Adding upstream version 6.10.3.upstream/6.10.3

Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>

37 files changed, 1784 insertions, 180 deletions

diff --git a/drivers/char/agp/alpha-agp.c b/drivers/char/agp/alpha-agp.c
index c9bf2c2198..f0d0c04473 100644
--- a/drivers/char/agp/alpha-agp.c
+++ b/drivers/char/agp/alpha-agp.c
@@ -149,7 +149,7 @@ struct agp_bridge_driver alpha_core_agp_driver = {
 
 struct agp_bridge_data *alpha_bridge;
 
-int __init
+static int __init
 alpha_core_agp_setup(void)
 {
 	alpha_agp_info *agp = alpha_mv.agp_info();
diff --git a/drivers/char/hw_random/amd-rng.c b/drivers/char/hw_random/amd-rng.c
index 86162a1368..9a24d19236 100644
--- a/drivers/char/hw_random/amd-rng.c
+++ b/drivers/char/hw_random/amd-rng.c
@@ -143,8 +143,10 @@ static int __init amd_rng_mod_init(void)
 
 found:
 	err = pci_read_config_dword(pdev, 0x58, &pmbase);
-	if (err)
+	if (err) {
+		err = pcibios_err_to_errno(err);
 		goto put_dev;
+	}
 
 	pmbase &= 0x0000FF00;
 	if (pmbase == 0) {
diff --git a/drivers/char/hw_random/core.c b/drivers/char/hw_random/core.c
index a3bbdd6e60..f6122a03ee 100644
--- a/drivers/char/hw_random/core.c
+++ b/drivers/char/hw_random/core.c
@@ -64,19 +64,6 @@ static size_t rng_buffer_size(void)
 	return RNG_BUFFER_SIZE;
 }
 
-static void add_early_randomness(struct hwrng *rng)
-{
-	int bytes_read;
-
-	mutex_lock(&reading_mutex);
-	bytes_read = rng_get_data(rng, rng_fillbuf, 32, 0);
-	mutex_unlock(&reading_mutex);
-	if (bytes_read > 0) {
-		size_t entropy = bytes_read * 8 * rng->quality / 1024;
-		add_hwgenerator_randomness(rng_fillbuf, bytes_read, entropy, false);
-	}
-}
-
 static inline void cleanup_rng(struct kref *kref)
 {
 	struct hwrng *rng = container_of(kref, struct hwrng, ref);
@@ -174,7 +161,6 @@ static int hwrng_init(struct hwrng *rng)
 	reinit_completion(&rng->cleanup_done);
 
 skip_init:
-	rng->quality = min_t(u16, min_t(u16, default_quality, 1024), rng->quality ?: 1024);
 	current_quality = rng->quality; /* obsolete */
 
 	return 0;
@@ -340,13 +326,12 @@ static ssize_t rng_current_store(struct device *dev,
 				 const char *buf, size_t len)
 {
 	int err;
-	struct hwrng *rng, *old_rng, *new_rng;
+	struct hwrng *rng, *new_rng;
 
 	err = mutex_lock_interruptible(&rng_mutex);
 	if (err)
 		return -ERESTARTSYS;
 
-	old_rng = current_rng;
 	if (sysfs_streq(buf, "")) {
 		err = enable_best_rng();
 	} else {
@@ -362,11 +347,8 @@ static ssize_t rng_current_store(struct device *dev,
 	new_rng = get_current_rng_nolock();
 	mutex_unlock(&rng_mutex);
 
-	if (new_rng) {
-		if (new_rng != old_rng)
-			add_early_randomness(new_rng);
+	if (new_rng)
 		put_rng(new_rng);
-	}
 
 	return err ? : len;
 }
@@ -382,7 +364,7 @@ static ssize_t rng_current_show(struct device *dev,
 	if (IS_ERR(rng))
 		return PTR_ERR(rng);
 
-	ret = snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%s\n", rng ? rng->name : "none");
+	ret = sysfs_emit(buf, "%s\n", rng ? rng->name : "none");
 	put_rng(rng);
 
 	return ret;
@@ -544,7 +526,6 @@ int hwrng_register(struct hwrng *rng)
 {
 	int err = -EINVAL;
 	struct hwrng *tmp;
-	bool is_new_current = false;
 
 	if (!rng->name || (!rng->data_read && !rng->read))
 		goto out;
@@ -563,6 +544,9 @@ int hwrng_register(struct hwrng *rng)
 	complete(&rng->cleanup_done);
 	init_completion(&rng->dying);
 
+	/* Adjust quality field to always have a proper value */
+	rng->quality = min_t(u16, min_t(u16, default_quality, 1024), rng->quality ?: 1024);
+
 	if (!current_rng ||
 	    (!cur_rng_set_by_user && rng->quality > current_rng->quality)) {
 		/*
@@ -573,25 +557,8 @@ int hwrng_register(struct hwrng *rng)
 		err = set_current_rng(rng);
 		if (err)
 			goto out_unlock;
-		/* to use current_rng in add_early_randomness() we need
-		 * to take a ref
-		 */
-		is_new_current = true;
-		kref_get(&rng->ref);
 	}
 	mutex_unlock(&rng_mutex);
-	if (is_new_current || !rng->init) {
-		/*
-		 * Use a new device's input to add some randomness to
-		 * the system.  If this rng device isn't going to be
-		 * used right away, its init function hasn't been
-		 * called yet by set_current_rng(); so only use the
-		 * randomness from devices that don't need an init callback
-		 */
-		add_early_randomness(rng);
-	}
-	if (is_new_current)
-		put_rng(rng);
 	return 0;
 out_unlock:
 	mutex_unlock(&rng_mutex);
@@ -602,12 +569,11 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(hwrng_register);
 
 void hwrng_unregister(struct hwrng *rng)
 {
-	struct hwrng *old_rng, *new_rng;
+	struct hwrng *new_rng;
 	int err;
 
 	mutex_lock(&rng_mutex);
 
-	old_rng = current_rng;
 	list_del(&rng->list);
 	complete_all(&rng->dying);
 	if (current_rng == rng) {
@@ -626,11 +592,8 @@ void hwrng_unregister(struct hwrng *rng)
 	} else
 		mutex_unlock(&rng_mutex);
 
-	if (new_rng) {
-		if (old_rng != new_rng)
-			add_early_randomness(new_rng);
+	if (new_rng)
 		put_rng(new_rng);
-	}
 
 	wait_for_completion(&rng->cleanup_done);
 }
diff --git a/drivers/char/hw_random/mxc-rnga.c b/drivers/char/hw_random/mxc-rnga.c
index 07ec000e4c..94ee18a112 100644
--- a/drivers/char/hw_random/mxc-rnga.c
+++ b/drivers/char/hw_random/mxc-rnga.c
@@ -131,7 +131,7 @@ static void mxc_rnga_cleanup(struct hwrng *rng)
 	__raw_writel(ctrl & ~RNGA_CONTROL_GO, mxc_rng->mem + RNGA_CONTROL);
 }
 
-static int __init mxc_rnga_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
+static int mxc_rnga_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
 {
 	int err;
 	struct mxc_rng *mxc_rng;
@@ -176,7 +176,7 @@ err_ioremap:
 	return err;
 }
 
-static void __exit mxc_rnga_remove(struct platform_device *pdev)
+static void mxc_rnga_remove(struct platform_device *pdev)
 {
 	struct mxc_rng *mxc_rng = platform_get_drvdata(pdev);
 
@@ -197,10 +197,11 @@ static struct platform_driver mxc_rnga_driver = {
 		.name = "mxc_rnga",
 		.of_match_table = mxc_rnga_of_match,
 	},
-	.remove_new = __exit_p(mxc_rnga_remove),
+	.probe = mxc_rnga_probe,
+	.remove_new = mxc_rnga_remove,
 };
 
-module_platform_driver_probe(mxc_rnga_driver, mxc_rnga_probe);
+module_platform_driver(mxc_rnga_driver);
 
 MODULE_AUTHOR("Freescale Semiconductor, Inc.");
 MODULE_DESCRIPTION("H/W RNGA driver for i.MX");
diff --git a/drivers/char/hw_random/nomadik-rng.c b/drivers/char/hw_random/nomadik-rng.c
index a2009fc4ad..f2a2aa7a53 100644
--- a/drivers/char/hw_random/nomadik-rng.c
+++ b/drivers/char/hw_random/nomadik-rng.c
@@ -78,7 +78,6 @@ MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE(amba, nmk_rng_ids);
 
 static struct amba_driver nmk_rng_driver = {
 	.drv = {
-		.owner = THIS_MODULE,
 		.name = "rng",
 		},
 	.probe = nmk_rng_probe,
diff --git a/drivers/char/hw_random/virtio-rng.c b/drivers/char/hw_random/virtio-rng.c
index 7a4b45393a..dd998f4fe4 100644
--- a/drivers/char/hw_random/virtio-rng.c
+++ b/drivers/char/hw_random/virtio-rng.c
@@ -245,7 +245,6 @@ static const struct virtio_device_id id_table[] = {
 
 static struct virtio_driver virtio_rng_driver = {
 	.driver.name =	KBUILD_MODNAME,
-	.driver.owner =	THIS_MODULE,
 	.id_table =	id_table,
 	.probe =	virtrng_probe,
 	.remove =	virtrng_remove,
diff --git a/drivers/char/ipmi/Makefile b/drivers/char/ipmi/Makefile
index cb6138b8de..e0944547c9 100644
--- a/drivers/char/ipmi/Makefile
+++ b/drivers/char/ipmi/Makefile
@@ -5,13 +5,10 @@
 
 ipmi_si-y := ipmi_si_intf.o ipmi_kcs_sm.o ipmi_smic_sm.o ipmi_bt_sm.o \
 	ipmi_si_hotmod.o ipmi_si_hardcode.o ipmi_si_platform.o \
-	ipmi_si_port_io.o ipmi_si_mem_io.o
-ifdef CONFIG_PCI
-ipmi_si-y += ipmi_si_pci.o
-endif
-ifdef CONFIG_PARISC
-ipmi_si-y += ipmi_si_parisc.o
-endif
+	ipmi_si_mem_io.o
+ipmi_si-$(CONFIG_HAS_IOPORT) += ipmi_si_port_io.o
+ipmi_si-$(CONFIG_PCI) += ipmi_si_pci.o
+ipmi_si-$(CONFIG_PARISC) += ipmi_si_parisc.o
 
 obj-$(CONFIG_IPMI_HANDLER) += ipmi_msghandler.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_IPMI_DEVICE_INTERFACE) += ipmi_devintf.o
diff --git a/drivers/char/ipmi/bt-bmc.c b/drivers/char/ipmi/bt-bmc.c
index 7450904e33..b8b9c07d3b 100644
--- a/drivers/char/ipmi/bt-bmc.c
+++ b/drivers/char/ipmi/bt-bmc.c
@@ -459,14 +459,13 @@ static int bt_bmc_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static int bt_bmc_remove(struct platform_device *pdev)
+static void bt_bmc_remove(struct platform_device *pdev)
 {
 	struct bt_bmc *bt_bmc = dev_get_drvdata(&pdev->dev);
 
 	misc_deregister(&bt_bmc->miscdev);
 	if (bt_bmc->irq < 0)
 		del_timer_sync(&bt_bmc->poll_timer);
-	return 0;
 }
 
 static const struct of_device_id bt_bmc_match[] = {
@@ -482,7 +481,7 @@ static struct platform_driver bt_bmc_driver = {
 		.of_match_table = bt_bmc_match,
 	},
 	.probe = bt_bmc_probe,
-	.remove = bt_bmc_remove,
+	.remove_new = bt_bmc_remove,
 };
 
 module_platform_driver(bt_bmc_driver);
diff --git a/drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_msghandler.c b/drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_msghandler.c
index b0eedc4595..e12b531f5c 100644
--- a/drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_msghandler.c
+++ b/drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_msghandler.c
@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@
 
 static struct ipmi_recv_msg *ipmi_alloc_recv_msg(void);
 static int ipmi_init_msghandler(void);
-static void smi_recv_tasklet(struct tasklet_struct *t);
+static void smi_recv_work(struct work_struct *t);
 static void handle_new_recv_msgs(struct ipmi_smi *intf);
 static void need_waiter(struct ipmi_smi *intf);
 static int handle_one_recv_msg(struct ipmi_smi *intf,
@@ -498,13 +498,13 @@ struct ipmi_smi {
 	/*
 	 * Messages queued for delivery.  If delivery fails (out of memory
 	 * for instance), They will stay in here to be processed later in a
-	 * periodic timer interrupt.  The tasklet is for handling received
+	 * periodic timer interrupt.  The workqueue is for handling received
 	 * messages directly from the handler.
 	 */
 	spinlock_t       waiting_rcv_msgs_lock;
 	struct list_head waiting_rcv_msgs;
 	atomic_t	 watchdog_pretimeouts_to_deliver;
-	struct tasklet_struct recv_tasklet;
+	struct work_struct recv_work;
 
 	spinlock_t             xmit_msgs_lock;
 	struct list_head       xmit_msgs;
@@ -704,7 +704,7 @@ static void clean_up_interface_data(struct ipmi_smi *intf)
 	struct cmd_rcvr  *rcvr, *rcvr2;
 	struct list_head list;
 
