Adding upstream version 6.6.15.upstream/6.6.15

Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>

26 files changed, 5929 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..59ec726b7c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig
@@ -0,0 +1,89 @@
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+menuconfig ASYMMETRIC_KEY_TYPE
+	bool "Asymmetric (public-key cryptographic) key type"
+	depends on KEYS
+	help
+	  This option provides support for a key type that holds the data for
+	  the asymmetric keys used for public key cryptographic operations such
+	  as encryption, decryption, signature generation and signature
+	  verification.
+
+if ASYMMETRIC_KEY_TYPE
+
+config ASYMMETRIC_PUBLIC_KEY_SUBTYPE
+	tristate "Asymmetric public-key crypto algorithm subtype"
+	select MPILIB
+	select CRYPTO_HASH_INFO
+	select CRYPTO_AKCIPHER
+	select CRYPTO_HASH
+	help
+	  This option provides support for asymmetric public key type handling.
+	  If signature generation and/or verification are to be used,
+	  appropriate hash algorithms (such as SHA-1) must be available.
+	  ENOPKG will be reported if the requisite algorithm is unavailable.
+
+config X509_CERTIFICATE_PARSER
+	tristate "X.509 certificate parser"
+	depends on ASYMMETRIC_PUBLIC_KEY_SUBTYPE
+	select ASN1
+	select OID_REGISTRY
+	help
+	  This option provides support for parsing X.509 format blobs for key
+	  data and provides the ability to instantiate a crypto key from a
+	  public key packet found inside the certificate.
+
+config PKCS8_PRIVATE_KEY_PARSER
+	tristate "PKCS#8 private key parser"
+	depends on ASYMMETRIC_PUBLIC_KEY_SUBTYPE
+	select ASN1
+	select OID_REGISTRY
+	help
+	  This option provides support for parsing PKCS#8 format blobs for
+	  private key data and provides the ability to instantiate a crypto key
+	  from that data.
+
+config PKCS7_MESSAGE_PARSER
+	tristate "PKCS#7 message parser"
+	depends on X509_CERTIFICATE_PARSER
+	select CRYPTO_HASH
+	select ASN1
+	select OID_REGISTRY
+	help
+	  This option provides support for parsing PKCS#7 format messages for
+	  signature data and provides the ability to verify the signature.
+
+config PKCS7_TEST_KEY
+	tristate "PKCS#7 testing key type"
+	depends on SYSTEM_DATA_VERIFICATION
+	help
+	  This option provides a type of key that can be loaded up from a
+	  PKCS#7 message - provided the message is signed by a trusted key.  If
+	  it is, the PKCS#7 wrapper is discarded and reading the key returns
+	  just the payload.  If it isn't, adding the key will fail with an
+	  error.
+
+	  This is intended for testing the PKCS#7 parser.
+
+config SIGNED_PE_FILE_VERIFICATION
+	bool "Support for PE file signature verification"
+	depends on PKCS7_MESSAGE_PARSER=y
+	depends on SYSTEM_DATA_VERIFICATION
+	select CRYPTO_HASH
+	select ASN1
+	select OID_REGISTRY
+	help
+	  This option provides support for verifying the signature(s) on a
+	  signed PE binary.
+
+config FIPS_SIGNATURE_SELFTEST
+	tristate "Run FIPS selftests on the X.509+PKCS7 signature verification"
+	help
+	  This option causes some selftests to be run on the signature
+	  verification code, using some built in data.  This is required
+	  for FIPS.
+	depends on KEYS
+	depends on ASYMMETRIC_KEY_TYPE
+	depends on PKCS7_MESSAGE_PARSER=X509_CERTIFICATE_PARSER
+	depends on X509_CERTIFICATE_PARSER
+
+endif # ASYMMETRIC_KEY_TYPE
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..1a273d6df3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile
@@ -0,0 +1,79 @@
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+#
+# Makefile for asymmetric cryptographic keys
+#
+
+obj-$(CONFIG_ASYMMETRIC_KEY_TYPE) += asymmetric_keys.o
+
+asymmetric_keys-y := \
+	asymmetric_type.o \
+	restrict.o \
+	signature.o
+
+obj-$(CONFIG_ASYMMETRIC_PUBLIC_KEY_SUBTYPE) += public_key.o
+
+#
+# X.509 Certificate handling
+#
+obj-$(CONFIG_X509_CERTIFICATE_PARSER) += x509_key_parser.o
+x509_key_parser-y := \
+	x509.asn1.o \
+	x509_akid.asn1.o \
+	x509_cert_parser.o \
+	x509_loader.o \
+	x509_public_key.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_FIPS_SIGNATURE_SELFTEST) += x509_selftest.o
+x509_selftest-y += selftest.o
+
+$(obj)/x509_cert_parser.o: \
+	$(obj)/x509.asn1.h \
+	$(obj)/x509_akid.asn1.h
+
+$(obj)/x509.asn1.o: $(obj)/x509.asn1.c $(obj)/x509.asn1.h
+$(obj)/x509_akid.asn1.o: $(obj)/x509_akid.asn1.c $(obj)/x509_akid.asn1.h
+
+#
+# PKCS#8 private key handling
+#
+obj-$(CONFIG_PKCS8_PRIVATE_KEY_PARSER) += pkcs8_key_parser.o
+pkcs8_key_parser-y := \
+	pkcs8.asn1.o \
+	pkcs8_parser.o
+
+$(obj)/pkcs8_parser.o: $(obj)/pkcs8.asn1.h
+$(obj)/pkcs8-asn1.o: $(obj)/pkcs8.asn1.c $(obj)/pkcs8.asn1.h
+
+clean-files	+= pkcs8.asn1.c pkcs8.asn1.h
+
+#
+# PKCS#7 message handling
+#
+obj-$(CONFIG_PKCS7_MESSAGE_PARSER) += pkcs7_message.o
+pkcs7_message-y := \
+	pkcs7.asn1.o \
+	pkcs7_parser.o \
+	pkcs7_trust.o \
+	pkcs7_verify.o
+
+$(obj)/pkcs7_parser.o: $(obj)/pkcs7.asn1.h
+$(obj)/pkcs7.asn1.o: $(obj)/pkcs7.asn1.c $(obj)/pkcs7.asn1.h
+
+#
+# PKCS#7 parser testing key
+#
+obj-$(CONFIG_PKCS7_TEST_KEY) += pkcs7_test_key.o
+pkcs7_test_key-y := \
+	pkcs7_key_type.o
+
+#
+# Signed PE binary-wrapped key handling
+#
+obj-$(CONFIG_SIGNED_PE_FILE_VERIFICATION) += verify_signed_pefile.o
+
+verify_signed_pefile-y := \
+	verify_pefile.o \
+	mscode_parser.o \
+	mscode.asn1.o
+
+$(obj)/mscode_parser.o: $(obj)/mscode.asn1.h $(obj)/mscode.asn1.h
+$(obj)/mscode.asn1.o: $(obj)/mscode.asn1.c $(obj)/mscode.asn1.h
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_keys.h b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_keys.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..dc854cb737
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_keys.h
@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later */
+/* Internal definitions for asymmetric key type
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2012 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
+ */
+
+#include <keys/asymmetric-type.h>
+
+extern struct asymmetric_key_id *asymmetric_key_hex_to_key_id(const char *id);
+
+extern int __asymmetric_key_hex_to_key_id(const char *id,
+					  struct asymmetric_key_id *match_id,
+					  size_t hexlen);
+
+extern int asymmetric_key_eds_op(struct kernel_pkey_params *params,
+				 const void *in, void *out);
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..a5da8ccd35
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c
@@ -0,0 +1,684 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
+/* Asymmetric public-key cryptography key type
+ *
+ * See Documentation/crypto/asymmetric-keys.rst
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2012 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
+ */
+#include <keys/asymmetric-subtype.h>
+#include <keys/asymmetric-parser.h>
+#include <crypto/public_key.h>
+#include <linux/seq_file.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/ctype.h>
+#include <keys/system_keyring.h>
+#include <keys/user-type.h>
+#include "asymmetric_keys.h"
+
+
+const char *const key_being_used_for[NR__KEY_BEING_USED_FOR] = {
+	[VERIFYING_MODULE_SIGNATURE]		= "mod sig",
+	[VERIFYING_FIRMWARE_SIGNATURE]		= "firmware sig",
+	[VERIFYING_KEXEC_PE_SIGNATURE]		= "kexec PE sig",
+	[VERIFYING_KEY_SIGNATURE]		= "key sig",
+	[VERIFYING_KEY_SELF_SIGNATURE]		= "key self sig",
+	[VERIFYING_UNSPECIFIED_SIGNATURE]	= "unspec sig",
+};
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(key_being_used_for);
+
+static LIST_HEAD(asymmetric_key_parsers);
+static DECLARE_RWSEM(asymmetric_key_parsers_sem);
+
+/**
+ * find_asymmetric_key - Find a key by ID.
+ * @keyring: The keys to search.
+ * @id_0: The first ID to look for or NULL.
+ * @id_1: The second ID to look for or NULL, matched together with @id_0
+ * against @keyring keys' id[0] and id[1].
+ * @id_2: The fallback ID to match against @keyring keys' id[2] if both of the
+ * other IDs are NULL.
+ * @partial: Use partial match for @id_0 and @id_1 if true, exact if false.
+ *
+ * Find a key in the given keyring by identifier.  The preferred identifier is
+ * the id_0 and the fallback identifier is the id_1.  If both are given, the
+ * former is matched (exactly or partially) against either of the sought key's
+ * identifiers and the latter must match the found key's second identifier
+ * exactly.  If both are missing, id_2 must match the sought key's third
+ * identifier exactly.
+ */
+struct key *find_asymmetric_key(struct key *keyring,
+				const struct asymmetric_key_id *id_0,
+				const struct asymmetric_key_id *id_1,
+				const struct asymmetric_key_id *id_2,
+				bool partial)
+{
+	struct key *key;
+	key_ref_t ref;
+	const char *lookup;
+	char *req, *p;
+	int len;
+
+	WARN_ON(!id_0 && !id_1 && !id_2);
+
+	if (id_0) {
+		lookup = id_0->data;
+		len = id_0->len;
+	} else if (id_1) {
+		lookup = id_1->data;
+		len = id_1->len;
+	} else {
+		lookup = id_2->data;
+		len = id_2->len;
+	}
+
+	/* Construct an identifier "id:<keyid>". */
+	p = req = kmalloc(2 + 1 + len * 2 + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!req)
+		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+
+	if (!id_0 && !id_1) {
+		*p++ = 'd';
+		*p++ = 'n';
+	} else if (partial) {
+		*p++ = 'i';
+		*p++ = 'd';
+	} else {
+		*p++ = 'e';
+		*p++ = 'x';
+	}
+	*p++ = ':';
+	p = bin2hex(p, lookup, len);
+	*p = 0;
+
+	pr_debug("Look up: \"%s\"\n", req);
+
+	ref = keyring_search(make_key_ref(keyring, 1),
+			     &key_type_asymmetric, req, true);
+	if (IS_ERR(ref))
+		pr_debug("Request for key '%s' err %ld\n", req, PTR_ERR(ref));
+	kfree(req);
+
+	if (IS_ERR(ref)) {
+		switch (PTR_ERR(ref)) {
+			/* Hide some search errors */
+		case -EACCES:
+		case -ENOTDIR:
+		case -EAGAIN:
+			return ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY);
+		default:
+			return ERR_CAST(ref);
+		}
+	}
+
+	key = key_ref_to_ptr(ref);
+	if (id_0 && id_1) {
+		const struct asymmetric_key_ids *kids = asymmetric_key_ids(key);
+
+		if (!kids->id[1]) {
+			pr_debug("First ID matches, but second is missing\n");
+			goto reject;
+		}
+		if (!asymmetric_key_id_same(id_1, kids->id[1])) {
+			pr_debug("First ID matches, but second does not\n");
+			goto reject;
+		}
+	}
+
+	pr_devel("<==%s() = 0 [%x]\n", __func__, key_serial(key));
+	return key;
+
+reject:
+	key_put(key);
+	return ERR_PTR(-EKEYREJECTED);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(find_asymmetric_key);
+
+/**
+ * asymmetric_key_generate_id: Construct an asymmetric key ID
+ * @val_1: First binary blob
+ * @len_1: Length of first binary blob
+ * @val_2: Second binary blob
+ * @len_2: Length of second binary blob
+ *
+ * Construct an asymmetric key ID from a pair of binary blobs.
+ */
+struct asymmetric_key_id *asymmetric_key_generate_id(const void *val_1,
+						     size_t len_1,
+						     const void *val_2,
+						     size_t len_2)
+{
+	struct asymmetric_key_id *kid;
+
+	kid = kmalloc(sizeof(struct asymmetric_key_id) + len_1 + len_2,
+		      GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!kid)
+		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+	kid->len = len_1 + len_2;
+	memcpy(kid->data, val_1, len_1);
+	memcpy(kid->data + len_1, val_2, len_2);
+	return kid;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(asymmetric_key_generate_id);
+
+/**
+ * asymmetric_key_id_same - Return true if two asymmetric keys IDs are the same.
+ * @kid1: The key ID to compare
+ * @kid2: The key ID to compare
+ */
+bool asymmetric_key_id_same(const struct asymmetric_key_id *kid1,
+			    const struct asymmetric_key_id *kid2)
+{
+	if (!kid1 || !kid2)
+		return false;
+	if (kid1->len != kid2->len)
+		return false;
+	return memcmp(kid1->data, kid2->data, kid1->len) == 0;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(asymmetric_key_id_same);
+
+/**
+ * asymmetric_key_id_partial - Return true if two asymmetric keys IDs
+ * partially match
+ * @kid1: The key ID to compare
+ * @kid2: The key ID to compare
+ */
+bool asymmetric_key_id_partial(const struct asymmetric_key_id *kid1,
+			       const struct asymmetric_key_id *kid2)
+{
+	if (!kid1 || !kid2)
+		return false;
+	if (kid1->len < kid2->len)
+		return false;
+	return memcmp(kid1->data + (kid1->len - kid2->len),
+		      kid2->data, kid2->len) == 0;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(asymmetric_key_id_partial);
+
+/**
+ * asymmetric_match_key_ids - Search asymmetric key IDs 1 & 2
+ * @kids: The pair of key IDs to check
+ * @match_id: The key ID we're looking for
+ * @match: The match function to use
+ */
+static bool asymmetric_match_key_ids(
+	const struct asymmetric_key_ids *kids,
+	const struct asymmetric_key_id *match_id,
+	bool (*match)(const struct asymmetric_key_id *kid1,
+		      const struct asymmetric_key_id *kid2))
+{
+	int i;
+
+	if (!kids || !match_id)
+		return false;
+	for (i = 0; i < 2; i++)
+		if (match(kids->id[i], match_id))
+			return true;
+	return false;
+}
+
+/* helper function can be called directly with pre-allocated memory */
+inline int __asymmetric_key_hex_to_key_id(const char *id,
+				   struct asymmetric_key_id *match_id,
+				   size_t hexlen)
+{
+	match_id->len = hexlen;
+	return hex2bin(match_id->data, id, hexlen);
+}
+
+/**
+ * asymmetric_key_hex_to_key_id - Convert a hex string into a key ID.
+ * @id: The ID as a hex string.
+ */
+struct asymmetric_key_id *asymmetric_key_hex_to_key_id(const char *id)
+{
+	struct asymmetric_key_id *match_id;
+	size_t asciihexlen;
+	int ret;
+
+	if (!*id)
+		return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+	asciihexlen = strlen(id);
+	if (asciihexlen & 1)
+		return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+
+	match_id = kmalloc(sizeof(struct asymmetric_key_id) + asciihexlen / 2,
+			   GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!match_id)
+		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+	ret = __asymmetric_key_hex_to_key_id(id, match_id, asciihexlen / 2);
+	if (ret < 0) {
+		kfree(match_id);
+		return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+	}
+	return match_id;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Match asymmetric keys by an exact match on one of the first two IDs.
+ */
+static bool asymmetric_key_cmp(const struct key *key,
+			       const struct key_match_data *match_data)
+{
+	const struct asymmetric_key_ids *kids = asymmetric_key_ids(key);
+	const struct asymmetric_key_id *match_id = match_data->preparsed;
+
+	return asymmetric_match_key_ids(kids, match_id,
+					asymmetric_key_id_same);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Match asymmetric keys by a partial match on one of the first two IDs.
+ */
+static bool asymmetric_key_cmp_partial(const struct key *key,
+				       const struct key_match_data *match_data)
+{
+	const struct asymmetric_key_ids *kids = asymmetric_key_ids(key);
+	const struct asymmetric_key_id *match_id = match_data->preparsed;
+
+	return asymmetric_match_key_ids(kids, match_id,
+					asymmetric_key_id_partial);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Match asymmetric keys by an exact match on the third IDs.
+ */
+static bool asymmetric_key_cmp_name(const struct key *key,
+				    const struct key_match_data *match_data)
+{
+	const struct asymmetric_key_ids *kids = asymmetric_key_ids(key);
+	const struct asymmetric_key_id *match_id = match_data->preparsed;
+
+	return kids && asymmetric_key_id_same(kids->id[2], match_id);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Preparse the match criterion.  If we don't set lookup_type and cmp,
+ * the default will be an exact match on the key description.
+ *
+ * There are some specifiers for matching key IDs rather than by the key
+ * description:
+ *
+ *	"id:<id>" - find a key by partial match on one of the first two IDs
+ *	"ex:<id>" - find a key by exact match on one of the first two IDs
+ *	"dn:<id>" - find a key by exact match on the third ID
+ *
+ * These have to be searched by iteration rather than by direct lookup because
+ * the key is hashed according to its description.
+ */
+static int asymmetric_key_match_preparse(struct key_match_data *match_data)
+{
+	struct asymmetric_key_id *match_id;
+	const char *spec = match_data->raw_data;
+	const char *id;
+	bool (*cmp)(const struct key *, const struct key_match_data *) =
+		asymmetric_key_cmp;
+
+	if (!spec || !*spec)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	if (spec[0] == 'i' &&
+	    spec[1] == 'd' &&
+	    spec[2] == ':') {
+		id = spec + 3;
+		cmp = asymmetric_key_cmp_partial;
+	} else if (spec[0] == 'e' &&
+		   spec[1] == 'x' &&
+		   spec[2] == ':') {
+		id = spec + 3;
+	} else if (spec[0] == 'd' &&
+		   spec[1] == 'n' &&
+		   spec[2] == ':') {
+		id = spec + 3;
+		cmp = asymmetric_key_cmp_name;
+	} else {
+		goto default_match;
+	}
+
+	match_id = asymmetric_key_hex_to_key_id(id);
+	if (IS_ERR(match_id))
+		return PTR_ERR(match_id);
+
+	match_data->preparsed = match_id;
+	match_data->cmp = cmp;
+	match_data->lookup_type = KEYRING_SEARCH_LOOKUP_ITERATE;
+	return 0;
+
+default_match:
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Free the preparsed the match criterion.
+ */
+static void asymmetric_key_match_free(struct key_match_data *match_data)
+{
+	kfree(match_data->preparsed);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Describe the asymmetric key
+ */
+static void asymmetric_key_describe(const struct key *key, struct seq_file *m)
+{
+	const struct asymmetric_key_subtype *subtype = asymmetric_key_subtype(key);
+	const struct asymmetric_key_ids *kids = asymmetric_key_ids(key);
+	const struct asymmetric_key_id *kid;
+	const unsigned char *p;
+	int n;
+
+	seq_puts(m, key->description);
+
+	if (subtype) {
+		seq_puts(m, ": ");
+		subtype->describe(key, m);
+
+		if (kids && kids->id[1]) {
+			kid = kids->id[1];
+			seq_putc(m, ' ');
+			n = kid->len;
+			p = kid->data;
+			if (n > 4) {
+				p += n - 4;
+				n = 4;
+			}
+			seq_printf(m, "%*phN", n, p);
+		}
+
+		seq_puts(m, " [");
+		/* put something here to indicate the key's capabilities */
+		seq_putc(m, ']');
+	}
+}
+
+/*
+ * Preparse a asymmetric payload to get format the contents appropriately for the
+ * internal payload to cut down on the number of scans of the data performed.
+ *
+ * We also generate a proposed description from the contents of the key that
+ * can be used to name the key if the user doesn't want to provide one.
+ */
+static int asymmetric_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
+{
+	struct asymmetric_key_parser *parser;
+	int ret;
+
+	pr_devel("==>%s()\n", __func__);
+
+	if (prep->datalen == 0)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	down_read(&asymmetric_key_parsers_sem);
+
+	ret = -EBADMSG;
+	list_for_each_entry(parser, &asymmetric_key_parsers, link) {
+		pr_debug("Trying parser '%s'\n", parser->name);
+
+		ret = parser->parse(prep);
+		if (ret != -EBADMSG) {
+			pr_debug("Parser recognised the format (ret %d)\n",
+				 ret);
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+
+	up_read(&asymmetric_key_parsers_sem);
+	pr_devel("<==%s() = %d\n", __func__, ret);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Clean up the key ID list
+ */
+static void asymmetric_key_free_kids(struct asymmetric_key_ids *kids)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	if (kids) {
+		for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(kids->id); i++)
+			kfree(kids->id[i]);
+		kfree(kids);
+	}
+}
+
+/*
+ * Clean up the preparse data
+ */
+static void asymmetric_key_free_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
+{
+	struct asymmetric_key_subtype *subtype = prep->payload.data[asym_subtype];
+	struct asymmetric_key_ids *kids = prep->payload.data[asym_key_ids];
+
+	pr_devel("==>%s()\n", __func__);
+
+	if (subtype) {
+		subtype->destroy(prep->payload.data[asym_crypto],
+				 prep->payload.data[asym_auth]);
+		module_put(subtype->owner);
+	}
+	asymmetric_key_free_kids(kids);
+	kfree(prep->description);
+}
+
+/*
+ * dispose of the data dangling from the corpse of a asymmetric key
+ */
+static void asymmetric_key_destroy(struct key *key)
+{
+	struct asymmetric_key_subtype *subtype = asymmetric_key_subtype(key);
+	struct asymmetric_key_ids *kids = key->payload.data[asym_key_ids];
+	void *data = key->payload.data[asym_crypto];
+	void *auth = key->payload.data[asym_auth];
+
+	key->payload.data[asym_crypto] = NULL;
+	key->payload.data[asym_subtype] = NULL;
+	key->payload.data[asym_key_ids] = NULL;
+	key->payload.data[asym_auth] = NULL;
+
+	if (subtype) {
+		subtype->destroy(data, auth);
+		module_put(subtype->owner);
+	}
+
+	asymmetric_key_free_kids(kids);
+}
+
+static struct key_restriction *asymmetric_restriction_alloc(
+	key_restrict_link_func_t check,
+	struct key *key)
+{
+	struct key_restriction *keyres =
+		kzalloc(sizeof(struct key_restriction), GFP_KERNEL);
+
+	if (!keyres)
+		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+
+	keyres->check = check;
+	keyres->key = key;
+	keyres->keytype = &key_type_asymmetric;
+
+	return keyres;
+}
+
+/*
+ * look up keyring restrict functions for asymmetric keys
+ */
+static struct key_restriction *asymmetric_lookup_restriction(
+	const char *restriction)
+{
+	char *restrict_method;
+	char *parse_buf;
+	char *next;
+	struct key_restriction *ret = ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+
+	if (strcmp("builtin_trusted", restriction) == 0)
+		return asymmetric_restriction_alloc(
+			restrict_link_by_builtin_trusted, NULL);
+
+	if (strcmp("builtin_and_secondary_trusted", restriction) == 0)
+		return asymmetric_restriction_alloc(
+			restrict_link_by_builtin_and_secondary_trusted, NULL);
+
+	parse_buf = kstrndup(restriction, PAGE_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!parse_buf)
+		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+
+	next = parse_buf;
+	restrict_method = strsep(&next, ":");
+
+	if ((strcmp(restrict_method, "key_or_keyring") == 0) && next) {
+		char *key_text;
+		key_serial_t serial;
+		struct key *key;
+		key_restrict_link_func_t link_fn =
+			restrict_link_by_key_or_keyring;
+		bool allow_null_key = false;
+
+		key_text = strsep(&next, ":");
+
+		if (next) {
+			if (strcmp(next, "chain") != 0)
+				goto out;
+
+			link_fn = restrict_link_by_key_or_keyring_chain;
+			allow_null_key = true;
+		}
+
+		if (kstrtos32(key_text, 0, &serial) < 0)
+			goto out;
+
+		if ((serial == 0) && allow_null_key) {
+			key = NULL;
+		} else {
+			key = key_lookup(serial);
+			if (IS_ERR(key)) {
+				ret = ERR_CAST(key);
+				goto out;
+			}
+		}
+
+		ret = asymmetric_restriction_alloc(link_fn, key);
+		if (IS_ERR(ret))
+			key_put(key);
+	}
+
+out:
+	kfree(parse_buf);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+int asymmetric_key_eds_op(struct kernel_pkey_params *params,
+			  const void *in, void *out)
+{
+	const struct asymmetric_key_subtype *subtype;
+	struct key *key = params->key;
+	int ret;
+
+	pr_devel("==>%s()\n", __func__);
+
+	if (key->type != &key_type_asymmetric)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	subtype = asymmetric_key_subtype(key);
+	if (!subtype ||
+	    !key->payload.data[0])
+		return -EINVAL;
+	if (!subtype->eds_op)
+		return -ENOTSUPP;
+
+	ret = subtype->eds_op(params, in, out);
+
+	pr_devel("<==%s() = %d\n", __func__, ret);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int asymmetric_key_verify_signature(struct kernel_pkey_params *params,
+					   const void *in, const void *in2)
+{
+	struct public_key_signature sig = {
+		.s_size		= params->in2_len,
+		.digest_size	= params->in_len,
+		.encoding	= params->encoding,
+		.hash_algo	= params->hash_algo,
+		.digest		= (void *)in,
+		.s		= (void *)in2,
+	};
+
+	return verify_signature(params->key, &sig);
+}
+
+struct key_type key_type_asymmetric = {
+	.name			= "asymmetric",
+	.preparse		= asymmetric_key_preparse,
+	.free_preparse		= asymmetric_key_free_preparse,
+	.instantiate		= generic_key_instantiate,
+	.match_preparse		= asymmetric_key_match_preparse,
+	.match_free		= asymmetric_key_match_free,
+	.destroy		= asymmetric_key_destroy,
+	.describe		= asymmetric_key_describe,
+	.lookup_restriction	= asymmetric_lookup_restriction,
+	.asym_query		= query_asymmetric_key,
+	.asym_eds_op		= asymmetric_key_eds_op,
+	.asym_verify_signature	= asymmetric_key_verify_signature,
+};
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(key_type_asymmetric);
+
+/**
+ * register_asymmetric_key_parser - Register a asymmetric key blob parser
+ * @parser: The parser to register
+ */
+int register_asymmetric_key_parser(struct asymmetric_key_parser *parser)
+{
+	struct asymmetric_key_parser *cursor;
+	int ret;
+
+	down_write(&asymmetric_key_parsers_sem);
+
+	list_for_each_entry(cursor, &asymmetric_key_parsers, link) {
+		if (strcmp(cursor->name, parser->name) == 0) {
+			pr_err("Asymmetric key parser '%s' already registered\n",
+			       parser->name);
+			ret = -EEXIST;
+			goto out;
+		}
+	}
+
+	list_add_tail(&parser->link, &asymmetric_key_parsers);
+
+	pr_notice("Asymmetric key parser '%s' registered\n", parser->name);
+	ret = 0;
+
+out:
+	up_write(&asymmetric_key_parsers_sem);
+	return ret;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(register_asymmetric_key_parser);
+
+/**
+ * unregister_asymmetric_key_parser - Unregister a asymmetric key blob parser
+ * @parser: The parser to unregister
+ */
+void unregister_asymmetric_key_parser(struct asymmetric_key_parser *parser)
+{
+	down_write(&asymmetric_key_parsers_sem);
+	list_del(&parser->link);
+	up_write(&asymmetric_key_parsers_sem);
+
+	pr_notice("Asymmetric key parser '%s' unregistered\n", parser->name);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(unregister_asymmetric_key_parser);
+
+/*
+ * Module stuff
+ */
+static int __init asymmetric_key_init(void)
+{
+	return register_key_type(&key_type_asymmetric);
+}
+
+static void __exit asymmetric_key_cleanup(void)
+{
+	unregister_key_type(&key_type_asymmetric);
+}
+
+module_init(asymmetric_key_init);
+module_exit(asymmetric_key_cleanup);
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/mscode.asn1 b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/mscode.asn1
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..6d09ba48c4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/mscode.asn1
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+--- Microsoft individual code signing data blob parser
+---
+--- Copyright (C) 2012 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
+--- Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
+---
+--- This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+--- modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence
+--- as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version
+--- 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version.
