmx))
+			return 1;
+
+		msr_info->data = vmx->msr_ia32_umwait_control;
+		break;
+	case MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL:
+		if (!msr_info->host_initiated &&
+		    !guest_has_spec_ctrl_msr(vcpu))
+			return 1;
+
+		msr_info->data = to_vmx(vcpu)->spec_ctrl;
+		break;
+	case MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_CS:
+		msr_info->data = vmcs_read32(GUEST_SYSENTER_CS);
+		break;
+	case MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_EIP:
+		msr_info->data = vmcs_readl(GUEST_SYSENTER_EIP);
+		break;
+	case MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_ESP:
+		msr_info->data = vmcs_readl(GUEST_SYSENTER_ESP);
+		break;
+	case MSR_IA32_BNDCFGS:
+		if (!kvm_mpx_supported() ||
+		    (!msr_info->host_initiated &&
+		     !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_MPX)))
+			return 1;
+		msr_info->data = vmcs_read64(GUEST_BNDCFGS);
+		break;
+	case MSR_IA32_MCG_EXT_CTL:
+		if (!msr_info->host_initiated &&
+		    !(vmx->msr_ia32_feature_control &
+		      FEAT_CTL_LMCE_ENABLED))
+			return 1;
+		msr_info->data = vcpu->arch.mcg_ext_ctl;
+		break;
+	case MSR_IA32_FEAT_CTL:
+		msr_info->data = vmx->msr_ia32_feature_control;
+		break;
+	case MSR_IA32_SGXLEPUBKEYHASH0 ... MSR_IA32_SGXLEPUBKEYHASH3:
+		if (!msr_info->host_initiated &&
+		    !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_SGX_LC))
+			return 1;
+		msr_info->data = to_vmx(vcpu)->msr_ia32_sgxlepubkeyhash
+			[msr_info->index - MSR_IA32_SGXLEPUBKEYHASH0];
+		break;
+	case KVM_FIRST_EMULATED_VMX_MSR ... KVM_LAST_EMULATED_VMX_MSR:
+		if (!guest_can_use(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_VMX))
+			return 1;
+		if (vmx_get_vmx_msr(&vmx->nested.msrs, msr_info->index,
+				    &msr_info->data))
+			return 1;
+		/*
+		 * Enlightened VMCS v1 doesn't have certain VMCS fields but
+		 * instead of just ignoring the features, different Hyper-V
+		 * versions are either trying to use them and fail or do some
+		 * sanity checking and refuse to boot. Filter all unsupported
+		 * features out.
+		 */
+		if (!msr_info->host_initiated && guest_cpuid_has_evmcs(vcpu))
+			nested_evmcs_filter_control_msr(vcpu, msr_info->index,
+							&msr_info->data);
+		break;
+	case MSR_IA32_RTIT_CTL:
+		if (!vmx_pt_mode_is_host_guest())
+			return 1;
+		msr_info->data = vmx->pt_desc.guest.ctl;
+		break;
+	case MSR_IA32_RTIT_STATUS:
+		if (!vmx_pt_mode_is_host_guest())
+			return 1;
+		msr_info->data = vmx->pt_desc.guest.status;
+		break;
+	case MSR_IA32_RTIT_CR3_MATCH:
+		if (!vmx_pt_mode_is_host_guest() ||
+			!intel_pt_validate_cap(vmx->pt_desc.caps,
+						PT_CAP_cr3_filtering))
+			return 1;
+		msr_info->data = vmx->pt_desc.guest.cr3_match;
+		break;
+	case MSR_IA32_RTIT_OUTPUT_BASE:
+		if (!vmx_pt_mode_is_host_guest() ||
+			(!intel_pt_validate_cap(vmx->pt_desc.caps,
+					PT_CAP_topa_output) &&
+			 !intel_pt_validate_cap(vmx->pt_desc.caps,
+					PT_CAP_single_range_output)))
+			return 1;
+		msr_info->data = vmx->pt_desc.guest.output_base;
+		break;
+	case MSR_IA32_RTIT_OUTPUT_MASK:
+		if (!vmx_pt_mode_is_host_guest() ||
+			(!intel_pt_validate_cap(vmx->pt_desc.caps,
+					PT_CAP_topa_output) &&
+			 !intel_pt_validate_cap(vmx->pt_desc.caps,
+					PT_CAP_single_range_output)))
+			return 1;
+		msr_info->data = vmx->pt_desc.guest.output_mask;
+		break;
+	case MSR_IA32_RTIT_ADDR0_A ... MSR_IA32_RTIT_ADDR3_B:
+		index = msr_info->index - MSR_IA32_RTIT_ADDR0_A;
+		if (!vmx_pt_mode_is_host_guest() ||
+		    (index >= 2 * vmx->pt_desc.num_address_ranges))
+			return 1;
+		if (index % 2)
+			msr_info->data = vmx->pt_desc.guest.addr_b[index / 2];
+		else
+			msr_info->data = vmx->pt_desc.guest.addr_a[index / 2];
+		break;
+	case MSR_IA32_DEBUGCTLMSR:
+		msr_info->data = vmcs_read64(GUEST_IA32_DEBUGCTL);
+		break;
+	default:
+	find_uret_msr:
+		msr = vmx_find_uret_msr(vmx, msr_info->index);
+		if (msr) {
+			msr_info->data = msr->data;
+			break;
+		}
+		return kvm_get_msr_common(vcpu, msr_info);
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static u64 nested_vmx_truncate_sysenter_addr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+						    u64 data)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+	if (!guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_LM))
+		return (u32)data;
+#endif
+	return (unsigned long)data;
+}
+
+static u64 vmx_get_supported_debugctl(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool host_initiated)
+{
+	u64 debugctl = 0;
+
+	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_BUS_LOCK_DETECT) &&
+	    (host_initiated || guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_BUS_LOCK_DETECT)))
+		debugctl |= DEBUGCTLMSR_BUS_LOCK_DETECT;
+
+	if ((kvm_caps.supported_perf_cap & PMU_CAP_LBR_FMT) &&
+	    (host_initiated || intel_pmu_lbr_is_enabled(vcpu)))
+		debugctl |= DEBUGCTLMSR_LBR | DEBUGCTLMSR_FREEZE_LBRS_ON_PMI;
+
+	return debugctl;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Writes msr value into the appropriate "register".
+ * Returns 0 on success, non-0 otherwise.
+ * Assumes vcpu_load() was already called.
+ */
+static int vmx_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
+{
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+	struct vmx_uret_msr *msr;
+	int ret = 0;
+	u32 msr_index = msr_info->index;
+	u64 data = msr_info->data;
+	u32 index;
+
+	switch (msr_index) {
+	case MSR_EFER:
+		ret = kvm_set_msr_common(vcpu, msr_info);
+		break;
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+	case MSR_FS_BASE:
+		vmx_segment_cache_clear(vmx);
+		vmcs_writel(GUEST_FS_BASE, data);
+		break;
+	case MSR_GS_BASE:
+		vmx_segment_cache_clear(vmx);
+		vmcs_writel(GUEST_GS_BASE, data);
+		break;
+	case MSR_KERNEL_GS_BASE:
+		vmx_write_guest_kernel_gs_base(vmx, data);
+		break;
+	case MSR_IA32_XFD:
+		ret = kvm_set_msr_common(vcpu, msr_info);
+		/*
+		 * Always intercepting WRMSR could incur non-negligible
+		 * overhead given xfd might be changed frequently in
+		 * guest context switch. Disable write interception
+		 * upon the first write with a non-zero value (indicating
+		 * potential usage on dynamic xfeatures). Also update
+		 * exception bitmap to trap #NM for proper virtualization
+		 * of guest xfd_err.
+		 */
+		if (!ret && data) {
+			vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, MSR_IA32_XFD,
+						      MSR_TYPE_RW);
+			vcpu->arch.xfd_no_write_intercept = true;
+			vmx_update_exception_bitmap(vcpu);
+		}
+		break;
+#endif
+	case MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_CS:
+		if (is_guest_mode(vcpu))
+			get_vmcs12(vcpu)->guest_sysenter_cs = data;
+		vmcs_write32(GUEST_SYSENTER_CS, data);
+		break;
+	case MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_EIP:
+		if (is_guest_mode(vcpu)) {
+			data = nested_vmx_truncate_sysenter_addr(vcpu, data);
+			get_vmcs12(vcpu)->guest_sysenter_eip = data;
+		}
+		vmcs_writel(GUEST_SYSENTER_EIP, data);
+		break;
+	case MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_ESP:
+		if (is_guest_mode(vcpu)) {
+			data = nested_vmx_truncate_sysenter_addr(vcpu, data);
+			get_vmcs12(vcpu)->guest_sysenter_esp = data;
+		}
+		vmcs_writel(GUEST_SYSENTER_ESP, data);
+		break;
+	case MSR_IA32_DEBUGCTLMSR: {
+		u64 invalid;
+
+		invalid = data & ~vmx_get_supported_debugctl(vcpu, msr_info->host_initiated);
+		if (invalid & (DEBUGCTLMSR_BTF|DEBUGCTLMSR_LBR)) {
+			kvm_pr_unimpl_wrmsr(vcpu, msr_index, data);
+			data &= ~(DEBUGCTLMSR_BTF|DEBUGCTLMSR_LBR);
+			invalid &= ~(DEBUGCTLMSR_BTF|DEBUGCTLMSR_LBR);
+		}
+
+		if (invalid)
+			return 1;
+
+		if (is_guest_mode(vcpu) && get_vmcs12(vcpu)->vm_exit_controls &
+						VM_EXIT_SAVE_DEBUG_CONTROLS)
+			get_vmcs12(vcpu)->guest_ia32_debugctl = data;
+
+		vmcs_write64(GUEST_IA32_DEBUGCTL, data);
+		if (intel_pmu_lbr_is_enabled(vcpu) && !to_vmx(vcpu)->lbr_desc.event &&
+		    (data & DEBUGCTLMSR_LBR))
+			intel_pmu_create_guest_lbr_event(vcpu);
+		return 0;
+	}
+	case MSR_IA32_BNDCFGS:
+		if (!kvm_mpx_supported() ||
+		    (!msr_info->host_initiated &&
+		     !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_MPX)))
+			return 1;
+		if (is_noncanonical_address(data & PAGE_MASK, vcpu) ||
+		    (data & MSR_IA32_BNDCFGS_RSVD))
+			return 1;
+
+		if (is_guest_mode(vcpu) &&
+		    ((vmx->nested.msrs.entry_ctls_high & VM_ENTRY_LOAD_BNDCFGS) ||
+		     (vmx->nested.msrs.exit_ctls_high & VM_EXIT_CLEAR_BNDCFGS)))
+			get_vmcs12(vcpu)->guest_bndcfgs = data;
+
+		vmcs_write64(GUEST_BNDCFGS, data);
+		break;
+	case MSR_IA32_UMWAIT_CONTROL:
+		if (!msr_info->host_initiated && !vmx_has_waitpkg(vmx))
+			return 1;
+
+		/* The reserved bit 1 and non-32 bit [63:32] should be zero */
+		if (data & (BIT_ULL(1) | GENMASK_ULL(63, 32)))
+			return 1;
+
+		vmx->msr_ia32_umwait_control = data;
+		break;
+	case MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL:
+		if (!msr_info->host_initiated &&
+		    !guest_has_spec_ctrl_msr(vcpu))
+			return 1;
+
+		if (kvm_spec_ctrl_test_value(data))
+			return 1;
+
+		vmx->spec_ctrl = data;
+		if (!data)
+			break;
+
+		/*
+		 * For non-nested:
+		 * When it's written (to non-zero) for the first time, pass
+		 * it through.
+		 *
+		 * For nested:
+		 * The handling of the MSR bitmap for L2 guests is done in
+		 * nested_vmx_prepare_msr_bitmap. We should not touch the
+		 * vmcs02.msr_bitmap here since it gets completely overwritten
+		 * in the merging. We update the vmcs01 here for L1 as well
+		 * since it will end up touching the MSR anyway now.
+		 */
+		vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(vcpu,
+					      MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL,
+					      MSR_TYPE_RW);
+		break;
+	case MSR_IA32_TSX_CTRL:
+		if (!msr_info->host_initiated &&
+		    !(vcpu->arch.arch_capabilities & ARCH_CAP_TSX_CTRL_MSR))
+			return 1;
+		if (data & ~(TSX_CTRL_RTM_DISABLE | TSX_CTRL_CPUID_CLEAR))
+			return 1;
+		goto find_uret_msr;
+	case MSR_IA32_CR_PAT:
+		ret = kvm_set_msr_common(vcpu, msr_info);
+		if (ret)
+			break;
+
+		if (is_guest_mode(vcpu) &&
+		    get_vmcs12(vcpu)->vm_exit_controls & VM_EXIT_SAVE_IA32_PAT)
+			get_vmcs12(vcpu)->guest_ia32_pat = data;
+
+		if (vmcs_config.vmentry_ctrl & VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_PAT)
+			vmcs_write64(GUEST_IA32_PAT, data);
+		break;
+	case MSR_IA32_MCG_EXT_CTL:
+		if ((!msr_info->host_initiated &&
+		     !(to_vmx(vcpu)->msr_ia32_feature_control &
+		       FEAT_CTL_LMCE_ENABLED)) ||
+		    (data & ~MCG_EXT_CTL_LMCE_EN))
+			return 1;
+		vcpu->arch.mcg_ext_ctl = data;
+		break;
+	case MSR_IA32_FEAT_CTL:
+		if (!is_vmx_feature_control_msr_valid(vmx, msr_info))
+			return 1;
+
+		vmx->msr_ia32_feature_control = data;
+		if (msr_info->host_initiated && data == 0)
+			vmx_leave_nested(vcpu);
+
+		/* SGX may be enabled/disabled by guest's firmware */
+		vmx_write_encls_bitmap(vcpu, NULL);
+		break;
+	case MSR_IA32_SGXLEPUBKEYHASH0 ... MSR_IA32_SGXLEPUBKEYHASH3:
+		/*
+		 * On real hardware, the LE hash MSRs are writable before
+		 * the firmware sets bit 0 in MSR 0x7a ("activating" SGX),
+		 * at which point SGX related bits in IA32_FEATURE_CONTROL
+		 * become writable.
+		 *
+		 * KVM does not emulate SGX activation for simplicity, so
+		 * allow writes to the LE hash MSRs if IA32_FEATURE_CONTROL
+		 * is unlocked.  This is technically not architectural
+		 * behavior, but it's close enough.
+		 */
+		if (!msr_info->host_initiated &&
+		    (!guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_SGX_LC) ||
+		    ((vmx->msr_ia32_feature_control & FEAT_CTL_LOCKED) &&
+		    !(vmx->msr_ia32_feature_control & FEAT_CTL_SGX_LC_ENABLED))))
+			return 1;
+		vmx->msr_ia32_sgxlepubkeyhash
+			[msr_index - MSR_IA32_SGXLEPUBKEYHASH0] = data;
+		break;
+	case KVM_FIRST_EMULATED_VMX_MSR ... KVM_LAST_EMULATED_VMX_MSR:
+		if (!msr_info->host_initiated)
+			return 1; /* they are read-only */
+		if (!guest_can_use(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_VMX))
+			return 1;
+		return vmx_set_vmx_msr(vcpu, msr_index, data);
+	case MSR_IA32_RTIT_CTL:
+		if (!vmx_pt_mode_is_host_guest() ||
+			vmx_rtit_ctl_check(vcpu, data) ||
+			vmx->nested.vmxon)
+			return 1;
+		vmcs_write64(GUEST_IA32_RTIT_CTL, data);
+		vmx->pt_desc.guest.ctl = data;
+		pt_update_intercept_for_msr(vcpu);
+		break;
+	case MSR_IA32_RTIT_STATUS:
+		if (!pt_can_write_msr(vmx))
+			return 1;
+		if (data & MSR_IA32_RTIT_STATUS_MASK)
+			return 1;
+		vmx->pt_desc.guest.status = data;
+		break;
+	case MSR_IA32_RTIT_CR3_MATCH:
+		if (!pt_can_write_msr(vmx))
+			return 1;
+		if (!intel_pt_validate_cap(vmx->pt_desc.caps,
+					   PT_CAP_cr3_filtering))
+			return 1;
+		vmx->pt_desc.guest.cr3_match = data;
+		break;
+	case MSR_IA32_RTIT_OUTPUT_BASE:
+		if (!pt_can_write_msr(vmx))
+			return 1;
+		if (!intel_pt_validate_cap(vmx->pt_desc.caps,
+					   PT_CAP_topa_output) &&
+		    !intel_pt_validate_cap(vmx->pt_desc.caps,
+					   PT_CAP_single_range_output))
+			return 1;
+		if (!pt_output_base_valid(vcpu, data))
+			return 1;
+		vmx->pt_desc.guest.output_base = data;
+		break;
+	case MSR_IA32_RTIT_OUTPUT_MASK:
+		if (!pt_can_write_msr(vmx))
+			return 1;
+		if (!intel_pt_validate_cap(vmx->pt_desc.caps,
+					   PT_CAP_topa_output) &&
+		    !intel_pt_validate_cap(vmx->pt_desc.caps,
+					   PT_CAP_single_range_output))
+			return 1;
+		vmx->pt_desc.guest.output_mask = data;
+		break;
+	case MSR_IA32_RTIT_ADDR0_A ... MSR_IA32_RTIT_ADDR3_B:
+		if (!pt_can_write_msr(vmx))
+			return 1;
+		index = msr_info->index - MSR_IA32_RTIT_ADDR0_A;
+		if (index >= 2 * vmx->pt_desc.num_address_ranges)
+			return 1;
+		if (is_noncanonical_address(data, vcpu))
+			return 1;
+		if (index % 2)
+			vmx->pt_desc.guest.addr_b[index / 2] = data;
+		else
+			vmx->pt_desc.guest.addr_a[index / 2] = data;
+		break;
+	case MSR_IA32_PERF_CAPABILITIES:
+		if (data && !vcpu_to_pmu(vcpu)->version)
+			return 1;
+		if (data & PMU_CAP_LBR_FMT) {
+			if ((data & PMU_CAP_LBR_FMT) !=
+			    (kvm_caps.supported_perf_cap & PMU_CAP_LBR_FMT))
+				return 1;
+			if (!cpuid_model_is_consistent(vcpu))
+				return 1;
+		}
+		if (data & PERF_CAP_PEBS_FORMAT) {
+			if ((data & PERF_CAP_PEBS_MASK) !=
+			    (kvm_caps.supported_perf_cap & PERF_CAP_PEBS_MASK))
+				return 1;
+			if (!guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_DS))
+				return 1;
+			if (!guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_DTES64))
+				return 1;
+			if (!cpuid_model_is_consistent(vcpu))
+				return 1;
+		}
+		ret = kvm_set_msr_common(vcpu, msr_info);
+		break;
+
+	default:
+	find_uret_msr:
+		msr = vmx_find_uret_msr(vmx, msr_index);
+		if (msr)
+			ret = vmx_set_guest_uret_msr(vmx, msr, data);
+		else
+			ret = kvm_set_msr_common(vcpu, msr_info);
+	}
+
+	/* FB_CLEAR may have changed, also update the FB_CLEAR_DIS behavior */
+	if (msr_index == MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES)
+		vmx_update_fb_clear_dis(vcpu, vmx);
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static void vmx_cache_reg(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, enum kvm_reg reg)
+{
+	unsigned long guest_owned_bits;
+
+	kvm_register_mark_available(vcpu, reg);
+
+	switch (reg) {
+	case VCPU_REGS_RSP:
+		vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RSP] = vmcs_readl(GUEST_RSP);
+		break;
+	case VCPU_REGS_RIP:
+		vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RIP] = vmcs_readl(GUEST_RIP);
+		break;
+	case VCPU_EXREG_PDPTR:
+		if (enable_ept)
+			ept_save_pdptrs(vcpu);
+		break;
+	case VCPU_EXREG_CR0:
+		guest_owned_bits = vcpu->arch.cr0_guest_owned_bits;
+
+		vcpu->arch.cr0 &= ~guest_owned_bits;
+		vcpu->arch.cr0 |= vmcs_readl(GUEST_CR0) & guest_owned_bits;
+		break;
+	case VCPU_EXREG_CR3:
+		/*
+		 * When intercepting CR3 loads, e.g. for shadowing paging, KVM's
+		 * CR3 is loaded into hardware, not the guest's CR3.
+		 */
+		if (!(exec_controls_get(to_vmx(vcpu)) & CPU_BASED_CR3_LOAD_EXITING))
+			vcpu->arch.cr3 = vmcs_readl(GUEST_CR3);
+		break;
+	case VCPU_EXREG_CR4:
+		guest_owned_bits = vcpu->arch.cr4_guest_owned_bits;
+
+		vcpu->arch.cr4 &= ~guest_owned_bits;
+		vcpu->arch.cr4 |= vmcs_readl(GUEST_CR4) & guest_owned_bits;
+		break;
+	default:
+		KVM_BUG_ON(1, vcpu->kvm);
+		break;
+	}
+}
+
+/*
+ * There is no X86_FEATURE for SGX yet, but anyway we need to query CPUID
+ * directly instead of going through cpu_has(), to ensure KVM is trapping
+ * ENCLS whenever it's supported in hardware.  It does not matter whether
+ * the host OS supports or has enabled SGX.
+ */
+static bool cpu_has_sgx(void)
+{
+	return cpuid_eax(0) >= 0x12 && (cpuid_eax(0x12) & BIT(0));
+}
+
+/*
+ * Some cpus support VM_{ENTRY,EXIT}_IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL but they
+ * can't be used due to errata where VM Exit may incorrectly clear
+ * IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL[34:32]. Work around the errata by using the
+ * MSR load mechanism to switch IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL.
+ */
+static bool cpu_has_perf_global_ctrl_bug(void)
+{
+	if (boot_cpu_data.x86 == 0x6) {
+		switch (boot_cpu_data.x86_model) {
+		case INTEL_FAM6_NEHALEM_EP:	/* AAK155 */
+		case INTEL_FAM6_NEHALEM:	/* AAP115 */
+		case INTEL_FAM6_WESTMERE:	/* AAT100 */
+		case INTEL_FAM6_WESTMERE_EP:	/* BC86,AAY89,BD102 */
+		case INTEL_FAM6_NEHALEM_EX:	/* BA97 */
+			return true;
+		default:
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+
+	return false;
+}
+
+static int adjust_vmx_controls(u32 ctl_min, u32 ctl_opt, u32 msr, u32 *result)
+{
+	u32 vmx_msr_low, vmx_msr_high;
+	u32 ctl = ctl_min | ctl_opt;
+
+	rdmsr(msr, vmx_msr_low, vmx_msr_high);
+
+	ctl &= vmx_msr_high; /* bit == 0 in high word ==> must be zero */
+	ctl |= vmx_msr_low;  /* bit == 1 in low word  ==> must be one  */
+
+	/* Ensure minimum (required) set of control bits are supported. */
+	if (ctl_min & ~ctl)
+		return -EIO;
+
+	*result = ctl;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static u64 adjust_vmx_controls64(u64 ctl_opt, u32 msr)
+{
+	u64 allowed;
+
+	rdmsrl(msr, allowed);
+
+	return  ctl_opt & allowed;
+}
+
+static int setup_vmcs_config(struct vmcs_config *vmcs_conf,
+			     struct vmx_capability *vmx_cap)
+{
+	u32 vmx_msr_low, vmx_msr_high;
+	u32 _pin_based_exec_control = 0;
+	u32 _cpu_based_exec_control = 0;
+	u32 _cpu_based_2nd_exec_control = 0;
+	u64 _cpu_based_3rd_exec_control = 0;
+	u32 _vmexit_control = 0;
+	u32 _vmentry_control = 0;
+	u64 misc_msr;
+	int i;
+
+	/*
+	 * LOAD/SAVE_DEBUG_CONTROLS are absent because both are mandatory.
+	 * SAVE_IA32_PAT and SAVE_IA32_EFER are absent because KVM always
+	 * intercepts writes to PAT and EFER, i.e. never enables those controls.
+	 */
+	struct {
+		u32 entry_control;
+		u32 exit_control;
+	} const vmcs_entry_exit_pairs[] = {
+		{ VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL,	VM_EXIT_LOAD_IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL },
+		{ VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_PAT,		VM_EXIT_LOAD_IA32_PAT },
+		{ VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_EFER,		VM_EXIT_LOAD_IA32_EFER },
+		{ VM_ENTRY_LOAD_BNDCFGS,		VM_EXIT_CLEAR_BNDCFGS },
+		{ VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_RTIT_CTL,		VM_EXIT_CLEAR_IA32_RTIT_CTL },
+	};
+
+	memset(vmcs_conf, 0, sizeof(*vmcs_conf));
+
+	if (adjust_vmx_controls(KVM_REQUIRED_VMX_CPU_BASED_VM_EXEC_CONTROL,
+				KVM_OPTIONAL_VMX_CPU_BASED_VM_EXEC_CONTROL,
+				MSR_IA32_VMX_PROCBASED_CTLS,
+				&_cpu_based_exec_control))
+		return -EIO;
+	if (_cpu_based_exec_control & CPU_BASED_ACTIVATE_SECONDARY_CONTROLS) {
+		if (adjust_vmx_controls(KVM_REQUIRED_VMX_SECONDARY_VM_EXEC_CONTROL,
+					KVM_OPTIONAL_VMX_SECONDARY_VM_EXEC_CONTROL,
+					MSR_IA32_VMX_PROCBASED_CTLS2,
+					&_cpu_based_2nd_exec_control))
+			return -EIO;
+	}
+#ifndef CONFIG_X86_64
+	if (!(_cpu_based_2nd_exec_control &
+				SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_APIC_ACCESSES))
+		_cpu_based_exec_control &= ~CPU_BASED_TPR_SHADOW;
+#endif
+
+	if (!(_cpu_based_exec_control & CPU_BASED_TPR_SHADOW))
+		_cpu_based_2nd_exec_control &= ~(
+				SECONDARY_EXEC_APIC_REGISTER_VIRT |
+				SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_X2APIC_MODE |
+				SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUAL_INTR_DELIVERY);
+
+	rdmsr_safe(MSR_IA32_VMX_EPT_VPID_CAP,
+		&vmx_cap->ept, &vmx_cap->vpid);
+
+	if (!(_cpu_based_2nd_exec_control & SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_EPT) &&
+	    vmx_cap->ept) {
+		pr_warn_once("EPT CAP should not exist if not support "
+				"1-setting enable EPT VM-execution control\n");
+
+		if (error_on_inconsistent_vmcs_config)
+			return -EIO;
+
+		vmx_cap->ept = 0;
+	}
+	if (!(_cpu_based_2nd_exec_control & SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_VPID) &&
+	    vmx_cap->vpid) {
+		pr_warn_once("VPID CAP should not exist if not support "
+				"1-setting enable VPID VM-execution control\n");
+
+		if (error_on_inconsistent_vmcs_config)
+			return -EIO;
+
+		vmx_cap->vpid = 0;
+	}
+
+	if (!cpu_has_sgx())
+		_cpu_based_2nd_exec_control &= ~SECONDARY_EXEC_ENCLS_EXITING;
+
+	if (_cpu_based_exec_control & CPU_BASED_ACTIVATE_TERTIARY_CONTROLS)
+		_cpu_based_3rd_exec_control =
+			adjust_vmx_controls64(KVM_OPTIONAL_VMX_TERTIARY_VM_EXEC_CONTROL,
+					      MSR_IA32_VMX_PROCBASED_CTLS3);
+
+	if (adjust_vmx_controls(KVM_REQUIRED_VMX_VM_EXIT_CONTROLS,
+				KVM_OPTIONAL_VMX_VM_EXIT_CONTROLS,
+				MSR_IA32_VMX_EXIT_CTLS,
+				&_vmexit_control))
+		return -EIO;
+
+	if (adjust_vmx_controls(KVM_REQUIRED_VMX_PIN_BASED_VM_EXEC_CONTROL,
+				KVM_OPTIONAL_VMX_PIN_BASED_VM_EXEC_CONTROL,
+				MSR_IA32_VMX_PINBASED_CTLS,
+				&_pin_based_exec_control))
+		return -EIO;
+
+	if (cpu_has_broken_vmx_preemption_timer())
+		_pin_based_exec_control &= ~PIN_BASED_VMX_PREEMPTION_TIMER;
+	if (!(_cpu_based_2nd_exec_control &
+		SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUAL_INTR_DELIVERY))
+		_pin_based_exec_control &= ~PIN_BASED_POSTED_INTR;
+
+	if (adjust_vmx_controls(KVM_REQUIRED_VMX_VM_ENTRY_CONTROLS,
+				KVM_OPTIONAL_VMX_VM_ENTRY_CONTROLS,
+				MSR_IA32_VMX_ENTRY_CTLS,
+				&_vmentry_control))
+		return -EIO;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(vmcs_entry_exit_pairs); i++) {
+		u32 n_ctrl = vmcs_entry_exit_pairs[i].entry_control;
+		u32 x_ctrl = vmcs_entry_exit_pairs[i].exit_control;
+
+		if (!(_vmentry_control & n_ctrl) == !(_vmexit_control & x_ctrl))
+			continue;
+
+		pr_warn_once("Inconsistent VM-Entry/VM-Exit pair, entry = %x, exit = %x\n",
+			     _vmentry_control & n_ctrl, _vmexit_control & x_ctrl);
+
+		if (error_on_inconsistent_vmcs_config)
+			return -EIO;
+
+		_vmentry_control &= ~n_ctrl;
+		_vmexit_control &= ~x_ctrl;
+	}
+
+	rdmsr(MSR_IA32_VMX_BASIC, vmx_msr_low, vmx_msr_high);
+
+	/* IA-32 SDM Vol 3B: VMCS size is never greater than 4kB. */
+	if ((vmx_msr_high & 0x1fff) > PAGE_SIZE)
+		return -EIO;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+	/* IA-32 SDM Vol 3B: 64-bit CPUs always have VMX_BASIC_MSR[48]==0. */
+	if (vmx_msr_high & (1u<<16))
+		return -EIO;
+#endif
+
+	/* Require Write-Back (WB) memory type for VMCS accesses. */
+	if (((vmx_msr_high >> 18) & 15) != 6)
+		return -EIO;
+
+	rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_VMX_MISC, misc_msr);
+
+	vmcs_conf->size = vmx_msr_high & 0x1fff;
+	vmcs_conf->basic_cap = vmx_msr_high & ~0x1fff;
+
+	vmcs_conf->revision_id = vmx_msr_low;
+
+	vmcs_conf->pin_based_exec_ctrl = _pin_based_exec_control;
+	vmcs_conf->cpu_based_exec_ctrl = _cpu_based_exec_control;
+	vmcs_conf->cpu_based_2nd_exec_ctrl = _cpu_based_2nd_exec_control;
+	vmcs_conf->cpu_based_3rd_exec_ctrl = _cpu_based_3rd_exec_control;
+	vmcs_conf->vmexit_ctrl         = _vmexit_control;
+	vmcs_conf->vmentry_ctrl        = _vmentry_control;
+	vmcs_conf->misc	= misc_msr;
+
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HYPERV)
+	if (enlightened_vmcs)
+		evmcs_sanitize_exec_ctrls(vmcs_conf);
+#endif
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static bool __kvm_is_vmx_supported(void)
+{
+	int cpu = smp_processor_id();
+
+	if (!(cpuid_ecx(1) & feature_bit(VMX))) {
+		pr_err("VMX not supported by CPU %d\n", cpu);
+		return false;
+	}
+
+	if (!this_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MSR_IA32_FEAT_CTL) ||
+	    !this_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_VMX)) {
+		pr_err("VMX not enabled (by BIOS) in MSR_IA32_FEAT_CTL on CPU %d\n", cpu);
+		return false;
+	}
+
+	return true;
+}
+
+static bool kvm_is_vmx_supported(void)
+{
+	bool supported;
+
+	migrate_disable();
+	supported = __kvm_is_vmx_supported();
+	migrate_enable();
+
+	return supported;
+}
+
+static int vmx_check_processor_compat(void)
+{
+	int cpu = raw_smp_processor_id();
+	struct vmcs_config vmcs_conf;
+	struct vmx_capability vmx_cap;
+
+	if (!__kvm_is_vmx_supported())
+		return -EIO;
+
+	if (setup_vmcs_config(&vmcs_conf, &vmx_cap) < 0) {
+		pr_err("Failed to setup VMCS config on CPU %d\n", cpu);
+		return -EIO;
+	}
+	if (nested)
+		nested_vmx_setup_ctls_msrs(&vmcs_conf, vmx_cap.ept);
+	if (memcmp(&vmcs_config, &vmcs_conf, sizeof(struct vmcs_config))) {
+		pr_err("Inconsistent VMCS config on CPU %d\n", cpu);
+		return -EIO;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int kvm_cpu_vmxon(u64 vmxon_pointer)
+{
+	u64 msr;
+
+	cr4_set_bits(X86_CR4_VMXE);
+
+	asm_volatile_goto("1: vmxon %[vmxon_pointer]\n\t"
+			  _ASM_EXTABLE(1b, %l[fault])
+			  : : [vmxon_pointer] "m"(vmxon_pointer)
+			  : : fault);
+	return 0;
+
+fault:
+	WARN_ONCE(1, "VMXON faulted, MSR_IA32_FEAT_CTL (0x3a) = 0x%llx\n",
+		  rdmsrl_safe(MSR_IA32_FEAT_CTL, &msr) ? 0xdeadbeef : msr);
+	cr4_clear_bits(X86_CR4_VMXE);
+
+	return -EFAULT;
+}
+
+static int vmx_hardware_enable(void)
+{
+	int cpu = raw_smp_processor_id();
+	u64 phys_addr = __pa(per_cpu(vmxarea, cpu));
+	int r;
+
+	if (cr4_read_shadow() & X86_CR4_VMXE)
+		return -EBUSY;
+
+	/*
+	 * This can happen if we hot-added a CPU but failed to allocate
+	 * VP assist page for it.
+	 */
+	if (kvm_is_using_evmcs() && !hv_get_vp_assist_page(cpu))
+		return -EFAULT;
+
+	intel_pt_handle_vmx(1);
+
+	r = kvm_cpu_vmxon(phys_addr);
+	if (r) {
+		intel_pt_handle_vmx(0);
+		return r;
+	}
+
+	if (enable_ept)
+		ept_sync_global();
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void vmclear_local_loaded_vmcss(void)
+{
+	int cpu = raw_smp_processor_id();
+	struct loaded_vmcs *v, *n;
+
+	list_for_each_entry_safe(v, n, &per_cpu(loaded_vmcss_on_cpu, cpu),
+				 loaded_vmcss_on_cpu_link)
+		__loaded_vmcs_clear(v);
+}
+
+static void vmx_hardware_disable(void)
+{
+	vmclear_local_loaded_vmcss();
+
+	if (kvm_cpu_vmxoff())
+		kvm_spurious_fault();
+
+	hv_reset_evmcs();
+
+	intel_pt_handle_vmx(0);
+}
+
+struct vmcs *alloc_vmcs_cpu(bool shadow, int cpu, gfp_t flags)
+{
+	int node = cpu_to_node(cpu);
+	struct page *pages;
+	struct vmcs *vmcs;
+
+	pages = __alloc_pages_node(node, flags, 0);
+	if (!pages)
+		return NULL;
+	vmcs = page_address(pages);
+	memset(vmcs, 0, vmcs_config.size);
+
+	/* KVM supports Enlightened VMCS v1 only */
+	if (kvm_is_using_evmcs())
+		vmcs->hdr.revision_id = KVM_EVMCS_VERSION;
+	else
+		vmcs->hdr.revision_id = vmcs_config.revision_id;
+
+	if (shadow)
+		vmcs->hdr.shadow_vmcs = 1;
+	return vmcs;
+}
+
+void free_vmcs(struct vmcs *vmcs)
+{
+	free_page((unsigned long)vmcs);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Free a VMCS, but before that VMCLEAR it on the CPU where it was last loaded
+ */
+void free_loaded_vmcs(struct loaded_vmcs *loaded_vmcs)
+{
+	if (!loaded_vmcs->vmcs)
+		return;
+	loaded_vmcs_clear(loaded_vmcs);
+	free_vmcs(loaded_vmcs->vmcs);
+	loaded_vmcs->vmcs = NULL;
+	if (loaded_vmcs->msr_bitmap)
+		free_page((unsigned long)loaded_vmcs->msr_bitmap);
+	WARN_ON(loaded_vmcs->shadow_vmcs != NULL);
+}
+
+int alloc_loaded_vmcs(struct loaded_vmcs *loaded_vmcs)
+{
+	loaded_vmcs->vmcs = alloc_vmcs(false);
+	if (!loaded_vmcs->vmcs)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	vmcs_clear(loaded_vmcs->vmcs);
+
+	loaded_vmcs->shadow_vmcs = NULL;
+	loaded_vmcs->hv_timer_soft_disabled = false;
+	loaded_vmcs->cpu = -1;
+	loaded_vmcs->launched = 0;
+
+	if (cpu_has_vmx_msr_bitmap()) {
+		loaded_vmcs->msr_bitmap = (unsigned long *)
+				__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
+		if (!loaded_vmcs->msr_bitmap)
+			goto out_vmcs;
+		memset(loaded_vmcs->msr_bitmap, 0xff, PAGE_SIZE);
+	}
+
+	memset(&loaded_vmcs->host_state, 0, sizeof(struct vmcs_host_state));
+	memset(&loaded_vmcs->controls_shadow, 0,
+		sizeof(struct vmcs_controls_shadow));
+
+	return 0;
+
+out_vmcs:
+	free_loaded_vmcs(loaded_vmcs);
+	return -ENOMEM;
+}
+
+static void free_kvm_area(void)
+{
+	int cpu;
+
+	for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) {
+		free_vmcs(per_cpu(vmxarea, cpu));
+		per_cpu(vmxarea, cpu) = NULL;
+	}
+}
+
+static __init int alloc_kvm_area(void)
+{
+	int cpu;
+
+	for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) {
+		struct vmcs *vmcs;
+
+		vmcs = alloc_vmcs_cpu(false, cpu, GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (!vmcs) {
+			free_kvm_area();
+			return -ENOMEM;
+		}
+
+		/*
+		 * When eVMCS is enabled, alloc_vmcs_cpu() sets
+		 * vmcs->revision_id to KVM_EVMCS_VERSION instead of
+		 * revision_id reported by MSR_IA32_VMX_BASIC.
+		 *
+		 * However, even though not explicitly documented by
+		 * TLFS, VMXArea passed as VMXON argument should
+		 * still be marked with revision_id reported by
+		 * physical CPU.
+		 */
+		if (kvm_is_using_evmcs())
+			vmcs->hdr.revision_id = vmcs_config.revision_id;
+
+		per_cpu(vmxarea, cpu) = vmcs;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void fix_pmode_seg(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int seg,
+		struct kvm_segment *save)
+{
+	if (!emulate_invalid_guest_state) {
+		/*
+		 * CS and SS RPL should be equal during guest entry according
+		 * to VMX spec, but in reality it is not always so. Since vcpu
+		 * is in the middle of the transition from real mode to
+		 * protected mode it is safe to assume that RPL 0 is a good
+		 * default value.
+		 */
+		if (seg == VCPU_SREG_CS || seg == VCPU_SREG_SS)
+			save->selector &= ~SEGMENT_RPL_MASK;
+		save->dpl = save->selector & SEGMENT_RPL_MASK;
+		save->s = 1;
+	}
+	__vmx_set_segment(vcpu, save, seg);
+}
+
+static void enter_pmode(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	unsigned long flags;
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+
+	/*
+	 * Update real mode segment cache. It may be not up-to-date if segment
+	 * register was written while vcpu was in a guest mode.
+	 */
+	vmx_get_segment(vcpu, &vmx->rmode.segs[VCPU_SREG_ES], VCPU_SREG_ES);
+	vmx_get_segment(vcpu, &vmx->rmode.segs[VCPU_SREG_DS], VCPU_SREG_DS);
+	vmx_get_segment(vcpu, &vmx->rmode.segs[VCPU_SREG_FS], VCPU_SREG_FS);
+	vmx_get_segment(vcpu, &vmx->rmode.segs[VCPU_SREG_GS], VCPU_SREG_GS);
+	vmx_get_segment(vcpu, &vmx->rmode.segs[VCPU_SREG_SS], VCPU_SREG_SS);
+	vmx_get_segment(vcpu, &vmx->rmode.segs[VCPU_SREG_CS], VCPU_SREG_CS);
+
+	vmx->rmode.vm86_active = 0;
+
+	__vmx_set_segment(vcpu, &vmx->rmode.segs[VCPU_SREG_TR], VCPU_SREG_TR);
+
+	flags = vmcs_readl(GUEST_RFLAGS);
+	flags &= RMODE_GUEST_OWNED_EFLAGS_BITS;
+	flags |= vmx->rmode.save_rflags & ~RMODE_GUEST_OWNED_EFLAGS_BITS;
+	vmcs_writel(GUEST_RFLAGS, flags);
+
+	vmcs_writel(GUEST_CR4, (vmcs_readl(GUEST_CR4) & ~X86_CR4_VME) |
+			(vmcs_readl(CR4_READ_SHADOW) & X86_CR4_VME));
+
+	vmx_update_exception_bitmap(vcpu);
+
+	fix_pmode_seg(vcpu, VCPU_SREG_CS, &vmx->rmode.segs[VCPU_SREG_CS]);
+	fix_pmode_seg(vcpu, VCPU_SREG_SS, &vmx->rmode.segs[VCPU_SREG_SS]);
+	fix_pmode_seg(vcpu, VCPU_SREG_ES, &vmx->rmode.segs[VCPU_SREG_ES]);
+	fix_pmode_seg(vcpu, VCPU_SREG_DS, &vmx->rmode.segs[VCPU_SREG_DS]);
+	fix_pmode_seg(vcpu, VCPU_SREG_FS, &vmx->rmode.segs[VCPU_SREG_FS]);
+	fix_pmode_seg(vcpu, VCPU_SREG_GS, &vmx->rmode.segs[VCPU_SREG_GS]);
+}
+
+static void fix_rmode_seg(int seg, struct kvm_segment *save)
+{
+	const struct kvm_vmx_segment_field *sf = &kvm_vmx_segment_fields[seg];
+	struct kvm_segment var = *save;
+
+	var.dpl = 0x3;
+	if (seg == VCPU_SREG_CS)
+		var.type = 0x3;
+
+	if (!emulate_invalid_guest_state) {
+		var.selector = var.base >> 4;
+		var.base = var.base & 0xffff0;
+		var.limit = 0xffff;
+		var.g = 0;
+		var.db = 0;
+		var.present = 1;
+		var.s = 1;
+		var.l = 0;
+		var.unusable = 0;
+		var.type = 0x3;
+		var.avl = 0;
+		if (save->base & 0xf)
+			pr_warn_once("segment base is not paragraph aligned "
+				     "when entering protected mode (seg=%d)", seg);
+	}
+
+	vmcs_write16(sf->selector, var.selector);
+	vmcs_writel(sf->base, var.base);
+	vmcs_write32(sf->limit, var.limit);
+	vmcs_write32(sf->ar_bytes, vmx_segment_access_rights(&var));
+}
+
+static void enter_rmode(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	unsigned long flags;
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+	struct kvm_vmx *kvm_vmx = to_kvm_vmx(vcpu->kvm);
+
+	/*
+	 * KVM should never use VM86 to virtualize Real Mode when L2 is active,
+	 * as using VM86 is unnecessary if unrestricted guest is enabled, and
+	 * if unrestricted guest is disabled, VM-Enter (from L1) with CR0.PG=0
+	 * should VM-Fail and KVM should reject userspace attempts to stuff
+	 * CR0.PG=0 when L2 is active.
+	 */
+	WARN_ON_ONCE(is_guest_mode(vcpu));
+
+	vmx_get_segment(vcpu, &vmx->rmode.segs[VCPU_SREG_TR], VCPU_SREG_TR);
+	vmx_get_segment(vcpu, &vmx->rmode.segs[VCPU_SREG_ES], VCPU_SREG_ES);
+	vmx_get_segment(vcpu, &vmx->rmode.segs[VCPU_SREG_DS], VCPU_SREG_DS);
+	vmx_get_segment(vcpu, &vmx->rmode.segs[VCPU_SREG_FS], VCPU_SREG_FS);
+	vmx_get_segment(vcpu, &vmx->rmode.segs[VCPU_SREG_GS], VCPU_SREG_GS);
+	vmx_get_segment(vcpu, &vmx->rmode.segs[VCPU_SREG_SS], VCPU_SREG_SS);
+	vmx_get_segment(vcpu, &vmx->rmode.segs[VCPU_SREG_CS], VCPU_SREG_CS);
+
+	vmx->rmode.vm86_active = 1;
+
+	vmx_segment_cache_clear(vmx);
+
+	vmcs_writel(GUEST_TR_BASE, kvm_vmx->tss_addr);
+	vmcs_write32(GUEST_TR_LIMIT, RMODE_TSS_SIZE - 1);
+	vmcs_write32(GUEST_TR_AR_BYTES, 0x008b);
+
+	flags = vmcs_readl(GUEST_RFLAGS);
+	vmx->rmode.save_rflags = flags;
+
+	flags |= X86_EFLAGS_IOPL | X86_EFLAGS_VM;
+
+	vmcs_writel(GUEST_RFLAGS, flags);
+	vmcs_writel(GUEST_CR4, vmcs_readl(GUEST_CR4) | X86_CR4_VME);
+	vmx_update_exception_bitmap(vcpu);
+
+	fix_rmode_seg(VCPU_SREG_SS, &vmx->rmode.segs[VCPU_SREG_SS]);
+	fix_rmode_seg(VCPU_SREG_CS, &vmx->rmode.segs[VCPU_SREG_CS]);
+	fix_rmode_seg(VCPU_SREG_ES, &vmx->rmode.segs[VCPU_SREG_ES]);
+	fix_rmode_seg(VCPU_SREG_DS, &vmx->rmode.segs[VCPU_SREG_DS]);
+	fix_rmode_seg(VCPU_SREG_GS, &vmx->rmode.segs[VCPU_SREG_GS]);
+	fix_rmode_seg(VCPU_SREG_FS, &vmx->rmode.segs[VCPU_SREG_FS]);
+}
+
+int vmx_set_efer(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 efer)
+{
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+
+	/* Nothing to do if hardware doesn't support EFER. */
+	if (!vmx_find_uret_msr(vmx, MSR_EFER))
+		return 0;
+
+	vcpu->arch.efer = efer;
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+	if (efer & EFER_LMA)
+		vm_entry_controls_setbit(vmx, VM_ENTRY_IA32E_MODE);
+	else
+		vm_entry_controls_clearbit(vmx, VM_ENTRY_IA32E_MODE);
+#else
+	if (KVM_BUG_ON(efer & EFER_LMA, vcpu->kvm))
+		return 1;
+#endif
+
+	vmx_setup_uret_msrs(vmx);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+
+static void enter_lmode(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	u32 guest_tr_ar;
+
+	vmx_segment_cache_clear(to_vmx(vcpu));
+
+	guest_tr_ar = vmcs_read32(GUEST_TR_AR_BYTES);
+	if ((guest_tr_ar & VMX_AR_TYPE_MASK) != VMX_AR_TYPE_BUSY_64_TSS) {
+		pr_debug_ratelimited("%s: tss fixup for long mode. \n",
+				     __func__);
+		vmcs_write32(GUEST_TR_AR_BYTES,
+			     (guest_tr_ar & ~VMX_AR_TYPE_MASK)
+			     | VMX_AR_TYPE_BUSY_64_TSS);
+	}
+	vmx_set_efer(vcpu, vcpu->arch.efer | EFER_LMA);
+}
+
+static void exit_lmode(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	vmx_set_efer(vcpu, vcpu->arch.efer & ~EFER_LMA);
+}
+
+#endif
+
+static void vmx_flush_tlb_all(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+
+	/*
+	 * INVEPT must be issued when EPT is enabled, irrespective of VPID, as
+	 * the CPU is not required to invalidate guest-physical mappings on
+	 * VM-Entry, even if VPID is disabled.  Guest-physical mappings are
+	 * associated with the root EPT structure and not any particular VPID
+	 * (INVVPID also isn't required to invalidate guest-physical mappings).
+	 */
+	if (enable_ept) {
+		ept_sync_global();
+	} else if (enable_vpid) {
+		if (cpu_has_vmx_invvpid_global()) {
+			vpid_sync_vcpu_global();
+		} else {
+			vpid_sync_vcpu_single(vmx->vpid);
+			vpid_sync_vcpu_single(vmx->nested.vpid02);
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+static inline int vmx_get_current_vpid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	if (is_guest_mode(vcpu))
+		return nested_get_vpid02(vcpu);
+	return to_vmx(vcpu)->vpid;
+}
+
+static void vmx_flush_tlb_current(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct kvm_mmu *mmu = vcpu->arch.mmu;
+	u64 root_hpa = mmu->root.hpa;
+
+	/* No flush required if the current context is invalid. */
+	if (!VALID_PAGE(root_hpa))
+		return;
+
+	if (enable_ept)
+		ept_sync_context(construct_eptp(vcpu, root_hpa,
+						mmu->root_role.level));
+	else
+		vpid_sync_context(vmx_get_current_vpid(vcpu));
+}
+
+static void vmx_flush_tlb_gva(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gva_t addr)
+{
+	/*
+	 * vpid_sync_vcpu_addr() is a nop if vpid==0, see the comment in
+	 * vmx_flush_tlb_guest() for an explanation of why this is ok.
+	 */
+	vpid_sync_vcpu_addr(vmx_get_current_vpid(vcpu), addr);
+}
+
+static void vmx_flush_tlb_guest(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	/*
+	 * vpid_sync_context() is a nop if vpid==0, e.g. if enable_vpid==0 or a
+	 * vpid couldn't be allocated for this vCPU.  VM-Enter and VM-Exit are
+	 * required to flush GVA->{G,H}PA mappings from the TLB if vpid is
+	 * disabled (VM-Enter with vpid enabled and vpid==0 is disallowed),
+	 * i.e. no explicit INVVPID is necessary.
+	 */
+	vpid_sync_context(vmx_get_current_vpid(vcpu));
+}
+
+void vmx_ept_load_pdptrs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct kvm_mmu *mmu = vcpu->arch.walk_mmu;
+
+	if (!kvm_register_is_dirty(vcpu, VCPU_EXREG_PDPTR))
+		return;
+
+	if (is_pae_paging(vcpu)) {
+		vmcs_write64(GUEST_PDPTR0, mmu->pdptrs[0]);
+		vmcs_write64(GUEST_PDPTR1, mmu->pdptrs[1]);
+		vmcs_write64(GUEST_PDPTR2, mmu->pdptrs[2]);
+		vmcs_write64(GUEST_PDPTR3, mmu->pdptrs[3]);
+	}
+}
+
+void ept_save_pdptrs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct kvm_mmu *mmu = vcpu->arch.walk_mmu;
+
+	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!is_pae_paging(vcpu)))
+		return;
+
+	mmu->pdptrs[0] = vmcs_read64(GUEST_PDPTR0);
+	mmu->pdptrs[1] = vmcs_read64(GUEST_PDPTR1);
+	mmu->pdptrs[2] = vmcs_read64(GUEST_PDPTR2);
+	mmu->pdptrs[3] = vmcs_read64(GUEST_PDPTR3);
+
+	kvm_register_mark_available(vcpu, VCPU_EXREG_PDPTR);
+}
+
+#define CR3_EXITING_BITS (CPU_BASED_CR3_LOAD_EXITING | \
+			  CPU_BASED_CR3_STORE_EXITING)
+
+static bool vmx_is_valid_cr0(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long cr0)
+{
+	if (is_guest_mode(vcpu))
+		return nested_guest_cr0_valid(vcpu, cr0);
+
+	if (to_vmx(vcpu)->nested.vmxon)
+		return nested_host_cr0_valid(vcpu, cr0);
+
+	return true;
+}
+
+void vmx_set_cr0(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long cr0)
+{
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+	unsigned long hw_cr0, old_cr0_pg;
+	u32 tmp;
+
+	old_cr0_pg = kvm_read_cr0_bits(vcpu, X86_CR0_PG);
+
+	hw_cr0 = (cr0 & ~KVM_VM_CR0_ALWAYS_OFF);
+	if (enable_unrestricted_guest)
+		hw_cr0 |= KVM_VM_CR0_ALWAYS_ON_UNRESTRICTED_GUEST;
+	else {
+		hw_cr0 |= KVM_VM_CR0_ALWAYS_ON;
+		if (!enable_ept)
+			hw_cr0 |= X86_CR0_WP;
+
+		if (vmx->rmode.vm86_active && (cr0 & X86_CR0_PE))
+			enter_pmode(vcpu);
+
+		if (!vmx->rmode.vm86_active && !(cr0 & X86_CR0_PE))
+			enter_rmode(vcpu);
+	}
+
+	vmcs_writel(CR0_READ_SHADOW, cr0);
+	vmcs_writel(GUEST_CR0, hw_cr0);
+	vcpu->arch.cr0 = cr0;
+	kvm_register_mark_available(vcpu, VCPU_EXREG_CR0);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+	if (vcpu->arch.efer & EFER_LME) {
+		if (!old_cr0_pg && (cr0 & X86_CR0_PG))
+			enter_lmode(vcpu);
+		else if (old_cr0_pg && !(cr0 & X86_CR0_PG))
+			exit_lmode(vcpu);
+	}
+#endif
+
+	if (enable_ept && !enable_unrestricted_guest) {
+		/*
+		 * Ensure KVM has an up-to-date snapshot of the guest's CR3.  If
+		 * the below code _enables_ CR3 exiting, vmx_cache_reg() will
+		 * (correctly) stop reading vmcs.GUEST_CR3 because it thinks
+		 * KVM's CR3 is installed.
+		 */
+		if (!kvm_register_is_available(vcpu, VCPU_EXREG_CR3))
+			vmx_cache_reg(vcpu, VCPU_EXREG_CR3);
+
+		/*
+		 * When running with EPT but not unrestricted guest, KVM must
+		 * intercept CR3 accesses when paging is _disabled_.  This is
+		 * necessary because restricted guests can't actually run with
+		 * paging disabled, and so KVM stuffs its own CR3 in order to
+		 * run the guest when identity mapped page tables.
+		 *
+		 * Do _NOT_ check the old CR0.PG, e.g. to optimize away the
+		 * update, it may be stale with respect to CR3 interception,
+		 * e.g. after nested VM-Enter.
+		 *
+		 * Lastly, honor L1's desires, i.e. intercept CR3 loads and/or
+		 * stores to forward them to L1, even if KVM does not need to
+		 * intercept them to preserve its identity mapped page tables.
+		 */
+		if (!(cr0 & X86_CR0_PG)) {
+			exec_controls_setbit(vmx, CR3_EXITING_BITS);
+		} else if (!is_guest_mode(vcpu)) {
+			exec_controls_clearbit(vmx, CR3_EXITING_BITS);
+		} else {
+			tmp = exec_controls_get(vmx);
+			tmp &= ~CR3_EXITING_BITS;
+			tmp |= get_vmcs12(vcpu)->cpu_based_vm_exec_control & CR3_EXITING_BITS;
+			exec_controls_set(vmx, tmp);
+		}
+
+		/* Note, vmx_set_cr4() consumes the new vcpu->arch.cr0. */
+		if ((old_cr0_pg ^ cr0) & X86_CR0_PG)
+			vmx_set_cr4(vcpu, kvm_read_cr4(vcpu));
+
+		/*
+		 * When !CR0_PG -> CR0_PG, vcpu->arch.cr3 becomes active, but
+		 * GUEST_CR3 is still vmx->ept_identity_map_addr if EPT + !URG.
+		 */
+		if (!(old_cr0_pg & X86_CR0_PG) && (cr0 & X86_CR0_PG))
+			kvm_register_mark_dirty(vcpu, VCPU_EXREG_CR3);
+	}
+
+	/* depends on vcpu->arch.cr0 to be set to a new value */
+	vmx->emulation_required = vmx_emulation_required(vcpu);
+}
+
+static int vmx_get_max_ept_level(void)
+{
+	if (cpu_has_vmx_ept_5levels())
+		return 5;
+	return 4;
+}
+
+u64 construct_eptp(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, hpa_t root_hpa, int root_level)
+{
+	u64 eptp = VMX_EPTP_MT_WB;
+
+	eptp |= (root_level == 5) ? VMX_EPTP_PWL_5 : VMX_EPTP_PWL_4;
+
+	if (enable_ept_ad_bits &&
+	    (!is_guest_mode(vcpu) || nested_ept_ad_enabled(vcpu)))
+		eptp |= VMX_EPTP_AD_ENABLE_BIT;
+	eptp |= root_hpa;
+
+	return eptp;
+}
+
+static void vmx_load_mmu_pgd(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, hpa_t root_hpa,
+			     int root_level)
+{
+	struct kvm *kvm = vcpu->kvm;
+	bool update_guest_cr3 = true;
+	unsigned long guest_cr3;
+	u64 eptp;
+
+	if (enable_ept) {
+		eptp = construct_eptp(vcpu, root_hpa, root_level);
+		vmcs_write64(EPT_POINTER, eptp);
+
+		hv_track_root_tdp(vcpu, root_hpa);
+
+		if (!enable_unrestricted_guest && !is_paging(vcpu))
+			guest_cr3 = to_kvm_vmx(kvm)->ept_identity_map_addr;
+		else if (kvm_register_is_dirty(vcpu, VCPU_EXREG_CR3))
+			guest_cr3 = vcpu->arch.cr3;
+		else /* vmcs.GUEST_CR3 is already up-to-date. */
+			update_guest_cr3 = false;
+		vmx_ept_load_pdptrs(vcpu);
+	} else {
+		guest_cr3 = root_hpa | kvm_get_active_pcid(vcpu);
+	}
+
+	if (update_guest_cr3)
+		vmcs_writel(GUEST_CR3, guest_cr3);
+}
+
+
+static bool vmx_is_valid_cr4(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long cr4)
+{
+	/*
+	 * We operate under the default treatment of SMM, so VMX cannot be
+	 * enabled under SMM.  Note, whether or not VMXE is allowed at all,
+	 * i.e. is a reserved bit, is handled by common x86 code.
+	 */
+	if ((cr4 & X86_CR4_VMXE) && is_smm(vcpu))
+		return false;
+
+	if (to_vmx(vcpu)->nested.vmxon && !nested_cr4_valid(vcpu, cr4))
+		return false;
+
+	return true;
+}
+
+void vmx_set_cr4(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long cr4)
+{
+	unsigned long old_cr4 = kvm_read_cr4(vcpu);
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+	unsigned long hw_cr4;
+
+	/*
+	 * Pass through host's Machine Check Enable value to hw_cr4, which
+	 * is in force while we are in guest mode.  Do not let guests control
+	 * this bit, even if host CR4.MCE == 0.
+	 */
+	hw_cr4 = (cr4_read_shadow() & X86_CR4_MCE) | (cr4 & ~X86_CR4_MCE);
+	if (enable_unrestricted_guest)
+		hw_cr4 |= KVM_VM_CR4_ALWAYS_ON_UNRESTRICTED_GUEST;
+	else if (vmx->rmode.vm86_active)
+		hw_cr4 |= KVM_RMODE_VM_CR4_ALWAYS_ON;
+	else
+		hw_cr4 |= KVM_PMODE_VM_CR4_ALWAYS_ON;
+
+	if (vmx_umip_emulated()) {
+		if (cr4 & X86_CR4_UMIP) {
+			secondary_exec_controls_setbit(vmx, SECONDARY_EXEC_DESC);
+			hw_cr4 &= ~X86_CR4_UMIP;
+		} else if (!is_guest_mode(vcpu) ||
+			!nested_cpu_has2(get_vmcs12(vcpu), SECONDARY_EXEC_DESC)) {
+			secondary_exec_controls_clearbit(vmx, SECONDARY_EXEC_DESC);
+		}
+	}
+
+	vcpu->arch.cr4 = cr4;
+	kvm_register_mark_available(vcpu, VCPU_EXREG_CR4);
+
+	if (!enable_unrestricted_guest) {
+		if (enable_ept) {
+			if (!is_paging(vcpu)) {
+				hw_cr4 &= ~X86_CR4_PAE;
+				hw_cr4 |= X86_CR4_PSE;
+			} else if (!(cr4 & X86_CR4_PAE)) {
+				hw_cr4 &= ~X86_CR4_PAE;
+			}
+		}
+
+		/*
+		 * SMEP/SMAP/PKU is disabled if CPU is in non-paging mode in
+		 * hardware.  To emulate this behavior, SMEP/SMAP/PKU needs
+		 * to be manually disabled when guest switches to non-paging
+		 * mode.
+		 *
+		 * If !enable_unrestricted_guest, the CPU is always running
+		 * with CR0.PG=1 and CR4 needs to be modified.
+		 * If enable_unrestricted_guest, the CPU automatically
+		 * disables SMEP/SMAP/PKU when the guest sets CR0.PG=0.
+		 */
+		if (!is_paging(vcpu))
+			hw_cr4 &= ~(X86_CR4_SMEP | X86_CR4_SMAP | X86_CR4_PKE);
+	}
+
+	vmcs_writel(CR4_READ_SHADOW, cr4);
+	vmcs_writel(GUEST_CR4, hw_cr4);
+
+	if ((cr4 ^ old_cr4) & (X86_CR4_OSXSAVE | X86_CR4_PKE))
+		kvm_update_cpuid_runtime(vcpu);
+}
+
+void vmx_get_segment(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_segment *var, int seg)
+{
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+	u32 ar;
+
+	if (vmx->rmode.vm86_active && seg != VCPU_SREG_LDTR) {
+		*var = vmx->rmode.segs[seg];
+		if (seg == VCPU_SREG_TR
+		    || var->selector == vmx_read_guest_seg_selector(vmx, seg))
+			return;
+		var->base = vmx_read_guest_seg_base(vmx, seg);
+		var->selector = vmx_read_guest_seg_selector(vmx, seg);
+		return;
+	}
+	var->base = vmx_read_guest_seg_base(vmx, seg);
+	var->limit = vmx_read_guest_seg_limit(vmx, seg);
+	var->selector = vmx_read_guest_seg_selector(vmx, seg);
+	ar = vmx_read_guest_seg_ar(vmx, seg);
+	var->unusable = (ar >> 16) & 1;
+	var->type = ar & 15;
+	var->s = (ar >> 4) & 1;
+	var->dpl = (ar >> 5) & 3;
+	/*
+	 * Some userspaces do not preserve unusable property. Since usable
+	 * segment has to be present according to VMX spec we can use present
+	 * property to amend userspace bug by making unusable segment always
+	 * nonpresent. vmx_segment_access_rights() already marks nonpresent
+	 * segment as unusable.
+	 */
+	var->present = !var->unusable;
+	var->avl = (ar >> 12) & 1;
+	var->l = (ar >> 13) & 1;
+	var->db = (ar >> 14) & 1;
+	var->g = (ar >> 15) & 1;
+}
+
+static u64 vmx_get_segment_base(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int seg)
+{
+	struct kvm_segment s;
+
+	if (to_vmx(vcpu)->rmode.vm86_active) {
+		vmx_get_segment(vcpu, &s, seg);
+		return s.base;
+	}
+	return vmx_read_guest_seg_base(to_vmx(vcpu), seg);
+}
+
+int vmx_get_cpl(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+
+	if (unlikely(vmx->rmode.vm86_active))
+		return 0;
+	else {
+		int ar = vmx_read_guest_seg_ar(vmx, VCPU_SREG_SS);
+		return VMX_AR_DPL(ar);
+	}
+}
+
+static u32 vmx_segment_access_rights(struct kvm_segment *var)
+{
+	u32 ar;
+
+	ar = var->type & 15;
+	ar |= (var->s & 1) << 4;
+	ar |= (var->dpl & 3) << 5;
+	ar |= (var->present & 1) << 7;
+	ar |= (var->avl & 1) << 12;
+	ar |= (var->l & 1) << 13;
+	ar |= (var->db & 1) << 14;
+	ar |= (var->g & 1) << 15;
+	ar |= (var->unusable || !var->present) << 16;
+
+	return ar;
+}
+
+void __vmx_set_segment(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_segment *var, int seg)
+{
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+	const struct kvm_vmx_segment_field *sf = &kvm_vmx_segment_fields[seg];
+
+	vmx_segment_cache_clear(vmx);
+
+	if (vmx->rmode.vm86_active && seg != VCPU_SREG_LDTR) {
+		vmx->rmode.segs[seg] = *var;
+		if (seg == VCPU_SREG_TR)
+			vmcs_write16(sf->selector, var->selector);
+		else if (var->s)
+			fix_rmode_seg(seg, &vmx->rmode.segs[seg]);
+		return;
+	}
+
+	vmcs_writel(sf->base, var->base);
+	vmcs_write32(sf->limit, var->limit);
+	vmcs_write16(sf->selector, var->selector);
+
+	/*
+	 *   Fix the "Accessed" bit in AR field of segment registers for older
+	 * qemu binaries.
+	 *   IA32 arch specifies that at the time of processor reset the
+	 * "Accessed" bit in the AR field of segment registers is 1. And qemu
+	 * is setting it to 0 in the userland code. This causes invalid guest
+	 * state vmexit when "unrestricted guest" mode is turned on.
+	 *    Fix for this setup issue in cpu_reset is being pushed in the qemu
+	 * tree. Newer qemu binaries with that qemu fix would not need this
+	 * kvm hack.
+	 */
+	if (is_unrestricted_guest(vcpu) && (seg != VCPU_SREG_LDTR))
+		var->type |= 0x1; /* Accessed */
+
+	vmcs_write32(sf->ar_bytes, vmx_segment_access_rights(var));
+}
+
+static void vmx_set_segment(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_segment *var, int seg)
+{
+	__vmx_set_segment(vcpu, var, seg);
+
+	to_vmx(vcpu)->emulation_required = vmx_emulation_required(vcpu);
+}
+
+static void vmx_get_cs_db_l_bits(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int *db, int *l)
+{
+	u32 ar = vmx_read_guest_seg_ar(to_vmx(vcpu), VCPU_SREG_CS);
+
+	*db = (ar >> 14) & 1;
+	*l = (ar >> 13) & 1;
+}
+
+static void vmx_get_idt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct desc_ptr *dt)
+{
+	dt->size = vmcs_read32(GUEST_IDTR_LIMIT);
+	dt->address = vmcs_readl(GUEST_IDTR_BASE);
+}
+
+static void vmx_set_idt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct desc_ptr *dt)
+{
+	vmcs_write32(GUEST_IDTR_LIMIT, dt->size);
+	vmcs_writel(GUEST_IDTR_BASE, dt->address);
+}
+
+static void vmx_get_gdt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct desc_ptr *dt)
+{
+	dt->size = vmcs_read32(GUEST_GDTR_LIMIT);
+	dt->address = vmcs_readl(GUEST_GDTR_BASE);
+}
+
+static void vmx_set_gdt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct desc_ptr *dt)
+{
+	vmcs_write32(GUEST_GDTR_LIMIT, dt->size);
+	vmcs_writel(GUEST_GDTR_BASE, dt->address);
+}
+
+static bool rmode_segment_valid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int seg)
+{
+	struct kvm_segment var;
+	u32 ar;
+
+	vmx_get_segment(vcpu, &var, seg);
+	var.dpl = 0x3;
+	if (seg == VCPU_SREG_CS)
+		var.type = 0x3;
+	ar = vmx_segment_access_rights(&var);
+
+	if (var.base != (var.selector << 4))
+		return false;
+	if (var.limit != 0xffff)
+		return false;
+	if (ar != 0xf3)
+		return false;
+
+	return true;
+}
+
+static bool code_segment_valid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct kvm_segment cs;
+	unsigned int cs_rpl;
+
+	vmx_get_segment(vcpu, &cs, VCPU_SREG_CS);
+	cs_rpl = cs.selector & SEGMENT_RPL_MASK;
+
+	if (cs.unusable)
+		return false;
+	if (~cs.type & (VMX_AR_TYPE_CODE_MASK|VMX_AR_TYPE_ACCESSES_MASK))
+		return false;
+	if (!cs.s)
+		return false;
+	if (cs.type & VMX_AR_TYPE_WRITEABLE_MASK) {
+		if (cs.dpl > cs_rpl)
+			return false;
+	} else {
+		if (cs.dpl != cs_rpl)
+			return false;
+	}
+	if (!cs.present)
+		return false;
+
+	/* TODO: Add Reserved field check, this'll require a new member in the kvm_segment_field structure */
+	return true;
+}
+
+static bool stack_segment_valid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct kvm_segment ss;
+	unsigned int ss_rpl;
+
+	vmx_get_segment(vcpu, &ss, VCPU_SREG_SS);
+	ss_rpl = ss.selector & SEGMENT_RPL_MASK;
+
+	if (ss.unusable)
+		return true;
+	if (ss.type != 3 && ss.type != 7)
+		return false;
+	if (!ss.s)
+		return false;
+	if (ss.dpl != ss_rpl) /* DPL != RPL */
+		return false;
+	if (!ss.present)
+		return false;
+
+	return true;
+}
+
+static bool data_segment_valid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int seg)
+{
+	struct kvm_segment var;
+	unsigned int rpl;
+
+	vmx_get_segment(vcpu, &var, seg);
+	rpl = var.selector & SEGMENT_RPL_MASK;
+
+	if (var.unusable)
+		return true;
+	if (!var.s)
+		return false;
+	if (!var.present)
+		return false;
+	if (~var.type & (VMX_AR_TYPE_CODE_MASK|VMX_AR_TYPE_WRITEABLE_MASK)) {
+		if (var.dpl < rpl) /* DPL < RPL */
+			return false;
+	}
+
+	/* TODO: Add other members to kvm_segment_field to allow checking for other access
+	 * rights flags
+	 */
+	return true;
+}
+
+static bool tr_valid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct kvm_segment tr;
+
+	vmx_get_segment(vcpu, &tr, VCPU_SREG_TR);
+
+	if (tr.unusable)
+		return false;
+	if (tr.selector & SEGMENT_TI_MASK)	/* TI = 1 */
+		return false;
+	if (tr.type != 3 && tr.type != 11) /* TODO: Check if guest is in IA32e mode */
+		return false;
+	if (!tr.present)
+		return false;
+
+	return true;
+}
+
+static bool ldtr_valid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct kvm_segment ldtr;
+
+	vmx_get_segment(vcpu, &ldtr, VCPU_SREG_LDTR);
+
+	if (ldtr.unusable)
+		return true;
+	if (ldtr.selector & SEGMENT_TI_MASK)	/* TI = 1 */
+		return false;
+	if (ldtr.type != 2)
+		return false;
+	if (!ldtr.present)
+		return false;
+
+	return true;
+}
+
+static bool cs_ss_rpl_check(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct kvm_segment cs, ss;
+
+	vmx_get_segment(vcpu, &cs, VCPU_SREG_CS);
+	vmx_get_segment(vcpu, &ss, VCPU_SREG_SS);
+
+	return ((cs.selector & SEGMENT_RPL_MASK) ==
+		 (ss.selector & SEGMENT_RPL_MASK));
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check if guest state is valid. Returns true if valid, false if
+ * not.
+ * We assume that registers are always usable
+ */
+bool __vmx_guest_state_valid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	/* real mode guest state checks */
+	if (!is_protmode(vcpu) || (vmx_get_rflags(vcpu) & X86_EFLAGS_VM)) {
+		if (!rmode_segment_valid(vcpu, VCPU_SREG_CS))
+			return false;
+		if (!rmode_segment_valid(vcpu, VCPU_SREG_SS))
+			return false;
+		if (!rmode_segment_valid(vcpu, VCPU_SREG_DS))
+			return false;
+		if (!rmode_segment_valid(vcpu, VCPU_SREG_ES))
+			return false;
+		if (!rmode_segment_valid(vcpu, VCPU_SREG_FS))
+			return false;
+		if (!rmode_segment_valid(vcpu, VCPU_SREG_GS))
+			return false;
+	} else {
+	/* protected mode guest state checks */
+		if (!cs_ss_rpl_check(vcpu))
+			return false;
+		if (!code_segment_valid(vcpu))
+			return false;
+		if (!stack_segment_valid(vcpu))
+			return false;
+		if (!data_segment_valid(vcpu, VCPU_SREG_DS))
+			return false;
+		if (!data_segment_valid(vcpu, VCPU_SREG_ES))
+			return false;
+		if (!data_segment_valid(vcpu, VCPU_SREG_FS))
+			return false;
+		if (!data_segment_valid(vcpu, VCPU_SREG_GS))
+			return false;
+		if (!tr_valid(vcpu))
+			return false;
+		if (!ldtr_valid(vcpu))
+			return false;
+	}
+	/* TODO:
+	 * - Add checks on RIP
+	 * - Add checks on RFLAGS
+	 */
+
+	return true;
+}
+
+static int init_rmode_tss(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *ua)
+{
+	const void *zero_page = (const void *) __va(page_to_phys(ZERO_PAGE(0)));
+	u16 data;
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < 3; i++) {
+		if (__copy_to_user(ua + PAGE_SIZE * i, zero_page, PAGE_SIZE))
+			return -EFAULT;
+	}
+
+	data = TSS_BASE_SIZE + TSS_REDIRECTION_SIZE;
+	if (__copy_to_user(ua + TSS_IOPB_BASE_OFFSET, &data, sizeof(u16)))
+		return -EFAULT;
+
+	data = ~0;
+	if (__copy_to_user(ua + RMODE_TSS_SIZE - 1, &data, sizeof(u8)))
+		return -EFAULT;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int init_rmode_identity_map(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+	struct kvm_vmx *kvm_vmx = to_kvm_vmx(kvm);
+	int i, r = 0;
+	void __user *uaddr;
+	u32 tmp;
+
+	/* Protect kvm_vmx->ept_identity_pagetable_done. */
+	mutex_lock(&kvm->slots_lock);
+
+	if (likely(kvm_vmx->ept_identity_pagetable_done))
+		goto out;
+
+	if (!kvm_vmx->ept_identity_map_addr)
+		kvm_vmx->ept_identity_map_addr = VMX_EPT_IDENTITY_PAGETABLE_ADDR;
+
+	uaddr = __x86_set_memory_region(kvm,
+					IDENTITY_PAGETABLE_PRIVATE_MEMSLOT,
+					kvm_vmx->ept_identity_map_addr,
+					PAGE_SIZE);
+	if (IS_ERR(uaddr)) {
+		r = PTR_ERR(uaddr);
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	/* Set up identity-mapping pagetable for EPT in real mode */
+	for (i = 0; i < (PAGE_SIZE / sizeof(tmp)); i++) {
+		tmp = (i << 22) + (_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_RW | _PAGE_USER |
+			_PAGE_ACCESSED | _PAGE_DIRTY | _PAGE_PSE);
+		if (__copy_to_user(uaddr + i * sizeof(tmp), &tmp, sizeof(tmp))) {
+			r = -EFAULT;
+			goto out;
+		}
+	}
+	kvm_vmx->ept_identity_pagetable_done = true;
+
+out:
+	mutex_unlock(&kvm->slots_lock);
+	return r;
+}
+
+static void seg_setup(int seg)
+{
+	const struct kvm_vmx_segment_field *sf = &kvm_vmx_segment_fields[seg];
+	unsigned int ar;
+
+	vmcs_write16(sf->selector, 0);
+	vmcs_writel(sf->base, 0);
+	vmcs_write32(sf->limit, 0xffff);
+	ar = 0x93;
+	if (seg == VCPU_SREG_CS)
+		ar |= 0x08; /* code segment */
+
+	vmcs_write32(sf->ar_bytes, ar);
+}
+
+int allocate_vpid(void)
+{
+	int vpid;
+
+	if (!enable_vpid)
+		return 0;
+	spin_lock(&vmx_vpid_lock);
+	vpid = find_first_zero_bit(vmx_vpid_bitmap, VMX_NR_VPIDS);
+	if (vpid < VMX_NR_VPIDS)
+		__set_bit(vpid, vmx_vpid_bitmap);
+	else
+		vpid = 0;
+	spin_unlock(&vmx_vpid_lock);
+	return vpid;
+}
+
+void free_vpid(int vpid)
+{
+	if (!enable_vpid || vpid == 0)
+		return;
+	spin_lock(&vmx_vpid_lock);
+	__clear_bit(vpid, vmx_vpid_bitmap);
+	spin_unlock(&vmx_vpid_lock);
+}
+
+static void vmx_msr_bitmap_l01_changed(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
+{
+	/*
+	 * When KVM is a nested hypervisor on top of Hyper-V and uses
+	 * 'Enlightened MSR Bitmap' feature L0 needs to know that MSR
+	 * bitmap has changed.
+	 */
+	if (kvm_is_using_evmcs()) {
+		struct hv_enlightened_vmcs *evmcs = (void *)vmx->vmcs01.vmcs;
+
+		if (evmcs->hv_enlightenments_control.msr_bitmap)
+			evmcs->hv_clean_fields &=
+				~HV_VMX_ENLIGHTENED_CLEAN_FIELD_MSR_BITMAP;
+	}
+
+	vmx->nested.force_msr_bitmap_recalc = true;
+}
+
+void vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 msr, int type)
+{
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+	unsigned long *msr_bitmap = vmx->vmcs01.msr_bitmap;
+
+	if (!cpu_has_vmx_msr_bitmap())
+		return;
+
+	vmx_msr_bitmap_l01_changed(vmx);
+
+	/*
+	 * Mark the desired intercept state in shadow bitmap, this is needed
+	 * for resync when the MSR filters change.
+	*/
+	if (is_valid_passthrough_msr(msr)) {
+		int idx = possible_passthrough_msr_slot(msr);
+
+		if (idx != -ENOENT) {
+			if (type & MSR_TYPE_R)
+				clear_bit(idx, vmx->shadow_msr_intercept.read);
+			if (type & MSR_TYPE_W)
+				clear_bit(idx, vmx->shadow_msr_intercept.write);
+		}
+	}
+
+	if ((type & MSR_TYPE_R) &&
+	    !kvm_msr_allowed(vcpu, msr, KVM_MSR_FILTER_READ)) {
+		vmx_set_msr_bitmap_read(msr_bitmap, msr);
+		type &= ~MSR_TYPE_R;
+	}
+
+	if ((type & MSR_TYPE_W) &&
+	    !kvm_msr_allowed(vcpu, msr, KVM_MSR_FILTER_WRITE)) {
+		vmx_set_msr_bitmap_write(msr_bitmap, msr);
+		type &= ~MSR_TYPE_W;
+	}
+
+	if (type & MSR_TYPE_R)
+		vmx_clear_msr_bitmap_read(msr_bitmap, msr);
+
+	if (type & MSR_TYPE_W)
+		vmx_clear_msr_bitmap_write(msr_bitmap, msr);
+}
+
+void vmx_enable_intercept_for_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 msr, int type)
+{
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+	unsigned long *msr_bitmap = vmx->vmcs01.msr_bitmap;
+
+	if (!cpu_has_vmx_msr_bitmap())
+		return;
+
+	vmx_msr_bitmap_l01_changed(vmx);
+
+	/*
+	 * Mark the desired intercept state in shadow bitmap, this is needed
+	 * for resync when the MSR filter changes.
+	*/
+	if (is_valid_passthrough_msr(msr)) {
+		int idx = possible_passthrough_msr_slot(msr);
+
+		if (idx != -ENOENT) {
+			if (type & MSR_TYPE_R)
+				set_bit(idx, vmx->shadow_msr_intercept.read);
+			if (type & MSR_TYPE_W)
+				set_bit(idx, vmx->shadow_msr_intercept.write);
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (type & MSR_TYPE_R)
+		vmx_set_msr_bitmap_read(msr_bitmap, msr);
+
+	if (type & MSR_TYPE_W)
+		vmx_set_msr_bitmap_write(msr_bitmap, msr);
+}
+
+static void vmx_update_msr_bitmap_x2apic(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	/*
+	 * x2APIC indices for 64-bit accesses into the RDMSR and WRMSR halves
+	 * of the MSR bitmap.  KVM emulates APIC registers up through 0x3f0,
+	 * i.e. MSR 0x83f, and so only needs to dynamically manipulate 64 bits.
+	 */
+	const int read_idx = APIC_BASE_MSR / BITS_PER_LONG_LONG;
+	const int write_idx = read_idx + (0x800 / sizeof(u64));
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+	u64 *msr_bitmap = (u64 *)vmx->vmcs01.msr_bitmap;
+	u8 mode;
+
+	if (!cpu_has_vmx_msr_bitmap() || WARN_ON_ONCE(!lapic_in_kernel(vcpu)))
+		return;
+
+	if (cpu_has_secondary_exec_ctrls() &&
+	    (secondary_exec_controls_get(vmx) &
+	     SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_X2APIC_MODE)) {
+		mode = MSR_BITMAP_MODE_X2APIC;
+		if (enable_apicv && kvm_vcpu_apicv_active(vcpu))
+			mode |= MSR_BITMAP_MODE_X2APIC_APICV;
+	} else {
+		mode = 0;
+	}
+
+	if (mode == vmx->x2apic_msr_bitmap_mode)
+		return;
+
+	vmx->x2apic_msr_bitmap_mode = mode;
+
+	/*
+	 * Reset the bitmap for MSRs 0x800 - 0x83f.  Leave AMD's uber-extended
+	 * registers (0x840 and above) intercepted, KVM doesn't support them.
+	 * Intercept all writes by default and poke holes as needed.  Pass
+	 * through reads for all valid registers by default in x2APIC+APICv
+	 * mode, only the current timer count needs on-demand emulation by KVM.
+	 */
+	if (mode & MSR_BITMAP_MODE_X2APIC_APICV)
+		msr_bitmap[read_idx] = ~kvm_lapic_readable_reg_mask(vcpu->arch.apic);
+	else
+		msr_bitmap[read_idx] = ~0ull;
+	msr_bitmap[write_idx] = ~0ull;
+
+	/*
+	 * TPR reads and writes can be virtualized even if virtual interrupt
+	 * delivery is not in use.
+	 */
+	vmx_set_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, X2APIC_MSR(APIC_TASKPRI), MSR_TYPE_RW,
+				  !(mode & MSR_BITMAP_MODE_X2APIC));
+
+	if (mode & MSR_BITMAP_MODE_X2APIC_APICV) {
+		vmx_enable_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, X2APIC_MSR(APIC_TMCCT), MSR_TYPE_RW);
+		vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, X2APIC_MSR(APIC_EOI), MSR_TYPE_W);
+		vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, X2APIC_MSR(APIC_SELF_IPI), MSR_TYPE_W);
+		if (enable_ipiv)
+			vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, X2APIC_MSR(APIC_ICR), MSR_TYPE_RW);
+	}
+}
+
+void pt_update_intercept_for_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+	bool flag = !(vmx->pt_desc.guest.ctl & RTIT_CTL_TRACEEN);
+	u32 i;
+
+	vmx_set_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, MSR_IA32_RTIT_STATUS, MSR_TYPE_RW, flag);
+	vmx_set_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, MSR_IA32_RTIT_OUTPUT_BASE, MSR_TYPE_RW, flag);
+	vmx_set_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, MSR_IA32_RTIT_OUTPUT_MASK, MSR_TYPE_RW, flag);
+	vmx_set_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, MSR_IA32_RTIT_CR3_MATCH, MSR_TYPE_RW, flag);
+	for (i = 0; i < vmx->pt_desc.num_address_ranges; i++) {
+		vmx_set_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, MSR_IA32_RTIT_ADDR0_A + i * 2, MSR_TYPE_RW, flag);
+		vmx_set_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, MSR_IA32_RTIT_ADDR0_B + i * 2, MSR_TYPE_RW, flag);
+	}
+}
+
+static bool vmx_guest_apic_has_interrupt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+	void *vapic_page;
+	u32 vppr;
+	int rvi;
+
+	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!is_guest_mode(vcpu)) ||
+		!nested_cpu_has_vid(get_vmcs12(vcpu)) ||
+		WARN_ON_ONCE(!vmx->nested.virtual_apic_map.gfn))
+		return false;
+
+	rvi = vmx_get_rvi();
+
+	vapic_page = vmx->nested.virtual_apic_map.hva;
+	vppr = *((u32 *)(vapic_page + APIC_PROCPRI));
+
+	return ((rvi & 0xf0) > (vppr & 0xf0));
+}
+
+static void vmx_msr_filter_changed(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+	u32 i;
+
+	/*
+	 * Redo intercept permissions for MSRs that KVM is passing through to
+	 * the guest.  Disabling interception will check the new MSR filter and
+	 * ensure that KVM enables interception if usersepace wants to filter
+	 * the MSR.  MSRs that KVM is already intercepting don't need to be
+	 * refreshed since KVM is going to intercept them regardless of what
+	 * userspace wants.
+	 */
+	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(vmx_possible_passthrough_msrs); i++) {
+		u32 msr = vmx_possible_passthrough_msrs[i];
+
+		if (!test_bit(i, vmx->shadow_msr_intercept.read))
+			vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, msr, MSR_TYPE_R);
+
+		if (!test_bit(i, vmx->shadow_msr_intercept.write))
+			vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, msr, MSR_TYPE_W);
+	}
+
+	/* PT MSRs can be passed through iff PT is exposed to the guest. */
+	if (vmx_pt_mode_is_host_guest())
+		pt_update_intercept_for_msr(vcpu);
+}
+
+static inline void kvm_vcpu_trigger_posted_interrupt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+						     int pi_vec)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
+	if (vcpu->mode == IN_GUEST_MODE) {
+		/*
+		 * The vector of the virtual has already been set in the PIR.
+		 * Send a notification event to deliver the virtual interrupt
+		 * unless the vCPU is the currently running vCPU, i.e. the
+		 * event is being sent from a fastpath VM-Exit handler, in
+		 * which case the PIR will be synced to the vIRR before
+		 * re-entering the guest.
+		 *
+		 * When the target is not the running vCPU, the following
+		 * possibilities emerge:
+		 *
+		 * Case 1: vCPU stays in non-root mode. Sending a notification
+		 * event posts the interrupt to the vCPU.
+		 *
+		 * Case 2: vCPU exits to root mode and is still runnable. The
+		 * PIR will be synced to the vIRR before re-entering the guest.
+		 * Sending a notification event is ok as the host IRQ handler
+		 * will ignore the spurious event.
+		 *
+		 * Case 3: vCPU exits to root mode and is blocked. vcpu_block()
+		 * has already synced PIR to vIRR and never blocks the vCPU if
+		 * the vIRR is not empty. Therefore, a blocked vCPU here does
+		 * not wait for any requested interrupts in PIR, and sending a
+		 * notification event also results in a benign, spurious event.
+		 */
+
+		if (vcpu != kvm_get_running_vcpu())
+			__apic_send_IPI_mask(get_cpu_mask(vcpu->cpu), pi_vec);
+		return;
+	}
+#endif
+	/*
+	 * The vCPU isn't in the guest; wake the vCPU in case it is blocking,
+	 * otherwise do nothing as KVM will grab the highest priority pending
+	 * IRQ via ->sync_pir_to_irr() in vcpu_enter_guest().
+	 */
+	kvm_vcpu_wake_up(vcpu);
+}
+
+static int vmx_deliver_nested_posted_interrupt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+						int vector)
+{
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+
+	if (is_guest_mode(vcpu) &&
+	    vector == vmx->nested.posted_intr_nv) {
+		/*
+		 * If a posted intr is not recognized by hardware,
+		 * we will accomplish it in the next vmentry.
+		 */
+		vmx->nested.pi_pending = true;
+		kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_EVENT, vcpu);
+
+		/*
+		 * This pairs with the smp_mb_*() after setting vcpu->mode in
+		 * vcpu_enter_guest() to guarantee the vCPU sees the event
+		 * request if triggering a posted interrupt "fails" because
+		 * vcpu->mode != IN_GUEST_MODE.  The extra barrier is needed as
+		 * the smb_wmb() in kvm_make_request() only ensures everything
+		 * done before making the request is visible when the request
+		 * is visible, it doesn't ensure ordering between the store to
+		 * vcpu->requests and the load from vcpu->mode.
+		 */
+		smp_mb__after_atomic();
+
+		/* the PIR and ON have been set by L1. */
+		kvm_vcpu_trigger_posted_interrupt(vcpu, POSTED_INTR_NESTED_VECTOR);
+		return 0;
+	}
+	return -1;
+}
+/*
+ * Send interrupt to vcpu via posted interrupt way.
+ * 1. If target vcpu is running(non-root mode), send posted interrupt
+ * notification to vcpu and hardware will sync PIR to vIRR atomically.
+ * 2. If target vcpu isn't running(root mode), kick it to pick up the
+ * interrupt from PIR in next vmentry.
+ */
+static int vmx_deliver_posted_interrupt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int vector)
+{
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+	int r;
+
+	r = vmx_deliver_nested_posted_interrupt(vcpu, vector);
+	if (!r)
+		return 0;
+
+	/* Note, this is called iff the local APIC is in-kernel. */
+	if (!vcpu->arch.apic->apicv_active)
+		return -1;
+
+	if (pi_test_and_set_pir(vector, &vmx->pi_desc))
+		return 0;
+
+	/* If a previous notification has sent the IPI, nothing to do.  */
+	if (pi_test_and_set_on(&vmx->pi_desc))
+		return 0;
+
+	/*
+	 * The implied barrier in pi_test_and_set_on() pairs with the smp_mb_*()
+	 * after setting vcpu->mode in vcpu_enter_guest(), thus the vCPU is
+	 * guaranteed to see PID.ON=1 and sync the PIR to IRR if triggering a
+	 * posted interrupt "fails" because vcpu->mode != IN_GUEST_MODE.
+	 */
+	kvm_vcpu_trigger_posted_interrupt(vcpu, POSTED_INTR_VECTOR);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void vmx_deliver_interrupt(struct kvm_lapic *apic, int delivery_mode,
+				  int trig_mode, int vector)
+{
+	struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = apic->vcpu;
+
+	if (vmx_deliver_posted_interrupt(vcpu, vector)) {
+		kvm_lapic_set_irr(vector, apic);
+		kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_EVENT, vcpu);
+		kvm_vcpu_kick(vcpu);
+	} else {
+		trace_kvm_apicv_accept_irq(vcpu->vcpu_id, delivery_mode,
+					   trig_mode, vector);
+	}
+}
+
+/*
+ * Set up the vmcs's constant host-state fields, i.e., host-state fields that
+ * will not change in the lifetime of the guest.
+ * Note that host-state that does change is set elsewhere. E.g., host-state
+ * that is set differently for each CPU is set in vmx_vcpu_load(), not here.
+ */
+void vmx_set_constant_host_state(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
+{
+	u32 low32, high32;
+	unsigned long tmpl;
+	unsigned long cr0, cr3, cr4;
+
+	cr0 = read_cr0();
+	WARN_ON(cr0 & X86_CR0_TS);
+	vmcs_writel(HOST_CR0, cr0);  /* 22.2.3 */
+
+	/*
+	 * Save the most likely value for this task's CR3 in the VMCS.
+	 * We can't use __get_current_cr3_fast() because we're not atomic.
+	 */
+	cr3 = __read_cr3();
+	vmcs_writel(HOST_CR3, cr3);		/* 22.2.3  FIXME: shadow tables */
+	vmx->loaded_vmcs->host_state.cr3 = cr3;
+
+	/* Save the most likely value for this task's CR4 in the VMCS. */
+	cr4 = cr4_read_shadow();
+	vmcs_writel(HOST_CR4, cr4);			/* 22.2.3, 22.2.5 */
+	vmx->loaded_vmcs->host_state.cr4 = cr4;
+
+	vmcs_write16(HOST_CS_SELECTOR, __KERNEL_CS);  /* 22.2.4 */
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+	/*
+	 * Load null selectors, so we can avoid reloading them in
+	 * vmx_prepare_switch_to_host(), in case userspace uses
+	 * the null selectors too (the expected case).
+	 */
+	vmcs_write16(HOST_DS_SELECTOR, 0);
+	vmcs_write16(HOST_ES_SELECTOR, 0);
+#else
+	vmcs_write16(HOST_DS_SELECTOR, __KERNEL_DS);  /* 22.2.4 */
+	vmcs_write16(HOST_ES_SELECTOR, __KERNEL_DS);  /* 22.2.4 */
+#endif
+	vmcs_write16(HOST_SS_SELECTOR, __KERNEL_DS);  /* 22.2.4 */
+	vmcs_write16(HOST_TR_SELECTOR, GDT_ENTRY_TSS*8);  /* 22.2.4 */
+
+	vmcs_writel(HOST_IDTR_BASE, host_idt_base);   /* 22.2.4 */
+
+	vmcs_writel(HOST_RIP, (unsigned long)vmx_vmexit); /* 22.2.5 */
+
+	rdmsr(MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_CS, low32, high32);
+	vmcs_write32(HOST_IA32_SYSENTER_CS, low32);
+
+	/*
+	 * SYSENTER is used for 32-bit system calls on either 32-bit or
+	 * 64-bit kernels.  It is always zero If neither is allowed, otherwise
+	 * vmx_vcpu_load_vmcs loads it with the per-CPU entry stack (and may
+	 * have already done so!).
+	 */
+	if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IA32_EMULATION) && !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_32))
+		vmcs_writel(HOST_IA32_SYSENTER_ESP, 0);
+
+	rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_EIP, tmpl);
+	vmcs_writel(HOST_IA32_SYSENTER_EIP, tmpl);   /* 22.2.3 */
+
+	if (vmcs_config.vmexit_ctrl & VM_EXIT_LOAD_IA32_PAT) {
+		rdmsr(MSR_IA32_CR_PAT, low32, high32);
+		vmcs_write64(HOST_IA32_PAT, low32 | ((u64) high32 << 32));
+	}
+
+	if (cpu_has_load_ia32_efer())
+		vmcs_write64(HOST_IA32_EFER, host_efer);
+}
+
+void set_cr4_guest_host_mask(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
+{
+	struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = &vmx->vcpu;
+
+	vcpu->arch.cr4_guest_owned_bits = KVM_POSSIBLE_CR4_GUEST_BITS &
+					  ~vcpu->arch.cr4_guest_rsvd_bits;
+	if (!enable_ept) {
+		vcpu->arch.cr4_guest_owned_bits &= ~X86_CR4_TLBFLUSH_BITS;
+		vcpu->arch.cr4_guest_owned_bits &= ~X86_CR4_PDPTR_BITS;
+	}
+	if (is_guest_mode(&vmx->vcpu))
+		vcpu->arch.cr4_guest_owned_bits &=
+			~get_vmcs12(vcpu)->cr4_guest_host_mask;
+	vmcs_writel(CR4_GUEST_HOST_MASK, ~vcpu->arch.cr4_guest_owned_bits);
+}
+
+static u32 vmx_pin_based_exec_ctrl(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
+{
+	u32 pin_based_exec_ctrl = vmcs_config.pin_based_exec_ctrl;
+
+	if (!kvm_vcpu_apicv_active(&vmx->vcpu))
+		pin_based_exec_ctrl &= ~PIN_BASED_POSTED_INTR;
+
+	if (!enable_vnmi)
+		pin_based_exec_ctrl &= ~PIN_BASED_VIRTUAL_NMIS;
+
+	if (!enable_preemption_timer)
+		pin_based_exec_ctrl &= ~PIN_BASED_VMX_PREEMPTION_TIMER;
+
+	return pin_based_exec_ctrl;
+}
+
+static u32 vmx_vmentry_ctrl(void)
+{
+	u32 vmentry_ctrl = vmcs_config.vmentry_ctrl;
+
+	if (vmx_pt_mode_is_system())
+		vmentry_ctrl &= ~(VM_ENTRY_PT_CONCEAL_PIP |
+				  VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_RTIT_CTL);
+	/*
+	 * IA32e mode, and loading of EFER and PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL are toggled dynamically.
+	 */
+	vmentry_ctrl &= ~(VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL |
+			  VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_EFER |
+			  VM_ENTRY_IA32E_MODE);
+
+	if (cpu_has_perf_global_ctrl_bug())
+		vmentry_ctrl &= ~VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL;
+
+	return vmentry_ctrl;
+}
+
+static u32 vmx_vmexit_ctrl(void)
+{
+	u32 vmexit_ctrl = vmcs_config.vmexit_ctrl;
+
+	/*
+	 * Not used by KVM and never set in vmcs01 or vmcs02, but emulated for
+	 * nested virtualization and thus allowed to be set in vmcs12.
+	 */
+	vmexit_ctrl &= ~(VM_EXIT_SAVE_IA32_PAT | VM_EXIT_SAVE_IA32_EFER |
+			 VM_EXIT_SAVE_VMX_PREEMPTION_TIMER);
+
+	if (vmx_pt_mode_is_system())
+		vmexit_ctrl &= ~(VM_EXIT_PT_CONCEAL_PIP |
+				 VM_EXIT_CLEAR_IA32_RTIT_CTL);
+
+	if (cpu_has_perf_global_ctrl_bug())
+		vmexit_ctrl &= ~VM_EXIT_LOAD_IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL;
+
+	/* Loading of EFER and PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL are toggled dynamically */
+	return vmexit_ctrl &
+		~(VM_EXIT_LOAD_IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL | VM_EXIT_LOAD_IA32_EFER);
+}
+
+static void vmx_refresh_apicv_exec_ctrl(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+
+	if (is_guest_mode(vcpu)) {
+		vmx->nested.update_vmcs01_apicv_status = true;
+		return;
+	}
+
+	pin_controls_set(vmx, vmx_pin_based_exec_ctrl(vmx));
+
+	if (kvm_vcpu_apicv_active(vcpu)) {
+		secondary_exec_controls_setbit(vmx,
+					       SECONDARY_EXEC_APIC_REGISTER_VIRT |
+					       SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUAL_INTR_DELIVERY);
+		if (enable_ipiv)
+			tertiary_exec_controls_setbit(vmx, TERTIARY_EXEC_IPI_VIRT);
+	} else {
+		secondary_exec_controls_clearbit(vmx,
+						 SECONDARY_EXEC_APIC_REGISTER_VIRT |
+						 SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUAL_INTR_DELIVERY);
+		if (enable_ipiv)
+			tertiary_exec_controls_clearbit(vmx, TERTIARY_EXEC_IPI_VIRT);
+	}
+
+	vmx_update_msr_bitmap_x2apic(vcpu);
+}
+
+static u32 vmx_exec_control(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
+{
+	u32 exec_control = vmcs_config.cpu_based_exec_ctrl;
+
+	/*
+	 * Not used by KVM, but fully supported for nesting, i.e. are allowed in
+	 * vmcs12 and propagated to vmcs02 when set in vmcs12.
+	 */
+	exec_control &= ~(CPU_BASED_RDTSC_EXITING |
+			  CPU_BASED_USE_IO_BITMAPS |
+			  CPU_BASED_MONITOR_TRAP_FLAG |
+			  CPU_BASED_PAUSE_EXITING);
+
+	/* INTR_WINDOW_EXITING and NMI_WINDOW_EXITING are toggled dynamically */
+	exec_control &= ~(CPU_BASED_INTR_WINDOW_EXITING |
+			  CPU_BASED_NMI_WINDOW_EXITING);
+
+	if (vmx->vcpu.arch.switch_db_regs & KVM_DEBUGREG_WONT_EXIT)
+		exec_control &= ~CPU_BASED_MOV_DR_EXITING;
+
+	if (!cpu_need_tpr_shadow(&vmx->vcpu))
+		exec_control &= ~CPU_BASED_TPR_SHADOW;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+	if (exec_control & CPU_BASED_TPR_SHADOW)
+		exec_control &= ~(CPU_BASED_CR8_LOAD_EXITING |
+				  CPU_BASED_CR8_STORE_EXITING);
+	else
+		exec_control |= CPU_BASED_CR8_STORE_EXITING |
+				CPU_BASED_CR8_LOAD_EXITING;
+#endif
+	/* No need to intercept CR3 access or INVPLG when using EPT. */
+	if (enable_ept)
+		exec_control &= ~(CPU_BASED_CR3_LOAD_EXITING |
+				  CPU_BASED_CR3_STORE_EXITING |
+				  CPU_BASED_INVLPG_EXITING);
+	if (kvm_mwait_in_guest(vmx->vcpu.kvm))
+		exec_control &= ~(CPU_BASED_MWAIT_EXITING |
+				CPU_BASED_MONITOR_EXITING);
+	if (kvm_hlt_in_guest(vmx->vcpu.kvm))
+		exec_control &= ~CPU_BASED_HLT_EXITING;
+	return exec_control;
+}
+
+static u64 vmx_tertiary_exec_control(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
+{
+	u64 exec_control = vmcs_config.cpu_based_3rd_exec_ctrl;
+
+	/*
+	 * IPI virtualization relies on APICv. Disable IPI virtualization if
+	 * APICv is inhibited.
+	 */
+	if (!enable_ipiv || !kvm_vcpu_apicv_active(&vmx->vcpu))
+		exec_control &= ~TERTIARY_EXEC_IPI_VIRT;
+
+	return exec_control;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Adjust a single secondary execution control bit to intercept/allow an
+ * instruction in the guest.  This is usually done based on whether or not a
+ * feature has been exposed to the guest in order to correctly emulate faults.
+ */
+static inline void
+vmx_adjust_secondary_exec_control(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, u32 *exec_control,
+				  u32 control, bool enabled, bool exiting)
+{
+	/*
+	 * If the control is for an opt-in feature, clear the control if the
+	 * feature is not exposed to the guest, i.e. not enabled.  If the
+	 * control is opt-out, i.e. an exiting control, clear the control if
+	 * the feature _is_ exposed to the guest, i.e. exiting/interception is
+	 * disabled for the associated instruction.  Note, the caller is
+	 * responsible presetting exec_control to set all supported bits.
+	 */
+	if (enabled == exiting)
+		*exec_control &= ~control;
+
+	/*
+	 * Update the nested MSR settings so that a nested VMM can/can't set
+	 * controls for features that are/aren't exposed to the guest.
+	 */
+	if (nested) {
+		/*
+		 * All features that can be added or removed to VMX MSRs must
+		 * be supported in the first place for nested virtualization.
+		 */
+		if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!(vmcs_config.nested.secondary_ctls_high & control)))
+			enabled = false;
+
+		if (enabled)
+			vmx->nested.msrs.secondary_ctls_high |= control;
+		else
+			vmx->nested.msrs.secondary_ctls_high &= ~control;
+	}
+}
+
+/*
+ * Wrapper macro for the common case of adjusting a secondary execution control
+ * based on a single guest CPUID bit, with a dedicated feature bit.  This also
+ * verifies that the control is actually supported by KVM and hardware.
+ */
+#define vmx_adjust_sec_exec_control(vmx, exec_control, name, feat_name, ctrl_name, exiting)	\
+({												\
+	struct kvm_vcpu *__vcpu = &(vmx)->vcpu;							\
+	bool __enabled;										\
+												\
+	if (cpu_has_vmx_##name()) {								\
+		if (kvm_is_governed_feature(X86_FEATURE_##feat_name))				\
+			__enabled = guest_can_use(__vcpu, X86_FEATURE_##feat_name);		\
+		else										\
+			__enabled = guest_cpuid_has(__vcpu, X86_FEATURE_##feat_name);		\
+		vmx_adjust_secondary_exec_control(vmx, exec_control, SECONDARY_EXEC_##ctrl_name,\
+						  __enabled, exiting);				\
+	}											\
+})
+
+/* More macro magic for ENABLE_/opt-in versus _EXITING/opt-out controls. */
+#define vmx_adjust_sec_exec_feature(vmx, exec_control, lname, uname) \
+	vmx_adjust_sec_exec_control(vmx, exec_control, lname, uname, ENABLE_##uname, false)
+
+#define vmx_adjust_sec_exec_exiting(vmx, exec_control, lname, uname) \
+	vmx_adjust_sec_exec_control(vmx, exec_control, lname, uname, uname##_EXITING, true)
+
+static u32 vmx_secondary_exec_control(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
+{
+	struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = &vmx->vcpu;
+
+	u32 exec_control = vmcs_config.cpu_based_2nd_exec_ctrl;
+
+	if (vmx_pt_mode_is_system())
+		exec_control &= ~(SECONDARY_EXEC_PT_USE_GPA | SECONDARY_EXEC_PT_CONCEAL_VMX);
+	if (!cpu_need_virtualize_apic_accesses(vcpu))
+		exec_control &= ~SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_APIC_ACCESSES;
+	if (vmx->vpid == 0)
+		exec_control &= ~SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_VPID;
+	if (!enable_ept) {
+		exec_control &= ~SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_EPT;
+		enable_unrestricted_guest = 0;
+	}
+	if (!enable_unrestricted_guest)
+		exec_control &= ~SECONDARY_EXEC_UNRESTRICTED_GUEST;
+	if (kvm_pause_in_guest(vmx->vcpu.kvm))
+		exec_control &= ~SECONDARY_EXEC_PAUSE_LOOP_EXITING;
+	if (!kvm_vcpu_apicv_active(vcpu))
+		exec_control &= ~(SECONDARY_EXEC_APIC_REGISTER_VIRT |
+				  SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUAL_INTR_DELIVERY);
+	exec_control &= ~SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_X2APIC_MODE;
+
+	/*
+	 * KVM doesn't support VMFUNC for L1, but the control is set in KVM's
+	 * base configuration as KVM emulates VMFUNC[EPTP_SWITCHING] for L2.
+	 */
+	exec_control &= ~SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_VMFUNC;
+
+	/* SECONDARY_EXEC_DESC is enabled/disabled on writes to CR4.UMIP,
+	 * in vmx_set_cr4.  */
+	exec_control &= ~SECONDARY_EXEC_DESC;
+
+	/* SECONDARY_EXEC_SHADOW_VMCS is enabled when L1 executes VMPTRLD
+	   (handle_vmptrld).
+	   We can NOT enable shadow_vmcs here because we don't have yet
+	   a current VMCS12
+	*/
+	exec_control &= ~SECONDARY_EXEC_SHADOW_VMCS;
+
+	/*
+	 * PML is enabled/disabled when dirty logging of memsmlots changes, but
+	 * it needs to be set here when dirty logging is already active, e.g.
+	 * if this vCPU was created after dirty logging was enabled.
+	 */
+	if (!enable_pml || !atomic_read(&vcpu->kvm->nr_memslots_dirty_logging))
+		exec_control &= ~SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_PML;
+
+	vmx_adjust_sec_exec_feature(vmx, &exec_control, xsaves, XSAVES);
+
+	/*
+	 * RDPID is also gated by ENABLE_RDTSCP, turn on the control if either
+	 * feature is exposed to the guest.  This creates a virtualization hole
+	 * if both are supported in hardware but only one is exposed to the
+	 * guest, but letting the guest execute RDTSCP or RDPID when either one
+	 * is advertised is preferable to emulating the advertised instruction
+	 * in KVM on #UD, and obviously better than incorrectly injecting #UD.
+	 */
+	if (cpu_has_vmx_rdtscp()) {
+		bool rdpid_or_rdtscp_enabled =
+			guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_RDTSCP) ||
+			guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_RDPID);
+
+		vmx_adjust_secondary_exec_control(vmx, &exec_control,
+						  SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_RDTSCP,
+						  rdpid_or_rdtscp_enabled, false);
+	}
+
+	vmx_adjust_sec_exec_feature(vmx, &exec_control, invpcid, INVPCID);
+
+	vmx_adjust_sec_exec_exiting(vmx, &exec_control, rdrand, RDRAND);
+	vmx_adjust_sec_exec_exiting(vmx, &exec_control, rdseed, RDSEED);
+
+	vmx_adjust_sec_exec_control(vmx, &exec_control, waitpkg, WAITPKG,
+				    ENABLE_USR_WAIT_PAUSE, false);
+
+	if (!vcpu->kvm->arch.bus_lock_detection_enabled)
+		exec_control &= ~SECONDARY_EXEC_BUS_LOCK_DETECTION;
+
+	if (!kvm_notify_vmexit_enabled(vcpu->kvm))
+		exec_control &= ~SECONDARY_EXEC_NOTIFY_VM_EXITING;
+
+	return exec_control;
+}
+
+static inline int vmx_get_pid_table_order(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+	return get_order(kvm->arch.max_vcpu_ids * sizeof(*to_kvm_vmx(kvm)->pid_table));
+}
+
+static int vmx_alloc_ipiv_pid_table(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+	struct page *pages;
+	struct kvm_vmx *kvm_vmx = to_kvm_vmx(kvm);
+
+	if (!irqchip_in_kernel(kvm) || !enable_ipiv)
+		return 0;
+
+	if (kvm_vmx->pid_table)
+		return 0;
+
+	pages = alloc_pages(GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT | __GFP_ZERO,
+			    vmx_get_pid_table_order(kvm));
+	if (!pages)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	kvm_vmx->pid_table = (void *)page_address(pages);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int vmx_vcpu_precreate(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+	return vmx_alloc_ipiv_pid_table(kvm);
+}
+
+#define VMX_XSS_EXIT_BITMAP 0
+
+static void init_vmcs(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
+{
+	struct kvm *kvm = vmx->vcpu.kvm;
+	struct kvm_vmx *kvm_vmx = to_kvm_vmx(kvm);
+
+	if (nested)
+		nested_vmx_set_vmcs_shadowing_bitmap();
+
+	if (cpu_has_vmx_msr_bitmap())
+		vmcs_write64(MSR_BITMAP, __pa(vmx->vmcs01.msr_bitmap));
+
+	vmcs_write64(VMCS_LINK_POINTER, INVALID_GPA); /* 22.3.1.5 */
+
+	/* Control */
+	pin_controls_set(vmx, vmx_pin_based_exec_ctrl(vmx));
+
+	exec_controls_set(vmx, vmx_exec_control(vmx));
+
+	if (cpu_has_secondary_exec_ctrls())
+		secondary_exec_controls_set(vmx, vmx_secondary_exec_control(vmx));
+
+	if (cpu_has_tertiary_exec_ctrls())
+		tertiary_exec_controls_set(vmx, vmx_tertiary_exec_control(vmx));
+
+	if (enable_apicv && lapic_in_kernel(&vmx->vcpu)) {
+		vmcs_write64(EOI_EXIT_BITMAP0, 0);
+		vmcs_write64(EOI_EXIT_BITMAP1, 0);
+		vmcs_write64(EOI_EXIT_BITMAP2, 0);
+		vmcs_write64(EOI_EXIT_BITMAP3, 0);
+
+		vmcs_write16(GUEST_INTR_STATUS, 0);
+
+		vmcs_write16(POSTED_INTR_NV, POSTED_INTR_VECTOR);
+		vmcs_write64(POSTED_INTR_DESC_ADDR, __pa((&vmx->pi_desc)));
+	}
+
+	if (vmx_can_use_ipiv(&vmx->vcpu)) {
+		vmcs_write64(PID_POINTER_TABLE, __pa(kvm_vmx->pid_table));
+		vmcs_write16(LAST_PID_POINTER_INDEX, kvm->arch.max_vcpu_ids - 1);
+	}
+
+	if (!kvm_pause_in_guest(kvm)) {
+		vmcs_write32(PLE_GAP, ple_gap);
+		vmx->ple_window = ple_window;
+		vmx->ple_window_dirty = true;
+	}
+
+	if (kvm_notify_vmexit_enabled(kvm))
+		vmcs_write32(NOTIFY_WINDOW, kvm->arch.notify_window);
+
+	vmcs_write32(PAGE_FAULT_ERROR_CODE_MASK, 0);
+	vmcs_write32(PAGE_FAULT_ERROR_CODE_MATCH, 0);
+	vmcs_write32(CR3_TARGET_COUNT, 0);           /* 22.2.1 */
+
+	vmcs_write16(HOST_FS_SELECTOR, 0);            /* 22.2.4 */
+	vmcs_write16(HOST_GS_SELECTOR, 0);            /* 22.2.4 */
+	vmx_set_constant_host_state(vmx);
+	vmcs_writel(HOST_FS_BASE, 0); /* 22.2.4 */
+	vmcs_writel(HOST_GS_BASE, 0); /* 22.2.4 */
+
+	if (cpu_has_vmx_vmfunc())
+		vmcs_write64(VM_FUNCTION_CONTROL, 0);
+
+	vmcs_write32(VM_EXIT_MSR_STORE_COUNT, 0);
+	vmcs_write32(VM_EXIT_MSR_LOAD_COUNT, 0);
+	vmcs_write64(VM_EXIT_MSR_LOAD_ADDR, __pa(vmx->msr_autoload.host.val));
+	vmcs_write32(VM_ENTRY_MSR_LOAD_COUNT, 0);
+	vmcs_write64(VM_ENTRY_MSR_LOAD_ADDR, __pa(vmx->msr_autoload.guest.val));
+
+	if (vmcs_config.vmentry_ctrl & VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_PAT)
+		vmcs_write64(GUEST_IA32_PAT, vmx->vcpu.arch.pat);
+
+	vm_exit_controls_set(vmx, vmx_vmexit_ctrl());
+
+	/* 22.2.1, 20.8.1 */
+	vm_entry_controls_set(vmx, vmx_vmentry_ctrl());
+
+	vmx->vcpu.arch.cr0_guest_owned_bits = vmx_l1_guest_owned_cr0_bits();
+	vmcs_writel(CR0_GUEST_HOST_MASK, ~vmx->vcpu.arch.cr0_guest_owned_bits);
+
+	set_cr4_guest_host_mask(vmx);
+
+	if (vmx->vpid != 0)
+		vmcs_write16(VIRTUAL_PROCESSOR_ID, vmx->vpid);
+
+	if (cpu_has_vmx_xsaves())
+		vmcs_write64(XSS_EXIT_BITMAP, VMX_XSS_EXIT_BITMAP);
+
+	if (enable_pml) {
+		vmcs_write64(PML_ADDRESS, page_to_phys(vmx->pml_pg));
+		vmcs_write16(GUEST_PML_INDEX, PML_ENTITY_NUM - 1);
+	}
+
+	vmx_write_encls_bitmap(&vmx->vcpu, NULL);
+
+	if (vmx_pt_mode_is_host_guest()) {
+		memset(&vmx->pt_desc, 0, sizeof(vmx->pt_desc));
+		/* Bit[6~0] are forced to 1, writes are ignored. */
+		vmx->pt_desc.guest.output_mask = 0x7F;
+		vmcs_write64(GUEST_IA32_RTIT_CTL, 0);
+	}
+
+	vmcs_write32(GUEST_SYSENTER_CS, 0);
+	vmcs_writel(GUEST_SYSENTER_ESP, 0);
+	vmcs_writel(GUEST_SYSENTER_EIP, 0);
+	vmcs_write64(GUEST_IA32_DEBUGCTL, 0);
+
+	if (cpu_has_vmx_tpr_shadow()) {
+		vmcs_write64(VIRTUAL_APIC_PAGE_ADDR, 0);
+		if (cpu_need_tpr_shadow(&vmx->vcpu))
+			vmcs_write64(VIRTUAL_APIC_PAGE_ADDR,
+				     __pa(vmx->vcpu.arch.apic->regs));
+		vmcs_write32(TPR_THRESHOLD, 0);
+	}
+
+	vmx_setup_uret_msrs(vmx);
+}
+
+static void __vmx_vcpu_reset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+
+	init_vmcs(vmx);
+
+	if (nested)
+		memcpy(&vmx->nested.msrs, &vmcs_config.nested, sizeof(vmx->nested.msrs));
+
+	vcpu_setup_sgx_lepubkeyhash(vcpu);
+
+	vmx->nested.posted_intr_nv = -1;
+	vmx->nested.vmxon_ptr = INVALID_GPA;
+	vmx->nested.current_vmptr = INVALID_GPA;
+	vmx->nested.hv_evmcs_vmptr = EVMPTR_INVALID;
+
+	vcpu->arch.microcode_version = 0x100000000ULL;
+	vmx->msr_ia32_feature_control_valid_bits = FEAT_CTL_LOCKED;
+
+	/*
+	 * Enforce invariant: pi_desc.nv is always either POSTED_INTR_VECTOR
+	 * or POSTED_INTR_WAKEUP_VECTOR.