-	tasklet_kill(&intf->recv_tasklet);
+	cancel_work_sync(&intf->recv_work);
 
 	free_smi_msg_list(&intf->waiting_rcv_msgs);
 	free_recv_msg_list(&intf->waiting_events);
@@ -1319,7 +1319,7 @@ static void free_user(struct kref *ref)
 {
 	struct ipmi_user *user = container_of(ref, struct ipmi_user, refcount);
 
-	/* SRCU cleanup must happen in task context. */
+	/* SRCU cleanup must happen in workqueue context. */
 	queue_work(remove_work_wq, &user->remove_work);
 }
 
@@ -3605,8 +3605,7 @@ int ipmi_add_smi(struct module         *owner,
 	intf->curr_seq = 0;
 	spin_lock_init(&intf->waiting_rcv_msgs_lock);
 	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&intf->waiting_rcv_msgs);
-	tasklet_setup(&intf->recv_tasklet,
-		     smi_recv_tasklet);
+	INIT_WORK(&intf->recv_work, smi_recv_work);
 	atomic_set(&intf->watchdog_pretimeouts_to_deliver, 0);
 	spin_lock_init(&intf->xmit_msgs_lock);
 	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&intf->xmit_msgs);
@@ -4779,7 +4778,7 @@ static void handle_new_recv_msgs(struct ipmi_smi *intf)
 			 * To preserve message order, quit if we
 			 * can't handle a message.  Add the message
 			 * back at the head, this is safe because this
-			 * tasklet is the only thing that pulls the
+			 * workqueue is the only thing that pulls the
 			 * messages.
 			 */
 			list_add(&smi_msg->link, &intf->waiting_rcv_msgs);
@@ -4812,10 +4811,10 @@ static void handle_new_recv_msgs(struct ipmi_smi *intf)
 	}
 }
 
-static void smi_recv_tasklet(struct tasklet_struct *t)
+static void smi_recv_work(struct work_struct *t)
 {
 	unsigned long flags = 0; /* keep us warning-free. */
-	struct ipmi_smi *intf = from_tasklet(intf, t, recv_tasklet);
+	struct ipmi_smi *intf = from_work(intf, t, recv_work);
 	int run_to_completion = intf->run_to_completion;
 	struct ipmi_smi_msg *newmsg = NULL;
 
@@ -4866,7 +4865,7 @@ void ipmi_smi_msg_received(struct ipmi_smi *intf,
 
 	/*
 	 * To preserve message order, we keep a queue and deliver from
-	 * a tasklet.
+	 * a workqueue.
 	 */
 	if (!run_to_completion)
 		spin_lock_irqsave(&intf->waiting_rcv_msgs_lock, flags);
@@ -4887,9 +4886,9 @@ void ipmi_smi_msg_received(struct ipmi_smi *intf,
 		spin_unlock_irqrestore(&intf->xmit_msgs_lock, flags);
 
 	if (run_to_completion)
-		smi_recv_tasklet(&intf->recv_tasklet);
+		smi_recv_work(&intf->recv_work);
 	else
-		tasklet_schedule(&intf->recv_tasklet);
+		queue_work(system_bh_wq, &intf->recv_work);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(ipmi_smi_msg_received);
 
@@ -4899,7 +4898,7 @@ void ipmi_smi_watchdog_pretimeout(struct ipmi_smi *intf)
 		return;
 
 	atomic_set(&intf->watchdog_pretimeouts_to_deliver, 1);
-	tasklet_schedule(&intf->recv_tasklet);
+	queue_work(system_bh_wq, &intf->recv_work);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(ipmi_smi_watchdog_pretimeout);
 
@@ -5068,7 +5067,7 @@ static bool ipmi_timeout_handler(struct ipmi_smi *intf,
 				       flags);
 	}
 
-	tasklet_schedule(&intf->recv_tasklet);
+	queue_work(system_bh_wq, &intf->recv_work);
 
 	return need_timer;
 }
diff --git a/drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_powernv.c b/drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_powernv.c
index da22a8cbe6..c59a86eb58 100644
--- a/drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_powernv.c
+++ b/drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_powernv.c
@@ -281,15 +281,13 @@ err_free:
 	return rc;
 }
 
-static int ipmi_powernv_remove(struct platform_device *pdev)
+static void ipmi_powernv_remove(struct platform_device *pdev)
 {
 	struct ipmi_smi_powernv *smi = dev_get_drvdata(&pdev->dev);
 
 	ipmi_unregister_smi(smi->intf);
 	free_irq(smi->irq, smi);
 	irq_dispose_mapping(smi->irq);
-
-	return 0;
 }
 
 static const struct of_device_id ipmi_powernv_match[] = {
@@ -304,7 +302,7 @@ static struct platform_driver powernv_ipmi_driver = {
 		.of_match_table	= ipmi_powernv_match,
 	},
 	.probe	= ipmi_powernv_probe,
-	.remove	= ipmi_powernv_remove,
+	.remove_new = ipmi_powernv_remove,
 };
 
 
diff --git a/drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_si_intf.c b/drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_si_intf.c
index 5cd031f3fc..eea23a3b96 100644
--- a/drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_si_intf.c
+++ b/drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_si_intf.c
@@ -1882,7 +1882,8 @@ int ipmi_si_add_smi(struct si_sm_io *io)
 	}
 
 	if (!io->io_setup) {
-		if (io->addr_space == IPMI_IO_ADDR_SPACE) {
+		if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HAS_IOPORT) &&
+		    io->addr_space == IPMI_IO_ADDR_SPACE) {
 			io->io_setup = ipmi_si_port_setup;
 		} else if (io->addr_space == IPMI_MEM_ADDR_SPACE) {
 			io->io_setup = ipmi_si_mem_setup;
diff --git a/drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_si_pci.c b/drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_si_pci.c
index 74fa205586..b83d55685b 100644
--- a/drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_si_pci.c
+++ b/drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_si_pci.c
@@ -97,6 +97,9 @@ static int ipmi_pci_probe(struct pci_dev *pdev,
 	}
 
 	if (pci_resource_flags(pdev, 0) & IORESOURCE_IO) {
+		if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HAS_IOPORT))
+			return -ENXIO;
+
 		io.addr_space = IPMI_IO_ADDR_SPACE;
 		io.io_setup = ipmi_si_port_setup;
 	} else {
diff --git a/drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_si_platform.c b/drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_si_platform.c
index cd2edd8f8a..96ba856481 100644
--- a/drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_si_platform.c
+++ b/drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_si_platform.c
@@ -405,11 +405,9 @@ static int ipmi_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
 	return platform_ipmi_probe(pdev);
 }
 
-static int ipmi_remove(struct platform_device *pdev)
+static void ipmi_remove(struct platform_device *pdev)
 {
 	ipmi_si_remove_by_dev(&pdev->dev);
-
-	return 0;
 }
 
 static int pdev_match_name(struct device *dev, const void *data)
@@ -447,7 +445,7 @@ struct platform_driver ipmi_platform_driver = {
 		.acpi_match_table = ACPI_PTR(acpi_ipmi_match),
 	},
 	.probe		= ipmi_probe,
-	.remove		= ipmi_remove,
+	.remove_new	= ipmi_remove,
 	.id_table       = si_plat_ids
 };
 
diff --git a/drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_ssif.c b/drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_ssif.c
index 1f7600c361..3f509a2221 100644
--- a/drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_ssif.c
+++ b/drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_ssif.c
@@ -2071,7 +2071,7 @@ static int ssif_platform_probe(struct platform_device *dev)
 	return dmi_ipmi_probe(dev);
 }
 
-static int ssif_platform_remove(struct platform_device *dev)
+static void ssif_platform_remove(struct platform_device *dev)
 {
 	struct ssif_addr_info *addr_info = dev_get_drvdata(&dev->dev);
 
@@ -2079,7 +2079,6 @@ static int ssif_platform_remove(struct platform_device *dev)
 	list_del(&addr_info->link);
 	kfree(addr_info);
 	mutex_unlock(&ssif_infos_mutex);
-	return 0;
 }
 
 static const struct platform_device_id ssif_plat_ids[] = {
@@ -2092,7 +2091,7 @@ static struct platform_driver ipmi_driver = {
 		.name = DEVICE_NAME,
 	},
 	.probe		= ssif_platform_probe,
-	.remove		= ssif_platform_remove,
+	.remove_new	= ssif_platform_remove,
 	.id_table       = ssif_plat_ids
 };
 
diff --git a/drivers/char/ipmi/kcs_bmc_aspeed.c b/drivers/char/ipmi/kcs_bmc_aspeed.c
index 72640da553..227bf06c7c 100644
--- a/drivers/char/ipmi/kcs_bmc_aspeed.c
+++ b/drivers/char/ipmi/kcs_bmc_aspeed.c
@@ -641,7 +641,7 @@ static int aspeed_kcs_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static int aspeed_kcs_remove(struct platform_device *pdev)
+static void aspeed_kcs_remove(struct platform_device *pdev)
 {
 	struct aspeed_kcs_bmc *priv = platform_get_drvdata(pdev);
 	struct kcs_bmc_device *kcs_bmc = &priv->kcs_bmc;
@@ -656,8 +656,6 @@ static int aspeed_kcs_remove(struct platform_device *pdev)
 	priv->obe.remove = true;
 	spin_unlock_irq(&priv->obe.lock);
 	del_timer_sync(&priv->obe.timer);
-
-	return 0;
 }
 
 static const struct of_device_id ast_kcs_bmc_match[] = {
@@ -674,7 +672,7 @@ static struct platform_driver ast_kcs_bmc_driver = {
 		.of_match_table = ast_kcs_bmc_match,
 	},
 	.probe  = aspeed_kcs_probe,
-	.remove = aspeed_kcs_remove,
+	.remove_new = aspeed_kcs_remove,
 };
 module_platform_driver(ast_kcs_bmc_driver);
 
diff --git a/drivers/char/ipmi/kcs_bmc_npcm7xx.c b/drivers/char/ipmi/kcs_bmc_npcm7xx.c
index 7961fec564..0771019823 100644
--- a/drivers/char/ipmi/kcs_bmc_npcm7xx.c
+++ b/drivers/char/ipmi/kcs_bmc_npcm7xx.c
@@ -218,7 +218,7 @@ static int npcm7xx_kcs_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static int npcm7xx_kcs_remove(struct platform_device *pdev)
+static void npcm7xx_kcs_remove(struct platform_device *pdev)
 {
 	struct npcm7xx_kcs_bmc *priv = platform_get_drvdata(pdev);
 	struct kcs_bmc_device *kcs_bmc = &priv->kcs_bmc;
@@ -227,8 +227,6 @@ static int npcm7xx_kcs_remove(struct platform_device *pdev)
 
 	npcm7xx_kcs_enable_channel(kcs_bmc, false);
 	npcm7xx_kcs_irq_mask_update(kcs_bmc, (KCS_BMC_EVENT_TYPE_IBF | KCS_BMC_EVENT_TYPE_OBE), 0);
-
-	return 0;
 }
 
 static const struct of_device_id npcm_kcs_bmc_match[] = {
@@ -243,7 +241,7 @@ static struct platform_driver npcm_kcs_bmc_driver = {
 		.of_match_table	= npcm_kcs_bmc_match,
 	},
 	.probe	= npcm7xx_kcs_probe,
-	.remove	= npcm7xx_kcs_remove,
+	.remove_new = npcm7xx_kcs_remove,
 };
 module_platform_driver(npcm_kcs_bmc_driver);
 
diff --git a/drivers/char/ipmi/ssif_bmc.c b/drivers/char/ipmi/ssif_bmc.c
index 56346fb328..ab4e87a99f 100644
--- a/drivers/char/ipmi/ssif_bmc.c
+++ b/drivers/char/ipmi/ssif_bmc.c
@@ -177,13 +177,15 @@ static ssize_t ssif_bmc_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, size_t
 	unsigned long flags;
 	ssize_t ret;
 
-	if (count > sizeof(struct ipmi_ssif_msg))
+	if (count < sizeof(msg.len) ||
+	    count > sizeof(struct ipmi_ssif_msg))
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	if (copy_from_user(&msg, buf, count))
 		return -EFAULT;
 
-	if (!msg.len || count < sizeof_field(struct ipmi_ssif_msg, len) + msg.len)
+	if (!msg.len || msg.len > IPMI_SSIF_PAYLOAD_MAX ||
+	    count < sizeof_field(struct ipmi_ssif_msg, len) + msg.len)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	spin_lock_irqsave(&ssif_bmc->lock, flags);
diff --git a/drivers/char/mem.c b/drivers/char/mem.c
index 3c6670cf90..7c359cc406 100644
--- a/drivers/char/mem.c
+++ b/drivers/char/mem.c
@@ -383,6 +383,7 @@ static int mmap_mem(struct file *file, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
 	return 0;
 }
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_DEVPORT
 static ssize_t read_port(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
 			 size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
 {
@@ -424,6 +425,7 @@ static ssize_t write_port(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 	*ppos = i;
 	return tmp-buf;
 }
+#endif
 
 static ssize_t read_null(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
 			 size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
@@ -544,7 +546,7 @@ static unsigned long get_unmapped_area_zero(struct file *file,
 	}
 
