Merging upstream version 6.7.9.

Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>

29 files changed, 372 insertions, 248 deletions

diff --git a/arch/arm64/crypto/aes-neonbs-glue.c b/arch/arm64/crypto/aes-neonbs-glue.c
index bac4cabef6..467ac2f768 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/crypto/aes-neonbs-glue.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/crypto/aes-neonbs-glue.c
@@ -227,8 +227,19 @@ static int ctr_encrypt(struct skcipher_request *req)
 			src += blocks * AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
 		}
 		if (nbytes && walk.nbytes == walk.total) {
+			u8 buf[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
+			u8 *d = dst;
+
+			if (unlikely(nbytes < AES_BLOCK_SIZE))
+				src = dst = memcpy(buf + sizeof(buf) - nbytes,
+						   src, nbytes);
+
 			neon_aes_ctr_encrypt(dst, src, ctx->enc, ctx->key.rounds,
 					     nbytes, walk.iv);
+
+			if (unlikely(nbytes < AES_BLOCK_SIZE))
+				memcpy(d, dst, nbytes);
+
 			nbytes = 0;
 		}
 		kernel_neon_end();
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/rtas.h b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/rtas.h
index c697c3c746..33024a2874 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/rtas.h
+++ b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/rtas.h
@@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ enum rtas_function_index {
 	RTAS_FNIDX__IBM_READ_SLOT_RESET_STATE,
 	RTAS_FNIDX__IBM_READ_SLOT_RESET_STATE2,
 	RTAS_FNIDX__IBM_REMOVE_PE_DMA_WINDOW,
-	RTAS_FNIDX__IBM_RESET_PE_DMA_WINDOWS,
+	RTAS_FNIDX__IBM_RESET_PE_DMA_WINDOW,
 	RTAS_FNIDX__IBM_SCAN_LOG_DUMP,
 	RTAS_FNIDX__IBM_SET_DYNAMIC_INDICATOR,
 	RTAS_FNIDX__IBM_SET_EEH_OPTION,
@@ -163,7 +163,7 @@ typedef struct {
 #define RTAS_FN_IBM_READ_SLOT_RESET_STATE         rtas_fn_handle(RTAS_FNIDX__IBM_READ_SLOT_RESET_STATE)
 #define RTAS_FN_IBM_READ_SLOT_RESET_STATE2        rtas_fn_handle(RTAS_FNIDX__IBM_READ_SLOT_RESET_STATE2)
 #define RTAS_FN_IBM_REMOVE_PE_DMA_WINDOW          rtas_fn_handle(RTAS_FNIDX__IBM_REMOVE_PE_DMA_WINDOW)
-#define RTAS_FN_IBM_RESET_PE_DMA_WINDOWS          rtas_fn_handle(RTAS_FNIDX__IBM_RESET_PE_DMA_WINDOWS)
+#define RTAS_FN_IBM_RESET_PE_DMA_WINDOW           rtas_fn_handle(RTAS_FNIDX__IBM_RESET_PE_DMA_WINDOW)
 #define RTAS_FN_IBM_SCAN_LOG_DUMP                 rtas_fn_handle(RTAS_FNIDX__IBM_SCAN_LOG_DUMP)
 #define RTAS_FN_IBM_SET_DYNAMIC_INDICATOR         rtas_fn_handle(RTAS_FNIDX__IBM_SET_DYNAMIC_INDICATOR)
 #define RTAS_FN_IBM_SET_EEH_OPTION                rtas_fn_handle(RTAS_FNIDX__IBM_SET_EEH_OPTION)
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/rtas.c b/arch/powerpc/kernel/rtas.c
index 87d65bdd3e..46b9476d75 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/rtas.c
+++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/rtas.c
@@ -310,8 +310,13 @@ static struct rtas_function rtas_function_table[] __ro_after_init = {
 	[RTAS_FNIDX__IBM_REMOVE_PE_DMA_WINDOW] = {
 		.name = "ibm,remove-pe-dma-window",
 	},
-	[RTAS_FNIDX__IBM_RESET_PE_DMA_WINDOWS] = {
-		.name = "ibm,reset-pe-dma-windows",
+	[RTAS_FNIDX__IBM_RESET_PE_DMA_WINDOW] = {
+		/*
+		 * Note: PAPR+ v2.13 7.3.31.4.1 spells this as
+		 * "ibm,reset-pe-dma-windows" (plural), but RTAS
+		 * implementations use the singular form in practice.
+		 */
+		.name = "ibm,reset-pe-dma-window",
 	},
 	[RTAS_FNIDX__IBM_SCAN_LOG_DUMP] = {
 		.name = "ibm,scan-log-dump",
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/iommu.c b/arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/iommu.c
index 496e16c588..e8c4129697 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/iommu.c
+++ b/arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/iommu.c
@@ -574,29 +574,6 @@ static void iommu_table_setparms(struct pci_controller *phb,
 
 struct iommu_table_ops iommu_table_lpar_multi_ops;
 
-/*
- * iommu_table_setparms_lpar
- *
- * Function: On pSeries LPAR systems, return TCE table info, given a pci bus.
- */
-static void iommu_table_setparms_lpar(struct pci_controller *phb,
-				      struct device_node *dn,
-				      struct iommu_table *tbl,
-				      struct iommu_table_group *table_group,
-				      const __be32 *dma_window)
-{
-	unsigned long offset, size, liobn;
-
-	of_parse_dma_window(dn, dma_window, &liobn, &offset, &size);
-
-	iommu_table_setparms_common(tbl, phb->bus->number, liobn, offset, size, IOMMU_PAGE_SHIFT_4K, NULL,
-				    &iommu_table_lpar_multi_ops);
-
-
-	table_group->tce32_start = offset;
-	table_group->tce32_size = size;
-}
-
 struct iommu_table_ops iommu_table_pseries_ops = {
 	.set = tce_build_pSeries,
 	.clear = tce_free_pSeries,
@@ -724,26 +701,71 @@ struct iommu_table_ops iommu_table_lpar_multi_ops = {
  * dynamic 64bit DMA window, walking up the device tree.
  */
 static struct device_node *pci_dma_find(struct device_node *dn,
-					const __be32 **dma_window)
+					struct dynamic_dma_window_prop *prop)
 {
-	const __be32 *dw = NULL;
+	const __be32 *default_prop = NULL;
+	const __be32 *ddw_prop = NULL;
+	struct device_node *rdn = NULL;
+	bool default_win = false, ddw_win = false;
 
