diff options
author | Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org> | 2024-04-11 08:27:49 +0000 |
---|---|---|
committer | Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org> | 2024-04-11 08:27:49 +0000 |
commit | ace9429bb58fd418f0c81d4c2835699bddf6bde6 (patch) | |
tree | b2d64bc10158fdd5497876388cd68142ca374ed3 /net/sunrpc/svcauth.c | |
parent | Initial commit. (diff) | |
download | linux-ace9429bb58fd418f0c81d4c2835699bddf6bde6.tar.xz linux-ace9429bb58fd418f0c81d4c2835699bddf6bde6.zip |
Adding upstream version 6.6.15.upstream/6.6.15
Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'net/sunrpc/svcauth.c')
-rw-r--r-- | net/sunrpc/svcauth.c | 260 |
1 files changed, 260 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/net/sunrpc/svcauth.c b/net/sunrpc/svcauth.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..aa4429d0b8 --- /dev/null +++ b/net/sunrpc/svcauth.c @@ -0,0 +1,260 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only +/* + * linux/net/sunrpc/svcauth.c + * + * The generic interface for RPC authentication on the server side. + * + * Copyright (C) 1995, 1996 Olaf Kirch <okir@monad.swb.de> + * + * CHANGES + * 19-Apr-2000 Chris Evans - Security fix + */ + +#include <linux/types.h> +#include <linux/module.h> +#include <linux/sunrpc/types.h> +#include <linux/sunrpc/xdr.h> +#include <linux/sunrpc/svcsock.h> +#include <linux/sunrpc/svcauth.h> +#include <linux/err.h> +#include <linux/hash.h> + +#include <trace/events/sunrpc.h> + +#include "sunrpc.h" + +#define RPCDBG_FACILITY RPCDBG_AUTH + + +/* + * Table of authenticators + */ +extern struct auth_ops svcauth_null; +extern struct auth_ops svcauth_unix; +extern struct auth_ops svcauth_tls; + +static struct auth_ops __rcu *authtab[RPC_AUTH_MAXFLAVOR] = { + [RPC_AUTH_NULL] = (struct auth_ops __force __rcu *)&svcauth_null, + [RPC_AUTH_UNIX] = (struct auth_ops __force __rcu *)&svcauth_unix, + [RPC_AUTH_TLS] = (struct auth_ops __force __rcu *)&svcauth_tls, +}; + +static struct auth_ops * +svc_get_auth_ops(rpc_authflavor_t flavor) +{ + struct auth_ops *aops; + + if (flavor >= RPC_AUTH_MAXFLAVOR) + return NULL; + rcu_read_lock(); + aops = rcu_dereference(authtab[flavor]); + if (aops != NULL && !try_module_get(aops->owner)) + aops = NULL; + rcu_read_unlock(); + return aops; +} + +static void +svc_put_auth_ops(struct auth_ops *aops) +{ + module_put(aops->owner); +} + +/** + * svc_authenticate - Initialize an outgoing credential + * @rqstp: RPC execution context + * + * Return values: + * %SVC_OK: XDR encoding of the result can begin + * %SVC_DENIED: Credential or verifier is not valid + * %SVC_GARBAGE: Failed to decode credential or verifier + * %SVC_COMPLETE: GSS context lifetime event; no further action + * %SVC_DROP: Drop this request; no further action + * %SVC_CLOSE: Like drop, but also close transport connection + */ +enum svc_auth_status svc_authenticate(struct svc_rqst *rqstp) +{ + struct auth_ops *aops; + u32 flavor; + + rqstp->rq_auth_stat = rpc_auth_ok; + + /* + * Decode the Call credential's flavor field. The credential's + * body field is decoded in the chosen ->accept method below. + */ + if (xdr_stream_decode_u32(&rqstp->rq_arg_stream, &flavor) < 0) + return SVC_GARBAGE; + + aops = svc_get_auth_ops(flavor); + if (aops == NULL) { + rqstp->rq_auth_stat = rpc_autherr_badcred; + return SVC_DENIED; + } + + rqstp->rq_auth_slack = 0; + init_svc_cred(&rqstp->rq_cred); + + rqstp->rq_authop = aops; + return aops->accept(rqstp); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(svc_authenticate); + +/** + * svc_set_client - Assign an appropriate 'auth_domain' as the client + * @rqstp: RPC execution context + * + * Return values: + * %SVC_OK: Client was found and assigned + * %SVC_DENY: Client was explicitly denied + * %SVC_DROP: Ignore this request + * %SVC_CLOSE: Ignore this request and close the connection + */ +enum svc_auth_status svc_set_client(struct svc_rqst *rqstp) +{ + rqstp->rq_client = NULL; + return rqstp->rq_authop->set_client(rqstp); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(svc_set_client); + +/** + * svc_authorise - Finalize credentials/verifier and release resources + * @rqstp: RPC execution context + * + * Returns zero on success, or a negative errno. + */ +int svc_authorise(struct svc_rqst *rqstp) +{ + struct auth_ops *aops = rqstp->rq_authop; + int rv = 0; + + rqstp->rq_authop = NULL; + + if (aops) { + rv = aops->release(rqstp); + svc_put_auth_ops(aops); + } + return rv; +} + +int +svc_auth_register(rpc_authflavor_t flavor, struct auth_ops *aops) +{ + struct auth_ops *old; + int rv = -EINVAL; + + if (flavor < RPC_AUTH_MAXFLAVOR) { + old = cmpxchg((struct auth_ops ** __force)&authtab[flavor], NULL, aops); + if (old == NULL || old == aops) + rv = 0; + } + return rv; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(svc_auth_register); + +void +svc_auth_unregister(rpc_authflavor_t flavor) +{ + if (flavor < RPC_AUTH_MAXFLAVOR) + rcu_assign_pointer(authtab[flavor], NULL); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(svc_auth_unregister); + +/************************************************** + * 'auth_domains' are stored in a hash table indexed by name. + * When the last reference to an 'auth_domain' is dropped, + * the object is unhashed and freed. + * If auth_domain_lookup fails to find an entry, it will return + * it's second argument 'new'. If this is non-null, it will + * have been atomically linked into the table. + */ + +#define DN_HASHBITS 6 +#define DN_HASHMAX (1<<DN_HASHBITS) + +static struct hlist_head auth_domain_table[DN_HASHMAX]; +static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(auth_domain_lock); + +static void auth_domain_release(struct kref *kref) + __releases(&auth_domain_lock) +{ + struct auth_domain *dom = container_of(kref, struct auth_domain, ref); + + hlist_del_rcu(&dom->hash); + dom->flavour->domain_release(dom); + spin_unlock(&auth_domain_lock); +} + +void auth_domain_put(struct auth_domain *dom) +{ + kref_put_lock(&dom->ref, auth_domain_release, &auth_domain_lock); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(auth_domain_put); + +struct auth_domain * +auth_domain_lookup(char *name, struct auth_domain *new) +{ + struct auth_domain *hp; + struct hlist_head *head; + + head = &auth_domain_table[hash_str(name, DN_HASHBITS)]; + + spin_lock(&auth_domain_lock); + + hlist_for_each_entry(hp, head, hash) { + if (strcmp(hp->name, name)==0) { + kref_get(&hp->ref); + spin_unlock(&auth_domain_lock); + return hp; + } + } + if (new) + hlist_add_head_rcu(&new->hash, head); + spin_unlock(&auth_domain_lock); + return new; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(auth_domain_lookup); + +struct auth_domain *auth_domain_find(char *name) +{ + struct auth_domain *hp; + struct hlist_head *head; + + head = &auth_domain_table[hash_str(name, DN_HASHBITS)]; + + rcu_read_lock(); + hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(hp, head, hash) { + if (strcmp(hp->name, name)==0) { + if (!kref_get_unless_zero(&hp->ref)) + hp = NULL; + rcu_read_unlock(); + return hp; + } + } + rcu_read_unlock(); + return NULL; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(auth_domain_find); + +/** + * auth_domain_cleanup - check that the auth_domain table is empty + * + * On module unload the auth_domain_table must be empty. To make it + * easier to catch bugs which don't clean up domains properly, we + * warn if anything remains in the table at cleanup time. + * + * Note that we cannot proactively remove the domains at this stage. + * The ->release() function might be in a module that has already been + * unloaded. + */ + +void auth_domain_cleanup(void) +{ + int h; + struct auth_domain *hp; + + for (h = 0; h < DN_HASHMAX; h++) + hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &auth_domain_table[h], hash) + pr_warn("svc: domain %s still present at module unload.\n", + hp->name); +} |