Adding debian version 6.6.15-2.debian/6.6.15-2

Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>

9 files changed, 923 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/debian/patches/features/all/db-mok-keyring/0003-MODSIGN-checking-the-blacklisted-hash-before-loading-a-kernel-module.patch b/debian/patches/features/all/db-mok-keyring/0003-MODSIGN-checking-the-blacklisted-hash-before-loading-a-kernel-module.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..f2278ce63e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/features/all/db-mok-keyring/0003-MODSIGN-checking-the-blacklisted-hash-before-loading-a-kernel-module.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,130 @@
+From: "Lee, Chun-Yi" <joeyli.kernel@gmail.com>
+Date: Tue, 13 Mar 2018 18:38:02 +0800
+Subject: [PATCH 3/4] MODSIGN: checking the blacklisted hash before loading a
+ kernel module
+Origin: https://lore.kernel.org/patchwork/patch/933175/
+
+This patch adds the logic for checking the kernel module's hash
+base on blacklist. The hash must be generated by sha256 and enrolled
+to dbx/mokx.
+
+For example:
+	sha256sum sample.ko
+	mokutil --mokx --import-hash $HASH_RESULT
+
+Whether the signature on ko file is stripped or not, the hash can be
+compared by kernel.
+
+Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
+Cc: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org>
+Cc: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
+Signed-off-by: "Lee, Chun-Yi" <jlee@suse.com>
+[Rebased by Luca Boccassi]
+[bwh: Forward-ported to 5.19:
+ - The type parameter to is_hash_blacklisted() is now an enumeration
+   rather than a string
+ - Adjust filename, context]
+---
+ kernel/module/signing.c | 59 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
+ 1 file changed, 57 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/kernel/module/signing.c
++++ b/kernel/module/signing.c
+@@ -13,6 +13,8 @@
+ #include <linux/verification.h>
+ #include <linux/security.h>
+ #include <crypto/public_key.h>
++#include <crypto/hash.h>
++#include <keys/system_keyring.h>
+ #include <uapi/linux/module.h>
+ #include "internal.h"
+ 
+@@ -37,13 +39,60 @@
+ 	sig_enforce = true;
+ }
+ 
++static int mod_is_hash_blacklisted(const void *mod, size_t verifylen)
++{
++	struct crypto_shash *tfm;
++	struct shash_desc *desc;
++	size_t digest_size, desc_size;
++	u8 *digest;
++	int ret;
++
++	tfm = crypto_alloc_shash("sha256", 0, 0);
++	if (IS_ERR(tfm)) {
++		ret = PTR_ERR(tfm);
++		goto error_return;
++	}
++
++	desc_size = crypto_shash_descsize(tfm) + sizeof(*desc);
++	digest_size = crypto_shash_digestsize(tfm);
++	digest = kzalloc(digest_size + desc_size, GFP_KERNEL);
++	if (!digest) {
++		pr_err("digest memory buffer allocate fail\n");
++		ret = -ENOMEM;
++		goto error_digest;
++	}
++	desc = (void *)digest + digest_size;
++	desc->tfm = tfm;
++	ret = crypto_shash_init(desc);
++	if (ret < 0)
++		goto error_shash;
++
++	ret = crypto_shash_finup(desc, mod, verifylen, digest);
++	if (ret < 0)
++		goto error_shash;
++
++	pr_debug("%ld digest: %*phN\n", verifylen, (int) digest_size, digest);
++
++	ret = is_hash_blacklisted(digest, digest_size, BLACKLIST_HASH_BINARY);
++	if (ret == -EKEYREJECTED)
++		pr_err("Module hash %*phN is blacklisted\n",
++		       (int) digest_size, digest);
++
++error_shash:
++	kfree(digest);
++error_digest:
++	crypto_free_shash(tfm);
++error_return:
++	return ret;
++}
++
+ /*
+  * Verify the signature on a module.
+  */
+ int mod_verify_sig(const void *mod, struct load_info *info)
+ {
+ 	struct module_signature ms;
+-	size_t sig_len, modlen = info->len;
++	size_t sig_len, modlen = info->len, wholelen;
+ 	int ret;
+ 
+ 	pr_devel("==>%s(,%zu)\n", __func__, modlen);
+@@ -51,6 +100,7 @@
+ 	if (modlen <= sizeof(ms))
+ 		return -EBADMSG;
+ 
++	wholelen = modlen + sizeof(MODULE_SIG_STRING) - 1;
+ 	memcpy(&ms, mod + (modlen - sizeof(ms)), sizeof(ms));
+ 
+ 	ret = mod_check_sig(&ms, modlen, "module");
+@@ -61,10 +111,17 @@
+ 	modlen -= sig_len + sizeof(ms);
+ 	info->len = modlen;
+ 
+-	return verify_pkcs7_signature(mod, modlen, mod + modlen, sig_len,
++	ret = verify_pkcs7_signature(mod, modlen, mod + modlen, sig_len,
+ 				      VERIFY_USE_SECONDARY_KEYRING,
+ 				      VERIFYING_MODULE_SIGNATURE,
+ 				      NULL, NULL);
++	pr_devel("verify_pkcs7_signature() = %d\n", ret);
++
++	/* checking hash of module is in blacklist */
++	if (!ret)
++		ret = mod_is_hash_blacklisted(mod, wholelen);
++
++	return ret;
+ }
+ 
+ int module_sig_check(struct load_info *info, int flags)
diff --git a/debian/patches/features/all/db-mok-keyring/KEYS-Make-use-of-platform-keyring-for-module-signature.patch b/debian/patches/features/all/db-mok-keyring/KEYS-Make-use-of-platform-keyring-for-module-signature.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..e46aefe4d0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/features/all/db-mok-keyring/KEYS-Make-use-of-platform-keyring-for-module-signature.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+From: Robert Holmes <robeholmes@gmail.com>
+Date: Tue, 23 Apr 2019 07:39:29 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] KEYS: Make use of platform keyring for module signature
+ verify
+Bug-Debian: https://bugs.debian.org/935945
+Bug-Debian: https://bugs.debian.org/1030200
+Origin: https://src.fedoraproject.org/rpms/kernel/raw/master/f/KEYS-Make-use-of-platform-keyring-for-module-signature.patch
+Forwarded: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-modules/qvgp2il2co4iyxkzxvcs4p2bpyilqsbfgcprtpfrsajwae2etc@3z2s2o52i3xg/t/#u
+
+This allows a cert in DB to be used to sign modules,
+in addition to certs in the MoK and built-in keyrings.
