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author | Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org> | 2024-04-11 08:27:49 +0000 |
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committer | Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org> | 2024-04-11 08:27:49 +0000 |
commit | ace9429bb58fd418f0c81d4c2835699bddf6bde6 (patch) | |
tree | b2d64bc10158fdd5497876388cd68142ca374ed3 /fs/ecryptfs/messaging.c | |
parent | Initial commit. (diff) | |
download | linux-ace9429bb58fd418f0c81d4c2835699bddf6bde6.tar.xz linux-ace9429bb58fd418f0c81d4c2835699bddf6bde6.zip |
Adding upstream version 6.6.15.upstream/6.6.15
Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'fs/ecryptfs/messaging.c')
-rw-r--r-- | fs/ecryptfs/messaging.c | 451 |
1 files changed, 451 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/fs/ecryptfs/messaging.c b/fs/ecryptfs/messaging.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..6318f3500e --- /dev/null +++ b/fs/ecryptfs/messaging.c @@ -0,0 +1,451 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only +/* + * eCryptfs: Linux filesystem encryption layer + * + * Copyright (C) 2004-2008 International Business Machines Corp. + * Author(s): Michael A. Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> + * Tyler Hicks <code@tyhicks.com> + */ +#include <linux/sched.h> +#include <linux/slab.h> +#include <linux/user_namespace.h> +#include <linux/nsproxy.h> +#include "ecryptfs_kernel.h" + +static LIST_HEAD(ecryptfs_msg_ctx_free_list); +static LIST_HEAD(ecryptfs_msg_ctx_alloc_list); +static DEFINE_MUTEX(ecryptfs_msg_ctx_lists_mux); + +static struct hlist_head *ecryptfs_daemon_hash; +DEFINE_MUTEX(ecryptfs_daemon_hash_mux); +static int ecryptfs_hash_bits; +#define ecryptfs_current_euid_hash(uid) \ + hash_long((unsigned long)from_kuid(&init_user_ns, current_euid()), ecryptfs_hash_bits) + +static u32 ecryptfs_msg_counter; +static struct ecryptfs_msg_ctx *ecryptfs_msg_ctx_arr; + +/** + * ecryptfs_acquire_free_msg_ctx + * @msg_ctx: The context that was acquired from the free list + * + * Acquires a context element from the free list and locks the mutex + * on the context. Sets the msg_ctx task to current. Returns zero on + * success; non-zero on error or upon failure to acquire a free + * context element. Must be called with ecryptfs_msg_ctx_lists_mux + * held. + */ +static int ecryptfs_acquire_free_msg_ctx(struct ecryptfs_msg_ctx **msg_ctx) +{ + struct list_head *p; + int rc; + + if (list_empty(&ecryptfs_msg_ctx_free_list)) { + printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: The eCryptfs free " + "context list is empty. It may be helpful to " + "specify the ecryptfs_message_buf_len " + "parameter to be greater than the current " + "value of [%d]\n", __func__, ecryptfs_message_buf_len); + rc = -ENOMEM; + goto out; + } + list_for_each(p, &ecryptfs_msg_ctx_free_list) { + *msg_ctx = list_entry(p, struct ecryptfs_msg_ctx, node); + if (mutex_trylock(&(*msg_ctx)->mux)) { + (*msg_ctx)->task = current; + rc = 0; + goto out; + } + } + rc = -ENOMEM; +out: + return rc; +} + +/** + * ecryptfs_msg_ctx_free_to_alloc + * @msg_ctx: The context to move from the free list to the alloc list + * + * Must be called with ecryptfs_msg_ctx_lists_mux held. + */ +static void ecryptfs_msg_ctx_free_to_alloc(struct ecryptfs_msg_ctx *msg_ctx) +{ + list_move(&msg_ctx->node, &ecryptfs_msg_ctx_alloc_list); + msg_ctx->state = ECRYPTFS_MSG_CTX_STATE_PENDING; + msg_ctx->counter = ++ecryptfs_msg_counter; +} + +/** + * ecryptfs_msg_ctx_alloc_to_free + * @msg_ctx: The context to move from the alloc list to the free list + * + * Must be called with ecryptfs_msg_ctx_lists_mux