Merging upstream version 6.9.7.

Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>

57 files changed, 2247 insertions, 1676 deletions

diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig
index 52c9af08ad..412e76f157 100644
--- a/security/Kconfig
+++ b/security/Kconfig
@@ -142,8 +142,6 @@ config HARDENED_USERCOPY
 config FORTIFY_SOURCE
 	bool "Harden common str/mem functions against buffer overflows"
 	depends on ARCH_HAS_FORTIFY_SOURCE
-	# https://bugs.llvm.org/show_bug.cgi?id=41459
-	depends on !CC_IS_CLANG || CLANG_VERSION >= 120001
 	# https://github.com/llvm/llvm-project/issues/53645
 	depends on !CC_IS_CLANG || !X86_32
 	help
diff --git a/security/apparmor/audit.c b/security/apparmor/audit.c
index 45beb1c5f7..6b5181c668 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/audit.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/audit.c
@@ -217,7 +217,7 @@ void aa_audit_rule_free(void *vrule)
 	}
 }
 
-int aa_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule)
+int aa_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule, gfp_t gfp)
 {
 	struct aa_audit_rule *rule;
 
@@ -230,14 +230,14 @@ int aa_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule)
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
-	rule = kzalloc(sizeof(struct aa_audit_rule), GFP_KERNEL);
+	rule = kzalloc(sizeof(struct aa_audit_rule), gfp);
 
 	if (!rule)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
 	/* Currently rules are treated as coming from the root ns */
 	rule->label = aa_label_parse(&root_ns->unconfined->label, rulestr,
-				     GFP_KERNEL, true, false);
+				     gfp, true, false);
 	if (IS_ERR(rule->label)) {
 		int err = PTR_ERR(rule->label);
 		aa_audit_rule_free(rule);
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/audit.h b/security/apparmor/include/audit.h
index acbb03b9bd..0c8cc86b41 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/audit.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/audit.h
@@ -200,7 +200,7 @@ static inline int complain_error(int error)
 }
 
 void aa_audit_rule_free(void *vrule);
-int aa_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule);
+int aa_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule, gfp_t gfp);
 int aa_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *rule);
 int aa_audit_rule_match(u32 sid, u32 field, u32 op, void *vrule);
 
diff --git a/security/integrity/Makefile b/security/integrity/Makefile
index d0ffe37dc1..92b63039c6 100644
--- a/security/integrity/Makefile
+++ b/security/integrity/Makefile
@@ -18,5 +18,6 @@ integrity-$(CONFIG_LOAD_IPL_KEYS) += platform_certs/load_ipl_s390.o
 integrity-$(CONFIG_LOAD_PPC_KEYS) += platform_certs/efi_parser.o \
                                      platform_certs/load_powerpc.o \
                                      platform_certs/keyring_handler.o
+# The relative order of the 'ima' and 'evm' LSMs depends on the order below.
 obj-$(CONFIG_IMA)			+= ima/
 obj-$(CONFIG_EVM)			+= evm/
diff --git a/security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c b/security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c
index 895f4b9ce8..de603cf42a 100644
--- a/security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c
+++ b/security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c
@@ -132,26 +132,3 @@ out:
 	pr_debug("%s() = %d\n", __func__, ret);
 	return ret;
 }
-
-/**
- * integrity_kernel_module_request - prevent crypto-pkcs1pad(rsa,*) requests
- * @kmod_name: kernel module name
- *
- * We have situation, when public_key_verify_signature() in case of RSA
- * algorithm use alg_name to store internal information in order to
- * construct an algorithm on the fly, but crypto_larval_lookup() will try
- * to use alg_name in order to load kernel module with same name.
- * Since we don't have any real "crypto-pkcs1pad(rsa,*)" kernel modules,
- * we are safe to fail such module request from crypto_larval_lookup().
- *
- * In this way we prevent modprobe execution during digsig verification
- * and avoid possible deadlock if modprobe and/or it's dependencies
- * also signed with digsig.
- */
-int integrity_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name)
-{
-	if (strncmp(kmod_name, "crypto-pkcs1pad(rsa,", 20) == 0)
-		return -EINVAL;
-
-	return 0;
-}
diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/Kconfig b/security/integrity/evm/Kconfig
index fba9ee359b..861b3bacab 100644
--- a/security/integrity/evm/Kconfig
+++ b/security/integrity/evm/Kconfig
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ config EVM
 	select CRYPTO_HMAC
 	select CRYPTO_SHA1
 	select CRYPTO_HASH_INFO
+	select SECURITY_PATH
 	default n
 	help
 	  EVM protects a file's security extended attributes against
diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm.h b/security/integrity/evm/evm.h
index 53bd7fec93..eb1a2c343b 100644
--- a/security/integrity/evm/evm.h
+++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm.h
@@ -32,6 +32,25 @@ struct xattr_list {
 	bool enabled;
 };
 
+#define EVM_NEW_FILE			0x00000001
+#define EVM_IMMUTABLE_DIGSIG		0x00000002
+
+/* EVM integrity metadata associated with an inode */
+struct evm_iint_cache {
+	unsigned long flags;
+	enum integrity_status evm_status:4;
+};
+
+extern struct lsm_blob_sizes evm_blob_sizes;
+
+static inline struct evm_iint_cache *evm_iint_inode(const struct inode *inode)
+{
+	if (unlikely(!inode->i_security))
+		return NULL;
+
+	return inode->i_security + evm_blob_sizes.lbs_inode;
+}
+
 extern int evm_initialized;
 
 #define EVM_ATTR_FSUUID		0x0001
diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c
index b1ffd4cc0b..7552d49d07 100644
--- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c
+++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c
@@ -322,10 +322,10 @@ int evm_calc_hash(struct dentry *dentry, const char *req_xattr_name,
 static int evm_is_immutable(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode)
 {
 	const struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_data = NULL;
-	struct integrity_iint_cache *iint;
+	struct evm_iint_cache *iint;
 	int rc = 0;
 
-	iint = integrity_iint_find(inode);
+	iint = evm_iint_inode(inode);
 	if (iint && (iint->flags & EVM_IMMUTABLE_DIGSIG))
 		return 1;
 
diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
index cc7956d787..81dbade5b9 100644
--- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
@@ -178,14 +178,14 @@ static int is_unsupported_fs(struct dentry *dentry)
 static enum integrity_status evm_verify_hmac(struct dentry *dentry,
 					     const char *xattr_name,
 					     char *xattr_value,
-					     size_t xattr_value_len,
-					     struct integrity_iint_cache *iint)
+					     size_t xattr_value_len)
 {
 	struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_data = NULL;
 	struct signature_v2_hdr *hdr;
 	enum integrity_status evm_status = INTEGRITY_PASS;
 	struct evm_digest digest;
-	struct inode *inode;
+	struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
+	struct evm_iint_cache *iint = evm_iint_inode(inode);
 	int rc, xattr_len, evm_immutable = 0;
 
 	if (iint && (iint->evm_status == INTEGRITY_PASS ||
@@ -254,8 +254,6 @@ static enum integrity_status evm_verify_hmac(struct dentry *dentry,
 					(const char *)xattr_data, xattr_len,
 					digest.digest, digest.hdr.length);
 		if (!rc) {
-			inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
-
 			if (xattr_data->type == EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG) {
 				if (iint)
 					iint->flags |= EVM_IMMUTABLE_DIGSIG;
@@ -403,7 +401,6 @@ int evm_read_protected_xattrs(struct dentry *dentry, u8 *buffer,
  * @xattr_name: requested xattr
  * @xattr_value: requested xattr value
  * @xattr_value_len: requested xattr value length
- * @iint: inode integrity metadata
  *
  * Calculate the HMAC for the given dentry and verify it against the stored
  * security.evm xattr. For performance, use the xattr value and length
@@ -416,8 +413,7 @@ int evm_read_protected_xattrs(struct dentry *dentry, u8 *buffer,
  */
 enum integrity_status evm_verifyxattr(struct dentry *dentry,
 				      const char *xattr_name,
-				      void *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len,
-				      struct integrity_iint_cache *iint)
+				      void *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len)
 {
 	if (!evm_key_loaded() || !evm_protected_xattr(xattr_name))
 		return INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
@@ -425,13 +421,8 @@ enum integrity_status evm_verifyxattr(struct dentry *dentry,
 	if (is_unsupported_fs(dentry))
 		return INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
 
-	if (!iint) {
-		iint = integrity_iint_find(d_backing_inode(dentry));
-		if (!iint)
-			return INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
-	}
 	return evm_verify_hmac(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value,
-				 xattr_value_len, iint);
+				 xattr_value_len);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(evm_verifyxattr);
 
@@ -448,7 +439,7 @@ static enum integrity_status evm_verify_current_integrity(struct dentry *dentry)
 
 	if (!evm_key_loaded() || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode) || evm_fixmode)
 		return INTEGRITY_PASS;
-	return evm_verify_hmac(dentry, NULL, NULL, 0, NULL);
+	return evm_verify_hmac(dentry, NULL, NULL, 0);
 }
 
 /*
@@ -526,14 +517,14 @@ static int evm_protect_xattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
 
 	evm_status = evm_verify_current_integrity(dentry);
 	if (evm_status == INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS) {
-		struct integrity_iint_cache *iint;
+		struct evm_iint_cache *iint;
 
 		/* Exception if the HMAC is not going to be calculated. */
 		if (evm_hmac_disabled())
 			return 0;
 
-		iint = integrity_iint_find(d_backing_inode(dentry));
-		if (iint && (iint->flags & IMA_NEW_FILE))
+		iint = evm_iint_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry));
+		if (iint && (iint->flags & EVM_NEW_FILE))
 			return 0;
 
 		/* exception for pseudo filesystems */
@@ -581,6 +572,7 @@ out:
  * @xattr_name: pointer to the affected extended attribute name
  * @xattr_value: pointer to the new extended attribute value
  * @xattr_value_len: pointer to the new extended attribute value length
+ * @flags: flags to pass into filesystem operations
  *
  * Before allowing the 'security.evm' protected xattr to be updated,
  * verify the existing value is valid.  As only the kernel should have
@@ -588,9 +580,9 @@ out:
  * userspace from writing HMAC value.  Writing 'security.evm' requires
  * requires CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileges.
  */
-int evm_inode_setxattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
-		       const char *xattr_name, const void *xattr_value,
-		       size_t xattr_value_len)
+static int evm_inode_setxattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
+			      const char *xattr_name, const void *xattr_value,
+			      size_t xattr_value_len, int flags)
 {
 	const struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_data = xattr_value;
 
@@ -620,8 +612,8 @@ int evm_inode_setxattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
  * Removing 'security.evm' requires CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileges and that
  * the current value is valid.
  */
-int evm_inode_removexattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
-			  struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name)
+static int evm_inode_removexattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
+				 const char *xattr_name)
 {
 	/* Policy permits modification of the protected xattrs even though
 	 * there's no HMAC key loaded
@@ -671,9 +663,11 @@ static inline int evm_inode_set_acl_change(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
  * Prevent modifying posix acls causing the EVM HMAC to be re-calculated
  * and 'security.evm' xattr updated, unless the existing 'security.evm' is
  * valid.
+ *
+ * Return: zero on success, -EPERM on failure.
  */
-int evm_inode_set_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
-		      const char *acl_name, struct posix_acl *kacl)
+static int evm_inode_set_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
+			     const char *acl_name, struct posix_acl *kacl)
 {
 	enum integrity_status evm_status;
 
@@ -712,11 +706,29 @@ int evm_inode_set_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
 	return -EPERM;
 }
 
+/**
+ * evm_inode_remove_acl - Protect the EVM extended attribute from posix acls
+ * @idmap: idmap of the mount
+ * @dentry: pointer to the affected dentry
+ * @acl_name: name of the posix acl
+ *
+ * Prevent removing posix acls causing the EVM HMAC to be re-calculated
+ * and 'security.evm' xattr updated, unless the existing 'security.evm' is
+ * valid.
+ *
+ * Return: zero on success, -EPERM on failure.
+ */
+static int evm_inode_remove_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
+				const char *acl_name)
+{
+	return evm_inode_set_acl(idmap, dentry, acl_name, NULL);
+}
+
 static void evm_reset_status(struct inode *inode)
 {
-	struct integrity_iint_cache *iint;
+	struct evm_iint_cache *iint;
 
-	iint = integrity_iint_find(inode);
+	iint = evm_iint_inode(inode);
 	if (iint)
 		iint->evm_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
 }
@@ -752,6 +764,7 @@ bool evm_revalidate_status(const char *xattr_name)
  * @xattr_name: pointer to the affected extended attribute name
  * @xattr_value: pointer to the new extended attribute value
  * @xattr_value_len: pointer to the new extended attribute value length
+ * @flags: flags to pass into filesystem operations
  *
  * Update the HMAC stored in 'security.evm' to reflect the change.
  *
@@ -759,8 +772,11 @@ bool evm_revalidate_status(const char *xattr_name)
  * __vfs_setxattr_noperm().  The caller of which has taken the inode's
  * i_mutex lock.
  */
-void evm_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name,
-			     const void *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len)
+static void evm_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry,
+				    const char *xattr_name,
+				    const void *xattr_value,
+				    size_t xattr_value_len,
+				    int flags)
 {
 	if (!evm_revalidate_status(xattr_name))
 		return;
@@ -780,6 +796,21 @@ void evm_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name,
 }
 
 /**
+ * evm_inode_post_set_acl - Update the EVM extended attribute from posix acls
+ * @dentry: pointer to the affected dentry
+ * @acl_name: name of the posix acl
+ * @kacl: pointer to the posix acls
+ *
+ * Update the 'security.evm' xattr with the EVM HMAC re-calculated after setting
+ * posix acls.
+ */
+static void evm_inode_post_set_acl(struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name,
+				   struct posix_acl *kacl)
+{
+	return evm_inode_post_setxattr(dentry, acl_name, NULL, 0, 0);
+}
+
+/**
  * evm_inode_post_removexattr - update 'security.evm' after removing the xattr
  * @dentry: pointer to the affected dentry
  * @xattr_name: pointer to the affected extended attribute name
@@ -789,7 +820,8 @@ void evm_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name,
  * No need to take the i_mutex lock here, as this function is called from
  * vfs_removexattr() which takes the i_mutex.
  */
-void evm_inode_post_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name)
+static void evm_inode_post_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry,
+				       const char *xattr_name)
 {
 	if (!evm_revalidate_status(xattr_name))
 		return;
@@ -805,6 +837,22 @@ void evm_inode_post_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name)
 	evm_update_evmxattr(dentry, xattr_name, NULL, 0);
 }
 
+/**
+ * evm_inode_post_remove_acl - Update the EVM extended attribute from posix acls
+ * @idmap: idmap of the mount
+ * @dentry: pointer to the affected dentry
+ * @acl_name: name of the posix acl
+ *
+ * Update the 'security.evm' xattr with the EVM HMAC re-calculated after
+ * removing posix acls.
+ */
+static inline void evm_inode_post_remove_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
+					     struct dentry *dentry,
+					     const char *acl_name)
+{
+	evm_inode_post_removexattr(dentry, acl_name);
+}
+
 static int evm_attr_change(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
 			   struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr)
 {
@@ -828,8 +876,8 @@ static int evm_attr_change(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
  * Permit update of file attributes when files have a valid EVM signature,
  * except in the case of them having an immutable portable signature.
  */
-int evm_inode_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
-		      struct iattr *attr)
+static int evm_inode_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
+			     struct iattr *attr)
 {
 	unsigned int ia_valid = attr->ia_valid;
 	enum integrity_status evm_status;
@@ -870,6 +918,7 @@ int evm_inode_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
 
 /**
  * evm_inode_post_setattr - update 'security.evm' after modifying metadata
+ * @idmap: idmap of the idmapped mount
  * @dentry: pointer to the affected dentry
  * @ia_valid: for the UID and GID status
  *
@@ -879,7 +928,8 @@ int evm_inode_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
  * This function is called from notify_change(), which expects the caller
  * to lock the inode's i_mutex.
  */
-void evm_inode_post_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, int ia_valid)
+static void evm_inode_post_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
+				   struct dentry *dentry, int ia_valid)
 {
 	if (!evm_revalidate_status(NULL))
 		return;
@@ -896,7 +946,7 @@ void evm_inode_post_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, int ia_valid)
 		evm_update_evmxattr(dentry, NULL, NULL, 0);
 }
 
-int evm_inode_copy_up_xattr(const char *name)
+static int evm_inode_copy_up_xattr(const char *name)
 {
 	if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_EVM) == 0)
 		return 1; /* Discard */
@@ -960,6 +1010,42 @@ out:
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(evm_inode_init_security);
 
+static int evm_inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
+{
+	struct evm_iint_cache *iint = evm_iint_inode(inode);
+
+	/* Called by security_inode_alloc(), it cannot be NULL. */
+	iint->flags = 0UL;
+	iint->evm_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void evm_file_release(struct file *file)
+{
+	struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
+	struct evm_iint_cache *iint = evm_iint_inode(inode);
+	fmode_t mode = file->f_mode;
+
+	if (!S_ISREG(inode->i_mode) || !(mode & FMODE_WRITE))
+		return;
+
+	if (iint && atomic_read(&inode->i_writecount) == 1)
+		iint->flags &= ~EVM_NEW_FILE;
+}
+
+static void evm_post_path_mknod(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+	struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
+	struct evm_iint_cache *iint = evm_iint_inode(inode);
+
+	if (!S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
+		return;
+
+	if (iint)
+		iint->flags |= EVM_NEW_FILE;
+}
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_EVM_LOAD_X509
 void __init evm_load_x509(void)
 {
@@ -999,4 +1085,45 @@ error:
 	return error;
 }
 