+	 */
+	vmx->pi_desc.nv = POSTED_INTR_VECTOR;
+	vmx->pi_desc.sn = 1;
+}
+
+static void vmx_vcpu_reset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool init_event)
+{
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+
+	if (!init_event)
+		__vmx_vcpu_reset(vcpu);
+
+	vmx->rmode.vm86_active = 0;
+	vmx->spec_ctrl = 0;
+
+	vmx->msr_ia32_umwait_control = 0;
+
+	vmx->hv_deadline_tsc = -1;
+	kvm_set_cr8(vcpu, 0);
+
+	vmx_segment_cache_clear(vmx);
+	kvm_register_mark_available(vcpu, VCPU_EXREG_SEGMENTS);
+
+	seg_setup(VCPU_SREG_CS);
+	vmcs_write16(GUEST_CS_SELECTOR, 0xf000);
+	vmcs_writel(GUEST_CS_BASE, 0xffff0000ul);
+
+	seg_setup(VCPU_SREG_DS);
+	seg_setup(VCPU_SREG_ES);
+	seg_setup(VCPU_SREG_FS);
+	seg_setup(VCPU_SREG_GS);
+	seg_setup(VCPU_SREG_SS);
+
+	vmcs_write16(GUEST_TR_SELECTOR, 0);
+	vmcs_writel(GUEST_TR_BASE, 0);
+	vmcs_write32(GUEST_TR_LIMIT, 0xffff);
+	vmcs_write32(GUEST_TR_AR_BYTES, 0x008b);
+
+	vmcs_write16(GUEST_LDTR_SELECTOR, 0);
+	vmcs_writel(GUEST_LDTR_BASE, 0);
+	vmcs_write32(GUEST_LDTR_LIMIT, 0xffff);
+	vmcs_write32(GUEST_LDTR_AR_BYTES, 0x00082);
+
+	vmcs_writel(GUEST_GDTR_BASE, 0);
+	vmcs_write32(GUEST_GDTR_LIMIT, 0xffff);
+
+	vmcs_writel(GUEST_IDTR_BASE, 0);
+	vmcs_write32(GUEST_IDTR_LIMIT, 0xffff);
+
+	vmcs_write32(GUEST_ACTIVITY_STATE, GUEST_ACTIVITY_ACTIVE);
+	vmcs_write32(GUEST_INTERRUPTIBILITY_INFO, 0);
+	vmcs_writel(GUEST_PENDING_DBG_EXCEPTIONS, 0);
+	if (kvm_mpx_supported())
+		vmcs_write64(GUEST_BNDCFGS, 0);
+
+	vmcs_write32(VM_ENTRY_INTR_INFO_FIELD, 0);  /* 22.2.1 */
+
+	kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_APIC_PAGE_RELOAD, vcpu);
+
+	vpid_sync_context(vmx->vpid);
+
+	vmx_update_fb_clear_dis(vcpu, vmx);
+}
+
+static void vmx_enable_irq_window(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	exec_controls_setbit(to_vmx(vcpu), CPU_BASED_INTR_WINDOW_EXITING);
+}
+
+static void vmx_enable_nmi_window(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	if (!enable_vnmi ||
+	    vmcs_read32(GUEST_INTERRUPTIBILITY_INFO) & GUEST_INTR_STATE_STI) {
+		vmx_enable_irq_window(vcpu);
+		return;
+	}
+
+	exec_controls_setbit(to_vmx(vcpu), CPU_BASED_NMI_WINDOW_EXITING);
+}
+
+static void vmx_inject_irq(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool reinjected)
+{
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+	uint32_t intr;
+	int irq = vcpu->arch.interrupt.nr;
+
+	trace_kvm_inj_virq(irq, vcpu->arch.interrupt.soft, reinjected);
+
+	++vcpu->stat.irq_injections;
+	if (vmx->rmode.vm86_active) {
+		int inc_eip = 0;
+		if (vcpu->arch.interrupt.soft)
+			inc_eip = vcpu->arch.event_exit_inst_len;
+		kvm_inject_realmode_interrupt(vcpu, irq, inc_eip);
+		return;
+	}
+	intr = irq | INTR_INFO_VALID_MASK;
+	if (vcpu->arch.interrupt.soft) {
+		intr |= INTR_TYPE_SOFT_INTR;
+		vmcs_write32(VM_ENTRY_INSTRUCTION_LEN,
+			     vmx->vcpu.arch.event_exit_inst_len);
+	} else
+		intr |= INTR_TYPE_EXT_INTR;
+	vmcs_write32(VM_ENTRY_INTR_INFO_FIELD, intr);
+
+	vmx_clear_hlt(vcpu);
+}
+
+static void vmx_inject_nmi(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+
+	if (!enable_vnmi) {
+		/*
+		 * Tracking the NMI-blocked state in software is built upon
+		 * finding the next open IRQ window. This, in turn, depends on
+		 * well-behaving guests: They have to keep IRQs disabled at
+		 * least as long as the NMI handler runs. Otherwise we may
+		 * cause NMI nesting, maybe breaking the guest. But as this is
+		 * highly unlikely, we can live with the residual risk.
+		 */
+		vmx->loaded_vmcs->soft_vnmi_blocked = 1;
+		vmx->loaded_vmcs->vnmi_blocked_time = 0;
+	}
+
+	++vcpu->stat.nmi_injections;
+	vmx->loaded_vmcs->nmi_known_unmasked = false;
+
+	if (vmx->rmode.vm86_active) {
+		kvm_inject_realmode_interrupt(vcpu, NMI_VECTOR, 0);
+		return;
+	}
+
+	vmcs_write32(VM_ENTRY_INTR_INFO_FIELD,
+			INTR_TYPE_NMI_INTR | INTR_INFO_VALID_MASK | NMI_VECTOR);
+
+	vmx_clear_hlt(vcpu);
+}
+
+bool vmx_get_nmi_mask(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+	bool masked;
+
+	if (!enable_vnmi)
+		return vmx->loaded_vmcs->soft_vnmi_blocked;
+	if (vmx->loaded_vmcs->nmi_known_unmasked)
+		return false;
+	masked = vmcs_read32(GUEST_INTERRUPTIBILITY_INFO) & GUEST_INTR_STATE_NMI;
+	vmx->loaded_vmcs->nmi_known_unmasked = !masked;
+	return masked;
+}
+
+void vmx_set_nmi_mask(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool masked)
+{
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+
+	if (!enable_vnmi) {
+		if (vmx->loaded_vmcs->soft_vnmi_blocked != masked) {
+			vmx->loaded_vmcs->soft_vnmi_blocked = masked;
+			vmx->loaded_vmcs->vnmi_blocked_time = 0;
+		}
+	} else {
+		vmx->loaded_vmcs->nmi_known_unmasked = !masked;
+		if (masked)
+			vmcs_set_bits(GUEST_INTERRUPTIBILITY_INFO,
+				      GUEST_INTR_STATE_NMI);
+		else
+			vmcs_clear_bits(GUEST_INTERRUPTIBILITY_INFO,
+					GUEST_INTR_STATE_NMI);
+	}
+}
+
+bool vmx_nmi_blocked(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	if (is_guest_mode(vcpu) && nested_exit_on_nmi(vcpu))
+		return false;
+
+	if (!enable_vnmi && to_vmx(vcpu)->loaded_vmcs->soft_vnmi_blocked)
+		return true;
+
+	return (vmcs_read32(GUEST_INTERRUPTIBILITY_INFO) &
+		(GUEST_INTR_STATE_MOV_SS | GUEST_INTR_STATE_STI |
+		 GUEST_INTR_STATE_NMI));
+}
+
+static int vmx_nmi_allowed(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool for_injection)
+{
+	if (to_vmx(vcpu)->nested.nested_run_pending)
+		return -EBUSY;
+
+	/* An NMI must not be injected into L2 if it's supposed to VM-Exit.  */
+	if (for_injection && is_guest_mode(vcpu) && nested_exit_on_nmi(vcpu))
+		return -EBUSY;
+
+	return !vmx_nmi_blocked(vcpu);
+}
+
+bool vmx_interrupt_blocked(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	if (is_guest_mode(vcpu) && nested_exit_on_intr(vcpu))
+		return false;
+
+	return !(vmx_get_rflags(vcpu) & X86_EFLAGS_IF) ||
+	       (vmcs_read32(GUEST_INTERRUPTIBILITY_INFO) &
+		(GUEST_INTR_STATE_STI | GUEST_INTR_STATE_MOV_SS));
+}
+
+static int vmx_interrupt_allowed(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool for_injection)
+{
+	if (to_vmx(vcpu)->nested.nested_run_pending)
+		return -EBUSY;
+
+	/*
+	 * An IRQ must not be injected into L2 if it's supposed to VM-Exit,
+	 * e.g. if the IRQ arrived asynchronously after checking nested events.
+	 */
+	if (for_injection && is_guest_mode(vcpu) && nested_exit_on_intr(vcpu))
+		return -EBUSY;
+
+	return !vmx_interrupt_blocked(vcpu);
+}
+
+static int vmx_set_tss_addr(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned int addr)
+{
+	void __user *ret;
+
+	if (enable_unrestricted_guest)
+		return 0;
+
+	mutex_lock(&kvm->slots_lock);
+	ret = __x86_set_memory_region(kvm, TSS_PRIVATE_MEMSLOT, addr,
+				      PAGE_SIZE * 3);
+	mutex_unlock(&kvm->slots_lock);
+
+	if (IS_ERR(ret))
+		return PTR_ERR(ret);
+
+	to_kvm_vmx(kvm)->tss_addr = addr;
+
+	return init_rmode_tss(kvm, ret);
+}
+
+static int vmx_set_identity_map_addr(struct kvm *kvm, u64 ident_addr)
+{
+	to_kvm_vmx(kvm)->ept_identity_map_addr = ident_addr;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static bool rmode_exception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int vec)
+{
+	switch (vec) {
+	case BP_VECTOR:
+		/*
+		 * Update instruction length as we may reinject the exception
+		 * from user space while in guest debugging mode.
+		 */
+		to_vmx(vcpu)->vcpu.arch.event_exit_inst_len =
+			vmcs_read32(VM_EXIT_INSTRUCTION_LEN);
+		if (vcpu->guest_debug & KVM_GUESTDBG_USE_SW_BP)
+			return false;
+		fallthrough;
+	case DB_VECTOR:
+		return !(vcpu->guest_debug &
+			(KVM_GUESTDBG_SINGLESTEP | KVM_GUESTDBG_USE_HW_BP));
+	case DE_VECTOR:
+	case OF_VECTOR:
+	case BR_VECTOR:
+	case UD_VECTOR:
+	case DF_VECTOR:
+	case SS_VECTOR:
+	case GP_VECTOR:
+	case MF_VECTOR:
+		return true;
+	}
+	return false;
+}
+
+static int handle_rmode_exception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+				  int vec, u32 err_code)
+{
+	/*
+	 * Instruction with address size override prefix opcode 0x67
+	 * Cause the #SS fault with 0 error code in VM86 mode.
+	 */
+	if (((vec == GP_VECTOR) || (vec == SS_VECTOR)) && err_code == 0) {
+		if (kvm_emulate_instruction(vcpu, 0)) {
+			if (vcpu->arch.halt_request) {
+				vcpu->arch.halt_request = 0;
+				return kvm_emulate_halt_noskip(vcpu);
+			}
+			return 1;
+		}
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Forward all other exceptions that are valid in real mode.
+	 * FIXME: Breaks guest debugging in real mode, needs to be fixed with
+	 *        the required debugging infrastructure rework.
+	 */
+	kvm_queue_exception(vcpu, vec);
+	return 1;
+}
+
+static int handle_machine_check(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	/* handled by vmx_vcpu_run() */
+	return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * If the host has split lock detection disabled, then #AC is
+ * unconditionally injected into the guest, which is the pre split lock
+ * detection behaviour.
+ *
+ * If the host has split lock detection enabled then #AC is
+ * only injected into the guest when:
+ *  - Guest CPL == 3 (user mode)
+ *  - Guest has #AC detection enabled in CR0
+ *  - Guest EFLAGS has AC bit set
+ */
+bool vmx_guest_inject_ac(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SPLIT_LOCK_DETECT))
+		return true;
+
+	return vmx_get_cpl(vcpu) == 3 && kvm_is_cr0_bit_set(vcpu, X86_CR0_AM) &&
+	       (kvm_get_rflags(vcpu) & X86_EFLAGS_AC);
+}
+
+static int handle_exception_nmi(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+	struct kvm_run *kvm_run = vcpu->run;
+	u32 intr_info, ex_no, error_code;
+	unsigned long cr2, dr6;
+	u32 vect_info;
+
+	vect_info = vmx->idt_vectoring_info;
+	intr_info = vmx_get_intr_info(vcpu);
+
+	/*
+	 * Machine checks are handled by handle_exception_irqoff(), or by
+	 * vmx_vcpu_run() if a #MC occurs on VM-Entry.  NMIs are handled by
+	 * vmx_vcpu_enter_exit().
+	 */
+	if (is_machine_check(intr_info) || is_nmi(intr_info))
+		return 1;
+
+	/*
+	 * Queue the exception here instead of in handle_nm_fault_irqoff().
+	 * This ensures the nested_vmx check is not skipped so vmexit can
+	 * be reflected to L1 (when it intercepts #NM) before reaching this
+	 * point.
+	 */
+	if (is_nm_fault(intr_info)) {
+		kvm_queue_exception(vcpu, NM_VECTOR);
+		return 1;
+	}
+
+	if (is_invalid_opcode(intr_info))
+		return handle_ud(vcpu);
+
+	error_code = 0;
+	if (intr_info & INTR_INFO_DELIVER_CODE_MASK)
+		error_code = vmcs_read32(VM_EXIT_INTR_ERROR_CODE);
+
+	if (!vmx->rmode.vm86_active && is_gp_fault(intr_info)) {
+		WARN_ON_ONCE(!enable_vmware_backdoor);
+
+		/*
+		 * VMware backdoor emulation on #GP interception only handles
+		 * IN{S}, OUT{S}, and RDPMC, none of which generate a non-zero
+		 * error code on #GP.
+		 */
+		if (error_code) {
+			kvm_queue_exception_e(vcpu, GP_VECTOR, error_code);
+			return 1;
+		}
+		return kvm_emulate_instruction(vcpu, EMULTYPE_VMWARE_GP);
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * The #PF with PFEC.RSVD = 1 indicates the guest is accessing
+	 * MMIO, it is better to report an internal error.
+	 * See the comments in vmx_handle_exit.
+	 */
+	if ((vect_info & VECTORING_INFO_VALID_MASK) &&
+	    !(is_page_fault(intr_info) && !(error_code & PFERR_RSVD_MASK))) {
+		vcpu->run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+		vcpu->run->internal.suberror = KVM_INTERNAL_ERROR_SIMUL_EX;
+		vcpu->run->internal.ndata = 4;
+		vcpu->run->internal.data[0] = vect_info;
+		vcpu->run->internal.data[1] = intr_info;
+		vcpu->run->internal.data[2] = error_code;
+		vcpu->run->internal.data[3] = vcpu->arch.last_vmentry_cpu;
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	if (is_page_fault(intr_info)) {
+		cr2 = vmx_get_exit_qual(vcpu);
+		if (enable_ept && !vcpu->arch.apf.host_apf_flags) {
+			/*
+			 * EPT will cause page fault only if we need to
+			 * detect illegal GPAs.
+			 */
+			WARN_ON_ONCE(!allow_smaller_maxphyaddr);
+			kvm_fixup_and_inject_pf_error(vcpu, cr2, error_code);
+			return 1;
+		} else
+			return kvm_handle_page_fault(vcpu, error_code, cr2, NULL, 0);
+	}
+
+	ex_no = intr_info & INTR_INFO_VECTOR_MASK;
+
+	if (vmx->rmode.vm86_active && rmode_exception(vcpu, ex_no))
+		return handle_rmode_exception(vcpu, ex_no, error_code);
+
+	switch (ex_no) {
+	case DB_VECTOR:
+		dr6 = vmx_get_exit_qual(vcpu);
+		if (!(vcpu->guest_debug &
+		      (KVM_GUESTDBG_SINGLESTEP | KVM_GUESTDBG_USE_HW_BP))) {
+			/*
+			 * If the #DB was due to ICEBP, a.k.a. INT1, skip the
+			 * instruction.  ICEBP generates a trap-like #DB, but
+			 * despite its interception control being tied to #DB,
+			 * is an instruction intercept, i.e. the VM-Exit occurs
+			 * on the ICEBP itself.  Use the inner "skip" helper to
+			 * avoid single-step #DB and MTF updates, as ICEBP is
+			 * higher priority.  Note, skipping ICEBP still clears
+			 * STI and MOVSS blocking.
+			 *
+			 * For all other #DBs, set vmcs.PENDING_DBG_EXCEPTIONS.BS
+			 * if single-step is enabled in RFLAGS and STI or MOVSS
+			 * blocking is active, as the CPU doesn't set the bit
+			 * on VM-Exit due to #DB interception.  VM-Entry has a
+			 * consistency check that a single-step #DB is pending
+			 * in this scenario as the previous instruction cannot
+			 * have toggled RFLAGS.TF 0=>1 (because STI and POP/MOV
+			 * don't modify RFLAGS), therefore the one instruction
+			 * delay when activating single-step breakpoints must
+			 * have already expired.  Note, the CPU sets/clears BS
+			 * as appropriate for all other VM-Exits types.
+			 */
+			if (is_icebp(intr_info))
+				WARN_ON(!skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu));
+			else if ((vmx_get_rflags(vcpu) & X86_EFLAGS_TF) &&
+				 (vmcs_read32(GUEST_INTERRUPTIBILITY_INFO) &
+				  (GUEST_INTR_STATE_STI | GUEST_INTR_STATE_MOV_SS)))
+				vmcs_writel(GUEST_PENDING_DBG_EXCEPTIONS,
+					    vmcs_readl(GUEST_PENDING_DBG_EXCEPTIONS) | DR6_BS);
+
+			kvm_queue_exception_p(vcpu, DB_VECTOR, dr6);
+			return 1;
+		}
+		kvm_run->debug.arch.dr6 = dr6 | DR6_ACTIVE_LOW;
+		kvm_run->debug.arch.dr7 = vmcs_readl(GUEST_DR7);
+		fallthrough;
+	case BP_VECTOR:
+		/*
+		 * Update instruction length as we may reinject #BP from
+		 * user space while in guest debugging mode. Reading it for
+		 * #DB as well causes no harm, it is not used in that case.
+		 */
+		vmx->vcpu.arch.event_exit_inst_len =
+			vmcs_read32(VM_EXIT_INSTRUCTION_LEN);
+		kvm_run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_DEBUG;
+		kvm_run->debug.arch.pc = kvm_get_linear_rip(vcpu);
+		kvm_run->debug.arch.exception = ex_no;
+		break;
+	case AC_VECTOR:
+		if (vmx_guest_inject_ac(vcpu)) {
+			kvm_queue_exception_e(vcpu, AC_VECTOR, error_code);
+			return 1;
+		}
+
+		/*
+		 * Handle split lock. Depending on detection mode this will
+		 * either warn and disable split lock detection for this
+		 * task or force SIGBUS on it.
+		 */
+		if (handle_guest_split_lock(kvm_rip_read(vcpu)))
+			return 1;
+		fallthrough;
+	default:
+		kvm_run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_EXCEPTION;
+		kvm_run->ex.exception = ex_no;
+		kvm_run->ex.error_code = error_code;
+		break;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static __always_inline int handle_external_interrupt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	++vcpu->stat.irq_exits;
+	return 1;
+}
+
+static int handle_triple_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	vcpu->run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_SHUTDOWN;
+	vcpu->mmio_needed = 0;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int handle_io(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	unsigned long exit_qualification;
+	int size, in, string;
+	unsigned port;
+
+	exit_qualification = vmx_get_exit_qual(vcpu);
+	string = (exit_qualification & 16) != 0;
+
+	++vcpu->stat.io_exits;
+
+	if (string)
+		return kvm_emulate_instruction(vcpu, 0);
+
+	port = exit_qualification >> 16;
+	size = (exit_qualification & 7) + 1;
+	in = (exit_qualification & 8) != 0;
+
+	return kvm_fast_pio(vcpu, size, port, in);
+}
+
+static void
+vmx_patch_hypercall(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned char *hypercall)
+{
+	/*
+	 * Patch in the VMCALL instruction:
+	 */
+	hypercall[0] = 0x0f;
+	hypercall[1] = 0x01;
+	hypercall[2] = 0xc1;
+}
+
+/* called to set cr0 as appropriate for a mov-to-cr0 exit. */
+static int handle_set_cr0(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long val)
+{
+	if (is_guest_mode(vcpu)) {
+		struct vmcs12 *vmcs12 = get_vmcs12(vcpu);
+		unsigned long orig_val = val;
+
+		/*
+		 * We get here when L2 changed cr0 in a way that did not change
+		 * any of L1's shadowed bits (see nested_vmx_exit_handled_cr),
+		 * but did change L0 shadowed bits. So we first calculate the
+		 * effective cr0 value that L1 would like to write into the
+		 * hardware. It consists of the L2-owned bits from the new
+		 * value combined with the L1-owned bits from L1's guest_cr0.
+		 */
+		val = (val & ~vmcs12->cr0_guest_host_mask) |
+			(vmcs12->guest_cr0 & vmcs12->cr0_guest_host_mask);
+
+		if (kvm_set_cr0(vcpu, val))
+			return 1;
+		vmcs_writel(CR0_READ_SHADOW, orig_val);
+		return 0;
+	} else {
+		return kvm_set_cr0(vcpu, val);
+	}
+}
+
+static int handle_set_cr4(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long val)
+{
+	if (is_guest_mode(vcpu)) {
+		struct vmcs12 *vmcs12 = get_vmcs12(vcpu);
+		unsigned long orig_val = val;
+
+		/* analogously to handle_set_cr0 */
+		val = (val & ~vmcs12->cr4_guest_host_mask) |
+			(vmcs12->guest_cr4 & vmcs12->cr4_guest_host_mask);
+		if (kvm_set_cr4(vcpu, val))
+			return 1;
+		vmcs_writel(CR4_READ_SHADOW, orig_val);
+		return 0;
+	} else
+		return kvm_set_cr4(vcpu, val);
+}
+
+static int handle_desc(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	/*
+	 * UMIP emulation relies on intercepting writes to CR4.UMIP, i.e. this
+	 * and other code needs to be updated if UMIP can be guest owned.
+	 */
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(KVM_POSSIBLE_CR4_GUEST_BITS & X86_CR4_UMIP);
+
+	WARN_ON_ONCE(!kvm_is_cr4_bit_set(vcpu, X86_CR4_UMIP));
+	return kvm_emulate_instruction(vcpu, 0);
+}
+
+static int handle_cr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	unsigned long exit_qualification, val;
+	int cr;
+	int reg;
+	int err;
+	int ret;
+
+	exit_qualification = vmx_get_exit_qual(vcpu);
+	cr = exit_qualification & 15;
+	reg = (exit_qualification >> 8) & 15;
+	switch ((exit_qualification >> 4) & 3) {
+	case 0: /* mov to cr */
+		val = kvm_register_read(vcpu, reg);
+		trace_kvm_cr_write(cr, val);
+		switch (cr) {
+		case 0:
+			err = handle_set_cr0(vcpu, val);
+			return kvm_complete_insn_gp(vcpu, err);
+		case 3:
+			WARN_ON_ONCE(enable_unrestricted_guest);
+
+			err = kvm_set_cr3(vcpu, val);
+			return kvm_complete_insn_gp(vcpu, err);
+		case 4:
+			err = handle_set_cr4(vcpu, val);
+			return kvm_complete_insn_gp(vcpu, err);
+		case 8: {
+				u8 cr8_prev = kvm_get_cr8(vcpu);
+				u8 cr8 = (u8)val;
+				err = kvm_set_cr8(vcpu, cr8);
+				ret = kvm_complete_insn_gp(vcpu, err);
+				if (lapic_in_kernel(vcpu))
+					return ret;
+				if (cr8_prev <= cr8)
+					return ret;
+				/*
+				 * TODO: we might be squashing a
+				 * KVM_GUESTDBG_SINGLESTEP-triggered
+				 * KVM_EXIT_DEBUG here.
+				 */
+				vcpu->run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_SET_TPR;
+				return 0;
+			}
+		}
+		break;
+	case 2: /* clts */
+		KVM_BUG(1, vcpu->kvm, "Guest always owns CR0.TS");
+		return -EIO;
+	case 1: /*mov from cr*/
+		switch (cr) {
+		case 3:
+			WARN_ON_ONCE(enable_unrestricted_guest);
+
+			val = kvm_read_cr3(vcpu);
+			kvm_register_write(vcpu, reg, val);
+			trace_kvm_cr_read(cr, val);
+			return kvm_skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
+		case 8:
+			val = kvm_get_cr8(vcpu);
+			kvm_register_write(vcpu, reg, val);
+			trace_kvm_cr_read(cr, val);
+			return kvm_skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
+		}
+		break;
+	case 3: /* lmsw */
+		val = (exit_qualification >> LMSW_SOURCE_DATA_SHIFT) & 0x0f;
+		trace_kvm_cr_write(0, (kvm_read_cr0_bits(vcpu, ~0xful) | val));
+		kvm_lmsw(vcpu, val);
+
+		return kvm_skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
+	default:
+		break;
+	}
+	vcpu->run->exit_reason = 0;
+	vcpu_unimpl(vcpu, "unhandled control register: op %d cr %d\n",
+	       (int)(exit_qualification >> 4) & 3, cr);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int handle_dr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	unsigned long exit_qualification;
+	int dr, dr7, reg;
+	int err = 1;
+
+	exit_qualification = vmx_get_exit_qual(vcpu);
+	dr = exit_qualification & DEBUG_REG_ACCESS_NUM;
+
+	/* First, if DR does not exist, trigger UD */
+	if (!kvm_require_dr(vcpu, dr))
+		return 1;
+
+	if (vmx_get_cpl(vcpu) > 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	dr7 = vmcs_readl(GUEST_DR7);
+	if (dr7 & DR7_GD) {
+		/*
+		 * As the vm-exit takes precedence over the debug trap, we
+		 * need to emulate the latter, either for the host or the
+		 * guest debugging itself.
+		 */
+		if (vcpu->guest_debug & KVM_GUESTDBG_USE_HW_BP) {
+			vcpu->run->debug.arch.dr6 = DR6_BD | DR6_ACTIVE_LOW;
+			vcpu->run->debug.arch.dr7 = dr7;
+			vcpu->run->debug.arch.pc = kvm_get_linear_rip(vcpu);
+			vcpu->run->debug.arch.exception = DB_VECTOR;
+			vcpu->run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_DEBUG;
+			return 0;
+		} else {
+			kvm_queue_exception_p(vcpu, DB_VECTOR, DR6_BD);
+			return 1;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (vcpu->guest_debug == 0) {
+		exec_controls_clearbit(to_vmx(vcpu), CPU_BASED_MOV_DR_EXITING);
+
+		/*
+		 * No more DR vmexits; force a reload of the debug registers
+		 * and reenter on this instruction.  The next vmexit will
+		 * retrieve the full state of the debug registers.
+		 */
+		vcpu->arch.switch_db_regs |= KVM_DEBUGREG_WONT_EXIT;
+		return 1;
+	}
+
+	reg = DEBUG_REG_ACCESS_REG(exit_qualification);
+	if (exit_qualification & TYPE_MOV_FROM_DR) {
+		unsigned long val;
+
+		kvm_get_dr(vcpu, dr, &val);
+		kvm_register_write(vcpu, reg, val);
+		err = 0;
+	} else {
+		err = kvm_set_dr(vcpu, dr, kvm_register_read(vcpu, reg));
+	}
+
+out:
+	return kvm_complete_insn_gp(vcpu, err);
+}
+
+static void vmx_sync_dirty_debug_regs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	get_debugreg(vcpu->arch.db[0], 0);
+	get_debugreg(vcpu->arch.db[1], 1);
+	get_debugreg(vcpu->arch.db[2], 2);
+	get_debugreg(vcpu->arch.db[3], 3);
+	get_debugreg(vcpu->arch.dr6, 6);
+	vcpu->arch.dr7 = vmcs_readl(GUEST_DR7);
+
+	vcpu->arch.switch_db_regs &= ~KVM_DEBUGREG_WONT_EXIT;
+	exec_controls_setbit(to_vmx(vcpu), CPU_BASED_MOV_DR_EXITING);
+
+	/*
+	 * exc_debug expects dr6 to be cleared after it runs, avoid that it sees
+	 * a stale dr6 from the guest.
+	 */
+	set_debugreg(DR6_RESERVED, 6);
+}
+
+static void vmx_set_dr7(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long val)
+{
+	vmcs_writel(GUEST_DR7, val);
+}
+
+static int handle_tpr_below_threshold(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	kvm_apic_update_ppr(vcpu);
+	return 1;
+}
+
+static int handle_interrupt_window(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	exec_controls_clearbit(to_vmx(vcpu), CPU_BASED_INTR_WINDOW_EXITING);
+
+	kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_EVENT, vcpu);
+
+	++vcpu->stat.irq_window_exits;
+	return 1;
+}
+
+static int handle_invlpg(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	unsigned long exit_qualification = vmx_get_exit_qual(vcpu);
+
+	kvm_mmu_invlpg(vcpu, exit_qualification);
+	return kvm_skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
+}
+
+static int handle_apic_access(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	if (likely(fasteoi)) {
+		unsigned long exit_qualification = vmx_get_exit_qual(vcpu);
+		int access_type, offset;
+
+		access_type = exit_qualification & APIC_ACCESS_TYPE;
+		offset = exit_qualification & APIC_ACCESS_OFFSET;
+		/*
+		 * Sane guest uses MOV to write EOI, with written value
+		 * not cared. So make a short-circuit here by avoiding
+		 * heavy instruction emulation.
+		 */
+		if ((access_type == TYPE_LINEAR_APIC_INST_WRITE) &&
+		    (offset == APIC_EOI)) {
+			kvm_lapic_set_eoi(vcpu);
+			return kvm_skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
+		}
+	}
+	return kvm_emulate_instruction(vcpu, 0);
+}
+
+static int handle_apic_eoi_induced(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	unsigned long exit_qualification = vmx_get_exit_qual(vcpu);
+	int vector = exit_qualification & 0xff;
+
+	/* EOI-induced VM exit is trap-like and thus no need to adjust IP */
+	kvm_apic_set_eoi_accelerated(vcpu, vector);
+	return 1;
+}
+
+static int handle_apic_write(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	unsigned long exit_qualification = vmx_get_exit_qual(vcpu);
+
+	/*
+	 * APIC-write VM-Exit is trap-like, KVM doesn't need to advance RIP and
+	 * hardware has done any necessary aliasing, offset adjustments, etc...
+	 * for the access.  I.e. the correct value has already been  written to
+	 * the vAPIC page for the correct 16-byte chunk.  KVM needs only to
+	 * retrieve the register value and emulate the access.
+	 */
+	u32 offset = exit_qualification & 0xff0;
+
+	kvm_apic_write_nodecode(vcpu, offset);
+	return 1;
+}
+
+static int handle_task_switch(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+	unsigned long exit_qualification;
+	bool has_error_code = false;
+	u32 error_code = 0;
+	u16 tss_selector;
+	int reason, type, idt_v, idt_index;
+
+	idt_v = (vmx->idt_vectoring_info & VECTORING_INFO_VALID_MASK);
+	idt_index = (vmx->idt_vectoring_info & VECTORING_INFO_VECTOR_MASK);
+	type = (vmx->idt_vectoring_info & VECTORING_INFO_TYPE_MASK);
+
+	exit_qualification = vmx_get_exit_qual(vcpu);
+
+	reason = (u32)exit_qualification >> 30;
+	if (reason == TASK_SWITCH_GATE && idt_v) {
+		switch (type) {
+		case INTR_TYPE_NMI_INTR:
+			vcpu->arch.nmi_injected = false;
+			vmx_set_nmi_mask(vcpu, true);
+			break;
+		case INTR_TYPE_EXT_INTR:
+		case INTR_TYPE_SOFT_INTR:
+			kvm_clear_interrupt_queue(vcpu);
+			break;
+		case INTR_TYPE_HARD_EXCEPTION:
+			if (vmx->idt_vectoring_info &
+			    VECTORING_INFO_DELIVER_CODE_MASK) {
+				has_error_code = true;
+				error_code =
+					vmcs_read32(IDT_VECTORING_ERROR_CODE);
+			}
+			fallthrough;
+		case INTR_TYPE_SOFT_EXCEPTION:
+			kvm_clear_exception_queue(vcpu);
+			break;
+		default:
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+	tss_selector = exit_qualification;
+
+	if (!idt_v || (type != INTR_TYPE_HARD_EXCEPTION &&
+		       type != INTR_TYPE_EXT_INTR &&
+		       type != INTR_TYPE_NMI_INTR))
+		WARN_ON(!skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu));
+
+	/*
+	 * TODO: What about debug traps on tss switch?
+	 *       Are we supposed to inject them and update dr6?
+	 */
+	return kvm_task_switch(vcpu, tss_selector,
+			       type == INTR_TYPE_SOFT_INTR ? idt_index : -1,
+			       reason, has_error_code, error_code);
+}
+
+static int handle_ept_violation(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	unsigned long exit_qualification;
+	gpa_t gpa;
+	u64 error_code;
+
+	exit_qualification = vmx_get_exit_qual(vcpu);
+
+	/*
+	 * EPT violation happened while executing iret from NMI,
+	 * "blocked by NMI" bit has to be set before next VM entry.
+	 * There are errata that may cause this bit to not be set:
+	 * AAK134, BY25.
+	 */
+	if (!(to_vmx(vcpu)->idt_vectoring_info & VECTORING_INFO_VALID_MASK) &&
+			enable_vnmi &&
+			(exit_qualification & INTR_INFO_UNBLOCK_NMI))
+		vmcs_set_bits(GUEST_INTERRUPTIBILITY_INFO, GUEST_INTR_STATE_NMI);
+
+	gpa = vmcs_read64(GUEST_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS);
+	trace_kvm_page_fault(vcpu, gpa, exit_qualification);
+
+	/* Is it a read fault? */
+	error_code = (exit_qualification & EPT_VIOLATION_ACC_READ)
+		     ? PFERR_USER_MASK : 0;
+	/* Is it a write fault? */
+	error_code |= (exit_qualification & EPT_VIOLATION_ACC_WRITE)
+		      ? PFERR_WRITE_MASK : 0;
+	/* Is it a fetch fault? */
+	error_code |= (exit_qualification & EPT_VIOLATION_ACC_INSTR)
+		      ? PFERR_FETCH_MASK : 0;
+	/* ept page table entry is present? */
+	error_code |= (exit_qualification & EPT_VIOLATION_RWX_MASK)
+		      ? PFERR_PRESENT_MASK : 0;
+
+	error_code |= (exit_qualification & EPT_VIOLATION_GVA_TRANSLATED) != 0 ?
+	       PFERR_GUEST_FINAL_MASK : PFERR_GUEST_PAGE_MASK;
+
+	vcpu->arch.exit_qualification = exit_qualification;
+
+	/*
+	 * Check that the GPA doesn't exceed physical memory limits, as that is
+	 * a guest page fault.  We have to emulate the instruction here, because
+	 * if the illegal address is that of a paging structure, then
+	 * EPT_VIOLATION_ACC_WRITE bit is set.  Alternatively, if supported we
+	 * would also use advanced VM-exit information for EPT violations to
+	 * reconstruct the page fault error code.
+	 */
+	if (unlikely(allow_smaller_maxphyaddr && kvm_vcpu_is_illegal_gpa(vcpu, gpa)))
+		return kvm_emulate_instruction(vcpu, 0);
+
+	return kvm_mmu_page_fault(vcpu, gpa, error_code, NULL, 0);
+}
+
+static int handle_ept_misconfig(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	gpa_t gpa;
+
+	if (!vmx_can_emulate_instruction(vcpu, EMULTYPE_PF, NULL, 0))
+		return 1;
+
+	/*
+	 * A nested guest cannot optimize MMIO vmexits, because we have an
+	 * nGPA here instead of the required GPA.
+	 */
+	gpa = vmcs_read64(GUEST_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS);
+	if (!is_guest_mode(vcpu) &&
+	    !kvm_io_bus_write(vcpu, KVM_FAST_MMIO_BUS, gpa, 0, NULL)) {
+		trace_kvm_fast_mmio(gpa);
+		return kvm_skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
+	}
+
+	return kvm_mmu_page_fault(vcpu, gpa, PFERR_RSVD_MASK, NULL, 0);
+}
+
+static int handle_nmi_window(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	if (KVM_BUG_ON(!enable_vnmi, vcpu->kvm))
+		return -EIO;
+
+	exec_controls_clearbit(to_vmx(vcpu), CPU_BASED_NMI_WINDOW_EXITING);
+	++vcpu->stat.nmi_window_exits;
+	kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_EVENT, vcpu);
+
+	return 1;
+}
+
+static bool vmx_emulation_required_with_pending_exception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+
+	return vmx->emulation_required && !vmx->rmode.vm86_active &&
+	       (kvm_is_exception_pending(vcpu) || vcpu->arch.exception.injected);
+}
+
+static int handle_invalid_guest_state(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+	bool intr_window_requested;
+	unsigned count = 130;
+
+	intr_window_requested = exec_controls_get(vmx) &
+				CPU_BASED_INTR_WINDOW_EXITING;
+
+	while (vmx->emulation_required && count-- != 0) {
+		if (intr_window_requested && !vmx_interrupt_blocked(vcpu))
+			return handle_interrupt_window(&vmx->vcpu);
+
+		if (kvm_test_request(KVM_REQ_EVENT, vcpu))
+			return 1;
+
+		if (!kvm_emulate_instruction(vcpu, 0))
+			return 0;
+
+		if (vmx_emulation_required_with_pending_exception(vcpu)) {
+			kvm_prepare_emulation_failure_exit(vcpu);
+			return 0;
+		}
+
+		if (vcpu->arch.halt_request) {
+			vcpu->arch.halt_request = 0;
+			return kvm_emulate_halt_noskip(vcpu);
+		}
+
+		/*
+		 * Note, return 1 and not 0, vcpu_run() will invoke
+		 * xfer_to_guest_mode() which will create a proper return
+		 * code.
+		 */
+		if (__xfer_to_guest_mode_work_pending())
+			return 1;
+	}
+
+	return 1;
+}
+
+static int vmx_vcpu_pre_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	if (vmx_emulation_required_with_pending_exception(vcpu)) {
+		kvm_prepare_emulation_failure_exit(vcpu);
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	return 1;
+}
+
+static void grow_ple_window(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+	unsigned int old = vmx->ple_window;
+
+	vmx->ple_window = __grow_ple_window(old, ple_window,
+					    ple_window_grow,
+					    ple_window_max);
+
+	if (vmx->ple_window != old) {
+		vmx->ple_window_dirty = true;
+		trace_kvm_ple_window_update(vcpu->vcpu_id,
+					    vmx->ple_window, old);
+	}
+}
+
+static void shrink_ple_window(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+	unsigned int old = vmx->ple_window;
+
+	vmx->ple_window = __shrink_ple_window(old, ple_window,
+					      ple_window_shrink,
+					      ple_window);
+
+	if (vmx->ple_window != old) {
+		vmx->ple_window_dirty = true;
+		trace_kvm_ple_window_update(vcpu->vcpu_id,
+					    vmx->ple_window, old);
+	}
+}
+
+/*
+ * Indicate a busy-waiting vcpu in spinlock. We do not enable the PAUSE
+ * exiting, so only get here on cpu with PAUSE-Loop-Exiting.
+ */
+static int handle_pause(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	if (!kvm_pause_in_guest(vcpu->kvm))
+		grow_ple_window(vcpu);
+
+	/*
+	 * Intel sdm vol3 ch-25.1.3 says: The "PAUSE-loop exiting"
+	 * VM-execution control is ignored if CPL > 0. OTOH, KVM
+	 * never set PAUSE_EXITING and just set PLE if supported,
+	 * so the vcpu must be CPL=0 if it gets a PAUSE exit.
+	 */
+	kvm_vcpu_on_spin(vcpu, true);
+	return kvm_skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
+}
+
+static int handle_monitor_trap(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	return 1;
+}
+
+static int handle_invpcid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	u32 vmx_instruction_info;
+	unsigned long type;
+	gva_t gva;
+	struct {
+		u64 pcid;
+		u64 gla;
+	} operand;
+	int gpr_index;
+
+	if (!guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_INVPCID)) {
+		kvm_queue_exception(vcpu, UD_VECTOR);
+		return 1;
+	}
+
+	vmx_instruction_info = vmcs_read32(VMX_INSTRUCTION_INFO);
+	gpr_index = vmx_get_instr_info_reg2(vmx_instruction_info);
+	type = kvm_register_read(vcpu, gpr_index);
+
+	/* According to the Intel instruction reference, the memory operand
+	 * is read even if it isn't needed (e.g., for type==all)
+	 */
+	if (get_vmx_mem_address(vcpu, vmx_get_exit_qual(vcpu),
+				vmx_instruction_info, false,
+				sizeof(operand), &gva))
+		return 1;
+
+	return kvm_handle_invpcid(vcpu, type, gva);
+}
+
+static int handle_pml_full(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	unsigned long exit_qualification;
+
+	trace_kvm_pml_full(vcpu->vcpu_id);
+
+	exit_qualification = vmx_get_exit_qual(vcpu);
+
+	/*
+	 * PML buffer FULL happened while executing iret from NMI,
+	 * "blocked by NMI" bit has to be set before next VM entry.
+	 */
+	if (!(to_vmx(vcpu)->idt_vectoring_info & VECTORING_INFO_VALID_MASK) &&
+			enable_vnmi &&
+			(exit_qualification & INTR_INFO_UNBLOCK_NMI))
+		vmcs_set_bits(GUEST_INTERRUPTIBILITY_INFO,
+				GUEST_INTR_STATE_NMI);
+
+	/*
+	 * PML buffer already flushed at beginning of VMEXIT. Nothing to do
+	 * here.., and there's no userspace involvement needed for PML.
+	 */
+	return 1;
+}
+
+static fastpath_t handle_fastpath_preemption_timer(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+
+	if (!vmx->req_immediate_exit &&
+	    !unlikely(vmx->loaded_vmcs->hv_timer_soft_disabled)) {
+		kvm_lapic_expired_hv_timer(vcpu);
+		return EXIT_FASTPATH_REENTER_GUEST;
+	}
+
+	return EXIT_FASTPATH_NONE;
+}
+
+static int handle_preemption_timer(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	handle_fastpath_preemption_timer(vcpu);
+	return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * When nested=0, all VMX instruction VM Exits filter here.  The handlers
+ * are overwritten by nested_vmx_setup() when nested=1.
+ */
+static int handle_vmx_instruction(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	kvm_queue_exception(vcpu, UD_VECTOR);
+	return 1;
+}
+
+#ifndef CONFIG_X86_SGX_KVM
+static int handle_encls(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	/*
+	 * SGX virtualization is disabled.  There is no software enable bit for
+	 * SGX, so KVM intercepts all ENCLS leafs and injects a #UD to prevent
+	 * the guest from executing ENCLS (when SGX is supported by hardware).
+	 */
+	kvm_queue_exception(vcpu, UD_VECTOR);
+	return 1;
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_X86_SGX_KVM */
+
+static int handle_bus_lock_vmexit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	/*
+	 * Hardware may or may not set the BUS_LOCK_DETECTED flag on BUS_LOCK
+	 * VM-Exits. Unconditionally set the flag here and leave the handling to
+	 * vmx_handle_exit().
+	 */
+	to_vmx(vcpu)->exit_reason.bus_lock_detected = true;
+	return 1;
+}
+
+static int handle_notify(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	unsigned long exit_qual = vmx_get_exit_qual(vcpu);
+	bool context_invalid = exit_qual & NOTIFY_VM_CONTEXT_INVALID;
+
+	++vcpu->stat.notify_window_exits;
+
+	/*
+	 * Notify VM exit happened while executing iret from NMI,
+	 * "blocked by NMI" bit has to be set before next VM entry.
+	 */
+	if (enable_vnmi && (exit_qual & INTR_INFO_UNBLOCK_NMI))
+		vmcs_set_bits(GUEST_INTERRUPTIBILITY_INFO,
+			      GUEST_INTR_STATE_NMI);
+
+	if (vcpu->kvm->arch.notify_vmexit_flags & KVM_X86_NOTIFY_VMEXIT_USER ||
+	    context_invalid) {
+		vcpu->run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_NOTIFY;
+		vcpu->run->notify.flags = context_invalid ?
+					  KVM_NOTIFY_CONTEXT_INVALID : 0;
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * The exit handlers return 1 if the exit was handled fully and guest execution
+ * may resume.  Otherwise they set the kvm_run parameter to indicate what needs
+ * to be done to userspace and return 0.
+ */
+static int (*kvm_vmx_exit_handlers[])(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) = {
+	[EXIT_REASON_EXCEPTION_NMI]           = handle_exception_nmi,
+	[EXIT_REASON_EXTERNAL_INTERRUPT]      = handle_external_interrupt,
+	[EXIT_REASON_TRIPLE_FAULT]            = handle_triple_fault,
+	[EXIT_REASON_NMI_WINDOW]	      = handle_nmi_window,
+	[EXIT_REASON_IO_INSTRUCTION]          = handle_io,
+	[EXIT_REASON_CR_ACCESS]               = handle_cr,
+	[EXIT_REASON_DR_ACCESS]               = handle_dr,
+	[EXIT_REASON_CPUID]                   = kvm_emulate_cpuid,
+	[EXIT_REASON_MSR_READ]                = kvm_emulate_rdmsr,
+	[EXIT_REASON_MSR_WRITE]               = kvm_emulate_wrmsr,
+	[EXIT_REASON_INTERRUPT_WINDOW]        = handle_interrupt_window,
+	[EXIT_REASON_HLT]                     = kvm_emulate_halt,
+	[EXIT_REASON_INVD]		      = kvm_emulate_invd,
+	[EXIT_REASON_INVLPG]		      = handle_invlpg,
+	[EXIT_REASON_RDPMC]                   = kvm_emulate_rdpmc,
+	[EXIT_REASON_VMCALL]                  = kvm_emulate_hypercall,
+	[EXIT_REASON_VMCLEAR]		      = handle_vmx_instruction,
+	[EXIT_REASON_VMLAUNCH]		      = handle_vmx_instruction,
+	[EXIT_REASON_VMPTRLD]		      = handle_vmx_instruction,
+	[EXIT_REASON_VMPTRST]		      = handle_vmx_instruction,
+	[EXIT_REASON_VMREAD]		      = handle_vmx_instruction,
+	[EXIT_REASON_VMRESUME]		      = handle_vmx_instruction,
+	[EXIT_REASON_VMWRITE]		      = handle_vmx_instruction,
+	[EXIT_REASON_VMOFF]		      = handle_vmx_instruction,
+	[EXIT_REASON_VMON]		      = handle_vmx_instruction,
+	[EXIT_REASON_TPR_BELOW_THRESHOLD]     = handle_tpr_below_threshold,
+	[EXIT_REASON_APIC_ACCESS]             = handle_apic_access,
+	[EXIT_REASON_APIC_WRITE]              = handle_apic_write,
+	[EXIT_REASON_EOI_INDUCED]             = handle_apic_eoi_induced,
+	[EXIT_REASON_WBINVD]                  = kvm_emulate_wbinvd,
+	[EXIT_REASON_XSETBV]                  = kvm_emulate_xsetbv,
+	[EXIT_REASON_TASK_SWITCH]             = handle_task_switch,
+	[EXIT_REASON_MCE_DURING_VMENTRY]      = handle_machine_check,
+	[EXIT_REASON_GDTR_IDTR]		      = handle_desc,
+	[EXIT_REASON_LDTR_TR]		      = handle_desc,
+	[EXIT_REASON_EPT_VIOLATION]	      = handle_ept_violation,
+	[EXIT_REASON_EPT_MISCONFIG]           = handle_ept_misconfig,
+	[EXIT_REASON_PAUSE_INSTRUCTION]       = handle_pause,
+	[EXIT_REASON_MWAIT_INSTRUCTION]	      = kvm_emulate_mwait,
+	[EXIT_REASON_MONITOR_TRAP_FLAG]       = handle_monitor_trap,
+	[EXIT_REASON_MONITOR_INSTRUCTION]     = kvm_emulate_monitor,
+	[EXIT_REASON_INVEPT]                  = handle_vmx_instruction,
+	[EXIT_REASON_INVVPID]                 = handle_vmx_instruction,
+	[EXIT_REASON_RDRAND]                  = kvm_handle_invalid_op,
+	[EXIT_REASON_RDSEED]                  = kvm_handle_invalid_op,
+	[EXIT_REASON_PML_FULL]		      = handle_pml_full,
+	[EXIT_REASON_INVPCID]                 = handle_invpcid,
+	[EXIT_REASON_VMFUNC]		      = handle_vmx_instruction,
+	[EXIT_REASON_PREEMPTION_TIMER]	      = handle_preemption_timer,
+	[EXIT_REASON_ENCLS]		      = handle_encls,
+	[EXIT_REASON_BUS_LOCK]                = handle_bus_lock_vmexit,
+	[EXIT_REASON_NOTIFY]		      = handle_notify,
+};
+
+static const int kvm_vmx_max_exit_handlers =
+	ARRAY_SIZE(kvm_vmx_exit_handlers);
+
+static void vmx_get_exit_info(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 *reason,
+			      u64 *info1, u64 *info2,
+			      u32 *intr_info, u32 *error_code)
+{
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+
+	*reason = vmx->exit_reason.full;
+	*info1 = vmx_get_exit_qual(vcpu);
+	if (!(vmx->exit_reason.failed_vmentry)) {
+		*info2 = vmx->idt_vectoring_info;
+		*intr_info = vmx_get_intr_info(vcpu);
+		if (is_exception_with_error_code(*intr_info))
+			*error_code = vmcs_read32(VM_EXIT_INTR_ERROR_CODE);
+		else
+			*error_code = 0;
+	} else {
+		*info2 = 0;
+		*intr_info = 0;
+		*error_code = 0;
+	}
+}
+
+static void vmx_destroy_pml_buffer(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
+{
+	if (vmx->pml_pg) {
+		__free_page(vmx->pml_pg);
+		vmx->pml_pg = NULL;
+	}
+}
+
+static void vmx_flush_pml_buffer(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+	u64 *pml_buf;
+	u16 pml_idx;
+
+	pml_idx = vmcs_read16(GUEST_PML_INDEX);
+
+	/* Do nothing if PML buffer is empty */
+	if (pml_idx == (PML_ENTITY_NUM - 1))
+		return;
+
+	/* PML index always points to next available PML buffer entity */
+	if (pml_idx >= PML_ENTITY_NUM)
+		pml_idx = 0;
+	else
+		pml_idx++;
+
+	pml_buf = page_address(vmx->pml_pg);
+	for (; pml_idx < PML_ENTITY_NUM; pml_idx++) {
+		u64 gpa;
+
+		gpa = pml_buf[pml_idx];
+		WARN_ON(gpa & (PAGE_SIZE - 1));
+		kvm_vcpu_mark_page_dirty(vcpu, gpa >> PAGE_SHIFT);
+	}
+
+	/* reset PML index */
+	vmcs_write16(GUEST_PML_INDEX, PML_ENTITY_NUM - 1);
+}
+
+static void vmx_dump_sel(char *name, uint32_t sel)
+{
+	pr_err("%s sel=0x%04x, attr=0x%05x, limit=0x%08x, base=0x%016lx\n",
+	       name, vmcs_read16(sel),
+	       vmcs_read32(sel + GUEST_ES_AR_BYTES - GUEST_ES_SELECTOR),
+	       vmcs_read32(sel + GUEST_ES_LIMIT - GUEST_ES_SELECTOR),
+	       vmcs_readl(sel + GUEST_ES_BASE - GUEST_ES_SELECTOR));
+}
+
+static void vmx_dump_dtsel(char *name, uint32_t limit)
+{
+	pr_err("%s                           limit=0x%08x, base=0x%016lx\n",
+	       name, vmcs_read32(limit),
+	       vmcs_readl(limit + GUEST_GDTR_BASE - GUEST_GDTR_LIMIT));
+}
+
+static void vmx_dump_msrs(char *name, struct vmx_msrs *m)
+{
+	unsigned int i;
+	struct vmx_msr_entry *e;
+
+	pr_err("MSR %s:\n", name);
+	for (i = 0, e = m->val; i < m->nr; ++i, ++e)
+		pr_err("  %2d: msr=0x%08x value=0x%016llx\n", i, e->index, e->value);
+}
+
+void dump_vmcs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+	u32 vmentry_ctl, vmexit_ctl;
+	u32 cpu_based_exec_ctrl, pin_based_exec_ctrl, secondary_exec_control;
+	u64 tertiary_exec_control;
+	unsigned long cr4;
+	int efer_slot;
+
+	if (!dump_invalid_vmcs) {
+		pr_warn_ratelimited("set kvm_intel.dump_invalid_vmcs=1 to dump internal KVM state.\n");
+		return;
+	}
+
+	vmentry_ctl = vmcs_read32(VM_ENTRY_CONTROLS);
+	vmexit_ctl = vmcs_read32(VM_EXIT_CONTROLS);
+	cpu_based_exec_ctrl = vmcs_read32(CPU_BASED_VM_EXEC_CONTROL);
+	pin_based_exec_ctrl = vmcs_read32(PIN_BASED_VM_EXEC_CONTROL);
+	cr4 = vmcs_readl(GUEST_CR4);
+
+	if (cpu_has_secondary_exec_ctrls())
+		secondary_exec_control = vmcs_read32(SECONDARY_VM_EXEC_CONTROL);
+	else
+		secondary_exec_control = 0;
+
+	if (cpu_has_tertiary_exec_ctrls())
+		tertiary_exec_control = vmcs_read64(TERTIARY_VM_EXEC_CONTROL);
+	else
+		tertiary_exec_control = 0;
+
+	pr_err("VMCS %p, last attempted VM-entry on CPU %d\n",
+	       vmx->loaded_vmcs->vmcs, vcpu->arch.last_vmentry_cpu);
+	pr_err("*** Guest State ***\n");
+	pr_err("CR0: actual=0x%016lx, shadow=0x%016lx, gh_mask=%016lx\n",
+	       vmcs_readl(GUEST_CR0), vmcs_readl(CR0_READ_SHADOW),
+	       vmcs_readl(CR0_GUEST_HOST_MASK));
+	pr_err("CR4: actual=0x%016lx, shadow=0x%016lx, gh_mask=%016lx\n",
+	       cr4, vmcs_readl(CR4_READ_SHADOW), vmcs_readl(CR4_GUEST_HOST_MASK));
+	pr_err("CR3 = 0x%016lx\n", vmcs_readl(GUEST_CR3));
+	if (cpu_has_vmx_ept()) {
+		pr_err("PDPTR0 = 0x%016llx  PDPTR1 = 0x%016llx\n",
+		       vmcs_read64(GUEST_PDPTR0), vmcs_read64(GUEST_PDPTR1));
+		pr_err("PDPTR2 = 0x%016llx  PDPTR3 = 0x%016llx\n",
+		       vmcs_read64(GUEST_PDPTR2), vmcs_read64(GUEST_PDPTR3));
+	}
+	pr_err("RSP = 0x%016lx  RIP = 0x%016lx\n",
+	       vmcs_readl(GUEST_RSP), vmcs_readl(GUEST_RIP));
+	pr_err("RFLAGS=0x%08lx         DR7 = 0x%016lx\n",
+	       vmcs_readl(GUEST_RFLAGS), vmcs_readl(GUEST_DR7));
+	pr_err("Sysenter RSP=%016lx CS:RIP=%04x:%016lx\n",
+	       vmcs_readl(GUEST_SYSENTER_ESP),
+	       vmcs_read32(GUEST_SYSENTER_CS), vmcs_readl(GUEST_SYSENTER_EIP));
+	vmx_dump_sel("CS:  ", GUEST_CS_SELECTOR);
+	vmx_dump_sel("DS:  ", GUEST_DS_SELECTOR);
+	vmx_dump_sel("SS:  ", GUEST_SS_SELECTOR);
+	vmx_dump_sel("ES:  ", GUEST_ES_SELECTOR);
+	vmx_dump_sel("FS:  ", GUEST_FS_SELECTOR);
+	vmx_dump_sel("GS:  ", GUEST_GS_SELECTOR);
+	vmx_dump_dtsel("GDTR:", GUEST_GDTR_LIMIT);
+	vmx_dump_sel("LDTR:", GUEST_LDTR_SELECTOR);
+	vmx_dump_dtsel("IDTR:", GUEST_IDTR_LIMIT);
+	vmx_dump_sel("TR:  ", GUEST_TR_SELECTOR);
+	efer_slot = vmx_find_loadstore_msr_slot(&vmx->msr_autoload.guest, MSR_EFER);
+	if (vmentry_ctl & VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_EFER)
+		pr_err("EFER= 0x%016llx\n", vmcs_read64(GUEST_IA32_EFER));
+	else if (efer_slot >= 0)
+		pr_err("EFER= 0x%016llx (autoload)\n",
+		       vmx->msr_autoload.guest.val[efer_slot].value);
+	else if (vmentry_ctl & VM_ENTRY_IA32E_MODE)
+		pr_err("EFER= 0x%016llx (effective)\n",
+		       vcpu->arch.efer | (EFER_LMA | EFER_LME));
+	else
+		pr_err("EFER= 0x%016llx (effective)\n",
+		       vcpu->arch.efer & ~(EFER_LMA | EFER_LME));
+	if (vmentry_ctl & VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_PAT)
+		pr_err("PAT = 0x%016llx\n", vmcs_read64(GUEST_IA32_PAT));
+	pr_err("DebugCtl = 0x%016llx  DebugExceptions = 0x%016lx\n",
+	       vmcs_read64(GUEST_IA32_DEBUGCTL),
+	       vmcs_readl(GUEST_PENDING_DBG_EXCEPTIONS));
+	if (cpu_has_load_perf_global_ctrl() &&
+	    vmentry_ctl & VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL)
+		pr_err("PerfGlobCtl = 0x%016llx\n",
+		       vmcs_read64(GUEST_IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL));
+	if (vmentry_ctl & VM_ENTRY_LOAD_BNDCFGS)
+		pr_err("BndCfgS = 0x%016llx\n", vmcs_read64(GUEST_BNDCFGS));
+	pr_err("Interruptibility = %08x  ActivityState = %08x\n",
+	       vmcs_read32(GUEST_INTERRUPTIBILITY_INFO),
+	       vmcs_read32(GUEST_ACTIVITY_STATE));
+	if (secondary_exec_control & SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUAL_INTR_DELIVERY)
+		pr_err("InterruptStatus = %04x\n",
+		       vmcs_read16(GUEST_INTR_STATUS));
+	if (vmcs_read32(VM_ENTRY_MSR_LOAD_COUNT) > 0)
+		vmx_dump_msrs("guest autoload", &vmx->msr_autoload.guest);
+	if (vmcs_read32(VM_EXIT_MSR_STORE_COUNT) > 0)
+		vmx_dump_msrs("guest autostore", &vmx->msr_autostore.guest);
+
+	pr_err("*** Host State ***\n");
+	pr_err("RIP = 0x%016lx  RSP = 0x%016lx\n",
+	       vmcs_readl(HOST_RIP), vmcs_readl(HOST_RSP));
+	pr_err("CS=%04x SS=%04x DS=%04x ES=%04x FS=%04x GS=%04x TR=%04x\n",
+	       vmcs_read16(HOST_CS_SELECTOR), vmcs_read16(HOST_SS_SELECTOR),
+	       vmcs_read16(HOST_DS_SELECTOR), vmcs_read16(HOST_ES_SELECTOR),
+	       vmcs_read16(HOST_FS_SELECTOR), vmcs_read16(HOST_GS_SELECTOR),
+	       vmcs_read16(HOST_TR_SELECTOR));
+	pr_err("FSBase=%016lx GSBase=%016lx TRBase=%016lx\n",
+	       vmcs_readl(HOST_FS_BASE), vmcs_readl(HOST_GS_BASE),
+	       vmcs_readl(HOST_TR_BASE));
+	pr_err("GDTBase=%016lx IDTBase=%016lx\n",
+	       vmcs_readl(HOST_GDTR_BASE), vmcs_readl(HOST_IDTR_BASE));
+	pr_err("CR0=%016lx CR3=%016lx CR4=%016lx\n",
+	       vmcs_readl(HOST_CR0), vmcs_readl(HOST_CR3),
+	       vmcs_readl(HOST_CR4));
+	pr_err("Sysenter RSP=%016lx CS:RIP=%04x:%016lx\n",
+	       vmcs_readl(HOST_IA32_SYSENTER_ESP),
+	       vmcs_read32(HOST_IA32_SYSENTER_CS),
+	       vmcs_readl(HOST_IA32_SYSENTER_EIP));
+	if (vmexit_ctl & VM_EXIT_LOAD_IA32_EFER)
+		pr_err("EFER= 0x%016llx\n", vmcs_read64(HOST_IA32_EFER));
+	if (vmexit_ctl & VM_EXIT_LOAD_IA32_PAT)
+		pr_err("PAT = 0x%016llx\n", vmcs_read64(HOST_IA32_PAT));
+	if (cpu_has_load_perf_global_ctrl() &&
+	    vmexit_ctl & VM_EXIT_LOAD_IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL)
+		pr_err("PerfGlobCtl = 0x%016llx\n",
+		       vmcs_read64(HOST_IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL));
+	if (vmcs_read32(VM_EXIT_MSR_LOAD_COUNT) > 0)
+		vmx_dump_msrs("host autoload", &vmx->msr_autoload.host);
+
+	pr_err("*** Control State ***\n");
+	pr_err("CPUBased=0x%08x SecondaryExec=0x%08x TertiaryExec=0x%016llx\n",
+	       cpu_based_exec_ctrl, secondary_exec_control, tertiary_exec_control);
+	pr_err("PinBased=0x%08x EntryControls=%08x ExitControls=%08x\n",
+	       pin_based_exec_ctrl, vmentry_ctl, vmexit_ctl);
+	pr_err("ExceptionBitmap=%08x PFECmask=%08x PFECmatch=%08x\n",
+	       vmcs_read32(EXCEPTION_BITMAP),
+	       vmcs_read32(PAGE_FAULT_ERROR_CODE_MASK),
+	       vmcs_read32(PAGE_FAULT_ERROR_CODE_MATCH));
+	pr_err("VMEntry: intr_info=%08x errcode=%08x ilen=%08x\n",
+	       vmcs_read32(VM_ENTRY_INTR_INFO_FIELD),
+	       vmcs_read32(VM_ENTRY_EXCEPTION_ERROR_CODE),
+	       vmcs_read32(VM_ENTRY_INSTRUCTION_LEN));
+	pr_err("VMExit: intr_info=%08x errcode=%08x ilen=%08x\n",
+	       vmcs_read32(VM_EXIT_INTR_INFO),
+	       vmcs_read32(VM_EXIT_INTR_ERROR_CODE),
+	       vmcs_read32(VM_EXIT_INSTRUCTION_LEN));
+	pr_err("        reason=%08x qualification=%016lx\n",
+	       vmcs_read32(VM_EXIT_REASON), vmcs_readl(EXIT_QUALIFICATION));
+	pr_err("IDTVectoring: info=%08x errcode=%08x\n",
+	       vmcs_read32(IDT_VECTORING_INFO_FIELD),
+	       vmcs_read32(IDT_VECTORING_ERROR_CODE));
+	pr_err("TSC Offset = 0x%016llx\n", vmcs_read64(TSC_OFFSET));
+	if (secondary_exec_control & SECONDARY_EXEC_TSC_SCALING)
+		pr_err("TSC Multiplier = 0x%016llx\n",
+		       vmcs_read64(TSC_MULTIPLIER));
+	if (cpu_based_exec_ctrl & CPU_BASED_TPR_SHADOW) {
+		if (secondary_exec_control & SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUAL_INTR_DELIVERY) {
+			u16 status = vmcs_read16(GUEST_INTR_STATUS);
+			pr_err("SVI|RVI = %02x|%02x ", status >> 8, status & 0xff);
+		}
+		pr_cont("TPR Threshold = 0x%02x\n", vmcs_read32(TPR_THRESHOLD));
+		if (secondary_exec_control & SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_APIC_ACCESSES)
+			pr_err("APIC-access addr = 0x%016llx ", vmcs_read64(APIC_ACCESS_ADDR));
+		pr_cont("virt-APIC addr = 0x%016llx\n", vmcs_read64(VIRTUAL_APIC_PAGE_ADDR));
+	}
+	if (pin_based_exec_ctrl & PIN_BASED_POSTED_INTR)
+		pr_err("PostedIntrVec = 0x%02x\n", vmcs_read16(POSTED_INTR_NV));
+	if ((secondary_exec_control & SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_EPT))
+		pr_err("EPT pointer = 0x%016llx\n", vmcs_read64(EPT_POINTER));
+	if (secondary_exec_control & SECONDARY_EXEC_PAUSE_LOOP_EXITING)
+		pr_err("PLE Gap=%08x Window=%08x\n",
+		       vmcs_read32(PLE_GAP), vmcs_read32(PLE_WINDOW));
+	if (secondary_exec_control & SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_VPID)
+		pr_err("Virtual processor ID = 0x%04x\n",
+		       vmcs_read16(VIRTUAL_PROCESSOR_ID));
+}
+
+/*
+ * The guest has exited.  See if we can fix it or if we need userspace
+ * assistance.
+ */
+static int __vmx_handle_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, fastpath_t exit_fastpath)
+{
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+	union vmx_exit_reason exit_reason = vmx->exit_reason;
+	u32 vectoring_info = vmx->idt_vectoring_info;
+	u16 exit_handler_index;
+
+	/*
+	 * Flush logged GPAs PML buffer, this will make dirty_bitmap more
+	 * updated. Another good is, in kvm_vm_ioctl_get_dirty_log, before
+	 * querying dirty_bitmap, we only need to kick all vcpus out of guest
+	 * mode as if vcpus is in root mode, the PML buffer must has been
+	 * flushed already.  Note, PML is never enabled in hardware while
+	 * running L2.
+	 */
+	if (enable_pml && !is_guest_mode(vcpu))
+		vmx_flush_pml_buffer(vcpu);
+
+	/*
+	 * KVM should never reach this point with a pending nested VM-Enter.
+	 * More specifically, short-circuiting VM-Entry to emulate L2 due to
+	 * invalid guest state should never happen as that means KVM knowingly
+	 * allowed a nested VM-Enter with an invalid vmcs12.  More below.
+	 */
+	if (KVM_BUG_ON(vmx->nested.nested_run_pending, vcpu->kvm))
+		return -EIO;
+
+	if (is_guest_mode(vcpu)) {
+		/*
+		 * PML is never enabled when running L2, bail immediately if a
+		 * PML full exit occurs as something is horribly wrong.
+		 */
+		if (exit_reason.basic == EXIT_REASON_PML_FULL)
+			goto unexpected_vmexit;
+
+		/*
+		 * The host physical addresses of some pages of guest memory
+		 * are loaded into the vmcs02 (e.g. vmcs12's Virtual APIC
+		 * Page). The CPU may write to these pages via their host
+		 * physical address while L2 is running, bypassing any
+		 * address-translation-based dirty tracking (e.g. EPT write
+		 * protection).
+		 *
+		 * Mark them dirty on every exit from L2 to prevent them from
+		 * getting out of sync with dirty tracking.
+		 */
+		nested_mark_vmcs12_pages_dirty(vcpu);
+
+		/*
+		 * Synthesize a triple fault if L2 state is invalid.  In normal
+		 * operation, nested VM-Enter rejects any attempt to enter L2
+		 * with invalid state.  However, those checks are skipped if
+		 * state is being stuffed via RSM or KVM_SET_NESTED_STATE.  If
+		 * L2 state is invalid, it means either L1 modified SMRAM state
+		 * or userspace provided bad state.  Synthesize TRIPLE_FAULT as
+		 * doing so is architecturally allowed in the RSM case, and is
+		 * the least awful solution for the userspace case without
+		 * risking false positives.
+		 */
+		if (vmx->emulation_required) {
+			nested_vmx_vmexit(vcpu, EXIT_REASON_TRIPLE_FAULT, 0, 0);
+			return 1;
+		}
+
+		if (nested_vmx_reflect_vmexit(vcpu))
+			return 1;
+	}
+
+	/* If guest state is invalid, start emulating.  L2 is handled above. */
+	if (vmx->emulation_required)
+		return handle_invalid_guest_state(vcpu);
+
+	if (exit_reason.failed_vmentry) {
+		dump_vmcs(vcpu);
+		vcpu->run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_FAIL_ENTRY;
+		vcpu->run->fail_entry.hardware_entry_failure_reason
+			= exit_reason.full;
+		vcpu->run->fail_entry.cpu = vcpu->arch.last_vmentry_cpu;
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	if (unlikely(vmx->fail)) {
+		dump_vmcs(vcpu);
+		vcpu->run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_FAIL_ENTRY;
+		vcpu->run->fail_entry.hardware_entry_failure_reason
+			= vmcs_read32(VM_INSTRUCTION_ERROR);
+		vcpu->run->fail_entry.cpu = vcpu->arch.last_vmentry_cpu;
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Note:
+	 * Do not try to fix EXIT_REASON_EPT_MISCONFIG if it caused by
+	 * delivery event since it indicates guest is accessing MMIO.
+	 * The vm-exit can be triggered again after return to guest that
+	 * will cause infinite loop.
+	 */
+	if ((vectoring_info & VECTORING_INFO_VALID_MASK) &&
+	    (exit_reason.basic != EXIT_REASON_EXCEPTION_NMI &&
+	     exit_reason.basic != EXIT_REASON_EPT_VIOLATION &&
+	     exit_reason.basic != EXIT_REASON_PML_FULL &&
+	     exit_reason.basic != EXIT_REASON_APIC_ACCESS &&
+	     exit_reason.basic != EXIT_REASON_TASK_SWITCH &&
+	     exit_reason.basic != EXIT_REASON_NOTIFY)) {
+		int ndata = 3;
+
+		vcpu->run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+		vcpu->run->internal.suberror = KVM_INTERNAL_ERROR_DELIVERY_EV;
+		vcpu->run->internal.data[0] = vectoring_info;
+		vcpu->run->internal.data[1] = exit_reason.full;
+		vcpu->run->internal.data[2] = vcpu->arch.exit_qualification;
+		if (exit_reason.basic == EXIT_REASON_EPT_MISCONFIG) {
+			vcpu->run->internal.data[ndata++] =
+				vmcs_read64(GUEST_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS);
+		}
+		vcpu->run->internal.data[ndata++] = vcpu->arch.last_vmentry_cpu;
+		vcpu->run->internal.ndata = ndata;
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	if (unlikely(!enable_vnmi &&
+		     vmx->loaded_vmcs->soft_vnmi_blocked)) {
+		if (!vmx_interrupt_blocked(vcpu)) {
+			vmx->loaded_vmcs->soft_vnmi_blocked = 0;
+		} else if (vmx->loaded_vmcs->vnmi_blocked_time > 1000000000LL &&
+			   vcpu->arch.nmi_pending) {
+			/*
+			 * This CPU don't support us in finding the end of an
+			 * NMI-blocked window if the guest runs with IRQs
+			 * disabled. So we pull the trigger after 1 s of
+			 * futile waiting, but inform the user about this.
+			 */
+			printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: Breaking out of NMI-blocked "
+			       "state on VCPU %d after 1 s timeout\n",
+			       __func__, vcpu->vcpu_id);
+			vmx->loaded_vmcs->soft_vnmi_blocked = 0;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (exit_fastpath != EXIT_FASTPATH_NONE)
+		return 1;
+
+	if (exit_reason.basic >= kvm_vmx_max_exit_handlers)
+		goto unexpected_vmexit;
+#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
+	if (exit_reason.basic == EXIT_REASON_MSR_WRITE)
+		return kvm_emulate_wrmsr(vcpu);
+	else if (exit_reason.basic == EXIT_REASON_PREEMPTION_TIMER)
+		return handle_preemption_timer(vcpu);
+	else if (exit_reason.basic == EXIT_REASON_INTERRUPT_WINDOW)
+		return handle_interrupt_window(vcpu);
+	else if (exit_reason.basic == EXIT_REASON_EXTERNAL_INTERRUPT)
+		return handle_external_interrupt(vcpu);
+	else if (exit_reason.basic == EXIT_REASON_HLT)
+		return kvm_emulate_halt(vcpu);
+	else if (exit_reason.basic == EXIT_REASON_EPT_MISCONFIG)
+		return handle_ept_misconfig(vcpu);
+#endif
+
+	exit_handler_index = array_index_nospec((u16)exit_reason.basic,
+						kvm_vmx_max_exit_handlers);
+	if (!kvm_vmx_exit_handlers[exit_handler_index])
+		goto unexpected_vmexit;
+
+	return kvm_vmx_exit_handlers[exit_handler_index](vcpu);
+
+unexpected_vmexit:
+	vcpu_unimpl(vcpu, "vmx: unexpected exit reason 0x%x\n",
+		    exit_reason.full);
+	dump_vmcs(vcpu);
+	vcpu->run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+	vcpu->run->internal.suberror =
+			KVM_INTERNAL_ERROR_UNEXPECTED_EXIT_REASON;
+	vcpu->run->internal.ndata = 2;
+	vcpu->run->internal.data[0] = exit_reason.full;
+	vcpu->run->internal.data[1] = vcpu->arch.last_vmentry_cpu;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int vmx_handle_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, fastpath_t exit_fastpath)
+{
+	int ret = __vmx_handle_exit(vcpu, exit_fastpath);
+
+	/*
+	 * Exit to user space when bus lock detected to inform that there is
+	 * a bus lock in guest.
+	 */
+	if (to_vmx(vcpu)->exit_reason.bus_lock_detected) {
+		if (ret > 0)
+			vcpu->run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_X86_BUS_LOCK;
+
+		vcpu->run->flags |= KVM_RUN_X86_BUS_LOCK;
+		return 0;
+	}
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Software based L1D cache flush which is used when microcode providing
+ * the cache control MSR is not loaded.
+ *
+ * The L1D cache is 32 KiB on Nehalem and later microarchitectures, but to
+ * flush it is required to read in 64 KiB because the replacement algorithm
+ * is not exactly LRU. This could be sized at runtime via topology
+ * information but as all relevant affected CPUs have 32KiB L1D cache size
+ * there is no point in doing so.
+ */
+static noinstr void vmx_l1d_flush(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	int size = PAGE_SIZE << L1D_CACHE_ORDER;
+
+	/*
+	 * This code is only executed when the flush mode is 'cond' or
+	 * 'always'
+	 */
+	if (static_branch_likely(&vmx_l1d_flush_cond)) {
+		bool flush_l1d;
+
+		/*
+		 * Clear the per-vcpu flush bit, it gets set again
+		 * either from vcpu_run() or from one of the unsafe
+		 * VMEXIT handlers.
+		 */
+		flush_l1d = vcpu->arch.l1tf_flush_l1d;
+		vcpu->arch.l1tf_flush_l1d = false;
+
+		/*
+		 * Clear the per-cpu flush bit, it gets set again from
+		 * the interrupt handlers.
+		 */
+		flush_l1d |= kvm_get_cpu_l1tf_flush_l1d();
+		kvm_clear_cpu_l1tf_flush_l1d();
+
+		if (!flush_l1d)
+			return;
+	}
+
+	vcpu->stat.l1d_flush++;
+
+	if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_FLUSH_L1D)) {
+		native_wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_FLUSH_CMD, L1D_FLUSH);
+		return;
+	}
+
+	asm volatile(
+		/* First ensure the pages are in the TLB */
+		"xorl	%%eax, %%eax\n"
+		".Lpopulate_tlb:\n\t"
+		"movzbl	(%[flush_pages], %%" _ASM_AX "), %%ecx\n\t"
+		"addl	$4096, %%eax\n\t"
+		"cmpl	%%eax, %[size]\n\t"
+		"jne	.Lpopulate_tlb\n\t"
+		"xorl	%%eax, %%eax\n\t"
+		"cpuid\n\t"
+		/* Now fill the cache */
+		"xorl	%%eax, %%eax\n"
+		".Lfill_cache:\n"
+		"movzbl	(%[flush_pages], %%" _ASM_AX "), %%ecx\n\t"
+		"addl	$64, %%eax\n\t"
+		"cmpl	%%eax, %[size]\n\t"
+		"jne	.Lfill_cache\n\t"
+		"lfence\n"
+		:: [flush_pages] "r" (vmx_l1d_flush_pages),
+		    [size] "r" (size)
+		: "eax", "ebx", "ecx", "edx");
+}
+
+static void vmx_update_cr8_intercept(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int tpr, int irr)
+{
+	struct vmcs12 *vmcs12 = get_vmcs12(vcpu);
+	int tpr_threshold;
+
+	if (is_guest_mode(vcpu) &&
+		nested_cpu_has(vmcs12, CPU_BASED_TPR_SHADOW))
+		return;
+
+	tpr_threshold = (irr == -1 || tpr < irr) ? 0 : irr;
+	if (is_guest_mode(vcpu))
+		to_vmx(vcpu)->nested.l1_tpr_threshold = tpr_threshold;
+	else
+		vmcs_write32(TPR_THRESHOLD, tpr_threshold);
+}
+
+void vmx_set_virtual_apic_mode(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+	u32 sec_exec_control;
+
+	if (!lapic_in_kernel(vcpu))
+		return;
+
+	if (!flexpriority_enabled &&
+	    !cpu_has_vmx_virtualize_x2apic_mode())
+		return;
+
+	/* Postpone execution until vmcs01 is the current VMCS. */
+	if (is_guest_mode(vcpu)) {
+		vmx->nested.change_vmcs01_virtual_apic_mode = true;
+		return;
+	}
+
+	sec_exec_control = secondary_exec_controls_get(vmx);
+	sec_exec_control &= ~(SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_APIC_ACCESSES |
+			      SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_X2APIC_MODE);
+
+	switch (kvm_get_apic_mode(vcpu)) {
+	case LAPIC_MODE_INVALID:
+		WARN_ONCE(true, "Invalid local APIC state");
+		break;
+	case LAPIC_MODE_DISABLED:
+		break;
+	case LAPIC_MODE_XAPIC:
+		if (flexpriority_enabled) {
+			sec_exec_control |=
+				SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_APIC_ACCESSES;
+			kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_APIC_PAGE_RELOAD, vcpu);
+
+			/*
+			 * Flush the TLB, reloading the APIC access page will
+			 * only do so if its physical address has changed, but
+			 * the guest may have inserted a non-APIC mapping into
+			 * the TLB while the APIC access page was disabled.
+			 */
+			kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_TLB_FLUSH_CURRENT, vcpu);
+		}
+		break;
+	case LAPIC_MODE_X2APIC:
+		if (cpu_has_vmx_virtualize_x2apic_mode())
+			sec_exec_control |=
+				SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_X2APIC_MODE;
+		break;
+	}
+	secondary_exec_controls_set(vmx, sec_exec_control);
+
+	vmx_update_msr_bitmap_x2apic(vcpu);
+}
+
+static void vmx_set_apic_access_page_addr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	const gfn_t gfn = APIC_DEFAULT_PHYS_BASE >> PAGE_SHIFT;
+	struct kvm *kvm = vcpu->kvm;
+	struct kvm_memslots *slots = kvm_memslots(kvm);
+	struct kvm_memory_slot *slot;
+	unsigned long mmu_seq;
+	kvm_pfn_t pfn;
+
+	/* Defer reload until vmcs01 is the current VMCS. */
+	if (is_guest_mode(vcpu)) {
+		to_vmx(vcpu)->nested.reload_vmcs01_apic_access_page = true;
+		return;
+	}
+
+	if (!(secondary_exec_controls_get(to_vmx(vcpu)) &
+	    SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_APIC_ACCESSES))
+		return;
+
+	/*
+	 * Grab the memslot so that the hva lookup for the mmu_notifier retry
+	 * is guaranteed to use the same memslot as the pfn lookup, i.e. rely
+	 * on the pfn lookup's validation of the memslot to ensure a valid hva
+	 * is used for the retry check.
+	 */
+	slot = id_to_memslot(slots, APIC_ACCESS_PAGE_PRIVATE_MEMSLOT);
+	if (!slot || slot->flags & KVM_MEMSLOT_INVALID)
+		return;
+
+	/*
+	 * Ensure that the mmu_notifier sequence count is read before KVM
+	 * retrieves the pfn from the primary MMU.  Note, the memslot is
+	 * protected by SRCU, not the mmu_notifier.  Pairs with the smp_wmb()
+	 * in kvm_mmu_invalidate_end().
+	 */
+	mmu_seq = kvm->mmu_invalidate_seq;
+	smp_rmb();
+
+	/*
+	 * No need to retry if the memslot does not exist or is invalid.  KVM
+	 * controls the APIC-access page memslot, and only deletes the memslot
+	 * if APICv is permanently inhibited, i.e. the memslot won't reappear.
+	 */
+	pfn = gfn_to_pfn_memslot(slot, gfn);
+	if (is_error_noslot_pfn(pfn))
+		return;
+
+	read_lock(&vcpu->kvm->mmu_lock);
+	if (mmu_invalidate_retry_hva(kvm, mmu_seq,
+				     gfn_to_hva_memslot(slot, gfn))) {
+		kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_APIC_PAGE_RELOAD, vcpu);
+		read_unlock(&vcpu->kvm->mmu_lock);
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	vmcs_write64(APIC_ACCESS_ADDR, pfn_to_hpa(pfn));
+	read_unlock(&vcpu->kvm->mmu_lock);
+
+	/*
+	 * No need for a manual TLB flush at this point, KVM has already done a
+	 * flush if there were SPTEs pointing at the previous page.
+	 */
+out:
+	/*
+	 * Do not pin apic access page in memory, the MMU notifier
+	 * will call us again if it is migrated or swapped out.
+	 */
+	kvm_release_pfn_clean(pfn);
+}
+
+static void vmx_hwapic_isr_update(int max_isr)
+{
+	u16 status;
+	u8 old;
+
+	if (max_isr == -1)
+		max_isr = 0;
+
+	status = vmcs_read16(GUEST_INTR_STATUS);
+	old = status >> 8;
+	if (max_isr != old) {
+		status &= 0xff;
+		status |= max_isr << 8;
+		vmcs_write16(GUEST_INTR_STATUS, status);
+	}
+}
+
+static void vmx_set_rvi(int vector)
+{
+	u16 status;
+	u8 old;
+
+	if (vector == -1)
+		vector = 0;
+
+	status = vmcs_read16(GUEST_INTR_STATUS);
+	old = (u8)status & 0xff;
+	if ((u8)vector != old) {
+		status &= ~0xff;
+		status |= (u8)vector;
+		vmcs_write16(GUEST_INTR_STATUS, status);
+	}
+}
+
+static void vmx_hwapic_irr_update(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int max_irr)
+{
+	/*
+	 * When running L2, updating RVI is only relevant when
+	 * vmcs12 virtual-interrupt-delivery enabled.
+	 * However, it can be enabled only when L1 also
+	 * intercepts external-interrupts and in that case
+	 * we should not update vmcs02 RVI but instead intercept
+	 * interrupt. Therefore, do nothing when running L2.
+	 */
+	if (!is_guest_mode(vcpu))
+		vmx_set_rvi(max_irr);
+}
+
+static int vmx_sync_pir_to_irr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+	int max_irr;
+	bool got_posted_interrupt;
+
+	if (KVM_BUG_ON(!enable_apicv, vcpu->kvm))
+		return -EIO;
+
+	if (pi_test_on(&vmx->pi_desc)) {
+		pi_clear_on(&vmx->pi_desc);
+		/*
+		 * IOMMU can write to PID.ON, so the barrier matters even on UP.
+		 * But on x86 this is just a compiler barrier anyway.
+		 */
+		smp_mb__after_atomic();
+		got_posted_interrupt =
+			kvm_apic_update_irr(vcpu, vmx->pi_desc.pir, &max_irr);
+	} else {
+		max_irr = kvm_lapic_find_highest_irr(vcpu);
+		got_posted_interrupt = false;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Newly recognized interrupts are injected via either virtual interrupt
+	 * delivery (RVI) or KVM_REQ_EVENT.  Virtual interrupt delivery is
+	 * disabled in two cases:
+	 *
+	 * 1) If L2 is running and the vCPU has a new pending interrupt.  If L1
+	 * wants to exit on interrupts, KVM_REQ_EVENT is needed to synthesize a
+	 * VM-Exit to L1.  If L1 doesn't want to exit, the interrupt is injected
+	 * into L2, but KVM doesn't use virtual interrupt delivery to inject
+	 * interrupts into L2, and so KVM_REQ_EVENT is again needed.
+	 *
+	 * 2) If APICv is disabled for this vCPU, assigned devices may still
+	 * attempt to post interrupts.  The posted interrupt vector will cause
+	 * a VM-Exit and the subsequent entry will call sync_pir_to_irr.
+	 */
+	if (!is_guest_mode(vcpu) && kvm_vcpu_apicv_active(vcpu))
+		vmx_set_rvi(max_irr);
+	else if (got_posted_interrupt)
+		kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_EVENT, vcpu);
+
+	return max_irr;
+}
+
+static void vmx_load_eoi_exitmap(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 *eoi_exit_bitmap)
+{
+	if (!kvm_vcpu_apicv_active(vcpu))
+		return;
+
+	vmcs_write64(EOI_EXIT_BITMAP0, eoi_exit_bitmap[0]);
+	vmcs_write64(EOI_EXIT_BITMAP1, eoi_exit_bitmap[1]);
+	vmcs_write64(EOI_EXIT_BITMAP2, eoi_exit_bitmap[2]);
+	vmcs_write64(EOI_EXIT_BITMAP3, eoi_exit_bitmap[3]);
+}
+
+static void vmx_apicv_pre_state_restore(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+
+	pi_clear_on(&vmx->pi_desc);
+	memset(vmx->pi_desc.pir, 0, sizeof(vmx->pi_desc.pir));
+}
+
+void vmx_do_interrupt_irqoff(unsigned long entry);
+void vmx_do_nmi_irqoff(void);
+
+static void handle_nm_fault_irqoff(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	/*
+	 * Save xfd_err to guest_fpu before interrupt is enabled, so the
+	 * MSR value is not clobbered by the host activity before the guest
+	 * has chance to consume it.
+	 *
+	 * Do not blindly read xfd_err here, since this exception might
+	 * be caused by L1 interception on a platform which doesn't
+	 * support xfd at all.
+	 *
+	 * Do it conditionally upon guest_fpu::xfd. xfd_err matters
+	 * only when xfd contains a non-zero value.
+	 *
+	 * Queuing exception is done in vmx_handle_exit. See comment there.
+	 */
+	if (vcpu->arch.guest_fpu.fpstate->xfd)
+		rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_XFD_ERR, vcpu->arch.guest_fpu.xfd_err);
+}
+
+static void handle_exception_irqoff(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
+{
+	u32 intr_info = vmx_get_intr_info(&vmx->vcpu);
+
+	/* if exit due to PF check for async PF */
+	if (is_page_fault(intr_info))
+		vmx->vcpu.arch.apf.host_apf_flags = kvm_read_and_reset_apf_flags();
+	/* if exit due to NM, handle before interrupts are enabled */
+	else if (is_nm_fault(intr_info))
+		handle_nm_fault_irqoff(&vmx->vcpu);
+	/* Handle machine checks before interrupts are enabled */
+	else if (is_machine_check(intr_info))
+		kvm_machine_check();
+}
+
+static void handle_external_interrupt_irqoff(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	u32 intr_info = vmx_get_intr_info(vcpu);
+	unsigned int vector = intr_info & INTR_INFO_VECTOR_MASK;
+	gate_desc *desc = (gate_desc *)host_idt_base + vector;
+
+	if (KVM_BUG(!is_external_intr(intr_info), vcpu->kvm,
+	    "unexpected VM-Exit interrupt info: 0x%x", intr_info))
+		return;
+
+	kvm_before_interrupt(vcpu, KVM_HANDLING_IRQ);
+	vmx_do_interrupt_irqoff(gate_offset(desc));
+	kvm_after_interrupt(vcpu);
+
+	vcpu->arch.at_instruction_boundary = true;
+}
+
+static void vmx_handle_exit_irqoff(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+
+	if (vmx->emulation_required)
+		return;
+
+	if (vmx->exit_reason.basic == EXIT_REASON_EXTERNAL_INTERRUPT)
+		handle_external_interrupt_irqoff(vcpu);
+	else if (vmx->exit_reason.basic == EXIT_REASON_EXCEPTION_NMI)
+		handle_exception_irqoff(vmx);
+}
+
+/*
+ * The kvm parameter can be NULL (module initialization, or invocation before
+ * VM creation). Be sure to check the kvm parameter before using it.
+ */
+static bool vmx_has_emulated_msr(struct kvm *kvm, u32 index)
+{
+	switch (index) {
+	case MSR_IA32_SMBASE:
+		if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KVM_SMM))
+			return false;
+		/*
+		 * We cannot do SMM unless we can run the guest in big
+		 * real mode.
+		 */
+		return enable_unrestricted_guest || emulate_invalid_guest_state;
+	case KVM_FIRST_EMULATED_VMX_MSR ... KVM_LAST_EMULATED_VMX_MSR:
+		return nested;
+	case MSR_AMD64_VIRT_SPEC_CTRL:
+	case MSR_AMD64_TSC_RATIO:
+		/* This is AMD only.  */
+		return false;
+	default:
+		return true;
+	}
+}
+
+static void vmx_recover_nmi_blocking(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
+{
+	u32 exit_intr_info;
+	bool unblock_nmi;
+	u8 vector;
+	bool idtv_info_valid;
+
+	idtv_info_valid = vmx->idt_vectoring_info & VECTORING_INFO_VALID_MASK;
+
+	if (enable_vnmi) {
+		if (vmx->loaded_vmcs->nmi_known_unmasked)
+			return;
+
+		exit_intr_info = vmx_get_intr_info(&vmx->vcpu);
+		unblock_nmi = (exit_intr_info & INTR_INFO_UNBLOCK_NMI) != 0;
+		vector = exit_intr_info & INTR_INFO_VECTOR_MASK;
+		/*
+		 * SDM 3: 27.7.1.2 (September 2008)
+		 * Re-set bit "block by NMI" before VM entry if vmexit caused by
+		 * a guest IRET fault.
+		 * SDM 3: 23.2.2 (September 2008)
+		 * Bit 12 is undefined in any of the following cases:
+		 *  If the VM exit sets the valid bit in the IDT-vectoring
+		 *   information field.
+		 *  If the VM exit is due to a double fault.
+		 */
+		if ((exit_intr_info & INTR_INFO_VALID_MASK) && unblock_nmi &&
+		    vector != DF_VECTOR && !idtv_info_valid)
+			vmcs_set_bits(GUEST_INTERRUPTIBILITY_INFO,
+				      GUEST_INTR_STATE_NMI);
+		else
+			vmx->loaded_vmcs->nmi_known_unmasked =
+				!(vmcs_read32(GUEST_INTERRUPTIBILITY_INFO)
+				  & GUEST_INTR_STATE_NMI);
+	} else if (unlikely(vmx->loaded_vmcs->soft_vnmi_blocked))
+		vmx->loaded_vmcs->vnmi_blocked_time +=
+			ktime_to_ns(ktime_sub(ktime_get(),
+					      vmx->loaded_vmcs->entry_time));
+}
+
+static void __vmx_complete_interrupts(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+				      u32 idt_vectoring_info,
+				      int instr_len_field,
+				      int error_code_field)
+{
+	u8 vector;
+	int type;
+	bool idtv_info_valid;
+
+	idtv_info_valid = idt_vectoring_info & VECTORING_INFO_VALID_MASK;
+
+	vcpu->arch.nmi_injected = false;
+	kvm_clear_exception_queue(vcpu);
+	kvm_clear_interrupt_queue(vcpu);
+
+	if (!idtv_info_valid)
+		return;
+
+	kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_EVENT, vcpu);
+
+	vector = idt_vectoring_info & VECTORING_INFO_VECTOR_MASK;
+	type = idt_vectoring_info & VECTORING_INFO_TYPE_MASK;
+
+	switch (type) {
+	case INTR_TYPE_NMI_INTR:
+		vcpu->arch.nmi_injected = true;
+		/*
+		 * SDM 3: 27.7.1.2 (September 2008)
+		 * Clear bit "block by NMI" before VM entry if a NMI
+		 * delivery faulted.
+		 */
+		vmx_set_nmi_mask(vcpu, false);
+		break;
+	case INTR_TYPE_SOFT_EXCEPTION:
+		vcpu->arch.event_exit_inst_len = vmcs_read32(instr_len_field);
+		fallthrough;
+	case INTR_TYPE_HARD_EXCEPTION:
+		if (idt_vectoring_info & VECTORING_INFO_DELIVER_CODE_MASK) {
+			u32 err = vmcs_read32(error_code_field);
+			kvm_requeue_exception_e(vcpu, vector, err);
+		} else
+			kvm_requeue_exception(vcpu, vector);
+		break;
+	case INTR_TYPE_SOFT_INTR:
+		vcpu->arch.event_exit_inst_len = vmcs_read32(instr_len_field);
+		fallthrough;
+	case INTR_TYPE_EXT_INTR:
+		kvm_queue_interrupt(vcpu, vector, type == INTR_TYPE_SOFT_INTR);
+		break;
+	default:
+		break;
+	}
+}
+
+static void vmx_complete_interrupts(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
+{
+	__vmx_complete_interrupts(&vmx->vcpu, vmx->idt_vectoring_info,
+				  VM_EXIT_INSTRUCTION_LEN,
+				  IDT_VECTORING_ERROR_CODE);
+}
+
+static void vmx_cancel_injection(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	__vmx_complete_interrupts(vcpu,
+				  vmcs_read32(VM_ENTRY_INTR_INFO_FIELD),
+				  VM_ENTRY_INSTRUCTION_LEN,
+				  VM_ENTRY_EXCEPTION_ERROR_CODE);
+
+	vmcs_write32(VM_ENTRY_INTR_INFO_FIELD, 0);
+}
+
+static void atomic_switch_perf_msrs(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
+{
+	int i, nr_msrs;
+	struct perf_guest_switch_msr *msrs;
+	struct kvm_pmu *pmu = vcpu_to_pmu(&vmx->vcpu);
+
+	pmu->host_cross_mapped_mask = 0;
+	if (pmu->pebs_enable & pmu->global_ctrl)
+		intel_pmu_cross_mapped_check(pmu);
+
+	/* Note, nr_msrs may be garbage if perf_guest_get_msrs() returns NULL. */
+	msrs = perf_guest_get_msrs(&nr_msrs, (void *)pmu);
+	if (!msrs)
+		return;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < nr_msrs; i++)
+		if (msrs[i].host == msrs[i].guest)
+			clear_atomic_switch_msr(vmx, msrs[i].msr);
+		else
+			add_atomic_switch_msr(vmx, msrs[i].msr, msrs[i].guest,
+					msrs[i].host, false);
+}
+
+static void vmx_update_hv_timer(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+	u64 tscl;
+	u32 delta_tsc;
+
+	if (vmx->req_immediate_exit) {
+		vmcs_write32(VMX_PREEMPTION_TIMER_VALUE, 0);
+		vmx->loaded_vmcs->hv_timer_soft_disabled = false;
+	} else if (vmx->hv_deadline_tsc != -1) {
+		tscl = rdtsc();
+		if (vmx->hv_deadline_tsc > tscl)
+			/* set_hv_timer ensures the delta fits in 32-bits */
+			delta_tsc = (u32)((vmx->hv_deadline_tsc - tscl) >>
+				cpu_preemption_timer_multi);
+		else
+			delta_tsc = 0;
+
+		vmcs_write32(VMX_PREEMPTION_TIMER_VALUE, delta_tsc);
+		vmx->loaded_vmcs->hv_timer_soft_disabled = false;
+	} else if (!vmx->loaded_vmcs->hv_timer_soft_disabled) {
+		vmcs_write32(VMX_PREEMPTION_TIMER_VALUE, -1);
+		vmx->loaded_vmcs->hv_timer_soft_disabled = true;
+	}
+}
+
+void noinstr vmx_update_host_rsp(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, unsigned long host_rsp)
+{
+	if (unlikely(host_rsp != vmx->loaded_vmcs->host_state.rsp)) {
+		vmx->loaded_vmcs->host_state.rsp = host_rsp;
+		vmcs_writel(HOST_RSP, host_rsp);
+	}
+}
+
+void noinstr vmx_spec_ctrl_restore_host(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx,
+					unsigned int flags)
+{
+	u64 hostval = this_cpu_read(x86_spec_ctrl_current);
+
+	if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_MSR_SPEC_CTRL))
+		return;
+
+	if (flags & VMX_RUN_SAVE_SPEC_CTRL)
+		vmx->spec_ctrl = __rdmsr(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL);
+
+	/*
+	 * If the guest/host SPEC_CTRL values differ, restore the host value.
+	 *
+	 * For legacy IBRS, the IBRS bit always needs to be written after
+	 * transitioning from a less privileged predictor mode, regardless of
+	 * whether the guest/host values differ.
+	 */
+	if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_KERNEL_IBRS) ||
+	    vmx->spec_ctrl != hostval)
+		native_wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, hostval);
+
+	barrier_nospec();
+}
+
+static fastpath_t vmx_exit_handlers_fastpath(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	switch (to_vmx(vcpu)->exit_reason.basic) {
+	case EXIT_REASON_MSR_WRITE:
+		return handle_fastpath_set_msr_irqoff(vcpu);
+	case EXIT_REASON_PREEMPTION_TIMER:
+		return handle_fastpath_preemption_timer(vcpu);
+	default:
+		return EXIT_FASTPATH_NONE;
+	}
+}
+
+static noinstr void vmx_vcpu_enter_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+					unsigned int flags)
+{
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+
+	guest_state_enter_irqoff();
+
+	/* L1D Flush includes CPU buffer clear to mitigate MDS */
+	if (static_branch_unlikely(&vmx_l1d_should_flush))
+		vmx_l1d_flush(vcpu);
+	else if (static_branch_unlikely(&mds_user_clear))
+		mds_clear_cpu_buffers();
+	else if (static_branch_unlikely(&mmio_stale_data_clear) &&
+		 kvm_arch_has_assigned_device(vcpu->kvm))
+		mds_clear_cpu_buffers();
+
+	vmx_disable_fb_clear(vmx);
+
+	if (vcpu->arch.cr2 != native_read_cr2())
+		native_write_cr2(vcpu->arch.cr2);
+
+	vmx->fail = __vmx_vcpu_run(vmx, (unsigned long *)&vcpu->arch.regs,
+				   flags);
+
+	vcpu->arch.cr2 = native_read_cr2();
+	vcpu->arch.regs_avail &= ~VMX_REGS_LAZY_LOAD_SET;
+
+	vmx->idt_vectoring_info = 0;
+
+	vmx_enable_fb_clear(vmx);
+
+	if (unlikely(vmx->fail)) {
+		vmx->exit_reason.full = 0xdead;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	vmx->exit_reason.full = vmcs_read32(VM_EXIT_REASON);
+	if (likely(!vmx->exit_reason.failed_vmentry))
+		vmx->idt_vectoring_info = vmcs_read32(IDT_VECTORING_INFO_FIELD);
+
+	if ((u16)vmx->exit_reason.basic == EXIT_REASON_EXCEPTION_NMI &&
+	    is_nmi(vmx_get_intr_info(vcpu))) {
+		kvm_before_interrupt(vcpu, KVM_HANDLING_NMI);
+		vmx_do_nmi_irqoff();
+		kvm_after_interrupt(vcpu);
+	}
+
+out:
+	guest_state_exit_irqoff();
+}
+
+static fastpath_t vmx_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+	unsigned long cr3, cr4;
+
+	/* Record the guest's net vcpu time for enforced NMI injections. */
+	if (unlikely(!enable_vnmi &&
+		     vmx->loaded_vmcs->soft_vnmi_blocked))
+		vmx->loaded_vmcs->entry_time = ktime_get();
+
+	/*
+	 * Don't enter VMX if guest state is invalid, let the exit handler
+	 * start emulation until we arrive back to a valid state.  Synthesize a
+	 * consistency check VM-Exit due to invalid guest state and bail.
+	 */
+	if (unlikely(vmx->emulation_required)) {
+		vmx->fail = 0;
+
+		vmx->exit_reason.full = EXIT_REASON_INVALID_STATE;
+		vmx->exit_reason.failed_vmentry = 1;
+		kvm_register_mark_available(vcpu, VCPU_EXREG_EXIT_INFO_1);
+		vmx->exit_qualification = ENTRY_FAIL_DEFAULT;
+		kvm_register_mark_available(vcpu, VCPU_EXREG_EXIT_INFO_2);
+		vmx->exit_intr_info = 0;
+		return EXIT_FASTPATH_NONE;
+	}
+
+	trace_kvm_entry(vcpu);
+
+	if (vmx->ple_window_dirty) {
+		vmx->ple_window_dirty = false;
+		vmcs_write32(PLE_WINDOW, vmx->ple_window);
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * We did this in prepare_switch_to_guest, because it needs to
+	 * be within srcu_read_lock.
+	 */
+	WARN_ON_ONCE(vmx->nested.need_vmcs12_to_shadow_sync);
+
+	if (kvm_register_is_dirty(vcpu, VCPU_REGS_RSP))
+		vmcs_writel(GUEST_RSP, vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RSP]);
+	if (kvm_register_is_dirty(vcpu, VCPU_REGS_RIP))
+		vmcs_writel(GUEST_RIP, vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RIP]);
+	vcpu->arch.regs_dirty = 0;
+
+	/*
+	 * Refresh vmcs.HOST_CR3 if necessary.  This must be done immediately
+	 * prior to VM-Enter, as the kernel may load a new ASID (PCID) any time
+	 * it switches back to the current->mm, which can occur in KVM context
+	 * when switching to a temporary mm to patch kernel code, e.g. if KVM
+	 * toggles a static key while handling a VM-Exit.
+	 */
+	cr3 = __get_current_cr3_fast();
+	if (unlikely(cr3 != vmx->loaded_vmcs->host_state.cr3)) {
+		vmcs_writel(HOST_CR3, cr3);
+		vmx->loaded_vmcs->host_state.cr3 = cr3;
+	}
+
+	cr4 = cr4_read_shadow();
+	if (unlikely(cr4 != vmx->loaded_vmcs->host_state.cr4)) {
+		vmcs_writel(HOST_CR4, cr4);
+		vmx->loaded_vmcs->host_state.cr4 = cr4;
+	}
+
+	/* When KVM_DEBUGREG_WONT_EXIT, dr6 is accessible in guest. */
+	if (unlikely(vcpu->arch.switch_db_regs & KVM_DEBUGREG_WONT_EXIT))
+		set_debugreg(vcpu->arch.dr6, 6);
+
+	/* When single-stepping over STI and MOV SS, we must clear the
+	 * corresponding interruptibility bits in the guest state. Otherwise
+	 * vmentry fails as it then expects bit 14 (BS) in pending debug
+	 * exceptions being set, but that's not correct for the guest debugging
+	 * case. */
+	if (vcpu->guest_debug & KVM_GUESTDBG_SINGLESTEP)
+		vmx_set_interrupt_shadow(vcpu, 0);
+
+	kvm_load_guest_xsave_state(vcpu);
+
+	pt_guest_enter(vmx);
+
+	atomic_switch_perf_msrs(vmx);
+	if (intel_pmu_lbr_is_enabled(vcpu))
+		vmx_passthrough_lbr_msrs(vcpu);
+
+	if (enable_preemption_timer)
+		vmx_update_hv_timer(vcpu);
+
+	kvm_wait_lapic_expire(vcpu);
+
+	/* The actual VMENTER/EXIT is in the .noinstr.text section. */
+	vmx_vcpu_enter_exit(vcpu, __vmx_vcpu_run_flags(vmx));
+
+	/* All fields are clean at this point */
+	if (kvm_is_using_evmcs()) {
+		current_evmcs->hv_clean_fields |=
+			HV_VMX_ENLIGHTENED_CLEAN_FIELD_ALL;
+
+		current_evmcs->hv_vp_id = kvm_hv_get_vpindex(vcpu);
+	}
+
+	/* MSR_IA32_DEBUGCTLMSR is zeroed on vmexit. Restore it if needed */
+	if (vmx->host_debugctlmsr)
+		update_debugctlmsr(vmx->host_debugctlmsr);
+
+#ifndef CONFIG_X86_64
+	/*
+	 * The sysexit path does not restore ds/es, so we must set them to
+	 * a reasonable value ourselves.
+	 *
+	 * We can't defer this to vmx_prepare_switch_to_host() since that
+	 * function may be executed in interrupt context, which saves and
+	 * restore segments around it, nullifying its effect.
+	 */
+	loadsegment(ds, __USER_DS);
+	loadsegment(es, __USER_DS);
+#endif
+
+	pt_guest_exit(vmx);
+
+	kvm_load_host_xsave_state(vcpu);
+
+	if (is_guest_mode(vcpu)) {
+		/*
+		 * Track VMLAUNCH/VMRESUME that have made past guest state
+		 * checking.
+		 */
+		if (vmx->nested.nested_run_pending &&
+		    !vmx->exit_reason.failed_vmentry)
+			++vcpu->stat.nested_run;
+
+		vmx->nested.nested_run_pending = 0;
+	}
+
+	if (unlikely(vmx->fail))
+		return EXIT_FASTPATH_NONE;
+
+	if (unlikely((u16)vmx->exit_reason.basic == EXIT_REASON_MCE_DURING_VMENTRY))
+		kvm_machine_check();
+
+	trace_kvm_exit(vcpu, KVM_ISA_VMX);
+
+	if (unlikely(vmx->exit_reason.failed_vmentry))
+		return EXIT_FASTPATH_NONE;
+
+	vmx->loaded_vmcs->launched = 1;
+
+	vmx_recover_nmi_blocking(vmx);
+	vmx_complete_interrupts(vmx);
+
+	if (is_guest_mode(vcpu))
+		return EXIT_FASTPATH_NONE;
+
+	return vmx_exit_handlers_fastpath(vcpu);
+}
+
+static void vmx_vcpu_free(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+
+	if (enable_pml)
+		vmx_destroy_pml_buffer(vmx);
+	free_vpid(vmx->vpid);
+	nested_vmx_free_vcpu(vcpu);
+	free_loaded_vmcs(vmx->loaded_vmcs);
+}
+
+static int vmx_vcpu_create(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct vmx_uret_msr *tsx_ctrl;
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx;
+	int i, err;
+
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(offsetof(struct vcpu_vmx, vcpu) != 0);
+	vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+
+	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&vmx->pi_wakeup_list);
+
+	err = -ENOMEM;
+
+	vmx->vpid = allocate_vpid();
+
+	/*
+	 * If PML is turned on, failure on enabling PML just results in failure
+	 * of creating the vcpu, therefore we can simplify PML logic (by
+	 * avoiding dealing with cases, such as enabling PML partially on vcpus
+	 * for the guest), etc.
+	 */
+	if (enable_pml) {
+		vmx->pml_pg = alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT | __GFP_ZERO);
+		if (!vmx->pml_pg)
+			goto free_vpid;
+	}
+
+	for (i = 0; i < kvm_nr_uret_msrs; ++i)
+		vmx->guest_uret_msrs[i].mask = -1ull;
+	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RTM)) {
+		/*
+		 * TSX_CTRL_CPUID_CLEAR is handled in the CPUID interception.
+		 * Keep the host value unchanged to avoid changing CPUID bits
+		 * under the host kernel's feet.
+		 */
+		tsx_ctrl = vmx_find_uret_msr(vmx, MSR_IA32_TSX_CTRL);
+		if (tsx_ctrl)
+			tsx_ctrl->mask = ~(u64)TSX_CTRL_CPUID_CLEAR;
+	}
+
+	err = alloc_loaded_vmcs(&vmx->vmcs01);
+	if (err < 0)
+		goto free_pml;
+
+	/*
+	 * Use Hyper-V 'Enlightened MSR Bitmap' feature when KVM runs as a
+	 * nested (L1) hypervisor and Hyper-V in L0 supports it. Enable the
+	 * feature only for vmcs01, KVM currently isn't equipped to realize any
+	 * performance benefits from enabling it for vmcs02.
+	 */
+	if (kvm_is_using_evmcs() &&
+	    (ms_hyperv.nested_features & HV_X64_NESTED_MSR_BITMAP)) {
+		struct hv_enlightened_vmcs *evmcs = (void *)vmx->vmcs01.vmcs;
+
+		evmcs->hv_enlightenments_control.msr_bitmap = 1;
+	}
+
+	/* The MSR bitmap starts with all ones */
+	bitmap_fill(vmx->shadow_msr_intercept.read, MAX_POSSIBLE_PASSTHROUGH_MSRS);
+	bitmap_fill(vmx->shadow_msr_intercept.write, MAX_POSSIBLE_PASSTHROUGH_MSRS);
+
+	vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, MSR_IA32_TSC, MSR_TYPE_R);
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+	vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, MSR_FS_BASE, MSR_TYPE_RW);
+	vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, MSR_GS_BASE, MSR_TYPE_RW);
+	vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, MSR_KERNEL_GS_BASE, MSR_TYPE_RW);
+#endif
+	vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_CS, MSR_TYPE_RW);
+	vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_ESP, MSR_TYPE_RW);
+	vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_EIP, MSR_TYPE_RW);
+	if (kvm_cstate_in_guest(vcpu->kvm)) {
+		vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, MSR_CORE_C1_RES, MSR_TYPE_R);
+		vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, MSR_CORE_C3_RESIDENCY, MSR_TYPE_R);
+		vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, MSR_CORE_C6_RESIDENCY, MSR_TYPE_R);
+		vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, MSR_CORE_C7_RESIDENCY, MSR_TYPE_R);
+	}
+
+	vmx->loaded_vmcs = &vmx->vmcs01;
+
+	if (cpu_need_virtualize_apic_accesses(vcpu)) {
+		err = kvm_alloc_apic_access_page(vcpu->kvm);
+		if (err)
+			goto free_vmcs;
+	}
+
+	if (enable_ept && !enable_unrestricted_guest) {
+		err = init_rmode_identity_map(vcpu->kvm);
+		if (err)
+			goto free_vmcs;
+	}
+
+	if (vmx_can_use_ipiv(vcpu))
+		WRITE_ONCE(to_kvm_vmx(vcpu->kvm)->pid_table[vcpu->vcpu_id],
+			   __pa(&vmx->pi_desc) | PID_TABLE_ENTRY_VALID);
+
+	return 0;
+
+free_vmcs:
+	free_loaded_vmcs(vmx->loaded_vmcs);
+free_pml:
+	vmx_destroy_pml_buffer(vmx);
+free_vpid:
+	free_vpid(vmx->vpid);
+	return err;
+}
+
+#define L1TF_MSG_SMT "L1TF CPU bug present and SMT on, data leak possible. See CVE-2018-3646 and https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/l1tf.html for details.\n"
+#define L1TF_MSG_L1D "L1TF CPU bug present and virtualization mitigation disabled, data leak possible. See CVE-2018-3646 and https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/l1tf.html for details.\n"
+
+static int vmx_vm_init(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+	if (!ple_gap)
+		kvm->arch.pause_in_guest = true;
+
+	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_BUG_L1TF) && enable_ept) {
+		switch (l1tf_mitigation) {
+		case L1TF_MITIGATION_OFF:
+		case L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH_NOWARN:
+			/* 'I explicitly don't care' is set */
+			break;
+		case L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH:
+		case L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH_NOSMT:
+		case L1TF_MITIGATION_FULL:
+			/*
+			 * Warn upon starting the first VM in a potentially
+			 * insecure environment.
+			 */
+			if (sched_smt_active())
+				pr_warn_once(L1TF_MSG_SMT);
+			if (l1tf_vmx_mitigation == VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_NEVER)
+				pr_warn_once(L1TF_MSG_L1D);
+			break;
+		case L1TF_MITIGATION_FULL_FORCE:
+			/* Flush is enforced */
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static u8 vmx_get_mt_mask(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gfn_t gfn, bool is_mmio)
+{
+	u8 cache;
+
+	/* We wanted to honor guest CD/MTRR/PAT, but doing so could result in
+	 * memory aliases with conflicting memory types and sometimes MCEs.
+	 * We have to be careful as to what are honored and when.
+	 *
+	 * For MMIO, guest CD/MTRR are ignored.  The EPT memory type is set to
+	 * UC.  The effective memory type is UC or WC depending on guest PAT.
+	 * This was historically the source of MCEs and we want to be
+	 * conservative.
+	 *
+	 * When there is no need to deal with noncoherent DMA (e.g., no VT-d
+	 * or VT-d has snoop control), guest CD/MTRR/PAT are all ignored.  The
+	 * EPT memory type is set to WB.  The effective memory type is forced
+	 * WB.
+	 *
+	 * Otherwise, we trust guest.  Guest CD/MTRR/PAT are all honored.  The
+	 * EPT memory type is used to emulate guest CD/MTRR.
+	 */
+
+	if (is_mmio)
+		return MTRR_TYPE_UNCACHABLE << VMX_EPT_MT_EPTE_SHIFT;
+
+	if (!kvm_arch_has_noncoherent_dma(vcpu->kvm))
+		return (MTRR_TYPE_WRBACK << VMX_EPT_MT_EPTE_SHIFT) | VMX_EPT_IPAT_BIT;
+
+	if (kvm_read_cr0_bits(vcpu, X86_CR0_CD)) {
+		if (kvm_check_has_quirk(vcpu->kvm, KVM_X86_QUIRK_CD_NW_CLEARED))
+			cache = MTRR_TYPE_WRBACK;
+		else
+			cache = MTRR_TYPE_UNCACHABLE;
+
+		return (cache << VMX_EPT_MT_EPTE_SHIFT) | VMX_EPT_IPAT_BIT;
+	}
+
+	return kvm_mtrr_get_guest_memory_type(vcpu, gfn) << VMX_EPT_MT_EPTE_SHIFT;
+}
+
+static void vmcs_set_secondary_exec_control(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, u32 new_ctl)
+{
+	/*
+	 * These bits in the secondary execution controls field
+	 * are dynamic, the others are mostly based on the hypervisor
+	 * architecture and the guest's CPUID.  Do not touch the
+	 * dynamic bits.
+	 */
+	u32 mask =
+		SECONDARY_EXEC_SHADOW_VMCS |
+		SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_X2APIC_MODE |
+		SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_APIC_ACCESSES |
+		SECONDARY_EXEC_DESC;
+
+	u32 cur_ctl = secondary_exec_controls_get(vmx);
+
+	secondary_exec_controls_set(vmx, (new_ctl & ~mask) | (cur_ctl & mask));
+}
+
+/*
+ * Generate MSR_IA32_VMX_CR{0,4}_FIXED1 according to CPUID. Only set bits
+ * (indicating "allowed-1") if they are supported in the guest's CPUID.
