Adding upstream version 6.8.9.upstream/6.8.9

Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>

1 files changed, 62 insertions, 79 deletions

diff --git a/kernel/ptrace.c b/kernel/ptrace.c
index d8b5e13a22..2fabd497d6 100644
--- a/kernel/ptrace.c
+++ b/kernel/ptrace.c
@@ -145,20 +145,9 @@ void __ptrace_unlink(struct task_struct *child)
 	 */
 	if (!(child->flags & PF_EXITING) &&
 	    (child->signal->flags & SIGNAL_STOP_STOPPED ||
-	     child->signal->group_stop_count)) {
+	     child->signal->group_stop_count))
 		child->jobctl |= JOBCTL_STOP_PENDING;
 
-		/*
-		 * This is only possible if this thread was cloned by the
-		 * traced task running in the stopped group, set the signal
-		 * for the future reports.
-		 * FIXME: we should change ptrace_init_task() to handle this
-		 * case.
-		 */
-		if (!(child->jobctl & JOBCTL_STOP_SIGMASK))
-			child->jobctl |= SIGSTOP;
-	}
-
 	/*
 	 * If transition to TASK_STOPPED is pending or in TASK_TRACED, kick
 	 * @child in the butt.  Note that @resume should be used iff @child
@@ -386,6 +375,34 @@ static int check_ptrace_options(unsigned long data)
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static inline void ptrace_set_stopped(struct task_struct *task)
+{
+	guard(spinlock)(&task->sighand->siglock);
+
+	/*
+	 * If the task is already STOPPED, set JOBCTL_TRAP_STOP and
+	 * TRAPPING, and kick it so that it transits to TRACED.  TRAPPING
+	 * will be cleared if the child completes the transition or any
+	 * event which clears the group stop states happens.  We'll wait
+	 * for the transition to complete before returning from this
+	 * function.
+	 *
+	 * This hides STOPPED -> RUNNING -> TRACED transition from the
+	 * attaching thread but a different thread in the same group can
+	 * still observe the transient RUNNING state.  IOW, if another
+	 * thread's WNOHANG wait(2) on the stopped tracee races against
+	 * ATTACH, the wait(2) may fail due to the transient RUNNING.
+	 *
+	 * The following task_is_stopped() test is safe as both transitions
+	 * in and out of STOPPED are protected by siglock.
+	 */
+	if (task_is_stopped(task) &&
+	    task_set_jobctl_pending(task, JOBCTL_TRAP_STOP | JOBCTL_TRAPPING)) {
+		task->jobctl &= ~JOBCTL_STOPPED;
+		signal_wake_up_state(task, __TASK_STOPPED);
+	}
+}
+
 static int ptrace_attach(struct task_struct *task, long request,
 			 unsigned long addr,
 			 unsigned long flags)
@@ -393,17 +410,17 @@ static int ptrace_attach(struct task_struct *task, long request,
 	bool seize = (request == PTRACE_SEIZE);
 	int retval;
 
-	retval = -EIO;
 	if (seize) {
 		if (addr != 0)
-			goto out;
+			return -EIO;
 		/*
 		 * This duplicates the check in check_ptrace_options() because
 		 * ptrace_attach() and ptrace_setoptions() have historically
 		 * used different error codes for unknown ptrace options.
 		 */
 		if (flags & ~(unsigned long)PTRACE_O_MASK)
-			goto out;
+			return -EIO;
+
 		retval = check_ptrace_options(flags);
 		if (retval)
 			return retval;
@@ -414,88 +431,54 @@ static int ptrace_attach(struct task_struct *task, long request,
 
 	audit_ptrace(task);
 
-	retval = -EPERM;
 	if (unlikely(task->flags & PF_KTHREAD))
-		goto out;
+		return -EPERM;
 	if (same_thread_group(task, current))
-		goto out;
+		return -EPERM;
 
 	/*
 	 * Protect exec's credential calculations against our interference;
 	 * SUID, SGID and LSM creds get determined differently
 	 * under ptrace.
 	 */
-	retval = -ERESTARTNOINTR;
-	if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&task->signal->cred_guard_mutex))
-		goto out;
+	scoped_cond_guard (mutex_intr, return -ERESTARTNOINTR,
+			   &task->signal->cred_guard_mutex) {
 
