diff options
author | Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org> | 2024-05-18 18:43:27 +0000 |
---|---|---|
committer | Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org> | 2024-05-18 18:43:27 +0000 |
commit | 2923512cee3cfb8eaf935324ddc8f6edd8263e93 (patch) | |
tree | 2cfe4d9883ebfd5ecede5f13892ee2d6e14c486e /arch | |
parent | Adding upstream version 6.7.7. (diff) | |
download | linux-2923512cee3cfb8eaf935324ddc8f6edd8263e93.tar.xz linux-2923512cee3cfb8eaf935324ddc8f6edd8263e93.zip |
Adding upstream version 6.7.9.upstream/6.7.9
Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>
Diffstat (limited to '')
29 files changed, 372 insertions, 248 deletions
diff --git a/arch/arm64/crypto/aes-neonbs-glue.c b/arch/arm64/crypto/aes-neonbs-glue.c index bac4cabef6..467ac2f768 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/crypto/aes-neonbs-glue.c +++ b/arch/arm64/crypto/aes-neonbs-glue.c @@ -227,8 +227,19 @@ static int ctr_encrypt(struct skcipher_request *req) src += blocks * AES_BLOCK_SIZE; } if (nbytes && walk.nbytes == walk.total) { + u8 buf[AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; + u8 *d = dst; + + if (unlikely(nbytes < AES_BLOCK_SIZE)) + src = dst = memcpy(buf + sizeof(buf) - nbytes, + src, nbytes); + neon_aes_ctr_encrypt(dst, src, ctx->enc, ctx->key.rounds, nbytes, walk.iv); + + if (unlikely(nbytes < AES_BLOCK_SIZE)) + memcpy(d, dst, nbytes); + nbytes = 0; } kernel_neon_end(); diff --git a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/rtas.h b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/rtas.h index c697c3c746..33024a2874 100644 --- a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/rtas.h +++ b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/rtas.h @@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ enum rtas_function_index { RTAS_FNIDX__IBM_READ_SLOT_RESET_STATE, RTAS_FNIDX__IBM_READ_SLOT_RESET_STATE2, RTAS_FNIDX__IBM_REMOVE_PE_DMA_WINDOW, - RTAS_FNIDX__IBM_RESET_PE_DMA_WINDOWS, + RTAS_FNIDX__IBM_RESET_PE_DMA_WINDOW, RTAS_FNIDX__IBM_SCAN_LOG_DUMP, RTAS_FNIDX__IBM_SET_DYNAMIC_INDICATOR, RTAS_FNIDX__IBM_SET_EEH_OPTION, @@ -163,7 +163,7 @@ typedef struct { #define RTAS_FN_IBM_READ_SLOT_RESET_STATE rtas_fn_handle(RTAS_FNIDX__IBM_READ_SLOT_RESET_STATE) #define RTAS_FN_IBM_READ_SLOT_RESET_STATE2 rtas_fn_handle(RTAS_FNIDX__IBM_READ_SLOT_RESET_STATE2) #define RTAS_FN_IBM_REMOVE_PE_DMA_WINDOW rtas_fn_handle(RTAS_FNIDX__IBM_REMOVE_PE_DMA_WINDOW) -#define RTAS_FN_IBM_RESET_PE_DMA_WINDOWS rtas_fn_handle(RTAS_FNIDX__IBM_RESET_PE_DMA_WINDOWS) +#define RTAS_FN_IBM_RESET_PE_DMA_WINDOW rtas_fn_handle(RTAS_FNIDX__IBM_RESET_PE_DMA_WINDOW) #define RTAS_FN_IBM_SCAN_LOG_DUMP rtas_fn_handle(RTAS_FNIDX__IBM_SCAN_LOG_DUMP) #define RTAS_FN_IBM_SET_DYNAMIC_INDICATOR rtas_fn_handle(RTAS_FNIDX__IBM_SET_DYNAMIC_INDICATOR) #define RTAS_FN_IBM_SET_EEH_OPTION rtas_fn_handle(RTAS_FNIDX__IBM_SET_EEH_OPTION) diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/rtas.c b/arch/powerpc/kernel/rtas.c index 87d65bdd3e..46b9476d75 100644 --- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/rtas.c +++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/rtas.c @@ -310,8 +310,13 @@ static struct rtas_function rtas_function_table[] __ro_after_init = { [RTAS_FNIDX__IBM_REMOVE_PE_DMA_WINDOW] = { .name = "ibm,remove-pe-dma-window", }, - [RTAS_FNIDX__IBM_RESET_PE_DMA_WINDOWS] = { - .name = "ibm,reset-pe-dma-windows", + [RTAS_FNIDX__IBM_RESET_PE_DMA_WINDOW] = { + /* + * Note: PAPR+ v2.13 7.3.31.4.1 spells this as + * "ibm,reset-pe-dma-windows" (plural), but RTAS + * implementations use the singular form in practice. + */ + .name = "ibm,reset-pe-dma-window", }, [RTAS_FNIDX__IBM_SCAN_LOG_DUMP] = { .name = "ibm,scan-log-dump", diff --git a/arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/iommu.c b/arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/iommu.c index 496e16c588..e8c4129697 100644 --- a/arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/iommu.c +++ b/arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/iommu.c @@ -574,29 +574,6 @@ static void iommu_table_setparms(struct pci_controller *phb, struct iommu_table_ops iommu_table_lpar_multi_ops; -/* - * iommu_table_setparms_lpar - * - * Function: On pSeries LPAR systems, return TCE table info, given a pci bus. - */ -static void iommu_table_setparms_lpar(struct pci_controller *phb, - struct device_node *dn, - struct iommu_table *tbl, - struct iommu_table_group *table_group, - const __be32 *dma_window) -{ - unsigned long offset, size, liobn; - - of_parse_dma_window(dn, dma_window, &liobn, &offset, &size); - - iommu_table_setparms_common(tbl, phb->bus->number, liobn, offset, size, IOMMU_PAGE_SHIFT_4K, NULL, - &iommu_table_lpar_multi_ops); - - - table_group->tce32_start = offset; - table_group->tce32_size = size; -} - struct iommu_table_ops iommu_table_pseries_ops = { .set = tce_build_pSeries, .clear = tce_free_pSeries, @@ -724,26 +701,71 @@ struct iommu_table_ops iommu_table_lpar_multi_ops = { * dynamic 64bit DMA window, walking up the device tree. */ static struct device_node *pci_dma_find(struct device_node *dn, - const __be32 **dma_window) + struct dynamic_dma_window_prop *prop) { - const __be32 *dw = NULL; + const __be32 *default_prop = NULL; + const __be32 *ddw_prop = NULL; + struct device_node *rdn = NULL; + bool default_win = false, ddw_win = false; for ( ; dn && PCI_DN(dn); dn = dn->parent) { - dw = of_get_property(dn, "ibm,dma-window", NULL); - if (dw) { - if (dma_window) - *dma_window = dw; - return dn; + default_prop = of_get_property(dn, "ibm,dma-window", NULL); + if (default_prop) { + rdn = dn; + default_win = true; + } + ddw_prop = of_get_property(dn, DIRECT64_PROPNAME, NULL); + if (ddw_prop) { + rdn = dn; + ddw_win = true; + break; + } + ddw_prop = of_get_property(dn, DMA64_PROPNAME, NULL); + if (ddw_prop) { + rdn = dn; + ddw_win = true; + break; } - dw = of_get_property(dn, DIRECT64_PROPNAME, NULL); - if (dw) - return dn; - dw = of_get_property(dn, DMA64_PROPNAME, NULL); - if (dw) - return dn; + + /* At least found default window, which is the case for normal boot */ + if (default_win) + break; } - return NULL; + /* For PCI devices there will always be a DMA window, either on the device + * or parent bus + */ + WARN_ON(!(default_win | ddw_win)); + + /* caller doesn't want to get DMA window property */ + if (!prop) + return rdn; + + /* parse DMA window property. During normal system boot, only default + * DMA window is passed in OF. But, for kdump, a dedicated adapter might + * have both default and DDW in FDT. In this scenario, DDW takes precedence + * over default window. + */ + if (ddw_win) { + struct dynamic_dma_window_prop *p; + + p = (struct dynamic_dma_window_prop *)ddw_prop; + prop->liobn = p->liobn; + prop->dma_base = p->dma_base; + prop->tce_shift = p->tce_shift; + prop->window_shift = p->window_shift; + } else if (default_win) { + unsigned long offset, size, liobn; + + of_parse_dma_window(rdn, default_prop, &liobn, &offset, &size); + + prop->liobn = cpu_to_be32((u32)liobn); + prop->dma_base = cpu_to_be64(offset); + prop->tce_shift = cpu_to_be32(IOMMU_PAGE_SHIFT_4K); + prop->window_shift = cpu_to_be32(order_base_2(size)); + } + + return rdn; } static void pci_dma_bus_setup_pSeriesLP(struct pci_bus *bus) @@ -751,17 +773,20 @@ static void pci_dma_bus_setup_pSeriesLP(struct pci_bus *bus) struct iommu_table *tbl; struct device_node *dn, *pdn; struct pci_dn *ppci; - const __be32 *dma_window = NULL; + struct dynamic_dma_window_prop prop; dn = pci_bus_to_OF_node(bus); pr_debug("pci_dma_bus_setup_pSeriesLP: setting up bus %pOF\n", dn); - pdn = pci_dma_find(dn, &dma_window); + pdn = pci_dma_find(dn, &prop); - if (dma_window == NULL) - pr_debug(" no ibm,dma-window property !\n"); + /* In PPC architecture, there will always be DMA window on bus or one of the + * parent bus. During reboot, there will be ibm,dma-window property to + * define DMA window. For kdump, there will at least be default window or DDW + * or both. + */ ppci = PCI_DN(pdn); @@ -771,13 +796,24 @@ static void pci_dma_bus_setup_pSeriesLP(struct pci_bus *bus) if (!ppci->table_group) { ppci->table_group = iommu_pseries_alloc_group(ppci->phb->node); tbl = ppci->table_group->tables[0]; - if (dma_window) { - iommu_table_setparms_lpar(ppci->phb, pdn, tbl, - ppci->table_group, dma_window); - if (!iommu_init_table(tbl, ppci->phb->node, 0, 0)) - panic("Failed to initialize iommu table"); - } + iommu_table_setparms_common(tbl, ppci->phb->bus->number, + be32_to_cpu(prop.liobn), + be64_to_cpu(prop.dma_base), + 1ULL << be32_to_cpu(prop.window_shift), + be32_to_cpu(prop.tce_shift), NULL, + &iommu_table_lpar_multi_ops); + + /* Only for normal boot with default window. Doesn't matter even + * if we set these with DDW which is 64bit during kdump, since + * these will not be used during kdump. + */ + ppci->table_group->tce32_start = be64_to_cpu(prop.dma_base); + ppci->table_group->tce32_size = 1 << be32_to_cpu(prop.window_shift); + + if (!iommu_init_table(tbl, ppci->phb->node, 0, 0)) + panic("Failed to initialize iommu table"); + iommu_register_group(ppci->table_group, pci_domain_nr(bus), 0); pr_debug(" created table: %p\n", ppci->table_group); @@ -968,6 +1004,12 @@ static void find_existing_ddw_windows_named(const char *name) continue; } + /* If at the time of system initialization, there are DDWs in OF, + * it means this is during kexec. DDW could be direct or dynamic. + * We will just mark DDWs as "dynamic" since this is kdump path, + * no need to worry about perforance. ddw_list_new_entry() will + * set window->direct = false. + */ window = ddw_list_new_entry(pdn, dma64); if (!window) { of_node_put(pdn); @@ -1524,8 +1566,8 @@ static void pci_dma_dev_setup_pSeriesLP(struct pci_dev *dev) { struct device_node *pdn, *dn; struct iommu_table *tbl; - const __be32 *dma_window = NULL; struct pci_dn *pci; + struct dynamic_dma_window_prop prop; pr_debug("pci_dma_dev_setup_pSeriesLP: %s\n", pci_name(dev)); @@ -1538,7 +1580,7 @@ static void pci_dma_dev_setup_pSeriesLP(struct pci_dev *dev) dn = pci_device_to_OF_node(dev); pr_debug(" node is %pOF\n", dn); - pdn = pci_dma_find(dn, &dma_window); + pdn = pci_dma_find(dn, &prop); if (!pdn || !PCI_DN(pdn)) { printk(KERN_WARNING "pci_dma_dev_setup_pSeriesLP: " "no DMA window found for pci dev=%s dn=%pOF\n", @@ -1551,8 +1593,20 @@ static void pci_dma_dev_setup_pSeriesLP(struct pci_dev *dev) if (!pci->table_group) { pci->table_group = iommu_pseries_alloc_group(pci->phb->node); tbl = pci->table_group->tables[0]; - iommu_table_setparms_lpar(pci->phb, pdn, tbl, - pci->table_group, dma_window); + + iommu_table_setparms_common(tbl, pci->phb->bus->number, + be32_to_cpu(prop.liobn), + be64_to_cpu(prop.dma_base), + 1ULL << be32_to_cpu(prop.window_shift), + be32_to_cpu(prop.tce_shift), NULL, + &iommu_table_lpar_multi_ops); + + /* Only for normal boot with default window. Doesn't matter even + * if we set these with DDW which is 64bit during kdump, since + * these will not be used during kdump. + */ + pci->table_group->tce32_start = be64_to_cpu(prop.dma_base); + pci->table_group->tce32_size = 1 << be32_to_cpu(prop.window_shift); iommu_init_table(tbl, pci->phb->node, 0, 0); iommu_register_group(pci->table_group, diff --git a/arch/riscv/Kconfig b/arch/riscv/Kconfig index cd4c9a204d..f6df30e8d1 100644 --- a/arch/riscv/Kconfig +++ b/arch/riscv/Kconfig @@ -294,7 +294,6 @@ config AS_HAS_OPTION_ARCH # https://reviews.llvm.org/D123515 def_bool y depends on $(as-instr, .option arch$(comma) +m) - depends on !$(as-instr, .option arch$(comma) -i) source "arch/riscv/Kconfig.socs" source "arch/riscv/Kconfig.errata" diff --git a/arch/riscv/include/asm/csr.h b/arch/riscv/include/asm/csr.h index 306a19a550..0f2e68f4e8 100644 --- a/arch/riscv/include/asm/csr.h +++ b/arch/riscv/include/asm/csr.h @@ -415,6 +415,7 @@ # define CSR_STATUS CSR_MSTATUS # define CSR_IE CSR_MIE # define CSR_TVEC CSR_MTVEC +# define CSR_ENVCFG CSR_MENVCFG # define CSR_SCRATCH CSR_MSCRATCH # define CSR_EPC CSR_MEPC # define CSR_CAUSE CSR_MCAUSE @@ -439,6 +440,7 @@ # define CSR_STATUS CSR_SSTATUS # define CSR_IE CSR_SIE # define CSR_TVEC CSR_STVEC +# define CSR_ENVCFG CSR_SENVCFG # define CSR_SCRATCH CSR_SSCRATCH # define CSR_EPC CSR_SEPC # define CSR_CAUSE CSR_SCAUSE diff --git a/arch/riscv/include/asm/ftrace.h b/arch/riscv/include/asm/ftrace.h index 2b2f5df7ef..42777f91a9 100644 --- a/arch/riscv/include/asm/ftrace.h +++ b/arch/riscv/include/asm/ftrace.h @@ -25,6 +25,11 @@ #define ARCH_SUPPORTS_FTRACE_OPS 1 #ifndef __ASSEMBLY__ + +extern void *return_address(unsigned int level); + +#define ftrace_return_address(n) return_address(n) + void MCOUNT_NAME(void); static inline unsigned long ftrace_call_adjust(unsigned long addr) { diff --git a/arch/riscv/include/asm/hugetlb.h b/arch/riscv/include/asm/hugetlb.h index 20f9c3ba23..22deb7a2a6 100644 --- a/arch/riscv/include/asm/hugetlb.h +++ b/arch/riscv/include/asm/hugetlb.h @@ -11,8 +11,10 @@ static inline void arch_clear_hugepage_flags(struct page *page) } #define arch_clear_hugepage_flags arch_clear_hugepage_flags +#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_ENABLE_HUGEPAGE_MIGRATION bool arch_hugetlb_migration_supported(struct hstate *h); #define arch_hugetlb_migration_supported arch_hugetlb_migration_supported +#endif #ifdef CONFIG_RISCV_ISA_SVNAPOT #define __HAVE_ARCH_HUGE_PTE_CLEAR diff --git a/arch/riscv/include/asm/pgalloc.h b/arch/riscv/include/asm/pgalloc.h index d169a4f41a..c80bb9990d 100644 --- a/arch/riscv/include/asm/pgalloc.h +++ b/arch/riscv/include/asm/pgalloc.h @@ -95,7 +95,13 @@ static inline void pud_free(struct mm_struct *mm, pud_t *pud) __pud_free(mm, pud); } -#define __pud_free_tlb(tlb, pud, addr) pud_free((tlb)->mm, pud) +#define __pud_free_tlb(tlb, pud, addr) \ +do { \ + if (pgtable_l4_enabled) { \ + pagetable_pud_dtor(virt_to_ptdesc(pud)); \ + tlb_remove_page_ptdesc((tlb), virt_to_ptdesc(pud)); \ + } \ +} while (0) #define p4d_alloc_one p4d_alloc_one static inline p4d_t *p4d_alloc_one(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long addr) @@ -124,7 +130,11 @@ static inline void p4d_free(struct mm_struct *mm, p4d_t *p4d) __p4d_free(mm, p4d); } -#define __p4d_free_tlb(tlb, p4d, addr) p4d_free((tlb)->mm, p4d) +#define __p4d_free_tlb(tlb, p4d, addr) \ +do { \ + if (pgtable_l5_enabled) \ + tlb_remove_page_ptdesc((tlb), virt_to_ptdesc(p4d)); \ +} while (0) #endif /* __PAGETABLE_PMD_FOLDED */ static inline void sync_kernel_mappings(pgd_t *pgd) @@ -149,7 +159,11 @@ static inline pgd_t *pgd_alloc(struct mm_struct *mm) #ifndef __PAGETABLE_PMD_FOLDED -#define __pmd_free_tlb(tlb, pmd, addr) pmd_free((tlb)->mm, pmd) +#define __pmd_free_tlb(tlb, pmd, addr) \ +do { \ + pagetable_pmd_dtor(virt_to_ptdesc(pmd)); \ + tlb_remove_page_ptdesc((tlb), virt_to_ptdesc(pmd)); \ +} while (0) #endif /* __PAGETABLE_PMD_FOLDED */ diff --git a/arch/riscv/include/asm/pgtable-64.h b/arch/riscv/include/asm/pgtable-64.h index 9a2c780a11..783837bbd8 100644 --- a/arch/riscv/include/asm/pgtable-64.h +++ b/arch/riscv/include/asm/pgtable-64.h @@ -136,7 +136,7 @@ enum napot_cont_order { * 10010 - IO Strongly-ordered, Non-cacheable, Non-bufferable, Shareable, Non-trustable */ #define _PAGE_PMA_THEAD ((1UL << 62) | (1UL << 61) | (1UL << 60)) -#define _PAGE_NOCACHE_THEAD ((1UL < 61) | (1UL << 60)) +#define _PAGE_NOCACHE_THEAD ((1UL << 61) | (1UL << 60)) #define _PAGE_IO_THEAD ((1UL << 63) | (1UL << 60)) #define _PAGE_MTMASK_THEAD (_PAGE_PMA_THEAD | _PAGE_IO_THEAD | (1UL << 59)) diff --git a/arch/riscv/include/asm/pgtable.h b/arch/riscv/include/asm/pgtable.h index 74ffb2178f..76b131e7bb 100644 --- a/arch/riscv/include/asm/pgtable.h +++ b/arch/riscv/include/asm/pgtable.h @@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ * Define vmemmap for pfn_to_page & page_to_pfn calls. Needed if kernel * is configured with CONFIG_SPARSEMEM_VMEMMAP enabled. */ -#define vmemmap ((struct page *)VMEMMAP_START) +#define vmemmap ((struct page *)VMEMMAP_START - (phys_ram_base >> PAGE_SHIFT)) #define PCI_IO_SIZE SZ_16M #define PCI_IO_END VMEMMAP_START @@ -439,6 +439,10 @@ static inline pte_t pte_mkhuge(pte_t pte) return pte; } +#define pte_leaf_size(pte) (pte_napot(pte) ? \ + napot_cont_size(napot_cont_order(pte)) :\ + PAGE_SIZE) + #ifdef CONFIG_NUMA_BALANCING /* * See the comment in include/asm-generic/pgtable.h diff --git a/arch/riscv/include/asm/vmalloc.h b/arch/riscv/include/asm/vmalloc.h index 924d01b56c..51f6dfe197 100644 --- a/arch/riscv/include/asm/vmalloc.h +++ b/arch/riscv/include/asm/vmalloc.h @@ -19,65 +19,6 @@ static inline bool arch_vmap_pmd_supported(pgprot_t prot) return true; } -#ifdef CONFIG_RISCV_ISA_SVNAPOT -#include <linux/pgtable.h> +#endif -#define arch_vmap_pte_range_map_size arch_vmap_pte_range_map_size -static inline unsigned long arch_vmap_pte_range_map_size(unsigned long addr, unsigned long end, - u64 pfn, unsigned int max_page_shift) -{ - unsigned long map_size = PAGE_SIZE; - unsigned long size, order; - - if (!has_svnapot()) - return map_size; - - for_each_napot_order_rev(order) { - if (napot_cont_shift(order) > max_page_shift) - continue; - - size = napot_cont_size(order); - if (end - addr < size) - continue; - - if (!IS_ALIGNED(addr, size)) - continue; - - if (!IS_ALIGNED(PFN_PHYS(pfn), size)) - continue; - - map_size = size; - break; - } - - return map_size; -} - -#define arch_vmap_pte_supported_shift arch_vmap_pte_supported_shift -static inline int arch_vmap_pte_supported_shift(unsigned long size) -{ - int shift = PAGE_SHIFT; - unsigned long order; - - if (!has_svnapot()) - return shift; - - WARN_ON_ONCE(size >= PMD_SIZE); - - for_each_napot_order_rev(order) { - if (napot_cont_size(order) > size) - continue; - - if (!IS_ALIGNED(size, napot_cont_size(order))) - continue; - - shift = napot_cont_shift(order); - break; - } - - return shift; -} - -#endif /* CONFIG_RISCV_ISA_SVNAPOT */ -#endif /* CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_HUGE_VMAP */ #endif /* _ASM_RISCV_VMALLOC_H */ diff --git a/arch/riscv/kernel/Makefile b/arch/riscv/kernel/Makefile index fee22a3d1b..40d054939a 100644 --- a/arch/riscv/kernel/Makefile +++ b/arch/riscv/kernel/Makefile @@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ ifdef CONFIG_FTRACE CFLAGS_REMOVE_ftrace.o = $(CC_FLAGS_FTRACE) CFLAGS_REMOVE_patch.o = $(CC_FLAGS_FTRACE) CFLAGS_REMOVE_sbi.o = $(CC_FLAGS_FTRACE) +CFLAGS_REMOVE_return_address.o = $(CC_FLAGS_FTRACE) endif CFLAGS_syscall_table.o += $(call cc-option,-Wno-override-init,) CFLAGS_compat_syscall_table.o += $(call cc-option,-Wno-override-init,) @@ -46,6 +47,7 @@ obj-y += irq.o obj-y += process.o obj-y += ptrace.o obj-y += reset.o +obj-y += return_address.o obj-y += setup.o obj-y += signal.o obj-y += syscall_table.o diff --git a/arch/riscv/kernel/cpufeature.c b/arch/riscv/kernel/cpufeature.c index b3785ffc15..8677788133 100644 --- a/arch/riscv/kernel/cpufeature.c +++ b/arch/riscv/kernel/cpufeature.c @@ -22,6 +22,7 @@ #include <asm/hwprobe.h> #include <asm/patch.h> #include <asm/processor.h> +#include <asm/sbi.h> #include <asm/vector.h> #include "copy-unaligned.h" @@ -402,6 +403,20 @@ static void __init riscv_fill_hwcap_from_isa_string(unsigned long *isa2hwcap) } /* + * "V" in ISA strings is ambiguous in practice: it should mean + * just the standard V-1.0 but vendors aren't well behaved. + * Many vendors with T-Head CPU cores which implement the 0.7.1 + * version of the vector specification put "v" into their DTs. + * CPU cores with the ratified spec will contain non-zero + * marchid. + */ + if (acpi_disabled && riscv_cached_mvendorid(cpu) == THEAD_VENDOR_ID && + riscv_cached_marchid(cpu) == 0x0) { + this_hwcap &= ~isa2hwcap[RISCV_ISA_EXT_v]; + clear_bit(RISCV_ISA_EXT_v, isainfo->isa); + } + + /* * All "okay" hart should have same isa. Set HWCAP based on * common capabilities of every "okay" hart, in case they don't * have. @@ -725,7 +740,7 @@ arch_initcall(check_unaligned_access_all_cpus); void riscv_user_isa_enable(void) { if (riscv_cpu_has_extension_unlikely(smp_processor_id(), RISCV_ISA_EXT_ZICBOZ)) - csr_set(CSR_SENVCFG, ENVCFG_CBZE); + csr_set(CSR_ENVCFG, ENVCFG_CBZE); } #ifdef CONFIG_RISCV_ALTERNATIVE diff --git a/arch/riscv/kernel/return_address.c b/arch/riscv/kernel/return_address.