+
+Signed-off-by: Robert Holmes <robeholmes@gmail.com>
+Signed-off-by: Jeremy Cline <jcline@redhat.com>
+[bwh: Forward-ported to 5.19: adjust filename]
+[наб: reinstate for 6.1, re-write description]
+---
+--- a/kernel/module/signing.c
++++ b/kernel/module/signing.c
+@@ -116,6 +116,13 @@ int mod_verify_sig(const void *mod, stru
+ 				      VERIFYING_MODULE_SIGNATURE,
+ 				      NULL, NULL);
+ 	pr_devel("verify_pkcs7_signature() = %d\n", ret);
++	if (ret == -ENOKEY && IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING)) {
++		ret = verify_pkcs7_signature(mod, modlen, mod + modlen, sig_len,
++					      VERIFY_USE_PLATFORM_KEYRING,
++					      VERIFYING_MODULE_SIGNATURE,
++					      NULL, NULL);
++		pr_devel("verify_pkcs7_signature() = %d\n", ret);
++	}
+ 
+ 	/* checking hash of module is in blacklist */
+ 	if (!ret)
diff --git a/debian/patches/features/all/db-mok-keyring/trust-machine-keyring-by-default.patch b/debian/patches/features/all/db-mok-keyring/trust-machine-keyring-by-default.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..c814c6d7f1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/features/all/db-mok-keyring/trust-machine-keyring-by-default.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+From 585cbcb982bffc4a8cee2f3d8d099fc64f9a74b9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Luca Boccassi <bluca@debian.org>
+Date: Fri, 14 Oct 2022 00:22:06 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] trust machine keyring (MoK) by default
+Forwarded: not-needed
+
+Debian always trusted keys in MoK by default. Upstream made it
+conditional on a new EFI variable being set.
+To keep backward compatibility skip this check.
+---
+ security/integrity/platform_certs/machine_keyring.c | 5 +----
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/security/integrity/platform_certs/machine_keyring.c b/security/integrity/platform_certs/machine_keyring.c
+index a401640a63cd..0627f14eacbe 100644
+--- a/security/integrity/platform_certs/machine_keyring.c
++++ b/security/integrity/platform_certs/machine_keyring.c
+@@ -68,10 +68,7 @@ static bool __init trust_moklist(void)
+ 
+ 	if (!initialized) {
+ 		initialized = true;
+-		trust_mok = false;
+-
+-		if (uefi_check_trust_mok_keys())
+-			trust_mok = true;
++		trust_mok = true;
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	return trust_mok;
diff --git a/debian/patches/features/all/drivers-media-dvb-usb-af9005-request_firmware.patch b/debian/patches/features/all/drivers-media-dvb-usb-af9005-request_firmware.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..a24ba17ef9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/features/all/drivers-media-dvb-usb-af9005-request_firmware.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,149 @@
+From: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
+Date: Mon, 24 Aug 2009 23:19:58 +0100
+Subject: af9005: Use request_firmware() to load register init script
+Forwarded: no
+
+Read the register init script from the Windows driver.  This is sick
+but should avoid the potential copyright infringement in distributing
+a version of the script which is directly derived from the driver.