held. + */ +void ecryptfs_msg_ctx_alloc_to_free(struct ecryptfs_msg_ctx *msg_ctx) +{ + list_move(&(msg_ctx->node), &ecryptfs_msg_ctx_free_list); + kfree(msg_ctx->msg); + msg_ctx->msg = NULL; + msg_ctx->state = ECRYPTFS_MSG_CTX_STATE_FREE; +} + +/** + * ecryptfs_find_daemon_by_euid + * @daemon: If return value is zero, points to the desired daemon pointer + * + * Must be called with ecryptfs_daemon_hash_mux held. + * + * Search the hash list for the current effective user id. + * + * Returns zero if the user id exists in the list; non-zero otherwise. + */ +int ecryptfs_find_daemon_by_euid(struct ecryptfs_daemon **daemon) +{ + int rc; + + hlist_for_each_entry(*daemon, + &ecryptfs_daemon_hash[ecryptfs_current_euid_hash()], + euid_chain) { + if (uid_eq((*daemon)->file->f_cred->euid, current_euid())) { + rc = 0; + goto out; + } + } + rc = -EINVAL; +out: + return rc; +} + +/** + * ecryptfs_spawn_daemon - Create and initialize a new daemon struct + * @daemon: Pointer to set to newly allocated daemon struct + * @file: File used when opening /dev/ecryptfs + * + * Must be called ceremoniously while in possession of + * ecryptfs_sacred_daemon_hash_mux + * + * Returns zero on success; non-zero otherwise + */ +int +ecryptfs_spawn_daemon(struct ecryptfs_daemon **daemon, struct file *file) +{ + int rc = 0; + + (*daemon) = kzalloc(sizeof(**daemon), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!(*daemon)) { + rc = -ENOMEM; + goto out; + } + (*daemon)->file = file; + mutex_init(&(*daemon)->mux); + INIT_LIST_HEAD(&(*daemon)->msg_ctx_out_queue); + init_waitqueue_head(&(*daemon)->wait); + (*daemon)->num_queued_msg_ctx = 0; + hlist_add_head(&(*daemon)->euid_chain, + &ecryptfs_daemon_hash[ecryptfs_current_euid_hash()]); +out: + return rc; +} + +/* + * ecryptfs_exorcise_daemon - Destroy the daemon struct + * + * Must be called ceremoniously while in possession of + * ecryptfs_daemon_hash_mux and the daemon's own mux. + */ +int ecryptfs_exorcise_daemon(struct ecryptfs_daemon *daemon) +{ + struct ecryptfs_msg_ctx *msg_ctx, *msg_ctx_tmp; + int rc = 0; + + mutex_lock(&daemon->mux); + if ((daemon->flags & ECRYPTFS_DAEMON_IN_READ) + || (daemon->flags & ECRYPTFS_DAEMON_IN_POLL)) { + rc = -EBUSY; + mutex_unlock(&daemon->mux); + goto out; + } + list_for_each_entry_safe(msg_ctx, msg_ctx_tmp, + &daemon->msg_ctx_out_queue, daemon_out_list) { + list_del(&msg_ctx->daemon_out_list); + daemon->num_queued_msg_ctx--; + printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: Warning: dropping message that is in " + "the out queue of a dying daemon\n", __func__); + ecryptfs_msg_ctx_alloc_to_free(msg_ctx); + } + hlist_del(&daemon->euid_chain); + mutex_unlock(&daemon->mux); + kfree_sensitive(daemon); +out: + return rc; +} + +/** + * ecryptfs_process_response + * @daemon: eCryptfs daemon object + * @msg: The ecryptfs message received; the caller should sanity check + * msg->data_len and free the memory + * @seq: The sequence number of the message; must match the sequence + * number for the existing message context waiting for this + * response + * + * Processes a response message after sending an operation request to + * userspace. Some other process is awaiting this response. Before + * sending out its first communications, the other process allocated a + * msg_ctx from the ecryptfs_msg_ctx_arr at a particular index. The + * response message contains this index so that we can copy over the + * response message into the msg_ctx that the process holds a + * reference to. The other process is going to wake up, check to see + * that msg_ctx->state == ECRYPTFS_MSG_CTX_STATE_DONE, and then + * proceed to read off and process the