Adding upstream version 6.6.15.upstream/6.6.15

Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>

19 files changed, 11637 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/Makefile b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/Makefile
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..ad1736d93b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/Makefile
@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+#
+# Makefile for Linux kernel rpcsec_gss implementation
+#
+
+obj-$(CONFIG_SUNRPC_GSS) += auth_rpcgss.o
+
+auth_rpcgss-y := auth_gss.o gss_generic_token.o \
+	gss_mech_switch.o svcauth_gss.o \
+	gss_rpc_upcall.o gss_rpc_xdr.o trace.o
+
+obj-$(CONFIG_RPCSEC_GSS_KRB5) += rpcsec_gss_krb5.o
+
+rpcsec_gss_krb5-y := gss_krb5_mech.o gss_krb5_seal.o gss_krb5_unseal.o \
+	gss_krb5_wrap.o gss_krb5_crypto.o gss_krb5_keys.o
+
+obj-$(CONFIG_RPCSEC_GSS_KRB5_KUNIT_TEST) += gss_krb5_test.o
diff --git a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/auth_gss.c b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/auth_gss.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..1af71fbb0d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/auth_gss.c
@@ -0,0 +1,2298 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
+/*
+ * linux/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/auth_gss.c
+ *
+ * RPCSEC_GSS client authentication.
+ *
+ *  Copyright (c) 2000 The Regents of the University of Michigan.
+ *  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ *  Dug Song       <dugsong@monkey.org>
+ *  Andy Adamson   <andros@umich.edu>
+ */
+
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/sched.h>
+#include <linux/pagemap.h>
+#include <linux/sunrpc/clnt.h>
+#include <linux/sunrpc/auth.h>
+#include <linux/sunrpc/auth_gss.h>
+#include <linux/sunrpc/gss_krb5.h>
+#include <linux/sunrpc/svcauth_gss.h>
+#include <linux/sunrpc/gss_err.h>
+#include <linux/workqueue.h>
+#include <linux/sunrpc/rpc_pipe_fs.h>
+#include <linux/sunrpc/gss_api.h>
+#include <linux/uaccess.h>
+#include <linux/hashtable.h>
+
+#include "auth_gss_internal.h"
+#include "../netns.h"
+
+#include <trace/events/rpcgss.h>
+
+static const struct rpc_authops authgss_ops;
+
+static const struct rpc_credops gss_credops;
+static const struct rpc_credops gss_nullops;
+
+#define GSS_RETRY_EXPIRED 5
+static unsigned int gss_expired_cred_retry_delay = GSS_RETRY_EXPIRED;
+
+#define GSS_KEY_EXPIRE_TIMEO 240
+static unsigned int gss_key_expire_timeo = GSS_KEY_EXPIRE_TIMEO;
+
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SUNRPC_DEBUG)
+# define RPCDBG_FACILITY	RPCDBG_AUTH
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * This compile-time check verifies that we will not exceed the
+ * slack space allotted by the client and server auth_gss code
+ * before they call gss_wrap().
+ */
+#define GSS_KRB5_MAX_SLACK_NEEDED					\
+	(GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN		/* gss token header */		\
+	+ GSS_KRB5_MAX_CKSUM_LEN	/* gss token checksum */	\
+	+ GSS_KRB5_MAX_BLOCKSIZE	/* confounder */		\
+	+ GSS_KRB5_MAX_BLOCKSIZE	/* possible padding */		\
+	+ GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN		/* encrypted hdr in v2 token */	\
+	+ GSS_KRB5_MAX_CKSUM_LEN	/* encryption hmac */		\
+	+ XDR_UNIT * 2			/* RPC verifier */		\
+	+ GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN						\
+	+ GSS_KRB5_MAX_CKSUM_LEN)
+
+#define GSS_CRED_SLACK		(RPC_MAX_AUTH_SIZE * 2)
+/* length of a krb5 verifier (48), plus data added before arguments when
+ * using integrity (two 4-byte integers): */
+#define GSS_VERF_SLACK		100
+
+static DEFINE_HASHTABLE(gss_auth_hash_table, 4);
+static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(gss_auth_hash_lock);
+
+struct gss_pipe {
+	struct rpc_pipe_dir_object pdo;
+	struct rpc_pipe *pipe;
+	struct rpc_clnt *clnt;
+	const char *name;
+	struct kref kref;
+};
+
+struct gss_auth {
+	struct kref kref;
+	struct hlist_node hash;
+	struct rpc_auth rpc_auth;
+	struct gss_api_mech *mech;
+	enum rpc_gss_svc service;
+	struct rpc_clnt *client;
+	struct net	*net;
+	netns_tracker	ns_tracker;
+	/*
+	 * There are two upcall pipes; dentry[1], named "gssd", is used
+	 * for the new text-based upcall; dentry[0] is named after the
+	 * mechanism (for example, "krb5") and exists for
+	 * backwards-compatibility with older gssd's.
+	 */
+	struct gss_pipe *gss_pipe[2];
+	const char *target_name;
+};
+
+/* pipe_version >= 0 if and only if someone has a pipe open. */
+static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(pipe_version_lock);
+static struct rpc_wait_queue pipe_version_rpc_waitqueue;
+static DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD(pipe_version_waitqueue);
+static void gss_put_auth(struct gss_auth *gss_auth);
+
+static void gss_free_ctx(struct gss_cl_ctx *);
+static const struct rpc_pipe_ops gss_upcall_ops_v0;
+static const struct rpc_pipe_ops gss_upcall_ops_v1;
+
+static inline struct gss_cl_ctx *
+gss_get_ctx(struct gss_cl_ctx *ctx)
+{
+	refcount_inc(&ctx->count);
+	return ctx;
+}
+
+static inline void
+gss_put_ctx(struct gss_cl_ctx *ctx)
+{
+	if (refcount_dec_and_test(&ctx->count))
+		gss_free_ctx(ctx);
+}
+
+/* gss_cred_set_ctx:
+ * called by gss_upcall_callback and gss_create_upcall in order
+ * to set the gss context. The actual exchange of an old context
+ * and a new one is protected by the pipe->lock.
+ */
+static void
+gss_cred_set_ctx(struct rpc_cred *cred, struct gss_cl_ctx *ctx)
+{
+	struct gss_cred *gss_cred = container_of(cred, struct gss_cred, gc_base);
+
+	if (!test_bit(RPCAUTH_CRED_NEW, &cred->cr_flags))
+		return;
+	gss_get_ctx(ctx);
+	rcu_assign_pointer(gss_cred->gc_ctx, ctx);
+	set_bit(RPCAUTH_CRED_UPTODATE, &cred->cr_flags);
+	smp_mb__before_atomic();
+	clear_bit(RPCAUTH_CRED_NEW, &cred->cr_flags);
+}
+
+static struct gss_cl_ctx *
+gss_cred_get_ctx(struct rpc_cred *cred)
+{
+	struct gss_cred *gss_cred = container_of(cred, struct gss_cred, gc_base);
+	struct gss_cl_ctx *ctx = NULL;
+
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	ctx = rcu_dereference(gss_cred->gc_ctx);
+	if (ctx)
+		gss_get_ctx(ctx);
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+	return ctx;
+}
+
+static struct gss_cl_ctx *
+gss_alloc_context(void)
+{
+	struct gss_cl_ctx *ctx;
+
+	ctx = kzalloc(sizeof(*ctx), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (ctx != NULL) {
+		ctx->gc_proc = RPC_GSS_PROC_DATA;
+		ctx->gc_seq = 1;	/* NetApp 6.4R1 doesn't accept seq. no. 0 */
+		spin_lock_init(&ctx->gc_seq_lock);
+		refcount_set(&ctx->count,1);
+	}
+	return ctx;
+}
+
+#define GSSD_MIN_TIMEOUT (60 * 60)
+static const void *
+gss_fill_context(const void *p, const void *end, struct gss_cl_ctx *ctx, struct gss_api_mech *gm)
+{
+	const void *q;
+	unsigned int seclen;
+	unsigned int timeout;
+	unsigned long now = jiffies;
+	u32 window_size;
+	int ret;
+
+	/* First unsigned int gives the remaining lifetime in seconds of the
+	 * credential - e.g. the remaining TGT lifetime for Kerberos or
+	 * the -t value passed to GSSD.
+	 */
+	p = simple_get_bytes(p, end, &timeout, sizeof(timeout));
+	if (IS_ERR(p))
+		goto err;
+	if (timeout == 0)
+		timeout = GSSD_MIN_TIMEOUT;
+	ctx->gc_expiry = now + ((unsigned long)timeout * HZ);
+	/* Sequence number window. Determines the maximum number of
+	 * simultaneous requests
+	 */
+	p = simple_get_bytes(p, end, &window_size, sizeof(window_size));
+	if (IS_ERR(p))
+		goto err;
+	ctx->gc_win = window_size;
+	/* gssd signals an error by passing ctx->gc_win = 0: */
+	if (ctx->gc_win == 0) {
+		/*
+		 * in which case, p points to an error code. Anything other
+		 * than -EKEYEXPIRED gets converted to -EACCES.
+		 */
+		p = simple_get_bytes(p, end, &ret, sizeof(ret));
+		if (!IS_ERR(p))
+			p = (ret == -EKEYEXPIRED) ? ERR_PTR(-EKEYEXPIRED) :
+						    ERR_PTR(-EACCES);
+		goto err;
+	}
+	/* copy the opaque wire context */
+	p = simple_get_netobj(p, end, &ctx->gc_wire_ctx);
+	if (IS_ERR(p))
+		goto err;
+	/* import the opaque security context */
+	p  = simple_get_bytes(p, end, &seclen, sizeof(seclen));
+	if (IS_ERR(p))
+		goto err;
+	q = (const void *)((const char *)p + seclen);
+	if (unlikely(q > end || q < p)) {
+		p = ERR_PTR(-EFAULT);
+		goto err;
+	}
+	ret = gss_import_sec_context(p, seclen, gm, &ctx->gc_gss_ctx, NULL, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (ret < 0) {
+		trace_rpcgss_import_ctx(ret);
+		p = ERR_PTR(ret);
+		goto err;
+	}
+
+	/* is there any trailing data? */
+	if (q == end) {
+		p = q;
+		goto done;
+	}
+
+	/* pull in acceptor name (if there is one) */
+	p = simple_get_netobj(q, end, &ctx->gc_acceptor);
+	if (IS_ERR(p))
+		goto err;
+done:
+	trace_rpcgss_context(window_size, ctx->gc_expiry, now, timeout,
+			     ctx->gc_acceptor.len, ctx->gc_acceptor.data);
+err:
+	return p;
+}
+
+/* XXX: Need some documentation about why UPCALL_BUF_LEN is so small.
+ *	Is user space expecting no more than UPCALL_BUF_LEN bytes?
+ *	Note that there are now _two_ NI_MAXHOST sized data items
+ *	being passed in this string.
+ */
+#define UPCALL_BUF_LEN	256
+
+struct gss_upcall_msg {
+	refcount_t count;
+	kuid_t	uid;
+	const char *service_name;
+	struct rpc_pipe_msg msg;
+	struct list_head list;
+	struct gss_auth *auth;
+	struct rpc_pipe *pipe;
+	struct rpc_wait_queue rpc_waitqueue;
+	wait_queue_head_t waitqueue;
+	struct gss_cl_ctx *ctx;
+	char databuf[UPCALL_BUF_LEN];
+};
+
+static int get_pipe_version(struct net *net)
+{
+	struct sunrpc_net *sn = net_generic(net, sunrpc_net_id);
+	int ret;
+
+	spin_lock(&pipe_version_lock);
+	if (sn->pipe_version >= 0) {
+		atomic_inc(&sn->pipe_users);
+		ret = sn->pipe_version;
+	} else
+		ret = -EAGAIN;
+	spin_unlock(&pipe_version_lock);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static void put_pipe_version(struct net *net)
+{
+	struct sunrpc_net *sn = net_generic(net, sunrpc_net_id);
+
+	if (atomic_dec_and_lock(&sn->pipe_users, &pipe_version_lock)) {
+		sn->pipe_version = -1;
+		spin_unlock(&pipe_version_lock);
+	}
+}
+
+static void
+gss_release_msg(struct gss_upcall_msg *gss_msg)
+{
+	struct net *net = gss_msg->auth->net;
+	if (!refcount_dec_and_test(&gss_msg->count))
+		return;
+	put_pipe_version(net);
+	BUG_ON(!list_empty(&gss_msg->list));
+	if (gss_msg->ctx != NULL)
+		gss_put_ctx(gss_msg->ctx);
+	rpc_destroy_wait_queue(&gss_msg->rpc_waitqueue);
+	gss_put_auth(gss_msg->auth);
+	kfree_const(gss_msg->service_name);
+	kfree(gss_msg);
+}
+
+static struct gss_upcall_msg *
+__gss_find_upcall(struct rpc_pipe *pipe, kuid_t uid, const struct gss_auth *auth)
+{
+	struct gss_upcall_msg *pos;
+	list_for_each_entry(pos, &pipe->in_downcall, list) {
+		if (!uid_eq(pos->uid, uid))
+			continue;
+		if (pos->auth->service != auth->service)
+			continue;
+		refcount_inc(&pos->count);
+		return pos;
+	}
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+/* Try to add an upcall to the pipefs queue.
+ * If an upcall owned by our uid already exists, then we return a reference
+ * to that upcall instead of adding the new upcall.
+ */
+static inline struct gss_upcall_msg *
+gss_add_msg(struct gss_upcall_msg *gss_msg)
+{
+	struct rpc_pipe *pipe = gss_msg->pipe;
+	struct gss_upcall_msg *old;
+
+	spin_lock(&pipe->lock);
+	old = __gss_find_upcall(pipe, gss_msg->uid, gss_msg->auth);
+	if (old == NULL) {
+		refcount_inc(&gss_msg->count);
+		list_add(&gss_msg->list, &pipe->in_downcall);
+	} else
+		gss_msg = old;
+	spin_unlock(&pipe->lock);
+	return gss_msg;
+}
+
+static void
+__gss_unhash_msg(struct gss_upcall_msg *gss_msg)
+{
+	list_del_init(&gss_msg->list);
+	rpc_wake_up_status(&gss_msg->rpc_waitqueue, gss_msg->msg.errno);
+	wake_up_all(&gss_msg->waitqueue);
+	refcount_dec(&gss_msg->count);
+}
+
+static void
+gss_unhash_msg(struct gss_upcall_msg *gss_msg)
+{
+	struct rpc_pipe *pipe = gss_msg->pipe;
+
+	if (list_empty(&gss_msg->list))
+		return;
+	spin_lock(&pipe->lock);
+	if (!list_empty(&gss_msg->list))
+		__gss_unhash_msg(gss_msg);
+	spin_unlock(&pipe->lock);
+}
+
+static void
+gss_handle_downcall_result(struct gss_cred *gss_cred, struct gss_upcall_msg *gss_msg)
+{
+	switch (gss_msg->msg.errno) {
+	case 0:
+		if (gss_msg->ctx == NULL)
+			break;
+		clear_bit(RPCAUTH_CRED_NEGATIVE, &gss_cred->gc_base.cr_flags);
+		gss_cred_set_ctx(&gss_cred->gc_base, gss_msg->ctx);
+		break;
+	case -EKEYEXPIRED:
+		set_bit(RPCAUTH_CRED_NEGATIVE, &gss_cred->gc_base.cr_flags);
+	}
+	gss_cred->gc_upcall_timestamp = jiffies;
+	gss_cred->gc_upcall = NULL;
+	rpc_wake_up_status(&gss_msg->rpc_waitqueue, gss_msg->msg.errno);
+}
+
+static void
+gss_upcall_callback(struct rpc_task *task)
+{
+	struct gss_cred *gss_cred = container_of(task->tk_rqstp->rq_cred,
+			struct gss_cred, gc_base);
+	struct gss_upcall_msg *gss_msg = gss_cred->gc_upcall;
+	struct rpc_pipe *pipe = gss_msg->pipe;
+
+	spin_lock(&pipe->lock);
+	gss_handle_downcall_result(gss_cred, gss_msg);
+	spin_unlock(&pipe->lock);
+	task->tk_status = gss_msg->msg.errno;
+	gss_release_msg(gss_msg);
+}
+
+static void gss_encode_v0_msg(struct gss_upcall_msg *gss_msg,
+			      const struct cred *cred)
+{
+	struct user_namespace *userns = cred->user_ns;
+
+	uid_t uid = from_kuid_munged(userns, gss_msg->uid);
+	memcpy(gss_msg->databuf, &uid, sizeof(uid));
+	gss_msg->msg.data = gss_msg->databuf;
+	gss_msg->msg.len = sizeof(uid);
+
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(uid) > sizeof(gss_msg->databuf));
+}
+
+static ssize_t
+gss_v0_upcall(struct file *file, struct rpc_pipe_msg *msg,
+		char __user *buf, size_t buflen)
+{
+	struct gss_upcall_msg *gss_msg = container_of(msg,
+						      struct gss_upcall_msg,
+						      msg);
+	if (msg->copied == 0)
+		gss_encode_v0_msg(gss_msg, file->f_cred);
+	return rpc_pipe_generic_upcall(file, msg, buf, buflen);
+}
+
+static int gss_encode_v1_msg(struct gss_upcall_msg *gss_msg,
+				const char *service_name,
+				const char *target_name,
+				const struct cred *cred)
+{
+	struct user_namespace *userns = cred->user_ns;
+	struct gss_api_mech *mech = gss_msg->auth->mech;
+	char *p = gss_msg->databuf;
+	size_t buflen = sizeof(gss_msg->databuf);
+	int len;
+
+	len = scnprintf(p, buflen, "mech=%s uid=%d", mech->gm_name,
+			from_kuid_munged(userns, gss_msg->uid));
+	buflen -= len;
+	p += len;
+	gss_msg->msg.len = len;
+
+	/*
+	 * target= is a full service principal that names the remote
+	 * identity that we are authenticating to.
+	 */
+	if (target_name) {
+		len = scnprintf(p, buflen, " target=%s", target_name);
+		buflen -= len;
+		p += len;
+		gss_msg->msg.len += len;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * gssd uses service= and srchost= to select a matching key from
+	 * the system's keytab to use as the source principal.
+	 *
+	 * service= is the service name part of the source principal,
+	 * or "*" (meaning choose any).
+	 *
+	 * srchost= is the hostname part of the source principal. When
+	 * not provided, gssd uses the local hostname.
+	 */
+	if (service_name) {
+		char *c = strchr(service_name, '@');
+
+		if (!c)
+			len = scnprintf(p, buflen, " service=%s",
+					service_name);
+		else
+			len = scnprintf(p, buflen,
+					" service=%.*s srchost=%s",
+					(int)(c - service_name),
+					service_name, c + 1);
+		buflen -= len;
+		p += len;
+		gss_msg->msg.len += len;
+	}
+
+	if (mech->gm_upcall_enctypes) {
+		len = scnprintf(p, buflen, " enctypes=%s",
+				mech->gm_upcall_enctypes);
+		buflen -= len;
+		p += len;
+		gss_msg->msg.len += len;
+	}
+	trace_rpcgss_upcall_msg(gss_msg->databuf);
+	len = scnprintf(p, buflen, "\n");
+	if (len == 0)
+		goto out_overflow;
+	gss_msg->msg.len += len;
+	gss_msg->msg.data = gss_msg->databuf;
+	return 0;
+out_overflow:
+	WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
+	return -ENOMEM;
+}
+
+static ssize_t
+gss_v1_upcall(struct file *file, struct rpc_pipe_msg *msg,
+		char __user *buf, size_t buflen)
+{
+	struct gss_upcall_msg *gss_msg = container_of(msg,
+						      struct gss_upcall_msg,
+						      msg);
+	int err;
+	if (msg->copied == 0) {
+		err = gss_encode_v1_msg(gss_msg,
+					gss_msg->service_name,
+					gss_msg->auth->target_name,
+					file->f_cred);
+		if (err)
+			return err;
+	}
+	return rpc_pipe_generic_upcall(file, msg, buf, buflen);
+}
+
+static struct gss_upcall_msg *
+gss_alloc_msg(struct gss_auth *gss_auth,
+		kuid_t uid, const char *service_name)
+{
+	struct gss_upcall_msg *gss_msg;
+	int vers;
+	int err = -ENOMEM;
+
+	gss_msg = kzalloc(sizeof(*gss_msg), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (gss_msg == NULL)
+		goto err;
+	vers = get_pipe_version(gss_auth->net);
+	err = vers;
+	if (err < 0)
+		goto err_free_msg;
+	gss_msg->pipe = gss_auth->gss_pipe[vers]->pipe;
+	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&gss_msg->list);
+	rpc_init_wait_queue(&gss_msg->rpc_waitqueue, "RPCSEC_GSS upcall waitq");
+	init_waitqueue_head(&gss_msg->waitqueue);
+	refcount_set(&gss_msg->count, 1);
+	gss_msg->uid = uid;
+	gss_msg->auth = gss_auth;
+	kref_get(&gss_auth->kref);
+	if (service_name) {
+		gss_msg->service_name = kstrdup_const(service_name, GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (!gss_msg->service_name) {
+			err = -ENOMEM;
+			goto err_put_pipe_version;
+		}
+	}
+	return gss_msg;
+err_put_pipe_version:
+	put_pipe_version(gss_auth->net);
+err_free_msg:
+	kfree(gss_msg);
+err:
+	return ERR_PTR(err);
+}
+
+static struct gss_upcall_msg *
+gss_setup_upcall(struct gss_auth *gss_auth, struct rpc_cred *cred)
+{
+	struct gss_cred *gss_cred = container_of(cred,
+			struct gss_cred, gc_base);
+	struct gss_upcall_msg *gss_new, *gss_msg;
+	kuid_t uid = cred->cr_cred->fsuid;
+
+	gss_new = gss_alloc_msg(gss_auth, uid, gss_cred->gc_principal);
+	if (IS_ERR(gss_new))
+		return gss_new;
+	gss_msg = gss_add_msg(gss_new);
+	if (gss_msg == gss_new) {
+		int res;
+		refcount_inc(&gss_msg->count);
+		res = rpc_queue_upcall(gss_new->pipe, &gss_new->msg);
+		if (res) {
+			gss_unhash_msg(gss_new);
+			refcount_dec(&gss_msg->count);
+			gss_release_msg(gss_new);
+			gss_msg = ERR_PTR(res);
+		}
+	} else
+		gss_release_msg(gss_new);
+	return gss_msg;
+}
+
+static void warn_gssd(void)
+{
+	dprintk("AUTH_GSS upcall failed. Please check user daemon is running.\n");
+}
+
+static inline int
+gss_refresh_upcall(struct rpc_task *task)
+{
+	struct rpc_cred *cred = task->tk_rqstp->rq_cred;
+	struct gss_auth *gss_auth = container_of(cred->cr_auth,
+			struct gss_auth, rpc_auth);
+	struct gss_cred *gss_cred = container_of(cred,
+			struct gss_cred, gc_base);
+	struct gss_upcall_msg *gss_msg;
+	struct rpc_pipe *pipe;
+	int err = 0;
+
+	gss_msg = gss_setup_upcall(gss_auth, cred);
+	if (PTR_ERR(gss_msg) == -EAGAIN) {
+		/* XXX: warning on the first, under the assumption we
+		 * shouldn't normally hit this case on a refresh. */
+		warn_gssd();
+		rpc_sleep_on_timeout(&pipe_version_rpc_waitqueue,
+				task, NULL, jiffies + (15 * HZ));
+		err = -EAGAIN;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (IS_ERR(gss_msg)) {
+		err = PTR_ERR(gss_msg);
+		goto out;
+	}
+	pipe = gss_msg->pipe;
+	spin_lock(&pipe->lock);
+	if (gss_cred->gc_upcall != NULL)
+		rpc_sleep_on(&gss_cred->gc_upcall->rpc_waitqueue, task, NULL);
+	else if (gss_msg->ctx == NULL && gss_msg->msg.errno >= 0) {
+		gss_cred->gc_upcall = gss_msg;
+		/* gss_upcall_callback will release the reference to gss_upcall_msg */
+		refcount_inc(&gss_msg->count);
+		rpc_sleep_on(&gss_msg->rpc_waitqueue, task, gss_upcall_callback);
+	} else {
+		gss_handle_downcall_result(gss_cred, gss_msg);
+		err = gss_msg->msg.errno;
+	}
+	spin_unlock(&pipe->lock);
+	gss_release_msg(gss_msg);
+out:
+	trace_rpcgss_upcall_result(from_kuid(&init_user_ns,
+					     cred->cr_cred->fsuid), err);
+	return err;
+}
+
+static inline int
+gss_create_upcall(struct gss_auth *gss_auth, struct gss_cred *gss_cred)
+{
+	struct net *net = gss_auth->net;
+	struct sunrpc_net *sn = net_generic(net, sunrpc_net_id);
+	struct rpc_pipe *pipe;
+	struct rpc_cred *cred = &gss_cred->gc_base;
+	struct gss_upcall_msg *gss_msg;
+	DEFINE_WAIT(wait);
+	int err;
+
+retry:
+	err = 0;
+	/* if gssd is down, just skip upcalling altogether */
+	if (!gssd_running(net)) {
+		warn_gssd();
+		err = -EACCES;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	gss_msg = gss_setup_upcall(gss_auth, cred);
+	if (PTR_ERR(gss_msg) == -EAGAIN) {
+		err = wait_event_interruptible_timeout(pipe_version_waitqueue,
+				sn->pipe_version >= 0, 15 * HZ);
+		if (sn->pipe_version < 0) {
+			warn_gssd();
+			err = -EACCES;
+		}
+		if (err < 0)
+			goto out;
+		goto retry;
+	}
+	if (IS_ERR(gss_msg)) {
+		err = PTR_ERR(gss_msg);
+		goto out;
+	}
+	pipe = gss_msg->pipe;
+	for (;;) {
+		prepare_to_wait(&gss_msg->waitqueue, &wait, TASK_KILLABLE);
+		spin_lock(&pipe->lock);
+		if (gss_msg->ctx != NULL || gss_msg->msg.errno < 0) {
+			break;
+		}
+		spin_unlock(&pipe->lock);
+		if (fatal_signal_pending(current)) {
+			err = -ERESTARTSYS;
+			goto out_intr;
+		}
+		schedule();
+	}
+	if (gss_msg->ctx) {
+		trace_rpcgss_ctx_init(gss_cred);
+		gss_cred_set_ctx(cred, gss_msg->ctx);
+	} else {
+		err = gss_msg->msg.errno;
+	}
+	spin_unlock(&pipe->lock);
+out_intr:
+	finish_wait(&gss_msg->waitqueue, &wait);
+	gss_release_msg(gss_msg);
+out:
+	trace_rpcgss_upcall_result(from_kuid(&init_user_ns,
+					     cred->cr_cred->fsuid), err);
+	return err;
+}
+
+static struct gss_upcall_msg *
+gss_find_downcall(struct rpc_pipe *pipe, kuid_t uid)
+{
+	struct gss_upcall_msg *pos;
+	list_for_each_entry(pos, &pipe->in_downcall, list) {
+		if (!uid_eq(pos->uid, uid))
+			continue;
+		if (!rpc_msg_is_inflight(&pos->msg))
+			continue;
+		refcount_inc(&pos->count);
+		return pos;
+	}
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+#define MSG_BUF_MAXSIZE 1024
+
+static ssize_t
+gss_pipe_downcall(struct file *filp, const char __user *src, size_t mlen)
+{
+	const void *p, *end;
+	void *buf;
+	struct gss_upcall_msg *gss_msg;
+	struct rpc_pipe *pipe = RPC_I(file_inode(filp))->pipe;
+	struct gss_cl_ctx *ctx;
+	uid_t id;
+	kuid_t uid;
+	ssize_t err = -EFBIG;
+
+	if (mlen > MSG_BUF_MAXSIZE)
+		goto out;
+	err = -ENOMEM;
+	buf = kmalloc(mlen, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!buf)
+		goto out;
+
+	err = -EFAULT;
+	if (copy_from_user(buf, src, mlen))
+		goto err;
+
+	end = (const void *)((char *)buf + mlen);
+	p = simple_get_bytes(buf, end, &id, sizeof(id));
+	if (IS_ERR(p)) {
+		err = PTR_ERR(p);
+		goto err;
+	}
+
+	uid = make_kuid(current_user_ns(), id);
+	if (!uid_valid(uid)) {
+		err = -EINVAL;
+		goto err;
+	}
+
+	err = -ENOMEM;
+	ctx = gss_alloc_context();
+	if (ctx == NULL)
+		goto err;
+
+	err = -ENOENT;
+	/* Find a matching upcall */
+	spin_lock(&pipe->lock);
+	gss_msg = gss_find_downcall(pipe, uid);
+	if (gss_msg == NULL) {
+		spin_unlock(&pipe->lock);
+		goto err_put_ctx;
+	}
+	list_del_init(&gss_msg->list);
+	spin_unlock(&pipe->lock);
+
+	p = gss_fill_context(p, end, ctx, gss_msg->auth->mech);
+	if (IS_ERR(p)) {
+		err = PTR_ERR(p);
+		switch (err) {
+		case -EACCES:
+		case -EKEYEXPIRED:
+			gss_msg->msg.errno = err;
+			err = mlen;
+			break;
+		case -EFAULT:
+		case -ENOMEM:
+		case -EINVAL:
+		case -ENOSYS:
+			gss_msg->msg.errno = -EAGAIN;
+			break;
+		default:
+			printk(KERN_CRIT "%s: bad return from "
+				"gss_fill_context: %zd\n", __func__, err);
+			gss_msg->msg.errno = -EIO;
+		}
+		goto err_release_msg;
+	}
+	gss_msg->ctx = gss_get_ctx(ctx);
+	err = mlen;
+
+err_release_msg:
+	spin_lock(&pipe->lock);
+	__gss_unhash_msg(gss_msg);
+	spin_unlock(&pipe->lock);
+	gss_release_msg(gss_msg);
+err_put_ctx:
+	gss_put_ctx(ctx);
+err:
+	kfree(buf);
+out:
+	return err;
+}
+
+static int gss_pipe_open(struct inode *inode, int new_version)
+{
+	struct net *net = inode->i_sb->s_fs_info;
+	struct sunrpc_net *sn = net_generic(net, sunrpc_net_id);
+	int ret = 0;
+
+	spin_lock(&pipe_version_lock);
+	if (sn->pipe_version < 0) {
+		/* First open of any gss pipe determines the version: */
+		sn->pipe_version = new_version;
+		rpc_wake_up(&pipe_version_rpc_waitqueue);
+		wake_up(&pipe_version_waitqueue);
+	} else if (sn->pipe_version != new_version) {
+		/* Trying to open a pipe of a different version */
+		ret = -EBUSY;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	atomic_inc(&sn->pipe_users);
+out:
+	spin_unlock(&pipe_version_lock);
+	return ret;
+
+}
+
+static int gss_pipe_open_v0(struct inode *inode)
+{
+	return gss_pipe_open(inode, 0);
+}
+
+static int gss_pipe_open_v1(struct inode *inode)
+{
+	return gss_pipe_open(inode, 1);
+}
+
+static void
+gss_pipe_release(struct inode *inode)
+{
+	struct net *net = inode->i_sb->s_fs_info;
+	struct rpc_pipe *pipe = RPC_I(inode)->pipe;
+	struct gss_upcall_msg *gss_msg;
+
+restart:
+	spin_lock(&pipe->lock);
+	list_for_each_entry(gss_msg, &pipe->in_downcall, list) {
+
+		if (!list_empty(&gss_msg->msg.list))
+			continue;
+		gss_msg->msg.errno = -EPIPE;
+		refcount_inc(&gss_msg->count);
+		__gss_unhash_msg(gss_msg);
+		spin_unlock(&pipe->lock);
+		gss_release_msg(gss_msg);
+		goto restart;
+	}
+	spin_unlock(&pipe->lock);
+
+	put_pipe_version(net);
+}
+
+static void
+gss_pipe_destroy_msg(struct rpc_pipe_msg *msg)
+{
+	struct gss_upcall_msg *gss_msg = container_of(msg, struct gss_upcall_msg, msg);
+
+	if (msg->errno < 0) {
+		refcount_inc(&gss_msg->count);
+		gss_unhash_msg(gss_msg);
+		if (msg->errno == -ETIMEDOUT)
+			warn_gssd();
+		gss_release_msg(gss_msg);
+	}
+	gss_release_msg(gss_msg);
+}
+
+static void gss_pipe_dentry_destroy(struct dentry *dir,
+		struct rpc_pipe_dir_object *pdo)
+{
+	struct gss_pipe *gss_pipe = pdo->pdo_data;
+	struct rpc_pipe *pipe = gss_pipe->pipe;
+
+	if (pipe->dentry != NULL) {
+		rpc_unlink(pipe->dentry);
+		pipe->dentry = NULL;
+	}
+}
+
+static int gss_pipe_dentry_create(struct dentry *dir,
+		struct rpc_pipe_dir_object *pdo)
+{
+	struct gss_pipe *p = pdo->pdo_data;
+	struct dentry *dentry;
+
+	dentry = rpc_mkpipe_dentry(dir, p->name, p->clnt, p->pipe);
+	if (IS_ERR(dentry))
+		return PTR_ERR(dentry);
+	p->pipe->dentry = dentry;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static const struct rpc_pipe_dir_object_ops gss_pipe_dir_object_ops = {
+	.create = gss_pipe_dentry_create,
+	.destroy = gss_pipe_dentry_destroy,
+};
+
+static struct gss_pipe *gss_pipe_alloc(struct rpc_clnt *clnt,
+		const char *name,
+		const struct rpc_pipe_ops *upcall_ops)
+{
+	struct gss_pipe *p;
+	int err = -ENOMEM;
+
+	p = kmalloc(sizeof(*p), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (p == NULL)
+		goto err;
+	p->pipe = rpc_mkpipe_data(upcall_ops, RPC_PIPE_WAIT_FOR_OPEN);
+	if (IS_ERR(p->pipe)) {
+		err = PTR_ERR(p->pipe);
+		goto err_free_gss_pipe;
+	}
+	p->name = name;
+	p->clnt = clnt;
+	kref_init(&p->kref);
+	rpc_init_pipe_dir_object(&p->pdo,
+			&gss_pipe_dir_object_ops,
+			p);
+	return p;
+err_free_gss_pipe:
+	kfree(p);
+err:
+	return ERR_PTR(err);
+}
+
+struct gss_alloc_pdo {
+	struct rpc_clnt *clnt;
+	const char *name;
+	const struct rpc_pipe_ops *upcall_ops;
+};
+
+static int gss_pipe_match_pdo(struct rpc_pipe_dir_object *pdo, void *data)
+{
+	struct gss_pipe *gss_pipe;
+	struct gss_alloc_pdo *args = data;
+
+	if (pdo->pdo_ops != &gss_pipe_dir_object_ops)
+		return 0;
+	gss_pipe = container_of(pdo, struct gss_pipe, pdo);
+	if (strcmp(gss_pipe->name, args->name) != 0)
+		return 0;
+	if (!kref_get_unless_zero(&gss_pipe->kref))
+		return 0;
+	return 1;
+}
+
+static struct rpc_pipe_dir_object *gss_pipe_alloc_pdo(void *data)
+{
+	struct gss_pipe *gss_pipe;
+	struct gss_alloc_pdo *args = data;
+
+	gss_pipe = gss_pipe_alloc(args->clnt, args->name, args->upcall_ops);
+	if (!IS_ERR(gss_pipe))
+		return &gss_pipe->pdo;
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+static struct gss_pipe *gss_pipe_get(struct rpc_clnt *clnt,
+		const char *name,
+		const struct rpc_pipe_ops *upcall_ops)
+{
+	struct net *net = rpc_net_ns(clnt);
+	struct rpc_pipe_dir_object *pdo;
+	struct gss_alloc_pdo args = {
+		.clnt = clnt,
+		.name = name,
+		.upcall_ops = upcall_ops,
+	};
+
+	pdo = rpc_find_or_alloc_pipe_dir_object(net,
+			&clnt->cl_pipedir_objects,
+			gss_pipe_match_pdo,
+			gss_pipe_alloc_pdo,
+			&args);
+	if (pdo != NULL)
+		return container_of(pdo, struct gss_pipe, pdo);
+	return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+}
+
+static void __gss_pipe_free(struct gss_pipe *p)
+{
+	struct rpc_clnt *clnt = p->clnt;
+	struct net *net = rpc_net_ns(clnt);
+
+	rpc_remove_pipe_dir_object(net,
+			&clnt->cl_pipedir_objects,
+			&p->pdo);
+	rpc_destroy_pipe_data(p->pipe);
+	kfree(p);
+}
+
+static void __gss_pipe_release(struct kref *kref)
+{
+	struct gss_pipe *p = container_of(kref, struct gss_pipe, kref);
+
+	__gss_pipe_free(p);
+}
+
+static void gss_pipe_free(struct gss_pipe *p)
+{
+	if (p != NULL)
+		kref_put(&p->kref, __gss_pipe_release);
+}
+
+/*
+ * NOTE: we have the opportunity to use different
+ * parameters based on the input flavor (which must be a pseudoflavor)
+ */
+static struct gss_auth *
+gss_create_new(const struct rpc_auth_create_args *args, struct rpc_clnt *clnt)
+{
+	rpc_authflavor_t flavor = args->pseudoflavor;
+	struct gss_auth *gss_auth;
+	struct gss_pipe *gss_pipe;
+	struct rpc_auth * auth;
+	int err = -ENOMEM; /* XXX? */
+
+	if (!try_module_get(THIS_MODULE))
+		return ERR_PTR(err);
+	if (!(gss_auth = kmalloc(sizeof(*gss_auth), GFP_KERNEL)))
+		goto out_dec;
+	INIT_HLIST_NODE(&gss_auth->hash);
+	gss_auth->target_name = NULL;
+	if (args->target_name) {
+		gss_auth->target_name = kstrdup(args->target_name, GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (gss_auth->target_name == NULL)
+			goto err_free;
+	}
+	gss_auth->client = clnt;
+	gss_auth->net = get_net_track(rpc_net_ns(clnt), &gss_auth->ns_tracker,
+				      GFP_KERNEL);
+	err = -EINVAL;
+	gss_auth->mech = gss_mech_get_by_pseudoflavor(flavor);
+	if (!gss_auth->mech)
+		goto err_put_net;
+	gss_auth->service = gss_pseudoflavor_to_service(gss_auth->mech, flavor);
+	if (gss_auth->service == 0)
+		goto err_put_mech;
+	if (!gssd_running(gss_auth->net))
+		goto err_put_mech;
+	auth = &gss_auth->rpc_auth;
+	auth->au_cslack = GSS_CRED_SLACK >> 2;
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(GSS_KRB5_MAX_SLACK_NEEDED > RPC_MAX_AUTH_SIZE);
+	auth->au_rslack = GSS_KRB5_MAX_SLACK_NEEDED >> 2;
+	auth->au_verfsize = GSS_VERF_SLACK >> 2;
+	auth->au_ralign = GSS_VERF_SLACK >> 2;
+	__set_bit(RPCAUTH_AUTH_UPDATE_SLACK, &auth->au_flags);
+	auth->au_ops = &authgss_ops;
+	auth->au_flavor = flavor;
+	if (gss_pseudoflavor_to_datatouch(gss_auth->mech, flavor))
+		__set_bit(RPCAUTH_AUTH_DATATOUCH, &auth->au_flags);
+	refcount_set(&auth->au_count, 1);
+	kref_init(&gss_auth->kref);
+
+	err = rpcauth_init_credcache(auth);
+	if (err)
+		goto err_put_mech;
+	/*
+	 * Note: if we created the old pipe first, then someone who
+	 * examined the directory at the right moment might conclude
+	 * that we supported only the old pipe.  So we instead create
+	 * the new pipe first.
+	 */
+	gss_pipe = gss_pipe_get(clnt, "gssd", &gss_upcall_ops_v1);
+	if (IS_ERR(gss_pipe)) {
+		err = PTR_ERR(gss_pipe);
+		goto err_destroy_credcache;
+	}
+	gss_auth->gss_pipe[1] = gss_pipe;
+
+	gss_pipe = gss_pipe_get(clnt, gss_auth->mech->gm_name,
+			&gss_upcall_ops_v0);
+	if (IS_ERR(gss_pipe)) {
+		err = PTR_ERR(gss_pipe);
+		goto err_destroy_pipe_1;
+	}
+	gss_auth->gss_pipe[0] = gss_pipe;
+
+	return gss_auth;
+err_destroy_pipe_1:
+	gss_pipe_free(gss_auth->gss_pipe[1]);
+err_destroy_credcache:
+	rpcauth_destroy_credcache(auth);
+err_put_mech:
+	gss_mech_put(gss_auth->mech);
+err_put_net:
+	put_net_track(gss_auth->net, &gss_auth->ns_tracker);
+err_free:
+	kfree(gss_auth->target_name);
+	kfree(gss_auth);
+out_dec:
+	module_put(THIS_MODULE);
+	trace_rpcgss_createauth(flavor, err);
+	return ERR_PTR(err);
+}
+
+static void
+gss_free(struct gss_auth *gss_auth)
+{
+	gss_pipe_free(gss_auth->gss_pipe[0]);
+	gss_pipe_free(gss_auth->gss_pipe[1]);
+	gss_mech_put(gss_auth->mech);
+	put_net_track(gss_auth->net, &gss_auth->ns_tracker);
+	kfree(gss_auth->target_name);
+
+	kfree(gss_auth);
+	module_put(THIS_MODULE);
+}
+
+static void
+gss_free_callback(struct kref *kref)
+{
+	struct gss_auth *gss_auth = container_of(kref, struct gss_auth, kref);
+
+	gss_free(gss_auth);
+}
+
+static void
+gss_put_auth(struct gss_auth *gss_auth)
+{
+	kref_put(&gss_auth->kref, gss_free_callback);
+}
+
+static void
+gss_destroy(struct rpc_auth *auth)
+{
+	struct gss_auth *gss_auth = container_of(auth,
+			struct gss_auth, rpc_auth);
+
+	if (hash_hashed(&gss_auth->hash)) {
+		spin_lock(&gss_auth_hash_lock);
+		hash_del(&gss_auth->hash);
+		spin_unlock(&gss_auth_hash_lock);
+	}
+
+	gss_pipe_free(gss_auth->gss_pipe[0]);
+	gss_auth->gss_pipe[0] = NULL;
+	gss_pipe_free(gss_auth->gss_pipe[1]);
+	gss_auth->gss_pipe[1] = NULL;
+	rpcauth_destroy_credcache(auth);
+
+	gss_put_auth(gss_auth);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Auths may be shared between rpc clients that were cloned from a
+ * common client with the same xprt, if they also share the flavor and
+ * target_name.
+ *
+ * The auth is looked up from the oldest parent sharing the same
+ * cl_xprt, and the auth itself references only that common parent
+ * (which is guaranteed to last as long as any of its descendants).
+ */
+static struct gss_auth *
+gss_auth_find_or_add_hashed(const struct rpc_auth_create_args *args,
+		struct rpc_clnt *clnt,
+		struct gss_auth *new)
+{
+	struct gss_auth *gss_auth;
+	unsigned long hashval = (unsigned long)clnt;
+
+	spin_lock(&gss_auth_hash_lock);
+	hash_for_each_possible(gss_auth_hash_table,
+			gss_auth,
+			hash,
+			hashval) {
+		if (gss_auth->client != clnt)
+			continue;
+		if (gss_auth->rpc_auth.au_flavor != args->pseudoflavor)
+			continue;
+		if (gss_auth->target_name != args->target_name) {
+			if (gss_auth->target_name == NULL)
+				continue;
+			if (args->target_name == NULL)
+				continue;
+			if (strcmp(gss_auth->target_name, args->target_name))
+				continue;
+		}
+		if (!refcount_inc_not_zero(&gss_auth->rpc_auth.au_count))
+			continue;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (new)
+		hash_add(gss_auth_hash_table, &new->hash, hashval);
+	gss_auth = new;
+out:
+	spin_unlock(&gss_auth_hash_lock);
+	return gss_auth;
+}
+
+static struct gss_auth *
+gss_create_hashed(const struct rpc_auth_create_args *args,
+		  struct rpc_clnt *clnt)
+{
+	struct gss_auth *gss_auth;
+	struct gss_auth *new;
+
+	gss_auth = gss_auth_find_or_add_hashed(args, clnt, NULL);
+	if (gss_auth != NULL)
+		goto out;
+	new = gss_create_new(args, clnt);
+	if (IS_ERR(new))
+		return new;
+	gss_auth = gss_auth_find_or_add_hashed(args, clnt, new);
+	if (gss_auth != new)
+		gss_destroy(&new->rpc_auth);
+out:
+	return gss_auth;
+}
+
+static struct rpc_auth *
+gss_create(const struct rpc_auth_create_args *args, struct rpc_clnt *clnt)
+{
+	struct gss_auth *gss_auth;
+	struct rpc_xprt_switch *xps = rcu_access_pointer(clnt->cl_xpi.xpi_xpswitch);
+
+	while (clnt != clnt->cl_parent) {
+		struct rpc_clnt *parent = clnt->cl_parent;
+		/* Find the original parent for this transport */
+		if (rcu_access_pointer(parent->cl_xpi.xpi_xpswitch) != xps)
+			break;
+		clnt = parent;
+	}
+
+	gss_auth = gss_create_hashed(args, clnt);
+	if (IS_ERR(gss_auth))
+		return ERR_CAST(gss_auth);
+	return &gss_auth->rpc_auth;
+}
+
+static struct gss_cred *
+gss_dup_cred(struct gss_auth *gss_auth, struct gss_cred *gss_cred)
+{
+	struct gss_cred *new;
+
+	/* Make a copy of the cred so that we can reference count it */
+	new = kzalloc(sizeof(*gss_cred), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (new) {
+		struct auth_cred acred = {
+			.cred = gss_cred->gc_base.cr_cred,
+		};
+		struct gss_cl_ctx *ctx =
+			rcu_dereference_protected(gss_cred->gc_ctx, 1);
+
+		rpcauth_init_cred(&new->gc_base, &acred,
+				&gss_auth->rpc_auth,
+				&gss_nullops);
+		new->gc_base.cr_flags = 1UL << RPCAUTH_CRED_UPTODATE;
+		new->gc_service = gss_cred->gc_service;
+		new->gc_principal = gss_cred->gc_principal;
+		kref_get(&gss_auth->kref);
+		rcu_assign_pointer(new->gc_ctx, ctx);
+		gss_get_ctx(ctx);
+	}
+	return new;
+}
+
+/*
+ * gss_send_destroy_context will cause the RPCSEC_GSS to send a NULL RPC call
+ * to the server with the GSS control procedure field set to
+ * RPC_GSS_PROC_DESTROY. This should normally cause the server to release
+ * all RPCSEC_GSS state associated with that context.
+ */
+static void
+gss_send_destroy_context(struct rpc_cred *cred)
+{
+	struct gss_cred *gss_cred = container_of(cred, struct gss_cred, gc_base);
+	struct gss_auth *gss_auth = container_of(cred->cr_auth, struct gss_auth, rpc_auth);
+	struct gss_cl_ctx *ctx = rcu_dereference_protected(gss_cred->gc_ctx, 1);
+	struct gss_cred *new;
+	struct rpc_task *task;
+
+	new = gss_dup_cred(gss_auth, gss_cred);
+	if (new) {
+		ctx->gc_proc = RPC_GSS_PROC_DESTROY;
+
+		trace_rpcgss_ctx_destroy(gss_cred);
+		task = rpc_call_null(gss_auth->client, &new->gc_base,
+				     RPC_TASK_ASYNC);
+		if (!IS_ERR(task))
+			rpc_put_task(task);
+
+		put_rpccred(&new->gc_base);
+	}
+}
+
+/* gss_destroy_cred (and gss_free_ctx) are used to clean up after failure
+ * to create a new cred or context, so they check that things have been
+ * allocated before freeing them. */
+static void
+gss_do_free_ctx(struct gss_cl_ctx *ctx)
+{
+	gss_delete_sec_context(&ctx->gc_gss_ctx);
+	kfree(ctx->gc_wire_ctx.data);
+	kfree(ctx->gc_acceptor.data);
+	kfree(ctx);
+}
+
+static void
+gss_free_ctx_callback(struct rcu_head *head)
+{
+	struct gss_cl_ctx *ctx = container_of(head, struct gss_cl_ctx, gc_rcu);
+	gss_do_free_ctx(ctx);
+}
+
+static void
+gss_free_ctx(struct gss_cl_ctx *ctx)
+{
+	call_rcu(&ctx->gc_rcu, gss_free_ctx_callback);
+}
+
+static void
+gss_free_cred(struct gss_cred *gss_cred)
+{
+	kfree(gss_cred);
+}
+
+static void
+gss_free_cred_callback(struct rcu_head *head)
+{
+	struct gss_cred *gss_cred = container_of(head, struct gss_cred, gc_base.cr_rcu);
+	gss_free_cred(gss_cred);
+}
+
+static void
+gss_destroy_nullcred(struct rpc_cred *cred)
+{
+	struct gss_cred *gss_cred = container_of(cred, struct gss_cred, gc_base);
+	struct gss_auth *gss_auth = container_of(cred->cr_auth, struct gss_auth, rpc_auth);
+	struct gss_cl_ctx *ctx = rcu_dereference_protected(gss_cred->gc_ctx, 1);
+
+	RCU_INIT_POINTER(gss_cred->gc_ctx, NULL);
+	put_cred(cred->cr_cred);
+	call_rcu(&cred->cr_rcu, gss_free_cred_callback);
+	if (ctx)
+		gss_put_ctx(ctx);
+	gss_put_auth(gss_auth);
+}
+
+static void
+gss_destroy_cred(struct rpc_cred *cred)
+{
+	if (test_and_clear_bit(RPCAUTH_CRED_UPTODATE, &cred->cr_flags) != 0)
+		gss_send_destroy_context(cred);
+	gss_destroy_nullcred(cred);
+}
+
+static int
+gss_hash_cred(struct auth_cred *acred, unsigned int hashbits)
+{
+	return hash_64(from_kuid(&init_user_ns, acred->cred->fsuid), hashbits);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Lookup RPCSEC_GSS cred for the current process
+ */
+static struct rpc_cred *gss_lookup_cred(struct rpc_auth *auth,
+					struct auth_cred *acred, int flags)
+{
+	return rpcauth_lookup_credcache(auth, acred, flags,
+					rpc_task_gfp_mask());
+}
+
+static struct rpc_cred *
+gss_create_cred(struct rpc_auth *auth, struct auth_cred *acred, int flags, gfp_t gfp)
+{
+	struct gss_auth *gss_auth = container_of(auth, struct gss_auth, rpc_auth);
+	struct gss_cred	*cred = NULL;
+	int err = -ENOMEM;
+
+	if (!(cred = kzalloc(sizeof(*cred), gfp)))
+		goto out_err;
+
+	rpcauth_init_cred(&cred->gc_base, acred, auth, &gss_credops);
+	/*
+	 * Note: in order to force a call to call_refresh(), we deliberately
+	 * fail to flag the credential as RPCAUTH_CRED_UPTODATE.
+	 */
+	cred->gc_base.cr_flags = 1UL << RPCAUTH_CRED_NEW;
+	cred->gc_service = gss_auth->service;
+	cred->gc_principal = acred->principal;
+	kref_get(&gss_auth->kref);
+	return &cred->gc_base;
+
+out_err:
+	return ERR_PTR(err);
+}
+
+static int
+gss_cred_init(struct rpc_auth *auth, struct rpc_cred *cred)
+{
+	struct gss_auth *gss_auth = container_of(auth, struct gss_auth, rpc_auth);
+	struct gss_cred *gss_cred = container_of(cred,struct gss_cred, gc_base);
+	int err;
+
+	do {
+		err = gss_create_upcall(gss_auth, gss_cred);
+	} while (err == -EAGAIN);
+	return err;
+}
+
+static char *
+gss_stringify_acceptor(struct rpc_cred *cred)
+{
+	char *string = NULL;
+	struct gss_cred *gss_cred = container_of(cred, struct gss_cred, gc_base);
+	struct gss_cl_ctx *ctx;
+	unsigned int len;
+	struct xdr_netobj *acceptor;
+
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	ctx = rcu_dereference(gss_cred->gc_ctx);
+	if (!ctx)
+		goto out;
+
+	len = ctx->gc_acceptor.len;
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+
+	/* no point if there's no string */
+	if (!len)
+		return NULL;
+realloc:
+	string = kmalloc(len + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!string)
+		return NULL;
+
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	ctx = rcu_dereference(gss_cred->gc_ctx);
+
+	/* did the ctx disappear or was it replaced by one with no acceptor? */
+	if (!ctx || !ctx->gc_acceptor.len) {
+		kfree(string);
+		string = NULL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	acceptor = &ctx->gc_acceptor;
+
+	/*
+	 * Did we find a new acceptor that's longer than the original? Allocate
+	 * a longer buffer and try again.
+	 */
+	if (len < acceptor->len) {
+		len = acceptor->len;
+		rcu_read_unlock();
+		kfree(string);
+		goto realloc;
+	}
+
+	memcpy(string, acceptor->data, acceptor->len);
+	string[acceptor->len] = '\0';
+out:
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+	return string;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Returns -EACCES if GSS context is NULL or will expire within the
+ * timeout (miliseconds)
+ */
+static int
+gss_key_timeout(struct rpc_cred *rc)
+{
+	struct gss_cred *gss_cred = container_of(rc, struct gss_cred, gc_base);
+	struct gss_cl_ctx *ctx;
+	unsigned long timeout = jiffies + (gss_key_expire_timeo * HZ);
+	int ret = 0;
+
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	ctx = rcu_dereference(gss_cred->gc_ctx);
+	if (!ctx || time_after(timeout, ctx->gc_expiry))
+		ret = -EACCES;
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int
+gss_match(struct auth_cred *acred, struct rpc_cred *rc, int flags)
+{
+	struct gss_cred *gss_cred = container_of(rc, struct gss_cred, gc_base);
+	struct gss_cl_ctx *ctx;
+	int ret;
+
+	if (test_bit(RPCAUTH_CRED_NEW, &rc->cr_flags))
+		goto out;
+	/* Don't match with creds that have expired. */
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	ctx = rcu_dereference(gss_cred->gc_ctx);
+	if (!ctx || time_after(jiffies, ctx->gc_expiry)) {
+		rcu_read_unlock();
+		return 0;
+	}
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+	if (!test_bit(RPCAUTH_CRED_UPTODATE, &rc->cr_flags))
+		return 0;
+out:
+	if (acred->principal != NULL) {
+		if (gss_cred->gc_principal == NULL)
+			return 0;
+		ret = strcmp(acred->principal, gss_cred->gc_principal) == 0;
+	} else {
+		if (gss_cred->gc_principal != NULL)
+			return 0;
+		ret = uid_eq(rc->cr_cred->fsuid, acred->cred->fsuid);
+	}
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Marshal credentials.
+ *
+ * The expensive part is computing the verifier. We can't cache a
+ * pre-computed version of the verifier because the seqno, which
+ * is different every time, is included in the MIC.