+---
+ drivers/media/dvb/dvb-usb/Kconfig     |    2 +-
+ drivers/media/dvb/dvb-usb/af9005-fe.c |   66 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
+ 2 files changed, 54 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
+
+Index: debian-kernel/drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb/Kconfig
+===================================================================
+--- debian-kernel.orig/drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb/Kconfig
++++ debian-kernel/drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb/Kconfig
+@@ -260,10 +260,10 @@ config DVB_USB_OPERA1
+ 
+ config DVB_USB_AF9005
+ 	tristate "Afatech AF9005 DVB-T USB1.1 support"
+-	depends on BROKEN
+ 	depends on DVB_USB
+ 	select MEDIA_TUNER_MT2060 if MEDIA_SUBDRV_AUTOSELECT
+ 	select MEDIA_TUNER_QT1010 if MEDIA_SUBDRV_AUTOSELECT
++	select FW_LOADER
+ 	help
+ 	  Say Y here to support the Afatech AF9005 based DVB-T USB1.1 receiver
+ 	  and the TerraTec Cinergy T USB XE (Rev.1)
+Index: debian-kernel/drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb/af9005-fe.c
+===================================================================
+--- debian-kernel.orig/drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb/af9005-fe.c
++++ debian-kernel/drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb/af9005-fe.c
+@@ -9,10 +9,26 @@
+  * see Documentation/driver-api/media/drivers/dvb-usb.rst for more information
+  */
+ #include "af9005.h"
+-#include "af9005-script.h"
+ #include "mt2060.h"
+ #include "qt1010.h"
+ #include <asm/div64.h>
++#include <linux/firmware.h>
++
++/* Register initialisation script to be extracted from the Windows driver */
++
++typedef struct {
++	__le16 reg;
++	u8 pos;
++	u8 len;
++	u8 val;
++	u8 pad;
++} __packed RegDesc;
++
++#define WIN_DRV_NAME		"AF05BDA.sys"
++#define WIN_DRV_VERSION		"6.3.2.1"
++#define WIN_DRV_SIZE		133504
++#define WIN_DRV_SCRIPT_OFFSET	88316
++#define WIN_DRV_SCRIPT_SIZE	1110
+ 
+ struct af9005_fe_state {
+ 	struct dvb_usb_device *d;
+@@ -804,6 +820,8 @@ static int af9005_fe_init(struct dvb_fro
+ {
+ 	struct af9005_fe_state *state = fe->demodulator_priv;
+ 	struct dvb_usb_adapter *adap = fe->dvb->priv;
++	const struct firmware *fw;
++	const RegDesc *script;
+ 	int ret, i, scriptlen;
+ 	u8 temp, temp0 = 0, temp1 = 0, temp2 = 0;
+ 	u8 buf[2];
+@@ -956,37 +974,55 @@ static int af9005_fe_init(struct dvb_fro
+ 	if ((ret = af9005_write_ofdm_register(state->d, 0xaefb, 0x01)))
+ 		return ret;
+ 
+-	/* load init script */
+-	deb_info("load init script\n");
+-	scriptlen = sizeof(script) / sizeof(RegDesc);
++	/* load and validate init script */
++	deb_info("load init script from Windows driver\n");
++	ret = request_firmware(&fw, WIN_DRV_NAME, &state->d->udev->dev);
++	if (ret)
++		return ret;
++	BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(RegDesc) != 6);
++	if (fw->size != WIN_DRV_SIZE ||
++	    memcmp(fw->data + WIN_DRV_SCRIPT_OFFSET,
++		   "\x80\xa1\x00\x08\x0a\x00", 6) ||
++	    memcmp(fw->data + WIN_DRV_SCRIPT_OFFSET + WIN_DRV_SCRIPT_SIZE - 6,
++		   "\x49\xa3\x00\x06\x02\x00", 6)) {
++		err("%s is invalid - should be version %s, size %u bytes\n",
++		    WIN_DRV_NAME, WIN_DRV_VERSION, WIN_DRV_SIZE);
++		ret = -EINVAL;
++		goto fail_release;
++	}
++
++	script = (const RegDesc *)(fw->data + WIN_DRV_SCRIPT_OFFSET);
++	scriptlen = WIN_DRV_SCRIPT_SIZE / sizeof(RegDesc);
+ 	for (i = 0; i < scriptlen; i++) {
++		u16 reg = le16_to_cpu(script[i].reg);
+ 		if ((ret =
+-		     af9005_write_register_bits(state->d, script[i].reg,
++		     af9005_write_register_bits(state->d, reg,
+ 						script[i].pos,
+ 						script[i].len, script[i].val)))
+-			return ret;
++			goto fail_release;
+ 		/* save 3 bytes of original fcw */
+-		if (script[i].reg == 0xae18)
++		if (reg == 0xae18)
+ 			temp2 = script[i].val;
+-		if (script[i].reg == 0xae19)
++		if (reg == 0xae19)
+ 			temp1 = script[i].val;
+-		if (script[i].reg == 0xae1a)
++		if (reg == 0xae1a)
+ 			temp0 = script[i].val;
+ 
+ 		/* save original unplug threshold */
+-		if (script[i].reg == xd_p_reg_unplug_th)
++		if (reg == xd_p_reg_unplug_th)
+ 			state->original_if_unplug_th = script[i].val;
+-		if (script[i].reg == xd_p_reg_unplug_rf_gain_th)
++		if (reg == xd_p_reg_unplug_rf_gain_th)
+ 			state->original_rf_unplug_th = script[i].val;
+-		if (script[i].reg == xd_p_reg_unplug_dtop_if_gain_th)
++		if (reg == xd_p_reg_unplug_dtop_if_gain_th)
+ 			state->original_dtop_if_unplug_th = script[i].val;
+-		if (script[i].reg == xd_p_reg_unplug_dtop_rf_gain_th)
++		if (reg == xd_p_reg_unplug_dtop_rf_gain_th)
+ 			state->original_dtop_rf_unplug_th = script[i].val;
+ 
+ 	}
+ 	state->original_fcw =
+ 	    ((u32) temp2 << 16) + ((u32) temp1 << 8) + (u32) temp0;
+ 
++	release_firmware(fw);
+ 
+ 	/* save original TOPs */
+ 	deb_info("save original TOPs\n");
+@@ -1066,6 +1102,10 @@ static int af9005_fe_init(struct dvb_fro
+ 
+ 	deb_info("profit!\n");
+ 	return 0;
++
++fail_release:
++	release_firmware(fw);
++	return ret;
+ }
+ 
+ static int af9005_fe_sleep(struct dvb_frontend *fe)
diff --git a/debian/patches/features/all/lockdown/arm64-add-kernel-config-option-to-lock-down-when.patch b/debian/patches/features/all/lockdown/arm64-add-kernel-config-option-to-lock-down-when.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..6f1ba8e5a6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/features/all/lockdown/arm64-add-kernel-config-option-to-lock-down-when.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,153 @@
+From: Linn Crosetto <linn@hpe.com>
+Date: Tue, 30 Aug 2016 11:54:38 -0600
+Subject: arm64: add kernel config option to lock down when in Secure Boot mode
+Bug-Debian: https://bugs.debian.org/831827
+Forwarded: no
+
+Add a kernel configuration option to lock down the kernel, to restrict
+userspace's ability to modify the running kernel when UEFI Secure Boot is
+enabled. Based on the x86 patch by Matthew Garrett.