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..c8115ec8fb --- /dev/null +++ b/arch/riscv/kernel/return_address.c @@ -0,0 +1,48 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only +/* + * This code come from arch/arm64/kernel/return_address.c + * + * Copyright (C) 2023 SiFive. + */ + +#include <linux/export.h> +#include <linux/kprobes.h> +#include <linux/stacktrace.h> + +struct return_address_data { + unsigned int level; + void *addr; +}; + +static bool save_return_addr(void *d, unsigned long pc) +{ + struct return_address_data *data = d; + + if (!data->level) { + data->addr = (void *)pc; + return false; + } + + --data->level; + + return true; +} +NOKPROBE_SYMBOL(save_return_addr); + +noinline void *return_address(unsigned int level) +{ + struct return_address_data data; + + data.level = level + 3; + data.addr = NULL; + + arch_stack_walk(save_return_addr, &data, current, NULL); + + if (!data.level) + return data.addr; + else + return NULL; + +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(return_address); +NOKPROBE_SYMBOL(return_address); diff --git a/arch/riscv/mm/hugetlbpage.c b/arch/riscv/mm/hugetlbpage.c index e7b6928187..fbe9188016 100644 --- a/arch/riscv/mm/hugetlbpage.c +++ b/arch/riscv/mm/hugetlbpage.c @@ -426,10 +426,12 @@ bool __init arch_hugetlb_valid_size(unsigned long size) return __hugetlb_valid_size(size); } +#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_ENABLE_HUGEPAGE_MIGRATION bool arch_hugetlb_migration_supported(struct hstate *h) { return __hugetlb_valid_size(huge_page_size(h)); } +#endif #ifdef CONFIG_CONTIG_ALLOC static __init int gigantic_pages_init(void) diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S b/arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S index c73047bf9f..fba4276468 100644 --- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S +++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S @@ -885,6 +885,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(entry_SYSENTER_32) BUG_IF_WRONG_CR3 no_user_check=1 popfl popl %eax + CLEAR_CPU_BUFFERS /* * Return back to the vDSO, which will pop ecx and edx. @@ -954,6 +955,7 @@ restore_all_switch_stack: /* Restore user state */ RESTORE_REGS pop=4 # skip orig_eax/error_code + CLEAR_CPU_BUFFERS .Lirq_return: /* * ARCH_HAS_MEMBARRIER_SYNC_CORE rely on IRET core serialization @@ -1146,6 +1148,7 @@ SYM_CODE_START(asm_exc_nmi) /* Not on SYSENTER stack. */ call exc_nmi + CLEAR_CPU_BUFFERS jmp .Lnmi_return .Lnmi_from_sysenter_stack: diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S index de6469dffe..bdb17fad5d 100644 --- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S +++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S @@ -161,6 +161,7 @@ syscall_return_via_sysret: SYM_INNER_LABEL(entry_SYSRETQ_unsafe_stack, SYM_L_GLOBAL) ANNOTATE_NOENDBR swapgs + CLEAR_CPU_BUFFERS sysretq SYM_INNER_LABEL(entry_SYSRETQ_end, SYM_L_GLOBAL) ANNOTATE_NOENDBR @@ -601,6 +602,7 @@ SYM_INNER_LABEL(swapgs_restore_regs_and_return_to_usermode, SYM_L_GLOBAL) /* Restore RDI. */ popq %rdi swapgs + CLEAR_CPU_BUFFERS jmp .Lnative_iret @@ -712,6 +714,8 @@ native_irq_return_ldt: */ popq %rax /* Restore user RAX */ + CLEAR_CPU_BUFFERS + /* * RSP now points to an ordinary IRET frame, except that the page * is read-only and RSP[31:16] are preloaded with the userspace @@ -1439,6 +1443,12 @@ nmi_restore: movq $0, 5*8(%rsp) /* clear "NMI executing" */ /* + * Skip CLEAR_CPU_BUFFERS here, since it only helps in rare cases like + * NMI in kernel after user state is restored. For an unprivileged user + * these conditions are hard to meet. + */ + + /* * iretq reads the "iret" frame and exits the NMI stack in a * single instruction. We are returning to kernel mode, so this * cannot result in a fault. Similarly, we don't need to worry @@ -1455,6 +1465,7 @@ SYM_CODE_START(entry_SYSCALL32_ignore) UNWIND_HINT_END_OF_STACK ENDBR mov $-ENOSYS, %eax + CLEAR_CPU_BUFFERS sysretl SYM_CODE_END(entry_SYSCALL32_ignore) diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S index de94e2e84e..eabf48c4d4 100644 --- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S +++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S @@ -270,6 +270,7 @@ SYM_INNER_LABEL(entry_SYSRETL_compat_unsafe_stack, SYM_L_GLOBAL) xorl %r9d, %r9d xorl %r10d, %r10d swapgs + CLEAR_CPU_BUFFERS sysretl SYM_INNER_LABEL(entry_SYSRETL_compat_end, SYM_L_GLOBAL) ANNOTATE_NOENDBR diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/entry-common.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/entry-common.h index ce8f50192a..7e523bb3d2 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/entry-common.