+static struct security_hook_list evm_hooks[] __ro_after_init = {
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setattr, evm_inode_setattr),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_post_setattr, evm_inode_post_setattr),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_copy_up_xattr, evm_inode_copy_up_xattr),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setxattr, evm_inode_setxattr),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_post_setxattr, evm_inode_post_setxattr),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_set_acl, evm_inode_set_acl),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_post_set_acl, evm_inode_post_set_acl),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_remove_acl, evm_inode_remove_acl),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_post_remove_acl, evm_inode_post_remove_acl),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_removexattr, evm_inode_removexattr),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_post_removexattr, evm_inode_post_removexattr),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_init_security, evm_inode_init_security),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_alloc_security, evm_inode_alloc_security),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_release, evm_file_release),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_post_mknod, evm_post_path_mknod),
+};
+
+static const struct lsm_id evm_lsmid = {
+	.name = "evm",
+	.id = LSM_ID_EVM,
+};
+
+static int __init init_evm_lsm(void)
+{
+	security_add_hooks(evm_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(evm_hooks), &evm_lsmid);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+struct lsm_blob_sizes evm_blob_sizes __ro_after_init = {
+	.lbs_inode = sizeof(struct evm_iint_cache),
+	.lbs_xattr_count = 1,
+};
+
+DEFINE_LSM(evm) = {
+	.name = "evm",
+	.init = init_evm_lsm,
+	.order = LSM_ORDER_LAST,
+	.blobs = &evm_blob_sizes,
+};
+
 late_initcall(init_evm);
diff --git a/security/integrity/iint.c b/security/integrity/iint.c
index d4419a2a1e..068ac6c2ae 100644
--- a/security/integrity/iint.c
+++ b/security/integrity/iint.c
@@ -6,208 +6,15 @@
  * Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
  *
  * File: integrity_iint.c
- *	- implements the integrity hooks: integrity_inode_alloc,
- *	  integrity_inode_free
- *	- cache integrity information associated with an inode
- *	  using a rbtree tree.
+ *	- initialize the integrity directory in securityfs
+ *	- load IMA and EVM keys
  */
-#include <linux/slab.h>
-#include <linux/init.h>
-#include <linux/spinlock.h>
-#include <linux/rbtree.h>
-#include <linux/file.h>
-#include <linux/uaccess.h>
 #include <linux/security.h>
-#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
 #include "integrity.h"
 
-static struct rb_root integrity_iint_tree = RB_ROOT;
-static DEFINE_RWLOCK(integrity_iint_lock);
-static struct kmem_cache *iint_cache __ro_after_init;
-
 struct dentry *integrity_dir;
 
 /*
- * __integrity_iint_find - return the iint associated with an inode
- */
-static struct integrity_iint_cache *__integrity_iint_find(struct inode *inode)
-{
-	struct integrity_iint_cache *iint;
-	struct rb_node *n = integrity_iint_tree.rb_node;
-
-	while (n) {
-		iint = rb_entry(n, struct integrity_iint_cache, rb_node);
-
-		if (inode < iint->inode)
-			n = n->rb_left;
-		else if (inode > iint->inode)
-			n = n->rb_right;
-		else
-			return iint;
-	}
-
-	return NULL;
-}
-
-/*
- * integrity_iint_find - return the iint associated with an inode
- */
-struct integrity_iint_cache *integrity_iint_find(struct inode *inode)
-{
-	struct integrity_iint_cache *iint;
-
-	if (!IS_IMA(inode))
-		return NULL;
-
-	read_lock(&integrity_iint_lock);
-	iint = __integrity_iint_find(inode);
-	read_unlock(&integrity_iint_lock);
-
-	return iint;
-}
-
-#define IMA_MAX_NESTING (FILESYSTEM_MAX_STACK_DEPTH+1)
-
-/*
- * It is not clear that IMA should be nested at all, but as long is it measures
- * files both on overlayfs and on underlying fs, we need to annotate the iint
- * mutex to avoid lockdep false positives related to IMA + overlayfs.
- * See ovl_lockdep_annotate_inode_mutex_key() for more details.
- */
-static inline void iint_lockdep_annotate(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
-					 struct inode *inode)
-{
-#ifdef CONFIG_LOCKDEP
-	static struct lock_class_key iint_mutex_key[IMA_MAX_NESTING];
-
-	int depth = inode->i_sb->s_stack_depth;
-
-	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(depth < 0 || depth >= IMA_MAX_NESTING))
-		depth = 0;
-
-	lockdep_set_class(&iint->mutex, &iint_mutex_key[depth]);
-#endif
-}
-
-static void iint_init_always(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
-			     struct inode *inode)
-{
-	iint->ima_hash = NULL;
-	iint->version = 0;
-	iint->flags = 0UL;
-	iint->atomic_flags = 0UL;
-	iint->ima_file_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
-	iint->ima_mmap_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
-	iint->ima_bprm_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
-	iint->ima_read_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
-	iint->ima_creds_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
-	iint->evm_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
-	iint->measured_pcrs = 0;
-	mutex_init(&iint->mutex);
-	iint_lockdep_annotate(iint, inode);
-}
-
-static void iint_free(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint)
-{
-	kfree(iint->ima_hash);
-	mutex_destroy(&iint->mutex);
-	kmem_cache_free(iint_cache, iint);
-}
-
-/**
- * integrity_inode_get - find or allocate an iint associated with an inode
- * @inode: pointer to the inode
- * @return: allocated iint
- *
- * Caller must lock i_mutex
- */
-struct integrity_iint_cache *integrity_inode_get(struct inode *inode)
-{
-	struct rb_node **p;
-	struct rb_node *node, *parent = NULL;
-	struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, *test_iint;
-
-	iint = integrity_iint_find(inode);
-	if (iint)
-		return iint;
-
-	iint = kmem_cache_alloc(iint_cache, GFP_NOFS);
-	if (!iint)
-		return NULL;
-
-	iint_init_always(iint, inode);
-
-	write_lock(&integrity_iint_lock);
-
-	p = &integrity_iint_tree.rb_node;
-	while (*p) {
-		parent = *p;
-		test_iint = rb_entry(parent, struct integrity_iint_cache,
-				     rb_node);
-		if (inode < test_iint->inode) {
-			p = &(*p)->rb_left;
-		} else if (inode > test_iint->inode) {
-			p = &(*p)->rb_right;
-		} else {
-			write_unlock(&integrity_iint_lock);
-			kmem_cache_free(iint_cache, iint);
-			return test_iint;
-		}
-	}
-
-	iint->inode = inode;
-	node = &iint->rb_node;
-	inode->i_flags |= S_IMA;
-	rb_link_node(node, parent, p);
-	rb_insert_color(node, &integrity_iint_tree);
-
-	write_unlock(&integrity_iint_lock);
-	return iint;
-}
-
-/**
- * integrity_inode_free - called on security_inode_free
- * @inode: pointer to the inode
- *
- * Free the integrity information(iint) associated with an inode.
- */
-void integrity_inode_free(struct inode *inode)
-{
-	struct integrity_iint_cache *iint;
-
-	if (!IS_IMA(inode))
-		return;
-
-	write_lock(&integrity_iint_lock);
-	iint = __integrity_iint_find(inode);
-	rb_erase(&iint->rb_node, &integrity_iint_tree);
-	write_unlock(&integrity_iint_lock);
-
-	iint_free(iint);
-}
-
-static void iint_init_once(void *foo)
-{
-	struct integrity_iint_cache *iint = (struct integrity_iint_cache *) foo;
-
-	memset(iint, 0, sizeof(*iint));
-}
-
-static int __init integrity_iintcache_init(void)
-{
-	iint_cache =
-	    kmem_cache_create("iint_cache", sizeof(struct integrity_iint_cache),
-			      0, SLAB_PANIC, iint_init_once);
-	return 0;
-}
-DEFINE_LSM(integrity) = {
-	.name = "integrity",
-	.init = integrity_iintcache_init,
-	.order = LSM_ORDER_LAST,
-};
-
-
-/*
  * integrity_kernel_read - read data from the file
  *
  * This is a function for reading file content instead of kernel_read().
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
index b98bfe9efd..475c326150 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ config IMA
 	select CRYPTO_HMAC
 	select CRYPTO_SHA1
 	select CRYPTO_HASH_INFO
+	select SECURITY_PATH
 	select TCG_TPM if HAS_IOMEM
 	select TCG_TIS if TCG_TPM && X86
 	select TCG_CRB if TCG_TPM && ACPI
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/Makefile b/security/integrity/ima/Makefile
index 2499f2485c..b376d38b4e 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/Makefile
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/Makefile
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
 # Measurement Architecture(IMA).
 #
 
-obj-$(CONFIG_IMA) += ima.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_IMA) += ima.o ima_iint.o
 
 ima-y := ima_fs.o ima_queue.o ima_init.o ima_main.o ima_crypto.o ima_api.o \
 	 ima_policy.o ima_template.o ima_template_lib.o
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
index c29db699c9..0a4f274f77 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
@@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ extern const char boot_aggregate_name[];
 
 /* IMA event related data */
 struct ima_event_data {
-	struct integrity_iint_cache *iint;
+	struct ima_iint_cache *iint;
 	struct file *file;
 	const unsigned char *filename;
 	struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value;
@@ -119,6 +119,107 @@ struct ima_kexec_hdr {
 	u64 count;
 };
 
+/* IMA iint action cache flags */
+#define IMA_MEASURE		0x00000001
+#define IMA_MEASURED		0x00000002
+#define IMA_APPRAISE		0x00000004
+#define IMA_APPRAISED		0x00000008
+/*#define IMA_COLLECT		0x00000010  do not use this flag */
+#define IMA_COLLECTED		0x00000020
+#define IMA_AUDIT		0x00000040
+#define IMA_AUDITED		0x00000080
+#define IMA_HASH		0x00000100
+#define IMA_HASHED		0x00000200
+
+/* IMA iint policy rule cache flags */
+#define IMA_NONACTION_FLAGS	0xff000000
+#define IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED	0x01000000
+#define IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO	0x02000000
+#define IMA_NEW_FILE		0x04000000
+#define IMA_FAIL_UNVERIFIABLE_SIGS	0x10000000
+#define IMA_MODSIG_ALLOWED	0x20000000
+#define IMA_CHECK_BLACKLIST	0x40000000
+#define IMA_VERITY_REQUIRED	0x80000000
+
+#define IMA_DO_MASK		(IMA_MEASURE | IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_AUDIT | \
+				 IMA_HASH | IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK)
+#define IMA_DONE_MASK		(IMA_MEASURED | IMA_APPRAISED | IMA_AUDITED | \
+				 IMA_HASHED | IMA_COLLECTED | \
+				 IMA_APPRAISED_SUBMASK)
+
+/* IMA iint subaction appraise cache flags */
+#define IMA_FILE_APPRAISE	0x00001000
+#define IMA_FILE_APPRAISED	0x00002000
+#define IMA_MMAP_APPRAISE	0x00004000
+#define IMA_MMAP_APPRAISED	0x00008000
+#define IMA_BPRM_APPRAISE	0x00010000
+#define IMA_BPRM_APPRAISED	0x00020000
+#define IMA_READ_APPRAISE	0x00040000
+#define IMA_READ_APPRAISED	0x00080000
+#define IMA_CREDS_APPRAISE	0x00100000
+#define IMA_CREDS_APPRAISED	0x00200000
+#define IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK	(IMA_FILE_APPRAISE | IMA_MMAP_APPRAISE | \
+				 IMA_BPRM_APPRAISE | IMA_READ_APPRAISE | \
+				 IMA_CREDS_APPRAISE)
+#define IMA_APPRAISED_SUBMASK	(IMA_FILE_APPRAISED | IMA_MMAP_APPRAISED | \
+				 IMA_BPRM_APPRAISED | IMA_READ_APPRAISED | \
+				 IMA_CREDS_APPRAISED)
+
+/* IMA iint cache atomic_flags */
+#define IMA_CHANGE_XATTR	0
+#define IMA_UPDATE_XATTR	1
+#define IMA_CHANGE_ATTR		2
+#define IMA_DIGSIG		3
+#define IMA_MUST_MEASURE	4
+
+/* IMA integrity metadata associated with an inode */
+struct ima_iint_cache {
+	struct mutex mutex;	/* protects: version, flags, digest */
+	u64 version;		/* track inode changes */
+	unsigned long flags;
+	unsigned long measured_pcrs;
+	unsigned long atomic_flags;
+	unsigned long real_ino;
+	dev_t real_dev;
+	enum integrity_status ima_file_status:4;
+	enum integrity_status ima_mmap_status:4;
+	enum integrity_status ima_bprm_status:4;
+	enum integrity_status ima_read_status:4;
+	enum integrity_status ima_creds_status:4;
+	struct ima_digest_data *ima_hash;
+};
+
+extern struct lsm_blob_sizes ima_blob_sizes;
+
+static inline struct ima_iint_cache *
+ima_inode_get_iint(const struct inode *inode)
+{
+	struct ima_iint_cache **iint_sec;
+
+	if (unlikely(!inode->i_security))
+		return NULL;
+
+	iint_sec = inode->i_security + ima_blob_sizes.lbs_inode;
+	return *iint_sec;
+}
+
+static inline void ima_inode_set_iint(const struct inode *inode,
+				      struct ima_iint_cache *iint)
+{
+	struct ima_iint_cache **iint_sec;
+
+	if (unlikely(!inode->i_security))
+		return;
+
+	iint_sec = inode->i_security + ima_blob_sizes.lbs_inode;
+	*iint_sec = iint;
+}
+
+struct ima_iint_cache *ima_iint_find(struct inode *inode);
+struct ima_iint_cache *ima_inode_get(struct inode *inode);
+void ima_inode_free(struct inode *inode);
+void __init ima_iintcache_init(void);
+
 extern const int read_idmap[];
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_IMA_KEXEC
@@ -127,6 +228,12 @@ void ima_load_kexec_buffer(void);
 static inline void ima_load_kexec_buffer(void) {}
 #endif /* CONFIG_HAVE_IMA_KEXEC */
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS
+void ima_post_key_create_or_update(struct key *keyring, struct key *key,
+				   const void *payload, size_t plen,
+				   unsigned long flags, bool create);
+#endif
+
 /*
  * The default binary_runtime_measurements list format is defined as the
  * platform native format.  The canonical format is defined as little-endian.
@@ -146,8 +253,8 @@ int ima_calc_field_array_hash(struct ima_field_data *field_data,
 			      struct ima_template_entry *entry);
 int ima_calc_boot_aggregate(struct ima_digest_data *hash);
 void ima_add_violation(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
-		       struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
-		       const char *op, const char *cause);
+		       struct ima_iint_cache *iint, const char *op,
+		       const char *cause);
 int ima_init_crypto(void);
 void ima_putc(struct seq_file *m, void *data, int datalen);
 void ima_print_digest(struct seq_file *m, u8 *digest, u32 size);
@@ -261,10 +368,10 @@ int ima_get_action(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct inode *inode,
 		   struct ima_template_desc **template_desc,
 		   const char *func_data, unsigned int *allowed_algos);
 int ima_must_measure(struct inode *inode, int mask, enum ima_hooks func);
-int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
-			    struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
-			    enum hash_algo algo, struct modsig *modsig);
-void ima_store_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file,
+int ima_collect_measurement(struct ima_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file,
+			    void *buf, loff_t size, enum hash_algo algo,
+			    struct modsig *modsig);
+void ima_store_measurement(struct ima_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file,
 			   const unsigned char *filename,
 			   struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value,
 			   int xattr_len, const struct modsig *modsig, int pcr,
@@ -274,7 +381,7 @@ int process_buffer_measurement(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
 			       const char *eventname, enum ima_hooks func,
 			       int pcr, const char *func_data,
 			       bool buf_hash, u8 *digest, size_t digest_len);
-void ima_audit_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
+void ima_audit_measurement(struct ima_iint_cache *iint,
 			   const unsigned char *filename);
 int ima_alloc_init_template(struct ima_event_data *event_data,
 			    struct ima_template_entry **entry,
@@ -312,32 +419,32 @@ int ima_policy_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v);
 #define IMA_APPRAISE_KEXEC	0x40
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE
-int ima_check_blacklist(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
+int ima_check_blacklist(struct ima_iint_cache *iint,
 			const struct modsig *modsig, int pcr);
-int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func,
-			     struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
+int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func, struct ima_iint_cache *iint,
 			     struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
 			     struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value,
 			     int xattr_len, const struct modsig *modsig);
 int ima_must_appraise(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct inode *inode,
 		      int mask, enum ima_hooks func);
-void ima_update_xattr(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file);
-enum integrity_status ima_get_cache_status(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
+void ima_update_xattr(struct ima_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file);
+enum integrity_status ima_get_cache_status(struct ima_iint_cache *iint,
 					   enum ima_hooks func);
 enum hash_algo ima_get_hash_algo(const struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value,
 				 int xattr_len);
 int ima_read_xattr(struct dentry *dentry,
 		   struct evm_ima_xattr_data **xattr_value, int xattr_len);
+void __init init_ima_appraise_lsm(const struct lsm_id *lsmid);
 
 #else
-static inline int ima_check_blacklist(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
+static inline int ima_check_blacklist(struct ima_iint_cache *iint,
 				      const struct modsig *modsig, int pcr)
 {
 	return 0;
 }
 
 static inline int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func,
-					   struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
+					   struct ima_iint_cache *iint,
 					   struct file *file,
 					   const unsigned char *filename,
 					   struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value,
@@ -354,14 +461,13 @@ static inline int ima_must_appraise(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static inline void ima_update_xattr(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
+static inline void ima_update_xattr(struct ima_iint_cache *iint,
 				    struct file *file)
 {
 }
 
-static inline enum integrity_status ima_get_cache_status(struct integrity_iint_cache
-							 *iint,
-							 enum ima_hooks func)
+static inline enum integrity_status
+ima_get_cache_status(struct ima_iint_cache *iint, enum ima_hooks func)
 {
 	return INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
 }
@@ -379,6 +485,10 @@ static inline int ima_read_xattr(struct dentry *dentry,
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static inline void __init init_ima_appraise_lsm(const struct lsm_id *lsmid)
+{
+}
+
 #endif /* CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE */
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_MODSIG
@@ -430,7 +540,7 @@ static inline void ima_free_modsig(struct modsig *modsig)
 #else
 
 static inline int ima_filter_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr,
-				       void **lsmrule)
+				       void **lsmrule, gfp_t gfp)
 {
 	return -EINVAL;
 }
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
index 597ea0c4d7..1856981e33 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
@@ -131,8 +131,8 @@ int ima_store_template(struct ima_template_entry *entry,
  * value is invalidated.
  */
 void ima_add_violation(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
-		       struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
-		       const char *op, const char *cause)
+		       struct ima_iint_cache *iint, const char *op,
+		       const char *cause)
 {
 	struct ima_template_entry *entry;
 	struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
@@ -201,7 +201,8 @@ int ima_get_action(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct inode *inode,
 				allowed_algos);
 }
 