+ */
+static void nested_vmx_cr_fixed1_bits_update(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+	struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *entry;
+
+	vmx->nested.msrs.cr0_fixed1 = 0xffffffff;
+	vmx->nested.msrs.cr4_fixed1 = X86_CR4_PCE;
+
+#define cr4_fixed1_update(_cr4_mask, _reg, _cpuid_mask) do {		\
+	if (entry && (entry->_reg & (_cpuid_mask)))			\
+		vmx->nested.msrs.cr4_fixed1 |= (_cr4_mask);	\
+} while (0)
+
+	entry = kvm_find_cpuid_entry(vcpu, 0x1);
+	cr4_fixed1_update(X86_CR4_VME,        edx, feature_bit(VME));
+	cr4_fixed1_update(X86_CR4_PVI,        edx, feature_bit(VME));
+	cr4_fixed1_update(X86_CR4_TSD,        edx, feature_bit(TSC));
+	cr4_fixed1_update(X86_CR4_DE,         edx, feature_bit(DE));
+	cr4_fixed1_update(X86_CR4_PSE,        edx, feature_bit(PSE));
+	cr4_fixed1_update(X86_CR4_PAE,        edx, feature_bit(PAE));
+	cr4_fixed1_update(X86_CR4_MCE,        edx, feature_bit(MCE));
+	cr4_fixed1_update(X86_CR4_PGE,        edx, feature_bit(PGE));
+	cr4_fixed1_update(X86_CR4_OSFXSR,     edx, feature_bit(FXSR));
+	cr4_fixed1_update(X86_CR4_OSXMMEXCPT, edx, feature_bit(XMM));
+	cr4_fixed1_update(X86_CR4_VMXE,       ecx, feature_bit(VMX));
+	cr4_fixed1_update(X86_CR4_SMXE,       ecx, feature_bit(SMX));
+	cr4_fixed1_update(X86_CR4_PCIDE,      ecx, feature_bit(PCID));
+	cr4_fixed1_update(X86_CR4_OSXSAVE,    ecx, feature_bit(XSAVE));
+
+	entry = kvm_find_cpuid_entry_index(vcpu, 0x7, 0);
+	cr4_fixed1_update(X86_CR4_FSGSBASE,   ebx, feature_bit(FSGSBASE));
+	cr4_fixed1_update(X86_CR4_SMEP,       ebx, feature_bit(SMEP));
+	cr4_fixed1_update(X86_CR4_SMAP,       ebx, feature_bit(SMAP));
+	cr4_fixed1_update(X86_CR4_PKE,        ecx, feature_bit(PKU));
+	cr4_fixed1_update(X86_CR4_UMIP,       ecx, feature_bit(UMIP));
+	cr4_fixed1_update(X86_CR4_LA57,       ecx, feature_bit(LA57));
+
+#undef cr4_fixed1_update
+}
+
+static void update_intel_pt_cfg(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+	struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *best = NULL;
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < PT_CPUID_LEAVES; i++) {
+		best = kvm_find_cpuid_entry_index(vcpu, 0x14, i);
+		if (!best)
+			return;
+		vmx->pt_desc.caps[CPUID_EAX + i*PT_CPUID_REGS_NUM] = best->eax;
+		vmx->pt_desc.caps[CPUID_EBX + i*PT_CPUID_REGS_NUM] = best->ebx;
+		vmx->pt_desc.caps[CPUID_ECX + i*PT_CPUID_REGS_NUM] = best->ecx;
+		vmx->pt_desc.caps[CPUID_EDX + i*PT_CPUID_REGS_NUM] = best->edx;
+	}
+
+	/* Get the number of configurable Address Ranges for filtering */
+	vmx->pt_desc.num_address_ranges = intel_pt_validate_cap(vmx->pt_desc.caps,
+						PT_CAP_num_address_ranges);
+
+	/* Initialize and clear the no dependency bits */
+	vmx->pt_desc.ctl_bitmask = ~(RTIT_CTL_TRACEEN | RTIT_CTL_OS |
+			RTIT_CTL_USR | RTIT_CTL_TSC_EN | RTIT_CTL_DISRETC |
+			RTIT_CTL_BRANCH_EN);
+
+	/*
+	 * If CPUID.(EAX=14H,ECX=0):EBX[0]=1 CR3Filter can be set otherwise
+	 * will inject an #GP
+	 */
+	if (intel_pt_validate_cap(vmx->pt_desc.caps, PT_CAP_cr3_filtering))
+		vmx->pt_desc.ctl_bitmask &= ~RTIT_CTL_CR3EN;
+
+	/*
+	 * If CPUID.(EAX=14H,ECX=0):EBX[1]=1 CYCEn, CycThresh and
+	 * PSBFreq can be set
+	 */
+	if (intel_pt_validate_cap(vmx->pt_desc.caps, PT_CAP_psb_cyc))
+		vmx->pt_desc.ctl_bitmask &= ~(RTIT_CTL_CYCLEACC |
+				RTIT_CTL_CYC_THRESH | RTIT_CTL_PSB_FREQ);
+
+	/*
+	 * If CPUID.(EAX=14H,ECX=0):EBX[3]=1 MTCEn and MTCFreq can be set
+	 */
+	if (intel_pt_validate_cap(vmx->pt_desc.caps, PT_CAP_mtc))
+		vmx->pt_desc.ctl_bitmask &= ~(RTIT_CTL_MTC_EN |
+					      RTIT_CTL_MTC_RANGE);
+
+	/* If CPUID.(EAX=14H,ECX=0):EBX[4]=1 FUPonPTW and PTWEn can be set */
+	if (intel_pt_validate_cap(vmx->pt_desc.caps, PT_CAP_ptwrite))
+		vmx->pt_desc.ctl_bitmask &= ~(RTIT_CTL_FUP_ON_PTW |
+							RTIT_CTL_PTW_EN);
+
+	/* If CPUID.(EAX=14H,ECX=0):EBX[5]=1 PwrEvEn can be set */
+	if (intel_pt_validate_cap(vmx->pt_desc.caps, PT_CAP_power_event_trace))
+		vmx->pt_desc.ctl_bitmask &= ~RTIT_CTL_PWR_EVT_EN;
+
+	/* If CPUID.(EAX=14H,ECX=0):ECX[0]=1 ToPA can be set */
+	if (intel_pt_validate_cap(vmx->pt_desc.caps, PT_CAP_topa_output))
+		vmx->pt_desc.ctl_bitmask &= ~RTIT_CTL_TOPA;
+
+	/* If CPUID.(EAX=14H,ECX=0):ECX[3]=1 FabricEn can be set */
+	if (intel_pt_validate_cap(vmx->pt_desc.caps, PT_CAP_output_subsys))
+		vmx->pt_desc.ctl_bitmask &= ~RTIT_CTL_FABRIC_EN;
+
+	/* unmask address range configure area */
+	for (i = 0; i < vmx->pt_desc.num_address_ranges; i++)
+		vmx->pt_desc.ctl_bitmask &= ~(0xfULL << (32 + i * 4));
+}
+
+static void vmx_vcpu_after_set_cpuid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+
+	/*
+	 * XSAVES is effectively enabled if and only if XSAVE is also exposed
+	 * to the guest.  XSAVES depends on CR4.OSXSAVE, and CR4.OSXSAVE can be
+	 * set if and only if XSAVE is supported.
+	 */
+	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_XSAVE) &&
+	    guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_XSAVE))
+		kvm_governed_feature_check_and_set(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_XSAVES);
+
+	kvm_governed_feature_check_and_set(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_VMX);
+
+	vmx_setup_uret_msrs(vmx);
+
+	if (cpu_has_secondary_exec_ctrls())
+		vmcs_set_secondary_exec_control(vmx,
+						vmx_secondary_exec_control(vmx));
+
+	if (guest_can_use(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_VMX))
+		vmx->msr_ia32_feature_control_valid_bits |=
+			FEAT_CTL_VMX_ENABLED_INSIDE_SMX |
+			FEAT_CTL_VMX_ENABLED_OUTSIDE_SMX;
+	else
+		vmx->msr_ia32_feature_control_valid_bits &=
+			~(FEAT_CTL_VMX_ENABLED_INSIDE_SMX |
+			  FEAT_CTL_VMX_ENABLED_OUTSIDE_SMX);
+
+	if (guest_can_use(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_VMX))
+		nested_vmx_cr_fixed1_bits_update(vcpu);
+
+	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_INTEL_PT) &&
+			guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_INTEL_PT))
+		update_intel_pt_cfg(vcpu);
+
+	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RTM)) {
+		struct vmx_uret_msr *msr;
+		msr = vmx_find_uret_msr(vmx, MSR_IA32_TSX_CTRL);
+		if (msr) {
+			bool enabled = guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_RTM);
+			vmx_set_guest_uret_msr(vmx, msr, enabled ? 0 : TSX_CTRL_RTM_DISABLE);
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (kvm_cpu_cap_has(X86_FEATURE_XFD))
+		vmx_set_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, MSR_IA32_XFD_ERR, MSR_TYPE_R,
+					  !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_XFD));
+
+	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB))
+		vmx_set_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD, MSR_TYPE_W,
+					  !guest_has_pred_cmd_msr(vcpu));
+
+	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_FLUSH_L1D))
+		vmx_set_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, MSR_IA32_FLUSH_CMD, MSR_TYPE_W,
+					  !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_FLUSH_L1D));
+
+	set_cr4_guest_host_mask(vmx);
+
+	vmx_write_encls_bitmap(vcpu, NULL);
+	if (guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_SGX))
+		vmx->msr_ia32_feature_control_valid_bits |= FEAT_CTL_SGX_ENABLED;
+	else
+		vmx->msr_ia32_feature_control_valid_bits &= ~FEAT_CTL_SGX_ENABLED;
+
+	if (guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_SGX_LC))
+		vmx->msr_ia32_feature_control_valid_bits |=
+			FEAT_CTL_SGX_LC_ENABLED;
+	else
+		vmx->msr_ia32_feature_control_valid_bits &=
+			~FEAT_CTL_SGX_LC_ENABLED;
+
+	/* Refresh #PF interception to account for MAXPHYADDR changes. */
+	vmx_update_exception_bitmap(vcpu);
+}
+
+static u64 vmx_get_perf_capabilities(void)
+{
+	u64 perf_cap = PMU_CAP_FW_WRITES;
+	struct x86_pmu_lbr lbr;
+	u64 host_perf_cap = 0;
+
+	if (!enable_pmu)
+		return 0;
+
+	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PDCM))
+		rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_PERF_CAPABILITIES, host_perf_cap);
+
+	if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_ARCH_LBR)) {
+		x86_perf_get_lbr(&lbr);
+		if (lbr.nr)
+			perf_cap |= host_perf_cap & PMU_CAP_LBR_FMT;
+	}
+
+	if (vmx_pebs_supported()) {
+		perf_cap |= host_perf_cap & PERF_CAP_PEBS_MASK;
+		if ((perf_cap & PERF_CAP_PEBS_FORMAT) < 4)
+			perf_cap &= ~PERF_CAP_PEBS_BASELINE;
+	}
+
+	return perf_cap;
+}
+
+static __init void vmx_set_cpu_caps(void)
+{
+	kvm_set_cpu_caps();
+
+	/* CPUID 0x1 */
+	if (nested)
+		kvm_cpu_cap_set(X86_FEATURE_VMX);
+
+	/* CPUID 0x7 */
+	if (kvm_mpx_supported())
+		kvm_cpu_cap_check_and_set(X86_FEATURE_MPX);
+	if (!cpu_has_vmx_invpcid())
+		kvm_cpu_cap_clear(X86_FEATURE_INVPCID);
+	if (vmx_pt_mode_is_host_guest())
+		kvm_cpu_cap_check_and_set(X86_FEATURE_INTEL_PT);
+	if (vmx_pebs_supported()) {
+		kvm_cpu_cap_check_and_set(X86_FEATURE_DS);
+		kvm_cpu_cap_check_and_set(X86_FEATURE_DTES64);
+	}
+
+	if (!enable_pmu)
+		kvm_cpu_cap_clear(X86_FEATURE_PDCM);
+	kvm_caps.supported_perf_cap = vmx_get_perf_capabilities();
+
+	if (!enable_sgx) {
+		kvm_cpu_cap_clear(X86_FEATURE_SGX);
+		kvm_cpu_cap_clear(X86_FEATURE_SGX_LC);
+		kvm_cpu_cap_clear(X86_FEATURE_SGX1);
+		kvm_cpu_cap_clear(X86_FEATURE_SGX2);
+	}
+
+	if (vmx_umip_emulated())
+		kvm_cpu_cap_set(X86_FEATURE_UMIP);
+
+	/* CPUID 0xD.1 */
+	kvm_caps.supported_xss = 0;
+	if (!cpu_has_vmx_xsaves())
+		kvm_cpu_cap_clear(X86_FEATURE_XSAVES);
+
+	/* CPUID 0x80000001 and 0x7 (RDPID) */
+	if (!cpu_has_vmx_rdtscp()) {
+		kvm_cpu_cap_clear(X86_FEATURE_RDTSCP);
+		kvm_cpu_cap_clear(X86_FEATURE_RDPID);
+	}
+
+	if (cpu_has_vmx_waitpkg())
+		kvm_cpu_cap_check_and_set(X86_FEATURE_WAITPKG);
+}
+
+static void vmx_request_immediate_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	to_vmx(vcpu)->req_immediate_exit = true;
+}
+
+static int vmx_check_intercept_io(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+				  struct x86_instruction_info *info)
+{
+	struct vmcs12 *vmcs12 = get_vmcs12(vcpu);
+	unsigned short port;
+	bool intercept;
+	int size;
+
+	if (info->intercept == x86_intercept_in ||
+	    info->intercept == x86_intercept_ins) {
+		port = info->src_val;
+		size = info->dst_bytes;
+	} else {
+		port = info->dst_val;
+		size = info->src_bytes;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * If the 'use IO bitmaps' VM-execution control is 0, IO instruction
+	 * VM-exits depend on the 'unconditional IO exiting' VM-execution
+	 * control.
+	 *
+	 * Otherwise, IO instruction VM-exits are controlled by the IO bitmaps.
+	 */
+	if (!nested_cpu_has(vmcs12, CPU_BASED_USE_IO_BITMAPS))
+		intercept = nested_cpu_has(vmcs12,
+					   CPU_BASED_UNCOND_IO_EXITING);
+	else
+		intercept = nested_vmx_check_io_bitmaps(vcpu, port, size);
+
+	/* FIXME: produce nested vmexit and return X86EMUL_INTERCEPTED.  */
+	return intercept ? X86EMUL_UNHANDLEABLE : X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
+}
+
+static int vmx_check_intercept(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+			       struct x86_instruction_info *info,
+			       enum x86_intercept_stage stage,
+			       struct x86_exception *exception)
+{
+	struct vmcs12 *vmcs12 = get_vmcs12(vcpu);
+
+	switch (info->intercept) {
+	/*
+	 * RDPID causes #UD if disabled through secondary execution controls.
+	 * Because it is marked as EmulateOnUD, we need to intercept it here.
+	 * Note, RDPID is hidden behind ENABLE_RDTSCP.
+	 */
+	case x86_intercept_rdpid:
+		if (!nested_cpu_has2(vmcs12, SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_RDTSCP)) {
+			exception->vector = UD_VECTOR;
+			exception->error_code_valid = false;
+			return X86EMUL_PROPAGATE_FAULT;
+		}
+		break;
+
+	case x86_intercept_in:
+	case x86_intercept_ins:
+	case x86_intercept_out:
+	case x86_intercept_outs:
+		return vmx_check_intercept_io(vcpu, info);
+
+	case x86_intercept_lgdt:
+	case x86_intercept_lidt:
+	case x86_intercept_lldt:
+	case x86_intercept_ltr:
+	case x86_intercept_sgdt:
+	case x86_intercept_sidt:
+	case x86_intercept_sldt:
+	case x86_intercept_str:
+		if (!nested_cpu_has2(vmcs12, SECONDARY_EXEC_DESC))
+			return X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
+
+		/* FIXME: produce nested vmexit and return X86EMUL_INTERCEPTED.  */
+		break;
+
+	case x86_intercept_pause:
+		/*
+		 * PAUSE is a single-byte NOP with a REPE prefix, i.e. collides
+		 * with vanilla NOPs in the emulator.  Apply the interception
+		 * check only to actual PAUSE instructions.  Don't check
+		 * PAUSE-loop-exiting, software can't expect a given PAUSE to
+		 * exit, i.e. KVM is within its rights to allow L2 to execute
+		 * the PAUSE.
+		 */
+		if ((info->rep_prefix != REPE_PREFIX) ||
+		    !nested_cpu_has2(vmcs12, CPU_BASED_PAUSE_EXITING))
+			return X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
+
+		break;
+
+	/* TODO: check more intercepts... */
+	default:
+		break;
+	}
+
+	return X86EMUL_UNHANDLEABLE;
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+/* (a << shift) / divisor, return 1 if overflow otherwise 0 */
+static inline int u64_shl_div_u64(u64 a, unsigned int shift,
+				  u64 divisor, u64 *result)
+{
+	u64 low = a << shift, high = a >> (64 - shift);
+
+	/* To avoid the overflow on divq */
+	if (high >= divisor)
+		return 1;
+
+	/* Low hold the result, high hold rem which is discarded */
+	asm("divq %2\n\t" : "=a" (low), "=d" (high) :
+	    "rm" (divisor), "0" (low), "1" (high));
+	*result = low;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int vmx_set_hv_timer(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 guest_deadline_tsc,
+			    bool *expired)
+{
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx;
+	u64 tscl, guest_tscl, delta_tsc, lapic_timer_advance_cycles;
+	struct kvm_timer *ktimer = &vcpu->arch.apic->lapic_timer;
+
+	vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+	tscl = rdtsc();
+	guest_tscl = kvm_read_l1_tsc(vcpu, tscl);
+	delta_tsc = max(guest_deadline_tsc, guest_tscl) - guest_tscl;
+	lapic_timer_advance_cycles = nsec_to_cycles(vcpu,
+						    ktimer->timer_advance_ns);
+
+	if (delta_tsc > lapic_timer_advance_cycles)
+		delta_tsc -= lapic_timer_advance_cycles;
+	else
+		delta_tsc = 0;
+
+	/* Convert to host delta tsc if tsc scaling is enabled */
+	if (vcpu->arch.l1_tsc_scaling_ratio != kvm_caps.default_tsc_scaling_ratio &&
+	    delta_tsc && u64_shl_div_u64(delta_tsc,
+				kvm_caps.tsc_scaling_ratio_frac_bits,
+				vcpu->arch.l1_tsc_scaling_ratio, &delta_tsc))
+		return -ERANGE;
+
+	/*
+	 * If the delta tsc can't fit in the 32 bit after the multi shift,
+	 * we can't use the preemption timer.
+	 * It's possible that it fits on later vmentries, but checking
+	 * on every vmentry is costly so we just use an hrtimer.
+	 */
+	if (delta_tsc >> (cpu_preemption_timer_multi + 32))
+		return -ERANGE;
+
+	vmx->hv_deadline_tsc = tscl + delta_tsc;
+	*expired = !delta_tsc;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void vmx_cancel_hv_timer(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	to_vmx(vcpu)->hv_deadline_tsc = -1;
+}
+#endif
+
+static void vmx_sched_in(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int cpu)
+{
+	if (!kvm_pause_in_guest(vcpu->kvm))
+		shrink_ple_window(vcpu);
+}
+
+void vmx_update_cpu_dirty_logging(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+
+	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!enable_pml))
+		return;
+
+	if (is_guest_mode(vcpu)) {
+		vmx->nested.update_vmcs01_cpu_dirty_logging = true;
+		return;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Note, nr_memslots_dirty_logging can be changed concurrent with this
+	 * code, but in that case another update request will be made and so
+	 * the guest will never run with a stale PML value.
+	 */
+	if (atomic_read(&vcpu->kvm->nr_memslots_dirty_logging))
+		secondary_exec_controls_setbit(vmx, SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_PML);
+	else
+		secondary_exec_controls_clearbit(vmx, SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_PML);
+}
+
+static void vmx_setup_mce(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	if (vcpu->arch.mcg_cap & MCG_LMCE_P)
+		to_vmx(vcpu)->msr_ia32_feature_control_valid_bits |=
+			FEAT_CTL_LMCE_ENABLED;
+	else
+		to_vmx(vcpu)->msr_ia32_feature_control_valid_bits &=
+			~FEAT_CTL_LMCE_ENABLED;
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_SMM
+static int vmx_smi_allowed(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool for_injection)
+{
+	/* we need a nested vmexit to enter SMM, postpone if run is pending */
+	if (to_vmx(vcpu)->nested.nested_run_pending)
+		return -EBUSY;
+	return !is_smm(vcpu);
+}
+
+static int vmx_enter_smm(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, union kvm_smram *smram)
+{
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+
+	/*
+	 * TODO: Implement custom flows for forcing the vCPU out/in of L2 on
+	 * SMI and RSM.  Using the common VM-Exit + VM-Enter routines is wrong
+	 * SMI and RSM only modify state that is saved and restored via SMRAM.
+	 * E.g. most MSRs are left untouched, but many are modified by VM-Exit
+	 * and VM-Enter, and thus L2's values may be corrupted on SMI+RSM.
+	 */
+	vmx->nested.smm.guest_mode = is_guest_mode(vcpu);
+	if (vmx->nested.smm.guest_mode)
+		nested_vmx_vmexit(vcpu, -1, 0, 0);
+
+	vmx->nested.smm.vmxon = vmx->nested.vmxon;
+	vmx->nested.vmxon = false;
+	vmx_clear_hlt(vcpu);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int vmx_leave_smm(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, const union kvm_smram *smram)
+{
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+	int ret;
+
+	if (vmx->nested.smm.vmxon) {
+		vmx->nested.vmxon = true;
+		vmx->nested.smm.vmxon = false;
+	}
+
+	if (vmx->nested.smm.guest_mode) {
+		ret = nested_vmx_enter_non_root_mode(vcpu, false);
+		if (ret)
+			return ret;
+
+		vmx->nested.nested_run_pending = 1;
+		vmx->nested.smm.guest_mode = false;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void vmx_enable_smi_window(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	/* RSM will cause a vmexit anyway.  */
+}
+#endif
+
+static bool vmx_apic_init_signal_blocked(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	return to_vmx(vcpu)->nested.vmxon && !is_guest_mode(vcpu);
+}
+
+static void vmx_migrate_timers(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	if (is_guest_mode(vcpu)) {
+		struct hrtimer *timer = &to_vmx(vcpu)->nested.preemption_timer;
+
+		if (hrtimer_try_to_cancel(timer) == 1)
+			hrtimer_start_expires(timer, HRTIMER_MODE_ABS_PINNED);
+	}
+}
+
+static void vmx_hardware_unsetup(void)
+{
+	kvm_set_posted_intr_wakeup_handler(NULL);
+
+	if (nested)
+		nested_vmx_hardware_unsetup();
+
+	free_kvm_area();
+}
+
+#define VMX_REQUIRED_APICV_INHIBITS			\
+(							\
+	BIT(APICV_INHIBIT_REASON_DISABLE)|		\
+	BIT(APICV_INHIBIT_REASON_ABSENT) |		\
+	BIT(APICV_INHIBIT_REASON_HYPERV) |		\
+	BIT(APICV_INHIBIT_REASON_BLOCKIRQ) |		\
+	BIT(APICV_INHIBIT_REASON_PHYSICAL_ID_ALIASED) |	\
+	BIT(APICV_INHIBIT_REASON_APIC_ID_MODIFIED) |	\
+	BIT(APICV_INHIBIT_REASON_APIC_BASE_MODIFIED)	\
+)
+
+static void vmx_vm_destroy(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+	struct kvm_vmx *kvm_vmx = to_kvm_vmx(kvm);
+
+	free_pages((unsigned long)kvm_vmx->pid_table, vmx_get_pid_table_order(kvm));
+}
+
+static struct kvm_x86_ops vmx_x86_ops __initdata = {
+	.name = KBUILD_MODNAME,
+
+	.check_processor_compatibility = vmx_check_processor_compat,
+
+	.hardware_unsetup = vmx_hardware_unsetup,
+
+	.hardware_enable = vmx_hardware_enable,
+	.hardware_disable = vmx_hardware_disable,
+	.has_emulated_msr = vmx_has_emulated_msr,
+
+	.vm_size = sizeof(struct kvm_vmx),
+	.vm_init = vmx_vm_init,
+	.vm_destroy = vmx_vm_destroy,
+
+	.vcpu_precreate = vmx_vcpu_precreate,
+	.vcpu_create = vmx_vcpu_create,
+	.vcpu_free = vmx_vcpu_free,
+	.vcpu_reset = vmx_vcpu_reset,
+
+	.prepare_switch_to_guest = vmx_prepare_switch_to_guest,
+	.vcpu_load = vmx_vcpu_load,
+	.vcpu_put = vmx_vcpu_put,
+
+	.update_exception_bitmap = vmx_update_exception_bitmap,
+	.get_msr_feature = vmx_get_msr_feature,
+	.get_msr = vmx_get_msr,
+	.set_msr = vmx_set_msr,
+	.get_segment_base = vmx_get_segment_base,
+	.get_segment = vmx_get_segment,
+	.set_segment = vmx_set_segment,
+	.get_cpl = vmx_get_cpl,
+	.get_cs_db_l_bits = vmx_get_cs_db_l_bits,
+	.is_valid_cr0 = vmx_is_valid_cr0,
+	.set_cr0 = vmx_set_cr0,
+	.is_valid_cr4 = vmx_is_valid_cr4,
+	.set_cr4 = vmx_set_cr4,
+	.set_efer = vmx_set_efer,
+	.get_idt = vmx_get_idt,
+	.set_idt = vmx_set_idt,
+	.get_gdt = vmx_get_gdt,
+	.set_gdt = vmx_set_gdt,
+	.set_dr7 = vmx_set_dr7,
+	.sync_dirty_debug_regs = vmx_sync_dirty_debug_regs,
+	.cache_reg = vmx_cache_reg,
+	.get_rflags = vmx_get_rflags,
+	.set_rflags = vmx_set_rflags,
+	.get_if_flag = vmx_get_if_flag,
+
+	.flush_tlb_all = vmx_flush_tlb_all,
+	.flush_tlb_current = vmx_flush_tlb_current,
+	.flush_tlb_gva = vmx_flush_tlb_gva,
+	.flush_tlb_guest = vmx_flush_tlb_guest,
+
+	.vcpu_pre_run = vmx_vcpu_pre_run,
+	.vcpu_run = vmx_vcpu_run,
+	.handle_exit = vmx_handle_exit,
+	.skip_emulated_instruction = vmx_skip_emulated_instruction,
+	.update_emulated_instruction = vmx_update_emulated_instruction,
+	.set_interrupt_shadow = vmx_set_interrupt_shadow,
+	.get_interrupt_shadow = vmx_get_interrupt_shadow,
+	.patch_hypercall = vmx_patch_hypercall,
+	.inject_irq = vmx_inject_irq,
+	.inject_nmi = vmx_inject_nmi,
+	.inject_exception = vmx_inject_exception,
+	.cancel_injection = vmx_cancel_injection,
+	.interrupt_allowed = vmx_interrupt_allowed,
+	.nmi_allowed = vmx_nmi_allowed,
+	.get_nmi_mask = vmx_get_nmi_mask,
+	.set_nmi_mask = vmx_set_nmi_mask,
+	.enable_nmi_window = vmx_enable_nmi_window,
+	.enable_irq_window = vmx_enable_irq_window,
+	.update_cr8_intercept = vmx_update_cr8_intercept,
+	.set_virtual_apic_mode = vmx_set_virtual_apic_mode,
+	.set_apic_access_page_addr = vmx_set_apic_access_page_addr,
+	.refresh_apicv_exec_ctrl = vmx_refresh_apicv_exec_ctrl,
+	.load_eoi_exitmap = vmx_load_eoi_exitmap,
+	.apicv_pre_state_restore = vmx_apicv_pre_state_restore,
+	.required_apicv_inhibits = VMX_REQUIRED_APICV_INHIBITS,
+	.hwapic_irr_update = vmx_hwapic_irr_update,
+	.hwapic_isr_update = vmx_hwapic_isr_update,
+	.guest_apic_has_interrupt = vmx_guest_apic_has_interrupt,
+	.sync_pir_to_irr = vmx_sync_pir_to_irr,
+	.deliver_interrupt = vmx_deliver_interrupt,
+	.dy_apicv_has_pending_interrupt = pi_has_pending_interrupt,
+
+	.set_tss_addr = vmx_set_tss_addr,
+	.set_identity_map_addr = vmx_set_identity_map_addr,
+	.get_mt_mask = vmx_get_mt_mask,
+
+	.get_exit_info = vmx_get_exit_info,
+
+	.vcpu_after_set_cpuid = vmx_vcpu_after_set_cpuid,
+
+	.has_wbinvd_exit = cpu_has_vmx_wbinvd_exit,
+
+	.get_l2_tsc_offset = vmx_get_l2_tsc_offset,
+	.get_l2_tsc_multiplier = vmx_get_l2_tsc_multiplier,
+	.write_tsc_offset = vmx_write_tsc_offset,
+	.write_tsc_multiplier = vmx_write_tsc_multiplier,
+
+	.load_mmu_pgd = vmx_load_mmu_pgd,
+
+	.check_intercept = vmx_check_intercept,
+	.handle_exit_irqoff = vmx_handle_exit_irqoff,
+
+	.request_immediate_exit = vmx_request_immediate_exit,
+
+	.sched_in = vmx_sched_in,
+
+	.cpu_dirty_log_size = PML_ENTITY_NUM,
+	.update_cpu_dirty_logging = vmx_update_cpu_dirty_logging,
+
+	.nested_ops = &vmx_nested_ops,
+
+	.pi_update_irte = vmx_pi_update_irte,
+	.pi_start_assignment = vmx_pi_start_assignment,
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+	.set_hv_timer = vmx_set_hv_timer,
+	.cancel_hv_timer = vmx_cancel_hv_timer,
+#endif
+
+	.setup_mce = vmx_setup_mce,
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_SMM
+	.smi_allowed = vmx_smi_allowed,
+	.enter_smm = vmx_enter_smm,
+	.leave_smm = vmx_leave_smm,
+	.enable_smi_window = vmx_enable_smi_window,
+#endif
+
+	.can_emulate_instruction = vmx_can_emulate_instruction,
+	.apic_init_signal_blocked = vmx_apic_init_signal_blocked,
+	.migrate_timers = vmx_migrate_timers,
+
+	.msr_filter_changed = vmx_msr_filter_changed,
+	.complete_emulated_msr = kvm_complete_insn_gp,
+
+	.vcpu_deliver_sipi_vector = kvm_vcpu_deliver_sipi_vector,
+};
+
+static unsigned int vmx_handle_intel_pt_intr(void)
+{
+	struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = kvm_get_running_vcpu();
+
+	/* '0' on failure so that the !PT case can use a RET0 static call. */
+	if (!vcpu || !kvm_handling_nmi_from_guest(vcpu))
+		return 0;
+
+	kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_PMI, vcpu);
+	__set_bit(MSR_CORE_PERF_GLOBAL_OVF_CTRL_TRACE_TOPA_PMI_BIT,
+		  (unsigned long *)&vcpu->arch.pmu.global_status);
+	return 1;
+}
+
+static __init void vmx_setup_user_return_msrs(void)
+{
+
+	/*
+	 * Though SYSCALL is only supported in 64-bit mode on Intel CPUs, kvm
+	 * will emulate SYSCALL in legacy mode if the vendor string in guest
+	 * CPUID.0:{EBX,ECX,EDX} is "AuthenticAMD" or "AMDisbetter!" To
+	 * support this emulation, MSR_STAR is included in the list for i386,
+	 * but is never loaded into hardware.  MSR_CSTAR is also never loaded
+	 * into hardware and is here purely for emulation purposes.
+	 */
+	const u32 vmx_uret_msrs_list[] = {
+	#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+		MSR_SYSCALL_MASK, MSR_LSTAR, MSR_CSTAR,
+	#endif
+		MSR_EFER, MSR_TSC_AUX, MSR_STAR,
+		MSR_IA32_TSX_CTRL,
+	};
+	int i;
+
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(ARRAY_SIZE(vmx_uret_msrs_list) != MAX_NR_USER_RETURN_MSRS);
+
+	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(vmx_uret_msrs_list); ++i)
+		kvm_add_user_return_msr(vmx_uret_msrs_list[i]);
+}
+
+static void __init vmx_setup_me_spte_mask(void)
+{
+	u64 me_mask = 0;
+
+	/*
+	 * kvm_get_shadow_phys_bits() returns shadow_phys_bits.  Use
+	 * the former to avoid exposing shadow_phys_bits.
+	 *
+	 * On pre-MKTME system, boot_cpu_data.x86_phys_bits equals to
+	 * shadow_phys_bits.  On MKTME and/or TDX capable systems,
+	 * boot_cpu_data.x86_phys_bits holds the actual physical address
+	 * w/o the KeyID bits, and shadow_phys_bits equals to MAXPHYADDR
+	 * reported by CPUID.  Those bits between are KeyID bits.
+	 */
+	if (boot_cpu_data.x86_phys_bits != kvm_get_shadow_phys_bits())
+		me_mask = rsvd_bits(boot_cpu_data.x86_phys_bits,
+			kvm_get_shadow_phys_bits() - 1);
+	/*
+	 * Unlike SME, host kernel doesn't support setting up any
+	 * MKTME KeyID on Intel platforms.  No memory encryption
+	 * bits should be included into the SPTE.
+	 */
+	kvm_mmu_set_me_spte_mask(0, me_mask);
+}
+
+static struct kvm_x86_init_ops vmx_init_ops __initdata;
+
+static __init int hardware_setup(void)
+{
+	unsigned long host_bndcfgs;
+	struct desc_ptr dt;
+	int r;
+
+	store_idt(&dt);
+	host_idt_base = dt.address;
+
+	vmx_setup_user_return_msrs();
+
+	if (setup_vmcs_config(&vmcs_config, &vmx_capability) < 0)
+		return -EIO;
+
+	if (cpu_has_perf_global_ctrl_bug())
+		pr_warn_once("VM_EXIT_LOAD_IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL "
+			     "does not work properly. Using workaround\n");
+
+	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_NX))
+		kvm_enable_efer_bits(EFER_NX);
+
+	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MPX)) {
+		rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_BNDCFGS, host_bndcfgs);
+		WARN_ONCE(host_bndcfgs, "BNDCFGS in host will be lost");
+	}
+
+	if (!cpu_has_vmx_mpx())
+		kvm_caps.supported_xcr0 &= ~(XFEATURE_MASK_BNDREGS |
+					     XFEATURE_MASK_BNDCSR);
+
+	if (!cpu_has_vmx_vpid() || !cpu_has_vmx_invvpid() ||
+	    !(cpu_has_vmx_invvpid_single() || cpu_has_vmx_invvpid_global()))
+		enable_vpid = 0;
+
+	if (!cpu_has_vmx_ept() ||
+	    !cpu_has_vmx_ept_4levels() ||
+	    !cpu_has_vmx_ept_mt_wb() ||
+	    !cpu_has_vmx_invept_global())
+		enable_ept = 0;
+
+	/* NX support is required for shadow paging. */
+	if (!enable_ept && !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_NX)) {
+		pr_err_ratelimited("NX (Execute Disable) not supported\n");
+		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+	}
+
+	if (!cpu_has_vmx_ept_ad_bits() || !enable_ept)
+		enable_ept_ad_bits = 0;
+
+	if (!cpu_has_vmx_unrestricted_guest() || !enable_ept)
+		enable_unrestricted_guest = 0;
+
+	if (!cpu_has_vmx_flexpriority())
+		flexpriority_enabled = 0;
+
+	if (!cpu_has_virtual_nmis())
+		enable_vnmi = 0;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_SGX_KVM
+	if (!cpu_has_vmx_encls_vmexit())
+		enable_sgx = false;
+#endif
+
+	/*
+	 * set_apic_access_page_addr() is used to reload apic access
+	 * page upon invalidation.  No need to do anything if not
+	 * using the APIC_ACCESS_ADDR VMCS field.
+	 */
+	if (!flexpriority_enabled)
+		vmx_x86_ops.set_apic_access_page_addr = NULL;
+
+	if (!cpu_has_vmx_tpr_shadow())
+		vmx_x86_ops.update_cr8_intercept = NULL;
+
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HYPERV)
+	if (ms_hyperv.nested_features & HV_X64_NESTED_GUEST_MAPPING_FLUSH
+	    && enable_ept) {
+		vmx_x86_ops.flush_remote_tlbs = hv_flush_remote_tlbs;
+		vmx_x86_ops.flush_remote_tlbs_range = hv_flush_remote_tlbs_range;
+	}
+#endif
+
+	if (!cpu_has_vmx_ple()) {
+		ple_gap = 0;
+		ple_window = 0;
+		ple_window_grow = 0;
+		ple_window_max = 0;
+		ple_window_shrink = 0;
+	}
+
+	if (!cpu_has_vmx_apicv())
+		enable_apicv = 0;
+	if (!enable_apicv)
+		vmx_x86_ops.sync_pir_to_irr = NULL;
+
+	if (!enable_apicv || !cpu_has_vmx_ipiv())
+		enable_ipiv = false;
+
+	if (cpu_has_vmx_tsc_scaling())
+		kvm_caps.has_tsc_control = true;
+
+	kvm_caps.max_tsc_scaling_ratio = KVM_VMX_TSC_MULTIPLIER_MAX;
+	kvm_caps.tsc_scaling_ratio_frac_bits = 48;
+	kvm_caps.has_bus_lock_exit = cpu_has_vmx_bus_lock_detection();
+	kvm_caps.has_notify_vmexit = cpu_has_notify_vmexit();
+
+	set_bit(0, vmx_vpid_bitmap); /* 0 is reserved for host */
+
+	if (enable_ept)
+		kvm_mmu_set_ept_masks(enable_ept_ad_bits,
+				      cpu_has_vmx_ept_execute_only());
+
+	/*
+	 * Setup shadow_me_value/shadow_me_mask to include MKTME KeyID
+	 * bits to shadow_zero_check.
+	 */
+	vmx_setup_me_spte_mask();
+
+	kvm_configure_mmu(enable_ept, 0, vmx_get_max_ept_level(),
+			  ept_caps_to_lpage_level(vmx_capability.ept));
+
+	/*
+	 * Only enable PML when hardware supports PML feature, and both EPT
+	 * and EPT A/D bit features are enabled -- PML depends on them to work.
+	 */
+	if (!enable_ept || !enable_ept_ad_bits || !cpu_has_vmx_pml())
+		enable_pml = 0;
+
+	if (!enable_pml)
+		vmx_x86_ops.cpu_dirty_log_size = 0;
+
+	if (!cpu_has_vmx_preemption_timer())
+		enable_preemption_timer = false;
+
+	if (enable_preemption_timer) {
+		u64 use_timer_freq = 5000ULL * 1000 * 1000;
+
+		cpu_preemption_timer_multi =
+			vmcs_config.misc & VMX_MISC_PREEMPTION_TIMER_RATE_MASK;
+
+		if (tsc_khz)
+			use_timer_freq = (u64)tsc_khz * 1000;
+		use_timer_freq >>= cpu_preemption_timer_multi;
+
+		/*
+		 * KVM "disables" the preemption timer by setting it to its max
+		 * value.  Don't use the timer if it might cause spurious exits
+		 * at a rate faster than 0.1 Hz (of uninterrupted guest time).
+		 */
+		if (use_timer_freq > 0xffffffffu / 10)
+			enable_preemption_timer = false;
+	}
+
+	if (!enable_preemption_timer) {
+		vmx_x86_ops.set_hv_timer = NULL;
+		vmx_x86_ops.cancel_hv_timer = NULL;
+		vmx_x86_ops.request_immediate_exit = __kvm_request_immediate_exit;
+	}
+
+	kvm_caps.supported_mce_cap |= MCG_LMCE_P;
+	kvm_caps.supported_mce_cap |= MCG_CMCI_P;
+
+	if (pt_mode != PT_MODE_SYSTEM && pt_mode != PT_MODE_HOST_GUEST)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	if (!enable_ept || !enable_pmu || !cpu_has_vmx_intel_pt())
+		pt_mode = PT_MODE_SYSTEM;
+	if (pt_mode == PT_MODE_HOST_GUEST)
+		vmx_init_ops.handle_intel_pt_intr = vmx_handle_intel_pt_intr;
+	else
+		vmx_init_ops.handle_intel_pt_intr = NULL;
+
+	setup_default_sgx_lepubkeyhash();
+
+	if (nested) {
+		nested_vmx_setup_ctls_msrs(&vmcs_config, vmx_capability.ept);
+
+		r = nested_vmx_hardware_setup(kvm_vmx_exit_handlers);
+		if (r)
+			return r;
+	}
+
+	vmx_set_cpu_caps();
+
+	r = alloc_kvm_area();
+	if (r && nested)
+		nested_vmx_hardware_unsetup();
+
+	kvm_set_posted_intr_wakeup_handler(pi_wakeup_handler);
+
+	return r;
+}
+
+static struct kvm_x86_init_ops vmx_init_ops __initdata = {
+	.hardware_setup = hardware_setup,
+	.handle_intel_pt_intr = NULL,
+
+	.runtime_ops = &vmx_x86_ops,
+	.pmu_ops = &intel_pmu_ops,
+};
+
+static void vmx_cleanup_l1d_flush(void)
+{
+	if (vmx_l1d_flush_pages) {
+		free_pages((unsigned long)vmx_l1d_flush_pages, L1D_CACHE_ORDER);
+		vmx_l1d_flush_pages = NULL;
+	}
+	/* Restore state so sysfs ignores VMX */
+	l1tf_vmx_mitigation = VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_AUTO;
+}
+
+static void __vmx_exit(void)
+{
+	allow_smaller_maxphyaddr = false;
+
+	cpu_emergency_unregister_virt_callback(vmx_emergency_disable);
+
+	vmx_cleanup_l1d_flush();
+}
+
+static void vmx_exit(void)
+{
+	kvm_exit();
+	kvm_x86_vendor_exit();
+
+	__vmx_exit();
+}
+module_exit(vmx_exit);
+
+static int __init vmx_init(void)
+{
+	int r, cpu;
+
+	if (!kvm_is_vmx_supported())
+		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+	/*
+	 * Note, hv_init_evmcs() touches only VMX knobs, i.e. there's nothing
+	 * to unwind if a later step fails.
+	 */
+	hv_init_evmcs();
+
+	r = kvm_x86_vendor_init(&vmx_init_ops);
+	if (r)
+		return r;
+
+	/*
+	 * Must be called after common x86 init so enable_ept is properly set
+	 * up. Hand the parameter mitigation value in which was stored in
+	 * the pre module init parser. If no parameter was given, it will
+	 * contain 'auto' which will be turned into the default 'cond'
+	 * mitigation mode.
+	 */
+	r = vmx_setup_l1d_flush(vmentry_l1d_flush_param);
+	if (r)
+		goto err_l1d_flush;
+
+	for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) {
+		INIT_LIST_HEAD(&per_cpu(loaded_vmcss_on_cpu, cpu));
+
+		pi_init_cpu(cpu);
+	}
+
+	cpu_emergency_register_virt_callback(vmx_emergency_disable);
+
+	vmx_check_vmcs12_offsets();
+
+	/*
+	 * Shadow paging doesn't have a (further) performance penalty
+	 * from GUEST_MAXPHYADDR < HOST_MAXPHYADDR so enable it
+	 * by default
+	 */
+	if (!enable_ept)
+		allow_smaller_maxphyaddr = true;
+
+	/*
+	 * Common KVM initialization _must_ come last, after this, /dev/kvm is
+	 * exposed to userspace!
+	 */
+	r = kvm_init(sizeof(struct vcpu_vmx), __alignof__(struct vcpu_vmx),
+		     THIS_MODULE);
+	if (r)
+		goto err_kvm_init;
+
+	return 0;
+
+err_kvm_init:
+	__vmx_exit();
+err_l1d_flush:
+	kvm_x86_vendor_exit();
+	return r;
+}
+module_init(vmx_init);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..c2130d2c8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h
@@ -0,0 +1,758 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+#ifndef __KVM_X86_VMX_H
+#define __KVM_X86_VMX_H
+
+#include <linux/kvm_host.h>
+
+#include <asm/kvm.h>
+#include <asm/intel_pt.h>
+#include <asm/perf_event.h>
+
+#include "capabilities.h"
+#include "../kvm_cache_regs.h"
+#include "posted_intr.h"
+#include "vmcs.h"
+#include "vmx_ops.h"
+#include "../cpuid.h"
+#include "run_flags.h"
+
+#define MSR_TYPE_R	1
+#define MSR_TYPE_W	2
+#define MSR_TYPE_RW	3
+
+#define X2APIC_MSR(r) (APIC_BASE_MSR + ((r) >> 4))
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+#define MAX_NR_USER_RETURN_MSRS	7
+#else
+#define MAX_NR_USER_RETURN_MSRS	4
+#endif
+
+#define MAX_NR_LOADSTORE_MSRS	8
+
+struct vmx_msrs {
+	unsigned int		nr;
+	struct vmx_msr_entry	val[MAX_NR_LOADSTORE_MSRS];
+};
+
+struct vmx_uret_msr {
+	bool load_into_hardware;
+	u64 data;
+	u64 mask;
+};
+
+enum segment_cache_field {
+	SEG_FIELD_SEL = 0,
+	SEG_FIELD_BASE = 1,
+	SEG_FIELD_LIMIT = 2,
+	SEG_FIELD_AR = 3,
+
+	SEG_FIELD_NR = 4
+};
+
+#define RTIT_ADDR_RANGE		4
+
+struct pt_ctx {
+	u64 ctl;
+	u64 status;
+	u64 output_base;
+	u64 output_mask;
+	u64 cr3_match;
+	u64 addr_a[RTIT_ADDR_RANGE];
+	u64 addr_b[RTIT_ADDR_RANGE];
+};
+
+struct pt_desc {
+	u64 ctl_bitmask;
+	u32 num_address_ranges;
+	u32 caps[PT_CPUID_REGS_NUM * PT_CPUID_LEAVES];
+	struct pt_ctx host;
+	struct pt_ctx guest;
+};
+
+union vmx_exit_reason {
+	struct {
+		u32	basic			: 16;
+		u32	reserved16		: 1;
+		u32	reserved17		: 1;
+		u32	reserved18		: 1;
+		u32	reserved19		: 1;
+		u32	reserved20		: 1;
+		u32	reserved21		: 1;
+		u32	reserved22		: 1;
+		u32	reserved23		: 1;
+		u32	reserved24		: 1;
+		u32	reserved25		: 1;
+		u32	bus_lock_detected	: 1;
+		u32	enclave_mode		: 1;
+		u32	smi_pending_mtf		: 1;
+		u32	smi_from_vmx_root	: 1;
+		u32	reserved30		: 1;
+		u32	failed_vmentry		: 1;
+	};
+	u32 full;
+};
+
+struct lbr_desc {
+	/* Basic info about guest LBR records. */
+	struct x86_pmu_lbr records;
+
+	/*
+	 * Emulate LBR feature via passthrough LBR registers when the
+	 * per-vcpu guest LBR event is scheduled on the current pcpu.
+	 *
+	 * The records may be inaccurate if the host reclaims the LBR.
+	 */
+	struct perf_event *event;
+
+	/* True if LBRs are marked as not intercepted in the MSR bitmap */
+	bool msr_passthrough;
+};
+
+/*
+ * The nested_vmx structure is part of vcpu_vmx, and holds information we need
+ * for correct emulation of VMX (i.e., nested VMX) on this vcpu.
+ */
+struct nested_vmx {
+	/* Has the level1 guest done vmxon? */
+	bool vmxon;
+	gpa_t vmxon_ptr;
+	bool pml_full;
+
+	/* The guest-physical address of the current VMCS L1 keeps for L2 */
+	gpa_t current_vmptr;
+	/*
+	 * Cache of the guest's VMCS, existing outside of guest memory.
+	 * Loaded from guest memory during VMPTRLD. Flushed to guest
+	 * memory during VMCLEAR and VMPTRLD.
+	 */
+	struct vmcs12 *cached_vmcs12;
+	/*
+	 * Cache of the guest's shadow VMCS, existing outside of guest
+	 * memory. Loaded from guest memory during VM entry. Flushed
+	 * to guest memory during VM exit.
+	 */
+	struct vmcs12 *cached_shadow_vmcs12;
+
+	/*
+	 * GPA to HVA cache for accessing vmcs12->vmcs_link_pointer
+	 */
+	struct gfn_to_hva_cache shadow_vmcs12_cache;
+
+	/*
+	 * GPA to HVA cache for VMCS12
+	 */
+	struct gfn_to_hva_cache vmcs12_cache;
+
+	/*
+	 * Indicates if the shadow vmcs or enlightened vmcs must be updated
+	 * with the data held by struct vmcs12.
+	 */
+	bool need_vmcs12_to_shadow_sync;
+	bool dirty_vmcs12;
+
+	/*
+	 * Indicates whether MSR bitmap for L2 needs to be rebuilt due to
+	 * changes in MSR bitmap for L1 or switching to a different L2. Note,
+	 * this flag can only be used reliably in conjunction with a paravirt L1
+	 * which informs L0 whether any changes to MSR bitmap for L2 were done
+	 * on its side.
+	 */
+	bool force_msr_bitmap_recalc;
+
+	/*
+	 * Indicates lazily loaded guest state has not yet been decached from
+	 * vmcs02.
+	 */
+	bool need_sync_vmcs02_to_vmcs12_rare;
+
+	/*
+	 * vmcs02 has been initialized, i.e. state that is constant for
+	 * vmcs02 has been written to the backing VMCS.  Initialization
+	 * is delayed until L1 actually attempts to run a nested VM.
+	 */
+	bool vmcs02_initialized;
+
+	bool change_vmcs01_virtual_apic_mode;
+	bool reload_vmcs01_apic_access_page;
+	bool update_vmcs01_cpu_dirty_logging;
+	bool update_vmcs01_apicv_status;
+
+	/*
+	 * Enlightened VMCS has been enabled. It does not mean that L1 has to
+	 * use it. However, VMX features available to L1 will be limited based
+	 * on what the enlightened VMCS supports.
+	 */
+	bool enlightened_vmcs_enabled;
+
+	/* L2 must run next, and mustn't decide to exit to L1. */
+	bool nested_run_pending;
+
+	/* Pending MTF VM-exit into L1.  */
+	bool mtf_pending;
+
+	struct loaded_vmcs vmcs02;
+
+	/*
+	 * Guest pages referred to in the vmcs02 with host-physical
+	 * pointers, so we must keep them pinned while L2 runs.
+	 */
+	struct kvm_host_map apic_access_page_map;
+	struct kvm_host_map virtual_apic_map;
+	struct kvm_host_map pi_desc_map;
+
+	struct kvm_host_map msr_bitmap_map;
+
+	struct pi_desc *pi_desc;
+	bool pi_pending;
+	u16 posted_intr_nv;
+
+	struct hrtimer preemption_timer;
+	u64 preemption_timer_deadline;
+	bool has_preemption_timer_deadline;
+	bool preemption_timer_expired;
+
+	/*
+	 * Used to snapshot MSRs that are conditionally loaded on VM-Enter in
+	 * order to propagate the guest's pre-VM-Enter value into vmcs02.  For
+	 * emulation of VMLAUNCH/VMRESUME, the snapshot will be of L1's value.
+	 * For KVM_SET_NESTED_STATE, the snapshot is of L2's value, _if_
+	 * userspace restores MSRs before nested state.  If userspace restores
+	 * MSRs after nested state, the snapshot holds garbage, but KVM can't
+	 * detect that, and the garbage value in vmcs02 will be overwritten by
+	 * MSR restoration in any case.
+	 */
+	u64 pre_vmenter_debugctl;
+	u64 pre_vmenter_bndcfgs;
+
+	/* to migrate it to L1 if L2 writes to L1's CR8 directly */
+	int l1_tpr_threshold;
+
+	u16 vpid02;
+	u16 last_vpid;
+
+	struct nested_vmx_msrs msrs;
+
+	/* SMM related state */
+	struct {
+		/* in VMX operation on SMM entry? */
+		bool vmxon;
+		/* in guest mode on SMM entry? */
+		bool guest_mode;
+	} smm;
+
+	gpa_t hv_evmcs_vmptr;
+	struct kvm_host_map hv_evmcs_map;
+	struct hv_enlightened_vmcs *hv_evmcs;
+};
+
+struct vcpu_vmx {
+	struct kvm_vcpu       vcpu;
+	u8                    fail;
+	u8		      x2apic_msr_bitmap_mode;
+
+	/*
+	 * If true, host state has been stored in vmx->loaded_vmcs for
+	 * the CPU registers that only need to be switched when transitioning
+	 * to/from the kernel, and the registers have been loaded with guest
+	 * values.  If false, host state is loaded in the CPU registers
+	 * and vmx->loaded_vmcs->host_state is invalid.
+	 */
+	bool		      guest_state_loaded;
+
+	unsigned long         exit_qualification;
+	u32                   exit_intr_info;
+	u32                   idt_vectoring_info;
+	ulong                 rflags;
+
+	/*
+	 * User return MSRs are always emulated when enabled in the guest, but
+	 * only loaded into hardware when necessary, e.g. SYSCALL #UDs outside
+	 * of 64-bit mode or if EFER.SCE=1, thus the SYSCALL MSRs don't need to
+	 * be loaded into hardware if those conditions aren't met.
+	 */
+	struct vmx_uret_msr   guest_uret_msrs[MAX_NR_USER_RETURN_MSRS];
+	bool                  guest_uret_msrs_loaded;
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+	u64		      msr_host_kernel_gs_base;
+	u64		      msr_guest_kernel_gs_base;
+#endif
+
+	u64		      spec_ctrl;
+	u32		      msr_ia32_umwait_control;
+
+	/*
+	 * loaded_vmcs points to the VMCS currently used in this vcpu. For a
+	 * non-nested (L1) guest, it always points to vmcs01. For a nested
+	 * guest (L2), it points to a different VMCS.
+	 */
+	struct loaded_vmcs    vmcs01;
+	struct loaded_vmcs   *loaded_vmcs;
+
+	struct msr_autoload {
+		struct vmx_msrs guest;
+		struct vmx_msrs host;
+	} msr_autoload;
+
+	struct msr_autostore {
+		struct vmx_msrs guest;
+	} msr_autostore;
+
+	struct {
+		int vm86_active;
+		ulong save_rflags;
+		struct kvm_segment segs[8];
+	} rmode;
+	struct {
+		u32 bitmask; /* 4 bits per segment (1 bit per field) */
+		struct kvm_save_segment {
+			u16 selector;
+			unsigned long base;
+			u32 limit;
+			u32 ar;
+		} seg[8];
+	} segment_cache;
+	int vpid;
+	bool emulation_required;
+
+	union vmx_exit_reason exit_reason;
+
+	/* Posted interrupt descriptor */
+	struct pi_desc pi_desc;
+
+	/* Used if this vCPU is waiting for PI notification wakeup. */
+	struct list_head pi_wakeup_list;
+
+	/* Support for a guest hypervisor (nested VMX) */
+	struct nested_vmx nested;
+
+	/* Dynamic PLE window. */
+	unsigned int ple_window;
+	bool ple_window_dirty;
+
+	bool req_immediate_exit;
+
+	/* Support for PML */
+#define PML_ENTITY_NUM		512
+	struct page *pml_pg;
+
+	/* apic deadline value in host tsc */
+	u64 hv_deadline_tsc;
+
+	unsigned long host_debugctlmsr;
+
+	/*
+	 * Only bits masked by msr_ia32_feature_control_valid_bits can be set in
+	 * msr_ia32_feature_control. FEAT_CTL_LOCKED is always included
+	 * in msr_ia32_feature_control_valid_bits.
+	 */
+	u64 msr_ia32_feature_control;
+	u64 msr_ia32_feature_control_valid_bits;
+	/* SGX Launch Control public key hash */
+	u64 msr_ia32_sgxlepubkeyhash[4];
+	u64 msr_ia32_mcu_opt_ctrl;
+	bool disable_fb_clear;
+
+	struct pt_desc pt_desc;
+	struct lbr_desc lbr_desc;
+
+	/* Save desired MSR intercept (read: pass-through) state */
+#define MAX_POSSIBLE_PASSTHROUGH_MSRS	16
+	struct {
+		DECLARE_BITMAP(read, MAX_POSSIBLE_PASSTHROUGH_MSRS);
+		DECLARE_BITMAP(write, MAX_POSSIBLE_PASSTHROUGH_MSRS);
+	} shadow_msr_intercept;
+};
+
+struct kvm_vmx {
+	struct kvm kvm;
+
+	unsigned int tss_addr;
+	bool ept_identity_pagetable_done;
+	gpa_t ept_identity_map_addr;
+	/* Posted Interrupt Descriptor (PID) table for IPI virtualization */
+	u64 *pid_table;
+};
+
+void vmx_vcpu_load_vmcs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int cpu,
+			struct loaded_vmcs *buddy);
+int allocate_vpid(void);
+void free_vpid(int vpid);
+void vmx_set_constant_host_state(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx);
+void vmx_prepare_switch_to_guest(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+void vmx_set_host_fs_gs(struct vmcs_host_state *host, u16 fs_sel, u16 gs_sel,
+			unsigned long fs_base, unsigned long gs_base);
+int vmx_get_cpl(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+bool vmx_emulation_required(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+unsigned long vmx_get_rflags(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+void vmx_set_rflags(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long rflags);
+u32 vmx_get_interrupt_shadow(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+void vmx_set_interrupt_shadow(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int mask);
+int vmx_set_efer(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 efer);
+void vmx_set_cr0(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long cr0);
+void vmx_set_cr4(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long cr4);
+void set_cr4_guest_host_mask(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx);
+void ept_save_pdptrs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+void vmx_get_segment(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_segment *var, int seg);
+void __vmx_set_segment(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_segment *var, int seg);
+u64 construct_eptp(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, hpa_t root_hpa, int root_level);
+
+bool vmx_guest_inject_ac(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+void vmx_update_exception_bitmap(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+bool vmx_nmi_blocked(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+bool vmx_interrupt_blocked(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+bool vmx_get_nmi_mask(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+void vmx_set_nmi_mask(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool masked);
+void vmx_set_virtual_apic_mode(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+struct vmx_uret_msr *vmx_find_uret_msr(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, u32 msr);
+void pt_update_intercept_for_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+void vmx_update_host_rsp(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, unsigned long host_rsp);
+void vmx_spec_ctrl_restore_host(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, unsigned int flags);
+unsigned int __vmx_vcpu_run_flags(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx);
+bool __vmx_vcpu_run(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, unsigned long *regs,
+		    unsigned int flags);
+int vmx_find_loadstore_msr_slot(struct vmx_msrs *m, u32 msr);
+void vmx_ept_load_pdptrs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+
+void vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 msr, int type);
+void vmx_enable_intercept_for_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 msr, int type);
+
+u64 vmx_get_l2_tsc_offset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+u64 vmx_get_l2_tsc_multiplier(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+
+static inline void vmx_set_intercept_for_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 msr,
+					     int type, bool value)
+{
+	if (value)
+		vmx_enable_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, msr, type);
+	else
+		vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, msr, type);
+}
+
+void vmx_update_cpu_dirty_logging(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+
+/*
+ * Note, early Intel manuals have the write-low and read-high bitmap offsets
+ * the wrong way round.  The bitmaps control MSRs 0x00000000-0x00001fff and
+ * 0xc0000000-0xc0001fff.  The former (low) uses bytes 0-0x3ff for reads and
+ * 0x800-0xbff for writes.  The latter (high) uses 0x400-0x7ff for reads and
+ * 0xc00-0xfff for writes.  MSRs not covered by either of the ranges always
+ * VM-Exit.
+ */
+#define __BUILD_VMX_MSR_BITMAP_HELPER(rtype, action, bitop, access, base)      \
+static inline rtype vmx_##action##_msr_bitmap_##access(unsigned long *bitmap,  \
+						       u32 msr)		       \
+{									       \
+	int f = sizeof(unsigned long);					       \
+									       \
+	if (msr <= 0x1fff)						       \
+		return bitop##_bit(msr, bitmap + base / f);		       \
+	else if ((msr >= 0xc0000000) && (msr <= 0xc0001fff))		       \
+		return bitop##_bit(msr & 0x1fff, bitmap + (base + 0x400) / f); \
+	return (rtype)true;						       \
+}
+#define BUILD_VMX_MSR_BITMAP_HELPERS(ret_type, action, bitop)		       \
+	__BUILD_VMX_MSR_BITMAP_HELPER(ret_type, action, bitop, read,  0x0)     \
+	__BUILD_VMX_MSR_BITMAP_HELPER(ret_type, action, bitop, write, 0x800)
+
+BUILD_VMX_MSR_BITMAP_HELPERS(bool, test, test)
+BUILD_VMX_MSR_BITMAP_HELPERS(void, clear, __clear)
+BUILD_VMX_MSR_BITMAP_HELPERS(void, set, __set)
+
+static inline u8 vmx_get_rvi(void)
+{
+	return vmcs_read16(GUEST_INTR_STATUS) & 0xff;
+}
+
+#define __KVM_REQUIRED_VMX_VM_ENTRY_CONTROLS				\
+	(VM_ENTRY_LOAD_DEBUG_CONTROLS)
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+	#define KVM_REQUIRED_VMX_VM_ENTRY_CONTROLS			\
+		(__KVM_REQUIRED_VMX_VM_ENTRY_CONTROLS |			\
+		 VM_ENTRY_IA32E_MODE)
+#else
+	#define KVM_REQUIRED_VMX_VM_ENTRY_CONTROLS			\
+		__KVM_REQUIRED_VMX_VM_ENTRY_CONTROLS
+#endif
+#define KVM_OPTIONAL_VMX_VM_ENTRY_CONTROLS				\
+	(VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL |				\
+	 VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_PAT |					\
+	 VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_EFER |					\
+	 VM_ENTRY_LOAD_BNDCFGS |					\
+	 VM_ENTRY_PT_CONCEAL_PIP |					\
+	 VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_RTIT_CTL)
+
+#define __KVM_REQUIRED_VMX_VM_EXIT_CONTROLS				\
+	(VM_EXIT_SAVE_DEBUG_CONTROLS |					\
+	 VM_EXIT_ACK_INTR_ON_EXIT)
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+	#define KVM_REQUIRED_VMX_VM_EXIT_CONTROLS			\
+		(__KVM_REQUIRED_VMX_VM_EXIT_CONTROLS |			\
+		 VM_EXIT_HOST_ADDR_SPACE_SIZE)
+#else
+	#define KVM_REQUIRED_VMX_VM_EXIT_CONTROLS			\
+		__KVM_REQUIRED_VMX_VM_EXIT_CONTROLS
+#endif
+#define KVM_OPTIONAL_VMX_VM_EXIT_CONTROLS				\
+	      (VM_EXIT_LOAD_IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL |			\
+	       VM_EXIT_SAVE_IA32_PAT |					\
+	       VM_EXIT_LOAD_IA32_PAT |					\
+	       VM_EXIT_SAVE_IA32_EFER |					\
+	       VM_EXIT_SAVE_VMX_PREEMPTION_TIMER |			\
+	       VM_EXIT_LOAD_IA32_EFER |					\
+	       VM_EXIT_CLEAR_BNDCFGS |					\
+	       VM_EXIT_PT_CONCEAL_PIP |					\
+	       VM_EXIT_CLEAR_IA32_RTIT_CTL)
+
+#define KVM_REQUIRED_VMX_PIN_BASED_VM_EXEC_CONTROL			\
+	(PIN_BASED_EXT_INTR_MASK |					\
+	 PIN_BASED_NMI_EXITING)
+#define KVM_OPTIONAL_VMX_PIN_BASED_VM_EXEC_CONTROL			\
+	(PIN_BASED_VIRTUAL_NMIS |					\
+	 PIN_BASED_POSTED_INTR |					\
+	 PIN_BASED_VMX_PREEMPTION_TIMER)
+
+#define __KVM_REQUIRED_VMX_CPU_BASED_VM_EXEC_CONTROL			\
+	(CPU_BASED_HLT_EXITING |					\
+	 CPU_BASED_CR3_LOAD_EXITING |					\
+	 CPU_BASED_CR3_STORE_EXITING |					\
+	 CPU_BASED_UNCOND_IO_EXITING |					\
+	 CPU_BASED_MOV_DR_EXITING |					\
+	 CPU_BASED_USE_TSC_OFFSETTING |					\
+	 CPU_BASED_MWAIT_EXITING |					\
+	 CPU_BASED_MONITOR_EXITING |					\
+	 CPU_BASED_INVLPG_EXITING |					\
+	 CPU_BASED_RDPMC_EXITING |					\
+	 CPU_BASED_INTR_WINDOW_EXITING)
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+	#define KVM_REQUIRED_VMX_CPU_BASED_VM_EXEC_CONTROL		\
+		(__KVM_REQUIRED_VMX_CPU_BASED_VM_EXEC_CONTROL |		\
+		 CPU_BASED_CR8_LOAD_EXITING |				\
+		 CPU_BASED_CR8_STORE_EXITING)
+#else
+	#define KVM_REQUIRED_VMX_CPU_BASED_VM_EXEC_CONTROL		\
+		__KVM_REQUIRED_VMX_CPU_BASED_VM_EXEC_CONTROL
+#endif
+
+#define KVM_OPTIONAL_VMX_CPU_BASED_VM_EXEC_CONTROL			\
+	(CPU_BASED_RDTSC_EXITING |					\
+	 CPU_BASED_TPR_SHADOW |						\
+	 CPU_BASED_USE_IO_BITMAPS |					\
+	 CPU_BASED_MONITOR_TRAP_FLAG |					\
+	 CPU_BASED_USE_MSR_BITMAPS |					\
+	 CPU_BASED_NMI_WINDOW_EXITING |					\
+	 CPU_BASED_PAUSE_EXITING |					\
+	 CPU_BASED_ACTIVATE_SECONDARY_CONTROLS |			\
+	 CPU_BASED_ACTIVATE_TERTIARY_CONTROLS)
+
+#define KVM_REQUIRED_VMX_SECONDARY_VM_EXEC_CONTROL 0
+#define KVM_OPTIONAL_VMX_SECONDARY_VM_EXEC_CONTROL			\
+	(SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_APIC_ACCESSES |			\
+	 SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_X2APIC_MODE |			\
+	 SECONDARY_EXEC_WBINVD_EXITING |				\
+	 SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_VPID |					\
+	 SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_EPT |					\
+	 SECONDARY_EXEC_UNRESTRICTED_GUEST |				\
+	 SECONDARY_EXEC_PAUSE_LOOP_EXITING |				\
+	 SECONDARY_EXEC_DESC |						\
+	 SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_RDTSCP |					\
+	 SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_INVPCID |				\
+	 SECONDARY_EXEC_APIC_REGISTER_VIRT |				\
+	 SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUAL_INTR_DELIVERY |				\
+	 SECONDARY_EXEC_SHADOW_VMCS |					\
+	 SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_XSAVES |					\
+	 SECONDARY_EXEC_RDSEED_EXITING |				\
+	 SECONDARY_EXEC_RDRAND_EXITING |				\
+	 SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_PML |					\
+	 SECONDARY_EXEC_TSC_SCALING |					\
+	 SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_USR_WAIT_PAUSE |				\
+	 SECONDARY_EXEC_PT_USE_GPA |					\
+	 SECONDARY_EXEC_PT_CONCEAL_VMX |				\
+	 SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_VMFUNC |					\
+	 SECONDARY_EXEC_BUS_LOCK_DETECTION |				\
+	 SECONDARY_EXEC_NOTIFY_VM_EXITING |				\
+	 SECONDARY_EXEC_ENCLS_EXITING)
+
+#define KVM_REQUIRED_VMX_TERTIARY_VM_EXEC_CONTROL 0
+#define KVM_OPTIONAL_VMX_TERTIARY_VM_EXEC_CONTROL			\
+	(TERTIARY_EXEC_IPI_VIRT)
+
+#define BUILD_CONTROLS_SHADOW(lname, uname, bits)						\
+static inline void lname##_controls_set(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, u##bits val)			\
+{												\
+	if (vmx->loaded_vmcs->controls_shadow.lname != val) {					\
+		vmcs_write##bits(uname, val);							\
+		vmx->loaded_vmcs->controls_shadow.lname = val;					\
+	}											\
+}												\
+static inline u##bits __##lname##_controls_get(struct loaded_vmcs *vmcs)			\
+{												\
+	return vmcs->controls_shadow.lname;							\
+}												\
+static inline u##bits lname##_controls_get(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)				\
+{												\
+	return __##lname##_controls_get(vmx->loaded_vmcs);					\
+}												\
+static __always_inline void lname##_controls_setbit(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, u##bits val)		\
+{												\
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(!(val & (KVM_REQUIRED_VMX_##uname | KVM_OPTIONAL_VMX_##uname)));		\
+	lname##_controls_set(vmx, lname##_controls_get(vmx) | val);				\
+}												\
+static __always_inline void lname##_controls_clearbit(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, u##bits val)	\
+{												\
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(!(val & (KVM_REQUIRED_VMX_##uname | KVM_OPTIONAL_VMX_##uname)));		\
+	lname##_controls_set(vmx, lname##_controls_get(vmx) & ~val);				\
+}
+BUILD_CONTROLS_SHADOW(vm_entry, VM_ENTRY_CONTROLS, 32)
+BUILD_CONTROLS_SHADOW(vm_exit, VM_EXIT_CONTROLS, 32)
+BUILD_CONTROLS_SHADOW(pin, PIN_BASED_VM_EXEC_CONTROL, 32)
+BUILD_CONTROLS_SHADOW(exec, CPU_BASED_VM_EXEC_CONTROL, 32)
+BUILD_CONTROLS_SHADOW(secondary_exec, SECONDARY_VM_EXEC_CONTROL, 32)
+BUILD_CONTROLS_SHADOW(tertiary_exec, TERTIARY_VM_EXEC_CONTROL, 64)
+
+/*
+ * VMX_REGS_LAZY_LOAD_SET - The set of registers that will be updated in the
+ * cache on demand.  Other registers not listed here are synced to
+ * the cache immediately after VM-Exit.
+ */
+#define VMX_REGS_LAZY_LOAD_SET	((1 << VCPU_REGS_RIP) |         \
+				(1 << VCPU_REGS_RSP) |          \
+				(1 << VCPU_EXREG_RFLAGS) |      \
+				(1 << VCPU_EXREG_PDPTR) |       \
+				(1 << VCPU_EXREG_SEGMENTS) |    \
+				(1 << VCPU_EXREG_CR0) |         \
+				(1 << VCPU_EXREG_CR3) |         \
+				(1 << VCPU_EXREG_CR4) |         \
+				(1 << VCPU_EXREG_EXIT_INFO_1) | \
+				(1 << VCPU_EXREG_EXIT_INFO_2))
+
+static inline unsigned long vmx_l1_guest_owned_cr0_bits(void)
+{
+	unsigned long bits = KVM_POSSIBLE_CR0_GUEST_BITS;
+
+	/*
+	 * CR0.WP needs to be intercepted when KVM is shadowing legacy paging
+	 * in order to construct shadow PTEs with the correct protections.
+	 * Note!  CR0.WP technically can be passed through to the guest if
+	 * paging is disabled, but checking CR0.PG would generate a cyclical
+	 * dependency of sorts due to forcing the caller to ensure CR0 holds
+	 * the correct value prior to determining which CR0 bits can be owned
+	 * by L1.  Keep it simple and limit the optimization to EPT.
+	 */
+	if (!enable_ept)
+		bits &= ~X86_CR0_WP;
+	return bits;
+}
+
+static __always_inline struct kvm_vmx *to_kvm_vmx(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+	return container_of(kvm, struct kvm_vmx, kvm);
+}
+
+static __always_inline struct vcpu_vmx *to_vmx(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	return container_of(vcpu, struct vcpu_vmx, vcpu);
+}
+
+static inline struct lbr_desc *vcpu_to_lbr_desc(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	return &to_vmx(vcpu)->lbr_desc;
+}
+
+static inline struct x86_pmu_lbr *vcpu_to_lbr_records(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	return &vcpu_to_lbr_desc(vcpu)->records;
+}
+
+static inline bool intel_pmu_lbr_is_enabled(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	return !!vcpu_to_lbr_records(vcpu)->nr;
+}
+
+void intel_pmu_cross_mapped_check(struct kvm_pmu *pmu);
+int intel_pmu_create_guest_lbr_event(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+void vmx_passthrough_lbr_msrs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+
+static __always_inline unsigned long vmx_get_exit_qual(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+
+	if (!kvm_register_test_and_mark_available(vcpu, VCPU_EXREG_EXIT_INFO_1))
+		vmx->exit_qualification = vmcs_readl(EXIT_QUALIFICATION);
+
+	return vmx->exit_qualification;
+}
+
+static __always_inline u32 vmx_get_intr_info(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+
+	if (!kvm_register_test_and_mark_available(vcpu, VCPU_EXREG_EXIT_INFO_2))
+		vmx->exit_intr_info = vmcs_read32(VM_EXIT_INTR_INFO);
+
+	return vmx->exit_intr_info;
+}
+
+struct vmcs *alloc_vmcs_cpu(bool shadow, int cpu, gfp_t flags);
+void free_vmcs(struct vmcs *vmcs);
+int alloc_loaded_vmcs(struct loaded_vmcs *loaded_vmcs);
+void free_loaded_vmcs(struct loaded_vmcs *loaded_vmcs);
+void loaded_vmcs_clear(struct loaded_vmcs *loaded_vmcs);
+
+static inline struct vmcs *alloc_vmcs(bool shadow)
+{
+	return alloc_vmcs_cpu(shadow, raw_smp_processor_id(),
+			      GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
+}
+
+static inline bool vmx_has_waitpkg(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
+{
+	return secondary_exec_controls_get(vmx) &
+		SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_USR_WAIT_PAUSE;
+}
+
+static inline bool vmx_need_pf_intercept(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	if (!enable_ept)
+		return true;
+
+	return allow_smaller_maxphyaddr && cpuid_maxphyaddr(vcpu) < boot_cpu_data.x86_phys_bits;
+}
+
+static inline bool is_unrestricted_guest(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	return enable_unrestricted_guest && (!is_guest_mode(vcpu) ||
+	    (secondary_exec_controls_get(to_vmx(vcpu)) &
+	    SECONDARY_EXEC_UNRESTRICTED_GUEST));
+}
+
+bool __vmx_guest_state_valid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+static inline bool vmx_guest_state_valid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	return is_unrestricted_guest(vcpu) || __vmx_guest_state_valid(vcpu);
+}
+
+void dump_vmcs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+
+static inline int vmx_get_instr_info_reg2(u32 vmx_instr_info)
+{
+	return (vmx_instr_info >> 28) & 0xf;
+}
+
+static inline bool vmx_can_use_ipiv(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	return  lapic_in_kernel(vcpu) && enable_ipiv;
+}
+
+static inline bool guest_cpuid_has_evmcs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	/*
+	 * eVMCS is exposed to the guest if Hyper-V is enabled in CPUID and
+	 * eVMCS has been explicitly enabled by userspace.
+	 */
+	return vcpu->arch.hyperv_enabled &&
+	       to_vmx(vcpu)->nested.enlightened_vmcs_enabled;
+}
+
+#endif /* __KVM_X86_VMX_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx_ops.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx_ops.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..33af7b4c6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx_ops.h
@@ -0,0 +1,369 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+#ifndef __KVM_X86_VMX_INSN_H
+#define __KVM_X86_VMX_INSN_H
+
+#include <linux/nospec.h>
+
+#include <asm/vmx.h>
+
+#include "hyperv.h"
+#include "vmcs.h"
+#include "../x86.h"
+
+void vmread_error(unsigned long field);
+void vmwrite_error(unsigned long field, unsigned long value);
+void vmclear_error(struct vmcs *vmcs, u64 phys_addr);
+void vmptrld_error(struct vmcs *vmcs, u64 phys_addr);
+void invvpid_error(unsigned long ext, u16 vpid, gva_t gva);
+void invept_error(unsigned long ext, u64 eptp, gpa_t gpa);
+
+#ifndef CONFIG_CC_HAS_ASM_GOTO_OUTPUT
+/*
+ * The VMREAD error trampoline _always_ uses the stack to pass parameters, even
+ * for 64-bit targets.  Preserving all registers allows the VMREAD inline asm
+ * blob to avoid clobbering GPRs, which in turn allows the compiler to better
+ * optimize sequences of VMREADs.
+ *
+ * Declare the trampoline as an opaque label as it's not safe to call from C
+ * code; there is no way to tell the compiler to pass params on the stack for
+ * 64-bit targets.
+ *
+ * void vmread_error_trampoline(unsigned long field, bool fault);
+ */
+extern unsigned long vmread_error_trampoline;
+
+/*
+ * The second VMREAD error trampoline, called from the assembly trampoline,
+ * exists primarily to enable instrumentation for the VM-Fail path.
+ */
+void vmread_error_trampoline2(unsigned long field, bool fault);
+
+#endif
+
+static __always_inline void vmcs_check16(unsigned long field)
+{
+	BUILD_BUG_ON_MSG(__builtin_constant_p(field) && ((field) & 0x6001) == 0x2000,
+			 "16-bit accessor invalid for 64-bit field");
+	BUILD_BUG_ON_MSG(__builtin_constant_p(field) && ((field) & 0x6001) == 0x2001,
+			 "16-bit accessor invalid for 64-bit high field");
+	BUILD_BUG_ON_MSG(__builtin_constant_p(field) && ((field) & 0x6000) == 0x4000,
+			 "16-bit accessor invalid for 32-bit high field");
+	BUILD_BUG_ON_MSG(__builtin_constant_p(field) && ((field) & 0x6000) == 0x6000,
+			 "16-bit accessor invalid for natural width field");
+}
+
+static __always_inline void vmcs_check32(unsigned long field)
+{
+	BUILD_BUG_ON_MSG(__builtin_constant_p(field) && ((field) & 0x6000) == 0,
+			 "32-bit accessor invalid for 16-bit field");
+	BUILD_BUG_ON_MSG(__builtin_constant_p(field) && ((field) & 0x6001) == 0x2000,
+			 "32-bit accessor invalid for 64-bit field");
+	BUILD_BUG_ON_MSG(__builtin_constant_p(field) && ((field) & 0x6001) == 0x2001,
+			 "32-bit accessor invalid for 64-bit high field");
+	BUILD_BUG_ON_MSG(__builtin_constant_p(field) && ((field) & 0x6000) == 0x6000,
+			 "32-bit accessor invalid for natural width field");
+}
+
+static __always_inline void vmcs_check64(unsigned long field)
+{
+	BUILD_BUG_ON_MSG(__builtin_constant_p(field) && ((field) & 0x6000) == 0,
+			 "64-bit accessor invalid for 16-bit field");
+	BUILD_BUG_ON_MSG(__builtin_constant_p(field) && ((field) & 0x6001) == 0x2001,
+			 "64-bit accessor invalid for 64-bit high field");
+	BUILD_BUG_ON_MSG(__builtin_constant_p(field) && ((field) & 0x6000) == 0x4000,
+			 "64-bit accessor invalid for 32-bit field");
+	BUILD_BUG_ON_MSG(__builtin_constant_p(field) && ((field) & 0x6000) == 0x6000,
+			 "64-bit accessor invalid for natural width field");
+}
+
+static __always_inline void vmcs_checkl(unsigned long field)
+{
+	BUILD_BUG_ON_MSG(__builtin_constant_p(field) && ((field) & 0x6000) == 0,
+			 "Natural width accessor invalid for 16-bit field");
+	BUILD_BUG_ON_MSG(__builtin_constant_p(field) && ((field) & 0x6001) == 0x2000,
+			 "Natural width accessor invalid for 64-bit field");
+	BUILD_BUG_ON_MSG(__builtin_constant_p(field) && ((field) & 0x6001) == 0x2001,
+			 "Natural width accessor invalid for 64-bit high field");
+	BUILD_BUG_ON_MSG(__builtin_constant_p(field) && ((field) & 0x6000) == 0x4000,
+			 "Natural width accessor invalid for 32-bit field");
+}
+
+static __always_inline unsigned long __vmcs_readl(unsigned long field)
+{
+	unsigned long value;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_CC_HAS_ASM_GOTO_OUTPUT
+
+	asm_volatile_goto("1: vmread %[field], %[output]\n\t"
+			  "jna %l[do_fail]\n\t"
+
+			  _ASM_EXTABLE(1b, %l[do_exception])
+
+			  : [output] "=r" (value)
+			  : [field] "r" (field)
+			  : "cc"
+			  : do_fail, do_exception);
+
+	return value;
+
+do_fail:
+	instrumentation_begin();
+	vmread_error(field);
+	instrumentation_end();
+	return 0;
+
+do_exception:
+	kvm_spurious_fault();
+	return 0;
+
+#else /* !CONFIG_CC_HAS_ASM_GOTO_OUTPUT */
+
+	asm volatile("1: vmread %2, %1\n\t"
+		     ".byte 0x3e\n\t" /* branch taken hint */
+		     "ja 3f\n\t"
+
+		     /*
+		      * VMREAD failed.  Push '0' for @fault, push the failing
+		      * @field, and bounce through the trampoline to preserve
+		      * volatile registers.
+		      */
+		     "xorl %k1, %k1\n\t"
+		     "2:\n\t"
+		     "push %1\n\t"
+		     "push %2\n\t"
+		     "call vmread_error_trampoline\n\t"
+
+		     /*
+		      * Unwind the stack.  Note, the trampoline zeros out the
+		      * memory for @fault so that the result is '0' on error.
+		      */
+		     "pop %2\n\t"
+		     "pop %1\n\t"
+		     "3:\n\t"
+
+		     /* VMREAD faulted.  As above, except push '1' for @fault. */
+		     _ASM_EXTABLE_TYPE_REG(1b, 2b, EX_TYPE_ONE_REG, %1)
+
+		     : ASM_CALL_CONSTRAINT, "=&r"(value) : "r"(field) : "cc");
+	return value;
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_CC_HAS_ASM_GOTO_OUTPUT */
+}
+
+static __always_inline u16 vmcs_read16(unsigned long field)
+{
+	vmcs_check16(field);
+	if (kvm_is_using_evmcs())
+		return evmcs_read16(field);
+	return __vmcs_readl(field);
+}
+
+static __always_inline u32 vmcs_read32(unsigned long field)
+{
+	vmcs_check32(field);
+	if (kvm_is_using_evmcs())
+		return evmcs_read32(field);
+	return __vmcs_readl(field);
+}
+
+static __always_inline u64 vmcs_read64(unsigned long field)
+{
+	vmcs_check64(field);
+	if (kvm_is_using_evmcs())
+		return evmcs_read64(field);
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+	return __vmcs_readl(field);
+#else
+	return __vmcs_readl(field) | ((u64)__vmcs_readl(field+1) << 32);
+#endif
+}
+
+static __always_inline unsigned long vmcs_readl(unsigned long field)
+{
+	vmcs_checkl(field);
+	if (kvm_is_using_evmcs())
+		return evmcs_read64(field);
+	return __vmcs_readl(field);
+}
+
+#define vmx_asm1(insn, op1, error_args...)				\
+do {									\
+	asm_volatile_goto("1: " __stringify(insn) " %0\n\t"		\
+			  ".byte 0x2e\n\t" /* branch not taken hint */	\
+			  "jna %l[error]\n\t"				\
+			  _ASM_EXTABLE(1b, %l[fault])			\
+			  : : op1 : "cc" : error, fault);		\
+	return;								\
+error:									\
+	instrumentation_begin();					\
+	insn##_error(error_args);					\
+	instrumentation_end();						\
+	return;								\
+fault:									\
+	kvm_spurious_fault();						\
+} while (0)
+
+#define vmx_asm2(insn, op1, op2, error_args...)				\
+do {									\
+	asm_volatile_goto("1: "  __stringify(insn) " %1, %0\n\t"	\
+			  ".byte 0x2e\n\t" /* branch not taken hint */	\
+			  "jna %l[error]\n\t"				\
+			  _ASM_EXTABLE(1b, %l[fault])			\
+			  : : op1, op2 : "cc" : error, fault);		\
+	return;								\
+error:									\
+	instrumentation_begin();					\
+	insn##_error(error_args);					\
+	instrumentation_end();						\
+	return;								\
+fault:									\
+	kvm_spurious_fault();						\
+} while (0)
+
+static __always_inline void __vmcs_writel(unsigned long field, unsigned long value)
+{
+	vmx_asm2(vmwrite, "r"(field), "rm"(value), field, value);
+}
+
+static __always_inline void vmcs_write16(unsigned long field, u16 value)
+{
+	vmcs_check16(field);
+	if (kvm_is_using_evmcs())
+		return evmcs_write16(field, value);
+
+	__vmcs_writel(field, value);
+}
+
+static __always_inline void vmcs_write32(unsigned long field, u32 value)
+{
+	vmcs_check32(field);
+	if (kvm_is_using_evmcs())
+		return evmcs_write32(field, value);
+
+	__vmcs_writel(field, value);
+}
+
+static __always_inline void vmcs_write64(unsigned long field, u64 value)
+{
+	vmcs_check64(field);
+	if (kvm_is_using_evmcs())
+		return evmcs_write64(field, value);
+
+	__vmcs_writel(field, value);
+#ifndef CONFIG_X86_64
+	__vmcs_writel(field+1, value >> 32);
+#endif
+}
+
+static __always_inline void vmcs_writel(unsigned long field, unsigned long value)
+{
+	vmcs_checkl(field);
+	if (kvm_is_using_evmcs())
+		return evmcs_write64(field, value);
+
+	__vmcs_writel(field, value);
+}
+
+static __always_inline void vmcs_clear_bits(unsigned long field, u32 mask)
+{
+	BUILD_BUG_ON_MSG(__builtin_constant_p(field) && ((field) & 0x6000) == 0x2000,
+			 "vmcs_clear_bits does not support 64-bit fields");
+	if (kvm_is_using_evmcs())
+		return evmcs_write32(field, evmcs_read32(field) & ~mask);
+
+	__vmcs_writel(field, __vmcs_readl(field) & ~mask);
+}
+
+static __always_inline void vmcs_set_bits(unsigned long field, u32 mask)
+{
+	BUILD_BUG_ON_MSG(__builtin_constant_p(field) && ((field) & 0x6000) == 0x2000,
+			 "vmcs_set_bits does not support 64-bit fields");
+	if (kvm_is_using_evmcs())
+		return evmcs_write32(field, evmcs_read32(field) | mask);
+
+	__vmcs_writel(field, __vmcs_readl(field) | mask);
+}
+
+static inline void vmcs_clear(struct vmcs *vmcs)
+{
+	u64 phys_addr = __pa(vmcs);
+
+	vmx_asm1(vmclear, "m"(phys_addr), vmcs, phys_addr);
+}
+
+static inline void vmcs_load(struct vmcs *vmcs)
+{
+	u64 phys_addr = __pa(vmcs);
+
+	if (kvm_is_using_evmcs())
+		return evmcs_load(phys_addr);
+
+	vmx_asm1(vmptrld, "m"(phys_addr), vmcs, phys_addr);
+}
+
+static inline void __invvpid(unsigned long ext, u16 vpid, gva_t gva)
+{
+	struct {
+		u64 vpid : 16;
+		u64 rsvd : 48;
+		u64 gva;
+	} operand = { vpid, 0, gva };
+
+	vmx_asm2(invvpid, "r"(ext), "m"(operand), ext, vpid, gva);
+}
+
+static inline void __invept(unsigned long ext, u64 eptp, gpa_t gpa)
+{
+	struct {
+		u64 eptp, gpa;
+	} operand = {eptp, gpa};
+
+	vmx_asm2(invept, "r"(ext), "m"(operand), ext, eptp, gpa);
+}
+
+static inline void vpid_sync_vcpu_single(int vpid)
+{
+	if (vpid == 0)
+		return;
+
+	__invvpid(VMX_VPID_EXTENT_SINGLE_CONTEXT, vpid, 0);
+}
+
+static inline void vpid_sync_vcpu_global(void)
+{
+	__invvpid(VMX_VPID_EXTENT_ALL_CONTEXT, 0, 0);
+}
+
+static inline void vpid_sync_context(int vpid)
+{
+	if (cpu_has_vmx_invvpid_single())
+		vpid_sync_vcpu_single(vpid);
+	else if (vpid != 0)
+		vpid_sync_vcpu_global();
+}
+
+static inline void vpid_sync_vcpu_addr(int vpid, gva_t addr)
+{
+	if (vpid == 0)
+		return;
+
+	if (cpu_has_vmx_invvpid_individual_addr())
+		__invvpid(VMX_VPID_EXTENT_INDIVIDUAL_ADDR, vpid, addr);
+	else
+		vpid_sync_context(vpid);
+}
+
+static inline void ept_sync_global(void)
+{
+	__invept(VMX_EPT_EXTENT_GLOBAL, 0, 0);
+}
+
+static inline void ept_sync_context(u64 eptp)
+{
+	if (cpu_has_vmx_invept_context())
+		__invept(VMX_EPT_EXTENT_CONTEXT, eptp, 0);
+	else
+		ept_sync_global();
+}
+
+#endif /* __KVM_X86_VMX_INSN_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..e179db7c1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
@@ -0,0 +1,13695 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * Kernel-based Virtual Machine driver for Linux
+ *
+ * derived from drivers/kvm/kvm_main.c
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2006 Qumranet, Inc.
+ * Copyright (C) 2008 Qumranet, Inc.
+ * Copyright IBM Corporation, 2008
+ * Copyright 2010 Red Hat, Inc. and/or its affiliates.
+ *
+ * Authors:
+ *   Avi Kivity   <avi@qumranet.com>
+ *   Yaniv Kamay  <yaniv@qumranet.com>
+ *   Amit Shah    <amit.shah@qumranet.com>
+ *   Ben-Ami Yassour <benami@il.ibm.com>
+ */
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
+
+#include <linux/kvm_host.h>
+#include "irq.h"
+#include "ioapic.h"
+#include "mmu.h"
+#include "i8254.h"
+#include "tss.h"
+#include "kvm_cache_regs.h"
+#include "kvm_emulate.h"
+#include "mmu/page_track.h"
+#include "x86.h"
+#include "cpuid.h"
+#include "pmu.h"
+#include "hyperv.h"
+#include "lapic.h"
+#include "xen.h"
+#include "smm.h"
+
+#include <linux/clocksource.h>
+#include <linux/interrupt.h>
+#include <linux/kvm.h>
+#include <linux/fs.h>
+#include <linux/vmalloc.h>
+#include <linux/export.h>
+#include <linux/moduleparam.h>
+#include <linux/mman.h>
+#include <linux/highmem.h>
+#include <linux/iommu.h>
+#include <linux/cpufreq.h>
+#include <linux/user-return-notifier.h>
+#include <linux/srcu.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/perf_event.h>
+#include <linux/uaccess.h>
+#include <linux/hash.h>
+#include <linux/pci.h>
+#include <linux/timekeeper_internal.h>
+#include <linux/pvclock_gtod.h>
+#include <linux/kvm_irqfd.h>
+#include <linux/irqbypass.h>
+#include <linux/sched/stat.h>
+#include <linux/sched/isolation.h>
+#include <linux/mem_encrypt.h>
+#include <linux/entry-kvm.h>
+#include <linux/suspend.h>
+#include <linux/smp.h>
+
+#include <trace/events/ipi.h>
+#include <trace/events/kvm.h>
+
+#include <asm/debugreg.h>
+#include <asm/msr.h>
+#include <asm/desc.h>
+#include <asm/mce.h>
+#include <asm/pkru.h>
+#include <linux/kernel_stat.h>
+#include <asm/fpu/api.h>
+#include <asm/fpu/xcr.h>
+#include <asm/fpu/xstate.h>
+#include <asm/pvclock.h>
+#include <asm/div64.h>
+#include <asm/irq_remapping.h>
+#include <asm/mshyperv.h>
+#include <asm/hypervisor.h>
+#include <asm/tlbflush.h>
+#include <asm/intel_pt.h>
+#include <asm/emulate_prefix.h>
+#include <asm/sgx.h>
+#include <clocksource/hyperv_timer.h>
+
+#define CREATE_TRACE_POINTS
+#include "trace.h"
+
+#define MAX_IO_MSRS 256
+#define KVM_MAX_MCE_BANKS 32
+
+struct kvm_caps kvm_caps __read_mostly = {
+	.supported_mce_cap = MCG_CTL_P | MCG_SER_P,
+};
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_caps);
+
+#define  ERR_PTR_USR(e)  ((void __user *)ERR_PTR(e))
+
+#define emul_to_vcpu(ctxt) \
+	((struct kvm_vcpu *)(ctxt)->vcpu)
+
+/* EFER defaults:
+ * - enable syscall per default because its emulated by KVM
+ * - enable LME and LMA per default on 64 bit KVM
+ */
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+static
+u64 __read_mostly efer_reserved_bits = ~((u64)(EFER_SCE | EFER_LME | EFER_LMA));
+#else
+static u64 __read_mostly efer_reserved_bits = ~((u64)EFER_SCE);
+#endif
+
+static u64 __read_mostly cr4_reserved_bits = CR4_RESERVED_BITS;
+
+#define KVM_EXIT_HYPERCALL_VALID_MASK (1 << KVM_HC_MAP_GPA_RANGE)
+
+#define KVM_CAP_PMU_VALID_MASK KVM_PMU_CAP_DISABLE
+
+#define KVM_X2APIC_API_VALID_FLAGS (KVM_X2APIC_API_USE_32BIT_IDS | \
+                                    KVM_X2APIC_API_DISABLE_BROADCAST_QUIRK)
+
+static void update_cr8_intercept(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+static void process_nmi(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+static void __kvm_set_rflags(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long rflags);
+static void store_regs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+static int sync_regs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+static int kvm_vcpu_do_singlestep(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+
+static int __set_sregs2(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_sregs2 *sregs2);
+static void __get_sregs2(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_sregs2 *sregs2);
+
+static DEFINE_MUTEX(vendor_module_lock);
+struct kvm_x86_ops kvm_x86_ops __read_mostly;
+
+#define KVM_X86_OP(func)					     \
+	DEFINE_STATIC_CALL_NULL(kvm_x86_##func,			     \
+				*(((struct kvm_x86_ops *)0)->func));
+#define KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL KVM_X86_OP
+#define KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL_RET0 KVM_X86_OP
+#include <asm/kvm-x86-ops.h>
+EXPORT_STATIC_CALL_GPL(kvm_x86_get_cs_db_l_bits);
+EXPORT_STATIC_CALL_GPL(kvm_x86_cache_reg);
+
+static bool __read_mostly ignore_msrs = 0;
+module_param(ignore_msrs, bool, S_IRUGO | S_IWUSR);
+
+bool __read_mostly report_ignored_msrs = true;
+module_param(report_ignored_msrs, bool, S_IRUGO | S_IWUSR);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(report_ignored_msrs);
+
+unsigned int min_timer_period_us = 200;
+module_param(min_timer_period_us, uint, S_IRUGO | S_IWUSR);
+
+static bool __read_mostly kvmclock_periodic_sync = true;
+module_param(kvmclock_periodic_sync, bool, S_IRUGO);
+
+/* tsc tolerance in parts per million - default to 1/2 of the NTP threshold */
+static u32 __read_mostly tsc_tolerance_ppm = 250;
+module_param(tsc_tolerance_ppm, uint, S_IRUGO | S_IWUSR);
+
+/*
+ * lapic timer advance (tscdeadline mode only) in nanoseconds.  '-1' enables
+ * adaptive tuning starting from default advancement of 1000ns.  '0' disables
+ * advancement entirely.  Any other value is used as-is and disables adaptive
+ * tuning, i.e. allows privileged userspace to set an exact advancement time.
+ */
+static int __read_mostly lapic_timer_advance_ns = -1;
+module_param(lapic_timer_advance_ns, int, S_IRUGO | S_IWUSR);
+
+static bool __read_mostly vector_hashing = true;
+module_param(vector_hashing, bool, S_IRUGO);
+
+bool __read_mostly enable_vmware_backdoor = false;
+module_param(enable_vmware_backdoor, bool, S_IRUGO);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(enable_vmware_backdoor);
+
+/*
+ * Flags to manipulate forced emulation behavior (any non-zero value will
+ * enable forced emulation).
+ */
+#define KVM_FEP_CLEAR_RFLAGS_RF	BIT(1)
+static int __read_mostly force_emulation_prefix;
+module_param(force_emulation_prefix, int, 0644);
+
+int __read_mostly pi_inject_timer = -1;
+module_param(pi_inject_timer, bint, S_IRUGO | S_IWUSR);
+
+/* Enable/disable PMU virtualization */
+bool __read_mostly enable_pmu = true;
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(enable_pmu);
+module_param(enable_pmu, bool, 0444);
+
+bool __read_mostly eager_page_split = true;
+module_param(eager_page_split, bool, 0644);
+
+/* Enable/disable SMT_RSB bug mitigation */
+static bool __read_mostly mitigate_smt_rsb;
+module_param(mitigate_smt_rsb, bool, 0444);
+
+/*
+ * Restoring the host value for MSRs that are only consumed when running in
+ * usermode, e.g. SYSCALL MSRs and TSC_AUX, can be deferred until the CPU
+ * returns to userspace, i.e. the kernel can run with the guest's value.
+ */
+#define KVM_MAX_NR_USER_RETURN_MSRS 16
+
+struct kvm_user_return_msrs {
+	struct user_return_notifier urn;
+	bool registered;
+	struct kvm_user_return_msr_values {
+		u64 host;
+		u64 curr;
+	} values[KVM_MAX_NR_USER_RETURN_MSRS];
+};
+
+u32 __read_mostly kvm_nr_uret_msrs;
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_nr_uret_msrs);
+static u32 __read_mostly kvm_uret_msrs_list[KVM_MAX_NR_USER_RETURN_MSRS];
+static struct kvm_user_return_msrs __percpu *user_return_msrs;
+
+#define KVM_SUPPORTED_XCR0     (XFEATURE_MASK_FP | XFEATURE_MASK_SSE \
+				| XFEATURE_MASK_YMM | XFEATURE_MASK_BNDREGS \
+				| XFEATURE_MASK_BNDCSR | XFEATURE_MASK_AVX512 \
+				| XFEATURE_MASK_PKRU | XFEATURE_MASK_XTILE)
+
+u64 __read_mostly host_efer;
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(host_efer);
+
+bool __read_mostly allow_smaller_maxphyaddr = 0;
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(allow_smaller_maxphyaddr);
+
+bool __read_mostly enable_apicv = true;
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(enable_apicv);
+
+u64 __read_mostly host_xss;
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(host_xss);
+
+u64 __read_mostly host_arch_capabilities;
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(host_arch_capabilities);
+
+const struct _kvm_stats_desc kvm_vm_stats_desc[] = {
+	KVM_GENERIC_VM_STATS(),
+	STATS_DESC_COUNTER(VM, mmu_shadow_zapped),
+	STATS_DESC_COUNTER(VM, mmu_pte_write),
+	STATS_DESC_COUNTER(VM, mmu_pde_zapped),
+	STATS_DESC_COUNTER(VM, mmu_flooded),
+	STATS_DESC_COUNTER(VM, mmu_recycled),
+	STATS_DESC_COUNTER(VM, mmu_cache_miss),
+	STATS_DESC_ICOUNTER(VM, mmu_unsync),
+	STATS_DESC_ICOUNTER(VM, pages_4k),
+	STATS_DESC_ICOUNTER(VM, pages_2m),
+	STATS_DESC_ICOUNTER(VM, pages_1g),
+	STATS_DESC_ICOUNTER(VM, nx_lpage_splits),
+	STATS_DESC_PCOUNTER(VM, max_mmu_rmap_size),
+	STATS_DESC_PCOUNTER(VM, max_mmu_page_hash_collisions)
+};
+
+const struct kvm_stats_header kvm_vm_stats_header = {
+	.name_size = KVM_STATS_NAME_SIZE,
+	.num_desc = ARRAY_SIZE(kvm_vm_stats_desc),
+	.id_offset = sizeof(struct kvm_stats_header),
+	.desc_offset = sizeof(struct kvm_stats_header) + KVM_STATS_NAME_SIZE,
+	.data_offset = sizeof(struct kvm_stats_header) + KVM_STATS_NAME_SIZE +
+		       sizeof(kvm_vm_stats_desc),
+};
+
+const struct _kvm_stats_desc kvm_vcpu_stats_desc[] = {
+	KVM_GENERIC_VCPU_STATS(),
+	STATS_DESC_COUNTER(VCPU, pf_taken),
+	STATS_DESC_COUNTER(VCPU, pf_fixed),
+	STATS_DESC_COUNTER(VCPU, pf_emulate),
+	STATS_DESC_COUNTER(VCPU, pf_spurious),
+	STATS_DESC_COUNTER(VCPU, pf_fast),
+	STATS_DESC_COUNTER(VCPU, pf_mmio_spte_created),
+	STATS_DESC_COUNTER(VCPU, pf_guest),
+	STATS_DESC_COUNTER(VCPU, tlb_flush),
+	STATS_DESC_COUNTER(VCPU, invlpg),
+	STATS_DESC_COUNTER(VCPU, exits),
+	STATS_DESC_COUNTER(VCPU, io_exits),
+	STATS_DESC_COUNTER(VCPU, mmio_exits),
+	STATS_DESC_COUNTER(VCPU, signal_exits),
+	STATS_DESC_COUNTER(VCPU, irq_window_exits),
+	STATS_DESC_COUNTER(VCPU, nmi_window_exits),
+	STATS_DESC_COUNTER(VCPU, l1d_flush),
+	STATS_DESC_COUNTER(VCPU, halt_exits),
+	STATS_DESC_COUNTER(VCPU, request_irq_exits),
+	STATS_DESC_COUNTER(VCPU, irq_exits),
+	STATS_DESC_COUNTER(VCPU, host_state_reload),
+	STATS_DESC_COUNTER(VCPU, fpu_reload),
+	STATS_DESC_COUNTER(VCPU, insn_emulation),
+	STATS_DESC_COUNTER(VCPU, insn_emulation_fail),
+	STATS_DESC_COUNTER(VCPU, hypercalls),
+	STATS_DESC_COUNTER(VCPU, irq_injections),
+	STATS_DESC_COUNTER(VCPU, nmi_injections),
+	STATS_DESC_COUNTER(VCPU, req_event),
+	STATS_DESC_COUNTER(VCPU, nested_run),
+	STATS_DESC_COUNTER(VCPU, directed_yield_attempted),
+	STATS_DESC_COUNTER(VCPU, directed_yield_successful),
+	STATS_DESC_COUNTER(VCPU, preemption_reported),
+	STATS_DESC_COUNTER(VCPU, preemption_other),
+	STATS_DESC_IBOOLEAN(VCPU, guest_mode),
+	STATS_DESC_COUNTER(VCPU, notify_window_exits),
+};
+
+const struct kvm_stats_header kvm_vcpu_stats_header = {
+	.name_size = KVM_STATS_NAME_SIZE,
+	.num_desc = ARRAY_SIZE(kvm_vcpu_stats_desc),
+	.id_offset = sizeof(struct kvm_stats_header),
+	.desc_offset = sizeof(struct kvm_stats_header) + KVM_STATS_NAME_SIZE,
+	.data_offset = sizeof(struct kvm_stats_header) + KVM_STATS_NAME_SIZE +
+		       sizeof(kvm_vcpu_stats_desc),
+};
+
+u64 __read_mostly host_xcr0;
+
+static struct kmem_cache *x86_emulator_cache;
+
+/*
+ * When called, it means the previous get/set msr reached an invalid msr.
+ * Return true if we want to ignore/silent this failed msr access.
+ */
+static bool kvm_msr_ignored_check(u32 msr, u64 data, bool write)
+{
+	const char *op = write ? "wrmsr" : "rdmsr";
+
+	if (ignore_msrs) {
+		if (report_ignored_msrs)
+			kvm_pr_unimpl("ignored %s: 0x%x data 0x%llx\n",
+				      op, msr, data);
+		/* Mask the error */
+		return true;
+	} else {
+		kvm_debug_ratelimited("unhandled %s: 0x%x data 0x%llx\n",
+				      op, msr, data);
+		return false;
+	}
+}
+
+static struct kmem_cache *kvm_alloc_emulator_cache(void)
+{
+	unsigned int useroffset = offsetof(struct x86_emulate_ctxt, src);
+	unsigned int size = sizeof(struct x86_emulate_ctxt);
+
+	return kmem_cache_create_usercopy("x86_emulator", size,
+					  __alignof__(struct x86_emulate_ctxt),
+					  SLAB_ACCOUNT, useroffset,
+					  size - useroffset, NULL);
+}
+
+static int emulator_fix_hypercall(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt);
+
+static inline void kvm_async_pf_hash_reset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	int i;
+	for (i = 0; i < ASYNC_PF_PER_VCPU; i++)
+		vcpu->arch.apf.gfns[i] = ~0;
+}
+
+static void kvm_on_user_return(struct user_return_notifier *urn)
+{
+	unsigned slot;
+	struct kvm_user_return_msrs *msrs
+		= container_of(urn, struct kvm_user_return_msrs, urn);
+	struct kvm_user_return_msr_values *values;
+	unsigned long flags;
+
+	/*
+	 * Disabling irqs at this point since the following code could be
+	 * interrupted and executed through kvm_arch_hardware_disable()
+	 */
+	local_irq_save(flags);
+	if (msrs->registered) {
+		msrs->registered = false;
+		user_return_notifier_unregister(urn);
+	}
+	local_irq_restore(flags);
+	for (slot = 0; slot < kvm_nr_uret_msrs; ++slot) {
+		values = &msrs->values[slot];
+		if (values->host != values->curr) {
+			wrmsrl(kvm_uret_msrs_list[slot], values->host);
+			values->curr = values->host;
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+static int kvm_probe_user_return_msr(u32 msr)
+{
+	u64 val;
+	int ret;
+
+	preempt_disable();
+	ret = rdmsrl_safe(msr, &val);
+	if (ret)
+		goto out;
+	ret = wrmsrl_safe(msr, val);
+out:
+	preempt_enable();
+	return ret;
+}
+
+int kvm_add_user_return_msr(u32 msr)
+{
+	BUG_ON(kvm_nr_uret_msrs >= KVM_MAX_NR_USER_RETURN_MSRS);
+
+	if (kvm_probe_user_return_msr(msr))
+		return -1;
+
+	kvm_uret_msrs_list[kvm_nr_uret_msrs] = msr;
+	return kvm_nr_uret_msrs++;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_add_user_return_msr);
+
+int kvm_find_user_return_msr(u32 msr)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < kvm_nr_uret_msrs; ++i) {
+		if (kvm_uret_msrs_list[i] == msr)
+			return i;
+	}
+	return -1;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_find_user_return_msr);
+
+static void kvm_user_return_msr_cpu_online(void)
+{
+	unsigned int cpu = smp_processor_id();
+	struct kvm_user_return_msrs *msrs = per_cpu_ptr(user_return_msrs, cpu);
+	u64 value;
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < kvm_nr_uret_msrs; ++i) {
+		rdmsrl_safe(kvm_uret_msrs_list[i], &value);
+		msrs->values[i].host = value;
+		msrs->values[i].curr = value;
+	}
+}
+
+int kvm_set_user_return_msr(unsigned slot, u64 value, u64 mask)
+{
+	unsigned int cpu = smp_processor_id();
+	struct kvm_user_return_msrs *msrs = per_cpu_ptr(user_return_msrs, cpu);
+	int err;
+
+	value = (value & mask) | (msrs->values[slot].host & ~mask);
+	if (value == msrs->values[slot].curr)
+		return 0;
+	err = wrmsrl_safe(kvm_uret_msrs_list[slot], value);
+	if (err)
+		return 1;
+
+	msrs->values[slot].curr = value;
+	if (!msrs->registered) {
+		msrs->urn.on_user_return = kvm_on_user_return;
+		user_return_notifier_register(&msrs->urn);
+		msrs->registered = true;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_set_user_return_msr);
+
+static void drop_user_return_notifiers(void)
+{
+	unsigned int cpu = smp_processor_id();
+	struct kvm_user_return_msrs *msrs = per_cpu_ptr(user_return_msrs, cpu);
+
+	if (msrs->registered)
+		kvm_on_user_return(&msrs->urn);
+}
+
+u64 kvm_get_apic_base(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	return vcpu->arch.apic_base;
+}
+
+enum lapic_mode kvm_get_apic_mode(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	return kvm_apic_mode(kvm_get_apic_base(vcpu));
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_get_apic_mode);
+
+int kvm_set_apic_base(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
+{
+	enum lapic_mode old_mode = kvm_get_apic_mode(vcpu);
+	enum lapic_mode new_mode = kvm_apic_mode(msr_info->data);
+	u64 reserved_bits = kvm_vcpu_reserved_gpa_bits_raw(vcpu) | 0x2ff |
+		(guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_X2APIC) ? 0 : X2APIC_ENABLE);
+
+	if ((msr_info->data & reserved_bits) != 0 || new_mode == LAPIC_MODE_INVALID)
+		return 1;
+	if (!msr_info->host_initiated) {
+		if (old_mode == LAPIC_MODE_X2APIC && new_mode == LAPIC_MODE_XAPIC)
+			return 1;
+		if (old_mode == LAPIC_MODE_DISABLED && new_mode == LAPIC_MODE_X2APIC)
+			return 1;
+	}
+
+	kvm_lapic_set_base(vcpu, msr_info->data);
+	kvm_recalculate_apic_map(vcpu->kvm);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Handle a fault on a hardware virtualization (VMX or SVM) instruction.
+ *
+ * Hardware virtualization extension instructions may fault if a reboot turns
+ * off virtualization while processes are running.  Usually after catching the
+ * fault we just panic; during reboot instead the instruction is ignored.
+ */
+noinstr void kvm_spurious_fault(void)
+{
+	/* Fault while not rebooting.  We want the trace. */
+	BUG_ON(!kvm_rebooting);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_spurious_fault);
+
+#define EXCPT_BENIGN		0
+#define EXCPT_CONTRIBUTORY	1
+#define EXCPT_PF		2
+
+static int exception_class(int vector)
+{
+	switch (vector) {
+	case PF_VECTOR:
+		return EXCPT_PF;
+	case DE_VECTOR:
+	case TS_VECTOR:
+	case NP_VECTOR:
+	case SS_VECTOR:
+	case GP_VECTOR:
+		return EXCPT_CONTRIBUTORY;
+	default:
+		break;
+	}
+	return EXCPT_BENIGN;
+}
+
+#define EXCPT_FAULT		0
+#define EXCPT_TRAP		1
+#define EXCPT_ABORT		2
+#define EXCPT_INTERRUPT		3
+#define EXCPT_DB		4
+
+static int exception_type(int vector)
+{
+	unsigned int mask;
+
+	if (WARN_ON(vector > 31 || vector == NMI_VECTOR))
+		return EXCPT_INTERRUPT;
+
+	mask = 1 << vector;
+
+	/*
+	 * #DBs can be trap-like or fault-like, the caller must check other CPU
+	 * state, e.g. DR6, to determine whether a #DB is a trap or fault.
+	 */
+	if (mask & (1 << DB_VECTOR))
+		return EXCPT_DB;
+
+	if (mask & ((1 << BP_VECTOR) | (1 << OF_VECTOR)))
+		return EXCPT_TRAP;
+
+	if (mask & ((1 << DF_VECTOR) | (1 << MC_VECTOR)))
+		return EXCPT_ABORT;
+
+	/* Reserved exceptions will result in fault */
+	return EXCPT_FAULT;
+}
+
+void kvm_deliver_exception_payload(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+				   struct kvm_queued_exception *ex)
+{
+	if (!ex->has_payload)
+		return;
+
+	switch (ex->vector) {
+	case DB_VECTOR:
+		/*
+		 * "Certain debug exceptions may clear bit 0-3.  The
+		 * remaining contents of the DR6 register are never
+		 * cleared by the processor".
+		 */
+		vcpu->arch.dr6 &= ~DR_TRAP_BITS;
+		/*
+		 * In order to reflect the #DB exception payload in guest
+		 * dr6, three components need to be considered: active low
+		 * bit, FIXED_1 bits and active high bits (e.g. DR6_BD,
+		 * DR6_BS and DR6_BT)
+		 * DR6_ACTIVE_LOW contains the FIXED_1 and active low bits.
+		 * In the target guest dr6:
+		 * FIXED_1 bits should always be set.
+		 * Active low bits should be cleared if 1-setting in payload.
+		 * Active high bits should be set if 1-setting in payload.
+		 *
+		 * Note, the payload is compatible with the pending debug
+		 * exceptions/exit qualification under VMX, that active_low bits
+		 * are active high in payload.
+		 * So they need to be flipped for DR6.
+		 */
+		vcpu->arch.dr6 |= DR6_ACTIVE_LOW;
+		vcpu->arch.dr6 |= ex->payload;
+		vcpu->arch.dr6 ^= ex->payload & DR6_ACTIVE_LOW;
+
+		/*
+		 * The #DB payload is defined as compatible with the 'pending
+		 * debug exceptions' field under VMX, not DR6. While bit 12 is
+		 * defined in the 'pending debug exceptions' field (enabled
+		 * breakpoint), it is reserved and must be zero in DR6.
+		 */
+		vcpu->arch.dr6 &= ~BIT(12);
+		break;
+	case PF_VECTOR:
+		vcpu->arch.cr2 = ex->payload;
+		break;
+	}
+
+	ex->has_payload = false;
+	ex->payload = 0;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_deliver_exception_payload);
+
+static void kvm_queue_exception_vmexit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned int vector,
+				       bool has_error_code, u32 error_code,
+				       bool has_payload, unsigned long payload)
+{
+	struct kvm_queued_exception *ex = &vcpu->arch.exception_vmexit;
+
+	ex->vector = vector;
+	ex->injected = false;
+	ex->pending = true;
+	ex->has_error_code = has_error_code;
+	ex->error_code = error_code;
+	ex->has_payload = has_payload;
+	ex->payload = payload;
+}
+
+/* Forcibly leave the nested mode in cases like a vCPU reset */
+static void kvm_leave_nested(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	kvm_x86_ops.nested_ops->leave_nested(vcpu);
+}
+
+static void kvm_multiple_exception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+		unsigned nr, bool has_error, u32 error_code,
+	        bool has_payload, unsigned long payload, bool reinject)
+{
+	u32 prev_nr;
+	int class1, class2;
+
+	kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_EVENT, vcpu);
+
+	/*
+	 * If the exception is destined for L2 and isn't being reinjected,
+	 * morph it to a VM-Exit if L1 wants to intercept the exception.  A
+	 * previously injected exception is not checked because it was checked
+	 * when it was original queued, and re-checking is incorrect if _L1_
+	 * injected the exception, in which case it's exempt from interception.
+	 */
+	if (!reinject && is_guest_mode(vcpu) &&
+	    kvm_x86_ops.nested_ops->is_exception_vmexit(vcpu, nr, error_code)) {
+		kvm_queue_exception_vmexit(vcpu, nr, has_error, error_code,
+					   has_payload, payload);
+		return;
+	}
+
+	if (!vcpu->arch.exception.pending && !vcpu->arch.exception.injected) {
+	queue:
+		if (reinject) {
+			/*
+			 * On VM-Entry, an exception can be pending if and only
+			 * if event injection was blocked by nested_run_pending.
+			 * In that case, however, vcpu_enter_guest() requests an
+			 * immediate exit, and the guest shouldn't proceed far
+			 * enough to need reinjection.
+			 */
+			WARN_ON_ONCE(kvm_is_exception_pending(vcpu));
+			vcpu->arch.exception.injected = true;
+			if (WARN_ON_ONCE(has_payload)) {
+				/*
+				 * A reinjected event has already
+				 * delivered its payload.
+				 */
+				has_payload = false;
+				payload = 0;
+			}
+		} else {
+			vcpu->arch.exception.pending = true;
+			vcpu->arch.exception.injected = false;
+		}
+		vcpu->arch.exception.has_error_code = has_error;
+		vcpu->arch.exception.vector = nr;
+		vcpu->arch.exception.error_code = error_code;
+		vcpu->arch.exception.has_payload = has_payload;
+		vcpu->arch.exception.payload = payload;
+		if (!is_guest_mode(vcpu))
+			kvm_deliver_exception_payload(vcpu,
+						      &vcpu->arch.exception);
+		return;
+	}
+
+	/* to check exception */
+	prev_nr = vcpu->arch.exception.vector;
+	if (prev_nr == DF_VECTOR) {
+		/* triple fault -> shutdown */
+		kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_TRIPLE_FAULT, vcpu);
+		return;
+	}
+	class1 = exception_class(prev_nr);
+	class2 = exception_class(nr);
+	if ((class1 == EXCPT_CONTRIBUTORY && class2 == EXCPT_CONTRIBUTORY) ||
+	    (class1 == EXCPT_PF && class2 != EXCPT_BENIGN)) {
+		/*
+		 * Synthesize #DF.  Clear the previously injected or pending
+		 * exception so as not to incorrectly trigger shutdown.
+		 */
+		vcpu->arch.exception.injected = false;
+		vcpu->arch.exception.pending = false;
+
+		kvm_queue_exception_e(vcpu, DF_VECTOR, 0);
+	} else {
+		/* replace previous exception with a new one in a hope
+		   that instruction re-execution will regenerate lost
+		   exception */
+		goto queue;
+	}
+}
+
+void kvm_queue_exception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned nr)
+{
+	kvm_multiple_exception(vcpu, nr, false, 0, false, 0, false);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_queue_exception);
+
+void kvm_requeue_exception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned nr)
+{
+	kvm_multiple_exception(vcpu, nr, false, 0, false, 0, true);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_requeue_exception);
+
+void kvm_queue_exception_p(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned nr,
+			   unsigned long payload)
+{
+	kvm_multiple_exception(vcpu, nr, false, 0, true, payload, false);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_queue_exception_p);
+
+static void kvm_queue_exception_e_p(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned nr,
+				    u32 error_code, unsigned long payload)
+{
+	kvm_multiple_exception(vcpu, nr, true, error_code,
+			       true, payload, false);
+}
+
+int kvm_complete_insn_gp(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int err)
+{
+	if (err)
+		kvm_inject_gp(vcpu, 0);
+	else
+		return kvm_skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
+
+	return 1;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_complete_insn_gp);
+
+static int complete_emulated_insn_gp(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int err)
+{
+	if (err) {
+		kvm_inject_gp(vcpu, 0);
+		return 1;
+	}
+
+	return kvm_emulate_instruction(vcpu, EMULTYPE_NO_DECODE | EMULTYPE_SKIP |
+				       EMULTYPE_COMPLETE_USER_EXIT);
+}
+
+void kvm_inject_page_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct x86_exception *fault)
+{
+	++vcpu->stat.pf_guest;
+
+	/*
+	 * Async #PF in L2 is always forwarded to L1 as a VM-Exit regardless of
+	 * whether or not L1 wants to intercept "regular" #PF.
+	 */
+	if (is_guest_mode(vcpu) && fault->async_page_fault)
+		kvm_queue_exception_vmexit(vcpu, PF_VECTOR,
+					   true, fault->error_code,
+					   true, fault->address);
+	else
+		kvm_queue_exception_e_p(vcpu, PF_VECTOR, fault->error_code,
+					fault->address);
+}
+
+void kvm_inject_emulated_page_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+				    struct x86_exception *fault)
+{
+	struct kvm_mmu *fault_mmu;
+	WARN_ON_ONCE(fault->vector != PF_VECTOR);
+
+	fault_mmu = fault->nested_page_fault ? vcpu->arch.mmu :
+					       vcpu->arch.walk_mmu;
+
+	/*
+	 * Invalidate the TLB entry for the faulting address, if it exists,
+	 * else the access will fault indefinitely (and to emulate hardware).