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/entry-common.h @@ -91,7 +91,6 @@ static inline void arch_exit_to_user_mode_prepare(struct pt_regs *regs, static __always_inline void arch_exit_to_user_mode(void) { - mds_user_clear_cpu_buffers(); amd_clear_divider(); } #define arch_exit_to_user_mode arch_exit_to_user_mode diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h index 2519615936..d15b35815e 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h @@ -540,7 +540,6 @@ DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(switch_to_cond_stibp); DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(switch_mm_cond_ibpb); DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(switch_mm_always_ibpb); -DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(mds_user_clear); DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(mds_idle_clear); DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(switch_mm_cond_l1d_flush); @@ -575,17 +574,6 @@ static __always_inline void mds_clear_cpu_buffers(void) } /** - * mds_user_clear_cpu_buffers - Mitigation for MDS and TAA vulnerability - * - * Clear CPU buffers if the corresponding static key is enabled - */ -static __always_inline void mds_user_clear_cpu_buffers(void) -{ - if (static_branch_likely(&mds_user_clear)) - mds_clear_cpu_buffers(); -} - -/** * mds_idle_clear_cpu_buffers - Mitigation for MDS vulnerability * * Clear CPU buffers if the corresponding static key is enabled diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c index bb0ab8466b..48d049cd74 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -111,9 +111,6 @@ DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(switch_mm_cond_ibpb); /* Control unconditional IBPB in switch_mm() */ DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(switch_mm_always_ibpb); -/* Control MDS CPU buffer clear before returning to user space */ -DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(mds_user_clear); -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(mds_user_clear); /* Control MDS CPU buffer clear before idling (halt, mwait) */ DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(mds_idle_clear); EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(mds_idle_clear); @@ -252,7 +249,7 @@ static void __init mds_select_mitigation(void) if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MD_CLEAR)) mds_mitigation = MDS_MITIGATION_VMWERV; - static_branch_enable(&mds_user_clear); + setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF); if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_BUG_MSBDS_ONLY) && (mds_nosmt || cpu_mitigations_auto_nosmt())) @@ -356,7 +353,7 @@ static void __init taa_select_mitigation(void) * For guests that can't determine whether the correct microcode is * present on host, enable the mitigation for UCODE_NEEDED as well. */ - static_branch_enable(&mds_user_clear); + setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF); if (taa_nosmt || cpu_mitigations_auto_nosmt()) cpu_smt_disable(false); @@ -424,7 +421,7 @@ static void __init mmio_select_mitigation(void) */ if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MDS) || (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_TAA) && boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RTM))) - static_branch_enable(&mds_user_clear); + setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF); else static_branch_enable(&mmio_stale_data_clear); @@ -484,12 +481,12 @@ static void __init md_clear_update_mitigation(void) if (cpu_mitigations_off()) return; - if (!static_key_enabled(&mds_user_clear)) + if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF)) goto out; /* - * mds_user_clear is now enabled. Update MDS, TAA and MMIO Stale Data - * mitigation, if necessary. + * X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF is now enabled. Update MDS, TAA and MMIO + * Stale Data mitigation, if necessary. */ if (mds_mitigation == MDS_MITIGATION_OFF && boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MDS)) { diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c index 98f7ea6b93..34cac9ea19 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c @@ -1596,6 +1596,7 @@ static void __init early_identify_cpu(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) get_cpu_vendor(c); get_cpu_cap(c); setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_CPUID); + get_cpu_address_sizes(c); cpu_parse_early_param(); if (this_cpu->c_early_init) @@ -1608,10 +1609,9 @@ static void __init early_identify_cpu(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) this_cpu->c_bsp_init(c); } else { setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_CPUID); + get_cpu_address_sizes(c); } - get_cpu_address_sizes(c); - setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_ALWAYS); cpu_set_bug_bits(c); diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c index a927a8fc96..40dec9b56f 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c @@ -184,6 +184,90 @@ static bool bad_spectre_microcode(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) return false; } +#define MSR_IA32_TME_ACTIVATE 0x982 + +/* Helpers to access TME_ACTIVATE MSR */ +#define TME_ACTIVATE_LOCKED(x) (x & 0x1) +#define TME_ACTIVATE_ENABLED(x) (x & 0x2) + +#define TME_ACTIVATE_POLICY(x) ((x >> 4) & 0xf) /* Bits 7:4 */ +#define TME_ACTIVATE_POLICY_AES_XTS_128 0 + +#define TME_ACTIVATE_KEYID_BITS(x) ((x >> 32) & 0xf) /* Bits 35:32 */ + +#define TME_ACTIVATE_CRYPTO_ALGS(x) ((x >> 48) & 0xffff) /* Bits 63:48 */ +#define TME_ACTIVATE_CRYPTO_AES_XTS_128 1 + +/* Values for mktme_status (SW only construct) */ +#define MKTME_ENABLED 0 +#define MKTME_DISABLED 1 +#define MKTME_UNINITIALIZED 2 +static int mktme_status = MKTME_UNINITIALIZED; + +static void detect_tme_early(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) +{ + u64 tme_activate, tme_policy, tme_crypto_algs; + int keyid_bits = 