 	for ( ; dn && PCI_DN(dn); dn = dn->parent) {
-		dw = of_get_property(dn, "ibm,dma-window", NULL);
-		if (dw) {
-			if (dma_window)
-				*dma_window = dw;
-			return dn;
+		default_prop = of_get_property(dn, "ibm,dma-window", NULL);
+		if (default_prop) {
+			rdn = dn;
+			default_win = true;
+		}
+		ddw_prop = of_get_property(dn, DIRECT64_PROPNAME, NULL);
+		if (ddw_prop) {
+			rdn = dn;
+			ddw_win = true;
+			break;
+		}
+		ddw_prop = of_get_property(dn, DMA64_PROPNAME, NULL);
+		if (ddw_prop) {
+			rdn = dn;
+			ddw_win = true;
+			break;
 		}
-		dw = of_get_property(dn, DIRECT64_PROPNAME, NULL);
-		if (dw)
-			return dn;
-		dw = of_get_property(dn, DMA64_PROPNAME, NULL);
-		if (dw)
-			return dn;
+
+		/* At least found default window, which is the case for normal boot */
+		if (default_win)
+			break;
 	}
 
-	return NULL;
+	/* For PCI devices there will always be a DMA window, either on the device
+	 * or parent bus
+	 */
+	WARN_ON(!(default_win | ddw_win));
+
+	/* caller doesn't want to get DMA window property */
+	if (!prop)
+		return rdn;
+
+	/* parse DMA window property. During normal system boot, only default
+	 * DMA window is passed in OF. But, for kdump, a dedicated adapter might
+	 * have both default and DDW in FDT. In this scenario, DDW takes precedence
+	 * over default window.
+	 */
+	if (ddw_win) {
+		struct dynamic_dma_window_prop *p;
+
+		p = (struct dynamic_dma_window_prop *)ddw_prop;
+		prop->liobn = p->liobn;
+		prop->dma_base = p->dma_base;
+		prop->tce_shift = p->tce_shift;
+		prop->window_shift = p->window_shift;
+	} else if (default_win) {
+		unsigned long offset, size, liobn;
+
+		of_parse_dma_window(rdn, default_prop, &liobn, &offset, &size);
+
+		prop->liobn = cpu_to_be32((u32)liobn);
+		prop->dma_base = cpu_to_be64(offset);
+		prop->tce_shift = cpu_to_be32(IOMMU_PAGE_SHIFT_4K);
+		prop->window_shift = cpu_to_be32(order_base_2(size));
+	}
+
+	return rdn;
 }
 
 static void pci_dma_bus_setup_pSeriesLP(struct pci_bus *bus)
@@ -751,17 +773,20 @@ static void pci_dma_bus_setup_pSeriesLP(struct pci_bus *bus)
 	struct iommu_table *tbl;
 	struct device_node *dn, *pdn;
 	struct pci_dn *ppci;
-	const __be32 *dma_window = NULL;
+	struct dynamic_dma_window_prop prop;
 
 	dn = pci_bus_to_OF_node(bus);
 
 	pr_debug("pci_dma_bus_setup_pSeriesLP: setting up bus %pOF\n",
 		 dn);
 
-	pdn = pci_dma_find(dn, &dma_window);
+	pdn = pci_dma_find(dn, &prop);
 
-	if (dma_window == NULL)
-		pr_debug("  no ibm,dma-window property !\n");
+	/* In PPC architecture, there will always be DMA window on bus or one of the
+	 * parent bus. During reboot, there will be ibm,dma-window property to
+	 * define DMA window. For kdump, there will at least be default window or DDW
+	 * or both.
+	 */
 
 	ppci = PCI_DN(pdn);
 
@@ -771,13 +796,24 @@ static void pci_dma_bus_setup_pSeriesLP(struct pci_bus *bus)
 	if (!ppci->table_group) {
 		ppci->table_group = iommu_pseries_alloc_group(ppci->phb->node);
 		tbl = ppci->table_group->tables[0];
-		if (dma_window) {
-			iommu_table_setparms_lpar(ppci->phb, pdn, tbl,
-						  ppci->table_group, dma_window);
 
-			if (!iommu_init_table(tbl, ppci->phb->node, 0, 0))
-				panic("Failed to initialize iommu table");
-		}
+		iommu_table_setparms_common(tbl, ppci->phb->bus->number,
+				be32_to_cpu(prop.liobn),
+				be64_to_cpu(prop.dma_base),
+				1ULL << be32_to_cpu(prop.window_shift),
+				be32_to_cpu(prop.tce_shift), NULL,
+				&iommu_table_lpar_multi_ops);
+
+		/* Only for normal boot with default window. Doesn't matter even
+		 * if we set these with DDW which is 64bit during kdump, since
+		 * these will not be used during kdump.
+		 */
+		ppci->table_group->tce32_start = be64_to_cpu(prop.dma_base);
+		ppci->table_group->tce32_size = 1 << be32_to_cpu(prop.window_shift);
+
+		if (!iommu_init_table(tbl, ppci->phb->node, 0, 0))
+			panic("Failed to initialize iommu table");
+
 		iommu_register_group(ppci->table_group,
 				pci_domain_nr(bus), 0);
 		pr_debug("  created table: %p\n", ppci->table_group);
@@ -968,6 +1004,12 @@ static void find_existing_ddw_windows_named(const char *name)
 			continue;
 		}
 
+		/* If at the time of system initialization, there are DDWs in OF,
+		 * it means this is during kexec. DDW could be direct or dynamic.
+		 * We will just mark DDWs as "dynamic" since this is kdump path,
+		 * no need to worry about perforance. ddw_list_new_entry() will
+		 * set window->direct = false.
+		 */
 		window = ddw_list_new_entry(pdn, dma64);
 		if (!window) {
 			of_node_put(pdn);
@@ -1524,8 +1566,8 @@ static void pci_dma_dev_setup_pSeriesLP(struct pci_dev *dev)
 {
 	struct device_node *pdn, *dn;
 	struct iommu_table *tbl;
-	const __be32 *dma_window = NULL;
 	struct pci_dn *pci;
+	struct dynamic_dma_window_prop prop;
 
 	pr_debug("pci_dma_dev_setup_pSeriesLP: %s\n", pci_name(dev));
 
@@ -1538,7 +1580,7 @@ static void pci_dma_dev_setup_pSeriesLP(struct pci_dev *dev)
 	dn = pci_device_to_OF_node(dev);
 	pr_debug("  node is %pOF\n", dn);
 