+
+Determine the state of Secure Boot in the EFI stub and pass this to the
+kernel using the FDT.
+
+Signed-off-by: Linn Crosetto <linn@hpe.com>
+[bwh: Forward-ported to 4.10: adjust context]
+[Lukas Wunner: Forward-ported to 4.11: drop parts applied upstream]
+[bwh: Forward-ported to 4.15 and lockdown patch set:
+ - Pass result of efi_get_secureboot() in stub through to
+   efi_set_secure_boot() in main kernel
+ - Use lockdown API and naming]
+[bwh: Forward-ported to 4.19.3: adjust context in update_fdt()]
+[dannf: Moved init_lockdown() call after uefi_init(), fixing SB detection]
+[bwh: Drop call to init_lockdown(), as efi_set_secure_boot() now calls this]
+[bwh: Forward-ported to 5.6: efi_get_secureboot() no longer takes a
+ sys_table parameter]
+[bwh: Forward-ported to 5.7: EFI initialisation from FDT was rewritten, so:
+ - Add Secure Boot mode to the parameter enumeration in fdtparams.c
+ - Add a parameter to efi_get_fdt_params() to return the Secure Boot mode
+ - Since Xen does not have a property name defined for Secure Boot mode,
+   change efi_get_fdt_prop() to handle a missing property name by clearing
+   the output variable]
+[Salvatore Bonaccorso: Forward-ported to 5.10: f30f242fb131 ("efi: Rename
+arm-init to efi-init common for all arch") renamed arm-init.c to efi-init.c]
+---
+ drivers/firmware/efi/efi-init.c    |    5 ++++-
+ drivers/firmware/efi/fdtparams.c   |   12 +++++++++++-
+ drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/fdt.c |    6 ++++++
+ include/linux/efi.h                |    3 ++-
+ 4 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/drivers/firmware/efi/efi-init.c
++++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/efi-init.c
+@@ -210,9 +210,10 @@ void __init efi_init(void)
+ {
+ 	struct efi_memory_map_data data;
+ 	u64 efi_system_table;
++	u32 secure_boot;
+ 
+ 	/* Grab UEFI information placed in FDT by stub */
+-	efi_system_table = efi_get_fdt_params(&data);
++	efi_system_table = efi_get_fdt_params(&data, &secure_boot);
+ 	if (!efi_system_table)
+ 		return;
+ 
+@@ -234,6 +235,8 @@ void __init efi_init(void)
+ 		return;
+ 	}
+ 
++	efi_set_secure_boot(secure_boot);
++
+ 	reserve_regions();
+ 	/*
+ 	 * For memblock manipulation, the cap should come after the memblock_add().