 	/* Otherwise flags & MAP_PRIVATE: with no shmem object beneath it */
-	return current->mm->get_unmapped_area(file, addr, len, pgoff, flags);
+	return mm_get_unmapped_area(current->mm, file, addr, len, pgoff, flags);
 #else
 	return -ENOSYS;
 #endif
@@ -653,12 +655,14 @@ static const struct file_operations null_fops = {
 	.uring_cmd	= uring_cmd_null,
 };
 
-static const struct file_operations __maybe_unused port_fops = {
+#ifdef CONFIG_DEVPORT
+static const struct file_operations port_fops = {
 	.llseek		= memory_lseek,
 	.read		= read_port,
 	.write		= write_port,
 	.open		= open_port,
 };
+#endif
 
 static const struct file_operations zero_fops = {
 	.llseek		= zero_lseek,
diff --git a/drivers/char/powernv-op-panel.c b/drivers/char/powernv-op-panel.c
index 3c99696b14..f2cff1a6fe 100644
--- a/drivers/char/powernv-op-panel.c
+++ b/drivers/char/powernv-op-panel.c
@@ -195,12 +195,11 @@ free_oppanel_data:
 	return rc;
 }
 
-static int oppanel_remove(struct platform_device *pdev)
+static void oppanel_remove(struct platform_device *pdev)
 {
 	misc_deregister(&oppanel_dev);
 	kfree(oppanel_lines);
 	kfree(oppanel_data);
-	return 0;
 }
 
 static const struct of_device_id oppanel_match[] = {
@@ -214,7 +213,7 @@ static struct platform_driver oppanel_driver = {
 		.of_match_table	= oppanel_match,
 	},
 	.probe	= oppanel_probe,
-	.remove	= oppanel_remove,
+	.remove_new = oppanel_remove,
 };
 
 module_platform_driver(oppanel_driver);
diff --git a/drivers/char/sonypi.c b/drivers/char/sonypi.c
index 22d249333f..bb5115b173 100644
--- a/drivers/char/sonypi.c
+++ b/drivers/char/sonypi.c
@@ -1408,7 +1408,7 @@ static int sonypi_probe(struct platform_device *dev)
 	return error;
 }
 
-static int sonypi_remove(struct platform_device *dev)
+static void sonypi_remove(struct platform_device *dev)
 {
 	sonypi_disable();
 
@@ -1432,8 +1432,6 @@ static int sonypi_remove(struct platform_device *dev)
 	}
 
 	kfifo_free(&sonypi_device.fifo);
-
-	return 0;
 }
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_PM_SLEEP
@@ -1470,7 +1468,7 @@ static struct platform_driver sonypi_driver = {
 		.pm	= SONYPI_PM,
 	},
 	.probe		= sonypi_probe,
-	.remove		= sonypi_remove,
+	.remove_new	= sonypi_remove,
 	.shutdown	= sonypi_shutdown,
 };
 
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/Kconfig b/drivers/char/tpm/Kconfig
index 927088b2c3..cf0be8a793 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/Kconfig
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/Kconfig
@@ -27,6 +27,20 @@ menuconfig TCG_TPM
 
 if TCG_TPM
 
+config TCG_TPM2_HMAC
+	bool "Use HMAC and encrypted transactions on the TPM bus"
+	default X86_64
+	select CRYPTO_ECDH
+	select CRYPTO_LIB_AESCFB
+	select CRYPTO_LIB_SHA256
+	help
+	  Setting this causes us to deploy a scheme which uses request
+	  and response HMACs in addition to encryption for
+	  communicating with the TPM to prevent or detect bus snooping
+	  and interposer attacks (see tpm-security.rst).  Saying Y
+	  here adds some encryption overhead to all kernel to TPM
+	  transactions.
+
 config HW_RANDOM_TPM
 	bool "TPM HW Random Number Generator support"
 	depends on TCG_TPM && HW_RANDOM && !(TCG_TPM=y && HW_RANDOM=m)
@@ -149,6 +163,7 @@ config TCG_NSC
 config TCG_ATMEL
 	tristate "Atmel TPM Interface"
 	depends on PPC64 || HAS_IOPORT_MAP
+	depends on HAS_IOPORT
 	help
 	  If you have a TPM security chip from Atmel say Yes and it 
 	  will be accessible from within Linux.  To compile this driver 
@@ -156,7 +171,7 @@ config TCG_ATMEL
 
 config TCG_INFINEON
 	tristate "Infineon Technologies TPM Interface"
-	depends on PNP
+	depends on PNP || COMPILE_TEST
 	help
 	  If you have a TPM security chip from Infineon Technologies
 	  (either SLD 9630 TT 1.1 or SLB 9635 TT 1.2) say Yes and it
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/Makefile b/drivers/char/tpm/Makefile
index 0222b1ddb3..9bb142c752 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/Makefile
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/Makefile
@@ -15,6 +15,8 @@ tpm-y += tpm-sysfs.o
 tpm-y += eventlog/common.o
 tpm-y += eventlog/tpm1.o
 tpm-y += eventlog/tpm2.o
+tpm-y += tpm-buf.o
+tpm-y += tpm2-sessions.o
 
 tpm-$(CONFIG_ACPI) += tpm_ppi.o eventlog/acpi.o
 tpm-$(CONFIG_EFI) += eventlog/efi.o
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/eventlog/acpi.c b/drivers/char/tpm/eventlog/acpi.c
index bd757d836c..69533d0bfb 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/eventlog/acpi.c
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/eventlog/acpi.c
@@ -142,7 +142,6 @@ int tpm_read_log_acpi(struct tpm_chip *chip)
 
 	log->bios_event_log_end = log->bios_event_log + len;
 
-	ret = -EIO;
 	virt = acpi_os_map_iomem(start, len);
 	if (!virt) {
 		dev_warn(&chip->dev, "%s: Failed to map ACPI memory\n", __func__);
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/eventlog/common.c b/drivers/char/tpm/eventlog/common.c
index 639c3f395a..4c0bbba64e 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/eventlog/common.c
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/eventlog/common.c
@@ -47,6 +47,8 @@ static int tpm_bios_measurements_open(struct inode *inode,
 	if (!err) {
 		seq = file->private_data;
 		seq->private = chip;
+	} else {
+		put_device(&chip->dev);
 	}
 
 	return err;
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-buf.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-buf.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..cad0048bcc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-buf.c
@@ -0,0 +1,226 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * Handling of TPM command and other buffers.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/tpm_command.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/tpm.h>
+
+/**
+ * tpm_buf_init() - Allocate and initialize a TPM command
+ * @buf:	A &tpm_buf
+ * @tag:	TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND, TPM2_ST_NO_SESSIONS or TPM2_ST_SESSIONS
+ * @ordinal:	A command ordinal
+ *
+ * Return: 0 or -ENOMEM
+ */
+int tpm_buf_init(struct tpm_buf *buf, u16 tag, u32 ordinal)
+{
+	buf->data = (u8 *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!buf->data)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	tpm_buf_reset(buf, tag, ordinal);
+	return 0;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_buf_init);
+
+/**
+ * tpm_buf_reset() - Initialize a TPM command
+ * @buf:	A &tpm_buf
+ * @tag:	TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND, TPM2_ST_NO_SESSIONS or TPM2_ST_SESSIONS
+ * @ordinal:	A command ordinal
+ */
+void tpm_buf_reset(struct tpm_buf *buf, u16 tag, u32 ordinal)
+{
+	struct tpm_header *head = (struct tpm_header *)buf->data;
+
+	WARN_ON(tag != TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND && tag != TPM2_ST_NO_SESSIONS &&
+		tag != TPM2_ST_SESSIONS && tag != 0);
+
+	buf->flags = 0;
+	buf->length = sizeof(*head);
+	head->tag = cpu_to_be16(tag);
+	head->length = cpu_to_be32(sizeof(*head));
+	head->ordinal = cpu_to_be32(ordinal);
+	buf->handles = 0;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_buf_reset);
+
+/**
+ * tpm_buf_init_sized() - Allocate and initialize a sized (TPM2B) buffer
+ * @buf:	A @tpm_buf
+ *
+ * Return: 0 or -ENOMEM
+ */
+int tpm_buf_init_sized(struct tpm_buf *buf)
+{
+	buf->data = (u8 *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!buf->data)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	tpm_buf_reset_sized(buf);
+	return 0;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_buf_init_sized);
+
+/**
+ * tpm_buf_reset_sized() - Initialize a sized buffer
+ * @buf:	A &tpm_buf
+ */
+void tpm_buf_reset_sized(struct tpm_buf *buf)
+{
+	buf->flags = TPM_BUF_TPM2B;
+	buf->length = 2;
+	buf->data[0] = 0;
+	buf->data[1] = 0;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_buf_reset_sized);
+
+void tpm_buf_destroy(struct tpm_buf *buf)
+{
+	free_page((unsigned long)buf->data);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_buf_destroy);
+
+/**
+ * tpm_buf_length() - Return the number of bytes consumed by the data
+ * @buf:	A &tpm_buf
+ *
+ * Return: The number of bytes consumed by the buffer
+ */
+u32 tpm_buf_length(struct tpm_buf *buf)
+{
+	return buf->length;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_buf_length);
+
+/**
+ * tpm_buf_append() - Append data to an initialized buffer
+ * @buf:	A &tpm_buf
+ * @new_data:	A data blob
+ * @new_length:	Size of the appended data
+ */
+void tpm_buf_append(struct tpm_buf *buf, const u8 *new_data, u16 new_length)
+{
+	/* Return silently if overflow has already happened. */
+	if (buf->flags & TPM_BUF_OVERFLOW)
+		return;
+
+	if ((buf->length + new_length) > PAGE_SIZE) {
+		WARN(1, "tpm_buf: write overflow\n");
+		buf->flags |= TPM_BUF_OVERFLOW;
+		return;
+	}
+
+	memcpy(&buf->data[buf->length], new_data, new_length);
+	buf->length += new_length;
+
+	if (buf->flags & TPM_BUF_TPM2B)
+		((__be16 *)buf->data)[0] = cpu_to_be16(buf->length - 2);
+	else
+		((struct tpm_header *)buf->data)->length = cpu_to_be32(buf->length);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_buf_append);
+
+void tpm_buf_append_u8(struct tpm_buf *buf, const u8 value)
+{
+	tpm_buf_append(buf, &value, 1);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_buf_append_u8);
+
+void tpm_buf_append_u16(struct tpm_buf *buf, const u16 value)
+{
+	__be16 value2 = cpu_to_be16(value);
+
+	tpm_buf_append(buf, (u8 *)&value2, 2);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_buf_append_u16);
+
+void tpm_buf_append_u32(struct tpm_buf *buf, const u32 value)
+{
+	__be32 value2 = cpu_to_be32(value);
+
+	tpm_buf_append(buf, (u8 *)&value2, 4);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_buf_append_u32);
+
+/**
+ * tpm_buf_read() - Read from a TPM buffer
+ * @buf:	&tpm_buf instance
+ * @offset:	offset within the buffer
+ * @count:	the number of bytes to read
+ * @output:	the output buffer
+ */
+static void tpm_buf_read(struct tpm_buf *buf, off_t *offset, size_t count, void *output)
+{
+	off_t next_offset;
+
+	/* Return silently if overflow has already happened. */
+	if (buf->flags & TPM_BUF_BOUNDARY_ERROR)
+		return;
+
+	next_offset = *offset + count;
+	if (next_offset > buf->length) {
+		WARN(1, "tpm_buf: read out of boundary\n");
+		buf->flags |= TPM_BUF_BOUNDARY_ERROR;
+		return;
+	}
+
+	memcpy(output, &buf->data[*offset], count);
+	*offset = next_offset;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tpm_buf_read_u8() - Read 8-bit word from a TPM buffer
+ * @buf:	&tpm_buf instance
+ * @offset:	offset within the buffer
+ *
+ * Return: next 8-bit word
+ */
+u8 tpm_buf_read_u8(struct tpm_buf *buf, off_t *offset)
+{
+	u8 value;
+
+	tpm_buf_read(buf, offset, sizeof(value), &value);
+
+	return value;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_buf_read_u8);
+
+/**
+ * tpm_buf_read_u16() - Read 16-bit word from a TPM buffer
+ * @buf:	&tpm_buf instance
+ * @offset:	offset within the buffer
+ *
+ * Return: next 16-bit word
+ */
+u16 tpm_buf_read_u16(struct tpm_buf *buf, off_t *offset)
+{
+	u16 value;
+
+	tpm_buf_read(buf, offset, sizeof(value), &value);
+
+	return be16_to_cpu(value);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_buf_read_u16);
+
+/**
+ * tpm_buf_read_u32() - Read 32-bit word from a TPM buffer
+ * @buf:	&tpm_buf instance
+ * @offset:	offset within the buffer
+ *
+ * Return: next 32-bit word
+ */
+u32 tpm_buf_read_u32(struct tpm_buf *buf, off_t *offset)
+{
+	u32 value;
+
+	tpm_buf_read(buf, offset, sizeof(value), &value);
+
+	return be32_to_cpu(value);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_buf_read_u32);
+
+
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c
index 42b1062e33..854546000c 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c
@@ -158,6 +158,9 @@ int tpm_try_get_ops(struct tpm_chip *chip)
 {
 	int rc = -EIO;
 