+---
+
+MSCode ::= SEQUENCE {
+	type			SEQUENCE {
+		contentType	ContentType,
+		parameters	ANY
+	},
+	content			SEQUENCE {
+		digestAlgorithm	DigestAlgorithmIdentifier,
+		digest		OCTET STRING ({ mscode_note_digest })
+	}
+}
+
+ContentType ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER ({ mscode_note_content_type })
+
+DigestAlgorithmIdentifier ::= SEQUENCE {
+	algorithm   OBJECT IDENTIFIER ({ mscode_note_digest_algo }),
+	parameters  ANY OPTIONAL
+}
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/mscode_parser.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/mscode_parser.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..839591ad21
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/mscode_parser.c
@@ -0,0 +1,129 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
+/* Parse a Microsoft Individual Code Signing blob
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2014 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
+ */
+
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) "MSCODE: "fmt
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/err.h>
+#include <linux/oid_registry.h>
+#include <crypto/pkcs7.h>
+#include "verify_pefile.h"
+#include "mscode.asn1.h"
+
+/*
+ * Parse a Microsoft Individual Code Signing blob
+ */
+int mscode_parse(void *_ctx, const void *content_data, size_t data_len,
+		 size_t asn1hdrlen)
+{
+	struct pefile_context *ctx = _ctx;
+
+	content_data -= asn1hdrlen;
+	data_len += asn1hdrlen;
+	pr_devel("Data: %zu [%*ph]\n", data_len, (unsigned)(data_len),
+		 content_data);
+
+	return asn1_ber_decoder(&mscode_decoder, ctx, content_data, data_len);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check the content type OID
+ */
+int mscode_note_content_type(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
+			     unsigned char tag,
+			     const void *value, size_t vlen)
+{
+	enum OID oid;
+
+	oid = look_up_OID(value, vlen);
+	if (oid == OID__NR) {
+		char buffer[50];
+
+		sprint_oid(value, vlen, buffer, sizeof(buffer));
+		pr_err("Unknown OID: %s\n", buffer);
+		return -EBADMSG;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * pesign utility had a bug where it was putting
+	 * OID_msIndividualSPKeyPurpose instead of OID_msPeImageDataObjId
+	 * So allow both OIDs.
+	 */
+	if (oid != OID_msPeImageDataObjId &&
+	    oid != OID_msIndividualSPKeyPurpose) {
+		pr_err("Unexpected content type OID %u\n", oid);
+		return -EBADMSG;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Note the digest algorithm OID
+ */
+int mscode_note_digest_algo(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
+			    unsigned char tag,
+			    const void *value, size_t vlen)
+{
+	struct pefile_context *ctx = context;
+	char buffer[50];
+	enum OID oid;
+
+	oid = look_up_OID(value, vlen);
+	switch (oid) {
+	case OID_md4:
+		ctx->digest_algo = "md4";
+		break;
+	case OID_md5:
+		ctx->digest_algo = "md5";
+		break;
+	case OID_sha1:
+		ctx->digest_algo = "sha1";
+		break;
+	case OID_sha256:
+		ctx->digest_algo = "sha256";
+		break;
+	case OID_sha384:
+		ctx->digest_algo = "sha384";
+		break;
+	case OID_sha512:
+		ctx->digest_algo = "sha512";
+		break;
+	case OID_sha224:
+		ctx->digest_algo = "sha224";
+		break;
+
+	case OID__NR:
+		sprint_oid(value, vlen, buffer, sizeof(buffer));
+		pr_err("Unknown OID: %s\n", buffer);
+		return -EBADMSG;
+
+	default:
+		pr_err("Unsupported content type: %u\n", oid);
+		return -ENOPKG;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Note the digest we're guaranteeing with this certificate
+ */
+int mscode_note_digest(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
+		       unsigned char tag,
+		       const void *value, size_t vlen)
+{
+	struct pefile_context *ctx = context;
+
+	ctx->digest = kmemdup(value, vlen, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!ctx->digest)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	ctx->digest_len = vlen;
+
+	return 0;
+}
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7.asn1 b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7.asn1
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..1eca740b81
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7.asn1
@@ -0,0 +1,135 @@
+PKCS7ContentInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
+	contentType	ContentType ({ pkcs7_check_content_type }),
+	content		[0] EXPLICIT SignedData OPTIONAL
+}
+
+ContentType ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER ({ pkcs7_note_OID })
+
+SignedData ::= SEQUENCE {
+	version			INTEGER ({ pkcs7_note_signeddata_version }),
+	digestAlgorithms	DigestAlgorithmIdentifiers,
+	contentInfo		ContentInfo ({ pkcs7_note_content }),
+	certificates		CHOICE {
+		certSet		[0] IMPLICIT ExtendedCertificatesAndCertificates,
+		certSequence	[2] IMPLICIT Certificates
+	} OPTIONAL ({ pkcs7_note_certificate_list }),
+	crls CHOICE {
+		crlSet		[1] IMPLICIT CertificateRevocationLists,
+		crlSequence	[3] IMPLICIT CRLSequence
+	} OPTIONAL,
+	signerInfos		SignerInfos
+}
+
+ContentInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
+	contentType	ContentType ({ pkcs7_note_OID }),
+	content		[0] EXPLICIT Data OPTIONAL
+}
+
+Data ::= ANY ({ pkcs7_note_data })
+
+DigestAlgorithmIdentifiers ::= CHOICE {
+	daSet			SET OF DigestAlgorithmIdentifier,
+	daSequence		SEQUENCE OF DigestAlgorithmIdentifier
+}
+
+DigestAlgorithmIdentifier ::= SEQUENCE {
+	algorithm   OBJECT IDENTIFIER ({ pkcs7_note_OID }),
+	parameters  ANY OPTIONAL
+}
+
+--
+-- Certificates and certificate lists
+--
+ExtendedCertificatesAndCertificates ::= SET OF ExtendedCertificateOrCertificate
+
+ExtendedCertificateOrCertificate ::= CHOICE {
+  certificate		Certificate,				-- X.509
+  extendedCertificate	[0] IMPLICIT ExtendedCertificate	-- PKCS#6
+}
+
+ExtendedCertificate ::= Certificate -- cheating
+
+Certificates ::= SEQUENCE OF Certificate
+
+CertificateRevocationLists ::= SET OF CertificateList
+
+CertificateList ::= SEQUENCE OF Certificate -- This may be defined incorrectly
+
+CRLSequence ::= SEQUENCE OF CertificateList
+
+Certificate ::= ANY ({ pkcs7_extract_cert }) -- X.509
+
+--
+-- Signer information
+--
+SignerInfos ::= CHOICE {
+	siSet		SET OF SignerInfo,
+	siSequence	SEQUENCE OF SignerInfo
+}
+
+SignerInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
+	version			INTEGER ({ pkcs7_note_signerinfo_version }),
+	sid			SignerIdentifier, -- CMS variant, not PKCS#7
+	digestAlgorithm		DigestAlgorithmIdentifier ({ pkcs7_sig_note_digest_algo }),
+	authenticatedAttributes	CHOICE {
+		aaSet		[0] IMPLICIT SetOfAuthenticatedAttribute
+					({ pkcs7_sig_note_set_of_authattrs }),
+		aaSequence	[2] EXPLICIT SEQUENCE OF AuthenticatedAttribute
+			-- Explicit because easier to compute digest on
+			-- sequence of attributes and then reuse encoded
+			-- sequence in aaSequence.
+	} OPTIONAL,
+	digestEncryptionAlgorithm
+				DigestEncryptionAlgorithmIdentifier ({ pkcs7_sig_note_pkey_algo }),
+	encryptedDigest		EncryptedDigest,
+	unauthenticatedAttributes CHOICE {
+		uaSet		[1] IMPLICIT SET OF UnauthenticatedAttribute,
+		uaSequence	[3] IMPLICIT SEQUENCE OF UnauthenticatedAttribute
+	} OPTIONAL
+} ({ pkcs7_note_signed_info })
+
+SignerIdentifier ::= CHOICE {
+	-- RFC5652 sec 5.3
+	issuerAndSerialNumber IssuerAndSerialNumber,
+        subjectKeyIdentifier [0] IMPLICIT SubjectKeyIdentifier
+}
+
+IssuerAndSerialNumber ::= SEQUENCE {
+	issuer			Name ({ pkcs7_sig_note_issuer }),
+	serialNumber		CertificateSerialNumber ({ pkcs7_sig_note_serial })
+}
+
+CertificateSerialNumber ::= INTEGER
+
+SubjectKeyIdentifier ::= OCTET STRING ({ pkcs7_sig_note_skid })
+
+SetOfAuthenticatedAttribute ::= SET OF AuthenticatedAttribute
+
+AuthenticatedAttribute ::= SEQUENCE {
+	type			OBJECT IDENTIFIER ({ pkcs7_note_OID }),
+	values			SET OF ANY ({ pkcs7_sig_note_authenticated_attr })
+}
+
+UnauthenticatedAttribute ::= SEQUENCE {
+	type			OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
+	values			SET OF ANY
+}
+
+DigestEncryptionAlgorithmIdentifier ::= SEQUENCE {
+	algorithm		OBJECT IDENTIFIER ({ pkcs7_note_OID }),
+	parameters		ANY OPTIONAL
+}
+
+EncryptedDigest ::= OCTET STRING ({ pkcs7_sig_note_signature })
+
+---
+--- X.500 Name
+---
+Name ::= SEQUENCE OF RelativeDistinguishedName
+
+RelativeDistinguishedName ::= SET OF AttributeValueAssertion
+
+AttributeValueAssertion ::= SEQUENCE {
+	attributeType		OBJECT IDENTIFIER ({ pkcs7_note_OID }),
+	attributeValue		ANY
+}
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_key_type.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_key_type.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..b930d3bbf1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_key_type.c
@@ -0,0 +1,95 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
+/* Testing module to load key from trusted PKCS#7 message
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2014 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
+ */
+
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) "PKCS7key: "fmt
+#include <linux/key.h>
+#include <linux/err.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/verification.h>
+#include <linux/key-type.h>
+#include <keys/user-type.h>
+
+MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
+MODULE_DESCRIPTION("PKCS#7 testing key type");
+MODULE_AUTHOR("Red Hat, Inc.");
+
+static unsigned pkcs7_usage;
+module_param_named(usage, pkcs7_usage, uint, S_IWUSR | S_IRUGO);
+MODULE_PARM_DESC(pkcs7_usage,
+		 "Usage to specify when verifying the PKCS#7 message");
+
+/*
+ * Retrieve the PKCS#7 message content.
+ */
+static int pkcs7_view_content(void *ctx, const void *data, size_t len,
+			      size_t asn1hdrlen)
+{
+	struct key_preparsed_payload *prep = ctx;
+	const void *saved_prep_data;
+	size_t saved_prep_datalen;
+	int ret;
+
+	saved_prep_data = prep->data;
+	saved_prep_datalen = prep->datalen;
+	prep->data = data;
+	prep->datalen = len;
+
+	ret = user_preparse(prep);
+
+	prep->data = saved_prep_data;
+	prep->datalen = saved_prep_datalen;
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Preparse a PKCS#7 wrapped and validated data blob.
+ */
+static int pkcs7_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
+{
+	enum key_being_used_for usage = pkcs7_usage;
+
+	if (usage >= NR__KEY_BEING_USED_FOR) {
+		pr_err("Invalid usage type %d\n", usage);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	return verify_pkcs7_signature(NULL, 0,
+				      prep->data, prep->datalen,
+				      VERIFY_USE_SECONDARY_KEYRING, usage,
+				      pkcs7_view_content, prep);
+}
+
+/*
+ * user defined keys take an arbitrary string as the description and an
+ * arbitrary blob of data as the payload
+ */
+static struct key_type key_type_pkcs7 = {
+	.name			= "pkcs7_test",
+	.preparse		= pkcs7_preparse,
+	.free_preparse		= user_free_preparse,
+	.instantiate		= generic_key_instantiate,
+	.revoke			= user_revoke,
+	.destroy		= user_destroy,
+	.describe		= user_describe,
+	.read			= user_read,
+};
+
+/*
+ * Module stuff
+ */
+static int __init pkcs7_key_init(void)
+{
+	return register_key_type(&key_type_pkcs7);
+}
+
+static void __exit pkcs7_key_cleanup(void)
+{
+	unregister_key_type(&key_type_pkcs7);
+}
+
+module_init(pkcs7_key_init);
+module_exit(pkcs7_key_cleanup);
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..277482bb17
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.c
@@ -0,0 +1,708 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
+/* PKCS#7 parser
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2012 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
+ */
+
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) "PKCS7: "fmt
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/export.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/err.h>
+#include <linux/oid_registry.h>
+#include <crypto/public_key.h>
+#include "pkcs7_parser.h"
+#include "pkcs7.asn1.h"
+
+MODULE_DESCRIPTION("PKCS#7 parser");
+MODULE_AUTHOR("Red Hat, Inc.");
+MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
+
+struct pkcs7_parse_context {
+	struct pkcs7_message	*msg;		/* Message being constructed */
+	struct pkcs7_signed_info *sinfo;	/* SignedInfo being constructed */
+	struct pkcs7_signed_info **ppsinfo;
+	struct x509_certificate *certs;		/* Certificate cache */
+	struct x509_certificate **ppcerts;
+	unsigned long	data;			/* Start of data */
+	enum OID	last_oid;		/* Last OID encountered */
+	unsigned	x509_index;
+	unsigned	sinfo_index;
+	const void	*raw_serial;
+	unsigned	raw_serial_size;
+	unsigned	raw_issuer_size;
+	const void	*raw_issuer;
+	const void	*raw_skid;
+	unsigned	raw_skid_size;
+	bool		expect_skid;
+};
+
+/*
+ * Free a signed information block.
+ */
+static void pkcs7_free_signed_info(struct pkcs7_signed_info *sinfo)
+{
+	if (sinfo) {
+		public_key_signature_free(sinfo->sig);
+		kfree(sinfo);
+	}
+}
+
+/**
+ * pkcs7_free_message - Free a PKCS#7 message
+ * @pkcs7: The PKCS#7 message to free
+ */
+void pkcs7_free_message(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7)
+{
+	struct x509_certificate *cert;
+	struct pkcs7_signed_info *sinfo;
+
+	if (pkcs7) {
+		while (pkcs7->certs) {
+			cert = pkcs7->certs;
+			pkcs7->certs = cert->next;
+			x509_free_certificate(cert);
+		}
+		while (pkcs7->crl) {
+			cert = pkcs7->crl;
+			pkcs7->crl = cert->next;
+			x509_free_certificate(cert);
+		}
+		while (pkcs7->signed_infos) {
+			sinfo = pkcs7->signed_infos;
+			pkcs7->signed_infos = sinfo->next;
+			pkcs7_free_signed_info(sinfo);
+		}
+		kfree(pkcs7);
+	}
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(pkcs7_free_message);
+
+/*
+ * Check authenticatedAttributes are provided or not provided consistently.
+ */
+static int pkcs7_check_authattrs(struct pkcs7_message *msg)
+{
+	struct pkcs7_signed_info *sinfo;
+	bool want = false;
+
+	sinfo = msg->signed_infos;
+	if (!sinfo)
+		goto inconsistent;
+
+	if (sinfo->authattrs) {
+		want = true;
+		msg->have_authattrs = true;
+	}
+
+	for (sinfo = sinfo->next; sinfo; sinfo = sinfo->next)
+		if (!!sinfo->authattrs != want)
+			goto inconsistent;
+	return 0;
+
+inconsistent:
+	pr_warn("Inconsistently supplied authAttrs\n");
+	return -EINVAL;
+}
+
+/**
+ * pkcs7_parse_message - Parse a PKCS#7 message
+ * @data: The raw binary ASN.1 encoded message to be parsed
+ * @datalen: The size of the encoded message
+ */
+struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7_parse_message(const void *data, size_t datalen)
+{
+	struct pkcs7_parse_context *ctx;
+	struct pkcs7_message *msg = ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+	int ret;
+
+	ctx = kzalloc(sizeof(struct pkcs7_parse_context), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!ctx)
+		goto out_no_ctx;
+	ctx->msg = kzalloc(sizeof(struct pkcs7_message), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!ctx->msg)
+		goto out_no_msg;
+	ctx->sinfo = kzalloc(sizeof(struct pkcs7_signed_info), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!ctx->sinfo)
+		goto out_no_sinfo;
+	ctx->sinfo->sig = kzalloc(sizeof(struct public_key_signature),
+				  GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!ctx->sinfo->sig)
+		goto out_no_sig;
+
+	ctx->data = (unsigned long)data;
+	ctx->ppcerts = &ctx->certs;
+	ctx->ppsinfo = &ctx->msg->signed_infos;
+
+	/* Attempt to decode the signature */
+	ret = asn1_ber_decoder(&pkcs7_decoder, ctx, data, datalen);
+	if (ret < 0) {
+		msg = ERR_PTR(ret);
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	ret = pkcs7_check_authattrs(ctx->msg);
+	if (ret < 0) {
+		msg = ERR_PTR(ret);
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	msg = ctx->msg;
+	ctx->msg = NULL;
+
+out:
+	while (ctx->certs) {
+		struct x509_certificate *cert = ctx->certs;
+		ctx->certs = cert->next;
+		x509_free_certificate(cert);
+	}
+out_no_sig:
+	pkcs7_free_signed_info(ctx->sinfo);
+out_no_sinfo:
+	pkcs7_free_message(ctx->msg);
+out_no_msg:
+	kfree(ctx);
+out_no_ctx:
+	return msg;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(pkcs7_parse_message);
+
+/**
+ * pkcs7_get_content_data - Get access to the PKCS#7 content
+ * @pkcs7: The preparsed PKCS#7 message to access
+ * @_data: Place to return a pointer to the data
+ * @_data_len: Place to return the data length
+ * @_headerlen: Size of ASN.1 header not included in _data
+ *
+ * Get access to the data content of the PKCS#7 message.  The size of the
+ * header of the ASN.1 object that contains it is also provided and can be used
+ * to adjust *_data and *_data_len to get the entire object.
+ *
+ * Returns -ENODATA if the data object was missing from the message.
+ */
+int pkcs7_get_content_data(const struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
+			   const void **_data, size_t *_data_len,
+			   size_t *_headerlen)
+{
+	if (!pkcs7->data)
+		return -ENODATA;
+
+	*_data = pkcs7->data;
+	*_data_len = pkcs7->data_len;
+	if (_headerlen)
+		*_headerlen = pkcs7->data_hdrlen;
+	return 0;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(pkcs7_get_content_data);
+
+/*
+ * Note an OID when we find one for later processing when we know how
+ * to interpret it.
+ */
+int pkcs7_note_OID(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
+		   unsigned char tag,
+		   const void *value, size_t vlen)
+{
+	struct pkcs7_parse_context *ctx = context;
+
+	ctx->last_oid = look_up_OID(value, vlen);
+	if (ctx->last_oid == OID__NR) {
+		char buffer[50];
+		sprint_oid(value, vlen, buffer, sizeof(buffer));
+		printk("PKCS7: Unknown OID: [%lu] %s\n",
+		       (unsigned long)value - ctx->data, buffer);
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Note the digest algorithm for the signature.
+ */
+int pkcs7_sig_note_digest_algo(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
+			       unsigned char tag,
+			       const void *value, size_t vlen)
+{
+	struct pkcs7_parse_context *ctx = context;
+
+	switch (ctx->last_oid) {
+	case OID_md4:
+		ctx->sinfo->sig->hash_algo = "md4";
+		break;
+	case OID_md5:
+		ctx->sinfo->sig->hash_algo = "md5";
+		break;
+	case OID_sha1:
+		ctx->sinfo->sig->hash_algo = "sha1";
+		break;
+	case OID_sha256:
+		ctx->sinfo->sig->hash_algo = "sha256";
+		break;
+	case OID_sha384:
+		ctx->sinfo->sig->hash_algo = "sha384";
+		break;
+	case OID_sha512:
+		ctx->sinfo->sig->hash_algo = "sha512";
+		break;
+	case OID_sha224:
+		ctx->sinfo->sig->hash_algo = "sha224";
+		break;
+	case OID_sm3:
+		ctx->sinfo->sig->hash_algo = "sm3";
+		break;
+	case OID_gost2012Digest256:
+		ctx->sinfo->sig->hash_algo = "streebog256";
+		break;
+	case OID_gost2012Digest512:
+		ctx->sinfo->sig->hash_algo = "streebog512";
+		break;
+	default:
+		printk("Unsupported digest algo: %u\n", ctx->last_oid);
+		return -ENOPKG;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Note the public key algorithm for the signature.
+ */
+int pkcs7_sig_note_pkey_algo(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
+			     unsigned char tag,
+			     const void *value, size_t vlen)
+{
+	struct pkcs7_parse_context *ctx = context;
+
+	switch (ctx->last_oid) {
+	case OID_rsaEncryption:
+		ctx->sinfo->sig->pkey_algo = "rsa";
+		ctx->sinfo->sig->encoding = "pkcs1";
+		break;
+	case OID_id_ecdsa_with_sha1:
+	case OID_id_ecdsa_with_sha224:
+	case OID_id_ecdsa_with_sha256:
+	case OID_id_ecdsa_with_sha384:
+	case OID_id_ecdsa_with_sha512:
+		ctx->sinfo->sig->pkey_algo = "ecdsa";
+		ctx->sinfo->sig->encoding = "x962";
+		break;
+	case OID_SM2_with_SM3:
+		ctx->sinfo->sig->pkey_algo = "sm2";
+		ctx->sinfo->sig->encoding = "raw";
+		break;
+	case OID_gost2012PKey256:
+	case OID_gost2012PKey512:
+		ctx->sinfo->sig->pkey_algo = "ecrdsa";
+		ctx->sinfo->sig->encoding = "raw";
+		break;
+	default:
+		printk("Unsupported pkey algo: %u\n", ctx->last_oid);
+		return -ENOPKG;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * We only support signed data [RFC2315 sec 9].
+ */
+int pkcs7_check_content_type(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
+			     unsigned char tag,
+			     const void *value, size_t vlen)
+{
+	struct pkcs7_parse_context *ctx = context;
+
+	if (ctx->last_oid != OID_signed_data) {
+		pr_warn("Only support pkcs7_signedData type\n");
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Note the SignedData version
+ */
+int pkcs7_note_signeddata_version(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
+				  unsigned char tag,
+				  const void *value, size_t vlen)
+{
+	struct pkcs7_parse_context *ctx = context;
+	unsigned version;
+
+	if (vlen != 1)
+		goto unsupported;
+
+	ctx->msg->version = version = *(const u8 *)value;
+	switch (version) {
+	case 1:
+		/* PKCS#7 SignedData [RFC2315 sec 9.1]
+		 * CMS ver 1 SignedData [RFC5652 sec 5.1]
+		 */
+		break;
+	case 3:
+		/* CMS ver 3 SignedData [RFC2315 sec 5.1] */
+		break;
+	default:
+		goto unsupported;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+
+unsupported:
+	pr_warn("Unsupported SignedData version\n");
+	return -EINVAL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Note the SignerInfo version
+ */
+int pkcs7_note_signerinfo_version(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
+				  unsigned char tag,
+				  const void *value, size_t vlen)
+{
+	struct pkcs7_parse_context *ctx = context;
+	unsigned version;
+
+	if (vlen != 1)
+		goto unsupported;
+
+	version = *(const u8 *)value;
+	switch (version) {
+	case 1:
+		/* PKCS#7 SignerInfo [RFC2315 sec 9.2]
+		 * CMS ver 1 SignerInfo [RFC5652 sec 5.3]
+		 */
+		if (ctx->msg->version != 1)
+			goto version_mismatch;
+		ctx->expect_skid = false;
+		break;
+	case 3:
+		/* CMS ver 3 SignerInfo [RFC2315 sec 5.3] */
+		if (ctx->msg->version == 1)
+			goto version_mismatch;
+		ctx->expect_skid = true;
+		break;
+	default:
+		goto unsupported;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+
+unsupported:
+	pr_warn("Unsupported SignerInfo version\n");
+	return -EINVAL;
+version_mismatch:
+	pr_warn("SignedData-SignerInfo version mismatch\n");
+	return -EBADMSG;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Extract a certificate and store it in the context.