-	task_lock(task);
-	retval = __ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH_REALCREDS);
-	task_unlock(task);
-	if (retval)
-		goto unlock_creds;
+		scoped_guard (task_lock, task) {
+			retval = __ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH_REALCREDS);
+			if (retval)
+				return retval;
+		}
 
-	write_lock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
-	retval = -EPERM;
-	if (unlikely(task->exit_state))
-		goto unlock_tasklist;
-	if (task->ptrace)
-		goto unlock_tasklist;
+		scoped_guard (write_lock_irq, &tasklist_lock) {
+			if (unlikely(task->exit_state))
+				return -EPERM;
+			if (task->ptrace)
+				return -EPERM;
 
-	task->ptrace = flags;
+			task->ptrace = flags;
 
-	ptrace_link(task, current);
+			ptrace_link(task, current);
 
-	/* SEIZE doesn't trap tracee on attach */
-	if (!seize)
-		send_sig_info(SIGSTOP, SEND_SIG_PRIV, task);
+			/* SEIZE doesn't trap tracee on attach */
+			if (!seize)
+				send_sig_info(SIGSTOP, SEND_SIG_PRIV, task);
 
-	spin_lock(&task->sighand->siglock);
+			ptrace_set_stopped(task);
+		}
+	}
 
 	/*
-	 * If the task is already STOPPED, set JOBCTL_TRAP_STOP and
-	 * TRAPPING, and kick it so that it transits to TRACED.  TRAPPING
-	 * will be cleared if the child completes the transition or any
-	 * event which clears the group stop states happens.  We'll wait
-	 * for the transition to complete before returning from this
-	 * function.
-	 *
-	 * This hides STOPPED -> RUNNING -> TRACED transition from the
-	 * attaching thread but a different thread in the same group can
-	 * still observe the transient RUNNING state.  IOW, if another
-	 * thread's WNOHANG wait(2) on the stopped tracee races against
-	 * ATTACH, the wait(2) may fail due to the transient RUNNING.
-	 *
-	 * The following task_is_stopped() test is safe as both transitions
-	 * in and out of STOPPED are protected by siglock.
+	 * We do not bother to change retval or clear JOBCTL_TRAPPING
+	 * if wait_on_bit() was interrupted by SIGKILL. The tracer will
+	 * not return to user-mode, it will exit and clear this bit in
+	 * __ptrace_unlink() if it wasn't already cleared by the tracee;
+	 * and until then nobody can ptrace this task.
 	 */
-	if (task_is_stopped(task) &&
-	    task_set_jobctl_pending(task, JOBCTL_TRAP_STOP | JOBCTL_TRAPPING)) {
-		task->jobctl &= ~JOBCTL_STOPPED;
-		signal_wake_up_state(task, __TASK_STOPPED);
-	}
-
-	spin_unlock(&task->sighand->siglock);
-
-	retval = 0;
-unlock_tasklist:
-	write_unlock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
-unlock_creds:
-	mutex_unlock(&task->signal->cred_guard_mutex);
-out:
-	if (!retval) {
-		/*
-		 * We do not bother to change retval or clear JOBCTL_TRAPPING
-		 * if wait_on_bit() was interrupted by SIGKILL. The tracer will
-		 * not return to user-mode, it will exit and clear this bit in
-		 * __ptrace_unlink() if it wasn't already cleared by the tracee;
-		 * and until then nobody can ptrace this task.
-		 */
-		wait_on_bit(&task->jobctl, JOBCTL_TRAPPING_BIT, TASK_KILLABLE);
-		proc_ptrace_connector(task, PTRACE_ATTACH);
-	}
+	wait_on_bit(&task->jobctl, JOBCTL_TRAPPING_BIT, TASK_KILLABLE);
+	proc_ptrace_connector(task, PTRACE_ATTACH);
 
-	return retval;
+	return 0;
 }
 
 /**