+ */
+static int gss_marshal(struct rpc_task *task, struct xdr_stream *xdr)
+{
+	struct rpc_rqst *req = task->tk_rqstp;
+	struct rpc_cred *cred = req->rq_cred;
+	struct gss_cred	*gss_cred = container_of(cred, struct gss_cred,
+						 gc_base);
+	struct gss_cl_ctx	*ctx = gss_cred_get_ctx(cred);
+	__be32		*p, *cred_len;
+	u32             maj_stat = 0;
+	struct xdr_netobj mic;
+	struct kvec	iov;
+	struct xdr_buf	verf_buf;
+	int status;
+
+	/* Credential */
+
+	p = xdr_reserve_space(xdr, 7 * sizeof(*p) +
+			      ctx->gc_wire_ctx.len);
+	if (!p)
+		goto marshal_failed;
+	*p++ = rpc_auth_gss;
+	cred_len = p++;
+
+	spin_lock(&ctx->gc_seq_lock);
+	req->rq_seqno = (ctx->gc_seq < MAXSEQ) ? ctx->gc_seq++ : MAXSEQ;
+	spin_unlock(&ctx->gc_seq_lock);
+	if (req->rq_seqno == MAXSEQ)
+		goto expired;
+	trace_rpcgss_seqno(task);
+
+	*p++ = cpu_to_be32(RPC_GSS_VERSION);
+	*p++ = cpu_to_be32(ctx->gc_proc);
+	*p++ = cpu_to_be32(req->rq_seqno);
+	*p++ = cpu_to_be32(gss_cred->gc_service);
+	p = xdr_encode_netobj(p, &ctx->gc_wire_ctx);
+	*cred_len = cpu_to_be32((p - (cred_len + 1)) << 2);
+
+	/* Verifier */
+
+	/* We compute the checksum for the verifier over the xdr-encoded bytes
+	 * starting with the xid and ending at the end of the credential: */
+	iov.iov_base = req->rq_snd_buf.head[0].iov_base;
+	iov.iov_len = (u8 *)p - (u8 *)iov.iov_base;
+	xdr_buf_from_iov(&iov, &verf_buf);
+
+	p = xdr_reserve_space(xdr, sizeof(*p));
+	if (!p)
+		goto marshal_failed;
+	*p++ = rpc_auth_gss;
+	mic.data = (u8 *)(p + 1);
+	maj_stat = gss_get_mic(ctx->gc_gss_ctx, &verf_buf, &mic);
+	if (maj_stat == GSS_S_CONTEXT_EXPIRED)
+		goto expired;
+	else if (maj_stat != 0)
+		goto bad_mic;
+	if (xdr_stream_encode_opaque_inline(xdr, (void **)&p, mic.len) < 0)
+		goto marshal_failed;
+	status = 0;
+out:
+	gss_put_ctx(ctx);
+	return status;
+expired:
+	clear_bit(RPCAUTH_CRED_UPTODATE, &cred->cr_flags);
+	status = -EKEYEXPIRED;
+	goto out;
+marshal_failed:
+	status = -EMSGSIZE;
+	goto out;
+bad_mic:
+	trace_rpcgss_get_mic(task, maj_stat);
+	status = -EIO;
+	goto out;
+}
+
+static int gss_renew_cred(struct rpc_task *task)
+{
+	struct rpc_cred *oldcred = task->tk_rqstp->rq_cred;
+	struct gss_cred *gss_cred = container_of(oldcred,
+						 struct gss_cred,
+						 gc_base);
+	struct rpc_auth *auth = oldcred->cr_auth;
+	struct auth_cred acred = {
+		.cred = oldcred->cr_cred,
+		.principal = gss_cred->gc_principal,
+	};
+	struct rpc_cred *new;
+
+	new = gss_lookup_cred(auth, &acred, RPCAUTH_LOOKUP_NEW);
+	if (IS_ERR(new))
+		return PTR_ERR(new);
+
+	task->tk_rqstp->rq_cred = new;
+	put_rpccred(oldcred);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int gss_cred_is_negative_entry(struct rpc_cred *cred)
+{
+	if (test_bit(RPCAUTH_CRED_NEGATIVE, &cred->cr_flags)) {
+		unsigned long now = jiffies;
+		unsigned long begin, expire;
+		struct gss_cred *gss_cred;
+
+		gss_cred = container_of(cred, struct gss_cred, gc_base);
+		begin = gss_cred->gc_upcall_timestamp;
+		expire = begin + gss_expired_cred_retry_delay * HZ;
+
+		if (time_in_range_open(now, begin, expire))
+			return 1;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+* Refresh credentials. XXX - finish
+*/
+static int
+gss_refresh(struct rpc_task *task)
+{
+	struct rpc_cred *cred = task->tk_rqstp->rq_cred;
+	int ret = 0;
+
+	if (gss_cred_is_negative_entry(cred))
+		return -EKEYEXPIRED;
+
+	if (!test_bit(RPCAUTH_CRED_NEW, &cred->cr_flags) &&
+			!test_bit(RPCAUTH_CRED_UPTODATE, &cred->cr_flags)) {
+		ret = gss_renew_cred(task);
+		if (ret < 0)
+			goto out;
+		cred = task->tk_rqstp->rq_cred;
+	}
+
+	if (test_bit(RPCAUTH_CRED_NEW, &cred->cr_flags))
+		ret = gss_refresh_upcall(task);
+out:
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/* Dummy refresh routine: used only when destroying the context */
+static int
+gss_refresh_null(struct rpc_task *task)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+gss_validate(struct rpc_task *task, struct xdr_stream *xdr)
+{
+	struct rpc_cred *cred = task->tk_rqstp->rq_cred;
+	struct gss_cl_ctx *ctx = gss_cred_get_ctx(cred);
+	__be32		*p, *seq = NULL;
+	struct kvec	iov;
+	struct xdr_buf	verf_buf;
+	struct xdr_netobj mic;
+	u32		len, maj_stat;
+	int		status;
+
+	p = xdr_inline_decode(xdr, 2 * sizeof(*p));
+	if (!p)
+		goto validate_failed;
+	if (*p++ != rpc_auth_gss)
+		goto validate_failed;
+	len = be32_to_cpup(p);
+	if (len > RPC_MAX_AUTH_SIZE)
+		goto validate_failed;
+	p = xdr_inline_decode(xdr, len);
+	if (!p)
+		goto validate_failed;
+
+	seq = kmalloc(4, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!seq)
+		goto validate_failed;
+	*seq = cpu_to_be32(task->tk_rqstp->rq_seqno);
+	iov.iov_base = seq;
+	iov.iov_len = 4;
+	xdr_buf_from_iov(&iov, &verf_buf);
+	mic.data = (u8 *)p;
+	mic.len = len;
+	maj_stat = gss_verify_mic(ctx->gc_gss_ctx, &verf_buf, &mic);
+	if (maj_stat == GSS_S_CONTEXT_EXPIRED)
+		clear_bit(RPCAUTH_CRED_UPTODATE, &cred->cr_flags);
+	if (maj_stat)
+		goto bad_mic;
+
+	/* We leave it to unwrap to calculate au_rslack. For now we just
+	 * calculate the length of the verifier: */
+	if (test_bit(RPCAUTH_AUTH_UPDATE_SLACK, &cred->cr_auth->au_flags))
+		cred->cr_auth->au_verfsize = XDR_QUADLEN(len) + 2;
+	status = 0;
+out:
+	gss_put_ctx(ctx);
+	kfree(seq);
+	return status;
+
+validate_failed:
+	status = -EIO;
+	goto out;
+bad_mic:
+	trace_rpcgss_verify_mic(task, maj_stat);
+	status = -EACCES;
+	goto out;
+}
+
+static noinline_for_stack int
+gss_wrap_req_integ(struct rpc_cred *cred, struct gss_cl_ctx *ctx,
+		   struct rpc_task *task, struct xdr_stream *xdr)
+{
+	struct rpc_rqst *rqstp = task->tk_rqstp;
+	struct xdr_buf integ_buf, *snd_buf = &rqstp->rq_snd_buf;
+	struct xdr_netobj mic;
+	__be32 *p, *integ_len;
+	u32 offset, maj_stat;
+
+	p = xdr_reserve_space(xdr, 2 * sizeof(*p));
+	if (!p)
+		goto wrap_failed;
+	integ_len = p++;
+	*p = cpu_to_be32(rqstp->rq_seqno);
+
+	if (rpcauth_wrap_req_encode(task, xdr))
+		goto wrap_failed;
+
+	offset = (u8 *)p - (u8 *)snd_buf->head[0].iov_base;
+	if (xdr_buf_subsegment(snd_buf, &integ_buf,
+				offset, snd_buf->len - offset))
+		goto wrap_failed;
+	*integ_len = cpu_to_be32(integ_buf.len);
+
+	p = xdr_reserve_space(xdr, 0);
+	if (!p)
+		goto wrap_failed;
+	mic.data = (u8 *)(p + 1);
+	maj_stat = gss_get_mic(ctx->gc_gss_ctx, &integ_buf, &mic);
+	if (maj_stat == GSS_S_CONTEXT_EXPIRED)
+		clear_bit(RPCAUTH_CRED_UPTODATE, &cred->cr_flags);
+	else if (maj_stat)
+		goto bad_mic;
+	/* Check that the trailing MIC fit in the buffer, after the fact */
+	if (xdr_stream_encode_opaque_inline(xdr, (void **)&p, mic.len) < 0)
+		goto wrap_failed;
+	return 0;
+wrap_failed:
+	return -EMSGSIZE;
+bad_mic:
+	trace_rpcgss_get_mic(task, maj_stat);
+	return -EIO;
+}
+
+static void
+priv_release_snd_buf(struct rpc_rqst *rqstp)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	for (i=0; i < rqstp->rq_enc_pages_num; i++)
+		__free_page(rqstp->rq_enc_pages[i]);
+	kfree(rqstp->rq_enc_pages);
+	rqstp->rq_release_snd_buf = NULL;
+}
+
+static int
+alloc_enc_pages(struct rpc_rqst *rqstp)
+{
+	struct xdr_buf *snd_buf = &rqstp->rq_snd_buf;
+	int first, last, i;
+
+	if (rqstp->rq_release_snd_buf)
+		rqstp->rq_release_snd_buf(rqstp);
+
+	if (snd_buf->page_len == 0) {
+		rqstp->rq_enc_pages_num = 0;
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	first = snd_buf->page_base >> PAGE_SHIFT;
+	last = (snd_buf->page_base + snd_buf->page_len - 1) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
+	rqstp->rq_enc_pages_num = last - first + 1 + 1;
+	rqstp->rq_enc_pages
+		= kmalloc_array(rqstp->rq_enc_pages_num,
+				sizeof(struct page *),
+				GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!rqstp->rq_enc_pages)
+		goto out;
+	for (i=0; i < rqstp->rq_enc_pages_num; i++) {
+		rqstp->rq_enc_pages[i] = alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (rqstp->rq_enc_pages[i] == NULL)
+			goto out_free;
+	}
+	rqstp->rq_release_snd_buf = priv_release_snd_buf;
+	return 0;
+out_free:
+	rqstp->rq_enc_pages_num = i;
+	priv_release_snd_buf(rqstp);
+out:
+	return -EAGAIN;
+}
+
+static noinline_for_stack int
+gss_wrap_req_priv(struct rpc_cred *cred, struct gss_cl_ctx *ctx,
+		  struct rpc_task *task, struct xdr_stream *xdr)
+{
+	struct rpc_rqst *rqstp = task->tk_rqstp;
+	struct xdr_buf	*snd_buf = &rqstp->rq_snd_buf;
+	u32		pad, offset, maj_stat;
+	int		status;
+	__be32		*p, *opaque_len;
+	struct page	**inpages;
+	int		first;
+	struct kvec	*iov;
+
+	status = -EIO;
+	p = xdr_reserve_space(xdr, 2 * sizeof(*p));
+	if (!p)
+		goto wrap_failed;
+	opaque_len = p++;
+	*p = cpu_to_be32(rqstp->rq_seqno);
+
+	if (rpcauth_wrap_req_encode(task, xdr))
+		goto wrap_failed;
+
+	status = alloc_enc_pages(rqstp);
+	if (unlikely(status))
+		goto wrap_failed;
+	first = snd_buf->page_base >> PAGE_SHIFT;
+	inpages = snd_buf->pages + first;
+	snd_buf->pages = rqstp->rq_enc_pages;
+	snd_buf->page_base -= first << PAGE_SHIFT;
+	/*
+	 * Move the tail into its own page, in case gss_wrap needs
+	 * more space in the head when wrapping.
+	 *
+	 * Still... Why can't gss_wrap just slide the tail down?
+	 */
+	if (snd_buf->page_len || snd_buf->tail[0].iov_len) {
+		char *tmp;
+
+		tmp = page_address(rqstp->rq_enc_pages[rqstp->rq_enc_pages_num - 1]);
+		memcpy(tmp, snd_buf->tail[0].iov_base, snd_buf->tail[0].iov_len);
+		snd_buf->tail[0].iov_base = tmp;
+	}
+	offset = (u8 *)p - (u8 *)snd_buf->head[0].iov_base;
+	maj_stat = gss_wrap(ctx->gc_gss_ctx, offset, snd_buf, inpages);
+	/* slack space should prevent this ever happening: */
+	if (unlikely(snd_buf->len > snd_buf->buflen))
+		goto wrap_failed;
+	/* We're assuming that when GSS_S_CONTEXT_EXPIRED, the encryption was
+	 * done anyway, so it's safe to put the request on the wire: */
+	if (maj_stat == GSS_S_CONTEXT_EXPIRED)
+		clear_bit(RPCAUTH_CRED_UPTODATE, &cred->cr_flags);
+	else if (maj_stat)
+		goto bad_wrap;
+
+	*opaque_len = cpu_to_be32(snd_buf->len - offset);
+	/* guess whether the pad goes into the head or the tail: */
+	if (snd_buf->page_len || snd_buf->tail[0].iov_len)
+		iov = snd_buf->tail;
+	else
+		iov = snd_buf->head;
+	p = iov->iov_base + iov->iov_len;
+	pad = xdr_pad_size(snd_buf->len - offset);
+	memset(p, 0, pad);
+	iov->iov_len += pad;
+	snd_buf->len += pad;
+
+	return 0;
+wrap_failed:
+	return status;
+bad_wrap:
+	trace_rpcgss_wrap(task, maj_stat);
+	return -EIO;
+}
+
+static int gss_wrap_req(struct rpc_task *task, struct xdr_stream *xdr)
+{
+	struct rpc_cred *cred = task->tk_rqstp->rq_cred;
+	struct gss_cred	*gss_cred = container_of(cred, struct gss_cred,
+			gc_base);
+	struct gss_cl_ctx *ctx = gss_cred_get_ctx(cred);
+	int status;
+
+	status = -EIO;
+	if (ctx->gc_proc != RPC_GSS_PROC_DATA) {
+		/* The spec seems a little ambiguous here, but I think that not
+		 * wrapping context destruction requests makes the most sense.
+		 */
+		status = rpcauth_wrap_req_encode(task, xdr);
+		goto out;
+	}
+	switch (gss_cred->gc_service) {
+	case RPC_GSS_SVC_NONE:
+		status = rpcauth_wrap_req_encode(task, xdr);
+		break;
+	case RPC_GSS_SVC_INTEGRITY:
+		status = gss_wrap_req_integ(cred, ctx, task, xdr);
+		break;
+	case RPC_GSS_SVC_PRIVACY:
+		status = gss_wrap_req_priv(cred, ctx, task, xdr);
+		break;
+	default:
+		status = -EIO;
+	}
+out:
+	gss_put_ctx(ctx);
+	return status;
+}
+
+/**
+ * gss_update_rslack - Possibly update RPC receive buffer size estimates
+ * @task: rpc_task for incoming RPC Reply being unwrapped
+ * @cred: controlling rpc_cred for @task
+ * @before: XDR words needed before each RPC Reply message
+ * @after: XDR words needed following each RPC Reply message
+ *
+ */
+static void gss_update_rslack(struct rpc_task *task, struct rpc_cred *cred,
+			      unsigned int before, unsigned int after)
+{
+	struct rpc_auth *auth = cred->cr_auth;
+
+	if (test_and_clear_bit(RPCAUTH_AUTH_UPDATE_SLACK, &auth->au_flags)) {
+		auth->au_ralign = auth->au_verfsize + before;
+		auth->au_rslack = auth->au_verfsize + after;
+		trace_rpcgss_update_slack(task, auth);
+	}
+}
+
+static int
+gss_unwrap_resp_auth(struct rpc_task *task, struct rpc_cred *cred)
+{
+	gss_update_rslack(task, cred, 0, 0);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * RFC 2203, Section 5.3.2.2
+ *
+ *	struct rpc_gss_integ_data {
+ *		opaque databody_integ<>;
+ *		opaque checksum<>;
+ *	};
+ *
+ *	struct rpc_gss_data_t {
+ *		unsigned int seq_num;
+ *		proc_req_arg_t arg;
+ *	};
+ */
+static noinline_for_stack int
+gss_unwrap_resp_integ(struct rpc_task *task, struct rpc_cred *cred,
+		      struct gss_cl_ctx *ctx, struct rpc_rqst *rqstp,
+		      struct xdr_stream *xdr)
+{
+	struct xdr_buf gss_data, *rcv_buf = &rqstp->rq_rcv_buf;
+	u32 len, offset, seqno, maj_stat;
+	struct xdr_netobj mic;
+	int ret;
+
+	ret = -EIO;
+	mic.data = NULL;
+
+	/* opaque databody_integ<>; */
+	if (xdr_stream_decode_u32(xdr, &len))
+		goto unwrap_failed;
+	if (len & 3)
+		goto unwrap_failed;
+	offset = rcv_buf->len - xdr_stream_remaining(xdr);
+	if (xdr_stream_decode_u32(xdr, &seqno))
+		goto unwrap_failed;
+	if (seqno != rqstp->rq_seqno)
+		goto bad_seqno;
+	if (xdr_buf_subsegment(rcv_buf, &gss_data, offset, len))
+		goto unwrap_failed;
+
+	/*
+	 * The xdr_stream now points to the beginning of the
+	 * upper layer payload, to be passed below to
+	 * rpcauth_unwrap_resp_decode(). The checksum, which
+	 * follows the upper layer payload in @rcv_buf, is
+	 * located and parsed without updating the xdr_stream.
+	 */
+
+	/* opaque checksum<>; */
+	offset += len;
+	if (xdr_decode_word(rcv_buf, offset, &len))
+		goto unwrap_failed;
+	offset += sizeof(__be32);
+	if (offset + len > rcv_buf->len)
+		goto unwrap_failed;
+	mic.len = len;
+	mic.data = kmalloc(len, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (ZERO_OR_NULL_PTR(mic.data))
+		goto unwrap_failed;
+	if (read_bytes_from_xdr_buf(rcv_buf, offset, mic.data, mic.len))
+		goto unwrap_failed;
+
+	maj_stat = gss_verify_mic(ctx->gc_gss_ctx, &gss_data, &mic);
+	if (maj_stat == GSS_S_CONTEXT_EXPIRED)
+		clear_bit(RPCAUTH_CRED_UPTODATE, &cred->cr_flags);
+	if (maj_stat != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
+		goto bad_mic;
+
+	gss_update_rslack(task, cred, 2, 2 + 1 + XDR_QUADLEN(mic.len));
+	ret = 0;
+
+out:
+	kfree(mic.data);
+	return ret;
+
+unwrap_failed:
+	trace_rpcgss_unwrap_failed(task);
+	goto out;
+bad_seqno:
+	trace_rpcgss_bad_seqno(task, rqstp->rq_seqno, seqno);
+	goto out;
+bad_mic:
+	trace_rpcgss_verify_mic(task, maj_stat);
+	goto out;
+}
+
+static noinline_for_stack int
+gss_unwrap_resp_priv(struct rpc_task *task, struct rpc_cred *cred,
+		     struct gss_cl_ctx *ctx, struct rpc_rqst *rqstp,
+		     struct xdr_stream *xdr)
+{
+	struct xdr_buf *rcv_buf = &rqstp->rq_rcv_buf;
+	struct kvec *head = rqstp->rq_rcv_buf.head;
+	u32 offset, opaque_len, maj_stat;
+	__be32 *p;
+
+	p = xdr_inline_decode(xdr, 2 * sizeof(*p));
+	if (unlikely(!p))
+		goto unwrap_failed;
+	opaque_len = be32_to_cpup(p++);
+	offset = (u8 *)(p) - (u8 *)head->iov_base;
+	if (offset + opaque_len > rcv_buf->len)
+		goto unwrap_failed;
+
+	maj_stat = gss_unwrap(ctx->gc_gss_ctx, offset,
+			      offset + opaque_len, rcv_buf);
+	if (maj_stat == GSS_S_CONTEXT_EXPIRED)
+		clear_bit(RPCAUTH_CRED_UPTODATE, &cred->cr_flags);
+	if (maj_stat != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
+		goto bad_unwrap;
+	/* gss_unwrap decrypted the sequence number */
+	if (be32_to_cpup(p++) != rqstp->rq_seqno)
+		goto bad_seqno;
+
+	/* gss_unwrap redacts the opaque blob from the head iovec.
+	 * rcv_buf has changed, thus the stream needs to be reset.
+	 */
+	xdr_init_decode(xdr, rcv_buf, p, rqstp);
+
+	gss_update_rslack(task, cred, 2 + ctx->gc_gss_ctx->align,
+			  2 + ctx->gc_gss_ctx->slack);
+
+	return 0;
+unwrap_failed:
+	trace_rpcgss_unwrap_failed(task);
+	return -EIO;
+bad_seqno:
+	trace_rpcgss_bad_seqno(task, rqstp->rq_seqno, be32_to_cpup(--p));
+	return -EIO;
+bad_unwrap:
+	trace_rpcgss_unwrap(task, maj_stat);
+	return -EIO;
+}
+
+static bool
+gss_seq_is_newer(u32 new, u32 old)
+{
+	return (s32)(new - old) > 0;
+}
+
+static bool
+gss_xmit_need_reencode(struct rpc_task *task)
+{
+	struct rpc_rqst *req = task->tk_rqstp;
+	struct rpc_cred *cred = req->rq_cred;
+	struct gss_cl_ctx *ctx = gss_cred_get_ctx(cred);
+	u32 win, seq_xmit = 0;
+	bool ret = true;
+
+	if (!ctx)
+		goto out;
+
+	if (gss_seq_is_newer(req->rq_seqno, READ_ONCE(ctx->gc_seq)))
+		goto out_ctx;
+
+	seq_xmit = READ_ONCE(ctx->gc_seq_xmit);
+	while (gss_seq_is_newer(req->rq_seqno, seq_xmit)) {
+		u32 tmp = seq_xmit;
+
+		seq_xmit = cmpxchg(&ctx->gc_seq_xmit, tmp, req->rq_seqno);
+		if (seq_xmit == tmp) {
+			ret = false;
+			goto out_ctx;
+		}
+	}
+
+	win = ctx->gc_win;
+	if (win > 0)
+		ret = !gss_seq_is_newer(req->rq_seqno, seq_xmit - win);
+
+out_ctx:
+	gss_put_ctx(ctx);
+out:
+	trace_rpcgss_need_reencode(task, seq_xmit, ret);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int
+gss_unwrap_resp(struct rpc_task *task, struct xdr_stream *xdr)
+{
+	struct rpc_rqst *rqstp = task->tk_rqstp;
+	struct rpc_cred *cred = rqstp->rq_cred;
+	struct gss_cred *gss_cred = container_of(cred, struct gss_cred,
+			gc_base);
+	struct gss_cl_ctx *ctx = gss_cred_get_ctx(cred);
+	int status = -EIO;
+
+	if (ctx->gc_proc != RPC_GSS_PROC_DATA)
+		goto out_decode;
+	switch (gss_cred->gc_service) {
+	case RPC_GSS_SVC_NONE:
+		status = gss_unwrap_resp_auth(task, cred);
+		break;
+	case RPC_GSS_SVC_INTEGRITY:
+		status = gss_unwrap_resp_integ(task, cred, ctx, rqstp, xdr);
+		break;
+	case RPC_GSS_SVC_PRIVACY:
+		status = gss_unwrap_resp_priv(task, cred, ctx, rqstp, xdr);
+		break;
+	}
+	if (status)
+		goto out;
+
+out_decode:
+	status = rpcauth_unwrap_resp_decode(task, xdr);
+out:
+	gss_put_ctx(ctx);
+	return status;
+}
+
+static const struct rpc_authops authgss_ops = {
+	.owner		= THIS_MODULE,
+	.au_flavor	= RPC_AUTH_GSS,
+	.au_name	= "RPCSEC_GSS",
+	.create		= gss_create,
+	.destroy	= gss_destroy,
+	.hash_cred	= gss_hash_cred,
+	.lookup_cred	= gss_lookup_cred,
+	.crcreate	= gss_create_cred,
+	.info2flavor	= gss_mech_info2flavor,
+	.flavor2info	= gss_mech_flavor2info,
+};
+
+static const struct rpc_credops gss_credops = {
+	.cr_name		= "AUTH_GSS",
+	.crdestroy		= gss_destroy_cred,
+	.cr_init		= gss_cred_init,
+	.crmatch		= gss_match,
+	.crmarshal		= gss_marshal,
+	.crrefresh		= gss_refresh,
+	.crvalidate		= gss_validate,
+	.crwrap_req		= gss_wrap_req,
+	.crunwrap_resp		= gss_unwrap_resp,
+	.crkey_timeout		= gss_key_timeout,
+	.crstringify_acceptor	= gss_stringify_acceptor,
+	.crneed_reencode	= gss_xmit_need_reencode,
+};
+
+static const struct rpc_credops gss_nullops = {
+	.cr_name		= "AUTH_GSS",
+	.crdestroy		= gss_destroy_nullcred,
+	.crmatch		= gss_match,
+	.crmarshal		= gss_marshal,
+	.crrefresh		= gss_refresh_null,
+	.crvalidate		= gss_validate,
+	.crwrap_req		= gss_wrap_req,
+	.crunwrap_resp		= gss_unwrap_resp,
+	.crstringify_acceptor	= gss_stringify_acceptor,
+};
+
+static const struct rpc_pipe_ops gss_upcall_ops_v0 = {
+	.upcall		= gss_v0_upcall,
+	.downcall	= gss_pipe_downcall,
+	.destroy_msg	= gss_pipe_destroy_msg,
+	.open_pipe	= gss_pipe_open_v0,
+	.release_pipe	= gss_pipe_release,
+};
+
+static const struct rpc_pipe_ops gss_upcall_ops_v1 = {
+	.upcall		= gss_v1_upcall,
+	.downcall	= gss_pipe_downcall,
+	.destroy_msg	= gss_pipe_destroy_msg,
+	.open_pipe	= gss_pipe_open_v1,
+	.release_pipe	= gss_pipe_release,
+};
+
+static __net_init int rpcsec_gss_init_net(struct net *net)
+{
+	return gss_svc_init_net(net);
+}
+
+static __net_exit void rpcsec_gss_exit_net(struct net *net)
+{
+	gss_svc_shutdown_net(net);
+}
+
+static struct pernet_operations rpcsec_gss_net_ops = {
+	.init = rpcsec_gss_init_net,
+	.exit = rpcsec_gss_exit_net,
+};
+
+/*
+ * Initialize RPCSEC_GSS module
+ */
+static int __init init_rpcsec_gss(void)
+{
+	int err = 0;
+
+	err = rpcauth_register(&authgss_ops);
+	if (err)
+		goto out;
+	err = gss_svc_init();
+	if (err)
+		goto out_unregister;
+	err = register_pernet_subsys(&rpcsec_gss_net_ops);
+	if (err)
+		goto out_svc_exit;
+	rpc_init_wait_queue(&pipe_version_rpc_waitqueue, "gss pipe version");
+	return 0;
+out_svc_exit:
+	gss_svc_shutdown();
+out_unregister:
+	rpcauth_unregister(&authgss_ops);
+out:
+	return err;
+}
+
+static void __exit exit_rpcsec_gss(void)
+{
+	unregister_pernet_subsys(&rpcsec_gss_net_ops);
+	gss_svc_shutdown();
+	rpcauth_unregister(&authgss_ops);
+	rcu_barrier(); /* Wait for completion of call_rcu()'s */
+}
+
+MODULE_ALIAS("rpc-auth-6");
+MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
+module_param_named(expired_cred_retry_delay,
+		   gss_expired_cred_retry_delay,
+		   uint, 0644);
+MODULE_PARM_DESC(expired_cred_retry_delay, "Timeout (in seconds) until "
+		"the RPC engine retries an expired credential");
+
+module_param_named(key_expire_timeo,
+		   gss_key_expire_timeo,
+		   uint, 0644);
+MODULE_PARM_DESC(key_expire_timeo, "Time (in seconds) at the end of a "
+		"credential keys lifetime where the NFS layer cleans up "
+		"prior to key expiration");
+
+module_init(init_rpcsec_gss)
+module_exit(exit_rpcsec_gss)
diff --git a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/auth_gss_internal.h b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/auth_gss_internal.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..c53b329092
--- /dev/null
+++ b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/auth_gss_internal.h
@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
+/*
+ * linux/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/auth_gss_internal.h
+ *
+ * Internal definitions for RPCSEC_GSS client authentication
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 2000 The Regents of the University of Michigan.
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ */
+#include <linux/err.h>
+#include <linux/string.h>
+#include <linux/sunrpc/xdr.h>
+
+static inline const void *
+simple_get_bytes(const void *p, const void *end, void *res, size_t len)
+{
+	const void *q = (const void *)((const char *)p + len);
+	if (unlikely(q > end || q < p))
+		return ERR_PTR(-EFAULT);
+	memcpy(res, p, len);
+	return q;
+}
+
+static inline const void *
+simple_get_netobj(const void *p, const void *end, struct xdr_netobj *dest)
+{
+	const void *q;
+	unsigned int len;
+
+	p = simple_get_bytes(p, end, &len, sizeof(len));
+	if (IS_ERR(p))
+		return p;
+	q = (const void *)((const char *)p + len);
+	if (unlikely(q > end || q < p))
+		return ERR_PTR(-EFAULT);
+	if (len) {
+		dest->data = kmemdup(p, len, GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (unlikely(dest->data == NULL))
+			return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+	} else
+		dest->data = NULL;
+	dest->len = len;
+	return q;
+}
diff --git a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_generic_token.c b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_generic_token.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..4a4082bb22
--- /dev/null
+++ b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_generic_token.c
@@ -0,0 +1,231 @@
+/*
+ *  linux/net/sunrpc/gss_generic_token.c
+ *
+ *  Adapted from MIT Kerberos 5-1.2.1 lib/gssapi/generic/util_token.c
+ *
+ *  Copyright (c) 2000 The Regents of the University of Michigan.
+ *  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ *  Andy Adamson   <andros@umich.edu>
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright 1993 by OpenVision Technologies, Inc.
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, distribute, and sell this software
+ * and its documentation for any purpose is hereby granted without fee,
+ * provided that the above copyright notice appears in all copies and
+ * that both that copyright notice and this permission notice appear in
+ * supporting documentation, and that the name of OpenVision not be used
+ * in advertising or publicity pertaining to distribution of the software
+ * without specific, written prior permission. OpenVision makes no
+ * representations about the suitability of this software for any
+ * purpose.  It is provided "as is" without express or implied warranty.
+ *
+ * OPENVISION DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE,
+ * INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS, IN NO
+ * EVENT SHALL OPENVISION BE LIABLE FOR ANY SPECIAL, INDIRECT OR
+ * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF
+ * USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR
+ * OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR
+ * PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/string.h>
+#include <linux/sunrpc/sched.h>
+#include <linux/sunrpc/gss_asn1.h>
+
+
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SUNRPC_DEBUG)
+# define RPCDBG_FACILITY        RPCDBG_AUTH
+#endif
+
+
+/* TWRITE_STR from gssapiP_generic.h */
+#define TWRITE_STR(ptr, str, len) \
+	memcpy((ptr), (char *) (str), (len)); \
+	(ptr) += (len);
+
+/* XXXX this code currently makes the assumption that a mech oid will
+   never be longer than 127 bytes.  This assumption is not inherent in
+   the interfaces, so the code can be fixed if the OSI namespace
+   balloons unexpectedly. */
+
+/* Each token looks like this:
+
+0x60				tag for APPLICATION 0, SEQUENCE
+					(constructed, definite-length)
+	<length>		possible multiple bytes, need to parse/generate
+	0x06			tag for OBJECT IDENTIFIER
+		<moid_length>	compile-time constant string (assume 1 byte)
+		<moid_bytes>	compile-time constant string
+	<inner_bytes>		the ANY containing the application token
+					bytes 0,1 are the token type
+					bytes 2,n are the token data
+
+For the purposes of this abstraction, the token "header" consists of
+the sequence tag and length octets, the mech OID DER encoding, and the
+first two inner bytes, which indicate the token type.  The token
+"body" consists of everything else.
+
+*/
+
+static int
+der_length_size( int length)
+{
+	if (length < (1<<7))
+		return 1;
+	else if (length < (1<<8))
+		return 2;
+#if (SIZEOF_INT == 2)
+	else
+		return 3;
+#else
+	else if (length < (1<<16))
+		return 3;
+	else if (length < (1<<24))
+		return 4;
+	else
+		return 5;
+#endif
+}
+
+static void
+der_write_length(unsigned char **buf, int length)
+{
+	if (length < (1<<7)) {
+		*(*buf)++ = (unsigned char) length;
+	} else {
+		*(*buf)++ = (unsigned char) (der_length_size(length)+127);
+#if (SIZEOF_INT > 2)
+		if (length >= (1<<24))
+			*(*buf)++ = (unsigned char) (length>>24);
+		if (length >= (1<<16))
+			*(*buf)++ = (unsigned char) ((length>>16)&0xff);
+#endif
+		if (length >= (1<<8))
+			*(*buf)++ = (unsigned char) ((length>>8)&0xff);
+		*(*buf)++ = (unsigned char) (length&0xff);
+	}
+}
+
+/* returns decoded length, or < 0 on failure.  Advances buf and
+   decrements bufsize */
+
+static int
+der_read_length(unsigned char **buf, int *bufsize)
+{
+	unsigned char sf;
+	int ret;
+
+	if (*bufsize < 1)
+		return -1;
+	sf = *(*buf)++;
+	(*bufsize)--;
+	if (sf & 0x80) {
+		if ((sf &= 0x7f) > ((*bufsize)-1))
+			return -1;
+		if (sf > SIZEOF_INT)
+			return -1;
+		ret = 0;
+		for (; sf; sf--) {
+			ret = (ret<<8) + (*(*buf)++);
+			(*bufsize)--;
+		}
+	} else {
+		ret = sf;
+	}
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/* returns the length of a token, given the mech oid and the body size */
+
+int
+g_token_size(struct xdr_netobj *mech, unsigned int body_size)
+{
+	/* set body_size to sequence contents size */
+	body_size += 2 + (int) mech->len;         /* NEED overflow check */
+	return 1 + der_length_size(body_size) + body_size;
+}
+
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(g_token_size);
+
+/* fills in a buffer with the token header.  The buffer is assumed to
+   be the right size.  buf is advanced past the token header */
+
+void
+g_make_token_header(struct xdr_netobj *mech, int body_size, unsigned char **buf)
+{
+	*(*buf)++ = 0x60;
+	der_write_length(buf, 2 + mech->len + body_size);
+	*(*buf)++ = 0x06;
+	*(*buf)++ = (unsigned char) mech->len;
+	TWRITE_STR(*buf, mech->data, ((int) mech->len));
+}
+
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(g_make_token_header);
+
+/*
+ * Given a buffer containing a token, reads and verifies the token,
+ * leaving buf advanced past the token header, and setting body_size
+ * to the number of remaining bytes.  Returns 0 on success,
+ * G_BAD_TOK_HEADER for a variety of errors, and G_WRONG_MECH if the
+ * mechanism in the token does not match the mech argument.  buf and
+ * *body_size are left unmodified on error.
+ */
+u32
+g_verify_token_header(struct xdr_netobj *mech, int *body_size,
+		      unsigned char **buf_in, int toksize)
+{
+	unsigned char *buf = *buf_in;
+	int seqsize;
+	struct xdr_netobj toid;
+	int ret = 0;
+
+	if ((toksize-=1) < 0)
+		return G_BAD_TOK_HEADER;
+	if (*buf++ != 0x60)
+		return G_BAD_TOK_HEADER;
+
+	if ((seqsize = der_read_length(&buf, &toksize)) < 0)
+		return G_BAD_TOK_HEADER;
+
+	if (seqsize != toksize)
+		return G_BAD_TOK_HEADER;
+
+	if ((toksize-=1) < 0)
+		return G_BAD_TOK_HEADER;
+	if (*buf++ != 0x06)
+		return G_BAD_TOK_HEADER;
+
+	if ((toksize-=1) < 0)
+		return G_BAD_TOK_HEADER;
+	toid.len = *buf++;
+
+	if ((toksize-=toid.len) < 0)
+		return G_BAD_TOK_HEADER;
+	toid.data = buf;
+	buf+=toid.len;
+
+	if (! g_OID_equal(&toid, mech))
+		ret = G_WRONG_MECH;
+
+   /* G_WRONG_MECH is not returned immediately because it's more important
+      to return G_BAD_TOK_HEADER if the token header is in fact bad */
+
+	if ((toksize-=2) < 0)
+		return G_BAD_TOK_HEADER;
+
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+
+	*buf_in = buf;
+	*body_size = toksize;
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(g_verify_token_header);
diff --git a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_crypto.c b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_crypto.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..9734e1d9f9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_crypto.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1154 @@
+/*
+ *  linux/net/sunrpc/gss_krb5_crypto.c
+ *
+ *  Copyright (c) 2000-2008 The Regents of the University of Michigan.
+ *  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ *  Andy Adamson   <andros@umich.edu>
+ *  Bruce Fields   <bfields@umich.edu>
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 1998 by the FundsXpress, INC.
+ *
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Export of this software from the United States of America may require
+ * a specific license from the United States Government.  It is the
+ * responsibility of any person or organization contemplating export to
+ * obtain such a license before exporting.
+ *
+ * WITHIN THAT CONSTRAINT, permission to use, copy, modify, and
+ * distribute this software and its documentation for any purpose and
+ * without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above copyright
+ * notice appear in all copies and that both that copyright notice and
+ * this permission notice appear in supporting documentation, and that
+ * the name of FundsXpress. not be used in advertising or publicity pertaining
+ * to distribution of the software without specific, written prior
+ * permission.  FundsXpress makes no representations about the suitability of
+ * this software for any purpose.  It is provided "as is" without express
+ * or implied warranty.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED ``AS IS'' AND WITHOUT ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, WITHOUT LIMITATION, THE IMPLIED
+ * WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTIBILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
+ */
+
+#include <crypto/algapi.h>
+#include <crypto/hash.h>
+#include <crypto/skcipher.h>
+#include <linux/err.h>
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/mm.h>
+#include <linux/scatterlist.h>
+#include <linux/highmem.h>
+#include <linux/pagemap.h>
+#include <linux/random.h>
+#include <linux/sunrpc/gss_krb5.h>
+#include <linux/sunrpc/xdr.h>
+#include <kunit/visibility.h>
+
+#include "gss_krb5_internal.h"
+
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SUNRPC_DEBUG)
+# define RPCDBG_FACILITY        RPCDBG_AUTH
+#endif
+
+/**
+ * krb5_make_confounder - Generate a confounder string
+ * @p: memory location into which to write the string
+ * @conflen: string length to write, in octets
+ *
+ * RFCs 1964 and 3961 mention only "a random confounder" without going
+ * into detail about its function or cryptographic requirements. The
+ * assumed purpose is to prevent repeated encryption of a plaintext with
+ * the same key from generating the same ciphertext. It is also used to
+ * pad minimum plaintext length to at least a single cipher block.
+ *
+ * However, in situations like the GSS Kerberos 5 mechanism, where the
+ * encryption IV is always all zeroes, the confounder also effectively
+ * functions like an IV. Thus, not only must it be unique from message
+ * to message, but it must also be difficult to predict. Otherwise an
+ * attacker can correlate the confounder to previous or future values,
+ * making the encryption easier to break.
+ *
+ * Given that the primary consumer of this encryption mechanism is a
+ * network storage protocol, a type of traffic that often carries
+ * predictable payloads (eg, all zeroes when reading unallocated blocks
+ * from a file), our confounder generation has to be cryptographically
+ * strong.
+ */
+void krb5_make_confounder(u8 *p, int conflen)
+{
+	get_random_bytes(p, conflen);
+}
+
+/**
+ * krb5_encrypt - simple encryption of an RPCSEC GSS payload
+ * @tfm: initialized cipher transform
+ * @iv: pointer to an IV
+ * @in: plaintext to encrypt
+ * @out: OUT: ciphertext
+ * @length: length of input and output buffers, in bytes
+ *
+ * @iv may be NULL to force the use of an all-zero IV.
+ * The buffer containing the IV must be as large as the
+ * cipher's ivsize.
+ *
+ * Return values:
+ *   %0: @in successfully encrypted into @out
+ *   negative errno: @in not encrypted
+ */
+u32
+krb5_encrypt(
+	struct crypto_sync_skcipher *tfm,
+	void * iv,
+	void * in,
+	void * out,
+	int length)
+{
+	u32 ret = -EINVAL;
+	struct scatterlist sg[1];
+	u8 local_iv[GSS_KRB5_MAX_BLOCKSIZE] = {0};
+	SYNC_SKCIPHER_REQUEST_ON_STACK(req, tfm);
+
+	if (length % crypto_sync_skcipher_blocksize(tfm) != 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	if (crypto_sync_skcipher_ivsize(tfm) > GSS_KRB5_MAX_BLOCKSIZE) {
+		dprintk("RPC:       gss_k5encrypt: tfm iv size too large %d\n",
+			crypto_sync_skcipher_ivsize(tfm));
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if (iv)
+		memcpy(local_iv, iv, crypto_sync_skcipher_ivsize(tfm));
+
+	memcpy(out, in, length);
+	sg_init_one(sg, out, length);
+
+	skcipher_request_set_sync_tfm(req, tfm);
+	skcipher_request_set_callback(req, 0, NULL, NULL);
+	skcipher_request_set_crypt(req, sg, sg, length, local_iv);
+
+	ret = crypto_skcipher_encrypt(req);
+	skcipher_request_zero(req);
+out:
+	dprintk("RPC:       krb5_encrypt returns %d\n", ret);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/**
+ * krb5_decrypt - simple decryption of an RPCSEC GSS payload
+ * @tfm: initialized cipher transform
+ * @iv: pointer to an IV
+ * @in: ciphertext to decrypt
+ * @out: OUT: plaintext
+ * @length: length of input and output buffers, in bytes
+ *
+ * @iv may be NULL to force the use of an all-zero IV.
+ * The buffer containing the IV must be as large as the
+ * cipher's ivsize.
+ *
+ * Return values:
+ *   %0: @in successfully decrypted into @out
+ *   negative errno: @in not decrypted
+ */
+u32
+krb5_decrypt(
+     struct crypto_sync_skcipher *tfm,
+     void * iv,
+     void * in,
+     void * out,
+     int length)
+{
+	u32 ret = -EINVAL;
+	struct scatterlist sg[1];
+	u8 local_iv[GSS_KRB5_MAX_BLOCKSIZE] = {0};
+	SYNC_SKCIPHER_REQUEST_ON_STACK(req, tfm);
+
+	if (length % crypto_sync_skcipher_blocksize(tfm) != 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	if (crypto_sync_skcipher_ivsize(tfm) > GSS_KRB5_MAX_BLOCKSIZE) {
+		dprintk("RPC:       gss_k5decrypt: tfm iv size too large %d\n",
+			crypto_sync_skcipher_ivsize(tfm));
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (iv)
+		memcpy(local_iv, iv, crypto_sync_skcipher_ivsize(tfm));
+
+	memcpy(out, in, length);
+	sg_init_one(sg, out, length);
+
+	skcipher_request_set_sync_tfm(req, tfm);
+	skcipher_request_set_callback(req, 0, NULL, NULL);
+	skcipher_request_set_crypt(req, sg, sg, length, local_iv);
+
+	ret = crypto_skcipher_decrypt(req);
+	skcipher_request_zero(req);
+out:
+	dprintk("RPC:       gss_k5decrypt returns %d\n",ret);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int
+checksummer(struct scatterlist *sg, void *data)
+{
+	struct ahash_request *req = data;
+
+	ahash_request_set_crypt(req, sg, NULL, sg->length);
+
+	return crypto_ahash_update(req);
+}
+
+/*
+ * checksum the plaintext data and hdrlen bytes of the token header
+ * The checksum is performed over the first 8 bytes of the
+ * gss token header and then over the data body
+ */
+u32
+make_checksum(struct krb5_ctx *kctx, char *header, int hdrlen,
+	      struct xdr_buf *body, int body_offset, u8 *cksumkey,
+	      unsigned int usage, struct xdr_netobj *cksumout)
+{
+	struct crypto_ahash *tfm;
+	struct ahash_request *req;
+	struct scatterlist              sg[1];
+	int err = -1;
+	u8 *checksumdata;
+	unsigned int checksumlen;
+
+	if (cksumout->len < kctx->gk5e->cksumlength) {
+		dprintk("%s: checksum buffer length, %u, too small for %s\n",
+			__func__, cksumout->len, kctx->gk5e->name);
+		return GSS_S_FAILURE;
+	}
+
+	checksumdata = kmalloc(GSS_KRB5_MAX_CKSUM_LEN, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (checksumdata == NULL)
+		return GSS_S_FAILURE;
+
+	tfm = crypto_alloc_ahash(kctx->gk5e->cksum_name, 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
+	if (IS_ERR(tfm))
+		goto out_free_cksum;
+
+	req = ahash_request_alloc(tfm, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!req)
+		goto out_free_ahash;
+
+	ahash_request_set_callback(req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP, NULL, NULL);
+
+	checksumlen = crypto_ahash_digestsize(tfm);
+
+	if (cksumkey != NULL) {
+		err = crypto_ahash_setkey(tfm, cksumkey,
+					  kctx->gk5e->keylength);
+		if (err)
+			goto out;
+	}
+
+	err = crypto_ahash_init(req);
+	if (err)
+		goto out;
+	sg_init_one(sg, header, hdrlen);
+	ahash_request_set_crypt(req, sg, NULL, hdrlen);
+	err = crypto_ahash_update(req);
+	if (err)
+		goto out;
+	err = xdr_process_buf(body, body_offset, body->len - body_offset,
+			      checksummer, req);
+	if (err)
+		goto out;
+	ahash_request_set_crypt(req, NULL, checksumdata, 0);
+	err = crypto_ahash_final(req);
+	if (err)
+		goto out;
+
+	switch (kctx->gk5e->ctype) {
+	case CKSUMTYPE_RSA_MD5:
+		err = krb5_encrypt(kctx->seq, NULL, checksumdata,
+				   checksumdata, checksumlen);
+		if (err)
+			goto out;
+		memcpy(cksumout->data,
+		       checksumdata + checksumlen - kctx->gk5e->cksumlength,
+		       kctx->gk5e->cksumlength);
+		break;
+	case CKSUMTYPE_HMAC_SHA1_DES3:
+		memcpy(cksumout->data, checksumdata, kctx->gk5e->cksumlength);
+		break;
+	default:
+		BUG();
+		break;
+	}
+	cksumout->len = kctx->gk5e->cksumlength;
+out:
+	ahash_request_free(req);
+out_free_ahash:
+	crypto_free_ahash(tfm);
+out_free_cksum:
+	kfree(checksumdata);
+	return err ? GSS_S_FAILURE : 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * gss_krb5_checksum - Compute the MAC for a GSS Wrap or MIC token
+ * @tfm: an initialized hash transform
+ * @header: pointer to a buffer containing the token header, or NULL
+ * @hdrlen: number of octets in @header
+ * @body: xdr_buf containing an RPC message (body.len is the message length)
+ * @body_offset: byte offset into @body to start checksumming
+ * @cksumout: OUT: a buffer to be filled in with the computed HMAC
+ *
+ * Usually expressed as H = HMAC(K, message)[1..h] .
+ *
+ * Caller provides the truncation length of the output token (h) in
+ * cksumout.len.
+ *
+ * Return values:
+ *   %GSS_S_COMPLETE: Digest computed, @cksumout filled in
+ *   %GSS_S_FAILURE: Call failed
+ */
+u32
+gss_krb5_checksum(struct crypto_ahash *tfm, char *header, int hdrlen,
+		  const struct xdr_buf *body, int body_offset,
+		  struct xdr_netobj *cksumout)
+{
+	struct ahash_request *req;
+	int err = -ENOMEM;
+	u8 *checksumdata;
+
+	checksumdata = kmalloc(crypto_ahash_digestsize(tfm), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!checksumdata)
+		return GSS_S_FAILURE;
+
+	req = ahash_request_alloc(tfm, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!req)
+		goto out_free_cksum;
+	ahash_request_set_callback(req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP, NULL, NULL);
+	err = crypto_ahash_init(req);
+	if (err)
+		goto out_free_ahash;
+
+	/*
+	 * Per RFC 4121 Section 4.2.4, the checksum is performed over the
+	 * data body first, then over the octets in "header".
+	 */
+	err = xdr_process_buf(body, body_offset, body->len - body_offset,
+			      checksummer, req);
+	if (err)
+		goto out_free_ahash;
+	if (header) {
+		struct scatterlist sg[1];
+
+		sg_init_one(sg, header, hdrlen);
+		ahash_request_set_crypt(req, sg, NULL, hdrlen);
+		err = crypto_ahash_update(req);
+		if (err)
+			goto out_free_ahash;
+	}
+
+	ahash_request_set_crypt(req, NULL, checksumdata, 0);
+	err = crypto_ahash_final(req);
+	if (err)
+		goto out_free_ahash;
+
+	memcpy(cksumout->data, checksumdata,
+	       min_t(int, cksumout->len, crypto_ahash_digestsize(tfm)));
+
+out_free_ahash:
+	ahash_request_free(req);
+out_free_cksum:
+	kfree_sensitive(checksumdata);
+	return err ? GSS_S_FAILURE : GSS_S_COMPLETE;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_IF_KUNIT(gss_krb5_checksum);
+
+struct encryptor_desc {
+	u8 iv[GSS_KRB5_MAX_BLOCKSIZE];
+	struct skcipher_request *req;
+	int pos;
+	struct xdr_buf *outbuf;
+	struct page **pages;
+	struct scatterlist infrags[4];
+	struct scatterlist outfrags[4];
+	int fragno;
+	int fraglen;
+};
+
+static int
+encryptor(struct scatterlist *sg, void *data)
+{
+	struct encryptor_desc *desc = data;
+	struct xdr_buf *outbuf = desc->outbuf;
+	struct crypto_sync_skcipher *tfm =
+		crypto_sync_skcipher_reqtfm(desc->req);
+	struct page *in_page;
+	int thislen = desc->fraglen + sg->length;
+	int fraglen, ret;
+	int page_pos;
+
+	/* Worst case is 4 fragments: head, end of page 1, start
+	 * of page 2, tail.  Anything more is a bug. */
+	BUG_ON(desc->fragno > 3);
+
+	page_pos = desc->pos - outbuf->head[0].iov_len;
+	if (page_pos >= 0 && page_pos < outbuf->page_len) {
+		/* pages are not in place: */
+		int i = (page_pos + outbuf->page_base) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
+		in_page = desc->pages[i];
+	} else {
+		in_page = sg_page(sg);
+	}
+	sg_set_page(&desc->infrags[desc->fragno], in_page, sg->length,
+		    sg->offset);
+	sg_set_page(&desc->outfrags[desc->fragno], sg_page(sg), sg->length,
+		    sg->offset);
+	desc->fragno++;
+	desc->fraglen += sg->length;
+	desc->pos += sg->length;
+
+	fraglen = thislen & (crypto_sync_skcipher_blocksize(tfm) - 1);
+	thislen -= fraglen;
+
+	if (thislen == 0)
+		return 0;
+
+	sg_mark_end(&desc->infrags[desc->fragno - 1]);
+	sg_mark_end(&desc->outfrags[desc->fragno - 1]);
+
+	skcipher_request_set_crypt(desc->req, desc->infrags, desc->outfrags,
+				   thislen, desc->iv);
+
+	ret = crypto_skcipher_encrypt(desc->req);
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+
+	sg_init_table(desc->infrags, 4);
+	sg_init_table(desc->outfrags, 4);
+
+	if (fraglen) {
+		sg_set_page(&desc->outfrags[0], sg_page(sg), fraglen,
+				sg->offset + sg->length - fraglen);
+		desc->infrags[0] = desc->outfrags[0];
+		sg_assign_page(&desc->infrags[0], in_page);
+		desc->fragno = 1;
+		desc->fraglen = fraglen;
+	} else {
+		desc->fragno = 0;
+		desc->fraglen = 0;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int
+gss_encrypt_xdr_buf(struct crypto_sync_skcipher *tfm, struct xdr_buf *buf,
+		    int offset, struct page **pages)
+{
+	int ret;
+	struct encryptor_desc desc;
+	SYNC_SKCIPHER_REQUEST_ON_STACK(req, tfm);
+
+	BUG_ON((buf->len - offset) % crypto_sync_skcipher_blocksize(tfm) != 0);
+
+	skcipher_request_set_sync_tfm(req, tfm);
+	skcipher_request_set_callback(req, 0, NULL, NULL);
+
+	memset(desc.iv, 0, sizeof(desc.iv));
+	desc.req = req;
+	desc.pos = offset;
+	desc.outbuf = buf;
+	desc.pages = pages;
+	desc.fragno = 0;
+	desc.fraglen = 0;
+
+	sg_init_table(desc.infrags, 4);
+	sg_init_table(desc.outfrags, 4);
+
+	ret = xdr_process_buf(buf, offset, buf->len - offset, encryptor, &desc);
+	skcipher_request_zero(req);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+struct decryptor_desc {
+	u8 iv[GSS_KRB5_MAX_BLOCKSIZE];
+	struct skcipher_request *req;
+	struct scatterlist frags[4];
+	int fragno;
+	int fraglen;
+};
+
+static int
+decryptor(struct scatterlist *sg, void *data)
+{
+	struct decryptor_desc *desc = data;
+	int thislen = desc->fraglen + sg->length;
+	struct crypto_sync_skcipher *tfm =
+		crypto_sync_skcipher_reqtfm(desc->req);
+	int fraglen, ret;
+
+	/* Worst case is 4 fragments: head, end of page 1, start
+	 * of page 2, tail.  Anything more is a bug. */
+	BUG_ON(desc->fragno > 3);
+	sg_set_page(&desc->frags[desc->fragno], sg_page(sg), sg->length,
+		    sg->offset);
+	desc->fragno++;
+	desc->fraglen += sg->length;
+
+	fraglen = thislen & (crypto_sync_skcipher_blocksize(tfm) - 1);
+	thislen -= fraglen;
+
+	if (thislen == 0)
+		return 0;
+
+	sg_mark_end(&desc->frags[desc->fragno - 1]);
+
+	skcipher_request_set_crypt(desc->req, desc->frags, desc->frags,
+				   thislen, desc->iv);
+
+	ret = crypto_skcipher_decrypt(desc->req);
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+
+	sg_init_table(desc->frags, 4);
+
+	if (fraglen) {
+		sg_set_page(&desc->frags[0], sg_page(sg), fraglen,
+				sg->offset + sg->length - fraglen);
+		desc->fragno = 1;
+		desc->fraglen = fraglen;
+	} else {
+		desc->fragno = 0;
+		desc->fraglen = 0;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int
+gss_decrypt_xdr_buf(struct crypto_sync_skcipher *tfm, struct xdr_buf *buf,
+		    int offset)
+{
+	int ret;
+	struct decryptor_desc desc;
+	SYNC_SKCIPHER_REQUEST_ON_STACK(req, tfm);
+
+	/* XXXJBF: */
+	BUG_ON((buf->len - offset) % crypto_sync_skcipher_blocksize(tfm) != 0);
+
+	skcipher_request_set_sync_tfm(req, tfm);
+	skcipher_request_set_callback(req, 0, NULL, NULL);
+
+	memset(desc.iv, 0, sizeof(desc.iv));
+	desc.req = req;
+	desc.fragno = 0;
+	desc.fraglen = 0;
+
+	sg_init_table(desc.frags, 4);
+
+	ret = xdr_process_buf(buf, offset, buf->len - offset, decryptor, &desc);
+	skcipher_request_zero(req);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * This function makes the assumption that it was ultimately called
+ * from gss_wrap().
+ *
+ * The client auth_gss code moves any existing tail data into a
+ * separate page before calling gss_wrap.
+ * The server svcauth_gss code ensures that both the head and the
+ * tail have slack space of RPC_MAX_AUTH_SIZE before calling gss_wrap.