+ */
+int pkcs7_extract_cert(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
+		       unsigned char tag,
+		       const void *value, size_t vlen)
+{
+	struct pkcs7_parse_context *ctx = context;
+	struct x509_certificate *x509;
+
+	if (tag != ((ASN1_UNIV << 6) | ASN1_CONS_BIT | ASN1_SEQ)) {
+		pr_debug("Cert began with tag %02x at %lu\n",
+			 tag, (unsigned long)ctx - ctx->data);
+		return -EBADMSG;
+	}
+
+	/* We have to correct for the header so that the X.509 parser can start
+	 * from the beginning.  Note that since X.509 stipulates DER, there
+	 * probably shouldn't be an EOC trailer - but it is in PKCS#7 (which
+	 * stipulates BER).
+	 */
+	value -= hdrlen;
+	vlen += hdrlen;
+
+	if (((u8*)value)[1] == 0x80)
+		vlen += 2; /* Indefinite length - there should be an EOC */
+
+	x509 = x509_cert_parse(value, vlen);
+	if (IS_ERR(x509))
+		return PTR_ERR(x509);
+
+	x509->index = ++ctx->x509_index;
+	pr_debug("Got cert %u for %s\n", x509->index, x509->subject);
+	pr_debug("- fingerprint %*phN\n", x509->id->len, x509->id->data);
+
+	*ctx->ppcerts = x509;
+	ctx->ppcerts = &x509->next;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Save the certificate list
+ */
+int pkcs7_note_certificate_list(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
+				unsigned char tag,
+				const void *value, size_t vlen)
+{
+	struct pkcs7_parse_context *ctx = context;
+
+	pr_devel("Got cert list (%02x)\n", tag);
+
+	*ctx->ppcerts = ctx->msg->certs;
+	ctx->msg->certs = ctx->certs;
+	ctx->certs = NULL;
+	ctx->ppcerts = &ctx->certs;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Note the content type.
+ */
+int pkcs7_note_content(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
+		       unsigned char tag,
+		       const void *value, size_t vlen)
+{
+	struct pkcs7_parse_context *ctx = context;
+
+	if (ctx->last_oid != OID_data &&
+	    ctx->last_oid != OID_msIndirectData) {
+		pr_warn("Unsupported data type %d\n", ctx->last_oid);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	ctx->msg->data_type = ctx->last_oid;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Extract the data from the message and store that and its content type OID in
+ * the context.
+ */
+int pkcs7_note_data(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
+		    unsigned char tag,
+		    const void *value, size_t vlen)
+{
+	struct pkcs7_parse_context *ctx = context;
+
+	pr_debug("Got data\n");
+
+	ctx->msg->data = value;
+	ctx->msg->data_len = vlen;
+	ctx->msg->data_hdrlen = hdrlen;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Parse authenticated attributes.
+ */
+int pkcs7_sig_note_authenticated_attr(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
+				      unsigned char tag,
+				      const void *value, size_t vlen)
+{
+	struct pkcs7_parse_context *ctx = context;
+	struct pkcs7_signed_info *sinfo = ctx->sinfo;
+	enum OID content_type;
+
+	pr_devel("AuthAttr: %02x %zu [%*ph]\n", tag, vlen, (unsigned)vlen, value);
+
+	switch (ctx->last_oid) {
+	case OID_contentType:
+		if (__test_and_set_bit(sinfo_has_content_type, &sinfo->aa_set))
+			goto repeated;
+		content_type = look_up_OID(value, vlen);
+		if (content_type != ctx->msg->data_type) {
+			pr_warn("Mismatch between global data type (%d) and sinfo %u (%d)\n",
+				ctx->msg->data_type, sinfo->index,
+				content_type);
+			return -EBADMSG;
+		}
+		return 0;
+
+	case OID_signingTime:
+		if (__test_and_set_bit(sinfo_has_signing_time, &sinfo->aa_set))
+			goto repeated;
+		/* Should we check that the signing time is consistent
+		 * with the signer's X.509 cert?
+		 */
+		return x509_decode_time(&sinfo->signing_time,
+					hdrlen, tag, value, vlen);
+
+	case OID_messageDigest:
+		if (__test_and_set_bit(sinfo_has_message_digest, &sinfo->aa_set))
+			goto repeated;
+		if (tag != ASN1_OTS)
+			return -EBADMSG;
+		sinfo->msgdigest = value;
+		sinfo->msgdigest_len = vlen;
+		return 0;
+
+	case OID_smimeCapabilites:
+		if (__test_and_set_bit(sinfo_has_smime_caps, &sinfo->aa_set))
+			goto repeated;
+		if (ctx->msg->data_type != OID_msIndirectData) {
+			pr_warn("S/MIME Caps only allowed with Authenticode\n");
+			return -EKEYREJECTED;
+		}
+		return 0;
+
+		/* Microsoft SpOpusInfo seems to be contain cont[0] 16-bit BE
+		 * char URLs and cont[1] 8-bit char URLs.
+		 *
+		 * Microsoft StatementType seems to contain a list of OIDs that
+		 * are also used as extendedKeyUsage types in X.509 certs.
+		 */
+	case OID_msSpOpusInfo:
+		if (__test_and_set_bit(sinfo_has_ms_opus_info, &sinfo->aa_set))
+			goto repeated;
+		goto authenticode_check;
+	case OID_msStatementType:
+		if (__test_and_set_bit(sinfo_has_ms_statement_type, &sinfo->aa_set))
+			goto repeated;
+	authenticode_check:
+		if (ctx->msg->data_type != OID_msIndirectData) {
+			pr_warn("Authenticode AuthAttrs only allowed with Authenticode\n");
+			return -EKEYREJECTED;
+		}
+		/* I'm not sure how to validate these */
+		return 0;
+	default:
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+repeated:
+	/* We permit max one item per AuthenticatedAttribute and no repeats */
+	pr_warn("Repeated/multivalue AuthAttrs not permitted\n");
+	return -EKEYREJECTED;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Note the set of auth attributes for digestion purposes [RFC2315 sec 9.3]
+ */
+int pkcs7_sig_note_set_of_authattrs(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
+				    unsigned char tag,
+				    const void *value, size_t vlen)
+{
+	struct pkcs7_parse_context *ctx = context;
+	struct pkcs7_signed_info *sinfo = ctx->sinfo;
+
+	if (!test_bit(sinfo_has_content_type, &sinfo->aa_set) ||
+	    !test_bit(sinfo_has_message_digest, &sinfo->aa_set)) {
+		pr_warn("Missing required AuthAttr\n");
+		return -EBADMSG;
+	}
+
+	if (ctx->msg->data_type != OID_msIndirectData &&
+	    test_bit(sinfo_has_ms_opus_info, &sinfo->aa_set)) {
+		pr_warn("Unexpected Authenticode AuthAttr\n");
+		return -EBADMSG;
+	}
+
+	/* We need to switch the 'CONT 0' to a 'SET OF' when we digest */
+	sinfo->authattrs = value - (hdrlen - 1);
+	sinfo->authattrs_len = vlen + (hdrlen - 1);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Note the issuing certificate serial number
+ */
+int pkcs7_sig_note_serial(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
+			  unsigned char tag,
+			  const void *value, size_t vlen)
+{
+	struct pkcs7_parse_context *ctx = context;
+	ctx->raw_serial = value;
+	ctx->raw_serial_size = vlen;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Note the issuer's name
+ */
+int pkcs7_sig_note_issuer(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
+			  unsigned char tag,
+			  const void *value, size_t vlen)
+{
+	struct pkcs7_parse_context *ctx = context;
+	ctx->raw_issuer = value;
+	ctx->raw_issuer_size = vlen;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Note the issuing cert's subjectKeyIdentifier
+ */
+int pkcs7_sig_note_skid(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
+			unsigned char tag,
+			const void *value, size_t vlen)
+{
+	struct pkcs7_parse_context *ctx = context;
+
+	pr_devel("SKID: %02x %zu [%*ph]\n", tag, vlen, (unsigned)vlen, value);
+
+	ctx->raw_skid = value;
+	ctx->raw_skid_size = vlen;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Note the signature data
+ */
+int pkcs7_sig_note_signature(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
+			     unsigned char tag,
+			     const void *value, size_t vlen)
+{
+	struct pkcs7_parse_context *ctx = context;
+
+	ctx->sinfo->sig->s = kmemdup(value, vlen, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!ctx->sinfo->sig->s)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	ctx->sinfo->sig->s_size = vlen;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Note a signature information block
+ */
+int pkcs7_note_signed_info(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
+			   unsigned char tag,
+			   const void *value, size_t vlen)
+{
+	struct pkcs7_parse_context *ctx = context;
+	struct pkcs7_signed_info *sinfo = ctx->sinfo;
+	struct asymmetric_key_id *kid;
+
+	if (ctx->msg->data_type == OID_msIndirectData && !sinfo->authattrs) {
+		pr_warn("Authenticode requires AuthAttrs\n");
+		return -EBADMSG;
+	}
+
+	/* Generate cert issuer + serial number key ID */
+	if (!ctx->expect_skid) {
+		kid = asymmetric_key_generate_id(ctx->raw_serial,
+						 ctx->raw_serial_size,
+						 ctx->raw_issuer,
+						 ctx->raw_issuer_size);
+	} else {
+		kid = asymmetric_key_generate_id(ctx->raw_skid,
+						 ctx->raw_skid_size,
+						 "", 0);
+	}
+	if (IS_ERR(kid))
+		return PTR_ERR(kid);
+
+	pr_devel("SINFO KID: %u [%*phN]\n", kid->len, kid->len, kid->data);
+
+	sinfo->sig->auth_ids[0] = kid;
+	sinfo->index = ++ctx->sinfo_index;
+	*ctx->ppsinfo = sinfo;
+	ctx->ppsinfo = &sinfo->next;
+	ctx->sinfo = kzalloc(sizeof(struct pkcs7_signed_info), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!ctx->sinfo)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	ctx->sinfo->sig = kzalloc(sizeof(struct public_key_signature),
+				  GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!ctx->sinfo->sig)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	return 0;
+}
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.h b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..e17f7ce4fb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.h
@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later */
+/* PKCS#7 crypto data parser internal definitions
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2012 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
+ */
+
+#include <linux/oid_registry.h>
+#include <crypto/pkcs7.h>
+#include "x509_parser.h"
+
+#define kenter(FMT, ...) \
+	pr_devel("==> %s("FMT")\n", __func__, ##__VA_ARGS__)
+#define kleave(FMT, ...) \
+	pr_devel("<== %s()"FMT"\n", __func__, ##__VA_ARGS__)
+
+struct pkcs7_signed_info {
+	struct pkcs7_signed_info *next;
+	struct x509_certificate *signer; /* Signing certificate (in msg->certs) */
+	unsigned	index;
+	bool		unsupported_crypto;	/* T if not usable due to missing crypto */
+	bool		blacklisted;
+
+	/* Message digest - the digest of the Content Data (or NULL) */
+	const void	*msgdigest;
+	unsigned	msgdigest_len;
+
+	/* Authenticated Attribute data (or NULL) */
+	unsigned	authattrs_len;
+	const void	*authattrs;
+	unsigned long	aa_set;
+#define	sinfo_has_content_type		0
+#define	sinfo_has_signing_time		1
+#define	sinfo_has_message_digest	2
+#define sinfo_has_smime_caps		3
+#define	sinfo_has_ms_opus_info		4
+#define	sinfo_has_ms_statement_type	5
+	time64_t	signing_time;
+
+	/* Message signature.
+	 *
+	 * This contains the generated digest of _either_ the Content Data or
+	 * the Authenticated Attributes [RFC2315 9.3].  If the latter, one of
+	 * the attributes contains the digest of the Content Data within it.
+	 *
+	 * This also contains the issuing cert serial number and issuer's name
+	 * [PKCS#7 or CMS ver 1] or issuing cert's SKID [CMS ver 3].
+	 */
+	struct public_key_signature *sig;
+};
+
+struct pkcs7_message {
+	struct x509_certificate *certs;	/* Certificate list */
+	struct x509_certificate *crl;	/* Revocation list */
+	struct pkcs7_signed_info *signed_infos;
+	u8		version;	/* Version of cert (1 -> PKCS#7 or CMS; 3 -> CMS) */
+	bool		have_authattrs;	/* T if have authattrs */
+
+	/* Content Data (or NULL) */
+	enum OID	data_type;	/* Type of Data */
+	size_t		data_len;	/* Length of Data */
+	size_t		data_hdrlen;	/* Length of Data ASN.1 header */
+	const void	*data;		/* Content Data (or 0) */
+};
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_trust.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_trust.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..9a87c34ed1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_trust.c
@@ -0,0 +1,188 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
+/* Validate the trust chain of a PKCS#7 message.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2012 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
+ */
+
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) "PKCS7: "fmt
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/export.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/err.h>
+#include <linux/asn1.h>
+#include <linux/key.h>
+#include <keys/asymmetric-type.h>
+#include <crypto/public_key.h>
+#include "pkcs7_parser.h"
+
+/*
+ * Check the trust on one PKCS#7 SignedInfo block.
+ */
+static int pkcs7_validate_trust_one(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
+				    struct pkcs7_signed_info *sinfo,
+				    struct key *trust_keyring)
+{
+	struct public_key_signature *sig = sinfo->sig;
+	struct x509_certificate *x509, *last = NULL, *p;
+	struct key *key;
+	int ret;
+
+	kenter(",%u,", sinfo->index);
+
+	if (sinfo->unsupported_crypto) {
+		kleave(" = -ENOPKG [cached]");
+		return -ENOPKG;
+	}
+
+	for (x509 = sinfo->signer; x509; x509 = x509->signer) {
+		if (x509->seen) {
+			if (x509->verified)
+				goto verified;
+			kleave(" = -ENOKEY [cached]");
+			return -ENOKEY;
+		}
+		x509->seen = true;
+
+		/* Look to see if this certificate is present in the trusted
+		 * keys.
+		 */
+		key = find_asymmetric_key(trust_keyring,
+					  x509->id, x509->skid, NULL, false);
+		if (!IS_ERR(key)) {
+			/* One of the X.509 certificates in the PKCS#7 message
+			 * is apparently the same as one we already trust.
+			 * Verify that the trusted variant can also validate
+			 * the signature on the descendant.
+			 */
+			pr_devel("sinfo %u: Cert %u as key %x\n",
+				 sinfo->index, x509->index, key_serial(key));
+			goto matched;
+		}
+		if (key == ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM))
+			return -ENOMEM;
+
+		 /* Self-signed certificates form roots of their own, and if we
+		  * don't know them, then we can't accept them.
+		  */
+		if (x509->signer == x509) {
+			kleave(" = -ENOKEY [unknown self-signed]");
+			return -ENOKEY;
+		}
+
+		might_sleep();
+		last = x509;
+		sig = last->sig;
+	}
+
+	/* No match - see if the root certificate has a signer amongst the
+	 * trusted keys.
+	 */
+	if (last && (last->sig->auth_ids[0] || last->sig->auth_ids[1])) {
+		key = find_asymmetric_key(trust_keyring,
+					  last->sig->auth_ids[0],
+					  last->sig->auth_ids[1],
+					  NULL, false);
+		if (!IS_ERR(key)) {
+			x509 = last;
+			pr_devel("sinfo %u: Root cert %u signer is key %x\n",
+				 sinfo->index, x509->index, key_serial(key));
+			goto matched;
+		}
+		if (PTR_ERR(key) != -ENOKEY)
+			return PTR_ERR(key);
+	}
+
+	/* As a last resort, see if we have a trusted public key that matches
+	 * the signed info directly.
+	 */
+	key = find_asymmetric_key(trust_keyring,
+				  sinfo->sig->auth_ids[0], NULL, NULL, false);
+	if (!IS_ERR(key)) {
+		pr_devel("sinfo %u: Direct signer is key %x\n",
+			 sinfo->index, key_serial(key));
+		x509 = NULL;
+		sig = sinfo->sig;
+		goto matched;
+	}
+	if (PTR_ERR(key) != -ENOKEY)
+		return PTR_ERR(key);
+
+	kleave(" = -ENOKEY [no backref]");
+	return -ENOKEY;
+
+matched:
+	ret = verify_signature(key, sig);
+	key_put(key);
+	if (ret < 0) {
+		if (ret == -ENOMEM)
+			return ret;
+		kleave(" = -EKEYREJECTED [verify %d]", ret);
+		return -EKEYREJECTED;
+	}
+
+verified:
+	if (x509) {
+		x509->verified = true;
+		for (p = sinfo->signer; p != x509; p = p->signer)
+			p->verified = true;
+	}
+	kleave(" = 0");
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * pkcs7_validate_trust - Validate PKCS#7 trust chain
+ * @pkcs7: The PKCS#7 certificate to validate
+ * @trust_keyring: Signing certificates to use as starting points
+ *
+ * Validate that the certificate chain inside the PKCS#7 message intersects
+ * keys we already know and trust.
+ *
+ * Returns, in order of descending priority:
+ *
+ *  (*) -EKEYREJECTED if a signature failed to match for which we have a valid
+ *	key, or:
+ *
+ *  (*) 0 if at least one signature chain intersects with the keys in the trust
+ *	keyring, or:
+ *
+ *  (*) -ENOPKG if a suitable crypto module couldn't be found for a check on a
+ *	chain.
+ *
+ *  (*) -ENOKEY if we couldn't find a match for any of the signature chains in
+ *	the message.
+ *
+ * May also return -ENOMEM.
+ */
+int pkcs7_validate_trust(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
+			 struct key *trust_keyring)
+{
+	struct pkcs7_signed_info *sinfo;
+	struct x509_certificate *p;
+	int cached_ret = -ENOKEY;
+	int ret;
+
+	for (p = pkcs7->certs; p; p = p->next)
+		p->seen = false;
+
+	for (sinfo = pkcs7->signed_infos; sinfo; sinfo = sinfo->next) {
+		ret = pkcs7_validate_trust_one(pkcs7, sinfo, trust_keyring);
+		switch (ret) {
+		case -ENOKEY:
+			continue;
+		case -ENOPKG:
+			if (cached_ret == -ENOKEY)
+				cached_ret = -ENOPKG;
+			continue;
+		case 0:
+			cached_ret = 0;
+			continue;
+		default:
+			return ret;
+		}
+	}
+
+	return cached_ret;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(pkcs7_validate_trust);
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..f0d4ff3c20
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c
@@ -0,0 +1,488 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
+/* Verify the signature on a PKCS#7 message.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2012 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
+ */
+
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) "PKCS7: "fmt
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/export.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/err.h>
+#include <linux/asn1.h>
+#include <crypto/hash.h>
+#include <crypto/hash_info.h>
+#include <crypto/public_key.h>
+#include "pkcs7_parser.h"
+
+/*
+ * Digest the relevant parts of the PKCS#7 data
+ */
+static int pkcs7_digest(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
+			struct pkcs7_signed_info *sinfo)
+{
+	struct public_key_signature *sig = sinfo->sig;
+	struct crypto_shash *tfm;
+	struct shash_desc *desc;
+	size_t desc_size;
+	int ret;
+
+	kenter(",%u,%s", sinfo->index, sinfo->sig->hash_algo);
+
+	/* The digest was calculated already. */
+	if (sig->digest)
+		return 0;
+
+	if (!sinfo->sig->hash_algo)
+		return -ENOPKG;
+
+	/* Allocate the hashing algorithm we're going to need and find out how
+	 * big the hash operational data will be.
+	 */
+	tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(sinfo->sig->hash_algo, 0, 0);
+	if (IS_ERR(tfm))
+		return (PTR_ERR(tfm) == -ENOENT) ? -ENOPKG : PTR_ERR(tfm);
+
+	desc_size = crypto_shash_descsize(tfm) + sizeof(*desc);
+	sig->digest_size = crypto_shash_digestsize(tfm);
+
+	ret = -ENOMEM;
+	sig->digest = kmalloc(sig->digest_size, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!sig->digest)
+		goto error_no_desc;
+
+	desc = kzalloc(desc_size, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!desc)
+		goto error_no_desc;
+
+	desc->tfm   = tfm;
+
+	/* Digest the message [RFC2315 9.3] */
+	ret = crypto_shash_digest(desc, pkcs7->data, pkcs7->data_len,
+				  sig->digest);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		goto error;
+	pr_devel("MsgDigest = [%*ph]\n", 8, sig->digest);
+
+	/* However, if there are authenticated attributes, there must be a
+	 * message digest attribute amongst them which corresponds to the
+	 * digest we just calculated.
+	 */
+	if (sinfo->authattrs) {
+		u8 tag;
+
+		if (!sinfo->msgdigest) {
+			pr_warn("Sig %u: No messageDigest\n", sinfo->index);
+			ret = -EKEYREJECTED;
+			goto error;
+		}
+
+		if (sinfo->msgdigest_len != sig->digest_size) {
+			pr_warn("Sig %u: Invalid digest size (%u)\n",
+				sinfo->index, sinfo->msgdigest_len);
+			ret = -EBADMSG;
+			goto error;
+		}
+
+		if (memcmp(sig->digest, sinfo->msgdigest,
+			   sinfo->msgdigest_len) != 0) {
+			pr_warn("Sig %u: Message digest doesn't match\n",
+				sinfo->index);
+			ret = -EKEYREJECTED;
+			goto error;
+		}
+
+		/* We then calculate anew, using the authenticated attributes
+		 * as the contents of the digest instead.  Note that we need to
+		 * convert the attributes from a CONT.0 into a SET before we
+		 * hash it.
+		 */
+		memset(sig->digest, 0, sig->digest_size);
+
+		ret = crypto_shash_init(desc);
+		if (ret < 0)
+			goto error;
+		tag = ASN1_CONS_BIT | ASN1_SET;
+		ret = crypto_shash_update(desc, &tag, 1);
+		if (ret < 0)
+			goto error;
+		ret = crypto_shash_finup(desc, sinfo->authattrs,
+					 sinfo->authattrs_len, sig->digest);
+		if (ret < 0)
+			goto error;
+		pr_devel("AADigest = [%*ph]\n", 8, sig->digest);
+	}
+
+error:
+	kfree(desc);
+error_no_desc:
+	crypto_free_shash(tfm);
+	kleave(" = %d", ret);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+int pkcs7_get_digest(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7, const u8 **buf, u32 *len,
+		     enum hash_algo *hash_algo)
+{
+	struct pkcs7_signed_info *sinfo = pkcs7->signed_infos;
+	int i, ret;
+
+	/*
+	 * This function doesn't support messages with more than one signature.
+	 */
+	if (sinfo == NULL || sinfo->next != NULL)
+		return -EBADMSG;
+
+	ret = pkcs7_digest(pkcs7, sinfo);
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+
+	*buf = sinfo->sig->digest;
+	*len = sinfo->sig->digest_size;
+
+	i = match_string(hash_algo_name, HASH_ALGO__LAST,
+			 sinfo->sig->hash_algo);
+	if (i >= 0)
+		*hash_algo = i;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Find the key (X.509 certificate) to use to verify a PKCS#7 message.  PKCS#7
+ * uses the issuer's name and the issuing certificate serial number for
+ * matching purposes.  These must match the certificate issuer's name (not
+ * subject's name) and the certificate serial number [RFC 2315 6.7].
+ */
+static int pkcs7_find_key(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
+			  struct pkcs7_signed_info *sinfo)
+{
+	struct x509_certificate *x509;
+	unsigned certix = 1;
+
+	kenter("%u", sinfo->index);
+
+	for (x509 = pkcs7->certs; x509; x509 = x509->next, certix++) {
+		/* I'm _assuming_ that the generator of the PKCS#7 message will
+		 * encode the fields from the X.509 cert in the same way in the
+		 * PKCS#7 message - but I can't be 100% sure of that.  It's
+		 * possible this will need element-by-element comparison.
+		 */
+		if (!asymmetric_key_id_same(x509->id, sinfo->sig->auth_ids[0]))
+			continue;
+		pr_devel("Sig %u: Found cert serial match X.509[%u]\n",
+			 sinfo->index, certix);
+
+		sinfo->signer = x509;
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	/* The relevant X.509 cert isn't found here, but it might be found in
+	 * the trust keyring.
+	 */
+	pr_debug("Sig %u: Issuing X.509 cert not found (#%*phN)\n",
+		 sinfo->index,
+		 sinfo->sig->auth_ids[0]->len, sinfo->sig->auth_ids[0]->data);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Verify the internal certificate chain as best we can.
+ */
+static int pkcs7_verify_sig_chain(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
+				  struct pkcs7_signed_info *sinfo)
+{
+	struct public_key_signature *sig;
+	struct x509_certificate *x509 = sinfo->signer, *p;
+	struct asymmetric_key_id *auth;
+	int ret;
+
+	kenter("");
+
+	for (p = pkcs7->certs; p; p = p->next)
+		p->seen = false;
+
+	for (;;) {
+		pr_debug("verify %s: %*phN\n",
+			 x509->subject,
+			 x509->raw_serial_size, x509->raw_serial);
+		x509->seen = true;
+
+		if (x509->blacklisted) {
+			/* If this cert is blacklisted, then mark everything
+			 * that depends on this as blacklisted too.