+	if (chip->flags & TPM_CHIP_FLAG_DISABLE)
+		return rc;
+
 	get_device(&chip->dev);
 
 	down_read(&chip->ops_sem);
@@ -275,6 +278,9 @@ static void tpm_dev_release(struct device *dev)
 	kfree(chip->work_space.context_buf);
 	kfree(chip->work_space.session_buf);
 	kfree(chip->allocated_banks);
+#ifdef CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC
+	kfree(chip->auth);
+#endif
 	kfree(chip);
 }
 
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c
index 757336324c..5da134f12c 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c
@@ -232,6 +232,7 @@ ssize_t tpm_transmit_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf,
 	if (len < min_rsp_body_length + TPM_HEADER_SIZE)
 		return -EFAULT;
 
+	buf->length = len;
 	return 0;
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_transmit_cmd);
@@ -342,31 +343,6 @@ out:
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_pcr_extend);
 
-/**
- * tpm_send - send a TPM command
- * @chip:	a &struct tpm_chip instance, %NULL for the default chip
- * @cmd:	a TPM command buffer
- * @buflen:	the length of the TPM command buffer
- *
- * Return: same as with tpm_transmit_cmd()
- */
-int tpm_send(struct tpm_chip *chip, void *cmd, size_t buflen)
-{
-	struct tpm_buf buf;
-	int rc;
-
-	chip = tpm_find_get_ops(chip);
-	if (!chip)
-		return -ENODEV;
-
-	buf.data = cmd;
-	rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &buf, 0, "attempting to a send a command");
-
-	tpm_put_ops(chip);
-	return rc;
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_send);
-
 int tpm_auto_startup(struct tpm_chip *chip)
 {
 	int rc;
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-sysfs.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-sysfs.c
index 54c71473aa..94231f052e 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-sysfs.c
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-sysfs.c
@@ -309,6 +309,21 @@ static ssize_t tpm_version_major_show(struct device *dev,
 }
 static DEVICE_ATTR_RO(tpm_version_major);
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC
+static ssize_t null_name_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
+			      char *buf)
+{
+	struct tpm_chip *chip = to_tpm_chip(dev);
+	int size = TPM2_NAME_SIZE;
+
+	bin2hex(buf, chip->null_key_name, size);
+	size *= 2;
+	buf[size++] = '\n';
+	return size;
+}
+static DEVICE_ATTR_RO(null_name);
+#endif
+
 static struct attribute *tpm1_dev_attrs[] = {
 	&dev_attr_pubek.attr,
 	&dev_attr_pcrs.attr,
@@ -326,6 +341,9 @@ static struct attribute *tpm1_dev_attrs[] = {
 
 static struct attribute *tpm2_dev_attrs[] = {
 	&dev_attr_tpm_version_major.attr,
+#ifdef CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC
+	&dev_attr_null_name.attr,
+#endif
 	NULL
 };
 
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h
index 61445f1dc4..7bb87fa5f7 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h
@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@
 #include <linux/tpm_eventlog.h>
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_X86
-#include <asm/intel-family.h>
+#include <asm/cpu_device_id.h>
 #endif
 
 #define TPM_MINOR		224	/* officially assigned */
@@ -312,9 +312,23 @@ int tpm2_commit_space(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_space *space, void *buf,
 		      size_t *bufsiz);
 int tpm_devs_add(struct tpm_chip *chip);
 void tpm_devs_remove(struct tpm_chip *chip);
+int tpm2_save_context(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 handle, u8 *buf,
+		      unsigned int buf_size, unsigned int *offset);
+int tpm2_load_context(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *buf,
+		      unsigned int *offset, u32 *handle);
 
 void tpm_bios_log_setup(struct tpm_chip *chip);
 void tpm_bios_log_teardown(struct tpm_chip *chip);
 int tpm_dev_common_init(void);
 void tpm_dev_common_exit(void);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC
+int tpm2_sessions_init(struct tpm_chip *chip);
+#else
+static inline int tpm2_sessions_init(struct tpm_chip *chip)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+#endif
+
 #endif
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c
index 93545be190..1e85625921 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c
@@ -216,13 +216,6 @@ out:
 	return rc;
 }
 
-struct tpm2_null_auth_area {
-	__be32  handle;
-	__be16  nonce_size;
-	u8  attributes;
-	__be16  auth_size;
-} __packed;
-
 /**
  * tpm2_pcr_extend() - extend a PCR value
  *
@@ -236,24 +229,22 @@ int tpm2_pcr_extend(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 pcr_idx,
 		    struct tpm_digest *digests)
 {
 	struct tpm_buf buf;
-	struct tpm2_null_auth_area auth_area;
 	int rc;
 	int i;
 
-	rc = tpm_buf_init(&buf, TPM2_ST_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_PCR_EXTEND);
+	rc = tpm2_start_auth_session(chip);
 	if (rc)
 		return rc;
 
-	tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, pcr_idx);
+	rc = tpm_buf_init(&buf, TPM2_ST_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_PCR_EXTEND);
+	if (rc) {
+		tpm2_end_auth_session(chip);
+		return rc;
+	}
 
-	auth_area.handle = cpu_to_be32(TPM2_RS_PW);
-	auth_area.nonce_size = 0;
-	auth_area.attributes = 0;
-	auth_area.auth_size = 0;
+	tpm_buf_append_name(chip, &buf, pcr_idx, NULL);
+	tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(chip, &buf, 0, NULL, 0);
 
-	tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, sizeof(struct tpm2_null_auth_area));
-	tpm_buf_append(&buf, (const unsigned char *)&auth_area,
-		       sizeof(auth_area));
 	tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, chip->nr_allocated_banks);
 
 	for (i = 0; i < chip->nr_allocated_banks; i++) {
@@ -262,7 +253,9 @@ int tpm2_pcr_extend(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 pcr_idx,
 			       chip->allocated_banks[i].digest_size);
 	}
 
+	tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(chip, &buf);
 	rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &buf, 0, "attempting extend a PCR value");
+	rc = tpm_buf_check_hmac_response(chip, &buf, rc);
 
 	tpm_buf_destroy(&buf);
 
@@ -288,6 +281,7 @@ struct tpm2_get_random_out {
 int tpm2_get_random(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *dest, size_t max)
 {
 	struct tpm2_get_random_out *out;
+	struct tpm_header *head;
 	struct tpm_buf buf;
 	u32 recd;
 	u32 num_bytes = max;
@@ -295,29 +289,46 @@ int tpm2_get_random(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *dest, size_t max)
 	int total = 0;
 	int retries = 5;
 	u8 *dest_ptr = dest;
+	off_t offset;
 
 	if (!num_bytes || max > TPM_MAX_RNG_DATA)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
-	err = tpm_buf_init(&buf, 0, 0);
+	err = tpm2_start_auth_session(chip);
 	if (err)
 		return err;
 
+	err = tpm_buf_init(&buf, 0, 0);
+	if (err) {
+		tpm2_end_auth_session(chip);
+		return err;
+	}
+
 	do {
-		tpm_buf_reset(&buf, TPM2_ST_NO_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_GET_RANDOM);
+		tpm_buf_reset(&buf, TPM2_ST_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_GET_RANDOM);
+		tpm_buf_append_hmac_session_opt(chip, &buf, TPM2_SA_ENCRYPT
+						| TPM2_SA_CONTINUE_SESSION,
+						NULL, 0);
 		tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, num_bytes);
+		tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(chip, &buf);
 		err = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &buf,
 				       offsetof(struct tpm2_get_random_out,
 						buffer),
 				       "attempting get random");
+		err = tpm_buf_check_hmac_response(chip, &buf, err);
 		if (err) {
 			if (err > 0)
 				err = -EIO;
 			goto out;
 		}
 
-		out = (struct tpm2_get_random_out *)
-			&buf.data[TPM_HEADER_SIZE];
+		head = (struct tpm_header *)buf.data;
+		offset = TPM_HEADER_SIZE;
+		/* Skip the parameter size field: */
+		if (be16_to_cpu(head->tag) == TPM2_ST_SESSIONS)
+			offset += 4;
+
+		out = (struct tpm2_get_random_out *)&buf.data[offset];
 		recd = min_t(u32, be16_to_cpu(out->size), num_bytes);
 		if (tpm_buf_length(&buf) <
 		    TPM_HEADER_SIZE +
@@ -334,9 +345,12 @@ int tpm2_get_random(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *dest, size_t max)
 	} while (retries-- && total < max);
 
 	tpm_buf_destroy(&buf);
+	tpm2_end_auth_session(chip);
+
 	return total ? total : -EIO;
 out:
 	tpm_buf_destroy(&buf);
+	tpm2_end_auth_session(chip);
 	return err;
 }
 