+--- a/drivers/firmware/efi/fdtparams.c
++++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/fdtparams.c
+@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ enum {
+ 	MMSIZE,
+ 	DCSIZE,
+ 	DCVERS,
++	SBMODE,
+ 
+ 	PARAMCOUNT
+ };
+@@ -26,6 +27,7 @@ static __initconst const char name[][22]
+ 	[MMSIZE] = "MemMap Size          ",
+ 	[DCSIZE] = "MemMap Desc. Size    ",
+ 	[DCVERS] = "MemMap Desc. Version ",
++	[SBMODE] = "Secure Boot Enabled  ",
+ };
+ 
+ static __initconst const struct {
+@@ -41,6 +43,7 @@ static __initconst const struct {
+ 			[MMSIZE] = "xen,uefi-mmap-size",
+ 			[DCSIZE] = "xen,uefi-mmap-desc-size",
+ 			[DCVERS] = "xen,uefi-mmap-desc-ver",
++			[SBMODE] = "",
+ 		}
+ 	}, {
+ #endif
+@@ -51,6 +54,7 @@ static __initconst const struct {
+ 			[MMSIZE] = "linux,uefi-mmap-size",
+ 			[DCSIZE] = "linux,uefi-mmap-desc-size",
+ 			[DCVERS] = "linux,uefi-mmap-desc-ver",
++			[SBMODE] = "linux,uefi-secure-boot",
+ 		}
+ 	}
+ };
+@@ -62,6 +66,11 @@ static int __init efi_get_fdt_prop(const
+ 	int len;
+ 	u64 val;
+ 
++	if (!pname[0]) {
++		memset(var, 0, size);
++		return 0;
++	}
++
+ 	prop = fdt_getprop(fdt, node, pname, &len);
+ 	if (!prop)
+ 		return 1;
+@@ -79,7 +88,7 @@ static int __init efi_get_fdt_prop(const
+ 	return 0;
+ }
+ 
+-u64 __init efi_get_fdt_params(struct efi_memory_map_data *mm)
++u64 __init efi_get_fdt_params(struct efi_memory_map_data *mm, u32 *secure_boot)
+ {
+ 	const void *fdt = initial_boot_params;
+ 	unsigned long systab;
+@@ -93,6 +102,7 @@ u64 __init efi_get_fdt_params(struct efi
+ 		[MMSIZE] = { &mm->size,		sizeof(mm->size) },
+ 		[DCSIZE] = { &mm->desc_size,	sizeof(mm->desc_size) },
+ 		[DCVERS] = { &mm->desc_version,	sizeof(mm->desc_version) },
++		[SBMODE] = { secure_boot,       sizeof(*secure_boot) },
+ 	};
+ 
+ 	BUILD_BUG_ON(ARRAY_SIZE(target) != ARRAY_SIZE(name));
+--- a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/fdt.c
++++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/fdt.c
+@@ -148,6 +148,12 @@ static efi_status_t update_fdt(void *ori
+ 		}
+ 	}
+ 
++	fdt_val32 = cpu_to_fdt32(efi_get_secureboot());
++	status = fdt_setprop(fdt, node, "linux,uefi-secure-boot",
++			     &fdt_val32, sizeof(fdt_val32));
++	if (status)
++		goto fdt_set_fail;
++
+ 	/* Shrink the FDT back to its minimum size: */
+ 	fdt_pack(fdt);
+ 
+--- a/include/linux/efi.h
++++ b/include/linux/efi.h
+@@ -662,7 +662,8 @@ extern void efi_mem_reserve(phys_addr_t
+ extern int efi_mem_reserve_persistent(phys_addr_t addr, u64 size);
+ extern void efi_initialize_iomem_resources(struct resource *code_resource,
+ 		struct resource *data_resource, struct resource *bss_resource);
+-extern u64 efi_get_fdt_params(struct efi_memory_map_data *data);
++extern u64 efi_get_fdt_params(struct efi_memory_map_data *data,
++			      u32 *secure_boot);
+ extern struct kobject *efi_kobj;
+ 
+ extern int efi_reboot_quirk_mode;
diff --git a/debian/patches/features/all/lockdown/efi-add-an-efi_secure_boot-flag-to-indicate-secure-b.patch b/debian/patches/features/all/lockdown/efi-add-an-efi_secure_boot-flag-to-indicate-secure-b.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..822beab21c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/features/all/lockdown/efi-add-an-efi_secure_boot-flag-to-indicate-secure-b.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,153 @@
+From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
+Date: Mon, 18 Feb 2019 12:45:03 +0000
+Subject: [28/30] efi: Add an EFI_SECURE_BOOT flag to indicate secure boot mode
+Origin: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs.git/commit?id=a5d70c55c603233c192b375f72116a395909da28
+
+UEFI machines can be booted in Secure Boot mode.  Add an EFI_SECURE_BOOT
+flag that can be passed to efi_enabled() to find out whether secure boot is
+enabled.
+
+Move the switch-statement in x86's setup_arch() that inteprets the
+secure_boot boot parameter to generic code and set the bit there.
+
+Suggested-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
+Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
+Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
+cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
+[rperier: Forward-ported to 5.5:
+ - Use pr_warn()
+ - Adjust context]
+[bwh: Forward-ported to 5.6: adjust context]
+[bwh: Forward-ported to 5.7:
+ - Use the next available bit in efi.flags
+ - Adjust context]
+---
+ arch/x86/kernel/setup.c           | 14 +----------
+ drivers/firmware/efi/Makefile     |  1 +
+ drivers/firmware/efi/secureboot.c | 39 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ include/linux/efi.h               | 16 ++++++++-----
+ 4 files changed, 51 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
+ create mode 100644 drivers/firmware/efi/secureboot.c
+
+--- a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
++++ b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
+@@ -1193,19 +1193,7 @@ void __init setup_arch(char **cmdline_p)
+ 	/* Allocate bigger log buffer */
+ 	setup_log_buf(1);
+ 
+-	if (efi_enabled(EFI_BOOT)) {
+-		switch (boot_params.secure_boot) {
+-		case efi_secureboot_mode_disabled:
+-			pr_info("Secure boot disabled\n");
+-			break;
+-		case efi_secureboot_mode_enabled:
+-			pr_info("Secure boot enabled\n");
+-			break;
+-		default:
+-			pr_info("Secure boot could not be determined\n");
+-			break;
+-		}
+-	}
++	efi_set_secure_boot(boot_params.secure_boot);
+ 
+ 	reserve_initrd();
+ 
+--- a/drivers/firmware/efi/Makefile
++++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/Makefile
+@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_EFI_FAKE_MEMMAP)		+= fake_m
+ obj-$(CONFIG_EFI_BOOTLOADER_CONTROL)	+= efibc.o
+ obj-$(CONFIG_EFI_TEST)			+= test/
+ obj-$(CONFIG_EFI_DEV_PATH_PARSER)	+= dev-path-parser.o
++obj-$(CONFIG_EFI)			+= secureboot.o
+ obj-$(CONFIG_APPLE_PROPERTIES)		+= apple-properties.o
+ obj-$(CONFIG_EFI_RCI2_TABLE)		+= rci2-table.o
+ obj-$(CONFIG_EFI_EMBEDDED_FIRMWARE)	+= embedded-firmware.o
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/secureboot.c
+@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
++
++/* Core kernel secure boot support.