-	pdn = pci_dma_find(dn, &dma_window);
+	pdn = pci_dma_find(dn, &prop);
 	if (!pdn || !PCI_DN(pdn)) {
 		printk(KERN_WARNING "pci_dma_dev_setup_pSeriesLP: "
 		       "no DMA window found for pci dev=%s dn=%pOF\n",
@@ -1551,8 +1593,20 @@ static void pci_dma_dev_setup_pSeriesLP(struct pci_dev *dev)
 	if (!pci->table_group) {
 		pci->table_group = iommu_pseries_alloc_group(pci->phb->node);
 		tbl = pci->table_group->tables[0];
-		iommu_table_setparms_lpar(pci->phb, pdn, tbl,
-				pci->table_group, dma_window);
+
+		iommu_table_setparms_common(tbl, pci->phb->bus->number,
+				be32_to_cpu(prop.liobn),
+				be64_to_cpu(prop.dma_base),
+				1ULL << be32_to_cpu(prop.window_shift),
+				be32_to_cpu(prop.tce_shift), NULL,
+				&iommu_table_lpar_multi_ops);
+
+		/* Only for normal boot with default window. Doesn't matter even
+		 * if we set these with DDW which is 64bit during kdump, since
+		 * these will not be used during kdump.
+		 */
+		pci->table_group->tce32_start = be64_to_cpu(prop.dma_base);
+		pci->table_group->tce32_size = 1 << be32_to_cpu(prop.window_shift);
 
 		iommu_init_table(tbl, pci->phb->node, 0, 0);
 		iommu_register_group(pci->table_group,
diff --git a/arch/riscv/Kconfig b/arch/riscv/Kconfig
index cd4c9a204d..f6df30e8d1 100644
--- a/arch/riscv/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/riscv/Kconfig
@@ -294,7 +294,6 @@ config AS_HAS_OPTION_ARCH
 	# https://reviews.llvm.org/D123515
 	def_bool y
 	depends on $(as-instr, .option arch$(comma) +m)
-	depends on !$(as-instr, .option arch$(comma) -i)
 
 source "arch/riscv/Kconfig.socs"
 source "arch/riscv/Kconfig.errata"
diff --git a/arch/riscv/include/asm/csr.h b/arch/riscv/include/asm/csr.h
index 306a19a550..0f2e68f4e8 100644
--- a/arch/riscv/include/asm/csr.h
+++ b/arch/riscv/include/asm/csr.h
@@ -415,6 +415,7 @@
 # define CSR_STATUS	CSR_MSTATUS
 # define CSR_IE		CSR_MIE
 # define CSR_TVEC	CSR_MTVEC
+# define CSR_ENVCFG	CSR_MENVCFG
 # define CSR_SCRATCH	CSR_MSCRATCH
 # define CSR_EPC	CSR_MEPC
 # define CSR_CAUSE	CSR_MCAUSE
@@ -439,6 +440,7 @@
 # define CSR_STATUS	CSR_SSTATUS
 # define CSR_IE		CSR_SIE
 # define CSR_TVEC	CSR_STVEC
+# define CSR_ENVCFG	CSR_SENVCFG
 # define CSR_SCRATCH	CSR_SSCRATCH
 # define CSR_EPC	CSR_SEPC
 # define CSR_CAUSE	CSR_SCAUSE
diff --git a/arch/riscv/include/asm/ftrace.h b/arch/riscv/include/asm/ftrace.h
index 2b2f5df7ef..42777f91a9 100644
--- a/arch/riscv/include/asm/ftrace.h
+++ b/arch/riscv/include/asm/ftrace.h
@@ -25,6 +25,11 @@
 
 #define ARCH_SUPPORTS_FTRACE_OPS 1
 #ifndef __ASSEMBLY__
+
+extern void *return_address(unsigned int level);
+
+#define ftrace_return_address(n) return_address(n)
+
 void MCOUNT_NAME(void);
 static inline unsigned long ftrace_call_adjust(unsigned long addr)
 {
diff --git a/arch/riscv/include/asm/hugetlb.h b/arch/riscv/include/asm/hugetlb.h
index 20f9c3ba23..22deb7a2a6 100644
--- a/arch/riscv/include/asm/hugetlb.h
+++ b/arch/riscv/include/asm/hugetlb.h
@@ -11,8 +11,10 @@ static inline void arch_clear_hugepage_flags(struct page *page)
 }
 #define arch_clear_hugepage_flags arch_clear_hugepage_flags
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_ENABLE_HUGEPAGE_MIGRATION
 bool arch_hugetlb_migration_supported(struct hstate *h);
 #define arch_hugetlb_migration_supported arch_hugetlb_migration_supported
+#endif
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_RISCV_ISA_SVNAPOT
 #define __HAVE_ARCH_HUGE_PTE_CLEAR
diff --git a/arch/riscv/include/asm/pgalloc.h b/arch/riscv/include/asm/pgalloc.h
index d169a4f41a..c80bb9990d 100644
--- a/arch/riscv/include/asm/pgalloc.h
+++ b/arch/riscv/include/asm/pgalloc.h
@@ -95,7 +95,13 @@ static inline void pud_free(struct mm_struct *mm, pud_t *pud)
 		__pud_free(mm, pud);
 }
 
-#define __pud_free_tlb(tlb, pud, addr)  pud_free((tlb)->mm, pud)
+#define __pud_free_tlb(tlb, pud, addr)					\
+do {									\
+	if (pgtable_l4_enabled) {					\
+		pagetable_pud_dtor(virt_to_ptdesc(pud));		\
+		tlb_remove_page_ptdesc((tlb), virt_to_ptdesc(pud));	\
+	}								\
+} while (0)
 
 #define p4d_alloc_one p4d_alloc_one
 static inline p4d_t *p4d_alloc_one(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long addr)
@@ -124,7 +130,11 @@ static inline void p4d_free(struct mm_struct *mm, p4d_t *p4d)
 		__p4d_free(mm, p4d);
 }
 
-#define __p4d_free_tlb(tlb, p4d, addr)  p4d_free((tlb)->mm, p4d)
+#define __p4d_free_tlb(tlb, p4d, addr)					\
+do {									\
+	if (pgtable_l5_enabled)						\
+		tlb_remove_page_ptdesc((tlb), virt_to_ptdesc(p4d));	\
+} while (0)
 #endif /* __PAGETABLE_PMD_FOLDED */
 
 static inline void sync_kernel_mappings(pgd_t *pgd)
@@ -149,7 +159,11 @@ static inline pgd_t *pgd_alloc(struct mm_struct *mm)
 