-static bool ima_get_verity_digest(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
+static bool ima_get_verity_digest(struct ima_iint_cache *iint,
+				  struct inode *inode,
 				  struct ima_max_digest_data *hash)
 {
 	enum hash_algo alg;
@@ -211,7 +212,7 @@ static bool ima_get_verity_digest(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
 	 * On failure, 'measure' policy rules will result in a file data
 	 * hash containing 0's.
 	 */
-	digest_len = fsverity_get_digest(iint->inode, hash->digest, NULL, &alg);
+	digest_len = fsverity_get_digest(inode, hash->digest, NULL, &alg);
 	if (digest_len == 0)
 		return false;
 
@@ -237,15 +238,15 @@ static bool ima_get_verity_digest(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
  *
  * Return 0 on success, error code otherwise
  */
-int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
-			    struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
-			    enum hash_algo algo, struct modsig *modsig)
+int ima_collect_measurement(struct ima_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file,
+			    void *buf, loff_t size, enum hash_algo algo,
+			    struct modsig *modsig)
 {
 	const char *audit_cause = "failed";
 	struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
 	struct inode *real_inode = d_real_inode(file_dentry(file));
-	const char *filename = file->f_path.dentry->d_name.name;
 	struct ima_max_digest_data hash;
+	struct name_snapshot filename;
 	struct kstat stat;
 	int result = 0;
 	int length;
@@ -280,7 +281,7 @@ int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
 	memset(&hash.digest, 0, sizeof(hash.digest));
 
 	if (iint->flags & IMA_VERITY_REQUIRED) {
-		if (!ima_get_verity_digest(iint, &hash)) {
+		if (!ima_get_verity_digest(iint, inode, &hash)) {
 			audit_cause = "no-verity-digest";
 			result = -ENODATA;
 		}
@@ -316,9 +317,13 @@ out:
 		if (file->f_flags & O_DIRECT)
 			audit_cause = "failed(directio)";
 
+		take_dentry_name_snapshot(&filename, file->f_path.dentry);
+
 		integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_DATA, inode,
-				    filename, "collect_data", audit_cause,
-				    result, 0);
+				    filename.name.name, "collect_data",
+				    audit_cause, result, 0);
+
+		release_dentry_name_snapshot(&filename);
 	}
 	return result;
 }
@@ -338,8 +343,8 @@ out:
  *
  * Must be called with iint->mutex held.
  */
-void ima_store_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
-			   struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
+void ima_store_measurement(struct ima_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file,
+			   const unsigned char *filename,
 			   struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value,
 			   int xattr_len, const struct modsig *modsig, int pcr,
 			   struct ima_template_desc *template_desc)
@@ -382,7 +387,7 @@ void ima_store_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
 		ima_free_template_entry(entry);
 }
 
-void ima_audit_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
+void ima_audit_measurement(struct ima_iint_cache *iint,
 			   const unsigned char *filename)
 {
 	struct audit_buffer *ab;
@@ -431,6 +436,7 @@ out:
  */
 const char *ima_d_path(const struct path *path, char **pathbuf, char *namebuf)
 {
+	struct name_snapshot filename;
 	char *pathname = NULL;
 
 	*pathbuf = __getname();
@@ -444,7 +450,10 @@ const char *ima_d_path(const struct path *path, char **pathbuf, char *namebuf)
 	}
 
 	if (!pathname) {
-		strscpy(namebuf, path->dentry->d_name.name, NAME_MAX);
+		take_dentry_name_snapshot(&filename, path->dentry);
+		strscpy(namebuf, filename.name.name, NAME_MAX);
+		release_dentry_name_snapshot(&filename);
+
 		pathname = namebuf;
 	}
 
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
index 870dde6770..3497741cae 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
@@ -84,8 +84,7 @@ int ima_must_appraise(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct inode *inode,
 				NULL, NULL, NULL);
 }
 
-static int ima_fix_xattr(struct dentry *dentry,
-			 struct integrity_iint_cache *iint)
+static int ima_fix_xattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct ima_iint_cache *iint)
 {
 	int rc, offset;
 	u8 algo = iint->ima_hash->algo;
@@ -106,7 +105,7 @@ static int ima_fix_xattr(struct dentry *dentry,
 }
 
 /* Return specific func appraised cached result */
-enum integrity_status ima_get_cache_status(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
+enum integrity_status ima_get_cache_status(struct ima_iint_cache *iint,
 					   enum ima_hooks func)
 {
 	switch (func) {
@@ -126,7 +125,7 @@ enum integrity_status ima_get_cache_status(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
 	}
 }
 
-static void ima_set_cache_status(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
+static void ima_set_cache_status(struct ima_iint_cache *iint,
 				 enum ima_hooks func,
 				 enum integrity_status status)
 {
@@ -152,8 +151,7 @@ static void ima_set_cache_status(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
 	}
 }
 
-static void ima_cache_flags(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
-			     enum ima_hooks func)
+static void ima_cache_flags(struct ima_iint_cache *iint, enum ima_hooks func)
 {
 	switch (func) {
 	case MMAP_CHECK:
@@ -276,7 +274,7 @@ static int calc_file_id_hash(enum evm_ima_xattr_type type,
  *
  * Return 0 on success, error code otherwise.
  */
-static int xattr_verify(enum ima_hooks func, struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
+static int xattr_verify(enum ima_hooks func, struct ima_iint_cache *iint,
 			struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, int xattr_len,
 			enum integrity_status *status, const char **cause)
 {
@@ -443,7 +441,7 @@ static int modsig_verify(enum ima_hooks func, const struct modsig *modsig,
  *
  * Returns -EPERM if the hash is blacklisted.
  */
-int ima_check_blacklist(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
+int ima_check_blacklist(struct ima_iint_cache *iint,
 			const struct modsig *modsig, int pcr)
 {
 	enum hash_algo hash_algo;
@@ -477,8 +475,7 @@ int ima_check_blacklist(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
  *
  * Return 0 on success, error code otherwise
  */
-int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func,
-			     struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
+int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func, struct ima_iint_cache *iint,
 			     struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
 			     struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value,
 			     int xattr_len, const struct modsig *modsig)
@@ -520,7 +517,7 @@ int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func,
 	}
 
 	status = evm_verifyxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_IMA, xattr_value,
-				 rc < 0 ? 0 : rc, iint);
+				 rc < 0 ? 0 : rc);
 	switch (status) {
 	case INTEGRITY_PASS:
 	case INTEGRITY_PASS_IMMUTABLE:
@@ -603,7 +600,7 @@ out:
 /*
  * ima_update_xattr - update 'security.ima' hash value
  */
-void ima_update_xattr(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file)
+void ima_update_xattr(struct ima_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file)
 {
 	struct dentry *dentry = file_dentry(file);
 	int rc = 0;
@@ -629,17 +626,18 @@ void ima_update_xattr(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file)
  * ima_inode_post_setattr - reflect file metadata changes
  * @idmap:  idmap of the mount the inode was found from
  * @dentry: pointer to the affected dentry
+ * @ia_valid: for the UID and GID status
  *
  * Changes to a dentry's metadata might result in needing to appraise.
  *
  * This function is called from notify_change(), which expects the caller
  * to lock the inode's i_mutex.
  */
-void ima_inode_post_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
-			    struct dentry *dentry)
+static void ima_inode_post_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
+				   struct dentry *dentry, int ia_valid)
 {
 	struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
-	struct integrity_iint_cache *iint;
+	struct ima_iint_cache *iint;
 	int action;
 
 	if (!(ima_policy_flag & IMA_APPRAISE) || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode)
@@ -647,7 +645,7 @@ void ima_inode_post_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
 		return;
 
 	action = ima_must_appraise(idmap, inode, MAY_ACCESS, POST_SETATTR);
-	iint = integrity_iint_find(inode);
+	iint = ima_iint_find(inode);
 	if (iint) {
 		set_bit(IMA_CHANGE_ATTR, &iint->atomic_flags);
 		if (!action)
@@ -673,12 +671,12 @@ static int ima_protect_xattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name,
 
 static void ima_reset_appraise_flags(struct inode *inode, int digsig)
 {
-	struct integrity_iint_cache *iint;
+	struct ima_iint_cache *iint;
 
 	if (!(ima_policy_flag & IMA_APPRAISE) || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
 		return;
 
-	iint = integrity_iint_find(inode);
+	iint = ima_iint_find(inode);
 	if (!iint)
 		return;
 	iint->measured_pcrs = 0;
@@ -749,8 +747,9 @@ static int validate_hash_algo(struct dentry *dentry,
 	return -EACCES;
 }
 
-int ima_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name,
-		       const void *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len)
+static int ima_inode_setxattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
+			      const char *xattr_name, const void *xattr_value,
+			      size_t xattr_value_len, int flags)
 {
 	const struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xvalue = xattr_value;
 	int digsig = 0;
@@ -779,8 +778,8 @@ int ima_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name,
 	return result;
 }
 
-int ima_inode_set_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
-		      const char *acl_name, struct posix_acl *kacl)
+static int ima_inode_set_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
+			     const char *acl_name, struct posix_acl *kacl)
 {
 	if (evm_revalidate_status(acl_name))
 		ima_reset_appraise_flags(d_backing_inode(dentry), 0);
@@ -788,7 +787,8 @@ int ima_inode_set_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
 	return 0;
 }
 
-int ima_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name)
+static int ima_inode_removexattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
+				 const char *xattr_name)
 {
 	int result;
 
@@ -800,3 +800,23 @@ int ima_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name)
 	}
 	return result;
 }
+
+static int ima_inode_remove_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
+				const char *acl_name)
+{
+	return ima_inode_set_acl(idmap, dentry, acl_name, NULL);
+}
+
+static struct security_hook_list ima_appraise_hooks[] __ro_after_init = {
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_post_setattr, ima_inode_post_setattr),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setxattr, ima_inode_setxattr),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_set_acl, ima_inode_set_acl),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_removexattr, ima_inode_removexattr),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_remove_acl, ima_inode_remove_acl),
+};
+
+void __init init_ima_appraise_lsm(const struct lsm_id *lsmid)
+{
+	security_add_hooks(ima_appraise_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(ima_appraise_hooks),
+			   lsmid);
+}
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_iint.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_iint.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..e7c9c216c1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_iint.c
@@ -0,0 +1,142 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2008 IBM Corporation
+ *
+ * Authors:
+ * Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
+ *
+ * File: ima_iint.c
+ *	- implements the IMA hook: ima_inode_free
+ *	- cache integrity information in the inode security blob
+ */
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+
+#include "ima.h"
+
+static struct kmem_cache *ima_iint_cache __ro_after_init;
+
+/**
+ * ima_iint_find - Return the iint associated with an inode
+ * @inode: Pointer to the inode
+ *
+ * Return the IMA integrity information (iint) associated with an inode, if the
+ * inode was processed by IMA.
+ *
+ * Return: Found iint or NULL.
+ */
+struct ima_iint_cache *ima_iint_find(struct inode *inode)
+{
+	if (!IS_IMA(inode))
+		return NULL;
+
+	return ima_inode_get_iint(inode);
+}
+
+#define IMA_MAX_NESTING (FILESYSTEM_MAX_STACK_DEPTH + 1)
+
+/*
+ * It is not clear that IMA should be nested at all, but as long is it measures
+ * files both on overlayfs and on underlying fs, we need to annotate the iint
+ * mutex to avoid lockdep false positives related to IMA + overlayfs.
+ * See ovl_lockdep_annotate_inode_mutex_key() for more details.
+ */
+static inline void ima_iint_lockdep_annotate(struct ima_iint_cache *iint,
+					     struct inode *inode)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_LOCKDEP
+	static struct lock_class_key ima_iint_mutex_key[IMA_MAX_NESTING];
+
+	int depth = inode->i_sb->s_stack_depth;
+
+	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(depth < 0 || depth >= IMA_MAX_NESTING))
+		depth = 0;
+
+	lockdep_set_class(&iint->mutex, &ima_iint_mutex_key[depth]);
+#endif
+}
+
+static void ima_iint_init_always(struct ima_iint_cache *iint,
+				 struct inode *inode)
+{
+	iint->ima_hash = NULL;
+	iint->version = 0;
+	iint->flags = 0UL;
+	iint->atomic_flags = 0UL;
+	iint->ima_file_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
+	iint->ima_mmap_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
+	iint->ima_bprm_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
+	iint->ima_read_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
+	iint->ima_creds_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
+	iint->measured_pcrs = 0;
+	mutex_init(&iint->mutex);
+	ima_iint_lockdep_annotate(iint, inode);
+}
+
+static void ima_iint_free(struct ima_iint_cache *iint)
+{
+	kfree(iint->ima_hash);
+	mutex_destroy(&iint->mutex);
+	kmem_cache_free(ima_iint_cache, iint);
+}
+
+/**
+ * ima_inode_get - Find or allocate an iint associated with an inode
+ * @inode: Pointer to the inode
+ *
+ * Find an iint associated with an inode, and allocate a new one if not found.
+ * Caller must lock i_mutex.
+ *
+ * Return: An iint on success, NULL on error.
+ */
+struct ima_iint_cache *ima_inode_get(struct inode *inode)
+{
+	struct ima_iint_cache *iint;
+
+	iint = ima_iint_find(inode);
+	if (iint)
+		return iint;
+
+	iint = kmem_cache_alloc(ima_iint_cache, GFP_NOFS);
+	if (!iint)
+		return NULL;
+
+	ima_iint_init_always(iint, inode);
+
+	inode->i_flags |= S_IMA;
+	ima_inode_set_iint(inode, iint);
+
+	return iint;
+}
+
+/**
+ * ima_inode_free - Called on inode free
+ * @inode: Pointer to the inode
+ *
+ * Free the iint associated with an inode.
+ */
+void ima_inode_free(struct inode *inode)
+{
+	struct ima_iint_cache *iint;
+
+	if (!IS_IMA(inode))
+		return;
+
+	iint = ima_iint_find(inode);
+	ima_inode_set_iint(inode, NULL);
+
+	ima_iint_free(iint);
+}
+
+static void ima_iint_init_once(void *foo)
+{
+	struct ima_iint_cache *iint = (struct ima_iint_cache *)foo;
+
+	memset(iint, 0, sizeof(*iint));
+}
+
+void __init ima_iintcache_init(void)
+{
+	ima_iint_cache =
+	    kmem_cache_create("ima_iint_cache", sizeof(struct ima_iint_cache),
+			      0, SLAB_PANIC, ima_iint_init_once);
+}
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c
index 63979aefc9..393f5c7912 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c
@@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ static int __init ima_add_boot_aggregate(void)
 	static const char op[] = "add_boot_aggregate";
 	const char *audit_cause = "ENOMEM";
 	struct ima_template_entry *entry;
-	struct integrity_iint_cache tmp_iint, *iint = &tmp_iint;
+	struct ima_iint_cache tmp_iint, *iint = &tmp_iint;
 	struct ima_event_data event_data = { .iint = iint,
 					     .filename = boot_aggregate_name };
 	struct ima_max_digest_data hash;
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index cc1217ac2c..c84e8c5533 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -114,7 +114,7 @@ static int mmap_violation_check(enum ima_hooks func, struct file *file,
  *
  */
 static void ima_rdwr_violation_check(struct file *file,
-				     struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
+				     struct ima_iint_cache *iint,
 				     int must_measure,
 				     char **pathbuf,
 				     const char **pathname,
@@ -127,7 +127,7 @@ static void ima_rdwr_violation_check(struct file *file,
 	if (mode & FMODE_WRITE) {
 		if (atomic_read(&inode->i_readcount) && IS_IMA(inode)) {
 			if (!iint)
-				iint = integrity_iint_find(inode);
+				iint = ima_iint_find(inode);
 			/* IMA_MEASURE is set from reader side */
 			if (iint && test_bit(IMA_MUST_MEASURE,
 						&iint->atomic_flags))
@@ -153,7 +153,7 @@ static void ima_rdwr_violation_check(struct file *file,
 				  "invalid_pcr", "open_writers");
 }
 
-static void ima_check_last_writer(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
+static void ima_check_last_writer(struct ima_iint_cache *iint,
 				  struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
 {
 	fmode_t mode = file->f_mode;
@@ -189,15 +189,15 @@ static void ima_check_last_writer(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
  *
  * Flag files that changed, based on i_version
  */
-void ima_file_free(struct file *file)
+static void ima_file_free(struct file *file)
 {
 	struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
-	struct integrity_iint_cache *iint;
+	struct ima_iint_cache *iint;
 
 	if (!ima_policy_flag || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
 		return;
 
-	iint = integrity_iint_find(inode);
+	iint = ima_iint_find(inode);
 	if (!iint)
 		return;
 
@@ -209,7 +209,7 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred,
 			       enum ima_hooks func)
 {
 	struct inode *backing_inode, *inode = file_inode(file);
-	struct integrity_iint_cache *iint = NULL;
+	struct ima_iint_cache *iint = NULL;
 	struct ima_template_desc *template_desc = NULL;
 	char *pathbuf = NULL;
 	char filename[NAME_MAX];
@@ -248,7 +248,7 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred,
 	inode_lock(inode);
 
 	if (action) {
-		iint = integrity_inode_get(inode);
+		iint = ima_inode_get(inode);
 		if (!iint)
 			rc = -ENOMEM;
 	}
@@ -427,8 +427,8 @@ out:
  * On success return 0.  On integrity appraisal error, assuming the file
  * is in policy and IMA-appraisal is in enforcing mode, return -EACCES.
  */
-int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
-		  unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags)
+static int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
+			 unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags)
 {
 	u32 secid;
 	int ret;
@@ -455,7 +455,8 @@ int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
 /**
  * ima_file_mprotect - based on policy, limit mprotect change
  * @vma: vm_area_struct protection is set to
- * @prot: contains the protection that will be applied by the kernel.
+ * @reqprot: protection requested by the application
+ * @prot: protection that will be applied by the kernel
  *
  * Files can be mmap'ed read/write and later changed to execute to circumvent
  * IMA's mmap appraisal policy rules.  Due to locking issues (mmap semaphore
@@ -465,7 +466,8 @@ int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
  *
  * On mprotect change success, return 0.  On failure, return -EACESS.
  */
-int ima_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long prot)
+static int ima_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long reqprot,
+			     unsigned long prot)
 {
 	struct ima_template_desc *template = NULL;
 	struct file *file;
@@ -523,7 +525,7 @@ int ima_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long prot)
  * On success return 0.  On integrity appraisal error, assuming the file
  * is in policy and IMA-appraisal is in enforcing mode, return -EACCES.
  */
-int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
+static int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 {
 	int ret;
 	u32 secid;
@@ -549,7 +551,7 @@ int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
  * On success return 0.  On integrity appraisal error, assuming the file
  * is in policy and IMA-appraisal is in enforcing mode, return -EACCES.
  */
-int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask)
+static int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask)
 {
 	u32 secid;
 