+			 */
+			sinfo->blacklisted = true;
+			for (p = sinfo->signer; p != x509; p = p->signer)
+				p->blacklisted = true;
+			pr_debug("- blacklisted\n");
+			return 0;
+		}
+
+		pr_debug("- issuer %s\n", x509->issuer);
+		sig = x509->sig;
+		if (sig->auth_ids[0])
+			pr_debug("- authkeyid.id %*phN\n",
+				 sig->auth_ids[0]->len, sig->auth_ids[0]->data);
+		if (sig->auth_ids[1])
+			pr_debug("- authkeyid.skid %*phN\n",
+				 sig->auth_ids[1]->len, sig->auth_ids[1]->data);
+
+		if (x509->self_signed) {
+			/* If there's no authority certificate specified, then
+			 * the certificate must be self-signed and is the root
+			 * of the chain.  Likewise if the cert is its own
+			 * authority.
+			 */
+			if (x509->unsupported_sig)
+				goto unsupported_sig_in_x509;
+			x509->signer = x509;
+			pr_debug("- self-signed\n");
+			return 0;
+		}
+
+		/* Look through the X.509 certificates in the PKCS#7 message's
+		 * list to see if the next one is there.
+		 */
+		auth = sig->auth_ids[0];
+		if (auth) {
+			pr_debug("- want %*phN\n", auth->len, auth->data);
+			for (p = pkcs7->certs; p; p = p->next) {
+				pr_debug("- cmp [%u] %*phN\n",
+					 p->index, p->id->len, p->id->data);
+				if (asymmetric_key_id_same(p->id, auth))
+					goto found_issuer_check_skid;
+			}
+		} else if (sig->auth_ids[1]) {
+			auth = sig->auth_ids[1];
+			pr_debug("- want %*phN\n", auth->len, auth->data);
+			for (p = pkcs7->certs; p; p = p->next) {
+				if (!p->skid)
+					continue;
+				pr_debug("- cmp [%u] %*phN\n",
+					 p->index, p->skid->len, p->skid->data);
+				if (asymmetric_key_id_same(p->skid, auth))
+					goto found_issuer;
+			}
+		}
+
+		/* We didn't find the root of this chain */
+		pr_debug("- top\n");
+		return 0;
+
+	found_issuer_check_skid:
+		/* We matched issuer + serialNumber, but if there's an
+		 * authKeyId.keyId, that must match the CA subjKeyId also.
+		 */
+		if (sig->auth_ids[1] &&
+		    !asymmetric_key_id_same(p->skid, sig->auth_ids[1])) {
+			pr_warn("Sig %u: X.509 chain contains auth-skid nonmatch (%u->%u)\n",
+				sinfo->index, x509->index, p->index);
+			return -EKEYREJECTED;
+		}
+	found_issuer:
+		pr_debug("- subject %s\n", p->subject);
+		if (p->seen) {
+			pr_warn("Sig %u: X.509 chain contains loop\n",
+				sinfo->index);
+			return 0;
+		}
+		ret = public_key_verify_signature(p->pub, x509->sig);
+		if (ret < 0)
+			return ret;
+		x509->signer = p;
+		if (x509 == p) {
+			pr_debug("- self-signed\n");
+			return 0;
+		}
+		x509 = p;
+		might_sleep();
+	}
+
+unsupported_sig_in_x509:
+	/* Just prune the certificate chain at this point if we lack some
+	 * crypto module to go further.  Note, however, we don't want to set
+	 * sinfo->unsupported_crypto as the signed info block may still be
+	 * validatable against an X.509 cert lower in the chain that we have a
+	 * trusted copy of.
+	 */
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Verify one signed information block from a PKCS#7 message.
+ */
+static int pkcs7_verify_one(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
+			    struct pkcs7_signed_info *sinfo)
+{
+	int ret;
+
+	kenter(",%u", sinfo->index);
+
+	/* First of all, digest the data in the PKCS#7 message and the
+	 * signed information block
+	 */
+	ret = pkcs7_digest(pkcs7, sinfo);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		return ret;
+
+	/* Find the key for the signature if there is one */
+	ret = pkcs7_find_key(pkcs7, sinfo);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		return ret;
+
+	if (!sinfo->signer)
+		return 0;
+
+	pr_devel("Using X.509[%u] for sig %u\n",
+		 sinfo->signer->index, sinfo->index);
+
+	/* Check that the PKCS#7 signing time is valid according to the X.509
+	 * certificate.  We can't, however, check against the system clock
+	 * since that may not have been set yet and may be wrong.
+	 */
+	if (test_bit(sinfo_has_signing_time, &sinfo->aa_set)) {
+		if (sinfo->signing_time < sinfo->signer->valid_from ||
+		    sinfo->signing_time > sinfo->signer->valid_to) {
+			pr_warn("Message signed outside of X.509 validity window\n");
+			return -EKEYREJECTED;
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* Verify the PKCS#7 binary against the key */
+	ret = public_key_verify_signature(sinfo->signer->pub, sinfo->sig);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		return ret;
+
+	pr_devel("Verified signature %u\n", sinfo->index);
+
+	/* Verify the internal certificate chain */
+	return pkcs7_verify_sig_chain(pkcs7, sinfo);
+}
+
+/**
+ * pkcs7_verify - Verify a PKCS#7 message
+ * @pkcs7: The PKCS#7 message to be verified
+ * @usage: The use to which the key is being put
+ *
+ * Verify a PKCS#7 message is internally consistent - that is, the data digest
+ * matches the digest in the AuthAttrs and any signature in the message or one
+ * of the X.509 certificates it carries that matches another X.509 cert in the
+ * message can be verified.
+ *
+ * This does not look to match the contents of the PKCS#7 message against any
+ * external public keys.
+ *
+ * Returns, in order of descending priority:
+ *
+ *  (*) -EKEYREJECTED if a key was selected that had a usage restriction at
+ *      odds with the specified usage, or:
+ *
+ *  (*) -EKEYREJECTED if a signature failed to match for which we found an
+ *	appropriate X.509 certificate, or:
+ *
+ *  (*) -EBADMSG if some part of the message was invalid, or:
+ *
+ *  (*) 0 if a signature chain passed verification, or:
+ *
+ *  (*) -EKEYREJECTED if a blacklisted key was encountered, or:
+ *
+ *  (*) -ENOPKG if none of the signature chains are verifiable because suitable
+ *	crypto modules couldn't be found.
+ */
+int pkcs7_verify(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
+		 enum key_being_used_for usage)
+{
+	struct pkcs7_signed_info *sinfo;
+	int actual_ret = -ENOPKG;
+	int ret;
+
+	kenter("");
+
+	switch (usage) {
+	case VERIFYING_MODULE_SIGNATURE:
+		if (pkcs7->data_type != OID_data) {
+			pr_warn("Invalid module sig (not pkcs7-data)\n");
+			return -EKEYREJECTED;
+		}
+		if (pkcs7->have_authattrs) {
+			pr_warn("Invalid module sig (has authattrs)\n");
+			return -EKEYREJECTED;
+		}
+		break;
+	case VERIFYING_FIRMWARE_SIGNATURE:
+		if (pkcs7->data_type != OID_data) {
+			pr_warn("Invalid firmware sig (not pkcs7-data)\n");
+			return -EKEYREJECTED;
+		}
+		if (!pkcs7->have_authattrs) {
+			pr_warn("Invalid firmware sig (missing authattrs)\n");
+			return -EKEYREJECTED;
+		}
+		break;
+	case VERIFYING_KEXEC_PE_SIGNATURE:
+		if (pkcs7->data_type != OID_msIndirectData) {
+			pr_warn("Invalid kexec sig (not Authenticode)\n");
+			return -EKEYREJECTED;
+		}
+		/* Authattr presence checked in parser */
+		break;
+	case VERIFYING_UNSPECIFIED_SIGNATURE:
+		if (pkcs7->data_type != OID_data) {
+			pr_warn("Invalid unspecified sig (not pkcs7-data)\n");
+			return -EKEYREJECTED;
+		}
+		break;
+	default:
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	for (sinfo = pkcs7->signed_infos; sinfo; sinfo = sinfo->next) {
+		ret = pkcs7_verify_one(pkcs7, sinfo);
+		if (sinfo->blacklisted) {
+			if (actual_ret == -ENOPKG)
+				actual_ret = -EKEYREJECTED;
+			continue;
+		}
+		if (ret < 0) {
+			if (ret == -ENOPKG) {
+				sinfo->unsupported_crypto = true;
+				continue;
+			}
+			kleave(" = %d", ret);
+			return ret;
+		}
+		actual_ret = 0;
+	}
+
+	kleave(" = %d", actual_ret);
+	return actual_ret;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(pkcs7_verify);
+
+/**
+ * pkcs7_supply_detached_data - Supply the data needed to verify a PKCS#7 message
+ * @pkcs7: The PKCS#7 message
+ * @data: The data to be verified
+ * @datalen: The amount of data
+ *
+ * Supply the detached data needed to verify a PKCS#7 message.  Note that no
+ * attempt to retain/pin the data is made.  That is left to the caller.  The
+ * data will not be modified by pkcs7_verify() and will not be freed when the
+ * PKCS#7 message is freed.
+ *
+ * Returns -EINVAL if data is already supplied in the message, 0 otherwise.
+ */
+int pkcs7_supply_detached_data(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
+			       const void *data, size_t datalen)
+{
+	if (pkcs7->data) {
+		pr_warn("Data already supplied\n");
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+	pkcs7->data = data;
+	pkcs7->data_len = datalen;
+	return 0;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(pkcs7_supply_detached_data);
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs8.asn1 b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs8.asn1
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..702c41a3c7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs8.asn1
@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+--
+-- This is the unencrypted variant
+--
+PrivateKeyInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
+	version			Version,
+	privateKeyAlgorithm	PrivateKeyAlgorithmIdentifier,
+	privateKey		PrivateKey,
+	attributes		[0] IMPLICIT Attributes OPTIONAL
+}
+
+Version ::= INTEGER  ({ pkcs8_note_version })
+
+PrivateKeyAlgorithmIdentifier ::= AlgorithmIdentifier ({ pkcs8_note_algo })
+
+PrivateKey ::= OCTET STRING ({ pkcs8_note_key })
+
+Attributes ::= SET OF Attribute
+
+Attribute ::= ANY
+
+AlgorithmIdentifier ::= SEQUENCE {
+	algorithm   OBJECT IDENTIFIER ({ pkcs8_note_OID }),
+	parameters  ANY OPTIONAL
+}
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs8_parser.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs8_parser.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..105dcce27f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs8_parser.c
@@ -0,0 +1,180 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
+/* PKCS#8 Private Key parser [RFC 5208].
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2016 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
+ */
+
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) "PKCS8: "fmt
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/export.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/err.h>
+#include <linux/oid_registry.h>
+#include <keys/asymmetric-subtype.h>
+#include <keys/asymmetric-parser.h>
+#include <crypto/public_key.h>
+#include "pkcs8.asn1.h"
+
+struct pkcs8_parse_context {
+	struct public_key *pub;
+	unsigned long	data;			/* Start of data */
+	enum OID	last_oid;		/* Last OID encountered */
+	enum OID	algo_oid;		/* Algorithm OID */
+	u32		key_size;
+	const void	*key;
+};
+
+/*
+ * Note an OID when we find one for later processing when we know how to
+ * interpret it.
+ */
+int pkcs8_note_OID(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
+		   unsigned char tag,
+		   const void *value, size_t vlen)
+{
+	struct pkcs8_parse_context *ctx = context;
+
+	ctx->last_oid = look_up_OID(value, vlen);
+	if (ctx->last_oid == OID__NR) {
+		char buffer[50];
+
+		sprint_oid(value, vlen, buffer, sizeof(buffer));
+		pr_info("Unknown OID: [%lu] %s\n",
+			(unsigned long)value - ctx->data, buffer);
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Note the version number of the ASN.1 blob.
+ */
+int pkcs8_note_version(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
+		       unsigned char tag,
+		       const void *value, size_t vlen)
+{
+	if (vlen != 1 || ((const u8 *)value)[0] != 0) {
+		pr_warn("Unsupported PKCS#8 version\n");
+		return -EBADMSG;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Note the public algorithm.
+ */
+int pkcs8_note_algo(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
+		    unsigned char tag,
+		    const void *value, size_t vlen)
+{
+	struct pkcs8_parse_context *ctx = context;
+
+	if (ctx->last_oid != OID_rsaEncryption)
+		return -ENOPKG;
+
+	ctx->pub->pkey_algo = "rsa";
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Note the key data of the ASN.1 blob.
+ */
+int pkcs8_note_key(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
+		   unsigned char tag,
+		   const void *value, size_t vlen)
+{
+	struct pkcs8_parse_context *ctx = context;
+
+	ctx->key = value;
+	ctx->key_size = vlen;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Parse a PKCS#8 private key blob.
+ */
+static struct public_key *pkcs8_parse(const void *data, size_t datalen)
+{
+	struct pkcs8_parse_context ctx;
+	struct public_key *pub;
+	long ret;
+
+	memset(&ctx, 0, sizeof(ctx));
+
+	ret = -ENOMEM;
+	ctx.pub = kzalloc(sizeof(struct public_key), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!ctx.pub)
+		goto error;
+
+	ctx.data = (unsigned long)data;
+
+	/* Attempt to decode the private key */
+	ret = asn1_ber_decoder(&pkcs8_decoder, &ctx, data, datalen);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		goto error_decode;
+
+	ret = -ENOMEM;
+	pub = ctx.pub;
+	pub->key = kmemdup(ctx.key, ctx.key_size, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!pub->key)
+		goto error_decode;
+
+	pub->keylen = ctx.key_size;
+	pub->key_is_private = true;
+	return pub;
+
+error_decode:
+	kfree(ctx.pub);
+error:
+	return ERR_PTR(ret);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Attempt to parse a data blob for a key as a PKCS#8 private key.
+ */
+static int pkcs8_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
+{
+	struct public_key *pub;
+
+	pub = pkcs8_parse(prep->data, prep->datalen);
+	if (IS_ERR(pub))
+		return PTR_ERR(pub);
+
+	pr_devel("Cert Key Algo: %s\n", pub->pkey_algo);
+	pub->id_type = "PKCS8";
+
+	/* We're pinning the module by being linked against it */
+	__module_get(public_key_subtype.owner);
+	prep->payload.data[asym_subtype] = &public_key_subtype;
+	prep->payload.data[asym_key_ids] = NULL;
+	prep->payload.data[asym_crypto] = pub;
+	prep->payload.data[asym_auth] = NULL;
+	prep->quotalen = 100;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static struct asymmetric_key_parser pkcs8_key_parser = {
+	.owner	= THIS_MODULE,
+	.name	= "pkcs8",
+	.parse	= pkcs8_key_preparse,
+};
+
+/*
+ * Module stuff
+ */
+static int __init pkcs8_key_init(void)
+{
+	return register_asymmetric_key_parser(&pkcs8_key_parser);
+}
+
+static void __exit pkcs8_key_exit(void)
+{
+	unregister_asymmetric_key_parser(&pkcs8_key_parser);
+}
+
+module_init(pkcs8_key_init);
+module_exit(pkcs8_key_exit);
+
+MODULE_DESCRIPTION("PKCS#8 certificate parser");
+MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..1dcab27986
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c
@@ -0,0 +1,473 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
+/* In-software asymmetric public-key crypto subtype
+ *
+ * See Documentation/crypto/asymmetric-keys.rst
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2012 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
+ */
+
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) "PKEY: "fmt
+#include <crypto/akcipher.h>
+#include <crypto/public_key.h>
+#include <crypto/sig.h>
+#include <keys/asymmetric-subtype.h>
+#include <linux/asn1.h>
+#include <linux/err.h>
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/seq_file.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/string.h>
+
+MODULE_DESCRIPTION("In-software asymmetric public-key subtype");
+MODULE_AUTHOR("Red Hat, Inc.");
+MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
+
+/*
+ * Provide a part of a description of the key for /proc/keys.
+ */
+static void public_key_describe(const struct key *asymmetric_key,
+				struct seq_file *m)
+{
+	struct public_key *key = asymmetric_key->payload.data[asym_crypto];
+
+	if (key)
+		seq_printf(m, "%s.%s", key->id_type, key->pkey_algo);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Destroy a public key algorithm key.
+ */
+void public_key_free(struct public_key *key)
+{
+	if (key) {
+		kfree_sensitive(key->key);
+		kfree(key->params);
+		kfree(key);
+	}
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(public_key_free);
+
+/*
+ * Destroy a public key algorithm key.
+ */
+static void public_key_destroy(void *payload0, void *payload3)
+{
+	public_key_free(payload0);
+	public_key_signature_free(payload3);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Given a public_key, and an encoding and hash_algo to be used for signing
+ * and/or verification with that key, determine the name of the corresponding
+ * akcipher algorithm.  Also check that encoding and hash_algo are allowed.
+ */
+static int
+software_key_determine_akcipher(const struct public_key *pkey,
+				const char *encoding, const char *hash_algo,
+				char alg_name[CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME], bool *sig,
+				enum kernel_pkey_operation op)
+{
+	int n;
+
+	*sig = true;
+
+	if (!encoding)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (strcmp(pkey->pkey_algo, "rsa") == 0) {
+		/*
+		 * RSA signatures usually use EMSA-PKCS1-1_5 [RFC3447 sec 8.2].
+		 */
+		if (strcmp(encoding, "pkcs1") == 0) {
+			*sig = op == kernel_pkey_sign ||
+			       op == kernel_pkey_verify;
+			if (!hash_algo) {
+				n = snprintf(alg_name, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME,
+					     "pkcs1pad(%s)",
+					     pkey->pkey_algo);
+			} else {
+				n = snprintf(alg_name, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME,
+					     "pkcs1pad(%s,%s)",
+					     pkey->pkey_algo, hash_algo);
+			}
+			return n >= CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME ? -EINVAL : 0;
+		}
+		if (strcmp(encoding, "raw") != 0)
+			return -EINVAL;
+		/*
+		 * Raw RSA cannot differentiate between different hash
+		 * algorithms.
+		 */
+		if (hash_algo)
+			return -EINVAL;
+		*sig = false;
+	} else if (strncmp(pkey->pkey_algo, "ecdsa", 5) == 0) {
+		if (strcmp(encoding, "x962") != 0)
+			return -EINVAL;
+		/*
+		 * ECDSA signatures are taken over a raw hash, so they don't
+		 * differentiate between different hash algorithms.  That means
+		 * that the verifier should hard-code a specific hash algorithm.
+		 * Unfortunately, in practice ECDSA is used with multiple SHAs,
+		 * so we have to allow all of them and not just one.
+		 */
+		if (!hash_algo)
+			return -EINVAL;
+		if (strcmp(hash_algo, "sha1") != 0 &&
+		    strcmp(hash_algo, "sha224") != 0 &&
+		    strcmp(hash_algo, "sha256") != 0 &&
+		    strcmp(hash_algo, "sha384") != 0 &&
+		    strcmp(hash_algo, "sha512") != 0)
+			return -EINVAL;
+	} else if (strcmp(pkey->pkey_algo, "sm2") == 0) {
+		if (strcmp(encoding, "raw") != 0)
+			return -EINVAL;
+		if (!hash_algo)
+			return -EINVAL;
+		if (strcmp(hash_algo, "sm3") != 0)
+			return -EINVAL;
+	} else if (strcmp(pkey->pkey_algo, "ecrdsa") == 0) {
+		if (strcmp(encoding, "raw") != 0)
+			return -EINVAL;
+		if (!hash_algo)
+			return -EINVAL;
+		if (strcmp(hash_algo, "streebog256") != 0 &&
+		    strcmp(hash_algo, "streebog512") != 0)
+			return -EINVAL;
+	} else {
+		/* Unknown public key algorithm */
+		return -ENOPKG;
+	}
+	if (strscpy(alg_name, pkey->pkey_algo, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME) < 0)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static u8 *pkey_pack_u32(u8 *dst, u32 val)
+{
+	memcpy(dst, &val, sizeof(val));
+	return dst + sizeof(val);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Query information about a key.
+ */
+static int software_key_query(const struct kernel_pkey_params *params,
+			      struct kernel_pkey_query *info)
+{
+	struct crypto_akcipher *tfm;
+	struct public_key *pkey = params->key->payload.data[asym_crypto];
+	char alg_name[CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME];
+	struct crypto_sig *sig;
+	u8 *key, *ptr;
+	int ret, len;
+	bool issig;
+
+	ret = software_key_determine_akcipher(pkey, params->encoding,
+					      params->hash_algo, alg_name,
+					      &issig, kernel_pkey_sign);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		return ret;
+
+	key = kmalloc(pkey->keylen + sizeof(u32) * 2 + pkey->paramlen,
+		      GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!key)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	memcpy(key, pkey->key, pkey->keylen);
+	ptr = key + pkey->keylen;
+	ptr = pkey_pack_u32(ptr, pkey->algo);
+	ptr = pkey_pack_u32(ptr, pkey->paramlen);
+	memcpy(ptr, pkey->params, pkey->paramlen);
+
+	if (issig) {
+		sig = crypto_alloc_sig(alg_name, 0, 0);
+		if (IS_ERR(sig)) {
+			ret = PTR_ERR(sig);
+			goto error_free_key;
+		}
+
+		if (pkey->key_is_private)
+			ret = crypto_sig_set_privkey(sig, key, pkey->keylen);
+		else
+			ret = crypto_sig_set_pubkey(sig, key, pkey->keylen);
+		if (ret < 0)
+			goto error_free_tfm;
+
+		len = crypto_sig_maxsize(sig);
+
+		info->supported_ops = KEYCTL_SUPPORTS_VERIFY;
+		if (pkey->key_is_private)
+			info->supported_ops |= KEYCTL_SUPPORTS_SIGN;
+
+		if (strcmp(params->encoding, "pkcs1") == 0) {
+			info->supported_ops |= KEYCTL_SUPPORTS_ENCRYPT;
+			if (pkey->key_is_private)
+				info->supported_ops |= KEYCTL_SUPPORTS_DECRYPT;
+		}
+	} else {
+		tfm = crypto_alloc_akcipher(alg_name, 0, 0);
+		if (IS_ERR(tfm)) {
+			ret = PTR_ERR(tfm);
+			goto error_free_key;
+		}
+
+		if (pkey->key_is_private)
+			ret = crypto_akcipher_set_priv_key(tfm, key, pkey->keylen);
+		else
+			ret = crypto_akcipher_set_pub_key(tfm, key, pkey->keylen);
+		if (ret < 0)
+			goto error_free_tfm;
+
+		len = crypto_akcipher_maxsize(tfm);
+
+		info->supported_ops = KEYCTL_SUPPORTS_ENCRYPT;
+		if (pkey->key_is_private)
+			info->supported_ops |= KEYCTL_SUPPORTS_DECRYPT;
+	}
+
+	info->key_size = len * 8;
+
+	if (strncmp(pkey->pkey_algo, "ecdsa", 5) == 0) {
+		/*
+		 * ECDSA key sizes are much smaller than RSA, and thus could
+		 * operate on (hashed) inputs that are larger than key size.
+		 * For example SHA384-hashed input used with secp256r1
+		 * based keys.  Set max_data_size to be at least as large as
+		 * the largest supported hash size (SHA512)
+		 */
+		info->max_data_size = 64;
+
+		/*
+		 * Verify takes ECDSA-Sig (described in RFC 5480) as input,
+		 * which is actually 2 'key_size'-bit integers encoded in
+		 * ASN.1.  Account for the ASN.1 encoding overhead here.
+		 */
+		info->max_sig_size = 2 * (len + 3) + 2;
+	} else {
+		info->max_data_size = len;
+		info->max_sig_size = len;
+	}
+
+	info->max_enc_size = len;
+	info->max_dec_size = len;
+
+	ret = 0;
+
+error_free_tfm:
+	if (issig)
+		crypto_free_sig(sig);
+	else
+		crypto_free_akcipher(tfm);
+error_free_key:
+	kfree_sensitive(key);
+	pr_devel("<==%s() = %d\n", __func__, ret);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Do encryption, decryption and signing ops.
+ */
+static int software_key_eds_op(struct kernel_pkey_params *params,
+			       const void *in, void *out)
+{
+	const struct public_key *pkey = params->key->payload.data[asym_crypto];
+	char alg_name[CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME];
+	struct crypto_akcipher *tfm;
+	struct crypto_sig *sig;
+	char *key, *ptr;
+	bool issig;
+	int ksz;
+	int ret;
+
+	pr_devel("==>%s()\n", __func__);
+
+	ret = software_key_determine_akcipher(pkey, params->encoding,
+					      params->hash_algo, alg_name,
+					      &issig, params->op);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		return ret;
+
+	key = kmalloc(pkey->keylen + sizeof(u32) * 2 + pkey->paramlen,
+		      GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!key)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	memcpy(key, pkey->key, pkey->keylen);
+	ptr = key + pkey->keylen;
+	ptr = pkey_pack_u32(ptr, pkey->algo);
+	ptr = pkey_pack_u32(ptr, pkey->paramlen);
+	memcpy(ptr, pkey->params, pkey->paramlen);
+
+	if (issig) {
+		sig = crypto_alloc_sig(alg_name, 0, 0);
+		if (IS_ERR(sig)) {
+			ret = PTR_ERR(sig);
+			goto error_free_key;
+		}
+
+		if (pkey->key_is_private)
+			ret = crypto_sig_set_privkey(sig, key, pkey->keylen);
+		else
+			ret = crypto_sig_set_pubkey(sig, key, pkey->keylen);
+		if (ret)
+			goto error_free_tfm;
+
+		ksz = crypto_sig_maxsize(sig);
+	} else {
+		tfm = crypto_alloc_akcipher(alg_name, 0, 0);
+		if (IS_ERR(tfm)) {
+			ret = PTR_ERR(tfm);
+			goto error_free_key;
+		}
+
+		if (pkey->key_is_private)
+			ret = crypto_akcipher_set_priv_key(tfm, key, pkey->keylen);
+		else
+			ret = crypto_akcipher_set_pub_key(tfm, key, pkey->keylen);
+		if (ret)
+			goto error_free_tfm;
+
+		ksz = crypto_akcipher_maxsize(tfm);
+	}
+
+	ret = -EINVAL;
+
+	/* Perform the encryption calculation. */
+	switch (params->op) {
+	case kernel_pkey_encrypt:
+		if (issig)
+			break;
+		ret = crypto_akcipher_sync_encrypt(tfm, in, params->in_len,
+						   out, params->out_len);
+		break;
+	case kernel_pkey_decrypt:
+		if (issig)
+			break;
+		ret = crypto_akcipher_sync_decrypt(tfm, in, params->in_len,
+						   out, params->out_len);
+		break;
+	case kernel_pkey_sign:
+		if (!issig)
+			break;
+		ret = crypto_sig_sign(sig, in, params->in_len,
+				      out, params->out_len);
+		break;
+	default:
+		BUG();
+	}
+
+	if (ret == 0)
+		ret = ksz;
+
+error_free_tfm:
+	if (issig)
+		crypto_free_sig(sig);
+	else
+		crypto_free_akcipher(tfm);
+error_free_key:
+	kfree_sensitive(key);
+	pr_devel("<==%s() = %d\n", __func__, ret);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Verify a signature using a public key.
