Adding upstream version 6.6.15.upstream/6.6.15

Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>

1 files changed, 295 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/mm/secretmem.c b/mm/secretmem.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..3afb5ad701
--- /dev/null
+++ b/mm/secretmem.c
@@ -0,0 +1,295 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * Copyright IBM Corporation, 2021
+ *
+ * Author: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>
+ */
+
+#include <linux/mm.h>
+#include <linux/fs.h>
+#include <linux/swap.h>
+#include <linux/mount.h>
+#include <linux/memfd.h>
+#include <linux/bitops.h>
+#include <linux/printk.h>
+#include <linux/pagemap.h>
+#include <linux/syscalls.h>
+#include <linux/pseudo_fs.h>
+#include <linux/secretmem.h>
+#include <linux/set_memory.h>
+#include <linux/sched/signal.h>
+
+#include <uapi/linux/magic.h>
+
+#include <asm/tlbflush.h>
+
+#include "internal.h"
+
+#undef pr_fmt
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) "secretmem: " fmt
+
+/*
+ * Define mode and flag masks to allow validation of the system call
+ * parameters.
+ */
+#define SECRETMEM_MODE_MASK	(0x0)
+#define SECRETMEM_FLAGS_MASK	SECRETMEM_MODE_MASK
+
+static bool secretmem_enable __ro_after_init = 1;
+module_param_named(enable, secretmem_enable, bool, 0400);
+MODULE_PARM_DESC(secretmem_enable,
+		 "Enable secretmem and memfd_secret(2) system call");
+
+static atomic_t secretmem_users;
+
+bool secretmem_active(void)
+{
+	return !!atomic_read(&secretmem_users);
+}
+
+static vm_fault_t secretmem_fault(struct vm_fault *vmf)
+{
+	struct address_space *mapping = vmf->vma->vm_file->f_mapping;
+	struct inode *inode = file_inode(vmf->vma->vm_file);
+	pgoff_t offset = vmf->pgoff;
+	gfp_t gfp = vmf->gfp_mask;
+	unsigned long addr;
+	struct page *page;
+	struct folio *folio;
+	vm_fault_t ret;
+	int err;
+
+	if (((loff_t)vmf->pgoff << PAGE_SHIFT) >= i_size_read(inode))
+		return vmf_error(-EINVAL);
+
+	filemap_invalidate_lock_shared(mapping);
+
+retry:
+	page = find_lock_page(mapping, offset);
+	if (!page) {
+		folio = folio_alloc(gfp | __GFP_ZERO, 0);
+		if (!folio) {
+			ret = VM_FAULT_OOM;
+			goto out;
+		}
+
+		page = &folio->page;
+		err = set_direct_map_invalid_noflush(page);
+		if (err) {
+			folio_put(folio);
+			ret = vmf_error(err);
+			goto out;
+		}
+
+		__folio_mark_uptodate(folio);
+		err = filemap_add_folio(mapping, folio, offset, gfp);
+		if (unlikely(err)) {
+			folio_put(folio);
+			/*
+			 * If a split of large page was required, it
+			 * already happened when we marked the page invalid
+			 * which guarantees that this call won't fail
+			 */
+			set_direct_map_default_noflush(page);
+			if (err == -EEXIST)
+				goto retry;
+
+			ret = vmf_error(err);
+			goto out;
+		}
+
+		addr = (unsigned long)page_address(page);
+		flush_tlb_kernel_range(addr, addr + PAGE_SIZE);
+	}
+
+	vmf->page = page;
+	ret = VM_FAULT_LOCKED;
+
+out:
+	filemap_invalidate_unlock_shared(mapping);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static const struct vm_operations_struct secretmem_vm_ops = {
+	.fault = secretmem_fault,
+};
+
+static int secretmem_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
+{
+	atomic_dec(&secretmem_users);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int secretmem_mmap(struct file *file, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
+{
+	unsigned long len = vma->vm_end - vma->vm_start;
+
+	if ((vma->vm_flags & (VM_SHARED | VM_MAYSHARE)) == 0)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (!mlock_future_ok(vma->vm_mm, vma->vm_flags | VM_LOCKED, len))
+		return -EAGAIN;
+
+	vm_flags_set(vma, VM_LOCKED | VM_DONTDUMP);
+	vma->vm_ops = &secretmem_vm_ops;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+bool vma_is_secretmem(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