@@ -759,6 +773,11 @@ int tpm2_auto_startup(struct tpm_chip *chip)
 		rc = 0;
 	}
 
+	if (rc)
+		goto out;
+
+	rc = tpm2_sessions_init(chip);
+
 out:
 	/*
 	 * Infineon TPM in field upgrade mode will return no data for the number
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..d3521aadd4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1365 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2018 James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com
+ *
+ * Cryptographic helper routines for handling TPM2 sessions for
+ * authorization HMAC and request response encryption.
+ *
+ * The idea is to ensure that every TPM command is HMAC protected by a
+ * session, meaning in-flight tampering would be detected and in
+ * addition all sensitive inputs and responses should be encrypted.
+ *
+ * The basic way this works is to use a TPM feature called salted
+ * sessions where a random secret used in session construction is
+ * encrypted to the public part of a known TPM key.  The problem is we
+ * have no known keys, so initially a primary Elliptic Curve key is
+ * derived from the NULL seed (we use EC because most TPMs generate
+ * these keys much faster than RSA ones).  The curve used is NIST_P256
+ * because that's now mandated to be present in 'TCG TPM v2.0
+ * Provisioning Guidance'
+ *
+ * Threat problems: the initial TPM2_CreatePrimary is not (and cannot
+ * be) session protected, so a clever Man in the Middle could return a
+ * public key they control to this command and from there intercept
+ * and decode all subsequent session based transactions.  The kernel
+ * cannot mitigate this threat but, after boot, userspace can get
+ * proof this has not happened by asking the TPM to certify the NULL
+ * key.  This certification would chain back to the TPM Endorsement
+ * Certificate and prove the NULL seed primary had not been tampered
+ * with and thus all sessions must have been cryptographically secure.
+ * To assist with this, the initial NULL seed public key name is made
+ * available in a sysfs file.
+ *
+ * Use of these functions:
+ *
+ * The design is all the crypto, hash and hmac gunk is confined in this
+ * file and never needs to be seen even by the kernel internal user.  To
+ * the user there's an init function tpm2_sessions_init() that needs to
+ * be called once per TPM which generates the NULL seed primary key.
+ *
+ * These are the usage functions:
+ *
+ * tpm2_start_auth_session() which allocates the opaque auth structure
+ *	and gets a session from the TPM.  This must be called before
+ *	any of the following functions.  The session is protected by a
+ *	session_key which is derived from a random salt value
+ *	encrypted to the NULL seed.
+ * tpm2_end_auth_session() kills the session and frees the resources.
+ *	Under normal operation this function is done by
+ *	tpm_buf_check_hmac_response(), so this is only to be used on
+ *	error legs where the latter is not executed.
+ * tpm_buf_append_name() to add a handle to the buffer.  This must be
+ *	used in place of the usual tpm_buf_append_u32() for adding
+ *	handles because handles have to be processed specially when
+ *	calculating the HMAC.  In particular, for NV, volatile and
+ *	permanent objects you now need to provide the name.
+ * tpm_buf_append_hmac_session() which appends the hmac session to the
+ *	buf in the same way tpm_buf_append_auth does().
+ * tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session() This calculates the correct hash and
+ *	places it in the buffer.  It must be called after the complete
+ *	command buffer is finalized so it can fill in the correct HMAC
+ *	based on the parameters.
+ * tpm_buf_check_hmac_response() which checks the session response in
+ *	the buffer and calculates what it should be.  If there's a
+ *	mismatch it will log a warning and return an error.  If
+ *	tpm_buf_append_hmac_session() did not specify
+ *	TPM_SA_CONTINUE_SESSION then the session will be closed (if it
+ *	hasn't been consumed) and the auth structure freed.
+ */
+
+#include "tpm.h"
+#include <linux/random.h>
+#include <linux/scatterlist.h>
+#include <asm/unaligned.h>
+#include <crypto/kpp.h>
+#include <crypto/ecdh.h>
+#include <crypto/hash.h>
+#include <crypto/hmac.h>
+
+/* maximum number of names the TPM must remember for authorization */
+#define AUTH_MAX_NAMES	3
+
+#define AES_KEY_BYTES	AES_KEYSIZE_128
+#define AES_KEY_BITS	(AES_KEY_BYTES*8)
+
+/*
+ * This is the structure that carries all the auth information (like
+ * session handle, nonces, session key and auth) from use to use it is
+ * designed to be opaque to anything outside.
+ */
+struct tpm2_auth {
+	u32 handle;
+	/*
+	 * This has two meanings: before tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session()
+	 * it marks the offset in the buffer of the start of the
+	 * sessions (i.e. after all the handles).  Once the buffer has
+	 * been filled it markes the session number of our auth
+	 * session so we can find it again in the response buffer.
+	 *
+	 * The two cases are distinguished because the first offset
+	 * must always be greater than TPM_HEADER_SIZE and the second
+	 * must be less than or equal to 5.
+	 */
+	u32 session;
+	/*
+	 * the size here is variable and set by the size of our_nonce
+	 * which must be between 16 and the name hash length. we set
+	 * the maximum sha256 size for the greatest protection
+	 */
+	u8 our_nonce[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE];
+	u8 tpm_nonce[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE];
+	/*
+	 * the salt is only used across the session command/response
+	 * after that it can be used as a scratch area
+	 */
+	union {
+		u8 salt[EC_PT_SZ];
+		/* scratch for key + IV */
+		u8 scratch[AES_KEY_BYTES + AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
+	};
+	/*
+	 * the session key and passphrase are the same size as the
+	 * name digest (sha256 again).  The session key is constant
+	 * for the use of the session and the passphrase can change
+	 * with every invocation.
+	 *
+	 * Note: these fields must be adjacent and in this order
+	 * because several HMAC/KDF schemes use the combination of the
+	 * session_key and passphrase.
+	 */
+	u8 session_key[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE];
+	u8 passphrase[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE];
+	int passphrase_len;
+	struct crypto_aes_ctx aes_ctx;
+	/* saved session attributes: */
+	u8 attrs;
+	__be32 ordinal;
+
+	/*
+	 * memory for three authorization handles.  We know them by
+	 * handle, but they are part of the session by name, which
+	 * we must compute and remember
+	 */
+	u32 name_h[AUTH_MAX_NAMES];
+	u8 name[AUTH_MAX_NAMES][2 + SHA512_DIGEST_SIZE];
+};
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC
+/*
+ * Name Size based on TPM algorithm (assumes no hash bigger than 255)
+ */
+static u8 name_size(const u8 *name)
+{
+	static u8 size_map[] = {
+		[TPM_ALG_SHA1] = SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE,
+		[TPM_ALG_SHA256] = SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE,
+		[TPM_ALG_SHA384] = SHA384_DIGEST_SIZE,
+		[TPM_ALG_SHA512] = SHA512_DIGEST_SIZE,
+	};
+	u16 alg = get_unaligned_be16(name);
+	return size_map[alg] + 2;
+}
+
+static int tpm2_parse_read_public(char *name, struct tpm_buf *buf)
+{
+	struct tpm_header *head = (struct tpm_header *)buf->data;
+	off_t offset = TPM_HEADER_SIZE;
+	u32 tot_len = be32_to_cpu(head->length);
+	u32 val;
+
+	/* we're starting after the header so adjust the length */
+	tot_len -= TPM_HEADER_SIZE;
+
+	/* skip public */
+	val = tpm_buf_read_u16(buf, &offset);
+	if (val > tot_len)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	offset += val;
+	/* name */
+	val = tpm_buf_read_u16(buf, &offset);
+	if (val != name_size(&buf->data[offset]))
+		return -EINVAL;
+	memcpy(name, &buf->data[offset], val);
+	/* forget the rest */
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int tpm2_read_public(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 handle, char *name)
+{
+	struct tpm_buf buf;
+	int rc;
+
+	rc = tpm_buf_init(&buf, TPM2_ST_NO_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_READ_PUBLIC);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, handle);
+	rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &buf, 0, "read public");
+	if (rc == TPM2_RC_SUCCESS)
+		rc = tpm2_parse_read_public(name, &buf);
+
+	tpm_buf_destroy(&buf);
+
+	return rc;
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC */
+
+/**
+ * tpm_buf_append_name() - add a handle area to the buffer
+ * @chip: the TPM chip structure
+ * @buf: The buffer to be appended
+ * @handle: The handle to be appended
+ * @name: The name of the handle (may be NULL)
+ *
+ * In order to compute session HMACs, we need to know the names of the
+ * objects pointed to by the handles.  For most objects, this is simply
+ * the actual 4 byte handle or an empty buf (in these cases @name
+ * should be NULL) but for volatile objects, permanent objects and NV
+ * areas, the name is defined as the hash (according to the name
+ * algorithm which should be set to sha256) of the public area to
+ * which the two byte algorithm id has been appended.  For these
+ * objects, the @name pointer should point to this.  If a name is
+ * required but @name is NULL, then TPM2_ReadPublic() will be called
+ * on the handle to obtain the name.
+ *
+ * As with most tpm_buf operations, success is assumed because failure
+ * will be caused by an incorrect programming model and indicated by a
+ * kernel message.
+ */
+void tpm_buf_append_name(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf,
+			 u32 handle, u8 *name)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC
+	enum tpm2_mso_type mso = tpm2_handle_mso(handle);
+	struct tpm2_auth *auth;
+	int slot;
+#endif
+
+	if (!tpm2_chip_auth(chip)) {
+		tpm_buf_append_u32(buf, handle);
+		/* count the number of handles in the upper bits of flags */
+		buf->handles++;
+		return;
+	}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC
+	slot = (tpm_buf_length(buf) - TPM_HEADER_SIZE) / 4;
+	if (slot >= AUTH_MAX_NAMES) {
+		dev_err(&chip->dev, "TPM: too many handles\n");
+		return;
+	}
+	auth = chip->auth;
+	WARN(auth->session != tpm_buf_length(buf),
+	     "name added in wrong place\n");
+	tpm_buf_append_u32(buf, handle);
+	auth->session += 4;
+
+	if (mso == TPM2_MSO_PERSISTENT ||
+	    mso == TPM2_MSO_VOLATILE ||
+	    mso == TPM2_MSO_NVRAM) {
+		if (!name)
+			tpm2_read_public(chip, handle, auth->name[slot]);
+	} else {
+		if (name)
+			dev_err(&chip->dev, "TPM: Handle does not require name but one is specified\n");
+	}
+
+	auth->name_h[slot] = handle;
+	if (name)
+		memcpy(auth->name[slot], name, name_size(name));
+#endif
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_buf_append_name);
+
+/**
+ * tpm_buf_append_hmac_session() - Append a TPM session element
+ * @chip: the TPM chip structure
+ * @buf: The buffer to be appended
+ * @attributes: The session attributes
+ * @passphrase: The session authority (NULL if none)
+ * @passphrase_len: The length of the session authority (0 if none)
+ *
+ * This fills in a session structure in the TPM command buffer, except
+ * for the HMAC which cannot be computed until the command buffer is
+ * complete.  The type of session is controlled by the @attributes,
+ * the main ones of which are TPM2_SA_CONTINUE_SESSION which means the
+ * session won't terminate after tpm_buf_check_hmac_response(),
+ * TPM2_SA_DECRYPT which means this buffers first parameter should be
+ * encrypted with a session key and TPM2_SA_ENCRYPT, which means the
+ * response buffer's first parameter needs to be decrypted (confusing,
+ * but the defines are written from the point of view of the TPM).
+ *
+ * Any session appended by this command must be finalized by calling
+ * tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session() otherwise the HMAC will be incorrect
+ * and the TPM will reject the command.
+ *
+ * As with most tpm_buf operations, success is assumed because failure
+ * will be caused by an incorrect programming model and indicated by a
+ * kernel message.
+ */
+void tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf,
+				 u8 attributes, u8 *passphrase,
+				 int passphrase_len)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC
+	u8 nonce[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE];
+	struct tpm2_auth *auth;
+	u32 len;
+#endif
+
+	if (!tpm2_chip_auth(chip)) {
+		/* offset tells us where the sessions area begins */
+		int offset = buf->handles * 4 + TPM_HEADER_SIZE;
+		u32 len = 9 + passphrase_len;
+
+		if (tpm_buf_length(buf) != offset) {
+			/* not the first session so update the existing length */
+			len += get_unaligned_be32(&buf->data[offset]);
+			put_unaligned_be32(len, &buf->data[offset]);
+		} else {
+			tpm_buf_append_u32(buf, len);
+		}
+		/* auth handle */
+		tpm_buf_append_u32(buf, TPM2_RS_PW);
+		/* nonce */
+		tpm_buf_append_u16(buf, 0);
+		/* attributes */
+		tpm_buf_append_u8(buf, 0);
+		/* passphrase */
+		tpm_buf_append_u16(buf, passphrase_len);
+		tpm_buf_append(buf, passphrase, passphrase_len);
+		return;
+	}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC
+	/*
+	 * The Architecture Guide requires us to strip trailing zeros
+	 * before computing the HMAC
+	 */
+	while (passphrase && passphrase_len > 0 && passphrase[passphrase_len - 1] == '\0')
+		passphrase_len--;
+
+	auth = chip->auth;
+	auth->attrs = attributes;
+	auth->passphrase_len = passphrase_len;
+	if (passphrase_len)
+		memcpy(auth->passphrase, passphrase, passphrase_len);
+
+	if (auth->session != tpm_buf_length(buf)) {
+		/* we're not the first session */
+		len = get_unaligned_be32(&buf->data[auth->session]);
+		if (4 + len + auth->session != tpm_buf_length(buf)) {
+			WARN(1, "session length mismatch, cannot append");
+			return;
+		}
+
+		/* add our new session */
+		len += 9 + 2 * SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE;
+		put_unaligned_be32(len, &buf->data[auth->session]);
+	} else {
+		tpm_buf_append_u32(buf, 9 + 2 * SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE);
+	}
+
+	/* random number for our nonce */
+	get_random_bytes(nonce, sizeof(nonce));
+	memcpy(auth->our_nonce, nonce, sizeof(nonce));
+	tpm_buf_append_u32(buf, auth->handle);
+	/* our new nonce */
+	tpm_buf_append_u16(buf, SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE);
+	tpm_buf_append(buf, nonce, SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE);
+	tpm_buf_append_u8(buf, auth->attrs);
+	/* and put a placeholder for the hmac */
+	tpm_buf_append_u16(buf, SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE);
+	tpm_buf_append(buf, nonce, SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE);
+#endif
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_buf_append_hmac_session);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC
+
+static int tpm2_create_primary(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 hierarchy,
+			       u32 *handle, u8 *name);
+
+/*
+ * It turns out the crypto hmac(sha256) is hard for us to consume
+ * because it assumes a fixed key and the TPM seems to change the key
+ * on every operation, so we weld the hmac init and final functions in
+ * here to give it the same usage characteristics as a regular hash
+ */
+static void tpm2_hmac_init(struct sha256_state *sctx, u8 *key, u32 key_len)
+{
+	u8 pad[SHA256_BLOCK_SIZE];
+	int i;
+
+	sha256_init(sctx);
+	for (i = 0; i < sizeof(pad); i++) {
+		if (i < key_len)
+			pad[i] = key[i];
+		else
+			pad[i] = 0;
+		pad[i] ^= HMAC_IPAD_VALUE;
+	}
+	sha256_update(sctx, pad, sizeof(pad));
+}
+
+static void tpm2_hmac_final(struct sha256_state *sctx, u8 *key, u32 key_len,
+			    u8 *out)
+{
+	u8 pad[SHA256_BLOCK_SIZE];
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < sizeof(pad); i++) {
+		if (i < key_len)
+			pad[i] = key[i];
+		else
+			pad[i] = 0;
+		pad[i] ^= HMAC_OPAD_VALUE;
+	}
+
+	/* collect the final hash;  use out as temporary storage */
+	sha256_final(sctx, out);
+
+	sha256_init(sctx);
+	sha256_update(sctx, pad, sizeof(pad));
+	sha256_update(sctx, out, SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE);
+	sha256_final(sctx, out);
+}
+
+/*
+ * assume hash sha256 and nonces u, v of size SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE but
+ * otherwise standard tpm2_KDFa.  Note output is in bytes not bits.
+ */
+static void tpm2_KDFa(u8 *key, u32 key_len, const char *label, u8 *u,
+		      u8 *v, u32 bytes, u8 *out)
+{
+	u32 counter = 1;
+	const __be32 bits = cpu_to_be32(bytes * 8);
+
+	while (bytes > 0) {
+		struct sha256_state sctx;
+		__be32 c = cpu_to_be32(counter);
+
+		tpm2_hmac_init(&sctx, key, key_len);
+		sha256_update(&sctx, (u8 *)&c, sizeof(c));
+		sha256_update(&sctx, label, strlen(label)+1);
+		sha256_update(&sctx, u, SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE);
+		sha256_update(&sctx, v, SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE);
+		sha256_update(&sctx, (u8 *)&bits, sizeof(bits));
+		tpm2_hmac_final(&sctx, key, key_len, out);
+
+		bytes -= SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE;
+		counter++;
+		out += SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE;
+	}
+}
+
+/*
+ * Somewhat of a bastardization of the real KDFe.  We're assuming
+ * we're working with known point sizes for the input parameters and
+ * the hash algorithm is fixed at sha256.  Because we know that the
+ * point size is 32 bytes like the hash size, there's no need to loop
+ * in this KDF.
+ */
+static void tpm2_KDFe(u8 z[EC_PT_SZ], const char *str, u8 *pt_u, u8 *pt_v,
+		      u8 *out)
+{
+	struct sha256_state sctx;
+	/*
+	 * this should be an iterative counter, but because we know
+	 *  we're only taking 32 bytes for the point using a sha256
+	 *  hash which is also 32 bytes, there's only one loop
+	 */
+	__be32 c = cpu_to_be32(1);
+
+	sha256_init(&sctx);
+	/* counter (BE) */
+	sha256_update(&sctx, (u8 *)&c, sizeof(c));
+	/* secret value */
+	sha256_update(&sctx, z, EC_PT_SZ);
+	/* string including trailing zero */
+	sha256_update(&sctx, str, strlen(str)+1);
+	sha256_update(&sctx, pt_u, EC_PT_SZ);
+	sha256_update(&sctx, pt_v, EC_PT_SZ);
+	sha256_final(&sctx, out);
+}
+
+static void tpm_buf_append_salt(struct tpm_buf *buf, struct tpm_chip *chip)
+{
+	struct crypto_kpp *kpp;
+	struct kpp_request *req;
+	struct scatterlist s[2], d[1];
+	struct ecdh p = {0};
+	u8 encoded_key[EC_PT_SZ], *x, *y;
+	unsigned int buf_len;
+
+	/* secret is two sized points */
+	tpm_buf_append_u16(buf, (EC_PT_SZ + 2)*2);
+	/*
+	 * we cheat here and append uninitialized data to form
+	 * the points.  All we care about is getting the two
+	 * co-ordinate pointers, which will be used to overwrite
+	 * the uninitialized data
+	 */
+	tpm_buf_append_u16(buf, EC_PT_SZ);
+	x = &buf->data[tpm_buf_length(buf)];
+	tpm_buf_append(buf, encoded_key, EC_PT_SZ);
+	tpm_buf_append_u16(buf, EC_PT_SZ);
+	y = &buf->data[tpm_buf_length(buf)];
+	tpm_buf_append(buf, encoded_key, EC_PT_SZ);
+	sg_init_table(s, 2);
+	sg_set_buf(&s[0], x, EC_PT_SZ);
+	sg_set_buf(&s[1], y, EC_PT_SZ);
+
+	kpp = crypto_alloc_kpp("ecdh-nist-p256", CRYPTO_ALG_INTERNAL, 0);
+	if (IS_ERR(kpp)) {
+		dev_err(&chip->dev, "crypto ecdh allocation failed\n");
+		return;
+	}
+
+	buf_len = crypto_ecdh_key_len(&p);
+	if (sizeof(encoded_key) < buf_len) {
+		dev_err(&chip->dev, "salt buffer too small needs %d\n",
+			buf_len);
+		goto out;
+	}
+	crypto_ecdh_encode_key(encoded_key, buf_len, &p);
+	/* this generates a random private key */
+	crypto_kpp_set_secret(kpp, encoded_key, buf_len);
+
+	/* salt is now the public point of this private key */
+	req = kpp_request_alloc(kpp, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!req)
+		goto out;
+	kpp_request_set_input(req, NULL, 0);
+	kpp_request_set_output(req, s, EC_PT_SZ*2);
+	crypto_kpp_generate_public_key(req);
+	/*
+	 * we're not done: now we have to compute the shared secret
+	 * which is our private key multiplied by the tpm_key public
+	 * point, we actually only take the x point and discard the y
+	 * point and feed it through KDFe to get the final secret salt
+	 */
+	sg_set_buf(&s[0], chip->null_ec_key_x, EC_PT_SZ);
+	sg_set_buf(&s[1], chip->null_ec_key_y, EC_PT_SZ);
+	kpp_request_set_input(req, s, EC_PT_SZ*2);
+	sg_init_one(d, chip->auth->salt, EC_PT_SZ);
+	kpp_request_set_output(req, d, EC_PT_SZ);
+	crypto_kpp_compute_shared_secret(req);
+	kpp_request_free(req);
+
+	/*
+	 * pass the shared secret through KDFe for salt. Note salt
+	 * area is used both for input shared secret and output salt.
+	 * This works because KDFe fully consumes the secret before it
+	 * writes the salt
+	 */
+	tpm2_KDFe(chip->auth->salt, "SECRET", x, chip->null_ec_key_x,
+		  chip->auth->salt);
+
+ out:
+	crypto_free_kpp(kpp);
+}
+
+/**
+ * tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session() - finalize the session HMAC
+ * @chip: the TPM chip structure
+ * @buf: The buffer to be appended
+ *
+ * This command must not be called until all of the parameters have
+ * been appended to @buf otherwise the computed HMAC will be
+ * incorrect.
+ *
+ * This function computes and fills in the session HMAC using the
+ * session key and, if TPM2_SA_DECRYPT was specified, computes the
+ * encryption key and encrypts the first parameter of the command
+ * buffer with it.
+ *
+ * As with most tpm_buf operations, success is assumed because failure
+ * will be caused by an incorrect programming model and indicated by a
+ * kernel message.
+ */
+void tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf)
+{
+	u32 cc, handles, val;
+	struct tpm2_auth *auth = chip->auth;
+	int i;
+	struct tpm_header *head = (struct tpm_header *)buf->data;
+	off_t offset_s = TPM_HEADER_SIZE, offset_p;
+	u8 *hmac = NULL;
+	u32 attrs;
+	u8 cphash[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE];
+	struct sha256_state sctx;
+
+	if (!auth)
+		return;
+
+	/* save the command code in BE format */
+	auth->ordinal = head->ordinal;
+
+	cc = be32_to_cpu(head->ordinal);
+
+	i = tpm2_find_cc(chip, cc);
+	if (i < 0) {
+		dev_err(&chip->dev, "Command 0x%x not found in TPM\n", cc);
+		return;
+	}
+	attrs = chip->cc_attrs_tbl[i];
+
+	handles = (attrs >> TPM2_CC_ATTR_CHANDLES) & GENMASK(2, 0);
+
+	/*
+	 * just check the names, it's easy to make mistakes.  This
+	 * would happen if someone added a handle via
+	 * tpm_buf_append_u32() instead of tpm_buf_append_name()
+	 */
+	for (i = 0; i < handles; i++) {
+		u32 handle = tpm_buf_read_u32(buf, &offset_s);
+
+		if (auth->name_h[i] != handle) {
+			dev_err(&chip->dev, "TPM: handle %d wrong for name\n",
+				  i);
+			return;
+		}
+	}
+	/* point offset_s to the start of the sessions */
+	val = tpm_buf_read_u32(buf, &offset_s);
+	/* point offset_p to the start of the parameters */
+	offset_p = offset_s + val;
+	for (i = 1; offset_s < offset_p; i++) {
+		u32 handle = tpm_buf_read_u32(buf, &offset_s);
+		u16 len;
+		u8 a;
+
+		/* nonce (already in auth) */
+		len = tpm_buf_read_u16(buf, &offset_s);
+		offset_s += len;
+
+		a = tpm_buf_read_u8(buf, &offset_s);
+
+		len = tpm_buf_read_u16(buf, &offset_s);
+		if (handle == auth->handle && auth->attrs == a) {
+			hmac = &buf->data[offset_s];
+			/*
+			 * save our session number so we know which
+			 * session in the response belongs to us
+			 */
+			auth->session = i;
+		}
+
+		offset_s += len;
+	}
+	if (offset_s != offset_p) {
+		dev_err(&chip->dev, "TPM session length is incorrect\n");
+		return;
+	}
+	if (!hmac) {
+		dev_err(&chip->dev, "TPM could not find HMAC session\n");
+		return;
+	}
+