+ */
+int public_key_verify_signature(const struct public_key *pkey,
+				const struct public_key_signature *sig)
+{
+	char alg_name[CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME];
+	struct crypto_sig *tfm;
+	char *key, *ptr;
+	bool issig;
+	int ret;
+
+	pr_devel("==>%s()\n", __func__);
+
+	BUG_ON(!pkey);
+	BUG_ON(!sig);
+	BUG_ON(!sig->s);
+
+	/*
+	 * If the signature specifies a public key algorithm, it *must* match
+	 * the key's actual public key algorithm.
+	 *
+	 * Small exception: ECDSA signatures don't specify the curve, but ECDSA
+	 * keys do.  So the strings can mismatch slightly in that case:
+	 * "ecdsa-nist-*" for the key, but "ecdsa" for the signature.
+	 */
+	if (sig->pkey_algo) {
+		if (strcmp(pkey->pkey_algo, sig->pkey_algo) != 0 &&
+		    (strncmp(pkey->pkey_algo, "ecdsa-", 6) != 0 ||
+		     strcmp(sig->pkey_algo, "ecdsa") != 0))
+			return -EKEYREJECTED;
+	}
+
+	ret = software_key_determine_akcipher(pkey, sig->encoding,
+					      sig->hash_algo, alg_name,
+					      &issig, kernel_pkey_verify);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		return ret;
+
+	tfm = crypto_alloc_sig(alg_name, 0, 0);
+	if (IS_ERR(tfm))
+		return PTR_ERR(tfm);
+
+	key = kmalloc(pkey->keylen + sizeof(u32) * 2 + pkey->paramlen,
+		      GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!key) {
+		ret = -ENOMEM;
+		goto error_free_tfm;
+	}
+
+	memcpy(key, pkey->key, pkey->keylen);
+	ptr = key + pkey->keylen;
+	ptr = pkey_pack_u32(ptr, pkey->algo);
+	ptr = pkey_pack_u32(ptr, pkey->paramlen);
+	memcpy(ptr, pkey->params, pkey->paramlen);
+
+	if (pkey->key_is_private)
+		ret = crypto_sig_set_privkey(tfm, key, pkey->keylen);
+	else
+		ret = crypto_sig_set_pubkey(tfm, key, pkey->keylen);
+	if (ret)
+		goto error_free_key;
+
+	ret = crypto_sig_verify(tfm, sig->s, sig->s_size,
+				sig->digest, sig->digest_size);
+
+error_free_key:
+	kfree_sensitive(key);
+error_free_tfm:
+	crypto_free_sig(tfm);
+	pr_devel("<==%s() = %d\n", __func__, ret);
+	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(ret > 0))
+		ret = -EINVAL;
+	return ret;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(public_key_verify_signature);
+
+static int public_key_verify_signature_2(const struct key *key,
+					 const struct public_key_signature *sig)
+{
+	const struct public_key *pk = key->payload.data[asym_crypto];
+	return public_key_verify_signature(pk, sig);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Public key algorithm asymmetric key subtype
+ */
+struct asymmetric_key_subtype public_key_subtype = {
+	.owner			= THIS_MODULE,
+	.name			= "public_key",
+	.name_len		= sizeof("public_key") - 1,
+	.describe		= public_key_describe,
+	.destroy		= public_key_destroy,
+	.query			= software_key_query,
+	.eds_op			= software_key_eds_op,
+	.verify_signature	= public_key_verify_signature_2,
+};
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(public_key_subtype);
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..6b69ea40da
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c
@@ -0,0 +1,359 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
+/* Instantiate a public key crypto key from an X.509 Certificate
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2012, 2016 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
+ */
+
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) "ASYM: "fmt
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/err.h>
+#include <crypto/public_key.h>
+#include "asymmetric_keys.h"
+
+static bool use_builtin_keys;
+static struct asymmetric_key_id *ca_keyid;
+
+#ifndef MODULE
+static struct {
+	struct asymmetric_key_id id;
+	unsigned char data[10];
+} cakey;
+
+static int __init ca_keys_setup(char *str)
+{
+	if (!str)		/* default system keyring */
+		return 1;
+
+	if (strncmp(str, "id:", 3) == 0) {
+		struct asymmetric_key_id *p = &cakey.id;
+		size_t hexlen = (strlen(str) - 3) / 2;
+		int ret;
+
+		if (hexlen == 0 || hexlen > sizeof(cakey.data)) {
+			pr_err("Missing or invalid ca_keys id\n");
+			return 1;
+		}
+
+		ret = __asymmetric_key_hex_to_key_id(str + 3, p, hexlen);
+		if (ret < 0)
+			pr_err("Unparsable ca_keys id hex string\n");
+		else
+			ca_keyid = p;	/* owner key 'id:xxxxxx' */
+	} else if (strcmp(str, "builtin") == 0) {
+		use_builtin_keys = true;
+	}
+
+	return 1;
+}
+__setup("ca_keys=", ca_keys_setup);
+#endif
+
+/**
+ * restrict_link_by_signature - Restrict additions to a ring of public keys
+ * @dest_keyring: Keyring being linked to.
+ * @type: The type of key being added.
+ * @payload: The payload of the new key.
+ * @trust_keyring: A ring of keys that can be used to vouch for the new cert.
+ *
+ * Check the new certificate against the ones in the trust keyring.  If one of
+ * those is the signing key and validates the new certificate, then mark the
+ * new certificate as being trusted.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if the new certificate was accepted, -ENOKEY if we couldn't find a
+ * matching parent certificate in the trusted list, -EKEYREJECTED if the
+ * signature check fails or the key is blacklisted, -ENOPKG if the signature
+ * uses unsupported crypto, or some other error if there is a matching
+ * certificate but the signature check cannot be performed.
+ */
+int restrict_link_by_signature(struct key *dest_keyring,
+			       const struct key_type *type,
+			       const union key_payload *payload,
+			       struct key *trust_keyring)
+{
+	const struct public_key_signature *sig;
+	struct key *key;
+	int ret;
+
+	pr_devel("==>%s()\n", __func__);
+
+	if (!trust_keyring)
+		return -ENOKEY;
+
+	if (type != &key_type_asymmetric)
+		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+	sig = payload->data[asym_auth];
+	if (!sig)
+		return -ENOPKG;
+	if (!sig->auth_ids[0] && !sig->auth_ids[1] && !sig->auth_ids[2])
+		return -ENOKEY;
+
+	if (ca_keyid && !asymmetric_key_id_partial(sig->auth_ids[1], ca_keyid))
+		return -EPERM;
+
+	/* See if we have a key that signed this one. */
+	key = find_asymmetric_key(trust_keyring,
+				  sig->auth_ids[0], sig->auth_ids[1],
+				  sig->auth_ids[2], false);
+	if (IS_ERR(key))
+		return -ENOKEY;
+
+	if (use_builtin_keys && !test_bit(KEY_FLAG_BUILTIN, &key->flags))
+		ret = -ENOKEY;
+	else
+		ret = verify_signature(key, sig);
+	key_put(key);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/**
+ * restrict_link_by_ca - Restrict additions to a ring of CA keys
+ * @dest_keyring: Keyring being linked to.
+ * @type: The type of key being added.
+ * @payload: The payload of the new key.
+ * @trust_keyring: Unused.
+ *
+ * Check if the new certificate is a CA. If it is a CA, then mark the new
+ * certificate as being ok to link.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if the new certificate was accepted, -ENOKEY if the
+ * certificate is not a CA. -ENOPKG if the signature uses unsupported
+ * crypto, or some other error if there is a matching certificate but
+ * the signature check cannot be performed.
+ */
+int restrict_link_by_ca(struct key *dest_keyring,
+			const struct key_type *type,
+			const union key_payload *payload,
+			struct key *trust_keyring)
+{
+	const struct public_key *pkey;
+
+	if (type != &key_type_asymmetric)
+		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+	pkey = payload->data[asym_crypto];
+	if (!pkey)
+		return -ENOPKG;
+	if (!test_bit(KEY_EFLAG_CA, &pkey->key_eflags))
+		return -ENOKEY;
+	if (!test_bit(KEY_EFLAG_KEYCERTSIGN, &pkey->key_eflags))
+		return -ENOKEY;
+	if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_CA_MACHINE_KEYRING_MAX))
+		return 0;
+	if (test_bit(KEY_EFLAG_DIGITALSIG, &pkey->key_eflags))
+		return -ENOKEY;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * restrict_link_by_digsig - Restrict additions to a ring of digsig keys
+ * @dest_keyring: Keyring being linked to.
+ * @type: The type of key being added.
+ * @payload: The payload of the new key.
+ * @trust_keyring: A ring of keys that can be used to vouch for the new cert.
+ *
+ * Check if the new certificate has digitalSignature usage set. If it is,
+ * then mark the new certificate as being ok to link. Afterwards verify
+ * the new certificate against the ones in the trust_keyring.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if the new certificate was accepted, -ENOKEY if the
+ * certificate is not a digsig. -ENOPKG if the signature uses unsupported
+ * crypto, or some other error if there is a matching certificate but
+ * the signature check cannot be performed.
+ */
+int restrict_link_by_digsig(struct key *dest_keyring,
+			    const struct key_type *type,
+			    const union key_payload *payload,
+			    struct key *trust_keyring)
+{
+	const struct public_key *pkey;
+
+	if (type != &key_type_asymmetric)
+		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+	pkey = payload->data[asym_crypto];
+
+	if (!pkey)
+		return -ENOPKG;
+
+	if (!test_bit(KEY_EFLAG_DIGITALSIG, &pkey->key_eflags))
+		return -ENOKEY;
+
+	if (test_bit(KEY_EFLAG_CA, &pkey->key_eflags))
+		return -ENOKEY;
+
+	if (test_bit(KEY_EFLAG_KEYCERTSIGN, &pkey->key_eflags))
+		return -ENOKEY;
+
+	return restrict_link_by_signature(dest_keyring, type, payload,
+					  trust_keyring);
+}
+
+static bool match_either_id(const struct asymmetric_key_id **pair,
+			    const struct asymmetric_key_id *single)
+{
+	return (asymmetric_key_id_same(pair[0], single) ||
+		asymmetric_key_id_same(pair[1], single));
+}
+
+static int key_or_keyring_common(struct key *dest_keyring,
+				 const struct key_type *type,
+				 const union key_payload *payload,
+				 struct key *trusted, bool check_dest)
+{
+	const struct public_key_signature *sig;
+	struct key *key = NULL;
+	int ret;
+
+	pr_devel("==>%s()\n", __func__);
+
+	if (!dest_keyring)
+		return -ENOKEY;
+	else if (dest_keyring->type != &key_type_keyring)
+		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+	if (!trusted && !check_dest)
+		return -ENOKEY;
+
+	if (type != &key_type_asymmetric)
+		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+	sig = payload->data[asym_auth];
+	if (!sig)
+		return -ENOPKG;
+	if (!sig->auth_ids[0] && !sig->auth_ids[1] && !sig->auth_ids[2])
+		return -ENOKEY;
+
+	if (trusted) {
+		if (trusted->type == &key_type_keyring) {
+			/* See if we have a key that signed this one. */
+			key = find_asymmetric_key(trusted, sig->auth_ids[0],
+						  sig->auth_ids[1],
+						  sig->auth_ids[2], false);
+			if (IS_ERR(key))
+				key = NULL;
+		} else if (trusted->type == &key_type_asymmetric) {
+			const struct asymmetric_key_id **signer_ids;
+
+			signer_ids = (const struct asymmetric_key_id **)
+				asymmetric_key_ids(trusted)->id;
+
+			/*
+			 * The auth_ids come from the candidate key (the
+			 * one that is being considered for addition to
+			 * dest_keyring) and identify the key that was
+			 * used to sign.
+			 *
+			 * The signer_ids are identifiers for the
+			 * signing key specified for dest_keyring.
+			 *
+			 * The first auth_id is the preferred id, 2nd and
+			 * 3rd are the fallbacks. If exactly one of
+			 * auth_ids[0] and auth_ids[1] is present, it may
+			 * match either signer_ids[0] or signed_ids[1].
+			 * If both are present the first one may match
+			 * either signed_id but the second one must match
+			 * the second signer_id. If neither of them is
+			 * available, auth_ids[2] is matched against
+			 * signer_ids[2] as a fallback.
+			 */
+			if (!sig->auth_ids[0] && !sig->auth_ids[1]) {
+				if (asymmetric_key_id_same(signer_ids[2],
+							   sig->auth_ids[2]))
+					key = __key_get(trusted);
+
+			} else if (!sig->auth_ids[0] || !sig->auth_ids[1]) {
+				const struct asymmetric_key_id *auth_id;
+
+				auth_id = sig->auth_ids[0] ?: sig->auth_ids[1];
+				if (match_either_id(signer_ids, auth_id))
+					key = __key_get(trusted);
+
+			} else if (asymmetric_key_id_same(signer_ids[1],
+							  sig->auth_ids[1]) &&
+				   match_either_id(signer_ids,
+						   sig->auth_ids[0])) {
+				key = __key_get(trusted);
+			}
+		} else {
+			return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (check_dest && !key) {
+		/* See if the destination has a key that signed this one. */
+		key = find_asymmetric_key(dest_keyring, sig->auth_ids[0],
+					  sig->auth_ids[1], sig->auth_ids[2],
+					  false);
+		if (IS_ERR(key))
+			key = NULL;
+	}
+
+	if (!key)
+		return -ENOKEY;
+
+	ret = key_validate(key);
+	if (ret == 0)
+		ret = verify_signature(key, sig);
+
+	key_put(key);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/**
+ * restrict_link_by_key_or_keyring - Restrict additions to a ring of public
+ * keys using the restrict_key information stored in the ring.
+ * @dest_keyring: Keyring being linked to.
+ * @type: The type of key being added.
+ * @payload: The payload of the new key.
+ * @trusted: A key or ring of keys that can be used to vouch for the new cert.
+ *
+ * Check the new certificate only against the key or keys passed in the data
+ * parameter. If one of those is the signing key and validates the new
+ * certificate, then mark the new certificate as being ok to link.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if the new certificate was accepted, -ENOKEY if we
+ * couldn't find a matching parent certificate in the trusted list,
+ * -EKEYREJECTED if the signature check fails, -ENOPKG if the signature uses
+ * unsupported crypto, or some other error if there is a matching certificate
+ * but the signature check cannot be performed.
+ */
+int restrict_link_by_key_or_keyring(struct key *dest_keyring,
+				    const struct key_type *type,
+				    const union key_payload *payload,
+				    struct key *trusted)
+{
+	return key_or_keyring_common(dest_keyring, type, payload, trusted,
+				     false);
+}
+
+/**
+ * restrict_link_by_key_or_keyring_chain - Restrict additions to a ring of
+ * public keys using the restrict_key information stored in the ring.
+ * @dest_keyring: Keyring being linked to.
+ * @type: The type of key being added.
+ * @payload: The payload of the new key.
+ * @trusted: A key or ring of keys that can be used to vouch for the new cert.
+ *
+ * Check the new certificate against the key or keys passed in the data
+ * parameter and against the keys already linked to the destination keyring. If
+ * one of those is the signing key and validates the new certificate, then mark
+ * the new certificate as being ok to link.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if the new certificate was accepted, -ENOKEY if we
+ * couldn't find a matching parent certificate in the trusted list,
+ * -EKEYREJECTED if the signature check fails, -ENOPKG if the signature uses
+ * unsupported crypto, or some other error if there is a matching certificate
+ * but the signature check cannot be performed.
+ */
+int restrict_link_by_key_or_keyring_chain(struct key *dest_keyring,
+					  const struct key_type *type,
+					  const union key_payload *payload,
+					  struct key *trusted)
+{
+	return key_or_keyring_common(dest_keyring, type, payload, trusted,
+				     true);
+}
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/selftest.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/selftest.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..c50da7ef90
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/selftest.c
@@ -0,0 +1,231 @@
+/* Self-testing for signature checking.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2022 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
+ */
+
+#include <crypto/pkcs7.h>
+#include <linux/cred.h>
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/key.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include "x509_parser.h"
+
+struct certs_test {
+	const u8	*data;
+	size_t		data_len;
+	const u8	*pkcs7;
+	size_t		pkcs7_len;
+};
+
+/*
+ * Set of X.509 certificates to provide public keys for the tests.  These will
+ * be loaded into a temporary keyring for the duration of the testing.
+ */
+static const __initconst u8 certs_selftest_keys[] = {
+	"\x30\x82\x05\x55\x30\x82\x03\x3d\xa0\x03\x02\x01\x02\x02\x14\x73"
+	"\x98\xea\x98\x2d\xd0\x2e\xa8\xb1\xcf\x57\xc7\xf2\x97\xb3\xe6\x1a"
+	"\xfc\x8c\x0a\x30\x0d\x06\x09\x2a\x86\x48\x86\xf7\x0d\x01\x01\x0b"
+	"\x05\x00\x30\x34\x31\x32\x30\x30\x06\x03\x55\x04\x03\x0c\x29\x43"
+	"\x65\x72\x74\x69\x66\x69\x63\x61\x74\x65\x20\x76\x65\x72\x69\x66"
+	"\x69\x63\x61\x74\x69\x6f\x6e\x20\x73\x65\x6c\x66\x2d\x74\x65\x73"
+	"\x74\x69\x6e\x67\x20\x6b\x65\x79\x30\x20\x17\x0d\x32\x32\x30\x35"
+	"\x31\x38\x32\x32\x33\x32\x34\x31\x5a\x18\x0f\x32\x31\x32\x32\x30"
+	"\x34\x32\x34\x32\x32\x33\x32\x34\x31\x5a\x30\x34\x31\x32\x30\x30"
+	"\x06\x03\x55\x04\x03\x0c\x29\x43\x65\x72\x74\x69\x66\x69\x63\x61"
+	"\x74\x65\x20\x76\x65\x72\x69\x66\x69\x63\x61\x74\x69\x6f\x6e\x20"
+	"\x73\x65\x6c\x66\x2d\x74\x65\x73\x74\x69\x6e\x67\x20\x6b\x65\x79"
+	"\x30\x82\x02\x22\x30\x0d\x06\x09\x2a\x86\x48\x86\xf7\x0d\x01\x01"
+	"\x01\x05\x00\x03\x82\x02\x0f\x00\x30\x82\x02\x0a\x02\x82\x02\x01"
+	"\x00\xcc\xac\x49\xdd\x3b\xca\xb0\x15\x7e\x84\x6a\xb2\x0a\x69\x5f"
+	"\x1c\x0a\x61\x82\x3b\x4f\x2c\xa3\x95\x2c\x08\x58\x4b\xb1\x5d\x99"
+	"\xe0\xc3\xc1\x79\xc2\xb3\xeb\xc0\x1e\x6d\x3e\x54\x1d\xbd\xb7\x92"
+	"\x7b\x4d\xb5\x95\x58\xb2\x52\x2e\xc6\x24\x4b\x71\x63\x80\x32\x77"
+	"\xa7\x38\x5e\xdb\x72\xae\x6e\x0d\xec\xfb\xb6\x6d\x01\x7f\xe9\x55"
+	"\x66\xdf\xbf\x1d\x76\x78\x02\x31\xe8\xe5\x07\xf8\xb7\x82\x5c\x0d"
+	"\xd4\xbb\xfb\xa2\x59\x0d\x2e\x3a\x78\x95\x3a\x8b\x46\x06\x47\x44"
+	"\x46\xd7\xcd\x06\x6a\x41\x13\xe3\x19\xf6\xbb\x6e\x38\xf4\x83\x01"
+	"\xa3\xbf\x4a\x39\x4f\xd7\x0a\xe9\x38\xb3\xf5\x94\x14\x4e\xdd\xf7"
+	"\x43\xfd\x24\xb2\x49\x3c\xa5\xf7\x7a\x7c\xd4\x45\x3d\x97\x75\x68"
+	"\xf1\xed\x4c\x42\x0b\x70\xca\x85\xf3\xde\xe5\x88\x2c\xc5\xbe\xb6"
+	"\x97\x34\xba\x24\x02\xcd\x8b\x86\x9f\xa9\x73\xca\x73\xcf\x92\x81"
+	"\xee\x75\x55\xbb\x18\x67\x5c\xff\x3f\xb5\xdd\x33\x1b\x0c\xe9\x78"
+	"\xdb\x5c\xcf\xaa\x5c\x43\x42\xdf\x5e\xa9\x6d\xec\xd7\xd7\xff\xe6"
+	"\xa1\x3a\x92\x1a\xda\xae\xf6\x8c\x6f\x7b\xd5\xb4\x6e\x06\xe9\x8f"
+	"\xe8\xde\x09\x31\x89\xed\x0e\x11\xa1\xfa\x8a\xe9\xe9\x64\x59\x62"
+	"\x53\xda\xd1\x70\xbe\x11\xd4\x99\x97\x11\xcf\x99\xde\x0b\x9d\x94"
+	"\x7e\xaa\xb8\x52\xea\x37\xdb\x90\x7e\x35\xbd\xd9\xfe\x6d\x0a\x48"
+	"\x70\x28\xdd\xd5\x0d\x7f\x03\x80\x93\x14\x23\x8f\xb9\x22\xcd\x7c"
+	"\x29\xfe\xf1\x72\xb5\x5c\x0b\x12\xcf\x9c\x15\xf6\x11\x4c\x7a\x45"
+	"\x25\x8c\x45\x0a\x34\xac\x2d\x9a\x81\xca\x0b\x13\x22\xcd\xeb\x1a"
+	"\x38\x88\x18\x97\x96\x08\x81\xaa\xcc\x8f\x0f\x8a\x32\x7b\x76\x68"
+	"\x03\x68\x43\xbf\x11\xba\x55\x60\xfd\x80\x1c\x0d\x9b\x69\xb6\x09"
+	"\x72\xbc\x0f\x41\x2f\x07\x82\xc6\xe3\xb2\x13\x91\xc4\x6d\x14\x95"
+	"\x31\xbe\x19\xbd\xbc\xed\xe1\x4c\x74\xa2\xe0\x78\x0b\xbb\x94\xec"
+	"\x4c\x53\x3a\xa2\xb5\x84\x1d\x4b\x65\x7e\xdc\xf7\xdb\x36\x7d\xbe"
+	"\x9e\x3b\x36\x66\x42\x66\x76\x35\xbf\xbe\xf0\xc1\x3c\x7c\xe9\x42"
+	"\x5c\x24\x53\x03\x05\xa8\x67\x24\x50\x02\x75\xff\x24\x46\x3b\x35"
+	"\x89\x76\xe6\x70\xda\xc5\x51\x8c\x9a\xe5\x05\xb0\x0b\xd0\x2d\xd4"
+	"\x7d\x57\x75\x94\x6b\xf9\x0a\xad\x0e\x41\x00\x15\xd0\x4f\xc0\x7f"
+	"\x90\x2d\x18\x48\x8f\x28\xfe\x5d\xa7\xcd\x99\x9e\xbd\x02\x6c\x8a"
+	"\x31\xf3\x1c\xc7\x4b\xe6\x93\xcd\x42\xa2\xe4\x68\x10\x47\x9d\xfc"
+	"\x21\x02\x03\x01\x00\x01\xa3\x5d\x30\x5b\x30\x0c\x06\x03\x55\x1d"
+	"\x13\x01\x01\xff\x04\x02\x30\x00\x30\x0b\x06\x03\x55\x1d\x0f\x04"
+	"\x04\x03\x02\x07\x80\x30\x1d\x06\x03\x55\x1d\x0e\x04\x16\x04\x14"
+	"\xf5\x87\x03\xbb\x33\xce\x1b\x73\xee\x02\xec\xcd\xee\x5b\x88\x17"
+	"\x51\x8f\xe3\xdb\x30\x1f\x06\x03\x55\x1d\x23\x04\x18\x30\x16\x80"
+	"\x14\xf5\x87\x03\xbb\x33\xce\x1b\x73\xee\x02\xec\xcd\xee\x5b\x88"
+	"\x17\x51\x8f\xe3\xdb\x30\x0d\x06\x09\x2a\x86\x48\x86\xf7\x0d\x01"
+	"\x01\x0b\x05\x00\x03\x82\x02\x01\x00\xc0\x2e\x12\x41\x7b\x73\x85"
+	"\x16\xc8\xdb\x86\x79\xe8\xf5\xcd\x44\xf4\xc6\xe2\x81\x23\x5e\x47"
+	"\xcb\xab\x25\xf1\x1e\x58\x3e\x31\x7f\x78\xad\x85\xeb\xfe\x14\x88"
+	"\x60\xf7\x7f\xd2\x26\xa2\xf4\x98\x2a\xfd\xba\x05\x0c\x20\x33\x12"
+	"\xcc\x4d\x14\x61\x64\x81\x93\xd3\x33\xed\xc8\xff\xf1\x78\xcc\x5f"
+	"\x51\x9f\x09\xd7\xbe\x0d\x5c\x74\xfd\x9b\xdf\x52\x4a\xc9\xa8\x71"
+	"\x25\x33\x04\x10\x67\x36\xd0\xb3\x0b\xc9\xa1\x40\x72\xae\x41\x7b"
+	"\x68\xe6\xe4\x7b\xd0\x28\xf7\x6d\xe7\x3f\x50\xfc\x91\x7c\x91\x56"
+	"\xd4\xdf\xa6\xbb\xe8\x4d\x1b\x58\xaa\x28\xfa\xc1\x19\xeb\x11\x2f"
+	"\x24\x8b\x7c\xc5\xa9\x86\x26\xaa\x6e\xb7\x9b\xd5\xf8\x06\xfb\x02"
+	"\x52\x7b\x9c\x9e\xa1\xe0\x07\x8b\x5e\xe4\xb8\x55\x29\xf6\x48\x52"
+	"\x1c\x1b\x54\x2d\x46\xd8\xe5\x71\xb9\x60\xd1\x45\xb5\x92\x89\x8a"
+	"\x63\x58\x2a\xb3\xc6\xb2\x76\xe2\x3c\x82\x59\x04\xae\x5a\xc4\x99"
+	"\x7b\x2e\x4b\x46\x57\xb8\x29\x24\xb2\xfd\xee\x2c\x0d\xa4\x83\xfa"
+	"\x65\x2a\x07\x35\x8b\x97\xcf\xbd\x96\x2e\xd1\x7e\x6c\xc2\x1e\x87"
+	"\xb6\x6c\x76\x65\xb5\xb2\x62\xda\x8b\xe9\x73\xe3\xdb\x33\xdd\x13"
+	"\x3a\x17\x63\x6a\x76\xde\x8d\x8f\xe0\x47\x61\x28\x3a\x83\xff\x8f"
+	"\xe7\xc7\xe0\x4a\xa3\xe5\x07\xcf\xe9\x8c\x35\x35\x2e\xe7\x80\x66"
+	"\x31\xbf\x91\x58\x0a\xe1\x25\x3d\x38\xd3\xa4\xf0\x59\x34\x47\x07"
+	"\x62\x0f\xbe\x30\xdd\x81\x88\x58\xf0\x28\xb0\x96\xe5\x82\xf8\x05"
+	"\xb7\x13\x01\xbc\xfa\xc6\x1f\x86\x72\xcc\xf9\xee\x8e\xd9\xd6\x04"
+	"\x8c\x24\x6c\xbf\x0f\x5d\x37\x39\xcf\x45\xc1\x93\x3a\xd2\xed\x5c"
+	"\x58\x79\x74\x86\x62\x30\x7e\x8e\xbb\xdd\x7a\xa9\xed\xca\x40\xcb"
+	"\x62\x47\xf4\xb4\x9f\x52\x7f\x72\x63\xa8\xf0\x2b\xaf\x45\x2a\x48"
+	"\x19\x6d\xe3\xfb\xf9\x19\x66\x69\xc8\xcc\x62\x87\x6c\x53\x2b\x2d"
+	"\x6e\x90\x6c\x54\x3a\x82\x25\x41\xcb\x18\x6a\xa4\x22\xa8\xa1\xc4"
+	"\x47\xd7\x81\x00\x1c\x15\x51\x0f\x1a\xaf\xef\x9f\xa6\x61\x8c\xbd"
+	"\x6b\x8b\xed\xe6\xac\x0e\xb6\x3a\x4c\x92\xe6\x0f\x91\x0a\x0f\x71"
+	"\xc7\xa0\xb9\x0d\x3a\x17\x5a\x6f\x35\xc8\xe7\x50\x4f\x46\xe8\x70"
+	"\x60\x48\x06\x82\x8b\x66\x58\xe6\x73\x91\x9c\x12\x3d\x35\x8e\x46"
+	"\xad\x5a\xf5\xb3\xdb\x69\x21\x04\xfd\xd3\x1c\xdf\x94\x9d\x56\xb0"
+	"\x0a\xd1\x95\x76\x8d\xec\x9e\xdd\x0b\x15\x97\x64\xad\xe5\xf2\x62"
+	"\x02\xfc\x9e\x5f\x56\x42\x39\x05\xb3"
+};
+
+/*
+ * Signed data and detached signature blobs that form the verification tests.