@@ -558,16 +560,15 @@ int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask)
 				   mask & (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC |
 					   MAY_APPEND), FILE_CHECK);
 }
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ima_file_check);
 
 static int __ima_inode_hash(struct inode *inode, struct file *file, char *buf,
 			    size_t buf_size)
 {
-	struct integrity_iint_cache *iint = NULL, tmp_iint;
+	struct ima_iint_cache *iint = NULL, tmp_iint;
 	int rc, hash_algo;
 
 	if (ima_policy_flag) {
-		iint = integrity_iint_find(inode);
+		iint = ima_iint_find(inode);
 		if (iint)
 			mutex_lock(&iint->mutex);
 	}
@@ -577,7 +578,6 @@ static int __ima_inode_hash(struct inode *inode, struct file *file, char *buf,
 			mutex_unlock(&iint->mutex);
 
 		memset(&tmp_iint, 0, sizeof(tmp_iint));
-		tmp_iint.inode = inode;
 		mutex_init(&tmp_iint.mutex);
 
 		rc = ima_collect_measurement(&tmp_iint, file, NULL, 0,
@@ -683,10 +683,11 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ima_inode_hash);
  * Skip calling process_measurement(), but indicate which newly, created
  * tmpfiles are in policy.
  */
-void ima_post_create_tmpfile(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
-			     struct inode *inode)
+static void ima_post_create_tmpfile(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
+				    struct inode *inode)
+
 {
-	struct integrity_iint_cache *iint;
+	struct ima_iint_cache *iint;
 	int must_appraise;
 
 	if (!ima_policy_flag || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
@@ -698,7 +699,7 @@ void ima_post_create_tmpfile(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
 		return;
 
 	/* Nothing to do if we can't allocate memory */
-	iint = integrity_inode_get(inode);
+	iint = ima_inode_get(inode);
 	if (!iint)
 		return;
 
@@ -715,10 +716,9 @@ void ima_post_create_tmpfile(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
  * Mark files created via the mknodat syscall as new, so that the
  * file data can be written later.
  */
-void ima_post_path_mknod(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
-			 struct dentry *dentry)
+static void ima_post_path_mknod(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry)
 {
-	struct integrity_iint_cache *iint;
+	struct ima_iint_cache *iint;
 	struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
 	int must_appraise;
 
@@ -731,7 +731,7 @@ void ima_post_path_mknod(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
 		return;
 
 	/* Nothing to do if we can't allocate memory */
-	iint = integrity_inode_get(inode);
+	iint = ima_inode_get(inode);
 	if (!iint)
 		return;
 
@@ -751,8 +751,8 @@ void ima_post_path_mknod(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
  *
  * For permission return 0, otherwise return -EACCES.
  */
-int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id read_id,
-		  bool contents)
+static int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id read_id,
+			 bool contents)
 {
 	enum ima_hooks func;
 	u32 secid;
@@ -801,8 +801,8 @@ const int read_idmap[READING_MAX_ID] = {
  * On success return 0.  On integrity appraisal error, assuming the file
  * is in policy and IMA-appraisal is in enforcing mode, return -EACCES.
  */
-int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
-		       enum kernel_read_file_id read_id)
+static int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size,
+			      enum kernel_read_file_id read_id)
 {
 	enum ima_hooks func;
 	u32 secid;
@@ -835,7 +835,7 @@ int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
  *
  * For permission return 0, otherwise return -EACCES.
  */
-int ima_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents)
+static int ima_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents)
 {
 	bool ima_enforce, sig_enforce;
 
@@ -889,9 +889,9 @@ int ima_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents)
  * On success return 0.  On integrity appraisal error, assuming the file
  * is in policy and IMA-appraisal is in enforcing mode, return -EACCES.
  */
-int ima_post_load_data(char *buf, loff_t size,
-		       enum kernel_load_data_id load_id,
-		       char *description)
+static int ima_post_load_data(char *buf, loff_t size,
+			      enum kernel_load_data_id load_id,
+			      char *description)
 {
 	if (load_id == LOADING_FIRMWARE) {
 		if ((ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_FIRMWARE) &&
@@ -934,7 +934,7 @@ int process_buffer_measurement(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
 	int ret = 0;
 	const char *audit_cause = "ENOMEM";
 	struct ima_template_entry *entry = NULL;
-	struct integrity_iint_cache iint = {};
+	struct ima_iint_cache iint = {};
 	struct ima_event_data event_data = {.iint = &iint,
 					    .filename = eventname,
 					    .buf = buf,
@@ -1089,6 +1089,39 @@ int ima_measure_critical_data(const char *event_label,
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ima_measure_critical_data);
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS
+
+/**
+ * ima_kernel_module_request - Prevent crypto-pkcs1pad(rsa,*) requests
+ * @kmod_name: kernel module name
+ *
+ * Avoid a verification loop where verifying the signature of the modprobe
+ * binary requires executing modprobe itself. Since the modprobe iint->mutex
+ * is already held when the signature verification is performed, a deadlock
+ * occurs as soon as modprobe is executed within the critical region, since
+ * the same lock cannot be taken again.
+ *
+ * This happens when public_key_verify_signature(), in case of RSA algorithm,
+ * use alg_name to store internal information in order to construct an
+ * algorithm on the fly, but crypto_larval_lookup() will try to use alg_name
+ * in order to load a kernel module with same name.
+ *
+ * Since we don't have any real "crypto-pkcs1pad(rsa,*)" kernel modules,
+ * we are safe to fail such module request from crypto_larval_lookup(), and
+ * avoid the verification loop.
+ *
+ * Return: Zero if it is safe to load the kernel module, -EINVAL otherwise.
+ */
+static int ima_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name)
+{
+	if (strncmp(kmod_name, "crypto-pkcs1pad(rsa,", 20) == 0)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS */
+
 static int __init init_ima(void)
 {
 	int error;
@@ -1120,4 +1153,49 @@ static int __init init_ima(void)
 	return error;
 }
 
+static struct security_hook_list ima_hooks[] __ro_after_init = {
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_check_security, ima_bprm_check),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_post_open, ima_file_check),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_post_create_tmpfile, ima_post_create_tmpfile),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_release, ima_file_free),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_file, ima_file_mmap),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_mprotect, ima_file_mprotect),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_load_data, ima_load_data),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_post_load_data, ima_post_load_data),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_read_file, ima_read_file),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_post_read_file, ima_post_read_file),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_post_mknod, ima_post_path_mknod),
+#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_post_create_or_update, ima_post_key_create_or_update),
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_module_request, ima_kernel_module_request),
+#endif
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_free_security, ima_inode_free),
+};
+
+static const struct lsm_id ima_lsmid = {
+	.name = "ima",
+	.id = LSM_ID_IMA,
+};
+
+static int __init init_ima_lsm(void)
+{
+	ima_iintcache_init();
+	security_add_hooks(ima_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(ima_hooks), &ima_lsmid);
+	init_ima_appraise_lsm(&ima_lsmid);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+struct lsm_blob_sizes ima_blob_sizes __ro_after_init = {
+	.lbs_inode = sizeof(struct ima_iint_cache *),
+};
+
+DEFINE_LSM(ima) = {
+	.name = "ima",
+	.init = init_ima_lsm,
+	.order = LSM_ORDER_LAST,
+	.blobs = &ima_blob_sizes,
+};
+
 late_initcall(init_ima);	/* Start IMA after the TPM is available */
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index f690626177..09da8e6392 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@
 #define DONT_HASH	0x0200
 
 #define INVALID_PCR(a) (((a) < 0) || \
-	(a) >= (sizeof_field(struct integrity_iint_cache, measured_pcrs) * 8))
+	(a) >= (sizeof_field(struct ima_iint_cache, measured_pcrs) * 8))
 
 int ima_policy_flag;
 static int temp_ima_appraise;
@@ -401,7 +401,8 @@ static void ima_free_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
 	kfree(entry);
 }
 
-static struct ima_rule_entry *ima_lsm_copy_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
+static struct ima_rule_entry *ima_lsm_copy_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry,
+						gfp_t gfp)
 {
 	struct ima_rule_entry *nentry;
 	int i;
@@ -410,7 +411,7 @@ static struct ima_rule_entry *ima_lsm_copy_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
 	 * Immutable elements are copied over as pointers and data; only
 	 * lsm rules can change
 	 */
-	nentry = kmemdup(entry, sizeof(*nentry), GFP_KERNEL);
+	nentry = kmemdup(entry, sizeof(*nentry), gfp);
 	if (!nentry)
 		return NULL;
 
@@ -425,7 +426,8 @@ static struct ima_rule_entry *ima_lsm_copy_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
 
 		ima_filter_rule_init(nentry->lsm[i].type, Audit_equal,
 				     nentry->lsm[i].args_p,
-				     &nentry->lsm[i].rule);
+				     &nentry->lsm[i].rule,
+				     gfp);
 		if (!nentry->lsm[i].rule)
 			pr_warn("rule for LSM \'%s\' is undefined\n",
 				nentry->lsm[i].args_p);
@@ -438,7 +440,7 @@ static int ima_lsm_update_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
 	int i;
 	struct ima_rule_entry *nentry;
 
-	nentry = ima_lsm_copy_rule(entry);
+	nentry = ima_lsm_copy_rule(entry, GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!nentry)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
@@ -664,7 +666,7 @@ retry:
 		}
 
 		if (rc == -ESTALE && !rule_reinitialized) {
-			lsm_rule = ima_lsm_copy_rule(rule);
+			lsm_rule = ima_lsm_copy_rule(rule, GFP_ATOMIC);
 			if (lsm_rule) {
 				rule_reinitialized = true;
 				goto retry;
@@ -1140,7 +1142,8 @@ static int ima_lsm_rule_init(struct ima_rule_entry *entry,
 	entry->lsm[lsm_rule].type = audit_type;
 	result = ima_filter_rule_init(entry->lsm[lsm_rule].type, Audit_equal,
 				      entry->lsm[lsm_rule].args_p,
-				      &entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rule);
+				      &entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rule,
+				      GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rule) {
 		pr_warn("rule for LSM \'%s\' is undefined\n",
 			entry->lsm[lsm_rule].args_p);
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c
index 6cd0add524..3b2cb8f100 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c
@@ -483,7 +483,10 @@ static int ima_eventname_init_common(struct ima_event_data *event_data,
 				     bool size_limit)
 {
 	const char *cur_filename = NULL;
+	struct name_snapshot filename;
 	u32 cur_filename_len = 0;
+	bool snapshot = false;
+	int ret;
 
 	BUG_ON(event_data->filename == NULL && event_data->file == NULL);
 
@@ -496,7 +499,10 @@ static int ima_eventname_init_common(struct ima_event_data *event_data,
 	}
 
 	if (event_data->file) {
-		cur_filename = event_data->file->f_path.dentry->d_name.name;
+		take_dentry_name_snapshot(&filename,
+					  event_data->file->f_path.dentry);
+		snapshot = true;
+		cur_filename = filename.name.name;
 		cur_filename_len = strlen(cur_filename);
 	} else
 		/*
@@ -505,8 +511,13 @@ static int ima_eventname_init_common(struct ima_event_data *event_data,
 		 */
 		cur_filename_len = IMA_EVENT_NAME_LEN_MAX;
 out:
-	return ima_write_template_field_data(cur_filename, cur_filename_len,
-					     DATA_FMT_STRING, field_data);
+	ret = ima_write_template_field_data(cur_filename, cur_filename_len,
+					    DATA_FMT_STRING, field_data);
+
+	if (snapshot)
+		release_dentry_name_snapshot(&filename);
+
+	return ret;
 }
 
 /*
diff --git a/security/integrity/integrity.h b/security/integrity/integrity.h
index 9561db7cf6..50d6f798e6 100644
--- a/security/integrity/integrity.h
+++ b/security/integrity/integrity.h
@@ -18,60 +18,7 @@
 #include <crypto/hash.h>
 #include <linux/key.h>
 #include <linux/audit.h>
-
-/* iint action cache flags */
-#define IMA_MEASURE		0x00000001
-#define IMA_MEASURED		0x00000002
-#define IMA_APPRAISE		0x00000004
-#define IMA_APPRAISED		0x00000008
-/*#define IMA_COLLECT		0x00000010  do not use this flag */
-#define IMA_COLLECTED		0x00000020
-#define IMA_AUDIT		0x00000040
-#define IMA_AUDITED		0x00000080
-#define IMA_HASH		0x00000100
-#define IMA_HASHED		0x00000200
-
-/* iint policy rule cache flags */
-#define IMA_NONACTION_FLAGS	0xff000000
-#define IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED	0x01000000
-#define IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO	0x02000000
-#define IMA_NEW_FILE		0x04000000
-#define EVM_IMMUTABLE_DIGSIG	0x08000000
-#define IMA_FAIL_UNVERIFIABLE_SIGS	0x10000000
-#define IMA_MODSIG_ALLOWED	0x20000000
-#define IMA_CHECK_BLACKLIST	0x40000000
-#define IMA_VERITY_REQUIRED	0x80000000
-
-#define IMA_DO_MASK		(IMA_MEASURE | IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_AUDIT | \
-				 IMA_HASH | IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK)
-#define IMA_DONE_MASK		(IMA_MEASURED | IMA_APPRAISED | IMA_AUDITED | \
-				 IMA_HASHED | IMA_COLLECTED | \
-				 IMA_APPRAISED_SUBMASK)
-
-/* iint subaction appraise cache flags */
-#define IMA_FILE_APPRAISE	0x00001000
-#define IMA_FILE_APPRAISED	0x00002000
-#define IMA_MMAP_APPRAISE	0x00004000
-#define IMA_MMAP_APPRAISED	0x00008000
-#define IMA_BPRM_APPRAISE	0x00010000
-#define IMA_BPRM_APPRAISED	0x00020000
-#define IMA_READ_APPRAISE	0x00040000
-#define IMA_READ_APPRAISED	0x00080000
-#define IMA_CREDS_APPRAISE	0x00100000
-#define IMA_CREDS_APPRAISED	0x00200000
-#define IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK	(IMA_FILE_APPRAISE | IMA_MMAP_APPRAISE | \
-				 IMA_BPRM_APPRAISE | IMA_READ_APPRAISE | \
-				 IMA_CREDS_APPRAISE)
-#define IMA_APPRAISED_SUBMASK	(IMA_FILE_APPRAISED | IMA_MMAP_APPRAISED | \
-				 IMA_BPRM_APPRAISED | IMA_READ_APPRAISED | \
-				 IMA_CREDS_APPRAISED)
-
-/* iint cache atomic_flags */
-#define IMA_CHANGE_XATTR	0
-#define IMA_UPDATE_XATTR	1
-#define IMA_CHANGE_ATTR		2
-#define IMA_DIGSIG		3
-#define IMA_MUST_MEASURE	4
+#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
 
 enum evm_ima_xattr_type {
 	IMA_XATTR_DIGEST = 0x01,
@@ -155,31 +102,6 @@ struct ima_file_id {
 	__u8 hash[HASH_MAX_DIGESTSIZE];
 } __packed;
 
-/* integrity data associated with an inode */
-struct integrity_iint_cache {
-	struct rb_node rb_node;	/* rooted in integrity_iint_tree */
-	struct mutex mutex;	/* protects: version, flags, digest */
-	struct inode *inode;	/* back pointer to inode in question */
-	u64 version;		/* track inode changes */
-	unsigned long flags;
-	unsigned long measured_pcrs;
-	unsigned long atomic_flags;
-	unsigned long real_ino;
-	dev_t real_dev;
-	enum integrity_status ima_file_status:4;
-	enum integrity_status ima_mmap_status:4;
-	enum integrity_status ima_bprm_status:4;
-	enum integrity_status ima_read_status:4;
-	enum integrity_status ima_creds_status:4;
-	enum integrity_status evm_status:4;
-	struct ima_digest_data *ima_hash;
-};
-
-/* rbtree tree calls to lookup, insert, delete
- * integrity data associated with an inode.
- */
-struct integrity_iint_cache *integrity_iint_find(struct inode *inode);
-
 int integrity_kernel_read(struct file *file, loff_t offset,
 			  void *addr, unsigned long count);
 
diff --git a/security/keys/key.c b/security/keys/key.c
index 74dfd961af..0aa5f01d16 100644
--- a/security/keys/key.c
+++ b/security/keys/key.c
@@ -13,7 +13,6 @@
 #include <linux/security.h>
 #include <linux/workqueue.h>
 #include <linux/random.h>
-#include <linux/ima.h>
 #include <linux/err.h>
 #include "internal.h"
 
@@ -931,8 +930,8 @@ static key_ref_t __key_create_or_update(key_ref_t keyring_ref,
 		goto error_link_end;
 	}
 
-	ima_post_key_create_or_update(keyring, key, payload, plen,
-				      flags, true);
+	security_key_post_create_or_update(keyring, key, payload, plen, flags,
+					   true);
 
 	key_ref = make_key_ref(key, is_key_possessed(keyring_ref));
 