0, nr_keyids = 0; + static u64 tme_activate_cpu0 = 0; + + rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_TME_ACTIVATE, tme_activate); + + if (mktme_status != MKTME_UNINITIALIZED) { + if (tme_activate != tme_activate_cpu0) { + /* Broken BIOS? */ + pr_err_once("x86/tme: configuration is inconsistent between CPUs\n"); + pr_err_once("x86/tme: MKTME is not usable\n"); + mktme_status = MKTME_DISABLED; + + /* Proceed. We may need to exclude bits from x86_phys_bits. */ + } + } else { + tme_activate_cpu0 = tme_activate; + } + + if (!TME_ACTIVATE_LOCKED(tme_activate) || !TME_ACTIVATE_ENABLED(tme_activate)) { + pr_info_once("x86/tme: not enabled by BIOS\n"); + mktme_status = MKTME_DISABLED; + return; + } + + if (mktme_status != MKTME_UNINITIALIZED) + goto detect_keyid_bits; + + pr_info("x86/tme: enabled by BIOS\n"); + + tme_policy = TME_ACTIVATE_POLICY(tme_activate); + if (tme_policy != TME_ACTIVATE_POLICY_AES_XTS_128) + pr_warn("x86/tme: Unknown policy is active: %#llx\n", tme_policy); + + tme_crypto_algs = TME_ACTIVATE_CRYPTO_ALGS(tme_activate); + if (!(tme_crypto_algs & TME_ACTIVATE_CRYPTO_AES_XTS_128)) { + pr_err("x86/mktme: No known encryption algorithm is supported: %#llx\n", + tme_crypto_algs); + mktme_status = MKTME_DISABLED; + } +detect_keyid_bits: + keyid_bits = TME_ACTIVATE_KEYID_BITS(tme_activate); + nr_keyids = (1UL << keyid_bits) - 1; + if (nr_keyids) { + pr_info_once("x86/mktme: enabled by BIOS\n"); + pr_info_once("x86/mktme: %d KeyIDs available\n", nr_keyids); + } else { + pr_info_once("x86/mktme: disabled by BIOS\n"); + } + + if (mktme_status == MKTME_UNINITIALIZED) { + /* MKTME is usable */ + mktme_status = MKTME_ENABLED; + } + + /* + * KeyID bits effectively lower the number of physical address + * bits. Update cpuinfo_x86::x86_phys_bits accordingly. + */ + c->x86_phys_bits -= keyid_bits; +} + static void early_init_intel(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) { u64 misc_enable; @@ -322,6 +406,13 @@ static void early_init_intel(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) */ if (detect_extended_topology_early(c) < 0) detect_ht_early(c); + + /* + * Adjust the number of physical bits early because it affects the + * valid bits of the MTRR mask registers. + */ + if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_TME)) + detect_tme_early(c); } static void bsp_init_intel(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) @@ -482,90 +573,6 @@ static void srat_detect_node(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) #endif } -#define MSR_IA32_TME_ACTIVATE 0x982 - -/* Helpers to access TME_ACTIVATE MSR */ -#define TME_ACTIVATE_LOCKED(x) (x & 0x1) -#define TME_ACTIVATE_ENABLED(x) (x & 0x2) - -#define TME_ACTIVATE_POLICY(x) ((x >> 4) & 0xf) /* Bits 7:4 */ -#define TME_ACTIVATE_POLICY_AES_XTS_128 0 - -#define TME_ACTIVATE_KEYID_BITS(x) ((x >> 32) & 0xf) /* Bits 35:32 */ - -#define TME_ACTIVATE_CRYPTO_ALGS(x) ((x >> 48) & 0xffff) /* Bits 63:48 */ -#define TME_ACTIVATE_CRYPTO_AES_XTS_128 1 - -/* Values for mktme_status (SW only construct) */ -#define MKTME_ENABLED 0 -#define MKTME_DISABLED 1 -#define MKTME_UNINITIALIZED 2 -static int mktme_status = MKTME_UNINITIALIZED; - -static void detect_tme(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) -{ - u64 tme_activate, tme_policy, tme_crypto_algs; - int keyid_bits = 0, nr_keyids = 0; - static u64 tme_activate_cpu0 = 0; - - rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_TME_ACTIVATE, tme_activate); - - if (mktme_status != MKTME_UNINITIALIZED) { - if (tme_activate != tme_activate_cpu0) { - /* Broken BIOS? */ - pr_err_once("x86/tme: configuration is inconsistent between CPUs\n"); - pr_err_once("x86/tme: MKTME is not usable\n"); - mktme_status = MKTME_DISABLED; - - /* Proceed. We may need to exclude bits from x86_phys_bits. */ - } - } else { - tme_activate_cpu0 = tme_activate; - } - - if (!TME_ACTIVATE_LOCKED(tme_activate) || !TME_ACTIVATE_ENABLED(tme_activate)) { - pr_info_once("x86/tme: not enabled by BIOS\n"); - mktme_status = MKTME_DISABLED; - return; - } - - if (mktme_status != MKTME_UNINITIALIZED) - goto detect_keyid_bits; - - pr_info("x86/tme: enabled by BIOS\n"); - - tme_policy = TME_ACTIVATE_POLICY(tme_activate); - if (tme_policy != TME_ACTIVATE_POLICY_AES_XTS_128) - pr_warn("x86/tme: Unknown policy is active: %#llx\n", tme_policy); - - tme_crypto_algs = TME_ACTIVATE_CRYPTO_ALGS(tme_activate); - if (!(tme_crypto_algs & TME_ACTIVATE_CRYPTO_AES_XTS_128)) { - pr_err("x86/mktme: No known encryption algorithm is supported: %#llx\n", - tme_crypto_algs); - mktme_status = MKTME_DISABLED; - } -detect_keyid_bits: - keyid_bits = TME_ACTIVATE_KEYID_BITS(tme_activate); - nr_keyids = (1UL << keyid_bits) - 1; - if (nr_keyids) { - pr_info_once("x86/mktme: enabled by BIOS\n"); - pr_info_once("x86/mktme: %d KeyIDs available\n", nr_keyids); - } else { - pr_info_once("x86/mktme: disabled by BIOS\n"); - } - - if (mktme_status == MKTME_UNINITIALIZED) { - /* MKTME is usable */ - mktme_status = MKTME_ENABLED; - } - - /* - * KeyID bits effectively lower the number of physical address - * bits. Update cpuinfo_x86::x86_phys_bits accordingly. - */ - c->x86_phys_bits -= keyid_bits; -} - static void init_cpuid_fault(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) { u64 msr; @@ -702,9 +709,6 @@ static void init_intel(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) init_ia32_feat_ctl(c); - if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_TME)) - detect_tme(c); - init_intel_misc_features(c); split_lock_init(); diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/e820.c b/arch/x86/kernel/e820.c index fb8cf95338..b66f540de0 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/e820.