+	 */
+	if ((fault->error_code & PFERR_PRESENT_MASK) &&
+	    !(fault->error_code & PFERR_RSVD_MASK))
+		kvm_mmu_invalidate_addr(vcpu, fault_mmu, fault->address,
+					KVM_MMU_ROOT_CURRENT);
+
+	fault_mmu->inject_page_fault(vcpu, fault);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_inject_emulated_page_fault);
+
+void kvm_inject_nmi(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	atomic_inc(&vcpu->arch.nmi_queued);
+	kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_NMI, vcpu);
+}
+
+void kvm_queue_exception_e(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned nr, u32 error_code)
+{
+	kvm_multiple_exception(vcpu, nr, true, error_code, false, 0, false);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_queue_exception_e);
+
+void kvm_requeue_exception_e(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned nr, u32 error_code)
+{
+	kvm_multiple_exception(vcpu, nr, true, error_code, false, 0, true);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_requeue_exception_e);
+
+/*
+ * Checks if cpl <= required_cpl; if true, return true.  Otherwise queue
+ * a #GP and return false.
+ */
+bool kvm_require_cpl(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int required_cpl)
+{
+	if (static_call(kvm_x86_get_cpl)(vcpu) <= required_cpl)
+		return true;
+	kvm_queue_exception_e(vcpu, GP_VECTOR, 0);
+	return false;
+}
+
+bool kvm_require_dr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int dr)
+{
+	if ((dr != 4 && dr != 5) || !kvm_is_cr4_bit_set(vcpu, X86_CR4_DE))
+		return true;
+
+	kvm_queue_exception(vcpu, UD_VECTOR);
+	return false;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_require_dr);
+
+static inline u64 pdptr_rsvd_bits(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	return vcpu->arch.reserved_gpa_bits | rsvd_bits(5, 8) | rsvd_bits(1, 2);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Load the pae pdptrs.  Return 1 if they are all valid, 0 otherwise.
+ */
+int load_pdptrs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long cr3)
+{
+	struct kvm_mmu *mmu = vcpu->arch.walk_mmu;
+	gfn_t pdpt_gfn = cr3 >> PAGE_SHIFT;
+	gpa_t real_gpa;
+	int i;
+	int ret;
+	u64 pdpte[ARRAY_SIZE(mmu->pdptrs)];
+
+	/*
+	 * If the MMU is nested, CR3 holds an L2 GPA and needs to be translated
+	 * to an L1 GPA.
+	 */
+	real_gpa = kvm_translate_gpa(vcpu, mmu, gfn_to_gpa(pdpt_gfn),
+				     PFERR_USER_MASK | PFERR_WRITE_MASK, NULL);
+	if (real_gpa == INVALID_GPA)
+		return 0;
+
+	/* Note the offset, PDPTRs are 32 byte aligned when using PAE paging. */
+	ret = kvm_vcpu_read_guest_page(vcpu, gpa_to_gfn(real_gpa), pdpte,
+				       cr3 & GENMASK(11, 5), sizeof(pdpte));
+	if (ret < 0)
+		return 0;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(pdpte); ++i) {
+		if ((pdpte[i] & PT_PRESENT_MASK) &&
+		    (pdpte[i] & pdptr_rsvd_bits(vcpu))) {
+			return 0;
+		}
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Marking VCPU_EXREG_PDPTR dirty doesn't work for !tdp_enabled.
+	 * Shadow page roots need to be reconstructed instead.
+	 */
+	if (!tdp_enabled && memcmp(mmu->pdptrs, pdpte, sizeof(mmu->pdptrs)))
+		kvm_mmu_free_roots(vcpu->kvm, mmu, KVM_MMU_ROOT_CURRENT);
+
+	memcpy(mmu->pdptrs, pdpte, sizeof(mmu->pdptrs));
+	kvm_register_mark_dirty(vcpu, VCPU_EXREG_PDPTR);
+	kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_LOAD_MMU_PGD, vcpu);
+	vcpu->arch.pdptrs_from_userspace = false;
+
+	return 1;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(load_pdptrs);
+
+static bool kvm_is_valid_cr0(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long cr0)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+	if (cr0 & 0xffffffff00000000UL)
+		return false;
+#endif
+
+	if ((cr0 & X86_CR0_NW) && !(cr0 & X86_CR0_CD))
+		return false;
+
+	if ((cr0 & X86_CR0_PG) && !(cr0 & X86_CR0_PE))
+		return false;
+
+	return static_call(kvm_x86_is_valid_cr0)(vcpu, cr0);
+}
+
+void kvm_post_set_cr0(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long old_cr0, unsigned long cr0)
+{
+	/*
+	 * CR0.WP is incorporated into the MMU role, but only for non-nested,
+	 * indirect shadow MMUs.  If paging is disabled, no updates are needed
+	 * as there are no permission bits to emulate.  If TDP is enabled, the
+	 * MMU's metadata needs to be updated, e.g. so that emulating guest
+	 * translations does the right thing, but there's no need to unload the
+	 * root as CR0.WP doesn't affect SPTEs.
+	 */
+	if ((cr0 ^ old_cr0) == X86_CR0_WP) {
+		if (!(cr0 & X86_CR0_PG))
+			return;
+
+		if (tdp_enabled) {
+			kvm_init_mmu(vcpu);
+			return;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if ((cr0 ^ old_cr0) & X86_CR0_PG) {
+		kvm_clear_async_pf_completion_queue(vcpu);
+		kvm_async_pf_hash_reset(vcpu);
+
+		/*
+		 * Clearing CR0.PG is defined to flush the TLB from the guest's
+		 * perspective.
+		 */
+		if (!(cr0 & X86_CR0_PG))
+			kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_TLB_FLUSH_GUEST, vcpu);
+	}
+
+	if ((cr0 ^ old_cr0) & KVM_MMU_CR0_ROLE_BITS)
+		kvm_mmu_reset_context(vcpu);
+
+	if (((cr0 ^ old_cr0) & X86_CR0_CD) &&
+	    kvm_arch_has_noncoherent_dma(vcpu->kvm) &&
+	    !kvm_check_has_quirk(vcpu->kvm, KVM_X86_QUIRK_CD_NW_CLEARED))
+		kvm_zap_gfn_range(vcpu->kvm, 0, ~0ULL);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_post_set_cr0);
+
+int kvm_set_cr0(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long cr0)
+{
+	unsigned long old_cr0 = kvm_read_cr0(vcpu);
+
+	if (!kvm_is_valid_cr0(vcpu, cr0))
+		return 1;
+
+	cr0 |= X86_CR0_ET;
+
+	/* Write to CR0 reserved bits are ignored, even on Intel. */
+	cr0 &= ~CR0_RESERVED_BITS;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+	if ((vcpu->arch.efer & EFER_LME) && !is_paging(vcpu) &&
+	    (cr0 & X86_CR0_PG)) {
+		int cs_db, cs_l;
+
+		if (!is_pae(vcpu))
+			return 1;
+		static_call(kvm_x86_get_cs_db_l_bits)(vcpu, &cs_db, &cs_l);
+		if (cs_l)
+			return 1;
+	}
+#endif
+	if (!(vcpu->arch.efer & EFER_LME) && (cr0 & X86_CR0_PG) &&
+	    is_pae(vcpu) && ((cr0 ^ old_cr0) & X86_CR0_PDPTR_BITS) &&
+	    !load_pdptrs(vcpu, kvm_read_cr3(vcpu)))
+		return 1;
+
+	if (!(cr0 & X86_CR0_PG) &&
+	    (is_64_bit_mode(vcpu) || kvm_is_cr4_bit_set(vcpu, X86_CR4_PCIDE)))
+		return 1;
+
+	static_call(kvm_x86_set_cr0)(vcpu, cr0);
+
+	kvm_post_set_cr0(vcpu, old_cr0, cr0);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_set_cr0);
+
+void kvm_lmsw(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long msw)
+{
+	(void)kvm_set_cr0(vcpu, kvm_read_cr0_bits(vcpu, ~0x0eul) | (msw & 0x0f));
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_lmsw);
+
+void kvm_load_guest_xsave_state(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	if (vcpu->arch.guest_state_protected)
+		return;
+
+	if (kvm_is_cr4_bit_set(vcpu, X86_CR4_OSXSAVE)) {
+
+		if (vcpu->arch.xcr0 != host_xcr0)
+			xsetbv(XCR_XFEATURE_ENABLED_MASK, vcpu->arch.xcr0);
+
+		if (guest_can_use(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_XSAVES) &&
+		    vcpu->arch.ia32_xss != host_xss)
+			wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_XSS, vcpu->arch.ia32_xss);
+	}
+
+	if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_PKU) &&
+	    vcpu->arch.pkru != vcpu->arch.host_pkru &&
+	    ((vcpu->arch.xcr0 & XFEATURE_MASK_PKRU) ||
+	     kvm_is_cr4_bit_set(vcpu, X86_CR4_PKE)))
+		write_pkru(vcpu->arch.pkru);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_load_guest_xsave_state);
+
+void kvm_load_host_xsave_state(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	if (vcpu->arch.guest_state_protected)
+		return;
+
+	if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_PKU) &&
+	    ((vcpu->arch.xcr0 & XFEATURE_MASK_PKRU) ||
+	     kvm_is_cr4_bit_set(vcpu, X86_CR4_PKE))) {
+		vcpu->arch.pkru = rdpkru();
+		if (vcpu->arch.pkru != vcpu->arch.host_pkru)
+			write_pkru(vcpu->arch.host_pkru);
+	}
+
+	if (kvm_is_cr4_bit_set(vcpu, X86_CR4_OSXSAVE)) {
+
+		if (vcpu->arch.xcr0 != host_xcr0)
+			xsetbv(XCR_XFEATURE_ENABLED_MASK, host_xcr0);
+
+		if (guest_can_use(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_XSAVES) &&
+		    vcpu->arch.ia32_xss != host_xss)
+			wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_XSS, host_xss);
+	}
+
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_load_host_xsave_state);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+static inline u64 kvm_guest_supported_xfd(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	return vcpu->arch.guest_supported_xcr0 & XFEATURE_MASK_USER_DYNAMIC;
+}
+#endif
+
+static int __kvm_set_xcr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 index, u64 xcr)
+{
+	u64 xcr0 = xcr;
+	u64 old_xcr0 = vcpu->arch.xcr0;
+	u64 valid_bits;
+
+	/* Only support XCR_XFEATURE_ENABLED_MASK(xcr0) now  */
+	if (index != XCR_XFEATURE_ENABLED_MASK)
+		return 1;
+	if (!(xcr0 & XFEATURE_MASK_FP))
+		return 1;
+	if ((xcr0 & XFEATURE_MASK_YMM) && !(xcr0 & XFEATURE_MASK_SSE))
+		return 1;
+
+	/*
+	 * Do not allow the guest to set bits that we do not support
+	 * saving.  However, xcr0 bit 0 is always set, even if the
+	 * emulated CPU does not support XSAVE (see kvm_vcpu_reset()).
+	 */
+	valid_bits = vcpu->arch.guest_supported_xcr0 | XFEATURE_MASK_FP;
+	if (xcr0 & ~valid_bits)
+		return 1;
+
+	if ((!(xcr0 & XFEATURE_MASK_BNDREGS)) !=
+	    (!(xcr0 & XFEATURE_MASK_BNDCSR)))
+		return 1;
+
+	if (xcr0 & XFEATURE_MASK_AVX512) {
+		if (!(xcr0 & XFEATURE_MASK_YMM))
+			return 1;
+		if ((xcr0 & XFEATURE_MASK_AVX512) != XFEATURE_MASK_AVX512)
+			return 1;
+	}
+
+	if ((xcr0 & XFEATURE_MASK_XTILE) &&
+	    ((xcr0 & XFEATURE_MASK_XTILE) != XFEATURE_MASK_XTILE))
+		return 1;
+
+	vcpu->arch.xcr0 = xcr0;
+
+	if ((xcr0 ^ old_xcr0) & XFEATURE_MASK_EXTEND)
+		kvm_update_cpuid_runtime(vcpu);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int kvm_emulate_xsetbv(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	/* Note, #UD due to CR4.OSXSAVE=0 has priority over the intercept. */
+	if (static_call(kvm_x86_get_cpl)(vcpu) != 0 ||
+	    __kvm_set_xcr(vcpu, kvm_rcx_read(vcpu), kvm_read_edx_eax(vcpu))) {
+		kvm_inject_gp(vcpu, 0);
+		return 1;
+	}
+
+	return kvm_skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_emulate_xsetbv);
+
+bool __kvm_is_valid_cr4(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long cr4)
+{
+	if (cr4 & cr4_reserved_bits)
+		return false;
+
+	if (cr4 & vcpu->arch.cr4_guest_rsvd_bits)
+		return false;
+
+	return true;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__kvm_is_valid_cr4);
+
+static bool kvm_is_valid_cr4(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long cr4)
+{
+	return __kvm_is_valid_cr4(vcpu, cr4) &&
+	       static_call(kvm_x86_is_valid_cr4)(vcpu, cr4);
+}
+
+void kvm_post_set_cr4(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long old_cr4, unsigned long cr4)
+{
+	if ((cr4 ^ old_cr4) & KVM_MMU_CR4_ROLE_BITS)
+		kvm_mmu_reset_context(vcpu);
+
+	/*
+	 * If CR4.PCIDE is changed 0 -> 1, there is no need to flush the TLB
+	 * according to the SDM; however, stale prev_roots could be reused
+	 * incorrectly in the future after a MOV to CR3 with NOFLUSH=1, so we
+	 * free them all.  This is *not* a superset of KVM_REQ_TLB_FLUSH_GUEST
+	 * or KVM_REQ_TLB_FLUSH_CURRENT, because the hardware TLB is not flushed,
+	 * so fall through.
+	 */
+	if (!tdp_enabled &&
+	    (cr4 & X86_CR4_PCIDE) && !(old_cr4 & X86_CR4_PCIDE))
+		kvm_mmu_unload(vcpu);
+
+	/*
+	 * The TLB has to be flushed for all PCIDs if any of the following
+	 * (architecturally required) changes happen:
+	 * - CR4.PCIDE is changed from 1 to 0
+	 * - CR4.PGE is toggled
+	 *
+	 * This is a superset of KVM_REQ_TLB_FLUSH_CURRENT.
+	 */
+	if (((cr4 ^ old_cr4) & X86_CR4_PGE) ||
+	    (!(cr4 & X86_CR4_PCIDE) && (old_cr4 & X86_CR4_PCIDE)))
+		kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_TLB_FLUSH_GUEST, vcpu);
+
+	/*
+	 * The TLB has to be flushed for the current PCID if any of the
+	 * following (architecturally required) changes happen:
+	 * - CR4.SMEP is changed from 0 to 1
+	 * - CR4.PAE is toggled
+	 */
+	else if (((cr4 ^ old_cr4) & X86_CR4_PAE) ||
+		 ((cr4 & X86_CR4_SMEP) && !(old_cr4 & X86_CR4_SMEP)))
+		kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_TLB_FLUSH_CURRENT, vcpu);
+
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_post_set_cr4);
+
+int kvm_set_cr4(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long cr4)
+{
+	unsigned long old_cr4 = kvm_read_cr4(vcpu);
+
+	if (!kvm_is_valid_cr4(vcpu, cr4))
+		return 1;
+
+	if (is_long_mode(vcpu)) {
+		if (!(cr4 & X86_CR4_PAE))
+			return 1;
+		if ((cr4 ^ old_cr4) & X86_CR4_LA57)
+			return 1;
+	} else if (is_paging(vcpu) && (cr4 & X86_CR4_PAE)
+		   && ((cr4 ^ old_cr4) & X86_CR4_PDPTR_BITS)
+		   && !load_pdptrs(vcpu, kvm_read_cr3(vcpu)))
+		return 1;
+
+	if ((cr4 & X86_CR4_PCIDE) && !(old_cr4 & X86_CR4_PCIDE)) {
+		/* PCID can not be enabled when cr3[11:0]!=000H or EFER.LMA=0 */
+		if ((kvm_read_cr3(vcpu) & X86_CR3_PCID_MASK) || !is_long_mode(vcpu))
+			return 1;
+	}
+
+	static_call(kvm_x86_set_cr4)(vcpu, cr4);
+
+	kvm_post_set_cr4(vcpu, old_cr4, cr4);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_set_cr4);
+
+static void kvm_invalidate_pcid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long pcid)
+{
+	struct kvm_mmu *mmu = vcpu->arch.mmu;
+	unsigned long roots_to_free = 0;
+	int i;
+
+	/*
+	 * MOV CR3 and INVPCID are usually not intercepted when using TDP, but
+	 * this is reachable when running EPT=1 and unrestricted_guest=0,  and
+	 * also via the emulator.  KVM's TDP page tables are not in the scope of
+	 * the invalidation, but the guest's TLB entries need to be flushed as
+	 * the CPU may have cached entries in its TLB for the target PCID.
+	 */
+	if (unlikely(tdp_enabled)) {
+		kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_TLB_FLUSH_GUEST, vcpu);
+		return;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * If neither the current CR3 nor any of the prev_roots use the given
+	 * PCID, then nothing needs to be done here because a resync will
+	 * happen anyway before switching to any other CR3.
+	 */
+	if (kvm_get_active_pcid(vcpu) == pcid) {
+		kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_MMU_SYNC, vcpu);
+		kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_TLB_FLUSH_CURRENT, vcpu);
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * If PCID is disabled, there is no need to free prev_roots even if the
+	 * PCIDs for them are also 0, because MOV to CR3 always flushes the TLB
+	 * with PCIDE=0.
+	 */
+	if (!kvm_is_cr4_bit_set(vcpu, X86_CR4_PCIDE))
+		return;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < KVM_MMU_NUM_PREV_ROOTS; i++)
+		if (kvm_get_pcid(vcpu, mmu->prev_roots[i].pgd) == pcid)
+			roots_to_free |= KVM_MMU_ROOT_PREVIOUS(i);
+
+	kvm_mmu_free_roots(vcpu->kvm, mmu, roots_to_free);
+}
+
+int kvm_set_cr3(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long cr3)
+{
+	bool skip_tlb_flush = false;
+	unsigned long pcid = 0;
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+	if (kvm_is_cr4_bit_set(vcpu, X86_CR4_PCIDE)) {
+		skip_tlb_flush = cr3 & X86_CR3_PCID_NOFLUSH;
+		cr3 &= ~X86_CR3_PCID_NOFLUSH;
+		pcid = cr3 & X86_CR3_PCID_MASK;
+	}
+#endif
+
+	/* PDPTRs are always reloaded for PAE paging. */
+	if (cr3 == kvm_read_cr3(vcpu) && !is_pae_paging(vcpu))
+		goto handle_tlb_flush;
+
+	/*
+	 * Do not condition the GPA check on long mode, this helper is used to
+	 * stuff CR3, e.g. for RSM emulation, and there is no guarantee that
+	 * the current vCPU mode is accurate.
+	 */
+	if (kvm_vcpu_is_illegal_gpa(vcpu, cr3))
+		return 1;
+
+	if (is_pae_paging(vcpu) && !load_pdptrs(vcpu, cr3))
+		return 1;
+
+	if (cr3 != kvm_read_cr3(vcpu))
+		kvm_mmu_new_pgd(vcpu, cr3);
+
+	vcpu->arch.cr3 = cr3;
+	kvm_register_mark_dirty(vcpu, VCPU_EXREG_CR3);
+	/* Do not call post_set_cr3, we do not get here for confidential guests.  */
+
+handle_tlb_flush:
+	/*
+	 * A load of CR3 that flushes the TLB flushes only the current PCID,
+	 * even if PCID is disabled, in which case PCID=0 is flushed.  It's a
+	 * moot point in the end because _disabling_ PCID will flush all PCIDs,
+	 * and it's impossible to use a non-zero PCID when PCID is disabled,
+	 * i.e. only PCID=0 can be relevant.
+	 */
+	if (!skip_tlb_flush)
+		kvm_invalidate_pcid(vcpu, pcid);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_set_cr3);
+
+int kvm_set_cr8(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long cr8)
+{
+	if (cr8 & CR8_RESERVED_BITS)
+		return 1;
+	if (lapic_in_kernel(vcpu))
+		kvm_lapic_set_tpr(vcpu, cr8);
+	else
+		vcpu->arch.cr8 = cr8;
+	return 0;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_set_cr8);
+
+unsigned long kvm_get_cr8(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	if (lapic_in_kernel(vcpu))
+		return kvm_lapic_get_cr8(vcpu);
+	else
+		return vcpu->arch.cr8;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_get_cr8);
+
+static void kvm_update_dr0123(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	if (!(vcpu->guest_debug & KVM_GUESTDBG_USE_HW_BP)) {
+		for (i = 0; i < KVM_NR_DB_REGS; i++)
+			vcpu->arch.eff_db[i] = vcpu->arch.db[i];
+	}
+}
+
+void kvm_update_dr7(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	unsigned long dr7;
+
+	if (vcpu->guest_debug & KVM_GUESTDBG_USE_HW_BP)
+		dr7 = vcpu->arch.guest_debug_dr7;
+	else
+		dr7 = vcpu->arch.dr7;
+	static_call(kvm_x86_set_dr7)(vcpu, dr7);
+	vcpu->arch.switch_db_regs &= ~KVM_DEBUGREG_BP_ENABLED;
+	if (dr7 & DR7_BP_EN_MASK)
+		vcpu->arch.switch_db_regs |= KVM_DEBUGREG_BP_ENABLED;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_update_dr7);
+
+static u64 kvm_dr6_fixed(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	u64 fixed = DR6_FIXED_1;
+
+	if (!guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_RTM))
+		fixed |= DR6_RTM;
+
+	if (!guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_BUS_LOCK_DETECT))
+		fixed |= DR6_BUS_LOCK;
+	return fixed;
+}
+
+int kvm_set_dr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int dr, unsigned long val)
+{
+	size_t size = ARRAY_SIZE(vcpu->arch.db);
+
+	switch (dr) {
+	case 0 ... 3:
+		vcpu->arch.db[array_index_nospec(dr, size)] = val;
+		if (!(vcpu->guest_debug & KVM_GUESTDBG_USE_HW_BP))
+			vcpu->arch.eff_db[dr] = val;
+		break;
+	case 4:
+	case 6:
+		if (!kvm_dr6_valid(val))
+			return 1; /* #GP */
+		vcpu->arch.dr6 = (val & DR6_VOLATILE) | kvm_dr6_fixed(vcpu);
+		break;
+	case 5:
+	default: /* 7 */
+		if (!kvm_dr7_valid(val))
+			return 1; /* #GP */
+		vcpu->arch.dr7 = (val & DR7_VOLATILE) | DR7_FIXED_1;
+		kvm_update_dr7(vcpu);
+		break;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_set_dr);
+
+void kvm_get_dr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int dr, unsigned long *val)
+{
+	size_t size = ARRAY_SIZE(vcpu->arch.db);
+
+	switch (dr) {
+	case 0 ... 3:
+		*val = vcpu->arch.db[array_index_nospec(dr, size)];
+		break;
+	case 4:
+	case 6:
+		*val = vcpu->arch.dr6;
+		break;
+	case 5:
+	default: /* 7 */
+		*val = vcpu->arch.dr7;
+		break;
+	}
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_get_dr);
+
+int kvm_emulate_rdpmc(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	u32 ecx = kvm_rcx_read(vcpu);
+	u64 data;
+
+	if (kvm_pmu_rdpmc(vcpu, ecx, &data)) {
+		kvm_inject_gp(vcpu, 0);
+		return 1;
+	}
+
+	kvm_rax_write(vcpu, (u32)data);
+	kvm_rdx_write(vcpu, data >> 32);
+	return kvm_skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_emulate_rdpmc);
+
+/*
+ * The three MSR lists(msrs_to_save, emulated_msrs, msr_based_features) track
+ * the set of MSRs that KVM exposes to userspace through KVM_GET_MSRS,
+ * KVM_SET_MSRS, and KVM_GET_MSR_INDEX_LIST.  msrs_to_save holds MSRs that
+ * require host support, i.e. should be probed via RDMSR.  emulated_msrs holds
+ * MSRs that KVM emulates without strictly requiring host support.
+ * msr_based_features holds MSRs that enumerate features, i.e. are effectively
+ * CPUID leafs.  Note, msr_based_features isn't mutually exclusive with
+ * msrs_to_save and emulated_msrs.
+ */
+
+static const u32 msrs_to_save_base[] = {
+	MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_CS, MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_ESP, MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_EIP,
+	MSR_STAR,
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+	MSR_CSTAR, MSR_KERNEL_GS_BASE, MSR_SYSCALL_MASK, MSR_LSTAR,
+#endif
+	MSR_IA32_TSC, MSR_IA32_CR_PAT, MSR_VM_HSAVE_PA,
+	MSR_IA32_FEAT_CTL, MSR_IA32_BNDCFGS, MSR_TSC_AUX,
+	MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, MSR_IA32_TSX_CTRL,
+	MSR_IA32_RTIT_CTL, MSR_IA32_RTIT_STATUS, MSR_IA32_RTIT_CR3_MATCH,
+	MSR_IA32_RTIT_OUTPUT_BASE, MSR_IA32_RTIT_OUTPUT_MASK,
+	MSR_IA32_RTIT_ADDR0_A, MSR_IA32_RTIT_ADDR0_B,
+	MSR_IA32_RTIT_ADDR1_A, MSR_IA32_RTIT_ADDR1_B,
+	MSR_IA32_RTIT_ADDR2_A, MSR_IA32_RTIT_ADDR2_B,
+	MSR_IA32_RTIT_ADDR3_A, MSR_IA32_RTIT_ADDR3_B,
+	MSR_IA32_UMWAIT_CONTROL,
+
+	MSR_IA32_XFD, MSR_IA32_XFD_ERR,
+};
+
+static const u32 msrs_to_save_pmu[] = {
+	MSR_ARCH_PERFMON_FIXED_CTR0, MSR_ARCH_PERFMON_FIXED_CTR1,
+	MSR_ARCH_PERFMON_FIXED_CTR0 + 2,
+	MSR_CORE_PERF_FIXED_CTR_CTRL, MSR_CORE_PERF_GLOBAL_STATUS,
+	MSR_CORE_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL, MSR_CORE_PERF_GLOBAL_OVF_CTRL,
+	MSR_IA32_PEBS_ENABLE, MSR_IA32_DS_AREA, MSR_PEBS_DATA_CFG,
+
+	/* This part of MSRs should match KVM_INTEL_PMC_MAX_GENERIC. */
+	MSR_ARCH_PERFMON_PERFCTR0, MSR_ARCH_PERFMON_PERFCTR1,
+	MSR_ARCH_PERFMON_PERFCTR0 + 2, MSR_ARCH_PERFMON_PERFCTR0 + 3,
+	MSR_ARCH_PERFMON_PERFCTR0 + 4, MSR_ARCH_PERFMON_PERFCTR0 + 5,
+	MSR_ARCH_PERFMON_PERFCTR0 + 6, MSR_ARCH_PERFMON_PERFCTR0 + 7,
+	MSR_ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL0, MSR_ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL1,
+	MSR_ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL0 + 2, MSR_ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL0 + 3,
+	MSR_ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL0 + 4, MSR_ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL0 + 5,
+	MSR_ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL0 + 6, MSR_ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL0 + 7,
+
+	MSR_K7_EVNTSEL0, MSR_K7_EVNTSEL1, MSR_K7_EVNTSEL2, MSR_K7_EVNTSEL3,
+	MSR_K7_PERFCTR0, MSR_K7_PERFCTR1, MSR_K7_PERFCTR2, MSR_K7_PERFCTR3,
+
+	/* This part of MSRs should match KVM_AMD_PMC_MAX_GENERIC. */
+	MSR_F15H_PERF_CTL0, MSR_F15H_PERF_CTL1, MSR_F15H_PERF_CTL2,
+	MSR_F15H_PERF_CTL3, MSR_F15H_PERF_CTL4, MSR_F15H_PERF_CTL5,
+	MSR_F15H_PERF_CTR0, MSR_F15H_PERF_CTR1, MSR_F15H_PERF_CTR2,
+	MSR_F15H_PERF_CTR3, MSR_F15H_PERF_CTR4, MSR_F15H_PERF_CTR5,
+
+	MSR_AMD64_PERF_CNTR_GLOBAL_CTL,
+	MSR_AMD64_PERF_CNTR_GLOBAL_STATUS,
+	MSR_AMD64_PERF_CNTR_GLOBAL_STATUS_CLR,
+};
+
+static u32 msrs_to_save[ARRAY_SIZE(msrs_to_save_base) +
+			ARRAY_SIZE(msrs_to_save_pmu)];
+static unsigned num_msrs_to_save;
+
+static const u32 emulated_msrs_all[] = {
+	MSR_KVM_SYSTEM_TIME, MSR_KVM_WALL_CLOCK,
+	MSR_KVM_SYSTEM_TIME_NEW, MSR_KVM_WALL_CLOCK_NEW,
+	HV_X64_MSR_GUEST_OS_ID, HV_X64_MSR_HYPERCALL,
+	HV_X64_MSR_TIME_REF_COUNT, HV_X64_MSR_REFERENCE_TSC,
+	HV_X64_MSR_TSC_FREQUENCY, HV_X64_MSR_APIC_FREQUENCY,
+	HV_X64_MSR_CRASH_P0, HV_X64_MSR_CRASH_P1, HV_X64_MSR_CRASH_P2,
+	HV_X64_MSR_CRASH_P3, HV_X64_MSR_CRASH_P4, HV_X64_MSR_CRASH_CTL,
+	HV_X64_MSR_RESET,
+	HV_X64_MSR_VP_INDEX,
+	HV_X64_MSR_VP_RUNTIME,
+	HV_X64_MSR_SCONTROL,
+	HV_X64_MSR_STIMER0_CONFIG,
+	HV_X64_MSR_VP_ASSIST_PAGE,
+	HV_X64_MSR_REENLIGHTENMENT_CONTROL, HV_X64_MSR_TSC_EMULATION_CONTROL,
+	HV_X64_MSR_TSC_EMULATION_STATUS, HV_X64_MSR_TSC_INVARIANT_CONTROL,
+	HV_X64_MSR_SYNDBG_OPTIONS,
+	HV_X64_MSR_SYNDBG_CONTROL, HV_X64_MSR_SYNDBG_STATUS,
+	HV_X64_MSR_SYNDBG_SEND_BUFFER, HV_X64_MSR_SYNDBG_RECV_BUFFER,
+	HV_X64_MSR_SYNDBG_PENDING_BUFFER,
+
+	MSR_KVM_ASYNC_PF_EN, MSR_KVM_STEAL_TIME,
+	MSR_KVM_PV_EOI_EN, MSR_KVM_ASYNC_PF_INT, MSR_KVM_ASYNC_PF_ACK,
+
+	MSR_IA32_TSC_ADJUST,
+	MSR_IA32_TSC_DEADLINE,
+	MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES,
+	MSR_IA32_PERF_CAPABILITIES,
+	MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE,
+	MSR_IA32_MCG_STATUS,
+	MSR_IA32_MCG_CTL,
+	MSR_IA32_MCG_EXT_CTL,
+	MSR_IA32_SMBASE,
+	MSR_SMI_COUNT,
+	MSR_PLATFORM_INFO,
+	MSR_MISC_FEATURES_ENABLES,
+	MSR_AMD64_VIRT_SPEC_CTRL,
+	MSR_AMD64_TSC_RATIO,
+	MSR_IA32_POWER_CTL,
+	MSR_IA32_UCODE_REV,
+
+	/*
+	 * KVM always supports the "true" VMX control MSRs, even if the host
+	 * does not.  The VMX MSRs as a whole are considered "emulated" as KVM
+	 * doesn't strictly require them to exist in the host (ignoring that
+	 * KVM would refuse to load in the first place if the core set of MSRs
+	 * aren't supported).
+	 */
+	MSR_IA32_VMX_BASIC,
+	MSR_IA32_VMX_TRUE_PINBASED_CTLS,
+	MSR_IA32_VMX_TRUE_PROCBASED_CTLS,
+	MSR_IA32_VMX_TRUE_EXIT_CTLS,
+	MSR_IA32_VMX_TRUE_ENTRY_CTLS,
+	MSR_IA32_VMX_MISC,
+	MSR_IA32_VMX_CR0_FIXED0,
+	MSR_IA32_VMX_CR4_FIXED0,
+	MSR_IA32_VMX_VMCS_ENUM,
+	MSR_IA32_VMX_PROCBASED_CTLS2,
+	MSR_IA32_VMX_EPT_VPID_CAP,
+	MSR_IA32_VMX_VMFUNC,
+
+	MSR_K7_HWCR,
+	MSR_KVM_POLL_CONTROL,
+};
+
+static u32 emulated_msrs[ARRAY_SIZE(emulated_msrs_all)];
+static unsigned num_emulated_msrs;
+
+/*
+ * List of MSRs that control the existence of MSR-based features, i.e. MSRs
+ * that are effectively CPUID leafs.  VMX MSRs are also included in the set of
+ * feature MSRs, but are handled separately to allow expedited lookups.
+ */
+static const u32 msr_based_features_all_except_vmx[] = {
+	MSR_AMD64_DE_CFG,
+	MSR_IA32_UCODE_REV,
+	MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES,
+	MSR_IA32_PERF_CAPABILITIES,
+};
+
+static u32 msr_based_features[ARRAY_SIZE(msr_based_features_all_except_vmx) +
+			      (KVM_LAST_EMULATED_VMX_MSR - KVM_FIRST_EMULATED_VMX_MSR + 1)];
+static unsigned int num_msr_based_features;
+
+/*
+ * All feature MSRs except uCode revID, which tracks the currently loaded uCode
+ * patch, are immutable once the vCPU model is defined.
+ */
+static bool kvm_is_immutable_feature_msr(u32 msr)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	if (msr >= KVM_FIRST_EMULATED_VMX_MSR && msr <= KVM_LAST_EMULATED_VMX_MSR)
+		return true;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(msr_based_features_all_except_vmx); i++) {
+		if (msr == msr_based_features_all_except_vmx[i])
+			return msr != MSR_IA32_UCODE_REV;
+	}
+
+	return false;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Some IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES bits have dependencies on MSRs that KVM
+ * does not yet virtualize. These include:
+ *   10 - MISC_PACKAGE_CTRLS
+ *   11 - ENERGY_FILTERING_CTL
+ *   12 - DOITM
+ *   18 - FB_CLEAR_CTRL
+ *   21 - XAPIC_DISABLE_STATUS
+ *   23 - OVERCLOCKING_STATUS
+ */
+
+#define KVM_SUPPORTED_ARCH_CAP \
+	(ARCH_CAP_RDCL_NO | ARCH_CAP_IBRS_ALL | ARCH_CAP_RSBA | \
+	 ARCH_CAP_SKIP_VMENTRY_L1DFLUSH | ARCH_CAP_SSB_NO | ARCH_CAP_MDS_NO | \
+	 ARCH_CAP_PSCHANGE_MC_NO | ARCH_CAP_TSX_CTRL_MSR | ARCH_CAP_TAA_NO | \
+	 ARCH_CAP_SBDR_SSDP_NO | ARCH_CAP_FBSDP_NO | ARCH_CAP_PSDP_NO | \
+	 ARCH_CAP_FB_CLEAR | ARCH_CAP_RRSBA | ARCH_CAP_PBRSB_NO | ARCH_CAP_GDS_NO)
+
+static u64 kvm_get_arch_capabilities(void)
+{
+	u64 data = host_arch_capabilities & KVM_SUPPORTED_ARCH_CAP;
+
+	/*
+	 * If nx_huge_pages is enabled, KVM's shadow paging will ensure that
+	 * the nested hypervisor runs with NX huge pages.  If it is not,
+	 * L1 is anyway vulnerable to ITLB_MULTIHIT exploits from other
+	 * L1 guests, so it need not worry about its own (L2) guests.
+	 */
+	data |= ARCH_CAP_PSCHANGE_MC_NO;
+
+	/*
+	 * If we're doing cache flushes (either "always" or "cond")
+	 * we will do one whenever the guest does a vmlaunch/vmresume.
+	 * If an outer hypervisor is doing the cache flush for us
+	 * (ARCH_CAP_SKIP_VMENTRY_L1DFLUSH), we can safely pass that
+	 * capability to the guest too, and if EPT is disabled we're not
+	 * vulnerable.  Overall, only VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_NEVER will
+	 * require a nested hypervisor to do a flush of its own.
+	 */
+	if (l1tf_vmx_mitigation != VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_NEVER)
+		data |= ARCH_CAP_SKIP_VMENTRY_L1DFLUSH;
+
+	if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_CPU_MELTDOWN))
+		data |= ARCH_CAP_RDCL_NO;
+	if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS))
+		data |= ARCH_CAP_SSB_NO;
+	if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MDS))
+		data |= ARCH_CAP_MDS_NO;
+
+	if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RTM)) {
+		/*
+		 * If RTM=0 because the kernel has disabled TSX, the host might
+		 * have TAA_NO or TSX_CTRL.  Clear TAA_NO (the guest sees RTM=0
+		 * and therefore knows that there cannot be TAA) but keep
+		 * TSX_CTRL: some buggy userspaces leave it set on tsx=on hosts,
+		 * and we want to allow migrating those guests to tsx=off hosts.
+		 */
+		data &= ~ARCH_CAP_TAA_NO;
+	} else if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_TAA)) {
+		data |= ARCH_CAP_TAA_NO;
+	} else {
+		/*
+		 * Nothing to do here; we emulate TSX_CTRL if present on the
+		 * host so the guest can choose between disabling TSX or
+		 * using VERW to clear CPU buffers.
+		 */
+	}
+
+	if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_GDS) || gds_ucode_mitigated())
+		data |= ARCH_CAP_GDS_NO;
+
+	return data;
+}
+
+static int kvm_get_msr_feature(struct kvm_msr_entry *msr)
+{
+	switch (msr->index) {
+	case MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES:
+		msr->data = kvm_get_arch_capabilities();
+		break;
+	case MSR_IA32_PERF_CAPABILITIES:
+		msr->data = kvm_caps.supported_perf_cap;
+		break;
+	case MSR_IA32_UCODE_REV:
+		rdmsrl_safe(msr->index, &msr->data);
+		break;
+	default:
+		return static_call(kvm_x86_get_msr_feature)(msr);
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int do_get_msr_feature(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned index, u64 *data)
+{
+	struct kvm_msr_entry msr;
+	int r;
+
+	msr.index = index;
+	r = kvm_get_msr_feature(&msr);
+
+	if (r == KVM_MSR_RET_INVALID) {
+		/* Unconditionally clear the output for simplicity */
+		*data = 0;
+		if (kvm_msr_ignored_check(index, 0, false))
+			r = 0;
+	}
+
+	if (r)
+		return r;
+
+	*data = msr.data;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static bool __kvm_valid_efer(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 efer)
+{
+	if (efer & EFER_AUTOIBRS && !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_AUTOIBRS))
+		return false;
+
+	if (efer & EFER_FFXSR && !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_FXSR_OPT))
+		return false;
+
+	if (efer & EFER_SVME && !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_SVM))
+		return false;
+
+	if (efer & (EFER_LME | EFER_LMA) &&
+	    !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_LM))
+		return false;
+
+	if (efer & EFER_NX && !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_NX))
+		return false;
+
+	return true;
+
+}
+bool kvm_valid_efer(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 efer)
+{
+	if (efer & efer_reserved_bits)
+		return false;
+
+	return __kvm_valid_efer(vcpu, efer);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_valid_efer);
+
+static int set_efer(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
+{
+	u64 old_efer = vcpu->arch.efer;
+	u64 efer = msr_info->data;
+	int r;
+
+	if (efer & efer_reserved_bits)
+		return 1;
+
+	if (!msr_info->host_initiated) {
+		if (!__kvm_valid_efer(vcpu, efer))
+			return 1;
+
+		if (is_paging(vcpu) &&
+		    (vcpu->arch.efer & EFER_LME) != (efer & EFER_LME))
+			return 1;
+	}
+
+	efer &= ~EFER_LMA;
+	efer |= vcpu->arch.efer & EFER_LMA;
+
+	r = static_call(kvm_x86_set_efer)(vcpu, efer);
+	if (r) {
+		WARN_ON(r > 0);
+		return r;
+	}
+
+	if ((efer ^ old_efer) & KVM_MMU_EFER_ROLE_BITS)
+		kvm_mmu_reset_context(vcpu);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+void kvm_enable_efer_bits(u64 mask)
+{
+       efer_reserved_bits &= ~mask;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_enable_efer_bits);
+
+bool kvm_msr_allowed(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 index, u32 type)
+{
+	struct kvm_x86_msr_filter *msr_filter;
+	struct msr_bitmap_range *ranges;
+	struct kvm *kvm = vcpu->kvm;
+	bool allowed;
+	int idx;
+	u32 i;
+
+	/* x2APIC MSRs do not support filtering. */
+	if (index >= 0x800 && index <= 0x8ff)
+		return true;
+
+	idx = srcu_read_lock(&kvm->srcu);
+
+	msr_filter = srcu_dereference(kvm->arch.msr_filter, &kvm->srcu);
+	if (!msr_filter) {
+		allowed = true;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	allowed = msr_filter->default_allow;
+	ranges = msr_filter->ranges;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < msr_filter->count; i++) {
+		u32 start = ranges[i].base;
+		u32 end = start + ranges[i].nmsrs;
+		u32 flags = ranges[i].flags;
+		unsigned long *bitmap = ranges[i].bitmap;
+
+		if ((index >= start) && (index < end) && (flags & type)) {
+			allowed = test_bit(index - start, bitmap);
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+
+out:
+	srcu_read_unlock(&kvm->srcu, idx);
+
+	return allowed;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_msr_allowed);
+
+/*
+ * Write @data into the MSR specified by @index.  Select MSR specific fault
+ * checks are bypassed if @host_initiated is %true.
+ * Returns 0 on success, non-0 otherwise.
+ * Assumes vcpu_load() was already called.
+ */
+static int __kvm_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 index, u64 data,
+			 bool host_initiated)
+{
+	struct msr_data msr;
+
+	switch (index) {
+	case MSR_FS_BASE:
+	case MSR_GS_BASE:
+	case MSR_KERNEL_GS_BASE:
+	case MSR_CSTAR:
+	case MSR_LSTAR:
+		if (is_noncanonical_address(data, vcpu))
+			return 1;
+		break;
+	case MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_EIP:
+	case MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_ESP:
+		/*
+		 * IA32_SYSENTER_ESP and IA32_SYSENTER_EIP cause #GP if
+		 * non-canonical address is written on Intel but not on
+		 * AMD (which ignores the top 32-bits, because it does
+		 * not implement 64-bit SYSENTER).
+		 *
+		 * 64-bit code should hence be able to write a non-canonical
+		 * value on AMD.  Making the address canonical ensures that
+		 * vmentry does not fail on Intel after writing a non-canonical
+		 * value, and that something deterministic happens if the guest
+		 * invokes 64-bit SYSENTER.
+		 */
+		data = __canonical_address(data, vcpu_virt_addr_bits(vcpu));
+		break;
+	case MSR_TSC_AUX:
+		if (!kvm_is_supported_user_return_msr(MSR_TSC_AUX))
+			return 1;
+
+		if (!host_initiated &&
+		    !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_RDTSCP) &&
+		    !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_RDPID))
+			return 1;
+
+		/*
+		 * Per Intel's SDM, bits 63:32 are reserved, but AMD's APM has
+		 * incomplete and conflicting architectural behavior.  Current
+		 * AMD CPUs completely ignore bits 63:32, i.e. they aren't
+		 * reserved and always read as zeros.  Enforce Intel's reserved
+		 * bits check if and only if the guest CPU is Intel, and clear
+		 * the bits in all other cases.  This ensures cross-vendor
+		 * migration will provide consistent behavior for the guest.
+		 */
+		if (guest_cpuid_is_intel(vcpu) && (data >> 32) != 0)
+			return 1;
+
+		data = (u32)data;
+		break;
+	}
+
+	msr.data = data;
+	msr.index = index;
+	msr.host_initiated = host_initiated;
+
+	return static_call(kvm_x86_set_msr)(vcpu, &msr);
+}
+
+static int kvm_set_msr_ignored_check(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+				     u32 index, u64 data, bool host_initiated)
+{
+	int ret = __kvm_set_msr(vcpu, index, data, host_initiated);
+
+	if (ret == KVM_MSR_RET_INVALID)
+		if (kvm_msr_ignored_check(index, data, true))
+			ret = 0;
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Read the MSR specified by @index into @data.  Select MSR specific fault
+ * checks are bypassed if @host_initiated is %true.
+ * Returns 0 on success, non-0 otherwise.
+ * Assumes vcpu_load() was already called.
+ */
+int __kvm_get_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 index, u64 *data,
+		  bool host_initiated)
+{
+	struct msr_data msr;
+	int ret;
+
+	switch (index) {
+	case MSR_TSC_AUX:
+		if (!kvm_is_supported_user_return_msr(MSR_TSC_AUX))
+			return 1;
+
+		if (!host_initiated &&
+		    !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_RDTSCP) &&
+		    !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_RDPID))
+			return 1;
+		break;
+	}
+
+	msr.index = index;
+	msr.host_initiated = host_initiated;
+
+	ret = static_call(kvm_x86_get_msr)(vcpu, &msr);
+	if (!ret)
+		*data = msr.data;
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int kvm_get_msr_ignored_check(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+				     u32 index, u64 *data, bool host_initiated)
+{
+	int ret = __kvm_get_msr(vcpu, index, data, host_initiated);
+
+	if (ret == KVM_MSR_RET_INVALID) {
+		/* Unconditionally clear *data for simplicity */
+		*data = 0;
+		if (kvm_msr_ignored_check(index, 0, false))
+			ret = 0;
+	}
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int kvm_get_msr_with_filter(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 index, u64 *data)
+{
+	if (!kvm_msr_allowed(vcpu, index, KVM_MSR_FILTER_READ))
+		return KVM_MSR_RET_FILTERED;
+	return kvm_get_msr_ignored_check(vcpu, index, data, false);
+}
+
+static int kvm_set_msr_with_filter(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 index, u64 data)
+{
+	if (!kvm_msr_allowed(vcpu, index, KVM_MSR_FILTER_WRITE))
+		return KVM_MSR_RET_FILTERED;
+	return kvm_set_msr_ignored_check(vcpu, index, data, false);
+}
+
+int kvm_get_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 index, u64 *data)
+{
+	return kvm_get_msr_ignored_check(vcpu, index, data, false);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_get_msr);
+
+int kvm_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 index, u64 data)
+{
+	return kvm_set_msr_ignored_check(vcpu, index, data, false);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_set_msr);
+
+static void complete_userspace_rdmsr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	if (!vcpu->run->msr.error) {
+		kvm_rax_write(vcpu, (u32)vcpu->run->msr.data);
+		kvm_rdx_write(vcpu, vcpu->run->msr.data >> 32);
+	}
+}
+
+static int complete_emulated_msr_access(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	return complete_emulated_insn_gp(vcpu, vcpu->run->msr.error);
+}
+
+static int complete_emulated_rdmsr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	complete_userspace_rdmsr(vcpu);
+	return complete_emulated_msr_access(vcpu);
+}
+
+static int complete_fast_msr_access(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	return static_call(kvm_x86_complete_emulated_msr)(vcpu, vcpu->run->msr.error);
+}
+
+static int complete_fast_rdmsr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	complete_userspace_rdmsr(vcpu);
+	return complete_fast_msr_access(vcpu);
+}
+
+static u64 kvm_msr_reason(int r)
+{
+	switch (r) {
+	case KVM_MSR_RET_INVALID:
+		return KVM_MSR_EXIT_REASON_UNKNOWN;
+	case KVM_MSR_RET_FILTERED:
+		return KVM_MSR_EXIT_REASON_FILTER;
+	default:
+		return KVM_MSR_EXIT_REASON_INVAL;
+	}
+}
+
+static int kvm_msr_user_space(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 index,
+			      u32 exit_reason, u64 data,
+			      int (*completion)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu),
+			      int r)
+{
+	u64 msr_reason = kvm_msr_reason(r);
+
+	/* Check if the user wanted to know about this MSR fault */
+	if (!(vcpu->kvm->arch.user_space_msr_mask & msr_reason))
+		return 0;
+
+	vcpu->run->exit_reason = exit_reason;
+	vcpu->run->msr.error = 0;
+	memset(vcpu->run->msr.pad, 0, sizeof(vcpu->run->msr.pad));
+	vcpu->run->msr.reason = msr_reason;
+	vcpu->run->msr.index = index;
+	vcpu->run->msr.data = data;
+	vcpu->arch.complete_userspace_io = completion;
+
+	return 1;
+}
+
+int kvm_emulate_rdmsr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	u32 ecx = kvm_rcx_read(vcpu);
+	u64 data;
+	int r;
+
+	r = kvm_get_msr_with_filter(vcpu, ecx, &data);
+
+	if (!r) {
+		trace_kvm_msr_read(ecx, data);
+
+		kvm_rax_write(vcpu, data & -1u);
+		kvm_rdx_write(vcpu, (data >> 32) & -1u);
+	} else {
+		/* MSR read failed? See if we should ask user space */
+		if (kvm_msr_user_space(vcpu, ecx, KVM_EXIT_X86_RDMSR, 0,
+				       complete_fast_rdmsr, r))
+			return 0;
+		trace_kvm_msr_read_ex(ecx);
+	}
+
+	return static_call(kvm_x86_complete_emulated_msr)(vcpu, r);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_emulate_rdmsr);
+
+int kvm_emulate_wrmsr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	u32 ecx = kvm_rcx_read(vcpu);
+	u64 data = kvm_read_edx_eax(vcpu);
+	int r;
+
+	r = kvm_set_msr_with_filter(vcpu, ecx, data);
+
+	if (!r) {
+		trace_kvm_msr_write(ecx, data);
+	} else {
+		/* MSR write failed? See if we should ask user space */
+		if (kvm_msr_user_space(vcpu, ecx, KVM_EXIT_X86_WRMSR, data,
+				       complete_fast_msr_access, r))
+			return 0;
+		/* Signal all other negative errors to userspace */
+		if (r < 0)
+			return r;
+		trace_kvm_msr_write_ex(ecx, data);
+	}
+
+	return static_call(kvm_x86_complete_emulated_msr)(vcpu, r);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_emulate_wrmsr);
+
+int kvm_emulate_as_nop(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	return kvm_skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
+}
+
+int kvm_emulate_invd(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	/* Treat an INVD instruction as a NOP and just skip it. */
+	return kvm_emulate_as_nop(vcpu);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_emulate_invd);
+
+int kvm_handle_invalid_op(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	kvm_queue_exception(vcpu, UD_VECTOR);
+	return 1;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_handle_invalid_op);
+
+
+static int kvm_emulate_monitor_mwait(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, const char *insn)
+{
+	if (!kvm_check_has_quirk(vcpu->kvm, KVM_X86_QUIRK_MWAIT_NEVER_UD_FAULTS) &&
+	    !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_MWAIT))
+		return kvm_handle_invalid_op(vcpu);
+
+	pr_warn_once("%s instruction emulated as NOP!\n", insn);
+	return kvm_emulate_as_nop(vcpu);
+}
+int kvm_emulate_mwait(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	return kvm_emulate_monitor_mwait(vcpu, "MWAIT");
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_emulate_mwait);
+
+int kvm_emulate_monitor(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	return kvm_emulate_monitor_mwait(vcpu, "MONITOR");
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_emulate_monitor);
+
+static inline bool kvm_vcpu_exit_request(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	xfer_to_guest_mode_prepare();
+	return vcpu->mode == EXITING_GUEST_MODE || kvm_request_pending(vcpu) ||
+		xfer_to_guest_mode_work_pending();
+}
+
+/*
+ * The fast path for frequent and performance sensitive wrmsr emulation,
+ * i.e. the sending of IPI, sending IPI early in the VM-Exit flow reduces
+ * the latency of virtual IPI by avoiding the expensive bits of transitioning
+ * from guest to host, e.g. reacquiring KVM's SRCU lock. In contrast to the
+ * other cases which must be called after interrupts are enabled on the host.
+ */
+static int handle_fastpath_set_x2apic_icr_irqoff(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 data)
+{
+	if (!lapic_in_kernel(vcpu) || !apic_x2apic_mode(vcpu->arch.apic))
+		return 1;
+
+	if (((data & APIC_SHORT_MASK) == APIC_DEST_NOSHORT) &&
+	    ((data & APIC_DEST_MASK) == APIC_DEST_PHYSICAL) &&
+	    ((data & APIC_MODE_MASK) == APIC_DM_FIXED) &&
+	    ((u32)(data >> 32) != X2APIC_BROADCAST))
+		return kvm_x2apic_icr_write(vcpu->arch.apic, data);
+
+	return 1;
+}
+
+static int handle_fastpath_set_tscdeadline(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 data)
+{
+	if (!kvm_can_use_hv_timer(vcpu))
+		return 1;
+
+	kvm_set_lapic_tscdeadline_msr(vcpu, data);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+fastpath_t handle_fastpath_set_msr_irqoff(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	u32 msr = kvm_rcx_read(vcpu);
+	u64 data;
+	fastpath_t ret = EXIT_FASTPATH_NONE;
+
+	kvm_vcpu_srcu_read_lock(vcpu);
+
+	switch (msr) {
+	case APIC_BASE_MSR + (APIC_ICR >> 4):
+		data = kvm_read_edx_eax(vcpu);
+		if (!handle_fastpath_set_x2apic_icr_irqoff(vcpu, data)) {
+			kvm_skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
+			ret = EXIT_FASTPATH_EXIT_HANDLED;
+		}
+		break;
+	case MSR_IA32_TSC_DEADLINE:
+		data = kvm_read_edx_eax(vcpu);
+		if (!handle_fastpath_set_tscdeadline(vcpu, data)) {
+			kvm_skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
+			ret = EXIT_FASTPATH_REENTER_GUEST;
+		}
+		break;
+	default:
+		break;
+	}
+
+	if (ret != EXIT_FASTPATH_NONE)
+		trace_kvm_msr_write(msr, data);
+
+	kvm_vcpu_srcu_read_unlock(vcpu);
+
+	return ret;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(handle_fastpath_set_msr_irqoff);
+
+/*
+ * Adapt set_msr() to msr_io()'s calling convention
+ */
+static int do_get_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned index, u64 *data)
+{
+	return kvm_get_msr_ignored_check(vcpu, index, data, true);
+}
+
+static int do_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned index, u64 *data)
+{
+	u64 val;
+
+	/*
+	 * Disallow writes to immutable feature MSRs after KVM_RUN.  KVM does
+	 * not support modifying the guest vCPU model on the fly, e.g. changing
+	 * the nVMX capabilities while L2 is running is nonsensical.  Ignore
+	 * writes of the same value, e.g. to allow userspace to blindly stuff
+	 * all MSRs when emulating RESET.
+	 */
+	if (kvm_vcpu_has_run(vcpu) && kvm_is_immutable_feature_msr(index)) {
+		if (do_get_msr(vcpu, index, &val) || *data != val)
+			return -EINVAL;
+
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	return kvm_set_msr_ignored_check(vcpu, index, *data, true);
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+struct pvclock_clock {
+	int vclock_mode;
+	u64 cycle_last;
+	u64 mask;
+	u32 mult;
+	u32 shift;
+	u64 base_cycles;
+	u64 offset;
+};
+
+struct pvclock_gtod_data {
+	seqcount_t	seq;
+
+	struct pvclock_clock clock; /* extract of a clocksource struct */
+	struct pvclock_clock raw_clock; /* extract of a clocksource struct */
+
+	ktime_t		offs_boot;
+	u64		wall_time_sec;
+};
+
+static struct pvclock_gtod_data pvclock_gtod_data;
+
+static void update_pvclock_gtod(struct timekeeper *tk)
+{
+	struct pvclock_gtod_data *vdata = &pvclock_gtod_data;
+
+	write_seqcount_begin(&vdata->seq);
+
+	/* copy pvclock gtod data */
+	vdata->clock.vclock_mode	= tk->tkr_mono.clock->vdso_clock_mode;
+	vdata->clock.cycle_last		= tk->tkr_mono.cycle_last;
+	vdata->clock.mask		= tk->tkr_mono.mask;
+	vdata->clock.mult		= tk->tkr_mono.mult;
+	vdata->clock.shift		= tk->tkr_mono.shift;
+	vdata->clock.base_cycles	= tk->tkr_mono.xtime_nsec;
+	vdata->clock.offset		= tk->tkr_mono.base;
+
+	vdata->raw_clock.vclock_mode	= tk->tkr_raw.clock->vdso_clock_mode;
+	vdata->raw_clock.cycle_last	= tk->tkr_raw.cycle_last;
+	vdata->raw_clock.mask		= tk->tkr_raw.mask;
+	vdata->raw_clock.mult		= tk->tkr_raw.mult;
+	vdata->raw_clock.shift		= tk->tkr_raw.shift;
+	vdata->raw_clock.base_cycles	= tk->tkr_raw.xtime_nsec;
+	vdata->raw_clock.offset		= tk->tkr_raw.base;
+
+	vdata->wall_time_sec            = tk->xtime_sec;
+
+	vdata->offs_boot		= tk->offs_boot;
+
+	write_seqcount_end(&vdata->seq);
+}
+
+static s64 get_kvmclock_base_ns(void)
+{
+	/* Count up from boot time, but with the frequency of the raw clock.  */
+	return ktime_to_ns(ktime_add(ktime_get_raw(), pvclock_gtod_data.offs_boot));
+}
+#else
+static s64 get_kvmclock_base_ns(void)
+{
+	/* Master clock not used, so we can just use CLOCK_BOOTTIME.  */
+	return ktime_get_boottime_ns();
+}
+#endif
+
+static void kvm_write_wall_clock(struct kvm *kvm, gpa_t wall_clock, int sec_hi_ofs)
+{
+	int version;
+	int r;
+	struct pvclock_wall_clock wc;
+	u32 wc_sec_hi;
+	u64 wall_nsec;
+
+	if (!wall_clock)
+		return;
+
+	r = kvm_read_guest(kvm, wall_clock, &version, sizeof(version));
+	if (r)
+		return;
+
+	if (version & 1)
+		++version;  /* first time write, random junk */
+
+	++version;
+
+	if (kvm_write_guest(kvm, wall_clock, &version, sizeof(version)))
+		return;
+
+	/*
+	 * The guest calculates current wall clock time by adding
+	 * system time (updated by kvm_guest_time_update below) to the
+	 * wall clock specified here.  We do the reverse here.
+	 */
+	wall_nsec = ktime_get_real_ns() - get_kvmclock_ns(kvm);
+
+	wc.nsec = do_div(wall_nsec, 1000000000);
+	wc.sec = (u32)wall_nsec; /* overflow in 2106 guest time */
+	wc.version = version;
+
+	kvm_write_guest(kvm, wall_clock, &wc, sizeof(wc));
+
+	if (sec_hi_ofs) {
+		wc_sec_hi = wall_nsec >> 32;
+		kvm_write_guest(kvm, wall_clock + sec_hi_ofs,
+				&wc_sec_hi, sizeof(wc_sec_hi));
+	}
+
+	version++;
+	kvm_write_guest(kvm, wall_clock, &version, sizeof(version));
+}
+
+static void kvm_write_system_time(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t system_time,
+				  bool old_msr, bool host_initiated)
+{
+	struct kvm_arch *ka = &vcpu->kvm->arch;
+
+	if (vcpu->vcpu_id == 0 && !host_initiated) {
+		if (ka->boot_vcpu_runs_old_kvmclock != old_msr)
+			kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_MASTERCLOCK_UPDATE, vcpu);
+
+		ka->boot_vcpu_runs_old_kvmclock = old_msr;
+	}
+
+	vcpu->arch.time = system_time;
+	kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_GLOBAL_CLOCK_UPDATE, vcpu);
+
+	/* we verify if the enable bit is set... */
+	if (system_time & 1)
+		kvm_gpc_activate(&vcpu->arch.pv_time, system_time & ~1ULL,
+				 sizeof(struct pvclock_vcpu_time_info));
+	else
+		kvm_gpc_deactivate(&vcpu->arch.pv_time);
+
+	return;
+}
+
+static uint32_t div_frac(uint32_t dividend, uint32_t divisor)
+{
+	do_shl32_div32(dividend, divisor);
+	return dividend;
+}
+
+static void kvm_get_time_scale(uint64_t scaled_hz, uint64_t base_hz,
+			       s8 *pshift, u32 *pmultiplier)
+{
+	uint64_t scaled64;
+	int32_t  shift = 0;
+	uint64_t tps64;
+	uint32_t tps32;
+
+	tps64 = base_hz;
+	scaled64 = scaled_hz;
+	while (tps64 > scaled64*2 || tps64 & 0xffffffff00000000ULL) {
+		tps64 >>= 1;
+		shift--;
+	}
+
+	tps32 = (uint32_t)tps64;
+	while (tps32 <= scaled64 || scaled64 & 0xffffffff00000000ULL) {
+		if (scaled64 & 0xffffffff00000000ULL || tps32 & 0x80000000)
+			scaled64 >>= 1;
+		else
+			tps32 <<= 1;
+		shift++;
+	}
+
+	*pshift = shift;
+	*pmultiplier = div_frac(scaled64, tps32);
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+static atomic_t kvm_guest_has_master_clock = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
+#endif
+
+static DEFINE_PER_CPU(unsigned long, cpu_tsc_khz);
+static unsigned long max_tsc_khz;
+
+static u32 adjust_tsc_khz(u32 khz, s32 ppm)
+{
+	u64 v = (u64)khz * (1000000 + ppm);
+	do_div(v, 1000000);
+	return v;
+}
+
+static void kvm_vcpu_write_tsc_multiplier(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 l1_multiplier);
+
+static int set_tsc_khz(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 user_tsc_khz, bool scale)
+{
+	u64 ratio;
+
+	/* Guest TSC same frequency as host TSC? */
+	if (!scale) {
+		kvm_vcpu_write_tsc_multiplier(vcpu, kvm_caps.default_tsc_scaling_ratio);
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	/* TSC scaling supported? */
+	if (!kvm_caps.has_tsc_control) {
+		if (user_tsc_khz > tsc_khz) {
+			vcpu->arch.tsc_catchup = 1;
+			vcpu->arch.tsc_always_catchup = 1;
+			return 0;
+		} else {
+			pr_warn_ratelimited("user requested TSC rate below hardware speed\n");
+			return -1;
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* TSC scaling required  - calculate ratio */
+	ratio = mul_u64_u32_div(1ULL << kvm_caps.tsc_scaling_ratio_frac_bits,
+				user_tsc_khz, tsc_khz);
+
+	if (ratio == 0 || ratio >= kvm_caps.max_tsc_scaling_ratio) {
+		pr_warn_ratelimited("Invalid TSC scaling ratio - virtual-tsc-khz=%u\n",
+			            user_tsc_khz);
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	kvm_vcpu_write_tsc_multiplier(vcpu, ratio);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int kvm_set_tsc_khz(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 user_tsc_khz)
+{
+	u32 thresh_lo, thresh_hi;
+	int use_scaling = 0;
+
+	/* tsc_khz can be zero if TSC calibration fails */
+	if (user_tsc_khz == 0) {
+		/* set tsc_scaling_ratio to a safe value */
+		kvm_vcpu_write_tsc_multiplier(vcpu, kvm_caps.default_tsc_scaling_ratio);
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	/* Compute a scale to convert nanoseconds in TSC cycles */
+	kvm_get_time_scale(user_tsc_khz * 1000LL, NSEC_PER_SEC,
+			   &vcpu->arch.virtual_tsc_shift,
+			   &vcpu->arch.virtual_tsc_mult);
+	vcpu->arch.virtual_tsc_khz = user_tsc_khz;
+
+	/*
+	 * Compute the variation in TSC rate which is acceptable
+	 * within the range of tolerance and decide if the
+	 * rate being applied is within that bounds of the hardware
+	 * rate.  If so, no scaling or compensation need be done.
+	 */
+	thresh_lo = adjust_tsc_khz(tsc_khz, -tsc_tolerance_ppm);
+	thresh_hi = adjust_tsc_khz(tsc_khz, tsc_tolerance_ppm);
+	if (user_tsc_khz < thresh_lo || user_tsc_khz > thresh_hi) {
+		pr_debug("requested TSC rate %u falls outside tolerance [%u,%u]\n",
+			 user_tsc_khz, thresh_lo, thresh_hi);
+		use_scaling = 1;
+	}
+	return set_tsc_khz(vcpu, user_tsc_khz, use_scaling);
+}
+
+static u64 compute_guest_tsc(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, s64 kernel_ns)
+{
+	u64 tsc = pvclock_scale_delta(kernel_ns-vcpu->arch.this_tsc_nsec,
+				      vcpu->arch.virtual_tsc_mult,
+				      vcpu->arch.virtual_tsc_shift);
+	tsc += vcpu->arch.this_tsc_write;
+	return tsc;
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+static inline int gtod_is_based_on_tsc(int mode)
+{
+	return mode == VDSO_CLOCKMODE_TSC || mode == VDSO_CLOCKMODE_HVCLOCK;
+}
+#endif
+
+static void kvm_track_tsc_matching(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+	bool vcpus_matched;
+	struct kvm_arch *ka = &vcpu->kvm->arch;
+	struct pvclock_gtod_data *gtod = &pvclock_gtod_data;
+
+	vcpus_matched = (ka->nr_vcpus_matched_tsc + 1 ==
+			 atomic_read(&vcpu->kvm->online_vcpus));
+
+	/*
+	 * Once the masterclock is enabled, always perform request in
+	 * order to update it.
+	 *
+	 * In order to enable masterclock, the host clocksource must be TSC
+	 * and the vcpus need to have matched TSCs.  When that happens,
+	 * perform request to enable masterclock.
+	 */
+	if (ka->use_master_clock ||
+	    (gtod_is_based_on_tsc(gtod->clock.vclock_mode) && vcpus_matched))
+		kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_MASTERCLOCK_UPDATE, vcpu);
+
+	trace_kvm_track_tsc(vcpu->vcpu_id, ka->nr_vcpus_matched_tsc,
+			    atomic_read(&vcpu->kvm->online_vcpus),
+		            ka->use_master_clock, gtod->clock.vclock_mode);
+#endif
+}
+
+/*
+ * Multiply tsc by a fixed point number represented by ratio.
+ *
+ * The most significant 64-N bits (mult) of ratio represent the
+ * integral part of the fixed point number; the remaining N bits
+ * (frac) represent the fractional part, ie. ratio represents a fixed
+ * point number (mult + frac * 2^(-N)).
+ *
+ * N equals to kvm_caps.tsc_scaling_ratio_frac_bits.
+ */
+static inline u64 __scale_tsc(u64 ratio, u64 tsc)
+{
+	return mul_u64_u64_shr(tsc, ratio, kvm_caps.tsc_scaling_ratio_frac_bits);
+}
+
+u64 kvm_scale_tsc(u64 tsc, u64 ratio)
+{
+	u64 _tsc = tsc;
+
+	if (ratio != kvm_caps.default_tsc_scaling_ratio)
+		_tsc = __scale_tsc(ratio, tsc);
+
+	return _tsc;
+}
+
+static u64 kvm_compute_l1_tsc_offset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 target_tsc)
+{
+	u64 tsc;
+
+	tsc = kvm_scale_tsc(rdtsc(), vcpu->arch.l1_tsc_scaling_ratio);
+
+	return target_tsc - tsc;
+}
+
+u64 kvm_read_l1_tsc(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 host_tsc)
+{
+	return vcpu->arch.l1_tsc_offset +
+		kvm_scale_tsc(host_tsc, vcpu->arch.l1_tsc_scaling_ratio);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_read_l1_tsc);
+
+u64 kvm_calc_nested_tsc_offset(u64 l1_offset, u64 l2_offset, u64 l2_multiplier)
+{
+	u64 nested_offset;
+
+	if (l2_multiplier == kvm_caps.default_tsc_scaling_ratio)
+		nested_offset = l1_offset;
+	else
+		nested_offset = mul_s64_u64_shr((s64) l1_offset, l2_multiplier,
+						kvm_caps.tsc_scaling_ratio_frac_bits);
+
+	nested_offset += l2_offset;
+	return nested_offset;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_calc_nested_tsc_offset);
+
+u64 kvm_calc_nested_tsc_multiplier(u64 l1_multiplier, u64 l2_multiplier)
+{
+	if (l2_multiplier != kvm_caps.default_tsc_scaling_ratio)
+		return mul_u64_u64_shr(l1_multiplier, l2_multiplier,
+				       kvm_caps.tsc_scaling_ratio_frac_bits);
+
+	return l1_multiplier;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_calc_nested_tsc_multiplier);
+
+static void kvm_vcpu_write_tsc_offset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 l1_offset)
+{
+	trace_kvm_write_tsc_offset(vcpu->vcpu_id,
+				   vcpu->arch.l1_tsc_offset,
+				   l1_offset);
+
+	vcpu->arch.l1_tsc_offset = l1_offset;
+
+	/*
+	 * If we are here because L1 chose not to trap WRMSR to TSC then
+	 * according to the spec this should set L1's TSC (as opposed to
+	 * setting L1's offset for L2).
+	 */
+	if (is_guest_mode(vcpu))
+		vcpu->arch.tsc_offset = kvm_calc_nested_tsc_offset(
+			l1_offset,
+			static_call(kvm_x86_get_l2_tsc_offset)(vcpu),
+			static_call(kvm_x86_get_l2_tsc_multiplier)(vcpu));
+	else
+		vcpu->arch.tsc_offset = l1_offset;
+
+	static_call(kvm_x86_write_tsc_offset)(vcpu);
+}
+
+static void kvm_vcpu_write_tsc_multiplier(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 l1_multiplier)
+{
+	vcpu->arch.l1_tsc_scaling_ratio = l1_multiplier;
+
+	/* Userspace is changing the multiplier while L2 is active */
+	if (is_guest_mode(vcpu))
+		vcpu->arch.tsc_scaling_ratio = kvm_calc_nested_tsc_multiplier(
+			l1_multiplier,
+			static_call(kvm_x86_get_l2_tsc_multiplier)(vcpu));
+	else
+		vcpu->arch.tsc_scaling_ratio = l1_multiplier;
+
+	if (kvm_caps.has_tsc_control)
+		static_call(kvm_x86_write_tsc_multiplier)(vcpu);
+}
+
+static inline bool kvm_check_tsc_unstable(void)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+	/*
+	 * TSC is marked unstable when we're running on Hyper-V,
+	 * 'TSC page' clocksource is good.
+	 */
+	if (pvclock_gtod_data.clock.vclock_mode == VDSO_CLOCKMODE_HVCLOCK)
+		return false;
+#endif
+	return check_tsc_unstable();
+}
+
+/*
+ * Infers attempts to synchronize the guest's tsc from host writes. Sets the
+ * offset for the vcpu and tracks the TSC matching generation that the vcpu
+ * participates in.
+ */
+static void __kvm_synchronize_tsc(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 offset, u64 tsc,
+				  u64 ns, bool matched)
+{
+	struct kvm *kvm = vcpu->kvm;
+
+	lockdep_assert_held(&kvm->arch.tsc_write_lock);
+
+	/*
+	 * We also track th most recent recorded KHZ, write and time to
+	 * allow the matching interval to be extended at each write.
+	 */
+	kvm->arch.last_tsc_nsec = ns;
+	kvm->arch.last_tsc_write = tsc;
+	kvm->arch.last_tsc_khz = vcpu->arch.virtual_tsc_khz;
+	kvm->arch.last_tsc_offset = offset;
+
+	vcpu->arch.last_guest_tsc = tsc;
+
+	kvm_vcpu_write_tsc_offset(vcpu, offset);
+
+	if (!matched) {
+		/*
+		 * We split periods of matched TSC writes into generations.
+		 * For each generation, we track the original measured
+		 * nanosecond time, offset, and write, so if TSCs are in
+		 * sync, we can match exact offset, and if not, we can match
+		 * exact software computation in compute_guest_tsc()
+		 *
+		 * These values are tracked in kvm->arch.cur_xxx variables.
+		 */
+		kvm->arch.cur_tsc_generation++;
+		kvm->arch.cur_tsc_nsec = ns;
+		kvm->arch.cur_tsc_write = tsc;
+		kvm->arch.cur_tsc_offset = offset;
+		kvm->arch.nr_vcpus_matched_tsc = 0;
+	} else if (vcpu->arch.this_tsc_generation != kvm->arch.cur_tsc_generation) {
+		kvm->arch.nr_vcpus_matched_tsc++;
+	}
+
+	/* Keep track of which generation this VCPU has synchronized to */
+	vcpu->arch.this_tsc_generation = kvm->arch.cur_tsc_generation;
+	vcpu->arch.this_tsc_nsec = kvm->arch.cur_tsc_nsec;
+	vcpu->arch.this_tsc_write = kvm->arch.cur_tsc_write;
+
+	kvm_track_tsc_matching(vcpu);
+}
+
+static void kvm_synchronize_tsc(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 data)
+{
+	struct kvm *kvm = vcpu->kvm;
+	u64 offset, ns, elapsed;
+	unsigned long flags;
+	bool matched = false;
+	bool synchronizing = false;
+
+	raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&kvm->arch.tsc_write_lock, flags);
+	offset = kvm_compute_l1_tsc_offset(vcpu, data);
+	ns = get_kvmclock_base_ns();
+	elapsed = ns - kvm->arch.last_tsc_nsec;
+
+	if (vcpu->arch.virtual_tsc_khz) {
+		if (data == 0) {
+			/*
+			 * detection of vcpu initialization -- need to sync
+			 * with other vCPUs. This particularly helps to keep
+			 * kvm_clock stable after CPU hotplug
+			 */
+			synchronizing = true;
+		} else {
+			u64 tsc_exp = kvm->arch.last_tsc_write +
+						nsec_to_cycles(vcpu, elapsed);
+			u64 tsc_hz = vcpu->arch.virtual_tsc_khz * 1000LL;
+			/*
+			 * Special case: TSC write with a small delta (1 second)
+			 * of virtual cycle time against real time is
+			 * interpreted as an attempt to synchronize the CPU.
+			 */
+			synchronizing = data < tsc_exp + tsc_hz &&
+					data + tsc_hz > tsc_exp;
+		}
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * For a reliable TSC, we can match TSC offsets, and for an unstable
+	 * TSC, we add elapsed time in this computation.  We could let the
+	 * compensation code attempt to catch up if we fall behind, but
+	 * it's better to try to match offsets from the beginning.
+         */
+	if (synchronizing &&
+	    vcpu->arch.virtual_tsc_khz == kvm->arch.last_tsc_khz) {
+		if (!kvm_check_tsc_unstable()) {
+			offset = kvm->arch.cur_tsc_offset;
+		} else {
+			u64 delta = nsec_to_cycles(vcpu, elapsed);
+			data += delta;
+			offset = kvm_compute_l1_tsc_offset(vcpu, data);
+		}
+		matched = true;
+	}
+
+	__kvm_synchronize_tsc(vcpu, offset, data, ns, matched);
+	raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&kvm->arch.tsc_write_lock, flags);
+}
+
+static inline void adjust_tsc_offset_guest(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+					   s64 adjustment)
+{
+	u64 tsc_offset = vcpu->arch.l1_tsc_offset;
+	kvm_vcpu_write_tsc_offset(vcpu, tsc_offset + adjustment);
+}
+
+static inline void adjust_tsc_offset_host(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, s64 adjustment)
+{
+	if (vcpu->arch.l1_tsc_scaling_ratio != kvm_caps.default_tsc_scaling_ratio)
+		WARN_ON(adjustment < 0);
+	adjustment = kvm_scale_tsc((u64) adjustment,
+				   vcpu->arch.l1_tsc_scaling_ratio);
+	adjust_tsc_offset_guest(vcpu, adjustment);
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+
+static u64 read_tsc(void)
+{
+	u64 ret = (u64)rdtsc_ordered();
+	u64 last = pvclock_gtod_data.clock.cycle_last;
+
+	if (likely(ret >= last))
+		return ret;
+
+	/*
+	 * GCC likes to generate cmov here, but this branch is extremely
+	 * predictable (it's just a function of time and the likely is
+	 * very likely) and there's a data dependence, so force GCC
+	 * to generate a branch instead.  I don't barrier() because
+	 * we don't actually need a barrier, and if this function
+	 * ever gets inlined it will generate worse code.
+	 */
+	asm volatile ("");
+	return last;
+}
+
+static inline u64 vgettsc(struct pvclock_clock *clock, u64 *tsc_timestamp,
+			  int *mode)
+{
+	u64 tsc_pg_val;
+	long v;
+
+	switch (clock->vclock_mode) {
+	case VDSO_CLOCKMODE_HVCLOCK:
+		if (hv_read_tsc_page_tsc(hv_get_tsc_page(),
+					 tsc_timestamp, &tsc_pg_val)) {
+			/* TSC page valid */
+			*mode = VDSO_CLOCKMODE_HVCLOCK;
+			v = (tsc_pg_val - clock->cycle_last) &
+				clock->mask;
+		} else {
+			/* TSC page invalid */
+			*mode = VDSO_CLOCKMODE_NONE;
+		}
+		break;
+	case VDSO_CLOCKMODE_TSC:
+		*mode = VDSO_CLOCKMODE_TSC;
+		*tsc_timestamp = read_tsc();
+		v = (*tsc_timestamp - clock->cycle_last) &
+			clock->mask;
+		break;
+	default:
+		*mode = VDSO_CLOCKMODE_NONE;
+	}
+
+	if (*mode == VDSO_CLOCKMODE_NONE)
+		*tsc_timestamp = v = 0;
+
+	return v * clock->mult;
+}
+
+static int do_monotonic_raw(s64 *t, u64 *tsc_timestamp)
+{
+	struct pvclock_gtod_data *gtod = &pvclock_gtod_data;
+	unsigned long seq;
+	int mode;
+	u64 ns;
+
+	do {
+		seq = read_seqcount_begin(&gtod->seq);
+		ns = gtod->raw_clock.base_cycles;
+		ns += vgettsc(&gtod->raw_clock, tsc_timestamp, &mode);
+		ns >>= gtod->raw_clock.shift;
+		ns += ktime_to_ns(ktime_add(gtod->raw_clock.offset, gtod->offs_boot));
+	} while (unlikely(read_seqcount_retry(&gtod->seq, seq)));
+	*t = ns;
+
+	return mode;
+}
+
+static int do_realtime(struct timespec64 *ts, u64 *tsc_timestamp)
+{
+	struct pvclock_gtod_data *gtod = &pvclock_gtod_data;
+	unsigned long seq;
+	int mode;
+	u64 ns;
+
+	do {
+		seq = read_seqcount_begin(&gtod->seq);
+		ts->tv_sec = gtod->wall_time_sec;
+		ns = gtod->clock.base_cycles;
+		ns += vgettsc(&gtod->clock, tsc_timestamp, &mode);
+		ns >>= gtod->clock.shift;
+	} while (unlikely(read_seqcount_retry(&gtod->seq, seq)));
+
+	ts->tv_sec += __iter_div_u64_rem(ns, NSEC_PER_SEC, &ns);
+	ts->tv_nsec = ns;
+
+	return mode;
+}
+
+/* returns true if host is using TSC based clocksource */
+static bool kvm_get_time_and_clockread(s64 *kernel_ns, u64 *tsc_timestamp)
+{
+	/* checked again under seqlock below */
+	if (!gtod_is_based_on_tsc(pvclock_gtod_data.clock.vclock_mode))
+		return false;
+
+	return gtod_is_based_on_tsc(do_monotonic_raw(kernel_ns,
+						      tsc_timestamp));
+}
+
+/* returns true if host is using TSC based clocksource */
+static bool kvm_get_walltime_and_clockread(struct timespec64 *ts,
+					   u64 *tsc_timestamp)
+{
+	/* checked again under seqlock below */
+	if (!gtod_is_based_on_tsc(pvclock_gtod_data.clock.vclock_mode))
+		return false;
+
+	return gtod_is_based_on_tsc(do_realtime(ts, tsc_timestamp));
+}
+#endif
+
+/*
+ *
+ * Assuming a stable TSC across physical CPUS, and a stable TSC
+ * across virtual CPUs, the following condition is possible.
+ * Each numbered line represents an event visible to both
+ * CPUs at the next numbered event.
+ *
+ * "timespecX" represents host monotonic time. "tscX" represents
+ * RDTSC value.
+ *
+ * 		VCPU0 on CPU0		|	VCPU1 on CPU1
+ *
+ * 1.  read timespec0,tsc0
+ * 2.					| timespec1 = timespec0 + N
+ * 					| tsc1 = tsc0 + M
+ * 3. transition to guest		| transition to guest
+ * 4. ret0 = timespec0 + (rdtsc - tsc0) |
+ * 5.				        | ret1 = timespec1 + (rdtsc - tsc1)
+ * 				        | ret1 = timespec0 + N + (rdtsc - (tsc0 + M))
+ *
+ * Since ret0 update is visible to VCPU1 at time 5, to obey monotonicity:
+ *
+ * 	- ret0 < ret1
+ *	- timespec0 + (rdtsc - tsc0) < timespec0 + N + (rdtsc - (tsc0 + M))
+ *		...
+ *	- 0 < N - M => M < N
+ *
+ * That is, when timespec0 != timespec1, M < N. Unfortunately that is not
+ * always the case (the difference between two distinct xtime instances
+ * might be smaller then the difference between corresponding TSC reads,
+ * when updating guest vcpus pvclock areas).
+ *
+ * To avoid that problem, do not allow visibility of distinct
+ * system_timestamp/tsc_timestamp values simultaneously: use a master
+ * copy of host monotonic time values. Update that master copy
+ * in lockstep.
+ *
+ * Rely on synchronization of host TSCs and guest TSCs for monotonicity.
+ *
+ */
+
+static void pvclock_update_vm_gtod_copy(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+	struct kvm_arch *ka = &kvm->arch;
+	int vclock_mode;
+	bool host_tsc_clocksource, vcpus_matched;
+
+	lockdep_assert_held(&kvm->arch.tsc_write_lock);
+	vcpus_matched = (ka->nr_vcpus_matched_tsc + 1 ==
+			atomic_read(&kvm->online_vcpus));
+
+	/*
+	 * If the host uses TSC clock, then passthrough TSC as stable
+	 * to the guest.
+	 */
+	host_tsc_clocksource = kvm_get_time_and_clockread(
+					&ka->master_kernel_ns,
+					&ka->master_cycle_now);
+
+	ka->use_master_clock = host_tsc_clocksource && vcpus_matched
+				&& !ka->backwards_tsc_observed
+				&& !ka->boot_vcpu_runs_old_kvmclock;
+
+	if (ka->use_master_clock)
+		atomic_set(&kvm_guest_has_master_clock, 1);
+
+	vclock_mode = pvclock_gtod_data.clock.vclock_mode;
+	trace_kvm_update_master_clock(ka->use_master_clock, vclock_mode,
+					vcpus_matched);
+#endif
+}
+
+static void kvm_make_mclock_inprogress_request(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+	kvm_make_all_cpus_request(kvm, KVM_REQ_MCLOCK_INPROGRESS);
+}
+
+static void __kvm_start_pvclock_update(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+	raw_spin_lock_irq(&kvm->arch.tsc_write_lock);
+	write_seqcount_begin(&kvm->arch.pvclock_sc);
+}
+
+static void kvm_start_pvclock_update(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+	kvm_make_mclock_inprogress_request(kvm);
+
+	/* no guest entries from this point */
+	__kvm_start_pvclock_update(kvm);
+}
+
+static void kvm_end_pvclock_update(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+	struct kvm_arch *ka = &kvm->arch;
+	struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu;
+	unsigned long i;
+
+	write_seqcount_end(&ka->pvclock_sc);
+	raw_spin_unlock_irq(&ka->tsc_write_lock);
+	kvm_for_each_vcpu(i, vcpu, kvm)
+		kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_CLOCK_UPDATE, vcpu);
+
+	/* guest entries allowed */
+	kvm_for_each_vcpu(i, vcpu, kvm)
+		kvm_clear_request(KVM_REQ_MCLOCK_INPROGRESS, vcpu);
+}
+
+static void kvm_update_masterclock(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+	kvm_hv_request_tsc_page_update(kvm);
+	kvm_start_pvclock_update(kvm);
+	pvclock_update_vm_gtod_copy(kvm);
+	kvm_end_pvclock_update(kvm);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Use the kernel's tsc_khz directly if the TSC is constant, otherwise use KVM's
+ * per-CPU value (which may be zero if a CPU is going offline).  Note, tsc_khz
+ * can change during boot even if the TSC is constant, as it's possible for KVM
+ * to be loaded before TSC calibration completes.  Ideally, KVM would get a
+ * notification when calibration completes, but practically speaking calibration
+ * will complete before userspace is alive enough to create VMs.
+ */
+static unsigned long get_cpu_tsc_khz(void)
+{
+	if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_CONSTANT_TSC))
+		return tsc_khz;
+	else
+		return __this_cpu_read(cpu_tsc_khz);
+}
+
+/* Called within read_seqcount_begin/retry for kvm->pvclock_sc.  */
+static void __get_kvmclock(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_clock_data *data)
+{
+	struct kvm_arch *ka = &kvm->arch;
+	struct pvclock_vcpu_time_info hv_clock;
+
+	/* both __this_cpu_read() and rdtsc() should be on the same cpu */
+	get_cpu();
+
+	data->flags = 0;
+	if (ka->use_master_clock &&
+	    (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_CONSTANT_TSC) || __this_cpu_read(cpu_tsc_khz))) {
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+		struct timespec64 ts;
+
+		if (kvm_get_walltime_and_clockread(&ts, &data->host_tsc)) {
+			data->realtime = ts.tv_nsec + NSEC_PER_SEC * ts.tv_sec;
+			data->flags |= KVM_CLOCK_REALTIME | KVM_CLOCK_HOST_TSC;
+		} else
+#endif
+		data->host_tsc = rdtsc();
+
+		data->flags |= KVM_CLOCK_TSC_STABLE;
+		hv_clock.tsc_timestamp = ka->master_cycle_now;
+		hv_clock.system_time = ka->master_kernel_ns + ka->kvmclock_offset;
+		kvm_get_time_scale(NSEC_PER_SEC, get_cpu_tsc_khz() * 1000LL,
+				   &hv_clock.tsc_shift,
+				   &hv_clock.tsc_to_system_mul);
+		data->clock = __pvclock_read_cycles(&hv_clock, data->host_tsc);
+	} else {
+		data->clock = get_kvmclock_base_ns() + ka->kvmclock_offset;
+	}
+
+	put_cpu();
+}
+
+static void get_kvmclock(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_clock_data *data)
+{
+	struct kvm_arch *ka = &kvm->arch;
+	unsigned seq;
+
+	do {
+		seq = read_seqcount_begin(&ka->pvclock_sc);
+		__get_kvmclock(kvm, data);
+	} while (read_seqcount_retry(&ka->pvclock_sc, seq));
+}
+
+u64 get_kvmclock_ns(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+	struct kvm_clock_data data;
+
+	get_kvmclock(kvm, &data);
+	return data.clock;
+}
+
+static void kvm_setup_guest_pvclock(struct kvm_vcpu *v,
+				    struct gfn_to_pfn_cache *gpc,
+				    unsigned int offset)
+{
+	struct kvm_vcpu_arch *vcpu = &v->arch;
+	struct pvclock_vcpu_time_info *guest_hv_clock;
+	unsigned long flags;
+
+	read_lock_irqsave(&gpc->lock, flags);
+	while (!kvm_gpc_check(gpc, offset + sizeof(*guest_hv_clock))) {
+		read_unlock_irqrestore(&gpc->lock, flags);
+
+		if (kvm_gpc_refresh(gpc, offset + sizeof(*guest_hv_clock)))
+			return;
+
+		read_lock_irqsave(&gpc->lock, flags);
+	}
+
+	guest_hv_clock = (void *)(gpc->khva + offset);
+
+	/*
+	 * This VCPU is paused, but it's legal for a guest to read another
+	 * VCPU's kvmclock, so we really have to follow the specification where
+	 * it says that version is odd if data is being modified, and even after
+	 * it is consistent.
+	 */
+
+	guest_hv_clock->version = vcpu->hv_clock.version = (guest_hv_clock->version + 1) | 1;
+	smp_wmb();
+
+	/* retain PVCLOCK_GUEST_STOPPED if set in guest copy */
+	vcpu->hv_clock.flags |= (guest_hv_clock->flags & PVCLOCK_GUEST_STOPPED);
+
+	if (vcpu->pvclock_set_guest_stopped_request) {
+		vcpu->hv_clock.flags |= PVCLOCK_GUEST_STOPPED;
+		vcpu->pvclock_set_guest_stopped_request = false;
+	}
+
+	memcpy(guest_hv_clock, &vcpu->hv_clock, sizeof(*guest_hv_clock));
+	smp_wmb();
+
+	guest_hv_clock->version = ++vcpu->hv_clock.version;
+
+	mark_page_dirty_in_slot(v->kvm, gpc->memslot, gpc->gpa >> PAGE_SHIFT);
+	read_unlock_irqrestore(&gpc->lock, flags);
+
+	trace_kvm_pvclock_update(v->vcpu_id, &vcpu->hv_clock);
+}
+
+static int kvm_guest_time_update(struct kvm_vcpu *v)
+{
+	unsigned long flags, tgt_tsc_khz;
+	unsigned seq;
+	struct kvm_vcpu_arch *vcpu = &v->arch;
+	struct kvm_arch *ka = &v->kvm->arch;
+	s64 kernel_ns;
+	u64 tsc_timestamp, host_tsc;
+	u8 pvclock_flags;
+	bool use_master_clock;
+
+	kernel_ns = 0;
+	host_tsc = 0;
+
+	/*
+	 * If the host uses TSC clock, then passthrough TSC as stable
+	 * to the guest.
+	 */
+	do {
+		seq = read_seqcount_begin(&ka->pvclock_sc);
+		use_master_clock = ka->use_master_clock;
+		if (use_master_clock) {
+			host_tsc = ka->master_cycle_now;
+			kernel_ns = ka->master_kernel_ns;
+		}
+	} while (read_seqcount_retry(&ka->pvclock_sc, seq));
+
+	/* Keep irq disabled to prevent changes to the clock */
+	local_irq_save(flags);
+	tgt_tsc_khz = get_cpu_tsc_khz();
+	if (unlikely(tgt_tsc_khz == 0)) {
+		local_irq_restore(flags);
+		kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_CLOCK_UPDATE, v);
+		return 1;
+	}
+	if (!use_master_clock) {
+		host_tsc = rdtsc();
+		kernel_ns = get_kvmclock_base_ns();
+	}
+
+	tsc_timestamp = kvm_read_l1_tsc(v, host_tsc);
+
+	/*
+	 * We may have to catch up the TSC to match elapsed wall clock
+	 * time for two reasons, even if kvmclock is used.
+	 *   1) CPU could have been running below the maximum TSC rate
+	 *   2) Broken TSC compensation resets the base at each VCPU
+	 *      entry to avoid unknown leaps of TSC even when running
+	 *      again on the same CPU.  This may cause apparent elapsed
+	 *      time to disappear, and the guest to stand still or run
+	 *	very slowly.
+	 */
+	if (vcpu->tsc_catchup) {
+		u64 tsc = compute_guest_tsc(v, kernel_ns);
+		if (tsc > tsc_timestamp) {
+			adjust_tsc_offset_guest(v, tsc - tsc_timestamp);
+			tsc_timestamp = tsc;
+		}
+	}
+
+	local_irq_restore(flags);
+
+	/* With all the info we got, fill in the values */
+
+	if (kvm_caps.has_tsc_control)
+		tgt_tsc_khz = kvm_scale_tsc(tgt_tsc_khz,
+					    v->arch.l1_tsc_scaling_ratio);
+
+	if (unlikely(vcpu->hw_tsc_khz != tgt_tsc_khz)) {
+		kvm_get_time_scale(NSEC_PER_SEC, tgt_tsc_khz * 1000LL,
+				   &vcpu->hv_clock.tsc_shift,
+				   &vcpu->hv_clock.tsc_to_system_mul);
+		vcpu->hw_tsc_khz = tgt_tsc_khz;
+		kvm_xen_update_tsc_info(v);
+	}
+
+	vcpu->hv_clock.tsc_timestamp = tsc_timestamp;
+	vcpu->hv_clock.system_time = kernel_ns + v->kvm->arch.kvmclock_offset;
+	vcpu->last_guest_tsc = tsc_timestamp;
+
+	/* If the host uses TSC clocksource, then it is stable */
+	pvclock_flags = 0;
+	if (use_master_clock)
+		pvclock_flags |= PVCLOCK_TSC_STABLE_BIT;
+
+	vcpu->hv_clock.flags = pvclock_flags;
+
+	if (vcpu->pv_time.active)
+		kvm_setup_guest_pvclock(v, &vcpu->pv_time, 0);
+	if (vcpu->xen.vcpu_info_cache.active)
+		kvm_setup_guest_pvclock(v, &vcpu->xen.vcpu_info_cache,
+					offsetof(struct compat_vcpu_info, time));
+	if (vcpu->xen.vcpu_time_info_cache.active)
+		kvm_setup_guest_pvclock(v, &vcpu->xen.vcpu_time_info_cache, 0);
+	kvm_hv_setup_tsc_page(v->kvm, &vcpu->hv_clock);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * kvmclock updates which are isolated to a given vcpu, such as
+ * vcpu->cpu migration, should not allow system_timestamp from
+ * the rest of the vcpus to remain static. Otherwise ntp frequency
+ * correction applies to one vcpu's system_timestamp but not
+ * the others.
+ *
+ * So in those cases, request a kvmclock update for all vcpus.
+ * We need to rate-limit these requests though, as they can
+ * considerably slow guests that have a large number of vcpus.
+ * The time for a remote vcpu to update its kvmclock is bound
+ * by the delay we use to rate-limit the updates.
+ */
+
+#define KVMCLOCK_UPDATE_DELAY msecs_to_jiffies(100)
+
+static void kvmclock_update_fn(struct work_struct *work)
+{
+	unsigned long i;
+	struct delayed_work *dwork = to_delayed_work(work);
+	struct kvm_arch *ka = container_of(dwork, struct kvm_arch,
+					   kvmclock_update_work);
+	struct kvm *kvm = container_of(ka, struct kvm, arch);
+	struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu;
+
+	kvm_for_each_vcpu(i, vcpu, kvm) {
+		kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_CLOCK_UPDATE, vcpu);
+		kvm_vcpu_kick(vcpu);
+	}
+}
+
+static void kvm_gen_kvmclock_update(struct kvm_vcpu *v)
+{
+	struct kvm *kvm = v->kvm;
+
+	kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_CLOCK_UPDATE, v);
+	schedule_delayed_work(&kvm->arch.kvmclock_update_work,
+					KVMCLOCK_UPDATE_DELAY);
+}
+
+#define KVMCLOCK_SYNC_PERIOD (300 * HZ)
+
+static void kvmclock_sync_fn(struct work_struct *work)
+{
+	struct delayed_work *dwork = to_delayed_work(work);
+	struct kvm_arch *ka = container_of(dwork, struct kvm_arch,
+					   kvmclock_sync_work);
+	struct kvm *kvm = container_of(ka, struct kvm, arch);
+
+	if (!kvmclock_periodic_sync)
+		return;
+
+	schedule_delayed_work(&kvm->arch.kvmclock_update_work, 0);
+	schedule_delayed_work(&kvm->arch.kvmclock_sync_work,
+					KVMCLOCK_SYNC_PERIOD);
+}
+
+/* These helpers are safe iff @msr is known to be an MCx bank MSR. */
+static bool is_mci_control_msr(u32 msr)
+{
+	return (msr & 3) == 0;
+}
+static bool is_mci_status_msr(u32 msr)
+{
+	return (msr & 3) == 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * On AMD, HWCR[McStatusWrEn] controls whether setting MCi_STATUS results in #GP.
+ */
+static bool can_set_mci_status(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	/* McStatusWrEn enabled? */
+	if (guest_cpuid_is_amd_or_hygon(vcpu))
+		return !!(vcpu->arch.msr_hwcr & BIT_ULL(18));
+
+	return false;
+}
+
+static int set_msr_mce(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
+{
+	u64 mcg_cap = vcpu->arch.mcg_cap;
+	unsigned bank_num = mcg_cap & 0xff;
+	u32 msr = msr_info->index;
+	u64 data = msr_info->data;
+	u32 offset, last_msr;
+
+	switch (msr) {
+	case MSR_IA32_MCG_STATUS:
+		vcpu->arch.mcg_status = data;
+		break;
+	case MSR_IA32_MCG_CTL:
+		if (!(mcg_cap & MCG_CTL_P) &&
+		    (data || !msr_info->host_initiated))
+			return 1;
+		if (data != 0 && data != ~(u64)0)
+			return 1;
+		vcpu->arch.mcg_ctl = data;
+		break;
+	case MSR_IA32_MC0_CTL2 ... MSR_IA32_MCx_CTL2(KVM_MAX_MCE_BANKS) - 1:
+		last_msr = MSR_IA32_MCx_CTL2(bank_num) - 1;
+		if (msr > last_msr)
+			return 1;
+
+		if (!(mcg_cap & MCG_CMCI_P) && (data || !msr_info->host_initiated))
+			return 1;
+		/* An attempt to write a 1 to a reserved bit raises #GP */
+		if (data & ~(MCI_CTL2_CMCI_EN | MCI_CTL2_CMCI_THRESHOLD_MASK))
+			return 1;
+		offset = array_index_nospec(msr - MSR_IA32_MC0_CTL2,
+					    last_msr + 1 - MSR_IA32_MC0_CTL2);
+		vcpu->arch.mci_ctl2_banks[offset] = data;
+		break;
+	case MSR_IA32_MC0_CTL ... MSR_IA32_MCx_CTL(KVM_MAX_MCE_BANKS) - 1:
+		last_msr = MSR_IA32_MCx_CTL(bank_num) - 1;
+		if (msr > last_msr)
+			return 1;
+
+		/*
+		 * Only 0 or all 1s can be written to IA32_MCi_CTL, all other
+		 * values are architecturally undefined.  But, some Linux
+		 * kernels clear bit 10 in bank 4 to workaround a BIOS/GART TLB
+		 * issue on AMD K8s, allow bit 10 to be clear when setting all
+		 * other bits in order to avoid an uncaught #GP in the guest.
+		 *
+		 * UNIXWARE clears bit 0 of MC1_CTL to ignore correctable,
+		 * single-bit ECC data errors.
+		 */
+		if (is_mci_control_msr(msr) &&
+		    data != 0 && (data | (1 << 10) | 1) != ~(u64)0)
+			return 1;
+
+		/*
+		 * All CPUs allow writing 0 to MCi_STATUS MSRs to clear the MSR.
+		 * AMD-based CPUs allow non-zero values, but if and only if
+		 * HWCR[McStatusWrEn] is set.
+		 */
+		if (!msr_info->host_initiated && is_mci_status_msr(msr) &&
+		    data != 0 && !can_set_mci_status(vcpu))
+			return 1;
+
+		offset = array_index_nospec(msr - MSR_IA32_MC0_CTL,
+					    last_msr + 1 - MSR_IA32_MC0_CTL);
+		vcpu->arch.mce_banks[offset] = data;
+		break;
+	default:
+		return 1;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static inline bool kvm_pv_async_pf_enabled(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	u64 mask = KVM_ASYNC_PF_ENABLED | KVM_ASYNC_PF_DELIVERY_AS_INT;
+
+	return (vcpu->arch.apf.msr_en_val & mask) == mask;
+}
+
+static int kvm_pv_enable_async_pf(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 data)
+{
+	gpa_t gpa = data & ~0x3f;
+
+	/* Bits 4:5 are reserved, Should be zero */
+	if (data & 0x30)
+		return 1;
+
+	if (!guest_pv_has(vcpu, KVM_FEATURE_ASYNC_PF_VMEXIT) &&
+	    (data & KVM_ASYNC_PF_DELIVERY_AS_PF_VMEXIT))
+		return 1;
+
+	if (!guest_pv_has(vcpu, KVM_FEATURE_ASYNC_PF_INT) &&
+	    (data & KVM_ASYNC_PF_DELIVERY_AS_INT))
+		return 1;
+
+	if (!lapic_in_kernel(vcpu))
+		return data ? 1 : 0;
+
+	vcpu->arch.apf.msr_en_val = data;
+
+	if (!kvm_pv_async_pf_enabled(vcpu)) {
+		kvm_clear_async_pf_completion_queue(vcpu);
+		kvm_async_pf_hash_reset(vcpu);
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	if (kvm_gfn_to_hva_cache_init(vcpu->kvm, &vcpu->arch.apf.data, gpa,
+					sizeof(u64)))
+		return 1;
+
+	vcpu->arch.apf.send_user_only = !(data & KVM_ASYNC_PF_SEND_ALWAYS);
+	vcpu->arch.apf.delivery_as_pf_vmexit = data & KVM_ASYNC_PF_DELIVERY_AS_PF_VMEXIT;
+
+	kvm_async_pf_wakeup_all(vcpu);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int kvm_pv_enable_async_pf_int(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 data)
+{
+	/* Bits 8-63 are reserved */
+	if (data >> 8)
+		return 1;
+
+	if (!lapic_in_kernel(vcpu))
+		return 1;
+
+	vcpu->arch.apf.msr_int_val = data;
+
+	vcpu->arch.apf.vec = data & KVM_ASYNC_PF_VEC_MASK;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void kvmclock_reset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	kvm_gpc_deactivate(&vcpu->arch.pv_time);
+	vcpu->arch.time = 0;
+}
+
+static void kvm_vcpu_flush_tlb_all(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	++vcpu->stat.tlb_flush;
+	static_call(kvm_x86_flush_tlb_all)(vcpu);
+
+	/* Flushing all ASIDs flushes the current ASID... */
+	kvm_clear_request(KVM_REQ_TLB_FLUSH_CURRENT, vcpu);
+}
+
+static void kvm_vcpu_flush_tlb_guest(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	++vcpu->stat.tlb_flush;
+
+	if (!tdp_enabled) {
+		/*
+		 * A TLB flush on behalf of the guest is equivalent to
+		 * INVPCID(all), toggling CR4.PGE, etc., which requires
+		 * a forced sync of the shadow page tables.  Ensure all the
+		 * roots are synced and the guest TLB in hardware is clean.
+		 */
+		kvm_mmu_sync_roots(vcpu);
+		kvm_mmu_sync_prev_roots(vcpu);
+	}
+
+	static_call(kvm_x86_flush_tlb_guest)(vcpu);
+
+	/*
+	 * Flushing all "guest" TLB is always a superset of Hyper-V's fine
+	 * grained flushing.
+	 */
+	kvm_hv_vcpu_purge_flush_tlb(vcpu);
+}
+
+
+static inline void kvm_vcpu_flush_tlb_current(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	++vcpu->stat.tlb_flush;
+	static_call(kvm_x86_flush_tlb_current)(vcpu);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Service "local" TLB flush requests, which are specific to the current MMU
+ * context.  In addition to the generic event handling in vcpu_enter_guest(),
+ * TLB flushes that are targeted at an MMU context also need to be serviced
+ * prior before nested VM-Enter/VM-Exit.
+ */
+void kvm_service_local_tlb_flush_requests(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	if (kvm_check_request(KVM_REQ_TLB_FLUSH_CURRENT, vcpu))
+		kvm_vcpu_flush_tlb_current(vcpu);
+
+	if (kvm_check_request(KVM_REQ_TLB_FLUSH_GUEST, vcpu))
+		kvm_vcpu_flush_tlb_guest(vcpu);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_service_local_tlb_flush_requests);
+
+static void record_steal_time(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct gfn_to_hva_cache *ghc = &vcpu->arch.st.cache;
+	struct kvm_steal_time __user *st;
+	struct kvm_memslots *slots;
+	gpa_t gpa = vcpu->arch.st.msr_val & KVM_STEAL_VALID_BITS;
+	u64 steal;
+	u32 version;
+
+	if (kvm_xen_msr_enabled(vcpu->kvm)) {
+		kvm_xen_runstate_set_running(vcpu);
+		return;
+	}
+
+	if (!(vcpu->arch.st.msr_val & KVM_MSR_ENABLED))
+		return;
+
+	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(current->mm != vcpu->kvm->mm))
+		return;
+
+	slots = kvm_memslots(vcpu->kvm);
+
+	if (unlikely(slots->generation != ghc->generation ||
+		     gpa != ghc->gpa ||
+		     kvm_is_error_hva(ghc->hva) || !ghc->memslot)) {
+		/* We rely on the fact that it fits in a single page. */
+		BUILD_BUG_ON((sizeof(*st) - 1) & KVM_STEAL_VALID_BITS);
+
+		if (kvm_gfn_to_hva_cache_init(vcpu->kvm, ghc, gpa, sizeof(*st)) ||
+		    kvm_is_error_hva(ghc->hva) || !ghc->memslot)
+			return;
+	}
+
+	st = (struct kvm_steal_time __user *)ghc->hva;
+	/*
+	 * Doing a TLB flush here, on the guest's behalf, can avoid
+	 * expensive IPIs.
+	 */
+	if (guest_pv_has(vcpu, KVM_FEATURE_PV_TLB_FLUSH)) {
+		u8 st_preempted = 0;
+		int err = -EFAULT;
+
+		if (!user_access_begin(st, sizeof(*st)))
+			return;
+
+		asm volatile("1: xchgb %0, %2\n"
+			     "xor %1, %1\n"
+			     "2:\n"
+			     _ASM_EXTABLE_UA(1b, 2b)
+			     : "+q" (st_preempted),
+			       "+&r" (err),
+			       "+m" (st->preempted));
+		if (err)
+			goto out;
+
+		user_access_end();
+
+		vcpu->arch.st.preempted = 0;
+
+		trace_kvm_pv_tlb_flush(vcpu->vcpu_id,
+				       st_preempted & KVM_VCPU_FLUSH_TLB);
+		if (st_preempted & KVM_VCPU_FLUSH_TLB)
+			kvm_vcpu_flush_tlb_guest(vcpu);
+
+		if (!user_access_begin(st, sizeof(*st)))
+			goto dirty;
+	} else {
+		if (!user_access_begin(st, sizeof(*st)))
+			return;
+
+		unsafe_put_user(0, &st->preempted, out);
+		vcpu->arch.st.preempted = 0;
+	}
+
+	unsafe_get_user(version, &st->version, out);
+	if (version & 1)
+		version += 1;  /* first time write, random junk */
+
+	version += 1;
+	unsafe_put_user(version, &st->version, out);
+
+	smp_wmb();
+
+	unsafe_get_user(steal, &st->steal, out);
+	steal += current->sched_info.run_delay -
+		vcpu->arch.st.last_steal;
+	vcpu->arch.st.last_steal = current->sched_info.run_delay;
+	unsafe_put_user(steal, &st->steal, out);
+
+	version += 1;
+	unsafe_put_user(version, &st->version, out);
+
+ out:
+	user_access_end();
+ dirty:
+	mark_page_dirty_in_slot(vcpu->kvm, ghc->memslot, gpa_to_gfn(ghc->gpa));
+}
+
+static bool kvm_is_msr_to_save(u32 msr_index)
+{
+	unsigned int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < num_msrs_to_save; i++) {
+		if (msrs_to_save[i] == msr_index)
+			return true;
+	}
+
+	return false;
+}
+
+int kvm_set_msr_common(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
+{
+	u32 msr = msr_info->index;
+	u64 data = msr_info->data;
+
+	if (msr && msr == vcpu->kvm->arch.xen_hvm_config.msr)
+		return kvm_xen_write_hypercall_page(vcpu, data);
+
+	switch (msr) {
+	case MSR_AMD64_NB_CFG:
+	case MSR_IA32_UCODE_WRITE:
+	case MSR_VM_HSAVE_PA:
+	case MSR_AMD64_PATCH_LOADER:
+	case MSR_AMD64_BU_CFG2:
+	case MSR_AMD64_DC_CFG:
+	case MSR_AMD64_TW_CFG:
+	case MSR_F15H_EX_CFG:
+		break;
+
+	case MSR_IA32_UCODE_REV:
+		if (msr_info->host_initiated)
+			vcpu->arch.microcode_version = data;
+		break;
+	case MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES:
+		if (!msr_info->host_initiated)
+			return 1;
+		vcpu->arch.arch_capabilities = data;
+		break;
+	case MSR_IA32_PERF_CAPABILITIES:
+		if (!msr_info->host_initiated)
+			return 1;
+		if (data & ~kvm_caps.supported_perf_cap)
+			return 1;
+
+		/*
+		 * Note, this is not just a performance optimization!  KVM
+		 * disallows changing feature MSRs after the vCPU has run; PMU
+		 * refresh will bug the VM if called after the vCPU has run.
+		 */
+		if (vcpu->arch.perf_capabilities == data)
+			break;
+
+		vcpu->arch.perf_capabilities = data;
+		kvm_pmu_refresh(vcpu);
+		break;
+	case MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD:
+		if (!msr_info->host_initiated && !guest_has_pred_cmd_msr(vcpu))
+			return 1;
+
+		if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB) || (data & ~PRED_CMD_IBPB))
+			return 1;
+		if (!data)
+			break;
+
+		wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD, PRED_CMD_IBPB);
+		break;
+	case MSR_IA32_FLUSH_CMD:
+		if (!msr_info->host_initiated &&
+		    !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_FLUSH_L1D))
+			return 1;
+
+		if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_FLUSH_L1D) || (data & ~L1D_FLUSH))
+			return 1;
+		if (!data)
+			break;
+
+		wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_FLUSH_CMD, L1D_FLUSH);
+		break;
+	case MSR_EFER:
+		return set_efer(vcpu, msr_info);
+	case MSR_K7_HWCR:
+		data &= ~(u64)0x40;	/* ignore flush filter disable */
+		data &= ~(u64)0x100;	/* ignore ignne emulation enable */
+		data &= ~(u64)0x8;	/* ignore TLB cache disable */
+
+		/* Handle McStatusWrEn */
+		if (data == BIT_ULL(18)) {
+			vcpu->arch.msr_hwcr = data;
+		} else if (data != 0) {
+			kvm_pr_unimpl_wrmsr(vcpu, msr, data);
+			return 1;
+		}
+		break;
+	case MSR_FAM10H_MMIO_CONF_BASE:
+		if (data != 0) {
+			kvm_pr_unimpl_wrmsr(vcpu, msr, data);
+			return 1;
+		}
+		break;
+	case MSR_IA32_CR_PAT:
+		if (!kvm_pat_valid(data))
+			return 1;
+
+		vcpu->arch.pat = data;
+		break;
+	case MTRRphysBase_MSR(0) ... MSR_MTRRfix4K_F8000:
+	case MSR_MTRRdefType:
+		return kvm_mtrr_set_msr(vcpu, msr, data);
+	case MSR_IA32_APICBASE:
+		return kvm_set_apic_base(vcpu, msr_info);
+	case APIC_BASE_MSR ... APIC_BASE_MSR + 0xff:
+		return kvm_x2apic_msr_write(vcpu, msr, data);
+	case MSR_IA32_TSC_DEADLINE:
+		kvm_set_lapic_tscdeadline_msr(vcpu, data);
+		break;
+	case MSR_IA32_TSC_ADJUST:
+		if (guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_TSC_ADJUST)) {
+			if (!msr_info->host_initiated) {
+				s64 adj = data - vcpu->arch.ia32_tsc_adjust_msr;
+				adjust_tsc_offset_guest(vcpu, adj);
+				/* Before back to guest, tsc_timestamp must be adjusted
+				 * as well, otherwise guest's percpu pvclock time could jump.
+				 */
+				kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_CLOCK_UPDATE, vcpu);
+			}
+			vcpu->arch.ia32_tsc_adjust_msr = data;
+		}
+		break;
+	case MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE: {
+		u64 old_val = vcpu->arch.ia32_misc_enable_msr;
+
+		if (!msr_info->host_initiated) {
+			/* RO bits */
+			if ((old_val ^ data) & MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE_PMU_RO_MASK)
+				return 1;
+
+			/* R bits, i.e. writes are ignored, but don't fault. */
+			data = data & ~MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE_EMON;
+			data |= old_val & MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE_EMON;
+		}
+
+		if (!kvm_check_has_quirk(vcpu->kvm, KVM_X86_QUIRK_MISC_ENABLE_NO_MWAIT) &&
+		    ((old_val ^ data)  & MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE_MWAIT)) {
+			if (!guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_XMM3))
+				return 1;
+			vcpu->arch.ia32_misc_enable_msr = data;
+			kvm_update_cpuid_runtime(vcpu);
+		} else {
+			vcpu->arch.ia32_misc_enable_msr = data;
+		}
+		break;
+	}
+	case MSR_IA32_SMBASE:
+		if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KVM_SMM) || !msr_info->host_initiated)
+			return 1;
+		vcpu->arch.smbase = data;
+		break;
+	case MSR_IA32_POWER_CTL:
+		vcpu->arch.msr_ia32_power_ctl = data;
+		break;
+	case MSR_IA32_TSC:
+		if (msr_info->host_initiated) {
+			kvm_synchronize_tsc(vcpu, data);
+		} else {
+			u64 adj = kvm_compute_l1_tsc_offset(vcpu, data) - vcpu->arch.l1_tsc_offset;
+			adjust_tsc_offset_guest(vcpu, adj);
+			vcpu->arch.ia32_tsc_adjust_msr += adj;
+		}
+		break;
+	case MSR_IA32_XSS:
+		if (!msr_info->host_initiated &&
+		    !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_XSAVES))
+			return 1;
+		/*
+		 * KVM supports exposing PT to the guest, but does not support
+		 * IA32_XSS[bit 8]. Guests have to use RDMSR/WRMSR rather than
+		 * XSAVES/XRSTORS to save/restore PT MSRs.
+		 */
+		if (data & ~kvm_caps.supported_xss)
+			return 1;
+		vcpu->arch.ia32_xss = data;
+		kvm_update_cpuid_runtime(vcpu);
+		break;
+	case MSR_SMI_COUNT:
+		if (!msr_info->host_initiated)
+			return 1;
+		vcpu->arch.smi_count = data;
+		break;
+	case MSR_KVM_WALL_CLOCK_NEW:
+		if (!guest_pv_has(vcpu, KVM_FEATURE_CLOCKSOURCE2))
+			return 1;
+
+		vcpu->kvm->arch.wall_clock = data;
+		kvm_write_wall_clock(vcpu->kvm, data, 0);
+		break;
+	case MSR_KVM_WALL_CLOCK:
+		if (!guest_pv_has(vcpu, KVM_FEATURE_CLOCKSOURCE))
+			return 1;
+
+		vcpu->kvm->arch.wall_clock = data;
+		kvm_write_wall_clock(vcpu->kvm, data, 0);
+		break;
+	case MSR_KVM_SYSTEM_TIME_NEW:
+		if (!guest_pv_has(vcpu, KVM_FEATURE_CLOCKSOURCE2))
+			return 1;
+
+		kvm_write_system_time(vcpu, data, false, msr_info->host_initiated);
+		break;
+	case MSR_KVM_SYSTEM_TIME:
+		if (!guest_pv_has(vcpu, KVM_FEATURE_CLOCKSOURCE))
+			return 1;
+
+		kvm_write_system_time(vcpu, data, true,  msr_info->host_initiated);
+		break;
+	case MSR_KVM_ASYNC_PF_EN:
+		if (!guest_pv_has(vcpu, KVM_FEATURE_ASYNC_PF))
+			return 1;
+
+		if (kvm_pv_enable_async_pf(vcpu, data))
+			return 1;
+		break;
+	case MSR_KVM_ASYNC_PF_INT:
+		if (!guest_pv_has(vcpu, KVM_FEATURE_ASYNC_PF_INT))
+			return 1;
+
+		if (kvm_pv_enable_async_pf_int(vcpu, data))
+			return 1;
+		break;
+	case MSR_KVM_ASYNC_PF_ACK:
+		if (!guest_pv_has(vcpu, KVM_FEATURE_ASYNC_PF_INT))
+			return 1;
+		if (data & 0x1) {
+			vcpu->arch.apf.pageready_pending = false;
+			kvm_check_async_pf_completion(vcpu);
+		}
+		break;
+	case MSR_KVM_STEAL_TIME:
+		if (!guest_pv_has(vcpu, KVM_FEATURE_STEAL_TIME))
+			return 1;
+
+		if (unlikely(!sched_info_on()))
+			return 1;
+
+		if (data & KVM_STEAL_RESERVED_MASK)
+			return 1;
+
+		vcpu->arch.st.msr_val = data;
+
+		if (!(data & KVM_MSR_ENABLED))
+			break;
+
+		kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_STEAL_UPDATE, vcpu);
+
+		break;
+	case MSR_KVM_PV_EOI_EN:
+		if (!guest_pv_has(vcpu, KVM_FEATURE_PV_EOI))
+			return 1;
+
+		if (kvm_lapic_set_pv_eoi(vcpu, data, sizeof(u8)))
+			return 1;
+		break;
+
+	case MSR_KVM_POLL_CONTROL:
+		if (!guest_pv_has(vcpu, KVM_FEATURE_POLL_CONTROL))
+			return 1;
+
+		/* only enable bit supported */
+		if (data & (-1ULL << 1))
+			return 1;
+
+		vcpu->arch.msr_kvm_poll_control = data;
+		break;
+
+	case MSR_IA32_MCG_CTL:
+	case MSR_IA32_MCG_STATUS:
+	case MSR_IA32_MC0_CTL ... MSR_IA32_MCx_CTL(KVM_MAX_MCE_BANKS) - 1:
+	case MSR_IA32_MC0_CTL2 ... MSR_IA32_MCx_CTL2(KVM_MAX_MCE_BANKS) - 1:
+		return set_msr_mce(vcpu, msr_info);
+
+	case MSR_K7_PERFCTR0 ... MSR_K7_PERFCTR3:
+	case MSR_P6_PERFCTR0 ... MSR_P6_PERFCTR1:
+	case MSR_K7_EVNTSEL0 ... MSR_K7_EVNTSEL3:
+	case MSR_P6_EVNTSEL0 ... MSR_P6_EVNTSEL1:
+		if (kvm_pmu_is_valid_msr(vcpu, msr))
+			return kvm_pmu_set_msr(vcpu, msr_info);
+
+		if (data)
+			kvm_pr_unimpl_wrmsr(vcpu, msr, data);
+		break;
+	case MSR_K7_CLK_CTL:
+		/*
+		 * Ignore all writes to this no longer documented MSR.
