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authorDaniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>2024-08-07 13:17:52 +0000
committerDaniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>2024-08-07 13:17:52 +0000
commit3afb00d3f86d3d924f88b56fa8285d4e9db85852 (patch)
tree95a985d3019522cea546b7d8df621369bc44fc6c /security/landlock
parentAdding debian version 6.9.12-1. (diff)
downloadlinux-3afb00d3f86d3d924f88b56fa8285d4e9db85852.tar.xz
linux-3afb00d3f86d3d924f88b56fa8285d4e9db85852.zip
Merging upstream version 6.10.3.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'security/landlock')
-rw-r--r--security/landlock/cred.c11
-rw-r--r--security/landlock/fs.c225
-rw-r--r--security/landlock/limits.h2
-rw-r--r--security/landlock/syscalls.c2
4 files changed, 233 insertions, 7 deletions
diff --git a/security/landlock/cred.c b/security/landlock/cred.c
index 786af18c4a..db9fe7d906 100644
--- a/security/landlock/cred.c
+++ b/security/landlock/cred.c
@@ -14,8 +14,8 @@
#include "ruleset.h"
#include "setup.h"
-static int hook_cred_prepare(struct cred *const new,
- const struct cred *const old, const gfp_t gfp)
+static void hook_cred_transfer(struct cred *const new,
+ const struct cred *const old)
{
struct landlock_ruleset *const old_dom = landlock_cred(old)->domain;
@@ -23,6 +23,12 @@ static int hook_cred_prepare(struct cred *const new,
landlock_get_ruleset(old_dom);
landlock_cred(new)->domain = old_dom;
}
+}
+
+static int hook_cred_prepare(struct cred *const new,
+ const struct cred *const old, const gfp_t gfp)
+{
+ hook_cred_transfer(new, old);
return 0;
}
@@ -36,6 +42,7 @@ static void hook_cred_free(struct cred *const cred)
static struct security_hook_list landlock_hooks[] __ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_prepare, hook_cred_prepare),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_transfer, hook_cred_transfer),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_free, hook_cred_free),
};
diff --git a/security/landlock/fs.c b/security/landlock/fs.c
index 3e43e68a63..7877a64cc6 100644
--- a/security/landlock/fs.c
+++ b/security/landlock/fs.c
@@ -5,8 +5,11 @@
* Copyright © 2016-2020 Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
* Copyright © 2018-2020 ANSSI
* Copyright © 2021-2022 Microsoft Corporation
+ * Copyright © 2022 Günther Noack <gnoack3000@gmail.com>
+ * Copyright © 2023-2024 Google LLC
*/
+#include <asm/ioctls.h>
#include <kunit/test.h>
#include <linux/atomic.h>
#include <linux/bitops.h>
@@ -14,6 +17,7 @@
#include <linux/compiler_types.h>
#include <linux/dcache.h>
#include <linux/err.h>
+#include <linux/falloc.h>
#include <linux/fs.h>
#include <linux/init.h>
#include <linux/kernel.h>
@@ -29,6 +33,7 @@
#include <linux/types.h>
#include <linux/wait_bit.h>
#include <linux/workqueue.h>
+#include <uapi/linux/fiemap.h>
#include <uapi/linux/landlock.h>
#include "common.h"
@@ -84,6 +89,160 @@ static const struct landlock_object_underops landlock_fs_underops = {
.release = release_inode
};
+/* IOCTL helpers */
+
+/**
+ * is_masked_device_ioctl - Determine whether an IOCTL command is always
+ * permitted with Landlock for device files. These commands can not be
+ * restricted on device files by enforcing a Landlock policy.
+ *
+ * @cmd: The IOCTL command that is supposed to be run.
+ *
+ * By default, any IOCTL on a device file requires the
+ * LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV right. However, we blanket-permit some
+ * commands, if:
+ *
+ * 1. The command is implemented in fs/ioctl.c's do_vfs_ioctl(),
+ * not in f_ops->unlocked_ioctl() or f_ops->compat_ioctl().
+ *
+ * 2. The command is harmless when invoked on devices.
+ *
+ * We also permit commands that do not make sense for devices, but where the
+ * do_vfs_ioctl() implementation returns a more conventional error code.
+ *
+ * Any new IOCTL commands that are implemented in fs/ioctl.c's do_vfs_ioctl()
+ * should be considered for inclusion here.
+ *
+ * Returns: true if the IOCTL @cmd can not be restricted with Landlock for
+ * device files.