+	/* encrypt before HMAC */
+	if (auth->attrs & TPM2_SA_DECRYPT) {
+		u16 len;
+
+		/* need key and IV */
+		tpm2_KDFa(auth->session_key, SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE
+			  + auth->passphrase_len, "CFB", auth->our_nonce,
+			  auth->tpm_nonce, AES_KEY_BYTES + AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
+			  auth->scratch);
+
+		len = tpm_buf_read_u16(buf, &offset_p);
+		aes_expandkey(&auth->aes_ctx, auth->scratch, AES_KEY_BYTES);
+		aescfb_encrypt(&auth->aes_ctx, &buf->data[offset_p],
+			       &buf->data[offset_p], len,
+			       auth->scratch + AES_KEY_BYTES);
+		/* reset p to beginning of parameters for HMAC */
+		offset_p -= 2;
+	}
+
+	sha256_init(&sctx);
+	/* ordinal is already BE */
+	sha256_update(&sctx, (u8 *)&head->ordinal, sizeof(head->ordinal));
+	/* add the handle names */
+	for (i = 0; i < handles; i++) {
+		enum tpm2_mso_type mso = tpm2_handle_mso(auth->name_h[i]);
+
+		if (mso == TPM2_MSO_PERSISTENT ||
+		    mso == TPM2_MSO_VOLATILE ||
+		    mso == TPM2_MSO_NVRAM) {
+			sha256_update(&sctx, auth->name[i],
+				      name_size(auth->name[i]));
+		} else {
+			__be32 h = cpu_to_be32(auth->name_h[i]);
+
+			sha256_update(&sctx, (u8 *)&h, 4);
+		}
+	}
+	if (offset_s != tpm_buf_length(buf))
+		sha256_update(&sctx, &buf->data[offset_s],
+			      tpm_buf_length(buf) - offset_s);
+	sha256_final(&sctx, cphash);
+
+	/* now calculate the hmac */
+	tpm2_hmac_init(&sctx, auth->session_key, sizeof(auth->session_key)
+		       + auth->passphrase_len);
+	sha256_update(&sctx, cphash, sizeof(cphash));
+	sha256_update(&sctx, auth->our_nonce, sizeof(auth->our_nonce));
+	sha256_update(&sctx, auth->tpm_nonce, sizeof(auth->tpm_nonce));
+	sha256_update(&sctx, &auth->attrs, 1);
+	tpm2_hmac_final(&sctx, auth->session_key, sizeof(auth->session_key)
+			+ auth->passphrase_len, hmac);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session);
+
+/**
+ * tpm_buf_check_hmac_response() - check the TPM return HMAC for correctness
+ * @chip: the TPM chip structure
+ * @buf: the original command buffer (which now contains the response)
+ * @rc: the return code from tpm_transmit_cmd
+ *
+ * If @rc is non zero, @buf may not contain an actual return, so @rc
+ * is passed through as the return and the session cleaned up and
+ * de-allocated if required (this is required if
+ * TPM2_SA_CONTINUE_SESSION was not specified as a session flag).
+ *
+ * If @rc is zero, the response HMAC is computed against the returned
+ * @buf and matched to the TPM one in the session area.  If there is a
+ * mismatch, an error is logged and -EINVAL returned.
+ *
+ * The reason for this is that the command issue and HMAC check
+ * sequence should look like:
+ *
+ *	rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(...);
+ *	rc = tpm_buf_check_hmac_response(&buf, auth, rc);
+ *	if (rc)
+ *		...
+ *
+ * Which is easily layered into the current contrl flow.
+ *
+ * Returns: 0 on success or an error.
+ */
+int tpm_buf_check_hmac_response(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf,
+				int rc)
+{
+	struct tpm_header *head = (struct tpm_header *)buf->data;
+	struct tpm2_auth *auth = chip->auth;
+	off_t offset_s, offset_p;
+	u8 rphash[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE];
+	u32 attrs, cc;
+	struct sha256_state sctx;
+	u16 tag = be16_to_cpu(head->tag);
+	int parm_len, len, i, handles;
+
+	if (!auth)
+		return rc;
+
+	cc = be32_to_cpu(auth->ordinal);
+
+	if (auth->session >= TPM_HEADER_SIZE) {
+		WARN(1, "tpm session not filled correctly\n");
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if (rc != 0)
+		/* pass non success rc through and close the session */
+		goto out;
+
+	rc = -EINVAL;
+	if (tag != TPM2_ST_SESSIONS) {
+		dev_err(&chip->dev, "TPM: HMAC response check has no sessions tag\n");
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	i = tpm2_find_cc(chip, cc);
+	if (i < 0)
+		goto out;
+	attrs = chip->cc_attrs_tbl[i];
+	handles = (attrs >> TPM2_CC_ATTR_RHANDLE) & 1;
+
+	/* point to area beyond handles */
+	offset_s = TPM_HEADER_SIZE + handles * 4;
+	parm_len = tpm_buf_read_u32(buf, &offset_s);
+	offset_p = offset_s;
+	offset_s += parm_len;
+	/* skip over any sessions before ours */
+	for (i = 0; i < auth->session - 1; i++) {
+		len = tpm_buf_read_u16(buf, &offset_s);
+		offset_s += len + 1;
+		len = tpm_buf_read_u16(buf, &offset_s);
+		offset_s += len;
+	}
+	/* TPM nonce */
+	len = tpm_buf_read_u16(buf, &offset_s);
+	if (offset_s + len > tpm_buf_length(buf))
+		goto out;
+	if (len != SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE)
+		goto out;
+	memcpy(auth->tpm_nonce, &buf->data[offset_s], len);
+	offset_s += len;
+	attrs = tpm_buf_read_u8(buf, &offset_s);
+	len = tpm_buf_read_u16(buf, &offset_s);
+	if (offset_s + len != tpm_buf_length(buf))
+		goto out;
+	if (len != SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE)
+		goto out;
+	/*
+	 * offset_s points to the HMAC. now calculate comparison, beginning
+	 * with rphash
+	 */
+	sha256_init(&sctx);
+	/* yes, I know this is now zero, but it's what the standard says */
+	sha256_update(&sctx, (u8 *)&head->return_code,
+		      sizeof(head->return_code));
+	/* ordinal is already BE */
+	sha256_update(&sctx, (u8 *)&auth->ordinal, sizeof(auth->ordinal));
+	sha256_update(&sctx, &buf->data[offset_p], parm_len);
+	sha256_final(&sctx, rphash);
+
+	/* now calculate the hmac */
+	tpm2_hmac_init(&sctx, auth->session_key, sizeof(auth->session_key)
+		       + auth->passphrase_len);
+	sha256_update(&sctx, rphash, sizeof(rphash));
+	sha256_update(&sctx, auth->tpm_nonce, sizeof(auth->tpm_nonce));
+	sha256_update(&sctx, auth->our_nonce, sizeof(auth->our_nonce));
+	sha256_update(&sctx, &auth->attrs, 1);
+	/* we're done with the rphash, so put our idea of the hmac there */
+	tpm2_hmac_final(&sctx, auth->session_key, sizeof(auth->session_key)
+			+ auth->passphrase_len, rphash);
+	if (memcmp(rphash, &buf->data[offset_s], SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE) == 0) {
+		rc = 0;
+	} else {
+		dev_err(&chip->dev, "TPM: HMAC check failed\n");
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	/* now do response decryption */
+	if (auth->attrs & TPM2_SA_ENCRYPT) {
+		/* need key and IV */
+		tpm2_KDFa(auth->session_key, SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE
+			  + auth->passphrase_len, "CFB", auth->tpm_nonce,
+			  auth->our_nonce, AES_KEY_BYTES + AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
+			  auth->scratch);
+
+		len = tpm_buf_read_u16(buf, &offset_p);
+		aes_expandkey(&auth->aes_ctx, auth->scratch, AES_KEY_BYTES);
+		aescfb_decrypt(&auth->aes_ctx, &buf->data[offset_p],
+			       &buf->data[offset_p], len,
+			       auth->scratch + AES_KEY_BYTES);
+	}
+
+ out:
+	if ((auth->attrs & TPM2_SA_CONTINUE_SESSION) == 0) {
+		if (rc)
+			/* manually close the session if it wasn't consumed */
+			tpm2_flush_context(chip, auth->handle);
+		memzero_explicit(auth, sizeof(*auth));
+	} else {
+		/* reset for next use  */
+		auth->session = TPM_HEADER_SIZE;
+	}
+
+	return rc;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(tpm_buf_check_hmac_response);
+
+/**
+ * tpm2_end_auth_session() - kill the allocated auth session
+ * @chip: the TPM chip structure
+ *
+ * ends the session started by tpm2_start_auth_session and frees all
+ * the resources.  Under normal conditions,
+ * tpm_buf_check_hmac_response() will correctly end the session if
+ * required, so this function is only for use in error legs that will
+ * bypass the normal invocation of tpm_buf_check_hmac_response().
+ */
+void tpm2_end_auth_session(struct tpm_chip *chip)
+{
+	struct tpm2_auth *auth = chip->auth;
+
+	if (!auth)
+		return;
+
+	tpm2_flush_context(chip, auth->handle);
+	memzero_explicit(auth, sizeof(*auth));
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(tpm2_end_auth_session);
+
+static int tpm2_parse_start_auth_session(struct tpm2_auth *auth,
+					 struct tpm_buf *buf)
+{
+	struct tpm_header *head = (struct tpm_header *)buf->data;
+	u32 tot_len = be32_to_cpu(head->length);
+	off_t offset = TPM_HEADER_SIZE;
+	u32 val;
+
+	/* we're starting after the header so adjust the length */
+	tot_len -= TPM_HEADER_SIZE;
+
+	/* should have handle plus nonce */
+	if (tot_len != 4 + 2 + sizeof(auth->tpm_nonce))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	auth->handle = tpm_buf_read_u32(buf, &offset);
+	val = tpm_buf_read_u16(buf, &offset);
+	if (val != sizeof(auth->tpm_nonce))
+		return -EINVAL;
+	memcpy(auth->tpm_nonce, &buf->data[offset], sizeof(auth->tpm_nonce));
+	/* now compute the session key from the nonces */
+	tpm2_KDFa(auth->salt, sizeof(auth->salt), "ATH", auth->tpm_nonce,
+		  auth->our_nonce, sizeof(auth->session_key),
+		  auth->session_key);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int tpm2_load_null(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 *null_key)
+{
+	int rc;
+	unsigned int offset = 0; /* dummy offset for null seed context */
+	u8 name[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE + 2];
+
+	rc = tpm2_load_context(chip, chip->null_key_context, &offset,
+			       null_key);
+	if (rc != -EINVAL)
+		return rc;
+
+	/* an integrity failure may mean the TPM has been reset */
+	dev_err(&chip->dev, "NULL key integrity failure!\n");
+	/* check the null name against what we know */
+	tpm2_create_primary(chip, TPM2_RH_NULL, NULL, name);
+	if (memcmp(name, chip->null_key_name, sizeof(name)) == 0)
+		/* name unchanged, assume transient integrity failure */
+		return rc;
+	/*
+	 * Fatal TPM failure: the NULL seed has actually changed, so
+	 * the TPM must have been illegally reset.  All in-kernel TPM
+	 * operations will fail because the NULL primary can't be
+	 * loaded to salt the sessions, but disable the TPM anyway so
+	 * userspace programmes can't be compromised by it.
+	 */
+	dev_err(&chip->dev, "NULL name has changed, disabling TPM due to interference\n");
+	chip->flags |= TPM_CHIP_FLAG_DISABLE;
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tpm2_start_auth_session() - create a HMAC authentication session with the TPM
+ * @chip: the TPM chip structure to create the session with
+ *
+ * This function loads the NULL seed from its saved context and starts
+ * an authentication session on the null seed, fills in the
+ * @chip->auth structure to contain all the session details necessary
+ * for performing the HMAC, encrypt and decrypt operations and
+ * returns.  The NULL seed is flushed before this function returns.
+ *
+ * Return: zero on success or actual error encountered.
+ */
+int tpm2_start_auth_session(struct tpm_chip *chip)
+{
+	struct tpm_buf buf;
+	struct tpm2_auth *auth = chip->auth;
+	int rc;
+	u32 null_key;
+
+	if (!auth) {
+		dev_warn_once(&chip->dev, "auth session is not active\n");
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	rc = tpm2_load_null(chip, &null_key);
+	if (rc)
+		goto out;
+
+	auth->session = TPM_HEADER_SIZE;
+
+	rc = tpm_buf_init(&buf, TPM2_ST_NO_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_START_AUTH_SESS);
+	if (rc)
+		goto out;
+
+	/* salt key handle */
+	tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, null_key);
+	/* bind key handle */
+	tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, TPM2_RH_NULL);
+	/* nonce caller */
+	get_random_bytes(auth->our_nonce, sizeof(auth->our_nonce));
+	tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, sizeof(auth->our_nonce));
+	tpm_buf_append(&buf, auth->our_nonce, sizeof(auth->our_nonce));
+
+	/* append encrypted salt and squirrel away unencrypted in auth */
+	tpm_buf_append_salt(&buf, chip);
+	/* session type (HMAC, audit or policy) */
+	tpm_buf_append_u8(&buf, TPM2_SE_HMAC);
+
+	/* symmetric encryption parameters */
+	/* symmetric algorithm */
+	tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, TPM_ALG_AES);
+	/* bits for symmetric algorithm */
+	tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, AES_KEY_BITS);
+	/* symmetric algorithm mode (must be CFB) */
+	tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, TPM_ALG_CFB);
+	/* hash algorithm for session */
+	tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, TPM_ALG_SHA256);
+
+	rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &buf, 0, "start auth session");
+	tpm2_flush_context(chip, null_key);
+
+	if (rc == TPM2_RC_SUCCESS)
+		rc = tpm2_parse_start_auth_session(auth, &buf);
+
+	tpm_buf_destroy(&buf);
+
+	if (rc)
+		goto out;
+
+ out:
+	return rc;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(tpm2_start_auth_session);
+
+/*
+ * A mask containing the object attributes for the kernel held null primary key
+ * used in HMAC encryption. For more information on specific attributes look up
+ * to "8.3 TPMA_OBJECT (Object Attributes)".
+ */
+#define TPM2_OA_NULL_KEY ( \
+	TPM2_OA_NO_DA | \
+	TPM2_OA_FIXED_TPM | \
+	TPM2_OA_FIXED_PARENT | \
+	TPM2_OA_SENSITIVE_DATA_ORIGIN |	\
+	TPM2_OA_USER_WITH_AUTH | \
+	TPM2_OA_DECRYPT | \
+	TPM2_OA_RESTRICTED)
+
+/**
+ * tpm2_parse_create_primary() - parse the data returned from TPM_CC_CREATE_PRIMARY
+ *
+ * @chip:	The TPM the primary was created under
+ * @buf:	The response buffer from the chip
+ * @handle:	pointer to be filled in with the return handle of the primary
+ * @hierarchy:	The hierarchy the primary was created for
+ * @name:	pointer to be filled in with the primary key name
+ *
+ * Return:
+ * * 0		- OK
+ * * -errno	- A system error
+ * * TPM_RC	- A TPM error
+ */
+static int tpm2_parse_create_primary(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf,
+				     u32 *handle, u32 hierarchy, u8 *name)
+{
+	struct tpm_header *head = (struct tpm_header *)buf->data;
+	off_t offset_r = TPM_HEADER_SIZE, offset_t;
+	u16 len = TPM_HEADER_SIZE;
+	u32 total_len = be32_to_cpu(head->length);
+	u32 val, param_len, keyhandle;
+
+	keyhandle = tpm_buf_read_u32(buf, &offset_r);
+	if (handle)
+		*handle = keyhandle;
+	else
+		tpm2_flush_context(chip, keyhandle);
+
+	param_len = tpm_buf_read_u32(buf, &offset_r);
+	/*
+	 * param_len doesn't include the header, but all the other
+	 * lengths and offsets do, so add it to parm len to make
+	 * the comparisons easier
+	 */
+	param_len += TPM_HEADER_SIZE;
+
+	if (param_len + 8 > total_len)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	len = tpm_buf_read_u16(buf, &offset_r);
+	offset_t = offset_r;
+	if (name) {
+		/*
+		 * now we have the public area, compute the name of
+		 * the object
+		 */
+		put_unaligned_be16(TPM_ALG_SHA256, name);
+		sha256(&buf->data[offset_r], len, name + 2);
+	}
+
+	/* validate the public key */
+	val = tpm_buf_read_u16(buf, &offset_t);
+
+	/* key type (must be what we asked for) */
+	if (val != TPM_ALG_ECC)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	val = tpm_buf_read_u16(buf, &offset_t);
+
+	/* name algorithm */
+	if (val != TPM_ALG_SHA256)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	val = tpm_buf_read_u32(buf, &offset_t);
+
+	/* object properties */
+	if (val != TPM2_OA_NULL_KEY)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	/* auth policy (empty) */
+	val = tpm_buf_read_u16(buf, &offset_t);
+	if (val != 0)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	/* symmetric key parameters */
+	val = tpm_buf_read_u16(buf, &offset_t);
+	if (val != TPM_ALG_AES)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	/* symmetric key length */
+	val = tpm_buf_read_u16(buf, &offset_t);
+	if (val != AES_KEY_BITS)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	/* symmetric encryption scheme */
+	val = tpm_buf_read_u16(buf, &offset_t);
+	if (val != TPM_ALG_CFB)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	/* signing scheme */
+	val = tpm_buf_read_u16(buf, &offset_t);
+	if (val != TPM_ALG_NULL)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	/* ECC Curve */
+	val = tpm_buf_read_u16(buf, &offset_t);
+	if (val != TPM2_ECC_NIST_P256)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	/* KDF Scheme */
+	val = tpm_buf_read_u16(buf, &offset_t);
+	if (val != TPM_ALG_NULL)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	/* extract public key (x and y points) */
+	val = tpm_buf_read_u16(buf, &offset_t);
+	if (val != EC_PT_SZ)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	memcpy(chip->null_ec_key_x, &buf->data[offset_t], val);
+	offset_t += val;
+	val = tpm_buf_read_u16(buf, &offset_t);
+	if (val != EC_PT_SZ)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	memcpy(chip->null_ec_key_y, &buf->data[offset_t], val);
+	offset_t += val;
+
+	/* original length of the whole TPM2B */
+	offset_r += len;
+
+	/* should have exactly consumed the TPM2B public structure */
+	if (offset_t != offset_r)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	if (offset_r > param_len)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	/* creation data (skip) */
+	len = tpm_buf_read_u16(buf, &offset_r);
+	offset_r += len;
+	if (offset_r > param_len)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	/* creation digest (must be sha256) */
+	len = tpm_buf_read_u16(buf, &offset_r);
+	offset_r += len;
+	if (len != SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE || offset_r > param_len)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	/* TPMT_TK_CREATION follows */
+	/* tag, must be TPM_ST_CREATION (0x8021) */
+	val = tpm_buf_read_u16(buf, &offset_r);
+	if (val != TPM2_ST_CREATION || offset_r > param_len)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	/* hierarchy */
+	val = tpm_buf_read_u32(buf, &offset_r);
+	if (val != hierarchy || offset_r > param_len)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	/* the ticket digest HMAC (might not be sha256) */
+	len = tpm_buf_read_u16(buf, &offset_r);
+	offset_r += len;
+	if (offset_r > param_len)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	/*
+	 * finally we have the name, which is a sha256 digest plus a 2
+	 * byte algorithm type
+	 */
+	len = tpm_buf_read_u16(buf, &offset_r);
+	if (offset_r + len != param_len + 8)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	if (len != SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE + 2)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (memcmp(chip->null_key_name, &buf->data[offset_r],
+		   SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE + 2) != 0) {
+		dev_err(&chip->dev, "NULL Seed name comparison failed\n");
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tpm2_create_primary() - create a primary key using a fixed P-256 template
+ *
+ * @chip:      the TPM chip to create under
+ * @hierarchy: The hierarchy handle to create under
+ * @handle:    The returned volatile handle on success
+ * @name:      The name of the returned key
+ *
+ * For platforms that might not have a persistent primary, this can be
+ * used to create one quickly on the fly (it uses Elliptic Curve not
+ * RSA, so even slow TPMs can create one fast).  The template uses the
+ * TCG mandated H one for non-endorsement ECC primaries, i.e. P-256
+ * elliptic curve (the only current one all TPM2s are required to
+ * have) a sha256 name hash and no policy.
+ *
+ * Return:
+ * * 0		- OK
+ * * -errno	- A system error
+ * * TPM_RC	- A TPM error
+ */
+static int tpm2_create_primary(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 hierarchy,
+			       u32 *handle, u8 *name)
+{
+	int rc;
+	struct tpm_buf buf;
+	struct tpm_buf template;
+
+	rc = tpm_buf_init(&buf, TPM2_ST_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_CREATE_PRIMARY);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	rc = tpm_buf_init_sized(&template);
+	if (rc) {
+		tpm_buf_destroy(&buf);
+		return rc;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * create the template.  Note: in order for userspace to
+	 * verify the security of the system, it will have to create
+	 * and certify this NULL primary, meaning all the template
+	 * parameters will have to be identical, so conform exactly to
+	 * the TCG TPM v2.0 Provisioning Guidance for the SRK ECC
+	 * key H template (H has zero size unique points)
+	 */
+
+	/* key type */
+	tpm_buf_append_u16(&template, TPM_ALG_ECC);
+
+	/* name algorithm */
+	tpm_buf_append_u16(&template, TPM_ALG_SHA256);
+
+	/* object properties */
+	tpm_buf_append_u32(&template, TPM2_OA_NULL_KEY);
+
+	/* sauth policy (empty) */
+	tpm_buf_append_u16(&template, 0);
+
+	/* BEGIN parameters: key specific; for ECC*/
+
+	/* symmetric algorithm */
+	tpm_buf_append_u16(&template, TPM_ALG_AES);
+
+	/* bits for symmetric algorithm */
+	tpm_buf_append_u16(&template, AES_KEY_BITS);
+
+	/* algorithm mode (must be CFB) */
+	tpm_buf_append_u16(&template, TPM_ALG_CFB);
+
+	/* scheme (NULL means any scheme) */
+	tpm_buf_append_u16(&template, TPM_ALG_NULL);
+
+	/* ECC Curve ID */
+	tpm_buf_append_u16(&template, TPM2_ECC_NIST_P256);
+
+	/* KDF Scheme */
+	tpm_buf_append_u16(&template, TPM_ALG_NULL);
+
+	/* unique: key specific; for ECC it is two zero size points */
+	tpm_buf_append_u16(&template, 0);
+	tpm_buf_append_u16(&template, 0);
+
+	/* END parameters */
+
+	/* primary handle */
+	tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, hierarchy);
+	tpm_buf_append_empty_auth(&buf, TPM2_RS_PW);
+
+	/* sensitive create size is 4 for two empty buffers */
+	tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, 4);
+
+	/* sensitive create auth data (empty) */
+	tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, 0);
+
+	/* sensitive create sensitive data (empty) */
+	tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, 0);
+
+	/* the public template */
+	tpm_buf_append(&buf, template.data, template.length);
+	tpm_buf_destroy(&template);
+
+	/* outside info (empty) */
+	tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, 0);
+
+	/* creation PCR (none) */
+	tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, 0);
+
+	rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &buf, 0,
+			      "attempting to create NULL primary");
+
+	if (rc == TPM2_RC_SUCCESS)
+		rc = tpm2_parse_create_primary(chip, &buf, handle, hierarchy,
+					       name);
+
+	tpm_buf_destroy(&buf);
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static int tpm2_create_null_primary(struct tpm_chip *chip)
+{
+	u32 null_key;
+	int rc;
+
+	rc = tpm2_create_primary(chip, TPM2_RH_NULL, &null_key,
+				 chip->null_key_name);
+
+	if (rc == TPM2_RC_SUCCESS) {
+		unsigned int offset = 0; /* dummy offset for null key context */
+
+		rc = tpm2_save_context(chip, null_key, chip->null_key_context,
+				       sizeof(chip->null_key_context), &offset);
+		tpm2_flush_context(chip, null_key);
+	}
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tpm2_sessions_init() - start of day initialization for the sessions code
+ * @chip: TPM chip
+ *
+ * Derive and context save the null primary and allocate memory in the
+ * struct tpm_chip for the authorizations.
+ */
+int tpm2_sessions_init(struct tpm_chip *chip)
+{
+	int rc;
+
+	rc = tpm2_create_null_primary(chip);
+	if (rc)
+		dev_err(&chip->dev, "TPM: security failed (NULL seed derivation): %d\n", rc);
+
+	chip->auth = kmalloc(sizeof(*chip->auth), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!chip->auth)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	return rc;
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC */
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-space.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-space.c
index 363afdd4d1..4892d491da 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-space.c
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-space.c
@@ -68,8 +68,8 @@ void tpm2_del_space(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_space *space)
 	kfree(space->session_buf);
 }
 