+ *
+ * Even with that guarantee, this function may be called more than
+ * once in the processing of gss_wrap().  The best we can do is
+ * verify at compile-time (see GSS_KRB5_SLACK_CHECK) that the
+ * largest expected shift will fit within RPC_MAX_AUTH_SIZE.
+ * At run-time we can verify that a single invocation of this
+ * function doesn't attempt to use more the RPC_MAX_AUTH_SIZE.
+ */
+
+int
+xdr_extend_head(struct xdr_buf *buf, unsigned int base, unsigned int shiftlen)
+{
+	u8 *p;
+
+	if (shiftlen == 0)
+		return 0;
+
+	BUG_ON(shiftlen > RPC_MAX_AUTH_SIZE);
+
+	p = buf->head[0].iov_base + base;
+
+	memmove(p + shiftlen, p, buf->head[0].iov_len - base);
+
+	buf->head[0].iov_len += shiftlen;
+	buf->len += shiftlen;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static u32
+gss_krb5_cts_crypt(struct crypto_sync_skcipher *cipher, struct xdr_buf *buf,
+		   u32 offset, u8 *iv, struct page **pages, int encrypt)
+{
+	u32 ret;
+	struct scatterlist sg[1];
+	SYNC_SKCIPHER_REQUEST_ON_STACK(req, cipher);
+	u8 *data;
+	struct page **save_pages;
+	u32 len = buf->len - offset;
+
+	if (len > GSS_KRB5_MAX_BLOCKSIZE * 2) {
+		WARN_ON(0);
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+	data = kmalloc(GSS_KRB5_MAX_BLOCKSIZE * 2, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!data)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	/*
+	 * For encryption, we want to read from the cleartext
+	 * page cache pages, and write the encrypted data to
+	 * the supplied xdr_buf pages.
+	 */
+	save_pages = buf->pages;
+	if (encrypt)
+		buf->pages = pages;
+
+	ret = read_bytes_from_xdr_buf(buf, offset, data, len);
+	buf->pages = save_pages;
+	if (ret)
+		goto out;
+
+	sg_init_one(sg, data, len);
+
+	skcipher_request_set_sync_tfm(req, cipher);
+	skcipher_request_set_callback(req, 0, NULL, NULL);
+	skcipher_request_set_crypt(req, sg, sg, len, iv);
+
+	if (encrypt)
+		ret = crypto_skcipher_encrypt(req);
+	else
+		ret = crypto_skcipher_decrypt(req);
+
+	skcipher_request_zero(req);
+
+	if (ret)
+		goto out;
+
+	ret = write_bytes_to_xdr_buf(buf, offset, data, len);
+
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KUNIT)
+	/*
+	 * CBC-CTS does not define an output IV but RFC 3962 defines it as the
+	 * penultimate block of ciphertext, so copy that into the IV buffer
+	 * before returning.
+	 */
+	if (encrypt)
+		memcpy(iv, data, crypto_sync_skcipher_ivsize(cipher));
+#endif
+
+out:
+	kfree(data);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/**
+ * krb5_cbc_cts_encrypt - encrypt in CBC mode with CTS
+ * @cts_tfm: CBC cipher with CTS
+ * @cbc_tfm: base CBC cipher
+ * @offset: starting byte offset for plaintext
+ * @buf: OUT: output buffer
+ * @pages: plaintext
+ * @iv: output CBC initialization vector, or NULL
+ * @ivsize: size of @iv, in octets
+ *
+ * To provide confidentiality, encrypt using cipher block chaining
+ * with ciphertext stealing. Message integrity is handled separately.
+ *
+ * Return values:
+ *   %0: encryption successful
+ *   negative errno: encryption could not be completed
+ */
+VISIBLE_IF_KUNIT
+int krb5_cbc_cts_encrypt(struct crypto_sync_skcipher *cts_tfm,
+			 struct crypto_sync_skcipher *cbc_tfm,
+			 u32 offset, struct xdr_buf *buf, struct page **pages,
+			 u8 *iv, unsigned int ivsize)
+{
+	u32 blocksize, nbytes, nblocks, cbcbytes;
+	struct encryptor_desc desc;
+	int err;
+
+	blocksize = crypto_sync_skcipher_blocksize(cts_tfm);
+	nbytes = buf->len - offset;
+	nblocks = (nbytes + blocksize - 1) / blocksize;
+	cbcbytes = 0;
+	if (nblocks > 2)
+		cbcbytes = (nblocks - 2) * blocksize;
+
+	memset(desc.iv, 0, sizeof(desc.iv));
+
+	/* Handle block-sized chunks of plaintext with CBC. */
+	if (cbcbytes) {
+		SYNC_SKCIPHER_REQUEST_ON_STACK(req, cbc_tfm);
+
+		desc.pos = offset;
+		desc.fragno = 0;
+		desc.fraglen = 0;
+		desc.pages = pages;
+		desc.outbuf = buf;
+		desc.req = req;
+
+		skcipher_request_set_sync_tfm(req, cbc_tfm);
+		skcipher_request_set_callback(req, 0, NULL, NULL);
+
+		sg_init_table(desc.infrags, 4);
+		sg_init_table(desc.outfrags, 4);
+
+		err = xdr_process_buf(buf, offset, cbcbytes, encryptor, &desc);
+		skcipher_request_zero(req);
+		if (err)
+			return err;
+	}
+
+	/* Remaining plaintext is handled with CBC-CTS. */
+	err = gss_krb5_cts_crypt(cts_tfm, buf, offset + cbcbytes,
+				 desc.iv, pages, 1);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	if (unlikely(iv))
+		memcpy(iv, desc.iv, ivsize);
+	return 0;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_IF_KUNIT(krb5_cbc_cts_encrypt);
+
+/**
+ * krb5_cbc_cts_decrypt - decrypt in CBC mode with CTS
+ * @cts_tfm: CBC cipher with CTS
+ * @cbc_tfm: base CBC cipher
+ * @offset: starting byte offset for plaintext
+ * @buf: OUT: output buffer
+ *
+ * Return values:
+ *   %0: decryption successful
+ *   negative errno: decryption could not be completed
+ */
+VISIBLE_IF_KUNIT
+int krb5_cbc_cts_decrypt(struct crypto_sync_skcipher *cts_tfm,
+			 struct crypto_sync_skcipher *cbc_tfm,
+			 u32 offset, struct xdr_buf *buf)
+{
+	u32 blocksize, nblocks, cbcbytes;
+	struct decryptor_desc desc;
+	int err;
+
+	blocksize = crypto_sync_skcipher_blocksize(cts_tfm);
+	nblocks = (buf->len + blocksize - 1) / blocksize;
+	cbcbytes = 0;
+	if (nblocks > 2)
+		cbcbytes = (nblocks - 2) * blocksize;
+
+	memset(desc.iv, 0, sizeof(desc.iv));
+
+	/* Handle block-sized chunks of plaintext with CBC. */
+	if (cbcbytes) {
+		SYNC_SKCIPHER_REQUEST_ON_STACK(req, cbc_tfm);
+
+		desc.fragno = 0;
+		desc.fraglen = 0;
+		desc.req = req;
+
+		skcipher_request_set_sync_tfm(req, cbc_tfm);
+		skcipher_request_set_callback(req, 0, NULL, NULL);
+
+		sg_init_table(desc.frags, 4);
+
+		err = xdr_process_buf(buf, 0, cbcbytes, decryptor, &desc);
+		skcipher_request_zero(req);
+		if (err)
+			return err;
+	}
+
+	/* Remaining plaintext is handled with CBC-CTS. */
+	return gss_krb5_cts_crypt(cts_tfm, buf, cbcbytes, desc.iv, NULL, 0);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_IF_KUNIT(krb5_cbc_cts_decrypt);
+
+u32
+gss_krb5_aes_encrypt(struct krb5_ctx *kctx, u32 offset,
+		     struct xdr_buf *buf, struct page **pages)
+{
+	u32 err;
+	struct xdr_netobj hmac;
+	u8 *ecptr;
+	struct crypto_sync_skcipher *cipher, *aux_cipher;
+	struct crypto_ahash *ahash;
+	struct page **save_pages;
+	unsigned int conflen;
+
+	if (kctx->initiate) {
+		cipher = kctx->initiator_enc;
+		aux_cipher = kctx->initiator_enc_aux;
+		ahash = kctx->initiator_integ;
+	} else {
+		cipher = kctx->acceptor_enc;
+		aux_cipher = kctx->acceptor_enc_aux;
+		ahash = kctx->acceptor_integ;
+	}
+	conflen = crypto_sync_skcipher_blocksize(cipher);
+
+	/* hide the gss token header and insert the confounder */
+	offset += GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN;
+	if (xdr_extend_head(buf, offset, conflen))
+		return GSS_S_FAILURE;
+	krb5_make_confounder(buf->head[0].iov_base + offset, conflen);
+	offset -= GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN;
+
+	if (buf->tail[0].iov_base != NULL) {
+		ecptr = buf->tail[0].iov_base + buf->tail[0].iov_len;
+	} else {
+		buf->tail[0].iov_base = buf->head[0].iov_base
+							+ buf->head[0].iov_len;
+		buf->tail[0].iov_len = 0;
+		ecptr = buf->tail[0].iov_base;
+	}
+
+	/* copy plaintext gss token header after filler (if any) */
+	memcpy(ecptr, buf->head[0].iov_base + offset, GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN);
+	buf->tail[0].iov_len += GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN;
+	buf->len += GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN;
+
+	hmac.len = kctx->gk5e->cksumlength;
+	hmac.data = buf->tail[0].iov_base + buf->tail[0].iov_len;
+
+	/*
+	 * When we are called, pages points to the real page cache
+	 * data -- which we can't go and encrypt!  buf->pages points
+	 * to scratch pages which we are going to send off to the
+	 * client/server.  Swap in the plaintext pages to calculate
+	 * the hmac.
+	 */
+	save_pages = buf->pages;
+	buf->pages = pages;
+
+	err = gss_krb5_checksum(ahash, NULL, 0, buf,
+				offset + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN, &hmac);
+	buf->pages = save_pages;
+	if (err)
+		return GSS_S_FAILURE;
+
+	err = krb5_cbc_cts_encrypt(cipher, aux_cipher,
+				   offset + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN,
+				   buf, pages, NULL, 0);
+	if (err)
+		return GSS_S_FAILURE;
+
+	/* Now update buf to account for HMAC */
+	buf->tail[0].iov_len += kctx->gk5e->cksumlength;
+	buf->len += kctx->gk5e->cksumlength;
+
+	return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
+}
+
+u32
+gss_krb5_aes_decrypt(struct krb5_ctx *kctx, u32 offset, u32 len,
+		     struct xdr_buf *buf, u32 *headskip, u32 *tailskip)
+{
+	struct crypto_sync_skcipher *cipher, *aux_cipher;
+	struct crypto_ahash *ahash;
+	struct xdr_netobj our_hmac_obj;
+	u8 our_hmac[GSS_KRB5_MAX_CKSUM_LEN];
+	u8 pkt_hmac[GSS_KRB5_MAX_CKSUM_LEN];
+	struct xdr_buf subbuf;
+	u32 ret = 0;
+
+	if (kctx->initiate) {
+		cipher = kctx->acceptor_enc;
+		aux_cipher = kctx->acceptor_enc_aux;
+		ahash = kctx->acceptor_integ;
+	} else {
+		cipher = kctx->initiator_enc;
+		aux_cipher = kctx->initiator_enc_aux;
+		ahash = kctx->initiator_integ;
+	}
+
+	/* create a segment skipping the header and leaving out the checksum */
+	xdr_buf_subsegment(buf, &subbuf, offset + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN,
+				    (len - offset - GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN -
+				     kctx->gk5e->cksumlength));
+
+	ret = krb5_cbc_cts_decrypt(cipher, aux_cipher, 0, &subbuf);
+	if (ret)
+		goto out_err;
+
+	our_hmac_obj.len = kctx->gk5e->cksumlength;
+	our_hmac_obj.data = our_hmac;
+	ret = gss_krb5_checksum(ahash, NULL, 0, &subbuf, 0, &our_hmac_obj);
+	if (ret)
+		goto out_err;
+
+	/* Get the packet's hmac value */
+	ret = read_bytes_from_xdr_buf(buf, len - kctx->gk5e->cksumlength,
+				      pkt_hmac, kctx->gk5e->cksumlength);
+	if (ret)
+		goto out_err;
+
+	if (crypto_memneq(pkt_hmac, our_hmac, kctx->gk5e->cksumlength) != 0) {
+		ret = GSS_S_BAD_SIG;
+		goto out_err;
+	}
+	*headskip = crypto_sync_skcipher_blocksize(cipher);
+	*tailskip = kctx->gk5e->cksumlength;
+out_err:
+	if (ret && ret != GSS_S_BAD_SIG)
+		ret = GSS_S_FAILURE;
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/**
+ * krb5_etm_checksum - Compute a MAC for a GSS Wrap token
+ * @cipher: an initialized cipher transform
+ * @tfm: an initialized hash transform
+ * @body: xdr_buf containing an RPC message (body.len is the message length)
+ * @body_offset: byte offset into @body to start checksumming
+ * @cksumout: OUT: a buffer to be filled in with the computed HMAC
+ *
+ * Usually expressed as H = HMAC(K, IV | ciphertext)[1..h] .
+ *
+ * Caller provides the truncation length of the output token (h) in
+ * cksumout.len.
+ *
+ * Return values:
+ *   %GSS_S_COMPLETE: Digest computed, @cksumout filled in
+ *   %GSS_S_FAILURE: Call failed
+ */
+VISIBLE_IF_KUNIT
+u32 krb5_etm_checksum(struct crypto_sync_skcipher *cipher,
+		      struct crypto_ahash *tfm, const struct xdr_buf *body,
+		      int body_offset, struct xdr_netobj *cksumout)
+{
+	unsigned int ivsize = crypto_sync_skcipher_ivsize(cipher);
+	struct ahash_request *req;
+	struct scatterlist sg[1];
+	u8 *iv, *checksumdata;
+	int err = -ENOMEM;
+
+	checksumdata = kmalloc(crypto_ahash_digestsize(tfm), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!checksumdata)
+		return GSS_S_FAILURE;
+	/* For RPCSEC, the "initial cipher state" is always all zeroes. */
+	iv = kzalloc(ivsize, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!iv)
+		goto out_free_mem;
+
+	req = ahash_request_alloc(tfm, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!req)
+		goto out_free_mem;
+	ahash_request_set_callback(req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP, NULL, NULL);
+	err = crypto_ahash_init(req);
+	if (err)
+		goto out_free_ahash;
+
+	sg_init_one(sg, iv, ivsize);
+	ahash_request_set_crypt(req, sg, NULL, ivsize);
+	err = crypto_ahash_update(req);
+	if (err)
+		goto out_free_ahash;
+	err = xdr_process_buf(body, body_offset, body->len - body_offset,
+			      checksummer, req);
+	if (err)
+		goto out_free_ahash;
+
+	ahash_request_set_crypt(req, NULL, checksumdata, 0);
+	err = crypto_ahash_final(req);
+	if (err)
+		goto out_free_ahash;
+	memcpy(cksumout->data, checksumdata, cksumout->len);
+
+out_free_ahash:
+	ahash_request_free(req);
+out_free_mem:
+	kfree(iv);
+	kfree_sensitive(checksumdata);
+	return err ? GSS_S_FAILURE : GSS_S_COMPLETE;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_IF_KUNIT(krb5_etm_checksum);
+
+/**
+ * krb5_etm_encrypt - Encrypt using the RFC 8009 rules
+ * @kctx: Kerberos context
+ * @offset: starting offset of the payload, in bytes
+ * @buf: OUT: send buffer to contain the encrypted payload
+ * @pages: plaintext payload
+ *
+ * The main difference with aes_encrypt is that "The HMAC is
+ * calculated over the cipher state concatenated with the AES
+ * output, instead of being calculated over the confounder and
+ * plaintext.  This allows the message receiver to verify the
+ * integrity of the message before decrypting the message."
+ *
+ * RFC 8009 Section 5:
+ *
+ * encryption function: as follows, where E() is AES encryption in
+ * CBC-CS3 mode, and h is the size of truncated HMAC (128 bits or
+ * 192 bits as described above).
+ *
+ *    N = random value of length 128 bits (the AES block size)
+ *    IV = cipher state
+ *    C = E(Ke, N | plaintext, IV)
+ *    H = HMAC(Ki, IV | C)
+ *    ciphertext = C | H[1..h]
+ *
+ * This encryption formula provides AEAD EtM with key separation.
+ *
+ * Return values:
+ *   %GSS_S_COMPLETE: Encryption successful
+ *   %GSS_S_FAILURE: Encryption failed
+ */
+u32
+krb5_etm_encrypt(struct krb5_ctx *kctx, u32 offset,
+		 struct xdr_buf *buf, struct page **pages)
+{
+	struct crypto_sync_skcipher *cipher, *aux_cipher;
+	struct crypto_ahash *ahash;
+	struct xdr_netobj hmac;
+	unsigned int conflen;
+	u8 *ecptr;
+	u32 err;
+
+	if (kctx->initiate) {
+		cipher = kctx->initiator_enc;
+		aux_cipher = kctx->initiator_enc_aux;
+		ahash = kctx->initiator_integ;
+	} else {
+		cipher = kctx->acceptor_enc;
+		aux_cipher = kctx->acceptor_enc_aux;
+		ahash = kctx->acceptor_integ;
+	}
+	conflen = crypto_sync_skcipher_blocksize(cipher);
+
+	offset += GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN;
+	if (xdr_extend_head(buf, offset, conflen))
+		return GSS_S_FAILURE;
+	krb5_make_confounder(buf->head[0].iov_base + offset, conflen);
+	offset -= GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN;
+
+	if (buf->tail[0].iov_base) {
+		ecptr = buf->tail[0].iov_base + buf->tail[0].iov_len;
+	} else {
+		buf->tail[0].iov_base = buf->head[0].iov_base
+							+ buf->head[0].iov_len;
+		buf->tail[0].iov_len = 0;
+		ecptr = buf->tail[0].iov_base;
+	}
+
+	memcpy(ecptr, buf->head[0].iov_base + offset, GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN);
+	buf->tail[0].iov_len += GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN;
+	buf->len += GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN;
+
+	err = krb5_cbc_cts_encrypt(cipher, aux_cipher,
+				   offset + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN,
+				   buf, pages, NULL, 0);
+	if (err)
+		return GSS_S_FAILURE;
+
+	hmac.data = buf->tail[0].iov_base + buf->tail[0].iov_len;
+	hmac.len = kctx->gk5e->cksumlength;
+	err = krb5_etm_checksum(cipher, ahash,
+				buf, offset + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN, &hmac);
+	if (err)
+		goto out_err;
+	buf->tail[0].iov_len += kctx->gk5e->cksumlength;
+	buf->len += kctx->gk5e->cksumlength;
+
+	return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
+
+out_err:
+	return GSS_S_FAILURE;
+}
+
+/**
+ * krb5_etm_decrypt - Decrypt using the RFC 8009 rules
+ * @kctx: Kerberos context
+ * @offset: starting offset of the ciphertext, in bytes
+ * @len:
+ * @buf:
+ * @headskip: OUT: the enctype's confounder length, in octets
+ * @tailskip: OUT: the enctype's HMAC length, in octets
+ *
+ * RFC 8009 Section 5:
+ *
+ * decryption function: as follows, where D() is AES decryption in
+ * CBC-CS3 mode, and h is the size of truncated HMAC.
+ *
+ *    (C, H) = ciphertext
+ *        (Note: H is the last h bits of the ciphertext.)
+ *    IV = cipher state
+ *    if H != HMAC(Ki, IV | C)[1..h]
+ *        stop, report error
+ *    (N, P) = D(Ke, C, IV)
+ *
+ * Return values:
+ *   %GSS_S_COMPLETE: Decryption successful
+ *   %GSS_S_BAD_SIG: computed HMAC != received HMAC
+ *   %GSS_S_FAILURE: Decryption failed
+ */
+u32
+krb5_etm_decrypt(struct krb5_ctx *kctx, u32 offset, u32 len,
+		 struct xdr_buf *buf, u32 *headskip, u32 *tailskip)
+{
+	struct crypto_sync_skcipher *cipher, *aux_cipher;
+	u8 our_hmac[GSS_KRB5_MAX_CKSUM_LEN];
+	u8 pkt_hmac[GSS_KRB5_MAX_CKSUM_LEN];
+	struct xdr_netobj our_hmac_obj;
+	struct crypto_ahash *ahash;
+	struct xdr_buf subbuf;
+	u32 ret = 0;
+
+	if (kctx->initiate) {
+		cipher = kctx->acceptor_enc;
+		aux_cipher = kctx->acceptor_enc_aux;
+		ahash = kctx->acceptor_integ;
+	} else {
+		cipher = kctx->initiator_enc;
+		aux_cipher = kctx->initiator_enc_aux;
+		ahash = kctx->initiator_integ;
+	}
+
+	/* Extract the ciphertext into @subbuf. */
+	xdr_buf_subsegment(buf, &subbuf, offset + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN,
+			   (len - offset - GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN -
+			    kctx->gk5e->cksumlength));
+
+	our_hmac_obj.data = our_hmac;
+	our_hmac_obj.len = kctx->gk5e->cksumlength;
+	ret = krb5_etm_checksum(cipher, ahash, &subbuf, 0, &our_hmac_obj);
+	if (ret)
+		goto out_err;
+	ret = read_bytes_from_xdr_buf(buf, len - kctx->gk5e->cksumlength,
+				      pkt_hmac, kctx->gk5e->cksumlength);
+	if (ret)
+		goto out_err;
+	if (crypto_memneq(pkt_hmac, our_hmac, kctx->gk5e->cksumlength) != 0) {
+		ret = GSS_S_BAD_SIG;
+		goto out_err;
+	}
+
+	ret = krb5_cbc_cts_decrypt(cipher, aux_cipher, 0, &subbuf);
+	if (ret) {
+		ret = GSS_S_FAILURE;
+		goto out_err;
+	}
+
+	*headskip = crypto_sync_skcipher_blocksize(cipher);
+	*tailskip = kctx->gk5e->cksumlength;
+	return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
+
+out_err:
+	if (ret != GSS_S_BAD_SIG)
+		ret = GSS_S_FAILURE;
+	return ret;
+}
diff --git a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_internal.h b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_internal.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..3afd4065bf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_internal.h
@@ -0,0 +1,209 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 or BSD-3-Clause */
+/*
+ * SunRPC GSS Kerberos 5 mechanism internal definitions
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 2022 Oracle and/or its affiliates.
+ */
+
+#ifndef _NET_SUNRPC_AUTH_GSS_KRB5_INTERNAL_H
+#define _NET_SUNRPC_AUTH_GSS_KRB5_INTERNAL_H
+
+/*
+ * The RFCs often specify payload lengths in bits. This helper
+ * converts a specified bit-length to the number of octets/bytes.
+ */
+#define BITS2OCTETS(x)	((x) / 8)
+
+struct krb5_ctx;
+
+struct gss_krb5_enctype {
+	const u32		etype;		/* encryption (key) type */
+	const u32		ctype;		/* checksum type */
+	const char		*name;		/* "friendly" name */
+	const char		*encrypt_name;	/* crypto encrypt name */
+	const char		*aux_cipher;	/* aux encrypt cipher name */
+	const char		*cksum_name;	/* crypto checksum name */
+	const u16		signalg;	/* signing algorithm */
+	const u16		sealalg;	/* sealing algorithm */
+	const u32		cksumlength;	/* checksum length */
+	const u32		keyed_cksum;	/* is it a keyed cksum? */
+	const u32		keybytes;	/* raw key len, in bytes */
+	const u32		keylength;	/* protocol key length, in octets */
+	const u32		Kc_length;	/* checksum subkey length, in octets */
+	const u32		Ke_length;	/* encryption subkey length, in octets */
+	const u32		Ki_length;	/* integrity subkey length, in octets */
+
+	int (*derive_key)(const struct gss_krb5_enctype *gk5e,
+			  const struct xdr_netobj *in,
+			  struct xdr_netobj *out,
+			  const struct xdr_netobj *label,
+			  gfp_t gfp_mask);
+	u32 (*encrypt)(struct krb5_ctx *kctx, u32 offset,
+		       struct xdr_buf *buf, struct page **pages);
+	u32 (*decrypt)(struct krb5_ctx *kctx, u32 offset, u32 len,
+		       struct xdr_buf *buf, u32 *headskip, u32 *tailskip);
+	u32 (*get_mic)(struct krb5_ctx *kctx, struct xdr_buf *text,
+		       struct xdr_netobj *token);
+	u32 (*verify_mic)(struct krb5_ctx *kctx, struct xdr_buf *message_buffer,
+			  struct xdr_netobj *read_token);
+	u32 (*wrap)(struct krb5_ctx *kctx, int offset,
+		    struct xdr_buf *buf, struct page **pages);
+	u32 (*unwrap)(struct krb5_ctx *kctx, int offset, int len,
+		      struct xdr_buf *buf, unsigned int *slack,
+		      unsigned int *align);
+};
+
+/* krb5_ctx flags definitions */
+#define KRB5_CTX_FLAG_INITIATOR         0x00000001
+#define KRB5_CTX_FLAG_ACCEPTOR_SUBKEY   0x00000004
+
+struct krb5_ctx {
+	int			initiate; /* 1 = initiating, 0 = accepting */
+	u32			enctype;
+	u32			flags;
+	const struct gss_krb5_enctype *gk5e; /* enctype-specific info */
+	struct crypto_sync_skcipher *enc;
+	struct crypto_sync_skcipher *seq;
+	struct crypto_sync_skcipher *acceptor_enc;
+	struct crypto_sync_skcipher *initiator_enc;
+	struct crypto_sync_skcipher *acceptor_enc_aux;
+	struct crypto_sync_skcipher *initiator_enc_aux;
+	struct crypto_ahash	*acceptor_sign;
+	struct crypto_ahash	*initiator_sign;
+	struct crypto_ahash	*initiator_integ;
+	struct crypto_ahash	*acceptor_integ;
+	u8			Ksess[GSS_KRB5_MAX_KEYLEN]; /* session key */
+	u8			cksum[GSS_KRB5_MAX_KEYLEN];
+	atomic_t		seq_send;
+	atomic64_t		seq_send64;
+	time64_t		endtime;
+	struct xdr_netobj	mech_used;
+};
+
+/*
+ * GSS Kerberos 5 mechanism Per-Message calls.
+ */
+
+u32 gss_krb5_get_mic_v2(struct krb5_ctx *ctx, struct xdr_buf *text,
+			struct xdr_netobj *token);
+
+u32 gss_krb5_verify_mic_v2(struct krb5_ctx *ctx, struct xdr_buf *message_buffer,
+			   struct xdr_netobj *read_token);
+
+u32 gss_krb5_wrap_v2(struct krb5_ctx *kctx, int offset,
+		     struct xdr_buf *buf, struct page **pages);
+
+u32 gss_krb5_unwrap_v2(struct krb5_ctx *kctx, int offset, int len,
+		       struct xdr_buf *buf, unsigned int *slack,
+		       unsigned int *align);
+
+/*
+ * Implementation internal functions
+ */
+
+/* Key Derivation Functions */
+
+int krb5_derive_key_v2(const struct gss_krb5_enctype *gk5e,
+		       const struct xdr_netobj *inkey,
+		       struct xdr_netobj *outkey,
+		       const struct xdr_netobj *label,
+		       gfp_t gfp_mask);
+
+int krb5_kdf_hmac_sha2(const struct gss_krb5_enctype *gk5e,
+		       const struct xdr_netobj *inkey,
+		       struct xdr_netobj *outkey,
+		       const struct xdr_netobj *in_constant,
+		       gfp_t gfp_mask);
+
+int krb5_kdf_feedback_cmac(const struct gss_krb5_enctype *gk5e,
+			   const struct xdr_netobj *inkey,
+			   struct xdr_netobj *outkey,
+			   const struct xdr_netobj *in_constant,
+			   gfp_t gfp_mask);
+
+/**
+ * krb5_derive_key - Derive a subkey from a protocol key
+ * @kctx: Kerberos 5 context
+ * @inkey: base protocol key
+ * @outkey: OUT: derived key
+ * @usage: key usage value
+ * @seed: key usage seed (one octet)
+ * @gfp_mask: memory allocation control flags
+ *
+ * Caller sets @outkey->len to the desired length of the derived key.
+ *
+ * On success, returns 0 and fills in @outkey. A negative errno value
+ * is returned on failure.
+ */
+static inline int krb5_derive_key(struct krb5_ctx *kctx,
+				  const struct xdr_netobj *inkey,
+				  struct xdr_netobj *outkey,
+				  u32 usage, u8 seed, gfp_t gfp_mask)
+{
+	const struct gss_krb5_enctype *gk5e = kctx->gk5e;
+	u8 label_data[GSS_KRB5_K5CLENGTH];
+	struct xdr_netobj label = {
+		.len	= sizeof(label_data),
+		.data	= label_data,
+	};
+	__be32 *p = (__be32 *)label_data;
+
+	*p = cpu_to_be32(usage);
+	label_data[4] = seed;
+	return gk5e->derive_key(gk5e, inkey, outkey, &label, gfp_mask);
+}
+
+void krb5_make_confounder(u8 *p, int conflen);
+
+u32 make_checksum(struct krb5_ctx *kctx, char *header, int hdrlen,
+		  struct xdr_buf *body, int body_offset, u8 *cksumkey,
+		  unsigned int usage, struct xdr_netobj *cksumout);
+
+u32 gss_krb5_checksum(struct crypto_ahash *tfm, char *header, int hdrlen,
+		      const struct xdr_buf *body, int body_offset,
+		      struct xdr_netobj *cksumout);
+
+u32 krb5_encrypt(struct crypto_sync_skcipher *key, void *iv, void *in,
+		 void *out, int length);
+
+u32 krb5_decrypt(struct crypto_sync_skcipher *key, void *iv, void *in,
+		 void *out, int length);
+
+int xdr_extend_head(struct xdr_buf *buf, unsigned int base,
+		    unsigned int shiftlen);
+
+int gss_encrypt_xdr_buf(struct crypto_sync_skcipher *tfm,
+			struct xdr_buf *outbuf, int offset,
+			struct page **pages);
+
+int gss_decrypt_xdr_buf(struct crypto_sync_skcipher *tfm,
+			struct xdr_buf *inbuf, int offset);
+
+u32 gss_krb5_aes_encrypt(struct krb5_ctx *kctx, u32 offset,
+			 struct xdr_buf *buf, struct page **pages);
+
+u32 gss_krb5_aes_decrypt(struct krb5_ctx *kctx, u32 offset, u32 len,
+			 struct xdr_buf *buf, u32 *plainoffset, u32 *plainlen);
+
+u32 krb5_etm_encrypt(struct krb5_ctx *kctx, u32 offset, struct xdr_buf *buf,
+		     struct page **pages);
+
+u32 krb5_etm_decrypt(struct krb5_ctx *kctx, u32 offset, u32 len,
+		     struct xdr_buf *buf, u32 *headskip, u32 *tailskip);
+
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KUNIT)
+void krb5_nfold(u32 inbits, const u8 *in, u32 outbits, u8 *out);
+const struct gss_krb5_enctype *gss_krb5_lookup_enctype(u32 etype);
+int krb5_cbc_cts_encrypt(struct crypto_sync_skcipher *cts_tfm,
+			 struct crypto_sync_skcipher *cbc_tfm, u32 offset,
+			 struct xdr_buf *buf, struct page **pages,
+			 u8 *iv, unsigned int ivsize);
+int krb5_cbc_cts_decrypt(struct crypto_sync_skcipher *cts_tfm,
+			 struct crypto_sync_skcipher *cbc_tfm,
+			 u32 offset, struct xdr_buf *buf);
+u32 krb5_etm_checksum(struct crypto_sync_skcipher *cipher,
+		      struct crypto_ahash *tfm, const struct xdr_buf *body,
+		      int body_offset, struct xdr_netobj *cksumout);
+#endif
+
+#endif /* _NET_SUNRPC_AUTH_GSS_KRB5_INTERNAL_H */
diff --git a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_keys.c b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_keys.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..06d8ee0db0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_keys.c
@@ -0,0 +1,546 @@
+/*
+ * COPYRIGHT (c) 2008
+ * The Regents of the University of Michigan
+ * ALL RIGHTS RESERVED
+ *
+ * Permission is granted to use, copy, create derivative works
+ * and redistribute this software and such derivative works
+ * for any purpose, so long as the name of The University of
+ * Michigan is not used in any advertising or publicity
+ * pertaining to the use of distribution of this software
+ * without specific, written prior authorization.  If the
+ * above copyright notice or any other identification of the
+ * University of Michigan is included in any copy of any
+ * portion of this software, then the disclaimer below must
+ * also be included.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED AS IS, WITHOUT REPRESENTATION
+ * FROM THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN AS TO ITS FITNESS FOR ANY
+ * PURPOSE, AND WITHOUT WARRANTY BY THE UNIVERSITY OF
+ * MICHIGAN OF ANY KIND, EITHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING
+ * WITHOUT LIMITATION THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. THE
+ * REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN SHALL NOT BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DAMAGES, INCLUDING SPECIAL, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, OR
+ * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES, WITH RESPECT TO ANY CLAIM ARISING
+ * OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OF THE SOFTWARE, EVEN
+ * IF IT HAS BEEN OR IS HEREAFTER ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGES.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 1998 by the FundsXpress, INC.
+ *
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Export of this software from the United States of America may require
+ * a specific license from the United States Government.  It is the
+ * responsibility of any person or organization contemplating export to
+ * obtain such a license before exporting.
+ *
+ * WITHIN THAT CONSTRAINT, permission to use, copy, modify, and
+ * distribute this software and its documentation for any purpose and
+ * without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above copyright
+ * notice appear in all copies and that both that copyright notice and
+ * this permission notice appear in supporting documentation, and that
+ * the name of FundsXpress. not be used in advertising or publicity pertaining
+ * to distribution of the software without specific, written prior
+ * permission.  FundsXpress makes no representations about the suitability of
+ * this software for any purpose.  It is provided "as is" without express
+ * or implied warranty.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED ``AS IS'' AND WITHOUT ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, WITHOUT LIMITATION, THE IMPLIED
+ * WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTIBILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
+ */
+
+#include <crypto/skcipher.h>
+#include <linux/err.h>
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/sunrpc/gss_krb5.h>
+#include <linux/sunrpc/xdr.h>
+#include <linux/lcm.h>
+#include <crypto/hash.h>
+#include <kunit/visibility.h>
+
+#include "gss_krb5_internal.h"
+
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SUNRPC_DEBUG)
+# define RPCDBG_FACILITY        RPCDBG_AUTH
+#endif
+
+/**
+ * krb5_nfold - n-fold function
+ * @inbits: number of bits in @in
+ * @in: buffer containing input to fold
+ * @outbits: number of bits in the output buffer
+ * @out: buffer to hold the result
+ *
+ * This is the n-fold function as described in rfc3961, sec 5.1
+ * Taken from MIT Kerberos and modified.
+ */
+VISIBLE_IF_KUNIT
+void krb5_nfold(u32 inbits, const u8 *in, u32 outbits, u8 *out)
+{
+	unsigned long ulcm;
+	int byte, i, msbit;
+
+	/* the code below is more readable if I make these bytes
+	   instead of bits */
+
+	inbits >>= 3;
+	outbits >>= 3;
+
+	/* first compute lcm(n,k) */
+	ulcm = lcm(inbits, outbits);
+
+	/* now do the real work */
+
+	memset(out, 0, outbits);
+	byte = 0;
+
+	/* this will end up cycling through k lcm(k,n)/k times, which
+	   is correct */
+	for (i = ulcm-1; i >= 0; i--) {
+		/* compute the msbit in k which gets added into this byte */
+		msbit = (
+			/* first, start with the msbit in the first,
+			 * unrotated byte */
+			 ((inbits << 3) - 1)
+			 /* then, for each byte, shift to the right
+			  * for each repetition */
+			 + (((inbits << 3) + 13) * (i/inbits))
+			 /* last, pick out the correct byte within
+			  * that shifted repetition */
+			 + ((inbits - (i % inbits)) << 3)
+			 ) % (inbits << 3);
+
+		/* pull out the byte value itself */
+		byte += (((in[((inbits - 1) - (msbit >> 3)) % inbits] << 8)|
+				  (in[((inbits) - (msbit >> 3)) % inbits]))
+				 >> ((msbit & 7) + 1)) & 0xff;
+
+		/* do the addition */
+		byte += out[i % outbits];
+		out[i % outbits] = byte & 0xff;
+
+		/* keep around the carry bit, if any */
+		byte >>= 8;
+
+	}
+
+	/* if there's a carry bit left over, add it back in */
+	if (byte) {
+		for (i = outbits - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
+			/* do the addition */
+			byte += out[i];
+			out[i] = byte & 0xff;
+
+			/* keep around the carry bit, if any */
+			byte >>= 8;
+		}
+	}
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_IF_KUNIT(krb5_nfold);
+
+/*
+ * This is the DK (derive_key) function as described in rfc3961, sec 5.1
+ * Taken from MIT Kerberos and modified.
+ */
+static int krb5_DK(const struct gss_krb5_enctype *gk5e,
+		   const struct xdr_netobj *inkey, u8 *rawkey,
+		   const struct xdr_netobj *in_constant, gfp_t gfp_mask)
+{
+	size_t blocksize, keybytes, keylength, n;
+	unsigned char *inblockdata, *outblockdata;
+	struct xdr_netobj inblock, outblock;
+	struct crypto_sync_skcipher *cipher;
+	int ret = -EINVAL;
+
+	keybytes = gk5e->keybytes;
+	keylength = gk5e->keylength;
+
+	if (inkey->len != keylength)
+		goto err_return;
+
+	cipher = crypto_alloc_sync_skcipher(gk5e->encrypt_name, 0, 0);
+	if (IS_ERR(cipher))
+		goto err_return;
+	blocksize = crypto_sync_skcipher_blocksize(cipher);
+	if (crypto_sync_skcipher_setkey(cipher, inkey->data, inkey->len))
+		goto err_return;
+
+	ret = -ENOMEM;
+	inblockdata = kmalloc(blocksize, gfp_mask);
+	if (inblockdata == NULL)
+		goto err_free_cipher;
+
+	outblockdata = kmalloc(blocksize, gfp_mask);
+	if (outblockdata == NULL)
+		goto err_free_in;
+
+	inblock.data = (char *) inblockdata;
+	inblock.len = blocksize;
+
+	outblock.data = (char *) outblockdata;
+	outblock.len = blocksize;
+
+	/* initialize the input block */
+
+	if (in_constant->len == inblock.len) {
+		memcpy(inblock.data, in_constant->data, inblock.len);
+	} else {
+		krb5_nfold(in_constant->len * 8, in_constant->data,
+			   inblock.len * 8, inblock.data);
+	}
+
+	/* loop encrypting the blocks until enough key bytes are generated */
+
+	n = 0;
+	while (n < keybytes) {
+		krb5_encrypt(cipher, NULL, inblock.data, outblock.data,
+			     inblock.len);
+
+		if ((keybytes - n) <= outblock.len) {
+			memcpy(rawkey + n, outblock.data, (keybytes - n));
+			break;
+		}
+
+		memcpy(rawkey + n, outblock.data, outblock.len);
+		memcpy(inblock.data, outblock.data, outblock.len);
+		n += outblock.len;
+	}
+
+	ret = 0;
+
+	kfree_sensitive(outblockdata);
+err_free_in:
+	kfree_sensitive(inblockdata);
+err_free_cipher:
+	crypto_free_sync_skcipher(cipher);
+err_return:
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * This is the identity function, with some sanity checking.
+ */
+static int krb5_random_to_key_v2(const struct gss_krb5_enctype *gk5e,
+				 struct xdr_netobj *randombits,
+				 struct xdr_netobj *key)
+{
+	int ret = -EINVAL;
+
+	if (key->len != 16 && key->len != 32) {
+		dprintk("%s: key->len is %d\n", __func__, key->len);
+		goto err_out;
+	}
+	if (randombits->len != 16 && randombits->len != 32) {
+		dprintk("%s: randombits->len is %d\n",
+			__func__, randombits->len);
+		goto err_out;
+	}
+	if (randombits->len != key->len) {
+		dprintk("%s: randombits->len is %d, key->len is %d\n",
+			__func__, randombits->len, key->len);
+		goto err_out;
+	}
+	memcpy(key->data, randombits->data, key->len);
+	ret = 0;
+err_out:
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/**
+ * krb5_derive_key_v2 - Derive a subkey for an RFC 3962 enctype
+ * @gk5e: Kerberos 5 enctype profile
+ * @inkey: base protocol key
+ * @outkey: OUT: derived key
+ * @label: subkey usage label
+ * @gfp_mask: memory allocation control flags
+ *
+ * Caller sets @outkey->len to the desired length of the derived key.
+ *
+ * On success, returns 0 and fills in @outkey. A negative errno value
+ * is returned on failure.
+ */
+int krb5_derive_key_v2(const struct gss_krb5_enctype *gk5e,
+		       const struct xdr_netobj *inkey,
+		       struct xdr_netobj *outkey,
+		       const struct xdr_netobj *label,
+		       gfp_t gfp_mask)
+{
+	struct xdr_netobj inblock;
+	int ret;
+
+	inblock.len = gk5e->keybytes;
+	inblock.data = kmalloc(inblock.len, gfp_mask);
+	if (!inblock.data)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	ret = krb5_DK(gk5e, inkey, inblock.data, label, gfp_mask);
+	if (!ret)
+		ret = krb5_random_to_key_v2(gk5e, &inblock, outkey);
+
+	kfree_sensitive(inblock.data);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * K(i) = CMAC(key, K(i-1) | i | constant | 0x00 | k)
+ *
+ *    i: A block counter is used with a length of 4 bytes, represented
+ *       in big-endian order.
+ *
+ *    constant: The label input to the KDF is the usage constant supplied
+ *              to the key derivation function
+ *
+ *    k: The length of the output key in bits, represented as a 4-byte
+ *       string in big-endian order.
+ *
+ * Caller fills in K(i-1) in @step, and receives the result K(i)
+ * in the same buffer.
+ */
+static int
+krb5_cmac_Ki(struct crypto_shash *tfm, const struct xdr_netobj *constant,
+	     u32 outlen, u32 count, struct xdr_netobj *step)
+{
+	__be32 k = cpu_to_be32(outlen * 8);
+	SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK(desc, tfm);
+	__be32 i = cpu_to_be32(count);
+	u8 zero = 0;
+	int ret;
+
+	desc->tfm = tfm;
+	ret = crypto_shash_init(desc);
+	if (ret)
+		goto out_err;
+
+	ret = crypto_shash_update(desc, step->data, step->len);
+	if (ret)
+		goto out_err;
+	ret = crypto_shash_update(desc, (u8 *)&i, sizeof(i));
+	if (ret)
+		goto out_err;
+	ret = crypto_shash_update(desc, constant->data, constant->len);
+	if (ret)
+		goto out_err;
+	ret = crypto_shash_update(desc, &zero, sizeof(zero));
+	if (ret)
+		goto out_err;
+	ret = crypto_shash_update(desc, (u8 *)&k, sizeof(k));
+	if (ret)
+		goto out_err;
+	ret = crypto_shash_final(desc, step->data);
+	if (ret)
+		goto out_err;
+
+out_err:
+	shash_desc_zero(desc);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/**
+ * krb5_kdf_feedback_cmac - Derive a subkey for a Camellia/CMAC-based enctype
+ * @gk5e: Kerberos 5 enctype parameters
+ * @inkey: base protocol key
+ * @outkey: OUT: derived key
+ * @constant: subkey usage label
+ * @gfp_mask: memory allocation control flags
+ *
+ * RFC 6803 Section 3:
+ *
+ * "We use a key derivation function from the family specified in
+ *  [SP800-108], Section 5.2, 'KDF in Feedback Mode'."
+ *
+ *	n = ceiling(k / 128)
+ *	K(0) = zeros
+ *	K(i) = CMAC(key, K(i-1) | i | constant | 0x00 | k)
+ *	DR(key, constant) = k-truncate(K(1) | K(2) | ... | K(n))
+ *	KDF-FEEDBACK-CMAC(key, constant) = random-to-key(DR(key, constant))
+ *
+ * Caller sets @outkey->len to the desired length of the derived key (k).
+ *
+ * On success, returns 0 and fills in @outkey. A negative errno value
+ * is returned on failure.
+ */
+int
+krb5_kdf_feedback_cmac(const struct gss_krb5_enctype *gk5e,
+		       const struct xdr_netobj *inkey,
+		       struct xdr_netobj *outkey,
+		       const struct xdr_netobj *constant,
+		       gfp_t gfp_mask)
+{
+	struct xdr_netobj step = { .data = NULL };
+	struct xdr_netobj DR = { .data = NULL };
+	unsigned int blocksize, offset;
+	struct crypto_shash *tfm;
+	int n, count, ret;
+
+	/*
+	 * This implementation assumes the CMAC used for an enctype's
+	 * key derivation is the same as the CMAC used for its
+	 * checksumming. This happens to be true for enctypes that
+	 * are currently supported by this implementation.
+	 */
+	tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(gk5e->cksum_name, 0, 0);
+	if (IS_ERR(tfm)) {
+		ret = PTR_ERR(tfm);
+		goto out;
+	}
+	ret = crypto_shash_setkey(tfm, inkey->data, inkey->len);
+	if (ret)
+		goto out_free_tfm;
+
+	blocksize = crypto_shash_digestsize(tfm);
+	n = (outkey->len + blocksize - 1) / blocksize;
+
+	/* K(0) is all zeroes */
+	ret = -ENOMEM;
+	step.len = blocksize;
+	step.data = kzalloc(step.len, gfp_mask);
+	if (!step.data)
+		goto out_free_tfm;
+
+	DR.len = blocksize * n;
+	DR.data = kmalloc(DR.len, gfp_mask);
+	if (!DR.data)
+		goto out_free_tfm;
+
+	/* XXX: Does not handle partial-block key sizes */
+	for (offset = 0, count = 1; count <= n; count++) {
+		ret = krb5_cmac_Ki(tfm, constant, outkey->len, count, &step);
+		if (ret)
+			goto out_free_tfm;
+
+		memcpy(DR.data + offset, step.data, blocksize);
+		offset += blocksize;
+	}
+
+	/* k-truncate and random-to-key */
+	memcpy(outkey->data, DR.data, outkey->len);
+	ret = 0;
+
+out_free_tfm:
+	crypto_free_shash(tfm);
+out:
+	kfree_sensitive(step.data);
+	kfree_sensitive(DR.data);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * K1 = HMAC-SHA(key, 0x00000001 | label | 0x00 | k)
+ *
+ *    key: The source of entropy from which subsequent keys are derived.
+ *
+ *    label: An octet string describing the intended usage of the
+ *    derived key.
+ *
+ *    k: Length in bits of the key to be outputted, expressed in
+ *    big-endian binary representation in 4 bytes.
+ */
+static int
+krb5_hmac_K1(struct crypto_shash *tfm, const struct xdr_netobj *label,
+	     u32 outlen, struct xdr_netobj *K1)
+{
+	__be32 k = cpu_to_be32(outlen * 8);
+	SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK(desc, tfm);
+	__be32 one = cpu_to_be32(1);
+	u8 zero = 0;
+	int ret;
+
+	desc->tfm = tfm;
+	ret = crypto_shash_init(desc);
+	if (ret)
+		goto out_err;
+	ret = crypto_shash_update(desc, (u8 *)&one, sizeof(one));
+	if (ret)
+		goto out_err;
+	ret = crypto_shash_update(desc, label->data, label->len);
+	if (ret)
+		goto out_err;
+	ret = crypto_shash_update(desc, &zero, sizeof(zero));
+	if (ret)
+		goto out_err;
+	ret = crypto_shash_update(desc, (u8 *)&k, sizeof(k));
+	if (ret)
+		goto out_err;
+	ret = crypto_shash_final(desc, K1->data);
+	if (ret)
+		goto out_err;
+
+out_err:
+	shash_desc_zero(desc);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/**
+ * krb5_kdf_hmac_sha2 - Derive a subkey for an AES/SHA2-based enctype
+ * @gk5e: Kerberos 5 enctype policy parameters
+ * @inkey: base protocol key
+ * @outkey: OUT: derived key
+ * @label: subkey usage label
+ * @gfp_mask: memory allocation control flags
+ *
+ * RFC 8009 Section 3:
+ *
+ *  "We use a key derivation function from Section 5.1 of [SP800-108],
+ *   which uses the HMAC algorithm as the PRF."
+ *
+ *	function KDF-HMAC-SHA2(key, label, [context,] k):
+ *		k-truncate(K1)
+ *
+ * Caller sets @outkey->len to the desired length of the derived key.
+ *
+ * On success, returns 0 and fills in @outkey. A negative errno value
+ * is returned on failure.
+ */
+int
+krb5_kdf_hmac_sha2(const struct gss_krb5_enctype *gk5e,
+		   const struct xdr_netobj *inkey,
+		   struct xdr_netobj *outkey,
+		   const struct xdr_netobj *label,
+		   gfp_t gfp_mask)
+{
+	struct crypto_shash *tfm;
+	struct xdr_netobj K1 = {
+		.data = NULL,
+	};
+	int ret;
+
+	/*
+	 * This implementation assumes the HMAC used for an enctype's
+	 * key derivation is the same as the HMAC used for its
+	 * checksumming. This happens to be true for enctypes that
+	 * are currently supported by this implementation.
+	 */
+	tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(gk5e->cksum_name, 0, 0);
+	if (IS_ERR(tfm)) {
+		ret = PTR_ERR(tfm);
+		goto out;
+	}
+	ret = crypto_shash_setkey(tfm, inkey->data, inkey->len);
+	if (ret)
+		goto out_free_tfm;
+
+	K1.len = crypto_shash_digestsize(tfm);
+	K1.data = kmalloc(K1.len, gfp_mask);
+	if (!K1.data) {
+		ret = -ENOMEM;
+		goto out_free_tfm;
+	}
+
+	ret = krb5_hmac_K1(tfm, label, outkey->len, &K1);
+	if (ret)
+		goto out_free_tfm;
+
+	/* k-truncate and random-to-key */
+	memcpy(outkey->data, K1.data, outkey->len);
+
+out_free_tfm:
+	kfree_sensitive(K1.data);
+	crypto_free_shash(tfm);
+out:
+	return ret;
+}
diff --git a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_mech.c b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_mech.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..e31cfdf7ea
--- /dev/null
+++ b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_mech.c
@@ -0,0 +1,655 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
+/*
+ *  linux/net/sunrpc/gss_krb5_mech.c
+ *
+ *  Copyright (c) 2001-2008 The Regents of the University of Michigan.
+ *  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ *  Andy Adamson <andros@umich.edu>
+ *  J. Bruce Fields <bfields@umich.edu>
+ */
+
+#include <crypto/hash.h>
+#include <crypto/skcipher.h>
+#include <linux/err.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/sunrpc/auth.h>
+#include <linux/sunrpc/gss_krb5.h>
+#include <linux/sunrpc/xdr.h>
+#include <kunit/visibility.h>
+
+#include "auth_gss_internal.h"
+#include "gss_krb5_internal.h"
+
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SUNRPC_DEBUG)
+# define RPCDBG_FACILITY	RPCDBG_AUTH
+#endif
+
+static struct gss_api_mech gss_kerberos_mech;
+
+static const struct gss_krb5_enctype supported_gss_krb5_enctypes[] = {
+#if defined(CONFIG_RPCSEC_GSS_KRB5_ENCTYPES_AES_SHA1)
+	/*
+	 * AES-128 with SHA-1 (RFC 3962)
+	 */
+	{
+	  .etype = ENCTYPE_AES128_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96,
+	  .ctype = CKSUMTYPE_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES128,
+	  .name = "aes128-cts",
+	  .encrypt_name = "cts(cbc(aes))",
+	  .aux_cipher = "cbc(aes)",
+	  .cksum_name = "hmac(sha1)",
+	  .derive_key = krb5_derive_key_v2,
+	  .encrypt = gss_krb5_aes_encrypt,
+	  .decrypt = gss_krb5_aes_decrypt,
+
+	  .get_mic = gss_krb5_get_mic_v2,
+	  .verify_mic = gss_krb5_verify_mic_v2,
+	  .wrap = gss_krb5_wrap_v2,
+	  .unwrap = gss_krb5_unwrap_v2,
+
+	  .signalg = -1,
+	  .sealalg = -1,
+	  .keybytes = 16,
+	  .keylength = BITS2OCTETS(128),
+	  .Kc_length = BITS2OCTETS(128),
+	  .Ke_length = BITS2OCTETS(128),
+	  .Ki_length = BITS2OCTETS(128),
+	  .cksumlength = BITS2OCTETS(96),
+	  .keyed_cksum = 1,
+	},
+	/*
+	 * AES-256 with SHA-1 (RFC 3962)
+	 */
+	{
+	  .etype = ENCTYPE_AES256_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96,
+	  .ctype = CKSUMTYPE_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES256,
+	  .name = "aes256-cts",
+	  .encrypt_name = "cts(cbc(aes))",
+	  .aux_cipher = "cbc(aes)",
+	  .cksum_name = "hmac(sha1)",
+	  .derive_key = krb5_derive_key_v2,
+	  .encrypt = gss_krb5_aes_encrypt,
+	  .decrypt = gss_krb5_aes_decrypt,
+
+	  .get_mic = gss_krb5_get_mic_v2,
+	  .verify_mic = gss_krb5_verify_mic_v2,
+	  .wrap = gss_krb5_wrap_v2,
+	  .unwrap = gss_krb5_unwrap_v2,
+
+	  .signalg = -1,
+	  .sealalg = -1,
+	  .keybytes = 32,
+	  .keylength = BITS2OCTETS(256),
+	  .Kc_length = BITS2OCTETS(256),
+	  .Ke_length = BITS2OCTETS(256),
+	  .Ki_length = BITS2OCTETS(256),
+	  .cksumlength = BITS2OCTETS(96),
+	  .keyed_cksum = 1,
+	},
+#endif
+
+#if defined(CONFIG_RPCSEC_GSS_KRB5_ENCTYPES_CAMELLIA)
+	/*
+	 * Camellia-128 with CMAC (RFC 6803)
+	 */
+	{
+		.etype		= ENCTYPE_CAMELLIA128_CTS_CMAC,
+		.ctype		= CKSUMTYPE_CMAC_CAMELLIA128,
+		.name		= "camellia128-cts-cmac",
+		.encrypt_name	= "cts(cbc(camellia))",
+		.aux_cipher	= "cbc(camellia)",
+		.cksum_name	= "cmac(camellia)",
+		.cksumlength	= BITS2OCTETS(128),
+		.keyed_cksum	= 1,
+		.keylength	= BITS2OCTETS(128),
+		.Kc_length	= BITS2OCTETS(128),
+		.Ke_length	= BITS2OCTETS(128),
+		.Ki_length	= BITS2OCTETS(128),
+
+		.derive_key	= krb5_kdf_feedback_cmac,
+		.encrypt	= gss_krb5_aes_encrypt,
+		.decrypt	= gss_krb5_aes_decrypt,
+
+		.get_mic	= gss_krb5_get_mic_v2,
+		.verify_mic	= gss_krb5_verify_mic_v2,
+		.wrap		= gss_krb5_wrap_v2,
+		.unwrap		= gss_krb5_unwrap_v2,
+	},
+	/*
+	 * Camellia-256 with CMAC (RFC 6803)
+	 */
+	{
+		.etype		= ENCTYPE_CAMELLIA256_CTS_CMAC,
+		.ctype		= CKSUMTYPE_CMAC_CAMELLIA256,
+		.name		= "camellia256-cts-cmac",
+		.encrypt_name	= "cts(cbc(camellia))",
+		.aux_cipher	= "cbc(camellia)",
+		.cksum_name	= "cmac(camellia)",
+		.cksumlength	= BITS2OCTETS(128),
+		.keyed_cksum	= 1,
+		.keylength	= BITS2OCTETS(256),
+		.Kc_length	= BITS2OCTETS(256),
+		.Ke_length	= BITS2OCTETS(256),
+		.Ki_length	= BITS2OCTETS(256),
+
+		.derive_key	= krb5_kdf_feedback_cmac,
+		.encrypt	= gss_krb5_aes_encrypt,
+		.decrypt	= gss_krb5_aes_decrypt,
+
+		.get_mic	= gss_krb5_get_mic_v2,
+		.verify_mic	= gss_krb5_verify_mic_v2,
+		.wrap		= gss_krb5_wrap_v2,
+		.unwrap		= gss_krb5_unwrap_v2,
+	},
+#endif
+
+#if defined(CONFIG_RPCSEC_GSS_KRB5_ENCTYPES_AES_SHA2)
+	/*
+	 * AES-128 with SHA-256 (RFC 8009)
+	 */
+	{
+		.etype		= ENCTYPE_AES128_CTS_HMAC_SHA256_128,
+		.ctype		= CKSUMTYPE_HMAC_SHA256_128_AES128,
+		.name		= "aes128-cts-hmac-sha256-128",
+		.encrypt_name	= "cts(cbc(aes))",
+		.aux_cipher	= "cbc(aes)",
+		.cksum_name	= "hmac(sha256)",
+		.cksumlength	= BITS2OCTETS(128),
+		.keyed_cksum	= 1,
+		.keylength	= BITS2OCTETS(128),
+		.Kc_length	= BITS2OCTETS(128),
+		.Ke_length	= BITS2OCTETS(128),
+		.Ki_length	= BITS2OCTETS(128),
+
+		.derive_key	= krb5_kdf_hmac_sha2,
+		.encrypt	= krb5_etm_encrypt,
+		.decrypt	= krb5_etm_decrypt,
+
+		.get_mic	= gss_krb5_get_mic_v2,
+		.verify_mic	= gss_krb5_verify_mic_v2,
+		.wrap		= gss_krb5_wrap_v2,
+		.unwrap		= gss_krb5_unwrap_v2,
+	},
+	/*
+	 * AES-256 with SHA-384 (RFC 8009)
+	 */
+	{
+		.etype		= ENCTYPE_AES256_CTS_HMAC_SHA384_192,
+		.ctype		= CKSUMTYPE_HMAC_SHA384_192_AES256,
+		.name		= "aes256-cts-hmac-sha384-192",
+		.encrypt_name	= "cts(cbc(aes))",
+		.aux_cipher	= "cbc(aes)",
+		.cksum_name	= "hmac(sha384)",
+		.cksumlength	= BITS2OCTETS(192),
+		.keyed_cksum	= 1,
+		.keylength	= BITS2OCTETS(256),
+		.Kc_length	= BITS2OCTETS(192),
+		.Ke_length	= BITS2OCTETS(256),
+		.Ki_length	= BITS2OCTETS(192),
+
+		.derive_key	= krb5_kdf_hmac_sha2,
+		.encrypt	= krb5_etm_encrypt,
+		.decrypt	= krb5_etm_decrypt,
+
+		.get_mic	= gss_krb5_get_mic_v2,
+		.verify_mic	= gss_krb5_verify_mic_v2,
+		.wrap		= gss_krb5_wrap_v2,
+		.unwrap		= gss_krb5_unwrap_v2,
+	},
+#endif
+};
+
+/*
+ * The list of advertised enctypes is specified in order of most
+ * preferred to least.