+ */
+static const __initconst u8 certs_selftest_1_data[] = {
+	"\x54\x68\x69\x73\x20\x69\x73\x20\x73\x6f\x6d\x65\x20\x74\x65\x73"
+	"\x74\x20\x64\x61\x74\x61\x20\x75\x73\x65\x64\x20\x66\x6f\x72\x20"
+	"\x73\x65\x6c\x66\x2d\x74\x65\x73\x74\x69\x6e\x67\x20\x63\x65\x72"
+	"\x74\x69\x66\x69\x63\x61\x74\x65\x20\x76\x65\x72\x69\x66\x69\x63"
+	"\x61\x74\x69\x6f\x6e\x2e\x0a"
+};
+
+static const __initconst u8 certs_selftest_1_pkcs7[] = {
+	"\x30\x82\x02\xab\x06\x09\x2a\x86\x48\x86\xf7\x0d\x01\x07\x02\xa0"
+	"\x82\x02\x9c\x30\x82\x02\x98\x02\x01\x01\x31\x0d\x30\x0b\x06\x09"
+	"\x60\x86\x48\x01\x65\x03\x04\x02\x01\x30\x0b\x06\x09\x2a\x86\x48"
+	"\x86\xf7\x0d\x01\x07\x01\x31\x82\x02\x75\x30\x82\x02\x71\x02\x01"
+	"\x01\x30\x4c\x30\x34\x31\x32\x30\x30\x06\x03\x55\x04\x03\x0c\x29"
+	"\x43\x65\x72\x74\x69\x66\x69\x63\x61\x74\x65\x20\x76\x65\x72\x69"
+	"\x66\x69\x63\x61\x74\x69\x6f\x6e\x20\x73\x65\x6c\x66\x2d\x74\x65"
+	"\x73\x74\x69\x6e\x67\x20\x6b\x65\x79\x02\x14\x73\x98\xea\x98\x2d"
+	"\xd0\x2e\xa8\xb1\xcf\x57\xc7\xf2\x97\xb3\xe6\x1a\xfc\x8c\x0a\x30"
+	"\x0b\x06\x09\x60\x86\x48\x01\x65\x03\x04\x02\x01\x30\x0d\x06\x09"
+	"\x2a\x86\x48\x86\xf7\x0d\x01\x01\x01\x05\x00\x04\x82\x02\x00\xac"
+	"\xb0\xf2\x07\xd6\x99\x6d\xc0\xc0\xd9\x8d\x31\x0d\x7e\x04\xeb\xc3"
+	"\x88\x90\xc4\x58\x46\xd4\xe2\xa0\xa3\x25\xe3\x04\x50\x37\x85\x8c"
+	"\x91\xc6\xfc\xc5\xd4\x92\xfd\x05\xd8\xb8\xa3\xb8\xba\x89\x13\x00"
+	"\x88\x79\x99\x51\x6b\x5b\x28\x31\xc0\xb3\x1b\x7a\x68\x2c\x00\xdb"
+	"\x4b\x46\x11\xf3\xfa\x50\x8e\x19\x89\xa2\x4c\xda\x4c\x89\x01\x11"
+	"\x89\xee\xd3\xc8\xc1\xe7\xa7\xf6\xb2\xa2\xf8\x65\xb8\x35\x20\x33"
+	"\xba\x12\x62\xd5\xbd\xaa\x71\xe5\x5b\xc0\x6a\x32\xff\x6a\x2e\x23"
+	"\xef\x2b\xb6\x58\xb1\xfb\x5f\x82\x34\x40\x6d\x9f\xbc\x27\xac\x37"
+	"\x23\x99\xcf\x7d\x20\xb2\x39\x01\xc0\x12\xce\xd7\x5d\x2f\xb6\xab"
+	"\xb5\x56\x4f\xef\xf4\x72\x07\x58\x65\xa9\xeb\x1f\x75\x1c\x5f\x0c"
+	"\x88\xe0\xa4\xe2\xcd\x73\x2b\x9e\xb2\x05\x7e\x12\xf8\xd0\x66\x41"
+	"\xcc\x12\x63\xd4\xd6\xac\x9b\x1d\x14\x77\x8d\x1c\x57\xd5\x27\xc6"
+	"\x49\xa2\x41\x43\xf3\x59\x29\xe5\xcb\xd1\x75\xbc\x3a\x97\x2a\x72"
+	"\x22\x66\xc5\x3b\xc1\xba\xfc\x53\x18\x98\xe2\x21\x64\xc6\x52\x87"
+	"\x13\xd5\x7c\x42\xe8\xfb\x9c\x9a\x45\x32\xd5\xa5\x22\x62\x9d\xd4"
+	"\xcb\xa4\xfa\x77\xbb\x50\x24\x0b\x8b\x88\x99\x15\x56\xa9\x1e\x92"
+	"\xbf\x5d\x94\x77\xb6\xf1\x67\x01\x60\x06\x58\x5c\xdf\x18\x52\x79"
+	"\x37\x30\x93\x7d\x87\x04\xf1\xe0\x55\x59\x52\xf3\xc2\xb1\x1c\x5b"
+	"\x12\x7c\x49\x87\xfb\xf7\xed\xdd\x95\x71\xec\x4b\x1a\x85\x08\xb0"
+	"\xa0\x36\xc4\x7b\xab\x40\xe0\xf1\x98\xcc\xaf\x19\x40\x8f\x47\x6f"
+	"\xf0\x6c\x84\x29\x7f\x7f\x04\x46\xcb\x08\x0f\xe0\xc1\xc9\x70\x6e"
+	"\x95\x3b\xa4\xbc\x29\x2b\x53\x67\x45\x1b\x0d\xbc\x13\xa5\x76\x31"
+	"\xaf\xb9\xd0\xe0\x60\x12\xd2\xf4\xb7\x7c\x58\x7e\xf6\x2d\xbb\x24"
+	"\x14\x5a\x20\x24\xa8\x12\xdf\x25\xbd\x42\xce\x96\x7c\x2e\xba\x14"
+	"\x1b\x81\x9f\x18\x45\xa4\xc6\x70\x3e\x0e\xf0\xd3\x7b\x9c\x10\xbe"
+	"\xb8\x7a\x89\xc5\x9e\xd9\x97\xdf\xd7\xe7\xc6\x1d\xc0\x20\x6c\xb8"
+	"\x1e\x3a\x63\xb8\x39\x8e\x8e\x62\xd5\xd2\xb4\xcd\xff\x46\xfc\x8e"
+	"\xec\x07\x35\x0c\xff\xb0\x05\xe6\xf4\xe5\xfe\xa2\xe3\x0a\xe6\x36"
+	"\xa7\x4a\x7e\x62\x1d\xc4\x50\x39\x35\x4e\x28\xcb\x4a\xfb\x9d\xdb"
+	"\xdd\x23\xd6\x53\xb1\x74\x77\x12\xf7\x9c\xf0\x9a\x6b\xf7\xa9\x64"
+	"\x2d\x86\x21\x2a\xcf\xc6\x54\xf5\xc9\xad\xfa\xb5\x12\xb4\xf3\x51"
+	"\x77\x55\x3c\x6f\x0c\x32\xd3\x8c\x44\x39\x71\x25\xfe\x96\xd2"
+};
+
+/*
+ * List of tests to be run.
+ */
+#define TEST(data, pkcs7) { data, sizeof(data) - 1, pkcs7, sizeof(pkcs7) - 1 }
+static const struct certs_test certs_tests[] __initconst = {
+	TEST(certs_selftest_1_data, certs_selftest_1_pkcs7),
+};
+
+static int __init fips_signature_selftest(void)
+{
+	struct key *keyring;
+	int ret, i;
+
+	pr_notice("Running certificate verification selftests\n");
+
+	keyring = keyring_alloc(".certs_selftest",
+				GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, GLOBAL_ROOT_GID, current_cred(),
+				(KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) |
+				KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ |
+				KEY_USR_SEARCH,
+				KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA,
+				NULL, NULL);
+	if (IS_ERR(keyring))
+		panic("Can't allocate certs selftest keyring: %ld\n",
+		      PTR_ERR(keyring));
+
+	ret = x509_load_certificate_list(certs_selftest_keys,
+					 sizeof(certs_selftest_keys) - 1, keyring);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		panic("Can't allocate certs selftest keyring: %d\n", ret);
+
+	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(certs_tests); i++) {
+		const struct certs_test *test = &certs_tests[i];
+		struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7;
+
+		pkcs7 = pkcs7_parse_message(test->pkcs7, test->pkcs7_len);
+		if (IS_ERR(pkcs7))
+			panic("Certs selftest %d: pkcs7_parse_message() = %d\n", i, ret);
+
+		pkcs7_supply_detached_data(pkcs7, test->data, test->data_len);
+
+		ret = pkcs7_verify(pkcs7, VERIFYING_MODULE_SIGNATURE);
+		if (ret < 0)
+			panic("Certs selftest %d: pkcs7_verify() = %d\n", i, ret);
+
+		ret = pkcs7_validate_trust(pkcs7, keyring);
+		if (ret < 0)
+			panic("Certs selftest %d: pkcs7_validate_trust() = %d\n", i, ret);
+
+		pkcs7_free_message(pkcs7);
+	}
+
+	key_put(keyring);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+late_initcall(fips_signature_selftest);
+
+MODULE_DESCRIPTION("X.509 self tests");
+MODULE_AUTHOR("Red Hat, Inc.");
+MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/signature.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/signature.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..2deff81f8a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/signature.c
@@ -0,0 +1,159 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
+/* Signature verification with an asymmetric key
+ *
+ * See Documentation/crypto/asymmetric-keys.rst
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2012 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
+ */
+
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) "SIG: "fmt
+#include <keys/asymmetric-subtype.h>
+#include <linux/export.h>
+#include <linux/err.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/keyctl.h>
+#include <crypto/public_key.h>
+#include <keys/user-type.h>
+#include "asymmetric_keys.h"
+
+/*
+ * Destroy a public key signature.
+ */
+void public_key_signature_free(struct public_key_signature *sig)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	if (sig) {
+		for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(sig->auth_ids); i++)
+			kfree(sig->auth_ids[i]);
+		kfree(sig->s);
+		kfree(sig->digest);
+		kfree(sig);
+	}
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(public_key_signature_free);
+
+/**
+ * query_asymmetric_key - Get information about an asymmetric key.
+ * @params: Various parameters.
+ * @info: Where to put the information.
+ */
+int query_asymmetric_key(const struct kernel_pkey_params *params,
+			 struct kernel_pkey_query *info)
+{
+	const struct asymmetric_key_subtype *subtype;
+	struct key *key = params->key;
+	int ret;
+
+	pr_devel("==>%s()\n", __func__);
+
+	if (key->type != &key_type_asymmetric)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	subtype = asymmetric_key_subtype(key);
+	if (!subtype ||
+	    !key->payload.data[0])
+		return -EINVAL;
+	if (!subtype->query)
+		return -ENOTSUPP;
+
+	ret = subtype->query(params, info);
+
+	pr_devel("<==%s() = %d\n", __func__, ret);
+	return ret;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(query_asymmetric_key);
+
+/**
+ * encrypt_blob - Encrypt data using an asymmetric key
+ * @params: Various parameters
+ * @data: Data blob to be encrypted, length params->data_len
+ * @enc: Encrypted data buffer, length params->enc_len
+ *
+ * Encrypt the specified data blob using the private key specified by
+ * params->key.  The encrypted data is wrapped in an encoding if
+ * params->encoding is specified (eg. "pkcs1").
+ *
+ * Returns the length of the data placed in the encrypted data buffer or an
+ * error.
+ */
+int encrypt_blob(struct kernel_pkey_params *params,
+		 const void *data, void *enc)
+{
+	params->op = kernel_pkey_encrypt;
+	return asymmetric_key_eds_op(params, data, enc);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(encrypt_blob);
+
+/**
+ * decrypt_blob - Decrypt data using an asymmetric key
+ * @params: Various parameters
+ * @enc: Encrypted data to be decrypted, length params->enc_len
+ * @data: Decrypted data buffer, length params->data_len
+ *
+ * Decrypt the specified data blob using the private key specified by
+ * params->key.  The decrypted data is wrapped in an encoding if
+ * params->encoding is specified (eg. "pkcs1").
+ *
+ * Returns the length of the data placed in the decrypted data buffer or an
+ * error.
+ */
+int decrypt_blob(struct kernel_pkey_params *params,
+		 const void *enc, void *data)
+{
+	params->op = kernel_pkey_decrypt;
+	return asymmetric_key_eds_op(params, enc, data);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(decrypt_blob);
+
+/**
+ * create_signature - Sign some data using an asymmetric key
+ * @params: Various parameters
+ * @data: Data blob to be signed, length params->data_len
+ * @enc: Signature buffer, length params->enc_len
+ *
+ * Sign the specified data blob using the private key specified by params->key.
+ * The signature is wrapped in an encoding if params->encoding is specified
+ * (eg. "pkcs1").  If the encoding needs to know the digest type, this can be
+ * passed through params->hash_algo (eg. "sha1").
+ *
+ * Returns the length of the data placed in the signature buffer or an error.
+ */
+int create_signature(struct kernel_pkey_params *params,
+		     const void *data, void *enc)
+{
+	params->op = kernel_pkey_sign;
+	return asymmetric_key_eds_op(params, data, enc);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(create_signature);
+
+/**
+ * verify_signature - Initiate the use of an asymmetric key to verify a signature
+ * @key: The asymmetric key to verify against
+ * @sig: The signature to check
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if successful or else an error.
+ */
+int verify_signature(const struct key *key,
+		     const struct public_key_signature *sig)
+{
+	const struct asymmetric_key_subtype *subtype;
+	int ret;
+
+	pr_devel("==>%s()\n", __func__);
+
+	if (key->type != &key_type_asymmetric)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	subtype = asymmetric_key_subtype(key);
+	if (!subtype ||
+	    !key->payload.data[0])
+		return -EINVAL;
+	if (!subtype->verify_signature)
+		return -ENOTSUPP;
+
+	ret = subtype->verify_signature(key, sig);
+
+	pr_devel("<==%s() = %d\n", __func__, ret);
+	return ret;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(verify_signature);
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/verify_pefile.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/verify_pefile.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..f440767bd7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/verify_pefile.c
@@ -0,0 +1,456 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
+/* Parse a signed PE binary
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2014 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
+ */
+
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) "PEFILE: "fmt
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/err.h>
+#include <linux/pe.h>
+#include <linux/asn1.h>
+#include <linux/verification.h>
+#include <crypto/hash.h>
+#include "verify_pefile.h"
+
+/*
+ * Parse a PE binary.
+ */
+static int pefile_parse_binary(const void *pebuf, unsigned int pelen,
+			       struct pefile_context *ctx)
+{
+	const struct mz_hdr *mz = pebuf;
+	const struct pe_hdr *pe;
+	const struct pe32_opt_hdr *pe32;
+	const struct pe32plus_opt_hdr *pe64;
+	const struct data_directory *ddir;
+	const struct data_dirent *dde;
+	const struct section_header *secs, *sec;
+	size_t cursor, datalen = pelen;
+
+	kenter("");
+
+#define chkaddr(base, x, s)						\
+	do {								\
+		if ((x) < base || (s) >= datalen || (x) > datalen - (s)) \
+			return -ELIBBAD;				\
+	} while (0)
+
+	chkaddr(0, 0, sizeof(*mz));
+	if (mz->magic != MZ_MAGIC)
+		return -ELIBBAD;
+	cursor = sizeof(*mz);
+
+	chkaddr(cursor, mz->peaddr, sizeof(*pe));
+	pe = pebuf + mz->peaddr;
+	if (pe->magic != PE_MAGIC)
+		return -ELIBBAD;
+	cursor = mz->peaddr + sizeof(*pe);
+
+	chkaddr(0, cursor, sizeof(pe32->magic));
+	pe32 = pebuf + cursor;
+	pe64 = pebuf + cursor;
+
+	switch (pe32->magic) {
+	case PE_OPT_MAGIC_PE32:
+		chkaddr(0, cursor, sizeof(*pe32));
+		ctx->image_checksum_offset =
+			(unsigned long)&pe32->csum - (unsigned long)pebuf;
+		ctx->header_size = pe32->header_size;
+		cursor += sizeof(*pe32);
+		ctx->n_data_dirents = pe32->data_dirs;
+		break;
+
+	case PE_OPT_MAGIC_PE32PLUS:
+		chkaddr(0, cursor, sizeof(*pe64));
+		ctx->image_checksum_offset =
+			(unsigned long)&pe64->csum - (unsigned long)pebuf;
+		ctx->header_size = pe64->header_size;
+		cursor += sizeof(*pe64);
+		ctx->n_data_dirents = pe64->data_dirs;
+		break;
+
+	default:
+		pr_warn("Unknown PEOPT magic = %04hx\n", pe32->magic);
+		return -ELIBBAD;
+	}
+
+	pr_debug("checksum @ %x\n", ctx->image_checksum_offset);
+	pr_debug("header size = %x\n", ctx->header_size);
+
+	if (cursor >= ctx->header_size || ctx->header_size >= datalen)
+		return -ELIBBAD;
+
+	if (ctx->n_data_dirents > (ctx->header_size - cursor) / sizeof(*dde))
+		return -ELIBBAD;
+
+	ddir = pebuf + cursor;
+	cursor += sizeof(*dde) * ctx->n_data_dirents;
+
+	ctx->cert_dirent_offset =
+		(unsigned long)&ddir->certs - (unsigned long)pebuf;
+	ctx->certs_size = ddir->certs.size;
+
+	if (!ddir->certs.virtual_address || !ddir->certs.size) {
+		pr_warn("Unsigned PE binary\n");
+		return -ENODATA;
+	}
+
+	chkaddr(ctx->header_size, ddir->certs.virtual_address,
+		ddir->certs.size);
+	ctx->sig_offset = ddir->certs.virtual_address;
+	ctx->sig_len = ddir->certs.size;
+	pr_debug("cert = %x @%x [%*ph]\n",
+		 ctx->sig_len, ctx->sig_offset,
+		 ctx->sig_len, pebuf + ctx->sig_offset);
+
+	ctx->n_sections = pe->sections;
+	if (ctx->n_sections > (ctx->header_size - cursor) / sizeof(*sec))
+		return -ELIBBAD;
+	ctx->secs = secs = pebuf + cursor;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check and strip the PE wrapper from around the signature and check that the
+ * remnant looks something like PKCS#7.
+ */
+static int pefile_strip_sig_wrapper(const void *pebuf,
+				    struct pefile_context *ctx)
+{
+	struct win_certificate wrapper;
+	const u8 *pkcs7;
+	unsigned len;
+
+	if (ctx->sig_len < sizeof(wrapper)) {
+		pr_warn("Signature wrapper too short\n");
+		return -ELIBBAD;
+	}
+
+	memcpy(&wrapper, pebuf + ctx->sig_offset, sizeof(wrapper));
+	pr_debug("sig wrapper = { %x, %x, %x }\n",
+		 wrapper.length, wrapper.revision, wrapper.cert_type);
+
+	/* sbsign rounds up the length of certificate table (in optional
+	 * header data directories) to 8 byte alignment.  However, the PE
+	 * specification states that while entries are 8-byte aligned, this is
+	 * not included in their length, and as a result, pesign has not
+	 * rounded up since 0.110.
+	 */
+	if (wrapper.length > ctx->sig_len) {
+		pr_warn("Signature wrapper bigger than sig len (%x > %x)\n",
+			ctx->sig_len, wrapper.length);
+		return -ELIBBAD;
+	}
+	if (wrapper.revision != WIN_CERT_REVISION_2_0) {
+		pr_warn("Signature is not revision 2.0\n");
+		return -ENOTSUPP;
+	}
+	if (wrapper.cert_type != WIN_CERT_TYPE_PKCS_SIGNED_DATA) {
+		pr_warn("Signature certificate type is not PKCS\n");
+		return -ENOTSUPP;
+	}
+
+	/* It looks like the pkcs signature length in wrapper->length and the
+	 * size obtained from the data dir entries, which lists the total size
+	 * of certificate table, are both aligned to an octaword boundary, so
+	 * we may have to deal with some padding.
+	 */
+	ctx->sig_len = wrapper.length;
+	ctx->sig_offset += sizeof(wrapper);
+	ctx->sig_len -= sizeof(wrapper);
+	if (ctx->sig_len < 4) {
+		pr_warn("Signature data missing\n");
+		return -EKEYREJECTED;
+	}
+
+	/* What's left should be a PKCS#7 cert */
+	pkcs7 = pebuf + ctx->sig_offset;
+	if (pkcs7[0] != (ASN1_CONS_BIT | ASN1_SEQ))
+		goto not_pkcs7;
+
+	switch (pkcs7[1]) {
+	case 0 ... 0x7f:
+		len = pkcs7[1] + 2;
+		goto check_len;
+	case ASN1_INDEFINITE_LENGTH:
+		return 0;
+	case 0x81:
+		len = pkcs7[2] + 3;
+		goto check_len;
+	case 0x82:
+		len = ((pkcs7[2] << 8) | pkcs7[3]) + 4;
+		goto check_len;
+	case 0x83 ... 0xff:
+		return -EMSGSIZE;
+	default:
+		goto not_pkcs7;
+	}
+
+check_len:
+	if (len <= ctx->sig_len) {
+		/* There may be padding */
+		ctx->sig_len = len;
+		return 0;
+	}
+not_pkcs7:
+	pr_warn("Signature data not PKCS#7\n");
+	return -ELIBBAD;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Compare two sections for canonicalisation.
+ */
+static int pefile_compare_shdrs(const void *a, const void *b)
+{
+	const struct section_header *shdra = a;
+	const struct section_header *shdrb = b;
+	int rc;
+
+	if (shdra->data_addr > shdrb->data_addr)
+		return 1;
+	if (shdrb->data_addr > shdra->data_addr)
+		return -1;
+
+	if (shdra->virtual_address > shdrb->virtual_address)
+		return 1;
+	if (shdrb->virtual_address > shdra->virtual_address)
+		return -1;
+
+	rc = strcmp(shdra->name, shdrb->name);
+	if (rc != 0)
+		return rc;
+
+	if (shdra->virtual_size > shdrb->virtual_size)
+		return 1;
+	if (shdrb->virtual_size > shdra->virtual_size)
+		return -1;
+
+	if (shdra->raw_data_size > shdrb->raw_data_size)
+		return 1;
+	if (shdrb->raw_data_size > shdra->raw_data_size)
+		return -1;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Load the contents of the PE binary into the digest, leaving out the image
+ * checksum and the certificate data block.
