Adding upstream version 6.6.15.upstream/6.6.15

Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>

1 files changed, 212 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/include/net/scm.h b/include/net/scm.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..e8c76b4be2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/include/net/scm.h
@@ -0,0 +1,212 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+#ifndef __LINUX_NET_SCM_H
+#define __LINUX_NET_SCM_H
+
+#include <linux/limits.h>
+#include <linux/net.h>
+#include <linux/cred.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
+#include <linux/pid.h>
+#include <linux/nsproxy.h>
+#include <linux/sched/signal.h>
+#include <net/compat.h>
+
+/* Well, we should have at least one descriptor open
+ * to accept passed FDs 8)
+ */
+#define SCM_MAX_FD	253
+
+struct scm_creds {
+	u32	pid;
+	kuid_t	uid;
+	kgid_t	gid;
+};
+
+struct scm_fp_list {
+	short			count;
+	short			max;
+	struct user_struct	*user;
+	struct file		*fp[SCM_MAX_FD];
+};
+
+struct scm_cookie {
+	struct pid		*pid;		/* Skb credentials */
+	struct scm_fp_list	*fp;		/* Passed files		*/
+	struct scm_creds	creds;		/* Skb credentials	*/
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
+	u32			secid;		/* Passed security ID 	*/
+#endif
+};
+
+void scm_detach_fds(struct msghdr *msg, struct scm_cookie *scm);
+void scm_detach_fds_compat(struct msghdr *msg, struct scm_cookie *scm);
+int __scm_send(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, struct scm_cookie *scm);
+void __scm_destroy(struct scm_cookie *scm);
+struct scm_fp_list *scm_fp_dup(struct scm_fp_list *fpl);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
+static __inline__ void unix_get_peersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct scm_cookie *scm)
+{
+	security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(sock, NULL, &scm->secid);
+}
+#else
+static __inline__ void unix_get_peersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct scm_cookie *scm)
+{ }
+#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK */
+
+static __inline__ void scm_set_cred(struct scm_cookie *scm,
+				    struct pid *pid, kuid_t uid, kgid_t gid)
+{
+	scm->pid  = get_pid(pid);
+	scm->creds.pid = pid_vnr(pid);
+	scm->creds.uid = uid;
+	scm->creds.gid = gid;
+}
+
+static __inline__ void scm_destroy_cred(struct scm_cookie *scm)
+{
+	put_pid(scm->pid);
+	scm->pid  = NULL;
+}
+
+static __inline__ void scm_destroy(struct scm_cookie *scm)
+{
+	scm_destroy_cred(scm);
+	if (scm->fp)
+		__scm_destroy(scm);
+}
+
+static __inline__ int scm_send(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
+			       struct scm_cookie *scm, bool forcecreds)
+{
+	memset(scm, 0, sizeof(*scm));
+	scm->creds.uid = INVALID_UID;
+	scm->creds.gid = INVALID_GID;
+	if (forcecreds)
+		scm_set_cred(scm, task_tgid(current), current_uid(), current_gid());
+	unix_get_peersec_dgram(sock, scm);
+	if (msg->msg_controllen <= 0)
+		return 0;
+	return __scm_send(sock, msg, scm);
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
+static inline void scm_passec(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, struct scm_cookie *scm)
+{
+	char *secdata;
+	u32 seclen;
+	int err;
+
+	if (test_bit(SOCK_PASSSEC, &sock->flags)) {
+		err = security_secid_to_secctx(scm->secid, &secdata, &seclen);
+
+		if (!err) {
+			put_cmsg(msg, SOL_SOCKET, SCM_SECURITY, seclen, secdata);
+			security_release_secctx(secdata, seclen);
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+static inline bool scm_has_secdata(struct socket *sock)
+{
+	return test_bit(SOCK_PASSSEC, &sock->flags);
+}
+#else
+static inline void scm_passec(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, struct scm_cookie *scm)
+{ }
+
+static inline bool scm_has_secdata(struct socket *sock)
+{
+	return false;
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK */
+
+static __inline__ void scm_pidfd_recv(struct msghdr *msg, struct scm_cookie *scm)
+{
+	struct file *pidfd_file = NULL;
+	int len, pidfd;
+
+	/* put_cmsg() doesn't return an error if CMSG is truncated,
+	 * that's why we need to opencode these checks here.
+	 */
+	if (msg->msg_flags & MSG_CMSG_COMPAT)
+		len = sizeof(struct compat_cmsghdr) + sizeof(int);
+	else
+		len = sizeof(struct cmsghdr) + sizeof(int);
+
+	if (msg->msg_controllen < len) {
+		msg->msg_flags |= MSG_CTRUNC;
+		return;
+	}
+
+	if (!scm->pid)
+		return;
+
+	pidfd = pidfd_prepare(scm->pid, 0, &pidfd_file);
+
+	if (put_cmsg(msg, SOL_SOCKET, SCM_PIDFD, sizeof(int), &pidfd)) {
+		if (pidfd_file) {
+			put_unused_fd(pidfd);
+			fput(pidfd_file);
+		}
+
+		return;
+	}
+
+	if (pidfd_file)
+		fd_install(pidfd, pidfd_file);
+}
+
+static inline bool __scm_recv_common(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
+				     struct scm_cookie *scm, int flags)
+{
+	if (!msg->msg_control) {
+		if (test_bit(SOCK_PASSCRED, &sock->flags) ||
+		    test_bit(SOCK_PASSPIDFD, &sock->flags) ||
+		    scm->fp || scm_has_secdata(sock))
+			msg->msg_flags |= MSG_CTRUNC;
+		scm_destroy(scm);
+		return false;
+	}
+
+	if (test_bit(SOCK_PASSCRED, &sock->flags)) {
+		struct user_namespace *current_ns = current_user_ns();
+		struct ucred ucreds = {
+			.pid = scm->creds.pid,
+			.uid = from_kuid_munged(current_ns, scm->creds.uid),
+			.gid = from_kgid_munged(current_ns, scm->creds.gid),
+		};
+		put_cmsg(msg, SOL_SOCKET, SCM_CREDENTIALS, sizeof(ucreds), &ucreds);
+	}
+
+	scm_passec(sock, msg, scm);
+
+	if (scm->fp)
+		scm_detach_fds(msg, scm);
+
+	return true;
+}
+
+static inline void scm_recv(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
+			    struct scm_cookie *scm, int flags)
+{
+	if (!__scm_recv_common(sock, msg, scm, flags))
+		return;
+
+	scm_destroy_cred(scm);
+}
+
+static inline void scm_recv_unix(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
+				 struct scm_cookie *scm, int flags)
+{
+	if (!__scm_recv_common(sock, msg, scm, flags))
+		return;
+
+	if (test_bit(SOCK_PASSPIDFD, &sock->flags))
+		scm_pidfd_recv(msg, scm);
+
+	scm_destroy_cred(scm);
+}
+
+#endif /* __LINUX_NET_SCM_H */
+