++ *
++ * Copyright (C) 2017 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
++ * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
++ *
++ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
++ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence
++ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version
++ * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version.
++ */
++
++#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
++
++#include <linux/efi.h>
++#include <linux/kernel.h>
++#include <linux/printk.h>
++
++/*
++ * Decide what to do when UEFI secure boot mode is enabled.
++ */
++void __init efi_set_secure_boot(enum efi_secureboot_mode mode)
++{
++	if (efi_enabled(EFI_BOOT)) {
++		switch (mode) {
++		case efi_secureboot_mode_disabled:
++			pr_info("Secure boot disabled\n");
++			break;
++		case efi_secureboot_mode_enabled:
++			set_bit(EFI_SECURE_BOOT, &efi.flags);
++			pr_info("Secure boot enabled\n");
++			break;
++		default:
++			pr_warn("Secure boot could not be determined (mode %u)\n",
++				mode);
++			break;
++		}
++	}
++}
+--- a/include/linux/efi.h
++++ b/include/linux/efi.h
+@@ -871,6 +871,14 @@ extern int __init efi_setup_pcdp_console
+ #define EFI_MEM_ATTR		10	/* Did firmware publish an EFI_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES table? */
+ #define EFI_MEM_NO_SOFT_RESERVE	11	/* Is the kernel configured to ignore soft reservations? */
+ #define EFI_PRESERVE_BS_REGIONS	12	/* Are EFI boot-services memory segments available? */
++#define EFI_SECURE_BOOT		13	/* Are we in Secure Boot mode? */
++
++enum efi_secureboot_mode {
++	efi_secureboot_mode_unset,
++	efi_secureboot_mode_unknown,
++	efi_secureboot_mode_disabled,
++	efi_secureboot_mode_enabled,
++};
+ 
+ #ifdef CONFIG_EFI
+ /*
+@@ -895,6 +903,7 @@ static inline bool efi_rt_services_suppo
+ 	return (efi.runtime_supported_mask & mask) == mask;
+ }
+ extern void efi_find_mirror(void);
++extern void __init efi_set_secure_boot(enum efi_secureboot_mode mode);
+ #else
+ static inline bool efi_enabled(int feature)
+ {
+@@ -914,6 +923,7 @@ static inline bool efi_rt_services_suppo
+ }
+ 
+ static inline void efi_find_mirror(void) {}
++static inline void efi_set_secure_boot(enum efi_secureboot_mode mode) {}
+ #endif
+ 
+ extern int efi_status_to_err(efi_status_t status);
+@@ -1133,13 +1143,6 @@ static inline bool efi_runtime_disabled(
+ extern void efi_call_virt_check_flags(unsigned long flags, const void *caller);
+ extern unsigned long efi_call_virt_save_flags(void);
+ 
+-enum efi_secureboot_mode {
+-	efi_secureboot_mode_unset,
+-	efi_secureboot_mode_unknown,
+-	efi_secureboot_mode_disabled,
+-	efi_secureboot_mode_enabled,
+-};
+-
+ static inline
+ enum efi_secureboot_mode efi_get_secureboot_mode(efi_get_variable_t *get_var)
+ {
diff --git a/debian/patches/features/all/lockdown/efi-lock-down-the-kernel-if-booted-in-secure-boot-mo.patch b/debian/patches/features/all/lockdown/efi-lock-down-the-kernel-if-booted-in-secure-boot-mo.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..3d8bdf0664
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/features/all/lockdown/efi-lock-down-the-kernel-if-booted-in-secure-boot-mo.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,121 @@
+From: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
+Date: Tue, 10 Sep 2019 11:54:28 +0100
+Subject: efi: Lock down the kernel if booted in secure boot mode
+
+Based on an earlier patch by David Howells, who wrote the following
+description:
+
+> UEFI Secure Boot provides a mechanism for ensuring that the firmware will
+> only load signed bootloaders and kernels.  Certain use cases may also
+> require that all kernel modules also be signed.  Add a configuration option
+> that to lock down the kernel - which includes requiring validly signed
+> modules - if the kernel is secure-booted.