+ */
+static char gss_krb5_enctype_priority_list[64];
+
+static void gss_krb5_prepare_enctype_priority_list(void)
+{
+	static const u32 gss_krb5_enctypes[] = {
+#if defined(CONFIG_RPCSEC_GSS_KRB5_ENCTYPES_AES_SHA2)
+		ENCTYPE_AES256_CTS_HMAC_SHA384_192,
+		ENCTYPE_AES128_CTS_HMAC_SHA256_128,
+#endif
+#if defined(CONFIG_RPCSEC_GSS_KRB5_ENCTYPES_CAMELLIA)
+		ENCTYPE_CAMELLIA256_CTS_CMAC,
+		ENCTYPE_CAMELLIA128_CTS_CMAC,
+#endif
+#if defined(CONFIG_RPCSEC_GSS_KRB5_ENCTYPES_AES_SHA1)
+		ENCTYPE_AES256_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96,
+		ENCTYPE_AES128_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96,
+#endif
+	};
+	size_t total, i;
+	char buf[16];
+	char *sep;
+	int n;
+
+	sep = "";
+	gss_krb5_enctype_priority_list[0] = '\0';
+	for (total = 0, i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(gss_krb5_enctypes); i++) {
+		n = sprintf(buf, "%s%u", sep, gss_krb5_enctypes[i]);
+		if (n < 0)
+			break;
+		if (total + n >= sizeof(gss_krb5_enctype_priority_list))
+			break;
+		strcat(gss_krb5_enctype_priority_list, buf);
+		sep = ",";
+		total += n;
+	}
+}
+
+/**
+ * gss_krb5_lookup_enctype - Retrieve profile information for a given enctype
+ * @etype: ENCTYPE value
+ *
+ * Returns a pointer to a gss_krb5_enctype structure, or NULL if no
+ * matching etype is found.
+ */
+VISIBLE_IF_KUNIT
+const struct gss_krb5_enctype *gss_krb5_lookup_enctype(u32 etype)
+{
+	size_t i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(supported_gss_krb5_enctypes); i++)
+		if (supported_gss_krb5_enctypes[i].etype == etype)
+			return &supported_gss_krb5_enctypes[i];
+	return NULL;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_IF_KUNIT(gss_krb5_lookup_enctype);
+
+static struct crypto_sync_skcipher *
+gss_krb5_alloc_cipher_v2(const char *cname, const struct xdr_netobj *key)
+{
+	struct crypto_sync_skcipher *tfm;
+
+	tfm = crypto_alloc_sync_skcipher(cname, 0, 0);
+	if (IS_ERR(tfm))
+		return NULL;
+	if (crypto_sync_skcipher_setkey(tfm, key->data, key->len)) {
+		crypto_free_sync_skcipher(tfm);
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	return tfm;
+}
+
+static struct crypto_ahash *
+gss_krb5_alloc_hash_v2(struct krb5_ctx *kctx, const struct xdr_netobj *key)
+{
+	struct crypto_ahash *tfm;
+
+	tfm = crypto_alloc_ahash(kctx->gk5e->cksum_name, 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
+	if (IS_ERR(tfm))
+		return NULL;
+	if (crypto_ahash_setkey(tfm, key->data, key->len)) {
+		crypto_free_ahash(tfm);
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	return tfm;
+}
+
+static int
+gss_krb5_import_ctx_v2(struct krb5_ctx *ctx, gfp_t gfp_mask)
+{
+	struct xdr_netobj keyin = {
+		.len	= ctx->gk5e->keylength,
+		.data	= ctx->Ksess,
+	};
+	struct xdr_netobj keyout;
+	int ret = -EINVAL;
+
+	keyout.data = kmalloc(GSS_KRB5_MAX_KEYLEN, gfp_mask);
+	if (!keyout.data)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	/* initiator seal encryption */
+	keyout.len = ctx->gk5e->Ke_length;
+	if (krb5_derive_key(ctx, &keyin, &keyout, KG_USAGE_INITIATOR_SEAL,
+			    KEY_USAGE_SEED_ENCRYPTION, gfp_mask))
+		goto out;
+	ctx->initiator_enc = gss_krb5_alloc_cipher_v2(ctx->gk5e->encrypt_name,
+						      &keyout);
+	if (ctx->initiator_enc == NULL)
+		goto out;
+	if (ctx->gk5e->aux_cipher) {
+		ctx->initiator_enc_aux =
+			gss_krb5_alloc_cipher_v2(ctx->gk5e->aux_cipher,
+						 &keyout);
+		if (ctx->initiator_enc_aux == NULL)
+			goto out_free;
+	}
+
+	/* acceptor seal encryption */
+	if (krb5_derive_key(ctx, &keyin, &keyout, KG_USAGE_ACCEPTOR_SEAL,
+			    KEY_USAGE_SEED_ENCRYPTION, gfp_mask))
+		goto out_free;
+	ctx->acceptor_enc = gss_krb5_alloc_cipher_v2(ctx->gk5e->encrypt_name,
+						     &keyout);
+	if (ctx->acceptor_enc == NULL)
+		goto out_free;
+	if (ctx->gk5e->aux_cipher) {
+		ctx->acceptor_enc_aux =
+			gss_krb5_alloc_cipher_v2(ctx->gk5e->aux_cipher,
+						 &keyout);
+		if (ctx->acceptor_enc_aux == NULL)
+			goto out_free;
+	}
+
+	/* initiator sign checksum */
+	keyout.len = ctx->gk5e->Kc_length;
+	if (krb5_derive_key(ctx, &keyin, &keyout, KG_USAGE_INITIATOR_SIGN,
+			    KEY_USAGE_SEED_CHECKSUM, gfp_mask))
+		goto out_free;
+	ctx->initiator_sign = gss_krb5_alloc_hash_v2(ctx, &keyout);
+	if (ctx->initiator_sign == NULL)
+		goto out_free;
+
+	/* acceptor sign checksum */
+	if (krb5_derive_key(ctx, &keyin, &keyout, KG_USAGE_ACCEPTOR_SIGN,
+			    KEY_USAGE_SEED_CHECKSUM, gfp_mask))
+		goto out_free;
+	ctx->acceptor_sign = gss_krb5_alloc_hash_v2(ctx, &keyout);
+	if (ctx->acceptor_sign == NULL)
+		goto out_free;
+
+	/* initiator seal integrity */
+	keyout.len = ctx->gk5e->Ki_length;
+	if (krb5_derive_key(ctx, &keyin, &keyout, KG_USAGE_INITIATOR_SEAL,
+			    KEY_USAGE_SEED_INTEGRITY, gfp_mask))
+		goto out_free;
+	ctx->initiator_integ = gss_krb5_alloc_hash_v2(ctx, &keyout);
+	if (ctx->initiator_integ == NULL)
+		goto out_free;
+
+	/* acceptor seal integrity */
+	if (krb5_derive_key(ctx, &keyin, &keyout, KG_USAGE_ACCEPTOR_SEAL,
+			    KEY_USAGE_SEED_INTEGRITY, gfp_mask))
+		goto out_free;
+	ctx->acceptor_integ = gss_krb5_alloc_hash_v2(ctx, &keyout);
+	if (ctx->acceptor_integ == NULL)
+		goto out_free;
+
+	ret = 0;
+out:
+	kfree_sensitive(keyout.data);
+	return ret;
+
+out_free:
+	crypto_free_ahash(ctx->acceptor_integ);
+	crypto_free_ahash(ctx->initiator_integ);
+	crypto_free_ahash(ctx->acceptor_sign);
+	crypto_free_ahash(ctx->initiator_sign);
+	crypto_free_sync_skcipher(ctx->acceptor_enc_aux);
+	crypto_free_sync_skcipher(ctx->acceptor_enc);
+	crypto_free_sync_skcipher(ctx->initiator_enc_aux);
+	crypto_free_sync_skcipher(ctx->initiator_enc);
+	goto out;
+}
+
+static int
+gss_import_v2_context(const void *p, const void *end, struct krb5_ctx *ctx,
+		gfp_t gfp_mask)
+{
+	u64 seq_send64;
+	int keylen;
+	u32 time32;
+
+	p = simple_get_bytes(p, end, &ctx->flags, sizeof(ctx->flags));
+	if (IS_ERR(p))
+		goto out_err;
+	ctx->initiate = ctx->flags & KRB5_CTX_FLAG_INITIATOR;
+
+	p = simple_get_bytes(p, end, &time32, sizeof(time32));
+	if (IS_ERR(p))
+		goto out_err;
+	/* unsigned 32-bit time overflows in year 2106 */
+	ctx->endtime = (time64_t)time32;
+	p = simple_get_bytes(p, end, &seq_send64, sizeof(seq_send64));
+	if (IS_ERR(p))
+		goto out_err;
+	atomic64_set(&ctx->seq_send64, seq_send64);
+	/* set seq_send for use by "older" enctypes */
+	atomic_set(&ctx->seq_send, seq_send64);
+	if (seq_send64 != atomic_read(&ctx->seq_send)) {
+		dprintk("%s: seq_send64 %llx, seq_send %x overflow?\n", __func__,
+			seq_send64, atomic_read(&ctx->seq_send));
+		p = ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+		goto out_err;
+	}
+	p = simple_get_bytes(p, end, &ctx->enctype, sizeof(ctx->enctype));
+	if (IS_ERR(p))
+		goto out_err;
+	ctx->gk5e = gss_krb5_lookup_enctype(ctx->enctype);
+	if (ctx->gk5e == NULL) {
+		dprintk("gss_kerberos_mech: unsupported krb5 enctype %u\n",
+			ctx->enctype);
+		p = ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+		goto out_err;
+	}
+	keylen = ctx->gk5e->keylength;
+
+	p = simple_get_bytes(p, end, ctx->Ksess, keylen);
+	if (IS_ERR(p))
+		goto out_err;
+
+	if (p != end) {
+		p = ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+		goto out_err;
+	}
+
+	ctx->mech_used.data = kmemdup(gss_kerberos_mech.gm_oid.data,
+				      gss_kerberos_mech.gm_oid.len, gfp_mask);
+	if (unlikely(ctx->mech_used.data == NULL)) {
+		p = ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+		goto out_err;
+	}
+	ctx->mech_used.len = gss_kerberos_mech.gm_oid.len;
+
+	return gss_krb5_import_ctx_v2(ctx, gfp_mask);
+
+out_err:
+	return PTR_ERR(p);
+}
+
+static int
+gss_krb5_import_sec_context(const void *p, size_t len, struct gss_ctx *ctx_id,
+			    time64_t *endtime, gfp_t gfp_mask)
+{
+	const void *end = (const void *)((const char *)p + len);
+	struct  krb5_ctx *ctx;
+	int ret;
+
+	ctx = kzalloc(sizeof(*ctx), gfp_mask);
+	if (ctx == NULL)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	ret = gss_import_v2_context(p, end, ctx, gfp_mask);
+	memzero_explicit(&ctx->Ksess, sizeof(ctx->Ksess));
+	if (ret) {
+		kfree(ctx);
+		return ret;
+	}
+
+	ctx_id->internal_ctx_id = ctx;
+	if (endtime)
+		*endtime = ctx->endtime;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void
+gss_krb5_delete_sec_context(void *internal_ctx)
+{
+	struct krb5_ctx *kctx = internal_ctx;
+
+	crypto_free_sync_skcipher(kctx->seq);
+	crypto_free_sync_skcipher(kctx->enc);
+	crypto_free_sync_skcipher(kctx->acceptor_enc);
+	crypto_free_sync_skcipher(kctx->initiator_enc);
+	crypto_free_sync_skcipher(kctx->acceptor_enc_aux);
+	crypto_free_sync_skcipher(kctx->initiator_enc_aux);
+	crypto_free_ahash(kctx->acceptor_sign);
+	crypto_free_ahash(kctx->initiator_sign);
+	crypto_free_ahash(kctx->acceptor_integ);
+	crypto_free_ahash(kctx->initiator_integ);
+	kfree(kctx->mech_used.data);
+	kfree(kctx);
+}
+
+/**
+ * gss_krb5_get_mic - get_mic for the Kerberos GSS mechanism
+ * @gctx: GSS context
+ * @text: plaintext to checksum
+ * @token: buffer into which to write the computed checksum
+ *
+ * Return values:
+ *    %GSS_S_COMPLETE - success, and @token is filled in
+ *    %GSS_S_FAILURE - checksum could not be generated
+ *    %GSS_S_CONTEXT_EXPIRED - Kerberos context is no longer valid
+ */
+static u32 gss_krb5_get_mic(struct gss_ctx *gctx, struct xdr_buf *text,
+			    struct xdr_netobj *token)
+{
+	struct krb5_ctx *kctx = gctx->internal_ctx_id;
+
+	return kctx->gk5e->get_mic(kctx, text, token);
+}
+
+/**
+ * gss_krb5_verify_mic - verify_mic for the Kerberos GSS mechanism
+ * @gctx: GSS context
+ * @message_buffer: plaintext to check
+ * @read_token: received checksum to check
+ *
+ * Return values:
+ *    %GSS_S_COMPLETE - computed and received checksums match
+ *    %GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN - received checksum is not valid
+ *    %GSS_S_BAD_SIG - computed and received checksums do not match
+ *    %GSS_S_FAILURE - received checksum could not be checked
+ *    %GSS_S_CONTEXT_EXPIRED - Kerberos context is no longer valid
+ */
+static u32 gss_krb5_verify_mic(struct gss_ctx *gctx,
+			       struct xdr_buf *message_buffer,
+			       struct xdr_netobj *read_token)
+{
+	struct krb5_ctx *kctx = gctx->internal_ctx_id;
+
+	return kctx->gk5e->verify_mic(kctx, message_buffer, read_token);
+}
+
+/**
+ * gss_krb5_wrap - gss_wrap for the Kerberos GSS mechanism
+ * @gctx: initialized GSS context
+ * @offset: byte offset in @buf to start writing the cipher text
+ * @buf: OUT: send buffer
+ * @pages: plaintext to wrap
+ *
+ * Return values:
+ *    %GSS_S_COMPLETE - success, @buf has been updated
+ *    %GSS_S_FAILURE - @buf could not be wrapped
+ *    %GSS_S_CONTEXT_EXPIRED - Kerberos context is no longer valid
+ */
+static u32 gss_krb5_wrap(struct gss_ctx *gctx, int offset,
+			 struct xdr_buf *buf, struct page **pages)
+{
+	struct krb5_ctx	*kctx = gctx->internal_ctx_id;
+
+	return kctx->gk5e->wrap(kctx, offset, buf, pages);
+}
+
+/**
+ * gss_krb5_unwrap - gss_unwrap for the Kerberos GSS mechanism
+ * @gctx: initialized GSS context
+ * @offset: starting byte offset into @buf
+ * @len: size of ciphertext to unwrap
+ * @buf: ciphertext to unwrap
+ *
+ * Return values:
+ *    %GSS_S_COMPLETE - success, @buf has been updated
+ *    %GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN - received blob is not valid
+ *    %GSS_S_BAD_SIG - computed and received checksums do not match
+ *    %GSS_S_FAILURE - @buf could not be unwrapped
+ *    %GSS_S_CONTEXT_EXPIRED - Kerberos context is no longer valid
+ */
+static u32 gss_krb5_unwrap(struct gss_ctx *gctx, int offset,
+			   int len, struct xdr_buf *buf)
+{
+	struct krb5_ctx	*kctx = gctx->internal_ctx_id;
+
+	return kctx->gk5e->unwrap(kctx, offset, len, buf,
+				  &gctx->slack, &gctx->align);
+}
+
+static const struct gss_api_ops gss_kerberos_ops = {
+	.gss_import_sec_context	= gss_krb5_import_sec_context,
+	.gss_get_mic		= gss_krb5_get_mic,
+	.gss_verify_mic		= gss_krb5_verify_mic,
+	.gss_wrap		= gss_krb5_wrap,
+	.gss_unwrap		= gss_krb5_unwrap,
+	.gss_delete_sec_context	= gss_krb5_delete_sec_context,
+};
+
+static struct pf_desc gss_kerberos_pfs[] = {
+	[0] = {
+		.pseudoflavor = RPC_AUTH_GSS_KRB5,
+		.qop = GSS_C_QOP_DEFAULT,
+		.service = RPC_GSS_SVC_NONE,
+		.name = "krb5",
+	},
+	[1] = {
+		.pseudoflavor = RPC_AUTH_GSS_KRB5I,
+		.qop = GSS_C_QOP_DEFAULT,
+		.service = RPC_GSS_SVC_INTEGRITY,
+		.name = "krb5i",
+		.datatouch = true,
+	},
+	[2] = {
+		.pseudoflavor = RPC_AUTH_GSS_KRB5P,
+		.qop = GSS_C_QOP_DEFAULT,
+		.service = RPC_GSS_SVC_PRIVACY,
+		.name = "krb5p",
+		.datatouch = true,
+	},
+};
+
+MODULE_ALIAS("rpc-auth-gss-krb5");
+MODULE_ALIAS("rpc-auth-gss-krb5i");
+MODULE_ALIAS("rpc-auth-gss-krb5p");
+MODULE_ALIAS("rpc-auth-gss-390003");
+MODULE_ALIAS("rpc-auth-gss-390004");
+MODULE_ALIAS("rpc-auth-gss-390005");
+MODULE_ALIAS("rpc-auth-gss-1.2.840.113554.1.2.2");
+
+static struct gss_api_mech gss_kerberos_mech = {
+	.gm_name	= "krb5",
+	.gm_owner	= THIS_MODULE,
+	.gm_oid		= { 9, "\x2a\x86\x48\x86\xf7\x12\x01\x02\x02" },
+	.gm_ops		= &gss_kerberos_ops,
+	.gm_pf_num	= ARRAY_SIZE(gss_kerberos_pfs),
+	.gm_pfs		= gss_kerberos_pfs,
+	.gm_upcall_enctypes = gss_krb5_enctype_priority_list,
+};
+
+static int __init init_kerberos_module(void)
+{
+	int status;
+
+	gss_krb5_prepare_enctype_priority_list();
+	status = gss_mech_register(&gss_kerberos_mech);
+	if (status)
+		printk("Failed to register kerberos gss mechanism!\n");
+	return status;
+}
+
+static void __exit cleanup_kerberos_module(void)
+{
+	gss_mech_unregister(&gss_kerberos_mech);
+}
+
+MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
+module_init(init_kerberos_module);
+module_exit(cleanup_kerberos_module);
diff --git a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_seal.c b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_seal.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..ce540df9bc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_seal.c
@@ -0,0 +1,133 @@
+/*
+ *  linux/net/sunrpc/gss_krb5_seal.c
+ *
+ *  Adapted from MIT Kerberos 5-1.2.1 lib/gssapi/krb5/k5seal.c
+ *
+ *  Copyright (c) 2000-2008 The Regents of the University of Michigan.
+ *  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ *  Andy Adamson	<andros@umich.edu>
+ *  J. Bruce Fields	<bfields@umich.edu>
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright 1993 by OpenVision Technologies, Inc.
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, distribute, and sell this software
+ * and its documentation for any purpose is hereby granted without fee,
+ * provided that the above copyright notice appears in all copies and
+ * that both that copyright notice and this permission notice appear in
+ * supporting documentation, and that the name of OpenVision not be used
+ * in advertising or publicity pertaining to distribution of the software
+ * without specific, written prior permission. OpenVision makes no
+ * representations about the suitability of this software for any
+ * purpose.  It is provided "as is" without express or implied warranty.
+ *
+ * OPENVISION DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE,
+ * INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS, IN NO
+ * EVENT SHALL OPENVISION BE LIABLE FOR ANY SPECIAL, INDIRECT OR
+ * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF
+ * USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR
+ * OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR
+ * PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 1998 by the FundsXpress, INC.
+ *
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Export of this software from the United States of America may require
+ * a specific license from the United States Government.  It is the
+ * responsibility of any person or organization contemplating export to
+ * obtain such a license before exporting.
+ *
+ * WITHIN THAT CONSTRAINT, permission to use, copy, modify, and
+ * distribute this software and its documentation for any purpose and
+ * without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above copyright
+ * notice appear in all copies and that both that copyright notice and
+ * this permission notice appear in supporting documentation, and that
+ * the name of FundsXpress. not be used in advertising or publicity pertaining
+ * to distribution of the software without specific, written prior
+ * permission.  FundsXpress makes no representations about the suitability of
+ * this software for any purpose.  It is provided "as is" without express
+ * or implied warranty.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED ``AS IS'' AND WITHOUT ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, WITHOUT LIMITATION, THE IMPLIED
+ * WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTIBILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/jiffies.h>
+#include <linux/sunrpc/gss_krb5.h>
+#include <linux/random.h>
+#include <linux/crypto.h>
+#include <linux/atomic.h>
+
+#include "gss_krb5_internal.h"
+
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SUNRPC_DEBUG)
+# define RPCDBG_FACILITY        RPCDBG_AUTH
+#endif
+
+static void *
+setup_token_v2(struct krb5_ctx *ctx, struct xdr_netobj *token)
+{
+	u16 *ptr;
+	void *krb5_hdr;
+	u8 *p, flags = 0x00;
+
+	if ((ctx->flags & KRB5_CTX_FLAG_INITIATOR) == 0)
+		flags |= 0x01;
+	if (ctx->flags & KRB5_CTX_FLAG_ACCEPTOR_SUBKEY)
+		flags |= 0x04;
+
+	/* Per rfc 4121, sec 4.2.6.1, there is no header,
+	 * just start the token.
+	 */
+	krb5_hdr = (u16 *)token->data;
+	ptr = krb5_hdr;
+
+	*ptr++ = KG2_TOK_MIC;
+	p = (u8 *)ptr;
+	*p++ = flags;
+	*p++ = 0xff;
+	ptr = (u16 *)p;
+	*ptr++ = 0xffff;
+	*ptr = 0xffff;
+
+	token->len = GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN + ctx->gk5e->cksumlength;
+	return krb5_hdr;
+}
+
+u32
+gss_krb5_get_mic_v2(struct krb5_ctx *ctx, struct xdr_buf *text,
+		    struct xdr_netobj *token)
+{
+	struct crypto_ahash *tfm = ctx->initiate ?
+				   ctx->initiator_sign : ctx->acceptor_sign;
+	struct xdr_netobj cksumobj = {
+		.len =	ctx->gk5e->cksumlength,
+	};
+	__be64 seq_send_be64;
+	void *krb5_hdr;
+	time64_t now;
+
+	dprintk("RPC:       %s\n", __func__);
+
+	krb5_hdr = setup_token_v2(ctx, token);
+
+	/* Set up the sequence number. Now 64-bits in clear
+	 * text and w/o direction indicator */
+	seq_send_be64 = cpu_to_be64(atomic64_fetch_inc(&ctx->seq_send64));
+	memcpy(krb5_hdr + 8, (char *) &seq_send_be64, 8);
+
+	cksumobj.data = krb5_hdr + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN;
+	if (gss_krb5_checksum(tfm, krb5_hdr, GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN,
+			      text, 0, &cksumobj))
+		return GSS_S_FAILURE;
+
+	now = ktime_get_real_seconds();
+	return (ctx->endtime < now) ? GSS_S_CONTEXT_EXPIRED : GSS_S_COMPLETE;
+}
diff --git a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_test.c b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_test.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..85625e3f38
--- /dev/null
+++ b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_test.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1859 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2022 Oracle and/or its affiliates.
+ *
+ * KUnit test of SunRPC's GSS Kerberos mechanism. Subsystem
+ * name is "rpcsec_gss_krb5".
+ */
+
+#include <kunit/test.h>
+#include <kunit/visibility.h>
+
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <crypto/hash.h>
+
+#include <linux/sunrpc/xdr.h>
+#include <linux/sunrpc/gss_krb5.h>
+
+#include "gss_krb5_internal.h"
+
+MODULE_IMPORT_NS(EXPORTED_FOR_KUNIT_TESTING);
+
+struct gss_krb5_test_param {
+	const char			*desc;
+	u32				enctype;
+	u32				nfold;
+	u32				constant;
+	const struct xdr_netobj		*base_key;
+	const struct xdr_netobj		*Ke;
+	const struct xdr_netobj		*usage;
+	const struct xdr_netobj		*plaintext;
+	const struct xdr_netobj		*confounder;
+	const struct xdr_netobj		*expected_result;
+	const struct xdr_netobj		*expected_hmac;
+	const struct xdr_netobj		*next_iv;
+};
+
+static inline void gss_krb5_get_desc(const struct gss_krb5_test_param *param,
+				     char *desc)
+{
+	strscpy(desc, param->desc, KUNIT_PARAM_DESC_SIZE);
+}
+
+static void kdf_case(struct kunit *test)
+{
+	const struct gss_krb5_test_param *param = test->param_value;
+	const struct gss_krb5_enctype *gk5e;
+	struct xdr_netobj derivedkey;
+	int err;
+
+	/* Arrange */
+	gk5e = gss_krb5_lookup_enctype(param->enctype);
+	if (!gk5e)
+		kunit_skip(test, "Encryption type is not available");
+
+	derivedkey.data = kunit_kzalloc(test, param->expected_result->len,
+					GFP_KERNEL);
+	KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_ERR_OR_NULL(test, derivedkey.data);
+	derivedkey.len = param->expected_result->len;
+
+	/* Act */
+	err = gk5e->derive_key(gk5e, param->base_key, &derivedkey,
+			       param->usage, GFP_KERNEL);
+	KUNIT_ASSERT_EQ(test, err, 0);
+
+	/* Assert */
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ_MSG(test,
+			    memcmp(param->expected_result->data,
+				   derivedkey.data, derivedkey.len), 0,
+			    "key mismatch");
+}
+
+static void checksum_case(struct kunit *test)
+{
+	const struct gss_krb5_test_param *param = test->param_value;
+	struct xdr_buf buf = {
+		.head[0].iov_len	= param->plaintext->len,
+		.len			= param->plaintext->len,
+	};
+	const struct gss_krb5_enctype *gk5e;
+	struct xdr_netobj Kc, checksum;
+	struct crypto_ahash *tfm;
+	int err;
+
+	/* Arrange */
+	gk5e = gss_krb5_lookup_enctype(param->enctype);
+	if (!gk5e)
+		kunit_skip(test, "Encryption type is not available");
+
+	Kc.len = gk5e->Kc_length;
+	Kc.data = kunit_kzalloc(test, Kc.len, GFP_KERNEL);
+	KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_ERR_OR_NULL(test, Kc.data);
+	err = gk5e->derive_key(gk5e, param->base_key, &Kc,
+			       param->usage, GFP_KERNEL);
+	KUNIT_ASSERT_EQ(test, err, 0);
+
+	tfm = crypto_alloc_ahash(gk5e->cksum_name, 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
+	KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_ERR_OR_NULL(test, tfm);
+	err = crypto_ahash_setkey(tfm, Kc.data, Kc.len);
+	KUNIT_ASSERT_EQ(test, err, 0);
+
+	buf.head[0].iov_base = kunit_kzalloc(test, buf.head[0].iov_len, GFP_KERNEL);
+	KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_ERR_OR_NULL(test, buf.head[0].iov_base);
+	memcpy(buf.head[0].iov_base, param->plaintext->data, buf.head[0].iov_len);
+
+	checksum.len = gk5e->cksumlength;
+	checksum.data = kunit_kzalloc(test, checksum.len, GFP_KERNEL);
+	KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_ERR_OR_NULL(test, checksum.data);
+
+	/* Act */
+	err = gss_krb5_checksum(tfm, NULL, 0, &buf, 0, &checksum);
+	KUNIT_ASSERT_EQ(test, err, 0);
+
+	/* Assert */
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ_MSG(test,
+			    memcmp(param->expected_result->data,
+				   checksum.data, checksum.len), 0,
+			    "checksum mismatch");
+
+	crypto_free_ahash(tfm);
+}
+
+#define DEFINE_HEX_XDR_NETOBJ(name, hex_array...)		\
+	static const u8 name ## _data[] = { hex_array };	\
+	static const struct xdr_netobj name = {			\
+		.data	= (u8 *)name##_data,			\
+		.len	= sizeof(name##_data),			\
+	}
+
+#define DEFINE_STR_XDR_NETOBJ(name, string)			\
+	static const u8 name ## _str[] = string;		\
+	static const struct xdr_netobj name = {			\
+		.data	= (u8 *)name##_str,			\
+		.len	= sizeof(name##_str) - 1,		\
+	}
+
+/*
+ * RFC 3961 Appendix A.1.  n-fold
+ *
+ * The n-fold function is defined in section 5.1 of RFC 3961.
+ *
+ * This test material is copyright (C) The Internet Society (2005).
+ */
+
+DEFINE_HEX_XDR_NETOBJ(nfold_test1_plaintext,
+		      0x30, 0x31, 0x32, 0x33, 0x34, 0x35
+);
+DEFINE_HEX_XDR_NETOBJ(nfold_test1_expected_result,
+		      0xbe, 0x07, 0x26, 0x31, 0x27, 0x6b, 0x19, 0x55
+);
+
+DEFINE_HEX_XDR_NETOBJ(nfold_test2_plaintext,
+		      0x70, 0x61, 0x73, 0x73, 0x77, 0x6f, 0x72, 0x64
+);
+DEFINE_HEX_XDR_NETOBJ(nfold_test2_expected_result,
+		      0x78, 0xa0, 0x7b, 0x6c, 0xaf, 0x85, 0xfa
+);
+
+DEFINE_HEX_XDR_NETOBJ(nfold_test3_plaintext,
+		      0x52, 0x6f, 0x75, 0x67, 0x68, 0x20, 0x43, 0x6f,
+		      0x6e, 0x73, 0x65, 0x6e, 0x73, 0x75, 0x73, 0x2c,
+		      0x20, 0x61, 0x6e, 0x64, 0x20, 0x52, 0x75, 0x6e,
+		      0x6e, 0x69, 0x6e, 0x67, 0x20, 0x43, 0x6f, 0x64,
+		      0x65
+);
+DEFINE_HEX_XDR_NETOBJ(nfold_test3_expected_result,
+		      0xbb, 0x6e, 0xd3, 0x08, 0x70, 0xb7, 0xf0, 0xe0
+);
+
+DEFINE_HEX_XDR_NETOBJ(nfold_test4_plaintext,
+		      0x70, 0x61, 0x73, 0x73, 0x77, 0x6f, 0x72, 0x64
+);
+DEFINE_HEX_XDR_NETOBJ(nfold_test4_expected_result,
+		      0x59, 0xe4, 0xa8, 0xca, 0x7c, 0x03, 0x85, 0xc3,
+		      0xc3, 0x7b, 0x3f, 0x6d, 0x20, 0x00, 0x24, 0x7c,
+		      0xb6, 0xe6, 0xbd, 0x5b, 0x3e
+);
+
+DEFINE_HEX_XDR_NETOBJ(nfold_test5_plaintext,
+		      0x4d, 0x41, 0x53, 0x53, 0x41, 0x43, 0x48, 0x56,
+		      0x53, 0x45, 0x54, 0x54, 0x53, 0x20, 0x49, 0x4e,
+		      0x53, 0x54, 0x49, 0x54, 0x56, 0x54, 0x45, 0x20,
+		      0x4f, 0x46, 0x20, 0x54, 0x45, 0x43, 0x48, 0x4e,
+		      0x4f, 0x4c, 0x4f, 0x47, 0x59
+);
+DEFINE_HEX_XDR_NETOBJ(nfold_test5_expected_result,
+		      0xdb, 0x3b, 0x0d, 0x8f, 0x0b, 0x06, 0x1e, 0x60,
+		      0x32, 0x82, 0xb3, 0x08, 0xa5, 0x08, 0x41, 0x22,
+		      0x9a, 0xd7, 0x98, 0xfa, 0xb9, 0x54, 0x0c, 0x1b
+);
+
+DEFINE_HEX_XDR_NETOBJ(nfold_test6_plaintext,
+		      0x51
+);
+DEFINE_HEX_XDR_NETOBJ(nfold_test6_expected_result,
+		      0x51, 0x8a, 0x54, 0xa2, 0x15, 0xa8, 0x45, 0x2a,
+		      0x51, 0x8a, 0x54, 0xa2, 0x15, 0xa8, 0x45, 0x2a,
+		      0x51, 0x8a, 0x54, 0xa2, 0x15
+);
+
+DEFINE_HEX_XDR_NETOBJ(nfold_test7_plaintext,
+		      0x62, 0x61
+);
+DEFINE_HEX_XDR_NETOBJ(nfold_test7_expected_result,
+		      0xfb, 0x25, 0xd5, 0x31, 0xae, 0x89, 0x74, 0x49,
+		      0x9f, 0x52, 0xfd, 0x92, 0xea, 0x98, 0x57, 0xc4,
+		      0xba, 0x24, 0xcf, 0x29, 0x7e
+);
+
+DEFINE_HEX_XDR_NETOBJ(nfold_test_kerberos,
+		      0x6b, 0x65, 0x72, 0x62, 0x65, 0x72, 0x6f, 0x73
+);
+DEFINE_HEX_XDR_NETOBJ(nfold_test8_expected_result,
+		      0x6b, 0x65, 0x72, 0x62, 0x65, 0x72, 0x6f, 0x73
+);
+DEFINE_HEX_XDR_NETOBJ(nfold_test9_expected_result,
+		      0x6b, 0x65, 0x72, 0x62, 0x65, 0x72, 0x6f, 0x73,
+		      0x7b, 0x9b, 0x5b, 0x2b, 0x93, 0x13, 0x2b, 0x93
+);
+DEFINE_HEX_XDR_NETOBJ(nfold_test10_expected_result,
+		      0x83, 0x72, 0xc2, 0x36, 0x34, 0x4e, 0x5f, 0x15,
+		      0x50, 0xcd, 0x07, 0x47, 0xe1, 0x5d, 0x62, 0xca,
+		      0x7a, 0x5a, 0x3b, 0xce, 0xa4
+);
+DEFINE_HEX_XDR_NETOBJ(nfold_test11_expected_result,
+		      0x6b, 0x65, 0x72, 0x62, 0x65, 0x72, 0x6f, 0x73,
+		      0x7b, 0x9b, 0x5b, 0x2b, 0x93, 0x13, 0x2b, 0x93,
+		      0x5c, 0x9b, 0xdc, 0xda, 0xd9, 0x5c, 0x98, 0x99,
+		      0xc4, 0xca, 0xe4, 0xde, 0xe6, 0xd6, 0xca, 0xe4
+);
+
+static const struct gss_krb5_test_param rfc3961_nfold_test_params[] = {
+	{
+		.desc			= "64-fold(\"012345\")",
+		.nfold			= 64,
+		.plaintext		= &nfold_test1_plaintext,
+		.expected_result	= &nfold_test1_expected_result,
+	},
+	{
+		.desc			= "56-fold(\"password\")",
+		.nfold			= 56,
+		.plaintext		= &nfold_test2_plaintext,
+		.expected_result	= &nfold_test2_expected_result,
+	},
+	{
+		.desc			= "64-fold(\"Rough Consensus, and Running Code\")",
+		.nfold			= 64,
+		.plaintext		= &nfold_test3_plaintext,
+		.expected_result	= &nfold_test3_expected_result,
+	},
+	{
+		.desc			= "168-fold(\"password\")",
+		.nfold			= 168,
+		.plaintext		= &nfold_test4_plaintext,
+		.expected_result	= &nfold_test4_expected_result,
+	},
+	{
+		.desc			= "192-fold(\"MASSACHVSETTS INSTITVTE OF TECHNOLOGY\")",
+		.nfold			= 192,
+		.plaintext		= &nfold_test5_plaintext,
+		.expected_result	= &nfold_test5_expected_result,
+	},
+	{
+		.desc			= "168-fold(\"Q\")",
+		.nfold			= 168,
+		.plaintext		= &nfold_test6_plaintext,
+		.expected_result	= &nfold_test6_expected_result,
+	},
+	{
+		.desc			= "168-fold(\"ba\")",
+		.nfold			= 168,
+		.plaintext		= &nfold_test7_plaintext,
+		.expected_result	= &nfold_test7_expected_result,
+	},
+	{
+		.desc			= "64-fold(\"kerberos\")",
+		.nfold			= 64,
+		.plaintext		= &nfold_test_kerberos,
+		.expected_result	= &nfold_test8_expected_result,
+	},
+	{
+		.desc			= "128-fold(\"kerberos\")",
+		.nfold			= 128,
+		.plaintext		= &nfold_test_kerberos,
+		.expected_result	= &nfold_test9_expected_result,
+	},
+	{
+		.desc			= "168-fold(\"kerberos\")",
+		.nfold			= 168,
+		.plaintext		= &nfold_test_kerberos,
+		.expected_result	= &nfold_test10_expected_result,
+	},
+	{
+		.desc			= "256-fold(\"kerberos\")",
+		.nfold			= 256,
+		.plaintext		= &nfold_test_kerberos,
+		.expected_result	= &nfold_test11_expected_result,
+	},
+};
+
+/* Creates the function rfc3961_nfold_gen_params */
+KUNIT_ARRAY_PARAM(rfc3961_nfold, rfc3961_nfold_test_params, gss_krb5_get_desc);
+
+static void rfc3961_nfold_case(struct kunit *test)
+{
+	const struct gss_krb5_test_param *param = test->param_value;
+	u8 *result;
+
+	/* Arrange */
+	result = kunit_kzalloc(test, 4096, GFP_KERNEL);
+	KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_ERR_OR_NULL(test, result);
+
+	/* Act */
+	krb5_nfold(param->plaintext->len * 8, param->plaintext->data,
+		   param->expected_result->len * 8, result);
+
+	/* Assert */
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ_MSG(test,
+			    memcmp(param->expected_result->data,
+				   result, param->expected_result->len), 0,
+			    "result mismatch");
+}
+
+static struct kunit_case rfc3961_test_cases[] = {
+	{
+		.name			= "RFC 3961 n-fold",
+		.run_case		= rfc3961_nfold_case,
+		.generate_params	= rfc3961_nfold_gen_params,
+	},
+	{}
+};
+
+static struct kunit_suite rfc3961_suite = {
+	.name			= "RFC 3961 tests",
+	.test_cases		= rfc3961_test_cases,
+};
+
+/*
+ * From RFC 3962 Appendix B:   Sample Test Vectors
+ *
+ * Some test vectors for CBC with ciphertext stealing, using an
+ * initial vector of all-zero.
+ *
+ * This test material is copyright (C) The Internet Society (2005).
+ */
+
+DEFINE_HEX_XDR_NETOBJ(rfc3962_encryption_key,
+		      0x63, 0x68, 0x69, 0x63, 0x6b, 0x65, 0x6e, 0x20,
+		      0x74, 0x65, 0x72, 0x69, 0x79, 0x61, 0x6b, 0x69
+);
+
+DEFINE_HEX_XDR_NETOBJ(rfc3962_enc_test1_plaintext,
+		      0x49, 0x20, 0x77, 0x6f, 0x75, 0x6c, 0x64, 0x20,
+		      0x6c, 0x69, 0x6b, 0x65, 0x20, 0x74, 0x68, 0x65,
+		      0x20
+);
+DEFINE_HEX_XDR_NETOBJ(rfc3962_enc_test1_expected_result,
+		      0xc6, 0x35, 0x35, 0x68, 0xf2, 0xbf, 0x8c, 0xb4,
+		      0xd8, 0xa5, 0x80, 0x36, 0x2d, 0xa7, 0xff, 0x7f,
+		      0x97
+);
+DEFINE_HEX_XDR_NETOBJ(rfc3962_enc_test1_next_iv,
+		      0xc6, 0x35, 0x35, 0x68, 0xf2, 0xbf, 0x8c, 0xb4,
+		      0xd8, 0xa5, 0x80, 0x36, 0x2d, 0xa7, 0xff, 0x7f
+);
+
+DEFINE_HEX_XDR_NETOBJ(rfc3962_enc_test2_plaintext,
+		      0x49, 0x20, 0x77, 0x6f, 0x75, 0x6c, 0x64, 0x20,
+		      0x6c, 0x69, 0x6b, 0x65, 0x20, 0x74, 0x68, 0x65,
+		      0x20, 0x47, 0x65, 0x6e, 0x65, 0x72, 0x61, 0x6c,
+		      0x20, 0x47, 0x61, 0x75, 0x27, 0x73, 0x20
+);
+DEFINE_HEX_XDR_NETOBJ(rfc3962_enc_test2_expected_result,
+		      0xfc, 0x00, 0x78, 0x3e, 0x0e, 0xfd, 0xb2, 0xc1,
+		      0xd4, 0x45, 0xd4, 0xc8, 0xef, 0xf7, 0xed, 0x22,
+		      0x97, 0x68, 0x72, 0x68, 0xd6, 0xec, 0xcc, 0xc0,
+		      0xc0, 0x7b, 0x25, 0xe2, 0x5e, 0xcf, 0xe5
+);
+DEFINE_HEX_XDR_NETOBJ(rfc3962_enc_test2_next_iv,
+		      0xfc, 0x00, 0x78, 0x3e, 0x0e, 0xfd, 0xb2, 0xc1,
+		      0xd4, 0x45, 0xd4, 0xc8, 0xef, 0xf7, 0xed, 0x22
+);
+
+DEFINE_HEX_XDR_NETOBJ(rfc3962_enc_test3_plaintext,
+		      0x49, 0x20, 0x77, 0x6f, 0x75, 0x6c, 0x64, 0x20,
+		      0x6c, 0x69, 0x6b, 0x65, 0x20, 0x74, 0x68, 0x65,
+		      0x20, 0x47, 0x65, 0x6e, 0x65, 0x72, 0x61, 0x6c,
+		      0x20, 0x47, 0x61, 0x75, 0x27, 0x73, 0x20, 0x43
+);
+DEFINE_HEX_XDR_NETOBJ(rfc3962_enc_test3_expected_result,
+		      0x39, 0x31, 0x25, 0x23, 0xa7, 0x86, 0x62, 0xd5,
+		      0xbe, 0x7f, 0xcb, 0xcc, 0x98, 0xeb, 0xf5, 0xa8,
+		      0x97, 0x68, 0x72, 0x68, 0xd6, 0xec, 0xcc, 0xc0,
+		      0xc0, 0x7b, 0x25, 0xe2, 0x5e, 0xcf, 0xe5, 0x84
+);
+DEFINE_HEX_XDR_NETOBJ(rfc3962_enc_test3_next_iv,
+		      0x39, 0x31, 0x25, 0x23, 0xa7, 0x86, 0x62, 0xd5,
+		      0xbe, 0x7f, 0xcb, 0xcc, 0x98, 0xeb, 0xf5, 0xa8
+);
+
+DEFINE_HEX_XDR_NETOBJ(rfc3962_enc_test4_plaintext,
+		      0x49, 0x20, 0x77, 0x6f, 0x75, 0x6c, 0x64, 0x20,
+		      0x6c, 0x69, 0x6b, 0x65, 0x20, 0x74, 0x68, 0x65,
+		      0x20, 0x47, 0x65, 0x6e, 0x65, 0x72, 0x61, 0x6c,
+		      0x20, 0x47, 0x61, 0x75, 0x27, 0x73, 0x20, 0x43,
+		      0x68, 0x69, 0x63, 0x6b, 0x65, 0x6e, 0x2c, 0x20,
+		      0x70, 0x6c, 0x65, 0x61, 0x73, 0x65, 0x2c
+);
+DEFINE_HEX_XDR_NETOBJ(rfc3962_enc_test4_expected_result,
+		      0x97, 0x68, 0x72, 0x68, 0xd6, 0xec, 0xcc, 0xc0,
+		      0xc0, 0x7b, 0x25, 0xe2, 0x5e, 0xcf, 0xe5, 0x84,
+		      0xb3, 0xff, 0xfd, 0x94, 0x0c, 0x16, 0xa1, 0x8c,
+		      0x1b, 0x55, 0x49, 0xd2, 0xf8, 0x38, 0x02, 0x9e,
+		      0x39, 0x31, 0x25, 0x23, 0xa7, 0x86, 0x62, 0xd5,
+		      0xbe, 0x7f, 0xcb, 0xcc, 0x98, 0xeb, 0xf5
+);
+DEFINE_HEX_XDR_NETOBJ(rfc3962_enc_test4_next_iv,
+		      0xb3, 0xff, 0xfd, 0x94, 0x0c, 0x16, 0xa1, 0x8c,
+		      0x1b, 0x55, 0x49, 0xd2, 0xf8, 0x38, 0x02, 0x9e
+);
+
+DEFINE_HEX_XDR_NETOBJ(rfc3962_enc_test5_plaintext,
+		      0x49, 0x20, 0x77, 0x6f, 0x75, 0x6c, 0x64, 0x20,
+		      0x6c, 0x69, 0x6b, 0x65, 0x20, 0x74, 0x68, 0x65,
+		      0x20, 0x47, 0x65, 0x6e, 0x65, 0x72, 0x61, 0x6c,
+		      0x20, 0x47, 0x61, 0x75, 0x27, 0x73, 0x20, 0x43,
+		      0x68, 0x69, 0x63, 0x6b, 0x65, 0x6e, 0x2c, 0x20,
+		      0x70, 0x6c, 0x65, 0x61, 0x73, 0x65, 0x2c, 0x20
+);
+DEFINE_HEX_XDR_NETOBJ(rfc3962_enc_test5_expected_result,
+		      0x97, 0x68, 0x72, 0x68, 0xd6, 0xec, 0xcc, 0xc0,
+		      0xc0, 0x7b, 0x25, 0xe2, 0x5e, 0xcf, 0xe5, 0x84,
+		      0x9d, 0xad, 0x8b, 0xbb, 0x96, 0xc4, 0xcd, 0xc0,
+		      0x3b, 0xc1, 0x03, 0xe1, 0xa1, 0x94, 0xbb, 0xd8,
+		      0x39, 0x31, 0x25, 0x23, 0xa7, 0x86, 0x62, 0xd5,
+		      0xbe, 0x7f, 0xcb, 0xcc, 0x98, 0xeb, 0xf5, 0xa8
+);
+DEFINE_HEX_XDR_NETOBJ(rfc3962_enc_test5_next_iv,
+		      0x9d, 0xad, 0x8b, 0xbb, 0x96, 0xc4, 0xcd, 0xc0,
+		      0x3b, 0xc1, 0x03, 0xe1, 0xa1, 0x94, 0xbb, 0xd8
+);
+
+DEFINE_HEX_XDR_NETOBJ(rfc3962_enc_test6_plaintext,
+		      0x49, 0x20, 0x77, 0x6f, 0x75, 0x6c, 0x64, 0x20,
+		      0x6c, 0x69, 0x6b, 0x65, 0x20, 0x74, 0x68, 0x65,
+		      0x20, 0x47, 0x65, 0x6e, 0x65, 0x72, 0x61, 0x6c,
+		      0x20, 0x47, 0x61, 0x75, 0x27, 0x73, 0x20, 0x43,
+		      0x68, 0x69, 0x63, 0x6b, 0x65, 0x6e, 0x2c, 0x20,
+		      0x70, 0x6c, 0x65, 0x61, 0x73, 0x65, 0x2c, 0x20,
+		      0x61, 0x6e, 0x64, 0x20, 0x77, 0x6f, 0x6e, 0x74,
+		      0x6f, 0x6e, 0x20, 0x73, 0x6f, 0x75, 0x70, 0x2e
+);
+DEFINE_HEX_XDR_NETOBJ(rfc3962_enc_test6_expected_result,
+		      0x97, 0x68, 0x72, 0x68, 0xd6, 0xec, 0xcc, 0xc0,
+		      0xc0, 0x7b, 0x25, 0xe2, 0x5e, 0xcf, 0xe5, 0x84,
+		      0x39, 0x31, 0x25, 0x23, 0xa7, 0x86, 0x62, 0xd5,
+		      0xbe, 0x7f, 0xcb, 0xcc, 0x98, 0xeb, 0xf5, 0xa8,
+		      0x48, 0x07, 0xef, 0xe8, 0x36, 0xee, 0x89, 0xa5,
+		      0x26, 0x73, 0x0d, 0xbc, 0x2f, 0x7b, 0xc8, 0x40,
+		      0x9d, 0xad, 0x8b, 0xbb, 0x96, 0xc4, 0xcd, 0xc0,
+		      0x3b, 0xc1, 0x03, 0xe1, 0xa1, 0x94, 0xbb, 0xd8
+);
+DEFINE_HEX_XDR_NETOBJ(rfc3962_enc_test6_next_iv,
+		      0x48, 0x07, 0xef, 0xe8, 0x36, 0xee, 0x89, 0xa5,
+		      0x26, 0x73, 0x0d, 0xbc, 0x2f, 0x7b, 0xc8, 0x40
+);
+
+static const struct gss_krb5_test_param rfc3962_encrypt_test_params[] = {
+	{
+		.desc			= "Encrypt with aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96 case 1",
+		.enctype		= ENCTYPE_AES128_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96,
+		.Ke			= &rfc3962_encryption_key,
+		.plaintext		= &rfc3962_enc_test1_plaintext,
+		.expected_result	= &rfc3962_enc_test1_expected_result,
+		.next_iv		= &rfc3962_enc_test1_next_iv,
+	},
+	{
+		.desc			= "Encrypt with aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96 case 2",
+		.enctype		= ENCTYPE_AES128_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96,
+		.Ke			= &rfc3962_encryption_key,
+		.plaintext		= &rfc3962_enc_test2_plaintext,
+		.expected_result	= &rfc3962_enc_test2_expected_result,
+		.next_iv		= &rfc3962_enc_test2_next_iv,
+	},
+	{
+		.desc			= "Encrypt with aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96 case 3",
+		.enctype		= ENCTYPE_AES128_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96,
+		.Ke			= &rfc3962_encryption_key,
+		.plaintext		= &rfc3962_enc_test3_plaintext,
+		.expected_result	= &rfc3962_enc_test3_expected_result,
+		.next_iv		= &rfc3962_enc_test3_next_iv,
+	},
+	{
+		.desc			= "Encrypt with aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96 case 4",
+		.enctype		= ENCTYPE_AES128_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96,
+		.Ke			= &rfc3962_encryption_key,
+		.plaintext		= &rfc3962_enc_test4_plaintext,
+		.expected_result	= &rfc3962_enc_test4_expected_result,
+		.next_iv		= &rfc3962_enc_test4_next_iv,
+	},
+	{
+		.desc			= "Encrypt with aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96 case 5",
+		.enctype		= ENCTYPE_AES128_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96,
+		.Ke			= &rfc3962_encryption_key,
+		.plaintext		= &rfc3962_enc_test5_plaintext,
+		.expected_result	= &rfc3962_enc_test5_expected_result,
+		.next_iv		= &rfc3962_enc_test5_next_iv,
+	},
+	{
+		.desc			= "Encrypt with aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96 case 6",
+		.enctype		= ENCTYPE_AES128_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96,
+		.Ke			= &rfc3962_encryption_key,
+		.plaintext		= &rfc3962_enc_test6_plaintext,
+		.expected_result	= &rfc3962_enc_test6_expected_result,
+		.next_iv		= &rfc3962_enc_test6_next_iv,
+	},
+};
+
+/* Creates the function rfc3962_encrypt_gen_params */
+KUNIT_ARRAY_PARAM(rfc3962_encrypt, rfc3962_encrypt_test_params,
+		  gss_krb5_get_desc);
+
+/*
+ * This tests the implementation of the encryption part of the mechanism.
+ * It does not apply a confounder or test the result of HMAC over the
+ * plaintext.