+		 * Writes are only relevant for old K7 processors,
+		 * all pre-dating SVM, but a recommended workaround from
+		 * AMD for these chips. It is possible to specify the
+		 * affected processor models on the command line, hence
+		 * the need to ignore the workaround.
+		 */
+		break;
+	case HV_X64_MSR_GUEST_OS_ID ... HV_X64_MSR_SINT15:
+	case HV_X64_MSR_SYNDBG_CONTROL ... HV_X64_MSR_SYNDBG_PENDING_BUFFER:
+	case HV_X64_MSR_SYNDBG_OPTIONS:
+	case HV_X64_MSR_CRASH_P0 ... HV_X64_MSR_CRASH_P4:
+	case HV_X64_MSR_CRASH_CTL:
+	case HV_X64_MSR_STIMER0_CONFIG ... HV_X64_MSR_STIMER3_COUNT:
+	case HV_X64_MSR_REENLIGHTENMENT_CONTROL:
+	case HV_X64_MSR_TSC_EMULATION_CONTROL:
+	case HV_X64_MSR_TSC_EMULATION_STATUS:
+	case HV_X64_MSR_TSC_INVARIANT_CONTROL:
+		return kvm_hv_set_msr_common(vcpu, msr, data,
+					     msr_info->host_initiated);
+	case MSR_IA32_BBL_CR_CTL3:
+		/* Drop writes to this legacy MSR -- see rdmsr
+		 * counterpart for further detail.
+		 */
+		kvm_pr_unimpl_wrmsr(vcpu, msr, data);
+		break;
+	case MSR_AMD64_OSVW_ID_LENGTH:
+		if (!guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_OSVW))
+			return 1;
+		vcpu->arch.osvw.length = data;
+		break;
+	case MSR_AMD64_OSVW_STATUS:
+		if (!guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_OSVW))
+			return 1;
+		vcpu->arch.osvw.status = data;
+		break;
+	case MSR_PLATFORM_INFO:
+		if (!msr_info->host_initiated ||
+		    (!(data & MSR_PLATFORM_INFO_CPUID_FAULT) &&
+		     cpuid_fault_enabled(vcpu)))
+			return 1;
+		vcpu->arch.msr_platform_info = data;
+		break;
+	case MSR_MISC_FEATURES_ENABLES:
+		if (data & ~MSR_MISC_FEATURES_ENABLES_CPUID_FAULT ||
+		    (data & MSR_MISC_FEATURES_ENABLES_CPUID_FAULT &&
+		     !supports_cpuid_fault(vcpu)))
+			return 1;
+		vcpu->arch.msr_misc_features_enables = data;
+		break;
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+	case MSR_IA32_XFD:
+		if (!msr_info->host_initiated &&
+		    !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_XFD))
+			return 1;
+
+		if (data & ~kvm_guest_supported_xfd(vcpu))
+			return 1;
+
+		fpu_update_guest_xfd(&vcpu->arch.guest_fpu, data);
+		break;
+	case MSR_IA32_XFD_ERR:
+		if (!msr_info->host_initiated &&
+		    !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_XFD))
+			return 1;
+
+		if (data & ~kvm_guest_supported_xfd(vcpu))
+			return 1;
+
+		vcpu->arch.guest_fpu.xfd_err = data;
+		break;
+#endif
+	default:
+		if (kvm_pmu_is_valid_msr(vcpu, msr))
+			return kvm_pmu_set_msr(vcpu, msr_info);
+
+		/*
+		 * Userspace is allowed to write '0' to MSRs that KVM reports
+		 * as to-be-saved, even if an MSRs isn't fully supported.
+		 */
+		if (msr_info->host_initiated && !data &&
+		    kvm_is_msr_to_save(msr))
+			break;
+
+		return KVM_MSR_RET_INVALID;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_set_msr_common);
+
+static int get_msr_mce(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 msr, u64 *pdata, bool host)
+{
+	u64 data;
+	u64 mcg_cap = vcpu->arch.mcg_cap;
+	unsigned bank_num = mcg_cap & 0xff;
+	u32 offset, last_msr;
+
+	switch (msr) {
+	case MSR_IA32_P5_MC_ADDR:
+	case MSR_IA32_P5_MC_TYPE:
+		data = 0;
+		break;
+	case MSR_IA32_MCG_CAP:
+		data = vcpu->arch.mcg_cap;
+		break;
+	case MSR_IA32_MCG_CTL:
+		if (!(mcg_cap & MCG_CTL_P) && !host)
+			return 1;
+		data = vcpu->arch.mcg_ctl;
+		break;
+	case MSR_IA32_MCG_STATUS:
+		data = vcpu->arch.mcg_status;
+		break;
+	case MSR_IA32_MC0_CTL2 ... MSR_IA32_MCx_CTL2(KVM_MAX_MCE_BANKS) - 1:
+		last_msr = MSR_IA32_MCx_CTL2(bank_num) - 1;
+		if (msr > last_msr)
+			return 1;
+
+		if (!(mcg_cap & MCG_CMCI_P) && !host)
+			return 1;
+		offset = array_index_nospec(msr - MSR_IA32_MC0_CTL2,
+					    last_msr + 1 - MSR_IA32_MC0_CTL2);
+		data = vcpu->arch.mci_ctl2_banks[offset];
+		break;
+	case MSR_IA32_MC0_CTL ... MSR_IA32_MCx_CTL(KVM_MAX_MCE_BANKS) - 1:
+		last_msr = MSR_IA32_MCx_CTL(bank_num) - 1;
+		if (msr > last_msr)
+			return 1;
+
+		offset = array_index_nospec(msr - MSR_IA32_MC0_CTL,
+					    last_msr + 1 - MSR_IA32_MC0_CTL);
+		data = vcpu->arch.mce_banks[offset];
+		break;
+	default:
+		return 1;
+	}
+	*pdata = data;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int kvm_get_msr_common(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
+{
+	switch (msr_info->index) {
+	case MSR_IA32_PLATFORM_ID:
+	case MSR_IA32_EBL_CR_POWERON:
+	case MSR_IA32_LASTBRANCHFROMIP:
+	case MSR_IA32_LASTBRANCHTOIP:
+	case MSR_IA32_LASTINTFROMIP:
+	case MSR_IA32_LASTINTTOIP:
+	case MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG:
+	case MSR_K8_TSEG_ADDR:
+	case MSR_K8_TSEG_MASK:
+	case MSR_VM_HSAVE_PA:
+	case MSR_K8_INT_PENDING_MSG:
+	case MSR_AMD64_NB_CFG:
+	case MSR_FAM10H_MMIO_CONF_BASE:
+	case MSR_AMD64_BU_CFG2:
+	case MSR_IA32_PERF_CTL:
+	case MSR_AMD64_DC_CFG:
+	case MSR_AMD64_TW_CFG:
+	case MSR_F15H_EX_CFG:
+	/*
+	 * Intel Sandy Bridge CPUs must support the RAPL (running average power
+	 * limit) MSRs. Just return 0, as we do not want to expose the host
+	 * data here. Do not conditionalize this on CPUID, as KVM does not do
+	 * so for existing CPU-specific MSRs.
+	 */
+	case MSR_RAPL_POWER_UNIT:
+	case MSR_PP0_ENERGY_STATUS:	/* Power plane 0 (core) */
+	case MSR_PP1_ENERGY_STATUS:	/* Power plane 1 (graphics uncore) */
+	case MSR_PKG_ENERGY_STATUS:	/* Total package */
+	case MSR_DRAM_ENERGY_STATUS:	/* DRAM controller */
+		msr_info->data = 0;
+		break;
+	case MSR_K7_EVNTSEL0 ... MSR_K7_EVNTSEL3:
+	case MSR_K7_PERFCTR0 ... MSR_K7_PERFCTR3:
+	case MSR_P6_PERFCTR0 ... MSR_P6_PERFCTR1:
+	case MSR_P6_EVNTSEL0 ... MSR_P6_EVNTSEL1:
+		if (kvm_pmu_is_valid_msr(vcpu, msr_info->index))
+			return kvm_pmu_get_msr(vcpu, msr_info);
+		msr_info->data = 0;
+		break;
+	case MSR_IA32_UCODE_REV:
+		msr_info->data = vcpu->arch.microcode_version;
+		break;
+	case MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES:
+		if (!msr_info->host_initiated &&
+		    !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_ARCH_CAPABILITIES))
+			return 1;
+		msr_info->data = vcpu->arch.arch_capabilities;
+		break;
+	case MSR_IA32_PERF_CAPABILITIES:
+		if (!msr_info->host_initiated &&
+		    !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_PDCM))
+			return 1;
+		msr_info->data = vcpu->arch.perf_capabilities;
+		break;
+	case MSR_IA32_POWER_CTL:
+		msr_info->data = vcpu->arch.msr_ia32_power_ctl;
+		break;
+	case MSR_IA32_TSC: {
+		/*
+		 * Intel SDM states that MSR_IA32_TSC read adds the TSC offset
+		 * even when not intercepted. AMD manual doesn't explicitly
+		 * state this but appears to behave the same.
+		 *
+		 * On userspace reads and writes, however, we unconditionally
+		 * return L1's TSC value to ensure backwards-compatible
+		 * behavior for migration.
+		 */
+		u64 offset, ratio;
+
+		if (msr_info->host_initiated) {
+			offset = vcpu->arch.l1_tsc_offset;
+			ratio = vcpu->arch.l1_tsc_scaling_ratio;
+		} else {
+			offset = vcpu->arch.tsc_offset;
+			ratio = vcpu->arch.tsc_scaling_ratio;
+		}
+
+		msr_info->data = kvm_scale_tsc(rdtsc(), ratio) + offset;
+		break;
+	}
+	case MSR_IA32_CR_PAT:
+		msr_info->data = vcpu->arch.pat;
+		break;
+	case MSR_MTRRcap:
+	case MTRRphysBase_MSR(0) ... MSR_MTRRfix4K_F8000:
+	case MSR_MTRRdefType:
+		return kvm_mtrr_get_msr(vcpu, msr_info->index, &msr_info->data);
+	case 0xcd: /* fsb frequency */
+		msr_info->data = 3;
+		break;
+		/*
+		 * MSR_EBC_FREQUENCY_ID
+		 * Conservative value valid for even the basic CPU models.
+		 * Models 0,1: 000 in bits 23:21 indicating a bus speed of
+		 * 100MHz, model 2 000 in bits 18:16 indicating 100MHz,
+		 * and 266MHz for model 3, or 4. Set Core Clock
+		 * Frequency to System Bus Frequency Ratio to 1 (bits
+		 * 31:24) even though these are only valid for CPU
+		 * models > 2, however guests may end up dividing or
+		 * multiplying by zero otherwise.
+		 */
+	case MSR_EBC_FREQUENCY_ID:
+		msr_info->data = 1 << 24;
+		break;
+	case MSR_IA32_APICBASE:
+		msr_info->data = kvm_get_apic_base(vcpu);
+		break;
+	case APIC_BASE_MSR ... APIC_BASE_MSR + 0xff:
+		return kvm_x2apic_msr_read(vcpu, msr_info->index, &msr_info->data);
+	case MSR_IA32_TSC_DEADLINE:
+		msr_info->data = kvm_get_lapic_tscdeadline_msr(vcpu);
+		break;
+	case MSR_IA32_TSC_ADJUST:
+		msr_info->data = (u64)vcpu->arch.ia32_tsc_adjust_msr;
+		break;
+	case MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE:
+		msr_info->data = vcpu->arch.ia32_misc_enable_msr;
+		break;
+	case MSR_IA32_SMBASE:
+		if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KVM_SMM) || !msr_info->host_initiated)
+			return 1;
+		msr_info->data = vcpu->arch.smbase;
+		break;
+	case MSR_SMI_COUNT:
+		msr_info->data = vcpu->arch.smi_count;
+		break;
+	case MSR_IA32_PERF_STATUS:
+		/* TSC increment by tick */
+		msr_info->data = 1000ULL;
+		/* CPU multiplier */
+		msr_info->data |= (((uint64_t)4ULL) << 40);
+		break;
+	case MSR_EFER:
+		msr_info->data = vcpu->arch.efer;
+		break;
+	case MSR_KVM_WALL_CLOCK:
+		if (!guest_pv_has(vcpu, KVM_FEATURE_CLOCKSOURCE))
+			return 1;
+
+		msr_info->data = vcpu->kvm->arch.wall_clock;
+		break;
+	case MSR_KVM_WALL_CLOCK_NEW:
+		if (!guest_pv_has(vcpu, KVM_FEATURE_CLOCKSOURCE2))
+			return 1;
+
+		msr_info->data = vcpu->kvm->arch.wall_clock;
+		break;
+	case MSR_KVM_SYSTEM_TIME:
+		if (!guest_pv_has(vcpu, KVM_FEATURE_CLOCKSOURCE))
+			return 1;
+
+		msr_info->data = vcpu->arch.time;
+		break;
+	case MSR_KVM_SYSTEM_TIME_NEW:
+		if (!guest_pv_has(vcpu, KVM_FEATURE_CLOCKSOURCE2))
+			return 1;
+
+		msr_info->data = vcpu->arch.time;
+		break;
+	case MSR_KVM_ASYNC_PF_EN:
+		if (!guest_pv_has(vcpu, KVM_FEATURE_ASYNC_PF))
+			return 1;
+
+		msr_info->data = vcpu->arch.apf.msr_en_val;
+		break;
+	case MSR_KVM_ASYNC_PF_INT:
+		if (!guest_pv_has(vcpu, KVM_FEATURE_ASYNC_PF_INT))
+			return 1;
+
+		msr_info->data = vcpu->arch.apf.msr_int_val;
+		break;
+	case MSR_KVM_ASYNC_PF_ACK:
+		if (!guest_pv_has(vcpu, KVM_FEATURE_ASYNC_PF_INT))
+			return 1;
+
+		msr_info->data = 0;
+		break;
+	case MSR_KVM_STEAL_TIME:
+		if (!guest_pv_has(vcpu, KVM_FEATURE_STEAL_TIME))
+			return 1;
+
+		msr_info->data = vcpu->arch.st.msr_val;
+		break;
+	case MSR_KVM_PV_EOI_EN:
+		if (!guest_pv_has(vcpu, KVM_FEATURE_PV_EOI))
+			return 1;
+
+		msr_info->data = vcpu->arch.pv_eoi.msr_val;
+		break;
+	case MSR_KVM_POLL_CONTROL:
+		if (!guest_pv_has(vcpu, KVM_FEATURE_POLL_CONTROL))
+			return 1;
+
+		msr_info->data = vcpu->arch.msr_kvm_poll_control;
+		break;
+	case MSR_IA32_P5_MC_ADDR:
+	case MSR_IA32_P5_MC_TYPE:
+	case MSR_IA32_MCG_CAP:
+	case MSR_IA32_MCG_CTL:
+	case MSR_IA32_MCG_STATUS:
+	case MSR_IA32_MC0_CTL ... MSR_IA32_MCx_CTL(KVM_MAX_MCE_BANKS) - 1:
+	case MSR_IA32_MC0_CTL2 ... MSR_IA32_MCx_CTL2(KVM_MAX_MCE_BANKS) - 1:
+		return get_msr_mce(vcpu, msr_info->index, &msr_info->data,
+				   msr_info->host_initiated);
+	case MSR_IA32_XSS:
+		if (!msr_info->host_initiated &&
+		    !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_XSAVES))
+			return 1;
+		msr_info->data = vcpu->arch.ia32_xss;
+		break;
+	case MSR_K7_CLK_CTL:
+		/*
+		 * Provide expected ramp-up count for K7. All other
+		 * are set to zero, indicating minimum divisors for
+		 * every field.
+		 *
+		 * This prevents guest kernels on AMD host with CPU
+		 * type 6, model 8 and higher from exploding due to
+		 * the rdmsr failing.
+		 */
+		msr_info->data = 0x20000000;
+		break;
+	case HV_X64_MSR_GUEST_OS_ID ... HV_X64_MSR_SINT15:
+	case HV_X64_MSR_SYNDBG_CONTROL ... HV_X64_MSR_SYNDBG_PENDING_BUFFER:
+	case HV_X64_MSR_SYNDBG_OPTIONS:
+	case HV_X64_MSR_CRASH_P0 ... HV_X64_MSR_CRASH_P4:
+	case HV_X64_MSR_CRASH_CTL:
+	case HV_X64_MSR_STIMER0_CONFIG ... HV_X64_MSR_STIMER3_COUNT:
+	case HV_X64_MSR_REENLIGHTENMENT_CONTROL:
+	case HV_X64_MSR_TSC_EMULATION_CONTROL:
+	case HV_X64_MSR_TSC_EMULATION_STATUS:
+	case HV_X64_MSR_TSC_INVARIANT_CONTROL:
+		return kvm_hv_get_msr_common(vcpu,
+					     msr_info->index, &msr_info->data,
+					     msr_info->host_initiated);
+	case MSR_IA32_BBL_CR_CTL3:
+		/* This legacy MSR exists but isn't fully documented in current
+		 * silicon.  It is however accessed by winxp in very narrow
+		 * scenarios where it sets bit #19, itself documented as
+		 * a "reserved" bit.  Best effort attempt to source coherent
+		 * read data here should the balance of the register be
+		 * interpreted by the guest:
+		 *
+		 * L2 cache control register 3: 64GB range, 256KB size,
+		 * enabled, latency 0x1, configured
+		 */
+		msr_info->data = 0xbe702111;
+		break;
+	case MSR_AMD64_OSVW_ID_LENGTH:
+		if (!guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_OSVW))
+			return 1;
+		msr_info->data = vcpu->arch.osvw.length;
+		break;
+	case MSR_AMD64_OSVW_STATUS:
+		if (!guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_OSVW))
+			return 1;
+		msr_info->data = vcpu->arch.osvw.status;
+		break;
+	case MSR_PLATFORM_INFO:
+		if (!msr_info->host_initiated &&
+		    !vcpu->kvm->arch.guest_can_read_msr_platform_info)
+			return 1;
+		msr_info->data = vcpu->arch.msr_platform_info;
+		break;
+	case MSR_MISC_FEATURES_ENABLES:
+		msr_info->data = vcpu->arch.msr_misc_features_enables;
+		break;
+	case MSR_K7_HWCR:
+		msr_info->data = vcpu->arch.msr_hwcr;
+		break;
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+	case MSR_IA32_XFD:
+		if (!msr_info->host_initiated &&
+		    !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_XFD))
+			return 1;
+
+		msr_info->data = vcpu->arch.guest_fpu.fpstate->xfd;
+		break;
+	case MSR_IA32_XFD_ERR:
+		if (!msr_info->host_initiated &&
+		    !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_XFD))
+			return 1;
+
+		msr_info->data = vcpu->arch.guest_fpu.xfd_err;
+		break;
+#endif
+	default:
+		if (kvm_pmu_is_valid_msr(vcpu, msr_info->index))
+			return kvm_pmu_get_msr(vcpu, msr_info);
+
+		/*
+		 * Userspace is allowed to read MSRs that KVM reports as
+		 * to-be-saved, even if an MSR isn't fully supported.
+		 */
+		if (msr_info->host_initiated &&
+		    kvm_is_msr_to_save(msr_info->index)) {
+			msr_info->data = 0;
+			break;
+		}
+
+		return KVM_MSR_RET_INVALID;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_get_msr_common);
+
+/*
+ * Read or write a bunch of msrs. All parameters are kernel addresses.
+ *
+ * @return number of msrs set successfully.
+ */
+static int __msr_io(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_msrs *msrs,
+		    struct kvm_msr_entry *entries,
+		    int (*do_msr)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+				  unsigned index, u64 *data))
+{
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < msrs->nmsrs; ++i)
+		if (do_msr(vcpu, entries[i].index, &entries[i].data))
+			break;
+
+	return i;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Read or write a bunch of msrs. Parameters are user addresses.
+ *
+ * @return number of msrs set successfully.
+ */
+static int msr_io(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_msrs __user *user_msrs,
+		  int (*do_msr)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+				unsigned index, u64 *data),
+		  int writeback)
+{
+	struct kvm_msrs msrs;
+	struct kvm_msr_entry *entries;
+	unsigned size;
+	int r;
+
+	r = -EFAULT;
+	if (copy_from_user(&msrs, user_msrs, sizeof(msrs)))
+		goto out;
+
+	r = -E2BIG;
+	if (msrs.nmsrs >= MAX_IO_MSRS)
+		goto out;
+
+	size = sizeof(struct kvm_msr_entry) * msrs.nmsrs;
+	entries = memdup_user(user_msrs->entries, size);
+	if (IS_ERR(entries)) {
+		r = PTR_ERR(entries);
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	r = __msr_io(vcpu, &msrs, entries, do_msr);
+
+	if (writeback && copy_to_user(user_msrs->entries, entries, size))
+		r = -EFAULT;
+
+	kfree(entries);
+out:
+	return r;
+}
+
+static inline bool kvm_can_mwait_in_guest(void)
+{
+	return boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MWAIT) &&
+		!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MONITOR) &&
+		boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_ARAT);
+}
+
+static int kvm_ioctl_get_supported_hv_cpuid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+					    struct kvm_cpuid2 __user *cpuid_arg)
+{
+	struct kvm_cpuid2 cpuid;
+	int r;
+
+	r = -EFAULT;
+	if (copy_from_user(&cpuid, cpuid_arg, sizeof(cpuid)))
+		return r;
+
+	r = kvm_get_hv_cpuid(vcpu, &cpuid, cpuid_arg->entries);
+	if (r)
+		return r;
+
+	r = -EFAULT;
+	if (copy_to_user(cpuid_arg, &cpuid, sizeof(cpuid)))
+		return r;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int kvm_vm_ioctl_check_extension(struct kvm *kvm, long ext)
+{
+	int r = 0;
+
+	switch (ext) {
+	case KVM_CAP_IRQCHIP:
+	case KVM_CAP_HLT:
+	case KVM_CAP_MMU_SHADOW_CACHE_CONTROL:
+	case KVM_CAP_SET_TSS_ADDR:
+	case KVM_CAP_EXT_CPUID:
+	case KVM_CAP_EXT_EMUL_CPUID:
+	case KVM_CAP_CLOCKSOURCE:
+	case KVM_CAP_PIT:
+	case KVM_CAP_NOP_IO_DELAY:
+	case KVM_CAP_MP_STATE:
+	case KVM_CAP_SYNC_MMU:
+	case KVM_CAP_USER_NMI:
+	case KVM_CAP_REINJECT_CONTROL:
+	case KVM_CAP_IRQ_INJECT_STATUS:
+	case KVM_CAP_IOEVENTFD:
+	case KVM_CAP_IOEVENTFD_NO_LENGTH:
+	case KVM_CAP_PIT2:
+	case KVM_CAP_PIT_STATE2:
+	case KVM_CAP_SET_IDENTITY_MAP_ADDR:
+	case KVM_CAP_VCPU_EVENTS:
+	case KVM_CAP_HYPERV:
+	case KVM_CAP_HYPERV_VAPIC:
+	case KVM_CAP_HYPERV_SPIN:
+	case KVM_CAP_HYPERV_SYNIC:
+	case KVM_CAP_HYPERV_SYNIC2:
+	case KVM_CAP_HYPERV_VP_INDEX:
+	case KVM_CAP_HYPERV_EVENTFD:
+	case KVM_CAP_HYPERV_TLBFLUSH:
+	case KVM_CAP_HYPERV_SEND_IPI:
+	case KVM_CAP_HYPERV_CPUID:
+	case KVM_CAP_HYPERV_ENFORCE_CPUID:
+	case KVM_CAP_SYS_HYPERV_CPUID:
+	case KVM_CAP_PCI_SEGMENT:
+	case KVM_CAP_DEBUGREGS:
+	case KVM_CAP_X86_ROBUST_SINGLESTEP:
+	case KVM_CAP_XSAVE:
+	case KVM_CAP_ASYNC_PF:
+	case KVM_CAP_ASYNC_PF_INT:
+	case KVM_CAP_GET_TSC_KHZ:
+	case KVM_CAP_KVMCLOCK_CTRL:
+	case KVM_CAP_READONLY_MEM:
+	case KVM_CAP_HYPERV_TIME:
+	case KVM_CAP_IOAPIC_POLARITY_IGNORED:
+	case KVM_CAP_TSC_DEADLINE_TIMER:
+	case KVM_CAP_DISABLE_QUIRKS:
+	case KVM_CAP_SET_BOOT_CPU_ID:
+ 	case KVM_CAP_SPLIT_IRQCHIP:
+	case KVM_CAP_IMMEDIATE_EXIT:
+	case KVM_CAP_PMU_EVENT_FILTER:
+	case KVM_CAP_PMU_EVENT_MASKED_EVENTS:
+	case KVM_CAP_GET_MSR_FEATURES:
+	case KVM_CAP_MSR_PLATFORM_INFO:
+	case KVM_CAP_EXCEPTION_PAYLOAD:
+	case KVM_CAP_X86_TRIPLE_FAULT_EVENT:
+	case KVM_CAP_SET_GUEST_DEBUG:
+	case KVM_CAP_LAST_CPU:
+	case KVM_CAP_X86_USER_SPACE_MSR:
+	case KVM_CAP_X86_MSR_FILTER:
+	case KVM_CAP_ENFORCE_PV_FEATURE_CPUID:
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_SGX_KVM
+	case KVM_CAP_SGX_ATTRIBUTE:
+#endif
+	case KVM_CAP_VM_COPY_ENC_CONTEXT_FROM:
+	case KVM_CAP_VM_MOVE_ENC_CONTEXT_FROM:
+	case KVM_CAP_SREGS2:
+	case KVM_CAP_EXIT_ON_EMULATION_FAILURE:
+	case KVM_CAP_VCPU_ATTRIBUTES:
+	case KVM_CAP_SYS_ATTRIBUTES:
+	case KVM_CAP_VAPIC:
+	case KVM_CAP_ENABLE_CAP:
+	case KVM_CAP_VM_DISABLE_NX_HUGE_PAGES:
+	case KVM_CAP_IRQFD_RESAMPLE:
+		r = 1;
+		break;
+	case KVM_CAP_EXIT_HYPERCALL:
+		r = KVM_EXIT_HYPERCALL_VALID_MASK;
+		break;
+	case KVM_CAP_SET_GUEST_DEBUG2:
+		return KVM_GUESTDBG_VALID_MASK;
+#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_XEN
+	case KVM_CAP_XEN_HVM:
+		r = KVM_XEN_HVM_CONFIG_HYPERCALL_MSR |
+		    KVM_XEN_HVM_CONFIG_INTERCEPT_HCALL |
+		    KVM_XEN_HVM_CONFIG_SHARED_INFO |
+		    KVM_XEN_HVM_CONFIG_EVTCHN_2LEVEL |
+		    KVM_XEN_HVM_CONFIG_EVTCHN_SEND;
+		if (sched_info_on())
+			r |= KVM_XEN_HVM_CONFIG_RUNSTATE |
+			     KVM_XEN_HVM_CONFIG_RUNSTATE_UPDATE_FLAG;
+		break;
+#endif
+	case KVM_CAP_SYNC_REGS:
+		r = KVM_SYNC_X86_VALID_FIELDS;
+		break;
+	case KVM_CAP_ADJUST_CLOCK:
+		r = KVM_CLOCK_VALID_FLAGS;
+		break;
+	case KVM_CAP_X86_DISABLE_EXITS:
+		r = KVM_X86_DISABLE_EXITS_PAUSE;
+
+		if (!mitigate_smt_rsb) {
+			r |= KVM_X86_DISABLE_EXITS_HLT |
+			     KVM_X86_DISABLE_EXITS_CSTATE;
+
+			if (kvm_can_mwait_in_guest())
+				r |= KVM_X86_DISABLE_EXITS_MWAIT;
+		}
+		break;
+	case KVM_CAP_X86_SMM:
+		if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KVM_SMM))
+			break;
+
+		/* SMBASE is usually relocated above 1M on modern chipsets,
+		 * and SMM handlers might indeed rely on 4G segment limits,
+		 * so do not report SMM to be available if real mode is
+		 * emulated via vm86 mode.  Still, do not go to great lengths
+		 * to avoid userspace's usage of the feature, because it is a
+		 * fringe case that is not enabled except via specific settings
+		 * of the module parameters.
+		 */
+		r = static_call(kvm_x86_has_emulated_msr)(kvm, MSR_IA32_SMBASE);
+		break;
+	case KVM_CAP_NR_VCPUS:
+		r = min_t(unsigned int, num_online_cpus(), KVM_MAX_VCPUS);
+		break;
+	case KVM_CAP_MAX_VCPUS:
+		r = KVM_MAX_VCPUS;
+		break;
+	case KVM_CAP_MAX_VCPU_ID:
+		r = KVM_MAX_VCPU_IDS;
+		break;
+	case KVM_CAP_PV_MMU:	/* obsolete */
+		r = 0;
+		break;
+	case KVM_CAP_MCE:
+		r = KVM_MAX_MCE_BANKS;
+		break;
+	case KVM_CAP_XCRS:
+		r = boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_XSAVE);
+		break;
+	case KVM_CAP_TSC_CONTROL:
+	case KVM_CAP_VM_TSC_CONTROL:
+		r = kvm_caps.has_tsc_control;
+		break;
+	case KVM_CAP_X2APIC_API:
+		r = KVM_X2APIC_API_VALID_FLAGS;
+		break;
+	case KVM_CAP_NESTED_STATE:
+		r = kvm_x86_ops.nested_ops->get_state ?
+			kvm_x86_ops.nested_ops->get_state(NULL, NULL, 0) : 0;
+		break;
+	case KVM_CAP_HYPERV_DIRECT_TLBFLUSH:
+		r = kvm_x86_ops.enable_l2_tlb_flush != NULL;
+		break;
+	case KVM_CAP_HYPERV_ENLIGHTENED_VMCS:
+		r = kvm_x86_ops.nested_ops->enable_evmcs != NULL;
+		break;
+	case KVM_CAP_SMALLER_MAXPHYADDR:
+		r = (int) allow_smaller_maxphyaddr;
+		break;
+	case KVM_CAP_STEAL_TIME:
+		r = sched_info_on();
+		break;
+	case KVM_CAP_X86_BUS_LOCK_EXIT:
+		if (kvm_caps.has_bus_lock_exit)
+			r = KVM_BUS_LOCK_DETECTION_OFF |
+			    KVM_BUS_LOCK_DETECTION_EXIT;
+		else
+			r = 0;
+		break;
+	case KVM_CAP_XSAVE2: {
+		r = xstate_required_size(kvm_get_filtered_xcr0(), false);
+		if (r < sizeof(struct kvm_xsave))
+			r = sizeof(struct kvm_xsave);
+		break;
+	}
+	case KVM_CAP_PMU_CAPABILITY:
+		r = enable_pmu ? KVM_CAP_PMU_VALID_MASK : 0;
+		break;
+	case KVM_CAP_DISABLE_QUIRKS2:
+		r = KVM_X86_VALID_QUIRKS;
+		break;
+	case KVM_CAP_X86_NOTIFY_VMEXIT:
+		r = kvm_caps.has_notify_vmexit;
+		break;
+	default:
+		break;
+	}
+	return r;
+}
+
+static inline void __user *kvm_get_attr_addr(struct kvm_device_attr *attr)
+{
+	void __user *uaddr = (void __user*)(unsigned long)attr->addr;
+
+	if ((u64)(unsigned long)uaddr != attr->addr)
+		return ERR_PTR_USR(-EFAULT);
+	return uaddr;
+}
+
+static int kvm_x86_dev_get_attr(struct kvm_device_attr *attr)
+{
+	u64 __user *uaddr = kvm_get_attr_addr(attr);
+
+	if (attr->group)
+		return -ENXIO;
+
+	if (IS_ERR(uaddr))
+		return PTR_ERR(uaddr);
+
+	switch (attr->attr) {
+	case KVM_X86_XCOMP_GUEST_SUPP:
+		if (put_user(kvm_caps.supported_xcr0, uaddr))
+			return -EFAULT;
+		return 0;
+	default:
+		return -ENXIO;
+	}
+}
+
+static int kvm_x86_dev_has_attr(struct kvm_device_attr *attr)
+{
+	if (attr->group)
+		return -ENXIO;
+
+	switch (attr->attr) {
+	case KVM_X86_XCOMP_GUEST_SUPP:
+		return 0;
+	default:
+		return -ENXIO;
+	}
+}
+
+long kvm_arch_dev_ioctl(struct file *filp,
+			unsigned int ioctl, unsigned long arg)
+{
+	void __user *argp = (void __user *)arg;
+	long r;
+
+	switch (ioctl) {
+	case KVM_GET_MSR_INDEX_LIST: {
+		struct kvm_msr_list __user *user_msr_list = argp;
+		struct kvm_msr_list msr_list;
+		unsigned n;
+
+		r = -EFAULT;
+		if (copy_from_user(&msr_list, user_msr_list, sizeof(msr_list)))
+			goto out;
+		n = msr_list.nmsrs;
+		msr_list.nmsrs = num_msrs_to_save + num_emulated_msrs;
+		if (copy_to_user(user_msr_list, &msr_list, sizeof(msr_list)))
+			goto out;
+		r = -E2BIG;
+		if (n < msr_list.nmsrs)
+			goto out;
+		r = -EFAULT;
+		if (copy_to_user(user_msr_list->indices, &msrs_to_save,
+				 num_msrs_to_save * sizeof(u32)))
+			goto out;
+		if (copy_to_user(user_msr_list->indices + num_msrs_to_save,
+				 &emulated_msrs,
+				 num_emulated_msrs * sizeof(u32)))
+			goto out;
+		r = 0;
+		break;
+	}
+	case KVM_GET_SUPPORTED_CPUID:
+	case KVM_GET_EMULATED_CPUID: {
+		struct kvm_cpuid2 __user *cpuid_arg = argp;
+		struct kvm_cpuid2 cpuid;
+
+		r = -EFAULT;
+		if (copy_from_user(&cpuid, cpuid_arg, sizeof(cpuid)))
+			goto out;
+
+		r = kvm_dev_ioctl_get_cpuid(&cpuid, cpuid_arg->entries,
+					    ioctl);
+		if (r)
+			goto out;
+
+		r = -EFAULT;
+		if (copy_to_user(cpuid_arg, &cpuid, sizeof(cpuid)))
+			goto out;
+		r = 0;
+		break;
+	}
+	case KVM_X86_GET_MCE_CAP_SUPPORTED:
+		r = -EFAULT;
+		if (copy_to_user(argp, &kvm_caps.supported_mce_cap,
+				 sizeof(kvm_caps.supported_mce_cap)))
+			goto out;
+		r = 0;
+		break;
+	case KVM_GET_MSR_FEATURE_INDEX_LIST: {
+		struct kvm_msr_list __user *user_msr_list = argp;
+		struct kvm_msr_list msr_list;
+		unsigned int n;
+
+		r = -EFAULT;
+		if (copy_from_user(&msr_list, user_msr_list, sizeof(msr_list)))
+			goto out;
+		n = msr_list.nmsrs;
+		msr_list.nmsrs = num_msr_based_features;
+		if (copy_to_user(user_msr_list, &msr_list, sizeof(msr_list)))
+			goto out;
+		r = -E2BIG;
+		if (n < msr_list.nmsrs)
+			goto out;
+		r = -EFAULT;
+		if (copy_to_user(user_msr_list->indices, &msr_based_features,
+				 num_msr_based_features * sizeof(u32)))
+			goto out;
+		r = 0;
+		break;
+	}
+	case KVM_GET_MSRS:
+		r = msr_io(NULL, argp, do_get_msr_feature, 1);
+		break;
+	case KVM_GET_SUPPORTED_HV_CPUID:
+		r = kvm_ioctl_get_supported_hv_cpuid(NULL, argp);
+		break;
+	case KVM_GET_DEVICE_ATTR: {
+		struct kvm_device_attr attr;
+		r = -EFAULT;
+		if (copy_from_user(&attr, (void __user *)arg, sizeof(attr)))
+			break;
+		r = kvm_x86_dev_get_attr(&attr);
+		break;
+	}
+	case KVM_HAS_DEVICE_ATTR: {
+		struct kvm_device_attr attr;
+		r = -EFAULT;
+		if (copy_from_user(&attr, (void __user *)arg, sizeof(attr)))
+			break;
+		r = kvm_x86_dev_has_attr(&attr);
+		break;
+	}
+	default:
+		r = -EINVAL;
+		break;
+	}
+out:
+	return r;
+}
+
+static void wbinvd_ipi(void *garbage)
+{
+	wbinvd();
+}
+
+static bool need_emulate_wbinvd(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	return kvm_arch_has_noncoherent_dma(vcpu->kvm);
+}
+
+void kvm_arch_vcpu_load(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int cpu)
+{
+	/* Address WBINVD may be executed by guest */
+	if (need_emulate_wbinvd(vcpu)) {
+		if (static_call(kvm_x86_has_wbinvd_exit)())
+			cpumask_set_cpu(cpu, vcpu->arch.wbinvd_dirty_mask);
+		else if (vcpu->cpu != -1 && vcpu->cpu != cpu)
+			smp_call_function_single(vcpu->cpu,
+					wbinvd_ipi, NULL, 1);
+	}
+
+	static_call(kvm_x86_vcpu_load)(vcpu, cpu);
+
+	/* Save host pkru register if supported */
+	vcpu->arch.host_pkru = read_pkru();
+
+	/* Apply any externally detected TSC adjustments (due to suspend) */
+	if (unlikely(vcpu->arch.tsc_offset_adjustment)) {
+		adjust_tsc_offset_host(vcpu, vcpu->arch.tsc_offset_adjustment);
+		vcpu->arch.tsc_offset_adjustment = 0;
+		kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_CLOCK_UPDATE, vcpu);
+	}
+
+	if (unlikely(vcpu->cpu != cpu) || kvm_check_tsc_unstable()) {
+		s64 tsc_delta = !vcpu->arch.last_host_tsc ? 0 :
+				rdtsc() - vcpu->arch.last_host_tsc;
+		if (tsc_delta < 0)
+			mark_tsc_unstable("KVM discovered backwards TSC");
+
+		if (kvm_check_tsc_unstable()) {
+			u64 offset = kvm_compute_l1_tsc_offset(vcpu,
+						vcpu->arch.last_guest_tsc);
+			kvm_vcpu_write_tsc_offset(vcpu, offset);
+			vcpu->arch.tsc_catchup = 1;
+		}
+
+		if (kvm_lapic_hv_timer_in_use(vcpu))
+			kvm_lapic_restart_hv_timer(vcpu);
+
+		/*
+		 * On a host with synchronized TSC, there is no need to update
+		 * kvmclock on vcpu->cpu migration
+		 */
+		if (!vcpu->kvm->arch.use_master_clock || vcpu->cpu == -1)
+			kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_GLOBAL_CLOCK_UPDATE, vcpu);
+		if (vcpu->cpu != cpu)
+			kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_MIGRATE_TIMER, vcpu);
+		vcpu->cpu = cpu;
+	}
+
+	kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_STEAL_UPDATE, vcpu);
+}
+
+static void kvm_steal_time_set_preempted(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct gfn_to_hva_cache *ghc = &vcpu->arch.st.cache;
+	struct kvm_steal_time __user *st;
+	struct kvm_memslots *slots;
+	static const u8 preempted = KVM_VCPU_PREEMPTED;
+	gpa_t gpa = vcpu->arch.st.msr_val & KVM_STEAL_VALID_BITS;
+
+	/*
+	 * The vCPU can be marked preempted if and only if the VM-Exit was on
+	 * an instruction boundary and will not trigger guest emulation of any
+	 * kind (see vcpu_run).  Vendor specific code controls (conservatively)
+	 * when this is true, for example allowing the vCPU to be marked
+	 * preempted if and only if the VM-Exit was due to a host interrupt.
+	 */
+	if (!vcpu->arch.at_instruction_boundary) {
+		vcpu->stat.preemption_other++;
+		return;
+	}
+
+	vcpu->stat.preemption_reported++;
+	if (!(vcpu->arch.st.msr_val & KVM_MSR_ENABLED))
+		return;
+
+	if (vcpu->arch.st.preempted)
+		return;
+
+	/* This happens on process exit */
+	if (unlikely(current->mm != vcpu->kvm->mm))
+		return;
+
+	slots = kvm_memslots(vcpu->kvm);
+
+	if (unlikely(slots->generation != ghc->generation ||
+		     gpa != ghc->gpa ||
+		     kvm_is_error_hva(ghc->hva) || !ghc->memslot))
+		return;
+
+	st = (struct kvm_steal_time __user *)ghc->hva;
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(st->preempted) != sizeof(preempted));
+
+	if (!copy_to_user_nofault(&st->preempted, &preempted, sizeof(preempted)))
+		vcpu->arch.st.preempted = KVM_VCPU_PREEMPTED;
+
+	mark_page_dirty_in_slot(vcpu->kvm, ghc->memslot, gpa_to_gfn(ghc->gpa));
+}
+
+void kvm_arch_vcpu_put(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	int idx;
+
+	if (vcpu->preempted) {
+		if (!vcpu->arch.guest_state_protected)
+			vcpu->arch.preempted_in_kernel = !static_call(kvm_x86_get_cpl)(vcpu);
+
+		/*
+		 * Take the srcu lock as memslots will be accessed to check the gfn
+		 * cache generation against the memslots generation.
+		 */
+		idx = srcu_read_lock(&vcpu->kvm->srcu);
+		if (kvm_xen_msr_enabled(vcpu->kvm))
+			kvm_xen_runstate_set_preempted(vcpu);
+		else
+			kvm_steal_time_set_preempted(vcpu);
+		srcu_read_unlock(&vcpu->kvm->srcu, idx);
+	}
+
+	static_call(kvm_x86_vcpu_put)(vcpu);
+	vcpu->arch.last_host_tsc = rdtsc();
+}
+
+static int kvm_vcpu_ioctl_get_lapic(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+				    struct kvm_lapic_state *s)
+{
+	static_call_cond(kvm_x86_sync_pir_to_irr)(vcpu);
+
+	return kvm_apic_get_state(vcpu, s);
+}
+
+static int kvm_vcpu_ioctl_set_lapic(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+				    struct kvm_lapic_state *s)
+{
+	int r;
+
+	r = kvm_apic_set_state(vcpu, s);
+	if (r)
+		return r;
+	update_cr8_intercept(vcpu);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int kvm_cpu_accept_dm_intr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	/*
+	 * We can accept userspace's request for interrupt injection
+	 * as long as we have a place to store the interrupt number.
+	 * The actual injection will happen when the CPU is able to
+	 * deliver the interrupt.
+	 */
+	if (kvm_cpu_has_extint(vcpu))
+		return false;
+
+	/* Acknowledging ExtINT does not happen if LINT0 is masked.  */
+	return (!lapic_in_kernel(vcpu) ||
+		kvm_apic_accept_pic_intr(vcpu));
+}
+
+static int kvm_vcpu_ready_for_interrupt_injection(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	/*
+	 * Do not cause an interrupt window exit if an exception
+	 * is pending or an event needs reinjection; userspace
+	 * might want to inject the interrupt manually using KVM_SET_REGS
+	 * or KVM_SET_SREGS.  For that to work, we must be at an
+	 * instruction boundary and with no events half-injected.
+	 */
+	return (kvm_arch_interrupt_allowed(vcpu) &&
+		kvm_cpu_accept_dm_intr(vcpu) &&
+		!kvm_event_needs_reinjection(vcpu) &&
+		!kvm_is_exception_pending(vcpu));
+}
+
+static int kvm_vcpu_ioctl_interrupt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+				    struct kvm_interrupt *irq)
+{
+	if (irq->irq >= KVM_NR_INTERRUPTS)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (!irqchip_in_kernel(vcpu->kvm)) {
+		kvm_queue_interrupt(vcpu, irq->irq, false);
+		kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_EVENT, vcpu);
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * With in-kernel LAPIC, we only use this to inject EXTINT, so
+	 * fail for in-kernel 8259.
+	 */
+	if (pic_in_kernel(vcpu->kvm))
+		return -ENXIO;
+
+	if (vcpu->arch.pending_external_vector != -1)
+		return -EEXIST;
+
+	vcpu->arch.pending_external_vector = irq->irq;
+	kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_EVENT, vcpu);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int kvm_vcpu_ioctl_nmi(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	kvm_inject_nmi(vcpu);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int vcpu_ioctl_tpr_access_reporting(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+					   struct kvm_tpr_access_ctl *tac)
+{
+	if (tac->flags)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	vcpu->arch.tpr_access_reporting = !!tac->enabled;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_setup_mce(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+					u64 mcg_cap)
+{
+	int r;
+	unsigned bank_num = mcg_cap & 0xff, bank;
+
+	r = -EINVAL;
+	if (!bank_num || bank_num > KVM_MAX_MCE_BANKS)
+		goto out;
+	if (mcg_cap & ~(kvm_caps.supported_mce_cap | 0xff | 0xff0000))
+		goto out;
+	r = 0;
+	vcpu->arch.mcg_cap = mcg_cap;
+	/* Init IA32_MCG_CTL to all 1s */
+	if (mcg_cap & MCG_CTL_P)
+		vcpu->arch.mcg_ctl = ~(u64)0;
+	/* Init IA32_MCi_CTL to all 1s, IA32_MCi_CTL2 to all 0s */
+	for (bank = 0; bank < bank_num; bank++) {
+		vcpu->arch.mce_banks[bank*4] = ~(u64)0;
+		if (mcg_cap & MCG_CMCI_P)
+			vcpu->arch.mci_ctl2_banks[bank] = 0;
+	}
+
+	kvm_apic_after_set_mcg_cap(vcpu);
+
+	static_call(kvm_x86_setup_mce)(vcpu);
+out:
+	return r;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Validate this is an UCNA (uncorrectable no action) error by checking the
+ * MCG_STATUS and MCi_STATUS registers:
+ * - none of the bits for Machine Check Exceptions are set
+ * - both the VAL (valid) and UC (uncorrectable) bits are set
+ * MCI_STATUS_PCC - Processor Context Corrupted
+ * MCI_STATUS_S - Signaled as a Machine Check Exception
+ * MCI_STATUS_AR - Software recoverable Action Required
+ */
+static bool is_ucna(struct kvm_x86_mce *mce)
+{
+	return	!mce->mcg_status &&
+		!(mce->status & (MCI_STATUS_PCC | MCI_STATUS_S | MCI_STATUS_AR)) &&
+		(mce->status & MCI_STATUS_VAL) &&
+		(mce->status & MCI_STATUS_UC);
+}
+
+static int kvm_vcpu_x86_set_ucna(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_x86_mce *mce, u64* banks)
+{
+	u64 mcg_cap = vcpu->arch.mcg_cap;
+
+	banks[1] = mce->status;
+	banks[2] = mce->addr;
+	banks[3] = mce->misc;
+	vcpu->arch.mcg_status = mce->mcg_status;
+
+	if (!(mcg_cap & MCG_CMCI_P) ||
+	    !(vcpu->arch.mci_ctl2_banks[mce->bank] & MCI_CTL2_CMCI_EN))
+		return 0;
+
+	if (lapic_in_kernel(vcpu))
+		kvm_apic_local_deliver(vcpu->arch.apic, APIC_LVTCMCI);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_set_mce(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+				      struct kvm_x86_mce *mce)
+{
+	u64 mcg_cap = vcpu->arch.mcg_cap;
+	unsigned bank_num = mcg_cap & 0xff;
+	u64 *banks = vcpu->arch.mce_banks;
+
+	if (mce->bank >= bank_num || !(mce->status & MCI_STATUS_VAL))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	banks += array_index_nospec(4 * mce->bank, 4 * bank_num);
+
+	if (is_ucna(mce))
+		return kvm_vcpu_x86_set_ucna(vcpu, mce, banks);
+
+	/*
+	 * if IA32_MCG_CTL is not all 1s, the uncorrected error
+	 * reporting is disabled
+	 */
+	if ((mce->status & MCI_STATUS_UC) && (mcg_cap & MCG_CTL_P) &&
+	    vcpu->arch.mcg_ctl != ~(u64)0)
+		return 0;
+	/*
+	 * if IA32_MCi_CTL is not all 1s, the uncorrected error
+	 * reporting is disabled for the bank
+	 */
+	if ((mce->status & MCI_STATUS_UC) && banks[0] != ~(u64)0)
+		return 0;
+	if (mce->status & MCI_STATUS_UC) {
+		if ((vcpu->arch.mcg_status & MCG_STATUS_MCIP) ||
+		    !kvm_is_cr4_bit_set(vcpu, X86_CR4_MCE)) {
+			kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_TRIPLE_FAULT, vcpu);
+			return 0;
+		}
+		if (banks[1] & MCI_STATUS_VAL)
+			mce->status |= MCI_STATUS_OVER;
+		banks[2] = mce->addr;
+		banks[3] = mce->misc;
+		vcpu->arch.mcg_status = mce->mcg_status;
+		banks[1] = mce->status;
+		kvm_queue_exception(vcpu, MC_VECTOR);
+	} else if (!(banks[1] & MCI_STATUS_VAL)
+		   || !(banks[1] & MCI_STATUS_UC)) {
+		if (banks[1] & MCI_STATUS_VAL)
+			mce->status |= MCI_STATUS_OVER;
+		banks[2] = mce->addr;
+		banks[3] = mce->misc;
+		banks[1] = mce->status;
+	} else
+		banks[1] |= MCI_STATUS_OVER;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_get_vcpu_events(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+					       struct kvm_vcpu_events *events)
+{
+	struct kvm_queued_exception *ex;
+
+	process_nmi(vcpu);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_SMM
+	if (kvm_check_request(KVM_REQ_SMI, vcpu))
+		process_smi(vcpu);
+#endif
+
+	/*
+	 * KVM's ABI only allows for one exception to be migrated.  Luckily,
+	 * the only time there can be two queued exceptions is if there's a
+	 * non-exiting _injected_ exception, and a pending exiting exception.
+	 * In that case, ignore the VM-Exiting exception as it's an extension
+	 * of the injected exception.
+	 */
+	if (vcpu->arch.exception_vmexit.pending &&
+	    !vcpu->arch.exception.pending &&
+	    !vcpu->arch.exception.injected)
+		ex = &vcpu->arch.exception_vmexit;
+	else
+		ex = &vcpu->arch.exception;
+
+	/*
+	 * In guest mode, payload delivery should be deferred if the exception
+	 * will be intercepted by L1, e.g. KVM should not modifying CR2 if L1
+	 * intercepts #PF, ditto for DR6 and #DBs.  If the per-VM capability,
+	 * KVM_CAP_EXCEPTION_PAYLOAD, is not set, userspace may or may not
+	 * propagate the payload and so it cannot be safely deferred.  Deliver
+	 * the payload if the capability hasn't been requested.
+	 */
+	if (!vcpu->kvm->arch.exception_payload_enabled &&
+	    ex->pending && ex->has_payload)
+		kvm_deliver_exception_payload(vcpu, ex);
+
+	memset(events, 0, sizeof(*events));
+
+	/*
+	 * The API doesn't provide the instruction length for software
+	 * exceptions, so don't report them. As long as the guest RIP
+	 * isn't advanced, we should expect to encounter the exception
+	 * again.
+	 */
+	if (!kvm_exception_is_soft(ex->vector)) {
+		events->exception.injected = ex->injected;
+		events->exception.pending = ex->pending;
+		/*
+		 * For ABI compatibility, deliberately conflate
+		 * pending and injected exceptions when
+		 * KVM_CAP_EXCEPTION_PAYLOAD isn't enabled.
+		 */
+		if (!vcpu->kvm->arch.exception_payload_enabled)
+			events->exception.injected |= ex->pending;
+	}
+	events->exception.nr = ex->vector;
+	events->exception.has_error_code = ex->has_error_code;
+	events->exception.error_code = ex->error_code;
+	events->exception_has_payload = ex->has_payload;
+	events->exception_payload = ex->payload;
+
+	events->interrupt.injected =
+		vcpu->arch.interrupt.injected && !vcpu->arch.interrupt.soft;
+	events->interrupt.nr = vcpu->arch.interrupt.nr;
+	events->interrupt.shadow = static_call(kvm_x86_get_interrupt_shadow)(vcpu);
+
+	events->nmi.injected = vcpu->arch.nmi_injected;
+	events->nmi.pending = kvm_get_nr_pending_nmis(vcpu);
+	events->nmi.masked = static_call(kvm_x86_get_nmi_mask)(vcpu);
+
+	/* events->sipi_vector is never valid when reporting to user space */
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_SMM
+	events->smi.smm = is_smm(vcpu);
+	events->smi.pending = vcpu->arch.smi_pending;
+	events->smi.smm_inside_nmi =
+		!!(vcpu->arch.hflags & HF_SMM_INSIDE_NMI_MASK);
+#endif
+	events->smi.latched_init = kvm_lapic_latched_init(vcpu);
+
+	events->flags = (KVM_VCPUEVENT_VALID_NMI_PENDING
+			 | KVM_VCPUEVENT_VALID_SHADOW
+			 | KVM_VCPUEVENT_VALID_SMM);
+	if (vcpu->kvm->arch.exception_payload_enabled)
+		events->flags |= KVM_VCPUEVENT_VALID_PAYLOAD;
+	if (vcpu->kvm->arch.triple_fault_event) {
+		events->triple_fault.pending = kvm_test_request(KVM_REQ_TRIPLE_FAULT, vcpu);
+		events->flags |= KVM_VCPUEVENT_VALID_TRIPLE_FAULT;
+	}
+}
+
+static int kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_set_vcpu_events(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+					      struct kvm_vcpu_events *events)
+{
+	if (events->flags & ~(KVM_VCPUEVENT_VALID_NMI_PENDING
+			      | KVM_VCPUEVENT_VALID_SIPI_VECTOR
+			      | KVM_VCPUEVENT_VALID_SHADOW
+			      | KVM_VCPUEVENT_VALID_SMM
+			      | KVM_VCPUEVENT_VALID_PAYLOAD
+			      | KVM_VCPUEVENT_VALID_TRIPLE_FAULT))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (events->flags & KVM_VCPUEVENT_VALID_PAYLOAD) {
+		if (!vcpu->kvm->arch.exception_payload_enabled)
+			return -EINVAL;
+		if (events->exception.pending)
+			events->exception.injected = 0;
+		else
+			events->exception_has_payload = 0;
+	} else {
+		events->exception.pending = 0;
+		events->exception_has_payload = 0;
+	}
+
+	if ((events->exception.injected || events->exception.pending) &&
+	    (events->exception.nr > 31 || events->exception.nr == NMI_VECTOR))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	/* INITs are latched while in SMM */
+	if (events->flags & KVM_VCPUEVENT_VALID_SMM &&
+	    (events->smi.smm || events->smi.pending) &&
+	    vcpu->arch.mp_state == KVM_MP_STATE_INIT_RECEIVED)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	process_nmi(vcpu);
+
+	/*
+	 * Flag that userspace is stuffing an exception, the next KVM_RUN will
+	 * morph the exception to a VM-Exit if appropriate.  Do this only for
+	 * pending exceptions, already-injected exceptions are not subject to
+	 * intercpetion.  Note, userspace that conflates pending and injected
+	 * is hosed, and will incorrectly convert an injected exception into a
+	 * pending exception, which in turn may cause a spurious VM-Exit.
+	 */
+	vcpu->arch.exception_from_userspace = events->exception.pending;
+
+	vcpu->arch.exception_vmexit.pending = false;
+
+	vcpu->arch.exception.injected = events->exception.injected;
+	vcpu->arch.exception.pending = events->exception.pending;
+	vcpu->arch.exception.vector = events->exception.nr;
+	vcpu->arch.exception.has_error_code = events->exception.has_error_code;
+	vcpu->arch.exception.error_code = events->exception.error_code;
+	vcpu->arch.exception.has_payload = events->exception_has_payload;
+	vcpu->arch.exception.payload = events->exception_payload;
+
+	vcpu->arch.interrupt.injected = events->interrupt.injected;
+	vcpu->arch.interrupt.nr = events->interrupt.nr;
+	vcpu->arch.interrupt.soft = events->interrupt.soft;
+	if (events->flags & KVM_VCPUEVENT_VALID_SHADOW)
+		static_call(kvm_x86_set_interrupt_shadow)(vcpu,
+						events->interrupt.shadow);
+
+	vcpu->arch.nmi_injected = events->nmi.injected;
+	if (events->flags & KVM_VCPUEVENT_VALID_NMI_PENDING) {
+		vcpu->arch.nmi_pending = 0;
+		atomic_set(&vcpu->arch.nmi_queued, events->nmi.pending);
+		kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_NMI, vcpu);
+	}
+	static_call(kvm_x86_set_nmi_mask)(vcpu, events->nmi.masked);
+
+	if (events->flags & KVM_VCPUEVENT_VALID_SIPI_VECTOR &&
+	    lapic_in_kernel(vcpu))
+		vcpu->arch.apic->sipi_vector = events->sipi_vector;
+
+	if (events->flags & KVM_VCPUEVENT_VALID_SMM) {
+#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_SMM
+		if (!!(vcpu->arch.hflags & HF_SMM_MASK) != events->smi.smm) {
+			kvm_leave_nested(vcpu);
+			kvm_smm_changed(vcpu, events->smi.smm);
+		}
+
+		vcpu->arch.smi_pending = events->smi.pending;
+
+		if (events->smi.smm) {
+			if (events->smi.smm_inside_nmi)
+				vcpu->arch.hflags |= HF_SMM_INSIDE_NMI_MASK;
+			else
+				vcpu->arch.hflags &= ~HF_SMM_INSIDE_NMI_MASK;
+		}
+
+#else
+		if (events->smi.smm || events->smi.pending ||
+		    events->smi.smm_inside_nmi)
+			return -EINVAL;
+#endif
+
+		if (lapic_in_kernel(vcpu)) {
+			if (events->smi.latched_init)
+				set_bit(KVM_APIC_INIT, &vcpu->arch.apic->pending_events);
+			else
+				clear_bit(KVM_APIC_INIT, &vcpu->arch.apic->pending_events);
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (events->flags & KVM_VCPUEVENT_VALID_TRIPLE_FAULT) {
+		if (!vcpu->kvm->arch.triple_fault_event)
+			return -EINVAL;
+		if (events->triple_fault.pending)
+			kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_TRIPLE_FAULT, vcpu);
+		else
+			kvm_clear_request(KVM_REQ_TRIPLE_FAULT, vcpu);
+	}
+
+	kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_EVENT, vcpu);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_get_debugregs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+					     struct kvm_debugregs *dbgregs)
+{
+	unsigned long val;
+
+	memset(dbgregs, 0, sizeof(*dbgregs));
+	memcpy(dbgregs->db, vcpu->arch.db, sizeof(vcpu->arch.db));
+	kvm_get_dr(vcpu, 6, &val);
+	dbgregs->dr6 = val;
+	dbgregs->dr7 = vcpu->arch.dr7;
+}
+
+static int kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_set_debugregs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+					    struct kvm_debugregs *dbgregs)
+{
+	if (dbgregs->flags)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (!kvm_dr6_valid(dbgregs->dr6))
+		return -EINVAL;
+	if (!kvm_dr7_valid(dbgregs->dr7))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	memcpy(vcpu->arch.db, dbgregs->db, sizeof(vcpu->arch.db));
+	kvm_update_dr0123(vcpu);
+	vcpu->arch.dr6 = dbgregs->dr6;
+	vcpu->arch.dr7 = dbgregs->dr7;
+	kvm_update_dr7(vcpu);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+
+static void kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_get_xsave2(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+					  u8 *state, unsigned int size)
+{
+	/*
+	 * Only copy state for features that are enabled for the guest.  The
+	 * state itself isn't problematic, but setting bits in the header for
+	 * features that are supported in *this* host but not exposed to the
+	 * guest can result in KVM_SET_XSAVE failing when live migrating to a
+	 * compatible host without the features that are NOT exposed to the
+	 * guest.
+	 *
+	 * FP+SSE can always be saved/restored via KVM_{G,S}ET_XSAVE, even if
+	 * XSAVE/XCRO are not exposed to the guest, and even if XSAVE isn't
+	 * supported by the host.
+	 */
+	u64 supported_xcr0 = vcpu->arch.guest_supported_xcr0 |
+			     XFEATURE_MASK_FPSSE;
+
+	if (fpstate_is_confidential(&vcpu->arch.guest_fpu))
+		return;
+
+	fpu_copy_guest_fpstate_to_uabi(&vcpu->arch.guest_fpu, state, size,
+				       supported_xcr0, vcpu->arch.pkru);
+}
+
+static void kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_get_xsave(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+					 struct kvm_xsave *guest_xsave)
+{
+	return kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_get_xsave2(vcpu, (void *)guest_xsave->region,
+					     sizeof(guest_xsave->region));
+}
+
+static int kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_set_xsave(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+					struct kvm_xsave *guest_xsave)
+{
+	if (fpstate_is_confidential(&vcpu->arch.guest_fpu))
+		return 0;
+
+	return fpu_copy_uabi_to_guest_fpstate(&vcpu->arch.guest_fpu,
+					      guest_xsave->region,
+					      kvm_caps.supported_xcr0,
+					      &vcpu->arch.pkru);
+}
+
+static void kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_get_xcrs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+					struct kvm_xcrs *guest_xcrs)
+{
+	if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_XSAVE)) {
+		guest_xcrs->nr_xcrs = 0;
+		return;
+	}
+
+	guest_xcrs->nr_xcrs = 1;
+	guest_xcrs->flags = 0;
+	guest_xcrs->xcrs[0].xcr = XCR_XFEATURE_ENABLED_MASK;
+	guest_xcrs->xcrs[0].value = vcpu->arch.xcr0;
+}
+
+static int kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_set_xcrs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+				       struct kvm_xcrs *guest_xcrs)
+{
+	int i, r = 0;
+
+	if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_XSAVE))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (guest_xcrs->nr_xcrs > KVM_MAX_XCRS || guest_xcrs->flags)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < guest_xcrs->nr_xcrs; i++)
+		/* Only support XCR0 currently */
+		if (guest_xcrs->xcrs[i].xcr == XCR_XFEATURE_ENABLED_MASK) {
+			r = __kvm_set_xcr(vcpu, XCR_XFEATURE_ENABLED_MASK,
+				guest_xcrs->xcrs[i].value);
+			break;
+		}
+	if (r)
+		r = -EINVAL;
+	return r;
+}
+
+/*
+ * kvm_set_guest_paused() indicates to the guest kernel that it has been
+ * stopped by the hypervisor.  This function will be called from the host only.
+ * EINVAL is returned when the host attempts to set the flag for a guest that
+ * does not support pv clocks.
+ */
+static int kvm_set_guest_paused(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	if (!vcpu->arch.pv_time.active)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	vcpu->arch.pvclock_set_guest_stopped_request = true;
+	kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_CLOCK_UPDATE, vcpu);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int kvm_arch_tsc_has_attr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+				 struct kvm_device_attr *attr)
+{
+	int r;
+
+	switch (attr->attr) {
+	case KVM_VCPU_TSC_OFFSET:
+		r = 0;
+		break;
+	default:
+		r = -ENXIO;
+	}
+
+	return r;
+}
+
+static int kvm_arch_tsc_get_attr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+				 struct kvm_device_attr *attr)
+{
+	u64 __user *uaddr = kvm_get_attr_addr(attr);
+	int r;
+
+	if (IS_ERR(uaddr))
+		return PTR_ERR(uaddr);
+
+	switch (attr->attr) {
+	case KVM_VCPU_TSC_OFFSET:
+		r = -EFAULT;
+		if (put_user(vcpu->arch.l1_tsc_offset, uaddr))
+			break;
+		r = 0;
+		break;
+	default:
+		r = -ENXIO;
+	}
+
+	return r;
+}
+
+static int kvm_arch_tsc_set_attr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+				 struct kvm_device_attr *attr)
+{
+	u64 __user *uaddr = kvm_get_attr_addr(attr);
+	struct kvm *kvm = vcpu->kvm;
+	int r;
+
+	if (IS_ERR(uaddr))
+		return PTR_ERR(uaddr);
+
+	switch (attr->attr) {
+	case KVM_VCPU_TSC_OFFSET: {
+		u64 offset, tsc, ns;
+		unsigned long flags;
+		bool matched;
+
+		r = -EFAULT;
+		if (get_user(offset, uaddr))
+			break;
+
+		raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&kvm->arch.tsc_write_lock, flags);
+
+		matched = (vcpu->arch.virtual_tsc_khz &&
+			   kvm->arch.last_tsc_khz == vcpu->arch.virtual_tsc_khz &&
+			   kvm->arch.last_tsc_offset == offset);
+
+		tsc = kvm_scale_tsc(rdtsc(), vcpu->arch.l1_tsc_scaling_ratio) + offset;
+		ns = get_kvmclock_base_ns();
+
+		__kvm_synchronize_tsc(vcpu, offset, tsc, ns, matched);
+		raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&kvm->arch.tsc_write_lock, flags);
+
+		r = 0;
+		break;
+	}
+	default:
+		r = -ENXIO;
+	}
+
+	return r;
+}
+
+static int kvm_vcpu_ioctl_device_attr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+				      unsigned int ioctl,
+				      void __user *argp)
+{
+	struct kvm_device_attr attr;
+	int r;
+
+	if (copy_from_user(&attr, argp, sizeof(attr)))
+		return -EFAULT;
+
+	if (attr.group != KVM_VCPU_TSC_CTRL)
+		return -ENXIO;
+
+	switch (ioctl) {
+	case KVM_HAS_DEVICE_ATTR:
+		r = kvm_arch_tsc_has_attr(vcpu, &attr);
+		break;
+	case KVM_GET_DEVICE_ATTR:
+		r = kvm_arch_tsc_get_attr(vcpu, &attr);
+		break;
+	case KVM_SET_DEVICE_ATTR:
+		r = kvm_arch_tsc_set_attr(vcpu, &attr);
+		break;
+	}
+
+	return r;
+}
+
+static int kvm_vcpu_ioctl_enable_cap(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+				     struct kvm_enable_cap *cap)
+{
+	int r;
+	uint16_t vmcs_version;
+	void __user *user_ptr;
+
+	if (cap->flags)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	switch (cap->cap) {
+	case KVM_CAP_HYPERV_SYNIC2:
+		if (cap->args[0])
+			return -EINVAL;
+		fallthrough;
+
+	case KVM_CAP_HYPERV_SYNIC:
+		if (!irqchip_in_kernel(vcpu->kvm))
+			return -EINVAL;
+		return kvm_hv_activate_synic(vcpu, cap->cap ==
+					     KVM_CAP_HYPERV_SYNIC2);
+	case KVM_CAP_HYPERV_ENLIGHTENED_VMCS:
+		if (!kvm_x86_ops.nested_ops->enable_evmcs)
+			return -ENOTTY;
+		r = kvm_x86_ops.nested_ops->enable_evmcs(vcpu, &vmcs_version);
+		if (!r) {
+			user_ptr = (void __user *)(uintptr_t)cap->args[0];
+			if (copy_to_user(user_ptr, &vmcs_version,
+					 sizeof(vmcs_version)))
+				r = -EFAULT;
+		}
+		return r;
+	case KVM_CAP_HYPERV_DIRECT_TLBFLUSH:
+		if (!kvm_x86_ops.enable_l2_tlb_flush)
+			return -ENOTTY;
+
+		return static_call(kvm_x86_enable_l2_tlb_flush)(vcpu);
+
+	case KVM_CAP_HYPERV_ENFORCE_CPUID:
+		return kvm_hv_set_enforce_cpuid(vcpu, cap->args[0]);
+
+	case KVM_CAP_ENFORCE_PV_FEATURE_CPUID:
+		vcpu->arch.pv_cpuid.enforce = cap->args[0];
+		if (vcpu->arch.pv_cpuid.enforce)
+			kvm_update_pv_runtime(vcpu);
+
+		return 0;
+	default:
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+}
+
+long kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl(struct file *filp,
+			 unsigned int ioctl, unsigned long arg)
+{
+	struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = filp->private_data;
+	void __user *argp = (void __user *)arg;
+	int r;
+	union {
+		struct kvm_sregs2 *sregs2;
+		struct kvm_lapic_state *lapic;
+		struct kvm_xsave *xsave;
+		struct kvm_xcrs *xcrs;
+		void *buffer;
+	} u;
+
+	vcpu_load(vcpu);
+
+	u.buffer = NULL;
+	switch (ioctl) {
+	case KVM_GET_LAPIC: {
+		r = -EINVAL;
+		if (!lapic_in_kernel(vcpu))
+			goto out;
+		u.lapic = kzalloc(sizeof(struct kvm_lapic_state),
+				GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
+
+		r = -ENOMEM;
+		if (!u.lapic)
+			goto out;
+		r = kvm_vcpu_ioctl_get_lapic(vcpu, u.lapic);
+		if (r)
+			goto out;
+		r = -EFAULT;
+		if (copy_to_user(argp, u.lapic, sizeof(struct kvm_lapic_state)))
+			goto out;
+		r = 0;
+		break;
+	}
+	case KVM_SET_LAPIC: {
+		r = -EINVAL;
+		if (!lapic_in_kernel(vcpu))
+			goto out;
+		u.lapic = memdup_user(argp, sizeof(*u.lapic));
+		if (IS_ERR(u.lapic)) {
+			r = PTR_ERR(u.lapic);
+			goto out_nofree;
+		}
+
+		r = kvm_vcpu_ioctl_set_lapic(vcpu, u.lapic);
+		break;
+	}
+	case KVM_INTERRUPT: {
+		struct kvm_interrupt irq;
+
+		r = -EFAULT;
+		if (copy_from_user(&irq, argp, sizeof(irq)))
+			goto out;
+		r = kvm_vcpu_ioctl_interrupt(vcpu, &irq);
+		break;
+	}
+	case KVM_NMI: {
+		r = kvm_vcpu_ioctl_nmi(vcpu);
+		break;
+	}
+	case KVM_SMI: {
+		r = kvm_inject_smi(vcpu);
+		break;
+	}
+	case KVM_SET_CPUID: {
+		struct kvm_cpuid __user *cpuid_arg = argp;
+		struct kvm_cpuid cpuid;
+
+		r = -EFAULT;
+		if (copy_from_user(&cpuid, cpuid_arg, sizeof(cpuid)))
+			goto out;
+		r = kvm_vcpu_ioctl_set_cpuid(vcpu, &cpuid, cpuid_arg->entries);
+		break;
+	}
+	case KVM_SET_CPUID2: {
+		struct kvm_cpuid2 __user *cpuid_arg = argp;
+		struct kvm_cpuid2 cpuid;
+
+		r = -EFAULT;
+		if (copy_from_user(&cpuid, cpuid_arg, sizeof(cpuid)))
+			goto out;
+		r = kvm_vcpu_ioctl_set_cpuid2(vcpu, &cpuid,
+					      cpuid_arg->entries);
+		break;
+	}
+	case KVM_GET_CPUID2: {
+		struct kvm_cpuid2 __user *cpuid_arg = argp;
+		struct kvm_cpuid2 cpuid;
+
+		r = -EFAULT;
+		if (copy_from_user(&cpuid, cpuid_arg, sizeof(cpuid)))
+			goto out;
+		r = kvm_vcpu_ioctl_get_cpuid2(vcpu, &cpuid,
+					      cpuid_arg->entries);
+		if (r)
+			goto out;
+		r = -EFAULT;
+		if (copy_to_user(cpuid_arg, &cpuid, sizeof(cpuid)))
+			goto out;
+		r = 0;
+		break;
+	}
+	case KVM_GET_MSRS: {
+		int idx = srcu_read_lock(&vcpu->kvm->srcu);
+		r = msr_io(vcpu, argp, do_get_msr, 1);
+		srcu_read_unlock(&vcpu->kvm->srcu, idx);
+		break;
+	}
+	case KVM_SET_MSRS: {
+		int idx = srcu_read_lock(&vcpu->kvm->srcu);
+		r = msr_io(vcpu, argp, do_set_msr, 0);
+		srcu_read_unlock(&vcpu->kvm->srcu, idx);
+		break;
+	}
+	case KVM_TPR_ACCESS_REPORTING: {
+		struct kvm_tpr_access_ctl tac;
+
+		r = -EFAULT;
+		if (copy_from_user(&tac, argp, sizeof(tac)))
+			goto out;
+		r = vcpu_ioctl_tpr_access_reporting(vcpu, &tac);
+		if (r)
+			goto out;
+		r = -EFAULT;
+		if (copy_to_user(argp, &tac, sizeof(tac)))
+			goto out;
+		r = 0;
+		break;
+	};
+	case KVM_SET_VAPIC_ADDR: {
+		struct kvm_vapic_addr va;
+		int idx;
+
+		r = -EINVAL;
+		if (!lapic_in_kernel(vcpu))
+			goto out;
+		r = -EFAULT;
+		if (copy_from_user(&va, argp, sizeof(va)))
+			goto out;
+		idx = srcu_read_lock(&vcpu->kvm->srcu);
+		r = kvm_lapic_set_vapic_addr(vcpu, va.vapic_addr);
+		srcu_read_unlock(&vcpu->kvm->srcu, idx);
+		break;
+	}
+	case KVM_X86_SETUP_MCE: {
+		u64 mcg_cap;
+
+		r = -EFAULT;
+		if (copy_from_user(&mcg_cap, argp, sizeof(mcg_cap)))
+			goto out;
+		r = kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_setup_mce(vcpu, mcg_cap);
+		break;
+	}
+	case KVM_X86_SET_MCE: {
+		struct kvm_x86_mce mce;
+
+		r = -EFAULT;
+		if (copy_from_user(&mce, argp, sizeof(mce)))
+			goto out;
+		r = kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_set_mce(vcpu, &mce);
+		break;
+	}
+	case KVM_GET_VCPU_EVENTS: {
+		struct kvm_vcpu_events events;
+
+		kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_get_vcpu_events(vcpu, &events);
+
+		r = -EFAULT;
+		if (copy_to_user(argp, &events, sizeof(struct kvm_vcpu_events)))
+			break;
+		r = 0;
+		break;
+	}
+	case KVM_SET_VCPU_EVENTS: {
+		struct kvm_vcpu_events events;
+
+		r = -EFAULT;
+		if (copy_from_user(&events, argp, sizeof(struct kvm_vcpu_events)))
+			break;
+
+		r = kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_set_vcpu_events(vcpu, &events);
+		break;
+	}
+	case KVM_GET_DEBUGREGS: {
+		struct kvm_debugregs dbgregs;
+
+		kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_get_debugregs(vcpu, &dbgregs);
+
+		r = -EFAULT;
+		if (copy_to_user(argp, &dbgregs,
+				 sizeof(struct kvm_debugregs)))
+			break;
+		r = 0;
+		break;
+	}
+	case KVM_SET_DEBUGREGS: {
+		struct kvm_debugregs dbgregs;
+
+		r = -EFAULT;
+		if (copy_from_user(&dbgregs, argp,
+				   sizeof(struct kvm_debugregs)))
+			break;
+
+		r = kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_set_debugregs(vcpu, &dbgregs);
+		break;
+	}
+	case KVM_GET_XSAVE: {
+		r = -EINVAL;
+		if (vcpu->arch.guest_fpu.uabi_size > sizeof(struct kvm_xsave))
+			break;
+
+		u.xsave = kzalloc(sizeof(struct kvm_xsave), GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
+		r = -ENOMEM;
+		if (!u.xsave)
+			break;
+
+		kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_get_xsave(vcpu, u.xsave);
+
+		r = -EFAULT;
+		if (copy_to_user(argp, u.xsave, sizeof(struct kvm_xsave)))
+			break;
+		r = 0;
+		break;
+	}
+	case KVM_SET_XSAVE: {
+		int size = vcpu->arch.guest_fpu.uabi_size;
+
+		u.xsave = memdup_user(argp, size);
+		if (IS_ERR(u.xsave)) {
+			r = PTR_ERR(u.xsave);
+			goto out_nofree;
+		}
+
+		r = kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_set_xsave(vcpu, u.xsave);
+		break;
+	}
+
+	case KVM_GET_XSAVE2: {
+		int size = vcpu->arch.guest_fpu.uabi_size;
+
+		u.xsave = kzalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
+		r = -ENOMEM;
+		if (!u.xsave)
+			break;
+
+		kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_get_xsave2(vcpu, u.buffer, size);
+
+		r = -EFAULT;
+		if (copy_to_user(argp, u.xsave, size))
+			break;
+
+		r = 0;
+		break;
+	}
+
+	case KVM_GET_XCRS: {
+		u.xcrs = kzalloc(sizeof(struct kvm_xcrs), GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
+		r = -ENOMEM;
+		if (!u.xcrs)
+			break;
+
+		kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_get_xcrs(vcpu, u.xcrs);
+
+		r = -EFAULT;
+		if (copy_to_user(argp, u.xcrs,
+				 sizeof(struct kvm_xcrs)))
+			break;
+		r = 0;
+		break;
+	}
+	case KVM_SET_XCRS: {
+		u.xcrs = memdup_user(argp, sizeof(*u.xcrs));
+		if (IS_ERR(u.xcrs)) {
+			r = PTR_ERR(u.xcrs);
+			goto out_nofree;
+		}
+
+		r = kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_set_xcrs(vcpu, u.xcrs);
+		break;
+	}
+	case KVM_SET_TSC_KHZ: {
+		u32 user_tsc_khz;
+
+		r = -EINVAL;
+		user_tsc_khz = (u32)arg;
+
+		if (kvm_caps.has_tsc_control &&
+		    user_tsc_khz >= kvm_caps.max_guest_tsc_khz)
+			goto out;
+
+		if (user_tsc_khz == 0)
+			user_tsc_khz = tsc_khz;
+
+		if (!kvm_set_tsc_khz(vcpu, user_tsc_khz))
+			r = 0;
+
+		goto out;
+	}
+	case KVM_GET_TSC_KHZ: {
+		r = vcpu->arch.virtual_tsc_khz;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	case KVM_KVMCLOCK_CTRL: {
+		r = kvm_set_guest_paused(vcpu);
+		goto out;
+	}
+	case KVM_ENABLE_CAP: {
+		struct kvm_enable_cap cap;
+
+		r = -EFAULT;
+		if (copy_from_user(&cap, argp, sizeof(cap)))
+			goto out;
+		r = kvm_vcpu_ioctl_enable_cap(vcpu, &cap);
+		break;
+	}
+	case KVM_GET_NESTED_STATE: {
+		struct kvm_nested_state __user *user_kvm_nested_state = argp;
+		u32 user_data_size;
+
+		r = -EINVAL;
+		if (!kvm_x86_ops.nested_ops->get_state)
+			break;
+
+		BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(user_data_size) != sizeof(user_kvm_nested_state->size));
+		r = -EFAULT;
+		if (get_user(user_data_size, &user_kvm_nested_state->size))
+			break;
+
+		r = kvm_x86_ops.nested_ops->get_state(vcpu, user_kvm_nested_state,
+						     user_data_size);
+		if (r < 0)
+			break;
+
+		if (r > user_data_size) {
+			if (put_user(r, &user_kvm_nested_state->size))
+				r = -EFAULT;
+			else
+				r = -E2BIG;
+			break;
+		}
+
+		r = 0;
+		break;
+	}
+	case KVM_SET_NESTED_STATE: {
+		struct kvm_nested_state __user *user_kvm_nested_state = argp;
+		struct kvm_nested_state kvm_state;
+		int idx;
+
+		r = -EINVAL;
+		if (!kvm_x86_ops.nested_ops->set_state)
+			break;
+
+		r = -EFAULT;
+		if (copy_from_user(&kvm_state, user_kvm_nested_state, sizeof(kvm_state)))
+			break;
+
+		r = -EINVAL;
+		if (kvm_state.size < sizeof(kvm_state))
+			break;
+
+		if (kvm_state.flags &
+		    ~(KVM_STATE_NESTED_RUN_PENDING | KVM_STATE_NESTED_GUEST_MODE
+		      | KVM_STATE_NESTED_EVMCS | KVM_STATE_NESTED_MTF_PENDING
+		      | KVM_STATE_NESTED_GIF_SET))
+			break;
+
+		/* nested_run_pending implies guest_mode.  */
+		if ((kvm_state.flags & KVM_STATE_NESTED_RUN_PENDING)
+		    && !(kvm_state.flags & KVM_STATE_NESTED_GUEST_MODE))
+			break;
+
+		idx = srcu_read_lock(&vcpu->kvm->srcu);
+		r = kvm_x86_ops.nested_ops->set_state(vcpu, user_kvm_nested_state, &kvm_state);
+		srcu_read_unlock(&vcpu->kvm->srcu, idx);
+		break;
+	}
+	case KVM_GET_SUPPORTED_HV_CPUID:
+		r = kvm_ioctl_get_supported_hv_cpuid(vcpu, argp);
+		break;
+#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_XEN
+	case KVM_XEN_VCPU_GET_ATTR: {
+		struct kvm_xen_vcpu_attr xva;
+
+		r = -EFAULT;
+		if (copy_from_user(&xva, argp, sizeof(xva)))
+			goto out;
+		r = kvm_xen_vcpu_get_attr(vcpu, &xva);
+		if (!r && copy_to_user(argp, &xva, sizeof(xva)))
+			r = -EFAULT;
+		break;
+	}
+	case KVM_XEN_VCPU_SET_ATTR: {
+		struct kvm_xen_vcpu_attr xva;
+
+		r = -EFAULT;
+		if (copy_from_user(&xva, argp, sizeof(xva)))
+			goto out;
+		r = kvm_xen_vcpu_set_attr(vcpu, &xva);
+		break;
+	}
+#endif
+	case KVM_GET_SREGS2: {
+		u.sregs2 = kzalloc(sizeof(struct kvm_sregs2), GFP_KERNEL);
+		r = -ENOMEM;
+		if (!u.sregs2)
+			goto out;
+		__get_sregs2(vcpu, u.sregs2);
+		r = -EFAULT;
+		if (copy_to_user(argp, u.sregs2, sizeof(struct kvm_sregs2)))
+			goto out;
+		r = 0;
+		break;
+	}
+	case KVM_SET_SREGS2: {
+		u.sregs2 = memdup_user(argp, sizeof(struct kvm_sregs2));
+		if (IS_ERR(u.sregs2)) {
+			r = PTR_ERR(u.sregs2);
+			u.sregs2 = NULL;
+			goto out;
+		}
+		r = __set_sregs2(vcpu, u.sregs2);
+		break;
+	}
+	case KVM_HAS_DEVICE_ATTR:
+	case KVM_GET_DEVICE_ATTR:
+	case KVM_SET_DEVICE_ATTR:
+		r = kvm_vcpu_ioctl_device_attr(vcpu, ioctl, argp);
+		break;
+	default:
+		r = -EINVAL;
+	}
+out:
+	kfree(u.buffer);
+out_nofree:
+	vcpu_put(vcpu);
+	return r;
+}
+
+vm_fault_t kvm_arch_vcpu_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct vm_fault *vmf)
+{
+	return VM_FAULT_SIGBUS;
+}
+
+static int kvm_vm_ioctl_set_tss_addr(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long addr)
+{
+	int ret;
+
+	if (addr > (unsigned int)(-3 * PAGE_SIZE))
+		return -EINVAL;
+	ret = static_call(kvm_x86_set_tss_addr)(kvm, addr);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int kvm_vm_ioctl_set_identity_map_addr(struct kvm *kvm,
+					      u64 ident_addr)
+{
+	return static_call(kvm_x86_set_identity_map_addr)(kvm, ident_addr);
+}
+
+static int kvm_vm_ioctl_set_nr_mmu_pages(struct kvm *kvm,
+					 unsigned long kvm_nr_mmu_pages)
+{
+	if (kvm_nr_mmu_pages < KVM_MIN_ALLOC_MMU_PAGES)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	mutex_lock(&kvm->slots_lock);
+
+	kvm_mmu_change_mmu_pages(kvm, kvm_nr_mmu_pages);
+	kvm->arch.n_requested_mmu_pages = kvm_nr_mmu_pages;
+
+	mutex_unlock(&kvm->slots_lock);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int kvm_vm_ioctl_get_irqchip(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_irqchip *chip)
+{
+	struct kvm_pic *pic = kvm->arch.vpic;
+	int r;
+
+	r = 0;
+	switch (chip->chip_id) {
+	case KVM_IRQCHIP_PIC_MASTER:
+		memcpy(&chip->chip.pic, &pic->pics[0],
+			sizeof(struct kvm_pic_state));
+		break;
+	case KVM_IRQCHIP_PIC_SLAVE:
+		memcpy(&chip->chip.pic, &pic->pics[1],
+			sizeof(struct kvm_pic_state));
+		break;
+	case KVM_IRQCHIP_IOAPIC:
+		kvm_get_ioapic(kvm, &chip->chip.ioapic);
+		break;
+	default:
+		r = -EINVAL;
+		break;
+	}
+	return r;
+}
+
+static int kvm_vm_ioctl_set_irqchip(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_irqchip *chip)
+{
+	struct kvm_pic *pic = kvm->arch.vpic;
+	int r;
+
+	r = 0;
+	switch (chip->chip_id) {
+	case KVM_IRQCHIP_PIC_MASTER:
+		spin_lock(&pic->lock);
+		memcpy(&pic->pics[0], &chip->chip.pic,
+			sizeof(struct kvm_pic_state));
+		spin_unlock(&pic->lock);
+		break;
+	case KVM_IRQCHIP_PIC_SLAVE:
+		spin_lock(&pic->lock);
+		memcpy(&pic->pics[1], &chip->chip.pic,
+			sizeof(struct kvm_pic_state));
+		spin_unlock(&pic->lock);
+		break;
+	case KVM_IRQCHIP_IOAPIC:
+		kvm_set_ioapic(kvm, &chip->chip.ioapic);
+		break;
+	default:
+		r = -EINVAL;
+		break;
+	}
+	kvm_pic_update_irq(pic);
+	return r;
+}
+
+static int kvm_vm_ioctl_get_pit(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_pit_state *ps)
+{
+	struct kvm_kpit_state *kps = &kvm->arch.vpit->pit_state;
+
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(*ps) != sizeof(kps->channels));
+
+	mutex_lock(&kps->lock);
+	memcpy(ps, &kps->channels, sizeof(*ps));
+	mutex_unlock(&kps->lock);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int kvm_vm_ioctl_set_pit(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_pit_state *ps)
+{
+	int i;
+	struct kvm_pit *pit = kvm->arch.vpit;
+
+	mutex_lock(&pit->pit_state.lock);
+	memcpy(&pit->pit_state.channels, ps, sizeof(*ps));
+	for (i = 0; i < 3; i++)
+		kvm_pit_load_count(pit, i, ps->channels[i].count, 0);
+	mutex_unlock(&pit->pit_state.lock);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int kvm_vm_ioctl_get_pit2(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_pit_state2 *ps)
+{
+	mutex_lock(&kvm->arch.vpit->pit_state.lock);
+	memcpy(ps->channels, &kvm->arch.vpit->pit_state.channels,
+		sizeof(ps->channels));
+	ps->flags = kvm->arch.vpit->pit_state.flags;
+	mutex_unlock(&kvm->arch.vpit->pit_state.lock);
+	memset(&ps->reserved, 0, sizeof(ps->reserved));
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int kvm_vm_ioctl_set_pit2(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_pit_state2 *ps)
+{
+	int start = 0;
+	int i;
+	u32 prev_legacy, cur_legacy;
+	struct kvm_pit *pit = kvm->arch.vpit;
+
+	mutex_lock(&pit->pit_state.lock);
+	prev_legacy = pit->pit_state.flags & KVM_PIT_FLAGS_HPET_LEGACY;
+	cur_legacy = ps->flags & KVM_PIT_FLAGS_HPET_LEGACY;
+	if (!prev_legacy && cur_legacy)
+		start = 1;
+	memcpy(&pit->pit_state.channels, &ps->channels,
+	       sizeof(pit->pit_state.channels));
+	pit->pit_state.flags = ps->flags;
+	for (i = 0; i < 3; i++)
+		kvm_pit_load_count(pit, i, pit->pit_state.channels[i].count,
+				   start && i == 0);
+	mutex_unlock(&pit->pit_state.lock);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int kvm_vm_ioctl_reinject(struct kvm *kvm,
+				 struct kvm_reinject_control *control)
+{
+	struct kvm_pit *pit = kvm->arch.vpit;
+
+	/* pit->pit_state.lock was overloaded to prevent userspace from getting
+	 * an inconsistent state after running multiple KVM_REINJECT_CONTROL
+	 * ioctls in parallel.  Use a separate lock if that ioctl isn't rare.
+	 */
+	mutex_lock(&pit->pit_state.lock);
+	kvm_pit_set_reinject(pit, control->pit_reinject);
+	mutex_unlock(&pit->pit_state.lock);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+void kvm_arch_sync_dirty_log(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_memory_slot *memslot)
+{
+
+	/*
+	 * Flush all CPUs' dirty log buffers to the  dirty_bitmap.  Called
+	 * before reporting dirty_bitmap to userspace.  KVM flushes the buffers
+	 * on all VM-Exits, thus we only need to kick running vCPUs to force a
+	 * VM-Exit.
+	 */
+	struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu;
+	unsigned long i;
+
+	kvm_for_each_vcpu(i, vcpu, kvm)
+		kvm_vcpu_kick(vcpu);
+}
+
+int kvm_vm_ioctl_irq_line(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_irq_level *irq_event,
+			bool line_status)
+{
+	if (!irqchip_in_kernel(kvm))
+		return -ENXIO;
+
+	irq_event->status = kvm_set_irq(kvm, KVM_USERSPACE_IRQ_SOURCE_ID,
+					irq_event->irq, irq_event->level,
+					line_status);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int kvm_vm_ioctl_enable_cap(struct kvm *kvm,
+			    struct kvm_enable_cap *cap)
+{
+	int r;
+
+	if (cap->flags)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	switch (cap->cap) {
+	case KVM_CAP_DISABLE_QUIRKS2:
+		r = -EINVAL;
+		if (cap->args[0] & ~KVM_X86_VALID_QUIRKS)
+			break;
+		fallthrough;
+	case KVM_CAP_DISABLE_QUIRKS:
+		kvm->arch.disabled_quirks = cap->args[0];
+		r = 0;
+		break;
+	case KVM_CAP_SPLIT_IRQCHIP: {
+		mutex_lock(&kvm->lock);
+		r = -EINVAL;
+		if (cap->args[0] > MAX_NR_RESERVED_IOAPIC_PINS)
+			goto split_irqchip_unlock;
+		r = -EEXIST;
+		if (irqchip_in_kernel(kvm))
+			goto split_irqchip_unlock;
+		if (kvm->created_vcpus)
+			goto split_irqchip_unlock;
+		r = kvm_setup_empty_irq_routing(kvm);
+		if (r)
+			goto split_irqchip_unlock;
+		/* Pairs with irqchip_in_kernel. */
+		smp_wmb();
+		kvm->arch.irqchip_mode = KVM_IRQCHIP_SPLIT;
+		kvm->arch.nr_reserved_ioapic_pins = cap->args[0];
+		kvm_clear_apicv_inhibit(kvm, APICV_INHIBIT_REASON_ABSENT);
+		r = 0;
+split_irqchip_unlock:
+		mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock);
+		break;
+	}
+	case KVM_CAP_X2APIC_API:
+		r = -EINVAL;
+		if (cap->args[0] & ~KVM_X2APIC_API_VALID_FLAGS)
+			break;
+
+		if (cap->args[0] & KVM_X2APIC_API_USE_32BIT_IDS)
+			kvm->arch.x2apic_format = true;
+		if (cap->args[0] & KVM_X2APIC_API_DISABLE_BROADCAST_QUIRK)
+			kvm->arch.x2apic_broadcast_quirk_disabled = true;
+
+		r = 0;
+		break;
+	case KVM_CAP_X86_DISABLE_EXITS:
+		r = -EINVAL;
+		if (cap->args[0] & ~KVM_X86_DISABLE_VALID_EXITS)
+			break;
+
+		if (cap->args[0] & KVM_X86_DISABLE_EXITS_PAUSE)
+			kvm->arch.pause_in_guest = true;
+
+#define SMT_RSB_MSG "This processor is affected by the Cross-Thread Return Predictions vulnerability. " \
+		    "KVM_CAP_X86_DISABLE_EXITS should only be used with SMT disabled or trusted guests."
+
+		if (!mitigate_smt_rsb) {
+			if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SMT_RSB) && cpu_smt_possible() &&
+			    (cap->args[0] & ~KVM_X86_DISABLE_EXITS_PAUSE))
+				pr_warn_once(SMT_RSB_MSG);
+
+			if ((cap->args[0] & KVM_X86_DISABLE_EXITS_MWAIT) &&
+			    kvm_can_mwait_in_guest())
+				kvm->arch.mwait_in_guest = true;
+			if (cap->args[0] & KVM_X86_DISABLE_EXITS_HLT)
+				kvm->arch.hlt_in_guest = true;
+			if (cap->args[0] & KVM_X86_DISABLE_EXITS_CSTATE)
+				kvm->arch.cstate_in_guest = true;
+		}
+
+		r = 0;
+		break;
+	case KVM_CAP_MSR_PLATFORM_INFO:
+		kvm->arch.guest_can_read_msr_platform_info = cap->args[0];
+		r = 0;
+		break;
+	case KVM_CAP_EXCEPTION_PAYLOAD:
+		kvm->arch.exception_payload_enabled = cap->args[0];
+		r = 0;
+		break;
+	case KVM_CAP_X86_TRIPLE_FAULT_EVENT:
+		kvm->arch.triple_fault_event = cap->args[0];
+		r = 0;
+		break;
+	case KVM_CAP_X86_USER_SPACE_MSR:
+		r = -EINVAL;
+		if (cap->args[0] & ~KVM_MSR_EXIT_REASON_VALID_MASK)
+			break;
+		kvm->arch.user_space_msr_mask = cap->args[0];
+		r = 0;
+		break;
+	case KVM_CAP_X86_BUS_LOCK_EXIT:
+		r = -EINVAL;
+		if (cap->args[0] & ~KVM_BUS_LOCK_DETECTION_VALID_MODE)
+			break;
+
+		if ((cap->args[0] & KVM_BUS_LOCK_DETECTION_OFF) &&
+		    (cap->args[0] & KVM_BUS_LOCK_DETECTION_EXIT))
+			break;
+
+		if (kvm_caps.has_bus_lock_exit &&
+		    cap->args[0] & KVM_BUS_LOCK_DETECTION_EXIT)
+			kvm->arch.bus_lock_detection_enabled = true;
+		r = 0;
+		break;
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_SGX_KVM
+	case KVM_CAP_SGX_ATTRIBUTE: {
+		unsigned long allowed_attributes = 0;
+
+		r = sgx_set_attribute(&allowed_attributes, cap->args[0]);
+		if (r)
+			break;
+
+		/* KVM only supports the PROVISIONKEY privileged attribute. */
+		if ((allowed_attributes & SGX_ATTR_PROVISIONKEY) &&
+		    !(allowed_attributes & ~SGX_ATTR_PROVISIONKEY))
+			kvm->arch.sgx_provisioning_allowed = true;
+		else
+			r = -EINVAL;
+		break;
+	}
+#endif
+	case KVM_CAP_VM_COPY_ENC_CONTEXT_FROM:
+		r = -EINVAL;
+		if (!kvm_x86_ops.vm_copy_enc_context_from)
+			break;
+
+		r = static_call(kvm_x86_vm_copy_enc_context_from)(kvm, cap->args[0]);
+		break;
+	case KVM_CAP_VM_MOVE_ENC_CONTEXT_FROM:
+		r = -EINVAL;
+		if (!kvm_x86_ops.vm_move_enc_context_from)
+			break;
+
+		r = static_call(kvm_x86_vm_move_enc_context_from)(kvm, cap->args[0]);
+		break;
+	case KVM_CAP_EXIT_HYPERCALL:
+		if (cap->args[0] & ~KVM_EXIT_HYPERCALL_VALID_MASK) {
+			r = -EINVAL;
+			break;
+		}
+		kvm->arch.hypercall_exit_enabled = cap->args[0];
+		r = 0;
+		break;
+	case KVM_CAP_EXIT_ON_EMULATION_FAILURE:
+		r = -EINVAL;
+		if (cap->args[0] & ~1)
+			break;
+		kvm->arch.exit_on_emulation_error = cap->args[0];
+		r = 0;
+		break;
+	case KVM_CAP_PMU_CAPABILITY:
+		r = -EINVAL;
+		if (!enable_pmu || (cap->args[0] & ~KVM_CAP_PMU_VALID_MASK))
+			break;
+
+		mutex_lock(&kvm->lock);
+		if (!kvm->created_vcpus) {
+			kvm->arch.enable_pmu = !(cap->args[0] & KVM_PMU_CAP_DISABLE);
+			r = 0;
+		}
+		mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock);
+		break;
+	case KVM_CAP_MAX_VCPU_ID:
+		r = -EINVAL;
+		if (cap->args[0] > KVM_MAX_VCPU_IDS)
+			break;
+
+		mutex_lock(&kvm->lock);
+		if (kvm->arch.max_vcpu_ids == cap->args[0]) {
+			r = 0;
+		} else if (!kvm->arch.max_vcpu_ids) {
+			kvm->arch.max_vcpu_ids = cap->args[0];
+			r = 0;
+		}
+		mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock);
+		break;
+	case KVM_CAP_X86_NOTIFY_VMEXIT:
+		r = -EINVAL;
+		if ((u32)cap->args[0] & ~KVM_X86_NOTIFY_VMEXIT_VALID_BITS)
+			break;
+		if (!kvm_caps.has_notify_vmexit)
+			break;
+		if (!((u32)cap->args[0] & KVM_X86_NOTIFY_VMEXIT_ENABLED))
+			break;
+		mutex_lock(&kvm->lock);
+		if (!kvm->created_vcpus) {
+			kvm->arch.notify_window = cap->args[0] >> 32;
+			kvm->arch.notify_vmexit_flags = (u32)cap->args[0];
+			r = 0;
+		}
+		mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock);
+		break;
+	case KVM_CAP_VM_DISABLE_NX_HUGE_PAGES:
+		r = -EINVAL;
+
+		/*
+		 * Since the risk of disabling NX hugepages is a guest crashing
+		 * the system, ensure the userspace process has permission to
+		 * reboot the system.
+		 *
+		 * Note that unlike the reboot() syscall, the process must have
+		 * this capability in the root namespace because exposing
+		 * /dev/kvm into a container does not limit the scope of the
+		 * iTLB multihit bug to that container. In other words,
+		 * this must use capable(), not ns_capable().
+		 */
+		if (!capable(CAP_SYS_BOOT)) {
+			r = -EPERM;
+			break;
+		}
+
+		if (cap->args[0])
+			break;
+
+		mutex_lock(&kvm->lock);
+		if (!kvm->created_vcpus) {
+			kvm->arch.disable_nx_huge_pages = true;
+			r = 0;
+		}
+		mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock);
+		break;
+	default:
+		r = -EINVAL;
+		break;
+	}
+	return r;
+}
+
+static struct kvm_x86_msr_filter *kvm_alloc_msr_filter(bool default_allow)
+{
+	struct kvm_x86_msr_filter *msr_filter;
+
+	msr_filter = kzalloc(sizeof(*msr_filter), GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
+	if (!msr_filter)
+		return NULL;
+
+	msr_filter->default_allow = default_allow;
+	return msr_filter;
+}
+
+static void kvm_free_msr_filter(struct kvm_x86_msr_filter *msr_filter)
+{
+	u32 i;
+
+	if (!msr_filter)
+		return;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < msr_filter->count; i++)
+		kfree(msr_filter->ranges[i].bitmap);
+
+	kfree(msr_filter);
+}
+
+static int kvm_add_msr_filter(struct kvm_x86_msr_filter *msr_filter,
+			      struct kvm_msr_filter_range *user_range)
+{
+	unsigned long *bitmap;
+	size_t bitmap_size;
+
+	if (!user_range->nmsrs)
+		return 0;
+
+	if (user_range->flags & ~KVM_MSR_FILTER_RANGE_VALID_MASK)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (!user_range->flags)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	bitmap_size = BITS_TO_LONGS(user_range->nmsrs) * sizeof(long);
+	if (!bitmap_size || bitmap_size > KVM_MSR_FILTER_MAX_BITMAP_SIZE)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	bitmap = memdup_user((__user u8*)user_range->bitmap, bitmap_size);
+	if (IS_ERR(bitmap))
+		return PTR_ERR(bitmap);
+
+	msr_filter->ranges[msr_filter->count] = (struct msr_bitmap_range) {
+		.flags = user_range->flags,
+		.base = user_range->base,
+		.nmsrs = user_range->nmsrs,
+		.bitmap = bitmap,
+	};
+
+	msr_filter->count++;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int kvm_vm_ioctl_set_msr_filter(struct kvm *kvm,
+				       struct kvm_msr_filter *filter)
+{
+	struct kvm_x86_msr_filter *new_filter, *old_filter;
+	bool default_allow;
+	bool empty = true;
+	int r;
+	u32 i;
+
+	if (filter->flags & ~KVM_MSR_FILTER_VALID_MASK)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(filter->ranges); i++)
+		empty &= !filter->ranges[i].nmsrs;
+
+	default_allow = !(filter->flags & KVM_MSR_FILTER_DEFAULT_DENY);
+	if (empty && !default_allow)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	new_filter = kvm_alloc_msr_filter(default_allow);
+	if (!new_filter)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(filter->ranges); i++) {
+		r = kvm_add_msr_filter(new_filter, &filter->ranges[i]);
+		if (r) {
+			kvm_free_msr_filter(new_filter);
+			return r;
+		}
+	}
+
+	mutex_lock(&kvm->lock);
+	old_filter = rcu_replace_pointer(kvm->arch.msr_filter, new_filter,
+					 mutex_is_locked(&kvm->lock));
+	mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock);
+	synchronize_srcu(&kvm->srcu);
+
+	kvm_free_msr_filter(old_filter);
+
+	kvm_make_all_cpus_request(kvm, KVM_REQ_MSR_FILTER_CHANGED);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_COMPAT
+/* for KVM_X86_SET_MSR_FILTER */
+struct kvm_msr_filter_range_compat {
+	__u32 flags;
+	__u32 nmsrs;
+	__u32 base;
+	__u32 bitmap;
+};
+
+struct kvm_msr_filter_compat {
+	__u32 flags;
+	struct kvm_msr_filter_range_compat ranges[KVM_MSR_FILTER_MAX_RANGES];
+};
+
+#define KVM_X86_SET_MSR_FILTER_COMPAT _IOW(KVMIO, 0xc6, struct kvm_msr_filter_compat)
+
+long kvm_arch_vm_compat_ioctl(struct file *filp, unsigned int ioctl,
+			      unsigned long arg)
+{
+	void __user *argp = (void __user *)arg;
+	struct kvm *kvm = filp->private_data;
+	long r = -ENOTTY;
+
+	switch (ioctl) {
+	case KVM_X86_SET_MSR_FILTER_COMPAT: {
+		struct kvm_msr_filter __user *user_msr_filter = argp;
+		struct kvm_msr_filter_compat filter_compat;
+		struct kvm_msr_filter filter;
+		int i;
+
+		if (copy_from_user(&filter_compat, user_msr_filter,
+				   sizeof(filter_compat)))
+			return -EFAULT;
+
+		filter.flags = filter_compat.flags;
+		for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(filter.ranges); i++) {
+			struct kvm_msr_filter_range_compat *cr;
+
+			cr = &filter_compat.ranges[i];
+			filter.ranges[i] = (struct kvm_msr_filter_range) {
+				.flags = cr->flags,
+				.nmsrs = cr->nmsrs,
+				.base = cr->base,
+				.bitmap = (__u8 *)(ulong)cr->bitmap,
+			};
+		}
+
+		r = kvm_vm_ioctl_set_msr_filter(kvm, &filter);
+		break;
+	}
+	}
+
+	return r;
+}
+#endif
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_KVM_PM_NOTIFIER
+static int kvm_arch_suspend_notifier(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+	struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu;
+	unsigned long i;
+	int ret = 0;
+
+	mutex_lock(&kvm->lock);
+	kvm_for_each_vcpu(i, vcpu, kvm) {
+		if (!vcpu->arch.pv_time.active)
+			continue;
+
+		ret = kvm_set_guest_paused(vcpu);
+		if (ret) {
+			kvm_err("Failed to pause guest VCPU%d: %d\n",
+				vcpu->vcpu_id, ret);
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+	mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock);
+
+	return ret ? NOTIFY_BAD : NOTIFY_DONE;
+}
+
+int kvm_arch_pm_notifier(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long state)
+{
+	switch (state) {
+	case PM_HIBERNATION_PREPARE:
+	case PM_SUSPEND_PREPARE:
+		return kvm_arch_suspend_notifier(kvm);
+	}
+
+	return NOTIFY_DONE;
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_HAVE_KVM_PM_NOTIFIER */
+
+static int kvm_vm_ioctl_get_clock(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp)
+{
+	struct kvm_clock_data data = { 0 };
+
+	get_kvmclock(kvm, &data);
+	if (copy_to_user(argp, &data, sizeof(data)))
+		return -EFAULT;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int kvm_vm_ioctl_set_clock(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp)
+{
+	struct kvm_arch *ka = &kvm->arch;
+	struct kvm_clock_data data;
+	u64 now_raw_ns;
+
+	if (copy_from_user(&data, argp, sizeof(data)))
+		return -EFAULT;
+
+	/*
+	 * Only KVM_CLOCK_REALTIME is used, but allow passing the
+	 * result of KVM_GET_CLOCK back to KVM_SET_CLOCK.
+	 */
+	if (data.flags & ~KVM_CLOCK_VALID_FLAGS)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	kvm_hv_request_tsc_page_update(kvm);
+	kvm_start_pvclock_update(kvm);
+	pvclock_update_vm_gtod_copy(kvm);
+
+	/*
+	 * This pairs with kvm_guest_time_update(): when masterclock is
+	 * in use, we use master_kernel_ns + kvmclock_offset to set
+	 * unsigned 'system_time' so if we use get_kvmclock_ns() (which
+	 * is slightly ahead) here we risk going negative on unsigned
+	 * 'system_time' when 'data.clock' is very small.
+	 */
+	if (data.flags & KVM_CLOCK_REALTIME) {
+		u64 now_real_ns = ktime_get_real_ns();
+
+		/*
+		 * Avoid stepping the kvmclock backwards.
+		 */
+		if (now_real_ns > data.realtime)
+			data.clock += now_real_ns - data.realtime;
+	}
+
+	if (ka->use_master_clock)
+		now_raw_ns = ka->master_kernel_ns;
+	else
+		now_raw_ns = get_kvmclock_base_ns();
+	ka->kvmclock_offset = data.clock - now_raw_ns;
+	kvm_end_pvclock_update(kvm);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int kvm_arch_vm_ioctl(struct file *filp, unsigned int ioctl, unsigned long arg)
+{
+	struct kvm *kvm = filp->private_data;
+	void __user *argp = (void __user *)arg;
+	int r = -ENOTTY;
+	/*
+	 * This union makes it completely explicit to gcc-3.x
+	 * that these two variables' stack usage should be
+	 * combined, not added together.
+	 */
+	union {
+		struct kvm_pit_state ps;
+		struct kvm_pit_state2 ps2;
+		struct kvm_pit_config pit_config;
+	} u;
+
+	switch (ioctl) {
+	case KVM_SET_TSS_ADDR:
+		r = kvm_vm_ioctl_set_tss_addr(kvm, arg);
+		break;
+	case KVM_SET_IDENTITY_MAP_ADDR: {
+		u64 ident_addr;
+
+		mutex_lock(&kvm->lock);
+		r = -EINVAL;
+		if (kvm->created_vcpus)
+			goto set_identity_unlock;
+		r = -EFAULT;
+		if (copy_from_user(&ident_addr, argp, sizeof(ident_addr)))
+			goto set_identity_unlock;
+		r = kvm_vm_ioctl_set_identity_map_addr(kvm, ident_addr);
+set_identity_unlock:
+		mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock);
+		break;
+	}
+	case KVM_SET_NR_MMU_PAGES:
+		r = kvm_vm_ioctl_set_nr_mmu_pages(kvm, arg);
+		break;
+	case KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP: {
+		mutex_lock(&kvm->lock);
+
+		r = -EEXIST;
+		if (irqchip_in_kernel(kvm))
+			goto create_irqchip_unlock;
+
+		r = -EINVAL;
+		if (kvm->created_vcpus)
+			goto create_irqchip_unlock;
+
+		r = kvm_pic_init(kvm);
+		if (r)
+			goto create_irqchip_unlock;
+
+		r = kvm_ioapic_init(kvm);
+		if (r) {
+			kvm_pic_destroy(kvm);
+			goto create_irqchip_unlock;
+		}
+
+		r = kvm_setup_default_irq_routing(kvm);
+		if (r) {
+			kvm_ioapic_destroy(kvm);
+			kvm_pic_destroy(kvm);
+			goto create_irqchip_unlock;
+		}
+		/* Write kvm->irq_routing before enabling irqchip_in_kernel. */
+		smp_wmb();
+		kvm->arch.irqchip_mode = KVM_IRQCHIP_KERNEL;
+		kvm_clear_apicv_inhibit(kvm, APICV_INHIBIT_REASON_ABSENT);
+	create_irqchip_unlock:
+		mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock);
+		break;
+	}
+	case KVM_CREATE_PIT:
+		u.pit_config.flags = KVM_PIT_SPEAKER_DUMMY;
+		goto create_pit;
+	case KVM_CREATE_PIT2:
+		r = -EFAULT;
+		if (copy_from_user(&u.pit_config, argp,
+				   sizeof(struct kvm_pit_config)))
+			goto out;
+	create_pit:
+		mutex_lock(&kvm->lock);
+		r = -EEXIST;
+		if (kvm->arch.vpit)
+			goto create_pit_unlock;
+		r = -ENOMEM;
+		kvm->arch.vpit = kvm_create_pit(kvm, u.pit_config.flags);
+		if (kvm->arch.vpit)
+			r = 0;
+	create_pit_unlock:
+		mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock);
+		break;
+	case KVM_GET_IRQCHIP: {
+		/* 0: PIC master, 1: PIC slave, 2: IOAPIC */
+		struct kvm_irqchip *chip;
+
+		chip = memdup_user(argp, sizeof(*chip));
+		if (IS_ERR(chip)) {
+			r = PTR_ERR(chip);
+			goto out;
+		}
+
+		r = -ENXIO;
+		if (!irqchip_kernel(kvm))
+			goto get_irqchip_out;
+		r = kvm_vm_ioctl_get_irqchip(kvm, chip);
+		if (r)
+			goto get_irqchip_out;
+		r = -EFAULT;
+		if (copy_to_user(argp, chip, sizeof(*chip)))
+			goto get_irqchip_out;
+		r = 0;
+	get_irqchip_out:
+		kfree(chip);
+		break;
+	}
+	case KVM_SET_IRQCHIP: {
+		/* 0: PIC master, 1: PIC slave, 2: IOAPIC */
+		struct kvm_irqchip *chip;
+
+		chip = memdup_user(argp, sizeof(*chip));
+		if (IS_ERR(chip)) {
+			r = PTR_ERR(chip);
+			goto out;
+		}
+
+		r = -ENXIO;
+		if (!irqchip_kernel(kvm))
+			goto set_irqchip_out;
+		r = kvm_vm_ioctl_set_irqchip(kvm, chip);
+	set_irqchip_out:
+		kfree(chip);
+		break;
+	}
+	case KVM_GET_PIT: {
+		r = -EFAULT;
+		if (copy_from_user(&u.ps, argp, sizeof(struct kvm_pit_state)))
+			goto out;
+		r = -ENXIO;
+		if (!kvm->arch.vpit)
+			goto out;
+		r = kvm_vm_ioctl_get_pit(kvm, &u.ps);
+		if (r)
+			goto out;
+		r = -EFAULT;
+		if (copy_to_user(argp, &u.ps, sizeof(struct kvm_pit_state)))
+			goto out;
+		r = 0;
+		break;
+	}
+	case KVM_SET_PIT: {
+		r = -EFAULT;
+		if (copy_from_user(&u.ps, argp, sizeof(u.ps)))
+			goto out;
+		mutex_lock(&kvm->lock);
+		r = -ENXIO;
+		if (!kvm->arch.vpit)
+			goto set_pit_out;
+		r = kvm_vm_ioctl_set_pit(kvm, &u.ps);
+set_pit_out:
+		mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock);
+		break;
+	}
+	case KVM_GET_PIT2: {
+		r = -ENXIO;
+		if (!kvm->arch.vpit)
+			goto out;
+		r = kvm_vm_ioctl_get_pit2(kvm, &u.ps2);
+		if (r)
+			goto out;
+		r = -EFAULT;
+		if (copy_to_user(argp, &u.ps2, sizeof(u.ps2)))
+			goto out;
+		r = 0;
+		break;
+	}
+	case KVM_SET_PIT2: {
+		r = -EFAULT;
+		if (copy_from_user(&u.ps2, argp, sizeof(u.ps2)))
+			goto out;
+		mutex_lock(&kvm->lock);
+		r = -ENXIO;
+		if (!kvm->arch.vpit)
+			goto set_pit2_out;
+		r = kvm_vm_ioctl_set_pit2(kvm, &u.ps2);
+set_pit2_out:
+		mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock);
+		break;
+	}
+	case KVM_REINJECT_CONTROL: {
+		struct kvm_reinject_control control;
+		r =  -EFAULT;
+		if (copy_from_user(&control, argp, sizeof(control)))
+			goto out;
+		r = -ENXIO;
+		if (!kvm->arch.vpit)
+			goto out;
+		r = kvm_vm_ioctl_reinject(kvm, &control);
+		break;
+	}
+	case KVM_SET_BOOT_CPU_ID:
+		r = 0;
+		mutex_lock(&kvm->lock);
+		if (kvm->created_vcpus)
+			r = -EBUSY;
+		else
+			kvm->arch.bsp_vcpu_id = arg;
+		mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock);
+		break;
+#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_XEN
+	case KVM_XEN_HVM_CONFIG: {
+		struct kvm_xen_hvm_config xhc;
+		r = -EFAULT;
+		if (copy_from_user(&xhc, argp, sizeof(xhc)))
+			goto out;
+		r = kvm_xen_hvm_config(kvm, &xhc);
+		break;
+	}
+	case KVM_XEN_HVM_GET_ATTR: {
+		struct kvm_xen_hvm_attr xha;
+
+		r = -EFAULT;
+		if (copy_from_user(&xha, argp, sizeof(xha)))
+			goto out;
+		r = kvm_xen_hvm_get_attr(kvm, &xha);
+		if (!r && copy_to_user(argp, &xha, sizeof(xha)))
+			r = -EFAULT;
+		break;
+	}
+	case KVM_XEN_HVM_SET_ATTR: {
+		struct kvm_xen_hvm_attr xha;
+
+		r = -EFAULT;
+		if (copy_from_user(&xha, argp, sizeof(xha)))
+			goto out;
+		r = kvm_xen_hvm_set_attr(kvm, &xha);
+		break;
+	}
+	case KVM_XEN_HVM_EVTCHN_SEND: {
+		struct kvm_irq_routing_xen_evtchn uxe;
+
+		r = -EFAULT;
+		if (copy_from_user(&uxe, argp, sizeof(uxe)))
+			goto out;
+		r = kvm_xen_hvm_evtchn_send(kvm, &uxe);
+		break;
+	}
+#endif
+	case KVM_SET_CLOCK:
+		r = kvm_vm_ioctl_set_clock(kvm, argp);
+		break;
+	case KVM_GET_CLOCK:
+		r = kvm_vm_ioctl_get_clock(kvm, argp);
+		break;
+	case KVM_SET_TSC_KHZ: {
+		u32 user_tsc_khz;
+
+		r = -EINVAL;
+		user_tsc_khz = (u32)arg;
+
+		if (kvm_caps.has_tsc_control &&
+		    user_tsc_khz >= kvm_caps.max_guest_tsc_khz)
+			goto out;
+
+		if (user_tsc_khz == 0)
+			user_tsc_khz = tsc_khz;
+
+		WRITE_ONCE(kvm->arch.default_tsc_khz, user_tsc_khz);
+		r = 0;
+
+		goto out;
+	}
+	case KVM_GET_TSC_KHZ: {
+		r = READ_ONCE(kvm->arch.default_tsc_khz);
+		goto out;
+	}
+	case KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_OP: {
+		r = -ENOTTY;
+		if (!kvm_x86_ops.mem_enc_ioctl)
+			goto out;
+
+		r = static_call(kvm_x86_mem_enc_ioctl)(kvm, argp);
+		break;
+	}
+	case KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_REG_REGION: {
+		struct kvm_enc_region region;
+
+		r = -EFAULT;
+		if (copy_from_user(&region, argp, sizeof(region)))
+			goto out;
+
+		r = -ENOTTY;
+		if (!kvm_x86_ops.mem_enc_register_region)
+			goto out;
+
+		r = static_call(kvm_x86_mem_enc_register_region)(kvm, &region);
+		break;
+	}
+	case KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_UNREG_REGION: {
+		struct kvm_enc_region region;
+
+		r = -EFAULT;
+		if (copy_from_user(&region, argp, sizeof(region)))
+			goto out;
+
+		r = -ENOTTY;
+		if (!kvm_x86_ops.mem_enc_unregister_region)
+			goto out;
+
+		r = static_call(kvm_x86_mem_enc_unregister_region)(kvm, &region);
+		break;
+	}
+	case KVM_HYPERV_EVENTFD: {
+		struct kvm_hyperv_eventfd hvevfd;
+
+		r = -EFAULT;
+		if (copy_from_user(&hvevfd, argp, sizeof(hvevfd)))
+			goto out;
+		r = kvm_vm_ioctl_hv_eventfd(kvm, &hvevfd);
+		break;
+	}
+	case KVM_SET_PMU_EVENT_FILTER:
+		r = kvm_vm_ioctl_set_pmu_event_filter(kvm, argp);
+		break;
+	case KVM_X86_SET_MSR_FILTER: {
+		struct kvm_msr_filter __user *user_msr_filter = argp;
+		struct kvm_msr_filter filter;
+
+		if (copy_from_user(&filter, user_msr_filter, sizeof(filter)))
+			return -EFAULT;
+
+		r = kvm_vm_ioctl_set_msr_filter(kvm, &filter);
+		break;
+	}
+	default:
+		r = -ENOTTY;
+	}
+out:
+	return r;
+}
+
+static void kvm_probe_feature_msr(u32 msr_index)
+{
+	struct kvm_msr_entry msr = {
+		.index = msr_index,
+	};
+
+	if (kvm_get_msr_feature(&msr))
+		return;
+
+	msr_based_features[num_msr_based_features++] = msr_index;
+}
+
+static void kvm_probe_msr_to_save(u32 msr_index)
+{
+	u32 dummy[2];
+
+	if (rdmsr_safe(msr_index, &dummy[0], &dummy[1]))
+		return;
+
+	/*
+	 * Even MSRs that are valid in the host may not be exposed to guests in
+	 * some cases.