-static int tpm2_load_context(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *buf,
-			     unsigned int *offset, u32 *handle)
+int tpm2_load_context(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *buf,
+		      unsigned int *offset, u32 *handle)
 {
 	struct tpm_buf tbuf;
 	struct tpm2_context *ctx;
@@ -105,6 +105,9 @@ static int tpm2_load_context(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *buf,
 		*handle = 0;
 		tpm_buf_destroy(&tbuf);
 		return -ENOENT;
+	} else if (tpm2_rc_value(rc) == TPM2_RC_INTEGRITY) {
+		tpm_buf_destroy(&tbuf);
+		return -EINVAL;
 	} else if (rc > 0) {
 		dev_warn(&chip->dev, "%s: failed with a TPM error 0x%04X\n",
 			 __func__, rc);
@@ -119,8 +122,8 @@ static int tpm2_load_context(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *buf,
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static int tpm2_save_context(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 handle, u8 *buf,
-			     unsigned int buf_size, unsigned int *offset)
+int tpm2_save_context(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 handle, u8 *buf,
+		      unsigned int buf_size, unsigned int *offset)
 {
 	struct tpm_buf tbuf;
 	unsigned int body_size;
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_infineon.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_infineon.c
index 9c924a1440..2d2ae37153 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_infineon.c
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_infineon.c
@@ -51,34 +51,40 @@ static struct tpm_inf_dev tpm_dev;
 