+ */
+static void rfc3962_encrypt_case(struct kunit *test)
+{
+	const struct gss_krb5_test_param *param = test->param_value;
+	struct crypto_sync_skcipher *cts_tfm, *cbc_tfm;
+	const struct gss_krb5_enctype *gk5e;
+	struct xdr_buf buf;
+	void *iv, *text;
+	u32 err;
+
+	/* Arrange */
+	gk5e = gss_krb5_lookup_enctype(param->enctype);
+	if (!gk5e)
+		kunit_skip(test, "Encryption type is not available");
+
+	cbc_tfm = crypto_alloc_sync_skcipher(gk5e->aux_cipher, 0, 0);
+	KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_ERR_OR_NULL(test, cbc_tfm);
+	err = crypto_sync_skcipher_setkey(cbc_tfm, param->Ke->data, param->Ke->len);
+	KUNIT_ASSERT_EQ(test, err, 0);
+
+	cts_tfm = crypto_alloc_sync_skcipher(gk5e->encrypt_name, 0, 0);
+	KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_ERR_OR_NULL(test, cts_tfm);
+	err = crypto_sync_skcipher_setkey(cts_tfm, param->Ke->data, param->Ke->len);
+	KUNIT_ASSERT_EQ(test, err, 0);
+
+	iv = kunit_kzalloc(test, crypto_sync_skcipher_ivsize(cts_tfm), GFP_KERNEL);
+	KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_ERR_OR_NULL(test, iv);
+
+	text = kunit_kzalloc(test, param->plaintext->len, GFP_KERNEL);
+	KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_ERR_OR_NULL(test, text);
+
+	memcpy(text, param->plaintext->data, param->plaintext->len);
+	memset(&buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
+	buf.head[0].iov_base = text;
+	buf.head[0].iov_len = param->plaintext->len;
+	buf.len = buf.head[0].iov_len;
+
+	/* Act */
+	err = krb5_cbc_cts_encrypt(cts_tfm, cbc_tfm, 0, &buf, NULL,
+				   iv, crypto_sync_skcipher_ivsize(cts_tfm));
+	KUNIT_ASSERT_EQ(test, err, 0);
+
+	/* Assert */
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ_MSG(test,
+			    param->expected_result->len, buf.len,
+			    "ciphertext length mismatch");
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ_MSG(test,
+			    memcmp(param->expected_result->data,
+				   text, param->expected_result->len), 0,
+			    "ciphertext mismatch");
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ_MSG(test,
+			    memcmp(param->next_iv->data, iv,
+				   param->next_iv->len), 0,
+			    "IV mismatch");
+
+	crypto_free_sync_skcipher(cts_tfm);
+	crypto_free_sync_skcipher(cbc_tfm);
+}
+
+static struct kunit_case rfc3962_test_cases[] = {
+	{
+		.name			= "RFC 3962 encryption",
+		.run_case		= rfc3962_encrypt_case,
+		.generate_params	= rfc3962_encrypt_gen_params,
+	},
+	{}
+};
+
+static struct kunit_suite rfc3962_suite = {
+	.name			= "RFC 3962 suite",
+	.test_cases		= rfc3962_test_cases,
+};
+
+/*
+ * From RFC 6803 Section 10.  Test vectors
+ *
+ * Sample results for key derivation
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 2012 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
+ * document authors.  All rights reserved.
+ */
+
+DEFINE_HEX_XDR_NETOBJ(camellia128_cts_cmac_basekey,
+		      0x57, 0xd0, 0x29, 0x72, 0x98, 0xff, 0xd9, 0xd3,
+		      0x5d, 0xe5, 0xa4, 0x7f, 0xb4, 0xbd, 0xe2, 0x4b
+);
+DEFINE_HEX_XDR_NETOBJ(camellia128_cts_cmac_Kc,
+		      0xd1, 0x55, 0x77, 0x5a, 0x20, 0x9d, 0x05, 0xf0,
+		      0x2b, 0x38, 0xd4, 0x2a, 0x38, 0x9e, 0x5a, 0x56
+);
+DEFINE_HEX_XDR_NETOBJ(camellia128_cts_cmac_Ke,
+		      0x64, 0xdf, 0x83, 0xf8, 0x5a, 0x53, 0x2f, 0x17,
+		      0x57, 0x7d, 0x8c, 0x37, 0x03, 0x57, 0x96, 0xab
+);
+DEFINE_HEX_XDR_NETOBJ(camellia128_cts_cmac_Ki,
+		      0x3e, 0x4f, 0xbd, 0xf3, 0x0f, 0xb8, 0x25, 0x9c,
+		      0x42, 0x5c, 0xb6, 0xc9, 0x6f, 0x1f, 0x46, 0x35
+);
+
+DEFINE_HEX_XDR_NETOBJ(camellia256_cts_cmac_basekey,
+		      0xb9, 0xd6, 0x82, 0x8b, 0x20, 0x56, 0xb7, 0xbe,
+		      0x65, 0x6d, 0x88, 0xa1, 0x23, 0xb1, 0xfa, 0xc6,
+		      0x82, 0x14, 0xac, 0x2b, 0x72, 0x7e, 0xcf, 0x5f,
+		      0x69, 0xaf, 0xe0, 0xc4, 0xdf, 0x2a, 0x6d, 0x2c
+);
+DEFINE_HEX_XDR_NETOBJ(camellia256_cts_cmac_Kc,
+		      0xe4, 0x67, 0xf9, 0xa9, 0x55, 0x2b, 0xc7, 0xd3,
+		      0x15, 0x5a, 0x62, 0x20, 0xaf, 0x9c, 0x19, 0x22,
+		      0x0e, 0xee, 0xd4, 0xff, 0x78, 0xb0, 0xd1, 0xe6,
+		      0xa1, 0x54, 0x49, 0x91, 0x46, 0x1a, 0x9e, 0x50
+);
+DEFINE_HEX_XDR_NETOBJ(camellia256_cts_cmac_Ke,
+		      0x41, 0x2a, 0xef, 0xc3, 0x62, 0xa7, 0x28, 0x5f,
+		      0xc3, 0x96, 0x6c, 0x6a, 0x51, 0x81, 0xe7, 0x60,
+		      0x5a, 0xe6, 0x75, 0x23, 0x5b, 0x6d, 0x54, 0x9f,
+		      0xbf, 0xc9, 0xab, 0x66, 0x30, 0xa4, 0xc6, 0x04
+);
+DEFINE_HEX_XDR_NETOBJ(camellia256_cts_cmac_Ki,
+		      0xfa, 0x62, 0x4f, 0xa0, 0xe5, 0x23, 0x99, 0x3f,
+		      0xa3, 0x88, 0xae, 0xfd, 0xc6, 0x7e, 0x67, 0xeb,
+		      0xcd, 0x8c, 0x08, 0xe8, 0xa0, 0x24, 0x6b, 0x1d,
+		      0x73, 0xb0, 0xd1, 0xdd, 0x9f, 0xc5, 0x82, 0xb0
+);
+
+DEFINE_HEX_XDR_NETOBJ(usage_checksum,
+		      0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x02, KEY_USAGE_SEED_CHECKSUM
+);
+DEFINE_HEX_XDR_NETOBJ(usage_encryption,
+		      0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x02, KEY_USAGE_SEED_ENCRYPTION
+);
+DEFINE_HEX_XDR_NETOBJ(usage_integrity,
+		      0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x02, KEY_USAGE_SEED_INTEGRITY
+);
+
+static const struct gss_krb5_test_param rfc6803_kdf_test_params[] = {
+	{
+		.desc			= "Derive Kc subkey for camellia128-cts-cmac",
+		.enctype		= ENCTYPE_CAMELLIA128_CTS_CMAC,
+		.base_key		= &camellia128_cts_cmac_basekey,
+		.usage			= &usage_checksum,
+		.expected_result	= &camellia128_cts_cmac_Kc,
+	},
+	{
+		.desc			= "Derive Ke subkey for camellia128-cts-cmac",
+		.enctype		= ENCTYPE_CAMELLIA128_CTS_CMAC,
+		.base_key		= &camellia128_cts_cmac_basekey,
+		.usage			= &usage_encryption,
+		.expected_result	= &camellia128_cts_cmac_Ke,
+	},
+	{
+		.desc			= "Derive Ki subkey for camellia128-cts-cmac",
+		.enctype		= ENCTYPE_CAMELLIA128_CTS_CMAC,
+		.base_key		= &camellia128_cts_cmac_basekey,
+		.usage			= &usage_integrity,
+		.expected_result	= &camellia128_cts_cmac_Ki,
+	},
+	{
+		.desc			= "Derive Kc subkey for camellia256-cts-cmac",
+		.enctype		= ENCTYPE_CAMELLIA256_CTS_CMAC,
+		.base_key		= &camellia256_cts_cmac_basekey,
+		.usage			= &usage_checksum,
+		.expected_result	= &camellia256_cts_cmac_Kc,
+	},
+	{
+		.desc			= "Derive Ke subkey for camellia256-cts-cmac",
+		.enctype		= ENCTYPE_CAMELLIA256_CTS_CMAC,
+		.base_key		= &camellia256_cts_cmac_basekey,
+		.usage			= &usage_encryption,
+		.expected_result	= &camellia256_cts_cmac_Ke,
+	},
+	{
+		.desc			= "Derive Ki subkey for camellia256-cts-cmac",
+		.enctype		= ENCTYPE_CAMELLIA256_CTS_CMAC,
+		.base_key		= &camellia256_cts_cmac_basekey,
+		.usage			= &usage_integrity,
+		.expected_result	= &camellia256_cts_cmac_Ki,
+	},
+};
+
+/* Creates the function rfc6803_kdf_gen_params */
+KUNIT_ARRAY_PARAM(rfc6803_kdf, rfc6803_kdf_test_params, gss_krb5_get_desc);
+
+/*
+ * From RFC 6803 Section 10.  Test vectors
+ *
+ * Sample checksums.
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 2012 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
+ * document authors.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * XXX: These tests are likely to fail on EBCDIC or Unicode platforms.
+ */
+DEFINE_STR_XDR_NETOBJ(rfc6803_checksum_test1_plaintext,
+		      "abcdefghijk");
+DEFINE_HEX_XDR_NETOBJ(rfc6803_checksum_test1_basekey,
+		      0x1d, 0xc4, 0x6a, 0x8d, 0x76, 0x3f, 0x4f, 0x93,
+		      0x74, 0x2b, 0xcb, 0xa3, 0x38, 0x75, 0x76, 0xc3
+);
+DEFINE_HEX_XDR_NETOBJ(rfc6803_checksum_test1_usage,
+		      0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x07, KEY_USAGE_SEED_CHECKSUM
+);
+DEFINE_HEX_XDR_NETOBJ(rfc6803_checksum_test1_expected_result,
+		      0x11, 0x78, 0xe6, 0xc5, 0xc4, 0x7a, 0x8c, 0x1a,
+		      0xe0, 0xc4, 0xb9, 0xc7, 0xd4, 0xeb, 0x7b, 0x6b
+);
+
+DEFINE_STR_XDR_NETOBJ(rfc6803_checksum_test2_plaintext,
+		      "ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ");
+DEFINE_HEX_XDR_NETOBJ(rfc6803_checksum_test2_basekey,
+		      0x50, 0x27, 0xbc, 0x23, 0x1d, 0x0f, 0x3a, 0x9d,
+		      0x23, 0x33, 0x3f, 0x1c, 0xa6, 0xfd, 0xbe, 0x7c
+);
+DEFINE_HEX_XDR_NETOBJ(rfc6803_checksum_test2_usage,
+		      0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x08, KEY_USAGE_SEED_CHECKSUM
+);
+DEFINE_HEX_XDR_NETOBJ(rfc6803_checksum_test2_expected_result,
+		      0xd1, 0xb3, 0x4f, 0x70, 0x04, 0xa7, 0x31, 0xf2,
+		      0x3a, 0x0c, 0x00, 0xbf, 0x6c, 0x3f, 0x75, 0x3a
+);
+
+DEFINE_STR_XDR_NETOBJ(rfc6803_checksum_test3_plaintext,
+		      "123456789");
+DEFINE_HEX_XDR_NETOBJ(rfc6803_checksum_test3_basekey,
+		      0xb6, 0x1c, 0x86, 0xcc, 0x4e, 0x5d, 0x27, 0x57,
+		      0x54, 0x5a, 0xd4, 0x23, 0x39, 0x9f, 0xb7, 0x03,
+		      0x1e, 0xca, 0xb9, 0x13, 0xcb, 0xb9, 0x00, 0xbd,
+		      0x7a, 0x3c, 0x6d, 0xd8, 0xbf, 0x92, 0x01, 0x5b
+);
+DEFINE_HEX_XDR_NETOBJ(rfc6803_checksum_test3_usage,
+		      0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x09, KEY_USAGE_SEED_CHECKSUM
+);
+DEFINE_HEX_XDR_NETOBJ(rfc6803_checksum_test3_expected_result,
+		      0x87, 0xa1, 0x2c, 0xfd, 0x2b, 0x96, 0x21, 0x48,
+		      0x10, 0xf0, 0x1c, 0x82, 0x6e, 0x77, 0x44, 0xb1
+);
+
+DEFINE_STR_XDR_NETOBJ(rfc6803_checksum_test4_plaintext,
+		      "!@#$%^&*()!@#$%^&*()!@#$%^&*()");
+DEFINE_HEX_XDR_NETOBJ(rfc6803_checksum_test4_basekey,
+		      0x32, 0x16, 0x4c, 0x5b, 0x43, 0x4d, 0x1d, 0x15,
+		      0x38, 0xe4, 0xcf, 0xd9, 0xbe, 0x80, 0x40, 0xfe,
+		      0x8c, 0x4a, 0xc7, 0xac, 0xc4, 0xb9, 0x3d, 0x33,
+		      0x14, 0xd2, 0x13, 0x36, 0x68, 0x14, 0x7a, 0x05
+);
+DEFINE_HEX_XDR_NETOBJ(rfc6803_checksum_test4_usage,
+		      0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x0a, KEY_USAGE_SEED_CHECKSUM
+);
+DEFINE_HEX_XDR_NETOBJ(rfc6803_checksum_test4_expected_result,
+		      0x3f, 0xa0, 0xb4, 0x23, 0x55, 0xe5, 0x2b, 0x18,
+		      0x91, 0x87, 0x29, 0x4a, 0xa2, 0x52, 0xab, 0x64
+);
+
+static const struct gss_krb5_test_param rfc6803_checksum_test_params[] = {
+	{
+		.desc			= "camellia128-cts-cmac checksum test 1",
+		.enctype		= ENCTYPE_CAMELLIA128_CTS_CMAC,
+		.base_key		= &rfc6803_checksum_test1_basekey,
+		.usage			= &rfc6803_checksum_test1_usage,
+		.plaintext		= &rfc6803_checksum_test1_plaintext,
+		.expected_result	= &rfc6803_checksum_test1_expected_result,
+	},
+	{
+		.desc			= "camellia128-cts-cmac checksum test 2",
+		.enctype		= ENCTYPE_CAMELLIA128_CTS_CMAC,
+		.base_key		= &rfc6803_checksum_test2_basekey,
+		.usage			= &rfc6803_checksum_test2_usage,
+		.plaintext		= &rfc6803_checksum_test2_plaintext,
+		.expected_result	= &rfc6803_checksum_test2_expected_result,
+	},
+	{
+		.desc			= "camellia256-cts-cmac checksum test 3",
+		.enctype		= ENCTYPE_CAMELLIA256_CTS_CMAC,
+		.base_key		= &rfc6803_checksum_test3_basekey,
+		.usage			= &rfc6803_checksum_test3_usage,
+		.plaintext		= &rfc6803_checksum_test3_plaintext,
+		.expected_result	= &rfc6803_checksum_test3_expected_result,
+	},
+	{
+		.desc			= "camellia256-cts-cmac checksum test 4",
+		.enctype		= ENCTYPE_CAMELLIA256_CTS_CMAC,
+		.base_key		= &rfc6803_checksum_test4_basekey,
+		.usage			= &rfc6803_checksum_test4_usage,
+		.plaintext		= &rfc6803_checksum_test4_plaintext,
+		.expected_result	= &rfc6803_checksum_test4_expected_result,
+	},
+};
+
+/* Creates the function rfc6803_checksum_gen_params */
+KUNIT_ARRAY_PARAM(rfc6803_checksum, rfc6803_checksum_test_params,
+		  gss_krb5_get_desc);
+
+/*
+ * From RFC 6803 Section 10.  Test vectors
+ *
+ * Sample encryptions (all using the default cipher state)
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 2012 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
+ * document authors.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Key usage values are from errata 4326 against RFC 6803.
+ */
+
+static const struct xdr_netobj rfc6803_enc_empty_plaintext = {
+	.len	= 0,
+};
+
+DEFINE_STR_XDR_NETOBJ(rfc6803_enc_1byte_plaintext, "1");
+DEFINE_STR_XDR_NETOBJ(rfc6803_enc_9byte_plaintext, "9 bytesss");
+DEFINE_STR_XDR_NETOBJ(rfc6803_enc_13byte_plaintext, "13 bytes byte");
+DEFINE_STR_XDR_NETOBJ(rfc6803_enc_30byte_plaintext,
+		      "30 bytes bytes bytes bytes byt"
+);
+
+DEFINE_HEX_XDR_NETOBJ(rfc6803_enc_test1_confounder,
+		      0xb6, 0x98, 0x22, 0xa1, 0x9a, 0x6b, 0x09, 0xc0,
+		      0xeb, 0xc8, 0x55, 0x7d, 0x1f, 0x1b, 0x6c, 0x0a
+);
+DEFINE_HEX_XDR_NETOBJ(rfc6803_enc_test1_basekey,
+		      0x1d, 0xc4, 0x6a, 0x8d, 0x76, 0x3f, 0x4f, 0x93,
+		      0x74, 0x2b, 0xcb, 0xa3, 0x38, 0x75, 0x76, 0xc3
+);
+DEFINE_HEX_XDR_NETOBJ(rfc6803_enc_test1_expected_result,
+		      0xc4, 0x66, 0xf1, 0x87, 0x10, 0x69, 0x92, 0x1e,
+		      0xdb, 0x7c, 0x6f, 0xde, 0x24, 0x4a, 0x52, 0xdb,
+		      0x0b, 0xa1, 0x0e, 0xdc, 0x19, 0x7b, 0xdb, 0x80,
+		      0x06, 0x65, 0x8c, 0xa3, 0xcc, 0xce, 0x6e, 0xb8
+);
+
+DEFINE_HEX_XDR_NETOBJ(rfc6803_enc_test2_confounder,
+		      0x6f, 0x2f, 0xc3, 0xc2, 0xa1, 0x66, 0xfd, 0x88,
+		      0x98, 0x96, 0x7a, 0x83, 0xde, 0x95, 0x96, 0xd9
+);
+DEFINE_HEX_XDR_NETOBJ(rfc6803_enc_test2_basekey,
+		      0x50, 0x27, 0xbc, 0x23, 0x1d, 0x0f, 0x3a, 0x9d,
+		      0x23, 0x33, 0x3f, 0x1c, 0xa6, 0xfd, 0xbe, 0x7c
+);
+DEFINE_HEX_XDR_NETOBJ(rfc6803_enc_test2_expected_result,
+		      0x84, 0x2d, 0x21, 0xfd, 0x95, 0x03, 0x11, 0xc0,
+		      0xdd, 0x46, 0x4a, 0x3f, 0x4b, 0xe8, 0xd6, 0xda,
+		      0x88, 0xa5, 0x6d, 0x55, 0x9c, 0x9b, 0x47, 0xd3,
+		      0xf9, 0xa8, 0x50, 0x67, 0xaf, 0x66, 0x15, 0x59,
+		      0xb8
+);
+
+DEFINE_HEX_XDR_NETOBJ(rfc6803_enc_test3_confounder,
+		      0xa5, 0xb4, 0xa7, 0x1e, 0x07, 0x7a, 0xee, 0xf9,
+		      0x3c, 0x87, 0x63, 0xc1, 0x8f, 0xdb, 0x1f, 0x10
+);
+DEFINE_HEX_XDR_NETOBJ(rfc6803_enc_test3_basekey,
+		      0xa1, 0xbb, 0x61, 0xe8, 0x05, 0xf9, 0xba, 0x6d,
+		      0xde, 0x8f, 0xdb, 0xdd, 0xc0, 0x5c, 0xde, 0xa0
+);
+DEFINE_HEX_XDR_NETOBJ(rfc6803_enc_test3_expected_result,
+		      0x61, 0x9f, 0xf0, 0x72, 0xe3, 0x62, 0x86, 0xff,
+		      0x0a, 0x28, 0xde, 0xb3, 0xa3, 0x52, 0xec, 0x0d,
+		      0x0e, 0xdf, 0x5c, 0x51, 0x60, 0xd6, 0x63, 0xc9,
+		      0x01, 0x75, 0x8c, 0xcf, 0x9d, 0x1e, 0xd3, 0x3d,
+		      0x71, 0xdb, 0x8f, 0x23, 0xaa, 0xbf, 0x83, 0x48,
+		      0xa0
+);
+
+DEFINE_HEX_XDR_NETOBJ(rfc6803_enc_test4_confounder,
+		      0x19, 0xfe, 0xe4, 0x0d, 0x81, 0x0c, 0x52, 0x4b,
+		      0x5b, 0x22, 0xf0, 0x18, 0x74, 0xc6, 0x93, 0xda
+);
+DEFINE_HEX_XDR_NETOBJ(rfc6803_enc_test4_basekey,
+		      0x2c, 0xa2, 0x7a, 0x5f, 0xaf, 0x55, 0x32, 0x24,
+		      0x45, 0x06, 0x43, 0x4e, 0x1c, 0xef, 0x66, 0x76
+);
+DEFINE_HEX_XDR_NETOBJ(rfc6803_enc_test4_expected_result,
+		      0xb8, 0xec, 0xa3, 0x16, 0x7a, 0xe6, 0x31, 0x55,
+		      0x12, 0xe5, 0x9f, 0x98, 0xa7, 0xc5, 0x00, 0x20,
+		      0x5e, 0x5f, 0x63, 0xff, 0x3b, 0xb3, 0x89, 0xaf,
+		      0x1c, 0x41, 0xa2, 0x1d, 0x64, 0x0d, 0x86, 0x15,
+		      0xc9, 0xed, 0x3f, 0xbe, 0xb0, 0x5a, 0xb6, 0xac,
+		      0xb6, 0x76, 0x89, 0xb5, 0xea
+);
+
+DEFINE_HEX_XDR_NETOBJ(rfc6803_enc_test5_confounder,
+		      0xca, 0x7a, 0x7a, 0xb4, 0xbe, 0x19, 0x2d, 0xab,
+		      0xd6, 0x03, 0x50, 0x6d, 0xb1, 0x9c, 0x39, 0xe2
+);
+DEFINE_HEX_XDR_NETOBJ(rfc6803_enc_test5_basekey,
+		      0x78, 0x24, 0xf8, 0xc1, 0x6f, 0x83, 0xff, 0x35,
+		      0x4c, 0x6b, 0xf7, 0x51, 0x5b, 0x97, 0x3f, 0x43
+);
+DEFINE_HEX_XDR_NETOBJ(rfc6803_enc_test5_expected_result,
+		      0xa2, 0x6a, 0x39, 0x05, 0xa4, 0xff, 0xd5, 0x81,
+		      0x6b, 0x7b, 0x1e, 0x27, 0x38, 0x0d, 0x08, 0x09,
+		      0x0c, 0x8e, 0xc1, 0xf3, 0x04, 0x49, 0x6e, 0x1a,
+		      0xbd, 0xcd, 0x2b, 0xdc, 0xd1, 0xdf, 0xfc, 0x66,
+		      0x09, 0x89, 0xe1, 0x17, 0xa7, 0x13, 0xdd, 0xbb,
+		      0x57, 0xa4, 0x14, 0x6c, 0x15, 0x87, 0xcb, 0xa4,
+		      0x35, 0x66, 0x65, 0x59, 0x1d, 0x22, 0x40, 0x28,
+		      0x2f, 0x58, 0x42, 0xb1, 0x05, 0xa5
+);
+
+DEFINE_HEX_XDR_NETOBJ(rfc6803_enc_test6_confounder,
+		      0x3c, 0xbb, 0xd2, 0xb4, 0x59, 0x17, 0x94, 0x10,
+		      0x67, 0xf9, 0x65, 0x99, 0xbb, 0x98, 0x92, 0x6c
+);
+DEFINE_HEX_XDR_NETOBJ(rfc6803_enc_test6_basekey,
+		      0xb6, 0x1c, 0x86, 0xcc, 0x4e, 0x5d, 0x27, 0x57,
+		      0x54, 0x5a, 0xd4, 0x23, 0x39, 0x9f, 0xb7, 0x03,
+		      0x1e, 0xca, 0xb9, 0x13, 0xcb, 0xb9, 0x00, 0xbd,
+		      0x7a, 0x3c, 0x6d, 0xd8, 0xbf, 0x92, 0x01, 0x5b
+);
+DEFINE_HEX_XDR_NETOBJ(rfc6803_enc_test6_expected_result,
+		      0x03, 0x88, 0x6d, 0x03, 0x31, 0x0b, 0x47, 0xa6,
+		      0xd8, 0xf0, 0x6d, 0x7b, 0x94, 0xd1, 0xdd, 0x83,
+		      0x7e, 0xcc, 0xe3, 0x15, 0xef, 0x65, 0x2a, 0xff,
+		      0x62, 0x08, 0x59, 0xd9, 0x4a, 0x25, 0x92, 0x66
+);
+
+DEFINE_HEX_XDR_NETOBJ(rfc6803_enc_test7_confounder,
+		      0xde, 0xf4, 0x87, 0xfc, 0xeb, 0xe6, 0xde, 0x63,
+		      0x46, 0xd4, 0xda, 0x45, 0x21, 0xbb, 0xa2, 0xd2
+);
+DEFINE_HEX_XDR_NETOBJ(rfc6803_enc_test7_basekey,
+		      0x1b, 0x97, 0xfe, 0x0a, 0x19, 0x0e, 0x20, 0x21,
+		      0xeb, 0x30, 0x75, 0x3e, 0x1b, 0x6e, 0x1e, 0x77,
+		      0xb0, 0x75, 0x4b, 0x1d, 0x68, 0x46, 0x10, 0x35,
+		      0x58, 0x64, 0x10, 0x49, 0x63, 0x46, 0x38, 0x33
+);
+DEFINE_HEX_XDR_NETOBJ(rfc6803_enc_test7_expected_result,
+		      0x2c, 0x9c, 0x15, 0x70, 0x13, 0x3c, 0x99, 0xbf,
+		      0x6a, 0x34, 0xbc, 0x1b, 0x02, 0x12, 0x00, 0x2f,
+		      0xd1, 0x94, 0x33, 0x87, 0x49, 0xdb, 0x41, 0x35,
+		      0x49, 0x7a, 0x34, 0x7c, 0xfc, 0xd9, 0xd1, 0x8a,
+		      0x12
+);
+
+DEFINE_HEX_XDR_NETOBJ(rfc6803_enc_test8_confounder,
+		      0xad, 0x4f, 0xf9, 0x04, 0xd3, 0x4e, 0x55, 0x53,
+		      0x84, 0xb1, 0x41, 0x00, 0xfc, 0x46, 0x5f, 0x88
+);
+DEFINE_HEX_XDR_NETOBJ(rfc6803_enc_test8_basekey,
+		      0x32, 0x16, 0x4c, 0x5b, 0x43, 0x4d, 0x1d, 0x15,
+		      0x38, 0xe4, 0xcf, 0xd9, 0xbe, 0x80, 0x40, 0xfe,
+		      0x8c, 0x4a, 0xc7, 0xac, 0xc4, 0xb9, 0x3d, 0x33,
+		      0x14, 0xd2, 0x13, 0x36, 0x68, 0x14, 0x7a, 0x05
+);
+DEFINE_HEX_XDR_NETOBJ(rfc6803_enc_test8_expected_result,
+		      0x9c, 0x6d, 0xe7, 0x5f, 0x81, 0x2d, 0xe7, 0xed,
+		      0x0d, 0x28, 0xb2, 0x96, 0x35, 0x57, 0xa1, 0x15,
+		      0x64, 0x09, 0x98, 0x27, 0x5b, 0x0a, 0xf5, 0x15,
+		      0x27, 0x09, 0x91, 0x3f, 0xf5, 0x2a, 0x2a, 0x9c,
+		      0x8e, 0x63, 0xb8, 0x72, 0xf9, 0x2e, 0x64, 0xc8,
+		      0x39
+);
+
+DEFINE_HEX_XDR_NETOBJ(rfc6803_enc_test9_confounder,
+		      0xcf, 0x9b, 0xca, 0x6d, 0xf1, 0x14, 0x4e, 0x0c,
+		      0x0a, 0xf9, 0xb8, 0xf3, 0x4c, 0x90, 0xd5, 0x14
+);
+DEFINE_HEX_XDR_NETOBJ(rfc6803_enc_test9_basekey,
+		      0xb0, 0x38, 0xb1, 0x32, 0xcd, 0x8e, 0x06, 0x61,
+		      0x22, 0x67, 0xfa, 0xb7, 0x17, 0x00, 0x66, 0xd8,
+		      0x8a, 0xec, 0xcb, 0xa0, 0xb7, 0x44, 0xbf, 0xc6,
+		      0x0d, 0xc8, 0x9b, 0xca, 0x18, 0x2d, 0x07, 0x15
+);
+DEFINE_HEX_XDR_NETOBJ(rfc6803_enc_test9_expected_result,
+		      0xee, 0xec, 0x85, 0xa9, 0x81, 0x3c, 0xdc, 0x53,
+		      0x67, 0x72, 0xab, 0x9b, 0x42, 0xde, 0xfc, 0x57,
+		      0x06, 0xf7, 0x26, 0xe9, 0x75, 0xdd, 0xe0, 0x5a,
+		      0x87, 0xeb, 0x54, 0x06, 0xea, 0x32, 0x4c, 0xa1,
+		      0x85, 0xc9, 0x98, 0x6b, 0x42, 0xaa, 0xbe, 0x79,
+		      0x4b, 0x84, 0x82, 0x1b, 0xee
+);
+
+DEFINE_HEX_XDR_NETOBJ(rfc6803_enc_test10_confounder,
+		      0x64, 0x4d, 0xef, 0x38, 0xda, 0x35, 0x00, 0x72,
+		      0x75, 0x87, 0x8d, 0x21, 0x68, 0x55, 0xe2, 0x28
+);
+DEFINE_HEX_XDR_NETOBJ(rfc6803_enc_test10_basekey,
+		      0xcc, 0xfc, 0xd3, 0x49, 0xbf, 0x4c, 0x66, 0x77,
+		      0xe8, 0x6e, 0x4b, 0x02, 0xb8, 0xea, 0xb9, 0x24,
+		      0xa5, 0x46, 0xac, 0x73, 0x1c, 0xf9, 0xbf, 0x69,
+		      0x89, 0xb9, 0x96, 0xe7, 0xd6, 0xbf, 0xbb, 0xa7
+);
+DEFINE_HEX_XDR_NETOBJ(rfc6803_enc_test10_expected_result,
+		      0x0e, 0x44, 0x68, 0x09, 0x85, 0x85, 0x5f, 0x2d,
+		      0x1f, 0x18, 0x12, 0x52, 0x9c, 0xa8, 0x3b, 0xfd,
+		      0x8e, 0x34, 0x9d, 0xe6, 0xfd, 0x9a, 0xda, 0x0b,
+		      0xaa, 0xa0, 0x48, 0xd6, 0x8e, 0x26, 0x5f, 0xeb,
+		      0xf3, 0x4a, 0xd1, 0x25, 0x5a, 0x34, 0x49, 0x99,
+		      0xad, 0x37, 0x14, 0x68, 0x87, 0xa6, 0xc6, 0x84,
+		      0x57, 0x31, 0xac, 0x7f, 0x46, 0x37, 0x6a, 0x05,
+		      0x04, 0xcd, 0x06, 0x57, 0x14, 0x74
+);
+
+static const struct gss_krb5_test_param rfc6803_encrypt_test_params[] = {
+	{
+		.desc			= "Encrypt empty plaintext with camellia128-cts-cmac",
+		.enctype		= ENCTYPE_CAMELLIA128_CTS_CMAC,
+		.constant		= 0,
+		.base_key		= &rfc6803_enc_test1_basekey,
+		.plaintext		= &rfc6803_enc_empty_plaintext,
+		.confounder		= &rfc6803_enc_test1_confounder,
+		.expected_result	= &rfc6803_enc_test1_expected_result,
+	},
+	{
+		.desc			= "Encrypt 1 byte with camellia128-cts-cmac",
+		.enctype		= ENCTYPE_CAMELLIA128_CTS_CMAC,
+		.constant		= 1,
+		.base_key		= &rfc6803_enc_test2_basekey,
+		.plaintext		= &rfc6803_enc_1byte_plaintext,
+		.confounder		= &rfc6803_enc_test2_confounder,
+		.expected_result	= &rfc6803_enc_test2_expected_result,
+	},
+	{
+		.desc			= "Encrypt 9 bytes with camellia128-cts-cmac",
+		.enctype		= ENCTYPE_CAMELLIA128_CTS_CMAC,
+		.constant		= 2,
+		.base_key		= &rfc6803_enc_test3_basekey,
+		.plaintext		= &rfc6803_enc_9byte_plaintext,
+		.confounder		= &rfc6803_enc_test3_confounder,
+		.expected_result	= &rfc6803_enc_test3_expected_result,
+	},
+	{
+		.desc			= "Encrypt 13 bytes with camellia128-cts-cmac",
+		.enctype		= ENCTYPE_CAMELLIA128_CTS_CMAC,
+		.constant		= 3,
+		.base_key		= &rfc6803_enc_test4_basekey,
+		.plaintext		= &rfc6803_enc_13byte_plaintext,
+		.confounder		= &rfc6803_enc_test4_confounder,
+		.expected_result	= &rfc6803_enc_test4_expected_result,
+	},
+	{
+		.desc			= "Encrypt 30 bytes with camellia128-cts-cmac",
+		.enctype		= ENCTYPE_CAMELLIA128_CTS_CMAC,
+		.constant		= 4,
+		.base_key		= &rfc6803_enc_test5_basekey,
+		.plaintext		= &rfc6803_enc_30byte_plaintext,
+		.confounder		= &rfc6803_enc_test5_confounder,
+		.expected_result	= &rfc6803_enc_test5_expected_result,
+	},
+	{
+		.desc			= "Encrypt empty plaintext with camellia256-cts-cmac",
+		.enctype		= ENCTYPE_CAMELLIA256_CTS_CMAC,
+		.constant		= 0,
+		.base_key		= &rfc6803_enc_test6_basekey,
+		.plaintext		= &rfc6803_enc_empty_plaintext,
+		.confounder		= &rfc6803_enc_test6_confounder,
+		.expected_result	= &rfc6803_enc_test6_expected_result,
+	},
+	{
+		.desc			= "Encrypt 1 byte with camellia256-cts-cmac",
+		.enctype		= ENCTYPE_CAMELLIA256_CTS_CMAC,
+		.constant		= 1,
+		.base_key		= &rfc6803_enc_test7_basekey,
+		.plaintext		= &rfc6803_enc_1byte_plaintext,
+		.confounder		= &rfc6803_enc_test7_confounder,
+		.expected_result	= &rfc6803_enc_test7_expected_result,
+	},
+	{
+		.desc			= "Encrypt 9 bytes with camellia256-cts-cmac",
+		.enctype		= ENCTYPE_CAMELLIA256_CTS_CMAC,
+		.constant		= 2,
+		.base_key		= &rfc6803_enc_test8_basekey,
+		.plaintext		= &rfc6803_enc_9byte_plaintext,
+		.confounder		= &rfc6803_enc_test8_confounder,
+		.expected_result	= &rfc6803_enc_test8_expected_result,
+	},
+	{
+		.desc			= "Encrypt 13 bytes with camellia256-cts-cmac",
+		.enctype		= ENCTYPE_CAMELLIA256_CTS_CMAC,
+		.constant		= 3,
+		.base_key		= &rfc6803_enc_test9_basekey,
+		.plaintext		= &rfc6803_enc_13byte_plaintext,
+		.confounder		= &rfc6803_enc_test9_confounder,
+		.expected_result	= &rfc6803_enc_test9_expected_result,
+	},
+	{
+		.desc			= "Encrypt 30 bytes with camellia256-cts-cmac",
+		.enctype		= ENCTYPE_CAMELLIA256_CTS_CMAC,
+		.constant		= 4,
+		.base_key		= &rfc6803_enc_test10_basekey,
+		.plaintext		= &rfc6803_enc_30byte_plaintext,
+		.confounder		= &rfc6803_enc_test10_confounder,
+		.expected_result	= &rfc6803_enc_test10_expected_result,
+	},
+};
+
+/* Creates the function rfc6803_encrypt_gen_params */
+KUNIT_ARRAY_PARAM(rfc6803_encrypt, rfc6803_encrypt_test_params,
+		  gss_krb5_get_desc);
+
+static void rfc6803_encrypt_case(struct kunit *test)
+{
+	const struct gss_krb5_test_param *param = test->param_value;
+	struct crypto_sync_skcipher *cts_tfm, *cbc_tfm;
+	const struct gss_krb5_enctype *gk5e;
+	struct xdr_netobj Ke, Ki, checksum;
+	u8 usage_data[GSS_KRB5_K5CLENGTH];
+	struct xdr_netobj usage = {
+		.data = usage_data,
+		.len = sizeof(usage_data),
+	};
+	struct crypto_ahash *ahash_tfm;
+	unsigned int blocksize;
+	struct xdr_buf buf;
+	void *text;
+	size_t len;
+	u32 err;
+
+	/* Arrange */
+	gk5e = gss_krb5_lookup_enctype(param->enctype);
+	if (!gk5e)
+		kunit_skip(test, "Encryption type is not available");
+
+	memset(usage_data, 0, sizeof(usage_data));
+	usage.data[3] = param->constant;
+
+	Ke.len = gk5e->Ke_length;
+	Ke.data = kunit_kzalloc(test, Ke.len, GFP_KERNEL);
+	KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_ERR_OR_NULL(test, Ke.data);
+	usage.data[4] = KEY_USAGE_SEED_ENCRYPTION;
+	err = gk5e->derive_key(gk5e, param->base_key, &Ke, &usage, GFP_KERNEL);
+	KUNIT_ASSERT_EQ(test, err, 0);
+
+	cbc_tfm = crypto_alloc_sync_skcipher(gk5e->aux_cipher, 0, 0);
+	KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_ERR_OR_NULL(test, cbc_tfm);
+	err = crypto_sync_skcipher_setkey(cbc_tfm, Ke.data, Ke.len);
+	KUNIT_ASSERT_EQ(test, err, 0);
+
+	cts_tfm = crypto_alloc_sync_skcipher(gk5e->encrypt_name, 0, 0);
+	KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_ERR_OR_NULL(test, cts_tfm);
+	err = crypto_sync_skcipher_setkey(cts_tfm, Ke.data, Ke.len);
+	KUNIT_ASSERT_EQ(test, err, 0);
+	blocksize = crypto_sync_skcipher_blocksize(cts_tfm);
+
+	len = param->confounder->len + param->plaintext->len + blocksize;
+	text = kunit_kzalloc(test, len, GFP_KERNEL);
+	KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_ERR_OR_NULL(test, text);
+	memcpy(text, param->confounder->data, param->confounder->len);
+	memcpy(text + param->confounder->len, param->plaintext->data,
+	       param->plaintext->len);
+
+	memset(&buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
+	buf.head[0].iov_base = text;
+	buf.head[0].iov_len = param->confounder->len + param->plaintext->len;
+	buf.len = buf.head[0].iov_len;
+
+	checksum.len = gk5e->cksumlength;
+	checksum.data = kunit_kzalloc(test, checksum.len, GFP_KERNEL);
+	KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_ERR_OR_NULL(test, checksum.data);
+
+	Ki.len = gk5e->Ki_length;
+	Ki.data = kunit_kzalloc(test, Ki.len, GFP_KERNEL);
+	KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_ERR_OR_NULL(test, Ki.data);
+	usage.data[4] = KEY_USAGE_SEED_INTEGRITY;
+	err = gk5e->derive_key(gk5e, param->base_key, &Ki,
+			       &usage, GFP_KERNEL);
+	KUNIT_ASSERT_EQ(test, err, 0);
+	ahash_tfm = crypto_alloc_ahash(gk5e->cksum_name, 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
+	KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_ERR_OR_NULL(test, ahash_tfm);
+	err = crypto_ahash_setkey(ahash_tfm, Ki.data, Ki.len);
+	KUNIT_ASSERT_EQ(test, err, 0);
+
+	/* Act */
+	err = gss_krb5_checksum(ahash_tfm, NULL, 0, &buf, 0, &checksum);
+	KUNIT_ASSERT_EQ(test, err, 0);
+
+	err = krb5_cbc_cts_encrypt(cts_tfm, cbc_tfm, 0, &buf, NULL, NULL, 0);
+	KUNIT_ASSERT_EQ(test, err, 0);
+
+	/* Assert */
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ_MSG(test, param->expected_result->len,
+			    buf.len + checksum.len,
+			    "ciphertext length mismatch");
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ_MSG(test,
+			    memcmp(param->expected_result->data,
+				   buf.head[0].iov_base, buf.len), 0,
+			    "encrypted result mismatch");
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ_MSG(test,
+			    memcmp(param->expected_result->data +
+				   (param->expected_result->len - checksum.len),
+				   checksum.data, checksum.len), 0,
+			    "HMAC mismatch");
+
+	crypto_free_ahash(ahash_tfm);
+	crypto_free_sync_skcipher(cts_tfm);
+	crypto_free_sync_skcipher(cbc_tfm);
+}
+
+static struct kunit_case rfc6803_test_cases[] = {
+	{
+		.name			= "RFC 6803 key derivation",
+		.run_case		= kdf_case,
+		.generate_params	= rfc6803_kdf_gen_params,
+	},
+	{
+		.name			= "RFC 6803 checksum",
+		.run_case		= checksum_case,
+		.generate_params	= rfc6803_checksum_gen_params,
+	},
+	{
+		.name			= "RFC 6803 encryption",
+		.run_case		= rfc6803_encrypt_case,
+		.generate_params	= rfc6803_encrypt_gen_params,
+	},
+	{}
+};
+
+static struct kunit_suite rfc6803_suite = {
+	.name			= "RFC 6803 suite",
+	.test_cases		= rfc6803_test_cases,
+};
+
+/*
+ * From RFC 8009 Appendix A.  Test Vectors
+ *
+ * Sample results for SHA-2 enctype key derivation
+ *
+ * This test material is copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the
+ * persons identified as the document authors.  All rights reserved.
+ */
+
+DEFINE_HEX_XDR_NETOBJ(aes128_cts_hmac_sha256_128_basekey,
+		      0x37, 0x05, 0xd9, 0x60, 0x80, 0xc1, 0x77, 0x28,
+		      0xa0, 0xe8, 0x00, 0xea, 0xb6, 0xe0, 0xd2, 0x3c
+);
+DEFINE_HEX_XDR_NETOBJ(aes128_cts_hmac_sha256_128_Kc,
+		      0xb3, 0x1a, 0x01, 0x8a, 0x48, 0xf5, 0x47, 0x76,
+		      0xf4, 0x03, 0xe9, 0xa3, 0x96, 0x32, 0x5d, 0xc3
+);
+DEFINE_HEX_XDR_NETOBJ(aes128_cts_hmac_sha256_128_Ke,
+		      0x9b, 0x19, 0x7d, 0xd1, 0xe8, 0xc5, 0x60, 0x9d,
+		      0x6e, 0x67, 0xc3, 0xe3, 0x7c, 0x62, 0xc7, 0x2e
+);
+DEFINE_HEX_XDR_NETOBJ(aes128_cts_hmac_sha256_128_Ki,
+		      0x9f, 0xda, 0x0e, 0x56, 0xab, 0x2d, 0x85, 0xe1,
+		      0x56, 0x9a, 0x68, 0x86, 0x96, 0xc2, 0x6a, 0x6c
+);
+
+DEFINE_HEX_XDR_NETOBJ(aes256_cts_hmac_sha384_192_basekey,
+		      0x6d, 0x40, 0x4d, 0x37, 0xfa, 0xf7, 0x9f, 0x9d,
+		      0xf0, 0xd3, 0x35, 0x68, 0xd3, 0x20, 0x66, 0x98,
+		      0x00, 0xeb, 0x48, 0x36, 0x47, 0x2e, 0xa8, 0xa0,
+		      0x26, 0xd1, 0x6b, 0x71, 0x82, 0x46, 0x0c, 0x52
+);
+DEFINE_HEX_XDR_NETOBJ(aes256_cts_hmac_sha384_192_Kc,
+		      0xef, 0x57, 0x18, 0xbe, 0x86, 0xcc, 0x84, 0x96,
+		      0x3d, 0x8b, 0xbb, 0x50, 0x31, 0xe9, 0xf5, 0xc4,
+		      0xba, 0x41, 0xf2, 0x8f, 0xaf, 0x69, 0xe7, 0x3d
+);
+DEFINE_HEX_XDR_NETOBJ(aes256_cts_hmac_sha384_192_Ke,
+		      0x56, 0xab, 0x22, 0xbe, 0xe6, 0x3d, 0x82, 0xd7,
+		      0xbc, 0x52, 0x27, 0xf6, 0x77, 0x3f, 0x8e, 0xa7,
+		      0xa5, 0xeb, 0x1c, 0x82, 0x51, 0x60, 0xc3, 0x83,
+		      0x12, 0x98, 0x0c, 0x44, 0x2e, 0x5c, 0x7e, 0x49
+);
+DEFINE_HEX_XDR_NETOBJ(aes256_cts_hmac_sha384_192_Ki,
+		      0x69, 0xb1, 0x65, 0x14, 0xe3, 0xcd, 0x8e, 0x56,
+		      0xb8, 0x20, 0x10, 0xd5, 0xc7, 0x30, 0x12, 0xb6,
+		      0x22, 0xc4, 0xd0, 0x0f, 0xfc, 0x23, 0xed, 0x1f
+);
+
+static const struct gss_krb5_test_param rfc8009_kdf_test_params[] = {
+	{
+		.desc			= "Derive Kc subkey for aes128-cts-hmac-sha256-128",
+		.enctype		= ENCTYPE_AES128_CTS_HMAC_SHA256_128,
+		.base_key		= &aes128_cts_hmac_sha256_128_basekey,
+		.usage			= &usage_checksum,
+		.expected_result	= &aes128_cts_hmac_sha256_128_Kc,
+	},
+	{
+		.desc			= "Derive Ke subkey for aes128-cts-hmac-sha256-128",
+		.enctype		= ENCTYPE_AES128_CTS_HMAC_SHA256_128,
+		.base_key		= &aes128_cts_hmac_sha256_128_basekey,
+		.usage			= &usage_encryption,
+		.expected_result	= &aes128_cts_hmac_sha256_128_Ke,
+	},
+	{
+		.desc			= "Derive Ki subkey for aes128-cts-hmac-sha256-128",
+		.enctype		= ENCTYPE_AES128_CTS_HMAC_SHA256_128,
+		.base_key		= &aes128_cts_hmac_sha256_128_basekey,
+		.usage			= &usage_integrity,
+		.expected_result	= &aes128_cts_hmac_sha256_128_Ki,
+	},
+	{
+		.desc			= "Derive Kc subkey for aes256-cts-hmac-sha384-192",
+		.enctype		= ENCTYPE_AES256_CTS_HMAC_SHA384_192,
+		.base_key		= &aes256_cts_hmac_sha384_192_basekey,
+		.usage			= &usage_checksum,
+		.expected_result	= &aes256_cts_hmac_sha384_192_Kc,
+	},
+	{
+		.desc			= "Derive Ke subkey for aes256-cts-hmac-sha384-192",
+		.enctype		= ENCTYPE_AES256_CTS_HMAC_SHA384_192,
+		.base_key		= &aes256_cts_hmac_sha384_192_basekey,
+		.usage			= &usage_encryption,
+		.expected_result	= &aes256_cts_hmac_sha384_192_Ke,
+	},
+	{
+		.desc			= "Derive Ki subkey for aes256-cts-hmac-sha384-192",
+		.enctype		= ENCTYPE_AES256_CTS_HMAC_SHA384_192,
+		.base_key		= &aes256_cts_hmac_sha384_192_basekey,
+		.usage			= &usage_integrity,
+		.expected_result	= &aes256_cts_hmac_sha384_192_Ki,
+	},
+};
+
+/* Creates the function rfc8009_kdf_gen_params */
+KUNIT_ARRAY_PARAM(rfc8009_kdf, rfc8009_kdf_test_params, gss_krb5_get_desc);
+
+/*
+ * From RFC 8009 Appendix A.  Test Vectors
+ *
+ * These sample checksums use the above sample key derivation results,
+ * including use of the same base-key and key usage values.
+ *
+ * This test material is copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the
+ * persons identified as the document authors.  All rights reserved.
+ */
+
+DEFINE_HEX_XDR_NETOBJ(rfc8009_checksum_plaintext,
+		      0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07,
+		      0x08, 0x09, 0x0a, 0x0b, 0x0c, 0x0d, 0x0e, 0x0f,
+		      0x10, 0x11, 0x12, 0x13, 0x14
+);
+DEFINE_HEX_XDR_NETOBJ(rfc8009_checksum_test1_expected_result,
+		      0xd7, 0x83, 0x67, 0x18, 0x66, 0x43, 0xd6, 0x7b,
+		      0x41, 0x1c, 0xba, 0x91, 0x39, 0xfc, 0x1d, 0xee
+);
+DEFINE_HEX_XDR_NETOBJ(rfc8009_checksum_test2_expected_result,
+		      0x45, 0xee, 0x79, 0x15, 0x67, 0xee, 0xfc, 0xa3,
+		      0x7f, 0x4a, 0xc1, 0xe0, 0x22, 0x2d, 0xe8, 0x0d,
+		      0x43, 0xc3, 0xbf, 0xa0, 0x66, 0x99, 0x67, 0x2a
+);
+
+static const struct gss_krb5_test_param rfc8009_checksum_test_params[] = {
+	{
+		.desc			= "Checksum with aes128-cts-hmac-sha256-128",
+		.enctype		= ENCTYPE_AES128_CTS_HMAC_SHA256_128,
+		.base_key		= &aes128_cts_hmac_sha256_128_basekey,
+		.usage			= &usage_checksum,
+		.plaintext		= &rfc8009_checksum_plaintext,
+		.expected_result	= &rfc8009_checksum_test1_expected_result,
+	},
+	{
+		.desc			= "Checksum with aes256-cts-hmac-sha384-192",
+		.enctype		= ENCTYPE_AES256_CTS_HMAC_SHA384_192,
+		.base_key		= &aes256_cts_hmac_sha384_192_basekey,
+		.usage			= &usage_checksum,
+		.plaintext		= &rfc8009_checksum_plaintext,
+		.expected_result	= &rfc8009_checksum_test2_expected_result,
+	},
+};
+
+/* Creates the function rfc8009_checksum_gen_params */
+KUNIT_ARRAY_PARAM(rfc8009_checksum, rfc8009_checksum_test_params,
+		  gss_krb5_get_desc);
+
+/*
+ * From RFC 8009 Appendix A.  Test Vectors
+ *
+ * Sample encryptions (all using the default cipher state):
+ * --------------------------------------------------------
+ *
+ * These sample encryptions use the above sample key derivation results,
+ * including use of the same base-key and key usage values.
+ *
+ * This test material is copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the
+ * persons identified as the document authors.  All rights reserved.