 #ifndef __PAGETABLE_PMD_FOLDED
 
-#define __pmd_free_tlb(tlb, pmd, addr)  pmd_free((tlb)->mm, pmd)
+#define __pmd_free_tlb(tlb, pmd, addr)				\
+do {								\
+	pagetable_pmd_dtor(virt_to_ptdesc(pmd));		\
+	tlb_remove_page_ptdesc((tlb), virt_to_ptdesc(pmd));	\
+} while (0)
 
 #endif /* __PAGETABLE_PMD_FOLDED */
 
diff --git a/arch/riscv/include/asm/pgtable-64.h b/arch/riscv/include/asm/pgtable-64.h
index 9a2c780a11..783837bbd8 100644
--- a/arch/riscv/include/asm/pgtable-64.h
+++ b/arch/riscv/include/asm/pgtable-64.h
@@ -136,7 +136,7 @@ enum napot_cont_order {
  * 10010 - IO   Strongly-ordered, Non-cacheable, Non-bufferable, Shareable, Non-trustable
  */
 #define _PAGE_PMA_THEAD		((1UL << 62) | (1UL << 61) | (1UL << 60))
-#define _PAGE_NOCACHE_THEAD	((1UL < 61) | (1UL << 60))
+#define _PAGE_NOCACHE_THEAD	((1UL << 61) | (1UL << 60))
 #define _PAGE_IO_THEAD		((1UL << 63) | (1UL << 60))
 #define _PAGE_MTMASK_THEAD	(_PAGE_PMA_THEAD | _PAGE_IO_THEAD | (1UL << 59))
 
diff --git a/arch/riscv/include/asm/pgtable.h b/arch/riscv/include/asm/pgtable.h
index 74ffb2178f..76b131e7bb 100644
--- a/arch/riscv/include/asm/pgtable.h
+++ b/arch/riscv/include/asm/pgtable.h
@@ -84,7 +84,7 @@
  * Define vmemmap for pfn_to_page & page_to_pfn calls. Needed if kernel
  * is configured with CONFIG_SPARSEMEM_VMEMMAP enabled.
  */
-#define vmemmap		((struct page *)VMEMMAP_START)
+#define vmemmap		((struct page *)VMEMMAP_START - (phys_ram_base >> PAGE_SHIFT))
 
 #define PCI_IO_SIZE      SZ_16M
 #define PCI_IO_END       VMEMMAP_START
@@ -439,6 +439,10 @@ static inline pte_t pte_mkhuge(pte_t pte)
 	return pte;
 }
 
+#define pte_leaf_size(pte)	(pte_napot(pte) ?				\
+					napot_cont_size(napot_cont_order(pte)) :\
+					PAGE_SIZE)
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_NUMA_BALANCING
 /*
  * See the comment in include/asm-generic/pgtable.h
diff --git a/arch/riscv/include/asm/vmalloc.h b/arch/riscv/include/asm/vmalloc.h
index 924d01b56c..51f6dfe197 100644
--- a/arch/riscv/include/asm/vmalloc.h
+++ b/arch/riscv/include/asm/vmalloc.h
@@ -19,65 +19,6 @@ static inline bool arch_vmap_pmd_supported(pgprot_t prot)
 	return true;
 }
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_RISCV_ISA_SVNAPOT
-#include <linux/pgtable.h>
+#endif
 
-#define arch_vmap_pte_range_map_size arch_vmap_pte_range_map_size
-static inline unsigned long arch_vmap_pte_range_map_size(unsigned long addr, unsigned long end,
-							 u64 pfn, unsigned int max_page_shift)
-{
-	unsigned long map_size = PAGE_SIZE;
-	unsigned long size, order;
-
-	if (!has_svnapot())
-		return map_size;
-
-	for_each_napot_order_rev(order) {
-		if (napot_cont_shift(order) > max_page_shift)
-			continue;
-
-		size = napot_cont_size(order);
-		if (end - addr < size)
-			continue;
-
-		if (!IS_ALIGNED(addr, size))
-			continue;
-
-		if (!IS_ALIGNED(PFN_PHYS(pfn), size))
-			continue;
-
-		map_size = size;
-		break;
-	}
-
-	return map_size;
-}
-
-#define arch_vmap_pte_supported_shift arch_vmap_pte_supported_shift
-static inline int arch_vmap_pte_supported_shift(unsigned long size)
-{
-	int shift = PAGE_SHIFT;
-	unsigned long order;
-
-	if (!has_svnapot())
-		return shift;
-
-	WARN_ON_ONCE(size >= PMD_SIZE);
-
-	for_each_napot_order_rev(order) {
-		if (napot_cont_size(order) > size)
-			continue;
-
-		if (!IS_ALIGNED(size, napot_cont_size(order)))
-			continue;
-
-		shift = napot_cont_shift(order);
-		break;
-	}
-
-	return shift;
-}
-
-#endif /* CONFIG_RISCV_ISA_SVNAPOT */
-#endif /* CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_HUGE_VMAP */
 #endif /* _ASM_RISCV_VMALLOC_H */
diff --git a/arch/riscv/kernel/Makefile b/arch/riscv/kernel/Makefile
index fee22a3d1b..40d054939a 100644
--- a/arch/riscv/kernel/Makefile
+++ b/arch/riscv/kernel/Makefile
@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ ifdef CONFIG_FTRACE
 CFLAGS_REMOVE_ftrace.o	= $(CC_FLAGS_FTRACE)
 CFLAGS_REMOVE_patch.o	= $(CC_FLAGS_FTRACE)
 CFLAGS_REMOVE_sbi.o	= $(CC_FLAGS_FTRACE)
+CFLAGS_REMOVE_return_address.o	= $(CC_FLAGS_FTRACE)
 endif
 CFLAGS_syscall_table.o	+= $(call cc-option,-Wno-override-init,)
 CFLAGS_compat_syscall_table.o += $(call cc-option,-Wno-override-init,)
@@ -46,6 +47,7 @@ obj-y	+= irq.o
 obj-y	+= process.o
 obj-y	+= ptrace.o
 obj-y	+= reset.o
+obj-y	+= return_address.o
 obj-y	+= setup.o
 obj-y	+= signal.o
 obj-y	+= syscall_table.o
diff --git a/arch/riscv/kernel/cpufeature.c b/arch/riscv/kernel/cpufeature.c
index b3785ffc15..8677788133 100644
--- a/arch/riscv/kernel/cpufeature.c
+++ b/arch/riscv/kernel/cpufeature.c
@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@
 #include <asm/hwprobe.h>
 #include <asm/patch.h>
 #include <asm/processor.h>
+#include <asm/sbi.h>
 #include <asm/vector.h>
 