@@ -965,9 +964,8 @@ error:
 	key_ref = __key_update(key_ref, &prep);
 
 	if (!IS_ERR(key_ref))
-		ima_post_key_create_or_update(keyring, key,
-					      payload, plen,
-					      flags, false);
+		security_key_post_create_or_update(keyring, key, payload, plen,
+						   flags, false);
 
 	goto error_free_prep;
 }
diff --git a/security/landlock/.kunitconfig b/security/landlock/.kunitconfig
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..03e1194666
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/landlock/.kunitconfig
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+CONFIG_KUNIT=y
+CONFIG_SECURITY=y
+CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK=y
+CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK_KUNIT_TEST=y
diff --git a/security/landlock/Kconfig b/security/landlock/Kconfig
index c4bf0d5eff..3f14934020 100644
--- a/security/landlock/Kconfig
+++ b/security/landlock/Kconfig
@@ -20,3 +20,18 @@ config SECURITY_LANDLOCK
 	  If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.  Otherwise,
 	  you should also prepend "landlock," to the content of CONFIG_LSM to
 	  enable Landlock at boot time.
+
+config SECURITY_LANDLOCK_KUNIT_TEST
+	bool "KUnit tests for Landlock" if !KUNIT_ALL_TESTS
+	depends on KUNIT=y
+	depends on SECURITY_LANDLOCK
+	default KUNIT_ALL_TESTS
+	help
+	  Build KUnit tests for Landlock.
+
+	  See the KUnit documentation in Documentation/dev-tools/kunit
+
+	  Run all KUnit tests for Landlock with:
+	  ./tools/testing/kunit/kunit.py run --kunitconfig security/landlock
+
+	  If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
diff --git a/security/landlock/Makefile b/security/landlock/Makefile
index c2e116f2a2..b4538b7cf7 100644
--- a/security/landlock/Makefile
+++ b/security/landlock/Makefile
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK) := landlock.o
 
 landlock-y := setup.o syscalls.o object.o ruleset.o \
-	cred.o ptrace.o fs.o
+	cred.o task.o fs.o
 
 landlock-$(CONFIG_INET) += net.o
diff --git a/security/landlock/common.h b/security/landlock/common.h
index 5dc0fe1570..0eb1d34c2e 100644
--- a/security/landlock/common.h
+++ b/security/landlock/common.h
@@ -17,4 +17,6 @@
 
 #define pr_fmt(fmt) LANDLOCK_NAME ": " fmt
 
+#define BIT_INDEX(bit) HWEIGHT(bit - 1)
+
 #endif /* _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_COMMON_H */
diff --git a/security/landlock/fs.c b/security/landlock/fs.c
index 0171f7eb6e..3e43e68a63 100644
--- a/security/landlock/fs.c
+++ b/security/landlock/fs.c
@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@
  * Copyright © 2021-2022 Microsoft Corporation
  */
 
+#include <kunit/test.h>
 #include <linux/atomic.h>
 #include <linux/bitops.h>
 #include <linux/bits.h>
@@ -247,15 +248,18 @@ get_handled_fs_accesses(const struct landlock_ruleset *const domain)
 	       LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_INITIALLY_DENIED;
 }
 
-static const struct landlock_ruleset *get_current_fs_domain(void)
+static const struct landlock_ruleset *
+get_fs_domain(const struct landlock_ruleset *const domain)
 {
-	const struct landlock_ruleset *const dom =
-		landlock_get_current_domain();
-
-	if (!dom || !get_raw_handled_fs_accesses(dom))
+	if (!domain || !get_raw_handled_fs_accesses(domain))
 		return NULL;
 
-	return dom;
+	return domain;
+}
+
+static const struct landlock_ruleset *get_current_fs_domain(void)
+{
+	return get_fs_domain(landlock_get_current_domain());
 }
 
 /*
@@ -311,6 +315,119 @@ static bool no_more_access(
 	return true;
 }
 
+#define NMA_TRUE(...) KUNIT_EXPECT_TRUE(test, no_more_access(__VA_ARGS__))
+#define NMA_FALSE(...) KUNIT_EXPECT_FALSE(test, no_more_access(__VA_ARGS__))
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK_KUNIT_TEST
+
+static void test_no_more_access(struct kunit *const test)
+{
+	const layer_mask_t rx0[LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_FS] = {
+		[BIT_INDEX(LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXECUTE)] = BIT_ULL(0),
+		[BIT_INDEX(LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE)] = BIT_ULL(0),
+	};
+	const layer_mask_t mx0[LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_FS] = {
+		[BIT_INDEX(LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXECUTE)] = BIT_ULL(0),
+		[BIT_INDEX(LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_REG)] = BIT_ULL(0),
+	};
+	const layer_mask_t x0[LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_FS] = {
+		[BIT_INDEX(LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXECUTE)] = BIT_ULL(0),
+	};
+	const layer_mask_t x1[LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_FS] = {
+		[BIT_INDEX(LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXECUTE)] = BIT_ULL(1),
+	};
+	const layer_mask_t x01[LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_FS] = {
+		[BIT_INDEX(LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXECUTE)] = BIT_ULL(0) |
+							  BIT_ULL(1),
+	};
+	const layer_mask_t allows_all[LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_FS] = {};
+
+	/* Checks without restriction. */
+	NMA_TRUE(&x0, &allows_all, false, &allows_all, NULL, false);
+	NMA_TRUE(&allows_all, &x0, false, &allows_all, NULL, false);
+	NMA_FALSE(&x0, &x0, false, &allows_all, NULL, false);
+
+	/*
+	 * Checks that we can only refer a file if no more access could be
+	 * inherited.
+	 */
+	NMA_TRUE(&x0, &x0, false, &rx0, NULL, false);
+	NMA_TRUE(&rx0, &rx0, false, &rx0, NULL, false);
+	NMA_FALSE(&rx0, &rx0, false, &x0, NULL, false);
+	NMA_FALSE(&rx0, &rx0, false, &x1, NULL, false);
+
+	/* Checks allowed referring with different nested domains. */
+	NMA_TRUE(&x0, &x1, false, &x0, NULL, false);
+	NMA_TRUE(&x1, &x0, false, &x0, NULL, false);
+	NMA_TRUE(&x0, &x01, false, &x0, NULL, false);
+	NMA_TRUE(&x0, &x01, false, &rx0, NULL, false);
+	NMA_TRUE(&x01, &x0, false, &x0, NULL, false);
+	NMA_TRUE(&x01, &x0, false, &rx0, NULL, false);
+	NMA_FALSE(&x01, &x01, false, &x0, NULL, false);
+
+	/* Checks that file access rights are also enforced for a directory. */
+	NMA_FALSE(&rx0, &rx0, true, &x0, NULL, false);
+
+	/* Checks that directory access rights don't impact file referring... */
+	NMA_TRUE(&mx0, &mx0, false, &x0, NULL, false);
+	/* ...but only directory referring. */
+	NMA_FALSE(&mx0, &mx0, true, &x0, NULL, false);
+
+	/* Checks directory exchange. */
+	NMA_TRUE(&mx0, &mx0, true, &mx0, &mx0, true);
+	NMA_TRUE(&mx0, &mx0, true, &mx0, &x0, true);
+	NMA_FALSE(&mx0, &mx0, true, &x0, &mx0, true);
+	NMA_FALSE(&mx0, &mx0, true, &x0, &x0, true);
+	NMA_FALSE(&mx0, &mx0, true, &x1, &x1, true);
+
+	/* Checks file exchange with directory access rights... */
+	NMA_TRUE(&mx0, &mx0, false, &mx0, &mx0, false);
+	NMA_TRUE(&mx0, &mx0, false, &mx0, &x0, false);
+	NMA_TRUE(&mx0, &mx0, false, &x0, &mx0, false);
+	NMA_TRUE(&mx0, &mx0, false, &x0, &x0, false);
+	/* ...and with file access rights. */
+	NMA_TRUE(&rx0, &rx0, false, &rx0, &rx0, false);
+	NMA_TRUE(&rx0, &rx0, false, &rx0, &x0, false);
+	NMA_FALSE(&rx0, &rx0, false, &x0, &rx0, false);
+	NMA_FALSE(&rx0, &rx0, false, &x0, &x0, false);
+	NMA_FALSE(&rx0, &rx0, false, &x1, &x1, false);
+
+	/*
+	 * Allowing the following requests should not be a security risk
+	 * because domain 0 denies execute access, and domain 1 is always
+	 * nested with domain 0.  However, adding an exception for this case
+	 * would mean to check all nested domains to make sure none can get
+	 * more privileges (e.g. processes only sandboxed by domain 0).
+	 * Moreover, this behavior (i.e. composition of N domains) could then
+	 * be inconsistent compared to domain 1's ruleset alone (e.g. it might
+	 * be denied to link/rename with domain 1's ruleset, whereas it would
+	 * be allowed if nested on top of domain 0).  Another drawback would be
+	 * to create a cover channel that could enable sandboxed processes to
+	 * infer most of the filesystem restrictions from their domain.  To
+	 * make it simple, efficient, safe, and more consistent, this case is
+	 * always denied.
+	 */
+	NMA_FALSE(&x1, &x1, false, &x0, NULL, false);
+	NMA_FALSE(&x1, &x1, false, &rx0, NULL, false);
+	NMA_FALSE(&x1, &x1, true, &x0, NULL, false);
+	NMA_FALSE(&x1, &x1, true, &rx0, NULL, false);
+
+	/* Checks the same case of exclusive domains with a file... */
+	NMA_TRUE(&x1, &x1, false, &x01, NULL, false);
+	NMA_FALSE(&x1, &x1, false, &x01, &x0, false);
+	NMA_FALSE(&x1, &x1, false, &x01, &x01, false);
+	NMA_FALSE(&x1, &x1, false, &x0, &x0, false);
+	/* ...and with a directory. */
+	NMA_FALSE(&x1, &x1, false, &x0, &x0, true);
+	NMA_FALSE(&x1, &x1, true, &x0, &x0, false);
+	NMA_FALSE(&x1, &x1, true, &x0, &x0, true);
+}
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK_KUNIT_TEST */
+
+#undef NMA_TRUE
+#undef NMA_FALSE
+
 /*
  * Removes @layer_masks accesses that are not requested.
  *
@@ -331,6 +448,57 @@ scope_to_request(const access_mask_t access_request,
 	return !memchr_inv(layer_masks, 0, sizeof(*layer_masks));
 }
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK_KUNIT_TEST
+
+static void test_scope_to_request_with_exec_none(struct kunit *const test)
+{
+	/* Allows everything. */
+	layer_mask_t layer_masks[LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_FS] = {};
+
+	/* Checks and scopes with execute. */
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_TRUE(test, scope_to_request(LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXECUTE,
+						 &layer_masks));
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, 0,
+			layer_masks[BIT_INDEX(LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXECUTE)]);
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, 0,
+			layer_masks[BIT_INDEX(LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE)]);
+}
+
+static void test_scope_to_request_with_exec_some(struct kunit *const test)
+{
+	/* Denies execute and write. */
+	layer_mask_t layer_masks[LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_FS] = {
+		[BIT_INDEX(LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXECUTE)] = BIT_ULL(0),
+		[BIT_INDEX(LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE)] = BIT_ULL(1),
+	};
+
+	/* Checks and scopes with execute. */
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_FALSE(test, scope_to_request(LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXECUTE,
+						  &layer_masks));
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, BIT_ULL(0),
+			layer_masks[BIT_INDEX(LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXECUTE)]);
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, 0,
+			layer_masks[BIT_INDEX(LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE)]);
+}
+
+static void test_scope_to_request_without_access(struct kunit *const test)
+{
+	/* Denies execute and write. */
+	layer_mask_t layer_masks[LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_FS] = {
+		[BIT_INDEX(LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXECUTE)] = BIT_ULL(0),
+		[BIT_INDEX(LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE)] = BIT_ULL(1),
+	};
+
+	/* Checks and scopes without access request. */
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_TRUE(test, scope_to_request(0, &layer_masks));
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, 0,
+			layer_masks[BIT_INDEX(LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXECUTE)]);
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, 0,
+			layer_masks[BIT_INDEX(LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE)]);
+}
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK_KUNIT_TEST */
+
 /*
  * Returns true if there is at least one access right different than
  * LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER.
@@ -354,6 +522,51 @@ is_eacces(const layer_mask_t (*const layer_masks)[LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_FS],
 	return false;
 }
 
+#define IE_TRUE(...) KUNIT_EXPECT_TRUE(test, is_eacces(__VA_ARGS__))
+#define IE_FALSE(...) KUNIT_EXPECT_FALSE(test, is_eacces(__VA_ARGS__))
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK_KUNIT_TEST
+
+static void test_is_eacces_with_none(struct kunit *const test)
+{
+	const layer_mask_t layer_masks[LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_FS] = {};
+
+	IE_FALSE(&layer_masks, 0);
+	IE_FALSE(&layer_masks, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER);
+	IE_FALSE(&layer_masks, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXECUTE);
+	IE_FALSE(&layer_masks, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE);
+}
+
+static void test_is_eacces_with_refer(struct kunit *const test)
+{
+	const layer_mask_t layer_masks[LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_FS] = {
+		[BIT_INDEX(LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER)] = BIT_ULL(0),
+	};
+
+	IE_FALSE(&layer_masks, 0);
+	IE_FALSE(&layer_masks, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER);
+	IE_FALSE(&layer_masks, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXECUTE);
+	IE_FALSE(&layer_masks, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE);
+}
+
+static void test_is_eacces_with_write(struct kunit *const test)
+{
+	const layer_mask_t layer_masks[LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_FS] = {
+		[BIT_INDEX(LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE)] = BIT_ULL(0),
+	};
+
+	IE_FALSE(&layer_masks, 0);
+	IE_FALSE(&layer_masks, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER);
+	IE_FALSE(&layer_masks, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXECUTE);
+
+	IE_TRUE(&layer_masks, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE);
+}
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK_KUNIT_TEST */
+
+#undef IE_TRUE
+#undef IE_FALSE
+
 /**
  * is_access_to_paths_allowed - Check accesses for requests with a common path
  *
@@ -737,6 +950,7 @@ static int current_check_refer_path(struct dentry *const old_dentry,
 	bool allow_parent1, allow_parent2;
 	access_mask_t access_request_parent1, access_request_parent2;
 	struct path mnt_dir;
+	struct dentry *old_parent;
 	layer_mask_t layer_masks_parent1[LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_FS] = {},
 		     layer_masks_parent2[LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_FS] = {};
 
@@ -784,9 +998,17 @@ static int current_check_refer_path(struct dentry *const old_dentry,
 	mnt_dir.mnt = new_dir->mnt;
 	mnt_dir.dentry = new_dir->mnt->mnt_root;
 
+	/*
+	 * old_dentry may be the root of the common mount point and
+	 * !IS_ROOT(old_dentry) at the same time (e.g. with open_tree() and
+	 * OPEN_TREE_CLONE).  We do not need to call dget(old_parent) because
+	 * we keep a reference to old_dentry.
+	 */
+	old_parent = (old_dentry == mnt_dir.dentry) ? old_dentry :
+						      old_dentry->d_parent;
+
 	/* new_dir->dentry is equal to new_dentry->d_parent */
-	allow_parent1 = collect_domain_accesses(dom, mnt_dir.dentry,
-						old_dentry->d_parent,
+	allow_parent1 = collect_domain_accesses(dom, mnt_dir.dentry, old_parent,
 						&layer_masks_parent1);
 	allow_parent2 = collect_domain_accesses(
 		dom, mnt_dir.dentry, new_dir->dentry, &layer_masks_parent2);
@@ -1124,7 +1346,8 @@ static int hook_file_open(struct file *const file)
 	layer_mask_t layer_masks[LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_FS] = {};
 	access_mask_t open_access_request, full_access_request, allowed_access;
 	const access_mask_t optional_access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE;
-	const struct landlock_ruleset *const dom = get_current_fs_domain();
+	const struct landlock_ruleset *const dom =
+		get_fs_domain(landlock_cred(file->f_cred)->domain);
 
 	if (!dom)
 		return 0;
@@ -1225,3 +1448,27 @@ __init void landlock_add_fs_hooks(void)
 	security_add_hooks(landlock_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(landlock_hooks),
 			   &landlock_lsmid);
 }
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK_KUNIT_TEST
+
+/* clang-format off */
+static struct kunit_case test_cases[] = {
+	KUNIT_CASE(test_no_more_access),
+	KUNIT_CASE(test_scope_to_request_with_exec_none),
+	KUNIT_CASE(test_scope_to_request_with_exec_some),
+	KUNIT_CASE(test_scope_to_request_without_access),
+	KUNIT_CASE(test_is_eacces_with_none),
+	KUNIT_CASE(test_is_eacces_with_refer),
+	KUNIT_CASE(test_is_eacces_with_write),
+	{}
+};
+/* clang-format on */
+
+static struct kunit_suite test_suite = {
+	.name = "landlock_fs",
+	.test_cases = test_cases,
+};
+
+kunit_test_suite(test_suite);
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK_KUNIT_TEST */
diff --git a/security/landlock/net.c b/security/landlock/net.c
index efa1b644a4..c8bcd29bde 100644
--- a/security/landlock/net.c
+++ b/security/landlock/net.c
@@ -64,12 +64,11 @@ static const struct landlock_ruleset *get_current_net_domain(void)
 static int current_check_access_socket(struct socket *const sock,
 				       struct sockaddr *const address,
 				       const int addrlen,
-				       const access_mask_t access_request)
+				       access_mask_t access_request)
 {
 	__be16 port;
 	layer_mask_t layer_masks[LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_NET] = {};
 	const struct landlock_rule *rule;
-	access_mask_t handled_access;
 	struct landlock_id id = {
 		.type = LANDLOCK_KEY_NET_PORT,
 	};
@@ -164,9 +163,9 @@ static int current_check_access_socket(struct socket *const sock,
 	BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(port) > sizeof(id.key.data));
 
 	rule = landlock_find_rule(dom, id);
-	handled_access = landlock_init_layer_masks(
+	access_request = landlock_init_layer_masks(
 		dom, access_request, &layer_masks, LANDLOCK_KEY_NET_PORT);
-	if (landlock_unmask_layers(rule, handled_access, &layer_masks,
+	if (landlock_unmask_layers(rule, access_request, &layer_masks,
 				   ARRAY_SIZE(layer_masks)))
 		return 0;
 
diff --git a/security/landlock/setup.c b/security/landlock/setup.c
index f6dd33143b..28519a45b1 100644
--- a/security/landlock/setup.c
+++ b/security/landlock/setup.c
@@ -14,8 +14,8 @@
 #include "cred.h"
 #include "fs.h"
 #include "net.h"
-#include "ptrace.h"
 #include "setup.h"
+#include "task.h"
 
 bool landlock_initialized __ro_after_init = false;
 