+ */
+
+static const struct xdr_netobj rfc8009_enc_empty_plaintext = {
+	.len	= 0,
+};
+DEFINE_HEX_XDR_NETOBJ(rfc8009_enc_short_plaintext,
+		      0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05
+);
+DEFINE_HEX_XDR_NETOBJ(rfc8009_enc_block_plaintext,
+		      0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07,
+		      0x08, 0x09, 0x0a, 0x0b, 0x0c, 0x0d, 0x0e, 0x0f
+);
+DEFINE_HEX_XDR_NETOBJ(rfc8009_enc_long_plaintext,
+		      0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07,
+		      0x08, 0x09, 0x0a, 0x0b, 0x0c, 0x0d, 0x0e, 0x0f,
+		      0x10, 0x11, 0x12, 0x13, 0x14
+);
+
+DEFINE_HEX_XDR_NETOBJ(rfc8009_enc_test1_confounder,
+		      0x7e, 0x58, 0x95, 0xea, 0xf2, 0x67, 0x24, 0x35,
+		      0xba, 0xd8, 0x17, 0xf5, 0x45, 0xa3, 0x71, 0x48
+);
+DEFINE_HEX_XDR_NETOBJ(rfc8009_enc_test1_expected_result,
+		      0xef, 0x85, 0xfb, 0x89, 0x0b, 0xb8, 0x47, 0x2f,
+		      0x4d, 0xab, 0x20, 0x39, 0x4d, 0xca, 0x78, 0x1d
+);
+DEFINE_HEX_XDR_NETOBJ(rfc8009_enc_test1_expected_hmac,
+		      0xad, 0x87, 0x7e, 0xda, 0x39, 0xd5, 0x0c, 0x87,
+		      0x0c, 0x0d, 0x5a, 0x0a, 0x8e, 0x48, 0xc7, 0x18
+);
+
+DEFINE_HEX_XDR_NETOBJ(rfc8009_enc_test2_confounder,
+		      0x7b, 0xca, 0x28, 0x5e, 0x2f, 0xd4, 0x13, 0x0f,
+		      0xb5, 0x5b, 0x1a, 0x5c, 0x83, 0xbc, 0x5b, 0x24
+);
+DEFINE_HEX_XDR_NETOBJ(rfc8009_enc_test2_expected_result,
+		      0x84, 0xd7, 0xf3, 0x07, 0x54, 0xed, 0x98, 0x7b,
+		      0xab, 0x0b, 0xf3, 0x50, 0x6b, 0xeb, 0x09, 0xcf,
+		      0xb5, 0x54, 0x02, 0xce, 0xf7, 0xe6
+);
+DEFINE_HEX_XDR_NETOBJ(rfc8009_enc_test2_expected_hmac,
+		      0x87, 0x7c, 0xe9, 0x9e, 0x24, 0x7e, 0x52, 0xd1,
+		      0x6e, 0xd4, 0x42, 0x1d, 0xfd, 0xf8, 0x97, 0x6c
+);
+
+DEFINE_HEX_XDR_NETOBJ(rfc8009_enc_test3_confounder,
+		      0x56, 0xab, 0x21, 0x71, 0x3f, 0xf6, 0x2c, 0x0a,
+		      0x14, 0x57, 0x20, 0x0f, 0x6f, 0xa9, 0x94, 0x8f
+);
+DEFINE_HEX_XDR_NETOBJ(rfc8009_enc_test3_expected_result,
+		      0x35, 0x17, 0xd6, 0x40, 0xf5, 0x0d, 0xdc, 0x8a,
+		      0xd3, 0x62, 0x87, 0x22, 0xb3, 0x56, 0x9d, 0x2a,
+		      0xe0, 0x74, 0x93, 0xfa, 0x82, 0x63, 0x25, 0x40,
+		      0x80, 0xea, 0x65, 0xc1, 0x00, 0x8e, 0x8f, 0xc2
+);
+DEFINE_HEX_XDR_NETOBJ(rfc8009_enc_test3_expected_hmac,
+		      0x95, 0xfb, 0x48, 0x52, 0xe7, 0xd8, 0x3e, 0x1e,
+		      0x7c, 0x48, 0xc3, 0x7e, 0xeb, 0xe6, 0xb0, 0xd3
+);
+
+DEFINE_HEX_XDR_NETOBJ(rfc8009_enc_test4_confounder,
+		      0xa7, 0xa4, 0xe2, 0x9a, 0x47, 0x28, 0xce, 0x10,
+		      0x66, 0x4f, 0xb6, 0x4e, 0x49, 0xad, 0x3f, 0xac
+);
+DEFINE_HEX_XDR_NETOBJ(rfc8009_enc_test4_expected_result,
+		      0x72, 0x0f, 0x73, 0xb1, 0x8d, 0x98, 0x59, 0xcd,
+		      0x6c, 0xcb, 0x43, 0x46, 0x11, 0x5c, 0xd3, 0x36,
+		      0xc7, 0x0f, 0x58, 0xed, 0xc0, 0xc4, 0x43, 0x7c,
+		      0x55, 0x73, 0x54, 0x4c, 0x31, 0xc8, 0x13, 0xbc,
+		      0xe1, 0xe6, 0xd0, 0x72, 0xc1
+);
+DEFINE_HEX_XDR_NETOBJ(rfc8009_enc_test4_expected_hmac,
+		      0x86, 0xb3, 0x9a, 0x41, 0x3c, 0x2f, 0x92, 0xca,
+		      0x9b, 0x83, 0x34, 0xa2, 0x87, 0xff, 0xcb, 0xfc
+);
+
+DEFINE_HEX_XDR_NETOBJ(rfc8009_enc_test5_confounder,
+		      0xf7, 0x64, 0xe9, 0xfa, 0x15, 0xc2, 0x76, 0x47,
+		      0x8b, 0x2c, 0x7d, 0x0c, 0x4e, 0x5f, 0x58, 0xe4
+);
+DEFINE_HEX_XDR_NETOBJ(rfc8009_enc_test5_expected_result,
+		      0x41, 0xf5, 0x3f, 0xa5, 0xbf, 0xe7, 0x02, 0x6d,
+		      0x91, 0xfa, 0xf9, 0xbe, 0x95, 0x91, 0x95, 0xa0
+);
+DEFINE_HEX_XDR_NETOBJ(rfc8009_enc_test5_expected_hmac,
+		      0x58, 0x70, 0x72, 0x73, 0xa9, 0x6a, 0x40, 0xf0,
+		      0xa0, 0x19, 0x60, 0x62, 0x1a, 0xc6, 0x12, 0x74,
+		      0x8b, 0x9b, 0xbf, 0xbe, 0x7e, 0xb4, 0xce, 0x3c
+);
+
+DEFINE_HEX_XDR_NETOBJ(rfc8009_enc_test6_confounder,
+		      0xb8, 0x0d, 0x32, 0x51, 0xc1, 0xf6, 0x47, 0x14,
+		      0x94, 0x25, 0x6f, 0xfe, 0x71, 0x2d, 0x0b, 0x9a
+);
+DEFINE_HEX_XDR_NETOBJ(rfc8009_enc_test6_expected_result,
+		      0x4e, 0xd7, 0xb3, 0x7c, 0x2b, 0xca, 0xc8, 0xf7,
+		      0x4f, 0x23, 0xc1, 0xcf, 0x07, 0xe6, 0x2b, 0xc7,
+		      0xb7, 0x5f, 0xb3, 0xf6, 0x37, 0xb9
+);
+DEFINE_HEX_XDR_NETOBJ(rfc8009_enc_test6_expected_hmac,
+		      0xf5, 0x59, 0xc7, 0xf6, 0x64, 0xf6, 0x9e, 0xab,
+		      0x7b, 0x60, 0x92, 0x23, 0x75, 0x26, 0xea, 0x0d,
+		      0x1f, 0x61, 0xcb, 0x20, 0xd6, 0x9d, 0x10, 0xf2
+);
+
+DEFINE_HEX_XDR_NETOBJ(rfc8009_enc_test7_confounder,
+		      0x53, 0xbf, 0x8a, 0x0d, 0x10, 0x52, 0x65, 0xd4,
+		      0xe2, 0x76, 0x42, 0x86, 0x24, 0xce, 0x5e, 0x63
+);
+DEFINE_HEX_XDR_NETOBJ(rfc8009_enc_test7_expected_result,
+		      0xbc, 0x47, 0xff, 0xec, 0x79, 0x98, 0xeb, 0x91,
+		      0xe8, 0x11, 0x5c, 0xf8, 0xd1, 0x9d, 0xac, 0x4b,
+		      0xbb, 0xe2, 0xe1, 0x63, 0xe8, 0x7d, 0xd3, 0x7f,
+		      0x49, 0xbe, 0xca, 0x92, 0x02, 0x77, 0x64, 0xf6
+);
+DEFINE_HEX_XDR_NETOBJ(rfc8009_enc_test7_expected_hmac,
+		      0x8c, 0xf5, 0x1f, 0x14, 0xd7, 0x98, 0xc2, 0x27,
+		      0x3f, 0x35, 0xdf, 0x57, 0x4d, 0x1f, 0x93, 0x2e,
+		      0x40, 0xc4, 0xff, 0x25, 0x5b, 0x36, 0xa2, 0x66
+);
+
+DEFINE_HEX_XDR_NETOBJ(rfc8009_enc_test8_confounder,
+		      0x76, 0x3e, 0x65, 0x36, 0x7e, 0x86, 0x4f, 0x02,
+		      0xf5, 0x51, 0x53, 0xc7, 0xe3, 0xb5, 0x8a, 0xf1
+);
+DEFINE_HEX_XDR_NETOBJ(rfc8009_enc_test8_expected_result,
+		      0x40, 0x01, 0x3e, 0x2d, 0xf5, 0x8e, 0x87, 0x51,
+		      0x95, 0x7d, 0x28, 0x78, 0xbc, 0xd2, 0xd6, 0xfe,
+		      0x10, 0x1c, 0xcf, 0xd5, 0x56, 0xcb, 0x1e, 0xae,
+		      0x79, 0xdb, 0x3c, 0x3e, 0xe8, 0x64, 0x29, 0xf2,
+		      0xb2, 0xa6, 0x02, 0xac, 0x86
+);
+DEFINE_HEX_XDR_NETOBJ(rfc8009_enc_test8_expected_hmac,
+		      0xfe, 0xf6, 0xec, 0xb6, 0x47, 0xd6, 0x29, 0x5f,
+		      0xae, 0x07, 0x7a, 0x1f, 0xeb, 0x51, 0x75, 0x08,
+		      0xd2, 0xc1, 0x6b, 0x41, 0x92, 0xe0, 0x1f, 0x62
+);
+
+static const struct gss_krb5_test_param rfc8009_encrypt_test_params[] = {
+	{
+		.desc			= "Encrypt empty plaintext with aes128-cts-hmac-sha256-128",
+		.enctype		= ENCTYPE_AES128_CTS_HMAC_SHA256_128,
+		.plaintext		= &rfc8009_enc_empty_plaintext,
+		.confounder		= &rfc8009_enc_test1_confounder,
+		.base_key		= &aes128_cts_hmac_sha256_128_basekey,
+		.expected_result	= &rfc8009_enc_test1_expected_result,
+		.expected_hmac		= &rfc8009_enc_test1_expected_hmac,
+	},
+	{
+		.desc			= "Encrypt short plaintext with aes128-cts-hmac-sha256-128",
+		.enctype		= ENCTYPE_AES128_CTS_HMAC_SHA256_128,
+		.plaintext		= &rfc8009_enc_short_plaintext,
+		.confounder		= &rfc8009_enc_test2_confounder,
+		.base_key		= &aes128_cts_hmac_sha256_128_basekey,
+		.expected_result	= &rfc8009_enc_test2_expected_result,
+		.expected_hmac		= &rfc8009_enc_test2_expected_hmac,
+	},
+	{
+		.desc			= "Encrypt block plaintext with aes128-cts-hmac-sha256-128",
+		.enctype		= ENCTYPE_AES128_CTS_HMAC_SHA256_128,
+		.plaintext		= &rfc8009_enc_block_plaintext,
+		.confounder		= &rfc8009_enc_test3_confounder,
+		.base_key		= &aes128_cts_hmac_sha256_128_basekey,
+		.expected_result	= &rfc8009_enc_test3_expected_result,
+		.expected_hmac		= &rfc8009_enc_test3_expected_hmac,
+	},
+	{
+		.desc			= "Encrypt long plaintext with aes128-cts-hmac-sha256-128",
+		.enctype		= ENCTYPE_AES128_CTS_HMAC_SHA256_128,
+		.plaintext		= &rfc8009_enc_long_plaintext,
+		.confounder		= &rfc8009_enc_test4_confounder,
+		.base_key		= &aes128_cts_hmac_sha256_128_basekey,
+		.expected_result	= &rfc8009_enc_test4_expected_result,
+		.expected_hmac		= &rfc8009_enc_test4_expected_hmac,
+	},
+	{
+		.desc			= "Encrypt empty plaintext with aes256-cts-hmac-sha384-192",
+		.enctype		= ENCTYPE_AES256_CTS_HMAC_SHA384_192,
+		.plaintext		= &rfc8009_enc_empty_plaintext,
+		.confounder		= &rfc8009_enc_test5_confounder,
+		.base_key		= &aes256_cts_hmac_sha384_192_basekey,
+		.expected_result	= &rfc8009_enc_test5_expected_result,
+		.expected_hmac		= &rfc8009_enc_test5_expected_hmac,
+	},
+	{
+		.desc			= "Encrypt short plaintext with aes256-cts-hmac-sha384-192",
+		.enctype		= ENCTYPE_AES256_CTS_HMAC_SHA384_192,
+		.plaintext		= &rfc8009_enc_short_plaintext,
+		.confounder		= &rfc8009_enc_test6_confounder,
+		.base_key		= &aes256_cts_hmac_sha384_192_basekey,
+		.expected_result	= &rfc8009_enc_test6_expected_result,
+		.expected_hmac		= &rfc8009_enc_test6_expected_hmac,
+	},
+	{
+		.desc			= "Encrypt block plaintext with aes256-cts-hmac-sha384-192",
+		.enctype		= ENCTYPE_AES256_CTS_HMAC_SHA384_192,
+		.plaintext		= &rfc8009_enc_block_plaintext,
+		.confounder		= &rfc8009_enc_test7_confounder,
+		.base_key		= &aes256_cts_hmac_sha384_192_basekey,
+		.expected_result	= &rfc8009_enc_test7_expected_result,
+		.expected_hmac		= &rfc8009_enc_test7_expected_hmac,
+	},
+	{
+		.desc			= "Encrypt long plaintext with aes256-cts-hmac-sha384-192",
+		.enctype		= ENCTYPE_AES256_CTS_HMAC_SHA384_192,
+		.plaintext		= &rfc8009_enc_long_plaintext,
+		.confounder		= &rfc8009_enc_test8_confounder,
+		.base_key		= &aes256_cts_hmac_sha384_192_basekey,
+		.expected_result	= &rfc8009_enc_test8_expected_result,
+		.expected_hmac		= &rfc8009_enc_test8_expected_hmac,
+	},
+};
+
+/* Creates the function rfc8009_encrypt_gen_params */
+KUNIT_ARRAY_PARAM(rfc8009_encrypt, rfc8009_encrypt_test_params,
+		  gss_krb5_get_desc);
+
+static void rfc8009_encrypt_case(struct kunit *test)
+{
+	const struct gss_krb5_test_param *param = test->param_value;
+	struct crypto_sync_skcipher *cts_tfm, *cbc_tfm;
+	const struct gss_krb5_enctype *gk5e;
+	struct xdr_netobj Ke, Ki, checksum;
+	u8 usage_data[GSS_KRB5_K5CLENGTH];
+	struct xdr_netobj usage = {
+		.data = usage_data,
+		.len = sizeof(usage_data),
+	};
+	struct crypto_ahash *ahash_tfm;
+	struct xdr_buf buf;
+	void *text;
+	size_t len;
+	u32 err;
+
+	/* Arrange */
+	gk5e = gss_krb5_lookup_enctype(param->enctype);
+	if (!gk5e)
+		kunit_skip(test, "Encryption type is not available");
+
+	*(__be32 *)usage.data = cpu_to_be32(2);
+
+	Ke.len = gk5e->Ke_length;
+	Ke.data = kunit_kzalloc(test, Ke.len, GFP_KERNEL);
+	KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_ERR_OR_NULL(test, Ke.data);
+	usage.data[4] = KEY_USAGE_SEED_ENCRYPTION;
+	err = gk5e->derive_key(gk5e, param->base_key, &Ke,
+			       &usage, GFP_KERNEL);
+	KUNIT_ASSERT_EQ(test, err, 0);
+
+	cbc_tfm = crypto_alloc_sync_skcipher(gk5e->aux_cipher, 0, 0);
+	KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_ERR_OR_NULL(test, cbc_tfm);
+	err = crypto_sync_skcipher_setkey(cbc_tfm, Ke.data, Ke.len);
+	KUNIT_ASSERT_EQ(test, err, 0);
+
+	cts_tfm = crypto_alloc_sync_skcipher(gk5e->encrypt_name, 0, 0);
+	KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_ERR_OR_NULL(test, cts_tfm);
+	err = crypto_sync_skcipher_setkey(cts_tfm, Ke.data, Ke.len);
+	KUNIT_ASSERT_EQ(test, err, 0);
+
+	len = param->confounder->len + param->plaintext->len;
+	text = kunit_kzalloc(test, len, GFP_KERNEL);
+	KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_ERR_OR_NULL(test, text);
+	memcpy(text, param->confounder->data, param->confounder->len);
+	memcpy(text + param->confounder->len, param->plaintext->data,
+	       param->plaintext->len);
+
+	memset(&buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
+	buf.head[0].iov_base = text;
+	buf.head[0].iov_len = param->confounder->len + param->plaintext->len;
+	buf.len = buf.head[0].iov_len;
+
+	checksum.len = gk5e->cksumlength;
+	checksum.data = kunit_kzalloc(test, checksum.len, GFP_KERNEL);
+	KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_ERR_OR_NULL(test, checksum.data);
+
+	Ki.len = gk5e->Ki_length;
+	Ki.data = kunit_kzalloc(test, Ki.len, GFP_KERNEL);
+	KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_ERR_OR_NULL(test, Ki.data);
+	usage.data[4] = KEY_USAGE_SEED_INTEGRITY;
+	err = gk5e->derive_key(gk5e, param->base_key, &Ki,
+			       &usage, GFP_KERNEL);
+	KUNIT_ASSERT_EQ(test, err, 0);
+
+	ahash_tfm = crypto_alloc_ahash(gk5e->cksum_name, 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
+	KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_ERR_OR_NULL(test, ahash_tfm);
+	err = crypto_ahash_setkey(ahash_tfm, Ki.data, Ki.len);
+	KUNIT_ASSERT_EQ(test, err, 0);
+
+	/* Act */
+	err = krb5_cbc_cts_encrypt(cts_tfm, cbc_tfm, 0, &buf, NULL, NULL, 0);
+	KUNIT_ASSERT_EQ(test, err, 0);
+	err = krb5_etm_checksum(cts_tfm, ahash_tfm, &buf, 0, &checksum);
+	KUNIT_ASSERT_EQ(test, err, 0);
+
+	/* Assert */
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ_MSG(test,
+			    param->expected_result->len, buf.len,
+			    "ciphertext length mismatch");
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ_MSG(test,
+			    memcmp(param->expected_result->data,
+				   buf.head[0].iov_base,
+				   param->expected_result->len), 0,
+			    "ciphertext mismatch");
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ_MSG(test, memcmp(param->expected_hmac->data,
+					 checksum.data,
+					 checksum.len), 0,
+			    "HMAC mismatch");
+
+	crypto_free_ahash(ahash_tfm);
+	crypto_free_sync_skcipher(cts_tfm);
+	crypto_free_sync_skcipher(cbc_tfm);
+}
+
+static struct kunit_case rfc8009_test_cases[] = {
+	{
+		.name			= "RFC 8009 key derivation",
+		.run_case		= kdf_case,
+		.generate_params	= rfc8009_kdf_gen_params,
+	},
+	{
+		.name			= "RFC 8009 checksum",
+		.run_case		= checksum_case,
+		.generate_params	= rfc8009_checksum_gen_params,
+	},
+	{
+		.name			= "RFC 8009 encryption",
+		.run_case		= rfc8009_encrypt_case,
+		.generate_params	= rfc8009_encrypt_gen_params,
+	},
+	{}
+};
+
+static struct kunit_suite rfc8009_suite = {
+	.name			= "RFC 8009 suite",
+	.test_cases		= rfc8009_test_cases,
+};
+
+/*
+ * Encryption self-tests
+ */
+
+DEFINE_STR_XDR_NETOBJ(encrypt_selftest_plaintext,
+		      "This is the plaintext for the encryption self-test.");
+
+static const struct gss_krb5_test_param encrypt_selftest_params[] = {
+	{
+		.desc			= "aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96 encryption self-test",
+		.enctype		= ENCTYPE_AES128_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96,
+		.Ke			= &rfc3962_encryption_key,
+		.plaintext		= &encrypt_selftest_plaintext,
+	},
+	{
+		.desc			= "aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96 encryption self-test",
+		.enctype		= ENCTYPE_AES256_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96,
+		.Ke			= &rfc3962_encryption_key,
+		.plaintext		= &encrypt_selftest_plaintext,
+	},
+	{
+		.desc			= "camellia128-cts-cmac encryption self-test",
+		.enctype		= ENCTYPE_CAMELLIA128_CTS_CMAC,
+		.Ke			= &camellia128_cts_cmac_Ke,
+		.plaintext		= &encrypt_selftest_plaintext,
+	},
+	{
+		.desc			= "camellia256-cts-cmac encryption self-test",
+		.enctype		= ENCTYPE_CAMELLIA256_CTS_CMAC,
+		.Ke			= &camellia256_cts_cmac_Ke,
+		.plaintext		= &encrypt_selftest_plaintext,
+	},
+	{
+		.desc			= "aes128-cts-hmac-sha256-128 encryption self-test",
+		.enctype		= ENCTYPE_AES128_CTS_HMAC_SHA256_128,
+		.Ke			= &aes128_cts_hmac_sha256_128_Ke,
+		.plaintext		= &encrypt_selftest_plaintext,
+	},
+	{
+		.desc			= "aes256-cts-hmac-sha384-192 encryption self-test",
+		.enctype		= ENCTYPE_AES256_CTS_HMAC_SHA384_192,
+		.Ke			= &aes256_cts_hmac_sha384_192_Ke,
+		.plaintext		= &encrypt_selftest_plaintext,
+	},
+};
+
+/* Creates the function encrypt_selftest_gen_params */
+KUNIT_ARRAY_PARAM(encrypt_selftest, encrypt_selftest_params,
+		  gss_krb5_get_desc);
+
+/*
+ * Encrypt and decrypt plaintext, and ensure the input plaintext
+ * matches the output plaintext. A confounder is not added in this
+ * case.
+ */
+static void encrypt_selftest_case(struct kunit *test)
+{
+	const struct gss_krb5_test_param *param = test->param_value;
+	struct crypto_sync_skcipher *cts_tfm, *cbc_tfm;
+	const struct gss_krb5_enctype *gk5e;
+	struct xdr_buf buf;
+	void *text;
+	int err;
+
+	/* Arrange */
+	gk5e = gss_krb5_lookup_enctype(param->enctype);
+	if (!gk5e)
+		kunit_skip(test, "Encryption type is not available");
+
+	cbc_tfm = crypto_alloc_sync_skcipher(gk5e->aux_cipher, 0, 0);
+	KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_ERR_OR_NULL(test, cbc_tfm);
+	err = crypto_sync_skcipher_setkey(cbc_tfm, param->Ke->data, param->Ke->len);
+	KUNIT_ASSERT_EQ(test, err, 0);
+
+	cts_tfm = crypto_alloc_sync_skcipher(gk5e->encrypt_name, 0, 0);
+	KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_ERR_OR_NULL(test, cts_tfm);
+	err = crypto_sync_skcipher_setkey(cts_tfm, param->Ke->data, param->Ke->len);
+	KUNIT_ASSERT_EQ(test, err, 0);
+
+	text = kunit_kzalloc(test, roundup(param->plaintext->len,
+					   crypto_sync_skcipher_blocksize(cbc_tfm)),
+			     GFP_KERNEL);
+	KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_ERR_OR_NULL(test, text);
+
+	memcpy(text, param->plaintext->data, param->plaintext->len);
+	memset(&buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
+	buf.head[0].iov_base = text;
+	buf.head[0].iov_len = param->plaintext->len;
+	buf.len = buf.head[0].iov_len;
+
+	/* Act */
+	err = krb5_cbc_cts_encrypt(cts_tfm, cbc_tfm, 0, &buf, NULL, NULL, 0);
+	KUNIT_ASSERT_EQ(test, err, 0);
+	err = krb5_cbc_cts_decrypt(cts_tfm, cbc_tfm, 0, &buf);
+	KUNIT_ASSERT_EQ(test, err, 0);
+
+	/* Assert */
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ_MSG(test,
+			    param->plaintext->len, buf.len,
+			    "length mismatch");
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ_MSG(test,
+			    memcmp(param->plaintext->data,
+				   buf.head[0].iov_base, buf.len), 0,
+			    "plaintext mismatch");
+
+	crypto_free_sync_skcipher(cts_tfm);
+	crypto_free_sync_skcipher(cbc_tfm);
+}
+
+static struct kunit_case encryption_test_cases[] = {
+	{
+		.name			= "Encryption self-tests",
+		.run_case		= encrypt_selftest_case,
+		.generate_params	= encrypt_selftest_gen_params,
+	},
+	{}
+};
+
+static struct kunit_suite encryption_test_suite = {
+	.name			= "Encryption test suite",
+	.test_cases		= encryption_test_cases,
+};
+
+kunit_test_suites(&rfc3961_suite,
+		  &rfc3962_suite,
+		  &rfc6803_suite,
+		  &rfc8009_suite,
+		  &encryption_test_suite);
+
+MODULE_DESCRIPTION("Test RPCSEC GSS Kerberos 5 functions");
+MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
diff --git a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_unseal.c b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_unseal.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..4fbc50a0a2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_unseal.c
@@ -0,0 +1,128 @@
+/*
+ *  linux/net/sunrpc/gss_krb5_unseal.c
+ *
+ *  Adapted from MIT Kerberos 5-1.2.1 lib/gssapi/krb5/k5unseal.c
+ *
+ *  Copyright (c) 2000-2008 The Regents of the University of Michigan.
+ *  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ *  Andy Adamson   <andros@umich.edu>
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright 1993 by OpenVision Technologies, Inc.
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, distribute, and sell this software
+ * and its documentation for any purpose is hereby granted without fee,
+ * provided that the above copyright notice appears in all copies and
+ * that both that copyright notice and this permission notice appear in
+ * supporting documentation, and that the name of OpenVision not be used
+ * in advertising or publicity pertaining to distribution of the software
+ * without specific, written prior permission. OpenVision makes no
+ * representations about the suitability of this software for any
+ * purpose.  It is provided "as is" without express or implied warranty.
+ *
+ * OPENVISION DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE,
+ * INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS, IN NO
+ * EVENT SHALL OPENVISION BE LIABLE FOR ANY SPECIAL, INDIRECT OR
+ * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF
+ * USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR
+ * OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR
+ * PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 1998 by the FundsXpress, INC.
+ *
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Export of this software from the United States of America may require
+ * a specific license from the United States Government.  It is the
+ * responsibility of any person or organization contemplating export to
+ * obtain such a license before exporting.
+ *
+ * WITHIN THAT CONSTRAINT, permission to use, copy, modify, and
+ * distribute this software and its documentation for any purpose and
+ * without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above copyright
+ * notice appear in all copies and that both that copyright notice and
+ * this permission notice appear in supporting documentation, and that
+ * the name of FundsXpress. not be used in advertising or publicity pertaining
+ * to distribution of the software without specific, written prior
+ * permission.  FundsXpress makes no representations about the suitability of
+ * this software for any purpose.  It is provided "as is" without express
+ * or implied warranty.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED ``AS IS'' AND WITHOUT ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, WITHOUT LIMITATION, THE IMPLIED
+ * WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTIBILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
+ */
+
+#include <crypto/algapi.h>
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/jiffies.h>
+#include <linux/sunrpc/gss_krb5.h>
+#include <linux/crypto.h>
+
+#include "gss_krb5_internal.h"
+
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SUNRPC_DEBUG)
+# define RPCDBG_FACILITY        RPCDBG_AUTH
+#endif
+
+u32
+gss_krb5_verify_mic_v2(struct krb5_ctx *ctx, struct xdr_buf *message_buffer,
+		       struct xdr_netobj *read_token)
+{
+	struct crypto_ahash *tfm = ctx->initiate ?
+				   ctx->acceptor_sign : ctx->initiator_sign;
+	char cksumdata[GSS_KRB5_MAX_CKSUM_LEN];
+	struct xdr_netobj cksumobj = {
+		.len	= ctx->gk5e->cksumlength,
+		.data	= cksumdata,
+	};
+	u8 *ptr = read_token->data;
+	__be16 be16_ptr;
+	time64_t now;
+	u8 flags;
+	int i;
+
+	dprintk("RPC:       %s\n", __func__);
+
+	memcpy(&be16_ptr, (char *) ptr, 2);
+	if (be16_to_cpu(be16_ptr) != KG2_TOK_MIC)
+		return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
+
+	flags = ptr[2];
+	if ((!ctx->initiate && (flags & KG2_TOKEN_FLAG_SENTBYACCEPTOR)) ||
+	    (ctx->initiate && !(flags & KG2_TOKEN_FLAG_SENTBYACCEPTOR)))
+		return GSS_S_BAD_SIG;
+
+	if (flags & KG2_TOKEN_FLAG_SEALED) {
+		dprintk("%s: token has unexpected sealed flag\n", __func__);
+		return GSS_S_FAILURE;
+	}
+
+	for (i = 3; i < 8; i++)
+		if (ptr[i] != 0xff)
+			return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
+
+	if (gss_krb5_checksum(tfm, ptr, GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN,
+			      message_buffer, 0, &cksumobj))
+		return GSS_S_FAILURE;
+
+	if (memcmp(cksumobj.data, ptr + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN,
+				ctx->gk5e->cksumlength))
+		return GSS_S_BAD_SIG;
+
+	/* it got through unscathed.  Make sure the context is unexpired */
+	now = ktime_get_real_seconds();
+	if (now > ctx->endtime)
+		return GSS_S_CONTEXT_EXPIRED;
+
+	/*
+	 * NOTE: the sequence number at ptr + 8 is skipped, rpcsec_gss
+	 * doesn't want it checked; see page 6 of rfc 2203.
+	 */
+
+	return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
+}
diff --git a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_wrap.c b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_wrap.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..b3e1738ff6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_wrap.c
@@ -0,0 +1,237 @@
+/*
+ * COPYRIGHT (c) 2008
+ * The Regents of the University of Michigan
+ * ALL RIGHTS RESERVED
+ *
+ * Permission is granted to use, copy, create derivative works
+ * and redistribute this software and such derivative works
+ * for any purpose, so long as the name of The University of
+ * Michigan is not used in any advertising or publicity
+ * pertaining to the use of distribution of this software
+ * without specific, written prior authorization.  If the
+ * above copyright notice or any other identification of the
+ * University of Michigan is included in any copy of any
+ * portion of this software, then the disclaimer below must
+ * also be included.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED AS IS, WITHOUT REPRESENTATION
+ * FROM THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN AS TO ITS FITNESS FOR ANY
+ * PURPOSE, AND WITHOUT WARRANTY BY THE UNIVERSITY OF
+ * MICHIGAN OF ANY KIND, EITHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING
+ * WITHOUT LIMITATION THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. THE
+ * REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN SHALL NOT BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DAMAGES, INCLUDING SPECIAL, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, OR
+ * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES, WITH RESPECT TO ANY CLAIM ARISING
+ * OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OF THE SOFTWARE, EVEN
+ * IF IT HAS BEEN OR IS HEREAFTER ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGES.
+ */
+
+#include <crypto/skcipher.h>
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/jiffies.h>
+#include <linux/sunrpc/gss_krb5.h>
+#include <linux/pagemap.h>
+
+#include "gss_krb5_internal.h"
+
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SUNRPC_DEBUG)
+# define RPCDBG_FACILITY	RPCDBG_AUTH
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * We can shift data by up to LOCAL_BUF_LEN bytes in a pass.  If we need
+ * to do more than that, we shift repeatedly.  Kevin Coffman reports
+ * seeing 28 bytes as the value used by Microsoft clients and servers
+ * with AES, so this constant is chosen to allow handling 28 in one pass
+ * without using too much stack space.
+ *
+ * If that proves to a problem perhaps we could use a more clever
+ * algorithm.
+ */
+#define LOCAL_BUF_LEN 32u
+
+static void rotate_buf_a_little(struct xdr_buf *buf, unsigned int shift)
+{
+	char head[LOCAL_BUF_LEN];
+	char tmp[LOCAL_BUF_LEN];
+	unsigned int this_len, i;
+
+	BUG_ON(shift > LOCAL_BUF_LEN);
+
+	read_bytes_from_xdr_buf(buf, 0, head, shift);
+	for (i = 0; i + shift < buf->len; i += LOCAL_BUF_LEN) {
+		this_len = min(LOCAL_BUF_LEN, buf->len - (i + shift));
+		read_bytes_from_xdr_buf(buf, i+shift, tmp, this_len);
+		write_bytes_to_xdr_buf(buf, i, tmp, this_len);
+	}
+	write_bytes_to_xdr_buf(buf, buf->len - shift, head, shift);
+}
+
+static void _rotate_left(struct xdr_buf *buf, unsigned int shift)
+{
+	int shifted = 0;
+	int this_shift;
+
+	shift %= buf->len;
+	while (shifted < shift) {
+		this_shift = min(shift - shifted, LOCAL_BUF_LEN);
+		rotate_buf_a_little(buf, this_shift);
+		shifted += this_shift;
+	}
+}
+
+static void rotate_left(u32 base, struct xdr_buf *buf, unsigned int shift)
+{
+	struct xdr_buf subbuf;
+
+	xdr_buf_subsegment(buf, &subbuf, base, buf->len - base);
+	_rotate_left(&subbuf, shift);
+}
+
+u32
+gss_krb5_wrap_v2(struct krb5_ctx *kctx, int offset,
+		 struct xdr_buf *buf, struct page **pages)
+{
+	u8		*ptr;
+	time64_t	now;
+	u8		flags = 0x00;
+	__be16		*be16ptr;
+	__be64		*be64ptr;
+	u32		err;
+
+	dprintk("RPC:       %s\n", __func__);
+
+	/* make room for gss token header */
+	if (xdr_extend_head(buf, offset, GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN))
+		return GSS_S_FAILURE;
+
+	/* construct gss token header */
+	ptr = buf->head[0].iov_base + offset;
+	*ptr++ = (unsigned char) ((KG2_TOK_WRAP>>8) & 0xff);
+	*ptr++ = (unsigned char) (KG2_TOK_WRAP & 0xff);
+
+	if ((kctx->flags & KRB5_CTX_FLAG_INITIATOR) == 0)
+		flags |= KG2_TOKEN_FLAG_SENTBYACCEPTOR;
+	if ((kctx->flags & KRB5_CTX_FLAG_ACCEPTOR_SUBKEY) != 0)
+		flags |= KG2_TOKEN_FLAG_ACCEPTORSUBKEY;
+	/* We always do confidentiality in wrap tokens */
+	flags |= KG2_TOKEN_FLAG_SEALED;
+
+	*ptr++ = flags;
+	*ptr++ = 0xff;
+	be16ptr = (__be16 *)ptr;
+
+	*be16ptr++ = 0;
+	/* "inner" token header always uses 0 for RRC */
+	*be16ptr++ = 0;
+
+	be64ptr = (__be64 *)be16ptr;
+	*be64ptr = cpu_to_be64(atomic64_fetch_inc(&kctx->seq_send64));
+
+	err = (*kctx->gk5e->encrypt)(kctx, offset, buf, pages);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	now = ktime_get_real_seconds();
+	return (kctx->endtime < now) ? GSS_S_CONTEXT_EXPIRED : GSS_S_COMPLETE;
+}
+
+u32
+gss_krb5_unwrap_v2(struct krb5_ctx *kctx, int offset, int len,
+		   struct xdr_buf *buf, unsigned int *slack,
+		   unsigned int *align)
+{
+	time64_t	now;
+	u8		*ptr;
+	u8		flags = 0x00;
+	u16		ec, rrc;
+	int		err;
+	u32		headskip, tailskip;
+	u8		decrypted_hdr[GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN];
+	unsigned int	movelen;
+
+
+	dprintk("RPC:       %s\n", __func__);
+
+	ptr = buf->head[0].iov_base + offset;
+
+	if (be16_to_cpu(*((__be16 *)ptr)) != KG2_TOK_WRAP)
+		return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
+
+	flags = ptr[2];
+	if ((!kctx->initiate && (flags & KG2_TOKEN_FLAG_SENTBYACCEPTOR)) ||
+	    (kctx->initiate && !(flags & KG2_TOKEN_FLAG_SENTBYACCEPTOR)))
+		return GSS_S_BAD_SIG;
+
+	if ((flags & KG2_TOKEN_FLAG_SEALED) == 0) {
+		dprintk("%s: token missing expected sealed flag\n", __func__);
+		return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
+	}
+
+	if (ptr[3] != 0xff)
+		return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
+
+	ec = be16_to_cpup((__be16 *)(ptr + 4));
+	rrc = be16_to_cpup((__be16 *)(ptr + 6));
+
+	/*
+	 * NOTE: the sequence number at ptr + 8 is skipped, rpcsec_gss
+	 * doesn't want it checked; see page 6 of rfc 2203.
+	 */
+
+	if (rrc != 0)
+		rotate_left(offset + 16, buf, rrc);
+
+	err = (*kctx->gk5e->decrypt)(kctx, offset, len, buf,
+				     &headskip, &tailskip);
+	if (err)
+		return GSS_S_FAILURE;
+
+	/*
+	 * Retrieve the decrypted gss token header and verify
+	 * it against the original
+	 */
+	err = read_bytes_from_xdr_buf(buf,
+				len - GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN - tailskip,
+				decrypted_hdr, GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN);
+	if (err) {
+		dprintk("%s: error %u getting decrypted_hdr\n", __func__, err);
+		return GSS_S_FAILURE;
+	}
+	if (memcmp(ptr, decrypted_hdr, 6)
+				|| memcmp(ptr + 8, decrypted_hdr + 8, 8)) {
+		dprintk("%s: token hdr, plaintext hdr mismatch!\n", __func__);
+		return GSS_S_FAILURE;
+	}
+
+	/* do sequencing checks */
+
+	/* it got through unscathed.  Make sure the context is unexpired */
+	now = ktime_get_real_seconds();
+	if (now > kctx->endtime)
+		return GSS_S_CONTEXT_EXPIRED;
+
+	/*
+	 * Move the head data back to the right position in xdr_buf.
+	 * We ignore any "ec" data since it might be in the head or
+	 * the tail, and we really don't need to deal with it.
+	 * Note that buf->head[0].iov_len may indicate the available
+	 * head buffer space rather than that actually occupied.
+	 */
+	movelen = min_t(unsigned int, buf->head[0].iov_len, len);
+	movelen -= offset + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN + headskip;
+	BUG_ON(offset + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN + headskip + movelen >
+							buf->head[0].iov_len);
+	memmove(ptr, ptr + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN + headskip, movelen);
+	buf->head[0].iov_len -= GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN + headskip;
+	buf->len = len - (GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN + headskip);
+
+	/* Trim off the trailing "extra count" and checksum blob */
+	xdr_buf_trim(buf, ec + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN + tailskip);
+
+	*align = XDR_QUADLEN(GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN + headskip);
+	*slack = *align + XDR_QUADLEN(ec + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN + tailskip);
+	return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
+}
diff --git a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_mech_switch.c b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_mech_switch.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..fae632da10
--- /dev/null
+++ b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_mech_switch.c
@@ -0,0 +1,448 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
+/*
+ *  linux/net/sunrpc/gss_mech_switch.c
+ *
+ *  Copyright (c) 2001 The Regents of the University of Michigan.
+ *  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ *  J. Bruce Fields   <bfields@umich.edu>
+ */
+
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/oid_registry.h>
+#include <linux/sunrpc/msg_prot.h>
+#include <linux/sunrpc/gss_asn1.h>
+#include <linux/sunrpc/auth_gss.h>
+#include <linux/sunrpc/svcauth_gss.h>
+#include <linux/sunrpc/gss_err.h>
+#include <linux/sunrpc/sched.h>
+#include <linux/sunrpc/gss_api.h>
+#include <linux/sunrpc/clnt.h>
+#include <trace/events/rpcgss.h>
+
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SUNRPC_DEBUG)
+# define RPCDBG_FACILITY        RPCDBG_AUTH
+#endif
+
+static LIST_HEAD(registered_mechs);
+static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(registered_mechs_lock);
+
+static void
+gss_mech_free(struct gss_api_mech *gm)
+{
+	struct pf_desc *pf;
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < gm->gm_pf_num; i++) {
+		pf = &gm->gm_pfs[i];
+		if (pf->domain)
+			auth_domain_put(pf->domain);
+		kfree(pf->auth_domain_name);
+		pf->auth_domain_name = NULL;
+	}
+}
+
+static inline char *
+make_auth_domain_name(char *name)
+{
+	static char	*prefix = "gss/";
+	char		*new;
+
+	new = kmalloc(strlen(name) + strlen(prefix) + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (new) {
+		strcpy(new, prefix);
+		strcat(new, name);
+	}
+	return new;
+}
+
+static int
+gss_mech_svc_setup(struct gss_api_mech *gm)
+{
+	struct auth_domain *dom;
+	struct pf_desc *pf;
+	int i, status;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < gm->gm_pf_num; i++) {
+		pf = &gm->gm_pfs[i];
+		pf->auth_domain_name = make_auth_domain_name(pf->name);
+		status = -ENOMEM;
+		if (pf->auth_domain_name == NULL)
+			goto out;
+		dom = svcauth_gss_register_pseudoflavor(
+			pf->pseudoflavor, pf->auth_domain_name);
+		if (IS_ERR(dom)) {
+			status = PTR_ERR(dom);
+			goto out;
+		}
+		pf->domain = dom;
+	}
+	return 0;
+out:
+	gss_mech_free(gm);
+	return status;
+}
+
+/**
+ * gss_mech_register - register a GSS mechanism
+ * @gm: GSS mechanism handle
+ *
+ * Returns zero if successful, or a negative errno.
+ */
+int gss_mech_register(struct gss_api_mech *gm)
+{
+	int status;
+
+	status = gss_mech_svc_setup(gm);
+	if (status)
+		return status;
+	spin_lock(&registered_mechs_lock);
+	list_add_rcu(&gm->gm_list, &registered_mechs);
+	spin_unlock(&registered_mechs_lock);
+	dprintk("RPC:       registered gss mechanism %s\n", gm->gm_name);
+	return 0;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(gss_mech_register);
+
+/**
+ * gss_mech_unregister - release a GSS mechanism
+ * @gm: GSS mechanism handle
+ *
+ */
+void gss_mech_unregister(struct gss_api_mech *gm)
+{
+	spin_lock(&registered_mechs_lock);
+	list_del_rcu(&gm->gm_list);
+	spin_unlock(&registered_mechs_lock);
+	dprintk("RPC:       unregistered gss mechanism %s\n", gm->gm_name);
+	gss_mech_free(gm);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(gss_mech_unregister);
+
+struct gss_api_mech *gss_mech_get(struct gss_api_mech *gm)
+{
+	__module_get(gm->gm_owner);
+	return gm;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(gss_mech_get);
+
+static struct gss_api_mech *
+_gss_mech_get_by_name(const char *name)
+{
+	struct gss_api_mech	*pos, *gm = NULL;
+
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	list_for_each_entry_rcu(pos, &registered_mechs, gm_list) {
+		if (0 == strcmp(name, pos->gm_name)) {
+			if (try_module_get(pos->gm_owner))
+				gm = pos;
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+	return gm;
+
+}
+
+struct gss_api_mech * gss_mech_get_by_name(const char *name)
+{
+	struct gss_api_mech *gm = NULL;
+
+	gm = _gss_mech_get_by_name(name);
+	if (!gm) {
+		request_module("rpc-auth-gss-%s", name);
+		gm = _gss_mech_get_by_name(name);
+	}
+	return gm;
+}
+
+struct gss_api_mech *gss_mech_get_by_OID(struct rpcsec_gss_oid *obj)
+{
+	struct gss_api_mech	*pos, *gm = NULL;
+	char buf[32];
+
+	if (sprint_oid(obj->data, obj->len, buf, sizeof(buf)) < 0)
+		return NULL;
+	request_module("rpc-auth-gss-%s", buf);
+
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	list_for_each_entry_rcu(pos, &registered_mechs, gm_list) {
+		if (obj->len == pos->gm_oid.len) {
+			if (0 == memcmp(obj->data, pos->gm_oid.data, obj->len)) {
+				if (try_module_get(pos->gm_owner))
+					gm = pos;
+				break;
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+	if (!gm)
+		trace_rpcgss_oid_to_mech(buf);
+	return gm;
+}
+
+static inline int
+mech_supports_pseudoflavor(struct gss_api_mech *gm, u32 pseudoflavor)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < gm->gm_pf_num; i++) {
+		if (gm->gm_pfs[i].pseudoflavor == pseudoflavor)
+			return 1;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static struct gss_api_mech *_gss_mech_get_by_pseudoflavor(u32 pseudoflavor)
+{
+	struct gss_api_mech *gm = NULL, *pos;
+
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	list_for_each_entry_rcu(pos, &registered_mechs, gm_list) {
+		if (!mech_supports_pseudoflavor(pos, pseudoflavor))
+			continue;
+		if (try_module_get(pos->gm_owner))
+			gm = pos;
+		break;
+	}
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+	return gm;
+}
+
+struct gss_api_mech *
+gss_mech_get_by_pseudoflavor(u32 pseudoflavor)
+{
+	struct gss_api_mech *gm;
+
+	gm = _gss_mech_get_by_pseudoflavor(pseudoflavor);
+
+	if (!gm) {
+		request_module("rpc-auth-gss-%u", pseudoflavor);
+		gm = _gss_mech_get_by_pseudoflavor(pseudoflavor);
+	}
+	return gm;
+}
+
+/**
+ * gss_svc_to_pseudoflavor - map a GSS service number to a pseudoflavor
+ * @gm: GSS mechanism handle
+ * @qop: GSS quality-of-protection value
+ * @service: GSS service value
+ *
+ * Returns a matching security flavor, or RPC_AUTH_MAXFLAVOR if none is found.
+ */
+rpc_authflavor_t gss_svc_to_pseudoflavor(struct gss_api_mech *gm, u32 qop,
+					 u32 service)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < gm->gm_pf_num; i++) {
+		if (gm->gm_pfs[i].qop == qop &&
+		    gm->gm_pfs[i].service == service) {
+			return gm->gm_pfs[i].pseudoflavor;
+		}
+	}
+	return RPC_AUTH_MAXFLAVOR;
+}
+
+/**
+ * gss_mech_info2flavor - look up a pseudoflavor given a GSS tuple
+ * @info: a GSS mech OID, quality of protection, and service value
+ *
+ * Returns a matching pseudoflavor, or RPC_AUTH_MAXFLAVOR if the tuple is
+ * not supported.
+ */
+rpc_authflavor_t gss_mech_info2flavor(struct rpcsec_gss_info *info)
+{
+	rpc_authflavor_t pseudoflavor;
+	struct gss_api_mech *gm;
+
+	gm = gss_mech_get_by_OID(&info->oid);
+	if (gm == NULL)
+		return RPC_AUTH_MAXFLAVOR;
+
+	pseudoflavor = gss_svc_to_pseudoflavor(gm, info->qop, info->service);
+
+	gss_mech_put(gm);
+	return pseudoflavor;
+}
+
+/**
+ * gss_mech_flavor2info - look up a GSS tuple for a given pseudoflavor
+ * @pseudoflavor: GSS pseudoflavor to match
+ * @info: rpcsec_gss_info structure to fill in
+ *
+ * Returns zero and fills in "info" if pseudoflavor matches a
+ * supported mechanism.  Otherwise a negative errno is returned.
+ */
+int gss_mech_flavor2info(rpc_authflavor_t pseudoflavor,
+			 struct rpcsec_gss_info *info)
+{
+	struct gss_api_mech *gm;
+	int i;
+
+	gm = gss_mech_get_by_pseudoflavor(pseudoflavor);
+	if (gm == NULL)
+		return -ENOENT;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < gm->gm_pf_num; i++) {
+		if (gm->gm_pfs[i].pseudoflavor == pseudoflavor) {
+			memcpy(info->oid.data, gm->gm_oid.data, gm->gm_oid.len);
+			info->oid.len = gm->gm_oid.len;
+			info->qop = gm->gm_pfs[i].qop;
+			info->service = gm->gm_pfs[i].service;
+			gss_mech_put(gm);
+			return 0;
+		}
+	}
+
+	gss_mech_put(gm);
+	return -ENOENT;
+}
+
+u32
+gss_pseudoflavor_to_service(struct gss_api_mech *gm, u32 pseudoflavor)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < gm->gm_pf_num; i++) {
+		if (gm->gm_pfs[i].pseudoflavor == pseudoflavor)
+			return gm->gm_pfs[i].service;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(gss_pseudoflavor_to_service);
+
+bool
+gss_pseudoflavor_to_datatouch(struct gss_api_mech *gm, u32 pseudoflavor)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < gm->gm_pf_num; i++) {
+		if (gm->gm_pfs[i].pseudoflavor == pseudoflavor)
+			return gm->gm_pfs[i].datatouch;
+	}
+	return false;
+}
+
+char *
+gss_service_to_auth_domain_name(struct gss_api_mech *gm, u32 service)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < gm->gm_pf_num; i++) {
+		if (gm->gm_pfs[i].service == service)
+			return gm->gm_pfs[i].auth_domain_name;
+	}
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+void
+gss_mech_put(struct gss_api_mech * gm)
+{
+	if (gm)
+		module_put(gm->gm_owner);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(gss_mech_put);
+
+/* The mech could probably be determined from the token instead, but it's just
+ * as easy for now to pass it in. */
+int
+gss_import_sec_context(const void *input_token, size_t bufsize,
+		       struct gss_api_mech	*mech,
+		       struct gss_ctx		**ctx_id,
+		       time64_t			*endtime,
+		       gfp_t gfp_mask)
+{
+	if (!(*ctx_id = kzalloc(sizeof(**ctx_id), gfp_mask)))
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	(*ctx_id)->mech_type = gss_mech_get(mech);
+
+	return mech->gm_ops->gss_import_sec_context(input_token, bufsize,
+						*ctx_id, endtime, gfp_mask);
+}
+
+/* gss_get_mic: compute a mic over message and return mic_token. */
+
+u32
+gss_get_mic(struct gss_ctx	*context_handle,
+	    struct xdr_buf	*message,
+	    struct xdr_netobj	*mic_token)
+{
+	 return context_handle->mech_type->gm_ops
+		->gss_get_mic(context_handle,
+			      message,
+			      mic_token);
+}
+
+/* gss_verify_mic: check whether the provided mic_token verifies message. */
+
+u32
+gss_verify_mic(struct gss_ctx		*context_handle,
+	       struct xdr_buf		*message,
+	       struct xdr_netobj	*mic_token)
+{
+	return context_handle->mech_type->gm_ops
+		->gss_verify_mic(context_handle,
+				 message,
+				 mic_token);
+}
+
+/*
+ * This function is called from both the client and server code.
+ * Each makes guarantees about how much "slack" space is available
+ * for the underlying function in "buf"'s head and tail while
+ * performing the wrap.
+ *
+ * The client and server code allocate RPC_MAX_AUTH_SIZE extra
+ * space in both the head and tail which is available for use by
+ * the wrap function.
+ *
+ * Underlying functions should verify they do not use more than
+ * RPC_MAX_AUTH_SIZE of extra space in either the head or tail
+ * when performing the wrap.
+ */
+u32
+gss_wrap(struct gss_ctx	*ctx_id,
+	 int		offset,
+	 struct xdr_buf	*buf,
+	 struct page	**inpages)
+{
+	return ctx_id->mech_type->gm_ops
+		->gss_wrap(ctx_id, offset, buf, inpages);
+}
+
+u32
+gss_unwrap(struct gss_ctx	*ctx_id,
+	   int			offset,
+	   int			len,
+	   struct xdr_buf	*buf)
+{
+	return ctx_id->mech_type->gm_ops
+		->gss_unwrap(ctx_id, offset, len, buf);
+}
+
+
+/* gss_delete_sec_context: free all resources associated with context_handle.