 #include "copy-unaligned.h"
@@ -402,6 +403,20 @@ static void __init riscv_fill_hwcap_from_isa_string(unsigned long *isa2hwcap)
 		}
 
 		/*
+		 * "V" in ISA strings is ambiguous in practice: it should mean
+		 * just the standard V-1.0 but vendors aren't well behaved.
+		 * Many vendors with T-Head CPU cores which implement the 0.7.1
+		 * version of the vector specification put "v" into their DTs.
+		 * CPU cores with the ratified spec will contain non-zero
+		 * marchid.
+		 */
+		if (acpi_disabled && riscv_cached_mvendorid(cpu) == THEAD_VENDOR_ID &&
+		    riscv_cached_marchid(cpu) == 0x0) {
+			this_hwcap &= ~isa2hwcap[RISCV_ISA_EXT_v];
+			clear_bit(RISCV_ISA_EXT_v, isainfo->isa);
+		}
+
+		/*
 		 * All "okay" hart should have same isa. Set HWCAP based on
 		 * common capabilities of every "okay" hart, in case they don't
 		 * have.
@@ -725,7 +740,7 @@ arch_initcall(check_unaligned_access_all_cpus);
 void riscv_user_isa_enable(void)
 {
 	if (riscv_cpu_has_extension_unlikely(smp_processor_id(), RISCV_ISA_EXT_ZICBOZ))
-		csr_set(CSR_SENVCFG, ENVCFG_CBZE);
+		csr_set(CSR_ENVCFG, ENVCFG_CBZE);
 }
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_RISCV_ALTERNATIVE
diff --git a/arch/riscv/kernel/return_address.c b/arch/riscv/kernel/return_address.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..c8115ec8fb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/riscv/kernel/return_address.c
@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * This code come from arch/arm64/kernel/return_address.c
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2023 SiFive.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/export.h>
+#include <linux/kprobes.h>
+#include <linux/stacktrace.h>
+
+struct return_address_data {
+	unsigned int level;
+	void *addr;
+};
+
+static bool save_return_addr(void *d, unsigned long pc)
+{
+	struct return_address_data *data = d;
+
+	if (!data->level) {
+		data->addr = (void *)pc;
+		return false;
+	}
+
+	--data->level;
+
+	return true;
+}
+NOKPROBE_SYMBOL(save_return_addr);
+
+noinline void *return_address(unsigned int level)
+{
+	struct return_address_data data;
+
+	data.level = level + 3;
+	data.addr = NULL;
+
+	arch_stack_walk(save_return_addr, &data, current, NULL);
+
+	if (!data.level)
+		return data.addr;
+	else
+		return NULL;
+
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(return_address);
+NOKPROBE_SYMBOL(return_address);
diff --git a/arch/riscv/mm/hugetlbpage.c b/arch/riscv/mm/hugetlbpage.c
index e7b6928187..fbe9188016 100644
--- a/arch/riscv/mm/hugetlbpage.c
+++ b/arch/riscv/mm/hugetlbpage.c
@@ -426,10 +426,12 @@ bool __init arch_hugetlb_valid_size(unsigned long size)
 	return __hugetlb_valid_size(size);
 }
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_ENABLE_HUGEPAGE_MIGRATION
 bool arch_hugetlb_migration_supported(struct hstate *h)
 {
 	return __hugetlb_valid_size(huge_page_size(h));
 }
+#endif
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_CONTIG_ALLOC
 static __init int gigantic_pages_init(void)
diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S b/arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S
index c73047bf9f..fba4276468 100644
--- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S
@@ -885,6 +885,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(entry_SYSENTER_32)
 	BUG_IF_WRONG_CR3 no_user_check=1
 	popfl
 	popl	%eax
+	CLEAR_CPU_BUFFERS
 
 	/*
 	 * Return back to the vDSO, which will pop ecx and edx.
@@ -954,6 +955,7 @@ restore_all_switch_stack:
 
 	/* Restore user state */
 	RESTORE_REGS pop=4			# skip orig_eax/error_code
+	CLEAR_CPU_BUFFERS
 .Lirq_return:
 	/*
 	 * ARCH_HAS_MEMBARRIER_SYNC_CORE rely on IRET core serialization
@@ -1146,6 +1148,7 @@ SYM_CODE_START(asm_exc_nmi)
 
 	/* Not on SYSENTER stack. */
 	call	exc_nmi
+	CLEAR_CPU_BUFFERS
 	jmp	.Lnmi_return
 
 .Lnmi_from_sysenter_stack:
diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
index de6469dffe..bdb17fad5d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
@@ -161,6 +161,7 @@ syscall_return_via_sysret:
 SYM_INNER_LABEL(entry_SYSRETQ_unsafe_stack, SYM_L_GLOBAL)
 	ANNOTATE_NOENDBR
 	swapgs
+	CLEAR_CPU_BUFFERS
 	sysretq
 SYM_INNER_LABEL(entry_SYSRETQ_end, SYM_L_GLOBAL)
 	ANNOTATE_NOENDBR
@@ -601,6 +602,7 @@ SYM_INNER_LABEL(swapgs_restore_regs_and_return_to_usermode, SYM_L_GLOBAL)
 	/* Restore RDI. */
 	popq	%rdi
 	swapgs
+	CLEAR_CPU_BUFFERS
 	jmp	.Lnative_iret
 
 
@@ -712,6 +714,8 @@ native_irq_return_ldt:
 	 */
 	popq	%rax				/* Restore user RAX */
 
+	CLEAR_CPU_BUFFERS
+
 	/*
 	 * RSP now points to an ordinary IRET frame, except that the page
 	 * is read-only and RSP[31:16] are preloaded with the userspace
@@ -1439,6 +1443,12 @@ nmi_restore:
 	movq	$0, 5*8(%rsp)		/* clear "NMI executing" */
 