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ const struct lsm_id landlock_lsmid = {
 static int __init landlock_init(void)
 {
 	landlock_add_cred_hooks();
-	landlock_add_ptrace_hooks();
+	landlock_add_task_hooks();
 	landlock_add_fs_hooks();
 	landlock_add_net_hooks();
 	landlock_initialized = true;
diff --git a/security/landlock/ptrace.c b/security/landlock/task.c
index 2bfc533d36..849f512361 100644
--- a/security/landlock/ptrace.c
+++ b/security/landlock/task.c
@@ -16,9 +16,9 @@
 
 #include "common.h"
 #include "cred.h"
-#include "ptrace.h"
 #include "ruleset.h"
 #include "setup.h"
+#include "task.h"
 
 /**
  * domain_scope_le - Checks domain ordering for scoped ptrace
@@ -113,7 +113,7 @@ static struct security_hook_list landlock_hooks[] __ro_after_init = {
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, hook_ptrace_traceme),
 };
 
-__init void landlock_add_ptrace_hooks(void)
+__init void landlock_add_task_hooks(void)
 {
 	security_add_hooks(landlock_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(landlock_hooks),
 			   &landlock_lsmid);
diff --git a/security/landlock/ptrace.h b/security/landlock/task.h
index 265b220ae3..7c00360219 100644
--- a/security/landlock/ptrace.h
+++ b/security/landlock/task.h
@@ -6,9 +6,9 @@
  * Copyright © 2019 ANSSI
  */
 
-#ifndef _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_PTRACE_H
-#define _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_PTRACE_H
+#ifndef _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_TASK_H
+#define _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_TASK_H
 
-__init void landlock_add_ptrace_hooks(void);
+__init void landlock_add_task_hooks(void);
 
-#endif /* _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_PTRACE_H */
+#endif /* _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_TASK_H */
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index a344b8fa55..4fd3c83935 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -19,15 +19,13 @@
 #include <linux/kernel.h>
 #include <linux/kernel_read_file.h>
 #include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
-#include <linux/integrity.h>
-#include <linux/ima.h>
-#include <linux/evm.h>
 #include <linux/fsnotify.h>
 #include <linux/mman.h>
 #include <linux/mount.h>
 #include <linux/personality.h>
 #include <linux/backing-dev.h>
 #include <linux/string.h>
+#include <linux/xattr.h>
 #include <linux/msg.h>
 #include <linux/overflow.h>
 #include <net/flow.h>
@@ -51,7 +49,9 @@
 	(IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_SAFESETID) ? 1 : 0) + \
 	(IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_LOCKDOWN_LSM) ? 1 : 0) + \
 	(IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_BPF_LSM) ? 1 : 0) + \
-	(IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK) ? 1 : 0))
+	(IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK) ? 1 : 0) + \
+	(IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IMA) ? 1 : 0) + \
+	(IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_EVM) ? 1 : 0))
 
 /*
  * These are descriptions of the reasons that can be passed to the
@@ -862,14 +862,14 @@ out:
 			P->hook.FUNC(__VA_ARGS__);		\
 	} while (0)
 
-#define call_int_hook(FUNC, IRC, ...) ({			\
-	int RC = IRC;						\
+#define call_int_hook(FUNC, ...) ({				\
+	int RC = LSM_RET_DEFAULT(FUNC);				\
 	do {							\
 		struct security_hook_list *P;			\
 								\
 		hlist_for_each_entry(P, &security_hook_heads.FUNC, list) { \
 			RC = P->hook.FUNC(__VA_ARGS__);		\
-			if (RC != 0)				\
+			if (RC != LSM_RET_DEFAULT(FUNC))	\
 				break;				\
 		}						\
 	} while (0);						\
@@ -888,7 +888,7 @@ out:
  */
 int security_binder_set_context_mgr(const struct cred *mgr)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(binder_set_context_mgr, 0, mgr);
+	return call_int_hook(binder_set_context_mgr, mgr);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -903,7 +903,7 @@ int security_binder_set_context_mgr(const struct cred *mgr)
 int security_binder_transaction(const struct cred *from,
 				const struct cred *to)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(binder_transaction, 0, from, to);
+	return call_int_hook(binder_transaction, from, to);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -918,7 +918,7 @@ int security_binder_transaction(const struct cred *from,
 int security_binder_transfer_binder(const struct cred *from,
 				    const struct cred *to)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(binder_transfer_binder, 0, from, to);
+	return call_int_hook(binder_transfer_binder, from, to);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -934,7 +934,7 @@ int security_binder_transfer_binder(const struct cred *from,
 int security_binder_transfer_file(const struct cred *from,
 				  const struct cred *to, const struct file *file)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(binder_transfer_file, 0, from, to, file);
+	return call_int_hook(binder_transfer_file, from, to, file);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -953,7 +953,7 @@ int security_binder_transfer_file(const struct cred *from,
  */
 int security_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(ptrace_access_check, 0, child, mode);
+	return call_int_hook(ptrace_access_check, child, mode);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -968,7 +968,7 @@ int security_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode)
  */
 int security_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(ptrace_traceme, 0, parent);
+	return call_int_hook(ptrace_traceme, parent);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -990,8 +990,7 @@ int security_capget(const struct task_struct *target,
 		    kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
 		    kernel_cap_t *permitted)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(capget, 0, target,
-			     effective, inheritable, permitted);
+	return call_int_hook(capget, target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -1012,8 +1011,8 @@ int security_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
 		    const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
 		    const kernel_cap_t *permitted)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(capset, 0, new, old,
-			     effective, inheritable, permitted);
+	return call_int_hook(capset, new, old, effective, inheritable,
+			     permitted);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -1034,7 +1033,7 @@ int security_capable(const struct cred *cred,
 		     int cap,
 		     unsigned int opts)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(capable, 0, cred, ns, cap, opts);
+	return call_int_hook(capable, cred, ns, cap, opts);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -1050,7 +1049,7 @@ int security_capable(const struct cred *cred,
  */
 int security_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, const struct super_block *sb)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(quotactl, 0, cmds, type, id, sb);
+	return call_int_hook(quotactl, cmds, type, id, sb);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -1063,7 +1062,7 @@ int security_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, const struct super_block *sb)
  */
 int security_quota_on(struct dentry *dentry)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(quota_on, 0, dentry);
+	return call_int_hook(quota_on, dentry);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -1078,7 +1077,7 @@ int security_quota_on(struct dentry *dentry)
  */
 int security_syslog(int type)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(syslog, 0, type);
+	return call_int_hook(syslog, type);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -1093,7 +1092,7 @@ int security_syslog(int type)
  */
 int security_settime64(const struct timespec64 *ts, const struct timezone *tz)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(settime, 0, ts, tz);
+	return call_int_hook(settime, ts, tz);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -1148,7 +1147,7 @@ int security_vm_enough_memory_mm(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
  */
 int security_bprm_creds_for_exec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(bprm_creds_for_exec, 0, bprm);
+	return call_int_hook(bprm_creds_for_exec, bprm);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -1172,7 +1171,7 @@ int security_bprm_creds_for_exec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
  */
 int security_bprm_creds_from_file(struct linux_binprm *bprm, const struct file *file)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(bprm_creds_from_file, 0, bprm, file);
+	return call_int_hook(bprm_creds_from_file, bprm, file);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -1189,12 +1188,7 @@ int security_bprm_creds_from_file(struct linux_binprm *bprm, const struct file *
  */
 int security_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 {
-	int ret;
-
-	ret = call_int_hook(bprm_check_security, 0, bprm);
-	if (ret)
-		return ret;
-	return ima_bprm_check(bprm);
+	return call_int_hook(bprm_check_security, bprm);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -1241,7 +1235,7 @@ void security_bprm_committed_creds(const struct linux_binprm *bprm)
  */
 int security_fs_context_submount(struct fs_context *fc, struct super_block *reference)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(fs_context_submount, 0, fc, reference);
+	return call_int_hook(fs_context_submount, fc, reference);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -1257,7 +1251,7 @@ int security_fs_context_submount(struct fs_context *fc, struct super_block *refe
  */
 int security_fs_context_dup(struct fs_context *fc, struct fs_context *src_fc)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(fs_context_dup, 0, fc, src_fc);
+	return call_int_hook(fs_context_dup, fc, src_fc);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -1306,7 +1300,7 @@ int security_sb_alloc(struct super_block *sb)
 
 	if (unlikely(rc))
 		return rc;
-	rc = call_int_hook(sb_alloc_security, 0, sb);
+	rc = call_int_hook(sb_alloc_security, sb);
 	if (unlikely(rc))
 		security_sb_free(sb);
 	return rc;
@@ -1364,7 +1358,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_free_mnt_opts);
  */
 int security_sb_eat_lsm_opts(char *options, void **mnt_opts)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(sb_eat_lsm_opts, 0, options, mnt_opts);
+	return call_int_hook(sb_eat_lsm_opts, options, mnt_opts);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sb_eat_lsm_opts);
 
@@ -1381,7 +1375,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sb_eat_lsm_opts);
 int security_sb_mnt_opts_compat(struct super_block *sb,
 				void *mnt_opts)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(sb_mnt_opts_compat, 0, sb, mnt_opts);
+	return call_int_hook(sb_mnt_opts_compat, sb, mnt_opts);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sb_mnt_opts_compat);
 
@@ -1398,7 +1392,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sb_mnt_opts_compat);
 int security_sb_remount(struct super_block *sb,
 			void *mnt_opts)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(sb_remount, 0, sb, mnt_opts);
+	return call_int_hook(sb_remount, sb, mnt_opts);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sb_remount);
 
@@ -1412,7 +1406,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sb_remount);
  */
 int security_sb_kern_mount(const struct super_block *sb)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(sb_kern_mount, 0, sb);
+	return call_int_hook(sb_kern_mount, sb);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -1426,7 +1420,7 @@ int security_sb_kern_mount(const struct super_block *sb)
  */
 int security_sb_show_options(struct seq_file *m, struct super_block *sb)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(sb_show_options, 0, m, sb);
+	return call_int_hook(sb_show_options, m, sb);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -1440,7 +1434,7 @@ int security_sb_show_options(struct seq_file *m, struct super_block *sb)
  */
 int security_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(sb_statfs, 0, dentry);
+	return call_int_hook(sb_statfs, dentry);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -1463,7 +1457,7 @@ int security_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry)
 int security_sb_mount(const char *dev_name, const struct path *path,
 		      const char *type, unsigned long flags, void *data)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(sb_mount, 0, dev_name, path, type, flags, data);
+	return call_int_hook(sb_mount, dev_name, path, type, flags, data);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -1477,7 +1471,7 @@ int security_sb_mount(const char *dev_name, const struct path *path,
  */
 int security_sb_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(sb_umount, 0, mnt, flags);
+	return call_int_hook(sb_umount, mnt, flags);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -1492,7 +1486,7 @@ int security_sb_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
 int security_sb_pivotroot(const struct path *old_path,
 			  const struct path *new_path)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(sb_pivotroot, 0, old_path, new_path);
+	return call_int_hook(sb_pivotroot, old_path, new_path);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -1511,9 +1505,17 @@ int security_sb_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
 			     unsigned long kern_flags,
 			     unsigned long *set_kern_flags)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(sb_set_mnt_opts,
-			     mnt_opts ? -EOPNOTSUPP : 0, sb,
-			     mnt_opts, kern_flags, set_kern_flags);
+	struct security_hook_list *hp;
+	int rc = mnt_opts ? -EOPNOTSUPP : LSM_RET_DEFAULT(sb_set_mnt_opts);
+
+	hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.sb_set_mnt_opts,
+			     list) {
+		rc = hp->hook.sb_set_mnt_opts(sb, mnt_opts, kern_flags,
+					      set_kern_flags);
+		if (rc != LSM_RET_DEFAULT(sb_set_mnt_opts))
+			break;
+	}
+	return rc;
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sb_set_mnt_opts);
 
@@ -1533,7 +1535,7 @@ int security_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb,
 			       unsigned long kern_flags,
 			       unsigned long *set_kern_flags)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(sb_clone_mnt_opts, 0, oldsb, newsb,
+	return call_int_hook(sb_clone_mnt_opts, oldsb, newsb,
 			     kern_flags, set_kern_flags);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sb_clone_mnt_opts);
@@ -1550,7 +1552,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sb_clone_mnt_opts);
 int security_move_mount(const struct path *from_path,
 			const struct path *to_path)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(move_mount, 0, from_path, to_path);
+	return call_int_hook(move_mount, from_path, to_path);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -1567,7 +1569,7 @@ int security_move_mount(const struct path *from_path,
 int security_path_notify(const struct path *path, u64 mask,
 			 unsigned int obj_type)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(path_notify, 0, path, mask, obj_type);
+	return call_int_hook(path_notify, path, mask, obj_type);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -1586,7 +1588,7 @@ int security_inode_alloc(struct inode *inode)
 
 	if (unlikely(rc))
 		return rc;
-	rc = call_int_hook(inode_alloc_security, 0, inode);
+	rc = call_int_hook(inode_alloc_security, inode);
 	if (unlikely(rc))
 		security_inode_free(inode);
 	return rc;
@@ -1608,7 +1610,6 @@ static void inode_free_by_rcu(struct rcu_head *head)
  */
 void security_inode_free(struct inode *inode)
 {
-	integrity_inode_free(inode);
 	call_void_hook(inode_free_security, inode);
 	/*
 	 * The inode may still be referenced in a path walk and
@@ -1644,20 +1645,8 @@ int security_dentry_init_security(struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
 				  const char **xattr_name, void **ctx,
 				  u32 *ctxlen)
 {
-	struct security_hook_list *hp;
-	int rc;
-
-	/*
-	 * Only one module will provide a security context.
-	 */
-	hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.dentry_init_security,
-			     list) {
-		rc = hp->hook.dentry_init_security(dentry, mode, name,
-						   xattr_name, ctx, ctxlen);
-		if (rc != LSM_RET_DEFAULT(dentry_init_security))
-			return rc;
-	}
-	return LSM_RET_DEFAULT(dentry_init_security);
+	return call_int_hook(dentry_init_security, dentry, mode, name,
+			     xattr_name, ctx, ctxlen);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_dentry_init_security);
 
@@ -1680,7 +1669,7 @@ int security_dentry_create_files_as(struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
 				    struct qstr *name,
 				    const struct cred *old, struct cred *new)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(dentry_create_files_as, 0, dentry, mode,
+	return call_int_hook(dentry_create_files_as, dentry, mode,
 			     name, old, new);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_dentry_create_files_as);
@@ -1727,8 +1716,8 @@ int security_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
 		return 0;
 
 	if (initxattrs) {
-		/* Allocate +1 for EVM and +1 as terminator. */
-		new_xattrs = kcalloc(blob_sizes.lbs_xattr_count + 2,
+		/* Allocate +1 as terminator. */
+		new_xattrs = kcalloc(blob_sizes.lbs_xattr_count + 1,
 				     sizeof(*new_xattrs), GFP_NOFS);
 		if (!new_xattrs)
 			return -ENOMEM;
@@ -1752,10 +1741,6 @@ int security_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
 	if (!xattr_count)
 		goto out;
 
-	ret = evm_inode_init_security(inode, dir, qstr, new_xattrs,
-				      &xattr_count);
-	if (ret)
-		goto out;
 	ret = initxattrs(inode, new_xattrs, fs_data);
 out:
 	for (; xattr_count > 0; xattr_count--)
@@ -1781,7 +1766,7 @@ int security_inode_init_security_anon(struct inode *inode,
 				      const struct qstr *name,
 				      const struct inode *context_inode)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(inode_init_security_anon, 0, inode, name,
+	return call_int_hook(inode_init_security_anon, inode, name,
 			     context_inode);
 }
 
@@ -1803,11 +1788,25 @@ int security_path_mknod(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
 {
 	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dir->dentry))))
 		return 0;
-	return call_int_hook(path_mknod, 0, dir, dentry, mode, dev);
+	return call_int_hook(path_mknod, dir, dentry, mode, dev);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_path_mknod);
 
 /**
+ * security_path_post_mknod() - Update inode security after reg file creation
+ * @idmap: idmap of the mount
+ * @dentry: new file
+ *
+ * Update inode security field after a regular file has been created.
+ */
+void security_path_post_mknod(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))))
+		return;
+	call_void_hook(path_post_mknod, idmap, dentry);
+}
+
+/**
  * security_path_mkdir() - Check if creating a new directory is allowed
  * @dir: parent directory
  * @dentry: new directory
@@ -1822,7 +1821,7 @@ int security_path_mkdir(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
 {
 	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dir->dentry))))
 		return 0;
-	return call_int_hook(path_mkdir, 0, dir, dentry, mode);
+	return call_int_hook(path_mkdir, dir, dentry, mode);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_path_mkdir);
 
@@ -1839,7 +1838,7 @@ int security_path_rmdir(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
 {
 	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dir->dentry))))
 		return 0;
-	return call_int_hook(path_rmdir, 0, dir, dentry);
+	return call_int_hook(path_rmdir, dir, dentry);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -1855,7 +1854,7 @@ int security_path_unlink(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
 {
 	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dir->dentry))))
 		return 0;
-	return call_int_hook(path_unlink, 0, dir, dentry);
+	return call_int_hook(path_unlink, dir, dentry);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_path_unlink);
 
@@ -1874,7 +1873,7 @@ int security_path_symlink(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
 {
 	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dir->dentry))))
 		return 0;
-	return call_int_hook(path_symlink, 0, dir, dentry, old_name);
+	return call_int_hook(path_symlink, dir, dentry, old_name);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -1892,7 +1891,7 @@ int security_path_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, const struct path *new_dir,
 {
 	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(old_dentry))))
 		return 0;
-	return call_int_hook(path_link, 0, old_dentry, new_dir, new_dentry);
+	return call_int_hook(path_link, old_dentry, new_dir, new_dentry);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -1916,7 +1915,7 @@ int security_path_rename(const struct path *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry,
 		      IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(new_dentry)))))
 		return 0;
 
