Merging upstream version 6.9.7.

Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>

5 files changed, 27 insertions, 34 deletions

diff --git a/fs/verity/fsverity_private.h b/fs/verity/fsverity_private.h
index a6a6b27492..b3506f56e1 100644
--- a/fs/verity/fsverity_private.h
+++ b/fs/verity/fsverity_private.h
@@ -69,7 +69,6 @@ struct fsverity_info {
 	u8 file_digest[FS_VERITY_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE];
 	const struct inode *inode;
 	unsigned long *hash_block_verified;
-	spinlock_t hash_page_init_lock;
 };
 
 #define FS_VERITY_MAX_SIGNATURE_SIZE	(FS_VERITY_MAX_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE - \
diff --git a/fs/verity/init.c b/fs/verity/init.c
index cb2c9aac61..f440f0e61e 100644
--- a/fs/verity/init.c
+++ b/fs/verity/init.c
@@ -10,8 +10,6 @@
 #include <linux/ratelimit.h>
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL
-static struct ctl_table_header *fsverity_sysctl_header;
-
 static struct ctl_table fsverity_sysctl_table[] = {
 #ifdef CONFIG_FS_VERITY_BUILTIN_SIGNATURES
 	{
@@ -28,10 +26,7 @@ static struct ctl_table fsverity_sysctl_table[] = {
 
 static void __init fsverity_init_sysctl(void)
 {
-	fsverity_sysctl_header = register_sysctl("fs/verity",
-						 fsverity_sysctl_table);
-	if (!fsverity_sysctl_header)
-		panic("fsverity sysctl registration failed");
+	register_sysctl_init("fs/verity", fsverity_sysctl_table);
 }
 #else /* CONFIG_SYSCTL */
 static inline void fsverity_init_sysctl(void)
diff --git a/fs/verity/measure.c b/fs/verity/measure.c
index bf7a5f4ccc..3969d54158 100644
--- a/fs/verity/measure.c
+++ b/fs/verity/measure.c
@@ -159,9 +159,9 @@ __bpf_kfunc int bpf_get_fsverity_digest(struct file *file, struct bpf_dynptr_ker
 
 __bpf_kfunc_end_defs();
 
-BTF_SET8_START(fsverity_set_ids)
+BTF_KFUNCS_START(fsverity_set_ids)
 BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_get_fsverity_digest, KF_TRUSTED_ARGS)
-BTF_SET8_END(fsverity_set_ids)
+BTF_KFUNCS_END(fsverity_set_ids)
 
 static int bpf_get_fsverity_digest_filter(const struct bpf_prog *prog, u32 kfunc_id)
 {
diff --git a/fs/verity/open.c b/fs/verity/open.c
index 6c31a871b8..fdeb95eca3 100644
--- a/fs/verity/open.c
+++ b/fs/verity/open.c
@@ -239,7 +239,6 @@ struct fsverity_info *fsverity_create_info(const struct inode *inode,
 			err = -ENOMEM;
 			goto fail;
 		}
-		spin_lock_init(&vi->hash_page_init_lock);
 	}
 
 	return vi;
diff --git a/fs/verity/verify.c b/fs/verity/verify.c
index 904ccd7e8e..4fcad0825a 100644
--- a/fs/verity/verify.c
+++ b/fs/verity/verify.c
@@ -19,7 +19,6 @@ static struct workqueue_struct *fsverity_read_workqueue;
 static bool is_hash_block_verified(struct fsverity_info *vi, struct page *hpage,
 				   unsigned long hblock_idx)
 {
-	bool verified;
 	unsigned int blocks_per_page;
 	unsigned int i;
 
@@ -43,12 +42,20 @@ static bool is_hash_block_verified(struct fsverity_info *vi, struct page *hpage,
 	 * re-instantiated from the backing storage are re-verified.  To do
 	 * this, we use PG_checked again, but now it doesn't really mean
 	 * "checked".  Instead, now it just serves as an indicator for whether
-	 * the hash page is newly instantiated or not.
+	 * the hash page is newly instantiated or not.  If the page is new, as
+	 * indicated by PG_checked=0, we clear the bitmap bits for the page's
+	 * blocks since they are untrustworthy, then set PG_checked=1.
+	 * Otherwise we return the bitmap bit for the requested block.
 	 *
-	 * The first thread that sees PG_checked=0 must clear the corresponding
-	 * bitmap bits, then set PG_checked=1.  This requires a spinlock.  To
-	 * avoid having to take this spinlock in the common case of
-	 * PG_checked=1, we start with an opportunistic lockless read.
+	 * Multiple threads may execute this code concurrently on the same page.
+	 * This is safe because we use memory barriers to ensure that if a
+	 * thread sees PG_checked=1, then it also sees the associated bitmap
+	 * clearing to have occurred.  Also, all writes and their corresponding
+	 * reads are atomic, and all writes are safe to repeat in the event that
+	 * multiple threads get into the PG_checked=0 section.  (Clearing a
+	 * bitmap bit again at worst causes a hash block to be verified
+	 * redundantly.  That event should be very rare, so it's not worth using
+	 * a lock to avoid.  Setting PG_checked again has no effect.)
 	 */
 	if (PageChecked(hpage)) {
 		/*
@@ -58,24 +65,17 @@ static bool is_hash_block_verified(struct fsverity_info *vi, struct page *hpage,
 		smp_rmb();
 		return test_bit(hblock_idx, vi->hash_block_verified);
 	}
-	spin_lock(&vi->hash_page_init_lock);
-	if (PageChecked(hpage)) {
-		verified = test_bit(hblock_idx, vi->hash_block_verified);
-	} else {
-		blocks_per_page = vi->tree_params.blocks_per_page;
-		hblock_idx = round_down(hblock_idx, blocks_per_page);
-		for (i = 0; i < blocks_per_page; i++)
-			clear_bit(hblock_idx + i, vi->hash_block_verified);
-		/*
-		 * A write memory barrier is needed here to give RELEASE
-		 * semantics to the below SetPageChecked() operation.
-		 */
-		smp_wmb();
-		SetPageChecked(hpage);
-		verified = false;
-	}
-	spin_unlock(&vi->hash_page_init_lock);
-	return verified;
+	blocks_per_page = vi->tree_params.blocks_per_page;
+	hblock_idx = round_down(hblock_idx, blocks_per_page);
+	for (i = 0; i < blocks_per_page; i++)
+		clear_bit(hblock_idx + i, vi->hash_block_verified);
+	/*
+	 * A write memory barrier is needed here to give RELEASE semantics to
+	 * the below SetPageChecked() operation.
+	 */
+	smp_wmb();
+	SetPageChecked(hpage);
+	return false;
 }
 
 /*