+
+Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
+[Salvatore Bonaccorso: After fixing https://bugs.debian.org/956197 the
+help text for LOCK_DOWN_IN_EFI_SECURE_BOOT was adjusted to mention that
+lockdown is triggered in integrity mode (https://bugs.debian.org/1025417)]
+Signed-off-by: Salvatore Bonaccorso <carnil@debian.org>
+---
+ arch/x86/kernel/setup.c           |    4 ++--
+ drivers/firmware/efi/secureboot.c |    3 +++
+ include/linux/security.h          |    6 ++++++
+ security/lockdown/Kconfig         |   15 +++++++++++++++
+ security/lockdown/lockdown.c      |    2 +-
+ 5 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
++++ b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
+@@ -1031,6 +1031,8 @@ void __init setup_arch(char **cmdline_p)
+ 	if (efi_enabled(EFI_BOOT))
+ 		efi_init();
+ 
++	efi_set_secure_boot(boot_params.secure_boot);
++
+ 	reserve_ibft_region();
+ 	dmi_setup();
+ 
+@@ -1192,8 +1194,6 @@ void __init setup_arch(char **cmdline_p)
+ 	/* Allocate bigger log buffer */
+ 	setup_log_buf(1);
+ 
+-	efi_set_secure_boot(boot_params.secure_boot);
+-
+ 	reserve_initrd();
+ 
+ 	acpi_table_upgrade();
+--- a/drivers/firmware/efi/secureboot.c
++++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/secureboot.c
+@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@
+ #include <linux/efi.h>
+ #include <linux/kernel.h>
+ #include <linux/printk.h>
++#include <linux/security.h>
+ 
+ /*
+  * Decide what to do when UEFI secure boot mode is enabled.
+@@ -28,6 +29,10 @@ void __init efi_set_secure_boot(enum efi
+ 			break;
+ 		case efi_secureboot_mode_enabled:
+ 			set_bit(EFI_SECURE_BOOT, &efi.flags);
++#ifdef CONFIG_LOCK_DOWN_IN_EFI_SECURE_BOOT
++			lock_kernel_down("EFI Secure Boot",
++					 LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX);
++#endif
+ 			pr_info("Secure boot enabled\n");
+ 			break;
+ 		default:
+--- a/include/linux/security.h
++++ b/include/linux/security.h
+@@ -482,6 +482,7 @@ int security_inode_notifysecctx(struct i
+ int security_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen);
+ int security_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen);
+ int security_locked_down(enum lockdown_reason what);
++int lock_kernel_down(const char *where, enum lockdown_reason level);
+ #else /* CONFIG_SECURITY */
+ 
+ static inline int call_blocking_lsm_notifier(enum lsm_event event, void *data)
+@@ -1388,6 +1389,11 @@ static inline int security_locked_down(e
+ {
+ 	return 0;
+ }
++static inline int
++lock_kernel_down(const char *where, enum lockdown_reason level)
++{
++	return -EOPNOTSUPP;
++}
+ #endif	/* CONFIG_SECURITY */
+ 
+ #if defined(CONFIG_SECURITY) && defined(CONFIG_WATCH_QUEUE)
+--- a/security/lockdown/Kconfig
++++ b/security/lockdown/Kconfig
+@@ -45,3 +45,18 @@ config LOCK_DOWN_KERNEL_FORCE_CONFIDENTI
+ 	 disabled.
+ 
+ endchoice
++
++config LOCK_DOWN_IN_EFI_SECURE_BOOT
++	bool "Lock down the kernel in EFI Secure Boot mode"
++	default n
++	depends on SECURITY_LOCKDOWN_LSM
++	depends on EFI
++	select SECURITY_LOCKDOWN_LSM_EARLY
++	help
++	  UEFI Secure Boot provides a mechanism for ensuring that the firmware
++	  will only load signed bootloaders and kernels.  Secure boot mode may
++	  be determined from EFI variables provided by the system firmware if
++	  not indicated by the boot parameters.
++
++	  Enabling this option results in kernel lockdown being
++	  triggered in integrity mode if EFI Secure Boot is set.
+--- a/security/lockdown/lockdown.c
++++ b/security/lockdown/lockdown.c
+@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ static const enum lockdown_reason lockdo
+ /*
+  * Put the kernel into lock-down mode.
+  */
+-static int lock_kernel_down(const char *where, enum lockdown_reason level)
++int lock_kernel_down(const char *where, enum lockdown_reason level)
+ {
+ 	if (kernel_locked_down >= level)
+ 		return -EPERM;
diff --git a/debian/patches/features/all/lockdown/mtd-disable-slram-and-phram-when-locked-down.patch b/debian/patches/features/all/lockdown/mtd-disable-slram-and-phram-when-locked-down.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..c718e7e2f0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/features/all/lockdown/mtd-disable-slram-and-phram-when-locked-down.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,75 @@
+From: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
+Date: Fri, 30 Aug 2019 15:54:24 +0100
+Subject: mtd: phram,slram: Disable when the kernel is locked down
+Forwarded: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-security-module/20190830154720.eekfjt6c4jzvlbfz@decadent.org.uk/
+
+These drivers allow mapping arbitrary memory ranges as MTD devices.
+This should be disabled to preserve the kernel's integrity when it is
+locked down.