-	return call_int_hook(path_rename, 0, old_dir, old_dentry, new_dir,
+	return call_int_hook(path_rename, old_dir, old_dentry, new_dir,
 			     new_dentry, flags);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_path_rename);
@@ -1935,7 +1934,7 @@ int security_path_truncate(const struct path *path)
 {
 	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(path->dentry))))
 		return 0;
-	return call_int_hook(path_truncate, 0, path);
+	return call_int_hook(path_truncate, path);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -1953,7 +1952,7 @@ int security_path_chmod(const struct path *path, umode_t mode)
 {
 	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(path->dentry))))
 		return 0;
-	return call_int_hook(path_chmod, 0, path, mode);
+	return call_int_hook(path_chmod, path, mode);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -1970,7 +1969,7 @@ int security_path_chown(const struct path *path, kuid_t uid, kgid_t gid)
 {
 	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(path->dentry))))
 		return 0;
-	return call_int_hook(path_chown, 0, path, uid, gid);
+	return call_int_hook(path_chown, path, uid, gid);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -1983,7 +1982,7 @@ int security_path_chown(const struct path *path, kuid_t uid, kgid_t gid)
  */
 int security_path_chroot(const struct path *path)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(path_chroot, 0, path);
+	return call_int_hook(path_chroot, path);
 }
 #endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH */
 
@@ -2002,11 +2001,26 @@ int security_inode_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
 {
 	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(dir)))
 		return 0;
-	return call_int_hook(inode_create, 0, dir, dentry, mode);
+	return call_int_hook(inode_create, dir, dentry, mode);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_inode_create);
 
 /**
+ * security_inode_post_create_tmpfile() - Update inode security of new tmpfile
+ * @idmap: idmap of the mount
+ * @inode: inode of the new tmpfile
+ *
+ * Update inode security data after a tmpfile has been created.
+ */
+void security_inode_post_create_tmpfile(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
+					struct inode *inode)
+{
+	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
+		return;
+	call_void_hook(inode_post_create_tmpfile, idmap, inode);
+}
+
+/**
  * security_inode_link() - Check if creating a hard link is allowed
  * @old_dentry: existing file
  * @dir: new parent directory
@@ -2021,7 +2035,7 @@ int security_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir,
 {
 	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(old_dentry))))
 		return 0;
-	return call_int_hook(inode_link, 0, old_dentry, dir, new_dentry);
+	return call_int_hook(inode_link, old_dentry, dir, new_dentry);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -2037,7 +2051,7 @@ int security_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
 {
 	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))))
 		return 0;
-	return call_int_hook(inode_unlink, 0, dir, dentry);
+	return call_int_hook(inode_unlink, dir, dentry);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -2055,7 +2069,7 @@ int security_inode_symlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
 {
 	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(dir)))
 		return 0;
-	return call_int_hook(inode_symlink, 0, dir, dentry, old_name);
+	return call_int_hook(inode_symlink, dir, dentry, old_name);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -2073,7 +2087,7 @@ int security_inode_mkdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode)
 {
 	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(dir)))
 		return 0;
-	return call_int_hook(inode_mkdir, 0, dir, dentry, mode);
+	return call_int_hook(inode_mkdir, dir, dentry, mode);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_inode_mkdir);
 
@@ -2090,7 +2104,7 @@ int security_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
 {
 	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))))
 		return 0;
-	return call_int_hook(inode_rmdir, 0, dir, dentry);
+	return call_int_hook(inode_rmdir, dir, dentry);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -2112,7 +2126,7 @@ int security_inode_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
 {
 	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(dir)))
 		return 0;
-	return call_int_hook(inode_mknod, 0, dir, dentry, mode, dev);
+	return call_int_hook(inode_mknod, dir, dentry, mode, dev);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -2137,13 +2151,13 @@ int security_inode_rename(struct inode *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry,
 		return 0;
 
 	if (flags & RENAME_EXCHANGE) {
-		int err = call_int_hook(inode_rename, 0, new_dir, new_dentry,
+		int err = call_int_hook(inode_rename, new_dir, new_dentry,
 					old_dir, old_dentry);
 		if (err)
 			return err;
 	}
 
-	return call_int_hook(inode_rename, 0, old_dir, old_dentry,
+	return call_int_hook(inode_rename, old_dir, old_dentry,
 			     new_dir, new_dentry);
 }
 
@@ -2159,7 +2173,7 @@ int security_inode_readlink(struct dentry *dentry)
 {
 	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))))
 		return 0;
-	return call_int_hook(inode_readlink, 0, dentry);
+	return call_int_hook(inode_readlink, dentry);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -2178,7 +2192,7 @@ int security_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode,
 {
 	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
 		return 0;
-	return call_int_hook(inode_follow_link, 0, dentry, inode, rcu);
+	return call_int_hook(inode_follow_link, dentry, inode, rcu);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -2199,7 +2213,7 @@ int security_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
 {
 	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
 		return 0;
-	return call_int_hook(inode_permission, 0, inode, mask);
+	return call_int_hook(inode_permission, inode, mask);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -2218,18 +2232,29 @@ int security_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
 int security_inode_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
 			   struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr)
 {
-	int ret;
-
 	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))))
 		return 0;
-	ret = call_int_hook(inode_setattr, 0, dentry, attr);
-	if (ret)
-		return ret;
-	return evm_inode_setattr(idmap, dentry, attr);
+	return call_int_hook(inode_setattr, idmap, dentry, attr);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_inode_setattr);
 
 /**
+ * security_inode_post_setattr() - Update the inode after a setattr operation
+ * @idmap: idmap of the mount
+ * @dentry: file
+ * @ia_valid: file attributes set
+ *
+ * Update inode security field after successful setting file attributes.
+ */
+void security_inode_post_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
+				 int ia_valid)
+{
+	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))))
+		return;
+	call_void_hook(inode_post_setattr, idmap, dentry, ia_valid);
+}
+
+/**
  * security_inode_getattr() - Check if getting file attributes is allowed
  * @path: file
  *
@@ -2241,7 +2266,7 @@ int security_inode_getattr(const struct path *path)
 {
 	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(path->dentry))))
 		return 0;
-	return call_int_hook(inode_getattr, 0, path);
+	return call_int_hook(inode_getattr, path);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -2269,17 +2294,12 @@ int security_inode_setxattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
 	 * SELinux and Smack integrate the cap call,
 	 * so assume that all LSMs supplying this call do so.
 	 */
-	ret = call_int_hook(inode_setxattr, 1, idmap, dentry, name, value,
-			    size, flags);
+	ret = call_int_hook(inode_setxattr, idmap, dentry, name, value, size,
+			    flags);
 
 	if (ret == 1)
 		ret = cap_inode_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size, flags);
-	if (ret)
-		return ret;
-	ret = ima_inode_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size);
-	if (ret)
-		return ret;
-	return evm_inode_setxattr(idmap, dentry, name, value, size);
+	return ret;
 }
 
 /**
@@ -2298,18 +2318,26 @@ int security_inode_set_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
 			   struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name,
 			   struct posix_acl *kacl)
 {
-	int ret;
-
 	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))))
 		return 0;
-	ret = call_int_hook(inode_set_acl, 0, idmap, dentry, acl_name,
-			    kacl);
-	if (ret)
-		return ret;
-	ret = ima_inode_set_acl(idmap, dentry, acl_name, kacl);
-	if (ret)
-		return ret;
-	return evm_inode_set_acl(idmap, dentry, acl_name, kacl);
+	return call_int_hook(inode_set_acl, idmap, dentry, acl_name, kacl);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_inode_post_set_acl() - Update inode security from posix acls set
+ * @dentry: file
+ * @acl_name: acl name
+ * @kacl: acl struct
+ *
+ * Update inode security data after successfully setting posix acls on @dentry.
+ * The posix acls in @kacl are identified by @acl_name.
+ */
+void security_inode_post_set_acl(struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name,
+				 struct posix_acl *kacl)
+{
+	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))))
+		return;
+	call_void_hook(inode_post_set_acl, dentry, acl_name, kacl);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -2328,7 +2356,7 @@ int security_inode_get_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
 {
 	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))))
 		return 0;
-	return call_int_hook(inode_get_acl, 0, idmap, dentry, acl_name);
+	return call_int_hook(inode_get_acl, idmap, dentry, acl_name);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -2345,17 +2373,26 @@ int security_inode_get_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
 int security_inode_remove_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
 			      struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name)
 {
-	int ret;
-
 	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))))
 		return 0;
-	ret = call_int_hook(inode_remove_acl, 0, idmap, dentry, acl_name);
-	if (ret)
-		return ret;
-	ret = ima_inode_remove_acl(idmap, dentry, acl_name);
-	if (ret)
-		return ret;
-	return evm_inode_remove_acl(idmap, dentry, acl_name);
+	return call_int_hook(inode_remove_acl, idmap, dentry, acl_name);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_inode_post_remove_acl() - Update inode security after rm posix acls
+ * @idmap: idmap of the mount
+ * @dentry: file
+ * @acl_name: acl name
+ *
+ * Update inode security data after successfully removing posix acls on
+ * @dentry in @idmap. The posix acls are identified by @acl_name.
+ */
+void security_inode_post_remove_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
+				    struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name)
+{
+	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))))
+		return;
+	call_void_hook(inode_post_remove_acl, idmap, dentry, acl_name);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -2374,7 +2411,6 @@ void security_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
 	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))))
 		return;
 	call_void_hook(inode_post_setxattr, dentry, name, value, size, flags);
-	evm_inode_post_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -2391,7 +2427,7 @@ int security_inode_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
 {
 	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))))
 		return 0;
-	return call_int_hook(inode_getxattr, 0, dentry, name);
+	return call_int_hook(inode_getxattr, dentry, name);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -2407,7 +2443,7 @@ int security_inode_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry)
 {
 	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))))
 		return 0;
-	return call_int_hook(inode_listxattr, 0, dentry);
+	return call_int_hook(inode_listxattr, dentry);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -2432,15 +2468,24 @@ int security_inode_removexattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
 	 * SELinux and Smack integrate the cap call,
 	 * so assume that all LSMs supplying this call do so.
 	 */
-	ret = call_int_hook(inode_removexattr, 1, idmap, dentry, name);
+	ret = call_int_hook(inode_removexattr, idmap, dentry, name);
 	if (ret == 1)
 		ret = cap_inode_removexattr(idmap, dentry, name);
-	if (ret)
-		return ret;
-	ret = ima_inode_removexattr(dentry, name);
-	if (ret)
-		return ret;
-	return evm_inode_removexattr(idmap, dentry, name);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_inode_post_removexattr() - Update the inode after a removexattr op
+ * @dentry: file
+ * @name: xattr name
+ *
+ * Update the inode after a successful removexattr operation.
+ */
+void security_inode_post_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
+{
+	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))))
+		return;
+	call_void_hook(inode_post_removexattr, dentry, name);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -2456,7 +2501,7 @@ int security_inode_removexattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
  */
 int security_inode_need_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(inode_need_killpriv, 0, dentry);
+	return call_int_hook(inode_need_killpriv, dentry);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -2473,7 +2518,7 @@ int security_inode_need_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
 int security_inode_killpriv(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
 			    struct dentry *dentry)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(inode_killpriv, 0, idmap, dentry);
+	return call_int_hook(inode_killpriv, idmap, dentry);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -2496,21 +2541,11 @@ int security_inode_getsecurity(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
 			       struct inode *inode, const char *name,
 			       void **buffer, bool alloc)
 {
-	struct security_hook_list *hp;
-	int rc;
-
 	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
 		return LSM_RET_DEFAULT(inode_getsecurity);
-	/*
-	 * Only one module will provide an attribute with a given name.
-	 */
-	hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.inode_getsecurity, list) {
-		rc = hp->hook.inode_getsecurity(idmap, inode, name, buffer,
-						alloc);
-		if (rc != LSM_RET_DEFAULT(inode_getsecurity))
-			return rc;
-	}
-	return LSM_RET_DEFAULT(inode_getsecurity);
+
+	return call_int_hook(inode_getsecurity, idmap, inode, name, buffer,
+			     alloc);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -2531,21 +2566,11 @@ int security_inode_getsecurity(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
 int security_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
 			       const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
 {
-	struct security_hook_list *hp;
-	int rc;
-
 	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
 		return LSM_RET_DEFAULT(inode_setsecurity);
-	/*
-	 * Only one module will provide an attribute with a given name.
-	 */
-	hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.inode_setsecurity, list) {
-		rc = hp->hook.inode_setsecurity(inode, name, value, size,
-						flags);
-		if (rc != LSM_RET_DEFAULT(inode_setsecurity))
-			return rc;
-	}
-	return LSM_RET_DEFAULT(inode_setsecurity);
+
+	return call_int_hook(inode_setsecurity, inode, name, value, size,
+			     flags);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -2566,7 +2591,7 @@ int security_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode,
 {
 	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
 		return 0;
-	return call_int_hook(inode_listsecurity, 0, inode, buffer, buffer_size);
+	return call_int_hook(inode_listsecurity, inode, buffer, buffer_size);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_listsecurity);
 
@@ -2597,7 +2622,7 @@ void security_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
  */
 int security_inode_copy_up(struct dentry *src, struct cred **new)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(inode_copy_up, 0, src, new);
+	return call_int_hook(inode_copy_up, src, new);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_copy_up);
 
@@ -2615,7 +2640,6 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_copy_up);
  */
 int security_inode_copy_up_xattr(const char *name)
 {
-	struct security_hook_list *hp;
 	int rc;
 
 	/*
@@ -2623,14 +2647,11 @@ int security_inode_copy_up_xattr(const char *name)
 	 * xattr), -EOPNOTSUPP if it does not know anything about the xattr or
 	 * any other error code in case of an error.
 	 */
-	hlist_for_each_entry(hp,
-			     &security_hook_heads.inode_copy_up_xattr, list) {
-		rc = hp->hook.inode_copy_up_xattr(name);
-		if (rc != LSM_RET_DEFAULT(inode_copy_up_xattr))
-			return rc;
-	}
+	rc = call_int_hook(inode_copy_up_xattr, name);
+	if (rc != LSM_RET_DEFAULT(inode_copy_up_xattr))
+		return rc;
 
-	return evm_inode_copy_up_xattr(name);
+	return LSM_RET_DEFAULT(inode_copy_up_xattr);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_copy_up_xattr);
 
@@ -2647,7 +2668,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_copy_up_xattr);
 int security_kernfs_init_security(struct kernfs_node *kn_dir,
 				  struct kernfs_node *kn)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(kernfs_init_security, 0, kn_dir, kn);
+	return call_int_hook(kernfs_init_security, kn_dir, kn);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -2671,7 +2692,7 @@ int security_kernfs_init_security(struct kernfs_node *kn_dir,
  */
 int security_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(file_permission, 0, file, mask);
+	return call_int_hook(file_permission, file, mask);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -2689,13 +2710,24 @@ int security_file_alloc(struct file *file)
 
 	if (rc)
 		return rc;
-	rc = call_int_hook(file_alloc_security, 0, file);
+	rc = call_int_hook(file_alloc_security, file);
 	if (unlikely(rc))
 		security_file_free(file);
 	return rc;
 }
 
 /**
+ * security_file_release() - Perform actions before releasing the file ref
+ * @file: the file
+ *
+ * Perform actions before releasing the last reference to a file.
+ */
+void security_file_release(struct file *file)
+{
+	call_void_hook(file_release, file);
+}
+
+/**
  * security_file_free() - Free a file's LSM blob
  * @file: the file
  *
@@ -2729,7 +2761,7 @@ void security_file_free(struct file *file)
  */
 int security_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(file_ioctl, 0, file, cmd, arg);
+	return call_int_hook(file_ioctl, file, cmd, arg);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_file_ioctl);
 
@@ -2747,7 +2779,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_file_ioctl);
 int security_file_ioctl_compat(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
 			       unsigned long arg)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(file_ioctl_compat, 0, file, cmd, arg);
+	return call_int_hook(file_ioctl_compat, file, cmd, arg);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_file_ioctl_compat);
 
@@ -2798,13 +2830,8 @@ static inline unsigned long mmap_prot(struct file *file, unsigned long prot)
 int security_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long prot,
 		       unsigned long flags)
 {
-	unsigned long prot_adj = mmap_prot(file, prot);
-	int ret;
-
-	ret = call_int_hook(mmap_file, 0, file, prot, prot_adj, flags);
-	if (ret)
-		return ret;
-	return ima_file_mmap(file, prot, prot_adj, flags);
+	return call_int_hook(mmap_file, file, prot, mmap_prot(file, prot),
+			     flags);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -2817,7 +2844,7 @@ int security_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long prot,
  */
 int security_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(mmap_addr, 0, addr);
+	return call_int_hook(mmap_addr, addr);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -2833,12 +2860,7 @@ int security_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr)
 int security_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long reqprot,
 			   unsigned long prot)
 {
-	int ret;
-
-	ret = call_int_hook(file_mprotect, 0, vma, reqprot, prot);
-	if (ret)
-		return ret;
-	return ima_file_mprotect(vma, prot);
+	return call_int_hook(file_mprotect, vma, reqprot, prot);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -2853,7 +2875,7 @@ int security_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long reqprot,
  */
 int security_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(file_lock, 0, file, cmd);
+	return call_int_hook(file_lock, file, cmd);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -2872,7 +2894,7 @@ int security_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
  */
 int security_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(file_fcntl, 0, file, cmd, arg);
+	return call_int_hook(file_fcntl, file, cmd, arg);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -2906,11 +2928,11 @@ void security_file_set_fowner(struct file *file)
 int security_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
 				 struct fown_struct *fown, int sig)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(file_send_sigiotask, 0, tsk, fown, sig);
+	return call_int_hook(file_send_sigiotask, tsk, fown, sig);
 }
 
 /**
- * security_file_receive() - Check is receiving a file via IPC is allowed
+ * security_file_receive() - Check if receiving a file via IPC is allowed
  * @file: file being received
  *
  * This hook allows security modules to control the ability of a process to
@@ -2920,7 +2942,7 @@ int security_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
  */
 int security_file_receive(struct file *file)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(file_receive, 0, file);
+	return call_int_hook(file_receive, file);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -2936,7 +2958,7 @@ int security_file_open(struct file *file)
 {
 	int ret;
 
-	ret = call_int_hook(file_open, 0, file);
+	ret = call_int_hook(file_open, file);
 	if (ret)
 		return ret;
 