+ * Note this differs from the RFC 2744-specified prototype in that we don't
+ * bother returning an output token, since it would never be used anyway. */
+
+u32
+gss_delete_sec_context(struct gss_ctx	**context_handle)
+{
+	dprintk("RPC:       gss_delete_sec_context deleting %p\n",
+			*context_handle);
+
+	if (!*context_handle)
+		return GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT;
+	if ((*context_handle)->internal_ctx_id)
+		(*context_handle)->mech_type->gm_ops
+			->gss_delete_sec_context((*context_handle)
+							->internal_ctx_id);
+	gss_mech_put((*context_handle)->mech_type);
+	kfree(*context_handle);
+	*context_handle=NULL;
+	return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
+}
diff --git a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_rpc_upcall.c b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_rpc_upcall.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..f549e4c05d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_rpc_upcall.c
@@ -0,0 +1,403 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+
+/*
+ *  linux/net/sunrpc/gss_rpc_upcall.c
+ *
+ *  Copyright (C) 2012 Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com>
+ */
+
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/un.h>
+
+#include <linux/sunrpc/svcauth.h>
+#include "gss_rpc_upcall.h"
+
+#define GSSPROXY_SOCK_PATHNAME	"/var/run/gssproxy.sock"
+
+#define GSSPROXY_PROGRAM	(400112u)
+#define GSSPROXY_VERS_1		(1u)
+
+/*
+ * Encoding/Decoding functions
+ */
+
+enum {
+	GSSX_NULL = 0,	/* Unused */
+        GSSX_INDICATE_MECHS = 1,
+        GSSX_GET_CALL_CONTEXT = 2,
+        GSSX_IMPORT_AND_CANON_NAME = 3,
+        GSSX_EXPORT_CRED = 4,
+        GSSX_IMPORT_CRED = 5,
+        GSSX_ACQUIRE_CRED = 6,
+        GSSX_STORE_CRED = 7,
+        GSSX_INIT_SEC_CONTEXT = 8,
+        GSSX_ACCEPT_SEC_CONTEXT = 9,
+        GSSX_RELEASE_HANDLE = 10,
+        GSSX_GET_MIC = 11,
+        GSSX_VERIFY = 12,
+        GSSX_WRAP = 13,
+        GSSX_UNWRAP = 14,
+        GSSX_WRAP_SIZE_LIMIT = 15,
+};
+
+#define PROC(proc, name)				\
+[GSSX_##proc] = {					\
+	.p_proc   = GSSX_##proc,			\
+	.p_encode = gssx_enc_##name,	\
+	.p_decode = gssx_dec_##name,	\
+	.p_arglen = GSSX_ARG_##name##_sz,		\
+	.p_replen = GSSX_RES_##name##_sz, 		\
+	.p_statidx = GSSX_##proc,			\
+	.p_name   = #proc,				\
+}
+
+static const struct rpc_procinfo gssp_procedures[] = {
+	PROC(INDICATE_MECHS, indicate_mechs),
+        PROC(GET_CALL_CONTEXT, get_call_context),
+        PROC(IMPORT_AND_CANON_NAME, import_and_canon_name),
+        PROC(EXPORT_CRED, export_cred),
+        PROC(IMPORT_CRED, import_cred),
+        PROC(ACQUIRE_CRED, acquire_cred),
+        PROC(STORE_CRED, store_cred),
+        PROC(INIT_SEC_CONTEXT, init_sec_context),
+        PROC(ACCEPT_SEC_CONTEXT, accept_sec_context),
+        PROC(RELEASE_HANDLE, release_handle),
+        PROC(GET_MIC, get_mic),
+        PROC(VERIFY, verify),
+        PROC(WRAP, wrap),
+        PROC(UNWRAP, unwrap),
+        PROC(WRAP_SIZE_LIMIT, wrap_size_limit),
+};
+
+
+
+/*
+ * Common transport functions
+ */
+
+static const struct rpc_program gssp_program;
+
+static int gssp_rpc_create(struct net *net, struct rpc_clnt **_clnt)
+{
+	static const struct sockaddr_un gssp_localaddr = {
+		.sun_family		= AF_LOCAL,
+		.sun_path		= GSSPROXY_SOCK_PATHNAME,
+	};
+	struct rpc_create_args args = {
+		.net		= net,
+		.protocol	= XPRT_TRANSPORT_LOCAL,
+		.address	= (struct sockaddr *)&gssp_localaddr,
+		.addrsize	= sizeof(gssp_localaddr),
+		.servername	= "localhost",
+		.program	= &gssp_program,
+		.version	= GSSPROXY_VERS_1,
+		.authflavor	= RPC_AUTH_NULL,
+		/*
+		 * Note we want connection to be done in the caller's
+		 * filesystem namespace.  We therefore turn off the idle
+		 * timeout, which would result in reconnections being
+		 * done without the correct namespace:
+		 */
+		.flags		= RPC_CLNT_CREATE_NOPING |
+				  RPC_CLNT_CREATE_CONNECTED |
+				  RPC_CLNT_CREATE_NO_IDLE_TIMEOUT
+	};
+	struct rpc_clnt *clnt;
+	int result = 0;
+
+	clnt = rpc_create(&args);
+	if (IS_ERR(clnt)) {
+		dprintk("RPC:       failed to create AF_LOCAL gssproxy "
+				"client (errno %ld).\n", PTR_ERR(clnt));
+		result = PTR_ERR(clnt);
+		*_clnt = NULL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	dprintk("RPC:       created new gssp local client (gssp_local_clnt: "
+			"%p)\n", clnt);
+	*_clnt = clnt;
+
+out:
+	return result;
+}
+
+void init_gssp_clnt(struct sunrpc_net *sn)
+{
+	mutex_init(&sn->gssp_lock);
+	sn->gssp_clnt = NULL;
+}
+
+int set_gssp_clnt(struct net *net)
+{
+	struct sunrpc_net *sn = net_generic(net, sunrpc_net_id);
+	struct rpc_clnt *clnt;
+	int ret;
+
+	mutex_lock(&sn->gssp_lock);
+	ret = gssp_rpc_create(net, &clnt);
+	if (!ret) {
+		if (sn->gssp_clnt)
+			rpc_shutdown_client(sn->gssp_clnt);
+		sn->gssp_clnt = clnt;
+	}
+	mutex_unlock(&sn->gssp_lock);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+void clear_gssp_clnt(struct sunrpc_net *sn)
+{
+	mutex_lock(&sn->gssp_lock);
+	if (sn->gssp_clnt) {
+		rpc_shutdown_client(sn->gssp_clnt);
+		sn->gssp_clnt = NULL;
+	}
+	mutex_unlock(&sn->gssp_lock);
+}
+
+static struct rpc_clnt *get_gssp_clnt(struct sunrpc_net *sn)
+{
+	struct rpc_clnt *clnt;
+
+	mutex_lock(&sn->gssp_lock);
+	clnt = sn->gssp_clnt;
+	if (clnt)
+		refcount_inc(&clnt->cl_count);
+	mutex_unlock(&sn->gssp_lock);
+	return clnt;
+}
+
+static int gssp_call(struct net *net, struct rpc_message *msg)
+{
+	struct sunrpc_net *sn = net_generic(net, sunrpc_net_id);
+	struct rpc_clnt *clnt;
+	int status;
+
+	clnt = get_gssp_clnt(sn);
+	if (!clnt)
+		return -EIO;
+	status = rpc_call_sync(clnt, msg, 0);
+	if (status < 0) {
+		dprintk("gssp: rpc_call returned error %d\n", -status);
+		switch (status) {
+		case -EPROTONOSUPPORT:
+			status = -EINVAL;
+			break;
+		case -ECONNREFUSED:
+		case -ETIMEDOUT:
+		case -ENOTCONN:
+			status = -EAGAIN;
+			break;
+		case -ERESTARTSYS:
+			if (signalled ())
+				status = -EINTR;
+			break;
+		default:
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+	rpc_release_client(clnt);
+	return status;
+}
+
+static void gssp_free_receive_pages(struct gssx_arg_accept_sec_context *arg)
+{
+	unsigned int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < arg->npages && arg->pages[i]; i++)
+		__free_page(arg->pages[i]);
+
+	kfree(arg->pages);
+}
+
+static int gssp_alloc_receive_pages(struct gssx_arg_accept_sec_context *arg)
+{
+	unsigned int i;
+
+	arg->npages = DIV_ROUND_UP(NGROUPS_MAX * 4, PAGE_SIZE);
+	arg->pages = kcalloc(arg->npages, sizeof(struct page *), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!arg->pages)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	for (i = 0; i < arg->npages; i++) {
+		arg->pages[i] = alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (!arg->pages[i]) {
+			gssp_free_receive_pages(arg);
+			return -ENOMEM;
+		}
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static char *gssp_stringify(struct xdr_netobj *netobj)
+{
+	return kmemdup_nul(netobj->data, netobj->len, GFP_KERNEL);
+}
+
+static void gssp_hostbased_service(char **principal)
+{
+	char *c;
+
+	if (!*principal)
+		return;
+
+	/* terminate and remove realm part */
+	c = strchr(*principal, '@');
+	if (c) {
+		*c = '\0';
+
+		/* change service-hostname delimiter */
+		c = strchr(*principal, '/');
+		if (c)
+			*c = '@';
+	}
+	if (!c) {
+		/* not a service principal */
+		kfree(*principal);
+		*principal = NULL;
+	}
+}
+
+/*
+ * Public functions
+ */
+
+/* numbers somewhat arbitrary but large enough for current needs */
+#define GSSX_MAX_OUT_HANDLE	128
+#define GSSX_MAX_SRC_PRINC	256
+#define GSSX_KMEMBUF (GSSX_max_output_handle_sz + \
+			GSSX_max_oid_sz + \
+			GSSX_max_princ_sz + \
+			sizeof(struct svc_cred))
+
+int gssp_accept_sec_context_upcall(struct net *net,
+				struct gssp_upcall_data *data)
+{
+	struct gssx_ctx ctxh = {
+		.state = data->in_handle
+	};
+	struct gssx_arg_accept_sec_context arg = {
+		.input_token = data->in_token,
+	};
+	struct gssx_ctx rctxh = {
+		/*
+		 * pass in the max length we expect for each of these
+		 * buffers but let the xdr code kmalloc them:
+		 */
+		.exported_context_token.len = GSSX_max_output_handle_sz,
+		.mech.len = GSS_OID_MAX_LEN,
+		.targ_name.display_name.len = GSSX_max_princ_sz,
+		.src_name.display_name.len = GSSX_max_princ_sz
+	};
+	struct gssx_res_accept_sec_context res = {
+		.context_handle = &rctxh,
+		.output_token = &data->out_token
+	};
+	struct rpc_message msg = {
+		.rpc_proc = &gssp_procedures[GSSX_ACCEPT_SEC_CONTEXT],
+		.rpc_argp = &arg,
+		.rpc_resp = &res,
+		.rpc_cred = NULL, /* FIXME ? */
+	};
+	struct xdr_netobj client_name = { 0 , NULL };
+	struct xdr_netobj target_name = { 0, NULL };
+	int ret;
+
+	if (data->in_handle.len != 0)
+		arg.context_handle = &ctxh;
+	res.output_token->len = GSSX_max_output_token_sz;
+
+	ret = gssp_alloc_receive_pages(&arg);
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+
+	ret = gssp_call(net, &msg);
+
+	gssp_free_receive_pages(&arg);
+
+	/* we need to fetch all data even in case of error so
+	 * that we can free special strctures is they have been allocated */
+	data->major_status = res.status.major_status;
+	data->minor_status = res.status.minor_status;
+	if (res.context_handle) {
+		data->out_handle = rctxh.exported_context_token;
+		data->mech_oid.len = rctxh.mech.len;
+		if (rctxh.mech.data) {
+			memcpy(data->mech_oid.data, rctxh.mech.data,
+						data->mech_oid.len);
+			kfree(rctxh.mech.data);
+		}
+		client_name = rctxh.src_name.display_name;
+		target_name = rctxh.targ_name.display_name;
+	}
+
+	if (res.options.count == 1) {
+		gssx_buffer *value = &res.options.data[0].value;
+		/* Currently we only decode CREDS_VALUE, if we add
+		 * anything else we'll have to loop and match on the
+		 * option name */
+		if (value->len == 1) {
+			/* steal group info from struct svc_cred */
+			data->creds = *(struct svc_cred *)value->data;
+			data->found_creds = 1;
+		}
+		/* whether we use it or not, free data */
+		kfree(value->data);
+	}
+
+	if (res.options.count != 0) {
+		kfree(res.options.data);
+	}
+
+	/* convert to GSS_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE form and set into creds */
+	if (data->found_creds) {
+		if (client_name.data) {
+			data->creds.cr_raw_principal =
+					gssp_stringify(&client_name);
+			data->creds.cr_principal =
+					gssp_stringify(&client_name);
+			gssp_hostbased_service(&data->creds.cr_principal);
+		}
+		if (target_name.data) {
+			data->creds.cr_targ_princ =
+					gssp_stringify(&target_name);
+			gssp_hostbased_service(&data->creds.cr_targ_princ);
+		}
+	}
+	kfree(client_name.data);
+	kfree(target_name.data);
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+void gssp_free_upcall_data(struct gssp_upcall_data *data)
+{
+	kfree(data->in_handle.data);
+	kfree(data->out_handle.data);
+	kfree(data->out_token.data);
+	free_svc_cred(&data->creds);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Initialization stuff
+ */
+static unsigned int gssp_version1_counts[ARRAY_SIZE(gssp_procedures)];
+static const struct rpc_version gssp_version1 = {
+	.number		= GSSPROXY_VERS_1,
+	.nrprocs	= ARRAY_SIZE(gssp_procedures),
+	.procs		= gssp_procedures,
+	.counts		= gssp_version1_counts,
+};
+
+static const struct rpc_version *gssp_version[] = {
+	NULL,
+	&gssp_version1,
+};
+
+static struct rpc_stat gssp_stats;
+
+static const struct rpc_program gssp_program = {
+	.name		= "gssproxy",
+	.number		= GSSPROXY_PROGRAM,
+	.nrvers		= ARRAY_SIZE(gssp_version),
+	.version	= gssp_version,
+	.stats		= &gssp_stats,
+};
diff --git a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_rpc_upcall.h b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_rpc_upcall.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..31e9634416
--- /dev/null
+++ b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_rpc_upcall.h
@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+ */
+/*
+ *  linux/net/sunrpc/gss_rpc_upcall.h
+ *
+ *  Copyright (C) 2012 Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com>
+ */
+
+#ifndef _GSS_RPC_UPCALL_H
+#define _GSS_RPC_UPCALL_H
+
+#include <linux/sunrpc/gss_api.h>
+#include <linux/sunrpc/auth_gss.h>
+#include "gss_rpc_xdr.h"
+#include "../netns.h"
+
+struct gssp_upcall_data {
+	struct xdr_netobj in_handle;
+	struct gssp_in_token in_token;
+	struct xdr_netobj out_handle;
+	struct xdr_netobj out_token;
+	struct rpcsec_gss_oid mech_oid;
+	struct svc_cred creds;
+	int found_creds;
+	int major_status;
+	int minor_status;
+};
+
+int gssp_accept_sec_context_upcall(struct net *net,
+				struct gssp_upcall_data *data);
+void gssp_free_upcall_data(struct gssp_upcall_data *data);
+
+void init_gssp_clnt(struct sunrpc_net *);
+int set_gssp_clnt(struct net *);
+void clear_gssp_clnt(struct sunrpc_net *);
+
+#endif /* _GSS_RPC_UPCALL_H */
diff --git a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_rpc_xdr.c b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_rpc_xdr.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..d79f12c255
--- /dev/null
+++ b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_rpc_xdr.c
@@ -0,0 +1,838 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+
+/*
+ * GSS Proxy upcall module
+ *
+ *  Copyright (C) 2012 Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com>
+ */
+
+#include <linux/sunrpc/svcauth.h>
+#include "gss_rpc_xdr.h"
+
+static int gssx_enc_bool(struct xdr_stream *xdr, int v)
+{
+	__be32 *p;
+
+	p = xdr_reserve_space(xdr, 4);
+	if (unlikely(p == NULL))
+		return -ENOSPC;
+	*p = v ? xdr_one : xdr_zero;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int gssx_dec_bool(struct xdr_stream *xdr, u32 *v)
+{
+	__be32 *p;
+
+	p = xdr_inline_decode(xdr, 4);
+	if (unlikely(p == NULL))
+		return -ENOSPC;
+	*v = be32_to_cpu(*p);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int gssx_enc_buffer(struct xdr_stream *xdr,
+			   const gssx_buffer *buf)
+{
+	__be32 *p;
+
+	p = xdr_reserve_space(xdr, sizeof(u32) + buf->len);
+	if (!p)
+		return -ENOSPC;
+	xdr_encode_opaque(p, buf->data, buf->len);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int gssx_enc_in_token(struct xdr_stream *xdr,
+			     const struct gssp_in_token *in)
+{
+	__be32 *p;
+
+	p = xdr_reserve_space(xdr, 4);
+	if (!p)
+		return -ENOSPC;
+	*p = cpu_to_be32(in->page_len);
+
+	/* all we need to do is to write pages */
+	xdr_write_pages(xdr, in->pages, in->page_base, in->page_len);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+
+static int gssx_dec_buffer(struct xdr_stream *xdr,
+			   gssx_buffer *buf)
+{
+	u32 length;
+	__be32 *p;
+
+	p = xdr_inline_decode(xdr, 4);
+	if (unlikely(p == NULL))
+		return -ENOSPC;
+
+	length = be32_to_cpup(p);
+	p = xdr_inline_decode(xdr, length);
+	if (unlikely(p == NULL))
+		return -ENOSPC;
+
+	if (buf->len == 0) {
+		/* we intentionally are not interested in this buffer */
+		return 0;
+	}
+	if (length > buf->len)
+		return -ENOSPC;
+
+	if (!buf->data) {
+		buf->data = kmemdup(p, length, GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (!buf->data)
+			return -ENOMEM;
+	} else {
+		memcpy(buf->data, p, length);
+	}
+	buf->len = length;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int gssx_enc_option(struct xdr_stream *xdr,
+			   struct gssx_option *opt)
+{
+	int err;
+
+	err = gssx_enc_buffer(xdr, &opt->option);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+	err = gssx_enc_buffer(xdr, &opt->value);
+	return err;
+}
+
+static int gssx_dec_option(struct xdr_stream *xdr,
+			   struct gssx_option *opt)
+{
+	int err;
+
+	err = gssx_dec_buffer(xdr, &opt->option);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+	err = gssx_dec_buffer(xdr, &opt->value);
+	return err;
+}
+
+static int dummy_enc_opt_array(struct xdr_stream *xdr,
+				const struct gssx_option_array *oa)
+{
+	__be32 *p;
+
+	if (oa->count != 0)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	p = xdr_reserve_space(xdr, 4);
+	if (!p)
+		return -ENOSPC;
+	*p = 0;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int dummy_dec_opt_array(struct xdr_stream *xdr,
+				struct gssx_option_array *oa)
+{
+	struct gssx_option dummy;
+	u32 count, i;
+	__be32 *p;
+
+	p = xdr_inline_decode(xdr, 4);
+	if (unlikely(p == NULL))
+		return -ENOSPC;
+	count = be32_to_cpup(p++);
+	memset(&dummy, 0, sizeof(dummy));
+	for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
+		gssx_dec_option(xdr, &dummy);
+	}
+
+	oa->count = 0;
+	oa->data = NULL;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int get_host_u32(struct xdr_stream *xdr, u32 *res)
+{
+	__be32 *p;
+
+	p = xdr_inline_decode(xdr, 4);
+	if (!p)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	/* Contents of linux creds are all host-endian: */
+	memcpy(res, p, sizeof(u32));
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int gssx_dec_linux_creds(struct xdr_stream *xdr,
+				struct svc_cred *creds)
+{
+	u32 length;
+	__be32 *p;
+	u32 tmp;
+	u32 N;
+	int i, err;
+
+	p = xdr_inline_decode(xdr, 4);
+	if (unlikely(p == NULL))
+		return -ENOSPC;
+
+	length = be32_to_cpup(p);
+
+	if (length > (3 + NGROUPS_MAX) * sizeof(u32))
+		return -ENOSPC;
+
+	/* uid */
+	err = get_host_u32(xdr, &tmp);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+	creds->cr_uid = make_kuid(&init_user_ns, tmp);
+
+	/* gid */
+	err = get_host_u32(xdr, &tmp);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+	creds->cr_gid = make_kgid(&init_user_ns, tmp);
+
+	/* number of additional gid's */
+	err = get_host_u32(xdr, &tmp);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+	N = tmp;
+	if ((3 + N) * sizeof(u32) != length)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	creds->cr_group_info = groups_alloc(N);
+	if (creds->cr_group_info == NULL)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	/* gid's */
+	for (i = 0; i < N; i++) {
+		kgid_t kgid;
+		err = get_host_u32(xdr, &tmp);
+		if (err)
+			goto out_free_groups;
+		err = -EINVAL;
+		kgid = make_kgid(&init_user_ns, tmp);
+		if (!gid_valid(kgid))
+			goto out_free_groups;
+		creds->cr_group_info->gid[i] = kgid;
+	}
+	groups_sort(creds->cr_group_info);
+
+	return 0;
+out_free_groups:
+	groups_free(creds->cr_group_info);
+	return err;
+}
+
+static int gssx_dec_option_array(struct xdr_stream *xdr,
+				 struct gssx_option_array *oa)
+{
+	struct svc_cred *creds;
+	u32 count, i;
+	__be32 *p;
+	int err;
+
+	p = xdr_inline_decode(xdr, 4);
+	if (unlikely(p == NULL))
+		return -ENOSPC;
+	count = be32_to_cpup(p++);
+	if (!count)
+		return 0;
+
+	/* we recognize only 1 currently: CREDS_VALUE */
+	oa->count = 1;
+
+	oa->data = kmalloc(sizeof(struct gssx_option), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!oa->data)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	creds = kzalloc(sizeof(struct svc_cred), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!creds) {
+		kfree(oa->data);
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+
+	oa->data[0].option.data = CREDS_VALUE;
+	oa->data[0].option.len = sizeof(CREDS_VALUE);
+	oa->data[0].value.data = (void *)creds;
+	oa->data[0].value.len = 0;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
+		gssx_buffer dummy = { 0, NULL };
+		u32 length;
+
+		/* option buffer */
+		p = xdr_inline_decode(xdr, 4);
+		if (unlikely(p == NULL))
+			return -ENOSPC;
+
+		length = be32_to_cpup(p);
+		p = xdr_inline_decode(xdr, length);
+		if (unlikely(p == NULL))
+			return -ENOSPC;
+
+		if (length == sizeof(CREDS_VALUE) &&
+		    memcmp(p, CREDS_VALUE, sizeof(CREDS_VALUE)) == 0) {
+			/* We have creds here. parse them */
+			err = gssx_dec_linux_creds(xdr, creds);
+			if (err)
+				return err;
+			oa->data[0].value.len = 1; /* presence */
+		} else {
+			/* consume uninteresting buffer */
+			err = gssx_dec_buffer(xdr, &dummy);
+			if (err)
+				return err;
+		}
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int gssx_dec_status(struct xdr_stream *xdr,
+			   struct gssx_status *status)
+{
+	__be32 *p;
+	int err;
+
+	/* status->major_status */
+	p = xdr_inline_decode(xdr, 8);
+	if (unlikely(p == NULL))
+		return -ENOSPC;
+	p = xdr_decode_hyper(p, &status->major_status);
+
+	/* status->mech */
+	err = gssx_dec_buffer(xdr, &status->mech);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	/* status->minor_status */
+	p = xdr_inline_decode(xdr, 8);
+	if (unlikely(p == NULL))
+		return -ENOSPC;
+	p = xdr_decode_hyper(p, &status->minor_status);
+
+	/* status->major_status_string */
+	err = gssx_dec_buffer(xdr, &status->major_status_string);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	/* status->minor_status_string */
+	err = gssx_dec_buffer(xdr, &status->minor_status_string);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	/* status->server_ctx */
+	err = gssx_dec_buffer(xdr, &status->server_ctx);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	/* we assume we have no options for now, so simply consume them */
+	/* status->options */
+	err = dummy_dec_opt_array(xdr, &status->options);
+
+	return err;
+}
+
+static int gssx_enc_call_ctx(struct xdr_stream *xdr,
+			     const struct gssx_call_ctx *ctx)
+{
+	struct gssx_option opt;
+	__be32 *p;
+	int err;
+
+	/* ctx->locale */
+	err = gssx_enc_buffer(xdr, &ctx->locale);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	/* ctx->server_ctx */
+	err = gssx_enc_buffer(xdr, &ctx->server_ctx);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	/* we always want to ask for lucid contexts */
+	/* ctx->options */
+	p = xdr_reserve_space(xdr, 4);
+	*p = cpu_to_be32(2);
+
+	/* we want a lucid_v1 context */
+	opt.option.data = LUCID_OPTION;
+	opt.option.len = sizeof(LUCID_OPTION);
+	opt.value.data = LUCID_VALUE;
+	opt.value.len = sizeof(LUCID_VALUE);
+	err = gssx_enc_option(xdr, &opt);
+
+	/* ..and user creds */
+	opt.option.data = CREDS_OPTION;
+	opt.option.len = sizeof(CREDS_OPTION);
+	opt.value.data = CREDS_VALUE;
+	opt.value.len = sizeof(CREDS_VALUE);
+	err = gssx_enc_option(xdr, &opt);
+
+	return err;
+}
+
+static int gssx_dec_name_attr(struct xdr_stream *xdr,
+			     struct gssx_name_attr *attr)
+{
+	int err;
+
+	/* attr->attr */
+	err = gssx_dec_buffer(xdr, &attr->attr);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	/* attr->value */
+	err = gssx_dec_buffer(xdr, &attr->value);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	/* attr->extensions */
+	err = dummy_dec_opt_array(xdr, &attr->extensions);
+
+	return err;
+}
+
+static int dummy_enc_nameattr_array(struct xdr_stream *xdr,
+				    struct gssx_name_attr_array *naa)
+{
+	__be32 *p;
+
+	if (naa->count != 0)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	p = xdr_reserve_space(xdr, 4);
+	if (!p)
+		return -ENOSPC;
+	*p = 0;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int dummy_dec_nameattr_array(struct xdr_stream *xdr,
+				    struct gssx_name_attr_array *naa)
+{
+	struct gssx_name_attr dummy = { .attr = {.len = 0} };
+	u32 count, i;
+	__be32 *p;
+
+	p = xdr_inline_decode(xdr, 4);
+	if (unlikely(p == NULL))
+		return -ENOSPC;
+	count = be32_to_cpup(p++);
+	for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
+		gssx_dec_name_attr(xdr, &dummy);
+	}
+
+	naa->count = 0;
+	naa->data = NULL;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static struct xdr_netobj zero_netobj = {};
+
+static struct gssx_name_attr_array zero_name_attr_array = {};
+
+static struct gssx_option_array zero_option_array = {};
+
+static int gssx_enc_name(struct xdr_stream *xdr,
+			 struct gssx_name *name)
+{
+	int err;
+
+	/* name->display_name */
+	err = gssx_enc_buffer(xdr, &name->display_name);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	/* name->name_type */
+	err = gssx_enc_buffer(xdr, &zero_netobj);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	/* name->exported_name */
+	err = gssx_enc_buffer(xdr, &zero_netobj);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	/* name->exported_composite_name */
+	err = gssx_enc_buffer(xdr, &zero_netobj);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	/* leave name_attributes empty for now, will add once we have any
+	 * to pass up at all */
+	/* name->name_attributes */
+	err = dummy_enc_nameattr_array(xdr, &zero_name_attr_array);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	/* leave options empty for now, will add once we have any options
+	 * to pass up at all */
+	/* name->extensions */
+	err = dummy_enc_opt_array(xdr, &zero_option_array);
+
+	return err;
+}
+
+
+static int gssx_dec_name(struct xdr_stream *xdr,
+			 struct gssx_name *name)
+{
+	struct xdr_netobj dummy_netobj = { .len = 0 };
+	struct gssx_name_attr_array dummy_name_attr_array = { .count = 0 };
+	struct gssx_option_array dummy_option_array = { .count = 0 };
+	int err;
+
+	/* name->display_name */
+	err = gssx_dec_buffer(xdr, &name->display_name);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	/* name->name_type */
+	err = gssx_dec_buffer(xdr, &dummy_netobj);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	/* name->exported_name */
+	err = gssx_dec_buffer(xdr, &dummy_netobj);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	/* name->exported_composite_name */
+	err = gssx_dec_buffer(xdr, &dummy_netobj);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	/* we assume we have no attributes for now, so simply consume them */
+	/* name->name_attributes */
+	err = dummy_dec_nameattr_array(xdr, &dummy_name_attr_array);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	/* we assume we have no options for now, so simply consume them */
+	/* name->extensions */
+	err = dummy_dec_opt_array(xdr, &dummy_option_array);
+
+	return err;
+}
+
+static int dummy_enc_credel_array(struct xdr_stream *xdr,
+				  struct gssx_cred_element_array *cea)
+{
+	__be32 *p;
+
+	if (cea->count != 0)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	p = xdr_reserve_space(xdr, 4);
+	if (!p)
+		return -ENOSPC;
+	*p = 0;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int gssx_enc_cred(struct xdr_stream *xdr,
+			 struct gssx_cred *cred)
+{
+	int err;
+
+	/* cred->desired_name */
+	err = gssx_enc_name(xdr, &cred->desired_name);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	/* cred->elements */
+	err = dummy_enc_credel_array(xdr, &cred->elements);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	/* cred->cred_handle_reference */
+	err = gssx_enc_buffer(xdr, &cred->cred_handle_reference);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	/* cred->needs_release */
+	err = gssx_enc_bool(xdr, cred->needs_release);
+
+	return err;
+}
+
+static int gssx_enc_ctx(struct xdr_stream *xdr,
+			struct gssx_ctx *ctx)
+{
+	__be32 *p;
+	int err;
+
+	/* ctx->exported_context_token */
+	err = gssx_enc_buffer(xdr, &ctx->exported_context_token);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	/* ctx->state */
+	err = gssx_enc_buffer(xdr, &ctx->state);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	/* ctx->need_release */
+	err = gssx_enc_bool(xdr, ctx->need_release);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	/* ctx->mech */
+	err = gssx_enc_buffer(xdr, &ctx->mech);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	/* ctx->src_name */
+	err = gssx_enc_name(xdr, &ctx->src_name);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	/* ctx->targ_name */
+	err = gssx_enc_name(xdr, &ctx->targ_name);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	/* ctx->lifetime */
+	p = xdr_reserve_space(xdr, 8+8);
+	if (!p)
+		return -ENOSPC;
+	p = xdr_encode_hyper(p, ctx->lifetime);
+
+	/* ctx->ctx_flags */
+	p = xdr_encode_hyper(p, ctx->ctx_flags);
+
+	/* ctx->locally_initiated */
+	err = gssx_enc_bool(xdr, ctx->locally_initiated);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	/* ctx->open */
+	err = gssx_enc_bool(xdr, ctx->open);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	/* leave options empty for now, will add once we have any options
+	 * to pass up at all */
+	/* ctx->options */
+	err = dummy_enc_opt_array(xdr, &ctx->options);
+
+	return err;
+}
+
+static int gssx_dec_ctx(struct xdr_stream *xdr,
+			struct gssx_ctx *ctx)
+{
+	__be32 *p;
+	int err;
+
+	/* ctx->exported_context_token */
+	err = gssx_dec_buffer(xdr, &ctx->exported_context_token);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	/* ctx->state */
+	err = gssx_dec_buffer(xdr, &ctx->state);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	/* ctx->need_release */
+	err = gssx_dec_bool(xdr, &ctx->need_release);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	/* ctx->mech */
+	err = gssx_dec_buffer(xdr, &ctx->mech);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	/* ctx->src_name */
+	err = gssx_dec_name(xdr, &ctx->src_name);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	/* ctx->targ_name */
+	err = gssx_dec_name(xdr, &ctx->targ_name);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	/* ctx->lifetime */
+	p = xdr_inline_decode(xdr, 8+8);
+	if (unlikely(p == NULL))
+		return -ENOSPC;
+	p = xdr_decode_hyper(p, &ctx->lifetime);
+
+	/* ctx->ctx_flags */
+	p = xdr_decode_hyper(p, &ctx->ctx_flags);
+
+	/* ctx->locally_initiated */
+	err = gssx_dec_bool(xdr, &ctx->locally_initiated);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	/* ctx->open */
+	err = gssx_dec_bool(xdr, &ctx->open);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	/* we assume we have no options for now, so simply consume them */
+	/* ctx->options */
+	err = dummy_dec_opt_array(xdr, &ctx->options);
+
+	return err;
+}
+
+static int gssx_enc_cb(struct xdr_stream *xdr, struct gssx_cb *cb)
+{
+	__be32 *p;
+	int err;
+
+	/* cb->initiator_addrtype */
+	p = xdr_reserve_space(xdr, 8);
+	if (!p)
+		return -ENOSPC;
+	p = xdr_encode_hyper(p, cb->initiator_addrtype);
+
+	/* cb->initiator_address */
+	err = gssx_enc_buffer(xdr, &cb->initiator_address);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	/* cb->acceptor_addrtype */
+	p = xdr_reserve_space(xdr, 8);
+	if (!p)
+		return -ENOSPC;
+	p = xdr_encode_hyper(p, cb->acceptor_addrtype);
+
+	/* cb->acceptor_address */
+	err = gssx_enc_buffer(xdr, &cb->acceptor_address);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	/* cb->application_data */
+	err = gssx_enc_buffer(xdr, &cb->application_data);
+
+	return err;
+}
+
+void gssx_enc_accept_sec_context(struct rpc_rqst *req,
+				 struct xdr_stream *xdr,
+				 const void *data)
+{
+	const struct gssx_arg_accept_sec_context *arg = data;
+	int err;
+
+	err = gssx_enc_call_ctx(xdr, &arg->call_ctx);
+	if (err)
+		goto done;
+
+	/* arg->context_handle */
+	if (arg->context_handle)
+		err = gssx_enc_ctx(xdr, arg->context_handle);
+	else
+		err = gssx_enc_bool(xdr, 0);
+	if (err)
+		goto done;
+
+	/* arg->cred_handle */
+	if (arg->cred_handle)
+		err = gssx_enc_cred(xdr, arg->cred_handle);
+	else
+		err = gssx_enc_bool(xdr, 0);
+	if (err)
+		goto done;
+
+	/* arg->input_token */
+	err = gssx_enc_in_token(xdr, &arg->input_token);
+	if (err)
+		goto done;
+
+	/* arg->input_cb */
+	if (arg->input_cb)
+		err = gssx_enc_cb(xdr, arg->input_cb);
+	else
+		err = gssx_enc_bool(xdr, 0);
+	if (err)
+		goto done;
+
+	err = gssx_enc_bool(xdr, arg->ret_deleg_cred);
+	if (err)
+		goto done;
+
+	/* leave options empty for now, will add once we have any options
+	 * to pass up at all */
+	/* arg->options */
+	err = dummy_enc_opt_array(xdr, &arg->options);
+
+	xdr_inline_pages(&req->rq_rcv_buf,
+		PAGE_SIZE/2 /* pretty arbitrary */,
+		arg->pages, 0 /* page base */, arg->npages * PAGE_SIZE);
+done:
+	if (err)
+		dprintk("RPC:       gssx_enc_accept_sec_context: %d\n", err);
+}
+
+int gssx_dec_accept_sec_context(struct rpc_rqst *rqstp,
+				struct xdr_stream *xdr,
+				void *data)
+{
+	struct gssx_res_accept_sec_context *res = data;
+	u32 value_follows;
+	int err;
+	struct page *scratch;
+
+	scratch = alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!scratch)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	xdr_set_scratch_page(xdr, scratch);
+
+	/* res->status */
+	err = gssx_dec_status(xdr, &res->status);
+	if (err)
+		goto out_free;
+
+	/* res->context_handle */
+	err = gssx_dec_bool(xdr, &value_follows);
+	if (err)
+		goto out_free;
+	if (value_follows) {
+		err = gssx_dec_ctx(xdr, res->context_handle);
+		if (err)
+			goto out_free;
+	} else {
+		res->context_handle = NULL;
+	}
+
+	/* res->output_token */
+	err = gssx_dec_bool(xdr, &value_follows);
+	if (err)
+		goto out_free;
+	if (value_follows) {
+		err = gssx_dec_buffer(xdr, res->output_token);
+		if (err)
+			goto out_free;
+	} else {
+		res->output_token = NULL;
+	}
+
+	/* res->delegated_cred_handle */
+	err = gssx_dec_bool(xdr, &value_follows);
+	if (err)
+		goto out_free;
+	if (value_follows) {
+		/* we do not support upcall servers sending this data. */
+		err = -EINVAL;
+		goto out_free;
+	}
+
+	/* res->options */
+	err = gssx_dec_option_array(xdr, &res->options);
+
+out_free:
+	__free_page(scratch);
+	return err;
+}
diff --git a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_rpc_xdr.h b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_rpc_xdr.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..3f17411b7e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_rpc_xdr.h
@@ -0,0 +1,252 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+ */
+/*
+ * GSS Proxy upcall module
+ *
+ *  Copyright (C) 2012 Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com>
+ */
+
+#ifndef _LINUX_GSS_RPC_XDR_H
+#define _LINUX_GSS_RPC_XDR_H
+
+#include <linux/sunrpc/xdr.h>
+#include <linux/sunrpc/clnt.h>
+#include <linux/sunrpc/xprtsock.h>
+
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SUNRPC_DEBUG)
+# define RPCDBG_FACILITY	RPCDBG_AUTH
+#endif
+
+#define LUCID_OPTION "exported_context_type"
+#define LUCID_VALUE  "linux_lucid_v1"
+#define CREDS_OPTION "exported_creds_type"
+#define CREDS_VALUE  "linux_creds_v1"
+
+typedef struct xdr_netobj gssx_buffer;
+typedef struct xdr_netobj utf8string;
+typedef struct xdr_netobj gssx_OID;
+
+enum gssx_cred_usage {
+	GSSX_C_INITIATE = 1,
+	GSSX_C_ACCEPT = 2,
+	GSSX_C_BOTH = 3,
+};
+
+struct gssx_option {
+	gssx_buffer option;
+	gssx_buffer value;
+};
+
+struct gssx_option_array {
+	u32 count;
+	struct gssx_option *data;
+};
+
+struct gssx_status {
+	u64 major_status;
+	gssx_OID mech;
+	u64 minor_status;
+	utf8string major_status_string;
+	utf8string minor_status_string;
+	gssx_buffer server_ctx;
+	struct gssx_option_array options;
+};
+
+struct gssx_call_ctx {
+	utf8string locale;
+	gssx_buffer server_ctx;
+	struct gssx_option_array options;
+};
+
+struct gssx_name_attr {
+	gssx_buffer attr;
+	gssx_buffer value;
+	struct gssx_option_array extensions;
+};
+
+struct gssx_name_attr_array {
+	u32 count;
+	struct gssx_name_attr *data;
+};
+
+struct gssx_name {
+	gssx_buffer display_name;
+};
+typedef struct gssx_name gssx_name;
+
+struct gssx_cred_element {
+	gssx_name MN;
+	gssx_OID mech;
+	u32 cred_usage;
+	u64 initiator_time_rec;
+	u64 acceptor_time_rec;
+	struct gssx_option_array options;
+};
+
+struct gssx_cred_element_array {
+	u32 count;
+	struct gssx_cred_element *data;
+};
+
+struct gssx_cred {
+	gssx_name desired_name;
+	struct gssx_cred_element_array elements;
+	gssx_buffer cred_handle_reference;
+	u32 needs_release;
+};
+
+struct gssx_ctx {
+	gssx_buffer exported_context_token;
+	gssx_buffer state;
+	u32 need_release;
+	gssx_OID mech;
+	gssx_name src_name;
+	gssx_name targ_name;
+	u64 lifetime;
+	u64 ctx_flags;
+	u32 locally_initiated;
+	u32 open;
+	struct gssx_option_array options;
+};
+
+struct gssx_cb {
+	u64 initiator_addrtype;
+	gssx_buffer initiator_address;
+	u64 acceptor_addrtype;
+	gssx_buffer acceptor_address;
+	gssx_buffer application_data;
+};
+
+
+/* This structure is not defined in the protocol.
+ * It is used in the kernel to carry around a big buffer
+ * as a set of pages */
+struct gssp_in_token {
+	struct page **pages;	/* Array of contiguous pages */
+	unsigned int page_base;	/* Start of page data */
+	unsigned int page_len;	/* Length of page data */
+};
+
+struct gssx_arg_accept_sec_context {
+	struct gssx_call_ctx call_ctx;
+	struct gssx_ctx *context_handle;
+	struct gssx_cred *cred_handle;
+	struct gssp_in_token input_token;
+	struct gssx_cb *input_cb;
+	u32 ret_deleg_cred;
+	struct gssx_option_array options;
+	struct page **pages;
+	unsigned int npages;
+};
+
+struct gssx_res_accept_sec_context {
+	struct gssx_status status;
+	struct gssx_ctx *context_handle;
+	gssx_buffer *output_token;
+	/* struct gssx_cred *delegated_cred_handle; not used in kernel */
+	struct gssx_option_array options;
+};
+
+
+
+#define gssx_enc_indicate_mechs NULL
+#define gssx_dec_indicate_mechs NULL
+#define gssx_enc_get_call_context NULL
+#define gssx_dec_get_call_context NULL
+#define gssx_enc_import_and_canon_name NULL
+#define gssx_dec_import_and_canon_name NULL
+#define gssx_enc_export_cred NULL
+#define gssx_dec_export_cred NULL
+#define gssx_enc_import_cred NULL
+#define gssx_dec_import_cred NULL
+#define gssx_enc_acquire_cred NULL
+#define gssx_dec_acquire_cred NULL
+#define gssx_enc_store_cred NULL
+#define gssx_dec_store_cred NULL
+#define gssx_enc_init_sec_context NULL
+#define gssx_dec_init_sec_context NULL
+void gssx_enc_accept_sec_context(struct rpc_rqst *req,
+				 struct xdr_stream *xdr,
+				 const void *data);
+int gssx_dec_accept_sec_context(struct rpc_rqst *rqstp,
+				struct xdr_stream *xdr,
+				void *data);
+#define gssx_enc_release_handle NULL
+#define gssx_dec_release_handle NULL
+#define gssx_enc_get_mic NULL
+#define gssx_dec_get_mic NULL
+#define gssx_enc_verify NULL
+#define gssx_dec_verify NULL
+#define gssx_enc_wrap NULL
+#define gssx_dec_wrap NULL
+#define gssx_enc_unwrap NULL
+#define gssx_dec_unwrap NULL
+#define gssx_enc_wrap_size_limit NULL
+#define gssx_dec_wrap_size_limit NULL
+
+/* non implemented calls are set to 0 size */
+#define GSSX_ARG_indicate_mechs_sz 0
+#define GSSX_RES_indicate_mechs_sz 0
+#define GSSX_ARG_get_call_context_sz 0
+#define GSSX_RES_get_call_context_sz 0
+#define GSSX_ARG_import_and_canon_name_sz 0
+#define GSSX_RES_import_and_canon_name_sz 0
+#define GSSX_ARG_export_cred_sz 0
+#define GSSX_RES_export_cred_sz 0
+#define GSSX_ARG_import_cred_sz 0
+#define GSSX_RES_import_cred_sz 0
+#define GSSX_ARG_acquire_cred_sz 0
+#define GSSX_RES_acquire_cred_sz 0
+#define GSSX_ARG_store_cred_sz 0
+#define GSSX_RES_store_cred_sz 0
+#define GSSX_ARG_init_sec_context_sz 0
+#define GSSX_RES_init_sec_context_sz 0
+
+#define GSSX_default_in_call_ctx_sz (4 + 4 + 4 + \
+			8 + sizeof(LUCID_OPTION) + sizeof(LUCID_VALUE) + \
+			8 + sizeof(CREDS_OPTION) + sizeof(CREDS_VALUE))
+#define GSSX_default_in_ctx_hndl_sz (4 + 4+8 + 4 + 4 + 6*4 + 6*4 + 8 + 8 + \
+					4 + 4 + 4)
+#define GSSX_default_in_cred_sz 4 /* we send in no cred_handle */
+#define GSSX_default_in_token_sz 4 /* does *not* include token data */
+#define GSSX_default_in_cb_sz 4 /* we do not use channel bindings */
+#define GSSX_ARG_accept_sec_context_sz (GSSX_default_in_call_ctx_sz + \
+					GSSX_default_in_ctx_hndl_sz + \
+					GSSX_default_in_cred_sz + \
+					GSSX_default_in_token_sz + \
+					GSSX_default_in_cb_sz + \
+					4 /* no deleg creds boolean */ + \
+					4) /* empty options */
+
+/* somewhat arbitrary numbers but large enough (we ignore some of the data
+ * sent down, but it is part of the protocol so we need enough space to take
+ * it in) */
+#define GSSX_default_status_sz 8 + 24 + 8 + 256 + 256 + 16 + 4
+#define GSSX_max_output_handle_sz 128
+#define GSSX_max_oid_sz 16
+#define GSSX_max_princ_sz 256
+#define GSSX_default_ctx_sz (GSSX_max_output_handle_sz + \
+			     16 + 4 + GSSX_max_oid_sz + \
+			     2 * GSSX_max_princ_sz + \
+			     8 + 8 + 4 + 4 + 4)
+#define GSSX_max_output_token_sz 1024
+/* grouplist not included; we allocate separate pages for that: */
+#define GSSX_max_creds_sz (4 + 4 + 4 /* + NGROUPS_MAX*4 */)
+#define GSSX_RES_accept_sec_context_sz (GSSX_default_status_sz + \
+					GSSX_default_ctx_sz + \
+					GSSX_max_output_token_sz + \
+					4 + GSSX_max_creds_sz)
+
+#define GSSX_ARG_release_handle_sz 0
+#define GSSX_RES_release_handle_sz 0
+#define GSSX_ARG_get_mic_sz 0
+#define GSSX_RES_get_mic_sz 0
+#define GSSX_ARG_verify_sz 0
+#define GSSX_RES_verify_sz 0
+#define GSSX_ARG_wrap_sz 0
+#define GSSX_RES_wrap_sz 0
+#define GSSX_ARG_unwrap_sz 0
+#define GSSX_RES_unwrap_sz 0
+#define GSSX_ARG_wrap_size_limit_sz 0
+#define GSSX_RES_wrap_size_limit_sz 0
+
+#endif /* _LINUX_GSS_RPC_XDR_H */
diff --git a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/svcauth_gss.c b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/svcauth_gss.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..18734e70c5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/svcauth_gss.c
@@ -0,0 +1,2134 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * Neil Brown <neilb@cse.unsw.edu.au>
+ * J. Bruce Fields <bfields@umich.edu>
+ * Andy Adamson <andros@umich.edu>
+ * Dug Song <dugsong@monkey.org>
+ *
+ * RPCSEC_GSS server authentication.
+ * This implements RPCSEC_GSS as defined in rfc2203 (rpcsec_gss) and rfc2078
+ * (gssapi)
+ *
+ * The RPCSEC_GSS involves three stages:
+ *  1/ context creation
+ *  2/ data exchange
+ *  3/ context destruction
+ *
+ * Context creation is handled largely by upcalls to user-space.
+ *  In particular, GSS_Accept_sec_context is handled by an upcall
+ * Data exchange is handled entirely within the kernel
+ *  In particular, GSS_GetMIC, GSS_VerifyMIC, GSS_Seal, GSS_Unseal are in-kernel.
+ * Context destruction is handled in-kernel
+ *  GSS_Delete_sec_context is in-kernel
+ *
+ * Context creation is initiated by a RPCSEC_GSS_INIT request arriving.
+ * The context handle and gss_token are used as a key into the rpcsec_init cache.
+ * The content of this cache includes some of the outputs of GSS_Accept_sec_context,
+ * being major_status, minor_status, context_handle, reply_token.
+ * These are sent back to the client.
+ * Sequence window management is handled by the kernel.  The window size if currently
+ * a compile time constant.
+ *
+ * When user-space is happy that a context is established, it places an entry
+ * in the rpcsec_context cache. The key for this cache is the context_handle.
+ * The content includes:
+ *   uid/gidlist - for determining access rights
+ *   mechanism type
+ *   mechanism specific information, such as a key
+ *
+ */
+
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/pagemap.h>
+#include <linux/user_namespace.h>
+
+#include <linux/sunrpc/auth_gss.h>
+#include <linux/sunrpc/gss_err.h>
+#include <linux/sunrpc/svcauth.h>
+#include <linux/sunrpc/svcauth_gss.h>
+#include <linux/sunrpc/cache.h>
+#include <linux/sunrpc/gss_krb5.h>
+
+#include <trace/events/rpcgss.h>
+
+#include "gss_rpc_upcall.h"
+
+/*
+ * Unfortunately there isn't a maximum checksum size exported via the
+ * GSS API. Manufacture one based on GSS mechanisms supported by this
+ * implementation.
+ */
+#define GSS_MAX_CKSUMSIZE (GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN + GSS_KRB5_MAX_CKSUM_LEN)
+
+/*
+ * This value may be increased in the future to accommodate other
+ * usage of the scratch buffer.
+ */
+#define GSS_SCRATCH_SIZE GSS_MAX_CKSUMSIZE
+
+struct gss_svc_data {
+	/* decoded gss client cred: */
+	struct rpc_gss_wire_cred	clcred;
+	u32				gsd_databody_offset;
+	struct rsc			*rsci;
+
+	/* for temporary results */
+	__be32				gsd_seq_num;
+	u8				gsd_scratch[GSS_SCRATCH_SIZE];
+};
+
+/* The rpcsec_init cache is used for mapping RPCSEC_GSS_{,CONT_}INIT requests
+ * into replies.
+ *
+ * Key is context handle (\x if empty) and gss_token.
+ * Content is major_status minor_status (integers) context_handle, reply_token.
+ *
+ */
+
+static int netobj_equal(struct xdr_netobj *a, struct xdr_netobj *b)
+{
+	return a->len == b->len && 0 == memcmp(a->data, b->data, a->len);
+}
+
+#define	RSI_HASHBITS	6
+#define	RSI_HASHMAX	(1<<RSI_HASHBITS)
+
+struct rsi {
+	struct cache_head	h;
+	struct xdr_netobj	in_handle, in_token;
+	struct xdr_netobj	out_handle, out_token;
+	int			major_status, minor_status;
+	struct rcu_head		rcu_head;
+};
+
+static struct rsi *rsi_update(struct cache_detail *cd, struct rsi *new, struct rsi *old);
+static struct rsi *rsi_lookup(struct cache_detail *cd, struct rsi *item);
+
+static void rsi_free(struct rsi *rsii)
+{
+	kfree(rsii->in_handle.data);
+	kfree(rsii->in_token.data);
+	kfree(rsii->out_handle.data);
+	kfree(rsii->out_token.data);
+}
+
+static void rsi_free_rcu(struct rcu_head *head)
+{
+	struct rsi *rsii = container_of(head, struct rsi, rcu_head);
+
+	rsi_free(rsii);
+	kfree(rsii);
+}
+
+static void rsi_put(struct kref *ref)
+{
+	struct rsi *rsii = container_of(ref, struct rsi, h.ref);
+
+	call_rcu(&rsii->rcu_head, rsi_free_rcu);
+}
+
+static inline int rsi_hash(struct rsi *item)
+{
+	return hash_mem(item->in_handle.data, item->in_handle.len, RSI_HASHBITS)
+	     ^ hash_mem(item->in_token.data, item->in_token.len, RSI_HASHBITS);
+}
+
+static int rsi_match(struct cache_head *a, struct cache_head *b)
+{
+	struct rsi *item = container_of(a, struct rsi, h);
+	struct rsi *tmp = container_of(b, struct rsi, h);
+	return netobj_equal(&item->in_handle, &tmp->in_handle) &&
+	       netobj_equal(&item->in_token, &tmp->in_token);
+}
+
+static int dup_to_netobj(struct xdr_netobj *dst, char *src, int len)
+{
+	dst->len = len;
+	dst->data = (len ? kmemdup(src, len, GFP_KERNEL) : NULL);
+	if (len && !dst->data)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static inline int dup_netobj(struct xdr_netobj *dst, struct xdr_netobj *src)
+{
+	return dup_to_netobj(dst, src->data, src->len);
+}
+
+static void rsi_init(struct cache_head *cnew, struct cache_head *citem)
+{
+	struct rsi *new = container_of(cnew, struct rsi, h);
+	struct rsi *item = container_of(citem, struct rsi, h);
+
+	new->out_handle.data = NULL;
+	new->out_handle.len = 0;
+	new->out_token.data = NULL;
+	new->out_token.len = 0;
+	new->in_handle.len = item->in_handle.len;
+	item->in_handle.len = 0;
+	new->in_token.len = item->in_token.len;
+	item->in_token.len = 0;
+	new->in_handle.data = item->in_handle.data;
+	item->in_handle.data = NULL;
+	new->in_token.data = item->in_token.data;
+	item->in_token.data = NULL;
+}
+
+static void update_rsi(struct cache_head *cnew, struct cache_head *citem)
+{
+	struct rsi *new = container_of(cnew, struct rsi, h);
+	struct rsi *item = container_of(citem, struct rsi, h);
+
+	BUG_ON(new->out_handle.data || new->out_token.data);
+	new->out_handle.len = item->out_handle.len;
+	item->out_handle.len = 0;
+	new->out_token.len = item->out_token.len;
+	item->out_token.len = 0;
+	new->out_handle.data = item->out_handle.data;
+	item->out_handle.data = NULL;
+	new->out_token.data = item->out_token.data;
+	item->out_token.data = NULL;
+
+	new->major_status = item->major_status;
+	new->minor_status = item->minor_status;
+}
+
+static struct cache_head *rsi_alloc(void)
+{
+	struct rsi *rsii = kmalloc(sizeof(*rsii), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (rsii)
+		return &rsii->h;
+	else
+		return NULL;
+}
+
+static int rsi_upcall(struct cache_detail *cd, struct cache_head *h)
+{
+	return sunrpc_cache_pipe_upcall_timeout(cd, h);
+}
+
+static void rsi_request(struct cache_detail *cd,
+		       struct cache_head *h,
+		       char **bpp, int *blen)
+{
+	struct rsi *rsii = container_of(h, struct rsi, h);
+
+	qword_addhex(bpp, blen, rsii->in_handle.data, rsii->in_handle.len);
+	qword_addhex(bpp, blen, rsii->in_token.data, rsii->in_token.len);
+	(*bpp)[-1] = '\n';
+	WARN_ONCE(*blen < 0,
+		  "RPCSEC/GSS credential too large - please use gssproxy\n");
+}
+
+static int rsi_parse(struct cache_detail *cd,
+		    char *mesg, int mlen)
+{
+	/* context token expiry major minor context token */
+	char *buf = mesg;
+	char *ep;
+	int len;
+	struct rsi rsii, *rsip = NULL;
+	time64_t expiry;
+	int status = -EINVAL;
+
+	memset(&rsii, 0, sizeof(rsii));
+	/* handle */
+	len = qword_get(&mesg, buf, mlen);
+	if (len < 0)
+		goto out;
+	status = -ENOMEM;
+	if (dup_to_netobj(&rsii.in_handle, buf, len))
+		goto out;
+
+	/* token */
+	len = qword_get(&mesg, buf, mlen);
+	status = -EINVAL;
+	if (len < 0)
+		goto out;
+	status = -ENOMEM;
+	if (dup_to_netobj(&rsii.in_token, buf, len))
+		goto out;
+
+	rsip = rsi_lookup(cd, &rsii);
+	if (!rsip)
+		goto out;
+
+	rsii.h.flags = 0;
+	/* expiry */
+	status = get_expiry(&mesg, &expiry);
+	if (status)
+		goto out;
+
+	status = -EINVAL;
+	/* major/minor */
+	len = qword_get(&mesg, buf, mlen);
+	if (len <= 0)
+		goto out;
+	rsii.major_status = simple_strtoul(buf, &ep, 10);
+	if (*ep)
+		goto out;
+	len = qword_get(&mesg, buf, mlen);
+	if (len <= 0)
+		goto out;
+	rsii.minor_status = simple_strtoul(buf, &ep, 10);
+	if (*ep)
+		goto out;
+
+	/* out_handle */
+	len = qword_get(&mesg, buf, mlen);
+	if (len < 0)
+		goto out;
+	status = -ENOMEM;
+	if (dup_to_netobj(&rsii.out_handle, buf, len))
+		goto out;
+
+	/* out_token */
+	len = qword_get(&mesg, buf, mlen);
+	status = -EINVAL;
+	if (len < 0)
+		goto out;
+	status = -ENOMEM;
+	if (dup_to_netobj(&rsii.out_token, buf, len))
+		goto out;
+	rsii.h.expiry_time = expiry;
+	rsip = rsi_update(cd, &rsii, rsip);
+	status = 0;
+out:
+	rsi_free(&rsii);
+	if (rsip)
+		cache_put(&rsip->h, cd);
+	else
+		status = -ENOMEM;
+	return status;
+}
+
+static const struct cache_detail rsi_cache_template = {
+	.owner		= THIS_MODULE,
+	.hash_size	= RSI_HASHMAX,
+	.name           = "auth.rpcsec.init",
+	.cache_put      = rsi_put,
+	.cache_upcall	= rsi_upcall,
+	.cache_request  = rsi_request,
+	.cache_parse    = rsi_parse,
+	.match		= rsi_match,
+	.init		= rsi_init,
+	.update		= update_rsi,
+	.alloc		= rsi_alloc,
+};
+
+static struct rsi *rsi_lookup(struct cache_detail *cd, struct rsi *item)
+{
+	struct cache_head *ch;
+	int hash = rsi_hash(item);
+
+	ch = sunrpc_cache_lookup_rcu(cd, &item->h, hash);
+	if (ch)
+		return container_of(ch, struct rsi, h);
+	else
+		return NULL;
+}
+
+static struct rsi *rsi_update(struct cache_detail *cd, struct rsi *new, struct rsi *old)
+{
+	struct cache_head *ch;
+	int hash = rsi_hash(new);
+
+	ch = sunrpc_cache_update(cd, &new->h,
+				 &old->h, hash);
+	if (ch)
+		return container_of(ch, struct rsi, h);
+	else
+		return NULL;
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * The rpcsec_context cache is used to store a context that is
+ * used in data exchange.
+ * The key is a context handle. The content is:
+ *  uid, gidlist, mechanism, service-set, mech-specific-data
+ */
+
+#define	RSC_HASHBITS	10
+#define	RSC_HASHMAX	(1<<RSC_HASHBITS)
+
+#define GSS_SEQ_WIN	128
+
+struct gss_svc_seq_data {
+	/* highest seq number seen so far: */
+	u32			sd_max;
+	/* for i such that sd_max-GSS_SEQ_WIN < i <= sd_max, the i-th bit of
+	 * sd_win is nonzero iff sequence number i has been seen already: */
+	unsigned long		sd_win[GSS_SEQ_WIN/BITS_PER_LONG];
+	spinlock_t		sd_lock;
+};
+
+struct rsc {
+	struct cache_head	h;
+	struct xdr_netobj	handle;
+	struct svc_cred		cred;
+	struct gss_svc_seq_data	seqdata;
+	struct gss_ctx		*mechctx;
+	struct rcu_head		rcu_head;
+};
+
+static struct rsc *rsc_update(struct cache_detail *cd, struct rsc *new, struct rsc *old);
+static struct rsc *rsc_lookup(struct cache_detail *cd, struct rsc *item);
+
+static void rsc_free(struct rsc *rsci)
+{
+	kfree(rsci->handle.data);
+	if (rsci->mechctx)
+		gss_delete_sec_context(&rsci->mechctx);
+	free_svc_cred(&rsci->cred);
+}
+
+static void rsc_free_rcu(struct rcu_head *head)
+{
+	struct rsc *rsci = container_of(head, struct rsc, rcu_head);
+
+	kfree(rsci->handle.data);
+	kfree(rsci);
+}
+
+static void rsc_put(struct kref *ref)
+{
+	struct rsc *rsci = container_of(ref, struct rsc, h.ref);
+
+	if (rsci->mechctx)
+		gss_delete_sec_context(&rsci->mechctx);
+	free_svc_cred(&rsci->cred);
+	call_rcu(&rsci->rcu_head, rsc_free_rcu);
+}
+
+static inline int
+rsc_hash(struct rsc *rsci)
+{
+	return hash_mem(rsci->handle.data, rsci->handle.len, RSC_HASHBITS);
+}
+
+static int
+rsc_match(struct cache_head *a, struct cache_head *b)
+{
+	struct rsc *new = container_of(a, struct rsc, h);
+	struct rsc *tmp = container_of(b, struct rsc, h);
+
+	return netobj_equal(&new->handle, &tmp->handle);
+}
+
+static void
+rsc_init(struct cache_head *cnew, struct cache_head *ctmp)
+{
+	struct rsc *new = container_of(cnew, struct rsc, h);
+	struct rsc *tmp = container_of(ctmp, struct rsc, h);
+
+	new->handle.len = tmp->handle.len;
+	tmp->handle.len = 0;
+	new->handle.data = tmp->handle.data;
+	tmp->handle.data = NULL;
+	new->mechctx = NULL;
+	init_svc_cred(&new->cred);
+}
+
+static void
+update_rsc(struct cache_head *cnew, struct cache_head *ctmp)
+{
+	struct rsc *new = container_of(cnew, struct rsc, h);
+	struct rsc *tmp = container_of(ctmp, struct rsc, h);
+
+	new->mechctx = tmp->mechctx;
+	tmp->mechctx = NULL;
+	memset(&new->seqdata, 0, sizeof(new->seqdata));
+	spin_lock_init(&new->seqdata.sd_lock);
+	new->cred = tmp->cred;
+	init_svc_cred(&tmp->cred);
+}
+
+static struct cache_head *
+rsc_alloc(void)
+{
+	struct rsc *rsci = kmalloc(sizeof(*rsci), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (rsci)
+		return &rsci->h;
+	else
+		return NULL;
+}
+
+static int rsc_upcall(struct cache_detail *cd, struct cache_head *h)
+{
+	return -EINVAL;
+}
+
+static int rsc_parse(struct cache_detail *cd,
+		     char *mesg, int mlen)
+{
+	/* contexthandle expiry [ uid gid N <n gids> mechname ...mechdata... ] */
+	char *buf = mesg;
+	int id;
+	int len, rv;
+	struct rsc rsci, *rscp = NULL;
+	time64_t expiry;
+	int status = -EINVAL;
+	struct gss_api_mech *gm = NULL;
+
+	memset(&rsci, 0, sizeof(rsci));
+	/* context handle */
+	len = qword_get(&mesg, buf, mlen);
+	if (len < 0) goto out;
+	status = -ENOMEM;
+	if (dup_to_netobj(&rsci.handle, buf, len))
+		goto out;
+
+	rsci.h.flags = 0;
+	/* expiry */
+	status = get_expiry(&mesg, &expiry);
+	if (status)
+		goto out;
+
+	status = -EINVAL;
+	rscp = rsc_lookup(cd, &rsci);
+	if (!rscp)
+		goto out;
+
+	/* uid, or NEGATIVE */
+	rv = get_int(&mesg, &id);
+	if (rv == -EINVAL)
+		goto out;
+	if (rv == -ENOENT)
+		set_bit(CACHE_NEGATIVE, &rsci.h.flags);
+	else {
+		int N, i;
+
+		/*
+		 * NOTE: we skip uid_valid()/gid_valid() checks here:
+		 * instead, * -1 id's are later mapped to the
+		 * (export-specific) anonymous id by nfsd_setuser.
+		 *
+		 * (But supplementary gid's get no such special
+		 * treatment so are checked for validity here.)