+ */
+static __attribute_const__ bool is_masked_device_ioctl(const unsigned int cmd)
+{
+ switch (cmd) {
+ /*
+ * FIOCLEX, FIONCLEX, FIONBIO and FIOASYNC manipulate the FD's
+ * close-on-exec and the file's buffered-IO and async flags. These
+ * operations are also available through fcntl(2), and are
+ * unconditionally permitted in Landlock.
+ */
+ case FIOCLEX:
+ case FIONCLEX:
+ case FIONBIO:
+ case FIOASYNC:
+ /*
+ * FIOQSIZE queries the size of a regular file, directory, or link.
+ *
+ * We still permit it, because it always returns -ENOTTY for
+ * other file types.
+ */
+ case FIOQSIZE:
+ /*
+ * FIFREEZE and FITHAW freeze and thaw the file system which the
+ * given file belongs to. Requires CAP_SYS_ADMIN.
+ *
+ * These commands operate on the file system's superblock rather
+ * than on the file itself. The same operations can also be
+ * done through any other file or directory on the same file
+ * system, so it is safe to permit these.
+ */
+ case FIFREEZE:
+ case FITHAW:
+ /*
+ * FS_IOC_FIEMAP queries information about the allocation of
+ * blocks within a file.
+ *
+ * This IOCTL command only makes sense for regular files and is
+ * not implemented by devices. It is harmless to permit.
+ */
+ case FS_IOC_FIEMAP:
+ /*
+ * FIGETBSZ queries the file system's block size for a file or
+ * directory.
+ *
+ * This command operates on the file system's superblock rather
+ * than on the file itself. The same operation can also be done
+ * through any other file or directory on the same file system,
+ * so it is safe to permit it.
+ */
+ case FIGETBSZ:
+ /*
+ * FICLONE, FICLONERANGE and FIDEDUPERANGE make files share
+ * their underlying storage ("reflink") between source and
+ * destination FDs, on file systems which support that.
+ *
+ * These IOCTL commands only apply to regular files
+ * and are harmless to permit for device files.
+ */
+ case FICLONE:
+ case FICLONERANGE:
+ case FIDEDUPERANGE:
+ /*
+ * FS_IOC_GETFSUUID and FS_IOC_GETFSSYSFSPATH both operate on
+ * the file system superblock, not on the specific file, so
+ * these operations are available through any other file on the
+ * same file system as well.
+ */
+ case FS_IOC_GETFSUUID:
+ case FS_IOC_GETFSSYSFSPATH:
+ return true;
+
+ /*
+ * FIONREAD, FS_IOC_GETFLAGS, FS_IOC_SETFLAGS, FS_IOC_FSGETXATTR and
+ * FS_IOC_FSSETXATTR are forwarded to device implementations.
+ */
+
+ /*
+ * file_ioctl() commands (FIBMAP, FS_IOC_RESVSP, FS_IOC_RESVSP64,
+ * FS_IOC_UNRESVSP, FS_IOC_UNRESVSP64 and FS_IOC_ZERO_RANGE) are
+ * forwarded to device implementations, so not permitted.
+ */
+
+ /* Other commands are guarded by the access right. */
+ default:
+ return false;
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * is_masked_device_ioctl_compat - same as the helper above, but checking the
+ * "compat" IOCTL commands.
+ *
+ * The IOCTL commands with special handling in compat-mode should behave the
+ * same as their non-compat counterparts.
+ */
+static __attribute_const__ bool
+is_masked_device_ioctl_compat(const unsigned int cmd)
+{
+ switch (cmd) {
+ /* FICLONE is permitted, same as in the non-compat variant. */
+ case FICLONE:
+ return true;
+
+#if defined(CONFIG_X86_64)
+ /*
+ * FS_IOC_RESVSP_32, FS_IOC_RESVSP64_32, FS_IOC_UNRESVSP_32,
+ * FS_IOC_UNRESVSP64_32, FS_IOC_ZERO_RANGE_32: not blanket-permitted,
+ * for consistency with their non-compat variants.
+ */
+ case FS_IOC_RESVSP_32:
+ case FS_IOC_RESVSP64_32:
+ case FS_IOC_UNRESVSP_32:
+ case FS_IOC_UNRESVSP64_32:
+ case FS_IOC_ZERO_RANGE_32:
+#endif
+
+ /*
+ * FS_IOC32_GETFLAGS, FS_IOC32_SETFLAGS are forwarded to their device
+ * implementations.