 	/*
+	 * Skip CLEAR_CPU_BUFFERS here, since it only helps in rare cases like
+	 * NMI in kernel after user state is restored. For an unprivileged user
+	 * these conditions are hard to meet.
+	 */
+
+	/*
 	 * iretq reads the "iret" frame and exits the NMI stack in a
 	 * single instruction.  We are returning to kernel mode, so this
 	 * cannot result in a fault.  Similarly, we don't need to worry
@@ -1455,6 +1465,7 @@ SYM_CODE_START(entry_SYSCALL32_ignore)
 	UNWIND_HINT_END_OF_STACK
 	ENDBR
 	mov	$-ENOSYS, %eax
+	CLEAR_CPU_BUFFERS
 	sysretl
 SYM_CODE_END(entry_SYSCALL32_ignore)
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S
index de94e2e84e..eabf48c4d4 100644
--- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S
@@ -270,6 +270,7 @@ SYM_INNER_LABEL(entry_SYSRETL_compat_unsafe_stack, SYM_L_GLOBAL)
 	xorl	%r9d, %r9d
 	xorl	%r10d, %r10d
 	swapgs
+	CLEAR_CPU_BUFFERS
 	sysretl
 SYM_INNER_LABEL(entry_SYSRETL_compat_end, SYM_L_GLOBAL)
 	ANNOTATE_NOENDBR
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/entry-common.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/entry-common.h
index ce8f50192a..7e523bb3d2 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/entry-common.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/entry-common.h
@@ -91,7 +91,6 @@ static inline void arch_exit_to_user_mode_prepare(struct pt_regs *regs,
 
 static __always_inline void arch_exit_to_user_mode(void)
 {
-	mds_user_clear_cpu_buffers();
 	amd_clear_divider();
 }
 #define arch_exit_to_user_mode arch_exit_to_user_mode
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
index 2519615936..d15b35815e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
@@ -540,7 +540,6 @@ DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(switch_to_cond_stibp);
 DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(switch_mm_cond_ibpb);
 DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(switch_mm_always_ibpb);
 
-DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(mds_user_clear);
 DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(mds_idle_clear);
 
 DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(switch_mm_cond_l1d_flush);
@@ -575,17 +574,6 @@ static __always_inline void mds_clear_cpu_buffers(void)
 }
 
 /**
- * mds_user_clear_cpu_buffers - Mitigation for MDS and TAA vulnerability
- *
- * Clear CPU buffers if the corresponding static key is enabled
- */
-static __always_inline void mds_user_clear_cpu_buffers(void)
-{
-	if (static_branch_likely(&mds_user_clear))
-		mds_clear_cpu_buffers();
-}
-
-/**
  * mds_idle_clear_cpu_buffers - Mitigation for MDS vulnerability
  *
  * Clear CPU buffers if the corresponding static key is enabled
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index bb0ab8466b..48d049cd74 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -111,9 +111,6 @@ DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(switch_mm_cond_ibpb);
 /* Control unconditional IBPB in switch_mm() */
 DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(switch_mm_always_ibpb);
 
-/* Control MDS CPU buffer clear before returning to user space */
-DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(mds_user_clear);
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(mds_user_clear);
 /* Control MDS CPU buffer clear before idling (halt, mwait) */
 DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(mds_idle_clear);
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(mds_idle_clear);
@@ -252,7 +249,7 @@ static void __init mds_select_mitigation(void)
 		if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MD_CLEAR))
 			mds_mitigation = MDS_MITIGATION_VMWERV;
 
-		static_branch_enable(&mds_user_clear);
+		setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF);
 
 		if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_BUG_MSBDS_ONLY) &&
 		    (mds_nosmt || cpu_mitigations_auto_nosmt()))
@@ -356,7 +353,7 @@ static void __init taa_select_mitigation(void)
 	 * For guests that can't determine whether the correct microcode is
 	 * present on host, enable the mitigation for UCODE_NEEDED as well.
 	 */
-	static_branch_enable(&mds_user_clear);
+	setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF);
 
 	if (taa_nosmt || cpu_mitigations_auto_nosmt())
 		cpu_smt_disable(false);
@@ -424,7 +421,7 @@ static void __init mmio_select_mitigation(void)
 	 */
 	if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MDS) || (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_TAA) &&
 					      boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RTM)))
-		static_branch_enable(&mds_user_clear);
+		setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF);
 	else
 		static_branch_enable(&mmio_stale_data_clear);
 
@@ -484,12 +481,12 @@ static void __init md_clear_update_mitigation(void)
 	if (cpu_mitigations_off())
 		return;
 
-	if (!static_key_enabled(&mds_user_clear))
+	if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF))
 		goto out;
 
 	/*
-	 * mds_user_clear is now enabled. Update MDS, TAA and MMIO Stale Data
-	 * mitigation, if necessary.
+	 * X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF is now enabled. Update MDS, TAA and MMIO
+	 * Stale Data mitigation, if necessary.
 	 */
 	if (mds_mitigation == MDS_MITIGATION_OFF &&
 	    boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MDS)) {
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
index 98f7ea6b93..34cac9ea19 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
@@ -1596,6 +1596,7 @@ static void __init early_identify_cpu(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 		get_cpu_vendor(c);
 		get_cpu_cap(c);
 		setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_CPUID);
+		get_cpu_address_sizes(c);
 		cpu_parse_early_param();
 
 		if (this_cpu->c_early_init)
@@ -1608,10 +1609,9 @@ static void __init early_identify_cpu(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 			this_cpu->c_bsp_init(c);
 	} else {
 		setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_CPUID);
+		get_cpu_address_sizes(c);
 	}
 
-	get_cpu_address_sizes(c);
-
 	setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_ALWAYS);
 
 	cpu_set_bug_bits(c);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c
index a927a8fc96..40dec9b56f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c
@@ -184,6 +184,90 @@ static bool bad_spectre_microcode(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 	return false;
 }
 