 static inline void tpm_data_out(unsigned char data, unsigned char offset)
 {
+#ifdef CONFIG_HAS_IOPORT
 	if (tpm_dev.iotype == TPM_INF_IO_PORT)
 		outb(data, tpm_dev.data_regs + offset);
 	else
+#endif
 		writeb(data, tpm_dev.mem_base + tpm_dev.data_regs + offset);
 }
 
 static inline unsigned char tpm_data_in(unsigned char offset)
 {
+#ifdef CONFIG_HAS_IOPORT
 	if (tpm_dev.iotype == TPM_INF_IO_PORT)
 		return inb(tpm_dev.data_regs + offset);
-	else
-		return readb(tpm_dev.mem_base + tpm_dev.data_regs + offset);
+#endif
+	return readb(tpm_dev.mem_base + tpm_dev.data_regs + offset);
 }
 
 static inline void tpm_config_out(unsigned char data, unsigned char offset)
 {
+#ifdef CONFIG_HAS_IOPORT
 	if (tpm_dev.iotype == TPM_INF_IO_PORT)
 		outb(data, tpm_dev.config_port + offset);
 	else
+#endif
 		writeb(data, tpm_dev.mem_base + tpm_dev.index_off + offset);
 }
 
 static inline unsigned char tpm_config_in(unsigned char offset)
 {
+#ifdef CONFIG_HAS_IOPORT
 	if (tpm_dev.iotype == TPM_INF_IO_PORT)
 		return inb(tpm_dev.config_port + offset);
-	else
-		return readb(tpm_dev.mem_base + tpm_dev.index_off + offset);
+#endif
+	return readb(tpm_dev.mem_base + tpm_dev.index_off + offset);
 }
 
 /* TPM header definitions */
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis_core.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis_core.c
index 0c20fbc089..fdef214b9f 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis_core.c
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis_core.c
@@ -1058,11 +1058,6 @@ static void tpm_tis_clkrun_enable(struct tpm_chip *chip, bool value)
 		clkrun_val &= ~LPC_CLKRUN_EN;
 		iowrite32(clkrun_val, data->ilb_base_addr + LPC_CNTRL_OFFSET);
 
-		/*
-		 * Write any random value on port 0x80 which is on LPC, to make
-		 * sure LPC clock is running before sending any TPM command.
-		 */
-		outb(0xCC, 0x80);
 	} else {
 		data->clkrun_enabled--;
 		if (data->clkrun_enabled)
@@ -1073,13 +1068,15 @@ static void tpm_tis_clkrun_enable(struct tpm_chip *chip, bool value)
 		/* Enable LPC CLKRUN# */
 		clkrun_val |= LPC_CLKRUN_EN;
 		iowrite32(clkrun_val, data->ilb_base_addr + LPC_CNTRL_OFFSET);
-
-		/*
-		 * Write any random value on port 0x80 which is on LPC, to make
-		 * sure LPC clock is running before sending any TPM command.
-		 */
-		outb(0xCC, 0x80);
 	}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_HAS_IOPORT
+	/*
+	 * Write any random value on port 0x80 which is on LPC, to make
+	 * sure LPC clock is running before sending any TPM command.
+	 */
+	outb(0xCC, 0x80);
+#endif
 }
 
 static const struct tpm_class_ops tpm_tis = {
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis_core.h b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis_core.h
index 13e99cf65e..690ad8e9b7 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis_core.h
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis_core.h
@@ -210,7 +210,7 @@ static inline int tpm_tis_verify_crc(struct tpm_tis_data *data, size_t len,
 static inline bool is_bsw(void)
 {
 #ifdef CONFIG_X86
-	return ((boot_cpu_data.x86_model == INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_AIRMONT) ? 1 : 0);
+	return (boot_cpu_data.x86_vfm == INTEL_ATOM_AIRMONT) ? 1 : 0;
 #else
 	return false;
 #endif
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis_spi_main.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis_spi_main.c
index c9eca24bba..61b42c83ce 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis_spi_main.c
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis_spi_main.c
@@ -318,6 +318,7 @@ static void tpm_tis_spi_remove(struct spi_device *dev)
 }
 
 static const struct spi_device_id tpm_tis_spi_id[] = {
+	{ "attpm20p", (unsigned long)tpm_tis_spi_probe },
 	{ "st33htpm-spi", (unsigned long)tpm_tis_spi_probe },
 	{ "slb9670", (unsigned long)tpm_tis_spi_probe },
 	{ "tpm_tis_spi", (unsigned long)tpm_tis_spi_probe },
diff --git a/drivers/char/virtio_console.c b/drivers/char/virtio_console.c
index 035f89f1a2..d9ee2dbc7e 100644
--- a/drivers/char/virtio_console.c
+++ b/drivers/char/virtio_console.c
@@ -2173,7 +2173,6 @@ static struct virtio_driver virtio_console = {
 	.feature_table = features,
 	.feature_table_size = ARRAY_SIZE(features),
 	.driver.name =	KBUILD_MODNAME,
-	.driver.owner =	THIS_MODULE,
 	.id_table =	id_table,
 	.probe =	virtcons_probe,
 	.remove =	virtcons_remove,
@@ -2188,7 +2187,6 @@ static struct virtio_driver virtio_rproc_serial = {
 	.feature_table = rproc_serial_features,
 	.feature_table_size = ARRAY_SIZE(rproc_serial_features),
 	.driver.name =	"virtio_rproc_serial",
-	.driver.owner =	THIS_MODULE,
 	.id_table =	rproc_serial_id_table,
 	.probe =	virtcons_probe,
 	.remove =	virtcons_remove,