+{
+	return vma->vm_ops == &secretmem_vm_ops;
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations secretmem_fops = {
+	.release	= secretmem_release,
+	.mmap		= secretmem_mmap,
+};
+
+static int secretmem_migrate_folio(struct address_space *mapping,
+		struct folio *dst, struct folio *src, enum migrate_mode mode)
+{
+	return -EBUSY;
+}
+
+static void secretmem_free_folio(struct folio *folio)
+{
+	set_direct_map_default_noflush(&folio->page);
+	folio_zero_segment(folio, 0, folio_size(folio));
+}
+
+const struct address_space_operations secretmem_aops = {
+	.dirty_folio	= noop_dirty_folio,
+	.free_folio	= secretmem_free_folio,
+	.migrate_folio	= secretmem_migrate_folio,
+};
+
+static int secretmem_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
+			     struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
+{
+	struct inode *inode = d_inode(dentry);
+	struct address_space *mapping = inode->i_mapping;
+	unsigned int ia_valid = iattr->ia_valid;
+	int ret;
+
+	filemap_invalidate_lock(mapping);
+
+	if ((ia_valid & ATTR_SIZE) && inode->i_size)
+		ret = -EINVAL;
+	else
+		ret = simple_setattr(idmap, dentry, iattr);
+
+	filemap_invalidate_unlock(mapping);
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static const struct inode_operations secretmem_iops = {
+	.setattr = secretmem_setattr,
+};
+
+static struct vfsmount *secretmem_mnt;
+
+static struct file *secretmem_file_create(unsigned long flags)
+{
+	struct file *file;
+	struct inode *inode;
+	const char *anon_name = "[secretmem]";
+	const struct qstr qname = QSTR_INIT(anon_name, strlen(anon_name));
+	int err;
+
+	inode = alloc_anon_inode(secretmem_mnt->mnt_sb);
+	if (IS_ERR(inode))
+		return ERR_CAST(inode);
+
+	err = security_inode_init_security_anon(inode, &qname, NULL);
+	if (err) {
+		file = ERR_PTR(err);
+		goto err_free_inode;
+	}
+
+	file = alloc_file_pseudo(inode, secretmem_mnt, "secretmem",
+				 O_RDWR, &secretmem_fops);
+	if (IS_ERR(file))
+		goto err_free_inode;
+
+	mapping_set_gfp_mask(inode->i_mapping, GFP_HIGHUSER);
+	mapping_set_unevictable(inode->i_mapping);
+
+	inode->i_op = &secretmem_iops;
+	inode->i_mapping->a_ops = &secretmem_aops;
+
+	/* pretend we are a normal file with zero size */
+	inode->i_mode |= S_IFREG;
+	inode->i_size = 0;
+
+	return file;
+
+err_free_inode:
+	iput(inode);
+	return file;
+}
+
+SYSCALL_DEFINE1(memfd_secret, unsigned int, flags)
+{
+	struct file *file;
+	int fd, err;
+
+	/* make sure local flags do not confict with global fcntl.h */
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(SECRETMEM_FLAGS_MASK & O_CLOEXEC);
+
+	if (!secretmem_enable)
+		return -ENOSYS;
+
+	if (flags & ~(SECRETMEM_FLAGS_MASK | O_CLOEXEC))
+		return -EINVAL;
+	if (atomic_read(&secretmem_users) < 0)
+		return -ENFILE;
+
+	fd = get_unused_fd_flags(flags & O_CLOEXEC);
+	if (fd < 0)
+		return fd;
+
+	file = secretmem_file_create(flags);
+	if (IS_ERR(file)) {
+		err = PTR_ERR(file);
+		goto err_put_fd;
+	}
+
+	file->f_flags |= O_LARGEFILE;
+
+	atomic_inc(&secretmem_users);
+	fd_install(fd, file);
+	return fd;
+
+err_put_fd:
+	put_unused_fd(fd);
+	return err;
+}
+
+static int secretmem_init_fs_context(struct fs_context *fc)
+{
+	return init_pseudo(fc, SECRETMEM_MAGIC) ? 0 : -ENOMEM;
+}
+
+static struct file_system_type secretmem_fs = {
+	.name		= "secretmem",
+	.init_fs_context = secretmem_init_fs_context,
+	.kill_sb	= kill_anon_super,
+};
+
+static int __init secretmem_init(void)
+{
+	if (!secretmem_enable)
+		return 0;
+
+	secretmem_mnt = kern_mount(&secretmem_fs);
+	if (IS_ERR(secretmem_mnt))
+		return PTR_ERR(secretmem_mnt);
+
+	/* prevent secretmem mappings from ever getting PROT_EXEC */
+	secretmem_mnt->mnt_flags |= MNT_NOEXEC;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+fs_initcall(secretmem_init);