+ */
+static int pefile_digest_pe_contents(const void *pebuf, unsigned int pelen,
+				     struct pefile_context *ctx,
+				     struct shash_desc *desc)
+{
+	unsigned *canon, tmp, loop, i, hashed_bytes;
+	int ret;
+
+	/* Digest the header and data directory, but leave out the image
+	 * checksum and the data dirent for the signature.
+	 */
+	ret = crypto_shash_update(desc, pebuf, ctx->image_checksum_offset);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		return ret;
+
+	tmp = ctx->image_checksum_offset + sizeof(uint32_t);
+	ret = crypto_shash_update(desc, pebuf + tmp,
+				  ctx->cert_dirent_offset - tmp);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		return ret;
+
+	tmp = ctx->cert_dirent_offset + sizeof(struct data_dirent);
+	ret = crypto_shash_update(desc, pebuf + tmp, ctx->header_size - tmp);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		return ret;
+
+	canon = kcalloc(ctx->n_sections, sizeof(unsigned), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!canon)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	/* We have to canonicalise the section table, so we perform an
+	 * insertion sort.
+	 */
+	canon[0] = 0;
+	for (loop = 1; loop < ctx->n_sections; loop++) {
+		for (i = 0; i < loop; i++) {
+			if (pefile_compare_shdrs(&ctx->secs[canon[i]],
+						 &ctx->secs[loop]) > 0) {
+				memmove(&canon[i + 1], &canon[i],
+					(loop - i) * sizeof(canon[0]));
+				break;
+			}
+		}
+		canon[i] = loop;
+	}
+
+	hashed_bytes = ctx->header_size;
+	for (loop = 0; loop < ctx->n_sections; loop++) {
+		i = canon[loop];
+		if (ctx->secs[i].raw_data_size == 0)
+			continue;
+		ret = crypto_shash_update(desc,
+					  pebuf + ctx->secs[i].data_addr,
+					  ctx->secs[i].raw_data_size);
+		if (ret < 0) {
+			kfree(canon);
+			return ret;
+		}
+		hashed_bytes += ctx->secs[i].raw_data_size;
+	}
+	kfree(canon);
+
+	if (pelen > hashed_bytes) {
+		tmp = hashed_bytes + ctx->certs_size;
+		ret = crypto_shash_update(desc,
+					  pebuf + hashed_bytes,
+					  pelen - tmp);
+		if (ret < 0)
+			return ret;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Digest the contents of the PE binary, leaving out the image checksum and the
+ * certificate data block.
+ */
+static int pefile_digest_pe(const void *pebuf, unsigned int pelen,
+			    struct pefile_context *ctx)
+{
+	struct crypto_shash *tfm;
+	struct shash_desc *desc;
+	size_t digest_size, desc_size;
+	void *digest;
+	int ret;
+
+	kenter(",%s", ctx->digest_algo);
+
+	/* Allocate the hashing algorithm we're going to need and find out how
+	 * big the hash operational data will be.
+	 */
+	tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(ctx->digest_algo, 0, 0);
+	if (IS_ERR(tfm))
+		return (PTR_ERR(tfm) == -ENOENT) ? -ENOPKG : PTR_ERR(tfm);
+
+	desc_size = crypto_shash_descsize(tfm) + sizeof(*desc);
+	digest_size = crypto_shash_digestsize(tfm);
+
+	if (digest_size != ctx->digest_len) {
+		pr_warn("Digest size mismatch (%zx != %x)\n",
+			digest_size, ctx->digest_len);
+		ret = -EBADMSG;
+		goto error_no_desc;
+	}
+	pr_debug("Digest: desc=%zu size=%zu\n", desc_size, digest_size);
+
+	ret = -ENOMEM;
+	desc = kzalloc(desc_size + digest_size, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!desc)
+		goto error_no_desc;
+
+	desc->tfm   = tfm;
+	ret = crypto_shash_init(desc);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		goto error;
+
+	ret = pefile_digest_pe_contents(pebuf, pelen, ctx, desc);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		goto error;
+
+	digest = (void *)desc + desc_size;
+	ret = crypto_shash_final(desc, digest);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		goto error;
+
+	pr_debug("Digest calc = [%*ph]\n", ctx->digest_len, digest);
+
+	/* Check that the PE file digest matches that in the MSCODE part of the
+	 * PKCS#7 certificate.
+	 */
+	if (memcmp(digest, ctx->digest, ctx->digest_len) != 0) {
+		pr_warn("Digest mismatch\n");
+		ret = -EKEYREJECTED;
+	} else {
+		pr_debug("The digests match!\n");
+	}
+
+error:
+	kfree_sensitive(desc);
+error_no_desc:
+	crypto_free_shash(tfm);
+	kleave(" = %d", ret);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/**
+ * verify_pefile_signature - Verify the signature on a PE binary image
+ * @pebuf: Buffer containing the PE binary image
+ * @pelen: Length of the binary image
+ * @trusted_keys: Signing certificate(s) to use as starting points
+ * @usage: The use to which the key is being put.
+ *
+ * Validate that the certificate chain inside the PKCS#7 message inside the PE
+ * binary image intersects keys we already know and trust.
+ *
+ * Returns, in order of descending priority:
+ *
+ *  (*) -ELIBBAD if the image cannot be parsed, or:
+ *
+ *  (*) -EKEYREJECTED if a signature failed to match for which we have a valid
+ *	key, or:
+ *
+ *  (*) 0 if at least one signature chain intersects with the keys in the trust
+ *	keyring, or:
+ *
+ *  (*) -ENODATA if there is no signature present.
+ *
+ *  (*) -ENOPKG if a suitable crypto module couldn't be found for a check on a
+ *	chain.
+ *
+ *  (*) -ENOKEY if we couldn't find a match for any of the signature chains in
+ *	the message.
+ *
+ * May also return -ENOMEM.
+ */
+int verify_pefile_signature(const void *pebuf, unsigned pelen,
+			    struct key *trusted_keys,
+			    enum key_being_used_for usage)
+{
+	struct pefile_context ctx;
+	int ret;
+
+	kenter("");
+
+	memset(&ctx, 0, sizeof(ctx));
+	ret = pefile_parse_binary(pebuf, pelen, &ctx);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		return ret;
+
+	ret = pefile_strip_sig_wrapper(pebuf, &ctx);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		return ret;
+
+	ret = verify_pkcs7_signature(NULL, 0,
+				     pebuf + ctx.sig_offset, ctx.sig_len,
+				     trusted_keys, usage,
+				     mscode_parse, &ctx);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		goto error;
+
+	pr_debug("Digest: %u [%*ph]\n",
+		 ctx.digest_len, ctx.digest_len, ctx.digest);
+
+	/* Generate the digest and check against the PKCS7 certificate
+	 * contents.
+	 */
+	ret = pefile_digest_pe(pebuf, pelen, &ctx);
+
+error:
+	kfree_sensitive(ctx.digest);
+	return ret;
+}
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/verify_pefile.h b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/verify_pefile.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..e1628e100c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/verify_pefile.h
@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later */
+/* PE Binary parser bits
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2014 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
+ */
+
+#include <crypto/pkcs7.h>
+#include <crypto/hash_info.h>
+
+struct pefile_context {
+	unsigned	header_size;
+	unsigned	image_checksum_offset;
+	unsigned	cert_dirent_offset;
+	unsigned	n_data_dirents;
+	unsigned	n_sections;
+	unsigned	certs_size;
+	unsigned	sig_offset;
+	unsigned	sig_len;
+	const struct section_header *secs;
+
+	/* PKCS#7 MS Individual Code Signing content */
+	const void	*digest;		/* Digest */
+	unsigned	digest_len;		/* Digest length */
+	const char	*digest_algo;		/* Digest algorithm */
+};
+
+#define kenter(FMT, ...)					\
+	pr_devel("==> %s("FMT")\n", __func__, ##__VA_ARGS__)
+#define kleave(FMT, ...) \
+	pr_devel("<== %s()"FMT"\n", __func__, ##__VA_ARGS__)
+
+/*
+ * mscode_parser.c
+ */
+extern int mscode_parse(void *_ctx, const void *content_data, size_t data_len,
+			size_t asn1hdrlen);
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509.asn1 b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509.asn1
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..92d59c32f9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509.asn1
@@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
+Certificate ::= SEQUENCE {
+	tbsCertificate		TBSCertificate ({ x509_note_tbs_certificate }),
+	signatureAlgorithm	AlgorithmIdentifier,
+	signature		BIT STRING ({ x509_note_signature })
+	}
+
+TBSCertificate ::= SEQUENCE {
+	version           [ 0 ]	Version DEFAULT,
+	serialNumber		CertificateSerialNumber ({ x509_note_serial }),
+	signature		AlgorithmIdentifier ({ x509_note_sig_algo }),
+	issuer			Name ({ x509_note_issuer }),
+	validity		Validity,
+	subject			Name ({ x509_note_subject }),
+	subjectPublicKeyInfo	SubjectPublicKeyInfo,
+	issuerUniqueID    [ 1 ]	IMPLICIT UniqueIdentifier OPTIONAL,
+	subjectUniqueID   [ 2 ]	IMPLICIT UniqueIdentifier OPTIONAL,
+	extensions        [ 3 ]	Extensions OPTIONAL
+	}
+
+Version ::= INTEGER
+CertificateSerialNumber ::= INTEGER
+
+AlgorithmIdentifier ::= SEQUENCE {
+	algorithm		OBJECT IDENTIFIER ({ x509_note_OID }),
+	parameters		ANY OPTIONAL ({ x509_note_params })
+}
+
+Name ::= SEQUENCE OF RelativeDistinguishedName
+
+RelativeDistinguishedName ::= SET OF AttributeValueAssertion
+
+AttributeValueAssertion ::= SEQUENCE {
+	attributeType		OBJECT IDENTIFIER ({ x509_note_OID }),
+	attributeValue		ANY ({ x509_extract_name_segment })
+	}
+
+Validity ::= SEQUENCE {
+	notBefore		Time ({ x509_note_not_before }),
+	notAfter		Time ({ x509_note_not_after })
+	}
+
+Time ::= CHOICE {
+	utcTime			UTCTime,
+	generalTime		GeneralizedTime
+	}
+
+SubjectPublicKeyInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
+	algorithm		AlgorithmIdentifier,
+	subjectPublicKey	BIT STRING ({ x509_extract_key_data })
+	}
+
+UniqueIdentifier ::= BIT STRING
+
+Extensions ::= SEQUENCE OF Extension
+
+Extension ::= SEQUENCE {
+	extnid			OBJECT IDENTIFIER ({ x509_note_OID }),
+	critical		BOOLEAN DEFAULT,
+	extnValue		OCTET STRING ({ x509_process_extension })
+	}
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_akid.asn1 b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_akid.asn1
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..1a33231a75
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_akid.asn1
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+-- X.509 AuthorityKeyIdentifier
+-- rfc5280 section 4.2.1.1
+
+AuthorityKeyIdentifier ::= SEQUENCE {
+	keyIdentifier			[0] IMPLICIT KeyIdentifier		OPTIONAL,
+	authorityCertIssuer		[1] IMPLICIT GeneralNames		OPTIONAL,
+	authorityCertSerialNumber	[2] IMPLICIT CertificateSerialNumber	OPTIONAL
+	}
+
+KeyIdentifier ::= OCTET STRING ({ x509_akid_note_kid })
+
+CertificateSerialNumber ::= INTEGER ({ x509_akid_note_serial })
+
+GeneralNames ::= SEQUENCE OF GeneralName
+
+GeneralName ::= CHOICE {
+	otherName			[0] ANY,
+	rfc822Name			[1] IA5String,
+	dNSName				[2] IA5String,
+	x400Address			[3] ANY,
+	directoryName			[4] Name ({ x509_akid_note_name }),
+	ediPartyName			[5] ANY,
+	uniformResourceIdentifier	[6] IA5String,
+	iPAddress			[7] OCTET STRING,
+	registeredID			[8] OBJECT IDENTIFIER
+	}
+
+Name ::= SEQUENCE OF RelativeDistinguishedName
+
+RelativeDistinguishedName ::= SET OF AttributeValueAssertion
+
+AttributeValueAssertion ::= SEQUENCE {
+	attributeType		OBJECT IDENTIFIER ({ x509_note_OID }),
+	attributeValue		ANY ({ x509_extract_name_segment })
+	}
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..0a7049b470
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c
@@ -0,0 +1,817 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
+/* X.509 certificate parser
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2012 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
+ */
+
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) "X.509: "fmt
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/export.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/err.h>
+#include <linux/oid_registry.h>
+#include <crypto/public_key.h>
+#include "x509_parser.h"
+#include "x509.asn1.h"
+#include "x509_akid.asn1.h"
+
+struct x509_parse_context {
+	struct x509_certificate	*cert;		/* Certificate being constructed */
+	unsigned long	data;			/* Start of data */
+	const void	*key;			/* Key data */
+	size_t		key_size;		/* Size of key data */
+	const void	*params;		/* Key parameters */
+	size_t		params_size;		/* Size of key parameters */
+	enum OID	key_algo;		/* Algorithm used by the cert's key */
+	enum OID	last_oid;		/* Last OID encountered */
+	enum OID	sig_algo;		/* Algorithm used to sign the cert */
+	u8		o_size;			/* Size of organizationName (O) */
+	u8		cn_size;		/* Size of commonName (CN) */
+	u8		email_size;		/* Size of emailAddress */
+	u16		o_offset;		/* Offset of organizationName (O) */
+	u16		cn_offset;		/* Offset of commonName (CN) */
+	u16		email_offset;		/* Offset of emailAddress */
+	unsigned	raw_akid_size;
+	const void	*raw_akid;		/* Raw authorityKeyId in ASN.1 */
+	const void	*akid_raw_issuer;	/* Raw directoryName in authorityKeyId */
+	unsigned	akid_raw_issuer_size;
+};
+
+/*
+ * Free an X.509 certificate
+ */
+void x509_free_certificate(struct x509_certificate *cert)
+{
+	if (cert) {
+		public_key_free(cert->pub);
+		public_key_signature_free(cert->sig);
+		kfree(cert->issuer);
+		kfree(cert->subject);
+		kfree(cert->id);
+		kfree(cert->skid);
+		kfree(cert);
+	}
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x509_free_certificate);
+
+/*
+ * Parse an X.509 certificate
+ */
+struct x509_certificate *x509_cert_parse(const void *data, size_t datalen)
+{
+	struct x509_certificate *cert;
+	struct x509_parse_context *ctx;
+	struct asymmetric_key_id *kid;
+	long ret;
+
+	ret = -ENOMEM;
+	cert = kzalloc(sizeof(struct x509_certificate), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!cert)
+		goto error_no_cert;
+	cert->pub = kzalloc(sizeof(struct public_key), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!cert->pub)
+		goto error_no_ctx;
+	cert->sig = kzalloc(sizeof(struct public_key_signature), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!cert->sig)
+		goto error_no_ctx;
+	ctx = kzalloc(sizeof(struct x509_parse_context), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!ctx)
+		goto error_no_ctx;
+
+	ctx->cert = cert;
+	ctx->data = (unsigned long)data;
+
+	/* Attempt to decode the certificate */
+	ret = asn1_ber_decoder(&x509_decoder, ctx, data, datalen);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		goto error_decode;
+
+	/* Decode the AuthorityKeyIdentifier */
+	if (ctx->raw_akid) {
+		pr_devel("AKID: %u %*phN\n",
+			 ctx->raw_akid_size, ctx->raw_akid_size, ctx->raw_akid);
+		ret = asn1_ber_decoder(&x509_akid_decoder, ctx,
+				       ctx->raw_akid, ctx->raw_akid_size);
+		if (ret < 0) {
+			pr_warn("Couldn't decode AuthKeyIdentifier\n");
+			goto error_decode;
+		}
+	}
+
+	ret = -ENOMEM;
+	cert->pub->key = kmemdup(ctx->key, ctx->key_size, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!cert->pub->key)
+		goto error_decode;
+
+	cert->pub->keylen = ctx->key_size;
+
+	cert->pub->params = kmemdup(ctx->params, ctx->params_size, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!cert->pub->params)
+		goto error_decode;
+
+	cert->pub->paramlen = ctx->params_size;
+	cert->pub->algo = ctx->key_algo;
+
+	/* Grab the signature bits */
+	ret = x509_get_sig_params(cert);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		goto error_decode;
+
+	/* Generate cert issuer + serial number key ID */
+	kid = asymmetric_key_generate_id(cert->raw_serial,
+					 cert->raw_serial_size,
+					 cert->raw_issuer,
+					 cert->raw_issuer_size);
+	if (IS_ERR(kid)) {
+		ret = PTR_ERR(kid);
+		goto error_decode;
+	}
+	cert->id = kid;
+
+	/* Detect self-signed certificates */
+	ret = x509_check_for_self_signed(cert);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		goto error_decode;
+
+	kfree(ctx);
+	return cert;
+
+error_decode:
+	kfree(ctx);
+error_no_ctx:
+	x509_free_certificate(cert);
+error_no_cert:
+	return ERR_PTR(ret);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x509_cert_parse);
+
+/*
+ * Note an OID when we find one for later processing when we know how
+ * to interpret it.
+ */
+int x509_note_OID(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
+	     unsigned char tag,
+	     const void *value, size_t vlen)
+{
+	struct x509_parse_context *ctx = context;
+
+	ctx->last_oid = look_up_OID(value, vlen);
+	if (ctx->last_oid == OID__NR) {
+		char buffer[50];
+		sprint_oid(value, vlen, buffer, sizeof(buffer));
+		pr_debug("Unknown OID: [%lu] %s\n",
+			 (unsigned long)value - ctx->data, buffer);
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Save the position of the TBS data so that we can check the signature over it
+ * later.
+ */
+int x509_note_tbs_certificate(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
+			      unsigned char tag,
+			      const void *value, size_t vlen)
+{
+	struct x509_parse_context *ctx = context;
+
+	pr_debug("x509_note_tbs_certificate(,%zu,%02x,%ld,%zu)!\n",
+		 hdrlen, tag, (unsigned long)value - ctx->data, vlen);
+
+	ctx->cert->tbs = value - hdrlen;
+	ctx->cert->tbs_size = vlen + hdrlen;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Record the algorithm that was used to sign this certificate.
+ */
+int x509_note_sig_algo(void *context, size_t hdrlen, unsigned char tag,
+		       const void *value, size_t vlen)
+{
+	struct x509_parse_context *ctx = context;
+
+	pr_debug("PubKey Algo: %u\n", ctx->last_oid);
+
+	switch (ctx->last_oid) {
+	case OID_md2WithRSAEncryption:
+	case OID_md3WithRSAEncryption:
+	default:
+		return -ENOPKG; /* Unsupported combination */
+
+	case OID_md4WithRSAEncryption:
+		ctx->cert->sig->hash_algo = "md4";
+		goto rsa_pkcs1;
+
+	case OID_sha1WithRSAEncryption:
+		ctx->cert->sig->hash_algo = "sha1";
+		goto rsa_pkcs1;
+
+	case OID_sha256WithRSAEncryption:
+		ctx->cert->sig->hash_algo = "sha256";
+		goto rsa_pkcs1;
+
+	case OID_sha384WithRSAEncryption:
+		ctx->cert->sig->hash_algo = "sha384";
+		goto rsa_pkcs1;
+
+	case OID_sha512WithRSAEncryption:
+		ctx->cert->sig->hash_algo = "sha512";
+		goto rsa_pkcs1;
+
+	case OID_sha224WithRSAEncryption:
+		ctx->cert->sig->hash_algo = "sha224";
+		goto rsa_pkcs1;
+
+	case OID_id_ecdsa_with_sha1:
+		ctx->cert->sig->hash_algo = "sha1";
+		goto ecdsa;
+
+	case OID_id_ecdsa_with_sha224:
+		ctx->cert->sig->hash_algo = "sha224";
+		goto ecdsa;
+
+	case OID_id_ecdsa_with_sha256:
+		ctx->cert->sig->hash_algo = "sha256";
+		goto ecdsa;
+
+	case OID_id_ecdsa_with_sha384:
+		ctx->cert->sig->hash_algo = "sha384";
+		goto ecdsa;
+
+	case OID_id_ecdsa_with_sha512:
+		ctx->cert->sig->hash_algo = "sha512";
+		goto ecdsa;
+
+	case OID_gost2012Signature256:
+		ctx->cert->sig->hash_algo = "streebog256";
+		goto ecrdsa;
+
+	case OID_gost2012Signature512:
+		ctx->cert->sig->hash_algo = "streebog512";
+		goto ecrdsa;
+
+	case OID_SM2_with_SM3:
+		ctx->cert->sig->hash_algo = "sm3";
+		goto sm2;
+	}
+
+rsa_pkcs1:
+	ctx->cert->sig->pkey_algo = "rsa";
+	ctx->cert->sig->encoding = "pkcs1";
+	ctx->sig_algo = ctx->last_oid;
+	return 0;
+ecrdsa:
+	ctx->cert->sig->pkey_algo = "ecrdsa";
+	ctx->cert->sig->encoding = "raw";
+	ctx->sig_algo = ctx->last_oid;
+	return 0;
+sm2:
+	ctx->cert->sig->pkey_algo = "sm2";
+	ctx->cert->sig->encoding = "raw";
+	ctx->sig_algo = ctx->last_oid;
+	return 0;
+ecdsa:
+	ctx->cert->sig->pkey_algo = "ecdsa";
+	ctx->cert->sig->encoding = "x962";
+	ctx->sig_algo = ctx->last_oid;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Note the whereabouts and type of the signature.
+ */
+int x509_note_signature(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
+			unsigned char tag,
+			const void *value, size_t vlen)
+{
+	struct x509_parse_context *ctx = context;
+
+	pr_debug("Signature: alg=%u, size=%zu\n", ctx->last_oid, vlen);
+
+	/*
+	 * In X.509 certificates, the signature's algorithm is stored in two
+	 * places: inside the TBSCertificate (the data that is signed), and
+	 * alongside the signature.  These *must* match.
+	 */
+	if (ctx->last_oid != ctx->sig_algo) {
+		pr_warn("signatureAlgorithm (%u) differs from tbsCertificate.signature (%u)\n",
+			ctx->last_oid, ctx->sig_algo);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	if (strcmp(ctx->cert->sig->pkey_algo, "rsa") == 0 ||
+	    strcmp(ctx->cert->sig->pkey_algo, "ecrdsa") == 0 ||
+	    strcmp(ctx->cert->sig->pkey_algo, "sm2") == 0 ||
+	    strcmp(ctx->cert->sig->pkey_algo, "ecdsa") == 0) {
+		/* Discard the BIT STRING metadata */
+		if (vlen < 1 || *(const u8 *)value != 0)
+			return -EBADMSG;
+
+		value++;
+		vlen--;
+	}
+
+	ctx->cert->raw_sig = value;
+	ctx->cert->raw_sig_size = vlen;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Note the certificate serial number
+ */
+int x509_note_serial(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
+		     unsigned char tag,
+		     const void *value, size_t vlen)
+{
+	struct x509_parse_context *ctx = context;
+	ctx->cert->raw_serial = value;
+	ctx->cert->raw_serial_size = vlen;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Note some of the name segments from which we'll fabricate a name.
+ */
+int x509_extract_name_segment(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
+			      unsigned char tag,
+			      const void *value, size_t vlen)
+{
+	struct x509_parse_context *ctx = context;
+
+	switch (ctx->last_oid) {
+	case OID_commonName:
+		ctx->cn_size = vlen;
+		ctx->cn_offset = (unsigned long)value - ctx->data;
+		break;
+	case OID_organizationName:
+		ctx->o_size = vlen;
+		ctx->o_offset = (unsigned long)value - ctx->data;
+		break;
+	case OID_email_address:
+		ctx->email_size = vlen;
+		ctx->email_offset = (unsigned long)value - ctx->data;
+		break;
+	default:
+		break;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Fabricate and save the issuer and subject names
+ */
+static int x509_fabricate_name(struct x509_parse_context *ctx, size_t hdrlen,
+			       unsigned char tag,
+			       char **_name, size_t vlen)
+{
+	const void *name, *data = (const void *)ctx->data;
+	size_t namesize;
+	char *buffer;
+
+	if (*_name)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	/* Empty name string if no material */
+	if (!ctx->cn_size && !ctx->o_size && !ctx->email_size) {
+		buffer = kmalloc(1, GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (!buffer)
+			return -ENOMEM;
+		buffer[0] = 0;
+		goto done;
+	}
+
+	if (ctx->cn_size && ctx->o_size) {
+		/* Consider combining O and CN, but use only the CN if it is
+		 * prefixed by the O, or a significant portion thereof.