+		 */
+		/* uid */
+		rsci.cred.cr_uid = make_kuid(current_user_ns(), id);
+
+		/* gid */
+		if (get_int(&mesg, &id))
+			goto out;
+		rsci.cred.cr_gid = make_kgid(current_user_ns(), id);
+
+		/* number of additional gid's */
+		if (get_int(&mesg, &N))
+			goto out;
+		if (N < 0 || N > NGROUPS_MAX)
+			goto out;
+		status = -ENOMEM;
+		rsci.cred.cr_group_info = groups_alloc(N);
+		if (rsci.cred.cr_group_info == NULL)
+			goto out;
+
+		/* gid's */
+		status = -EINVAL;
+		for (i=0; i<N; i++) {
+			kgid_t kgid;
+			if (get_int(&mesg, &id))
+				goto out;
+			kgid = make_kgid(current_user_ns(), id);
+			if (!gid_valid(kgid))
+				goto out;
+			rsci.cred.cr_group_info->gid[i] = kgid;
+		}
+		groups_sort(rsci.cred.cr_group_info);
+
+		/* mech name */
+		len = qword_get(&mesg, buf, mlen);
+		if (len < 0)
+			goto out;
+		gm = rsci.cred.cr_gss_mech = gss_mech_get_by_name(buf);
+		status = -EOPNOTSUPP;
+		if (!gm)
+			goto out;
+
+		status = -EINVAL;
+		/* mech-specific data: */
+		len = qword_get(&mesg, buf, mlen);
+		if (len < 0)
+			goto out;
+		status = gss_import_sec_context(buf, len, gm, &rsci.mechctx,
+						NULL, GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (status)
+			goto out;
+
+		/* get client name */
+		len = qword_get(&mesg, buf, mlen);
+		if (len > 0) {
+			rsci.cred.cr_principal = kstrdup(buf, GFP_KERNEL);
+			if (!rsci.cred.cr_principal) {
+				status = -ENOMEM;
+				goto out;
+			}
+		}
+
+	}
+	rsci.h.expiry_time = expiry;
+	rscp = rsc_update(cd, &rsci, rscp);
+	status = 0;
+out:
+	rsc_free(&rsci);
+	if (rscp)
+		cache_put(&rscp->h, cd);
+	else
+		status = -ENOMEM;
+	return status;
+}
+
+static const struct cache_detail rsc_cache_template = {
+	.owner		= THIS_MODULE,
+	.hash_size	= RSC_HASHMAX,
+	.name		= "auth.rpcsec.context",
+	.cache_put	= rsc_put,
+	.cache_upcall	= rsc_upcall,
+	.cache_parse	= rsc_parse,
+	.match		= rsc_match,
+	.init		= rsc_init,
+	.update		= update_rsc,
+	.alloc		= rsc_alloc,
+};
+
+static struct rsc *rsc_lookup(struct cache_detail *cd, struct rsc *item)
+{
+	struct cache_head *ch;
+	int hash = rsc_hash(item);
+
+	ch = sunrpc_cache_lookup_rcu(cd, &item->h, hash);
+	if (ch)
+		return container_of(ch, struct rsc, h);
+	else
+		return NULL;
+}
+
+static struct rsc *rsc_update(struct cache_detail *cd, struct rsc *new, struct rsc *old)
+{
+	struct cache_head *ch;
+	int hash = rsc_hash(new);
+
+	ch = sunrpc_cache_update(cd, &new->h,
+				 &old->h, hash);
+	if (ch)
+		return container_of(ch, struct rsc, h);
+	else
+		return NULL;
+}
+
+
+static struct rsc *
+gss_svc_searchbyctx(struct cache_detail *cd, struct xdr_netobj *handle)
+{
+	struct rsc rsci;
+	struct rsc *found;
+
+	memset(&rsci, 0, sizeof(rsci));
+	if (dup_to_netobj(&rsci.handle, handle->data, handle->len))
+		return NULL;
+	found = rsc_lookup(cd, &rsci);
+	rsc_free(&rsci);
+	if (!found)
+		return NULL;
+	if (cache_check(cd, &found->h, NULL))
+		return NULL;
+	return found;
+}
+
+/**
+ * gss_check_seq_num - GSS sequence number window check
+ * @rqstp: RPC Call to use when reporting errors
+ * @rsci: cached GSS context state (updated on return)
+ * @seq_num: sequence number to check
+ *
+ * Implements sequence number algorithm as specified in
+ * RFC 2203, Section 5.3.3.1. "Context Management".
+ *
+ * Return values:
+ *   %true: @rqstp's GSS sequence number is inside the window
+ *   %false: @rqstp's GSS sequence number is outside the window
+ */
+static bool gss_check_seq_num(const struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct rsc *rsci,
+			      u32 seq_num)
+{
+	struct gss_svc_seq_data *sd = &rsci->seqdata;
+	bool result = false;
+
+	spin_lock(&sd->sd_lock);
+	if (seq_num > sd->sd_max) {
+		if (seq_num >= sd->sd_max + GSS_SEQ_WIN) {
+			memset(sd->sd_win, 0, sizeof(sd->sd_win));
+			sd->sd_max = seq_num;
+		} else while (sd->sd_max < seq_num) {
+			sd->sd_max++;
+			__clear_bit(sd->sd_max % GSS_SEQ_WIN, sd->sd_win);
+		}
+		__set_bit(seq_num % GSS_SEQ_WIN, sd->sd_win);
+		goto ok;
+	} else if (seq_num + GSS_SEQ_WIN <= sd->sd_max) {
+		goto toolow;
+	}
+	if (__test_and_set_bit(seq_num % GSS_SEQ_WIN, sd->sd_win))
+		goto alreadyseen;
+
+ok:
+	result = true;
+out:
+	spin_unlock(&sd->sd_lock);
+	return result;
+
+toolow:
+	trace_rpcgss_svc_seqno_low(rqstp, seq_num,
+				   sd->sd_max - GSS_SEQ_WIN,
+				   sd->sd_max);
+	goto out;
+alreadyseen:
+	trace_rpcgss_svc_seqno_seen(rqstp, seq_num);
+	goto out;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Decode and verify a Call's verifier field. For RPC_AUTH_GSS Calls,
+ * the body of this field contains a variable length checksum.
+ *
+ * GSS-specific auth_stat values are mandated by RFC 2203 Section
+ * 5.3.3.3.
+ */
+static int
+svcauth_gss_verify_header(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct rsc *rsci,
+			  __be32 *rpcstart, struct rpc_gss_wire_cred *gc)
+{
+	struct xdr_stream	*xdr = &rqstp->rq_arg_stream;
+	struct gss_ctx		*ctx_id = rsci->mechctx;
+	u32			flavor, maj_stat;
+	struct xdr_buf		rpchdr;
+	struct xdr_netobj	checksum;
+	struct kvec		iov;
+
+	/*
+	 * Compute the checksum of the incoming Call from the
+	 * XID field to credential field:
+	 */
+	iov.iov_base = rpcstart;
+	iov.iov_len = (u8 *)xdr->p - (u8 *)rpcstart;
+	xdr_buf_from_iov(&iov, &rpchdr);
+
+	/* Call's verf field: */
+	if (xdr_stream_decode_opaque_auth(xdr, &flavor,
+					  (void **)&checksum.data,
+					  &checksum.len) < 0) {
+		rqstp->rq_auth_stat = rpc_autherr_badverf;
+		return SVC_DENIED;
+	}
+	if (flavor != RPC_AUTH_GSS) {
+		rqstp->rq_auth_stat = rpc_autherr_badverf;
+		return SVC_DENIED;
+	}
+
+	if (rqstp->rq_deferred)
+		return SVC_OK;
+	maj_stat = gss_verify_mic(ctx_id, &rpchdr, &checksum);
+	if (maj_stat != GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
+		trace_rpcgss_svc_mic(rqstp, maj_stat);
+		rqstp->rq_auth_stat = rpcsec_gsserr_credproblem;
+		return SVC_DENIED;
+	}
+
+	if (gc->gc_seq > MAXSEQ) {
+		trace_rpcgss_svc_seqno_large(rqstp, gc->gc_seq);
+		rqstp->rq_auth_stat = rpcsec_gsserr_ctxproblem;
+		return SVC_DENIED;
+	}
+	if (!gss_check_seq_num(rqstp, rsci, gc->gc_seq))
+		return SVC_DROP;
+	return SVC_OK;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Construct and encode a Reply's verifier field. The verifier's body
+ * field contains a variable-length checksum of the GSS sequence
+ * number.
+ */
+static bool
+svcauth_gss_encode_verf(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct gss_ctx *ctx_id, u32 seq)
+{
+	struct gss_svc_data	*gsd = rqstp->rq_auth_data;
+	u32			maj_stat;
+	struct xdr_buf		verf_data;
+	struct xdr_netobj	checksum;
+	struct kvec		iov;
+
+	gsd->gsd_seq_num = cpu_to_be32(seq);
+	iov.iov_base = &gsd->gsd_seq_num;
+	iov.iov_len = XDR_UNIT;
+	xdr_buf_from_iov(&iov, &verf_data);
+
+	checksum.data = gsd->gsd_scratch;
+	maj_stat = gss_get_mic(ctx_id, &verf_data, &checksum);
+	if (maj_stat != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
+		goto bad_mic;
+
+	return xdr_stream_encode_opaque_auth(&rqstp->rq_res_stream, RPC_AUTH_GSS,
+					     checksum.data, checksum.len) > 0;
+
+bad_mic:
+	trace_rpcgss_svc_get_mic(rqstp, maj_stat);
+	return false;
+}
+
+struct gss_domain {
+	struct auth_domain	h;
+	u32			pseudoflavor;
+};
+
+static struct auth_domain *
+find_gss_auth_domain(struct gss_ctx *ctx, u32 svc)
+{
+	char *name;
+
+	name = gss_service_to_auth_domain_name(ctx->mech_type, svc);
+	if (!name)
+		return NULL;
+	return auth_domain_find(name);
+}
+
+static struct auth_ops svcauthops_gss;
+
+u32 svcauth_gss_flavor(struct auth_domain *dom)
+{
+	struct gss_domain *gd = container_of(dom, struct gss_domain, h);
+
+	return gd->pseudoflavor;
+}
+
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(svcauth_gss_flavor);
+
+struct auth_domain *
+svcauth_gss_register_pseudoflavor(u32 pseudoflavor, char * name)
+{
+	struct gss_domain	*new;
+	struct auth_domain	*test;
+	int			stat = -ENOMEM;
+
+	new = kmalloc(sizeof(*new), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!new)
+		goto out;
+	kref_init(&new->h.ref);
+	new->h.name = kstrdup(name, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!new->h.name)
+		goto out_free_dom;
+	new->h.flavour = &svcauthops_gss;
+	new->pseudoflavor = pseudoflavor;
+
+	test = auth_domain_lookup(name, &new->h);
+	if (test != &new->h) {
+		pr_warn("svc: duplicate registration of gss pseudo flavour %s.\n",
+			name);
+		stat = -EADDRINUSE;
+		auth_domain_put(test);
+		goto out_free_name;
+	}
+	return test;
+
+out_free_name:
+	kfree(new->h.name);
+out_free_dom:
+	kfree(new);
+out:
+	return ERR_PTR(stat);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(svcauth_gss_register_pseudoflavor);
+
+/*
+ * RFC 2203, Section 5.3.2.2
+ *
+ *	struct rpc_gss_integ_data {
+ *		opaque databody_integ<>;
+ *		opaque checksum<>;
+ *	};
+ *
+ *	struct rpc_gss_data_t {
+ *		unsigned int seq_num;
+ *		proc_req_arg_t arg;
+ *	};
+ */
+static noinline_for_stack int
+svcauth_gss_unwrap_integ(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, u32 seq, struct gss_ctx *ctx)
+{
+	struct gss_svc_data *gsd = rqstp->rq_auth_data;
+	struct xdr_stream *xdr = &rqstp->rq_arg_stream;
+	u32 len, offset, seq_num, maj_stat;
+	struct xdr_buf *buf = xdr->buf;
+	struct xdr_buf databody_integ;
+	struct xdr_netobj checksum;
+
+	/* NFS READ normally uses splice to send data in-place. However
+	 * the data in cache can change after the reply's MIC is computed
+	 * but before the RPC reply is sent. To prevent the client from
+	 * rejecting the server-computed MIC in this somewhat rare case,
+	 * do not use splice with the GSS integrity service.
+	 */
+	clear_bit(RQ_SPLICE_OK, &rqstp->rq_flags);
+
+	/* Did we already verify the signature on the original pass through? */
+	if (rqstp->rq_deferred)
+		return 0;
+
+	if (xdr_stream_decode_u32(xdr, &len) < 0)
+		goto unwrap_failed;
+	if (len & 3)
+		goto unwrap_failed;
+	offset = xdr_stream_pos(xdr);
+	if (xdr_buf_subsegment(buf, &databody_integ, offset, len))
+		goto unwrap_failed;
+
+	/*
+	 * The xdr_stream now points to the @seq_num field. The next
+	 * XDR data item is the @arg field, which contains the clear
+	 * text RPC program payload. The checksum, which follows the
+	 * @arg field, is located and decoded without updating the
+	 * xdr_stream.
+	 */
+
+	offset += len;
+	if (xdr_decode_word(buf, offset, &checksum.len))
+		goto unwrap_failed;
+	if (checksum.len > sizeof(gsd->gsd_scratch))
+		goto unwrap_failed;
+	checksum.data = gsd->gsd_scratch;
+	if (read_bytes_from_xdr_buf(buf, offset + XDR_UNIT, checksum.data,
+				    checksum.len))
+		goto unwrap_failed;
+
+	maj_stat = gss_verify_mic(ctx, &databody_integ, &checksum);
+	if (maj_stat != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
+		goto bad_mic;
+
+	/* The received seqno is protected by the checksum. */
+	if (xdr_stream_decode_u32(xdr, &seq_num) < 0)
+		goto unwrap_failed;
+	if (seq_num != seq)
+		goto bad_seqno;
+
+	xdr_truncate_decode(xdr, XDR_UNIT + checksum.len);
+	return 0;
+
+unwrap_failed:
+	trace_rpcgss_svc_unwrap_failed(rqstp);
+	return -EINVAL;
+bad_seqno:
+	trace_rpcgss_svc_seqno_bad(rqstp, seq, seq_num);
+	return -EINVAL;
+bad_mic:
+	trace_rpcgss_svc_mic(rqstp, maj_stat);
+	return -EINVAL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * RFC 2203, Section 5.3.2.3
+ *
+ *	struct rpc_gss_priv_data {
+ *		opaque databody_priv<>
+ *	};
+ *
+ *	struct rpc_gss_data_t {
+ *		unsigned int seq_num;
+ *		proc_req_arg_t arg;
+ *	};
+ */
+static noinline_for_stack int
+svcauth_gss_unwrap_priv(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, u32 seq, struct gss_ctx *ctx)
+{
+	struct xdr_stream *xdr = &rqstp->rq_arg_stream;
+	u32 len, maj_stat, seq_num, offset;
+	struct xdr_buf *buf = xdr->buf;
+	unsigned int saved_len;
+
+	clear_bit(RQ_SPLICE_OK, &rqstp->rq_flags);
+
+	if (xdr_stream_decode_u32(xdr, &len) < 0)
+		goto unwrap_failed;
+	if (rqstp->rq_deferred) {
+		/* Already decrypted last time through! The sequence number
+		 * check at out_seq is unnecessary but harmless: */
+		goto out_seq;
+	}
+	if (len > xdr_stream_remaining(xdr))
+		goto unwrap_failed;
+	offset = xdr_stream_pos(xdr);
+
+	saved_len = buf->len;
+	maj_stat = gss_unwrap(ctx, offset, offset + len, buf);
+	if (maj_stat != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
+		goto bad_unwrap;
+	xdr->nwords -= XDR_QUADLEN(saved_len - buf->len);
+
+out_seq:
+	/* gss_unwrap() decrypted the sequence number. */
+	if (xdr_stream_decode_u32(xdr, &seq_num) < 0)
+		goto unwrap_failed;
+	if (seq_num != seq)
+		goto bad_seqno;
+	return 0;
+
+unwrap_failed:
+	trace_rpcgss_svc_unwrap_failed(rqstp);
+	return -EINVAL;
+bad_seqno:
+	trace_rpcgss_svc_seqno_bad(rqstp, seq, seq_num);
+	return -EINVAL;
+bad_unwrap:
+	trace_rpcgss_svc_unwrap(rqstp, maj_stat);
+	return -EINVAL;
+}
+
+static enum svc_auth_status
+svcauth_gss_set_client(struct svc_rqst *rqstp)
+{
+	struct gss_svc_data *svcdata = rqstp->rq_auth_data;
+	struct rsc *rsci = svcdata->rsci;
+	struct rpc_gss_wire_cred *gc = &svcdata->clcred;
+	int stat;
+
+	rqstp->rq_auth_stat = rpc_autherr_badcred;
+
+	/*
+	 * A gss export can be specified either by:
+	 * 	export	*(sec=krb5,rw)
+	 * or by
+	 * 	export gss/krb5(rw)
+	 * The latter is deprecated; but for backwards compatibility reasons
+	 * the nfsd code will still fall back on trying it if the former
+	 * doesn't work; so we try to make both available to nfsd, below.
+	 */
+	rqstp->rq_gssclient = find_gss_auth_domain(rsci->mechctx, gc->gc_svc);
+	if (rqstp->rq_gssclient == NULL)
+		return SVC_DENIED;
+	stat = svcauth_unix_set_client(rqstp);
+	if (stat == SVC_DROP || stat == SVC_CLOSE)
+		return stat;
+
+	rqstp->rq_auth_stat = rpc_auth_ok;
+	return SVC_OK;
+}
+
+static bool
+svcauth_gss_proc_init_verf(struct cache_detail *cd, struct svc_rqst *rqstp,
+			   struct xdr_netobj *out_handle, int *major_status,
+			   u32 seq_num)
+{
+	struct xdr_stream *xdr = &rqstp->rq_res_stream;
+	struct rsc *rsci;
+	bool rc;
+
+	if (*major_status != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
+		goto null_verifier;
+	rsci = gss_svc_searchbyctx(cd, out_handle);
+	if (rsci == NULL) {
+		*major_status = GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT;
+		goto null_verifier;
+	}
+
+	rc = svcauth_gss_encode_verf(rqstp, rsci->mechctx, seq_num);
+	cache_put(&rsci->h, cd);
+	return rc;
+
+null_verifier:
+	return xdr_stream_encode_opaque_auth(xdr, RPC_AUTH_NULL, NULL, 0) > 0;
+}
+
+static void gss_free_in_token_pages(struct gssp_in_token *in_token)
+{
+	u32 inlen;
+	int i;
+
+	i = 0;
+	inlen = in_token->page_len;
+	while (inlen) {
+		if (in_token->pages[i])
+			put_page(in_token->pages[i]);
+		inlen -= inlen > PAGE_SIZE ? PAGE_SIZE : inlen;
+	}
+
+	kfree(in_token->pages);
+	in_token->pages = NULL;
+}
+
+static int gss_read_proxy_verf(struct svc_rqst *rqstp,
+			       struct rpc_gss_wire_cred *gc,
+			       struct xdr_netobj *in_handle,
+			       struct gssp_in_token *in_token)
+{
+	struct xdr_stream *xdr = &rqstp->rq_arg_stream;
+	unsigned int length, pgto_offs, pgfrom_offs;
+	int pages, i, pgto, pgfrom;
+	size_t to_offs, from_offs;
+	u32 inlen;
+
+	if (dup_netobj(in_handle, &gc->gc_ctx))
+		return SVC_CLOSE;
+
+	/*
+	 *  RFC 2203 Section 5.2.2
+	 *
+	 *	struct rpc_gss_init_arg {
+	 *		opaque gss_token<>;
+	 *	};
+	 */
+	if (xdr_stream_decode_u32(xdr, &inlen) < 0)
+		goto out_denied_free;
+	if (inlen > xdr_stream_remaining(xdr))
+		goto out_denied_free;
+
+	pages = DIV_ROUND_UP(inlen, PAGE_SIZE);
+	in_token->pages = kcalloc(pages, sizeof(struct page *), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!in_token->pages)
+		goto out_denied_free;
+	in_token->page_base = 0;
+	in_token->page_len = inlen;
+	for (i = 0; i < pages; i++) {
+		in_token->pages[i] = alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (!in_token->pages[i]) {
+			gss_free_in_token_pages(in_token);
+			goto out_denied_free;
+		}
+	}
+
+	length = min_t(unsigned int, inlen, (char *)xdr->end - (char *)xdr->p);
+	memcpy(page_address(in_token->pages[0]), xdr->p, length);
+	inlen -= length;
+
+	to_offs = length;
+	from_offs = rqstp->rq_arg.page_base;
+	while (inlen) {
+		pgto = to_offs >> PAGE_SHIFT;
+		pgfrom = from_offs >> PAGE_SHIFT;
+		pgto_offs = to_offs & ~PAGE_MASK;
+		pgfrom_offs = from_offs & ~PAGE_MASK;
+
+		length = min_t(unsigned int, inlen,
+			 min_t(unsigned int, PAGE_SIZE - pgto_offs,
+			       PAGE_SIZE - pgfrom_offs));
+		memcpy(page_address(in_token->pages[pgto]) + pgto_offs,
+		       page_address(rqstp->rq_arg.pages[pgfrom]) + pgfrom_offs,
+		       length);
+
+		to_offs += length;
+		from_offs += length;
+		inlen -= length;
+	}
+	return 0;
+
+out_denied_free:
+	kfree(in_handle->data);
+	return SVC_DENIED;
+}
+
+/*
+ * RFC 2203, Section 5.2.3.1.
+ *
+ *	struct rpc_gss_init_res {
+ *		opaque handle<>;
+ *		unsigned int gss_major;
+ *		unsigned int gss_minor;
+ *		unsigned int seq_window;
+ *		opaque gss_token<>;
+ *	};
+ */
+static bool
+svcxdr_encode_gss_init_res(struct xdr_stream *xdr,
+			   struct xdr_netobj *handle,
+			   struct xdr_netobj *gss_token,
+			   unsigned int major_status,
+			   unsigned int minor_status, u32 seq_num)
+{
+	if (xdr_stream_encode_opaque(xdr, handle->data, handle->len) < 0)
+		return false;
+	if (xdr_stream_encode_u32(xdr, major_status) < 0)
+		return false;
+	if (xdr_stream_encode_u32(xdr, minor_status) < 0)
+		return false;
+	if (xdr_stream_encode_u32(xdr, seq_num) < 0)
+		return false;
+	if (xdr_stream_encode_opaque(xdr, gss_token->data, gss_token->len) < 0)
+		return false;
+	return true;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Having read the cred already and found we're in the context
+ * initiation case, read the verifier and initiate (or check the results
+ * of) upcalls to userspace for help with context initiation.  If
+ * the upcall results are available, write the verifier and result.
+ * Otherwise, drop the request pending an answer to the upcall.
+ */
+static int
+svcauth_gss_legacy_init(struct svc_rqst *rqstp,
+			struct rpc_gss_wire_cred *gc)
+{
+	struct xdr_stream *xdr = &rqstp->rq_arg_stream;
+	struct rsi *rsip, rsikey;
+	__be32 *p;
+	u32 len;
+	int ret;
+	struct sunrpc_net *sn = net_generic(SVC_NET(rqstp), sunrpc_net_id);
+
+	memset(&rsikey, 0, sizeof(rsikey));
+	if (dup_netobj(&rsikey.in_handle, &gc->gc_ctx))
+		return SVC_CLOSE;
+
+	/*
+	 *  RFC 2203 Section 5.2.2
+	 *
+	 *	struct rpc_gss_init_arg {
+	 *		opaque gss_token<>;
+	 *	};
+	 */
+	if (xdr_stream_decode_u32(xdr, &len) < 0) {
+		kfree(rsikey.in_handle.data);
+		return SVC_DENIED;
+	}
+	p = xdr_inline_decode(xdr, len);
+	if (!p) {
+		kfree(rsikey.in_handle.data);
+		return SVC_DENIED;
+	}
+	rsikey.in_token.data = kmalloc(len, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (ZERO_OR_NULL_PTR(rsikey.in_token.data)) {
+		kfree(rsikey.in_handle.data);
+		return SVC_CLOSE;
+	}
+	memcpy(rsikey.in_token.data, p, len);
+	rsikey.in_token.len = len;
+
+	/* Perform upcall, or find upcall result: */
+	rsip = rsi_lookup(sn->rsi_cache, &rsikey);
+	rsi_free(&rsikey);
+	if (!rsip)
+		return SVC_CLOSE;
+	if (cache_check(sn->rsi_cache, &rsip->h, &rqstp->rq_chandle) < 0)
+		/* No upcall result: */
+		return SVC_CLOSE;
+
+	ret = SVC_CLOSE;
+	if (!svcauth_gss_proc_init_verf(sn->rsc_cache, rqstp, &rsip->out_handle,
+					&rsip->major_status, GSS_SEQ_WIN))
+		goto out;
+	if (!svcxdr_set_accept_stat(rqstp))
+		goto out;
+	if (!svcxdr_encode_gss_init_res(&rqstp->rq_res_stream, &rsip->out_handle,
+					&rsip->out_token, rsip->major_status,
+					rsip->minor_status, GSS_SEQ_WIN))
+		goto out;
+
+	ret = SVC_COMPLETE;
+out:
+	cache_put(&rsip->h, sn->rsi_cache);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int gss_proxy_save_rsc(struct cache_detail *cd,
+				struct gssp_upcall_data *ud,
+				uint64_t *handle)
+{
+	struct rsc rsci, *rscp = NULL;
+	static atomic64_t ctxhctr;
+	long long ctxh;
+	struct gss_api_mech *gm = NULL;
+	time64_t expiry;
+	int status;
+
+	memset(&rsci, 0, sizeof(rsci));
+	/* context handle */
+	status = -ENOMEM;
+	/* the handle needs to be just a unique id,
+	 * use a static counter */
+	ctxh = atomic64_inc_return(&ctxhctr);
+
+	/* make a copy for the caller */
+	*handle = ctxh;
+
+	/* make a copy for the rsc cache */
+	if (dup_to_netobj(&rsci.handle, (char *)handle, sizeof(uint64_t)))
+		goto out;
+	rscp = rsc_lookup(cd, &rsci);
+	if (!rscp)
+		goto out;
+
+	/* creds */
+	if (!ud->found_creds) {
+		/* userspace seem buggy, we should always get at least a
+		 * mapping to nobody */
+		goto out;
+	} else {
+		struct timespec64 boot;
+
+		/* steal creds */
+		rsci.cred = ud->creds;
+		memset(&ud->creds, 0, sizeof(struct svc_cred));
+
+		status = -EOPNOTSUPP;
+		/* get mech handle from OID */
+		gm = gss_mech_get_by_OID(&ud->mech_oid);
+		if (!gm)
+			goto out;
+		rsci.cred.cr_gss_mech = gm;
+
+		status = -EINVAL;
+		/* mech-specific data: */
+		status = gss_import_sec_context(ud->out_handle.data,
+						ud->out_handle.len,
+						gm, &rsci.mechctx,
+						&expiry, GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (status)
+			goto out;
+
+		getboottime64(&boot);
+		expiry -= boot.tv_sec;
+	}
+
+	rsci.h.expiry_time = expiry;
+	rscp = rsc_update(cd, &rsci, rscp);
+	status = 0;
+out:
+	rsc_free(&rsci);
+	if (rscp)
+		cache_put(&rscp->h, cd);
+	else
+		status = -ENOMEM;
+	return status;
+}
+
+static int svcauth_gss_proxy_init(struct svc_rqst *rqstp,
+				  struct rpc_gss_wire_cred *gc)
+{
+	struct xdr_netobj cli_handle;
+	struct gssp_upcall_data ud;
+	uint64_t handle;
+	int status;
+	int ret;
+	struct net *net = SVC_NET(rqstp);
+	struct sunrpc_net *sn = net_generic(net, sunrpc_net_id);
+
+	memset(&ud, 0, sizeof(ud));
+	ret = gss_read_proxy_verf(rqstp, gc, &ud.in_handle, &ud.in_token);
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+
+	ret = SVC_CLOSE;
+
+	/* Perform synchronous upcall to gss-proxy */
+	status = gssp_accept_sec_context_upcall(net, &ud);
+	if (status)
+		goto out;
+
+	trace_rpcgss_svc_accept_upcall(rqstp, ud.major_status, ud.minor_status);
+
+	switch (ud.major_status) {
+	case GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED:
+		cli_handle = ud.out_handle;
+		break;
+	case GSS_S_COMPLETE:
+		status = gss_proxy_save_rsc(sn->rsc_cache, &ud, &handle);
+		if (status)
+			goto out;
+		cli_handle.data = (u8 *)&handle;
+		cli_handle.len = sizeof(handle);
+		break;
+	default:
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if (!svcauth_gss_proc_init_verf(sn->rsc_cache, rqstp, &cli_handle,
+					&ud.major_status, GSS_SEQ_WIN))
+		goto out;
+	if (!svcxdr_set_accept_stat(rqstp))
+		goto out;
+	if (!svcxdr_encode_gss_init_res(&rqstp->rq_res_stream, &cli_handle,
+					&ud.out_token, ud.major_status,
+					ud.minor_status, GSS_SEQ_WIN))
+		goto out;
+
+	ret = SVC_COMPLETE;
+out:
+	gss_free_in_token_pages(&ud.in_token);
+	gssp_free_upcall_data(&ud);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Try to set the sn->use_gss_proxy variable to a new value. We only allow
+ * it to be changed if it's currently undefined (-1). If it's any other value
+ * then return -EBUSY unless the type wouldn't have changed anyway.
+ */
+static int set_gss_proxy(struct net *net, int type)
+{
+	struct sunrpc_net *sn = net_generic(net, sunrpc_net_id);
+	int ret;
+
+	WARN_ON_ONCE(type != 0 && type != 1);
+	ret = cmpxchg(&sn->use_gss_proxy, -1, type);
+	if (ret != -1 && ret != type)
+		return -EBUSY;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static bool use_gss_proxy(struct net *net)
+{
+	struct sunrpc_net *sn = net_generic(net, sunrpc_net_id);
+
+	/* If use_gss_proxy is still undefined, then try to disable it */
+	if (sn->use_gss_proxy == -1)
+		set_gss_proxy(net, 0);
+	return sn->use_gss_proxy;
+}
+
+static noinline_for_stack int
+svcauth_gss_proc_init(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct rpc_gss_wire_cred *gc)
+{
+	struct xdr_stream *xdr = &rqstp->rq_arg_stream;
+	u32 flavor, len;
+	void *body;
+
+	/* Call's verf field: */
+	if (xdr_stream_decode_opaque_auth(xdr, &flavor, &body, &len) < 0)
+		return SVC_GARBAGE;
+	if (flavor != RPC_AUTH_NULL || len != 0) {
+		rqstp->rq_auth_stat = rpc_autherr_badverf;
+		return SVC_DENIED;
+	}
+
+	if (gc->gc_proc == RPC_GSS_PROC_INIT && gc->gc_ctx.len != 0) {
+		rqstp->rq_auth_stat = rpc_autherr_badcred;
+		return SVC_DENIED;
+	}
+
+	if (!use_gss_proxy(SVC_NET(rqstp)))
+		return svcauth_gss_legacy_init(rqstp, gc);
+	return svcauth_gss_proxy_init(rqstp, gc);
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS
+
+static ssize_t write_gssp(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
+			 size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+	struct net *net = pde_data(file_inode(file));
+	char tbuf[20];
+	unsigned long i;
+	int res;
+
+	if (*ppos || count > sizeof(tbuf)-1)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	if (copy_from_user(tbuf, buf, count))
+		return -EFAULT;
+
+	tbuf[count] = 0;
+	res = kstrtoul(tbuf, 0, &i);
+	if (res)
+		return res;
+	if (i != 1)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	res = set_gssp_clnt(net);
+	if (res)
+		return res;
+	res = set_gss_proxy(net, 1);
+	if (res)
+		return res;
+	return count;
+}
+
+static ssize_t read_gssp(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
+			 size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+	struct net *net = pde_data(file_inode(file));
+	struct sunrpc_net *sn = net_generic(net, sunrpc_net_id);
+	unsigned long p = *ppos;
+	char tbuf[10];
+	size_t len;
+
+	snprintf(tbuf, sizeof(tbuf), "%d\n", sn->use_gss_proxy);
+	len = strlen(tbuf);
+	if (p >= len)
+		return 0;
+	len -= p;
+	if (len > count)
+		len = count;
+	if (copy_to_user(buf, (void *)(tbuf+p), len))
+		return -EFAULT;
+	*ppos += len;
+	return len;
+}
+
+static const struct proc_ops use_gss_proxy_proc_ops = {
+	.proc_open	= nonseekable_open,
+	.proc_write	= write_gssp,
+	.proc_read	= read_gssp,
+};
+
+static int create_use_gss_proxy_proc_entry(struct net *net)
+{
+	struct sunrpc_net *sn = net_generic(net, sunrpc_net_id);
+	struct proc_dir_entry **p = &sn->use_gssp_proc;
+
+	sn->use_gss_proxy = -1;
+	*p = proc_create_data("use-gss-proxy", S_IFREG | 0600,
+			      sn->proc_net_rpc,
+			      &use_gss_proxy_proc_ops, net);
+	if (!*p)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	init_gssp_clnt(sn);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void destroy_use_gss_proxy_proc_entry(struct net *net)
+{
+	struct sunrpc_net *sn = net_generic(net, sunrpc_net_id);
+
+	if (sn->use_gssp_proc) {
+		remove_proc_entry("use-gss-proxy", sn->proc_net_rpc);
+		clear_gssp_clnt(sn);
+	}
+}
+
+static ssize_t read_gss_krb5_enctypes(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
+				      size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+	struct rpcsec_gss_oid oid = {
+		.len	= 9,
+		.data	= "\x2a\x86\x48\x86\xf7\x12\x01\x02\x02",
+	};
+	struct gss_api_mech *mech;
+	ssize_t ret;
+
+	mech = gss_mech_get_by_OID(&oid);
+	if (!mech)
+		return 0;
+	if (!mech->gm_upcall_enctypes) {
+		gss_mech_put(mech);
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	ret = simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos,
+				      mech->gm_upcall_enctypes,
+				      strlen(mech->gm_upcall_enctypes));
+	gss_mech_put(mech);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static const struct proc_ops gss_krb5_enctypes_proc_ops = {
+	.proc_open	= nonseekable_open,
+	.proc_read	= read_gss_krb5_enctypes,
+};
+
+static int create_krb5_enctypes_proc_entry(struct net *net)
+{
+	struct sunrpc_net *sn = net_generic(net, sunrpc_net_id);
+
+	sn->gss_krb5_enctypes =
+		proc_create_data("gss_krb5_enctypes", S_IFREG | 0444,
+				 sn->proc_net_rpc, &gss_krb5_enctypes_proc_ops,
+				 net);
+	return sn->gss_krb5_enctypes ? 0 : -ENOMEM;
+}
+
+static void destroy_krb5_enctypes_proc_entry(struct net *net)
+{
+	struct sunrpc_net *sn = net_generic(net, sunrpc_net_id);
+
+	if (sn->gss_krb5_enctypes)
+		remove_proc_entry("gss_krb5_enctypes", sn->proc_net_rpc);
+}
+
+#else /* CONFIG_PROC_FS */
+
+static int create_use_gss_proxy_proc_entry(struct net *net)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void destroy_use_gss_proxy_proc_entry(struct net *net) {}
+
+static int create_krb5_enctypes_proc_entry(struct net *net)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void destroy_krb5_enctypes_proc_entry(struct net *net) {}
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_PROC_FS */
+
+/*
+ * The Call's credential body should contain a struct rpc_gss_cred_t.
+ *
+ * RFC 2203 Section 5
+ *
+ *	struct rpc_gss_cred_t {
+ *		union switch (unsigned int version) {
+ *		case RPCSEC_GSS_VERS_1:
+ *			struct {
+ *				rpc_gss_proc_t gss_proc;
+ *				unsigned int seq_num;
+ *				rpc_gss_service_t service;
+ *				opaque handle<>;
+ *			} rpc_gss_cred_vers_1_t;
+ *		}
+ *	};
+ */
+static bool
+svcauth_gss_decode_credbody(struct xdr_stream *xdr,
+			    struct rpc_gss_wire_cred *gc,
+			    __be32 **rpcstart)
+{
+	ssize_t handle_len;
+	u32 body_len;
+	__be32 *p;
+
+	p = xdr_inline_decode(xdr, XDR_UNIT);
+	if (!p)
+		return false;
+	/*
+	 * start of rpc packet is 7 u32's back from here:
+	 * xid direction rpcversion prog vers proc flavour
+	 */
+	*rpcstart = p - 7;
+	body_len = be32_to_cpup(p);
+	if (body_len > RPC_MAX_AUTH_SIZE)
+		return false;
+
+	/* struct rpc_gss_cred_t */
+	if (xdr_stream_decode_u32(xdr, &gc->gc_v) < 0)
+		return false;
+	if (xdr_stream_decode_u32(xdr, &gc->gc_proc) < 0)
+		return false;
+	if (xdr_stream_decode_u32(xdr, &gc->gc_seq) < 0)
+		return false;
+	if (xdr_stream_decode_u32(xdr, &gc->gc_svc) < 0)
+		return false;
+	handle_len = xdr_stream_decode_opaque_inline(xdr,
+						     (void **)&gc->gc_ctx.data,
+						     body_len);
+	if (handle_len < 0)
+		return false;
+	if (body_len != XDR_UNIT * 5 + xdr_align_size(handle_len))
+		return false;
+
+	gc->gc_ctx.len = handle_len;
+	return true;
+}
+
+/**
+ * svcauth_gss_accept - Decode and validate incoming RPC_AUTH_GSS credential
+ * @rqstp: RPC transaction
+ *
+ * Return values:
+ *   %SVC_OK: Success
+ *   %SVC_COMPLETE: GSS context lifetime event
+ *   %SVC_DENIED: Credential or verifier is not valid
+ *   %SVC_GARBAGE: Failed to decode credential or verifier
+ *   %SVC_CLOSE: Temporary failure
+ *
+ * The rqstp->rq_auth_stat field is also set (see RFCs 2203 and 5531).
+ */
+static enum svc_auth_status
+svcauth_gss_accept(struct svc_rqst *rqstp)
+{
+	struct gss_svc_data *svcdata = rqstp->rq_auth_data;
+	__be32		*rpcstart;
+	struct rpc_gss_wire_cred *gc;
+	struct rsc	*rsci = NULL;
+	int		ret;
+	struct sunrpc_net *sn = net_generic(SVC_NET(rqstp), sunrpc_net_id);
+
+	rqstp->rq_auth_stat = rpc_autherr_badcred;
+	if (!svcdata)
+		svcdata = kmalloc(sizeof(*svcdata), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!svcdata)
+		goto auth_err;
+	rqstp->rq_auth_data = svcdata;
+	svcdata->gsd_databody_offset = 0;
+	svcdata->rsci = NULL;
+	gc = &svcdata->clcred;
+
+	if (!svcauth_gss_decode_credbody(&rqstp->rq_arg_stream, gc, &rpcstart))
+		goto auth_err;
+	if (gc->gc_v != RPC_GSS_VERSION)
+		goto auth_err;
+
+	switch (gc->gc_proc) {
+	case RPC_GSS_PROC_INIT:
+	case RPC_GSS_PROC_CONTINUE_INIT:
+		if (rqstp->rq_proc != 0)
+			goto auth_err;
+		return svcauth_gss_proc_init(rqstp, gc);
+	case RPC_GSS_PROC_DESTROY:
+		if (rqstp->rq_proc != 0)
+			goto auth_err;
+		fallthrough;
+	case RPC_GSS_PROC_DATA:
+		rqstp->rq_auth_stat = rpcsec_gsserr_credproblem;
+		rsci = gss_svc_searchbyctx(sn->rsc_cache, &gc->gc_ctx);
+		if (!rsci)
+			goto auth_err;
+		switch (svcauth_gss_verify_header(rqstp, rsci, rpcstart, gc)) {
+		case SVC_OK:
+			break;
+		case SVC_DENIED:
+			goto auth_err;
+		case SVC_DROP:
+			goto drop;
+		}
+		break;
+	default:
+		if (rqstp->rq_proc != 0)
+			goto auth_err;
+		rqstp->rq_auth_stat = rpc_autherr_rejectedcred;
+		goto auth_err;
+	}
+
+	/* now act upon the command: */
+	switch (gc->gc_proc) {
+	case RPC_GSS_PROC_DESTROY:
+		if (!svcauth_gss_encode_verf(rqstp, rsci->mechctx, gc->gc_seq))
+			goto auth_err;
+		if (!svcxdr_set_accept_stat(rqstp))
+			goto auth_err;
+		/* Delete the entry from the cache_list and call cache_put */
+		sunrpc_cache_unhash(sn->rsc_cache, &rsci->h);
+		goto complete;
+	case RPC_GSS_PROC_DATA:
+		rqstp->rq_auth_stat = rpcsec_gsserr_ctxproblem;
+		if (!svcauth_gss_encode_verf(rqstp, rsci->mechctx, gc->gc_seq))
+			goto auth_err;
+		if (!svcxdr_set_accept_stat(rqstp))
+			goto auth_err;
+		svcdata->gsd_databody_offset = xdr_stream_pos(&rqstp->rq_res_stream);
+		rqstp->rq_cred = rsci->cred;
+		get_group_info(rsci->cred.cr_group_info);
+		rqstp->rq_auth_stat = rpc_autherr_badcred;
+		switch (gc->gc_svc) {
+		case RPC_GSS_SVC_NONE:
+			break;
+		case RPC_GSS_SVC_INTEGRITY:
+			/* placeholders for body length and seq. number: */
+			xdr_reserve_space(&rqstp->rq_res_stream, XDR_UNIT * 2);
+			if (svcauth_gss_unwrap_integ(rqstp, gc->gc_seq,
+						     rsci->mechctx))
+				goto garbage_args;
+			svcxdr_set_auth_slack(rqstp, RPC_MAX_AUTH_SIZE);
+			break;
+		case RPC_GSS_SVC_PRIVACY:
+			/* placeholders for body length and seq. number: */
+			xdr_reserve_space(&rqstp->rq_res_stream, XDR_UNIT * 2);
+			if (svcauth_gss_unwrap_priv(rqstp, gc->gc_seq,
+						    rsci->mechctx))
+				goto garbage_args;
+			svcxdr_set_auth_slack(rqstp, RPC_MAX_AUTH_SIZE * 2);
+			break;
+		default:
+			goto auth_err;
+		}
+		svcdata->rsci = rsci;
+		cache_get(&rsci->h);
+		rqstp->rq_cred.cr_flavor = gss_svc_to_pseudoflavor(
+					rsci->mechctx->mech_type,
+					GSS_C_QOP_DEFAULT,
+					gc->gc_svc);
+		ret = SVC_OK;
+		trace_rpcgss_svc_authenticate(rqstp, gc);
+		goto out;
+	}
+garbage_args:
+	ret = SVC_GARBAGE;
+	goto out;
+auth_err:
+	xdr_truncate_encode(&rqstp->rq_res_stream, XDR_UNIT * 2);
+	ret = SVC_DENIED;
+	goto out;
+complete:
+	ret = SVC_COMPLETE;
+	goto out;
+drop:
+	ret = SVC_CLOSE;
+out:
+	if (rsci)
+		cache_put(&rsci->h, sn->rsc_cache);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static u32
+svcauth_gss_prepare_to_wrap(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct gss_svc_data *gsd)
+{
+	u32 offset;
+
+	/* Release can be called twice, but we only wrap once. */
+	offset = gsd->gsd_databody_offset;
+	gsd->gsd_databody_offset = 0;
+
+	/* AUTH_ERROR replies are not wrapped. */
+	if (rqstp->rq_auth_stat != rpc_auth_ok)
+		return 0;
+
+	/* Also don't wrap if the accept_stat is nonzero: */
+	if (*rqstp->rq_accept_statp != rpc_success)
+		return 0;
+
+	return offset;
+}
+
+/*
+ * RFC 2203, Section 5.3.2.2
+ *
+ *	struct rpc_gss_integ_data {
+ *		opaque databody_integ<>;
+ *		opaque checksum<>;
+ *	};
+ *
+ *	struct rpc_gss_data_t {
+ *		unsigned int seq_num;
+ *		proc_req_arg_t arg;
+ *	};
+ *
+ * The RPC Reply message has already been XDR-encoded. rq_res_stream
+ * is now positioned so that the checksum can be written just past
+ * the RPC Reply message.
+ */
+static int svcauth_gss_wrap_integ(struct svc_rqst *rqstp)
+{
+	struct gss_svc_data *gsd = rqstp->rq_auth_data;
+	struct xdr_stream *xdr = &rqstp->rq_res_stream;
+	struct rpc_gss_wire_cred *gc = &gsd->clcred;
+	struct xdr_buf *buf = xdr->buf;
+	struct xdr_buf databody_integ;
+	struct xdr_netobj checksum;
+	u32 offset, maj_stat;
+
+	offset = svcauth_gss_prepare_to_wrap(rqstp, gsd);
+	if (!offset)
+		goto out;
+
+	if (xdr_buf_subsegment(buf, &databody_integ, offset + XDR_UNIT,
+			       buf->len - offset - XDR_UNIT))
+		goto wrap_failed;
+	/* Buffer space for these has already been reserved in
+	 * svcauth_gss_accept(). */
+	if (xdr_encode_word(buf, offset, databody_integ.len))
+		goto wrap_failed;
+	if (xdr_encode_word(buf, offset + XDR_UNIT, gc->gc_seq))
+		goto wrap_failed;
+
+	checksum.data = gsd->gsd_scratch;
+	maj_stat = gss_get_mic(gsd->rsci->mechctx, &databody_integ, &checksum);
+	if (maj_stat != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
+		goto bad_mic;
+
+	if (xdr_stream_encode_opaque(xdr, checksum.data, checksum.len) < 0)
+		goto wrap_failed;
+	xdr_commit_encode(xdr);
+
+out:
+	return 0;
+
+bad_mic:
+	trace_rpcgss_svc_get_mic(rqstp, maj_stat);
+	return -EINVAL;
+wrap_failed:
+	trace_rpcgss_svc_wrap_failed(rqstp);
+	return -EINVAL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * RFC 2203, Section 5.3.2.3
+ *
+ *	struct rpc_gss_priv_data {
+ *		opaque databody_priv<>
+ *	};
+ *
+ *	struct rpc_gss_data_t {
+ *		unsigned int seq_num;
+ *		proc_req_arg_t arg;
+ *	};
+ *
+ * gss_wrap() expands the size of the RPC message payload in the
+ * response buffer. The main purpose of svcauth_gss_wrap_priv()
+ * is to ensure there is adequate space in the response buffer to
+ * avoid overflow during the wrap.
+ */
+static int svcauth_gss_wrap_priv(struct svc_rqst *rqstp)
+{
+	struct gss_svc_data *gsd = rqstp->rq_auth_data;
+	struct rpc_gss_wire_cred *gc = &gsd->clcred;
+	struct xdr_buf *buf = &rqstp->rq_res;
+	struct kvec *head = buf->head;
+	struct kvec *tail = buf->tail;
+	u32 offset, pad, maj_stat;
+	__be32 *p;
+
+	offset = svcauth_gss_prepare_to_wrap(rqstp, gsd);
+	if (!offset)
+		return 0;
+
+	/*
+	 * Buffer space for this field has already been reserved
+	 * in svcauth_gss_accept(). Note that the GSS sequence
+	 * number is encrypted along with the RPC reply payload.
+	 */
+	if (xdr_encode_word(buf, offset + XDR_UNIT, gc->gc_seq))
+		goto wrap_failed;
+
+	/*
+	 * If there is currently tail data, make sure there is
+	 * room for the head, tail, and 2 * RPC_MAX_AUTH_SIZE in
+	 * the page, and move the current tail data such that
+	 * there is RPC_MAX_AUTH_SIZE slack space available in
+	 * both the head and tail.
+	 */
+	if (tail->iov_base) {
+		if (tail->iov_base >= head->iov_base + PAGE_SIZE)
+			goto wrap_failed;
+		if (tail->iov_base < head->iov_base)
+			goto wrap_failed;
+		if (tail->iov_len + head->iov_len
+				+ 2 * RPC_MAX_AUTH_SIZE > PAGE_SIZE)
+			goto wrap_failed;
+		memmove(tail->iov_base + RPC_MAX_AUTH_SIZE, tail->iov_base,
+			tail->iov_len);
+		tail->iov_base += RPC_MAX_AUTH_SIZE;
+	}
+	/*
+	 * If there is no current tail data, make sure there is
+	 * room for the head data, and 2 * RPC_MAX_AUTH_SIZE in the
+	 * allotted page, and set up tail information such that there
+	 * is RPC_MAX_AUTH_SIZE slack space available in both the
+	 * head and tail.
+	 */
+	if (!tail->iov_base) {
+		if (head->iov_len + 2 * RPC_MAX_AUTH_SIZE > PAGE_SIZE)
+			goto wrap_failed;
+		tail->iov_base = head->iov_base
+			+ head->iov_len + RPC_MAX_AUTH_SIZE;
+		tail->iov_len = 0;
+	}
+
+	maj_stat = gss_wrap(gsd->rsci->mechctx, offset + XDR_UNIT, buf,
+			    buf->pages);
+	if (maj_stat != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
+		goto bad_wrap;
+
+	/* Wrapping can change the size of databody_priv. */
+	if (xdr_encode_word(buf, offset, buf->len - offset - XDR_UNIT))
+		goto wrap_failed;
+	pad = xdr_pad_size(buf->len - offset - XDR_UNIT);
+	p = (__be32 *)(tail->iov_base + tail->iov_len);
+	memset(p, 0, pad);
+	tail->iov_len += pad;
+	buf->len += pad;
+
+	return 0;
+wrap_failed:
+	trace_rpcgss_svc_wrap_failed(rqstp);
+	return -EINVAL;
+bad_wrap:
+	trace_rpcgss_svc_wrap(rqstp, maj_stat);
+	return -ENOMEM;
+}
+
+/**
+ * svcauth_gss_release - Wrap payload and release resources
+ * @rqstp: RPC transaction context
+ *
+ * Return values:
+ *    %0: the Reply is ready to be sent
+ *    %-ENOMEM: failed to allocate memory
+ *    %-EINVAL: encoding error
+ */
+static int
+svcauth_gss_release(struct svc_rqst *rqstp)
+{
+	struct sunrpc_net *sn = net_generic(SVC_NET(rqstp), sunrpc_net_id);
+	struct gss_svc_data *gsd = rqstp->rq_auth_data;
+	struct rpc_gss_wire_cred *gc;
+	int stat;
+
+	if (!gsd)
+		goto out;
+	gc = &gsd->clcred;
+	if (gc->gc_proc != RPC_GSS_PROC_DATA)
+		goto out;
+
+	switch (gc->gc_svc) {
+	case RPC_GSS_SVC_NONE:
+		break;
+	case RPC_GSS_SVC_INTEGRITY:
+		stat = svcauth_gss_wrap_integ(rqstp);
+		if (stat)
+			goto out_err;
+		break;
+	case RPC_GSS_SVC_PRIVACY:
+		stat = svcauth_gss_wrap_priv(rqstp);
+		if (stat)
+			goto out_err;
+		break;
+	/*
+	 * For any other gc_svc value, svcauth_gss_accept() already set
+	 * the auth_error appropriately; just fall through:
+	 */
+	}
+
+out:
+	stat = 0;
+out_err:
+	if (rqstp->rq_client)
+		auth_domain_put(rqstp->rq_client);
+	rqstp->rq_client = NULL;
+	if (rqstp->rq_gssclient)
+		auth_domain_put(rqstp->rq_gssclient);
+	rqstp->rq_gssclient = NULL;
+	if (rqstp->rq_cred.cr_group_info)
+		put_group_info(rqstp->rq_cred.cr_group_info);
+	rqstp->rq_cred.cr_group_info = NULL;
+	if (gsd && gsd->rsci) {
+		cache_put(&gsd->rsci->h, sn->rsc_cache);
+		gsd->rsci = NULL;
+	}
+	return stat;
+}
+
+static void
+svcauth_gss_domain_release_rcu(struct rcu_head *head)
+{
+	struct auth_domain *dom = container_of(head, struct auth_domain, rcu_head);
+	struct gss_domain *gd = container_of(dom, struct gss_domain, h);
+
+	kfree(dom->name);
+	kfree(gd);
+}
+
+static void
+svcauth_gss_domain_release(struct auth_domain *dom)
+{
+	call_rcu(&dom->rcu_head, svcauth_gss_domain_release_rcu);
+}
+
+static struct auth_ops svcauthops_gss = {
+	.name		= "rpcsec_gss",
+	.owner		= THIS_MODULE,
+	.flavour	= RPC_AUTH_GSS,
+	.accept		= svcauth_gss_accept,
+	.release	= svcauth_gss_release,
+	.domain_release = svcauth_gss_domain_release,
+	.set_client	= svcauth_gss_set_client,
+};
+
+static int rsi_cache_create_net(struct net *net)
+{
+	struct sunrpc_net *sn = net_generic(net, sunrpc_net_id);
+	struct cache_detail *cd;
+	int err;
+
+	cd = cache_create_net(&rsi_cache_template, net);
+	if (IS_ERR(cd))
+		return PTR_ERR(cd);
+	err = cache_register_net(cd, net);
+	if (err) {
+		cache_destroy_net(cd, net);
+		return err;
+	}
+	sn->rsi_cache = cd;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void rsi_cache_destroy_net(struct net *net)
+{
+	struct sunrpc_net *sn = net_generic(net, sunrpc_net_id);
+	struct cache_detail *cd = sn->rsi_cache;
+
+	sn->rsi_cache = NULL;
+	cache_purge(cd);
+	cache_unregister_net(cd, net);
+	cache_destroy_net(cd, net);
+}
+
+static int rsc_cache_create_net(struct net *net)
+{
+	struct sunrpc_net *sn = net_generic(net, sunrpc_net_id);
+	struct cache_detail *cd;
+	int err;
+
+	cd = cache_create_net(&rsc_cache_template, net);
+	if (IS_ERR(cd))
+		return PTR_ERR(cd);
+	err = cache_register_net(cd, net);
+	if (err) {
+		cache_destroy_net(cd, net);
+		return err;
+	}
+	sn->rsc_cache = cd;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void rsc_cache_destroy_net(struct net *net)
+{
+	struct sunrpc_net *sn = net_generic(net, sunrpc_net_id);
+	struct cache_detail *cd = sn->rsc_cache;
+
+	sn->rsc_cache = NULL;
+	cache_purge(cd);
+	cache_unregister_net(cd, net);
+	cache_destroy_net(cd, net);
+}
+
+int
+gss_svc_init_net(struct net *net)
+{
+	int rv;
+
+	rv = rsc_cache_create_net(net);
+	if (rv)
+		return rv;
+	rv = rsi_cache_create_net(net);
+	if (rv)
+		goto out1;
+	rv = create_use_gss_proxy_proc_entry(net);
+	if (rv)
+		goto out2;
+
+	rv = create_krb5_enctypes_proc_entry(net);
+	if (rv)
+		goto out3;
+
+	return 0;
+
+out3:
+	destroy_use_gss_proxy_proc_entry(net);
+out2:
+	rsi_cache_destroy_net(net);
+out1:
+	rsc_cache_destroy_net(net);
+	return rv;
+}
+
+void
+gss_svc_shutdown_net(struct net *net)
+{
+	destroy_krb5_enctypes_proc_entry(net);
+	destroy_use_gss_proxy_proc_entry(net);
+	rsi_cache_destroy_net(net);
+	rsc_cache_destroy_net(net);
+}
+
+int
+gss_svc_init(void)
+{
+	return svc_auth_register(RPC_AUTH_GSS, &svcauthops_gss);
+}
+
+void
+gss_svc_shutdown(void)
+{
+	svc_auth_unregister(RPC_AUTH_GSS);
+}
diff --git a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/trace.c b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/trace.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..76685abba6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/trace.c
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2018, 2019 Oracle. All rights reserved.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/sunrpc/clnt.h>
+#include <linux/sunrpc/sched.h>
+#include <linux/sunrpc/svc.h>
+#include <linux/sunrpc/svc_xprt.h>
+#include <linux/sunrpc/auth_gss.h>
+#include <linux/sunrpc/gss_err.h>
+
+#define CREATE_TRACE_POINTS
+#include <trace/events/rpcgss.h>