response message. Returns zero + * upon delivery to desired context element; non-zero upon delivery + * failure or error. + * + * Returns zero on success; non-zero otherwise + */ +int ecryptfs_process_response(struct ecryptfs_daemon *daemon, + struct ecryptfs_message *msg, u32 seq) +{ + struct ecryptfs_msg_ctx *msg_ctx; + size_t msg_size; + int rc; + + if (msg->index >= ecryptfs_message_buf_len) { + rc = -EINVAL; + printk(KERN_ERR "%s: Attempt to reference " + "context buffer at index [%d]; maximum " + "allowable is [%d]\n", __func__, msg->index, + (ecryptfs_message_buf_len - 1)); + goto out; + } + msg_ctx = &ecryptfs_msg_ctx_arr[msg->index]; + mutex_lock(&msg_ctx->mux); + if (msg_ctx->state != ECRYPTFS_MSG_CTX_STATE_PENDING) { + rc = -EINVAL; + printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: Desired context element is not " + "pending a response\n", __func__); + goto unlock; + } else if (msg_ctx->counter != seq) { + rc = -EINVAL; + printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: Invalid message sequence; " + "expected [%d]; received [%d]\n", __func__, + msg_ctx->counter, seq); + goto unlock; + } + msg_size = (sizeof(*msg) + msg->data_len); + msg_ctx->msg = kmemdup(msg, msg_size, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!msg_ctx->msg) { + rc = -ENOMEM; + goto unlock; + } + msg_ctx->state = ECRYPTFS_MSG_CTX_STATE_DONE; + wake_up_process(msg_ctx->task); + rc = 0; +unlock: + mutex_unlock(&msg_ctx->mux); +out: + return rc; +} + +/** + * ecryptfs_send_message_locked + * @data: The data to send + * @data_len: The length of data + * @msg_type: Type of message + * @msg_ctx: The message context allocated for the send + * + * Must be called with ecryptfs_daemon_hash_mux held. + * + * Returns zero on success; non-zero otherwise + */ +static int +ecryptfs_send_message_locked(char *data, int data_len, u8 msg_type, + struct ecryptfs_msg_ctx **msg_ctx) +{ + struct ecryptfs_daemon *daemon; + int rc; + + rc = ecryptfs_find_daemon_by_euid(&daemon); + if (rc) { + rc = -ENOTCONN; + goto out; + } + mutex_lock(&ecryptfs_msg_ctx_lists_mux); + rc = ecryptfs_acquire_free_msg_ctx(msg_ctx); + if (rc) { + mutex_unlock(&ecryptfs_msg_ctx_lists_mux); + printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: Could not claim a free " + "context element\n", __func__); + goto out; + } + ecryptfs_msg_ctx_free_to_alloc(*msg_ctx); + mutex_unlock(&(*msg_ctx)->mux); + mutex_unlock(&ecryptfs_msg_ctx_lists_mux); + rc = ecryptfs_send_miscdev(data, data_len, *msg_ctx, msg_type, 0, + daemon); + if (rc) + printk(KERN_ERR "%s: Error attempting to send message to " + "userspace daemon; rc = [%d]\n", __func__, rc); +out: + return rc; +} + +/** + * ecryptfs_send_message + * @data: The data to send + * @data_len: The length of data + * @msg_ctx: The message context allocated for the send + * + * Grabs ecryptfs_daemon_hash_mux. + * + * Returns zero on success; non-zero otherwise + */ +int ecryptfs_send_message(char *data, int data_len, + struct ecryptfs_msg_ctx **msg_ctx) +{ + int rc; + + mutex_lock(&ecryptfs_daemon_hash_mux); + rc = ecryptfs_send_message_locked(data, data_len, ECRYPTFS_MSG_REQUEST, + msg_ctx); + mutex_unlock(&ecryptfs_daemon_hash_mux); + return rc; +} + +/** + * ecryptfs_wait_for_response + * @msg_ctx: The context that was assigned when sending a message + * @msg: The incoming message from userspace; not set if rc != 0 + * + * Sleeps until awaken by ecryptfs_receive_message or until the amount + * of time exceeds ecryptfs_message_wait_timeout. If zero is + * returned, msg will point to a valid message from userspace; a + * non-zero value is returned upon failure to receive a message or