+
+* Add the HWPARAM flag to the module parameters
+* When slram is built-in, it uses __setup() to read kernel parameters,
+  so add an explicit check security_locked_down() check
+
+Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
+Cc: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
+Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
+Cc: Joern Engel <joern@lazybastard.org>
+Cc: linux-mtd@lists.infradead.org
+---
+ drivers/mtd/devices/phram.c | 6 +++++-
+ drivers/mtd/devices/slram.c | 9 ++++++++-
+ 2 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/drivers/mtd/devices/phram.c
++++ b/drivers/mtd/devices/phram.c
+@@ -364,7 +364,11 @@ static int phram_param_call(const char *
+ #endif
+ }
+ 
+-module_param_call(phram, phram_param_call, NULL, NULL, 0200);
++static const struct kernel_param_ops phram_param_ops = {
++	.set = phram_param_call
++};
++__module_param_call(MODULE_PARAM_PREFIX, phram, &phram_param_ops, NULL,
++		    0200, -1, KERNEL_PARAM_FL_HWPARAM | hwparam_iomem);
+ MODULE_PARM_DESC(phram, "Memory region to map. \"phram=<name>,<start>,<length>[,<erasesize>]\"");
+ 
+ #ifdef CONFIG_OF
+--- a/drivers/mtd/devices/slram.c
++++ b/drivers/mtd/devices/slram.c
+@@ -43,6 +43,7 @@
+ #include <linux/ioctl.h>
+ #include <linux/init.h>
+ #include <linux/io.h>
++#include <linux/security.h>
+ 
+ #include <linux/mtd/mtd.h>
+ 
+@@ -65,7 +66,7 @@ typedef struct slram_mtd_list {
+ #ifdef MODULE
+ static char *map[SLRAM_MAX_DEVICES_PARAMS];
+ 
+-module_param_array(map, charp, NULL, 0);
++module_param_hw_array(map, charp, iomem, NULL, 0);
+ MODULE_PARM_DESC(map, "List of memory regions to map. \"map=<name>, <start>, <length / end>\"");
+ #else
+ static char *map;
+@@ -281,11 +282,17 @@ static int __init init_slram(void)
+ #ifndef MODULE
+ 	char *devstart;
+ 	char *devlength;
++	int ret;
+ 
+ 	if (!map) {
+ 		E("slram: not enough parameters.\n");
+ 		return(-EINVAL);
+ 	}
++
++	ret = security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_MODULE_PARAMETERS);
++	if (ret)
++		return ret;
++
+ 	while (map) {
+ 		devname = devstart = devlength = NULL;
+ 
diff --git a/debian/patches/features/all/security-perf-allow-further-restriction-of-perf_event_open.patch b/debian/patches/features/all/security-perf-allow-further-restriction-of-perf_event_open.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..9ca7803757
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/features/all/security-perf-allow-further-restriction-of-perf_event_open.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
+From: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
+Date: Mon, 11 Jan 2016 15:23:55 +0000
+Subject: security,perf: Allow further restriction of perf_event_open
+Forwarded: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20160111152355.GS28542@decadent.org.uk/
+
+When kernel.perf_event_open is set to 3 (or greater), disallow all
+access to performance events by users without CAP_SYS_ADMIN.
+Add a Kconfig symbol CONFIG_SECURITY_PERF_EVENTS_RESTRICT that
+makes this value the default.
+
+This is based on a similar feature in grsecurity
+(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PERF_HARDEN).  This version doesn't include making
+the variable read-only.  It also allows enabling further restriction
+at run-time regardless of whether the default is changed.
+
+Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
+---
+ include/linux/perf_event.h | 5 +++++
+ kernel/events/core.c       | 8 ++++++++
+ security/Kconfig           | 9 +++++++++
+ 3 files changed, 22 insertions(+)
+
+--- a/include/linux/perf_event.h
++++ b/include/linux/perf_event.h
+@@ -1387,6 +1387,11 @@ int perf_cpu_time_max_percent_handler(st
+ int perf_event_max_stack_handler(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
+ 		void *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos);
+ 
++static inline bool perf_paranoid_any(void)
++{
++	return sysctl_perf_event_paranoid > 2;
++}
++
+ /* Access to perf_event_open(2) syscall. */
+ #define PERF_SECURITY_OPEN		0
+ 
+--- a/kernel/events/core.c
++++ b/kernel/events/core.c
+@@ -415,8 +415,13 @@ static struct kmem_cache *perf_event_cac
+  *   0 - disallow raw tracepoint access for unpriv
+  *   1 - disallow cpu events for unpriv
+  *   2 - disallow kernel profiling for unpriv
++ *   3 - disallow all unpriv perf event use
+  */
++#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_PERF_EVENTS_RESTRICT
++int sysctl_perf_event_paranoid __read_mostly = 3;
++#else
+ int sysctl_perf_event_paranoid __read_mostly = 2;
++#endif
+ 
+ /* Minimum for 512 kiB + 1 user control page */
+ int sysctl_perf_event_mlock __read_mostly = 512 + (PAGE_SIZE / 1024); /* 'free' kiB per user */
+@@ -12325,6 +12330,9 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open,
+ 	if (err)
+ 		return err;
+ 
++	if (perf_paranoid_any() && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
++		return -EACCES;
++
+ 	/* Do we allow access to perf_event_open(2) ? */
+ 	err = security_perf_event_open(&attr, PERF_SECURITY_OPEN);
+ 	if (err)
+--- a/security/Kconfig
++++ b/security/Kconfig
+@@ -19,6 +19,15 @@ config SECURITY_DMESG_RESTRICT
+ 
+ 	  If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
+ 
++config SECURITY_PERF_EVENTS_RESTRICT
++	bool "Restrict unprivileged use of performance events"
++	depends on PERF_EVENTS
++	help
++	  If you say Y here, the kernel.perf_event_paranoid sysctl
++	  will be set to 3 by default, and no unprivileged use of the
++	  perf_event_open syscall will be permitted unless it is
++	  changed.
++
+ config SECURITY
+ 	bool "Enable different security models"
+ 	depends on SYSFS