+#define MSR_IA32_TME_ACTIVATE		0x982
+
+/* Helpers to access TME_ACTIVATE MSR */
+#define TME_ACTIVATE_LOCKED(x)		(x & 0x1)
+#define TME_ACTIVATE_ENABLED(x)		(x & 0x2)
+
+#define TME_ACTIVATE_POLICY(x)		((x >> 4) & 0xf)	/* Bits 7:4 */
+#define TME_ACTIVATE_POLICY_AES_XTS_128	0
+
+#define TME_ACTIVATE_KEYID_BITS(x)	((x >> 32) & 0xf)	/* Bits 35:32 */
+
+#define TME_ACTIVATE_CRYPTO_ALGS(x)	((x >> 48) & 0xffff)	/* Bits 63:48 */
+#define TME_ACTIVATE_CRYPTO_AES_XTS_128	1
+
+/* Values for mktme_status (SW only construct) */
+#define MKTME_ENABLED			0
+#define MKTME_DISABLED			1
+#define MKTME_UNINITIALIZED		2
+static int mktme_status = MKTME_UNINITIALIZED;
+
+static void detect_tme_early(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
+{
+	u64 tme_activate, tme_policy, tme_crypto_algs;
+	int keyid_bits = 0, nr_keyids = 0;
+	static u64 tme_activate_cpu0 = 0;
+
+	rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_TME_ACTIVATE, tme_activate);
+
+	if (mktme_status != MKTME_UNINITIALIZED) {
+		if (tme_activate != tme_activate_cpu0) {
+			/* Broken BIOS? */
+			pr_err_once("x86/tme: configuration is inconsistent between CPUs\n");
+			pr_err_once("x86/tme: MKTME is not usable\n");
+			mktme_status = MKTME_DISABLED;
+
+			/* Proceed. We may need to exclude bits from x86_phys_bits. */
+		}
+	} else {
+		tme_activate_cpu0 = tme_activate;
+	}
+
+	if (!TME_ACTIVATE_LOCKED(tme_activate) || !TME_ACTIVATE_ENABLED(tme_activate)) {
+		pr_info_once("x86/tme: not enabled by BIOS\n");
+		mktme_status = MKTME_DISABLED;
+		return;
+	}
+
+	if (mktme_status != MKTME_UNINITIALIZED)
+		goto detect_keyid_bits;
+
+	pr_info("x86/tme: enabled by BIOS\n");
+
+	tme_policy = TME_ACTIVATE_POLICY(tme_activate);
+	if (tme_policy != TME_ACTIVATE_POLICY_AES_XTS_128)
+		pr_warn("x86/tme: Unknown policy is active: %#llx\n", tme_policy);
+
+	tme_crypto_algs = TME_ACTIVATE_CRYPTO_ALGS(tme_activate);
+	if (!(tme_crypto_algs & TME_ACTIVATE_CRYPTO_AES_XTS_128)) {
+		pr_err("x86/mktme: No known encryption algorithm is supported: %#llx\n",
+				tme_crypto_algs);
+		mktme_status = MKTME_DISABLED;
+	}
+detect_keyid_bits:
+	keyid_bits = TME_ACTIVATE_KEYID_BITS(tme_activate);
+	nr_keyids = (1UL << keyid_bits) - 1;
+	if (nr_keyids) {
+		pr_info_once("x86/mktme: enabled by BIOS\n");
+		pr_info_once("x86/mktme: %d KeyIDs available\n", nr_keyids);
+	} else {
+		pr_info_once("x86/mktme: disabled by BIOS\n");
+	}
+
+	if (mktme_status == MKTME_UNINITIALIZED) {
+		/* MKTME is usable */
+		mktme_status = MKTME_ENABLED;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * KeyID bits effectively lower the number of physical address
+	 * bits.  Update cpuinfo_x86::x86_phys_bits accordingly.
+	 */
+	c->x86_phys_bits -= keyid_bits;
+}
+
 static void early_init_intel(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 {
 	u64 misc_enable;
@@ -322,6 +406,13 @@ static void early_init_intel(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 	 */
 	if (detect_extended_topology_early(c) < 0)
 		detect_ht_early(c);
+
+	/*
+	 * Adjust the number of physical bits early because it affects the
+	 * valid bits of the MTRR mask registers.
+	 */
+	if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_TME))
+		detect_tme_early(c);
 }
 
 static void bsp_init_intel(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
@@ -482,90 +573,6 @@ static void srat_detect_node(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 #endif
 }
 
-#define MSR_IA32_TME_ACTIVATE		0x982
-
-/* Helpers to access TME_ACTIVATE MSR */
-#define TME_ACTIVATE_LOCKED(x)		(x & 0x1)
-#define TME_ACTIVATE_ENABLED(x)		(x & 0x2)
-
-#define TME_ACTIVATE_POLICY(x)		((x >> 4) & 0xf)	/* Bits 7:4 */
-#define TME_ACTIVATE_POLICY_AES_XTS_128	0
-
-#define TME_ACTIVATE_KEYID_BITS(x)	((x >> 32) & 0xf)	/* Bits 35:32 */
-
-#define TME_ACTIVATE_CRYPTO_ALGS(x)	((x >> 48) & 0xffff)	/* Bits 63:48 */
-#define TME_ACTIVATE_CRYPTO_AES_XTS_128	1
-
-/* Values for mktme_status (SW only construct) */
-#define MKTME_ENABLED			0
-#define MKTME_DISABLED			1
-#define MKTME_UNINITIALIZED		2
-static int mktme_status = MKTME_UNINITIALIZED;
-
-static void detect_tme(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
-{
-	u64 tme_activate, tme_policy, tme_crypto_algs;
-	int keyid_bits = 0, nr_keyids = 0;
-	static u64 tme_activate_cpu0 = 0;
-
-	rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_TME_ACTIVATE, tme_activate);
-
-	if (mktme_status != MKTME_UNINITIALIZED) {
-		if (tme_activate != tme_activate_cpu0) {
-			/* Broken BIOS? */
-			pr_err_once("x86/tme: configuration is inconsistent between CPUs\n");
-			pr_err_once("x86/tme: MKTME is not usable\n");
-			mktme_status = MKTME_DISABLED;
-
-			/* Proceed. We may need to exclude bits from x86_phys_bits. */
-		}
-	} else {
-		tme_activate_cpu0 = tme_activate;
-	}
-
-	if (!TME_ACTIVATE_LOCKED(tme_activate) || !TME_ACTIVATE_ENABLED(tme_activate)) {
-		pr_info_once("x86/tme: not enabled by BIOS\n");
-		mktme_status = MKTME_DISABLED;
-		return;
-	}
-
-	if (mktme_status != MKTME_UNINITIALIZED)
-		goto detect_keyid_bits;
-
-	pr_info("x86/tme: enabled by BIOS\n");
-
-	tme_policy = TME_ACTIVATE_POLICY(tme_activate);
-	if (tme_policy != TME_ACTIVATE_POLICY_AES_XTS_128)
-		pr_warn("x86/tme: Unknown policy is active: %#llx\n", tme_policy);
-
-	tme_crypto_algs = TME_ACTIVATE_CRYPTO_ALGS(tme_activate);
-	if (!(tme_crypto_algs & TME_ACTIVATE_CRYPTO_AES_XTS_128)) {
-		pr_err("x86/mktme: No known encryption algorithm is supported: %#llx\n",
-				tme_crypto_algs);
-		mktme_status = MKTME_DISABLED;
-	}
-detect_keyid_bits:
-	keyid_bits = TME_ACTIVATE_KEYID_BITS(tme_activate);
-	nr_keyids = (1UL << keyid_bits) - 1;
-	if (nr_keyids) {
-		pr_info_once("x86/mktme: enabled by BIOS\n");
-		pr_info_once("x86/mktme: %d KeyIDs available\n", nr_keyids);
-	} else {
-		pr_info_once("x86/mktme: disabled by BIOS\n");
-	}
-
-	if (mktme_status == MKTME_UNINITIALIZED) {
-		/* MKTME is usable */
-		mktme_status = MKTME_ENABLED;
-	}
-
-	/*
-	 * KeyID bits effectively lower the number of physical address
-	 * bits.  Update cpuinfo_x86::x86_phys_bits accordingly.
-	 */
-	c->x86_phys_bits -= keyid_bits;
-}
-
 static void init_cpuid_fault(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 {
 	u64 msr;
@@ -702,9 +709,6 @@ static void init_intel(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 
 	init_ia32_feat_ctl(c);
 