+ */
+ case FS_IOC32_GETFLAGS:
+ case FS_IOC32_SETFLAGS:
+ return false;
+ default:
+ return is_masked_device_ioctl(cmd);
+ }
+}
+
/* Ruleset management */
static struct landlock_object *get_inode_object(struct inode *const inode)
@@ -148,7 +307,8 @@ retry:
LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXECUTE | \
LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE | \
LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE | \
- LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE)
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE | \
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV)
/* clang-format on */
/*
@@ -1341,11 +1501,18 @@ static int hook_file_alloc_security(struct file *const file)
return 0;
}
+static bool is_device(const struct file *const file)
+{
+ const struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
+
+ return S_ISBLK(inode->i_mode) || S_ISCHR(inode->i_mode);
+}
+
static int hook_file_open(struct file *const file)
{
layer_mask_t layer_masks[LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_FS] = {};
- access_mask_t open_access_request, full_access_request, allowed_access;
- const access_mask_t optional_access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE;
+ access_mask_t open_access_request, full_access_request, allowed_access,
+ optional_access;
const struct landlock_ruleset *const dom =
get_fs_domain(landlock_cred(file->f_cred)->domain);
@@ -1363,6 +1530,10 @@ static int hook_file_open(struct file *const file)
* We look up more access than what we immediately need for open(), so
* that we can later authorize operations on opened files.
*/
+ optional_access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE;
+ if (is_device(file))
+ optional_access |= LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV;
+
full_access_request = open_access_request | optional_access;
if (is_access_to_paths_allowed(
@@ -1419,6 +1590,52 @@ static int hook_file_truncate(struct file *const file)
return -EACCES;
}
+static int hook_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
+ unsigned long arg)
+{
+ access_mask_t allowed_access = landlock_file(file)->allowed_access;
+
+ /*
+ * It is the access rights at the time of opening the file which
+ * determine whether IOCTL can be used on the opened file later.
+ *
+ * The access right is attached to the opened file in hook_file_open().
+ */
+ if (allowed_access & LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (!is_device(file))
+ return 0;
+
+ if (is_masked_device_ioctl(cmd))
+ return 0;
+
+ return -EACCES;
+}
+
+static int hook_file_ioctl_compat(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
+ unsigned long arg)
+{
+ access_mask_t allowed_access = landlock_file(file)->allowed_access;
+
+ /*
+ * It is the access rights at the time of opening the file which
+ * determine whether IOCTL can be used on the opened file later.
+ *
+ * The access right is attached to the opened file in hook_file_open().
+ */
+ if (allowed_access & LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (!is_device(file))
+ return 0;
+
+ if (is_masked_device_ioctl_compat(cmd))
+ return 0;
+
+ return -EACCES;
+}
+
static struct security_hook_list landlock_hooks[] __ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_free_security, hook_inode_free_security),
@@ -1441,6 +1658,8 @@ static struct security_hook_list landlock_hooks[] __ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_alloc_security, hook_file_alloc_security),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_open, hook_file_open),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_truncate, hook_file_truncate),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_ioctl, hook_file_ioctl),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_ioctl_compat, hook_file_ioctl_compat),
};
__init void landlock_add_fs_hooks(void)
diff --git a/security/landlock/limits.h b/security/landlock/limits.h
index 93c9c6f915..20fdb5ff35 100644
--- a/security/landlock/limits.h
+++ b/security/landlock/limits.h
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@
#define LANDLOCK_MAX_NUM_LAYERS 16
#define LANDLOCK_MAX_NUM_RULES U32_MAX
-#define LANDLOCK_LAST_ACCESS_FS LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE
+#define LANDLOCK_LAST_ACCESS_FS LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV
#define LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_FS ((LANDLOCK_LAST_ACCESS_FS << 1) - 1)
#define LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_FS __const_hweight64(LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_FS)
#define LANDLOCK_SHIFT_ACCESS_FS 0
diff --git a/security/landlock/syscalls.c b/security/landlock/syscalls.c
index 6788e73b66..03b470f5a8 100644
--- a/security/landlock/syscalls.c
+++ b/security/landlock/syscalls.c
@@ -149,7 +149,7 @@ static const struct file_operations ruleset_fops = {
.write = fop_dummy_write,
};
-#define LANDLOCK_ABI_VERSION 4
+#define LANDLOCK_ABI_VERSION 5
/**
* sys_landlock_create_ruleset - Create a new ruleset