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/e820.c @@ -1017,10 +1017,12 @@ void __init e820__reserve_setup_data(void) e820__range_update(pa_data, sizeof(*data)+data->len, E820_TYPE_RAM, E820_TYPE_RESERVED_KERN); /* - * SETUP_EFI and SETUP_IMA are supplied by kexec and do not need - * to be reserved. + * SETUP_EFI, SETUP_IMA and SETUP_RNG_SEED are supplied by + * kexec and do not need to be reserved. */ - if (data->type != SETUP_EFI && data->type != SETUP_IMA) + if (data->type != SETUP_EFI && + data->type != SETUP_IMA && + data->type != SETUP_RNG_SEED) e820__range_update_kexec(pa_data, sizeof(*data) + data->len, E820_TYPE_RAM, E820_TYPE_RESERVED_KERN); diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/nmi.c b/arch/x86/kernel/nmi.c index 17e955ab69..3082cf24b6 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/nmi.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/nmi.c @@ -563,9 +563,6 @@ nmi_restart: } if (this_cpu_dec_return(nmi_state)) goto nmi_restart; - - if (user_mode(regs)) - mds_user_clear_cpu_buffers(); } #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KVM_INTEL) diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/run_flags.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/run_flags.h index edc3f16cc1..6a9bfdfbb6 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/run_flags.h +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/run_flags.h @@ -2,7 +2,10 @@ #ifndef __KVM_X86_VMX_RUN_FLAGS_H #define __KVM_X86_VMX_RUN_FLAGS_H -#define VMX_RUN_VMRESUME (1 << 0) -#define VMX_RUN_SAVE_SPEC_CTRL (1 << 1) +#define VMX_RUN_VMRESUME_SHIFT 0 +#define VMX_RUN_SAVE_SPEC_CTRL_SHIFT 1 + +#define VMX_RUN_VMRESUME BIT(VMX_RUN_VMRESUME_SHIFT) +#define VMX_RUN_SAVE_SPEC_CTRL BIT(VMX_RUN_SAVE_SPEC_CTRL_SHIFT) #endif /* __KVM_X86_VMX_RUN_FLAGS_H */ diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S index be275a0410..139960deb7 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S @@ -139,7 +139,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(__vmx_vcpu_run) mov (%_ASM_SP), %_ASM_AX /* Check if vmlaunch or vmresume is needed */ - test $VMX_RUN_VMRESUME, %ebx + bt $VMX_RUN_VMRESUME_SHIFT, %ebx /* Load guest registers. Don't clobber flags. */ mov VCPU_RCX(%_ASM_AX), %_ASM_CX @@ -161,8 +161,11 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(__vmx_vcpu_run) /* Load guest RAX. This kills the @regs pointer! */ mov VCPU_RAX(%_ASM_AX), %_ASM_AX - /* Check EFLAGS.ZF from 'test VMX_RUN_VMRESUME' above */ - jz .Lvmlaunch + /* Clobbers EFLAGS.ZF */ + CLEAR_CPU_BUFFERS + + /* Check EFLAGS.CF from the VMX_RUN_VMRESUME bit test above. */ + jnc .Lvmlaunch /* * After a successful VMRESUME/VMLAUNCH, control flow "magically" diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c index 94082169bb..856eef56b3 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c @@ -387,7 +387,16 @@ static __always_inline void vmx_enable_fb_clear(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx) static void vmx_update_fb_clear_dis(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct vcpu_vmx *vmx) { - vmx->disable_fb_clear = (host_arch_capabilities & ARCH_CAP_FB_CLEAR_CTRL) && + /* + * Disable VERW's behavior of clearing CPU buffers for the guest if the + * CPU isn't affected by MDS/TAA, and the host hasn't forcefully enabled + * the mitigation. Disabling the clearing behavior provides a + * performance boost for guests that aren't aware that manually clearing + * CPU buffers is unnecessary, at the cost of MSR accesses on VM-Entry + * and VM-Exit. + */ + vmx->disable_fb_clear = !cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF) && + (host_arch_capabilities & ARCH_CAP_FB_CLEAR_CTRL) && !boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MDS) && !boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_TAA); @@ -7226,11 +7235,14 @@ static noinstr void vmx_vcpu_enter_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, guest_state_enter_irqoff(); - /* L1D Flush includes CPU buffer clear to mitigate MDS */ + /* + * L1D Flush includes CPU buffer clear to mitigate MDS, but VERW + * mitigation for MDS is done late in VMentry and is still + * executed in spite of L1D Flush. This is because an extra VERW + * should not matter much after the big hammer L1D Flush. + */ if (static_branch_unlikely(&vmx_l1d_should_flush)) vmx_l1d_flush(vcpu); - else if (static_branch_unlikely(&mds_user_clear)) - mds_clear_cpu_buffers(); else if (static_branch_unlikely(&mmio_stale_data_clear) && kvm_arch_has_assigned_device(vcpu->kvm)) mds_clear_cpu_buffers(); |