an + * error occurs. Callee must free @msg on success. + */ +int ecryptfs_wait_for_response(struct ecryptfs_msg_ctx *msg_ctx, + struct ecryptfs_message **msg) +{ + signed long timeout = ecryptfs_message_wait_timeout * HZ; + int rc = 0; + +sleep: + timeout = schedule_timeout_interruptible(timeout); + mutex_lock(&ecryptfs_msg_ctx_lists_mux); + mutex_lock(&msg_ctx->mux); + if (msg_ctx->state != ECRYPTFS_MSG_CTX_STATE_DONE) { + if (timeout) { + mutex_unlock(&msg_ctx->mux); + mutex_unlock(&ecryptfs_msg_ctx_lists_mux); + goto sleep; + } + rc = -ENOMSG; + } else { + *msg = msg_ctx->msg; + msg_ctx->msg = NULL; + } + ecryptfs_msg_ctx_alloc_to_free(msg_ctx); + mutex_unlock(&msg_ctx->mux); + mutex_unlock(&ecryptfs_msg_ctx_lists_mux); + return rc; +} + +int __init ecryptfs_init_messaging(void) +{ + int i; + int rc = 0; + + if (ecryptfs_number_of_users > ECRYPTFS_MAX_NUM_USERS) { + ecryptfs_number_of_users = ECRYPTFS_MAX_NUM_USERS; + printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: Specified number of users is " + "too large, defaulting to [%d] users\n", __func__, + ecryptfs_number_of_users); + } + mutex_lock(&ecryptfs_daemon_hash_mux); + ecryptfs_hash_bits = 1; + while (ecryptfs_number_of_users >> ecryptfs_hash_bits) + ecryptfs_hash_bits++; + ecryptfs_daemon_hash = kmalloc((sizeof(struct hlist_head) + * (1 << ecryptfs_hash_bits)), + GFP_KERNEL); + if (!ecryptfs_daemon_hash) { + rc = -ENOMEM; + mutex_unlock(&ecryptfs_daemon_hash_mux); + goto out; + } + for (i = 0; i < (1 << ecryptfs_hash_bits); i++) + INIT_HLIST_HEAD(&ecryptfs_daemon_hash[i]); + mutex_unlock(&ecryptfs_daemon_hash_mux); + ecryptfs_msg_ctx_arr = kmalloc((sizeof(struct ecryptfs_msg_ctx) + * ecryptfs_message_buf_len), + GFP_KERNEL); + if (!ecryptfs_msg_ctx_arr) { + kfree(ecryptfs_daemon_hash); + rc = -ENOMEM; + goto out; + } + mutex_lock(&ecryptfs_msg_ctx_lists_mux); + ecryptfs_msg_counter = 0; + for (i = 0; i < ecryptfs_message_buf_len; i++) { + INIT_LIST_HEAD(&ecryptfs_msg_ctx_arr[i].node); + INIT_LIST_HEAD(&ecryptfs_msg_ctx_arr[i].daemon_out_list); + mutex_init(&ecryptfs_msg_ctx_arr[i].mux); + mutex_lock(&ecryptfs_msg_ctx_arr[i].mux); + ecryptfs_msg_ctx_arr[i].index = i; + ecryptfs_msg_ctx_arr[i].state = ECRYPTFS_MSG_CTX_STATE_FREE; + ecryptfs_msg_ctx_arr[i].counter = 0; + ecryptfs_msg_ctx_arr[i].task = NULL; + ecryptfs_msg_ctx_arr[i].msg = NULL; + list_add_tail(&ecryptfs_msg_ctx_arr[i].node, + &ecryptfs_msg_ctx_free_list); + mutex_unlock(&ecryptfs_msg_ctx_arr[i].mux); + } + mutex_unlock(&ecryptfs_msg_ctx_lists_mux); + rc = ecryptfs_init_ecryptfs_miscdev(); + if (rc) + ecryptfs_release_messaging(); +out: + return rc; +} + +void ecryptfs_release_messaging(void) +{ + if (ecryptfs_msg_ctx_arr) { + int i; + + mutex_lock(&ecryptfs_msg_ctx_lists_mux); + for (i = 0; i < ecryptfs_message_buf_len; i++) { + mutex_lock(&ecryptfs_msg_ctx_arr[i].mux); + kfree(ecryptfs_msg_ctx_arr[i].msg); + mutex_unlock(&ecryptfs_msg_ctx_arr[i].mux); + } + kfree(ecryptfs_msg_ctx_arr); + mutex_unlock(&ecryptfs_msg_ctx_lists_mux); + } + if (ecryptfs_daemon_hash) { + struct ecryptfs_daemon *daemon; + struct hlist_node *n; + int i; + + mutex_lock(&ecryptfs_daemon_hash_mux); + for (i = 0; i < (1 << ecryptfs_hash_bits); i++) { + int rc; + + hlist_for_each_entry_safe(daemon, n, + &ecryptfs_daemon_hash[i], + euid_chain) { + rc = ecryptfs_exorcise_daemon(daemon); + if (rc) + printk(KERN_ERR "%s: Error whilst " + "attempting to destroy daemon; " + "rc = [%d]. Dazed and confused, " + "but trying to continue.\n", + __func__, rc); + } + } + kfree(ecryptfs_daemon_hash); + mutex_unlock(&ecryptfs_daemon_hash_mux); + } + ecryptfs_destroy_ecryptfs_miscdev(); + return; +} |