+	 */
+	switch (msr_index) {
+	case MSR_IA32_BNDCFGS:
+		if (!kvm_mpx_supported())
+			return;
+		break;
+	case MSR_TSC_AUX:
+		if (!kvm_cpu_cap_has(X86_FEATURE_RDTSCP) &&
+		    !kvm_cpu_cap_has(X86_FEATURE_RDPID))
+			return;
+		break;
+	case MSR_IA32_UMWAIT_CONTROL:
+		if (!kvm_cpu_cap_has(X86_FEATURE_WAITPKG))
+			return;
+		break;
+	case MSR_IA32_RTIT_CTL:
+	case MSR_IA32_RTIT_STATUS:
+		if (!kvm_cpu_cap_has(X86_FEATURE_INTEL_PT))
+			return;
+		break;
+	case MSR_IA32_RTIT_CR3_MATCH:
+		if (!kvm_cpu_cap_has(X86_FEATURE_INTEL_PT) ||
+		    !intel_pt_validate_hw_cap(PT_CAP_cr3_filtering))
+			return;
+		break;
+	case MSR_IA32_RTIT_OUTPUT_BASE:
+	case MSR_IA32_RTIT_OUTPUT_MASK:
+		if (!kvm_cpu_cap_has(X86_FEATURE_INTEL_PT) ||
+		    (!intel_pt_validate_hw_cap(PT_CAP_topa_output) &&
+		     !intel_pt_validate_hw_cap(PT_CAP_single_range_output)))
+			return;
+		break;
+	case MSR_IA32_RTIT_ADDR0_A ... MSR_IA32_RTIT_ADDR3_B:
+		if (!kvm_cpu_cap_has(X86_FEATURE_INTEL_PT) ||
+		    (msr_index - MSR_IA32_RTIT_ADDR0_A >=
+		     intel_pt_validate_hw_cap(PT_CAP_num_address_ranges) * 2))
+			return;
+		break;
+	case MSR_ARCH_PERFMON_PERFCTR0 ... MSR_ARCH_PERFMON_PERFCTR_MAX:
+		if (msr_index - MSR_ARCH_PERFMON_PERFCTR0 >=
+		    kvm_pmu_cap.num_counters_gp)
+			return;
+		break;
+	case MSR_ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL0 ... MSR_ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL_MAX:
+		if (msr_index - MSR_ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL0 >=
+		    kvm_pmu_cap.num_counters_gp)
+			return;
+		break;
+	case MSR_ARCH_PERFMON_FIXED_CTR0 ... MSR_ARCH_PERFMON_FIXED_CTR_MAX:
+		if (msr_index - MSR_ARCH_PERFMON_FIXED_CTR0 >=
+		    kvm_pmu_cap.num_counters_fixed)
+			return;
+		break;
+	case MSR_AMD64_PERF_CNTR_GLOBAL_CTL:
+	case MSR_AMD64_PERF_CNTR_GLOBAL_STATUS:
+	case MSR_AMD64_PERF_CNTR_GLOBAL_STATUS_CLR:
+		if (!kvm_cpu_cap_has(X86_FEATURE_PERFMON_V2))
+			return;
+		break;
+	case MSR_IA32_XFD:
+	case MSR_IA32_XFD_ERR:
+		if (!kvm_cpu_cap_has(X86_FEATURE_XFD))
+			return;
+		break;
+	case MSR_IA32_TSX_CTRL:
+		if (!(kvm_get_arch_capabilities() & ARCH_CAP_TSX_CTRL_MSR))
+			return;
+		break;
+	default:
+		break;
+	}
+
+	msrs_to_save[num_msrs_to_save++] = msr_index;
+}
+
+static void kvm_init_msr_lists(void)
+{
+	unsigned i;
+
+	BUILD_BUG_ON_MSG(KVM_PMC_MAX_FIXED != 3,
+			 "Please update the fixed PMCs in msrs_to_save_pmu[]");
+
+	num_msrs_to_save = 0;
+	num_emulated_msrs = 0;
+	num_msr_based_features = 0;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(msrs_to_save_base); i++)
+		kvm_probe_msr_to_save(msrs_to_save_base[i]);
+
+	if (enable_pmu) {
+		for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(msrs_to_save_pmu); i++)
+			kvm_probe_msr_to_save(msrs_to_save_pmu[i]);
+	}
+
+	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(emulated_msrs_all); i++) {
+		if (!static_call(kvm_x86_has_emulated_msr)(NULL, emulated_msrs_all[i]))
+			continue;
+
+		emulated_msrs[num_emulated_msrs++] = emulated_msrs_all[i];
+	}
+
+	for (i = KVM_FIRST_EMULATED_VMX_MSR; i <= KVM_LAST_EMULATED_VMX_MSR; i++)
+		kvm_probe_feature_msr(i);
+
+	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(msr_based_features_all_except_vmx); i++)
+		kvm_probe_feature_msr(msr_based_features_all_except_vmx[i]);
+}
+
+static int vcpu_mmio_write(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t addr, int len,
+			   const void *v)
+{
+	int handled = 0;
+	int n;
+
+	do {
+		n = min(len, 8);
+		if (!(lapic_in_kernel(vcpu) &&
+		      !kvm_iodevice_write(vcpu, &vcpu->arch.apic->dev, addr, n, v))
+		    && kvm_io_bus_write(vcpu, KVM_MMIO_BUS, addr, n, v))
+			break;
+		handled += n;
+		addr += n;
+		len -= n;
+		v += n;
+	} while (len);
+
+	return handled;
+}
+
+static int vcpu_mmio_read(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t addr, int len, void *v)
+{
+	int handled = 0;
+	int n;
+
+	do {
+		n = min(len, 8);
+		if (!(lapic_in_kernel(vcpu) &&
+		      !kvm_iodevice_read(vcpu, &vcpu->arch.apic->dev,
+					 addr, n, v))
+		    && kvm_io_bus_read(vcpu, KVM_MMIO_BUS, addr, n, v))
+			break;
+		trace_kvm_mmio(KVM_TRACE_MMIO_READ, n, addr, v);
+		handled += n;
+		addr += n;
+		len -= n;
+		v += n;
+	} while (len);
+
+	return handled;
+}
+
+void kvm_set_segment(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+		     struct kvm_segment *var, int seg)
+{
+	static_call(kvm_x86_set_segment)(vcpu, var, seg);
+}
+
+void kvm_get_segment(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+		     struct kvm_segment *var, int seg)
+{
+	static_call(kvm_x86_get_segment)(vcpu, var, seg);
+}
+
+gpa_t translate_nested_gpa(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t gpa, u64 access,
+			   struct x86_exception *exception)
+{
+	struct kvm_mmu *mmu = vcpu->arch.mmu;
+	gpa_t t_gpa;
+
+	BUG_ON(!mmu_is_nested(vcpu));
+
+	/* NPT walks are always user-walks */
+	access |= PFERR_USER_MASK;
+	t_gpa  = mmu->gva_to_gpa(vcpu, mmu, gpa, access, exception);
+
+	return t_gpa;
+}
+
+gpa_t kvm_mmu_gva_to_gpa_read(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gva_t gva,
+			      struct x86_exception *exception)
+{
+	struct kvm_mmu *mmu = vcpu->arch.walk_mmu;
+
+	u64 access = (static_call(kvm_x86_get_cpl)(vcpu) == 3) ? PFERR_USER_MASK : 0;
+	return mmu->gva_to_gpa(vcpu, mmu, gva, access, exception);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_mmu_gva_to_gpa_read);
+
+gpa_t kvm_mmu_gva_to_gpa_write(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gva_t gva,
+			       struct x86_exception *exception)
+{
+	struct kvm_mmu *mmu = vcpu->arch.walk_mmu;
+
+	u64 access = (static_call(kvm_x86_get_cpl)(vcpu) == 3) ? PFERR_USER_MASK : 0;
+	access |= PFERR_WRITE_MASK;
+	return mmu->gva_to_gpa(vcpu, mmu, gva, access, exception);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_mmu_gva_to_gpa_write);
+
+/* uses this to access any guest's mapped memory without checking CPL */
+gpa_t kvm_mmu_gva_to_gpa_system(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gva_t gva,
+				struct x86_exception *exception)
+{
+	struct kvm_mmu *mmu = vcpu->arch.walk_mmu;
+
+	return mmu->gva_to_gpa(vcpu, mmu, gva, 0, exception);
+}
+
+static int kvm_read_guest_virt_helper(gva_t addr, void *val, unsigned int bytes,
+				      struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 access,
+				      struct x86_exception *exception)
+{
+	struct kvm_mmu *mmu = vcpu->arch.walk_mmu;
+	void *data = val;
+	int r = X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
+
+	while (bytes) {
+		gpa_t gpa = mmu->gva_to_gpa(vcpu, mmu, addr, access, exception);
+		unsigned offset = addr & (PAGE_SIZE-1);
+		unsigned toread = min(bytes, (unsigned)PAGE_SIZE - offset);
+		int ret;
+
+		if (gpa == INVALID_GPA)
+			return X86EMUL_PROPAGATE_FAULT;
+		ret = kvm_vcpu_read_guest_page(vcpu, gpa >> PAGE_SHIFT, data,
+					       offset, toread);
+		if (ret < 0) {
+			r = X86EMUL_IO_NEEDED;
+			goto out;
+		}
+
+		bytes -= toread;
+		data += toread;
+		addr += toread;
+	}
+out:
+	return r;
+}
+
+/* used for instruction fetching */
+static int kvm_fetch_guest_virt(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt,
+				gva_t addr, void *val, unsigned int bytes,
+				struct x86_exception *exception)
+{
+	struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = emul_to_vcpu(ctxt);
+	struct kvm_mmu *mmu = vcpu->arch.walk_mmu;
+	u64 access = (static_call(kvm_x86_get_cpl)(vcpu) == 3) ? PFERR_USER_MASK : 0;
+	unsigned offset;
+	int ret;
+
+	/* Inline kvm_read_guest_virt_helper for speed.  */
+	gpa_t gpa = mmu->gva_to_gpa(vcpu, mmu, addr, access|PFERR_FETCH_MASK,
+				    exception);
+	if (unlikely(gpa == INVALID_GPA))
+		return X86EMUL_PROPAGATE_FAULT;
+
+	offset = addr & (PAGE_SIZE-1);
+	if (WARN_ON(offset + bytes > PAGE_SIZE))
+		bytes = (unsigned)PAGE_SIZE - offset;
+	ret = kvm_vcpu_read_guest_page(vcpu, gpa >> PAGE_SHIFT, val,
+				       offset, bytes);
+	if (unlikely(ret < 0))
+		return X86EMUL_IO_NEEDED;
+
+	return X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
+}
+
+int kvm_read_guest_virt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+			       gva_t addr, void *val, unsigned int bytes,
+			       struct x86_exception *exception)
+{
+	u64 access = (static_call(kvm_x86_get_cpl)(vcpu) == 3) ? PFERR_USER_MASK : 0;
+
+	/*
+	 * FIXME: this should call handle_emulation_failure if X86EMUL_IO_NEEDED
+	 * is returned, but our callers are not ready for that and they blindly
+	 * call kvm_inject_page_fault.  Ensure that they at least do not leak
+	 * uninitialized kernel stack memory into cr2 and error code.
+	 */
+	memset(exception, 0, sizeof(*exception));
+	return kvm_read_guest_virt_helper(addr, val, bytes, vcpu, access,
+					  exception);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_read_guest_virt);
+
+static int emulator_read_std(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt,
+			     gva_t addr, void *val, unsigned int bytes,
+			     struct x86_exception *exception, bool system)
+{
+	struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = emul_to_vcpu(ctxt);
+	u64 access = 0;
+
+	if (system)
+		access |= PFERR_IMPLICIT_ACCESS;
+	else if (static_call(kvm_x86_get_cpl)(vcpu) == 3)
+		access |= PFERR_USER_MASK;
+
+	return kvm_read_guest_virt_helper(addr, val, bytes, vcpu, access, exception);
+}
+
+static int kvm_write_guest_virt_helper(gva_t addr, void *val, unsigned int bytes,
+				      struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 access,
+				      struct x86_exception *exception)
+{
+	struct kvm_mmu *mmu = vcpu->arch.walk_mmu;
+	void *data = val;
+	int r = X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
+
+	while (bytes) {
+		gpa_t gpa = mmu->gva_to_gpa(vcpu, mmu, addr, access, exception);
+		unsigned offset = addr & (PAGE_SIZE-1);
+		unsigned towrite = min(bytes, (unsigned)PAGE_SIZE - offset);
+		int ret;
+
+		if (gpa == INVALID_GPA)
+			return X86EMUL_PROPAGATE_FAULT;
+		ret = kvm_vcpu_write_guest(vcpu, gpa, data, towrite);
+		if (ret < 0) {
+			r = X86EMUL_IO_NEEDED;
+			goto out;
+		}
+
+		bytes -= towrite;
+		data += towrite;
+		addr += towrite;
+	}
+out:
+	return r;
+}
+
+static int emulator_write_std(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, gva_t addr, void *val,
+			      unsigned int bytes, struct x86_exception *exception,
+			      bool system)
+{
+	struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = emul_to_vcpu(ctxt);
+	u64 access = PFERR_WRITE_MASK;
+
+	if (system)
+		access |= PFERR_IMPLICIT_ACCESS;
+	else if (static_call(kvm_x86_get_cpl)(vcpu) == 3)
+		access |= PFERR_USER_MASK;
+
+	return kvm_write_guest_virt_helper(addr, val, bytes, vcpu,
+					   access, exception);
+}
+
+int kvm_write_guest_virt_system(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gva_t addr, void *val,
+				unsigned int bytes, struct x86_exception *exception)
+{
+	/* kvm_write_guest_virt_system can pull in tons of pages. */
+	vcpu->arch.l1tf_flush_l1d = true;
+
+	return kvm_write_guest_virt_helper(addr, val, bytes, vcpu,
+					   PFERR_WRITE_MASK, exception);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_write_guest_virt_system);
+
+static int kvm_can_emulate_insn(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int emul_type,
+				void *insn, int insn_len)
+{
+	return static_call(kvm_x86_can_emulate_instruction)(vcpu, emul_type,
+							    insn, insn_len);
+}
+
+int handle_ud(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	static const char kvm_emulate_prefix[] = { __KVM_EMULATE_PREFIX };
+	int fep_flags = READ_ONCE(force_emulation_prefix);
+	int emul_type = EMULTYPE_TRAP_UD;
+	char sig[5]; /* ud2; .ascii "kvm" */
+	struct x86_exception e;
+
+	if (unlikely(!kvm_can_emulate_insn(vcpu, emul_type, NULL, 0)))
+		return 1;
+
+	if (fep_flags &&
+	    kvm_read_guest_virt(vcpu, kvm_get_linear_rip(vcpu),
+				sig, sizeof(sig), &e) == 0 &&
+	    memcmp(sig, kvm_emulate_prefix, sizeof(sig)) == 0) {
+		if (fep_flags & KVM_FEP_CLEAR_RFLAGS_RF)
+			kvm_set_rflags(vcpu, kvm_get_rflags(vcpu) & ~X86_EFLAGS_RF);
+		kvm_rip_write(vcpu, kvm_rip_read(vcpu) + sizeof(sig));
+		emul_type = EMULTYPE_TRAP_UD_FORCED;
+	}
+
+	return kvm_emulate_instruction(vcpu, emul_type);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(handle_ud);
+
+static int vcpu_is_mmio_gpa(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long gva,
+			    gpa_t gpa, bool write)
+{
+	/* For APIC access vmexit */
+	if ((gpa & PAGE_MASK) == APIC_DEFAULT_PHYS_BASE)
+		return 1;
+
+	if (vcpu_match_mmio_gpa(vcpu, gpa)) {
+		trace_vcpu_match_mmio(gva, gpa, write, true);
+		return 1;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int vcpu_mmio_gva_to_gpa(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long gva,
+				gpa_t *gpa, struct x86_exception *exception,
+				bool write)
+{
+	struct kvm_mmu *mmu = vcpu->arch.walk_mmu;
+	u64 access = ((static_call(kvm_x86_get_cpl)(vcpu) == 3) ? PFERR_USER_MASK : 0)
+		| (write ? PFERR_WRITE_MASK : 0);
+
+	/*
+	 * currently PKRU is only applied to ept enabled guest so
+	 * there is no pkey in EPT page table for L1 guest or EPT
+	 * shadow page table for L2 guest.
+	 */
+	if (vcpu_match_mmio_gva(vcpu, gva) && (!is_paging(vcpu) ||
+	    !permission_fault(vcpu, vcpu->arch.walk_mmu,
+			      vcpu->arch.mmio_access, 0, access))) {
+		*gpa = vcpu->arch.mmio_gfn << PAGE_SHIFT |
+					(gva & (PAGE_SIZE - 1));
+		trace_vcpu_match_mmio(gva, *gpa, write, false);
+		return 1;
+	}
+
+	*gpa = mmu->gva_to_gpa(vcpu, mmu, gva, access, exception);
+
+	if (*gpa == INVALID_GPA)
+		return -1;
+
+	return vcpu_is_mmio_gpa(vcpu, gva, *gpa, write);
+}
+
+int emulator_write_phys(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t gpa,
+			const void *val, int bytes)
+{
+	int ret;
+
+	ret = kvm_vcpu_write_guest(vcpu, gpa, val, bytes);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		return 0;
+	kvm_page_track_write(vcpu, gpa, val, bytes);
+	return 1;
+}
+
+struct read_write_emulator_ops {
+	int (*read_write_prepare)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, void *val,
+				  int bytes);
+	int (*read_write_emulate)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t gpa,
+				  void *val, int bytes);
+	int (*read_write_mmio)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t gpa,
+			       int bytes, void *val);
+	int (*read_write_exit_mmio)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t gpa,
+				    void *val, int bytes);
+	bool write;
+};
+
+static int read_prepare(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, void *val, int bytes)
+{
+	if (vcpu->mmio_read_completed) {
+		trace_kvm_mmio(KVM_TRACE_MMIO_READ, bytes,
+			       vcpu->mmio_fragments[0].gpa, val);
+		vcpu->mmio_read_completed = 0;
+		return 1;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int read_emulate(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t gpa,
+			void *val, int bytes)
+{
+	return !kvm_vcpu_read_guest(vcpu, gpa, val, bytes);
+}
+
+static int write_emulate(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t gpa,
+			 void *val, int bytes)
+{
+	return emulator_write_phys(vcpu, gpa, val, bytes);
+}
+
+static int write_mmio(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t gpa, int bytes, void *val)
+{
+	trace_kvm_mmio(KVM_TRACE_MMIO_WRITE, bytes, gpa, val);
+	return vcpu_mmio_write(vcpu, gpa, bytes, val);
+}
+
+static int read_exit_mmio(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t gpa,
+			  void *val, int bytes)
+{
+	trace_kvm_mmio(KVM_TRACE_MMIO_READ_UNSATISFIED, bytes, gpa, NULL);
+	return X86EMUL_IO_NEEDED;
+}
+
+static int write_exit_mmio(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t gpa,
+			   void *val, int bytes)
+{
+	struct kvm_mmio_fragment *frag = &vcpu->mmio_fragments[0];
+
+	memcpy(vcpu->run->mmio.data, frag->data, min(8u, frag->len));
+	return X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
+}
+
+static const struct read_write_emulator_ops read_emultor = {
+	.read_write_prepare = read_prepare,
+	.read_write_emulate = read_emulate,
+	.read_write_mmio = vcpu_mmio_read,
+	.read_write_exit_mmio = read_exit_mmio,
+};
+
+static const struct read_write_emulator_ops write_emultor = {
+	.read_write_emulate = write_emulate,
+	.read_write_mmio = write_mmio,
+	.read_write_exit_mmio = write_exit_mmio,
+	.write = true,
+};
+
+static int emulator_read_write_onepage(unsigned long addr, void *val,
+				       unsigned int bytes,
+				       struct x86_exception *exception,
+				       struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+				       const struct read_write_emulator_ops *ops)
+{
+	gpa_t gpa;
+	int handled, ret;
+	bool write = ops->write;
+	struct kvm_mmio_fragment *frag;
+	struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt = vcpu->arch.emulate_ctxt;
+
+	/*
+	 * If the exit was due to a NPF we may already have a GPA.
+	 * If the GPA is present, use it to avoid the GVA to GPA table walk.
+	 * Note, this cannot be used on string operations since string
+	 * operation using rep will only have the initial GPA from the NPF
+	 * occurred.
+	 */
+	if (ctxt->gpa_available && emulator_can_use_gpa(ctxt) &&
+	    (addr & ~PAGE_MASK) == (ctxt->gpa_val & ~PAGE_MASK)) {
+		gpa = ctxt->gpa_val;
+		ret = vcpu_is_mmio_gpa(vcpu, addr, gpa, write);
+	} else {
+		ret = vcpu_mmio_gva_to_gpa(vcpu, addr, &gpa, exception, write);
+		if (ret < 0)
+			return X86EMUL_PROPAGATE_FAULT;
+	}
+
+	if (!ret && ops->read_write_emulate(vcpu, gpa, val, bytes))
+		return X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
+
+	/*
+	 * Is this MMIO handled locally?
+	 */
+	handled = ops->read_write_mmio(vcpu, gpa, bytes, val);
+	if (handled == bytes)
+		return X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
+
+	gpa += handled;
+	bytes -= handled;
+	val += handled;
+
+	WARN_ON(vcpu->mmio_nr_fragments >= KVM_MAX_MMIO_FRAGMENTS);
+	frag = &vcpu->mmio_fragments[vcpu->mmio_nr_fragments++];
+	frag->gpa = gpa;
+	frag->data = val;
+	frag->len = bytes;
+	return X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
+}
+
+static int emulator_read_write(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt,
+			unsigned long addr,
+			void *val, unsigned int bytes,
+			struct x86_exception *exception,
+			const struct read_write_emulator_ops *ops)
+{
+	struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = emul_to_vcpu(ctxt);
+	gpa_t gpa;
+	int rc;
+
+	if (ops->read_write_prepare &&
+		  ops->read_write_prepare(vcpu, val, bytes))
+		return X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
+
+	vcpu->mmio_nr_fragments = 0;
+
+	/* Crossing a page boundary? */
+	if (((addr + bytes - 1) ^ addr) & PAGE_MASK) {
+		int now;
+
+		now = -addr & ~PAGE_MASK;
+		rc = emulator_read_write_onepage(addr, val, now, exception,
+						 vcpu, ops);
+
+		if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
+			return rc;
+		addr += now;
+		if (ctxt->mode != X86EMUL_MODE_PROT64)
+			addr = (u32)addr;
+		val += now;
+		bytes -= now;
+	}
+
+	rc = emulator_read_write_onepage(addr, val, bytes, exception,
+					 vcpu, ops);
+	if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
+		return rc;
+
+	if (!vcpu->mmio_nr_fragments)
+		return rc;
+
+	gpa = vcpu->mmio_fragments[0].gpa;
+
+	vcpu->mmio_needed = 1;
+	vcpu->mmio_cur_fragment = 0;
+
+	vcpu->run->mmio.len = min(8u, vcpu->mmio_fragments[0].len);
+	vcpu->run->mmio.is_write = vcpu->mmio_is_write = ops->write;
+	vcpu->run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_MMIO;
+	vcpu->run->mmio.phys_addr = gpa;
+
+	return ops->read_write_exit_mmio(vcpu, gpa, val, bytes);
+}
+
+static int emulator_read_emulated(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt,
+				  unsigned long addr,
+				  void *val,
+				  unsigned int bytes,
+				  struct x86_exception *exception)
+{
+	return emulator_read_write(ctxt, addr, val, bytes,
+				   exception, &read_emultor);
+}
+
+static int emulator_write_emulated(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt,
+			    unsigned long addr,
+			    const void *val,
+			    unsigned int bytes,
+			    struct x86_exception *exception)
+{
+	return emulator_read_write(ctxt, addr, (void *)val, bytes,
+				   exception, &write_emultor);
+}
+
+#define emulator_try_cmpxchg_user(t, ptr, old, new) \
+	(__try_cmpxchg_user((t __user *)(ptr), (t *)(old), *(t *)(new), efault ## t))
+
+static int emulator_cmpxchg_emulated(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt,
+				     unsigned long addr,
+				     const void *old,
+				     const void *new,
+				     unsigned int bytes,
+				     struct x86_exception *exception)
+{
+	struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = emul_to_vcpu(ctxt);
+	u64 page_line_mask;
+	unsigned long hva;
+	gpa_t gpa;
+	int r;
+
+	/* guests cmpxchg8b have to be emulated atomically */
+	if (bytes > 8 || (bytes & (bytes - 1)))
+		goto emul_write;
+
+	gpa = kvm_mmu_gva_to_gpa_write(vcpu, addr, NULL);
+
+	if (gpa == INVALID_GPA ||
+	    (gpa & PAGE_MASK) == APIC_DEFAULT_PHYS_BASE)
+		goto emul_write;
+
+	/*
+	 * Emulate the atomic as a straight write to avoid #AC if SLD is
+	 * enabled in the host and the access splits a cache line.
+	 */
+	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SPLIT_LOCK_DETECT))
+		page_line_mask = ~(cache_line_size() - 1);
+	else
+		page_line_mask = PAGE_MASK;
+
+	if (((gpa + bytes - 1) & page_line_mask) != (gpa & page_line_mask))
+		goto emul_write;
+
+	hva = kvm_vcpu_gfn_to_hva(vcpu, gpa_to_gfn(gpa));
+	if (kvm_is_error_hva(hva))
+		goto emul_write;
+
+	hva += offset_in_page(gpa);
+
+	switch (bytes) {
+	case 1:
+		r = emulator_try_cmpxchg_user(u8, hva, old, new);
+		break;
+	case 2:
+		r = emulator_try_cmpxchg_user(u16, hva, old, new);
+		break;
+	case 4:
+		r = emulator_try_cmpxchg_user(u32, hva, old, new);
+		break;
+	case 8:
+		r = emulator_try_cmpxchg_user(u64, hva, old, new);
+		break;
+	default:
+		BUG();
+	}
+
+	if (r < 0)
+		return X86EMUL_UNHANDLEABLE;
+	if (r)
+		return X86EMUL_CMPXCHG_FAILED;
+
+	kvm_page_track_write(vcpu, gpa, new, bytes);
+
+	return X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
+
+emul_write:
+	pr_warn_once("emulating exchange as write\n");
+
+	return emulator_write_emulated(ctxt, addr, new, bytes, exception);
+}
+
+static int emulator_pio_in_out(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int size,
+			       unsigned short port, void *data,
+			       unsigned int count, bool in)
+{
+	unsigned i;
+	int r;
+
+	WARN_ON_ONCE(vcpu->arch.pio.count);
+	for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
+		if (in)
+			r = kvm_io_bus_read(vcpu, KVM_PIO_BUS, port, size, data);
+		else
+			r = kvm_io_bus_write(vcpu, KVM_PIO_BUS, port, size, data);
+
+		if (r) {
+			if (i == 0)
+				goto userspace_io;
+
+			/*
+			 * Userspace must have unregistered the device while PIO
+			 * was running.  Drop writes / read as 0.
+			 */
+			if (in)
+				memset(data, 0, size * (count - i));
+			break;
+		}
+
+		data += size;
+	}
+	return 1;
+
+userspace_io:
+	vcpu->arch.pio.port = port;
+	vcpu->arch.pio.in = in;
+	vcpu->arch.pio.count = count;
+	vcpu->arch.pio.size = size;
+
+	if (in)
+		memset(vcpu->arch.pio_data, 0, size * count);
+	else
+		memcpy(vcpu->arch.pio_data, data, size * count);
+
+	vcpu->run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_IO;
+	vcpu->run->io.direction = in ? KVM_EXIT_IO_IN : KVM_EXIT_IO_OUT;
+	vcpu->run->io.size = size;
+	vcpu->run->io.data_offset = KVM_PIO_PAGE_OFFSET * PAGE_SIZE;
+	vcpu->run->io.count = count;
+	vcpu->run->io.port = port;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int emulator_pio_in(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int size,
+      			   unsigned short port, void *val, unsigned int count)
+{
+	int r = emulator_pio_in_out(vcpu, size, port, val, count, true);
+	if (r)
+		trace_kvm_pio(KVM_PIO_IN, port, size, count, val);
+
+	return r;
+}
+
+static void complete_emulator_pio_in(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, void *val)
+{
+	int size = vcpu->arch.pio.size;
+	unsigned int count = vcpu->arch.pio.count;
+	memcpy(val, vcpu->arch.pio_data, size * count);
+	trace_kvm_pio(KVM_PIO_IN, vcpu->arch.pio.port, size, count, vcpu->arch.pio_data);
+	vcpu->arch.pio.count = 0;
+}
+
+static int emulator_pio_in_emulated(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt,
+				    int size, unsigned short port, void *val,
+				    unsigned int count)
+{
+	struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = emul_to_vcpu(ctxt);
+	if (vcpu->arch.pio.count) {
+		/*
+		 * Complete a previous iteration that required userspace I/O.
+		 * Note, @count isn't guaranteed to match pio.count as userspace
+		 * can modify ECX before rerunning the vCPU.  Ignore any such
+		 * shenanigans as KVM doesn't support modifying the rep count,
+		 * and the emulator ensures @count doesn't overflow the buffer.
+		 */
+		complete_emulator_pio_in(vcpu, val);
+		return 1;
+	}
+
+	return emulator_pio_in(vcpu, size, port, val, count);
+}
+
+static int emulator_pio_out(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int size,
+			    unsigned short port, const void *val,
+			    unsigned int count)
+{
+	trace_kvm_pio(KVM_PIO_OUT, port, size, count, val);
+	return emulator_pio_in_out(vcpu, size, port, (void *)val, count, false);
+}
+
+static int emulator_pio_out_emulated(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt,
+				     int size, unsigned short port,
+				     const void *val, unsigned int count)
+{
+	return emulator_pio_out(emul_to_vcpu(ctxt), size, port, val, count);
+}
+
+static unsigned long get_segment_base(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int seg)
+{
+	return static_call(kvm_x86_get_segment_base)(vcpu, seg);
+}
+
+static void emulator_invlpg(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, ulong address)
+{
+	kvm_mmu_invlpg(emul_to_vcpu(ctxt), address);
+}
+
+static int kvm_emulate_wbinvd_noskip(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	if (!need_emulate_wbinvd(vcpu))
+		return X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
+
+	if (static_call(kvm_x86_has_wbinvd_exit)()) {
+		int cpu = get_cpu();
+
+		cpumask_set_cpu(cpu, vcpu->arch.wbinvd_dirty_mask);
+		on_each_cpu_mask(vcpu->arch.wbinvd_dirty_mask,
+				wbinvd_ipi, NULL, 1);
+		put_cpu();
+		cpumask_clear(vcpu->arch.wbinvd_dirty_mask);
+	} else
+		wbinvd();
+	return X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
+}
+
+int kvm_emulate_wbinvd(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	kvm_emulate_wbinvd_noskip(vcpu);
+	return kvm_skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_emulate_wbinvd);
+
+
+
+static void emulator_wbinvd(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
+{
+	kvm_emulate_wbinvd_noskip(emul_to_vcpu(ctxt));
+}
+
+static void emulator_get_dr(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, int dr,
+			    unsigned long *dest)
+{
+	kvm_get_dr(emul_to_vcpu(ctxt), dr, dest);
+}
+
+static int emulator_set_dr(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, int dr,
+			   unsigned long value)
+{
+
+	return kvm_set_dr(emul_to_vcpu(ctxt), dr, value);
+}
+
+static u64 mk_cr_64(u64 curr_cr, u32 new_val)
+{
+	return (curr_cr & ~((1ULL << 32) - 1)) | new_val;
+}
+
+static unsigned long emulator_get_cr(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, int cr)
+{
+	struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = emul_to_vcpu(ctxt);
+	unsigned long value;
+
+	switch (cr) {
+	case 0:
+		value = kvm_read_cr0(vcpu);
+		break;
+	case 2:
+		value = vcpu->arch.cr2;
+		break;
+	case 3:
+		value = kvm_read_cr3(vcpu);
+		break;
+	case 4:
+		value = kvm_read_cr4(vcpu);
+		break;
+	case 8:
+		value = kvm_get_cr8(vcpu);
+		break;
+	default:
+		kvm_err("%s: unexpected cr %u\n", __func__, cr);
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	return value;
+}
+
+static int emulator_set_cr(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, int cr, ulong val)
+{
+	struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = emul_to_vcpu(ctxt);
+	int res = 0;
+
+	switch (cr) {
+	case 0:
+		res = kvm_set_cr0(vcpu, mk_cr_64(kvm_read_cr0(vcpu), val));
+		break;
+	case 2:
+		vcpu->arch.cr2 = val;
+		break;
+	case 3:
+		res = kvm_set_cr3(vcpu, val);
+		break;
+	case 4:
+		res = kvm_set_cr4(vcpu, mk_cr_64(kvm_read_cr4(vcpu), val));
+		break;
+	case 8:
+		res = kvm_set_cr8(vcpu, val);
+		break;
+	default:
+		kvm_err("%s: unexpected cr %u\n", __func__, cr);
+		res = -1;
+	}
+
+	return res;
+}
+
+static int emulator_get_cpl(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
+{
+	return static_call(kvm_x86_get_cpl)(emul_to_vcpu(ctxt));
+}
+
+static void emulator_get_gdt(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, struct desc_ptr *dt)
+{
+	static_call(kvm_x86_get_gdt)(emul_to_vcpu(ctxt), dt);
+}
+
+static void emulator_get_idt(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, struct desc_ptr *dt)
+{
+	static_call(kvm_x86_get_idt)(emul_to_vcpu(ctxt), dt);
+}
+
+static void emulator_set_gdt(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, struct desc_ptr *dt)
+{
+	static_call(kvm_x86_set_gdt)(emul_to_vcpu(ctxt), dt);
+}
+
+static void emulator_set_idt(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, struct desc_ptr *dt)
+{
+	static_call(kvm_x86_set_idt)(emul_to_vcpu(ctxt), dt);
+}
+
+static unsigned long emulator_get_cached_segment_base(
+	struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, int seg)
+{
+	return get_segment_base(emul_to_vcpu(ctxt), seg);
+}
+
+static bool emulator_get_segment(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, u16 *selector,
+				 struct desc_struct *desc, u32 *base3,
+				 int seg)
+{
+	struct kvm_segment var;
+
+	kvm_get_segment(emul_to_vcpu(ctxt), &var, seg);
+	*selector = var.selector;
+
+	if (var.unusable) {
+		memset(desc, 0, sizeof(*desc));
+		if (base3)
+			*base3 = 0;
+		return false;
+	}
+
+	if (var.g)
+		var.limit >>= 12;
+	set_desc_limit(desc, var.limit);
+	set_desc_base(desc, (unsigned long)var.base);
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+	if (base3)
+		*base3 = var.base >> 32;
+#endif
+	desc->type = var.type;
+	desc->s = var.s;
+	desc->dpl = var.dpl;
+	desc->p = var.present;
+	desc->avl = var.avl;
+	desc->l = var.l;
+	desc->d = var.db;
+	desc->g = var.g;
+
+	return true;
+}
+
+static void emulator_set_segment(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, u16 selector,
+				 struct desc_struct *desc, u32 base3,
+				 int seg)
+{
+	struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = emul_to_vcpu(ctxt);
+	struct kvm_segment var;
+
+	var.selector = selector;
+	var.base = get_desc_base(desc);
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+	var.base |= ((u64)base3) << 32;
+#endif
+	var.limit = get_desc_limit(desc);
+	if (desc->g)
+		var.limit = (var.limit << 12) | 0xfff;
+	var.type = desc->type;
+	var.dpl = desc->dpl;
+	var.db = desc->d;
+	var.s = desc->s;
+	var.l = desc->l;
+	var.g = desc->g;
+	var.avl = desc->avl;
+	var.present = desc->p;
+	var.unusable = !var.present;
+	var.padding = 0;
+
+	kvm_set_segment(vcpu, &var, seg);
+	return;
+}
+
+static int emulator_get_msr_with_filter(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt,
+					u32 msr_index, u64 *pdata)
+{
+	struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = emul_to_vcpu(ctxt);
+	int r;
+
+	r = kvm_get_msr_with_filter(vcpu, msr_index, pdata);
+	if (r < 0)
+		return X86EMUL_UNHANDLEABLE;
+
+	if (r) {
+		if (kvm_msr_user_space(vcpu, msr_index, KVM_EXIT_X86_RDMSR, 0,
+				       complete_emulated_rdmsr, r))
+			return X86EMUL_IO_NEEDED;
+
+		trace_kvm_msr_read_ex(msr_index);
+		return X86EMUL_PROPAGATE_FAULT;
+	}
+
+	trace_kvm_msr_read(msr_index, *pdata);
+	return X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
+}
+
+static int emulator_set_msr_with_filter(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt,
+					u32 msr_index, u64 data)
+{
+	struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = emul_to_vcpu(ctxt);
+	int r;
+
+	r = kvm_set_msr_with_filter(vcpu, msr_index, data);
+	if (r < 0)
+		return X86EMUL_UNHANDLEABLE;
+
+	if (r) {
+		if (kvm_msr_user_space(vcpu, msr_index, KVM_EXIT_X86_WRMSR, data,
+				       complete_emulated_msr_access, r))
+			return X86EMUL_IO_NEEDED;
+
+		trace_kvm_msr_write_ex(msr_index, data);
+		return X86EMUL_PROPAGATE_FAULT;
+	}
+
+	trace_kvm_msr_write(msr_index, data);
+	return X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
+}
+
+static int emulator_get_msr(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt,
+			    u32 msr_index, u64 *pdata)
+{
+	return kvm_get_msr(emul_to_vcpu(ctxt), msr_index, pdata);
+}
+
+static int emulator_check_pmc(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt,
+			      u32 pmc)
+{
+	if (kvm_pmu_is_valid_rdpmc_ecx(emul_to_vcpu(ctxt), pmc))
+		return 0;
+	return -EINVAL;
+}
+
+static int emulator_read_pmc(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt,
+			     u32 pmc, u64 *pdata)
+{
+	return kvm_pmu_rdpmc(emul_to_vcpu(ctxt), pmc, pdata);
+}
+
+static void emulator_halt(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
+{
+	emul_to_vcpu(ctxt)->arch.halt_request = 1;
+}
+
+static int emulator_intercept(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt,
+			      struct x86_instruction_info *info,
+			      enum x86_intercept_stage stage)
+{
+	return static_call(kvm_x86_check_intercept)(emul_to_vcpu(ctxt), info, stage,
+					    &ctxt->exception);
+}
+
+static bool emulator_get_cpuid(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt,
+			      u32 *eax, u32 *ebx, u32 *ecx, u32 *edx,
+			      bool exact_only)
+{
+	return kvm_cpuid(emul_to_vcpu(ctxt), eax, ebx, ecx, edx, exact_only);
+}
+
+static bool emulator_guest_has_movbe(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
+{
+	return guest_cpuid_has(emul_to_vcpu(ctxt), X86_FEATURE_MOVBE);
+}
+
+static bool emulator_guest_has_fxsr(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
+{
+	return guest_cpuid_has(emul_to_vcpu(ctxt), X86_FEATURE_FXSR);
+}
+
+static bool emulator_guest_has_rdpid(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
+{
+	return guest_cpuid_has(emul_to_vcpu(ctxt), X86_FEATURE_RDPID);
+}
+
+static ulong emulator_read_gpr(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, unsigned reg)
+{
+	return kvm_register_read_raw(emul_to_vcpu(ctxt), reg);
+}
+
+static void emulator_write_gpr(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, unsigned reg, ulong val)
+{
+	kvm_register_write_raw(emul_to_vcpu(ctxt), reg, val);
+}
+
+static void emulator_set_nmi_mask(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, bool masked)
+{
+	static_call(kvm_x86_set_nmi_mask)(emul_to_vcpu(ctxt), masked);
+}
+
+static bool emulator_is_smm(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
+{
+	return is_smm(emul_to_vcpu(ctxt));
+}
+
+static bool emulator_is_guest_mode(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
+{
+	return is_guest_mode(emul_to_vcpu(ctxt));
+}
+
+#ifndef CONFIG_KVM_SMM
+static int emulator_leave_smm(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
+{
+	WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
+	return X86EMUL_UNHANDLEABLE;
+}
+#endif
+
+static void emulator_triple_fault(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
+{
+	kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_TRIPLE_FAULT, emul_to_vcpu(ctxt));
+}
+
+static int emulator_set_xcr(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, u32 index, u64 xcr)
+{
+	return __kvm_set_xcr(emul_to_vcpu(ctxt), index, xcr);
+}
+
+static void emulator_vm_bugged(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
+{
+	struct kvm *kvm = emul_to_vcpu(ctxt)->kvm;
+
+	if (!kvm->vm_bugged)
+		kvm_vm_bugged(kvm);
+}
+
+static const struct x86_emulate_ops emulate_ops = {
+	.vm_bugged           = emulator_vm_bugged,
+	.read_gpr            = emulator_read_gpr,
+	.write_gpr           = emulator_write_gpr,
+	.read_std            = emulator_read_std,
+	.write_std           = emulator_write_std,
+	.fetch               = kvm_fetch_guest_virt,
+	.read_emulated       = emulator_read_emulated,
+	.write_emulated      = emulator_write_emulated,
+	.cmpxchg_emulated    = emulator_cmpxchg_emulated,
+	.invlpg              = emulator_invlpg,
+	.pio_in_emulated     = emulator_pio_in_emulated,
+	.pio_out_emulated    = emulator_pio_out_emulated,
+	.get_segment         = emulator_get_segment,
+	.set_segment         = emulator_set_segment,
+	.get_cached_segment_base = emulator_get_cached_segment_base,
+	.get_gdt             = emulator_get_gdt,
+	.get_idt	     = emulator_get_idt,
+	.set_gdt             = emulator_set_gdt,
+	.set_idt	     = emulator_set_idt,
+	.get_cr              = emulator_get_cr,
+	.set_cr              = emulator_set_cr,
+	.cpl                 = emulator_get_cpl,
+	.get_dr              = emulator_get_dr,
+	.set_dr              = emulator_set_dr,
+	.set_msr_with_filter = emulator_set_msr_with_filter,
+	.get_msr_with_filter = emulator_get_msr_with_filter,
+	.get_msr             = emulator_get_msr,
+	.check_pmc	     = emulator_check_pmc,
+	.read_pmc            = emulator_read_pmc,
+	.halt                = emulator_halt,
+	.wbinvd              = emulator_wbinvd,
+	.fix_hypercall       = emulator_fix_hypercall,
+	.intercept           = emulator_intercept,
+	.get_cpuid           = emulator_get_cpuid,
+	.guest_has_movbe     = emulator_guest_has_movbe,
+	.guest_has_fxsr      = emulator_guest_has_fxsr,
+	.guest_has_rdpid     = emulator_guest_has_rdpid,
+	.set_nmi_mask        = emulator_set_nmi_mask,
+	.is_smm              = emulator_is_smm,
+	.is_guest_mode       = emulator_is_guest_mode,
+	.leave_smm           = emulator_leave_smm,
+	.triple_fault        = emulator_triple_fault,
+	.set_xcr             = emulator_set_xcr,
+};
+
+static void toggle_interruptibility(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 mask)
+{
+	u32 int_shadow = static_call(kvm_x86_get_interrupt_shadow)(vcpu);
+	/*
+	 * an sti; sti; sequence only disable interrupts for the first
+	 * instruction. So, if the last instruction, be it emulated or
+	 * not, left the system with the INT_STI flag enabled, it
+	 * means that the last instruction is an sti. We should not
+	 * leave the flag on in this case. The same goes for mov ss
+	 */
+	if (int_shadow & mask)
+		mask = 0;
+	if (unlikely(int_shadow || mask)) {
+		static_call(kvm_x86_set_interrupt_shadow)(vcpu, mask);
+		if (!mask)
+			kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_EVENT, vcpu);
+	}
+}
+
+static void inject_emulated_exception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt = vcpu->arch.emulate_ctxt;
+
+	if (ctxt->exception.vector == PF_VECTOR)
+		kvm_inject_emulated_page_fault(vcpu, &ctxt->exception);
+	else if (ctxt->exception.error_code_valid)
+		kvm_queue_exception_e(vcpu, ctxt->exception.vector,
+				      ctxt->exception.error_code);
+	else
+		kvm_queue_exception(vcpu, ctxt->exception.vector);
+}
+
+static struct x86_emulate_ctxt *alloc_emulate_ctxt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt;
+
+	ctxt = kmem_cache_zalloc(x86_emulator_cache, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
+	if (!ctxt) {
+		pr_err("failed to allocate vcpu's emulator\n");
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	ctxt->vcpu = vcpu;
+	ctxt->ops = &emulate_ops;
+	vcpu->arch.emulate_ctxt = ctxt;
+
+	return ctxt;
+}
+
+static void init_emulate_ctxt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt = vcpu->arch.emulate_ctxt;
+	int cs_db, cs_l;
+
+	static_call(kvm_x86_get_cs_db_l_bits)(vcpu, &cs_db, &cs_l);
+
+	ctxt->gpa_available = false;
+	ctxt->eflags = kvm_get_rflags(vcpu);
+	ctxt->tf = (ctxt->eflags & X86_EFLAGS_TF) != 0;
+
+	ctxt->eip = kvm_rip_read(vcpu);
+	ctxt->mode = (!is_protmode(vcpu))		? X86EMUL_MODE_REAL :
+		     (ctxt->eflags & X86_EFLAGS_VM)	? X86EMUL_MODE_VM86 :
+		     (cs_l && is_long_mode(vcpu))	? X86EMUL_MODE_PROT64 :
+		     cs_db				? X86EMUL_MODE_PROT32 :
+							  X86EMUL_MODE_PROT16;
+	ctxt->interruptibility = 0;
+	ctxt->have_exception = false;
+	ctxt->exception.vector = -1;
+	ctxt->perm_ok = false;
+
+	init_decode_cache(ctxt);
+	vcpu->arch.emulate_regs_need_sync_from_vcpu = false;
+}
+
+void kvm_inject_realmode_interrupt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int irq, int inc_eip)
+{
+	struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt = vcpu->arch.emulate_ctxt;
+	int ret;
+
+	init_emulate_ctxt(vcpu);
+
+	ctxt->op_bytes = 2;
+	ctxt->ad_bytes = 2;
+	ctxt->_eip = ctxt->eip + inc_eip;
+	ret = emulate_int_real(ctxt, irq);
+
+	if (ret != X86EMUL_CONTINUE) {
+		kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_TRIPLE_FAULT, vcpu);
+	} else {
+		ctxt->eip = ctxt->_eip;
+		kvm_rip_write(vcpu, ctxt->eip);
+		kvm_set_rflags(vcpu, ctxt->eflags);
+	}
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_inject_realmode_interrupt);
+
+static void prepare_emulation_failure_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 *data,
+					   u8 ndata, u8 *insn_bytes, u8 insn_size)
+{
+	struct kvm_run *run = vcpu->run;
+	u64 info[5];
+	u8 info_start;
+
+	/*
+	 * Zero the whole array used to retrieve the exit info, as casting to
+	 * u32 for select entries will leave some chunks uninitialized.
+	 */
+	memset(&info, 0, sizeof(info));
+
+	static_call(kvm_x86_get_exit_info)(vcpu, (u32 *)&info[0], &info[1],
+					   &info[2], (u32 *)&info[3],
+					   (u32 *)&info[4]);
+
+	run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+	run->emulation_failure.suberror = KVM_INTERNAL_ERROR_EMULATION;
+
+	/*
+	 * There's currently space for 13 entries, but 5 are used for the exit
+	 * reason and info.  Restrict to 4 to reduce the maintenance burden
+	 * when expanding kvm_run.emulation_failure in the future.
+	 */
+	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(ndata > 4))
+		ndata = 4;
+
+	/* Always include the flags as a 'data' entry. */
+	info_start = 1;
+	run->emulation_failure.flags = 0;
+
+	if (insn_size) {
+		BUILD_BUG_ON((sizeof(run->emulation_failure.insn_size) +
+			      sizeof(run->emulation_failure.insn_bytes) != 16));
+		info_start += 2;
+		run->emulation_failure.flags |=
+			KVM_INTERNAL_ERROR_EMULATION_FLAG_INSTRUCTION_BYTES;
+		run->emulation_failure.insn_size = insn_size;
+		memset(run->emulation_failure.insn_bytes, 0x90,
+		       sizeof(run->emulation_failure.insn_bytes));
+		memcpy(run->emulation_failure.insn_bytes, insn_bytes, insn_size);
+	}
+
+	memcpy(&run->internal.data[info_start], info, sizeof(info));
+	memcpy(&run->internal.data[info_start + ARRAY_SIZE(info)], data,
+	       ndata * sizeof(data[0]));
+
+	run->emulation_failure.ndata = info_start + ARRAY_SIZE(info) + ndata;
+}
+
+static void prepare_emulation_ctxt_failure_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt = vcpu->arch.emulate_ctxt;
+
+	prepare_emulation_failure_exit(vcpu, NULL, 0, ctxt->fetch.data,
+				       ctxt->fetch.end - ctxt->fetch.data);
+}
+
+void __kvm_prepare_emulation_failure_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 *data,
+					  u8 ndata)
+{
+	prepare_emulation_failure_exit(vcpu, data, ndata, NULL, 0);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__kvm_prepare_emulation_failure_exit);
+
+void kvm_prepare_emulation_failure_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	__kvm_prepare_emulation_failure_exit(vcpu, NULL, 0);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_prepare_emulation_failure_exit);
+
+static int handle_emulation_failure(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int emulation_type)
+{
+	struct kvm *kvm = vcpu->kvm;
+
+	++vcpu->stat.insn_emulation_fail;
+	trace_kvm_emulate_insn_failed(vcpu);
+
+	if (emulation_type & EMULTYPE_VMWARE_GP) {
+		kvm_queue_exception_e(vcpu, GP_VECTOR, 0);
+		return 1;
+	}
+
+	if (kvm->arch.exit_on_emulation_error ||
+	    (emulation_type & EMULTYPE_SKIP)) {
+		prepare_emulation_ctxt_failure_exit(vcpu);
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	kvm_queue_exception(vcpu, UD_VECTOR);
+
+	if (!is_guest_mode(vcpu) && static_call(kvm_x86_get_cpl)(vcpu) == 0) {
+		prepare_emulation_ctxt_failure_exit(vcpu);
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	return 1;
+}
+
+static bool reexecute_instruction(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t cr2_or_gpa,
+				  int emulation_type)
+{
+	gpa_t gpa = cr2_or_gpa;
+	kvm_pfn_t pfn;
+
+	if (!(emulation_type & EMULTYPE_ALLOW_RETRY_PF))
+		return false;
+
+	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(is_guest_mode(vcpu)) ||
+	    WARN_ON_ONCE(!(emulation_type & EMULTYPE_PF)))
+		return false;
+
+	if (!vcpu->arch.mmu->root_role.direct) {
+		/*
+		 * Write permission should be allowed since only
+		 * write access need to be emulated.
+		 */
+		gpa = kvm_mmu_gva_to_gpa_write(vcpu, cr2_or_gpa, NULL);
+
+		/*
+		 * If the mapping is invalid in guest, let cpu retry
+		 * it to generate fault.
+		 */
+		if (gpa == INVALID_GPA)
+			return true;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Do not retry the unhandleable instruction if it faults on the
+	 * readonly host memory, otherwise it will goto a infinite loop:
+	 * retry instruction -> write #PF -> emulation fail -> retry
+	 * instruction -> ...
+	 */
+	pfn = gfn_to_pfn(vcpu->kvm, gpa_to_gfn(gpa));
+
+	/*
+	 * If the instruction failed on the error pfn, it can not be fixed,
+	 * report the error to userspace.
+	 */
+	if (is_error_noslot_pfn(pfn))
+		return false;
+
+	kvm_release_pfn_clean(pfn);
+
+	/* The instructions are well-emulated on direct mmu. */
+	if (vcpu->arch.mmu->root_role.direct) {
+		unsigned int indirect_shadow_pages;
+
+		write_lock(&vcpu->kvm->mmu_lock);
+		indirect_shadow_pages = vcpu->kvm->arch.indirect_shadow_pages;
+		write_unlock(&vcpu->kvm->mmu_lock);
+
+		if (indirect_shadow_pages)
+			kvm_mmu_unprotect_page(vcpu->kvm, gpa_to_gfn(gpa));
+
+		return true;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * if emulation was due to access to shadowed page table
+	 * and it failed try to unshadow page and re-enter the
+	 * guest to let CPU execute the instruction.
+	 */
+	kvm_mmu_unprotect_page(vcpu->kvm, gpa_to_gfn(gpa));
+
+	/*
+	 * If the access faults on its page table, it can not
+	 * be fixed by unprotecting shadow page and it should
+	 * be reported to userspace.
+	 */
+	return !(emulation_type & EMULTYPE_WRITE_PF_TO_SP);
+}
+
+static bool retry_instruction(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt,
+			      gpa_t cr2_or_gpa,  int emulation_type)
+{
+	struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = emul_to_vcpu(ctxt);
+	unsigned long last_retry_eip, last_retry_addr, gpa = cr2_or_gpa;
+
+	last_retry_eip = vcpu->arch.last_retry_eip;
+	last_retry_addr = vcpu->arch.last_retry_addr;
+
+	/*
+	 * If the emulation is caused by #PF and it is non-page_table
+	 * writing instruction, it means the VM-EXIT is caused by shadow
+	 * page protected, we can zap the shadow page and retry this
+	 * instruction directly.
+	 *
+	 * Note: if the guest uses a non-page-table modifying instruction
+	 * on the PDE that points to the instruction, then we will unmap
+	 * the instruction and go to an infinite loop. So, we cache the
+	 * last retried eip and the last fault address, if we meet the eip
+	 * and the address again, we can break out of the potential infinite
+	 * loop.
+	 */
+	vcpu->arch.last_retry_eip = vcpu->arch.last_retry_addr = 0;
+
+	if (!(emulation_type & EMULTYPE_ALLOW_RETRY_PF))
+		return false;
+
+	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(is_guest_mode(vcpu)) ||
+	    WARN_ON_ONCE(!(emulation_type & EMULTYPE_PF)))
+		return false;
+
+	if (x86_page_table_writing_insn(ctxt))
+		return false;
+
+	if (ctxt->eip == last_retry_eip && last_retry_addr == cr2_or_gpa)
+		return false;
+
+	vcpu->arch.last_retry_eip = ctxt->eip;
+	vcpu->arch.last_retry_addr = cr2_or_gpa;
+
+	if (!vcpu->arch.mmu->root_role.direct)
+		gpa = kvm_mmu_gva_to_gpa_write(vcpu, cr2_or_gpa, NULL);
+
+	kvm_mmu_unprotect_page(vcpu->kvm, gpa_to_gfn(gpa));
+
+	return true;
+}
+
+static int complete_emulated_mmio(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+static int complete_emulated_pio(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+
+static int kvm_vcpu_check_hw_bp(unsigned long addr, u32 type, u32 dr7,
+				unsigned long *db)
+{
+	u32 dr6 = 0;
+	int i;
+	u32 enable, rwlen;
+
+	enable = dr7;
+	rwlen = dr7 >> 16;
+	for (i = 0; i < 4; i++, enable >>= 2, rwlen >>= 4)
+		if ((enable & 3) && (rwlen & 15) == type && db[i] == addr)
+			dr6 |= (1 << i);
+	return dr6;
+}
+
+static int kvm_vcpu_do_singlestep(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct kvm_run *kvm_run = vcpu->run;
+
+	if (vcpu->guest_debug & KVM_GUESTDBG_SINGLESTEP) {
+		kvm_run->debug.arch.dr6 = DR6_BS | DR6_ACTIVE_LOW;
+		kvm_run->debug.arch.pc = kvm_get_linear_rip(vcpu);
+		kvm_run->debug.arch.exception = DB_VECTOR;
+		kvm_run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_DEBUG;
+		return 0;
+	}
+	kvm_queue_exception_p(vcpu, DB_VECTOR, DR6_BS);
+	return 1;
+}
+
+int kvm_skip_emulated_instruction(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	unsigned long rflags = static_call(kvm_x86_get_rflags)(vcpu);
+	int r;
+
+	r = static_call(kvm_x86_skip_emulated_instruction)(vcpu);
+	if (unlikely(!r))
+		return 0;
+
+	kvm_pmu_trigger_event(vcpu, PERF_COUNT_HW_INSTRUCTIONS);
+
+	/*
+	 * rflags is the old, "raw" value of the flags.  The new value has
+	 * not been saved yet.
+	 *
+	 * This is correct even for TF set by the guest, because "the
+	 * processor will not generate this exception after the instruction
+	 * that sets the TF flag".
+	 */
+	if (unlikely(rflags & X86_EFLAGS_TF))
+		r = kvm_vcpu_do_singlestep(vcpu);
+	return r;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_skip_emulated_instruction);
+
+static bool kvm_is_code_breakpoint_inhibited(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	u32 shadow;
+
+	if (kvm_get_rflags(vcpu) & X86_EFLAGS_RF)
+		return true;
+
+	/*
+	 * Intel CPUs inhibit code #DBs when MOV/POP SS blocking is active,
+	 * but AMD CPUs do not.  MOV/POP SS blocking is rare, check that first
+	 * to avoid the relatively expensive CPUID lookup.
+	 */
+	shadow = static_call(kvm_x86_get_interrupt_shadow)(vcpu);
+	return (shadow & KVM_X86_SHADOW_INT_MOV_SS) &&
+	       guest_cpuid_is_intel(vcpu);
+}
+
+static bool kvm_vcpu_check_code_breakpoint(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+					   int emulation_type, int *r)
+{
+	WARN_ON_ONCE(emulation_type & EMULTYPE_NO_DECODE);
+
+	/*
+	 * Do not check for code breakpoints if hardware has already done the
+	 * checks, as inferred from the emulation type.  On NO_DECODE and SKIP,
+	 * the instruction has passed all exception checks, and all intercepted
+	 * exceptions that trigger emulation have lower priority than code
+	 * breakpoints, i.e. the fact that the intercepted exception occurred
+	 * means any code breakpoints have already been serviced.
+	 *
+	 * Note, KVM needs to check for code #DBs on EMULTYPE_TRAP_UD_FORCED as
+	 * hardware has checked the RIP of the magic prefix, but not the RIP of
+	 * the instruction being emulated.  The intent of forced emulation is
+	 * to behave as if KVM intercepted the instruction without an exception
+	 * and without a prefix.
+	 */
+	if (emulation_type & (EMULTYPE_NO_DECODE | EMULTYPE_SKIP |
+			      EMULTYPE_TRAP_UD | EMULTYPE_VMWARE_GP | EMULTYPE_PF))
+		return false;
+
+	if (unlikely(vcpu->guest_debug & KVM_GUESTDBG_USE_HW_BP) &&
+	    (vcpu->arch.guest_debug_dr7 & DR7_BP_EN_MASK)) {
+		struct kvm_run *kvm_run = vcpu->run;
+		unsigned long eip = kvm_get_linear_rip(vcpu);
+		u32 dr6 = kvm_vcpu_check_hw_bp(eip, 0,
+					   vcpu->arch.guest_debug_dr7,
+					   vcpu->arch.eff_db);
+
+		if (dr6 != 0) {
+			kvm_run->debug.arch.dr6 = dr6 | DR6_ACTIVE_LOW;
+			kvm_run->debug.arch.pc = eip;
+			kvm_run->debug.arch.exception = DB_VECTOR;
+			kvm_run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_DEBUG;
+			*r = 0;
+			return true;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (unlikely(vcpu->arch.dr7 & DR7_BP_EN_MASK) &&
+	    !kvm_is_code_breakpoint_inhibited(vcpu)) {
+		unsigned long eip = kvm_get_linear_rip(vcpu);
+		u32 dr6 = kvm_vcpu_check_hw_bp(eip, 0,
+					   vcpu->arch.dr7,
+					   vcpu->arch.db);
+
+		if (dr6 != 0) {
+			kvm_queue_exception_p(vcpu, DB_VECTOR, dr6);
+			*r = 1;
+			return true;
+		}
+	}
+
+	return false;
+}
+
+static bool is_vmware_backdoor_opcode(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
+{
+	switch (ctxt->opcode_len) {
+	case 1:
+		switch (ctxt->b) {
+		case 0xe4:	/* IN */
+		case 0xe5:
+		case 0xec:
+		case 0xed:
+		case 0xe6:	/* OUT */
+		case 0xe7:
+		case 0xee:
+		case 0xef:
+		case 0x6c:	/* INS */
+		case 0x6d:
+		case 0x6e:	/* OUTS */
+		case 0x6f:
+			return true;
+		}
+		break;
+	case 2:
+		switch (ctxt->b) {
+		case 0x33:	/* RDPMC */
+			return true;
+		}
+		break;
+	}
+
+	return false;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Decode an instruction for emulation.  The caller is responsible for handling
+ * code breakpoints.  Note, manually detecting code breakpoints is unnecessary
+ * (and wrong) when emulating on an intercepted fault-like exception[*], as
+ * code breakpoints have higher priority and thus have already been done by
+ * hardware.
+ *
+ * [*] Except #MC, which is higher priority, but KVM should never emulate in
+ *     response to a machine check.
+ */
+int x86_decode_emulated_instruction(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int emulation_type,
+				    void *insn, int insn_len)
+{
+	struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt = vcpu->arch.emulate_ctxt;
+	int r;
+
+	init_emulate_ctxt(vcpu);
+
+	r = x86_decode_insn(ctxt, insn, insn_len, emulation_type);
+
+	trace_kvm_emulate_insn_start(vcpu);
+	++vcpu->stat.insn_emulation;
+
+	return r;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x86_decode_emulated_instruction);
+
+int x86_emulate_instruction(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t cr2_or_gpa,
+			    int emulation_type, void *insn, int insn_len)
+{
+	int r;
+	struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt = vcpu->arch.emulate_ctxt;
+	bool writeback = true;
+
+	if (unlikely(!kvm_can_emulate_insn(vcpu, emulation_type, insn, insn_len)))
+		return 1;
+
+	vcpu->arch.l1tf_flush_l1d = true;
+
+	if (!(emulation_type & EMULTYPE_NO_DECODE)) {
+		kvm_clear_exception_queue(vcpu);
+
+		/*
+		 * Return immediately if RIP hits a code breakpoint, such #DBs
+		 * are fault-like and are higher priority than any faults on
+		 * the code fetch itself.
+		 */
+		if (kvm_vcpu_check_code_breakpoint(vcpu, emulation_type, &r))
+			return r;
+
+		r = x86_decode_emulated_instruction(vcpu, emulation_type,
+						    insn, insn_len);
+		if (r != EMULATION_OK)  {
+			if ((emulation_type & EMULTYPE_TRAP_UD) ||
+			    (emulation_type & EMULTYPE_TRAP_UD_FORCED)) {
+				kvm_queue_exception(vcpu, UD_VECTOR);
+				return 1;
+			}
+			if (reexecute_instruction(vcpu, cr2_or_gpa,
+						  emulation_type))
+				return 1;
+
+			if (ctxt->have_exception &&
+			    !(emulation_type & EMULTYPE_SKIP)) {
+				/*
+				 * #UD should result in just EMULATION_FAILED, and trap-like
+				 * exception should not be encountered during decode.
+				 */
+				WARN_ON_ONCE(ctxt->exception.vector == UD_VECTOR ||
+					     exception_type(ctxt->exception.vector) == EXCPT_TRAP);
+				inject_emulated_exception(vcpu);
+				return 1;
+			}
+			return handle_emulation_failure(vcpu, emulation_type);
+		}
+	}
+
+	if ((emulation_type & EMULTYPE_VMWARE_GP) &&
+	    !is_vmware_backdoor_opcode(ctxt)) {
+		kvm_queue_exception_e(vcpu, GP_VECTOR, 0);
+		return 1;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * EMULTYPE_SKIP without EMULTYPE_COMPLETE_USER_EXIT is intended for
+	 * use *only* by vendor callbacks for kvm_skip_emulated_instruction().
+	 * The caller is responsible for updating interruptibility state and
+	 * injecting single-step #DBs.
+	 */
+	if (emulation_type & EMULTYPE_SKIP) {
+		if (ctxt->mode != X86EMUL_MODE_PROT64)
+			ctxt->eip = (u32)ctxt->_eip;
+		else
+			ctxt->eip = ctxt->_eip;
+
+		if (emulation_type & EMULTYPE_COMPLETE_USER_EXIT) {
+			r = 1;
+			goto writeback;
+		}
+
+		kvm_rip_write(vcpu, ctxt->eip);
+		if (ctxt->eflags & X86_EFLAGS_RF)
+			kvm_set_rflags(vcpu, ctxt->eflags & ~X86_EFLAGS_RF);
+		return 1;
+	}
+
+	if (retry_instruction(ctxt, cr2_or_gpa, emulation_type))
+		return 1;
+
+	/* this is needed for vmware backdoor interface to work since it
+	   changes registers values  during IO operation */
+	if (vcpu->arch.emulate_regs_need_sync_from_vcpu) {
+		vcpu->arch.emulate_regs_need_sync_from_vcpu = false;
+		emulator_invalidate_register_cache(ctxt);
+	}
+
+restart:
+	if (emulation_type & EMULTYPE_PF) {
+		/* Save the faulting GPA (cr2) in the address field */
+		ctxt->exception.address = cr2_or_gpa;
+
+		/* With shadow page tables, cr2 contains a GVA or nGPA. */
+		if (vcpu->arch.mmu->root_role.direct) {
+			ctxt->gpa_available = true;
+			ctxt->gpa_val = cr2_or_gpa;
+		}
+	} else {
+		/* Sanitize the address out of an abundance of paranoia. */
+		ctxt->exception.address = 0;
+	}
+
+	r = x86_emulate_insn(ctxt);
+
+	if (r == EMULATION_INTERCEPTED)
+		return 1;
+
+	if (r == EMULATION_FAILED) {
+		if (reexecute_instruction(vcpu, cr2_or_gpa, emulation_type))
+			return 1;
+
+		return handle_emulation_failure(vcpu, emulation_type);
+	}
+
+	if (ctxt->have_exception) {
+		WARN_ON_ONCE(vcpu->mmio_needed && !vcpu->mmio_is_write);
+		vcpu->mmio_needed = false;
+		r = 1;
+		inject_emulated_exception(vcpu);
+	} else if (vcpu->arch.pio.count) {
+		if (!vcpu->arch.pio.in) {
+			/* FIXME: return into emulator if single-stepping.  */
+			vcpu->arch.pio.count = 0;
+		} else {
+			writeback = false;
+			vcpu->arch.complete_userspace_io = complete_emulated_pio;
+		}
+		r = 0;
+	} else if (vcpu->mmio_needed) {
+		++vcpu->stat.mmio_exits;
+
+		if (!vcpu->mmio_is_write)
+			writeback = false;
+		r = 0;
+		vcpu->arch.complete_userspace_io = complete_emulated_mmio;
+	} else if (vcpu->arch.complete_userspace_io) {
+		writeback = false;
+		r = 0;
+	} else if (r == EMULATION_RESTART)
+		goto restart;
+	else
+		r = 1;
+
+writeback:
+	if (writeback) {
+		unsigned long rflags = static_call(kvm_x86_get_rflags)(vcpu);
+		toggle_interruptibility(vcpu, ctxt->interruptibility);
+		vcpu->arch.emulate_regs_need_sync_to_vcpu = false;
+
+		/*
+		 * Note, EXCPT_DB is assumed to be fault-like as the emulator
+		 * only supports code breakpoints and general detect #DB, both
+		 * of which are fault-like.
+		 */
+		if (!ctxt->have_exception ||
+		    exception_type(ctxt->exception.vector) == EXCPT_TRAP) {
+			kvm_pmu_trigger_event(vcpu, PERF_COUNT_HW_INSTRUCTIONS);
+			if (ctxt->is_branch)
+				kvm_pmu_trigger_event(vcpu, PERF_COUNT_HW_BRANCH_INSTRUCTIONS);
+			kvm_rip_write(vcpu, ctxt->eip);
+			if (r && (ctxt->tf || (vcpu->guest_debug & KVM_GUESTDBG_SINGLESTEP)))
+				r = kvm_vcpu_do_singlestep(vcpu);
+			static_call_cond(kvm_x86_update_emulated_instruction)(vcpu);
+			__kvm_set_rflags(vcpu, ctxt->eflags);
+		}
+
+		/*
+		 * For STI, interrupts are shadowed; so KVM_REQ_EVENT will
+		 * do nothing, and it will be requested again as soon as
+		 * the shadow expires.  But we still need to check here,
+		 * because POPF has no interrupt shadow.
+		 */
+		if (unlikely((ctxt->eflags & ~rflags) & X86_EFLAGS_IF))
+			kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_EVENT, vcpu);
+	} else
+		vcpu->arch.emulate_regs_need_sync_to_vcpu = true;
+
+	return r;
+}
+
+int kvm_emulate_instruction(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int emulation_type)
+{
+	return x86_emulate_instruction(vcpu, 0, emulation_type, NULL, 0);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_emulate_instruction);
+
+int kvm_emulate_instruction_from_buffer(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+					void *insn, int insn_len)
+{
+	return x86_emulate_instruction(vcpu, 0, 0, insn, insn_len);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_emulate_instruction_from_buffer);
+
+static int complete_fast_pio_out_port_0x7e(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	vcpu->arch.pio.count = 0;
+	return 1;
+}
+
+static int complete_fast_pio_out(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	vcpu->arch.pio.count = 0;
+
+	if (unlikely(!kvm_is_linear_rip(vcpu, vcpu->arch.pio.linear_rip)))
+		return 1;
+
+	return kvm_skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
+}
+
+static int kvm_fast_pio_out(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int size,
+			    unsigned short port)
+{
+	unsigned long val = kvm_rax_read(vcpu);
+	int ret = emulator_pio_out(vcpu, size, port, &val, 1);
+
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+
+	/*
+	 * Workaround userspace that relies on old KVM behavior of %rip being
+	 * incremented prior to exiting to userspace to handle "OUT 0x7e".
+	 */
+	if (port == 0x7e &&
+	    kvm_check_has_quirk(vcpu->kvm, KVM_X86_QUIRK_OUT_7E_INC_RIP)) {
+		vcpu->arch.complete_userspace_io =
+			complete_fast_pio_out_port_0x7e;
+		kvm_skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
+	} else {
+		vcpu->arch.pio.linear_rip = kvm_get_linear_rip(vcpu);
+		vcpu->arch.complete_userspace_io = complete_fast_pio_out;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int complete_fast_pio_in(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	unsigned long val;
+
+	/* We should only ever be called with arch.pio.count equal to 1 */
+	BUG_ON(vcpu->arch.pio.count != 1);
+
+	if (unlikely(!kvm_is_linear_rip(vcpu, vcpu->arch.pio.linear_rip))) {
+		vcpu->arch.pio.count = 0;
+		return 1;
+	}
+
+	/* For size less than 4 we merge, else we zero extend */
+	val = (vcpu->arch.pio.size < 4) ? kvm_rax_read(vcpu) : 0;
+
+	complete_emulator_pio_in(vcpu, &val);
+	kvm_rax_write(vcpu, val);
+
+	return kvm_skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
+}
+
+static int kvm_fast_pio_in(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int size,
+			   unsigned short port)
+{
+	unsigned long val;
+	int ret;
+
+	/* For size less than 4 we merge, else we zero extend */
+	val = (size < 4) ? kvm_rax_read(vcpu) : 0;
+
+	ret = emulator_pio_in(vcpu, size, port, &val, 1);
+	if (ret) {
+		kvm_rax_write(vcpu, val);
+		return ret;
+	}
+
+	vcpu->arch.pio.linear_rip = kvm_get_linear_rip(vcpu);
+	vcpu->arch.complete_userspace_io = complete_fast_pio_in;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int kvm_fast_pio(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int size, unsigned short port, int in)
+{
+	int ret;
+
+	if (in)
+		ret = kvm_fast_pio_in(vcpu, size, port);
+	else
+		ret = kvm_fast_pio_out(vcpu, size, port);
+	return ret && kvm_skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_fast_pio);
+
+static int kvmclock_cpu_down_prep(unsigned int cpu)
+{
+	__this_cpu_write(cpu_tsc_khz, 0);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void tsc_khz_changed(void *data)
+{
+	struct cpufreq_freqs *freq = data;
+	unsigned long khz;
+
+	WARN_ON_ONCE(boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_CONSTANT_TSC));
+
+	if (data)
+		khz = freq->new;
+	else
+		khz = cpufreq_quick_get(raw_smp_processor_id());
+	if (!khz)
+		khz = tsc_khz;
+	__this_cpu_write(cpu_tsc_khz, khz);
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+static void kvm_hyperv_tsc_notifier(void)
+{
+	struct kvm *kvm;
+	int cpu;
+
+	mutex_lock(&kvm_lock);
+	list_for_each_entry(kvm, &vm_list, vm_list)
+		kvm_make_mclock_inprogress_request(kvm);
+
+	/* no guest entries from this point */
+	hyperv_stop_tsc_emulation();
+
+	/* TSC frequency always matches when on Hyper-V */
+	if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_CONSTANT_TSC)) {
+		for_each_present_cpu(cpu)
+			per_cpu(cpu_tsc_khz, cpu) = tsc_khz;
+	}
+	kvm_caps.max_guest_tsc_khz = tsc_khz;
+
+	list_for_each_entry(kvm, &vm_list, vm_list) {
+		__kvm_start_pvclock_update(kvm);
+		pvclock_update_vm_gtod_copy(kvm);
+		kvm_end_pvclock_update(kvm);
+	}
+
+	mutex_unlock(&kvm_lock);
+}
+#endif
+
+static void __kvmclock_cpufreq_notifier(struct cpufreq_freqs *freq, int cpu)
+{
+	struct kvm *kvm;
+	struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu;
+	int send_ipi = 0;
+	unsigned long i;
+
+	/*
+	 * We allow guests to temporarily run on slowing clocks,
+	 * provided we notify them after, or to run on accelerating
+	 * clocks, provided we notify them before.  Thus time never
+	 * goes backwards.
+	 *
+	 * However, we have a problem.  We can't atomically update
+	 * the frequency of a given CPU from this function; it is
+	 * merely a notifier, which can be called from any CPU.
+	 * Changing the TSC frequency at arbitrary points in time
+	 * requires a recomputation of local variables related to
+	 * the TSC for each VCPU.  We must flag these local variables
+	 * to be updated and be sure the update takes place with the
+	 * new frequency before any guests proceed.
+	 *
+	 * Unfortunately, the combination of hotplug CPU and frequency
+	 * change creates an intractable locking scenario; the order
+	 * of when these callouts happen is undefined with respect to
+	 * CPU hotplug, and they can race with each other.  As such,
+	 * merely setting per_cpu(cpu_tsc_khz) = X during a hotadd is
+	 * undefined; you can actually have a CPU frequency change take
+	 * place in between the computation of X and the setting of the
+	 * variable.  To protect against this problem, all updates of
+	 * the per_cpu tsc_khz variable are done in an interrupt
+	 * protected IPI, and all callers wishing to update the value
+	 * must wait for a synchronous IPI to complete (which is trivial
+	 * if the caller is on the CPU already).  This establishes the
+	 * necessary total order on variable updates.
+	 *
+	 * Note that because a guest time update may take place
+	 * anytime after the setting of the VCPU's request bit, the
+	 * correct TSC value must be set before the request.  However,
+	 * to ensure the update actually makes it to any guest which
+	 * starts running in hardware virtualization between the set
+	 * and the acquisition of the spinlock, we must also ping the
+	 * CPU after setting the request bit.
+	 *
+	 */
+
+	smp_call_function_single(cpu, tsc_khz_changed, freq, 1);
+
+	mutex_lock(&kvm_lock);
+	list_for_each_entry(kvm, &vm_list, vm_list) {
+		kvm_for_each_vcpu(i, vcpu, kvm) {
+			if (vcpu->cpu != cpu)
+				continue;
+			kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_CLOCK_UPDATE, vcpu);
+			if (vcpu->cpu != raw_smp_processor_id())
+				send_ipi = 1;
+		}
+	}
+	mutex_unlock(&kvm_lock);
+
+	if (freq->old < freq->new && send_ipi) {
+		/*
+		 * We upscale the frequency.  Must make the guest
+		 * doesn't see old kvmclock values while running with
+		 * the new frequency, otherwise we risk the guest sees
+		 * time go backwards.
+		 *
+		 * In case we update the frequency for another cpu
+		 * (which might be in guest context) send an interrupt
+		 * to kick the cpu out of guest context.  Next time
+		 * guest context is entered kvmclock will be updated,
+		 * so the guest will not see stale values.
+		 */
+		smp_call_function_single(cpu, tsc_khz_changed, freq, 1);
+	}
+}
+
+static int kvmclock_cpufreq_notifier(struct notifier_block *nb, unsigned long val,
+				     void *data)
+{
+	struct cpufreq_freqs *freq = data;
+	int cpu;
+
+	if (val == CPUFREQ_PRECHANGE && freq->old > freq->new)
+		return 0;
+	if (val == CPUFREQ_POSTCHANGE && freq->old < freq->new)
+		return 0;
+
+	for_each_cpu(cpu, freq->policy->cpus)
+		__kvmclock_cpufreq_notifier(freq, cpu);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static struct notifier_block kvmclock_cpufreq_notifier_block = {
+	.notifier_call  = kvmclock_cpufreq_notifier
+};
+
+static int kvmclock_cpu_online(unsigned int cpu)
+{
+	tsc_khz_changed(NULL);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void kvm_timer_init(void)
+{
+	if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_CONSTANT_TSC)) {
+		max_tsc_khz = tsc_khz;
+
+		if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CPU_FREQ)) {
+			struct cpufreq_policy *policy;
+			int cpu;
+
+			cpu = get_cpu();
+			policy = cpufreq_cpu_get(cpu);
+			if (policy) {
+				if (policy->cpuinfo.max_freq)
+					max_tsc_khz = policy->cpuinfo.max_freq;
+				cpufreq_cpu_put(policy);
+			}
+			put_cpu();
+		}
+		cpufreq_register_notifier(&kvmclock_cpufreq_notifier_block,
+					  CPUFREQ_TRANSITION_NOTIFIER);
+
+		cpuhp_setup_state(CPUHP_AP_X86_KVM_CLK_ONLINE, "x86/kvm/clk:online",
+				  kvmclock_cpu_online, kvmclock_cpu_down_prep);
+	}
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+static void pvclock_gtod_update_fn(struct work_struct *work)
+{
+	struct kvm *kvm;
+	struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu;
+	unsigned long i;
+
+	mutex_lock(&kvm_lock);
+	list_for_each_entry(kvm, &vm_list, vm_list)
+		kvm_for_each_vcpu(i, vcpu, kvm)
+			kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_MASTERCLOCK_UPDATE, vcpu);
+	atomic_set(&kvm_guest_has_master_clock, 0);
+	mutex_unlock(&kvm_lock);
+}
+
+static DECLARE_WORK(pvclock_gtod_work, pvclock_gtod_update_fn);
+
+/*
+ * Indirection to move queue_work() out of the tk_core.seq write held
+ * region to prevent possible deadlocks against time accessors which
+ * are invoked with work related locks held.
+ */
+static void pvclock_irq_work_fn(struct irq_work *w)
+{
+	queue_work(system_long_wq, &pvclock_gtod_work);
+}
+
+static DEFINE_IRQ_WORK(pvclock_irq_work, pvclock_irq_work_fn);
+
+/*
+ * Notification about pvclock gtod data update.
+ */
+static int pvclock_gtod_notify(struct notifier_block *nb, unsigned long unused,
+			       void *priv)
+{
+	struct pvclock_gtod_data *gtod = &pvclock_gtod_data;
+	struct timekeeper *tk = priv;
+
+	update_pvclock_gtod(tk);
+
+	/*
+	 * Disable master clock if host does not trust, or does not use,
+	 * TSC based clocksource. Delegate queue_work() to irq_work as
+	 * this is invoked with tk_core.seq write held.
+	 */
+	if (!gtod_is_based_on_tsc(gtod->clock.vclock_mode) &&
+	    atomic_read(&kvm_guest_has_master_clock) != 0)
+		irq_work_queue(&pvclock_irq_work);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static struct notifier_block pvclock_gtod_notifier = {
+	.notifier_call = pvclock_gtod_notify,
+};
+#endif
+
+static inline void kvm_ops_update(struct kvm_x86_init_ops *ops)
+{
+	memcpy(&kvm_x86_ops, ops->runtime_ops, sizeof(kvm_x86_ops));
+
+#define __KVM_X86_OP(func) \
+	static_call_update(kvm_x86_##func, kvm_x86_ops.func);
+#define KVM_X86_OP(func) \
+	WARN_ON(!kvm_x86_ops.func); __KVM_X86_OP(func)
+#define KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL __KVM_X86_OP
+#define KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL_RET0(func) \
+	static_call_update(kvm_x86_##func, (void *)kvm_x86_ops.func ? : \
+					   (void *)__static_call_return0);
+#include <asm/kvm-x86-ops.h>
+#undef __KVM_X86_OP
+
+	kvm_pmu_ops_update(ops->pmu_ops);
+}
+
+static int kvm_x86_check_processor_compatibility(void)
+{
+	int cpu = smp_processor_id();
+	struct cpuinfo_x86 *c = &cpu_data(cpu);
+
+	/*
+	 * Compatibility checks are done when loading KVM and when enabling
+	 * hardware, e.g. during CPU hotplug, to ensure all online CPUs are
+	 * compatible, i.e. KVM should never perform a compatibility check on
+	 * an offline CPU.
+	 */
+	WARN_ON(!cpu_online(cpu));
+
+	if (__cr4_reserved_bits(cpu_has, c) !=
+	    __cr4_reserved_bits(cpu_has, &boot_cpu_data))
+		return -EIO;
+
+	return static_call(kvm_x86_check_processor_compatibility)();
+}
+
+static void kvm_x86_check_cpu_compat(void *ret)
+{
+	*(int *)ret = kvm_x86_check_processor_compatibility();
+}
+
+static int __kvm_x86_vendor_init(struct kvm_x86_init_ops *ops)
+{
+	u64 host_pat;
+	int r, cpu;
+
+	if (kvm_x86_ops.hardware_enable) {
+		pr_err("already loaded vendor module '%s'\n", kvm_x86_ops.name);
+		return -EEXIST;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * KVM explicitly assumes that the guest has an FPU and
+	 * FXSAVE/FXRSTOR. For example, the KVM_GET_FPU explicitly casts the
+	 * vCPU's FPU state as a fxregs_state struct.
+	 */
+	if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_FPU) || !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_FXSR)) {
+		pr_err("inadequate fpu\n");
+		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+	}
+
+	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PREEMPT_RT) && !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_CONSTANT_TSC)) {
+		pr_err("RT requires X86_FEATURE_CONSTANT_TSC\n");
+		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * KVM assumes that PAT entry '0' encodes WB memtype and simply zeroes
+	 * the PAT bits in SPTEs.  Bail if PAT[0] is programmed to something
+	 * other than WB.  Note, EPT doesn't utilize the PAT, but don't bother
+	 * with an exception.  PAT[0] is set to WB on RESET and also by the
+	 * kernel, i.e. failure indicates a kernel bug or broken firmware.
+	 */
+	if (rdmsrl_safe(MSR_IA32_CR_PAT, &host_pat) ||
+	    (host_pat & GENMASK(2, 0)) != 6) {
+		pr_err("host PAT[0] is not WB\n");
+		return -EIO;
+	}
+
+	x86_emulator_cache = kvm_alloc_emulator_cache();
+	if (!x86_emulator_cache) {
+		pr_err("failed to allocate cache for x86 emulator\n");
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+
+	user_return_msrs = alloc_percpu(struct kvm_user_return_msrs);
+	if (!user_return_msrs) {
+		pr_err("failed to allocate percpu kvm_user_return_msrs\n");
+		r = -ENOMEM;
+		goto out_free_x86_emulator_cache;
+	}
+	kvm_nr_uret_msrs = 0;
+
+	r = kvm_mmu_vendor_module_init();
+	if (r)
+		goto out_free_percpu;
+
+	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_XSAVE)) {
+		host_xcr0 = xgetbv(XCR_XFEATURE_ENABLED_MASK);
+		kvm_caps.supported_xcr0 = host_xcr0 & KVM_SUPPORTED_XCR0;
+	}
+
+	rdmsrl_safe(MSR_EFER, &host_efer);
+
+	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_XSAVES))
+		rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_XSS, host_xss);
+
+	kvm_init_pmu_capability(ops->pmu_ops);
+
+	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_ARCH_CAPABILITIES))
+		rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES, host_arch_capabilities);
+
+	r = ops->hardware_setup();
+	if (r != 0)
+		goto out_mmu_exit;
+
+	kvm_ops_update(ops);
+
+	for_each_online_cpu(cpu) {
+		smp_call_function_single(cpu, kvm_x86_check_cpu_compat, &r, 1);
+		if (r < 0)
+			goto out_unwind_ops;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Point of no return!  DO NOT add error paths below this point unless
+	 * absolutely necessary, as most operations from this point forward
+	 * require unwinding.
+	 */
+	kvm_timer_init();
+
+	if (pi_inject_timer == -1)
+		pi_inject_timer = housekeeping_enabled(HK_TYPE_TIMER);
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+	pvclock_gtod_register_notifier(&pvclock_gtod_notifier);
+
+	if (hypervisor_is_type(X86_HYPER_MS_HYPERV))
+		set_hv_tscchange_cb(kvm_hyperv_tsc_notifier);
+#endif
+
+	kvm_register_perf_callbacks(ops->handle_intel_pt_intr);
+
+	if (!kvm_cpu_cap_has(X86_FEATURE_XSAVES))
+		kvm_caps.supported_xss = 0;
+
+#define __kvm_cpu_cap_has(UNUSED_, f) kvm_cpu_cap_has(f)
+	cr4_reserved_bits = __cr4_reserved_bits(__kvm_cpu_cap_has, UNUSED_);
+#undef __kvm_cpu_cap_has
+
+	if (kvm_caps.has_tsc_control) {
+		/*
+		 * Make sure the user can only configure tsc_khz values that
+		 * fit into a signed integer.
+		 * A min value is not calculated because it will always
+		 * be 1 on all machines.
+		 */
+		u64 max = min(0x7fffffffULL,
+			      __scale_tsc(kvm_caps.max_tsc_scaling_ratio, tsc_khz));
+		kvm_caps.max_guest_tsc_khz = max;
+	}
+	kvm_caps.default_tsc_scaling_ratio = 1ULL << kvm_caps.tsc_scaling_ratio_frac_bits;
+	kvm_init_msr_lists();
+	return 0;
+
+out_unwind_ops:
+	kvm_x86_ops.hardware_enable = NULL;
+	static_call(kvm_x86_hardware_unsetup)();
+out_mmu_exit:
+	kvm_mmu_vendor_module_exit();
+out_free_percpu:
+	free_percpu(user_return_msrs);
+out_free_x86_emulator_cache:
+	kmem_cache_destroy(x86_emulator_cache);
+	return r;
+}
+
+int kvm_x86_vendor_init(struct kvm_x86_init_ops *ops)
+{
+	int r;
+
+	mutex_lock(&vendor_module_lock);
+	r = __kvm_x86_vendor_init(ops);
+	mutex_unlock(&vendor_module_lock);
+
+	return r;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_x86_vendor_init);
+
+void kvm_x86_vendor_exit(void)
+{
+	kvm_unregister_perf_callbacks();
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+	if (hypervisor_is_type(X86_HYPER_MS_HYPERV))
+		clear_hv_tscchange_cb();
+#endif
+	kvm_lapic_exit();
+
+	if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_CONSTANT_TSC)) {
+		cpufreq_unregister_notifier(&kvmclock_cpufreq_notifier_block,
+					    CPUFREQ_TRANSITION_NOTIFIER);
+		cpuhp_remove_state_nocalls(CPUHP_AP_X86_KVM_CLK_ONLINE);
+	}
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+	pvclock_gtod_unregister_notifier(&pvclock_gtod_notifier);
+	irq_work_sync(&pvclock_irq_work);
+	cancel_work_sync(&pvclock_gtod_work);
+#endif
+	static_call(kvm_x86_hardware_unsetup)();
+	kvm_mmu_vendor_module_exit();
+	free_percpu(user_return_msrs);
+	kmem_cache_destroy(x86_emulator_cache);
+#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_XEN
+	static_key_deferred_flush(&kvm_xen_enabled);
+	WARN_ON(static_branch_unlikely(&kvm_xen_enabled.key));
+#endif
+	mutex_lock(&vendor_module_lock);
+	kvm_x86_ops.hardware_enable = NULL;
+	mutex_unlock(&vendor_module_lock);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_x86_vendor_exit);
+
+static int __kvm_emulate_halt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int state, int reason)
+{
+	/*
+	 * The vCPU has halted, e.g. executed HLT.  Update the run state if the
+	 * local APIC is in-kernel, the run loop will detect the non-runnable
+	 * state and halt the vCPU.  Exit to userspace if the local APIC is
+	 * managed by userspace, in which case userspace is responsible for
+	 * handling wake events.
+	 */
+	++vcpu->stat.halt_exits;
+	if (lapic_in_kernel(vcpu)) {
+		vcpu->arch.mp_state = state;
+		return 1;
+	} else {
+		vcpu->run->exit_reason = reason;
+		return 0;
+	}
+}
+
+int kvm_emulate_halt_noskip(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	return __kvm_emulate_halt(vcpu, KVM_MP_STATE_HALTED, KVM_EXIT_HLT);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_emulate_halt_noskip);
+
+int kvm_emulate_halt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	int ret = kvm_skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
+	/*
+	 * TODO: we might be squashing a GUESTDBG_SINGLESTEP-triggered
+	 * KVM_EXIT_DEBUG here.
+	 */
+	return kvm_emulate_halt_noskip(vcpu) && ret;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_emulate_halt);
+
+int kvm_emulate_ap_reset_hold(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	int ret = kvm_skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
+
+	return __kvm_emulate_halt(vcpu, KVM_MP_STATE_AP_RESET_HOLD,
+					KVM_EXIT_AP_RESET_HOLD) && ret;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_emulate_ap_reset_hold);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+static int kvm_pv_clock_pairing(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t paddr,
+			        unsigned long clock_type)
+{
+	struct kvm_clock_pairing clock_pairing;
+	struct timespec64 ts;
+	u64 cycle;
+	int ret;
+
+	if (clock_type != KVM_CLOCK_PAIRING_WALLCLOCK)
+		return -KVM_EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+	/*
+	 * When tsc is in permanent catchup mode guests won't be able to use
+	 * pvclock_read_retry loop to get consistent view of pvclock
+	 */
+	if (vcpu->arch.tsc_always_catchup)
+		return -KVM_EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+	if (!kvm_get_walltime_and_clockread(&ts, &cycle))
+		return -KVM_EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+	clock_pairing.sec = ts.tv_sec;
+	clock_pairing.nsec = ts.tv_nsec;
+	clock_pairing.tsc = kvm_read_l1_tsc(vcpu, cycle);
+	clock_pairing.flags = 0;
+	memset(&clock_pairing.pad, 0, sizeof(clock_pairing.pad));
+
+	ret = 0;
+	if (kvm_write_guest(vcpu->kvm, paddr, &clock_pairing,
+			    sizeof(struct kvm_clock_pairing)))
+		ret = -KVM_EFAULT;
+
+	return ret;
+}
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * kvm_pv_kick_cpu_op:  Kick a vcpu.
+ *
+ * @apicid - apicid of vcpu to be kicked.
+ */
+static void kvm_pv_kick_cpu_op(struct kvm *kvm, int apicid)
+{
+	/*
+	 * All other fields are unused for APIC_DM_REMRD, but may be consumed by
+	 * common code, e.g. for tracing. Defer initialization to the compiler.
+	 */
+	struct kvm_lapic_irq lapic_irq = {
+		.delivery_mode = APIC_DM_REMRD,
+		.dest_mode = APIC_DEST_PHYSICAL,
+		.shorthand = APIC_DEST_NOSHORT,
+		.dest_id = apicid,
+	};
+
+	kvm_irq_delivery_to_apic(kvm, NULL, &lapic_irq, NULL);
+}
+
+bool kvm_apicv_activated(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+	return (READ_ONCE(kvm->arch.apicv_inhibit_reasons) == 0);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_apicv_activated);
+
+bool kvm_vcpu_apicv_activated(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	ulong vm_reasons = READ_ONCE(vcpu->kvm->arch.apicv_inhibit_reasons);
+	ulong vcpu_reasons = static_call(kvm_x86_vcpu_get_apicv_inhibit_reasons)(vcpu);
+
+	return (vm_reasons | vcpu_reasons) == 0;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_vcpu_apicv_activated);
+
+static void set_or_clear_apicv_inhibit(unsigned long *inhibits,
+				       enum kvm_apicv_inhibit reason, bool set)
+{
+	if (set)
+		__set_bit(reason, inhibits);
+	else
+		__clear_bit(reason, inhibits);
+
+	trace_kvm_apicv_inhibit_changed(reason, set, *inhibits);
+}
+
+static void kvm_apicv_init(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+	unsigned long *inhibits = &kvm->arch.apicv_inhibit_reasons;
+
+	init_rwsem(&kvm->arch.apicv_update_lock);
+
+	set_or_clear_apicv_inhibit(inhibits, APICV_INHIBIT_REASON_ABSENT, true);
+
+	if (!enable_apicv)
+		set_or_clear_apicv_inhibit(inhibits,
+					   APICV_INHIBIT_REASON_DISABLE, true);
+}
+
+static void kvm_sched_yield(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long dest_id)
+{
+	struct kvm_vcpu *target = NULL;
+	struct kvm_apic_map *map;
+
+	vcpu->stat.directed_yield_attempted++;
+
+	if (single_task_running())
+		goto no_yield;
+
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	map = rcu_dereference(vcpu->kvm->arch.apic_map);
+
+	if (likely(map) && dest_id <= map->max_apic_id && map->phys_map[dest_id])
+		target = map->phys_map[dest_id]->vcpu;
+
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+
+	if (!target || !READ_ONCE(target->ready))
+		goto no_yield;
+
+	/* Ignore requests to yield to self */
+	if (vcpu == target)
+		goto no_yield;
+
+	if (kvm_vcpu_yield_to(target) <= 0)
+		goto no_yield;
+
+	vcpu->stat.directed_yield_successful++;
+
+no_yield:
+	return;
+}
+
+static int complete_hypercall_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	u64 ret = vcpu->run->hypercall.ret;
+
+	if (!is_64_bit_mode(vcpu))
+		ret = (u32)ret;
+	kvm_rax_write(vcpu, ret);
+	++vcpu->stat.hypercalls;
+	return kvm_skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
+}
+
+int kvm_emulate_hypercall(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	unsigned long nr, a0, a1, a2, a3, ret;
+	int op_64_bit;
+
+	if (kvm_xen_hypercall_enabled(vcpu->kvm))
+		return kvm_xen_hypercall(vcpu);
+
+	if (kvm_hv_hypercall_enabled(vcpu))
+		return kvm_hv_hypercall(vcpu);
+
+	nr = kvm_rax_read(vcpu);
+	a0 = kvm_rbx_read(vcpu);
+	a1 = kvm_rcx_read(vcpu);
+	a2 = kvm_rdx_read(vcpu);
+	a3 = kvm_rsi_read(vcpu);
+
+	trace_kvm_hypercall(nr, a0, a1, a2, a3);
+
+	op_64_bit = is_64_bit_hypercall(vcpu);
+	if (!op_64_bit) {
+		nr &= 0xFFFFFFFF;
+		a0 &= 0xFFFFFFFF;
+		a1 &= 0xFFFFFFFF;
+		a2 &= 0xFFFFFFFF;
+		a3 &= 0xFFFFFFFF;
+	}
+
+	if (static_call(kvm_x86_get_cpl)(vcpu) != 0) {
+		ret = -KVM_EPERM;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	ret = -KVM_ENOSYS;
+
+	switch (nr) {
+	case KVM_HC_VAPIC_POLL_IRQ:
+		ret = 0;
+		break;
+	case KVM_HC_KICK_CPU:
+		if (!guest_pv_has(vcpu, KVM_FEATURE_PV_UNHALT))
+			break;
+
+		kvm_pv_kick_cpu_op(vcpu->kvm, a1);
+		kvm_sched_yield(vcpu, a1);
+		ret = 0;
+		break;
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+	case KVM_HC_CLOCK_PAIRING:
+		ret = kvm_pv_clock_pairing(vcpu, a0, a1);
+		break;
+#endif
+	case KVM_HC_SEND_IPI:
+		if (!guest_pv_has(vcpu, KVM_FEATURE_PV_SEND_IPI))
+			break;
+
+		ret = kvm_pv_send_ipi(vcpu->kvm, a0, a1, a2, a3, op_64_bit);
+		break;
+	case KVM_HC_SCHED_YIELD:
+		if (!guest_pv_has(vcpu, KVM_FEATURE_PV_SCHED_YIELD))
+			break;
+
+		kvm_sched_yield(vcpu, a0);
+		ret = 0;
+		break;
+	case KVM_HC_MAP_GPA_RANGE: {
+		u64 gpa = a0, npages = a1, attrs = a2;
+
+		ret = -KVM_ENOSYS;
+		if (!(vcpu->kvm->arch.hypercall_exit_enabled & (1 << KVM_HC_MAP_GPA_RANGE)))
+			break;
+
+		if (!PAGE_ALIGNED(gpa) || !npages ||
+		    gpa_to_gfn(gpa) + npages <= gpa_to_gfn(gpa)) {
+			ret = -KVM_EINVAL;
+			break;
+		}
+
+		vcpu->run->exit_reason        = KVM_EXIT_HYPERCALL;
+		vcpu->run->hypercall.nr       = KVM_HC_MAP_GPA_RANGE;
+		vcpu->run->hypercall.args[0]  = gpa;
+		vcpu->run->hypercall.args[1]  = npages;
+		vcpu->run->hypercall.args[2]  = attrs;
+		vcpu->run->hypercall.flags    = 0;
+		if (op_64_bit)
+			vcpu->run->hypercall.flags |= KVM_EXIT_HYPERCALL_LONG_MODE;
+
+		WARN_ON_ONCE(vcpu->run->hypercall.flags & KVM_EXIT_HYPERCALL_MBZ);
+		vcpu->arch.complete_userspace_io = complete_hypercall_exit;
+		return 0;
+	}
+	default:
+		ret = -KVM_ENOSYS;
+		break;
+	}
+out:
+	if (!op_64_bit)
+		ret = (u32)ret;
+	kvm_rax_write(vcpu, ret);
+
+	++vcpu->stat.hypercalls;
+	return kvm_skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_emulate_hypercall);
+
+static int emulator_fix_hypercall(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
+{
+	struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = emul_to_vcpu(ctxt);
+	char instruction[3];
+	unsigned long rip = kvm_rip_read(vcpu);
+
+	/*
+	 * If the quirk is disabled, synthesize a #UD and let the guest pick up
+	 * the pieces.
+	 */
+	if (!kvm_check_has_quirk(vcpu->kvm, KVM_X86_QUIRK_FIX_HYPERCALL_INSN)) {
+		ctxt->exception.error_code_valid = false;
+		ctxt->exception.vector = UD_VECTOR;
+		ctxt->have_exception = true;
+		return X86EMUL_PROPAGATE_FAULT;
+	}
+
+	static_call(kvm_x86_patch_hypercall)(vcpu, instruction);
+
+	return emulator_write_emulated(ctxt, rip, instruction, 3,
+		&ctxt->exception);
+}
+
+static int dm_request_for_irq_injection(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	return vcpu->run->request_interrupt_window &&
+		likely(!pic_in_kernel(vcpu->kvm));
+}
+
+/* Called within kvm->srcu read side.  */
+static void post_kvm_run_save(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct kvm_run *kvm_run = vcpu->run;
+
+	kvm_run->if_flag = static_call(kvm_x86_get_if_flag)(vcpu);
+	kvm_run->cr8 = kvm_get_cr8(vcpu);
+	kvm_run->apic_base = kvm_get_apic_base(vcpu);
+
+	kvm_run->ready_for_interrupt_injection =
+		pic_in_kernel(vcpu->kvm) ||
+		kvm_vcpu_ready_for_interrupt_injection(vcpu);
+
+	if (is_smm(vcpu))
+		kvm_run->flags |= KVM_RUN_X86_SMM;
+}
+
+static void update_cr8_intercept(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	int max_irr, tpr;
+
+	if (!kvm_x86_ops.update_cr8_intercept)
+		return;
+
+	if (!lapic_in_kernel(vcpu))
+		return;
+
+	if (vcpu->arch.apic->apicv_active)
+		return;
+
+	if (!vcpu->arch.apic->vapic_addr)
+		max_irr = kvm_lapic_find_highest_irr(vcpu);
+	else
+		max_irr = -1;
+
+	if (max_irr != -1)
+		max_irr >>= 4;
+
+	tpr = kvm_lapic_get_cr8(vcpu);
+
+	static_call(kvm_x86_update_cr8_intercept)(vcpu, tpr, max_irr);
+}
+
+
+int kvm_check_nested_events(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	if (kvm_test_request(KVM_REQ_TRIPLE_FAULT, vcpu)) {
+		kvm_x86_ops.nested_ops->triple_fault(vcpu);
+		return 1;
+	}
+
+	return kvm_x86_ops.nested_ops->check_events(vcpu);
+}
+
+static void kvm_inject_exception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	/*
+	 * Suppress the error code if the vCPU is in Real Mode, as Real Mode
+	 * exceptions don't report error codes.  The presence of an error code
+	 * is carried with the exception and only stripped when the exception
+	 * is injected as intercepted #PF VM-Exits for AMD's Paged Real Mode do
+	 * report an error code despite the CPU being in Real Mode.
+	 */
+	vcpu->arch.exception.has_error_code &= is_protmode(vcpu);
+
+	trace_kvm_inj_exception(vcpu->arch.exception.vector,
+				vcpu->arch.exception.has_error_code,
+				vcpu->arch.exception.error_code,
+				vcpu->arch.exception.injected);
+
+	static_call(kvm_x86_inject_exception)(vcpu);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check for any event (interrupt or exception) that is ready to be injected,
+ * and if there is at least one event, inject the event with the highest
+ * priority.  This handles both "pending" events, i.e. events that have never
+ * been injected into the guest, and "injected" events, i.e. events that were
+ * injected as part of a previous VM-Enter, but weren't successfully delivered
+ * and need to be re-injected.
+ *
+ * Note, this is not guaranteed to be invoked on a guest instruction boundary,
+ * i.e. doesn't guarantee that there's an event window in the guest.  KVM must
+ * be able to inject exceptions in the "middle" of an instruction, and so must
+ * also be able to re-inject NMIs and IRQs in the middle of an instruction.
+ * I.e. for exceptions and re-injected events, NOT invoking this on instruction
+ * boundaries is necessary and correct.
+ *
+ * For simplicity, KVM uses a single path to inject all events (except events
+ * that are injected directly from L1 to L2) and doesn't explicitly track
+ * instruction boundaries for asynchronous events.  However, because VM-Exits
+ * that can occur during instruction execution typically result in KVM skipping
+ * the instruction or injecting an exception, e.g. instruction and exception
+ * intercepts, and because pending exceptions have higher priority than pending
+ * interrupts, KVM still honors instruction boundaries in most scenarios.
+ *
+ * But, if a VM-Exit occurs during instruction execution, and KVM does NOT skip
+ * the instruction or inject an exception, then KVM can incorrecty inject a new
+ * asynchrounous event if the event became pending after the CPU fetched the
+ * instruction (in the guest).  E.g. if a page fault (#PF, #NPF, EPT violation)
+ * occurs and is resolved by KVM, a coincident NMI, SMI, IRQ, etc... can be
+ * injected on the restarted instruction instead of being deferred until the
+ * instruction completes.
+ *
+ * In practice, this virtualization hole is unlikely to be observed by the
+ * guest, and even less likely to cause functional problems.  To detect the
+ * hole, the guest would have to trigger an event on a side effect of an early
+ * phase of instruction execution, e.g. on the instruction fetch from memory.
+ * And for it to be a functional problem, the guest would need to depend on the
+ * ordering between that side effect, the instruction completing, _and_ the
+ * delivery of the asynchronous event.
+ */
+static int kvm_check_and_inject_events(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+				       bool *req_immediate_exit)
+{
+	bool can_inject;
+	int r;
+
+	/*
+	 * Process nested events first, as nested VM-Exit supercedes event
+	 * re-injection.  If there's an event queued for re-injection, it will
+	 * be saved into the appropriate vmc{b,s}12 fields on nested VM-Exit.
+	 */
+	if (is_guest_mode(vcpu))
+		r = kvm_check_nested_events(vcpu);
+	else
+		r = 0;
+
+	/*
+	 * Re-inject exceptions and events *especially* if immediate entry+exit
+	 * to/from L2 is needed, as any event that has already been injected
+	 * into L2 needs to complete its lifecycle before injecting a new event.
+	 *
+	 * Don't re-inject an NMI or interrupt if there is a pending exception.
+	 * This collision arises if an exception occurred while vectoring the
+	 * injected event, KVM intercepted said exception, and KVM ultimately
+	 * determined the fault belongs to the guest and queues the exception
+	 * for injection back into the guest.
+	 *
+	 * "Injected" interrupts can also collide with pending exceptions if
+	 * userspace ignores the "ready for injection" flag and blindly queues
+	 * an interrupt.  In that case, prioritizing the exception is correct,
+	 * as the exception "occurred" before the exit to userspace.  Trap-like
+	 * exceptions, e.g. most #DBs, have higher priority than interrupts.
+	 * And while fault-like exceptions, e.g. #GP and #PF, are the lowest
+	 * priority, they're only generated (pended) during instruction
+	 * execution, and interrupts are recognized at instruction boundaries.
+	 * Thus a pending fault-like exception means the fault occurred on the
+	 * *previous* instruction and must be serviced prior to recognizing any
+	 * new events in order to fully complete the previous instruction.
+	 */
+	if (vcpu->arch.exception.injected)
+		kvm_inject_exception(vcpu);
+	else if (kvm_is_exception_pending(vcpu))
+		; /* see above */
+	else if (vcpu->arch.nmi_injected)
+		static_call(kvm_x86_inject_nmi)(vcpu);
+	else if (vcpu->arch.interrupt.injected)
+		static_call(kvm_x86_inject_irq)(vcpu, true);
+
+	/*
+	 * Exceptions that morph to VM-Exits are handled above, and pending
+	 * exceptions on top of injected exceptions that do not VM-Exit should
+	 * either morph to #DF or, sadly, override the injected exception.
+	 */
+	WARN_ON_ONCE(vcpu->arch.exception.injected &&
+		     vcpu->arch.exception.pending);
+
+	/*
+	 * Bail if immediate entry+exit to/from the guest is needed to complete
+	 * nested VM-Enter or event re-injection so that a different pending
+	 * event can be serviced (or if KVM needs to exit to userspace).
+	 *
+	 * Otherwise, continue processing events even if VM-Exit occurred.  The
+	 * VM-Exit will have cleared exceptions that were meant for L2, but
+	 * there may now be events that can be injected into L1.
+	 */
+	if (r < 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	/*
+	 * A pending exception VM-Exit should either result in nested VM-Exit
+	 * or force an immediate re-entry and exit to/from L2, and exception
+	 * VM-Exits cannot be injected (flag should _never_ be set).
+	 */
+	WARN_ON_ONCE(vcpu->arch.exception_vmexit.injected ||
+		     vcpu->arch.exception_vmexit.pending);
+
+	/*
+	 * New events, other than exceptions, cannot be injected if KVM needs
+	 * to re-inject a previous event.  See above comments on re-injecting
+	 * for why pending exceptions get priority.
+	 */
+	can_inject = !kvm_event_needs_reinjection(vcpu);
+
+	if (vcpu->arch.exception.pending) {
+		/*
+		 * Fault-class exceptions, except #DBs, set RF=1 in the RFLAGS
+		 * value pushed on the stack.  Trap-like exception and all #DBs
+		 * leave RF as-is (KVM follows Intel's behavior in this regard;
+		 * AMD states that code breakpoint #DBs excplitly clear RF=0).
+		 *
+		 * Note, most versions of Intel's SDM and AMD's APM incorrectly
+		 * describe the behavior of General Detect #DBs, which are
+		 * fault-like.  They do _not_ set RF, a la code breakpoints.
+		 */
+		if (exception_type(vcpu->arch.exception.vector) == EXCPT_FAULT)
+			__kvm_set_rflags(vcpu, kvm_get_rflags(vcpu) |
+					     X86_EFLAGS_RF);
+
+		if (vcpu->arch.exception.vector == DB_VECTOR) {
+			kvm_deliver_exception_payload(vcpu, &vcpu->arch.exception);
+			if (vcpu->arch.dr7 & DR7_GD) {
+				vcpu->arch.dr7 &= ~DR7_GD;
+				kvm_update_dr7(vcpu);
+			}
+		}
+
+		kvm_inject_exception(vcpu);
+
+		vcpu->arch.exception.pending = false;
+		vcpu->arch.exception.injected = true;
+
+		can_inject = false;
+	}
+
+	/* Don't inject interrupts if the user asked to avoid doing so */
+	if (vcpu->guest_debug & KVM_GUESTDBG_BLOCKIRQ)
+		return 0;
+
+	/*
+	 * Finally, inject interrupt events.  If an event cannot be injected
+	 * due to architectural conditions (e.g. IF=0) a window-open exit
+	 * will re-request KVM_REQ_EVENT.  Sometimes however an event is pending
+	 * and can architecturally be injected, but we cannot do it right now:
+	 * an interrupt could have arrived just now and we have to inject it
+	 * as a vmexit, or there could already an event in the queue, which is
+	 * indicated by can_inject.  In that case we request an immediate exit
+	 * in order to make progress and get back here for another iteration.
+	 * The kvm_x86_ops hooks communicate this by returning -EBUSY.
+	 */
+#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_SMM
+	if (vcpu->arch.smi_pending) {
+		r = can_inject ? static_call(kvm_x86_smi_allowed)(vcpu, true) : -EBUSY;
+		if (r < 0)
+			goto out;
+		if (r) {
+			vcpu->arch.smi_pending = false;
+			++vcpu->arch.smi_count;
+			enter_smm(vcpu);
+			can_inject = false;
+		} else
+			static_call(kvm_x86_enable_smi_window)(vcpu);
+	}
+#endif
+
+	if (vcpu->arch.nmi_pending) {
+		r = can_inject ? static_call(kvm_x86_nmi_allowed)(vcpu, true) : -EBUSY;
+		if (r < 0)
+			goto out;
+		if (r) {
+			--vcpu->arch.nmi_pending;
+			vcpu->arch.nmi_injected = true;
+			static_call(kvm_x86_inject_nmi)(vcpu);
+			can_inject = false;
+			WARN_ON(static_call(kvm_x86_nmi_allowed)(vcpu, true) < 0);
+		}
+		if (vcpu->arch.nmi_pending)
+			static_call(kvm_x86_enable_nmi_window)(vcpu);
+	}
+
+	if (kvm_cpu_has_injectable_intr(vcpu)) {
+		r = can_inject ? static_call(kvm_x86_interrupt_allowed)(vcpu, true) : -EBUSY;
+		if (r < 0)
+			goto out;
+		if (r) {
+			int irq = kvm_cpu_get_interrupt(vcpu);
+
+			if (!WARN_ON_ONCE(irq == -1)) {
+				kvm_queue_interrupt(vcpu, irq, false);
+				static_call(kvm_x86_inject_irq)(vcpu, false);
+				WARN_ON(static_call(kvm_x86_interrupt_allowed)(vcpu, true) < 0);
+			}
+		}
+		if (kvm_cpu_has_injectable_intr(vcpu))
+			static_call(kvm_x86_enable_irq_window)(vcpu);
+	}
+
+	if (is_guest_mode(vcpu) &&
+	    kvm_x86_ops.nested_ops->has_events &&
+	    kvm_x86_ops.nested_ops->has_events(vcpu))
+		*req_immediate_exit = true;
+
+	/*
+	 * KVM must never queue a new exception while injecting an event; KVM
+	 * is done emulating and should only propagate the to-be-injected event
+	 * to the VMCS/VMCB.  Queueing a new exception can put the vCPU into an
+	 * infinite loop as KVM will bail from VM-Enter to inject the pending
+	 * exception and start the cycle all over.
+	 *
+	 * Exempt triple faults as they have special handling and won't put the
+	 * vCPU into an infinite loop.  Triple fault can be queued when running
+	 * VMX without unrestricted guest, as that requires KVM to emulate Real
+	 * Mode events (see kvm_inject_realmode_interrupt()).
+	 */
+	WARN_ON_ONCE(vcpu->arch.exception.pending ||
+		     vcpu->arch.exception_vmexit.pending);
+	return 0;
+
+out:
+	if (r == -EBUSY) {
+		*req_immediate_exit = true;
+		r = 0;
+	}
+	return r;
+}
+
+static void process_nmi(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	unsigned int limit;
+
+	/*
+	 * x86 is limited to one NMI pending, but because KVM can't react to
+	 * incoming NMIs as quickly as bare metal, e.g. if the vCPU is
+	 * scheduled out, KVM needs to play nice with two queued NMIs showing
+	 * up at the same time.  To handle this scenario, allow two NMIs to be
+	 * (temporarily) pending so long as NMIs are not blocked and KVM is not
+	 * waiting for a previous NMI injection to complete (which effectively
+	 * blocks NMIs).  KVM will immediately inject one of the two NMIs, and
+	 * will request an NMI window to handle the second NMI.
+	 */
+	if (static_call(kvm_x86_get_nmi_mask)(vcpu) || vcpu->arch.nmi_injected)
+		limit = 1;
+	else
+		limit = 2;
+
+	/*
+	 * Adjust the limit to account for pending virtual NMIs, which aren't
+	 * tracked in vcpu->arch.nmi_pending.