+		 */
+		namesize = ctx->cn_size;
+		name = data + ctx->cn_offset;
+		if (ctx->cn_size >= ctx->o_size &&
+		    memcmp(data + ctx->cn_offset, data + ctx->o_offset,
+			   ctx->o_size) == 0)
+			goto single_component;
+		if (ctx->cn_size >= 7 &&
+		    ctx->o_size >= 7 &&
+		    memcmp(data + ctx->cn_offset, data + ctx->o_offset, 7) == 0)
+			goto single_component;
+
+		buffer = kmalloc(ctx->o_size + 2 + ctx->cn_size + 1,
+				 GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (!buffer)
+			return -ENOMEM;
+
+		memcpy(buffer,
+		       data + ctx->o_offset, ctx->o_size);
+		buffer[ctx->o_size + 0] = ':';
+		buffer[ctx->o_size + 1] = ' ';
+		memcpy(buffer + ctx->o_size + 2,
+		       data + ctx->cn_offset, ctx->cn_size);
+		buffer[ctx->o_size + 2 + ctx->cn_size] = 0;
+		goto done;
+
+	} else if (ctx->cn_size) {
+		namesize = ctx->cn_size;
+		name = data + ctx->cn_offset;
+	} else if (ctx->o_size) {
+		namesize = ctx->o_size;
+		name = data + ctx->o_offset;
+	} else {
+		namesize = ctx->email_size;
+		name = data + ctx->email_offset;
+	}
+
+single_component:
+	buffer = kmalloc(namesize + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!buffer)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	memcpy(buffer, name, namesize);
+	buffer[namesize] = 0;
+
+done:
+	*_name = buffer;
+	ctx->cn_size = 0;
+	ctx->o_size = 0;
+	ctx->email_size = 0;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int x509_note_issuer(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
+		     unsigned char tag,
+		     const void *value, size_t vlen)
+{
+	struct x509_parse_context *ctx = context;
+	struct asymmetric_key_id *kid;
+
+	ctx->cert->raw_issuer = value;
+	ctx->cert->raw_issuer_size = vlen;
+
+	if (!ctx->cert->sig->auth_ids[2]) {
+		kid = asymmetric_key_generate_id(value, vlen, "", 0);
+		if (IS_ERR(kid))
+			return PTR_ERR(kid);
+		ctx->cert->sig->auth_ids[2] = kid;
+	}
+
+	return x509_fabricate_name(ctx, hdrlen, tag, &ctx->cert->issuer, vlen);
+}
+
+int x509_note_subject(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
+		      unsigned char tag,
+		      const void *value, size_t vlen)
+{
+	struct x509_parse_context *ctx = context;
+	ctx->cert->raw_subject = value;
+	ctx->cert->raw_subject_size = vlen;
+	return x509_fabricate_name(ctx, hdrlen, tag, &ctx->cert->subject, vlen);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Extract the parameters for the public key
+ */
+int x509_note_params(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
+		     unsigned char tag,
+		     const void *value, size_t vlen)
+{
+	struct x509_parse_context *ctx = context;
+
+	/*
+	 * AlgorithmIdentifier is used three times in the x509, we should skip
+	 * first and ignore third, using second one which is after subject and
+	 * before subjectPublicKey.
+	 */
+	if (!ctx->cert->raw_subject || ctx->key)
+		return 0;
+	ctx->params = value - hdrlen;
+	ctx->params_size = vlen + hdrlen;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Extract the data for the public key algorithm
+ */
+int x509_extract_key_data(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
+			  unsigned char tag,
+			  const void *value, size_t vlen)
+{
+	struct x509_parse_context *ctx = context;
+	enum OID oid;
+
+	ctx->key_algo = ctx->last_oid;
+	switch (ctx->last_oid) {
+	case OID_rsaEncryption:
+		ctx->cert->pub->pkey_algo = "rsa";
+		break;
+	case OID_gost2012PKey256:
+	case OID_gost2012PKey512:
+		ctx->cert->pub->pkey_algo = "ecrdsa";
+		break;
+	case OID_sm2:
+		ctx->cert->pub->pkey_algo = "sm2";
+		break;
+	case OID_id_ecPublicKey:
+		if (parse_OID(ctx->params, ctx->params_size, &oid) != 0)
+			return -EBADMSG;
+
+		switch (oid) {
+		case OID_sm2:
+			ctx->cert->pub->pkey_algo = "sm2";
+			break;
+		case OID_id_prime192v1:
+			ctx->cert->pub->pkey_algo = "ecdsa-nist-p192";
+			break;
+		case OID_id_prime256v1:
+			ctx->cert->pub->pkey_algo = "ecdsa-nist-p256";
+			break;
+		case OID_id_ansip384r1:
+			ctx->cert->pub->pkey_algo = "ecdsa-nist-p384";
+			break;
+		default:
+			return -ENOPKG;
+		}
+		break;
+	default:
+		return -ENOPKG;
+	}
+
+	/* Discard the BIT STRING metadata */
+	if (vlen < 1 || *(const u8 *)value != 0)
+		return -EBADMSG;
+	ctx->key = value + 1;
+	ctx->key_size = vlen - 1;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/* The keyIdentifier in AuthorityKeyIdentifier SEQUENCE is tag(CONT,PRIM,0) */
+#define SEQ_TAG_KEYID (ASN1_CONT << 6)
+
+/*
+ * Process certificate extensions that are used to qualify the certificate.
+ */
+int x509_process_extension(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
+			   unsigned char tag,
+			   const void *value, size_t vlen)
+{
+	struct x509_parse_context *ctx = context;
+	struct asymmetric_key_id *kid;
+	const unsigned char *v = value;
+
+	pr_debug("Extension: %u\n", ctx->last_oid);
+
+	if (ctx->last_oid == OID_subjectKeyIdentifier) {
+		/* Get hold of the key fingerprint */
+		if (ctx->cert->skid || vlen < 3)
+			return -EBADMSG;
+		if (v[0] != ASN1_OTS || v[1] != vlen - 2)
+			return -EBADMSG;
+		v += 2;
+		vlen -= 2;
+
+		ctx->cert->raw_skid_size = vlen;
+		ctx->cert->raw_skid = v;
+		kid = asymmetric_key_generate_id(v, vlen, "", 0);
+		if (IS_ERR(kid))
+			return PTR_ERR(kid);
+		ctx->cert->skid = kid;
+		pr_debug("subjkeyid %*phN\n", kid->len, kid->data);
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	if (ctx->last_oid == OID_keyUsage) {
+		/*
+		 * Get hold of the keyUsage bit string
+		 * v[1] is the encoding size
+		 *       (Expect either 0x02 or 0x03, making it 1 or 2 bytes)
+		 * v[2] is the number of unused bits in the bit string
+		 *       (If >= 3 keyCertSign is missing when v[1] = 0x02)
+		 * v[3] and possibly v[4] contain the bit string
+		 *
+		 * From RFC 5280 4.2.1.3:
+		 *   0x04 is where keyCertSign lands in this bit string
+		 *   0x80 is where digitalSignature lands in this bit string
+		 */
+		if (v[0] != ASN1_BTS)
+			return -EBADMSG;
+		if (vlen < 4)
+			return -EBADMSG;
+		if (v[2] >= 8)
+			return -EBADMSG;
+		if (v[3] & 0x80)
+			ctx->cert->pub->key_eflags |= 1 << KEY_EFLAG_DIGITALSIG;
+		if (v[1] == 0x02 && v[2] <= 2 && (v[3] & 0x04))
+			ctx->cert->pub->key_eflags |= 1 << KEY_EFLAG_KEYCERTSIGN;
+		else if (vlen > 4 && v[1] == 0x03 && (v[3] & 0x04))
+			ctx->cert->pub->key_eflags |= 1 << KEY_EFLAG_KEYCERTSIGN;
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	if (ctx->last_oid == OID_authorityKeyIdentifier) {
+		/* Get hold of the CA key fingerprint */
+		ctx->raw_akid = v;
+		ctx->raw_akid_size = vlen;
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	if (ctx->last_oid == OID_basicConstraints) {
+		/*
+		 * Get hold of the basicConstraints
+		 * v[1] is the encoding size
+		 *	(Expect 0x2 or greater, making it 1 or more bytes)
+		 * v[2] is the encoding type
+		 *	(Expect an ASN1_BOOL for the CA)
+		 * v[3] is the contents of the ASN1_BOOL
+		 *      (Expect 1 if the CA is TRUE)
+		 * vlen should match the entire extension size
+		 */
+		if (v[0] != (ASN1_CONS_BIT | ASN1_SEQ))
+			return -EBADMSG;
+		if (vlen < 2)
+			return -EBADMSG;
+		if (v[1] != vlen - 2)
+			return -EBADMSG;
+		if (vlen >= 4 && v[1] != 0 && v[2] == ASN1_BOOL && v[3] == 1)
+			ctx->cert->pub->key_eflags |= 1 << KEY_EFLAG_CA;
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * x509_decode_time - Decode an X.509 time ASN.1 object
+ * @_t: The time to fill in
+ * @hdrlen: The length of the object header
+ * @tag: The object tag
+ * @value: The object value
+ * @vlen: The size of the object value
+ *
+ * Decode an ASN.1 universal time or generalised time field into a struct the
+ * kernel can handle and check it for validity.  The time is decoded thus:
+ *
+ *	[RFC5280 §4.1.2.5]
+ *	CAs conforming to this profile MUST always encode certificate validity
+ *	dates through the year 2049 as UTCTime; certificate validity dates in
+ *	2050 or later MUST be encoded as GeneralizedTime.  Conforming
+ *	applications MUST be able to process validity dates that are encoded in
+ *	either UTCTime or GeneralizedTime.
+ */
+int x509_decode_time(time64_t *_t,  size_t hdrlen,
+		     unsigned char tag,
+		     const unsigned char *value, size_t vlen)
+{
+	static const unsigned char month_lengths[] = { 31, 28, 31, 30, 31, 30,
+						       31, 31, 30, 31, 30, 31 };
+	const unsigned char *p = value;
+	unsigned year, mon, day, hour, min, sec, mon_len;
+
+#define dec2bin(X) ({ unsigned char x = (X) - '0'; if (x > 9) goto invalid_time; x; })
+#define DD2bin(P) ({ unsigned x = dec2bin(P[0]) * 10 + dec2bin(P[1]); P += 2; x; })
+
+	if (tag == ASN1_UNITIM) {
+		/* UTCTime: YYMMDDHHMMSSZ */
+		if (vlen != 13)
+			goto unsupported_time;
+		year = DD2bin(p);
+		if (year >= 50)
+			year += 1900;
+		else
+			year += 2000;
+	} else if (tag == ASN1_GENTIM) {
+		/* GenTime: YYYYMMDDHHMMSSZ */
+		if (vlen != 15)
+			goto unsupported_time;
+		year = DD2bin(p) * 100 + DD2bin(p);
+		if (year >= 1950 && year <= 2049)
+			goto invalid_time;
+	} else {
+		goto unsupported_time;
+	}
+
+	mon  = DD2bin(p);
+	day = DD2bin(p);
+	hour = DD2bin(p);
+	min  = DD2bin(p);
+	sec  = DD2bin(p);
+
+	if (*p != 'Z')
+		goto unsupported_time;
+
+	if (year < 1970 ||
+	    mon < 1 || mon > 12)
+		goto invalid_time;
+
+	mon_len = month_lengths[mon - 1];
+	if (mon == 2) {
+		if (year % 4 == 0) {
+			mon_len = 29;
+			if (year % 100 == 0) {
+				mon_len = 28;
+				if (year % 400 == 0)
+					mon_len = 29;
+			}
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (day < 1 || day > mon_len ||
+	    hour > 24 || /* ISO 8601 permits 24:00:00 as midnight tomorrow */
+	    min > 59 ||
+	    sec > 60) /* ISO 8601 permits leap seconds [X.680 46.3] */
+		goto invalid_time;
+
+	*_t = mktime64(year, mon, day, hour, min, sec);
+	return 0;
+
+unsupported_time:
+	pr_debug("Got unsupported time [tag %02x]: '%*phN'\n",
+		 tag, (int)vlen, value);
+	return -EBADMSG;
+invalid_time:
+	pr_debug("Got invalid time [tag %02x]: '%*phN'\n",
+		 tag, (int)vlen, value);
+	return -EBADMSG;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x509_decode_time);
+
+int x509_note_not_before(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
+			 unsigned char tag,
+			 const void *value, size_t vlen)
+{
+	struct x509_parse_context *ctx = context;
+	return x509_decode_time(&ctx->cert->valid_from, hdrlen, tag, value, vlen);
+}
+
+int x509_note_not_after(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
+			unsigned char tag,
+			const void *value, size_t vlen)
+{
+	struct x509_parse_context *ctx = context;
+	return x509_decode_time(&ctx->cert->valid_to, hdrlen, tag, value, vlen);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Note a key identifier-based AuthorityKeyIdentifier
+ */
+int x509_akid_note_kid(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
+		       unsigned char tag,
+		       const void *value, size_t vlen)
+{
+	struct x509_parse_context *ctx = context;
+	struct asymmetric_key_id *kid;
+
+	pr_debug("AKID: keyid: %*phN\n", (int)vlen, value);
+
+	if (ctx->cert->sig->auth_ids[1])
+		return 0;
+
+	kid = asymmetric_key_generate_id(value, vlen, "", 0);
+	if (IS_ERR(kid))
+		return PTR_ERR(kid);
+	pr_debug("authkeyid %*phN\n", kid->len, kid->data);
+	ctx->cert->sig->auth_ids[1] = kid;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Note a directoryName in an AuthorityKeyIdentifier
+ */
+int x509_akid_note_name(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
+			unsigned char tag,
+			const void *value, size_t vlen)
+{
+	struct x509_parse_context *ctx = context;
+
+	pr_debug("AKID: name: %*phN\n", (int)vlen, value);
+
+	ctx->akid_raw_issuer = value;
+	ctx->akid_raw_issuer_size = vlen;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Note a serial number in an AuthorityKeyIdentifier
+ */
+int x509_akid_note_serial(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
+			  unsigned char tag,
+			  const void *value, size_t vlen)
+{
+	struct x509_parse_context *ctx = context;
+	struct asymmetric_key_id *kid;
+
+	pr_debug("AKID: serial: %*phN\n", (int)vlen, value);
+
+	if (!ctx->akid_raw_issuer || ctx->cert->sig->auth_ids[0])
+		return 0;
+
+	kid = asymmetric_key_generate_id(value,
+					 vlen,
+					 ctx->akid_raw_issuer,
+					 ctx->akid_raw_issuer_size);
+	if (IS_ERR(kid))
+		return PTR_ERR(kid);
+
+	pr_debug("authkeyid %*phN\n", kid->len, kid->data);
+	ctx->cert->sig->auth_ids[0] = kid;
+	return 0;
+}
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_loader.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_loader.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..a417413269
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_loader.c
@@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
+
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/key.h>
+#include <keys/asymmetric-type.h>
+
+int x509_load_certificate_list(const u8 cert_list[],
+			       const unsigned long list_size,
+			       const struct key *keyring)
+{
+	key_ref_t key;
+	const u8 *p, *end;
+	size_t plen;
+
+	p = cert_list;
+	end = p + list_size;
+	while (p < end) {
+		/* Each cert begins with an ASN.1 SEQUENCE tag and must be more
+		 * than 256 bytes in size.
+		 */
+		if (end - p < 4)
+			goto dodgy_cert;
+		if (p[0] != 0x30 &&
+		    p[1] != 0x82)
+			goto dodgy_cert;
+		plen = (p[2] << 8) | p[3];
+		plen += 4;
+		if (plen > end - p)
+			goto dodgy_cert;
+
+		key = key_create_or_update(make_key_ref(keyring, 1),
+					   "asymmetric",
+					   NULL,
+					   p,
+					   plen,
+					   ((KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) |
+					   KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ),
+					   KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA |
+					   KEY_ALLOC_BUILT_IN |
+					   KEY_ALLOC_BYPASS_RESTRICTION);
+		if (IS_ERR(key)) {
+			pr_err("Problem loading in-kernel X.509 certificate (%ld)\n",
+			       PTR_ERR(key));
+		} else {
+			pr_notice("Loaded X.509 cert '%s'\n",
+				  key_ref_to_ptr(key)->description);
+			key_ref_put(key);
+		}
+		p += plen;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+
+dodgy_cert:
+	pr_err("Problem parsing in-kernel X.509 certificate list\n");
+	return 0;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x509_load_certificate_list);
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..97a886cbe0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h
@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later */
+/* X.509 certificate parser internal definitions
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2012 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
+ */
+
+#include <linux/time.h>
+#include <crypto/public_key.h>
+#include <keys/asymmetric-type.h>
+
+struct x509_certificate {
+	struct x509_certificate *next;
+	struct x509_certificate *signer;	/* Certificate that signed this one */
+	struct public_key *pub;			/* Public key details */
+	struct public_key_signature *sig;	/* Signature parameters */
+	char		*issuer;		/* Name of certificate issuer */
+	char		*subject;		/* Name of certificate subject */
+	struct asymmetric_key_id *id;		/* Issuer + Serial number */
+	struct asymmetric_key_id *skid;		/* Subject + subjectKeyId (optional) */
+	time64_t	valid_from;
+	time64_t	valid_to;
+	const void	*tbs;			/* Signed data */
+	unsigned	tbs_size;		/* Size of signed data */
+	unsigned	raw_sig_size;		/* Size of signature */
+	const void	*raw_sig;		/* Signature data */
+	const void	*raw_serial;		/* Raw serial number in ASN.1 */
+	unsigned	raw_serial_size;
+	unsigned	raw_issuer_size;
+	const void	*raw_issuer;		/* Raw issuer name in ASN.1 */
+	const void	*raw_subject;		/* Raw subject name in ASN.1 */
+	unsigned	raw_subject_size;
+	unsigned	raw_skid_size;
+	const void	*raw_skid;		/* Raw subjectKeyId in ASN.1 */
+	unsigned	index;
+	bool		seen;			/* Infinite recursion prevention */
+	bool		verified;
+	bool		self_signed;		/* T if self-signed (check unsupported_sig too) */
+	bool		unsupported_sig;	/* T if signature uses unsupported crypto */
+	bool		blacklisted;
+};
+
+/*
+ * x509_cert_parser.c
+ */
+extern void x509_free_certificate(struct x509_certificate *cert);
+extern struct x509_certificate *x509_cert_parse(const void *data, size_t datalen);
+extern int x509_decode_time(time64_t *_t,  size_t hdrlen,
+			    unsigned char tag,
+			    const unsigned char *value, size_t vlen);
+
+/*
+ * x509_public_key.c
+ */
+extern int x509_get_sig_params(struct x509_certificate *cert);
+extern int x509_check_for_self_signed(struct x509_certificate *cert);
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..6a4f00be22
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c
@@ -0,0 +1,280 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
+/* Instantiate a public key crypto key from an X.509 Certificate
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2012 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
+ */
+
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) "X.509: "fmt
+#include <crypto/hash.h>
+#include <crypto/sm2.h>
+#include <keys/asymmetric-parser.h>
+#include <keys/asymmetric-subtype.h>
+#include <keys/system_keyring.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/string.h>
+#include "asymmetric_keys.h"
+#include "x509_parser.h"
+
+/*
+ * Set up the signature parameters in an X.509 certificate.  This involves
+ * digesting the signed data and extracting the signature.
+ */
+int x509_get_sig_params(struct x509_certificate *cert)
+{
+	struct public_key_signature *sig = cert->sig;
+	struct crypto_shash *tfm;
+	struct shash_desc *desc;
+	size_t desc_size;
+	int ret;
+
+	pr_devel("==>%s()\n", __func__);
+
+	sig->s = kmemdup(cert->raw_sig, cert->raw_sig_size, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!sig->s)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	sig->s_size = cert->raw_sig_size;
+
+	/* Allocate the hashing algorithm we're going to need and find out how
+	 * big the hash operational data will be.
+	 */
+	tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(sig->hash_algo, 0, 0);
+	if (IS_ERR(tfm)) {
+		if (PTR_ERR(tfm) == -ENOENT) {
+			cert->unsupported_sig = true;
+			return 0;
+		}
+		return PTR_ERR(tfm);
+	}
+
+	desc_size = crypto_shash_descsize(tfm) + sizeof(*desc);
+	sig->digest_size = crypto_shash_digestsize(tfm);
+
+	ret = -ENOMEM;
+	sig->digest = kmalloc(sig->digest_size, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!sig->digest)
+		goto error;
+
+	desc = kzalloc(desc_size, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!desc)
+		goto error;
+
+	desc->tfm = tfm;
+
+	if (strcmp(cert->pub->pkey_algo, "sm2") == 0) {
+		ret = strcmp(sig->hash_algo, "sm3") != 0 ? -EINVAL :
+		      crypto_shash_init(desc) ?:
+		      sm2_compute_z_digest(desc, cert->pub->key,
+					   cert->pub->keylen, sig->digest) ?:
+		      crypto_shash_init(desc) ?:
+		      crypto_shash_update(desc, sig->digest,
+					  sig->digest_size) ?:
+		      crypto_shash_finup(desc, cert->tbs, cert->tbs_size,
+					 sig->digest);
+	} else {
+		ret = crypto_shash_digest(desc, cert->tbs, cert->tbs_size,
+					  sig->digest);
+	}
+
+	if (ret < 0)
+		goto error_2;
+
+	ret = is_hash_blacklisted(sig->digest, sig->digest_size,
+				  BLACKLIST_HASH_X509_TBS);
+	if (ret == -EKEYREJECTED) {
+		pr_err("Cert %*phN is blacklisted\n",
+		       sig->digest_size, sig->digest);
+		cert->blacklisted = true;
+		ret = 0;
+	}
+
+error_2:
+	kfree(desc);
+error:
+	crypto_free_shash(tfm);
+	pr_devel("<==%s() = %d\n", __func__, ret);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check for self-signedness in an X.509 cert and if found, check the signature
+ * immediately if we can.
+ */
+int x509_check_for_self_signed(struct x509_certificate *cert)
+{
+	int ret = 0;
+
+	pr_devel("==>%s()\n", __func__);
+
+	if (cert->raw_subject_size != cert->raw_issuer_size ||
+	    memcmp(cert->raw_subject, cert->raw_issuer,
+		   cert->raw_issuer_size) != 0)
+		goto not_self_signed;
+
+	if (cert->sig->auth_ids[0] || cert->sig->auth_ids[1]) {
+		/* If the AKID is present it may have one or two parts.  If
+		 * both are supplied, both must match.
+		 */
+		bool a = asymmetric_key_id_same(cert->skid, cert->sig->auth_ids[1]);
+		bool b = asymmetric_key_id_same(cert->id, cert->sig->auth_ids[0]);
+
+		if (!a && !b)
+			goto not_self_signed;
+
+		ret = -EKEYREJECTED;
+		if (((a && !b) || (b && !a)) &&
+		    cert->sig->auth_ids[0] && cert->sig->auth_ids[1])
+			goto out;
+	}
+
+	if (cert->unsupported_sig) {
+		ret = 0;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	ret = public_key_verify_signature(cert->pub, cert->sig);
+	if (ret < 0) {
+		if (ret == -ENOPKG) {
+			cert->unsupported_sig = true;
+			ret = 0;
+		}
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	pr_devel("Cert Self-signature verified");
+	cert->self_signed = true;
+
+out:
+	pr_devel("<==%s() = %d\n", __func__, ret);
+	return ret;
+
+not_self_signed:
+	pr_devel("<==%s() = 0 [not]\n", __func__);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Attempt to parse a data blob for a key as an X509 certificate.
+ */
+static int x509_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
+{
+	struct asymmetric_key_ids *kids;
+	struct x509_certificate *cert;
+	const char *q;
+	size_t srlen, sulen;
+	char *desc = NULL, *p;
+	int ret;
+
+	cert = x509_cert_parse(prep->data, prep->datalen);
+	if (IS_ERR(cert))
+		return PTR_ERR(cert);
+
+	pr_devel("Cert Issuer: %s\n", cert->issuer);
+	pr_devel("Cert Subject: %s\n", cert->subject);
+	pr_devel("Cert Key Algo: %s\n", cert->pub->pkey_algo);
+	pr_devel("Cert Valid period: %lld-%lld\n", cert->valid_from, cert->valid_to);
+
+	cert->pub->id_type = "X509";
+
+	if (cert->unsupported_sig) {
+		public_key_signature_free(cert->sig);
+		cert->sig = NULL;
+	} else {
+		pr_devel("Cert Signature: %s + %s\n",
+			 cert->sig->pkey_algo, cert->sig->hash_algo);
+	}
+
+	/* Don't permit addition of blacklisted keys */
+	ret = -EKEYREJECTED;
+	if (cert->blacklisted)
+		goto error_free_cert;
+
+	/* Propose a description */
+	sulen = strlen(cert->subject);
+	if (cert->raw_skid) {
+		srlen = cert->raw_skid_size;
+		q = cert->raw_skid;
+	} else {
+		srlen = cert->raw_serial_size;
+		q = cert->raw_serial;
+	}
+
+	ret = -ENOMEM;
+	desc = kmalloc(sulen + 2 + srlen * 2 + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!desc)
+		goto error_free_cert;
+	p = memcpy(desc, cert->subject, sulen);
+	p += sulen;
+	*p++ = ':';
+	*p++ = ' ';
+	p = bin2hex(p, q, srlen);
+	*p = 0;
+
+	kids = kmalloc(sizeof(struct asymmetric_key_ids), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!kids)
+		goto error_free_desc;
+	kids->id[0] = cert->id;
+	kids->id[1] = cert->skid;
+	kids->id[2] = asymmetric_key_generate_id(cert->raw_subject,
+						 cert->raw_subject_size,
+						 "", 0);
+	if (IS_ERR(kids->id[2])) {
+		ret = PTR_ERR(kids->id[2]);
+		goto error_free_kids;
+	}
+
+	/* We're pinning the module by being linked against it */
+	__module_get(public_key_subtype.owner);
+	prep->payload.data[asym_subtype] = &public_key_subtype;
+	prep->payload.data[asym_key_ids] = kids;
+	prep->payload.data[asym_crypto] = cert->pub;
+	prep->payload.data[asym_auth] = cert->sig;
+	prep->description = desc;
+	prep->quotalen = 100;
+
+	/* We've finished with the certificate */
+	cert->pub = NULL;
+	cert->id = NULL;
+	cert->skid = NULL;
+	cert->sig = NULL;
+	desc = NULL;
+	kids = NULL;
+	ret = 0;
+
+error_free_kids:
+	kfree(kids);
+error_free_desc:
+	kfree(desc);
+error_free_cert:
+	x509_free_certificate(cert);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static struct asymmetric_key_parser x509_key_parser = {
+	.owner	= THIS_MODULE,
+	.name	= "x509",
+	.parse	= x509_key_preparse,
+};
+
+/*
+ * Module stuff
+ */
+static int __init x509_key_init(void)
+{
+	return register_asymmetric_key_parser(&x509_key_parser);
+}
+
+static void __exit x509_key_exit(void)
+{
+	unregister_asymmetric_key_parser(&x509_key_parser);
+}
+
+module_init(x509_key_init);
+module_exit(x509_key_exit);
+
+MODULE_DESCRIPTION("X.509 certificate parser");
+MODULE_AUTHOR("Red Hat, Inc.");
+MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");