-	if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_TME))
-		detect_tme(c);
-
 	init_intel_misc_features(c);
 
 	split_lock_init();
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/e820.c b/arch/x86/kernel/e820.c
index fb8cf95338..b66f540de0 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/e820.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/e820.c
@@ -1017,10 +1017,12 @@ void __init e820__reserve_setup_data(void)
 		e820__range_update(pa_data, sizeof(*data)+data->len, E820_TYPE_RAM, E820_TYPE_RESERVED_KERN);
 
 		/*
-		 * SETUP_EFI and SETUP_IMA are supplied by kexec and do not need
-		 * to be reserved.
+		 * SETUP_EFI, SETUP_IMA and SETUP_RNG_SEED are supplied by
+		 * kexec and do not need to be reserved.
 		 */
-		if (data->type != SETUP_EFI && data->type != SETUP_IMA)
+		if (data->type != SETUP_EFI &&
+		    data->type != SETUP_IMA &&
+		    data->type != SETUP_RNG_SEED)
 			e820__range_update_kexec(pa_data,
 						 sizeof(*data) + data->len,
 						 E820_TYPE_RAM, E820_TYPE_RESERVED_KERN);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/nmi.c b/arch/x86/kernel/nmi.c
index 17e955ab69..3082cf24b6 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/nmi.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/nmi.c
@@ -563,9 +563,6 @@ nmi_restart:
 	}
 	if (this_cpu_dec_return(nmi_state))
 		goto nmi_restart;
-
-	if (user_mode(regs))
-		mds_user_clear_cpu_buffers();
 }
 
 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KVM_INTEL)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/run_flags.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/run_flags.h
index edc3f16cc1..6a9bfdfbb6 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/run_flags.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/run_flags.h
@@ -2,7 +2,10 @@
 #ifndef __KVM_X86_VMX_RUN_FLAGS_H
 #define __KVM_X86_VMX_RUN_FLAGS_H
 
-#define VMX_RUN_VMRESUME	(1 << 0)
-#define VMX_RUN_SAVE_SPEC_CTRL	(1 << 1)
+#define VMX_RUN_VMRESUME_SHIFT		0
+#define VMX_RUN_SAVE_SPEC_CTRL_SHIFT	1
+
+#define VMX_RUN_VMRESUME		BIT(VMX_RUN_VMRESUME_SHIFT)
+#define VMX_RUN_SAVE_SPEC_CTRL		BIT(VMX_RUN_SAVE_SPEC_CTRL_SHIFT)
 
 #endif /* __KVM_X86_VMX_RUN_FLAGS_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S
index be275a0410..139960deb7 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S
@@ -139,7 +139,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(__vmx_vcpu_run)
 	mov (%_ASM_SP), %_ASM_AX
 
 	/* Check if vmlaunch or vmresume is needed */
-	test $VMX_RUN_VMRESUME, %ebx
+	bt   $VMX_RUN_VMRESUME_SHIFT, %ebx
 
 	/* Load guest registers.  Don't clobber flags. */
 	mov VCPU_RCX(%_ASM_AX), %_ASM_CX
@@ -161,8 +161,11 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(__vmx_vcpu_run)
 	/* Load guest RAX.  This kills the @regs pointer! */
 	mov VCPU_RAX(%_ASM_AX), %_ASM_AX
 
-	/* Check EFLAGS.ZF from 'test VMX_RUN_VMRESUME' above */
-	jz .Lvmlaunch
+	/* Clobbers EFLAGS.ZF */
+	CLEAR_CPU_BUFFERS
+
+	/* Check EFLAGS.CF from the VMX_RUN_VMRESUME bit test above. */
+	jnc .Lvmlaunch
 
 	/*
 	 * After a successful VMRESUME/VMLAUNCH, control flow "magically"
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
index 94082169bb..856eef56b3 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
@@ -387,7 +387,16 @@ static __always_inline void vmx_enable_fb_clear(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
 
 static void vmx_update_fb_clear_dis(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
 {
-	vmx->disable_fb_clear = (host_arch_capabilities & ARCH_CAP_FB_CLEAR_CTRL) &&
+	/*
+	 * Disable VERW's behavior of clearing CPU buffers for the guest if the
+	 * CPU isn't affected by MDS/TAA, and the host hasn't forcefully enabled
+	 * the mitigation. Disabling the clearing behavior provides a
+	 * performance boost for guests that aren't aware that manually clearing
+	 * CPU buffers is unnecessary, at the cost of MSR accesses on VM-Entry
+	 * and VM-Exit.
+	 */
+	vmx->disable_fb_clear = !cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF) &&
+				(host_arch_capabilities & ARCH_CAP_FB_CLEAR_CTRL) &&
 				!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MDS) &&
 				!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_TAA);
 
@@ -7226,11 +7235,14 @@ static noinstr void vmx_vcpu_enter_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
 
 	guest_state_enter_irqoff();
 
-	/* L1D Flush includes CPU buffer clear to mitigate MDS */
+	/*
+	 * L1D Flush includes CPU buffer clear to mitigate MDS, but VERW
+	 * mitigation for MDS is done late in VMentry and is still
+	 * executed in spite of L1D Flush. This is because an extra VERW
+	 * should not matter much after the big hammer L1D Flush.
+	 */
 	if (static_branch_unlikely(&vmx_l1d_should_flush))
 		vmx_l1d_flush(vcpu);
-	else if (static_branch_unlikely(&mds_user_clear))
-		mds_clear_cpu_buffers();
 	else if (static_branch_unlikely(&mmio_stale_data_clear) &&
 		 kvm_arch_has_assigned_device(vcpu->kvm))
 		mds_clear_cpu_buffers();