+	 */
+	if (static_call(kvm_x86_is_vnmi_pending)(vcpu))
+		limit--;
+
+	vcpu->arch.nmi_pending += atomic_xchg(&vcpu->arch.nmi_queued, 0);
+	vcpu->arch.nmi_pending = min(vcpu->arch.nmi_pending, limit);
+
+	if (vcpu->arch.nmi_pending &&
+	    (static_call(kvm_x86_set_vnmi_pending)(vcpu)))
+		vcpu->arch.nmi_pending--;
+
+	if (vcpu->arch.nmi_pending)
+		kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_EVENT, vcpu);
+}
+
+/* Return total number of NMIs pending injection to the VM */
+int kvm_get_nr_pending_nmis(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	return vcpu->arch.nmi_pending +
+	       static_call(kvm_x86_is_vnmi_pending)(vcpu);
+}
+
+void kvm_make_scan_ioapic_request_mask(struct kvm *kvm,
+				       unsigned long *vcpu_bitmap)
+{
+	kvm_make_vcpus_request_mask(kvm, KVM_REQ_SCAN_IOAPIC, vcpu_bitmap);
+}
+
+void kvm_make_scan_ioapic_request(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+	kvm_make_all_cpus_request(kvm, KVM_REQ_SCAN_IOAPIC);
+}
+
+void __kvm_vcpu_update_apicv(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct kvm_lapic *apic = vcpu->arch.apic;
+	bool activate;
+
+	if (!lapic_in_kernel(vcpu))
+		return;
+
+	down_read(&vcpu->kvm->arch.apicv_update_lock);
+	preempt_disable();
+
+	/* Do not activate APICV when APIC is disabled */
+	activate = kvm_vcpu_apicv_activated(vcpu) &&
+		   (kvm_get_apic_mode(vcpu) != LAPIC_MODE_DISABLED);
+
+	if (apic->apicv_active == activate)
+		goto out;
+
+	apic->apicv_active = activate;
+	kvm_apic_update_apicv(vcpu);
+	static_call(kvm_x86_refresh_apicv_exec_ctrl)(vcpu);
+
+	/*
+	 * When APICv gets disabled, we may still have injected interrupts
+	 * pending. At the same time, KVM_REQ_EVENT may not be set as APICv was
+	 * still active when the interrupt got accepted. Make sure
+	 * kvm_check_and_inject_events() is called to check for that.
+	 */
+	if (!apic->apicv_active)
+		kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_EVENT, vcpu);
+
+out:
+	preempt_enable();
+	up_read(&vcpu->kvm->arch.apicv_update_lock);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__kvm_vcpu_update_apicv);
+
+static void kvm_vcpu_update_apicv(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	if (!lapic_in_kernel(vcpu))
+		return;
+
+	/*
+	 * Due to sharing page tables across vCPUs, the xAPIC memslot must be
+	 * deleted if any vCPU has xAPIC virtualization and x2APIC enabled, but
+	 * and hardware doesn't support x2APIC virtualization.  E.g. some AMD
+	 * CPUs support AVIC but not x2APIC.  KVM still allows enabling AVIC in
+	 * this case so that KVM can the AVIC doorbell to inject interrupts to
+	 * running vCPUs, but KVM must not create SPTEs for the APIC base as
+	 * the vCPU would incorrectly be able to access the vAPIC page via MMIO
+	 * despite being in x2APIC mode.  For simplicity, inhibiting the APIC
+	 * access page is sticky.
+	 */
+	if (apic_x2apic_mode(vcpu->arch.apic) &&
+	    kvm_x86_ops.allow_apicv_in_x2apic_without_x2apic_virtualization)
+		kvm_inhibit_apic_access_page(vcpu);
+
+	__kvm_vcpu_update_apicv(vcpu);
+}
+
+void __kvm_set_or_clear_apicv_inhibit(struct kvm *kvm,
+				      enum kvm_apicv_inhibit reason, bool set)
+{
+	unsigned long old, new;
+
+	lockdep_assert_held_write(&kvm->arch.apicv_update_lock);
+
+	if (!(kvm_x86_ops.required_apicv_inhibits & BIT(reason)))
+		return;
+
+	old = new = kvm->arch.apicv_inhibit_reasons;
+
+	set_or_clear_apicv_inhibit(&new, reason, set);
+
+	if (!!old != !!new) {
+		/*
+		 * Kick all vCPUs before setting apicv_inhibit_reasons to avoid
+		 * false positives in the sanity check WARN in svm_vcpu_run().
+		 * This task will wait for all vCPUs to ack the kick IRQ before
+		 * updating apicv_inhibit_reasons, and all other vCPUs will
+		 * block on acquiring apicv_update_lock so that vCPUs can't
+		 * redo svm_vcpu_run() without seeing the new inhibit state.
+		 *
+		 * Note, holding apicv_update_lock and taking it in the read
+		 * side (handling the request) also prevents other vCPUs from
+		 * servicing the request with a stale apicv_inhibit_reasons.
+		 */
+		kvm_make_all_cpus_request(kvm, KVM_REQ_APICV_UPDATE);
+		kvm->arch.apicv_inhibit_reasons = new;
+		if (new) {
+			unsigned long gfn = gpa_to_gfn(APIC_DEFAULT_PHYS_BASE);
+			int idx = srcu_read_lock(&kvm->srcu);
+
+			kvm_zap_gfn_range(kvm, gfn, gfn+1);
+			srcu_read_unlock(&kvm->srcu, idx);
+		}
+	} else {
+		kvm->arch.apicv_inhibit_reasons = new;
+	}
+}
+
+void kvm_set_or_clear_apicv_inhibit(struct kvm *kvm,
+				    enum kvm_apicv_inhibit reason, bool set)
+{
+	if (!enable_apicv)
+		return;
+
+	down_write(&kvm->arch.apicv_update_lock);
+	__kvm_set_or_clear_apicv_inhibit(kvm, reason, set);
+	up_write(&kvm->arch.apicv_update_lock);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_set_or_clear_apicv_inhibit);
+
+static void vcpu_scan_ioapic(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	if (!kvm_apic_present(vcpu))
+		return;
+
+	bitmap_zero(vcpu->arch.ioapic_handled_vectors, 256);
+
+	if (irqchip_split(vcpu->kvm))
+		kvm_scan_ioapic_routes(vcpu, vcpu->arch.ioapic_handled_vectors);
+	else {
+		static_call_cond(kvm_x86_sync_pir_to_irr)(vcpu);
+		if (ioapic_in_kernel(vcpu->kvm))
+			kvm_ioapic_scan_entry(vcpu, vcpu->arch.ioapic_handled_vectors);
+	}
+
+	if (is_guest_mode(vcpu))
+		vcpu->arch.load_eoi_exitmap_pending = true;
+	else
+		kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_LOAD_EOI_EXITMAP, vcpu);
+}
+
+static void vcpu_load_eoi_exitmap(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	u64 eoi_exit_bitmap[4];
+
+	if (!kvm_apic_hw_enabled(vcpu->arch.apic))
+		return;
+
+	if (to_hv_vcpu(vcpu)) {
+		bitmap_or((ulong *)eoi_exit_bitmap,
+			  vcpu->arch.ioapic_handled_vectors,
+			  to_hv_synic(vcpu)->vec_bitmap, 256);
+		static_call_cond(kvm_x86_load_eoi_exitmap)(vcpu, eoi_exit_bitmap);
+		return;
+	}
+
+	static_call_cond(kvm_x86_load_eoi_exitmap)(
+		vcpu, (u64 *)vcpu->arch.ioapic_handled_vectors);
+}
+
+void kvm_arch_guest_memory_reclaimed(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+	static_call_cond(kvm_x86_guest_memory_reclaimed)(kvm);
+}
+
+static void kvm_vcpu_reload_apic_access_page(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	if (!lapic_in_kernel(vcpu))
+		return;
+
+	static_call_cond(kvm_x86_set_apic_access_page_addr)(vcpu);
+}
+
+void __kvm_request_immediate_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	smp_send_reschedule(vcpu->cpu);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__kvm_request_immediate_exit);
+
+/*
+ * Called within kvm->srcu read side.
+ * Returns 1 to let vcpu_run() continue the guest execution loop without
+ * exiting to the userspace.  Otherwise, the value will be returned to the
+ * userspace.
+ */
+static int vcpu_enter_guest(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	int r;
+	bool req_int_win =
+		dm_request_for_irq_injection(vcpu) &&
+		kvm_cpu_accept_dm_intr(vcpu);
+	fastpath_t exit_fastpath;
+
+	bool req_immediate_exit = false;
+
+	if (kvm_request_pending(vcpu)) {
+		if (kvm_check_request(KVM_REQ_VM_DEAD, vcpu)) {
+			r = -EIO;
+			goto out;
+		}
+
+		if (kvm_dirty_ring_check_request(vcpu)) {
+			r = 0;
+			goto out;
+		}
+
+		if (kvm_check_request(KVM_REQ_GET_NESTED_STATE_PAGES, vcpu)) {
+			if (unlikely(!kvm_x86_ops.nested_ops->get_nested_state_pages(vcpu))) {
+				r = 0;
+				goto out;
+			}
+		}
+		if (kvm_check_request(KVM_REQ_MMU_FREE_OBSOLETE_ROOTS, vcpu))
+			kvm_mmu_free_obsolete_roots(vcpu);
+		if (kvm_check_request(KVM_REQ_MIGRATE_TIMER, vcpu))
+			__kvm_migrate_timers(vcpu);
+		if (kvm_check_request(KVM_REQ_MASTERCLOCK_UPDATE, vcpu))
+			kvm_update_masterclock(vcpu->kvm);
+		if (kvm_check_request(KVM_REQ_GLOBAL_CLOCK_UPDATE, vcpu))
+			kvm_gen_kvmclock_update(vcpu);
+		if (kvm_check_request(KVM_REQ_CLOCK_UPDATE, vcpu)) {
+			r = kvm_guest_time_update(vcpu);
+			if (unlikely(r))
+				goto out;
+		}
+		if (kvm_check_request(KVM_REQ_MMU_SYNC, vcpu))
+			kvm_mmu_sync_roots(vcpu);
+		if (kvm_check_request(KVM_REQ_LOAD_MMU_PGD, vcpu))
+			kvm_mmu_load_pgd(vcpu);
+
+		/*
+		 * Note, the order matters here, as flushing "all" TLB entries
+		 * also flushes the "current" TLB entries, i.e. servicing the
+		 * flush "all" will clear any request to flush "current".
+		 */
+		if (kvm_check_request(KVM_REQ_TLB_FLUSH, vcpu))
+			kvm_vcpu_flush_tlb_all(vcpu);
+
+		kvm_service_local_tlb_flush_requests(vcpu);
+
+		/*
+		 * Fall back to a "full" guest flush if Hyper-V's precise
+		 * flushing fails.  Note, Hyper-V's flushing is per-vCPU, but
+		 * the flushes are considered "remote" and not "local" because
+		 * the requests can be initiated from other vCPUs.
+		 */
+		if (kvm_check_request(KVM_REQ_HV_TLB_FLUSH, vcpu) &&
+		    kvm_hv_vcpu_flush_tlb(vcpu))
+			kvm_vcpu_flush_tlb_guest(vcpu);
+
+		if (kvm_check_request(KVM_REQ_REPORT_TPR_ACCESS, vcpu)) {
+			vcpu->run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_TPR_ACCESS;
+			r = 0;
+			goto out;
+		}
+		if (kvm_test_request(KVM_REQ_TRIPLE_FAULT, vcpu)) {
+			if (is_guest_mode(vcpu))
+				kvm_x86_ops.nested_ops->triple_fault(vcpu);
+
+			if (kvm_check_request(KVM_REQ_TRIPLE_FAULT, vcpu)) {
+				vcpu->run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_SHUTDOWN;
+				vcpu->mmio_needed = 0;
+				r = 0;
+				goto out;
+			}
+		}
+		if (kvm_check_request(KVM_REQ_APF_HALT, vcpu)) {
+			/* Page is swapped out. Do synthetic halt */
+			vcpu->arch.apf.halted = true;
+			r = 1;
+			goto out;
+		}
+		if (kvm_check_request(KVM_REQ_STEAL_UPDATE, vcpu))
+			record_steal_time(vcpu);
+#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_SMM
+		if (kvm_check_request(KVM_REQ_SMI, vcpu))
+			process_smi(vcpu);
+#endif
+		if (kvm_check_request(KVM_REQ_NMI, vcpu))
+			process_nmi(vcpu);
+		if (kvm_check_request(KVM_REQ_PMU, vcpu))
+			kvm_pmu_handle_event(vcpu);
+		if (kvm_check_request(KVM_REQ_PMI, vcpu))
+			kvm_pmu_deliver_pmi(vcpu);
+		if (kvm_check_request(KVM_REQ_IOAPIC_EOI_EXIT, vcpu)) {
+			BUG_ON(vcpu->arch.pending_ioapic_eoi > 255);
+			if (test_bit(vcpu->arch.pending_ioapic_eoi,
+				     vcpu->arch.ioapic_handled_vectors)) {
+				vcpu->run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_IOAPIC_EOI;
+				vcpu->run->eoi.vector =
+						vcpu->arch.pending_ioapic_eoi;
+				r = 0;
+				goto out;
+			}
+		}
+		if (kvm_check_request(KVM_REQ_SCAN_IOAPIC, vcpu))
+			vcpu_scan_ioapic(vcpu);
+		if (kvm_check_request(KVM_REQ_LOAD_EOI_EXITMAP, vcpu))
+			vcpu_load_eoi_exitmap(vcpu);
+		if (kvm_check_request(KVM_REQ_APIC_PAGE_RELOAD, vcpu))
+			kvm_vcpu_reload_apic_access_page(vcpu);
+		if (kvm_check_request(KVM_REQ_HV_CRASH, vcpu)) {
+			vcpu->run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_SYSTEM_EVENT;
+			vcpu->run->system_event.type = KVM_SYSTEM_EVENT_CRASH;
+			vcpu->run->system_event.ndata = 0;
+			r = 0;
+			goto out;
+		}
+		if (kvm_check_request(KVM_REQ_HV_RESET, vcpu)) {
+			vcpu->run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_SYSTEM_EVENT;
+			vcpu->run->system_event.type = KVM_SYSTEM_EVENT_RESET;
+			vcpu->run->system_event.ndata = 0;
+			r = 0;
+			goto out;
+		}
+		if (kvm_check_request(KVM_REQ_HV_EXIT, vcpu)) {
+			struct kvm_vcpu_hv *hv_vcpu = to_hv_vcpu(vcpu);
+
+			vcpu->run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_HYPERV;
+			vcpu->run->hyperv = hv_vcpu->exit;
+			r = 0;
+			goto out;
+		}
+
+		/*
+		 * KVM_REQ_HV_STIMER has to be processed after
+		 * KVM_REQ_CLOCK_UPDATE, because Hyper-V SynIC timers
+		 * depend on the guest clock being up-to-date
+		 */
+		if (kvm_check_request(KVM_REQ_HV_STIMER, vcpu))
+			kvm_hv_process_stimers(vcpu);
+		if (kvm_check_request(KVM_REQ_APICV_UPDATE, vcpu))
+			kvm_vcpu_update_apicv(vcpu);
+		if (kvm_check_request(KVM_REQ_APF_READY, vcpu))
+			kvm_check_async_pf_completion(vcpu);
+		if (kvm_check_request(KVM_REQ_MSR_FILTER_CHANGED, vcpu))
+			static_call(kvm_x86_msr_filter_changed)(vcpu);
+
+		if (kvm_check_request(KVM_REQ_UPDATE_CPU_DIRTY_LOGGING, vcpu))
+			static_call(kvm_x86_update_cpu_dirty_logging)(vcpu);
+	}
+
+	if (kvm_check_request(KVM_REQ_EVENT, vcpu) || req_int_win ||
+	    kvm_xen_has_interrupt(vcpu)) {
+		++vcpu->stat.req_event;
+		r = kvm_apic_accept_events(vcpu);
+		if (r < 0) {
+			r = 0;
+			goto out;
+		}
+		if (vcpu->arch.mp_state == KVM_MP_STATE_INIT_RECEIVED) {
+			r = 1;
+			goto out;
+		}
+
+		r = kvm_check_and_inject_events(vcpu, &req_immediate_exit);
+		if (r < 0) {
+			r = 0;
+			goto out;
+		}
+		if (req_int_win)
+			static_call(kvm_x86_enable_irq_window)(vcpu);
+
+		if (kvm_lapic_enabled(vcpu)) {
+			update_cr8_intercept(vcpu);
+			kvm_lapic_sync_to_vapic(vcpu);
+		}
+	}
+
+	r = kvm_mmu_reload(vcpu);
+	if (unlikely(r)) {
+		goto cancel_injection;
+	}
+
+	preempt_disable();
+
+	static_call(kvm_x86_prepare_switch_to_guest)(vcpu);
+
+	/*
+	 * Disable IRQs before setting IN_GUEST_MODE.  Posted interrupt
+	 * IPI are then delayed after guest entry, which ensures that they
+	 * result in virtual interrupt delivery.
+	 */
+	local_irq_disable();
+
+	/* Store vcpu->apicv_active before vcpu->mode.  */
+	smp_store_release(&vcpu->mode, IN_GUEST_MODE);
+
+	kvm_vcpu_srcu_read_unlock(vcpu);
+
+	/*
+	 * 1) We should set ->mode before checking ->requests.  Please see
+	 * the comment in kvm_vcpu_exiting_guest_mode().
+	 *
+	 * 2) For APICv, we should set ->mode before checking PID.ON. This
+	 * pairs with the memory barrier implicit in pi_test_and_set_on
+	 * (see vmx_deliver_posted_interrupt).
+	 *
+	 * 3) This also orders the write to mode from any reads to the page
+	 * tables done while the VCPU is running.  Please see the comment
+	 * in kvm_flush_remote_tlbs.
+	 */
+	smp_mb__after_srcu_read_unlock();
+
+	/*
+	 * Process pending posted interrupts to handle the case where the
+	 * notification IRQ arrived in the host, or was never sent (because the
+	 * target vCPU wasn't running).  Do this regardless of the vCPU's APICv
+	 * status, KVM doesn't update assigned devices when APICv is inhibited,
+	 * i.e. they can post interrupts even if APICv is temporarily disabled.
+	 */
+	if (kvm_lapic_enabled(vcpu))
+		static_call_cond(kvm_x86_sync_pir_to_irr)(vcpu);
+
+	if (kvm_vcpu_exit_request(vcpu)) {
+		vcpu->mode = OUTSIDE_GUEST_MODE;
+		smp_wmb();
+		local_irq_enable();
+		preempt_enable();
+		kvm_vcpu_srcu_read_lock(vcpu);
+		r = 1;
+		goto cancel_injection;
+	}
+
+	if (req_immediate_exit) {
+		kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_EVENT, vcpu);
+		static_call(kvm_x86_request_immediate_exit)(vcpu);
+	}
+
+	fpregs_assert_state_consistent();
+	if (test_thread_flag(TIF_NEED_FPU_LOAD))
+		switch_fpu_return();
+
+	if (vcpu->arch.guest_fpu.xfd_err)
+		wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_XFD_ERR, vcpu->arch.guest_fpu.xfd_err);
+
+	if (unlikely(vcpu->arch.switch_db_regs)) {
+		set_debugreg(0, 7);
+		set_debugreg(vcpu->arch.eff_db[0], 0);
+		set_debugreg(vcpu->arch.eff_db[1], 1);
+		set_debugreg(vcpu->arch.eff_db[2], 2);
+		set_debugreg(vcpu->arch.eff_db[3], 3);
+	} else if (unlikely(hw_breakpoint_active())) {
+		set_debugreg(0, 7);
+	}
+
+	guest_timing_enter_irqoff();
+
+	for (;;) {
+		/*
+		 * Assert that vCPU vs. VM APICv state is consistent.  An APICv
+		 * update must kick and wait for all vCPUs before toggling the
+		 * per-VM state, and responsing vCPUs must wait for the update
+		 * to complete before servicing KVM_REQ_APICV_UPDATE.
+		 */
+		WARN_ON_ONCE((kvm_vcpu_apicv_activated(vcpu) != kvm_vcpu_apicv_active(vcpu)) &&
+			     (kvm_get_apic_mode(vcpu) != LAPIC_MODE_DISABLED));
+
+		exit_fastpath = static_call(kvm_x86_vcpu_run)(vcpu);
+		if (likely(exit_fastpath != EXIT_FASTPATH_REENTER_GUEST))
+			break;
+
+		if (kvm_lapic_enabled(vcpu))
+			static_call_cond(kvm_x86_sync_pir_to_irr)(vcpu);
+
+		if (unlikely(kvm_vcpu_exit_request(vcpu))) {
+			exit_fastpath = EXIT_FASTPATH_EXIT_HANDLED;
+			break;
+		}
+
+		/* Note, VM-Exits that go down the "slow" path are accounted below. */
+		++vcpu->stat.exits;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Do this here before restoring debug registers on the host.  And
+	 * since we do this before handling the vmexit, a DR access vmexit
+	 * can (a) read the correct value of the debug registers, (b) set
+	 * KVM_DEBUGREG_WONT_EXIT again.
+	 */
+	if (unlikely(vcpu->arch.switch_db_regs & KVM_DEBUGREG_WONT_EXIT)) {
+		WARN_ON(vcpu->guest_debug & KVM_GUESTDBG_USE_HW_BP);
+		static_call(kvm_x86_sync_dirty_debug_regs)(vcpu);
+		kvm_update_dr0123(vcpu);
+		kvm_update_dr7(vcpu);
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * If the guest has used debug registers, at least dr7
+	 * will be disabled while returning to the host.
+	 * If we don't have active breakpoints in the host, we don't
+	 * care about the messed up debug address registers. But if
+	 * we have some of them active, restore the old state.
+	 */
+	if (hw_breakpoint_active())
+		hw_breakpoint_restore();
+
+	vcpu->arch.last_vmentry_cpu = vcpu->cpu;
+	vcpu->arch.last_guest_tsc = kvm_read_l1_tsc(vcpu, rdtsc());
+
+	vcpu->mode = OUTSIDE_GUEST_MODE;
+	smp_wmb();
+
+	/*
+	 * Sync xfd before calling handle_exit_irqoff() which may
+	 * rely on the fact that guest_fpu::xfd is up-to-date (e.g.
+	 * in #NM irqoff handler).
+	 */
+	if (vcpu->arch.xfd_no_write_intercept)
+		fpu_sync_guest_vmexit_xfd_state();
+
+	static_call(kvm_x86_handle_exit_irqoff)(vcpu);
+
+	if (vcpu->arch.guest_fpu.xfd_err)
+		wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_XFD_ERR, 0);
+
+	/*
+	 * Consume any pending interrupts, including the possible source of
+	 * VM-Exit on SVM and any ticks that occur between VM-Exit and now.
+	 * An instruction is required after local_irq_enable() to fully unblock
+	 * interrupts on processors that implement an interrupt shadow, the
+	 * stat.exits increment will do nicely.
+	 */
+	kvm_before_interrupt(vcpu, KVM_HANDLING_IRQ);
+	local_irq_enable();
+	++vcpu->stat.exits;
+	local_irq_disable();
+	kvm_after_interrupt(vcpu);
+
+	/*
+	 * Wait until after servicing IRQs to account guest time so that any
+	 * ticks that occurred while running the guest are properly accounted
+	 * to the guest.  Waiting until IRQs are enabled degrades the accuracy
+	 * of accounting via context tracking, but the loss of accuracy is
+	 * acceptable for all known use cases.
+	 */
+	guest_timing_exit_irqoff();
+
+	local_irq_enable();
+	preempt_enable();
+
+	kvm_vcpu_srcu_read_lock(vcpu);
+
+	/*
+	 * Profile KVM exit RIPs:
+	 */
+	if (unlikely(prof_on == KVM_PROFILING)) {
+		unsigned long rip = kvm_rip_read(vcpu);
+		profile_hit(KVM_PROFILING, (void *)rip);
+	}
+
+	if (unlikely(vcpu->arch.tsc_always_catchup))
+		kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_CLOCK_UPDATE, vcpu);
+
+	if (vcpu->arch.apic_attention)
+		kvm_lapic_sync_from_vapic(vcpu);
+
+	r = static_call(kvm_x86_handle_exit)(vcpu, exit_fastpath);
+	return r;
+
+cancel_injection:
+	if (req_immediate_exit)
+		kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_EVENT, vcpu);
+	static_call(kvm_x86_cancel_injection)(vcpu);
+	if (unlikely(vcpu->arch.apic_attention))
+		kvm_lapic_sync_from_vapic(vcpu);
+out:
+	return r;
+}
+
+/* Called within kvm->srcu read side.  */
+static inline int vcpu_block(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	bool hv_timer;
+
+	if (!kvm_arch_vcpu_runnable(vcpu)) {
+		/*
+		 * Switch to the software timer before halt-polling/blocking as
+		 * the guest's timer may be a break event for the vCPU, and the
+		 * hypervisor timer runs only when the CPU is in guest mode.
+		 * Switch before halt-polling so that KVM recognizes an expired
+		 * timer before blocking.
+		 */
+		hv_timer = kvm_lapic_hv_timer_in_use(vcpu);
+		if (hv_timer)
+			kvm_lapic_switch_to_sw_timer(vcpu);
+
+		kvm_vcpu_srcu_read_unlock(vcpu);
+		if (vcpu->arch.mp_state == KVM_MP_STATE_HALTED)
+			kvm_vcpu_halt(vcpu);
+		else
+			kvm_vcpu_block(vcpu);
+		kvm_vcpu_srcu_read_lock(vcpu);
+
+		if (hv_timer)
+			kvm_lapic_switch_to_hv_timer(vcpu);
+
+		/*
+		 * If the vCPU is not runnable, a signal or another host event
+		 * of some kind is pending; service it without changing the
+		 * vCPU's activity state.
+		 */
+		if (!kvm_arch_vcpu_runnable(vcpu))
+			return 1;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Evaluate nested events before exiting the halted state.  This allows
+	 * the halt state to be recorded properly in the VMCS12's activity
+	 * state field (AMD does not have a similar field and a VM-Exit always
+	 * causes a spurious wakeup from HLT).
+	 */
+	if (is_guest_mode(vcpu)) {
+		if (kvm_check_nested_events(vcpu) < 0)
+			return 0;
+	}
+
+	if (kvm_apic_accept_events(vcpu) < 0)
+		return 0;
+	switch(vcpu->arch.mp_state) {
+	case KVM_MP_STATE_HALTED:
+	case KVM_MP_STATE_AP_RESET_HOLD:
+		vcpu->arch.pv.pv_unhalted = false;
+		vcpu->arch.mp_state =
+			KVM_MP_STATE_RUNNABLE;
+		fallthrough;
+	case KVM_MP_STATE_RUNNABLE:
+		vcpu->arch.apf.halted = false;
+		break;
+	case KVM_MP_STATE_INIT_RECEIVED:
+		break;
+	default:
+		WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
+		break;
+	}
+	return 1;
+}
+
+static inline bool kvm_vcpu_running(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	return (vcpu->arch.mp_state == KVM_MP_STATE_RUNNABLE &&
+		!vcpu->arch.apf.halted);
+}
+
+/* Called within kvm->srcu read side.  */
+static int vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	int r;
+
+	vcpu->arch.l1tf_flush_l1d = true;
+
+	for (;;) {
+		/*
+		 * If another guest vCPU requests a PV TLB flush in the middle
+		 * of instruction emulation, the rest of the emulation could
+		 * use a stale page translation. Assume that any code after
+		 * this point can start executing an instruction.
+		 */
+		vcpu->arch.at_instruction_boundary = false;
+		if (kvm_vcpu_running(vcpu)) {
+			r = vcpu_enter_guest(vcpu);
+		} else {
+			r = vcpu_block(vcpu);
+		}
+
+		if (r <= 0)
+			break;
+
+		kvm_clear_request(KVM_REQ_UNBLOCK, vcpu);
+		if (kvm_xen_has_pending_events(vcpu))
+			kvm_xen_inject_pending_events(vcpu);
+
+		if (kvm_cpu_has_pending_timer(vcpu))
+			kvm_inject_pending_timer_irqs(vcpu);
+
+		if (dm_request_for_irq_injection(vcpu) &&
+			kvm_vcpu_ready_for_interrupt_injection(vcpu)) {
+			r = 0;
+			vcpu->run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_IRQ_WINDOW_OPEN;
+			++vcpu->stat.request_irq_exits;
+			break;
+		}
+
+		if (__xfer_to_guest_mode_work_pending()) {
+			kvm_vcpu_srcu_read_unlock(vcpu);
+			r = xfer_to_guest_mode_handle_work(vcpu);
+			kvm_vcpu_srcu_read_lock(vcpu);
+			if (r)
+				return r;
+		}
+	}
+
+	return r;
+}
+
+static inline int complete_emulated_io(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	return kvm_emulate_instruction(vcpu, EMULTYPE_NO_DECODE);
+}
+
+static int complete_emulated_pio(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	BUG_ON(!vcpu->arch.pio.count);
+
+	return complete_emulated_io(vcpu);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Implements the following, as a state machine:
+ *
+ * read:
+ *   for each fragment
+ *     for each mmio piece in the fragment
+ *       write gpa, len
+ *       exit
+ *       copy data
+ *   execute insn
+ *
+ * write:
+ *   for each fragment
+ *     for each mmio piece in the fragment
+ *       write gpa, len
+ *       copy data
+ *       exit
+ */
+static int complete_emulated_mmio(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct kvm_run *run = vcpu->run;
+	struct kvm_mmio_fragment *frag;
+	unsigned len;
+
+	BUG_ON(!vcpu->mmio_needed);
+
+	/* Complete previous fragment */
+	frag = &vcpu->mmio_fragments[vcpu->mmio_cur_fragment];
+	len = min(8u, frag->len);
+	if (!vcpu->mmio_is_write)
+		memcpy(frag->data, run->mmio.data, len);
+
+	if (frag->len <= 8) {
+		/* Switch to the next fragment. */
+		frag++;
+		vcpu->mmio_cur_fragment++;
+	} else {
+		/* Go forward to the next mmio piece. */
+		frag->data += len;
+		frag->gpa += len;
+		frag->len -= len;
+	}
+
+	if (vcpu->mmio_cur_fragment >= vcpu->mmio_nr_fragments) {
+		vcpu->mmio_needed = 0;
+
+		/* FIXME: return into emulator if single-stepping.  */
+		if (vcpu->mmio_is_write)
+			return 1;
+		vcpu->mmio_read_completed = 1;
+		return complete_emulated_io(vcpu);
+	}
+
+	run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_MMIO;
+	run->mmio.phys_addr = frag->gpa;
+	if (vcpu->mmio_is_write)
+		memcpy(run->mmio.data, frag->data, min(8u, frag->len));
+	run->mmio.len = min(8u, frag->len);
+	run->mmio.is_write = vcpu->mmio_is_write;
+	vcpu->arch.complete_userspace_io = complete_emulated_mmio;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/* Swap (qemu) user FPU context for the guest FPU context. */
+static void kvm_load_guest_fpu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	/* Exclude PKRU, it's restored separately immediately after VM-Exit. */
+	fpu_swap_kvm_fpstate(&vcpu->arch.guest_fpu, true);
+	trace_kvm_fpu(1);
+}
+
+/* When vcpu_run ends, restore user space FPU context. */
+static void kvm_put_guest_fpu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	fpu_swap_kvm_fpstate(&vcpu->arch.guest_fpu, false);
+	++vcpu->stat.fpu_reload;
+	trace_kvm_fpu(0);
+}
+
+int kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct kvm_queued_exception *ex = &vcpu->arch.exception;
+	struct kvm_run *kvm_run = vcpu->run;
+	int r;
+
+	vcpu_load(vcpu);
+	kvm_sigset_activate(vcpu);
+	kvm_run->flags = 0;
+	kvm_load_guest_fpu(vcpu);
+
+	kvm_vcpu_srcu_read_lock(vcpu);
+	if (unlikely(vcpu->arch.mp_state == KVM_MP_STATE_UNINITIALIZED)) {
+		if (kvm_run->immediate_exit) {
+			r = -EINTR;
+			goto out;
+		}
+
+		/*
+		 * Don't bother switching APIC timer emulation from the
+		 * hypervisor timer to the software timer, the only way for the
+		 * APIC timer to be active is if userspace stuffed vCPU state,
+		 * i.e. put the vCPU into a nonsensical state.  Only an INIT
+		 * will transition the vCPU out of UNINITIALIZED (without more
+		 * state stuffing from userspace), which will reset the local
+		 * APIC and thus cancel the timer or drop the IRQ (if the timer
+		 * already expired).
+		 */
+		kvm_vcpu_srcu_read_unlock(vcpu);
+		kvm_vcpu_block(vcpu);
+		kvm_vcpu_srcu_read_lock(vcpu);
+
+		if (kvm_apic_accept_events(vcpu) < 0) {
+			r = 0;
+			goto out;
+		}
+		r = -EAGAIN;
+		if (signal_pending(current)) {
+			r = -EINTR;
+			kvm_run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_INTR;
+			++vcpu->stat.signal_exits;
+		}
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if ((kvm_run->kvm_valid_regs & ~KVM_SYNC_X86_VALID_FIELDS) ||
+	    (kvm_run->kvm_dirty_regs & ~KVM_SYNC_X86_VALID_FIELDS)) {
+		r = -EINVAL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if (kvm_run->kvm_dirty_regs) {
+		r = sync_regs(vcpu);
+		if (r != 0)
+			goto out;
+	}
+
+	/* re-sync apic's tpr */
+	if (!lapic_in_kernel(vcpu)) {
+		if (kvm_set_cr8(vcpu, kvm_run->cr8) != 0) {
+			r = -EINVAL;
+			goto out;
+		}
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * If userspace set a pending exception and L2 is active, convert it to
+	 * a pending VM-Exit if L1 wants to intercept the exception.
+	 */
+	if (vcpu->arch.exception_from_userspace && is_guest_mode(vcpu) &&
+	    kvm_x86_ops.nested_ops->is_exception_vmexit(vcpu, ex->vector,
+							ex->error_code)) {
+		kvm_queue_exception_vmexit(vcpu, ex->vector,
+					   ex->has_error_code, ex->error_code,
+					   ex->has_payload, ex->payload);
+		ex->injected = false;
+		ex->pending = false;
+	}
+	vcpu->arch.exception_from_userspace = false;
+
+	if (unlikely(vcpu->arch.complete_userspace_io)) {
+		int (*cui)(struct kvm_vcpu *) = vcpu->arch.complete_userspace_io;
+		vcpu->arch.complete_userspace_io = NULL;
+		r = cui(vcpu);
+		if (r <= 0)
+			goto out;
+	} else {
+		WARN_ON_ONCE(vcpu->arch.pio.count);
+		WARN_ON_ONCE(vcpu->mmio_needed);
+	}
+
+	if (kvm_run->immediate_exit) {
+		r = -EINTR;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	r = static_call(kvm_x86_vcpu_pre_run)(vcpu);
+	if (r <= 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	r = vcpu_run(vcpu);
+
+out:
+	kvm_put_guest_fpu(vcpu);
+	if (kvm_run->kvm_valid_regs)
+		store_regs(vcpu);
+	post_kvm_run_save(vcpu);
+	kvm_vcpu_srcu_read_unlock(vcpu);
+
+	kvm_sigset_deactivate(vcpu);
+	vcpu_put(vcpu);
+	return r;
+}
+
+static void __get_regs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_regs *regs)
+{
+	if (vcpu->arch.emulate_regs_need_sync_to_vcpu) {
+		/*
+		 * We are here if userspace calls get_regs() in the middle of
+		 * instruction emulation. Registers state needs to be copied
+		 * back from emulation context to vcpu. Userspace shouldn't do
+		 * that usually, but some bad designed PV devices (vmware
+		 * backdoor interface) need this to work
+		 */
+		emulator_writeback_register_cache(vcpu->arch.emulate_ctxt);
+		vcpu->arch.emulate_regs_need_sync_to_vcpu = false;
+	}
+	regs->rax = kvm_rax_read(vcpu);
+	regs->rbx = kvm_rbx_read(vcpu);
+	regs->rcx = kvm_rcx_read(vcpu);
+	regs->rdx = kvm_rdx_read(vcpu);
+	regs->rsi = kvm_rsi_read(vcpu);
+	regs->rdi = kvm_rdi_read(vcpu);
+	regs->rsp = kvm_rsp_read(vcpu);
+	regs->rbp = kvm_rbp_read(vcpu);
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+	regs->r8 = kvm_r8_read(vcpu);
+	regs->r9 = kvm_r9_read(vcpu);
+	regs->r10 = kvm_r10_read(vcpu);
+	regs->r11 = kvm_r11_read(vcpu);
+	regs->r12 = kvm_r12_read(vcpu);
+	regs->r13 = kvm_r13_read(vcpu);
+	regs->r14 = kvm_r14_read(vcpu);
+	regs->r15 = kvm_r15_read(vcpu);
+#endif
+
+	regs->rip = kvm_rip_read(vcpu);
+	regs->rflags = kvm_get_rflags(vcpu);
+}
+
+int kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_get_regs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_regs *regs)
+{
+	vcpu_load(vcpu);
+	__get_regs(vcpu, regs);
+	vcpu_put(vcpu);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void __set_regs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_regs *regs)
+{
+	vcpu->arch.emulate_regs_need_sync_from_vcpu = true;
+	vcpu->arch.emulate_regs_need_sync_to_vcpu = false;
+
+	kvm_rax_write(vcpu, regs->rax);
+	kvm_rbx_write(vcpu, regs->rbx);
+	kvm_rcx_write(vcpu, regs->rcx);
+	kvm_rdx_write(vcpu, regs->rdx);
+	kvm_rsi_write(vcpu, regs->rsi);
+	kvm_rdi_write(vcpu, regs->rdi);
+	kvm_rsp_write(vcpu, regs->rsp);
+	kvm_rbp_write(vcpu, regs->rbp);
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+	kvm_r8_write(vcpu, regs->r8);
+	kvm_r9_write(vcpu, regs->r9);
+	kvm_r10_write(vcpu, regs->r10);
+	kvm_r11_write(vcpu, regs->r11);
+	kvm_r12_write(vcpu, regs->r12);
+	kvm_r13_write(vcpu, regs->r13);
+	kvm_r14_write(vcpu, regs->r14);
+	kvm_r15_write(vcpu, regs->r15);
+#endif
+
+	kvm_rip_write(vcpu, regs->rip);
+	kvm_set_rflags(vcpu, regs->rflags | X86_EFLAGS_FIXED);
+
+	vcpu->arch.exception.pending = false;
+	vcpu->arch.exception_vmexit.pending = false;
+
+	kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_EVENT, vcpu);
+}
+
+int kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_set_regs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_regs *regs)
+{
+	vcpu_load(vcpu);
+	__set_regs(vcpu, regs);
+	vcpu_put(vcpu);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void __get_sregs_common(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_sregs *sregs)
+{
+	struct desc_ptr dt;
+
+	if (vcpu->arch.guest_state_protected)
+		goto skip_protected_regs;
+
+	kvm_get_segment(vcpu, &sregs->cs, VCPU_SREG_CS);
+	kvm_get_segment(vcpu, &sregs->ds, VCPU_SREG_DS);
+	kvm_get_segment(vcpu, &sregs->es, VCPU_SREG_ES);
+	kvm_get_segment(vcpu, &sregs->fs, VCPU_SREG_FS);
+	kvm_get_segment(vcpu, &sregs->gs, VCPU_SREG_GS);
+	kvm_get_segment(vcpu, &sregs->ss, VCPU_SREG_SS);
+
+	kvm_get_segment(vcpu, &sregs->tr, VCPU_SREG_TR);
+	kvm_get_segment(vcpu, &sregs->ldt, VCPU_SREG_LDTR);
+
+	static_call(kvm_x86_get_idt)(vcpu, &dt);
+	sregs->idt.limit = dt.size;
+	sregs->idt.base = dt.address;
+	static_call(kvm_x86_get_gdt)(vcpu, &dt);
+	sregs->gdt.limit = dt.size;
+	sregs->gdt.base = dt.address;
+
+	sregs->cr2 = vcpu->arch.cr2;
+	sregs->cr3 = kvm_read_cr3(vcpu);
+
+skip_protected_regs:
+	sregs->cr0 = kvm_read_cr0(vcpu);
+	sregs->cr4 = kvm_read_cr4(vcpu);
+	sregs->cr8 = kvm_get_cr8(vcpu);
+	sregs->efer = vcpu->arch.efer;
+	sregs->apic_base = kvm_get_apic_base(vcpu);
+}
+
+static void __get_sregs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_sregs *sregs)
+{
+	__get_sregs_common(vcpu, sregs);
+
+	if (vcpu->arch.guest_state_protected)
+		return;
+
+	if (vcpu->arch.interrupt.injected && !vcpu->arch.interrupt.soft)
+		set_bit(vcpu->arch.interrupt.nr,
+			(unsigned long *)sregs->interrupt_bitmap);
+}
+
+static void __get_sregs2(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_sregs2 *sregs2)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	__get_sregs_common(vcpu, (struct kvm_sregs *)sregs2);
+
+	if (vcpu->arch.guest_state_protected)
+		return;
+
+	if (is_pae_paging(vcpu)) {
+		for (i = 0 ; i < 4 ; i++)
+			sregs2->pdptrs[i] = kvm_pdptr_read(vcpu, i);
+		sregs2->flags |= KVM_SREGS2_FLAGS_PDPTRS_VALID;
+	}
+}
+
+int kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_get_sregs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+				  struct kvm_sregs *sregs)
+{
+	vcpu_load(vcpu);
+	__get_sregs(vcpu, sregs);
+	vcpu_put(vcpu);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_get_mpstate(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+				    struct kvm_mp_state *mp_state)
+{
+	int r;
+
+	vcpu_load(vcpu);
+	if (kvm_mpx_supported())
+		kvm_load_guest_fpu(vcpu);
+
+	r = kvm_apic_accept_events(vcpu);
+	if (r < 0)
+		goto out;
+	r = 0;
+
+	if ((vcpu->arch.mp_state == KVM_MP_STATE_HALTED ||
+	     vcpu->arch.mp_state == KVM_MP_STATE_AP_RESET_HOLD) &&
+	    vcpu->arch.pv.pv_unhalted)
+		mp_state->mp_state = KVM_MP_STATE_RUNNABLE;
+	else
+		mp_state->mp_state = vcpu->arch.mp_state;
+
+out:
+	if (kvm_mpx_supported())
+		kvm_put_guest_fpu(vcpu);
+	vcpu_put(vcpu);
+	return r;
+}
+
+int kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_set_mpstate(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+				    struct kvm_mp_state *mp_state)
+{
+	int ret = -EINVAL;
+
+	vcpu_load(vcpu);
+
+	switch (mp_state->mp_state) {
+	case KVM_MP_STATE_UNINITIALIZED:
+	case KVM_MP_STATE_HALTED:
+	case KVM_MP_STATE_AP_RESET_HOLD:
+	case KVM_MP_STATE_INIT_RECEIVED:
+	case KVM_MP_STATE_SIPI_RECEIVED:
+		if (!lapic_in_kernel(vcpu))
+			goto out;
+		break;
+
+	case KVM_MP_STATE_RUNNABLE:
+		break;
+
+	default:
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Pending INITs are reported using KVM_SET_VCPU_EVENTS, disallow
+	 * forcing the guest into INIT/SIPI if those events are supposed to be
+	 * blocked.  KVM prioritizes SMI over INIT, so reject INIT/SIPI state
+	 * if an SMI is pending as well.
+	 */
+	if ((!kvm_apic_init_sipi_allowed(vcpu) || vcpu->arch.smi_pending) &&
+	    (mp_state->mp_state == KVM_MP_STATE_SIPI_RECEIVED ||
+	     mp_state->mp_state == KVM_MP_STATE_INIT_RECEIVED))
+		goto out;
+
+	if (mp_state->mp_state == KVM_MP_STATE_SIPI_RECEIVED) {
+		vcpu->arch.mp_state = KVM_MP_STATE_INIT_RECEIVED;
+		set_bit(KVM_APIC_SIPI, &vcpu->arch.apic->pending_events);
+	} else
+		vcpu->arch.mp_state = mp_state->mp_state;
+	kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_EVENT, vcpu);
+
+	ret = 0;
+out:
+	vcpu_put(vcpu);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+int kvm_task_switch(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u16 tss_selector, int idt_index,
+		    int reason, bool has_error_code, u32 error_code)
+{
+	struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt = vcpu->arch.emulate_ctxt;
+	int ret;
+
+	init_emulate_ctxt(vcpu);
+
+	ret = emulator_task_switch(ctxt, tss_selector, idt_index, reason,
+				   has_error_code, error_code);
+	if (ret) {
+		vcpu->run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+		vcpu->run->internal.suberror = KVM_INTERNAL_ERROR_EMULATION;
+		vcpu->run->internal.ndata = 0;
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	kvm_rip_write(vcpu, ctxt->eip);
+	kvm_set_rflags(vcpu, ctxt->eflags);
+	return 1;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_task_switch);
+
+static bool kvm_is_valid_sregs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_sregs *sregs)
+{
+	if ((sregs->efer & EFER_LME) && (sregs->cr0 & X86_CR0_PG)) {
+		/*
+		 * When EFER.LME and CR0.PG are set, the processor is in
+		 * 64-bit mode (though maybe in a 32-bit code segment).
+		 * CR4.PAE and EFER.LMA must be set.
+		 */
+		if (!(sregs->cr4 & X86_CR4_PAE) || !(sregs->efer & EFER_LMA))
+			return false;
+		if (kvm_vcpu_is_illegal_gpa(vcpu, sregs->cr3))
+			return false;
+	} else {
+		/*
+		 * Not in 64-bit mode: EFER.LMA is clear and the code
+		 * segment cannot be 64-bit.
+		 */
+		if (sregs->efer & EFER_LMA || sregs->cs.l)
+			return false;
+	}
+
+	return kvm_is_valid_cr4(vcpu, sregs->cr4) &&
+	       kvm_is_valid_cr0(vcpu, sregs->cr0);
+}
+
+static int __set_sregs_common(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_sregs *sregs,
+		int *mmu_reset_needed, bool update_pdptrs)
+{
+	struct msr_data apic_base_msr;
+	int idx;
+	struct desc_ptr dt;
+
+	if (!kvm_is_valid_sregs(vcpu, sregs))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	apic_base_msr.data = sregs->apic_base;
+	apic_base_msr.host_initiated = true;
+	if (kvm_set_apic_base(vcpu, &apic_base_msr))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (vcpu->arch.guest_state_protected)
+		return 0;
+
+	dt.size = sregs->idt.limit;
+	dt.address = sregs->idt.base;
+	static_call(kvm_x86_set_idt)(vcpu, &dt);
+	dt.size = sregs->gdt.limit;
+	dt.address = sregs->gdt.base;
+	static_call(kvm_x86_set_gdt)(vcpu, &dt);
+
+	vcpu->arch.cr2 = sregs->cr2;
+	*mmu_reset_needed |= kvm_read_cr3(vcpu) != sregs->cr3;
+	vcpu->arch.cr3 = sregs->cr3;
+	kvm_register_mark_dirty(vcpu, VCPU_EXREG_CR3);
+	static_call_cond(kvm_x86_post_set_cr3)(vcpu, sregs->cr3);
+
+	kvm_set_cr8(vcpu, sregs->cr8);
+
+	*mmu_reset_needed |= vcpu->arch.efer != sregs->efer;
+	static_call(kvm_x86_set_efer)(vcpu, sregs->efer);
+
+	*mmu_reset_needed |= kvm_read_cr0(vcpu) != sregs->cr0;
+	static_call(kvm_x86_set_cr0)(vcpu, sregs->cr0);
+	vcpu->arch.cr0 = sregs->cr0;
+
+	*mmu_reset_needed |= kvm_read_cr4(vcpu) != sregs->cr4;
+	static_call(kvm_x86_set_cr4)(vcpu, sregs->cr4);
+
+	if (update_pdptrs) {
+		idx = srcu_read_lock(&vcpu->kvm->srcu);
+		if (is_pae_paging(vcpu)) {
+			load_pdptrs(vcpu, kvm_read_cr3(vcpu));
+			*mmu_reset_needed = 1;
+		}
+		srcu_read_unlock(&vcpu->kvm->srcu, idx);
+	}
+
+	kvm_set_segment(vcpu, &sregs->cs, VCPU_SREG_CS);
+	kvm_set_segment(vcpu, &sregs->ds, VCPU_SREG_DS);
+	kvm_set_segment(vcpu, &sregs->es, VCPU_SREG_ES);
+	kvm_set_segment(vcpu, &sregs->fs, VCPU_SREG_FS);
+	kvm_set_segment(vcpu, &sregs->gs, VCPU_SREG_GS);
+	kvm_set_segment(vcpu, &sregs->ss, VCPU_SREG_SS);
+
+	kvm_set_segment(vcpu, &sregs->tr, VCPU_SREG_TR);
+	kvm_set_segment(vcpu, &sregs->ldt, VCPU_SREG_LDTR);
+
+	update_cr8_intercept(vcpu);
+
+	/* Older userspace won't unhalt the vcpu on reset. */
+	if (kvm_vcpu_is_bsp(vcpu) && kvm_rip_read(vcpu) == 0xfff0 &&
+	    sregs->cs.selector == 0xf000 && sregs->cs.base == 0xffff0000 &&
+	    !is_protmode(vcpu))
+		vcpu->arch.mp_state = KVM_MP_STATE_RUNNABLE;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int __set_sregs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_sregs *sregs)
+{
+	int pending_vec, max_bits;
+	int mmu_reset_needed = 0;
+	int ret = __set_sregs_common(vcpu, sregs, &mmu_reset_needed, true);
+
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+
+	if (mmu_reset_needed)
+		kvm_mmu_reset_context(vcpu);
+
+	max_bits = KVM_NR_INTERRUPTS;
+	pending_vec = find_first_bit(
+		(const unsigned long *)sregs->interrupt_bitmap, max_bits);
+
+	if (pending_vec < max_bits) {
+		kvm_queue_interrupt(vcpu, pending_vec, false);
+		pr_debug("Set back pending irq %d\n", pending_vec);
+		kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_EVENT, vcpu);
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int __set_sregs2(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_sregs2 *sregs2)
+{
+	int mmu_reset_needed = 0;
+	bool valid_pdptrs = sregs2->flags & KVM_SREGS2_FLAGS_PDPTRS_VALID;
+	bool pae = (sregs2->cr0 & X86_CR0_PG) && (sregs2->cr4 & X86_CR4_PAE) &&
+		!(sregs2->efer & EFER_LMA);
+	int i, ret;
+
+	if (sregs2->flags & ~KVM_SREGS2_FLAGS_PDPTRS_VALID)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (valid_pdptrs && (!pae || vcpu->arch.guest_state_protected))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	ret = __set_sregs_common(vcpu, (struct kvm_sregs *)sregs2,
+				 &mmu_reset_needed, !valid_pdptrs);
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+
+	if (valid_pdptrs) {
+		for (i = 0; i < 4 ; i++)
+			kvm_pdptr_write(vcpu, i, sregs2->pdptrs[i]);
+
+		kvm_register_mark_dirty(vcpu, VCPU_EXREG_PDPTR);
+		mmu_reset_needed = 1;
+		vcpu->arch.pdptrs_from_userspace = true;
+	}
+	if (mmu_reset_needed)
+		kvm_mmu_reset_context(vcpu);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_set_sregs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+				  struct kvm_sregs *sregs)
+{
+	int ret;
+
+	vcpu_load(vcpu);
+	ret = __set_sregs(vcpu, sregs);
+	vcpu_put(vcpu);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static void kvm_arch_vcpu_guestdbg_update_apicv_inhibit(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+	bool set = false;
+	struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu;
+	unsigned long i;
+
+	if (!enable_apicv)
+		return;
+
+	down_write(&kvm->arch.apicv_update_lock);
+
+	kvm_for_each_vcpu(i, vcpu, kvm) {
+		if (vcpu->guest_debug & KVM_GUESTDBG_BLOCKIRQ) {
+			set = true;
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+	__kvm_set_or_clear_apicv_inhibit(kvm, APICV_INHIBIT_REASON_BLOCKIRQ, set);
+	up_write(&kvm->arch.apicv_update_lock);
+}
+
+int kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_set_guest_debug(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+					struct kvm_guest_debug *dbg)
+{
+	unsigned long rflags;
+	int i, r;
+
+	if (vcpu->arch.guest_state_protected)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	vcpu_load(vcpu);
+
+	if (dbg->control & (KVM_GUESTDBG_INJECT_DB | KVM_GUESTDBG_INJECT_BP)) {
+		r = -EBUSY;
+		if (kvm_is_exception_pending(vcpu))
+			goto out;
+		if (dbg->control & KVM_GUESTDBG_INJECT_DB)
+			kvm_queue_exception(vcpu, DB_VECTOR);
+		else
+			kvm_queue_exception(vcpu, BP_VECTOR);
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Read rflags as long as potentially injected trace flags are still
+	 * filtered out.
+	 */
+	rflags = kvm_get_rflags(vcpu);
+
+	vcpu->guest_debug = dbg->control;
+	if (!(vcpu->guest_debug & KVM_GUESTDBG_ENABLE))
+		vcpu->guest_debug = 0;
+
+	if (vcpu->guest_debug & KVM_GUESTDBG_USE_HW_BP) {
+		for (i = 0; i < KVM_NR_DB_REGS; ++i)
+			vcpu->arch.eff_db[i] = dbg->arch.debugreg[i];
+		vcpu->arch.guest_debug_dr7 = dbg->arch.debugreg[7];
+	} else {
+		for (i = 0; i < KVM_NR_DB_REGS; i++)
+			vcpu->arch.eff_db[i] = vcpu->arch.db[i];
+	}
+	kvm_update_dr7(vcpu);
+
+	if (vcpu->guest_debug & KVM_GUESTDBG_SINGLESTEP)
+		vcpu->arch.singlestep_rip = kvm_get_linear_rip(vcpu);
+
+	/*
+	 * Trigger an rflags update that will inject or remove the trace
+	 * flags.
+	 */
+	kvm_set_rflags(vcpu, rflags);
+
+	static_call(kvm_x86_update_exception_bitmap)(vcpu);
+
+	kvm_arch_vcpu_guestdbg_update_apicv_inhibit(vcpu->kvm);
+
+	r = 0;
+
+out:
+	vcpu_put(vcpu);
+	return r;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Translate a guest virtual address to a guest physical address.
+ */
+int kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_translate(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+				    struct kvm_translation *tr)
+{
+	unsigned long vaddr = tr->linear_address;
+	gpa_t gpa;
+	int idx;
+
+	vcpu_load(vcpu);
+
+	idx = srcu_read_lock(&vcpu->kvm->srcu);
+	gpa = kvm_mmu_gva_to_gpa_system(vcpu, vaddr, NULL);
+	srcu_read_unlock(&vcpu->kvm->srcu, idx);
+	tr->physical_address = gpa;
+	tr->valid = gpa != INVALID_GPA;
+	tr->writeable = 1;
+	tr->usermode = 0;
+
+	vcpu_put(vcpu);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_get_fpu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_fpu *fpu)
+{
+	struct fxregs_state *fxsave;
+
+	if (fpstate_is_confidential(&vcpu->arch.guest_fpu))
+		return 0;
+
+	vcpu_load(vcpu);
+
+	fxsave = &vcpu->arch.guest_fpu.fpstate->regs.fxsave;
+	memcpy(fpu->fpr, fxsave->st_space, 128);
+	fpu->fcw = fxsave->cwd;
+	fpu->fsw = fxsave->swd;
+	fpu->ftwx = fxsave->twd;
+	fpu->last_opcode = fxsave->fop;
+	fpu->last_ip = fxsave->rip;
+	fpu->last_dp = fxsave->rdp;
+	memcpy(fpu->xmm, fxsave->xmm_space, sizeof(fxsave->xmm_space));
+
+	vcpu_put(vcpu);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_set_fpu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_fpu *fpu)
+{
+	struct fxregs_state *fxsave;
+
+	if (fpstate_is_confidential(&vcpu->arch.guest_fpu))
+		return 0;
+
+	vcpu_load(vcpu);
+
+	fxsave = &vcpu->arch.guest_fpu.fpstate->regs.fxsave;
+
+	memcpy(fxsave->st_space, fpu->fpr, 128);
+	fxsave->cwd = fpu->fcw;
+	fxsave->swd = fpu->fsw;
+	fxsave->twd = fpu->ftwx;
+	fxsave->fop = fpu->last_opcode;
+	fxsave->rip = fpu->last_ip;
+	fxsave->rdp = fpu->last_dp;
+	memcpy(fxsave->xmm_space, fpu->xmm, sizeof(fxsave->xmm_space));
+
+	vcpu_put(vcpu);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void store_regs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(struct kvm_sync_regs) > SYNC_REGS_SIZE_BYTES);
+
+	if (vcpu->run->kvm_valid_regs & KVM_SYNC_X86_REGS)
+		__get_regs(vcpu, &vcpu->run->s.regs.regs);
+
+	if (vcpu->run->kvm_valid_regs & KVM_SYNC_X86_SREGS)
+		__get_sregs(vcpu, &vcpu->run->s.regs.sregs);
+
+	if (vcpu->run->kvm_valid_regs & KVM_SYNC_X86_EVENTS)
+		kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_get_vcpu_events(
+				vcpu, &vcpu->run->s.regs.events);
+}
+
+static int sync_regs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	if (vcpu->run->kvm_dirty_regs & KVM_SYNC_X86_REGS) {
+		__set_regs(vcpu, &vcpu->run->s.regs.regs);
+		vcpu->run->kvm_dirty_regs &= ~KVM_SYNC_X86_REGS;
+	}
+
+	if (vcpu->run->kvm_dirty_regs & KVM_SYNC_X86_SREGS) {
+		struct kvm_sregs sregs = vcpu->run->s.regs.sregs;
+
+		if (__set_sregs(vcpu, &sregs))
+			return -EINVAL;
+
+		vcpu->run->kvm_dirty_regs &= ~KVM_SYNC_X86_SREGS;
+	}
+
+	if (vcpu->run->kvm_dirty_regs & KVM_SYNC_X86_EVENTS) {
+		struct kvm_vcpu_events events = vcpu->run->s.regs.events;
+
+		if (kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_set_vcpu_events(vcpu, &events))
+			return -EINVAL;
+
+		vcpu->run->kvm_dirty_regs &= ~KVM_SYNC_X86_EVENTS;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int kvm_arch_vcpu_precreate(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned int id)
+{
+	if (kvm_check_tsc_unstable() && kvm->created_vcpus)
+		pr_warn_once("SMP vm created on host with unstable TSC; "
+			     "guest TSC will not be reliable\n");
+
+	if (!kvm->arch.max_vcpu_ids)
+		kvm->arch.max_vcpu_ids = KVM_MAX_VCPU_IDS;
+
+	if (id >= kvm->arch.max_vcpu_ids)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	return static_call(kvm_x86_vcpu_precreate)(kvm);
+}
+
+int kvm_arch_vcpu_create(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct page *page;
+	int r;
+
+	vcpu->arch.last_vmentry_cpu = -1;
+	vcpu->arch.regs_avail = ~0;
+	vcpu->arch.regs_dirty = ~0;
+
+	kvm_gpc_init(&vcpu->arch.pv_time, vcpu->kvm, vcpu, KVM_HOST_USES_PFN);
+
+	if (!irqchip_in_kernel(vcpu->kvm) || kvm_vcpu_is_reset_bsp(vcpu))
+		vcpu->arch.mp_state = KVM_MP_STATE_RUNNABLE;
+	else
+		vcpu->arch.mp_state = KVM_MP_STATE_UNINITIALIZED;
+
+	r = kvm_mmu_create(vcpu);
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
+
+	if (irqchip_in_kernel(vcpu->kvm)) {
+		r = kvm_create_lapic(vcpu, lapic_timer_advance_ns);
+		if (r < 0)
+			goto fail_mmu_destroy;
+
+		/*
+		 * Defer evaluating inhibits until the vCPU is first run, as
+		 * this vCPU will not get notified of any changes until this
+		 * vCPU is visible to other vCPUs (marked online and added to
+		 * the set of vCPUs).  Opportunistically mark APICv active as
+		 * VMX in particularly is highly unlikely to have inhibits.
+		 * Ignore the current per-VM APICv state so that vCPU creation
+		 * is guaranteed to run with a deterministic value, the request
+		 * will ensure the vCPU gets the correct state before VM-Entry.
+		 */
+		if (enable_apicv) {
+			vcpu->arch.apic->apicv_active = true;
+			kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_APICV_UPDATE, vcpu);
+		}
+	} else
+		static_branch_inc(&kvm_has_noapic_vcpu);
+
+	r = -ENOMEM;
+
+	page = alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT | __GFP_ZERO);
+	if (!page)
+		goto fail_free_lapic;
+	vcpu->arch.pio_data = page_address(page);
+
+	vcpu->arch.mce_banks = kcalloc(KVM_MAX_MCE_BANKS * 4, sizeof(u64),
+				       GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
+	vcpu->arch.mci_ctl2_banks = kcalloc(KVM_MAX_MCE_BANKS, sizeof(u64),
+					    GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
+	if (!vcpu->arch.mce_banks || !vcpu->arch.mci_ctl2_banks)
+		goto fail_free_mce_banks;
+	vcpu->arch.mcg_cap = KVM_MAX_MCE_BANKS;
+
+	if (!zalloc_cpumask_var(&vcpu->arch.wbinvd_dirty_mask,
+				GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT))
+		goto fail_free_mce_banks;
+
+	if (!alloc_emulate_ctxt(vcpu))
+		goto free_wbinvd_dirty_mask;
+
+	if (!fpu_alloc_guest_fpstate(&vcpu->arch.guest_fpu)) {
+		pr_err("failed to allocate vcpu's fpu\n");
+		goto free_emulate_ctxt;
+	}
+
+	vcpu->arch.maxphyaddr = cpuid_query_maxphyaddr(vcpu);
+	vcpu->arch.reserved_gpa_bits = kvm_vcpu_reserved_gpa_bits_raw(vcpu);
+
+	vcpu->arch.pat = MSR_IA32_CR_PAT_DEFAULT;
+
+	kvm_async_pf_hash_reset(vcpu);
+
+	vcpu->arch.perf_capabilities = kvm_caps.supported_perf_cap;
+	kvm_pmu_init(vcpu);
+
+	vcpu->arch.pending_external_vector = -1;
+	vcpu->arch.preempted_in_kernel = false;
+
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HYPERV)
+	vcpu->arch.hv_root_tdp = INVALID_PAGE;
+#endif
+
+	r = static_call(kvm_x86_vcpu_create)(vcpu);
+	if (r)
+		goto free_guest_fpu;
+
+	vcpu->arch.arch_capabilities = kvm_get_arch_capabilities();
+	vcpu->arch.msr_platform_info = MSR_PLATFORM_INFO_CPUID_FAULT;
+	kvm_xen_init_vcpu(vcpu);
+	kvm_vcpu_mtrr_init(vcpu);
+	vcpu_load(vcpu);
+	kvm_set_tsc_khz(vcpu, vcpu->kvm->arch.default_tsc_khz);
+	kvm_vcpu_reset(vcpu, false);
+	kvm_init_mmu(vcpu);
+	vcpu_put(vcpu);
+	return 0;
+
+free_guest_fpu:
+	fpu_free_guest_fpstate(&vcpu->arch.guest_fpu);
+free_emulate_ctxt:
+	kmem_cache_free(x86_emulator_cache, vcpu->arch.emulate_ctxt);
+free_wbinvd_dirty_mask:
+	free_cpumask_var(vcpu->arch.wbinvd_dirty_mask);
+fail_free_mce_banks:
+	kfree(vcpu->arch.mce_banks);
+	kfree(vcpu->arch.mci_ctl2_banks);
+	free_page((unsigned long)vcpu->arch.pio_data);
+fail_free_lapic:
+	kvm_free_lapic(vcpu);
+fail_mmu_destroy:
+	kvm_mmu_destroy(vcpu);
+	return r;
+}
+
+void kvm_arch_vcpu_postcreate(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct kvm *kvm = vcpu->kvm;
+
+	if (mutex_lock_killable(&vcpu->mutex))
+		return;
+	vcpu_load(vcpu);
+	kvm_synchronize_tsc(vcpu, 0);
+	vcpu_put(vcpu);
+
+	/* poll control enabled by default */
+	vcpu->arch.msr_kvm_poll_control = 1;
+
+	mutex_unlock(&vcpu->mutex);
+
+	if (kvmclock_periodic_sync && vcpu->vcpu_idx == 0)
+		schedule_delayed_work(&kvm->arch.kvmclock_sync_work,
+						KVMCLOCK_SYNC_PERIOD);
+}
+
+void kvm_arch_vcpu_destroy(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	int idx;
+
+	kvmclock_reset(vcpu);
+
+	static_call(kvm_x86_vcpu_free)(vcpu);
+
+	kmem_cache_free(x86_emulator_cache, vcpu->arch.emulate_ctxt);
+	free_cpumask_var(vcpu->arch.wbinvd_dirty_mask);
+	fpu_free_guest_fpstate(&vcpu->arch.guest_fpu);
+
+	kvm_xen_destroy_vcpu(vcpu);
+	kvm_hv_vcpu_uninit(vcpu);
+	kvm_pmu_destroy(vcpu);
+	kfree(vcpu->arch.mce_banks);
+	kfree(vcpu->arch.mci_ctl2_banks);
+	kvm_free_lapic(vcpu);
+	idx = srcu_read_lock(&vcpu->kvm->srcu);
+	kvm_mmu_destroy(vcpu);
+	srcu_read_unlock(&vcpu->kvm->srcu, idx);
+	free_page((unsigned long)vcpu->arch.pio_data);
+	kvfree(vcpu->arch.cpuid_entries);
+	if (!lapic_in_kernel(vcpu))
+		static_branch_dec(&kvm_has_noapic_vcpu);
+}
+
+void kvm_vcpu_reset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool init_event)
+{
+	struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *cpuid_0x1;
+	unsigned long old_cr0 = kvm_read_cr0(vcpu);
+	unsigned long new_cr0;
+
+	/*
+	 * Several of the "set" flows, e.g. ->set_cr0(), read other registers
+	 * to handle side effects.  RESET emulation hits those flows and relies
+	 * on emulated/virtualized registers, including those that are loaded
+	 * into hardware, to be zeroed at vCPU creation.  Use CRs as a sentinel
+	 * to detect improper or missing initialization.
+	 */
+	WARN_ON_ONCE(!init_event &&
+		     (old_cr0 || kvm_read_cr3(vcpu) || kvm_read_cr4(vcpu)));
+
+	/*
+	 * SVM doesn't unconditionally VM-Exit on INIT and SHUTDOWN, thus it's
+	 * possible to INIT the vCPU while L2 is active.  Force the vCPU back
+	 * into L1 as EFER.SVME is cleared on INIT (along with all other EFER
+	 * bits), i.e. virtualization is disabled.
+	 */
+	if (is_guest_mode(vcpu))
+		kvm_leave_nested(vcpu);
+
+	kvm_lapic_reset(vcpu, init_event);
+
+	WARN_ON_ONCE(is_guest_mode(vcpu) || is_smm(vcpu));
+	vcpu->arch.hflags = 0;
+
+	vcpu->arch.smi_pending = 0;
+	vcpu->arch.smi_count = 0;
+	atomic_set(&vcpu->arch.nmi_queued, 0);
+	vcpu->arch.nmi_pending = 0;
+	vcpu->arch.nmi_injected = false;
+	kvm_clear_interrupt_queue(vcpu);
+	kvm_clear_exception_queue(vcpu);
+
+	memset(vcpu->arch.db, 0, sizeof(vcpu->arch.db));
+	kvm_update_dr0123(vcpu);
+	vcpu->arch.dr6 = DR6_ACTIVE_LOW;
+	vcpu->arch.dr7 = DR7_FIXED_1;
+	kvm_update_dr7(vcpu);
+
+	vcpu->arch.cr2 = 0;
+
+	kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_EVENT, vcpu);
+	vcpu->arch.apf.msr_en_val = 0;
+	vcpu->arch.apf.msr_int_val = 0;
+	vcpu->arch.st.msr_val = 0;
+
+	kvmclock_reset(vcpu);
+
+	kvm_clear_async_pf_completion_queue(vcpu);
+	kvm_async_pf_hash_reset(vcpu);
+	vcpu->arch.apf.halted = false;
+
+	if (vcpu->arch.guest_fpu.fpstate && kvm_mpx_supported()) {
+		struct fpstate *fpstate = vcpu->arch.guest_fpu.fpstate;
+
+		/*
+		 * All paths that lead to INIT are required to load the guest's
+		 * FPU state (because most paths are buried in KVM_RUN).
+		 */
+		if (init_event)
+			kvm_put_guest_fpu(vcpu);
+
+		fpstate_clear_xstate_component(fpstate, XFEATURE_BNDREGS);
+		fpstate_clear_xstate_component(fpstate, XFEATURE_BNDCSR);
+
+		if (init_event)
+			kvm_load_guest_fpu(vcpu);
+	}
+
+	if (!init_event) {
+		kvm_pmu_reset(vcpu);
+		vcpu->arch.smbase = 0x30000;
+
+		vcpu->arch.msr_misc_features_enables = 0;
+		vcpu->arch.ia32_misc_enable_msr = MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE_PEBS_UNAVAIL |
+						  MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE_BTS_UNAVAIL;
+
+		__kvm_set_xcr(vcpu, 0, XFEATURE_MASK_FP);
+		__kvm_set_msr(vcpu, MSR_IA32_XSS, 0, true);
+	}
+
+	/* All GPRs except RDX (handled below) are zeroed on RESET/INIT. */
+	memset(vcpu->arch.regs, 0, sizeof(vcpu->arch.regs));
+	kvm_register_mark_dirty(vcpu, VCPU_REGS_RSP);
+
+	/*
+	 * Fall back to KVM's default Family/Model/Stepping of 0x600 (P6/Athlon)
+	 * if no CPUID match is found.  Note, it's impossible to get a match at
+	 * RESET since KVM emulates RESET before exposing the vCPU to userspace,
+	 * i.e. it's impossible for kvm_find_cpuid_entry() to find a valid entry
+	 * on RESET.  But, go through the motions in case that's ever remedied.
+	 */
+	cpuid_0x1 = kvm_find_cpuid_entry(vcpu, 1);
+	kvm_rdx_write(vcpu, cpuid_0x1 ? cpuid_0x1->eax : 0x600);
+
+	static_call(kvm_x86_vcpu_reset)(vcpu, init_event);
+
+	kvm_set_rflags(vcpu, X86_EFLAGS_FIXED);
+	kvm_rip_write(vcpu, 0xfff0);
+
+	vcpu->arch.cr3 = 0;
+	kvm_register_mark_dirty(vcpu, VCPU_EXREG_CR3);
+
+	/*
+	 * CR0.CD/NW are set on RESET, preserved on INIT.  Note, some versions
+	 * of Intel's SDM list CD/NW as being set on INIT, but they contradict
+	 * (or qualify) that with a footnote stating that CD/NW are preserved.
+	 */
+	new_cr0 = X86_CR0_ET;
+	if (init_event)
+		new_cr0 |= (old_cr0 & (X86_CR0_NW | X86_CR0_CD));
+	else
+		new_cr0 |= X86_CR0_NW | X86_CR0_CD;
+
+	static_call(kvm_x86_set_cr0)(vcpu, new_cr0);
+	static_call(kvm_x86_set_cr4)(vcpu, 0);
+	static_call(kvm_x86_set_efer)(vcpu, 0);
+	static_call(kvm_x86_update_exception_bitmap)(vcpu);
+
+	/*
+	 * On the standard CR0/CR4/EFER modification paths, there are several
+	 * complex conditions determining whether the MMU has to be reset and/or
+	 * which PCIDs have to be flushed.  However, CR0.WP and the paging-related
+	 * bits in CR4 and EFER are irrelevant if CR0.PG was '0'; and a reset+flush
+	 * is needed anyway if CR0.PG was '1' (which can only happen for INIT, as
+	 * CR0 will be '0' prior to RESET).  So we only need to check CR0.PG here.
+	 */
+	if (old_cr0 & X86_CR0_PG) {
+		kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_TLB_FLUSH_GUEST, vcpu);
+		kvm_mmu_reset_context(vcpu);
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Intel's SDM states that all TLB entries are flushed on INIT.  AMD's
+	 * APM states the TLBs are untouched by INIT, but it also states that
+	 * the TLBs are flushed on "External initialization of the processor."
+	 * Flush the guest TLB regardless of vendor, there is no meaningful
+	 * benefit in relying on the guest to flush the TLB immediately after
+	 * INIT.  A spurious TLB flush is benign and likely negligible from a
+	 * performance perspective.
+	 */
+	if (init_event)
+		kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_TLB_FLUSH_GUEST, vcpu);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_vcpu_reset);
+
+void kvm_vcpu_deliver_sipi_vector(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u8 vector)
+{
+	struct kvm_segment cs;
+
+	kvm_get_segment(vcpu, &cs, VCPU_SREG_CS);
+	cs.selector = vector << 8;
+	cs.base = vector << 12;
+	kvm_set_segment(vcpu, &cs, VCPU_SREG_CS);
+	kvm_rip_write(vcpu, 0);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_vcpu_deliver_sipi_vector);
+
+int kvm_arch_hardware_enable(void)
+{
+	struct kvm *kvm;
+	struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu;
+	unsigned long i;
+	int ret;
+	u64 local_tsc;
+	u64 max_tsc = 0;
+	bool stable, backwards_tsc = false;
+
+	kvm_user_return_msr_cpu_online();
+
+	ret = kvm_x86_check_processor_compatibility();
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+
+	ret = static_call(kvm_x86_hardware_enable)();
+	if (ret != 0)
+		return ret;
+
+	local_tsc = rdtsc();
+	stable = !kvm_check_tsc_unstable();
+	list_for_each_entry(kvm, &vm_list, vm_list) {
+		kvm_for_each_vcpu(i, vcpu, kvm) {
+			if (!stable && vcpu->cpu == smp_processor_id())
+				kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_CLOCK_UPDATE, vcpu);
+			if (stable && vcpu->arch.last_host_tsc > local_tsc) {
+				backwards_tsc = true;
+				if (vcpu->arch.last_host_tsc > max_tsc)
+					max_tsc = vcpu->arch.last_host_tsc;
+			}
+		}
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Sometimes, even reliable TSCs go backwards.  This happens on
+	 * platforms that reset TSC during suspend or hibernate actions, but
+	 * maintain synchronization.  We must compensate.  Fortunately, we can
+	 * detect that condition here, which happens early in CPU bringup,
+	 * before any KVM threads can be running.  Unfortunately, we can't
+	 * bring the TSCs fully up to date with real time, as we aren't yet far
+	 * enough into CPU bringup that we know how much real time has actually
+	 * elapsed; our helper function, ktime_get_boottime_ns() will be using boot
+	 * variables that haven't been updated yet.
+	 *
+	 * So we simply find the maximum observed TSC above, then record the
+	 * adjustment to TSC in each VCPU.  When the VCPU later gets loaded,
+	 * the adjustment will be applied.  Note that we accumulate
+	 * adjustments, in case multiple suspend cycles happen before some VCPU
+	 * gets a chance to run again.  In the event that no KVM threads get a
+	 * chance to run, we will miss the entire elapsed period, as we'll have
+	 * reset last_host_tsc, so VCPUs will not have the TSC adjusted and may
+	 * loose cycle time.  This isn't too big a deal, since the loss will be
+	 * uniform across all VCPUs (not to mention the scenario is extremely
+	 * unlikely). It is possible that a second hibernate recovery happens
+	 * much faster than a first, causing the observed TSC here to be
+	 * smaller; this would require additional padding adjustment, which is
+	 * why we set last_host_tsc to the local tsc observed here.
+	 *
+	 * N.B. - this code below runs only on platforms with reliable TSC,
+	 * as that is the only way backwards_tsc is set above.  Also note
+	 * that this runs for ALL vcpus, which is not a bug; all VCPUs should
+	 * have the same delta_cyc adjustment applied if backwards_tsc
+	 * is detected.  Note further, this adjustment is only done once,
+	 * as we reset last_host_tsc on all VCPUs to stop this from being
+	 * called multiple times (one for each physical CPU bringup).
+	 *
+	 * Platforms with unreliable TSCs don't have to deal with this, they
+	 * will be compensated by the logic in vcpu_load, which sets the TSC to
+	 * catchup mode.  This will catchup all VCPUs to real time, but cannot
+	 * guarantee that they stay in perfect synchronization.
+	 */
+	if (backwards_tsc) {
+		u64 delta_cyc = max_tsc - local_tsc;
+		list_for_each_entry(kvm, &vm_list, vm_list) {
+			kvm->arch.backwards_tsc_observed = true;
+			kvm_for_each_vcpu(i, vcpu, kvm) {
+				vcpu->arch.tsc_offset_adjustment += delta_cyc;
+				vcpu->arch.last_host_tsc = local_tsc;
+				kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_MASTERCLOCK_UPDATE, vcpu);
+			}
+
+			/*
+			 * We have to disable TSC offset matching.. if you were
+			 * booting a VM while issuing an S4 host suspend....
+			 * you may have some problem.  Solving this issue is
+			 * left as an exercise to the reader.
+			 */
+			kvm->arch.last_tsc_nsec = 0;
+			kvm->arch.last_tsc_write = 0;
+		}
+
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+void kvm_arch_hardware_disable(void)
+{
+	static_call(kvm_x86_hardware_disable)();
+	drop_user_return_notifiers();
+}
+
+bool kvm_vcpu_is_reset_bsp(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	return vcpu->kvm->arch.bsp_vcpu_id == vcpu->vcpu_id;
+}
+
+bool kvm_vcpu_is_bsp(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	return (vcpu->arch.apic_base & MSR_IA32_APICBASE_BSP) != 0;
+}
+
+__read_mostly DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(kvm_has_noapic_vcpu);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_has_noapic_vcpu);
+
+void kvm_arch_sched_in(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int cpu)
+{
+	struct kvm_pmu *pmu = vcpu_to_pmu(vcpu);
+
+	vcpu->arch.l1tf_flush_l1d = true;
+	if (pmu->version && unlikely(pmu->event_count)) {
+		pmu->need_cleanup = true;
+		kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_PMU, vcpu);
+	}
+	static_call(kvm_x86_sched_in)(vcpu, cpu);
+}
+
+void kvm_arch_free_vm(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+	kfree(to_kvm_hv(kvm)->hv_pa_pg);
+	__kvm_arch_free_vm(kvm);
+}
+
+
+int kvm_arch_init_vm(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long type)
+{
+	int ret;
+	unsigned long flags;
+
+	if (type)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	ret = kvm_page_track_init(kvm);
+	if (ret)
+		goto out;
+
+	kvm_mmu_init_vm(kvm);
+
+	ret = static_call(kvm_x86_vm_init)(kvm);
+	if (ret)
+		goto out_uninit_mmu;
+
+	INIT_HLIST_HEAD(&kvm->arch.mask_notifier_list);
+	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&kvm->arch.assigned_dev_head);
+	atomic_set(&kvm->arch.noncoherent_dma_count, 0);
+
+	/* Reserve bit 0 of irq_sources_bitmap for userspace irq source */
+	set_bit(KVM_USERSPACE_IRQ_SOURCE_ID, &kvm->arch.irq_sources_bitmap);
+	/* Reserve bit 1 of irq_sources_bitmap for irqfd-resampler */
+	set_bit(KVM_IRQFD_RESAMPLE_IRQ_SOURCE_ID,
+		&kvm->arch.irq_sources_bitmap);
+
+	raw_spin_lock_init(&kvm->arch.tsc_write_lock);
+	mutex_init(&kvm->arch.apic_map_lock);
+	seqcount_raw_spinlock_init(&kvm->arch.pvclock_sc, &kvm->arch.tsc_write_lock);
+	kvm->arch.kvmclock_offset = -get_kvmclock_base_ns();
+
+	raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&kvm->arch.tsc_write_lock, flags);
+	pvclock_update_vm_gtod_copy(kvm);
+	raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&kvm->arch.tsc_write_lock, flags);
+
+	kvm->arch.default_tsc_khz = max_tsc_khz ? : tsc_khz;
+	kvm->arch.guest_can_read_msr_platform_info = true;
+	kvm->arch.enable_pmu = enable_pmu;
+
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HYPERV)
+	spin_lock_init(&kvm->arch.hv_root_tdp_lock);
+	kvm->arch.hv_root_tdp = INVALID_PAGE;
+#endif
+
+	INIT_DELAYED_WORK(&kvm->arch.kvmclock_update_work, kvmclock_update_fn);
+	INIT_DELAYED_WORK(&kvm->arch.kvmclock_sync_work, kvmclock_sync_fn);
+
+	kvm_apicv_init(kvm);
+	kvm_hv_init_vm(kvm);
+	kvm_xen_init_vm(kvm);
+
+	return 0;
+
+out_uninit_mmu:
+	kvm_mmu_uninit_vm(kvm);
+	kvm_page_track_cleanup(kvm);
+out:
+	return ret;
+}
+
+int kvm_arch_post_init_vm(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+	return kvm_mmu_post_init_vm(kvm);
+}
+
+static void kvm_unload_vcpu_mmu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	vcpu_load(vcpu);
+	kvm_mmu_unload(vcpu);
+	vcpu_put(vcpu);
+}
+
+static void kvm_unload_vcpu_mmus(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+	unsigned long i;
+	struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu;
+
+	kvm_for_each_vcpu(i, vcpu, kvm) {
+		kvm_clear_async_pf_completion_queue(vcpu);
+		kvm_unload_vcpu_mmu(vcpu);
+	}
+}
+
+void kvm_arch_sync_events(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+	cancel_delayed_work_sync(&kvm->arch.kvmclock_sync_work);
+	cancel_delayed_work_sync(&kvm->arch.kvmclock_update_work);
+	kvm_free_pit(kvm);
+}
+
+/**
+ * __x86_set_memory_region: Setup KVM internal memory slot
+ *
+ * @kvm: the kvm pointer to the VM.
+ * @id: the slot ID to setup.
+ * @gpa: the GPA to install the slot (unused when @size == 0).
+ * @size: the size of the slot. Set to zero to uninstall a slot.
+ *
+ * This function helps to setup a KVM internal memory slot.  Specify
+ * @size > 0 to install a new slot, while @size == 0 to uninstall a
+ * slot.  The return code can be one of the following:
+ *
+ *   HVA:           on success (uninstall will return a bogus HVA)
+ *   -errno:        on error
+ *
+ * The caller should always use IS_ERR() to check the return value
+ * before use.  Note, the KVM internal memory slots are guaranteed to
+ * remain valid and unchanged until the VM is destroyed, i.e., the
+ * GPA->HVA translation will not change.  However, the HVA is a user
+ * address, i.e. its accessibility is not guaranteed, and must be
+ * accessed via __copy_{to,from}_user().
+ */
+void __user * __x86_set_memory_region(struct kvm *kvm, int id, gpa_t gpa,
+				      u32 size)
+{
+	int i, r;
+	unsigned long hva, old_npages;
+	struct kvm_memslots *slots = kvm_memslots(kvm);
+	struct kvm_memory_slot *slot;
+
+	/* Called with kvm->slots_lock held.  */
+	if (WARN_ON(id >= KVM_MEM_SLOTS_NUM))
+		return ERR_PTR_USR(-EINVAL);
+
+	slot = id_to_memslot(slots, id);
+	if (size) {
+		if (slot && slot->npages)
+			return ERR_PTR_USR(-EEXIST);
+
+		/*
+		 * MAP_SHARED to prevent internal slot pages from being moved
+		 * by fork()/COW.
+		 */
+		hva = vm_mmap(NULL, 0, size, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE,
+			      MAP_SHARED | MAP_ANONYMOUS, 0);
+		if (IS_ERR_VALUE(hva))
+			return (void __user *)hva;
+	} else {
+		if (!slot || !slot->npages)
+			return NULL;
+
+		old_npages = slot->npages;
+		hva = slot->userspace_addr;
+	}
+
+	for (i = 0; i < KVM_ADDRESS_SPACE_NUM; i++) {
+		struct kvm_userspace_memory_region m;
+
+		m.slot = id | (i << 16);
+		m.flags = 0;
+		m.guest_phys_addr = gpa;
+		m.userspace_addr = hva;
+		m.memory_size = size;
+		r = __kvm_set_memory_region(kvm, &m);
+		if (r < 0)
+			return ERR_PTR_USR(r);
+	}
+
+	if (!size)
+		vm_munmap(hva, old_npages * PAGE_SIZE);
+
+	return (void __user *)hva;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__x86_set_memory_region);
+
+void kvm_arch_pre_destroy_vm(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+	kvm_mmu_pre_destroy_vm(kvm);
+}
+
+void kvm_arch_destroy_vm(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+	if (current->mm == kvm->mm) {
+		/*
+		 * Free memory regions allocated on behalf of userspace,
+		 * unless the memory map has changed due to process exit
+		 * or fd copying.
+		 */
+		mutex_lock(&kvm->slots_lock);
+		__x86_set_memory_region(kvm, APIC_ACCESS_PAGE_PRIVATE_MEMSLOT,
+					0, 0);
+		__x86_set_memory_region(kvm, IDENTITY_PAGETABLE_PRIVATE_MEMSLOT,
+					0, 0);
+		__x86_set_memory_region(kvm, TSS_PRIVATE_MEMSLOT, 0, 0);
+		mutex_unlock(&kvm->slots_lock);
+	}
+	kvm_unload_vcpu_mmus(kvm);
+	static_call_cond(kvm_x86_vm_destroy)(kvm);
+	kvm_free_msr_filter(srcu_dereference_check(kvm->arch.msr_filter, &kvm->srcu, 1));
+	kvm_pic_destroy(kvm);
+	kvm_ioapic_destroy(kvm);
+	kvm_destroy_vcpus(kvm);
+	kvfree(rcu_dereference_check(kvm->arch.apic_map, 1));
+	kfree(srcu_dereference_check(kvm->arch.pmu_event_filter, &kvm->srcu, 1));
+	kvm_mmu_uninit_vm(kvm);
+	kvm_page_track_cleanup(kvm);
+	kvm_xen_destroy_vm(kvm);
+	kvm_hv_destroy_vm(kvm);
+}
+
+static void memslot_rmap_free(struct kvm_memory_slot *slot)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < KVM_NR_PAGE_SIZES; ++i) {
+		kvfree(slot->arch.rmap[i]);
+		slot->arch.rmap[i] = NULL;
+	}
+}
+
+void kvm_arch_free_memslot(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_memory_slot *slot)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	memslot_rmap_free(slot);
+
+	for (i = 1; i < KVM_NR_PAGE_SIZES; ++i) {
+		kvfree(slot->arch.lpage_info[i - 1]);
+		slot->arch.lpage_info[i - 1] = NULL;
+	}
+
+	kvm_page_track_free_memslot(slot);
+}
+
+int memslot_rmap_alloc(struct kvm_memory_slot *slot, unsigned long npages)
+{
+	const int sz = sizeof(*slot->arch.rmap[0]);
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < KVM_NR_PAGE_SIZES; ++i) {
+		int level = i + 1;
+		int lpages = __kvm_mmu_slot_lpages(slot, npages, level);
+
+		if (slot->arch.rmap[i])
+			continue;
+
+		slot->arch.rmap[i] = __vcalloc(lpages, sz, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
+		if (!slot->arch.rmap[i]) {
+			memslot_rmap_free(slot);
+			return -ENOMEM;
+		}
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int kvm_alloc_memslot_metadata(struct kvm *kvm,
+				      struct kvm_memory_slot *slot)
+{
+	unsigned long npages = slot->npages;
+	int i, r;
+
+	/*
+	 * Clear out the previous array pointers for the KVM_MR_MOVE case.  The
+	 * old arrays will be freed by __kvm_set_memory_region() if installing
+	 * the new memslot is successful.
+	 */
+	memset(&slot->arch, 0, sizeof(slot->arch));
+
+	if (kvm_memslots_have_rmaps(kvm)) {
+		r = memslot_rmap_alloc(slot, npages);
+		if (r)
+			return r;
+	}
+
+	for (i = 1; i < KVM_NR_PAGE_SIZES; ++i) {
+		struct kvm_lpage_info *linfo;
+		unsigned long ugfn;
+		int lpages;
+		int level = i + 1;
+
+		lpages = __kvm_mmu_slot_lpages(slot, npages, level);
+
+		linfo = __vcalloc(lpages, sizeof(*linfo), GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
+		if (!linfo)
+			goto out_free;
+
+		slot->arch.lpage_info[i - 1] = linfo;
+
+		if (slot->base_gfn & (KVM_PAGES_PER_HPAGE(level) - 1))
+			linfo[0].disallow_lpage = 1;
+		if ((slot->base_gfn + npages) & (KVM_PAGES_PER_HPAGE(level) - 1))
+			linfo[lpages - 1].disallow_lpage = 1;
+		ugfn = slot->userspace_addr >> PAGE_SHIFT;
+		/*
+		 * If the gfn and userspace address are not aligned wrt each
+		 * other, disable large page support for this slot.
+		 */
+		if ((slot->base_gfn ^ ugfn) & (KVM_PAGES_PER_HPAGE(level) - 1)) {
+			unsigned long j;
+
+			for (j = 0; j < lpages; ++j)
+				linfo[j].disallow_lpage = 1;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (kvm_page_track_create_memslot(kvm, slot, npages))
+		goto out_free;
+
+	return 0;
+
+out_free:
+	memslot_rmap_free(slot);
+
+	for (i = 1; i < KVM_NR_PAGE_SIZES; ++i) {
+		kvfree(slot->arch.lpage_info[i - 1]);
+		slot->arch.lpage_info[i - 1] = NULL;
+	}
+	return -ENOMEM;
+}
+
+void kvm_arch_memslots_updated(struct kvm *kvm, u64 gen)
+{
+	struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu;
+	unsigned long i;
+
+	/*
+	 * memslots->generation has been incremented.
+	 * mmio generation may have reached its maximum value.
+	 */
+	kvm_mmu_invalidate_mmio_sptes(kvm, gen);
+
+	/* Force re-initialization of steal_time cache */
+	kvm_for_each_vcpu(i, vcpu, kvm)
+		kvm_vcpu_kick(vcpu);
+}
+
+int kvm_arch_prepare_memory_region(struct kvm *kvm,
+				   const struct kvm_memory_slot *old,
+				   struct kvm_memory_slot *new,
+				   enum kvm_mr_change change)
+{
+	/*
+	 * KVM doesn't support moving memslots when there are external page
+	 * trackers attached to the VM, i.e. if KVMGT is in use.
+	 */
+	if (change == KVM_MR_MOVE && kvm_page_track_has_external_user(kvm))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (change == KVM_MR_CREATE || change == KVM_MR_MOVE) {
+		if ((new->base_gfn + new->npages - 1) > kvm_mmu_max_gfn())
+			return -EINVAL;
+
+		return kvm_alloc_memslot_metadata(kvm, new);
+	}
+
+	if (change == KVM_MR_FLAGS_ONLY)
+		memcpy(&new->arch, &old->arch, sizeof(old->arch));
+	else if (WARN_ON_ONCE(change != KVM_MR_DELETE))
+		return -EIO;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+
+static void kvm_mmu_update_cpu_dirty_logging(struct kvm *kvm, bool enable)
+{
+	int nr_slots;
+
+	if (!kvm_x86_ops.cpu_dirty_log_size)
+		return;
+
+	nr_slots = atomic_read(&kvm->nr_memslots_dirty_logging);
+	if ((enable && nr_slots == 1) || !nr_slots)
+		kvm_make_all_cpus_request(kvm, KVM_REQ_UPDATE_CPU_DIRTY_LOGGING);
+}
+
+static void kvm_mmu_slot_apply_flags(struct kvm *kvm,
+				     struct kvm_memory_slot *old,
+				     const struct kvm_memory_slot *new,
+				     enum kvm_mr_change change)
+{
+	u32 old_flags = old ? old->flags : 0;
+	u32 new_flags = new ? new->flags : 0;
+	bool log_dirty_pages = new_flags & KVM_MEM_LOG_DIRTY_PAGES;
+
+	/*
+	 * Update CPU dirty logging if dirty logging is being toggled.  This
+	 * applies to all operations.
+	 */
+	if ((old_flags ^ new_flags) & KVM_MEM_LOG_DIRTY_PAGES)
+		kvm_mmu_update_cpu_dirty_logging(kvm, log_dirty_pages);
+
+	/*
+	 * Nothing more to do for RO slots (which can't be dirtied and can't be
+	 * made writable) or CREATE/MOVE/DELETE of a slot.
+	 *
+	 * For a memslot with dirty logging disabled:
+	 * CREATE:      No dirty mappings will already exist.
+	 * MOVE/DELETE: The old mappings will already have been cleaned up by
+	 *		kvm_arch_flush_shadow_memslot()
+	 *
+	 * For a memslot with dirty logging enabled:
+	 * CREATE:      No shadow pages exist, thus nothing to write-protect
+	 *		and no dirty bits to clear.
+	 * MOVE/DELETE: The old mappings will already have been cleaned up by
+	 *		kvm_arch_flush_shadow_memslot().
+	 */
+	if ((change != KVM_MR_FLAGS_ONLY) || (new_flags & KVM_MEM_READONLY))
+		return;
+
+	/*
+	 * READONLY and non-flags changes were filtered out above, and the only
+	 * other flag is LOG_DIRTY_PAGES, i.e. something is wrong if dirty
+	 * logging isn't being toggled on or off.
+	 */
+	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!((old_flags ^ new_flags) & KVM_MEM_LOG_DIRTY_PAGES)))
+		return;
+
+	if (!log_dirty_pages) {
+		/*
+		 * Dirty logging tracks sptes in 4k granularity, meaning that
+		 * large sptes have to be split.  If live migration succeeds,
+		 * the guest in the source machine will be destroyed and large
+		 * sptes will be created in the destination.  However, if the
+		 * guest continues to run in the source machine (for example if
+		 * live migration fails), small sptes will remain around and
+		 * cause bad performance.
+		 *
+		 * Scan sptes if dirty logging has been stopped, dropping those
+		 * which can be collapsed into a single large-page spte.  Later
+		 * page faults will create the large-page sptes.
+		 */
+		kvm_mmu_zap_collapsible_sptes(kvm, new);
+	} else {
+		/*
+		 * Initially-all-set does not require write protecting any page,
+		 * because they're all assumed to be dirty.
+		 */
+		if (kvm_dirty_log_manual_protect_and_init_set(kvm))
+			return;
+
+		if (READ_ONCE(eager_page_split))
+			kvm_mmu_slot_try_split_huge_pages(kvm, new, PG_LEVEL_4K);
+
+		if (kvm_x86_ops.cpu_dirty_log_size) {
+			kvm_mmu_slot_leaf_clear_dirty(kvm, new);
+			kvm_mmu_slot_remove_write_access(kvm, new, PG_LEVEL_2M);
+		} else {
+			kvm_mmu_slot_remove_write_access(kvm, new, PG_LEVEL_4K);
+		}
+
+		/*
+		 * Unconditionally flush the TLBs after enabling dirty logging.
+		 * A flush is almost always going to be necessary (see below),
+		 * and unconditionally flushing allows the helpers to omit
+		 * the subtly complex checks when removing write access.
+		 *
+		 * Do the flush outside of mmu_lock to reduce the amount of
+		 * time mmu_lock is held.  Flushing after dropping mmu_lock is
+		 * safe as KVM only needs to guarantee the slot is fully
+		 * write-protected before returning to userspace, i.e. before
+		 * userspace can consume the dirty status.
+		 *
+		 * Flushing outside of mmu_lock requires KVM to be careful when
+		 * making decisions based on writable status of an SPTE, e.g. a
+		 * !writable SPTE doesn't guarantee a CPU can't perform writes.
+		 *
+		 * Specifically, KVM also write-protects guest page tables to
+		 * monitor changes when using shadow paging, and must guarantee
+		 * no CPUs can write to those page before mmu_lock is dropped.
+		 * Because CPUs may have stale TLB entries at this point, a
+		 * !writable SPTE doesn't guarantee CPUs can't perform writes.
+		 *
+		 * KVM also allows making SPTES writable outside of mmu_lock,
+		 * e.g. to allow dirty logging without taking mmu_lock.
+		 *
+		 * To handle these scenarios, KVM uses a separate software-only
+		 * bit (MMU-writable) to track if a SPTE is !writable due to
+		 * a guest page table being write-protected (KVM clears the
+		 * MMU-writable flag when write-protecting for shadow paging).
+		 *
+		 * The use of MMU-writable is also the primary motivation for
+		 * the unconditional flush.  Because KVM must guarantee that a
+		 * CPU doesn't contain stale, writable TLB entries for a
+		 * !MMU-writable SPTE, KVM must flush if it encounters any
+		 * MMU-writable SPTE regardless of whether the actual hardware
+		 * writable bit was set.  I.e. KVM is almost guaranteed to need
+		 * to flush, while unconditionally flushing allows the "remove
+		 * write access" helpers to ignore MMU-writable entirely.
+		 *
+		 * See is_writable_pte() for more details (the case involving
+		 * access-tracked SPTEs is particularly relevant).
+		 */
+		kvm_flush_remote_tlbs_memslot(kvm, new);
+	}
+}
+
+void kvm_arch_commit_memory_region(struct kvm *kvm,
+				struct kvm_memory_slot *old,
+				const struct kvm_memory_slot *new,
+				enum kvm_mr_change change)
+{
+	if (change == KVM_MR_DELETE)
+		kvm_page_track_delete_slot(kvm, old);
+
+	if (!kvm->arch.n_requested_mmu_pages &&
+	    (change == KVM_MR_CREATE || change == KVM_MR_DELETE)) {
+		unsigned long nr_mmu_pages;
+
+		nr_mmu_pages = kvm->nr_memslot_pages / KVM_MEMSLOT_PAGES_TO_MMU_PAGES_RATIO;
+		nr_mmu_pages = max(nr_mmu_pages, KVM_MIN_ALLOC_MMU_PAGES);
+		kvm_mmu_change_mmu_pages(kvm, nr_mmu_pages);
+	}
+
+	kvm_mmu_slot_apply_flags(kvm, old, new, change);
+
+	/* Free the arrays associated with the old memslot. */
+	if (change == KVM_MR_MOVE)
+		kvm_arch_free_memslot(kvm, old);
+}
+
+static inline bool kvm_guest_apic_has_interrupt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	return (is_guest_mode(vcpu) &&
+		static_call(kvm_x86_guest_apic_has_interrupt)(vcpu));
+}
+
+static inline bool kvm_vcpu_has_events(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	if (!list_empty_careful(&vcpu->async_pf.done))
+		return true;
+
+	if (kvm_apic_has_pending_init_or_sipi(vcpu) &&
+	    kvm_apic_init_sipi_allowed(vcpu))
+		return true;
+
+	if (vcpu->arch.pv.pv_unhalted)
+		return true;
+
+	if (kvm_is_exception_pending(vcpu))
+		return true;
+
+	if (kvm_test_request(KVM_REQ_NMI, vcpu) ||
+	    (vcpu->arch.nmi_pending &&
+	     static_call(kvm_x86_nmi_allowed)(vcpu, false)))
+		return true;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_SMM
+	if (kvm_test_request(KVM_REQ_SMI, vcpu) ||
+	    (vcpu->arch.smi_pending &&
+	     static_call(kvm_x86_smi_allowed)(vcpu, false)))
+		return true;
+#endif
+
+	if (kvm_test_request(KVM_REQ_PMI, vcpu))
+		return true;
+
+	if (kvm_arch_interrupt_allowed(vcpu) &&
+	    (kvm_cpu_has_interrupt(vcpu) ||
+	    kvm_guest_apic_has_interrupt(vcpu)))
+		return true;
+
+	if (kvm_hv_has_stimer_pending(vcpu))
+		return true;
+
+	if (is_guest_mode(vcpu) &&
+	    kvm_x86_ops.nested_ops->has_events &&
+	    kvm_x86_ops.nested_ops->has_events(vcpu))
+		return true;
+
+	if (kvm_xen_has_pending_events(vcpu))
+		return true;
+
+	return false;
+}
+
+int kvm_arch_vcpu_runnable(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	return kvm_vcpu_running(vcpu) || kvm_vcpu_has_events(vcpu);
+}
+
+bool kvm_arch_dy_has_pending_interrupt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	if (kvm_vcpu_apicv_active(vcpu) &&
+	    static_call(kvm_x86_dy_apicv_has_pending_interrupt)(vcpu))
+		return true;
+
+	return false;
+}
+
+bool kvm_arch_dy_runnable(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	if (READ_ONCE(vcpu->arch.pv.pv_unhalted))
+		return true;
+
+	if (kvm_test_request(KVM_REQ_NMI, vcpu) ||
+#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_SMM
+		kvm_test_request(KVM_REQ_SMI, vcpu) ||
+#endif
+		 kvm_test_request(KVM_REQ_EVENT, vcpu))
+		return true;
+
+	return kvm_arch_dy_has_pending_interrupt(vcpu);
+}
+
+bool kvm_arch_vcpu_in_kernel(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	if (vcpu->arch.guest_state_protected)
+		return true;
+
+	return vcpu->arch.preempted_in_kernel;
+}
+
+unsigned long kvm_arch_vcpu_get_ip(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	return kvm_rip_read(vcpu);
+}
+
+int kvm_arch_vcpu_should_kick(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	return kvm_vcpu_exiting_guest_mode(vcpu) == IN_GUEST_MODE;
+}
+
+int kvm_arch_interrupt_allowed(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	return static_call(kvm_x86_interrupt_allowed)(vcpu, false);
+}
+
+unsigned long kvm_get_linear_rip(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	/* Can't read the RIP when guest state is protected, just return 0 */
+	if (vcpu->arch.guest_state_protected)
+		return 0;
+
+	if (is_64_bit_mode(vcpu))
+		return kvm_rip_read(vcpu);
+	return (u32)(get_segment_base(vcpu, VCPU_SREG_CS) +
+		     kvm_rip_read(vcpu));
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_get_linear_rip);
+
+bool kvm_is_linear_rip(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long linear_rip)
+{
+	return kvm_get_linear_rip(vcpu) == linear_rip;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_is_linear_rip);
+
+unsigned long kvm_get_rflags(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	unsigned long rflags;
+
+	rflags = static_call(kvm_x86_get_rflags)(vcpu);
+	if (vcpu->guest_debug & KVM_GUESTDBG_SINGLESTEP)
+		rflags &= ~X86_EFLAGS_TF;
+	return rflags;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_get_rflags);
+
+static void __kvm_set_rflags(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long rflags)
+{
+	if (vcpu->guest_debug & KVM_GUESTDBG_SINGLESTEP &&
+	    kvm_is_linear_rip(vcpu, vcpu->arch.singlestep_rip))
+		rflags |= X86_EFLAGS_TF;
+	static_call(kvm_x86_set_rflags)(vcpu, rflags);
+}
+
+void kvm_set_rflags(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long rflags)
+{
+	__kvm_set_rflags(vcpu, rflags);
+	kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_EVENT, vcpu);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_set_rflags);
+
+static inline u32 kvm_async_pf_hash_fn(gfn_t gfn)
+{
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(!is_power_of_2(ASYNC_PF_PER_VCPU));
+
+	return hash_32(gfn & 0xffffffff, order_base_2(ASYNC_PF_PER_VCPU));
+}
+
+static inline u32 kvm_async_pf_next_probe(u32 key)
+{
+	return (key + 1) & (ASYNC_PF_PER_VCPU - 1);
+}
+
+static void kvm_add_async_pf_gfn(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gfn_t gfn)
+{
+	u32 key = kvm_async_pf_hash_fn(gfn);
+
+	while (vcpu->arch.apf.gfns[key] != ~0)
+		key = kvm_async_pf_next_probe(key);
+
+	vcpu->arch.apf.gfns[key] = gfn;
+}
+
+static u32 kvm_async_pf_gfn_slot(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gfn_t gfn)
+{
+	int i;
+	u32 key = kvm_async_pf_hash_fn(gfn);
+
+	for (i = 0; i < ASYNC_PF_PER_VCPU &&
+		     (vcpu->arch.apf.gfns[key] != gfn &&
+		      vcpu->arch.apf.gfns[key] != ~0); i++)
+		key = kvm_async_pf_next_probe(key);
+
+	return key;
+}
+
+bool kvm_find_async_pf_gfn(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gfn_t gfn)
+{
+	return vcpu->arch.apf.gfns[kvm_async_pf_gfn_slot(vcpu, gfn)] == gfn;
+}
+
+static void kvm_del_async_pf_gfn(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gfn_t gfn)
+{
+	u32 i, j, k;
+
+	i = j = kvm_async_pf_gfn_slot(vcpu, gfn);
+
+	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(vcpu->arch.apf.gfns[i] != gfn))
+		return;
+
+	while (true) {
+		vcpu->arch.apf.gfns[i] = ~0;
+		do {
+			j = kvm_async_pf_next_probe(j);
+			if (vcpu->arch.apf.gfns[j] == ~0)
+				return;
+			k = kvm_async_pf_hash_fn(vcpu->arch.apf.gfns[j]);
+			/*
+			 * k lies cyclically in ]i,j]
+			 * |    i.k.j |
+			 * |....j i.k.| or  |.k..j i...|
+			 */
+		} while ((i <= j) ? (i < k && k <= j) : (i < k || k <= j));
+		vcpu->arch.apf.gfns[i] = vcpu->arch.apf.gfns[j];
+		i = j;
+	}
+}
+
+static inline int apf_put_user_notpresent(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	u32 reason = KVM_PV_REASON_PAGE_NOT_PRESENT;
+
+	return kvm_write_guest_cached(vcpu->kvm, &vcpu->arch.apf.data, &reason,
+				      sizeof(reason));
+}
+
+static inline int apf_put_user_ready(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 token)
+{
+	unsigned int offset = offsetof(struct kvm_vcpu_pv_apf_data, token);
+
+	return kvm_write_guest_offset_cached(vcpu->kvm, &vcpu->arch.apf.data,
+					     &token, offset, sizeof(token));
+}
+
+static inline bool apf_pageready_slot_free(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	unsigned int offset = offsetof(struct kvm_vcpu_pv_apf_data, token);
+	u32 val;
+
+	if (kvm_read_guest_offset_cached(vcpu->kvm, &vcpu->arch.apf.data,
+					 &val, offset, sizeof(val)))
+		return false;
+
+	return !val;
+}
+
+static bool kvm_can_deliver_async_pf(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+
+	if (!kvm_pv_async_pf_enabled(vcpu))
+		return false;
+
+	if (vcpu->arch.apf.send_user_only &&
+	    static_call(kvm_x86_get_cpl)(vcpu) == 0)
+		return false;
+
+	if (is_guest_mode(vcpu)) {
+		/*
+		 * L1 needs to opt into the special #PF vmexits that are
+		 * used to deliver async page faults.
+		 */
+		return vcpu->arch.apf.delivery_as_pf_vmexit;
+	} else {
+		/*
+		 * Play it safe in case the guest temporarily disables paging.
+		 * The real mode IDT in particular is unlikely to have a #PF
+		 * exception setup.
+		 */
+		return is_paging(vcpu);
+	}
+}
+
+bool kvm_can_do_async_pf(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	if (unlikely(!lapic_in_kernel(vcpu) ||
+		     kvm_event_needs_reinjection(vcpu) ||
+		     kvm_is_exception_pending(vcpu)))
+		return false;
+
+	if (kvm_hlt_in_guest(vcpu->kvm) && !kvm_can_deliver_async_pf(vcpu))
+		return false;
+
+	/*
+	 * If interrupts are off we cannot even use an artificial
+	 * halt state.
+	 */
+	return kvm_arch_interrupt_allowed(vcpu);
+}
+
+bool kvm_arch_async_page_not_present(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+				     struct kvm_async_pf *work)
+{
+	struct x86_exception fault;
+
+	trace_kvm_async_pf_not_present(work->arch.token, work->cr2_or_gpa);
+	kvm_add_async_pf_gfn(vcpu, work->arch.gfn);
+
+	if (kvm_can_deliver_async_pf(vcpu) &&
+	    !apf_put_user_notpresent(vcpu)) {
+		fault.vector = PF_VECTOR;
+		fault.error_code_valid = true;
+		fault.error_code = 0;
+		fault.nested_page_fault = false;
+		fault.address = work->arch.token;
+		fault.async_page_fault = true;
+		kvm_inject_page_fault(vcpu, &fault);
+		return true;
+	} else {
+		/*
+		 * It is not possible to deliver a paravirtualized asynchronous
+		 * page fault, but putting the guest in an artificial halt state
+		 * can be beneficial nevertheless: if an interrupt arrives, we
+		 * can deliver it timely and perhaps the guest will schedule
+		 * another process.  When the instruction that triggered a page
+		 * fault is retried, hopefully the page will be ready in the host.
+		 */
+		kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_APF_HALT, vcpu);
+		return false;
+	}
+}
+
+void kvm_arch_async_page_present(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+				 struct kvm_async_pf *work)
+{
+	struct kvm_lapic_irq irq = {
+		.delivery_mode = APIC_DM_FIXED,
+		.vector = vcpu->arch.apf.vec
+	};
+
+	if (work->wakeup_all)
+		work->arch.token = ~0; /* broadcast wakeup */
+	else
+		kvm_del_async_pf_gfn(vcpu, work->arch.gfn);
+	trace_kvm_async_pf_ready(work->arch.token, work->cr2_or_gpa);
+
+	if ((work->wakeup_all || work->notpresent_injected) &&
+	    kvm_pv_async_pf_enabled(vcpu) &&
+	    !apf_put_user_ready(vcpu, work->arch.token)) {
+		vcpu->arch.apf.pageready_pending = true;
+		kvm_apic_set_irq(vcpu, &irq, NULL);
+	}
+
+	vcpu->arch.apf.halted = false;
+	vcpu->arch.mp_state = KVM_MP_STATE_RUNNABLE;
+}
+
+void kvm_arch_async_page_present_queued(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_APF_READY, vcpu);
+	if (!vcpu->arch.apf.pageready_pending)
+		kvm_vcpu_kick(vcpu);
+}
+
+bool kvm_arch_can_dequeue_async_page_present(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	if (!kvm_pv_async_pf_enabled(vcpu))
+		return true;
+	else
+		return kvm_lapic_enabled(vcpu) && apf_pageready_slot_free(vcpu);
+}
+
+void kvm_arch_start_assignment(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+	if (atomic_inc_return(&kvm->arch.assigned_device_count) == 1)
+		static_call_cond(kvm_x86_pi_start_assignment)(kvm);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_arch_start_assignment);
+
+void kvm_arch_end_assignment(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+	atomic_dec(&kvm->arch.assigned_device_count);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_arch_end_assignment);
+
+bool noinstr kvm_arch_has_assigned_device(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+	return raw_atomic_read(&kvm->arch.assigned_device_count);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_arch_has_assigned_device);
+
+void kvm_arch_register_noncoherent_dma(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+	atomic_inc(&kvm->arch.noncoherent_dma_count);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_arch_register_noncoherent_dma);
+
+void kvm_arch_unregister_noncoherent_dma(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+	atomic_dec(&kvm->arch.noncoherent_dma_count);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_arch_unregister_noncoherent_dma);
+
+bool kvm_arch_has_noncoherent_dma(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+	return atomic_read(&kvm->arch.noncoherent_dma_count);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_arch_has_noncoherent_dma);
+
+bool kvm_arch_has_irq_bypass(void)
+{
+	return enable_apicv && irq_remapping_cap(IRQ_POSTING_CAP);
+}
+
+int kvm_arch_irq_bypass_add_producer(struct irq_bypass_consumer *cons,
+				      struct irq_bypass_producer *prod)
+{
+	struct kvm_kernel_irqfd *irqfd =
+		container_of(cons, struct kvm_kernel_irqfd, consumer);
+	int ret;
+
+	irqfd->producer = prod;
+	kvm_arch_start_assignment(irqfd->kvm);
+	ret = static_call(kvm_x86_pi_update_irte)(irqfd->kvm,
+					 prod->irq, irqfd->gsi, 1);
+
+	if (ret)
+		kvm_arch_end_assignment(irqfd->kvm);
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+void kvm_arch_irq_bypass_del_producer(struct irq_bypass_consumer *cons,
+				      struct irq_bypass_producer *prod)
+{
+	int ret;
+	struct kvm_kernel_irqfd *irqfd =
+		container_of(cons, struct kvm_kernel_irqfd, consumer);
+
+	WARN_ON(irqfd->producer != prod);
+	irqfd->producer = NULL;
+
+	/*
+	 * When producer of consumer is unregistered, we change back to
+	 * remapped mode, so we can re-use the current implementation
+	 * when the irq is masked/disabled or the consumer side (KVM
+	 * int this case doesn't want to receive the interrupts.
+	*/
+	ret = static_call(kvm_x86_pi_update_irte)(irqfd->kvm, prod->irq, irqfd->gsi, 0);
+	if (ret)
+		printk(KERN_INFO "irq bypass consumer (token %p) unregistration"
+		       " fails: %d\n", irqfd->consumer.token, ret);
+
+	kvm_arch_end_assignment(irqfd->kvm);
+}
+
+int kvm_arch_update_irqfd_routing(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned int host_irq,
+				   uint32_t guest_irq, bool set)
+{
+	return static_call(kvm_x86_pi_update_irte)(kvm, host_irq, guest_irq, set);
+}
+
+bool kvm_arch_irqfd_route_changed(struct kvm_kernel_irq_routing_entry *old,
+				  struct kvm_kernel_irq_routing_entry *new)
+{
+	if (new->type != KVM_IRQ_ROUTING_MSI)
+		return true;
+
+	return !!memcmp(&old->msi, &new->msi, sizeof(new->msi));
+}
+
+bool kvm_vector_hashing_enabled(void)
+{
+	return vector_hashing;
+}
+
+bool kvm_arch_no_poll(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	return (vcpu->arch.msr_kvm_poll_control & 1) == 0;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_arch_no_poll);
+
+
+int kvm_spec_ctrl_test_value(u64 value)
+{
+	/*
+	 * test that setting IA32_SPEC_CTRL to given value
+	 * is allowed by the host processor
+	 */
+
+	u64 saved_value;
+	unsigned long flags;
+	int ret = 0;
+
+	local_irq_save(flags);
+
+	if (rdmsrl_safe(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, &saved_value))
+		ret = 1;
+	else if (wrmsrl_safe(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, value))
+		ret = 1;
+	else
+		wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, saved_value);
+
+	local_irq_restore(flags);
+
+	return ret;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_spec_ctrl_test_value);
+
+void kvm_fixup_and_inject_pf_error(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gva_t gva, u16 error_code)
+{
+	struct kvm_mmu *mmu = vcpu->arch.walk_mmu;
+	struct x86_exception fault;
+	u64 access = error_code &
+		(PFERR_WRITE_MASK | PFERR_FETCH_MASK | PFERR_USER_MASK);
+
+	if (!(error_code & PFERR_PRESENT_MASK) ||
+	    mmu->gva_to_gpa(vcpu, mmu, gva, access, &fault) != INVALID_GPA) {
+		/*
+		 * If vcpu->arch.walk_mmu->gva_to_gpa succeeded, the page
+		 * tables probably do not match the TLB.  Just proceed
+		 * with the error code that the processor gave.
+		 */
+		fault.vector = PF_VECTOR;
+		fault.error_code_valid = true;
+		fault.error_code = error_code;
+		fault.nested_page_fault = false;
+		fault.address = gva;
+		fault.async_page_fault = false;
+	}
+	vcpu->arch.walk_mmu->inject_page_fault(vcpu, &fault);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_fixup_and_inject_pf_error);
+
+/*
+ * Handles kvm_read/write_guest_virt*() result and either injects #PF or returns
+ * KVM_EXIT_INTERNAL_ERROR for cases not currently handled by KVM. Return value
+ * indicates whether exit to userspace is needed.
+ */
+int kvm_handle_memory_failure(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int r,
+			      struct x86_exception *e)
+{
+	if (r == X86EMUL_PROPAGATE_FAULT) {
+		if (KVM_BUG_ON(!e, vcpu->kvm))
+			return -EIO;
+
+		kvm_inject_emulated_page_fault(vcpu, e);
+		return 1;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * In case kvm_read/write_guest_virt*() failed with X86EMUL_IO_NEEDED
+	 * while handling a VMX instruction KVM could've handled the request
+	 * correctly by exiting to userspace and performing I/O but there
+	 * doesn't seem to be a real use-case behind such requests, just return
+	 * KVM_EXIT_INTERNAL_ERROR for now.
+	 */
+	kvm_prepare_emulation_failure_exit(vcpu);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_handle_memory_failure);
+
+int kvm_handle_invpcid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long type, gva_t gva)
+{
+	bool pcid_enabled;
+	struct x86_exception e;
+	struct {
+		u64 pcid;
+		u64 gla;
+	} operand;
+	int r;
+
+	r = kvm_read_guest_virt(vcpu, gva, &operand, sizeof(operand), &e);
+	if (r != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
+		return kvm_handle_memory_failure(vcpu, r, &e);
+
+	if (operand.pcid >> 12 != 0) {
+		kvm_inject_gp(vcpu, 0);
+		return 1;
+	}
+
+	pcid_enabled = kvm_is_cr4_bit_set(vcpu, X86_CR4_PCIDE);
+
+	switch (type) {
+	case INVPCID_TYPE_INDIV_ADDR:
+		if ((!pcid_enabled && (operand.pcid != 0)) ||
+		    is_noncanonical_address(operand.gla, vcpu)) {
+			kvm_inject_gp(vcpu, 0);
+			return 1;
+		}
+		kvm_mmu_invpcid_gva(vcpu, operand.gla, operand.pcid);
+		return kvm_skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
+
+	case INVPCID_TYPE_SINGLE_CTXT:
+		if (!pcid_enabled && (operand.pcid != 0)) {
+			kvm_inject_gp(vcpu, 0);
+			return 1;
+		}
+
+		kvm_invalidate_pcid(vcpu, operand.pcid);
+		return kvm_skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
+
+	case INVPCID_TYPE_ALL_NON_GLOBAL:
+		/*
+		 * Currently, KVM doesn't mark global entries in the shadow
+		 * page tables, so a non-global flush just degenerates to a
+		 * global flush. If needed, we could optimize this later by
+		 * keeping track of global entries in shadow page tables.
+		 */
+
+		fallthrough;
+	case INVPCID_TYPE_ALL_INCL_GLOBAL:
+		kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_TLB_FLUSH_GUEST, vcpu);
+		return kvm_skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
+
+	default:
+		kvm_inject_gp(vcpu, 0);
+		return 1;
+	}
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_handle_invpcid);
+
+static int complete_sev_es_emulated_mmio(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct kvm_run *run = vcpu->run;
+	struct kvm_mmio_fragment *frag;
+	unsigned int len;
+
+	BUG_ON(!vcpu->mmio_needed);
+
+	/* Complete previous fragment */
+	frag = &vcpu->mmio_fragments[vcpu->mmio_cur_fragment];
+	len = min(8u, frag->len);
+	if (!vcpu->mmio_is_write)
+		memcpy(frag->data, run->mmio.data, len);
+
+	if (frag->len <= 8) {
+		/* Switch to the next fragment. */
+		frag++;
+		vcpu->mmio_cur_fragment++;
+	} else {
+		/* Go forward to the next mmio piece. */
+		frag->data += len;
+		frag->gpa += len;
+		frag->len -= len;
+	}
+
+	if (vcpu->mmio_cur_fragment >= vcpu->mmio_nr_fragments) {
+		vcpu->mmio_needed = 0;
+
+		// VMG change, at this point, we're always done
+		// RIP has already been advanced
+		return 1;
+	}
+
+	// More MMIO is needed
+	run->mmio.phys_addr = frag->gpa;
+	run->mmio.len = min(8u, frag->len);
+	run->mmio.is_write = vcpu->mmio_is_write;
+	if (run->mmio.is_write)
+		memcpy(run->mmio.data, frag->data, min(8u, frag->len));
+	run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_MMIO;
+
+	vcpu->arch.complete_userspace_io = complete_sev_es_emulated_mmio;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int kvm_sev_es_mmio_write(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t gpa, unsigned int bytes,
+			  void *data)
+{
+	int handled;
+	struct kvm_mmio_fragment *frag;
+
+	if (!data)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	handled = write_emultor.read_write_mmio(vcpu, gpa, bytes, data);
+	if (handled == bytes)
+		return 1;
+
+	bytes -= handled;
+	gpa += handled;
+	data += handled;
+
+	/*TODO: Check if need to increment number of frags */
+	frag = vcpu->mmio_fragments;
+	vcpu->mmio_nr_fragments = 1;
+	frag->len = bytes;
+	frag->gpa = gpa;
+	frag->data = data;
+
+	vcpu->mmio_needed = 1;
+	vcpu->mmio_cur_fragment = 0;
+
+	vcpu->run->mmio.phys_addr = gpa;
+	vcpu->run->mmio.len = min(8u, frag->len);
+	vcpu->run->mmio.is_write = 1;
+	memcpy(vcpu->run->mmio.data, frag->data, min(8u, frag->len));
+	vcpu->run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_MMIO;
+
+	vcpu->arch.complete_userspace_io = complete_sev_es_emulated_mmio;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_sev_es_mmio_write);
+
+int kvm_sev_es_mmio_read(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t gpa, unsigned int bytes,
+			 void *data)
+{
+	int handled;
+	struct kvm_mmio_fragment *frag;
+
+	if (!data)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	handled = read_emultor.read_write_mmio(vcpu, gpa, bytes, data);
+	if (handled == bytes)
+		return 1;
+
+	bytes -= handled;
+	gpa += handled;
+	data += handled;
+
+	/*TODO: Check if need to increment number of frags */
+	frag = vcpu->mmio_fragments;
+	vcpu->mmio_nr_fragments = 1;
+	frag->len = bytes;
+	frag->gpa = gpa;
+	frag->data = data;
+
+	vcpu->mmio_needed = 1;
+	vcpu->mmio_cur_fragment = 0;
+
+	vcpu->run->mmio.phys_addr = gpa;
+	vcpu->run->mmio.len = min(8u, frag->len);
+	vcpu->run->mmio.is_write = 0;
+	vcpu->run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_MMIO;
+
+	vcpu->arch.complete_userspace_io = complete_sev_es_emulated_mmio;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_sev_es_mmio_read);
+
+static void advance_sev_es_emulated_pio(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned count, int size)
+{
+	vcpu->arch.sev_pio_count -= count;
+	vcpu->arch.sev_pio_data += count * size;
+}
+
+static int kvm_sev_es_outs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned int size,
+			   unsigned int port);
+
+static int complete_sev_es_emulated_outs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	int size = vcpu->arch.pio.size;
+	int port = vcpu->arch.pio.port;
+
+	vcpu->arch.pio.count = 0;
+	if (vcpu->arch.sev_pio_count)
+		return kvm_sev_es_outs(vcpu, size, port);
+	return 1;
+}
+
+static int kvm_sev_es_outs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned int size,
+			   unsigned int port)
+{
+	for (;;) {
+		unsigned int count =
+			min_t(unsigned int, PAGE_SIZE / size, vcpu->arch.sev_pio_count);
+		int ret = emulator_pio_out(vcpu, size, port, vcpu->arch.sev_pio_data, count);
+
+		/* memcpy done already by emulator_pio_out.  */
+		advance_sev_es_emulated_pio(vcpu, count, size);
+		if (!ret)
+			break;
+
+		/* Emulation done by the kernel.  */
+		if (!vcpu->arch.sev_pio_count)
+			return 1;
+	}
+
+	vcpu->arch.complete_userspace_io = complete_sev_es_emulated_outs;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int kvm_sev_es_ins(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned int size,
+			  unsigned int port);
+
+static int complete_sev_es_emulated_ins(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	unsigned count = vcpu->arch.pio.count;
+	int size = vcpu->arch.pio.size;
+	int port = vcpu->arch.pio.port;
+
+	complete_emulator_pio_in(vcpu, vcpu->arch.sev_pio_data);
+	advance_sev_es_emulated_pio(vcpu, count, size);
+	if (vcpu->arch.sev_pio_count)
+		return kvm_sev_es_ins(vcpu, size, port);
+	return 1;
+}
+
+static int kvm_sev_es_ins(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned int size,
+			  unsigned int port)
+{
+	for (;;) {
+		unsigned int count =
+			min_t(unsigned int, PAGE_SIZE / size, vcpu->arch.sev_pio_count);
+		if (!emulator_pio_in(vcpu, size, port, vcpu->arch.sev_pio_data, count))
+			break;
+
+		/* Emulation done by the kernel.  */
+		advance_sev_es_emulated_pio(vcpu, count, size);
+		if (!vcpu->arch.sev_pio_count)
+			return 1;
+	}
+
+	vcpu->arch.complete_userspace_io = complete_sev_es_emulated_ins;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int kvm_sev_es_string_io(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned int size,
+			 unsigned int port, void *data,  unsigned int count,
+			 int in)
+{
+	vcpu->arch.sev_pio_data = data;
+	vcpu->arch.sev_pio_count = count;
+	return in ? kvm_sev_es_ins(vcpu, size, port)
+		  : kvm_sev_es_outs(vcpu, size, port);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_sev_es_string_io);
+
+EXPORT_TRACEPOINT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_entry);
+EXPORT_TRACEPOINT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_exit);
+EXPORT_TRACEPOINT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_fast_mmio);
+EXPORT_TRACEPOINT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_inj_virq);
+EXPORT_TRACEPOINT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_page_fault);
+EXPORT_TRACEPOINT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_msr);
+EXPORT_TRACEPOINT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_cr);
+EXPORT_TRACEPOINT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_nested_vmenter);
+EXPORT_TRACEPOINT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_nested_vmexit);
+EXPORT_TRACEPOINT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_nested_vmexit_inject);
+EXPORT_TRACEPOINT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_nested_intr_vmexit);
+EXPORT_TRACEPOINT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_nested_vmenter_failed);
+EXPORT_TRACEPOINT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_invlpga);
+EXPORT_TRACEPOINT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_skinit);
+EXPORT_TRACEPOINT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_nested_intercepts);
+EXPORT_TRACEPOINT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_write_tsc_offset);
+EXPORT_TRACEPOINT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_ple_window_update);
+EXPORT_TRACEPOINT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_pml_full);
+EXPORT_TRACEPOINT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_pi_irte_update);
+EXPORT_TRACEPOINT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_avic_unaccelerated_access);
+EXPORT_TRACEPOINT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_avic_incomplete_ipi);
+EXPORT_TRACEPOINT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_avic_ga_log);
+EXPORT_TRACEPOINT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_avic_kick_vcpu_slowpath);
+EXPORT_TRACEPOINT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_avic_doorbell);
+EXPORT_TRACEPOINT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_apicv_accept_irq);
+EXPORT_TRACEPOINT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_vmgexit_enter);
+EXPORT_TRACEPOINT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_vmgexit_exit);
+EXPORT_TRACEPOINT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_vmgexit_msr_protocol_enter);
+EXPORT_TRACEPOINT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_vmgexit_msr_protocol_exit);
+
+static int __init kvm_x86_init(void)
+{
+	kvm_mmu_x86_module_init();
+	mitigate_smt_rsb &= boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SMT_RSB) && cpu_smt_possible();
+	return 0;
+}
+module_init(kvm_x86_init);
+
+static void __exit kvm_x86_exit(void)
+{
+	/*
+	 * If module_init() is implemented, module_exit() must also be
+	 * implemented to allow module unload.
+	 */
+}
+module_exit(kvm_x86_exit);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..1e7be1f6a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h
@@ -0,0 +1,543 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+#ifndef ARCH_X86_KVM_X86_H
+#define ARCH_X86_KVM_X86_H
+
+#include <linux/kvm_host.h>
+#include <asm/fpu/xstate.h>
+#include <asm/mce.h>
+#include <asm/pvclock.h>
+#include "kvm_cache_regs.h"
+#include "kvm_emulate.h"
+
+struct kvm_caps {
+	/* control of guest tsc rate supported? */
+	bool has_tsc_control;
+	/* maximum supported tsc_khz for guests */
+	u32  max_guest_tsc_khz;
+	/* number of bits of the fractional part of the TSC scaling ratio */
+	u8   tsc_scaling_ratio_frac_bits;
+	/* maximum allowed value of TSC scaling ratio */
+	u64  max_tsc_scaling_ratio;
+	/* 1ull << kvm_caps.tsc_scaling_ratio_frac_bits */
+	u64  default_tsc_scaling_ratio;
+	/* bus lock detection supported? */
+	bool has_bus_lock_exit;
+	/* notify VM exit supported? */
+	bool has_notify_vmexit;
+
+	u64 supported_mce_cap;
+	u64 supported_xcr0;
+	u64 supported_xss;
+	u64 supported_perf_cap;
+};
+
+void kvm_spurious_fault(void);
+
+#define KVM_NESTED_VMENTER_CONSISTENCY_CHECK(consistency_check)		\
+({									\
+	bool failed = (consistency_check);				\
+	if (failed)							\
+		trace_kvm_nested_vmenter_failed(#consistency_check, 0);	\
+	failed;								\
+})
+
+/*
+ * The first...last VMX feature MSRs that are emulated by KVM.  This may or may
+ * not cover all known VMX MSRs, as KVM doesn't emulate an MSR until there's an
+ * associated feature that KVM supports for nested virtualization.
+ */
+#define KVM_FIRST_EMULATED_VMX_MSR	MSR_IA32_VMX_BASIC
+#define KVM_LAST_EMULATED_VMX_MSR	MSR_IA32_VMX_VMFUNC
+
+#define KVM_DEFAULT_PLE_GAP		128
+#define KVM_VMX_DEFAULT_PLE_WINDOW	4096
+#define KVM_DEFAULT_PLE_WINDOW_GROW	2
+#define KVM_DEFAULT_PLE_WINDOW_SHRINK	0
+#define KVM_VMX_DEFAULT_PLE_WINDOW_MAX	UINT_MAX
+#define KVM_SVM_DEFAULT_PLE_WINDOW_MAX	USHRT_MAX
+#define KVM_SVM_DEFAULT_PLE_WINDOW	3000
+
+static inline unsigned int __grow_ple_window(unsigned int val,
+		unsigned int base, unsigned int modifier, unsigned int max)
+{
+	u64 ret = val;
+
+	if (modifier < 1)
+		return base;
+
+	if (modifier < base)
+		ret *= modifier;
+	else
+		ret += modifier;
+
+	return min(ret, (u64)max);
+}
+
+static inline unsigned int __shrink_ple_window(unsigned int val,
+		unsigned int base, unsigned int modifier, unsigned int min)
+{
+	if (modifier < 1)
+		return base;
+
+	if (modifier < base)
+		val /= modifier;
+	else
+		val -= modifier;
+
+	return max(val, min);
+}
+
+#define MSR_IA32_CR_PAT_DEFAULT  0x0007040600070406ULL
+
+void kvm_service_local_tlb_flush_requests(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+int kvm_check_nested_events(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+
+static inline bool kvm_vcpu_has_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	return vcpu->arch.last_vmentry_cpu != -1;
+}
+
+static inline bool kvm_is_exception_pending(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	return vcpu->arch.exception.pending ||
+	       vcpu->arch.exception_vmexit.pending ||
+	       kvm_test_request(KVM_REQ_TRIPLE_FAULT, vcpu);
+}
+
+static inline void kvm_clear_exception_queue(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	vcpu->arch.exception.pending = false;
+	vcpu->arch.exception.injected = false;
+	vcpu->arch.exception_vmexit.pending = false;
+}
+
+static inline void kvm_queue_interrupt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u8 vector,
+	bool soft)
+{
+	vcpu->arch.interrupt.injected = true;
+	vcpu->arch.interrupt.soft = soft;
+	vcpu->arch.interrupt.nr = vector;
+}
+
+static inline void kvm_clear_interrupt_queue(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	vcpu->arch.interrupt.injected = false;
+}
+
+static inline bool kvm_event_needs_reinjection(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	return vcpu->arch.exception.injected || vcpu->arch.interrupt.injected ||
+		vcpu->arch.nmi_injected;
+}
+
+static inline bool kvm_exception_is_soft(unsigned int nr)
+{
+	return (nr == BP_VECTOR) || (nr == OF_VECTOR);
+}
+
+static inline bool is_protmode(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	return kvm_is_cr0_bit_set(vcpu, X86_CR0_PE);
+}
+
+static inline bool is_long_mode(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+	return !!(vcpu->arch.efer & EFER_LMA);
+#else
+	return false;
+#endif
+}
+
+static inline bool is_64_bit_mode(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	int cs_db, cs_l;
+
+	WARN_ON_ONCE(vcpu->arch.guest_state_protected);
+
+	if (!is_long_mode(vcpu))
+		return false;
+	static_call(kvm_x86_get_cs_db_l_bits)(vcpu, &cs_db, &cs_l);
+	return cs_l;
+}
+
+static inline bool is_64_bit_hypercall(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	/*
+	 * If running with protected guest state, the CS register is not
+	 * accessible. The hypercall register values will have had to been
+	 * provided in 64-bit mode, so assume the guest is in 64-bit.
+	 */
+	return vcpu->arch.guest_state_protected || is_64_bit_mode(vcpu);
+}
+
+static inline bool x86_exception_has_error_code(unsigned int vector)
+{
+	static u32 exception_has_error_code = BIT(DF_VECTOR) | BIT(TS_VECTOR) |
+			BIT(NP_VECTOR) | BIT(SS_VECTOR) | BIT(GP_VECTOR) |
+			BIT(PF_VECTOR) | BIT(AC_VECTOR);
+
+	return (1U << vector) & exception_has_error_code;
+}
+
+static inline bool mmu_is_nested(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	return vcpu->arch.walk_mmu == &vcpu->arch.nested_mmu;
+}
+
+static inline bool is_pae(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	return kvm_is_cr4_bit_set(vcpu, X86_CR4_PAE);
+}
+
+static inline bool is_pse(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	return kvm_is_cr4_bit_set(vcpu, X86_CR4_PSE);
+}
+
+static inline bool is_paging(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	return likely(kvm_is_cr0_bit_set(vcpu, X86_CR0_PG));
+}
+
+static inline bool is_pae_paging(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	return !is_long_mode(vcpu) && is_pae(vcpu) && is_paging(vcpu);
+}
+
+static inline u8 vcpu_virt_addr_bits(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	return kvm_is_cr4_bit_set(vcpu, X86_CR4_LA57) ? 57 : 48;
+}
+
+static inline bool is_noncanonical_address(u64 la, struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	return !__is_canonical_address(la, vcpu_virt_addr_bits(vcpu));
+}
+
+static inline void vcpu_cache_mmio_info(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+					gva_t gva, gfn_t gfn, unsigned access)
+{
+	u64 gen = kvm_memslots(vcpu->kvm)->generation;
+
+	if (unlikely(gen & KVM_MEMSLOT_GEN_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS))
+		return;
+
+	/*
+	 * If this is a shadow nested page table, the "GVA" is
+	 * actually a nGPA.
+	 */
+	vcpu->arch.mmio_gva = mmu_is_nested(vcpu) ? 0 : gva & PAGE_MASK;
+	vcpu->arch.mmio_access = access;
+	vcpu->arch.mmio_gfn = gfn;
+	vcpu->arch.mmio_gen = gen;
+}
+
+static inline bool vcpu_match_mmio_gen(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	return vcpu->arch.mmio_gen == kvm_memslots(vcpu->kvm)->generation;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Clear the mmio cache info for the given gva. If gva is MMIO_GVA_ANY, we
+ * clear all mmio cache info.
+ */
+#define MMIO_GVA_ANY (~(gva_t)0)
+
+static inline void vcpu_clear_mmio_info(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gva_t gva)
+{
+	if (gva != MMIO_GVA_ANY && vcpu->arch.mmio_gva != (gva & PAGE_MASK))
+		return;
+
+	vcpu->arch.mmio_gva = 0;
+}
+
+static inline bool vcpu_match_mmio_gva(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long gva)
+{
+	if (vcpu_match_mmio_gen(vcpu) && vcpu->arch.mmio_gva &&
+	      vcpu->arch.mmio_gva == (gva & PAGE_MASK))
+		return true;
+
+	return false;
+}
+
+static inline bool vcpu_match_mmio_gpa(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t gpa)
+{
+	if (vcpu_match_mmio_gen(vcpu) && vcpu->arch.mmio_gfn &&
+	      vcpu->arch.mmio_gfn == gpa >> PAGE_SHIFT)
+		return true;
+
+	return false;
+}
+
+static inline unsigned long kvm_register_read(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int reg)
+{
+	unsigned long val = kvm_register_read_raw(vcpu, reg);
+
+	return is_64_bit_mode(vcpu) ? val : (u32)val;
+}
+
+static inline void kvm_register_write(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+				       int reg, unsigned long val)
+{
+	if (!is_64_bit_mode(vcpu))
+		val = (u32)val;
+	return kvm_register_write_raw(vcpu, reg, val);
+}
+
+static inline bool kvm_check_has_quirk(struct kvm *kvm, u64 quirk)
+{
+	return !(kvm->arch.disabled_quirks & quirk);
+}
+
+void kvm_inject_realmode_interrupt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int irq, int inc_eip);
+
+u64 get_kvmclock_ns(struct kvm *kvm);
+
+int kvm_read_guest_virt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+	gva_t addr, void *val, unsigned int bytes,
+	struct x86_exception *exception);
+
+int kvm_write_guest_virt_system(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+	gva_t addr, void *val, unsigned int bytes,
+	struct x86_exception *exception);
+
+int handle_ud(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+
+void kvm_deliver_exception_payload(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+				   struct kvm_queued_exception *ex);
+
+void kvm_vcpu_mtrr_init(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+u8 kvm_mtrr_get_guest_memory_type(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gfn_t gfn);
+int kvm_mtrr_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 msr, u64 data);
+int kvm_mtrr_get_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 msr, u64 *pdata);
+bool kvm_mtrr_check_gfn_range_consistency(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gfn_t gfn,
+					  int page_num);
+bool kvm_vector_hashing_enabled(void);
+void kvm_fixup_and_inject_pf_error(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gva_t gva, u16 error_code);
+int x86_decode_emulated_instruction(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int emulation_type,
+				    void *insn, int insn_len);
+int x86_emulate_instruction(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t cr2_or_gpa,
+			    int emulation_type, void *insn, int insn_len);
+fastpath_t handle_fastpath_set_msr_irqoff(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+
+extern u64 host_xcr0;
+extern u64 host_xss;
+extern u64 host_arch_capabilities;
+
+extern struct kvm_caps kvm_caps;
+
+extern bool enable_pmu;
+
+/*
+ * Get a filtered version of KVM's supported XCR0 that strips out dynamic
+ * features for which the current process doesn't (yet) have permission to use.
+ * This is intended to be used only when enumerating support to userspace,
+ * e.g. in KVM_GET_SUPPORTED_CPUID and KVM_CAP_XSAVE2, it does NOT need to be
+ * used to check/restrict guest behavior as KVM rejects KVM_SET_CPUID{2} if
+ * userspace attempts to enable unpermitted features.
+ */
+static inline u64 kvm_get_filtered_xcr0(void)
+{
+	u64 permitted_xcr0 = kvm_caps.supported_xcr0;
+
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(XFEATURE_MASK_USER_DYNAMIC != XFEATURE_MASK_XTILE_DATA);
+
+	if (permitted_xcr0 & XFEATURE_MASK_USER_DYNAMIC) {
+		permitted_xcr0 &= xstate_get_guest_group_perm();
+
+		/*
+		 * Treat XTILE_CFG as unsupported if the current process isn't
+		 * allowed to use XTILE_DATA, as attempting to set XTILE_CFG in
+		 * XCR0 without setting XTILE_DATA is architecturally illegal.
+		 */
+		if (!(permitted_xcr0 & XFEATURE_MASK_XTILE_DATA))
+			permitted_xcr0 &= ~XFEATURE_MASK_XTILE_CFG;
+	}
+	return permitted_xcr0;
+}
+
+static inline bool kvm_mpx_supported(void)
+{
+	return (kvm_caps.supported_xcr0 & (XFEATURE_MASK_BNDREGS | XFEATURE_MASK_BNDCSR))
+		== (XFEATURE_MASK_BNDREGS | XFEATURE_MASK_BNDCSR);
+}
+
+extern unsigned int min_timer_period_us;
+
+extern bool enable_vmware_backdoor;
+
+extern int pi_inject_timer;
+
+extern bool report_ignored_msrs;
+
+extern bool eager_page_split;
+
+static inline void kvm_pr_unimpl_wrmsr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 msr, u64 data)
+{
+	if (report_ignored_msrs)
+		vcpu_unimpl(vcpu, "Unhandled WRMSR(0x%x) = 0x%llx\n", msr, data);
+}
+
+static inline void kvm_pr_unimpl_rdmsr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 msr)
+{
+	if (report_ignored_msrs)
+		vcpu_unimpl(vcpu, "Unhandled RDMSR(0x%x)\n", msr);
+}
+
+static inline u64 nsec_to_cycles(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 nsec)
+{
+	return pvclock_scale_delta(nsec, vcpu->arch.virtual_tsc_mult,
+				   vcpu->arch.virtual_tsc_shift);
+}
+
+/* Same "calling convention" as do_div:
+ * - divide (n << 32) by base
+ * - put result in n
+ * - return remainder
+ */
+#define do_shl32_div32(n, base)					\
+	({							\
+	    u32 __quot, __rem;					\
+	    asm("divl %2" : "=a" (__quot), "=d" (__rem)		\
+			: "rm" (base), "0" (0), "1" ((u32) n));	\
+	    n = __quot;						\
+	    __rem;						\
+	 })
+
+static inline bool kvm_mwait_in_guest(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+	return kvm->arch.mwait_in_guest;
+}
+
+static inline bool kvm_hlt_in_guest(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+	return kvm->arch.hlt_in_guest;
+}
+
+static inline bool kvm_pause_in_guest(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+	return kvm->arch.pause_in_guest;
+}
+
+static inline bool kvm_cstate_in_guest(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+	return kvm->arch.cstate_in_guest;
+}
+
+static inline bool kvm_notify_vmexit_enabled(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+	return kvm->arch.notify_vmexit_flags & KVM_X86_NOTIFY_VMEXIT_ENABLED;
+}
+
+enum kvm_intr_type {
+	/* Values are arbitrary, but must be non-zero. */
+	KVM_HANDLING_IRQ = 1,
+	KVM_HANDLING_NMI,
+};
+
+static __always_inline void kvm_before_interrupt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+						 enum kvm_intr_type intr)
+{
+	WRITE_ONCE(vcpu->arch.handling_intr_from_guest, (u8)intr);
+}
+
+static __always_inline void kvm_after_interrupt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	WRITE_ONCE(vcpu->arch.handling_intr_from_guest, 0);
+}
+
+static inline bool kvm_handling_nmi_from_guest(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	return vcpu->arch.handling_intr_from_guest == KVM_HANDLING_NMI;
+}
+
+static inline bool kvm_pat_valid(u64 data)
+{
+	if (data & 0xF8F8F8F8F8F8F8F8ull)
+		return false;
+	/* 0, 1, 4, 5, 6, 7 are valid values.  */
+	return (data | ((data & 0x0202020202020202ull) << 1)) == data;
+}
+
+static inline bool kvm_dr7_valid(u64 data)
+{
+	/* Bits [63:32] are reserved */
+	return !(data >> 32);
+}
+static inline bool kvm_dr6_valid(u64 data)
+{
+	/* Bits [63:32] are reserved */
+	return !(data >> 32);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Trigger machine check on the host. We assume all the MSRs are already set up
+ * by the CPU and that we still run on the same CPU as the MCE occurred on.
+ * We pass a fake environment to the machine check handler because we want
+ * the guest to be always treated like user space, no matter what context
+ * it used internally.
+ */
+static inline void kvm_machine_check(void)
+{
+#if defined(CONFIG_X86_MCE)
+	struct pt_regs regs = {
+		.cs = 3, /* Fake ring 3 no matter what the guest ran on */
+		.flags = X86_EFLAGS_IF,
+	};
+
+	do_machine_check(&regs);
+#endif
+}
+
+void kvm_load_guest_xsave_state(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+void kvm_load_host_xsave_state(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+int kvm_spec_ctrl_test_value(u64 value);
+bool __kvm_is_valid_cr4(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long cr4);
+int kvm_handle_memory_failure(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int r,
+			      struct x86_exception *e);
+int kvm_handle_invpcid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long type, gva_t gva);
+bool kvm_msr_allowed(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 index, u32 type);
+
+/*
+ * Internal error codes that are used to indicate that MSR emulation encountered
+ * an error that should result in #GP in the guest, unless userspace
+ * handles it.
+ */
+#define  KVM_MSR_RET_INVALID	2	/* in-kernel MSR emulation #GP condition */
+#define  KVM_MSR_RET_FILTERED	3	/* #GP due to userspace MSR filter */
+
+#define __cr4_reserved_bits(__cpu_has, __c)             \
+({                                                      \
+	u64 __reserved_bits = CR4_RESERVED_BITS;        \
+                                                        \
+	if (!__cpu_has(__c, X86_FEATURE_XSAVE))         \
+		__reserved_bits |= X86_CR4_OSXSAVE;     \
+	if (!__cpu_has(__c, X86_FEATURE_SMEP))          \
+		__reserved_bits |= X86_CR4_SMEP;        \
+	if (!__cpu_has(__c, X86_FEATURE_SMAP))          \
+		__reserved_bits |= X86_CR4_SMAP;        \
+	if (!__cpu_has(__c, X86_FEATURE_FSGSBASE))      \
+		__reserved_bits |= X86_CR4_FSGSBASE;    \
+	if (!__cpu_has(__c, X86_FEATURE_PKU))           \
+		__reserved_bits |= X86_CR4_PKE;         \
+	if (!__cpu_has(__c, X86_FEATURE_LA57))          \
+		__reserved_bits |= X86_CR4_LA57;        \
+	if (!__cpu_has(__c, X86_FEATURE_UMIP))          \
+		__reserved_bits |= X86_CR4_UMIP;        \
+	if (!__cpu_has(__c, X86_FEATURE_VMX))           \
+		__reserved_bits |= X86_CR4_VMXE;        \
+	if (!__cpu_has(__c, X86_FEATURE_PCID))          \
+		__reserved_bits |= X86_CR4_PCIDE;       \
+	__reserved_bits;                                \
+})
+
+int kvm_sev_es_mmio_write(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t src, unsigned int bytes,
+			  void *dst);
+int kvm_sev_es_mmio_read(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t src, unsigned int bytes,
+			 void *dst);
+int kvm_sev_es_string_io(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned int size,
+			 unsigned int port, void *data,  unsigned int count,
+			 int in);
+
+#endif
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/xen.c b/arch/x86/kvm/xen.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..40edf4d19
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/xen.c
@@ -0,0 +1,2129 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * Copyright © 2019 Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright © 2020 Amazon.com, Inc. or its affiliates. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * KVM Xen emulation
+ */
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
+
+#include "x86.h"
+#include "xen.h"
+#include "hyperv.h"
+#include "lapic.h"
+
+#include <linux/eventfd.h>
+#include <linux/kvm_host.h>
+#include <linux/sched/stat.h>
+
+#include <trace/events/kvm.h>
+#include <xen/interface/xen.h>
+#include <xen/interface/vcpu.h>
+#include <xen/interface/version.h>
+#include <xen/interface/event_channel.h>
+#include <xen/interface/sched.h>
+
+#include <asm/xen/cpuid.h>
+
+#include "cpuid.h"
+#include "trace.h"
+
+static int kvm_xen_set_evtchn(struct kvm_xen_evtchn *xe, struct kvm *kvm);
+static int kvm_xen_setattr_evtchn(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_xen_hvm_attr *data);
+static bool kvm_xen_hcall_evtchn_send(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 param, u64 *r);
+
+DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_DEFERRED_FALSE(kvm_xen_enabled, HZ);
+
+static int kvm_xen_shared_info_init(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t gfn)
+{
+	struct gfn_to_pfn_cache *gpc = &kvm->arch.xen.shinfo_cache;
+	struct pvclock_wall_clock *wc;
+	gpa_t gpa = gfn_to_gpa(gfn);
+	u32 *wc_sec_hi;
+	u32 wc_version;
+	u64 wall_nsec;
+	int ret = 0;
+	int idx = srcu_read_lock(&kvm->srcu);
+
+	if (gfn == KVM_XEN_INVALID_GFN) {
+		kvm_gpc_deactivate(gpc);
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	do {
+		ret = kvm_gpc_activate(gpc, gpa, PAGE_SIZE);
+		if (ret)
+			goto out;
+
+		/*
+		 * This code mirrors kvm_write_wall_clock() except that it writes
+		 * directly through the pfn cache and doesn't mark the page dirty.
+		 */
+		wall_nsec = ktime_get_real_ns() - get_kvmclock_ns(kvm);
+
+		/* It could be invalid again already, so we need to check */
+		read_lock_irq(&gpc->lock);
+
+		if (gpc->valid)
+			break;
+
+		read_unlock_irq(&gpc->lock);
+	} while (1);
+
+	/* Paranoia checks on the 32-bit struct layout */
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(offsetof(struct compat_shared_info, wc) != 0x900);
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(offsetof(struct compat_shared_info, arch.wc_sec_hi) != 0x924);
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(offsetof(struct pvclock_vcpu_time_info, version) != 0);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+	/* Paranoia checks on the 64-bit struct layout */
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(offsetof(struct shared_info, wc) != 0xc00);
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(offsetof(struct shared_info, wc_sec_hi) != 0xc0c);
+
+	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_64BIT) && kvm->arch.xen.long_mode) {
+		struct shared_info *shinfo = gpc->khva;
+
+		wc_sec_hi = &shinfo->wc_sec_hi;
+		wc = &shinfo->wc;
+	} else
+#endif
+	{
+		struct compat_shared_info *shinfo = gpc->khva;
+
+		wc_sec_hi = &shinfo->arch.wc_sec_hi;
+		wc = &shinfo->wc;
+	}
+
+	/* Increment and ensure an odd value */
+	wc_version = wc->version = (wc->version + 1) | 1;
+	smp_wmb();
+
+	wc->nsec = do_div(wall_nsec,  1000000000);
+	wc->sec = (u32)wall_nsec;
+	*wc_sec_hi = wall_nsec >> 32;
+	smp_wmb();
+
+	wc->version = wc_version + 1;
+	read_unlock_irq(&gpc->lock);
+
+	kvm_make_all_cpus_request(kvm, KVM_REQ_MASTERCLOCK_UPDATE);
+
+out:
+	srcu_read_unlock(&kvm->srcu, idx);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+void kvm_xen_inject_timer_irqs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	if (atomic_read(&vcpu->arch.xen.timer_pending) > 0) {
+		struct kvm_xen_evtchn e;
+
+		e.vcpu_id = vcpu->vcpu_id;
+		e.vcpu_idx = vcpu->vcpu_idx;
+		e.port = vcpu->arch.xen.timer_virq;
+		e.priority = KVM_IRQ_ROUTING_XEN_EVTCHN_PRIO_2LEVEL;
+
+		kvm_xen_set_evtchn(&e, vcpu->kvm);
+
+		vcpu->arch.xen.timer_expires = 0;
+		atomic_set(&vcpu->arch.xen.timer_pending, 0);
+	}
+}
+
+static enum hrtimer_restart xen_timer_callback(struct hrtimer *timer)
+{
+	struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = container_of(timer, struct kvm_vcpu,
+					     arch.xen.timer);
+	if (atomic_read(&vcpu->arch.xen.timer_pending))
+		return HRTIMER_NORESTART;
+
+	atomic_inc(&vcpu->arch.xen.timer_pending);
+	kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_UNBLOCK, vcpu);
+	kvm_vcpu_kick(vcpu);
+
+	return HRTIMER_NORESTART;
+}
+
+static void kvm_xen_start_timer(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 guest_abs, s64 delta_ns)
+{
+	atomic_set(&vcpu->arch.xen.timer_pending, 0);
+	vcpu->arch.xen.timer_expires = guest_abs;
+
+	if (delta_ns <= 0) {
+		xen_timer_callback(&vcpu->arch.xen.timer);
+	} else {
+		ktime_t ktime_now = ktime_get();
+		hrtimer_start(&vcpu->arch.xen.timer,
+			      ktime_add_ns(ktime_now, delta_ns),
+			      HRTIMER_MODE_ABS_HARD);
+	}
+}
+
+static void kvm_xen_stop_timer(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	hrtimer_cancel(&vcpu->arch.xen.timer);
+	vcpu->arch.xen.timer_expires = 0;
+	atomic_set(&vcpu->arch.xen.timer_pending, 0);
+}
+
+static void kvm_xen_init_timer(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	hrtimer_init(&vcpu->arch.xen.timer, CLOCK_MONOTONIC,
+		     HRTIMER_MODE_ABS_HARD);
+	vcpu->arch.xen.timer.function = xen_timer_callback;
+}
+
+static void kvm_xen_update_runstate_guest(struct kvm_vcpu *v, bool atomic)
+{
+	struct kvm_vcpu_xen *vx = &v->arch.xen;
+	struct gfn_to_pfn_cache *gpc1 = &vx->runstate_cache;
+	struct gfn_to_pfn_cache *gpc2 = &vx->runstate2_cache;
+	size_t user_len, user_len1, user_len2;
+	struct vcpu_runstate_info rs;
+	unsigned long flags;
+	size_t times_ofs;
+	uint8_t *update_bit = NULL;
+	uint64_t entry_time;
+	uint64_t *rs_times;
+	int *rs_state;
+
+	/*
+	 * The only difference between 32-bit and 64-bit versions of the
+	 * runstate struct is the alignment of uint64_t in 32-bit, which
+	 * means that the 64-bit version has an additional 4 bytes of
+	 * padding after the first field 'state'. Let's be really really
+	 * paranoid about that, and matching it with our internal data
+	 * structures that we memcpy into it...
+	 */
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(offsetof(struct vcpu_runstate_info, state) != 0);
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(offsetof(struct compat_vcpu_runstate_info, state) != 0);
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(struct compat_vcpu_runstate_info) != 0x2c);
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+	/*
+	 * The 64-bit structure has 4 bytes of padding before 'state_entry_time'
+	 * so each subsequent field is shifted by 4, and it's 4 bytes longer.
+	 */
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(offsetof(struct vcpu_runstate_info, state_entry_time) !=
+		     offsetof(struct compat_vcpu_runstate_info, state_entry_time) + 4);
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(offsetof(struct vcpu_runstate_info, time) !=
+		     offsetof(struct compat_vcpu_runstate_info, time) + 4);
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(struct vcpu_runstate_info) != 0x2c + 4);
+#endif
+	/*
+	 * The state field is in the same place at the start of both structs,
+	 * and is the same size (int) as vx->current_runstate.
+	 */
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(offsetof(struct vcpu_runstate_info, state) !=
+		     offsetof(struct compat_vcpu_runstate_info, state));
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof_field(struct vcpu_runstate_info, state) !=
+		     sizeof(vx->current_runstate));
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof_field(struct compat_vcpu_runstate_info, state) !=
+		     sizeof(vx->current_runstate));
+
+	/*
+	 * The state_entry_time field is 64 bits in both versions, and the
+	 * XEN_RUNSTATE_UPDATE flag is in the top bit, which given that x86
+	 * is little-endian means that it's in the last *byte* of the word.
+	 * That detail is important later.
+	 */
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof_field(struct vcpu_runstate_info, state_entry_time) !=
+		     sizeof(uint64_t));
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof_field(struct compat_vcpu_runstate_info, state_entry_time) !=
+		     sizeof(uint64_t));
+	BUILD_BUG_ON((XEN_RUNSTATE_UPDATE >> 56) != 0x80);
+
+	/*
+	 * The time array is four 64-bit quantities in both versions, matching
+	 * the vx->runstate_times and immediately following state_entry_time.
+	 */
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(offsetof(struct vcpu_runstate_info, state_entry_time) !=
+		     offsetof(struct vcpu_runstate_info, time) - sizeof(uint64_t));
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(offsetof(struct compat_vcpu_runstate_info, state_entry_time) !=
+		     offsetof(struct compat_vcpu_runstate_info, time) - sizeof(uint64_t));
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof_field(struct vcpu_runstate_info, time) !=
+		     sizeof_field(struct compat_vcpu_runstate_info, time));
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof_field(struct vcpu_runstate_info, time) !=
+		     sizeof(vx->runstate_times));
+
+	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_64BIT) && v->kvm->arch.xen.long_mode) {
+		user_len = sizeof(struct vcpu_runstate_info);
+		times_ofs = offsetof(struct vcpu_runstate_info,
+				     state_entry_time);
+	} else {
+		user_len = sizeof(struct compat_vcpu_runstate_info);
+		times_ofs = offsetof(struct compat_vcpu_runstate_info,
+				     state_entry_time);
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * There are basically no alignment constraints. The guest can set it
+	 * up so it crosses from one page to the next, and at arbitrary byte
+	 * alignment (and the 32-bit ABI doesn't align the 64-bit integers
+	 * anyway, even if the overall struct had been 64-bit aligned).
+	 */
+	if ((gpc1->gpa & ~PAGE_MASK) + user_len >= PAGE_SIZE) {
+		user_len1 = PAGE_SIZE - (gpc1->gpa & ~PAGE_MASK);
+		user_len2 = user_len - user_len1;
+	} else {
+		user_len1 = user_len;
+		user_len2 = 0;
+	}
+	BUG_ON(user_len1 + user_len2 != user_len);
+
+ retry:
+	/*
+	 * Attempt to obtain the GPC lock on *both* (if there are two)
+	 * gfn_to_pfn caches that cover the region.
+	 */
+	if (atomic) {
+		local_irq_save(flags);
+		if (!read_trylock(&gpc1->lock)) {
+			local_irq_restore(flags);
+			return;
+		}
+	} else {
+		read_lock_irqsave(&gpc1->lock, flags);
+	}
+	while (!kvm_gpc_check(gpc1, user_len1)) {
+		read_unlock_irqrestore(&gpc1->lock, flags);
+
+		/* When invoked from kvm_sched_out() we cannot sleep */
+		if (atomic)
+			return;
+
+		if (kvm_gpc_refresh(gpc1, user_len1))
+			return;
+
+		read_lock_irqsave(&gpc1->lock, flags);
+	}
+
+	if (likely(!user_len2)) {
+		/*
+		 * Set up three pointers directly to the runstate_info
+		 * struct in the guest (via the GPC).
+		 *
+		 *  • @rs_state   → state field
+		 *  • @rs_times   → state_entry_time field.
+		 *  • @update_bit → last byte of state_entry_time, which
+		 *                  contains the XEN_RUNSTATE_UPDATE bit.
+		 */
+		rs_state = gpc1->khva;
+		rs_times = gpc1->khva + times_ofs;
+		if (v->kvm->arch.xen.runstate_update_flag)
+			update_bit = ((void *)(&rs_times[1])) - 1;
+	} else {
+		/*
+		 * The guest's runstate_info is split across two pages and we
+		 * need to hold and validate both GPCs simultaneously. We can
+		 * declare a lock ordering GPC1 > GPC2 because nothing else
+		 * takes them more than one at a time. Set a subclass on the
+		 * gpc1 lock to make lockdep shut up about it.
+		 */
+		lock_set_subclass(&gpc1->lock.dep_map, 1, _THIS_IP_);
+		if (atomic) {
+			if (!read_trylock(&gpc2->lock)) {
+				read_unlock_irqrestore(&gpc1->lock, flags);
+				return;
+			}
+		} else {
+			read_lock(&gpc2->lock);
+		}
+
+		if (!kvm_gpc_check(gpc2, user_len2)) {
+			read_unlock(&gpc2->lock);
+			read_unlock_irqrestore(&gpc1->lock, flags);
+
+			/* When invoked from kvm_sched_out() we cannot sleep */
+			if (atomic)
+				return;
+
+			/*
+			 * Use kvm_gpc_activate() here because if the runstate
+			 * area was configured in 32-bit mode and only extends
+			 * to the second page now because the guest changed to
+			 * 64-bit mode, the second GPC won't have been set up.
+			 */
+			if (kvm_gpc_activate(gpc2, gpc1->gpa + user_len1,
+					     user_len2))
+				return;
+
+			/*
+			 * We dropped the lock on GPC1 so we have to go all the
+			 * way back and revalidate that too.
+			 */
+			goto retry;
+		}
+
+		/*
+		 * In this case, the runstate_info struct will be assembled on
+		 * the kernel stack (compat or not as appropriate) and will
+		 * be copied to GPC1/GPC2 with a dual memcpy. Set up the three
+		 * rs pointers accordingly.
+		 */
+		rs_times = &rs.state_entry_time;
+
+		/*
+		 * The rs_state pointer points to the start of what we'll
+		 * copy to the guest, which in the case of a compat guest
+		 * is the 32-bit field that the compiler thinks is padding.
+		 */
+		rs_state = ((void *)rs_times) - times_ofs;
+
+		/*
+		 * The update_bit is still directly in the guest memory,
+		 * via one GPC or the other.
+		 */
+		if (v->kvm->arch.xen.runstate_update_flag) {
+			if (user_len1 >= times_ofs + sizeof(uint64_t))
+				update_bit = gpc1->khva + times_ofs +
+					sizeof(uint64_t) - 1;
+			else
+				update_bit = gpc2->khva + times_ofs +
+					sizeof(uint64_t) - 1 - user_len1;
+		}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+		/*
+		 * Don't leak kernel memory through the padding in the 64-bit
+		 * version of the struct.
+		 */
+		memset(&rs, 0, offsetof(struct vcpu_runstate_info, state_entry_time));
+#endif
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * First, set the XEN_RUNSTATE_UPDATE bit in the top bit of the
+	 * state_entry_time field, directly in the guest. We need to set
+	 * that (and write-barrier) before writing to the rest of the
+	 * structure, and clear it last. Just as Xen does, we address the
+	 * single *byte* in which it resides because it might be in a
+	 * different cache line to the rest of the 64-bit word, due to
+	 * the (lack of) alignment constraints.
+	 */
+	entry_time = vx->runstate_entry_time;
+	if (update_bit) {
+		entry_time |= XEN_RUNSTATE_UPDATE;
+		*update_bit = (vx->runstate_entry_time | XEN_RUNSTATE_UPDATE) >> 56;
+		smp_wmb();
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Now assemble the actual structure, either on our kernel stack
+	 * or directly in the guest according to how the rs_state and
+	 * rs_times pointers were set up above.
+	 */
+	*rs_state = vx->current_runstate;
+	rs_times[0] = entry_time;
+	memcpy(rs_times + 1, vx->runstate_times, sizeof(vx->runstate_times));
+
+	/* For the split case, we have to then copy it to the guest. */
+	if (user_len2) {
+		memcpy(gpc1->khva, rs_state, user_len1);
+		memcpy(gpc2->khva, ((void *)rs_state) + user_len1, user_len2);
+	}
+	smp_wmb();
+
+	/* Finally, clear the XEN_RUNSTATE_UPDATE bit. */
+	if (update_bit) {
+		entry_time &= ~XEN_RUNSTATE_UPDATE;
+		*update_bit = entry_time >> 56;
+		smp_wmb();
+	}
+
+	if (user_len2)
+		read_unlock(&gpc2->lock);
+
+	read_unlock_irqrestore(&gpc1->lock, flags);
+
+	mark_page_dirty_in_slot(v->kvm, gpc1->memslot, gpc1->gpa >> PAGE_SHIFT);
+	if (user_len2)
+		mark_page_dirty_in_slot(v->kvm, gpc2->memslot, gpc2->gpa >> PAGE_SHIFT);
+}
+
+void kvm_xen_update_runstate(struct kvm_vcpu *v, int state)
+{
+	struct kvm_vcpu_xen *vx = &v->arch.xen;
+	u64 now = get_kvmclock_ns(v->kvm);
+	u64 delta_ns = now - vx->runstate_entry_time;
+	u64 run_delay = current->sched_info.run_delay;
+
+	if (unlikely(!vx->runstate_entry_time))
+		vx->current_runstate = RUNSTATE_offline;
+
+	/*
+	 * Time waiting for the scheduler isn't "stolen" if the
+	 * vCPU wasn't running anyway.
+	 */
+	if (vx->current_runstate == RUNSTATE_running) {
+		u64 steal_ns = run_delay - vx->last_steal;
+
+		delta_ns -= steal_ns;
+
+		vx->runstate_times[RUNSTATE_runnable] += steal_ns;
+	}
+	vx->last_steal = run_delay;
+
+	vx->runstate_times[vx->current_runstate] += delta_ns;
+	vx->current_runstate = state;
+	vx->runstate_entry_time = now;
+
+	if (vx->runstate_cache.active)
+		kvm_xen_update_runstate_guest(v, state == RUNSTATE_runnable);
+}
+
+static void kvm_xen_inject_vcpu_vector(struct kvm_vcpu *v)
+{
+	struct kvm_lapic_irq irq = { };
+	int r;
+
+	irq.dest_id = v->vcpu_id;
+	irq.vector = v->arch.xen.upcall_vector;
+	irq.dest_mode = APIC_DEST_PHYSICAL;
+	irq.shorthand = APIC_DEST_NOSHORT;
+	irq.delivery_mode = APIC_DM_FIXED;
+	irq.level = 1;
+
+	/* The fast version will always work for physical unicast */
+	WARN_ON_ONCE(!kvm_irq_delivery_to_apic_fast(v->kvm, NULL, &irq, &r, NULL));
+}
+
+/*
+ * On event channel delivery, the vcpu_info may not have been accessible.
+ * In that case, there are bits in vcpu->arch.xen.evtchn_pending_sel which
+ * need to be marked into the vcpu_info (and evtchn_upcall_pending set).
+ * Do so now that we can sleep in the context of the vCPU to bring the
+ * page in, and refresh the pfn cache for it.
+ */
+void kvm_xen_inject_pending_events(struct kvm_vcpu *v)
+{
+	unsigned long evtchn_pending_sel = READ_ONCE(v->arch.xen.evtchn_pending_sel);
+	struct gfn_to_pfn_cache *gpc = &v->arch.xen.vcpu_info_cache;
+	unsigned long flags;
+
+	if (!evtchn_pending_sel)
+		return;
+
+	/*
+	 * Yes, this is an open-coded loop. But that's just what put_user()
+	 * does anyway. Page it in and retry the instruction. We're just a
+	 * little more honest about it.
+	 */
+	read_lock_irqsave(&gpc->lock, flags);
+	while (!kvm_gpc_check(gpc, sizeof(struct vcpu_info))) {
+		read_unlock_irqrestore(&gpc->lock, flags);
+
+		if (kvm_gpc_refresh(gpc, sizeof(struct vcpu_info)))
+			return;
+
+		read_lock_irqsave(&gpc->lock, flags);
+	}
+
+	/* Now gpc->khva is a valid kernel address for the vcpu_info */
+	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_64BIT) && v->kvm->arch.xen.long_mode) {
+		struct vcpu_info *vi = gpc->khva;
+
+		asm volatile(LOCK_PREFIX "orq %0, %1\n"
+			     "notq %0\n"
+			     LOCK_PREFIX "andq %0, %2\n"
+			     : "=r" (evtchn_pending_sel),
+			       "+m" (vi->evtchn_pending_sel),
+			       "+m" (v->arch.xen.evtchn_pending_sel)
+			     : "0" (evtchn_pending_sel));
+		WRITE_ONCE(vi->evtchn_upcall_pending, 1);
+	} else {
+		u32 evtchn_pending_sel32 = evtchn_pending_sel;
+		struct compat_vcpu_info *vi = gpc->khva;
+
+		asm volatile(LOCK_PREFIX "orl %0, %1\n"
+			     "notl %0\n"
+			     LOCK_PREFIX "andl %0, %2\n"
+			     : "=r" (evtchn_pending_sel32),
+			       "+m" (vi->evtchn_pending_sel),
+			       "+m" (v->arch.xen.evtchn_pending_sel)
+			     : "0" (evtchn_pending_sel32));
+		WRITE_ONCE(vi->evtchn_upcall_pending, 1);
+	}
+	read_unlock_irqrestore(&gpc->lock, flags);
+
+	/* For the per-vCPU lapic vector, deliver it as MSI. */
+	if (v->arch.xen.upcall_vector)
+		kvm_xen_inject_vcpu_vector(v);
+
+	mark_page_dirty_in_slot(v->kvm, gpc->memslot, gpc->gpa >> PAGE_SHIFT);
+}
+
+int __kvm_xen_has_interrupt(struct kvm_vcpu *v)
+{
+	struct gfn_to_pfn_cache *gpc = &v->arch.xen.vcpu_info_cache;
+	unsigned long flags;
+	u8 rc = 0;
+
+	/*
+	 * If the global upcall vector (HVMIRQ_callback_vector) is set and
+	 * the vCPU's evtchn_upcall_pending flag is set, the IRQ is pending.
+	 */
+
+	/* No need for compat handling here */
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(offsetof(struct vcpu_info, evtchn_upcall_pending) !=
+		     offsetof(struct compat_vcpu_info, evtchn_upcall_pending));
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(rc) !=
+		     sizeof_field(struct vcpu_info, evtchn_upcall_pending));
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(rc) !=
+		     sizeof_field(struct compat_vcpu_info, evtchn_upcall_pending));
+
+	read_lock_irqsave(&gpc->lock, flags);
+	while (!kvm_gpc_check(gpc, sizeof(struct vcpu_info))) {
+		read_unlock_irqrestore(&gpc->lock, flags);
+
+		/*
+		 * This function gets called from kvm_vcpu_block() after setting the
+		 * task to TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE, to see if it needs to wake immediately
+		 * from a HLT. So we really mustn't sleep. If the page ended up absent
+		 * at that point, just return 1 in order to trigger an immediate wake,
+		 * and we'll end up getting called again from a context where we *can*
+		 * fault in the page and wait for it.
+		 */
+		if (in_atomic() || !task_is_running(current))
+			return 1;
+
+		if (kvm_gpc_refresh(gpc, sizeof(struct vcpu_info))) {
+			/*
+			 * If this failed, userspace has screwed up the
+			 * vcpu_info mapping. No interrupts for you.
+			 */
+			return 0;
+		}
+		read_lock_irqsave(&gpc->lock, flags);
+	}
+
+	rc = ((struct vcpu_info *)gpc->khva)->evtchn_upcall_pending;
+	read_unlock_irqrestore(&gpc->lock, flags);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+int kvm_xen_hvm_set_attr(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_xen_hvm_attr *data)
+{
+	int r = -ENOENT;
+
+
+	switch (data->type) {
+	case KVM_XEN_ATTR_TYPE_LONG_MODE:
+		if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_64BIT) && data->u.long_mode) {
+			r = -EINVAL;
+		} else {
+			mutex_lock(&kvm->arch.xen.xen_lock);
+			kvm->arch.xen.long_mode = !!data->u.long_mode;
+			mutex_unlock(&kvm->arch.xen.xen_lock);
+			r = 0;
+		}
+		break;
+
+	case KVM_XEN_ATTR_TYPE_SHARED_INFO:
+		mutex_lock(&kvm->arch.xen.xen_lock);
+		r = kvm_xen_shared_info_init(kvm, data->u.shared_info.gfn);
+		mutex_unlock(&kvm->arch.xen.xen_lock);
+		break;
+
+	case KVM_XEN_ATTR_TYPE_UPCALL_VECTOR:
+		if (data->u.vector && data->u.vector < 0x10)
+			r = -EINVAL;
+		else {
+			mutex_lock(&kvm->arch.xen.xen_lock);
+			kvm->arch.xen.upcall_vector = data->u.vector;
+			mutex_unlock(&kvm->arch.xen.xen_lock);
+			r = 0;
+		}
+		break;
+
+	case KVM_XEN_ATTR_TYPE_EVTCHN:
+		r = kvm_xen_setattr_evtchn(kvm, data);
+		break;
+
+	case KVM_XEN_ATTR_TYPE_XEN_VERSION:
+		mutex_lock(&kvm->arch.xen.xen_lock);
+		kvm->arch.xen.xen_version = data->u.xen_version;
+		mutex_unlock(&kvm->arch.xen.xen_lock);
+		r = 0;
+		break;
+
+	case KVM_XEN_ATTR_TYPE_RUNSTATE_UPDATE_FLAG:
+		if (!sched_info_on()) {
+			r = -EOPNOTSUPP;
+			break;
+		}
+		mutex_lock(&kvm->arch.xen.xen_lock);
+		kvm->arch.xen.runstate_update_flag = !!data->u.runstate_update_flag;
+		mutex_unlock(&kvm->arch.xen.xen_lock);
+		r = 0;
+		break;
+
+	default:
+		break;
+	}
+
+	return r;
+}
+
+int kvm_xen_hvm_get_attr(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_xen_hvm_attr *data)
+{
+	int r = -ENOENT;
+
+	mutex_lock(&kvm->arch.xen.xen_lock);
+
+	switch (data->type) {
+	case KVM_XEN_ATTR_TYPE_LONG_MODE:
+		data->u.long_mode = kvm->arch.xen.long_mode;
+		r = 0;
+		break;
+
+	case KVM_XEN_ATTR_TYPE_SHARED_INFO:
+		if (kvm->arch.xen.shinfo_cache.active)
+			data->u.shared_info.gfn = gpa_to_gfn(kvm->arch.xen.shinfo_cache.gpa);
+		else
+			data->u.shared_info.gfn = KVM_XEN_INVALID_GFN;
+		r = 0;
+		break;
+
+	case KVM_XEN_ATTR_TYPE_UPCALL_VECTOR:
+		data->u.vector = kvm->arch.xen.upcall_vector;
+		r = 0;
+		break;
+
+	case KVM_XEN_ATTR_TYPE_XEN_VERSION:
+		data->u.xen_version = kvm->arch.xen.xen_version;
+		r = 0;
+		break;
+
+	case KVM_XEN_ATTR_TYPE_RUNSTATE_UPDATE_FLAG:
+		if (!sched_info_on()) {
+			r = -EOPNOTSUPP;
+			break;
+		}
+		data->u.runstate_update_flag = kvm->arch.xen.runstate_update_flag;
+		r = 0;
+		break;
+
+	default:
+		break;
+	}
+
+	mutex_unlock(&kvm->arch.xen.xen_lock);
+	return r;
+}
+
+int kvm_xen_vcpu_set_attr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_xen_vcpu_attr *data)
+{
+	int idx, r = -ENOENT;
+
+	mutex_lock(&vcpu->kvm->arch.xen.xen_lock);
+	idx = srcu_read_lock(&vcpu->kvm->srcu);
+
+	switch (data->type) {
+	case KVM_XEN_VCPU_ATTR_TYPE_VCPU_INFO:
+		/* No compat necessary here. */
+		BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(struct vcpu_info) !=
+			     sizeof(struct compat_vcpu_info));
+		BUILD_BUG_ON(offsetof(struct vcpu_info, time) !=
+			     offsetof(struct compat_vcpu_info, time));
+
+		if (data->u.gpa == KVM_XEN_INVALID_GPA) {
+			kvm_gpc_deactivate(&vcpu->arch.xen.vcpu_info_cache);
+			r = 0;
+			break;
+		}
+
+		r = kvm_gpc_activate(&vcpu->arch.xen.vcpu_info_cache,
+				     data->u.gpa, sizeof(struct vcpu_info));
+		if (!r)
+			kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_CLOCK_UPDATE, vcpu);
+
+		break;
+
+	case KVM_XEN_VCPU_ATTR_TYPE_VCPU_TIME_INFO:
+		if (data->u.gpa == KVM_XEN_INVALID_GPA) {
+			kvm_gpc_deactivate(&vcpu->arch.xen.vcpu_time_info_cache);
+			r = 0;
+			break;
+		}
+
+		r = kvm_gpc_activate(&vcpu->arch.xen.vcpu_time_info_cache,
+				     data->u.gpa,
+				     sizeof(struct pvclock_vcpu_time_info));
+		if (!r)
+			kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_CLOCK_UPDATE, vcpu);
+		break;
+
+	case KVM_XEN_VCPU_ATTR_TYPE_RUNSTATE_ADDR: {
+		size_t sz, sz1, sz2;
+
+		if (!sched_info_on()) {
+			r = -EOPNOTSUPP;
+			break;
+		}
+		if (data->u.gpa == KVM_XEN_INVALID_GPA) {
+			r = 0;
+		deactivate_out:
+			kvm_gpc_deactivate(&vcpu->arch.xen.runstate_cache);
+			kvm_gpc_deactivate(&vcpu->arch.xen.runstate2_cache);
+			break;
+		}
+
+		/*
+		 * If the guest switches to 64-bit mode after setting the runstate
+		 * address, that's actually OK. kvm_xen_update_runstate_guest()
+		 * will cope.
+		 */
+		if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_64BIT) && vcpu->kvm->arch.xen.long_mode)
+			sz = sizeof(struct vcpu_runstate_info);
+		else
+			sz = sizeof(struct compat_vcpu_runstate_info);
+
+		/* How much fits in the (first) page? */
+		sz1 = PAGE_SIZE - (data->u.gpa & ~PAGE_MASK);
+		r = kvm_gpc_activate(&vcpu->arch.xen.runstate_cache,
+				     data->u.gpa, sz1);
+		if (r)
+			goto deactivate_out;
+
+		/* Either map the second page, or deactivate the second GPC */
+		if (sz1 >= sz) {
+			kvm_gpc_deactivate(&vcpu->arch.xen.runstate2_cache);
+		} else {
+			sz2 = sz - sz1;
+			BUG_ON((data->u.gpa + sz1) & ~PAGE_MASK);
+			r = kvm_gpc_activate(&vcpu->arch.xen.runstate2_cache,
+					     data->u.gpa + sz1, sz2);
+			if (r)
+				goto deactivate_out;
+		}
+
+		kvm_xen_update_runstate_guest(vcpu, false);
+		break;
+	}
+	case KVM_XEN_VCPU_ATTR_TYPE_RUNSTATE_CURRENT:
+		if (!sched_info_on()) {
+			r = -EOPNOTSUPP;
+			break;
+		}
+		if (data->u.runstate.state > RUNSTATE_offline) {
+			r = -EINVAL;
+			break;
+		}
+
+		kvm_xen_update_runstate(vcpu, data->u.runstate.state);
+		r = 0;
+		break;
+
+	case KVM_XEN_VCPU_ATTR_TYPE_RUNSTATE_DATA:
+		if (!sched_info_on()) {
+			r = -EOPNOTSUPP;
+			break;
+		}
+		if (data->u.runstate.state > RUNSTATE_offline) {
+			r = -EINVAL;
+			break;
+		}
+		if (data->u.runstate.state_entry_time !=
+		    (data->u.runstate.time_running +
+		     data->u.runstate.time_runnable +
+		     data->u.runstate.time_blocked +
+		     data->u.runstate.time_offline)) {
+			r = -EINVAL;
+			break;
+		}
+		if (get_kvmclock_ns(vcpu->kvm) <
+		    data->u.runstate.state_entry_time) {
+			r = -EINVAL;
+			break;
+		}
+
+		vcpu->arch.xen.current_runstate = data->u.runstate.state;
+		vcpu->arch.xen.runstate_entry_time =
+			data->u.runstate.state_entry_time;
+		vcpu->arch.xen.runstate_times[RUNSTATE_running] =
+			data->u.runstate.time_running;
+		vcpu->arch.xen.runstate_times[RUNSTATE_runnable] =
+			data->u.runstate.time_runnable;
+		vcpu->arch.xen.runstate_times[RUNSTATE_blocked] =
+			data->u.runstate.time_blocked;
+		vcpu->arch.xen.runstate_times[RUNSTATE_offline] =
+			data->u.runstate.time_offline;
+		vcpu->arch.xen.last_steal = current->sched_info.run_delay;
+		r = 0;
+		break;
+
+	case KVM_XEN_VCPU_ATTR_TYPE_RUNSTATE_ADJUST:
+		if (!sched_info_on()) {
+			r = -EOPNOTSUPP;
+			break;
+		}
+		if (data->u.runstate.state > RUNSTATE_offline &&
+		    data->u.runstate.state != (u64)-1) {
+			r = -EINVAL;
+			break;
+		}
+		/* The adjustment must add up */
+		if (data->u.runstate.state_entry_time !=
+		    (data->u.runstate.time_running +
+		     data->u.runstate.time_runnable +
+		     data->u.runstate.time_blocked +
+		     data->u.runstate.time_offline)) {
+			r = -EINVAL;
+			break;
+		}
+
+		if (get_kvmclock_ns(vcpu->kvm) <
+		    (vcpu->arch.xen.runstate_entry_time +
+		     data->u.runstate.state_entry_time)) {
+			r = -EINVAL;
+			break;
+		}
+
+		vcpu->arch.xen.runstate_entry_time +=
+			data->u.runstate.state_entry_time;
+		vcpu->arch.xen.runstate_times[RUNSTATE_running] +=
+			data->u.runstate.time_running;
+		vcpu->arch.xen.runstate_times[RUNSTATE_runnable] +=
+			data->u.runstate.time_runnable;
+		vcpu->arch.xen.runstate_times[RUNSTATE_blocked] +=
+			data->u.runstate.time_blocked;
+		vcpu->arch.xen.runstate_times[RUNSTATE_offline] +=
+			data->u.runstate.time_offline;
+
+		if (data->u.runstate.state <= RUNSTATE_offline)
+			kvm_xen_update_runstate(vcpu, data->u.runstate.state);
+		else if (vcpu->arch.xen.runstate_cache.active)
+			kvm_xen_update_runstate_guest(vcpu, false);
+		r = 0;
+		break;
+
+	case KVM_XEN_VCPU_ATTR_TYPE_VCPU_ID:
+		if (data->u.vcpu_id >= KVM_MAX_VCPUS)
+			r = -EINVAL;
+		else {
+			vcpu->arch.xen.vcpu_id = data->u.vcpu_id;
+			r = 0;
+		}
+		break;
+
+	case KVM_XEN_VCPU_ATTR_TYPE_TIMER:
+		if (data->u.timer.port &&
+		    data->u.timer.priority != KVM_IRQ_ROUTING_XEN_EVTCHN_PRIO_2LEVEL) {
+			r = -EINVAL;
+			break;
+		}
+
+		if (!vcpu->arch.xen.timer.function)
+			kvm_xen_init_timer(vcpu);
+
+		/* Stop the timer (if it's running) before changing the vector */
+		kvm_xen_stop_timer(vcpu);
+		vcpu->arch.xen.timer_virq = data->u.timer.port;
+
+		/* Start the timer if the new value has a valid vector+expiry. */
+		if (data->u.timer.port && data->u.timer.expires_ns)
+			kvm_xen_start_timer(vcpu, data->u.timer.expires_ns,
+					    data->u.timer.expires_ns -
+					    get_kvmclock_ns(vcpu->kvm));
+
+		r = 0;
+		break;
+
+	case KVM_XEN_VCPU_ATTR_TYPE_UPCALL_VECTOR:
+		if (data->u.vector && data->u.vector < 0x10)
+			r = -EINVAL;
+		else {
+			vcpu->arch.xen.upcall_vector = data->u.vector;
+			r = 0;
+		}
+		break;
+
+	default:
+		break;
+	}
+
+	srcu_read_unlock(&vcpu->kvm->srcu, idx);
+	mutex_unlock(&vcpu->kvm->arch.xen.xen_lock);
+	return r;
+}
+
+int kvm_xen_vcpu_get_attr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_xen_vcpu_attr *data)
+{
+	int r = -ENOENT;
+
+	mutex_lock(&vcpu->kvm->arch.xen.xen_lock);
+
+	switch (data->type) {
+	case KVM_XEN_VCPU_ATTR_TYPE_VCPU_INFO:
+		if (vcpu->arch.xen.vcpu_info_cache.active)
+			data->u.gpa = vcpu->arch.xen.vcpu_info_cache.gpa;
+		else
+			data->u.gpa = KVM_XEN_INVALID_GPA;
+		r = 0;
+		break;
+
+	case KVM_XEN_VCPU_ATTR_TYPE_VCPU_TIME_INFO:
+		if (vcpu->arch.xen.vcpu_time_info_cache.active)
+			data->u.gpa = vcpu->arch.xen.vcpu_time_info_cache.gpa;
+		else
+			data->u.gpa = KVM_XEN_INVALID_GPA;
+		r = 0;
+		break;
+
+	case KVM_XEN_VCPU_ATTR_TYPE_RUNSTATE_ADDR:
+		if (!sched_info_on()) {
+			r = -EOPNOTSUPP;
+			break;
+		}
+		if (vcpu->arch.xen.runstate_cache.active) {
+			data->u.gpa = vcpu->arch.xen.runstate_cache.gpa;
+			r = 0;
+		}
+		break;
+
+	case KVM_XEN_VCPU_ATTR_TYPE_RUNSTATE_CURRENT:
+		if (!sched_info_on()) {
+			r = -EOPNOTSUPP;
+			break;
+		}
+		data->u.runstate.state = vcpu->arch.xen.current_runstate;
+		r = 0;
+		break;
+
+	case KVM_XEN_VCPU_ATTR_TYPE_RUNSTATE_DATA:
+		if (!sched_info_on()) {
+			r = -EOPNOTSUPP;
+			break;
+		}
+		data->u.runstate.state = vcpu->arch.xen.current_runstate;
+		data->u.runstate.state_entry_time =
+			vcpu->arch.xen.runstate_entry_time;
+		data->u.runstate.time_running =
+			vcpu->arch.xen.runstate_times[RUNSTATE_running];
+		data->u.runstate.time_runnable =
+			vcpu->arch.xen.runstate_times[RUNSTATE_runnable];
+		data->u.runstate.time_blocked =
+			vcpu->arch.xen.runstate_times[RUNSTATE_blocked];
+		data->u.runstate.time_offline =
+			vcpu->arch.xen.runstate_times[RUNSTATE_offline];
+		r = 0;
+		break;
+
+	case KVM_XEN_VCPU_ATTR_TYPE_RUNSTATE_ADJUST:
+		r = -EINVAL;
+		break;
+
+	case KVM_XEN_VCPU_ATTR_TYPE_VCPU_ID:
+		data->u.vcpu_id = vcpu->arch.xen.vcpu_id;
+		r = 0;
+		break;
+
+	case KVM_XEN_VCPU_ATTR_TYPE_TIMER:
+		data->u.timer.port = vcpu->arch.xen.timer_virq;
+		data->u.timer.priority = KVM_IRQ_ROUTING_XEN_EVTCHN_PRIO_2LEVEL;
+		data->u.timer.expires_ns = vcpu->arch.xen.timer_expires;
+		r = 0;
+		break;
+
+	case KVM_XEN_VCPU_ATTR_TYPE_UPCALL_VECTOR:
+		data->u.vector = vcpu->arch.xen.upcall_vector;
+		r = 0;
+		break;
+
+	default:
+		break;
+	}
+
+	mutex_unlock(&vcpu->kvm->arch.xen.xen_lock);
+	return r;
+}
+
+int kvm_xen_write_hypercall_page(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 data)
+{
+	struct kvm *kvm = vcpu->kvm;
+	u32 page_num = data & ~PAGE_MASK;
+	u64 page_addr = data & PAGE_MASK;
+	bool lm = is_long_mode(vcpu);
+
+	/* Latch long_mode for shared_info pages etc. */
+	vcpu->kvm->arch.xen.long_mode = lm;
+
+	/*
+	 * If Xen hypercall intercept is enabled, fill the hypercall
+	 * page with VMCALL/VMMCALL instructions since that's what
+	 * we catch. Else the VMM has provided the hypercall pages
+	 * with instructions of its own choosing, so use those.
+	 */
+	if (kvm_xen_hypercall_enabled(kvm)) {
+		u8 instructions[32];
+		int i;
+
+		if (page_num)
+			return 1;
+
+		/* mov imm32, %eax */
+		instructions[0] = 0xb8;
+
+		/* vmcall / vmmcall */
+		static_call(kvm_x86_patch_hypercall)(vcpu, instructions + 5);
+
+		/* ret */
+		instructions[8] = 0xc3;
+
+		/* int3 to pad */
+		memset(instructions + 9, 0xcc, sizeof(instructions) - 9);
+
+		for (i = 0; i < PAGE_SIZE / sizeof(instructions); i++) {
+			*(u32 *)&instructions[1] = i;
+			if (kvm_vcpu_write_guest(vcpu,
+						 page_addr + (i * sizeof(instructions)),
+						 instructions, sizeof(instructions)))
+				return 1;
+		}
+	} else {
+		/*
+		 * Note, truncation is a non-issue as 'lm' is guaranteed to be
+		 * false for a 32-bit kernel, i.e. when hva_t is only 4 bytes.
+		 */
+		hva_t blob_addr = lm ? kvm->arch.xen_hvm_config.blob_addr_64
+				     : kvm->arch.xen_hvm_config.blob_addr_32;
+		u8 blob_size = lm ? kvm->arch.xen_hvm_config.blob_size_64
+				  : kvm->arch.xen_hvm_config.blob_size_32;
+		u8 *page;
+		int ret;
+
+		if (page_num >= blob_size)
+			return 1;
+
+		blob_addr += page_num * PAGE_SIZE;
+
+		page = memdup_user((u8 __user *)blob_addr, PAGE_SIZE);
+		if (IS_ERR(page))
+			return PTR_ERR(page);
+
+		ret = kvm_vcpu_write_guest(vcpu, page_addr, page, PAGE_SIZE);
+		kfree(page);
+		if (ret)
+			return 1;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int kvm_xen_hvm_config(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_xen_hvm_config *xhc)
+{
+	/* Only some feature flags need to be *enabled* by userspace */
+	u32 permitted_flags = KVM_XEN_HVM_CONFIG_INTERCEPT_HCALL |
+		KVM_XEN_HVM_CONFIG_EVTCHN_SEND;
+
+	if (xhc->flags & ~permitted_flags)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	/*
+	 * With hypercall interception the kernel generates its own
+	 * hypercall page so it must not be provided.
+	 */
+	if ((xhc->flags & KVM_XEN_HVM_CONFIG_INTERCEPT_HCALL) &&
+	    (xhc->blob_addr_32 || xhc->blob_addr_64 ||
+	     xhc->blob_size_32 || xhc->blob_size_64))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	mutex_lock(&kvm->arch.xen.xen_lock);
+
+	if (xhc->msr && !kvm->arch.xen_hvm_config.msr)
+		static_branch_inc(&kvm_xen_enabled.key);
+	else if (!xhc->msr && kvm->arch.xen_hvm_config.msr)
+		static_branch_slow_dec_deferred(&kvm_xen_enabled);
+
+	memcpy(&kvm->arch.xen_hvm_config, xhc, sizeof(*xhc));
+
+	mutex_unlock(&kvm->arch.xen.xen_lock);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int kvm_xen_hypercall_set_result(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 result)
+{
+	kvm_rax_write(vcpu, result);
+	return kvm_skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
+}
+
+static int kvm_xen_hypercall_complete_userspace(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct kvm_run *run = vcpu->run;
+
+	if (unlikely(!kvm_is_linear_rip(vcpu, vcpu->arch.xen.hypercall_rip)))
+		return 1;
+
+	return kvm_xen_hypercall_set_result(vcpu, run->xen.u.hcall.result);
+}
+
+static inline int max_evtchn_port(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_64BIT) && kvm->arch.xen.long_mode)
+		return EVTCHN_2L_NR_CHANNELS;
+	else
+		return COMPAT_EVTCHN_2L_NR_CHANNELS;
+}
+
+static bool wait_pending_event(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int nr_ports,
+			       evtchn_port_t *ports)
+{
+	struct kvm *kvm = vcpu->kvm;
+	struct gfn_to_pfn_cache *gpc = &kvm->arch.xen.shinfo_cache;
+	unsigned long *pending_bits;
+	unsigned long flags;
+	bool ret = true;
+	int idx, i;
+
+	idx = srcu_read_lock(&kvm->srcu);
+	read_lock_irqsave(&gpc->lock, flags);
+	if (!kvm_gpc_check(gpc, PAGE_SIZE))
+		goto out_rcu;
+
+	ret = false;
+	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_64BIT) && kvm->arch.xen.long_mode) {
+		struct shared_info *shinfo = gpc->khva;
+		pending_bits = (unsigned long *)&shinfo->evtchn_pending;
+	} else {
+		struct compat_shared_info *shinfo = gpc->khva;
+		pending_bits = (unsigned long *)&shinfo->evtchn_pending;
+	}
+
+	for (i = 0; i < nr_ports; i++) {
+		if (test_bit(ports[i], pending_bits)) {
+			ret = true;
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+
+ out_rcu:
+	read_unlock_irqrestore(&gpc->lock, flags);
+	srcu_read_unlock(&kvm->srcu, idx);
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static bool kvm_xen_schedop_poll(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool longmode,
+				 u64 param, u64 *r)
+{
+	struct sched_poll sched_poll;
+	evtchn_port_t port, *ports;
+	struct x86_exception e;
+	int i;
+
+	if (!lapic_in_kernel(vcpu) ||
+	    !(vcpu->kvm->arch.xen_hvm_config.flags & KVM_XEN_HVM_CONFIG_EVTCHN_SEND))
+		return false;
+
+	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_64BIT) && !longmode) {
+		struct compat_sched_poll sp32;
+
+		/* Sanity check that the compat struct definition is correct */
+		BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(sp32) != 16);
+
+		if (kvm_read_guest_virt(vcpu, param, &sp32, sizeof(sp32), &e)) {
+			*r = -EFAULT;
+			return true;
+		}
+
+		/*
+		 * This is a 32-bit pointer to an array of evtchn_port_t which
+		 * are uint32_t, so once it's converted no further compat
+		 * handling is needed.
+		 */
+		sched_poll.ports = (void *)(unsigned long)(sp32.ports);
+		sched_poll.nr_ports = sp32.nr_ports;
+		sched_poll.timeout = sp32.timeout;
+	} else {
+		if (kvm_read_guest_virt(vcpu, param, &sched_poll,
+					sizeof(sched_poll), &e)) {
+			*r = -EFAULT;
+			return true;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (unlikely(sched_poll.nr_ports > 1)) {
+		/* Xen (unofficially) limits number of pollers to 128 */
+		if (sched_poll.nr_ports > 128) {
+			*r = -EINVAL;
+			return true;
+		}
+
+		ports = kmalloc_array(sched_poll.nr_ports,
+				      sizeof(*ports), GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (!ports) {
+			*r = -ENOMEM;
+			return true;
+		}
+	} else
+		ports = &port;
+
+	if (kvm_read_guest_virt(vcpu, (gva_t)sched_poll.ports, ports,
+				sched_poll.nr_ports * sizeof(*ports), &e)) {
+		*r = -EFAULT;
+		return true;
+	}
+
+	for (i = 0; i < sched_poll.nr_ports; i++) {
+		if (ports[i] >= max_evtchn_port(vcpu->kvm)) {
+			*r = -EINVAL;
+			goto out;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (sched_poll.nr_ports == 1)
+		vcpu->arch.xen.poll_evtchn = port;
+	else
+		vcpu->arch.xen.poll_evtchn = -1;
+
+	set_bit(vcpu->vcpu_idx, vcpu->kvm->arch.xen.poll_mask);
+
+	if (!wait_pending_event(vcpu, sched_poll.nr_ports, ports)) {
+		vcpu->arch.mp_state = KVM_MP_STATE_HALTED;
+
+		if (sched_poll.timeout)
+			mod_timer(&vcpu->arch.xen.poll_timer,
+				  jiffies + nsecs_to_jiffies(sched_poll.timeout));
+
+		kvm_vcpu_halt(vcpu);
+
+		if (sched_poll.timeout)
+			del_timer(&vcpu->arch.xen.poll_timer);
+
+		vcpu->arch.mp_state = KVM_MP_STATE_RUNNABLE;
+	}
+
+	vcpu->arch.xen.poll_evtchn = 0;
+	*r = 0;
+out:
+	/* Really, this is only needed in case of timeout */
+	clear_bit(vcpu->vcpu_idx, vcpu->kvm->arch.xen.poll_mask);
+
+	if (unlikely(sched_poll.nr_ports > 1))
+		kfree(ports);
+	return true;
+}
+
+static void cancel_evtchn_poll(struct timer_list *t)
+{
+	struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = from_timer(vcpu, t, arch.xen.poll_timer);
+
+	kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_UNBLOCK, vcpu);
+	kvm_vcpu_kick(vcpu);
+}
+
+static bool kvm_xen_hcall_sched_op(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool longmode,
+				   int cmd, u64 param, u64 *r)
+{
+	switch (cmd) {
+	case SCHEDOP_poll:
+		if (kvm_xen_schedop_poll(vcpu, longmode, param, r))
+			return true;
+		fallthrough;
+	case SCHEDOP_yield:
+		kvm_vcpu_on_spin(vcpu, true);
+		*r = 0;
+		return true;
+	default:
+		break;
+	}
+
+	return false;
+}
+
+struct compat_vcpu_set_singleshot_timer {
+    uint64_t timeout_abs_ns;
+    uint32_t flags;
+} __attribute__((packed));
+
+static bool kvm_xen_hcall_vcpu_op(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool longmode, int cmd,
+				  int vcpu_id, u64 param, u64 *r)
+{
+	struct vcpu_set_singleshot_timer oneshot;
+	struct x86_exception e;
+	s64 delta;
+
+	if (!kvm_xen_timer_enabled(vcpu))
+		return false;
+
+	switch (cmd) {
+	case VCPUOP_set_singleshot_timer:
+		if (vcpu->arch.xen.vcpu_id != vcpu_id) {
+			*r = -EINVAL;
+			return true;
+		}
+
+		/*
+		 * The only difference for 32-bit compat is the 4 bytes of
+		 * padding after the interesting part of the structure. So
+		 * for a faithful emulation of Xen we have to *try* to copy
+		 * the padding and return -EFAULT if we can't. Otherwise we
+		 * might as well just have copied the 12-byte 32-bit struct.
+		 */
+		BUILD_BUG_ON(offsetof(struct compat_vcpu_set_singleshot_timer, timeout_abs_ns) !=
+			     offsetof(struct vcpu_set_singleshot_timer, timeout_abs_ns));
+		BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof_field(struct compat_vcpu_set_singleshot_timer, timeout_abs_ns) !=
+			     sizeof_field(struct vcpu_set_singleshot_timer, timeout_abs_ns));
+		BUILD_BUG_ON(offsetof(struct compat_vcpu_set_singleshot_timer, flags) !=
+			     offsetof(struct vcpu_set_singleshot_timer, flags));
+		BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof_field(struct compat_vcpu_set_singleshot_timer, flags) !=
+			     sizeof_field(struct vcpu_set_singleshot_timer, flags));
+
+		if (kvm_read_guest_virt(vcpu, param, &oneshot, longmode ? sizeof(oneshot) :
+					sizeof(struct compat_vcpu_set_singleshot_timer), &e)) {
+			*r = -EFAULT;
+			return true;
+		}
+
+		delta = oneshot.timeout_abs_ns - get_kvmclock_ns(vcpu->kvm);
+		if ((oneshot.flags & VCPU_SSHOTTMR_future) && delta < 0) {
+			*r = -ETIME;
+			return true;
+		}
+
+		kvm_xen_start_timer(vcpu, oneshot.timeout_abs_ns, delta);
+		*r = 0;
+		return true;
+
+	case VCPUOP_stop_singleshot_timer:
+		if (vcpu->arch.xen.vcpu_id != vcpu_id) {
+			*r = -EINVAL;
+			return true;
+		}
+		kvm_xen_stop_timer(vcpu);
+		*r = 0;
+		return true;
+	}
+
+	return false;
+}
+
+static bool kvm_xen_hcall_set_timer_op(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, uint64_t timeout,
+				       u64 *r)
+{
+	if (!kvm_xen_timer_enabled(vcpu))
+		return false;
+
+	if (timeout) {
+		uint64_t guest_now = get_kvmclock_ns(vcpu->kvm);
+		int64_t delta = timeout - guest_now;
+
+		/* Xen has a 'Linux workaround' in do_set_timer_op() which
+		 * checks for negative absolute timeout values (caused by
+		 * integer overflow), and for values about 13 days in the
+		 * future (2^50ns) which would be caused by jiffies
+		 * overflow. For those cases, it sets the timeout 100ms in
+		 * the future (not *too* soon, since if a guest really did
+		 * set a long timeout on purpose we don't want to keep
+		 * churning CPU time by waking it up).
+		 */
+		if (unlikely((int64_t)timeout < 0 ||
+			     (delta > 0 && (uint32_t) (delta >> 50) != 0))) {
+			delta = 100 * NSEC_PER_MSEC;
+			timeout = guest_now + delta;
+		}
+
+		kvm_xen_start_timer(vcpu, timeout, delta);
+	} else {
+		kvm_xen_stop_timer(vcpu);
+	}
+
+	*r = 0;
+	return true;
+}
+
+int kvm_xen_hypercall(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	bool longmode;
+	u64 input, params[6], r = -ENOSYS;
+	bool handled = false;
+	u8 cpl;
+
+	input = (u64)kvm_register_read(vcpu, VCPU_REGS_RAX);
+
+	/* Hyper-V hypercalls get bit 31 set in EAX */
+	if ((input & 0x80000000) &&
+	    kvm_hv_hypercall_enabled(vcpu))
+		return kvm_hv_hypercall(vcpu);
+
+	longmode = is_64_bit_hypercall(vcpu);
+	if (!longmode) {
+		params[0] = (u32)kvm_rbx_read(vcpu);
+		params[1] = (u32)kvm_rcx_read(vcpu);
+		params[2] = (u32)kvm_rdx_read(vcpu);
+		params[3] = (u32)kvm_rsi_read(vcpu);
+		params[4] = (u32)kvm_rdi_read(vcpu);
+		params[5] = (u32)kvm_rbp_read(vcpu);
+	}
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+	else {
+		params[0] = (u64)kvm_rdi_read(vcpu);
+		params[1] = (u64)kvm_rsi_read(vcpu);
+		params[2] = (u64)kvm_rdx_read(vcpu);
+		params[3] = (u64)kvm_r10_read(vcpu);
+		params[4] = (u64)kvm_r8_read(vcpu);
+		params[5] = (u64)kvm_r9_read(vcpu);
+	}
+#endif
+	cpl = static_call(kvm_x86_get_cpl)(vcpu);
+	trace_kvm_xen_hypercall(cpl, input, params[0], params[1], params[2],
+				params[3], params[4], params[5]);
+
+	/*
+	 * Only allow hypercall acceleration for CPL0. The rare hypercalls that
+	 * are permitted in guest userspace can be handled by the VMM.
+	 */
+	if (unlikely(cpl > 0))
+		goto handle_in_userspace;
+
+	switch (input) {
+	case __HYPERVISOR_xen_version:
+		if (params[0] == XENVER_version && vcpu->kvm->arch.xen.xen_version) {
+			r = vcpu->kvm->arch.xen.xen_version;
+			handled = true;
+		}
+		break;
+	case __HYPERVISOR_event_channel_op:
+		if (params[0] == EVTCHNOP_send)
+			handled = kvm_xen_hcall_evtchn_send(vcpu, params[1], &r);
+		break;
+	case __HYPERVISOR_sched_op:
+		handled = kvm_xen_hcall_sched_op(vcpu, longmode, params[0],
+						 params[1], &r);
+		break;
+	case __HYPERVISOR_vcpu_op:
+		handled = kvm_xen_hcall_vcpu_op(vcpu, longmode, params[0], params[1],
+						params[2], &r);
+		break;
+	case __HYPERVISOR_set_timer_op: {
+		u64 timeout = params[0];
+		/* In 32-bit mode, the 64-bit timeout is in two 32-bit params. */
+		if (!longmode)
+			timeout |= params[1] << 32;
+		handled = kvm_xen_hcall_set_timer_op(vcpu, timeout, &r);
+		break;
+	}
+	default:
+		break;
+	}
+
+	if (handled)
+		return kvm_xen_hypercall_set_result(vcpu, r);
+
+handle_in_userspace:
+	vcpu->run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_XEN;
+	vcpu->run->xen.type = KVM_EXIT_XEN_HCALL;
+	vcpu->run->xen.u.hcall.longmode = longmode;
+	vcpu->run->xen.u.hcall.cpl = cpl;
+	vcpu->run->xen.u.hcall.input = input;
+	vcpu->run->xen.u.hcall.params[0] = params[0];
+	vcpu->run->xen.u.hcall.params[1] = params[1];
+	vcpu->run->xen.u.hcall.params[2] = params[2];
+	vcpu->run->xen.u.hcall.params[3] = params[3];
+	vcpu->run->xen.u.hcall.params[4] = params[4];
+	vcpu->run->xen.u.hcall.params[5] = params[5];
+	vcpu->arch.xen.hypercall_rip = kvm_get_linear_rip(vcpu);
+	vcpu->arch.complete_userspace_io =
+		kvm_xen_hypercall_complete_userspace;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void kvm_xen_check_poller(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int port)
+{
+	int poll_evtchn = vcpu->arch.xen.poll_evtchn;
+
+	if ((poll_evtchn == port || poll_evtchn == -1) &&
+	    test_and_clear_bit(vcpu->vcpu_idx, vcpu->kvm->arch.xen.poll_mask)) {
+		kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_UNBLOCK, vcpu);
+		kvm_vcpu_kick(vcpu);
+	}
+}
+
+/*
+ * The return value from this function is propagated to kvm_set_irq() API,
+ * so it returns:
+ *  < 0   Interrupt was ignored (masked or not delivered for other reasons)
+ *  = 0   Interrupt was coalesced (previous irq is still pending)
+ *  > 0   Number of CPUs interrupt was delivered to
+ *
+ * It is also called directly from kvm_arch_set_irq_inatomic(), where the
+ * only check on its return value is a comparison with -EWOULDBLOCK'.
+ */
+int kvm_xen_set_evtchn_fast(struct kvm_xen_evtchn *xe, struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+	struct gfn_to_pfn_cache *gpc = &kvm->arch.xen.shinfo_cache;
+	struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu;
+	unsigned long *pending_bits, *mask_bits;
+	unsigned long flags;
+	int port_word_bit;
+	bool kick_vcpu = false;
+	int vcpu_idx, idx, rc;
+
+	vcpu_idx = READ_ONCE(xe->vcpu_idx);
+	if (vcpu_idx >= 0)
+		vcpu = kvm_get_vcpu(kvm, vcpu_idx);
+	else {
+		vcpu = kvm_get_vcpu_by_id(kvm, xe->vcpu_id);
+		if (!vcpu)
+			return -EINVAL;
+		WRITE_ONCE(xe->vcpu_idx, vcpu->vcpu_idx);
+	}
+
+	if (!vcpu->arch.xen.vcpu_info_cache.active)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (xe->port >= max_evtchn_port(kvm))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	rc = -EWOULDBLOCK;
+
+	idx = srcu_read_lock(&kvm->srcu);
+
+	read_lock_irqsave(&gpc->lock, flags);
+	if (!kvm_gpc_check(gpc, PAGE_SIZE))
+		goto out_rcu;
+
+	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_64BIT) && kvm->arch.xen.long_mode) {
+		struct shared_info *shinfo = gpc->khva;
+		pending_bits = (unsigned long *)&shinfo->evtchn_pending;
+		mask_bits = (unsigned long *)&shinfo->evtchn_mask;
+		port_word_bit = xe->port / 64;
+	} else {
+		struct compat_shared_info *shinfo = gpc->khva;
+		pending_bits = (unsigned long *)&shinfo->evtchn_pending;
+		mask_bits = (unsigned long *)&shinfo->evtchn_mask;
+		port_word_bit = xe->port / 32;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * If this port wasn't already set, and if it isn't masked, then
+	 * we try to set the corresponding bit in the in-kernel shadow of
+	 * evtchn_pending_sel for the target vCPU. And if *that* wasn't
+	 * already set, then we kick the vCPU in question to write to the
+	 * *real* evtchn_pending_sel in its own guest vcpu_info struct.
+	 */
+	if (test_and_set_bit(xe->port, pending_bits)) {
+		rc = 0; /* It was already raised */
+	} else if (test_bit(xe->port, mask_bits)) {
+		rc = -ENOTCONN; /* Masked */
+		kvm_xen_check_poller(vcpu, xe->port);
+	} else {
+		rc = 1; /* Delivered to the bitmap in shared_info. */
+		/* Now switch to the vCPU's vcpu_info to set the index and pending_sel */
+		read_unlock_irqrestore(&gpc->lock, flags);
+		gpc = &vcpu->arch.xen.vcpu_info_cache;
+
+		read_lock_irqsave(&gpc->lock, flags);
+		if (!kvm_gpc_check(gpc, sizeof(struct vcpu_info))) {
+			/*
+			 * Could not access the vcpu_info. Set the bit in-kernel
+			 * and prod the vCPU to deliver it for itself.
+			 */
+			if (!test_and_set_bit(port_word_bit, &vcpu->arch.xen.evtchn_pending_sel))
+				kick_vcpu = true;
+			goto out_rcu;
+		}
+
+		if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_64BIT) && kvm->arch.xen.long_mode) {
+			struct vcpu_info *vcpu_info = gpc->khva;
+			if (!test_and_set_bit(port_word_bit, &vcpu_info->evtchn_pending_sel)) {
+				WRITE_ONCE(vcpu_info->evtchn_upcall_pending, 1);
+				kick_vcpu = true;
+			}
+		} else {
+			struct compat_vcpu_info *vcpu_info = gpc->khva;
+			if (!test_and_set_bit(port_word_bit,
+					      (unsigned long *)&vcpu_info->evtchn_pending_sel)) {
+				WRITE_ONCE(vcpu_info->evtchn_upcall_pending, 1);
+				kick_vcpu = true;
+			}
+		}
+
+		/* For the per-vCPU lapic vector, deliver it as MSI. */
+		if (kick_vcpu && vcpu->arch.xen.upcall_vector) {
+			kvm_xen_inject_vcpu_vector(vcpu);
+			kick_vcpu = false;
+		}
+	}
+
+ out_rcu:
+	read_unlock_irqrestore(&gpc->lock, flags);
+	srcu_read_unlock(&kvm->srcu, idx);
+
+	if (kick_vcpu) {
+		kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_UNBLOCK, vcpu);
+		kvm_vcpu_kick(vcpu);
+	}
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static int kvm_xen_set_evtchn(struct kvm_xen_evtchn *xe, struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+	bool mm_borrowed = false;
+	int rc;
+
+	rc = kvm_xen_set_evtchn_fast(xe, kvm);
+	if (rc != -EWOULDBLOCK)
+		return rc;
+
+	if (current->mm != kvm->mm) {
+		/*
+		 * If not on a thread which already belongs to this KVM,
+		 * we'd better be in the irqfd workqueue.
+		 */
+		if (WARN_ON_ONCE(current->mm))
+			return -EINVAL;
+
+		kthread_use_mm(kvm->mm);
+		mm_borrowed = true;
+	}
+
+	mutex_lock(&kvm->arch.xen.xen_lock);
+
+	/*
+	 * It is theoretically possible for the page to be unmapped
+	 * and the MMU notifier to invalidate the shared_info before
+	 * we even get to use it. In that case, this looks like an
+	 * infinite loop. It was tempting to do it via the userspace
+	 * HVA instead... but that just *hides* the fact that it's
+	 * an infinite loop, because if a fault occurs and it waits
+	 * for the page to come back, it can *still* immediately
+	 * fault and have to wait again, repeatedly.
+	 *
+	 * Conversely, the page could also have been reinstated by
+	 * another thread before we even obtain the mutex above, so
+	 * check again *first* before remapping it.
+	 */
+	do {
+		struct gfn_to_pfn_cache *gpc = &kvm->arch.xen.shinfo_cache;
+		int idx;
+
+		rc = kvm_xen_set_evtchn_fast(xe, kvm);
+		if (rc != -EWOULDBLOCK)
+			break;
+
+		idx = srcu_read_lock(&kvm->srcu);
+		rc = kvm_gpc_refresh(gpc, PAGE_SIZE);
+		srcu_read_unlock(&kvm->srcu, idx);
+	} while(!rc);
+
+	mutex_unlock(&kvm->arch.xen.xen_lock);
+
+	if (mm_borrowed)
+		kthread_unuse_mm(kvm->mm);
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/* This is the version called from kvm_set_irq() as the .set function */
+static int evtchn_set_fn(struct kvm_kernel_irq_routing_entry *e, struct kvm *kvm,
+			 int irq_source_id, int level, bool line_status)
+{
+	if (!level)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	return kvm_xen_set_evtchn(&e->xen_evtchn, kvm);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Set up an event channel interrupt from the KVM IRQ routing table.
+ * Used for e.g. PIRQ from passed through physical devices.
+ */
+int kvm_xen_setup_evtchn(struct kvm *kvm,
+			 struct kvm_kernel_irq_routing_entry *e,
+			 const struct kvm_irq_routing_entry *ue)
+
+{
+	struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu;
+
+	if (ue->u.xen_evtchn.port >= max_evtchn_port(kvm))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	/* We only support 2 level event channels for now */
+	if (ue->u.xen_evtchn.priority != KVM_IRQ_ROUTING_XEN_EVTCHN_PRIO_2LEVEL)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	/*
+	 * Xen gives us interesting mappings from vCPU index to APIC ID,
+	 * which means kvm_get_vcpu_by_id() has to iterate over all vCPUs
+	 * to find it. Do that once at setup time, instead of every time.
+	 * But beware that on live update / live migration, the routing
+	 * table might be reinstated before the vCPU threads have finished
+	 * recreating their vCPUs.
+	 */
+	vcpu = kvm_get_vcpu_by_id(kvm, ue->u.xen_evtchn.vcpu);
+	if (vcpu)
+		e->xen_evtchn.vcpu_idx = vcpu->vcpu_idx;
+	else
+		e->xen_evtchn.vcpu_idx = -1;
+
+	e->xen_evtchn.port = ue->u.xen_evtchn.port;
+	e->xen_evtchn.vcpu_id = ue->u.xen_evtchn.vcpu;
+	e->xen_evtchn.priority = ue->u.xen_evtchn.priority;
+	e->set = evtchn_set_fn;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Explicit event sending from userspace with KVM_XEN_HVM_EVTCHN_SEND ioctl.
+ */
+int kvm_xen_hvm_evtchn_send(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_irq_routing_xen_evtchn *uxe)
+{
+	struct kvm_xen_evtchn e;
+	int ret;
+
+	if (!uxe->port || uxe->port >= max_evtchn_port(kvm))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	/* We only support 2 level event channels for now */
+	if (uxe->priority != KVM_IRQ_ROUTING_XEN_EVTCHN_PRIO_2LEVEL)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	e.port = uxe->port;
+	e.vcpu_id = uxe->vcpu;
+	e.vcpu_idx = -1;
+	e.priority = uxe->priority;
+
+	ret = kvm_xen_set_evtchn(&e, kvm);
+
+	/*
+	 * None of that 'return 1 if it actually got delivered' nonsense.
+	 * We don't care if it was masked (-ENOTCONN) either.
+	 */
+	if (ret > 0 || ret == -ENOTCONN)
+		ret = 0;
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Support for *outbound* event channel events via the EVTCHNOP_send hypercall.
+ */
+struct evtchnfd {
+	u32 send_port;
+	u32 type;
+	union {
+		struct kvm_xen_evtchn port;
+		struct {
+			u32 port; /* zero */
+			struct eventfd_ctx *ctx;
+		} eventfd;
+	} deliver;
+};
+
+/*
+ * Update target vCPU or priority for a registered sending channel.
+ */
+static int kvm_xen_eventfd_update(struct kvm *kvm,
+				  struct kvm_xen_hvm_attr *data)
+{
+	u32 port = data->u.evtchn.send_port;
+	struct evtchnfd *evtchnfd;
+	int ret;
+
+	/* Protect writes to evtchnfd as well as the idr lookup.  */
+	mutex_lock(&kvm->arch.xen.xen_lock);
+	evtchnfd = idr_find(&kvm->arch.xen.evtchn_ports, port);
+
+	ret = -ENOENT;
+	if (!evtchnfd)
+		goto out_unlock;
+
+	/* For an UPDATE, nothing may change except the priority/vcpu */
+	ret = -EINVAL;
+	if (evtchnfd->type != data->u.evtchn.type)
+		goto out_unlock;
+
+	/*
+	 * Port cannot change, and if it's zero that was an eventfd
+	 * which can't be changed either.
+	 */
+	if (!evtchnfd->deliver.port.port ||
+	    evtchnfd->deliver.port.port != data->u.evtchn.deliver.port.port)
+		goto out_unlock;
+
+	/* We only support 2 level event channels for now */
+	if (data->u.evtchn.deliver.port.priority != KVM_IRQ_ROUTING_XEN_EVTCHN_PRIO_2LEVEL)
+		goto out_unlock;
+
+	evtchnfd->deliver.port.priority = data->u.evtchn.deliver.port.priority;
+	if (evtchnfd->deliver.port.vcpu_id != data->u.evtchn.deliver.port.vcpu) {
+		evtchnfd->deliver.port.vcpu_id = data->u.evtchn.deliver.port.vcpu;
+		evtchnfd->deliver.port.vcpu_idx = -1;
+	}
+	ret = 0;
+out_unlock:
+	mutex_unlock(&kvm->arch.xen.xen_lock);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Configure the target (eventfd or local port delivery) for sending on
+ * a given event channel.
+ */
+static int kvm_xen_eventfd_assign(struct kvm *kvm,
+				  struct kvm_xen_hvm_attr *data)
+{
+	u32 port = data->u.evtchn.send_port;
+	struct eventfd_ctx *eventfd = NULL;
+	struct evtchnfd *evtchnfd;
+	int ret = -EINVAL;
+
+	evtchnfd = kzalloc(sizeof(struct evtchnfd), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!evtchnfd)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	switch(data->u.evtchn.type) {
+	case EVTCHNSTAT_ipi:
+		/* IPI  must map back to the same port# */
+		if (data->u.evtchn.deliver.port.port != data->u.evtchn.send_port)
+			goto out_noeventfd; /* -EINVAL */
+		break;
+
+	case EVTCHNSTAT_interdomain:
+		if (data->u.evtchn.deliver.port.port) {
+			if (data->u.evtchn.deliver.port.port >= max_evtchn_port(kvm))
+				goto out_noeventfd; /* -EINVAL */
+		} else {
+			eventfd = eventfd_ctx_fdget(data->u.evtchn.deliver.eventfd.fd);
+			if (IS_ERR(eventfd)) {
+				ret = PTR_ERR(eventfd);
+				goto out_noeventfd;
+			}
+		}
+		break;
+
+	case EVTCHNSTAT_virq:
+	case EVTCHNSTAT_closed:
+	case EVTCHNSTAT_unbound:
+	case EVTCHNSTAT_pirq:
+	default: /* Unknown event channel type */
+		goto out; /* -EINVAL */
+	}
+
+	evtchnfd->send_port = data->u.evtchn.send_port;
+	evtchnfd->type = data->u.evtchn.type;
+	if (eventfd) {
+		evtchnfd->deliver.eventfd.ctx = eventfd;
+	} else {
+		/* We only support 2 level event channels for now */
+		if (data->u.evtchn.deliver.port.priority != KVM_IRQ_ROUTING_XEN_EVTCHN_PRIO_2LEVEL)
+			goto out; /* -EINVAL; */
+
+		evtchnfd->deliver.port.port = data->u.evtchn.deliver.port.port;
+		evtchnfd->deliver.port.vcpu_id = data->u.evtchn.deliver.port.vcpu;
+		evtchnfd->deliver.port.vcpu_idx = -1;
+		evtchnfd->deliver.port.priority = data->u.evtchn.deliver.port.priority;
+	}
+
+	mutex_lock(&kvm->arch.xen.xen_lock);
+	ret = idr_alloc(&kvm->arch.xen.evtchn_ports, evtchnfd, port, port + 1,
+			GFP_KERNEL);
+	mutex_unlock(&kvm->arch.xen.xen_lock);
+	if (ret >= 0)
+		return 0;
+
+	if (ret == -ENOSPC)
+		ret = -EEXIST;
+out:
+	if (eventfd)
+		eventfd_ctx_put(eventfd);
+out_noeventfd:
+	kfree(evtchnfd);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int kvm_xen_eventfd_deassign(struct kvm *kvm, u32 port)
+{
+	struct evtchnfd *evtchnfd;
+
+	mutex_lock(&kvm->arch.xen.xen_lock);
+	evtchnfd = idr_remove(&kvm->arch.xen.evtchn_ports, port);
+	mutex_unlock(&kvm->arch.xen.xen_lock);
+
+	if (!evtchnfd)
+		return -ENOENT;
+
+	synchronize_srcu(&kvm->srcu);
+	if (!evtchnfd->deliver.port.port)
+		eventfd_ctx_put(evtchnfd->deliver.eventfd.ctx);
+	kfree(evtchnfd);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int kvm_xen_eventfd_reset(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+	struct evtchnfd *evtchnfd, **all_evtchnfds;
+	int i;
+	int n = 0;
+
+	mutex_lock(&kvm->arch.xen.xen_lock);
+
+	/*
+	 * Because synchronize_srcu() cannot be called inside the
+	 * critical section, first collect all the evtchnfd objects
+	 * in an array as they are removed from evtchn_ports.
+	 */
+	idr_for_each_entry(&kvm->arch.xen.evtchn_ports, evtchnfd, i)
+		n++;
+
+	all_evtchnfds = kmalloc_array(n, sizeof(struct evtchnfd *), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!all_evtchnfds) {
+		mutex_unlock(&kvm->arch.xen.xen_lock);
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+
+	n = 0;
+	idr_for_each_entry(&kvm->arch.xen.evtchn_ports, evtchnfd, i) {
+		all_evtchnfds[n++] = evtchnfd;
+		idr_remove(&kvm->arch.xen.evtchn_ports, evtchnfd->send_port);
+	}
+	mutex_unlock(&kvm->arch.xen.xen_lock);
+
+	synchronize_srcu(&kvm->srcu);
+
+	while (n--) {
+		evtchnfd = all_evtchnfds[n];
+		if (!evtchnfd->deliver.port.port)
+			eventfd_ctx_put(evtchnfd->deliver.eventfd.ctx);
+		kfree(evtchnfd);
+	}
+	kfree(all_evtchnfds);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int kvm_xen_setattr_evtchn(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_xen_hvm_attr *data)
+{
+	u32 port = data->u.evtchn.send_port;
+
+	if (data->u.evtchn.flags == KVM_XEN_EVTCHN_RESET)
+		return kvm_xen_eventfd_reset(kvm);
+
+	if (!port || port >= max_evtchn_port(kvm))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (data->u.evtchn.flags == KVM_XEN_EVTCHN_DEASSIGN)
+		return kvm_xen_eventfd_deassign(kvm, port);
+	if (data->u.evtchn.flags == KVM_XEN_EVTCHN_UPDATE)
+		return kvm_xen_eventfd_update(kvm, data);
+	if (data->u.evtchn.flags)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	return kvm_xen_eventfd_assign(kvm, data);
+}
+
+static bool kvm_xen_hcall_evtchn_send(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 param, u64 *r)
+{
+	struct evtchnfd *evtchnfd;
+	struct evtchn_send send;
+	struct x86_exception e;
+
+	/* Sanity check: this structure is the same for 32-bit and 64-bit */
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(send) != 4);
+	if (kvm_read_guest_virt(vcpu, param, &send, sizeof(send), &e)) {
+		*r = -EFAULT;
+		return true;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * evtchnfd is protected by kvm->srcu; the idr lookup instead
+	 * is protected by RCU.
+	 */
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	evtchnfd = idr_find(&vcpu->kvm->arch.xen.evtchn_ports, send.port);
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+	if (!evtchnfd)
+		return false;
+
+	if (evtchnfd->deliver.port.port) {
+		int ret = kvm_xen_set_evtchn(&evtchnfd->deliver.port, vcpu->kvm);
+		if (ret < 0 && ret != -ENOTCONN)
+			return false;
+	} else {
+		eventfd_signal(evtchnfd->deliver.eventfd.ctx, 1);
+	}
+
+	*r = 0;
+	return true;
+}
+
+void kvm_xen_init_vcpu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	vcpu->arch.xen.vcpu_id = vcpu->vcpu_idx;
+	vcpu->arch.xen.poll_evtchn = 0;
+
+	timer_setup(&vcpu->arch.xen.poll_timer, cancel_evtchn_poll, 0);
+
+	kvm_gpc_init(&vcpu->arch.xen.runstate_cache, vcpu->kvm, NULL,
+		     KVM_HOST_USES_PFN);
+	kvm_gpc_init(&vcpu->arch.xen.runstate2_cache, vcpu->kvm, NULL,
+		     KVM_HOST_USES_PFN);
+	kvm_gpc_init(&vcpu->arch.xen.vcpu_info_cache, vcpu->kvm, NULL,
+		     KVM_HOST_USES_PFN);
+	kvm_gpc_init(&vcpu->arch.xen.vcpu_time_info_cache, vcpu->kvm, NULL,
+		     KVM_HOST_USES_PFN);
+}
+
+void kvm_xen_destroy_vcpu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	if (kvm_xen_timer_enabled(vcpu))
+		kvm_xen_stop_timer(vcpu);
+
+	kvm_gpc_deactivate(&vcpu->arch.xen.runstate_cache);
+	kvm_gpc_deactivate(&vcpu->arch.xen.runstate2_cache);
+	kvm_gpc_deactivate(&vcpu->arch.xen.vcpu_info_cache);
+	kvm_gpc_deactivate(&vcpu->arch.xen.vcpu_time_info_cache);
+
+	del_timer_sync(&vcpu->arch.xen.poll_timer);
+}
+
+void kvm_xen_update_tsc_info(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *entry;
+	u32 function;
+
+	if (!vcpu->arch.xen.cpuid.base)
+		return;
+
+	function = vcpu->arch.xen.cpuid.base | XEN_CPUID_LEAF(3);
+	if (function > vcpu->arch.xen.cpuid.limit)
+		return;
+
+	entry = kvm_find_cpuid_entry_index(vcpu, function, 1);
+	if (entry) {
+		entry->ecx = vcpu->arch.hv_clock.tsc_to_system_mul;
+		entry->edx = vcpu->arch.hv_clock.tsc_shift;
+	}
+
+	entry = kvm_find_cpuid_entry_index(vcpu, function, 2);
+	if (entry)
+		entry->eax = vcpu->arch.hw_tsc_khz;
+}
+
+void kvm_xen_init_vm(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+	mutex_init(&kvm->arch.xen.xen_lock);
+	idr_init(&kvm->arch.xen.evtchn_ports);
+	kvm_gpc_init(&kvm->arch.xen.shinfo_cache, kvm, NULL, KVM_HOST_USES_PFN);
+}
+
+void kvm_xen_destroy_vm(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+	struct evtchnfd *evtchnfd;
+	int i;
+
+	kvm_gpc_deactivate(&kvm->arch.xen.shinfo_cache);
+
+	idr_for_each_entry(&kvm->arch.xen.evtchn_ports, evtchnfd, i) {
+		if (!evtchnfd->deliver.port.port)
+			eventfd_ctx_put(evtchnfd->deliver.eventfd.ctx);
+		kfree(evtchnfd);
+	}
+	idr_destroy(&kvm->arch.xen.evtchn_ports);
+
+	if (kvm->arch.xen_hvm_config.msr)
+		static_branch_slow_dec_deferred(&kvm_xen_enabled);
+}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/xen.h b/arch/x86/kvm/xen.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..f8f1fe22d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/xen.h
@@ -0,0 +1,224 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * Copyright © 2019 Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright © 2020 Amazon.com, Inc. or its affiliates. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * KVM Xen emulation
+ */
+
+#ifndef __ARCH_X86_KVM_XEN_H__
+#define __ARCH_X86_KVM_XEN_H__
+
+#include <asm/xen/hypervisor.h>
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_XEN
+#include <linux/jump_label_ratelimit.h>
+
+extern struct static_key_false_deferred kvm_xen_enabled;
+
+int __kvm_xen_has_interrupt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+void kvm_xen_inject_pending_events(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+int kvm_xen_vcpu_set_attr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_xen_vcpu_attr *data);
+int kvm_xen_vcpu_get_attr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_xen_vcpu_attr *data);
+int kvm_xen_hvm_set_attr(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_xen_hvm_attr *data);
+int kvm_xen_hvm_get_attr(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_xen_hvm_attr *data);
+int kvm_xen_hvm_evtchn_send(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_irq_routing_xen_evtchn *evt);
+int kvm_xen_write_hypercall_page(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 data);
+int kvm_xen_hvm_config(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_xen_hvm_config *xhc);
+void kvm_xen_init_vm(struct kvm *kvm);
+void kvm_xen_destroy_vm(struct kvm *kvm);
+void kvm_xen_init_vcpu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+void kvm_xen_destroy_vcpu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+int kvm_xen_set_evtchn_fast(struct kvm_xen_evtchn *xe,
+			    struct kvm *kvm);
+int kvm_xen_setup_evtchn(struct kvm *kvm,
+			 struct kvm_kernel_irq_routing_entry *e,
+			 const struct kvm_irq_routing_entry *ue);
+void kvm_xen_update_tsc_info(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+
+static inline bool kvm_xen_msr_enabled(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+	return static_branch_unlikely(&kvm_xen_enabled.key) &&
+		kvm->arch.xen_hvm_config.msr;
+}
+
+static inline bool kvm_xen_hypercall_enabled(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+	return static_branch_unlikely(&kvm_xen_enabled.key) &&
+		(kvm->arch.xen_hvm_config.flags &
+		 KVM_XEN_HVM_CONFIG_INTERCEPT_HCALL);
+}
+
+static inline int kvm_xen_has_interrupt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	if (static_branch_unlikely(&kvm_xen_enabled.key) &&
+	    vcpu->arch.xen.vcpu_info_cache.active &&
+	    vcpu->kvm->arch.xen.upcall_vector)
+		return __kvm_xen_has_interrupt(vcpu);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static inline bool kvm_xen_has_pending_events(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	return static_branch_unlikely(&kvm_xen_enabled.key) &&
+		vcpu->arch.xen.evtchn_pending_sel;
+}
+
+static inline bool kvm_xen_timer_enabled(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	return !!vcpu->arch.xen.timer_virq;
+}
+
+static inline int kvm_xen_has_pending_timer(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	if (kvm_xen_hypercall_enabled(vcpu->kvm) && kvm_xen_timer_enabled(vcpu))
+		return atomic_read(&vcpu->arch.xen.timer_pending);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+void kvm_xen_inject_timer_irqs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+#else
+static inline int kvm_xen_write_hypercall_page(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 data)
+{
+	return 1;
+}
+
+static inline void kvm_xen_init_vm(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+}
+
+static inline void kvm_xen_destroy_vm(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+}
+
+static inline void kvm_xen_init_vcpu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+}
+
+static inline void kvm_xen_destroy_vcpu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+}
+
+static inline bool kvm_xen_msr_enabled(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+	return false;
+}
+
+static inline bool kvm_xen_hypercall_enabled(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+	return false;
+}
+
+static inline int kvm_xen_has_interrupt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static inline void kvm_xen_inject_pending_events(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+}
+
+static inline bool kvm_xen_has_pending_events(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	return false;
+}
+
+static inline int kvm_xen_has_pending_timer(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static inline void kvm_xen_inject_timer_irqs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+}
+
+static inline bool kvm_xen_timer_enabled(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	return false;
+}
+
+static inline void kvm_xen_update_tsc_info(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+}
+#endif
+
+int kvm_xen_hypercall(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+
+#include <asm/pvclock-abi.h>
+#include <asm/xen/interface.h>
+#include <xen/interface/vcpu.h>
+
+void kvm_xen_update_runstate(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int state);
+
+static inline void kvm_xen_runstate_set_running(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	kvm_xen_update_runstate(vcpu, RUNSTATE_running);
+}
+
+static inline void kvm_xen_runstate_set_preempted(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	/*
+	 * If the vCPU wasn't preempted but took a normal exit for
+	 * some reason (hypercalls, I/O, etc.), that is accounted as
+	 * still RUNSTATE_running, as the VMM is still operating on
+	 * behalf of the vCPU. Only if the VMM does actually block
+	 * does it need to enter RUNSTATE_blocked.
+	 */
+	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!vcpu->preempted))
+		return;
+
+	kvm_xen_update_runstate(vcpu, RUNSTATE_runnable);
+}
+
+/* 32-bit compatibility definitions, also used natively in 32-bit build */
+struct compat_arch_vcpu_info {
+	unsigned int cr2;
+	unsigned int pad[5];
+};
+
+struct compat_vcpu_info {
+	uint8_t evtchn_upcall_pending;
+	uint8_t evtchn_upcall_mask;
+	uint16_t pad;
+	uint32_t evtchn_pending_sel;
+	struct compat_arch_vcpu_info arch;
+	struct pvclock_vcpu_time_info time;
+}; /* 64 bytes (x86) */
+
+struct compat_arch_shared_info {
+	unsigned int max_pfn;
+	unsigned int pfn_to_mfn_frame_list_list;
+	unsigned int nmi_reason;
+	unsigned int p2m_cr3;
+	unsigned int p2m_vaddr;
+	unsigned int p2m_generation;
+	uint32_t wc_sec_hi;
+};
+
+struct compat_shared_info {
+	struct compat_vcpu_info vcpu_info[MAX_VIRT_CPUS];
+	uint32_t evtchn_pending[32];
+	uint32_t evtchn_mask[32];
+	struct pvclock_wall_clock wc;
+	struct compat_arch_shared_info arch;
+};
+
+#define COMPAT_EVTCHN_2L_NR_CHANNELS (8 *				\
+				      sizeof_field(struct compat_shared_info, \
+						   evtchn_pending))
+struct compat_vcpu_runstate_info {
+    int state;
+    uint64_t state_entry_time;
+    uint64_t time[4];
+} __attribute__((packed));
+
+struct compat_sched_poll {
+	/* This is actually a guest virtual address which points to ports. */
+	uint32_t ports;
+	unsigned int nr_ports;
+	uint64_t timeout;
+};
+
+#endif /* __ARCH_X86_KVM_XEN_H__ */