@@ -2944,6 +2966,23 @@ int security_file_open(struct file *file)
 }
 
 /**
+ * security_file_post_open() - Evaluate a file after it has been opened
+ * @file: the file
+ * @mask: access mask
+ *
+ * Evaluate an opened file and the access mask requested with open(). The hook
+ * is useful for LSMs that require the file content to be available in order to
+ * make decisions.
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
+ */
+int security_file_post_open(struct file *file, int mask)
+{
+	return call_int_hook(file_post_open, file, mask);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_file_post_open);
+
+/**
  * security_file_truncate() - Check if truncating a file is allowed
  * @file: file
  *
@@ -2955,7 +2994,7 @@ int security_file_open(struct file *file)
  */
 int security_file_truncate(struct file *file)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(file_truncate, 0, file);
+	return call_int_hook(file_truncate, file);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -2973,7 +3012,7 @@ int security_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long clone_flags)
 
 	if (rc)
 		return rc;
-	rc = call_int_hook(task_alloc, 0, task, clone_flags);
+	rc = call_int_hook(task_alloc, task, clone_flags);
 	if (unlikely(rc))
 		security_task_free(task);
 	return rc;
@@ -3011,7 +3050,7 @@ int security_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp)
 	if (rc)
 		return rc;
 
-	rc = call_int_hook(cred_alloc_blank, 0, cred, gfp);
+	rc = call_int_hook(cred_alloc_blank, cred, gfp);
 	if (unlikely(rc))
 		security_cred_free(cred);
 	return rc;
@@ -3055,7 +3094,7 @@ int security_prepare_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, gfp_t gfp)
 	if (rc)
 		return rc;
 
-	rc = call_int_hook(cred_prepare, 0, new, old, gfp);
+	rc = call_int_hook(cred_prepare, new, old, gfp);
 	if (unlikely(rc))
 		security_cred_free(new);
 	return rc;
@@ -3100,7 +3139,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_cred_getsecid);
  */
 int security_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(kernel_act_as, 0, new, secid);
+	return call_int_hook(kernel_act_as, new, secid);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -3116,11 +3155,11 @@ int security_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
  */
 int security_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(kernel_create_files_as, 0, new, inode);
+	return call_int_hook(kernel_create_files_as, new, inode);
 }
 
 /**
- * security_kernel_module_request() - Check is loading a module is allowed
+ * security_kernel_module_request() - Check if loading a module is allowed
  * @kmod_name: module name
  *
  * Ability to trigger the kernel to automatically upcall to userspace for
@@ -3130,12 +3169,7 @@ int security_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode)
  */
 int security_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name)
 {
-	int ret;
-
-	ret = call_int_hook(kernel_module_request, 0, kmod_name);
-	if (ret)
-		return ret;
-	return integrity_kernel_module_request(kmod_name);
+	return call_int_hook(kernel_module_request, kmod_name);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -3151,12 +3185,7 @@ int security_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name)
 int security_kernel_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id,
 			      bool contents)
 {
-	int ret;
-
-	ret = call_int_hook(kernel_read_file, 0, file, id, contents);
-	if (ret)
-		return ret;
-	return ima_read_file(file, id, contents);
+	return call_int_hook(kernel_read_file, file, id, contents);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_kernel_read_file);
 
@@ -3176,12 +3205,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_kernel_read_file);
 int security_kernel_post_read_file(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size,
 				   enum kernel_read_file_id id)
 {
-	int ret;
-
-	ret = call_int_hook(kernel_post_read_file, 0, file, buf, size, id);
-	if (ret)
-		return ret;
-	return ima_post_read_file(file, buf, size, id);
+	return call_int_hook(kernel_post_read_file, file, buf, size, id);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_kernel_post_read_file);
 
@@ -3196,12 +3220,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_kernel_post_read_file);
  */
 int security_kernel_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents)
 {
-	int ret;
-
-	ret = call_int_hook(kernel_load_data, 0, id, contents);
-	if (ret)
-		return ret;
-	return ima_load_data(id, contents);
+	return call_int_hook(kernel_load_data, id, contents);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_kernel_load_data);
 
@@ -3223,13 +3242,7 @@ int security_kernel_post_load_data(char *buf, loff_t size,
 				   enum kernel_load_data_id id,
 				   char *description)
 {
-	int ret;
-
-	ret = call_int_hook(kernel_post_load_data, 0, buf, size, id,
-			    description);
-	if (ret)
-		return ret;
-	return ima_post_load_data(buf, size, id, description);
+	return call_int_hook(kernel_post_load_data, buf, size, id, description);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_kernel_post_load_data);
 
@@ -3250,7 +3263,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_kernel_post_load_data);
 int security_task_fix_setuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
 			     int flags)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(task_fix_setuid, 0, new, old, flags);
+	return call_int_hook(task_fix_setuid, new, old, flags);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -3270,7 +3283,7 @@ int security_task_fix_setuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
 int security_task_fix_setgid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
 			     int flags)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(task_fix_setgid, 0, new, old, flags);
+	return call_int_hook(task_fix_setgid, new, old, flags);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -3287,7 +3300,7 @@ int security_task_fix_setgid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
  */
 int security_task_fix_setgroups(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(task_fix_setgroups, 0, new, old);
+	return call_int_hook(task_fix_setgroups, new, old);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -3302,7 +3315,7 @@ int security_task_fix_setgroups(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
  */
 int security_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(task_setpgid, 0, p, pgid);
+	return call_int_hook(task_setpgid, p, pgid);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -3316,7 +3329,7 @@ int security_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
  */
 int security_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(task_getpgid, 0, p);
+	return call_int_hook(task_getpgid, p);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -3329,7 +3342,7 @@ int security_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p)
  */
 int security_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(task_getsid, 0, p);
+	return call_int_hook(task_getsid, p);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -3372,7 +3385,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_task_getsecid_obj);
  */
 int security_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(task_setnice, 0, p, nice);
+	return call_int_hook(task_setnice, p, nice);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -3386,7 +3399,7 @@ int security_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
  */
 int security_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(task_setioprio, 0, p, ioprio);
+	return call_int_hook(task_setioprio, p, ioprio);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -3399,7 +3412,7 @@ int security_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
  */
 int security_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(task_getioprio, 0, p);
+	return call_int_hook(task_getioprio, p);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -3416,7 +3429,7 @@ int security_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p)
 int security_task_prlimit(const struct cred *cred, const struct cred *tcred,
 			  unsigned int flags)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(task_prlimit, 0, cred, tcred, flags);
+	return call_int_hook(task_prlimit, cred, tcred, flags);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -3434,7 +3447,7 @@ int security_task_prlimit(const struct cred *cred, const struct cred *tcred,
 int security_task_setrlimit(struct task_struct *p, unsigned int resource,
 			    struct rlimit *new_rlim)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(task_setrlimit, 0, p, resource, new_rlim);
+	return call_int_hook(task_setrlimit, p, resource, new_rlim);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -3448,7 +3461,7 @@ int security_task_setrlimit(struct task_struct *p, unsigned int resource,
  */
 int security_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(task_setscheduler, 0, p);
+	return call_int_hook(task_setscheduler, p);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -3461,7 +3474,7 @@ int security_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
  */
 int security_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(task_getscheduler, 0, p);
+	return call_int_hook(task_getscheduler, p);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -3474,7 +3487,7 @@ int security_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
  */
 int security_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(task_movememory, 0, p);
+	return call_int_hook(task_movememory, p);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -3495,7 +3508,7 @@ int security_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p)
 int security_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct kernel_siginfo *info,
 		       int sig, const struct cred *cred)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(task_kill, 0, p, info, sig, cred);
+	return call_int_hook(task_kill, p, info, sig, cred);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -3553,7 +3566,7 @@ void security_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p, struct inode *inode)
  */
 int security_create_user_ns(const struct cred *cred)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(userns_create, 0, cred);
+	return call_int_hook(userns_create, cred);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -3567,7 +3580,7 @@ int security_create_user_ns(const struct cred *cred)
  */
 int security_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(ipc_permission, 0, ipcp, flag);
+	return call_int_hook(ipc_permission, ipcp, flag);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -3599,7 +3612,7 @@ int security_msg_msg_alloc(struct msg_msg *msg)
 
 	if (unlikely(rc))
 		return rc;
-	rc = call_int_hook(msg_msg_alloc_security, 0, msg);
+	rc = call_int_hook(msg_msg_alloc_security, msg);
 	if (unlikely(rc))
 		security_msg_msg_free(msg);
 	return rc;
@@ -3633,7 +3646,7 @@ int security_msg_queue_alloc(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq)
 
 	if (unlikely(rc))
 		return rc;
-	rc = call_int_hook(msg_queue_alloc_security, 0, msq);
+	rc = call_int_hook(msg_queue_alloc_security, msq);
 	if (unlikely(rc))
 		security_msg_queue_free(msq);
 	return rc;
@@ -3665,7 +3678,7 @@ void security_msg_queue_free(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq)
  */
 int security_msg_queue_associate(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, int msqflg)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(msg_queue_associate, 0, msq, msqflg);
+	return call_int_hook(msg_queue_associate, msq, msqflg);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -3680,7 +3693,7 @@ int security_msg_queue_associate(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, int msqflg)
  */
 int security_msg_queue_msgctl(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, int cmd)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(msg_queue_msgctl, 0, msq, cmd);
+	return call_int_hook(msg_queue_msgctl, msq, cmd);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -3697,7 +3710,7 @@ int security_msg_queue_msgctl(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, int cmd)
 int security_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq,
 			      struct msg_msg *msg, int msqflg)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(msg_queue_msgsnd, 0, msq, msg, msqflg);
+	return call_int_hook(msg_queue_msgsnd, msq, msg, msqflg);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -3718,7 +3731,7 @@ int security_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq,
 int security_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
 			      struct task_struct *target, long type, int mode)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(msg_queue_msgrcv, 0, msq, msg, target, type, mode);
+	return call_int_hook(msg_queue_msgrcv, msq, msg, target, type, mode);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -3736,7 +3749,7 @@ int security_shm_alloc(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp)
 
 	if (unlikely(rc))
 		return rc;
-	rc = call_int_hook(shm_alloc_security, 0, shp);
+	rc = call_int_hook(shm_alloc_security, shp);
 	if (unlikely(rc))
 		security_shm_free(shp);
 	return rc;
@@ -3769,7 +3782,7 @@ void security_shm_free(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp)
  */
 int security_shm_associate(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp, int shmflg)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(shm_associate, 0, shp, shmflg);
+	return call_int_hook(shm_associate, shp, shmflg);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -3784,7 +3797,7 @@ int security_shm_associate(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp, int shmflg)
  */
 int security_shm_shmctl(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp, int cmd)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(shm_shmctl, 0, shp, cmd);
+	return call_int_hook(shm_shmctl, shp, cmd);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -3802,7 +3815,7 @@ int security_shm_shmctl(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp, int cmd)
 int security_shm_shmat(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp,
 		       char __user *shmaddr, int shmflg)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(shm_shmat, 0, shp, shmaddr, shmflg);
+	return call_int_hook(shm_shmat, shp, shmaddr, shmflg);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -3820,7 +3833,7 @@ int security_sem_alloc(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma)
 
 	if (unlikely(rc))
 		return rc;
-	rc = call_int_hook(sem_alloc_security, 0, sma);
+	rc = call_int_hook(sem_alloc_security, sma);
 	if (unlikely(rc))
 		security_sem_free(sma);
 	return rc;
@@ -3852,7 +3865,7 @@ void security_sem_free(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma)
  */
 int security_sem_associate(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma, int semflg)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(sem_associate, 0, sma, semflg);
+	return call_int_hook(sem_associate, sma, semflg);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -3867,7 +3880,7 @@ int security_sem_associate(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma, int semflg)
  */
 int security_sem_semctl(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma, int cmd)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(sem_semctl, 0, sma, cmd);
+	return call_int_hook(sem_semctl, sma, cmd);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -3885,7 +3898,7 @@ int security_sem_semctl(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma, int cmd)
 int security_sem_semop(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma, struct sembuf *sops,
 		       unsigned nsops, int alter)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(sem_semop, 0, sma, sops, nsops, alter);
+	return call_int_hook(sem_semop, sma, sops, nsops, alter);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -4116,11 +4129,11 @@ int security_setprocattr(int lsmid, const char *name, void *value, size_t size)
  */
 int security_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(netlink_send, 0, sk, skb);
+	return call_int_hook(netlink_send, sk, skb);
 }
 
 /**
- * security_ismaclabel() - Check is the named attribute is a MAC label
+ * security_ismaclabel() - Check if the named attribute is a MAC label
  * @name: full extended attribute name
  *
  * Check if the extended attribute specified by @name represents a MAC label.
@@ -4129,7 +4142,7 @@ int security_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
  */
 int security_ismaclabel(const char *name)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(ismaclabel, 0, name);
+	return call_int_hook(ismaclabel, name);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_ismaclabel);
 
@@ -4148,20 +4161,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_ismaclabel);
  */
 int security_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
 {
-	struct security_hook_list *hp;
-	int rc;
-
-	/*
-	 * Currently, only one LSM can implement secid_to_secctx (i.e this
-	 * LSM hook is not "stackable").
-	 */
-	hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.secid_to_secctx, list) {
-		rc = hp->hook.secid_to_secctx(secid, secdata, seclen);
-		if (rc != LSM_RET_DEFAULT(secid_to_secctx))
-			return rc;
-	}
-
-	return LSM_RET_DEFAULT(secid_to_secctx);
+	return call_int_hook(secid_to_secctx, secid, secdata, seclen);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secid_to_secctx);
 
@@ -4178,7 +4178,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secid_to_secctx);
 int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid)
 {
 	*secid = 0;
-	return call_int_hook(secctx_to_secid, 0, secdata, seclen, secid);
+	return call_int_hook(secctx_to_secid, secdata, seclen, secid);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secctx_to_secid);
 
@@ -4225,7 +4225,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_invalidate_secctx);
  */
 int security_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(inode_notifysecctx, 0, inode, ctx, ctxlen);
+	return call_int_hook(inode_notifysecctx, inode, ctx, ctxlen);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_notifysecctx);
 
@@ -4247,7 +4247,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_notifysecctx);
  */
 int security_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(inode_setsecctx, 0, dentry, ctx, ctxlen);
+	return call_int_hook(inode_setsecctx, dentry, ctx, ctxlen);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_setsecctx);
 
@@ -4264,19 +4264,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_setsecctx);
  */
 int security_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen)
 {
-	struct security_hook_list *hp;
-	int rc;
-
-	/*
-	 * Only one module will provide a security context.
-	 */
-	hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.inode_getsecctx, list) {
-		rc = hp->hook.inode_getsecctx(inode, ctx, ctxlen);
-		if (rc != LSM_RET_DEFAULT(inode_getsecctx))
-			return rc;
-	}
-
-	return LSM_RET_DEFAULT(inode_getsecctx);
+	return call_int_hook(inode_getsecctx, inode, ctx, ctxlen);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_getsecctx);
 
@@ -4295,7 +4283,7 @@ int security_post_notification(const struct cred *w_cred,
 			       const struct cred *cred,
 			       struct watch_notification *n)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(post_notification, 0, w_cred, cred, n);
+	return call_int_hook(post_notification, w_cred, cred, n);
 }
 #endif /* CONFIG_WATCH_QUEUE */
 
@@ -4311,7 +4299,7 @@ int security_post_notification(const struct cred *w_cred,
  */
 int security_watch_key(struct key *key)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(watch_key, 0, key);
+	return call_int_hook(watch_key, key);
 }
 #endif /* CONFIG_KEY_NOTIFICATIONS */
 
@@ -4340,7 +4328,7 @@ int security_watch_key(struct key *key)
 int security_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock, struct sock *other,
 				 struct sock *newsk)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(unix_stream_connect, 0, sock, other, newsk);
+	return call_int_hook(unix_stream_connect, sock, other, newsk);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_unix_stream_connect);
 
@@ -4366,7 +4354,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_unix_stream_connect);
  */
 int security_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock,  struct socket *other)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(unix_may_send, 0, sock, other);
+	return call_int_hook(unix_may_send, sock, other);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_unix_may_send);
 
@@ -4383,7 +4371,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_unix_may_send);
  */
 int security_socket_create(int family, int type, int protocol, int kern)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(socket_create, 0, family, type, protocol, kern);
+	return call_int_hook(socket_create, family, type, protocol, kern);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -4407,7 +4395,7 @@ int security_socket_create(int family, int type, int protocol, int kern)
 int security_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
 				int type, int protocol, int kern)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(socket_post_create, 0, sock, family, type,
+	return call_int_hook(socket_post_create, sock, family, type,
 			     protocol, kern);
 }
 
@@ -4423,7 +4411,7 @@ int security_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
  */
 int security_socket_socketpair(struct socket *socka, struct socket *sockb)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(socket_socketpair, 0, socka, sockb);
+	return call_int_hook(socket_socketpair, socka, sockb);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_socket_socketpair);
 
@@ -4442,7 +4430,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_socket_socketpair);
 int security_socket_bind(struct socket *sock,
 			 struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(socket_bind, 0, sock, address, addrlen);
+	return call_int_hook(socket_bind, sock, address, addrlen);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -4459,7 +4447,7 @@ int security_socket_bind(struct socket *sock,
 int security_socket_connect(struct socket *sock,
 			    struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(socket_connect, 0, sock, address, addrlen);
+	return call_int_hook(socket_connect, sock, address, addrlen);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -4473,7 +4461,7 @@ int security_socket_connect(struct socket *sock,
  */
 int security_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(socket_listen, 0, sock, backlog);
+	return call_int_hook(socket_listen, sock, backlog);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -4489,11 +4477,11 @@ int security_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog)
  */
 int security_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(socket_accept, 0, sock, newsock);
+	return call_int_hook(socket_accept, sock, newsock);
 }
 
 /**
- * security_socket_sendmsg() - Check is sending a message is allowed
+ * security_socket_sendmsg() - Check if sending a message is allowed
  * @sock: sending socket
  * @msg: message to send
  * @size: size of message
@@ -4504,7 +4492,7 @@ int security_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock)
  */
 int security_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, int size)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(socket_sendmsg, 0, sock, msg, size);
+	return call_int_hook(socket_sendmsg, sock, msg, size);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -4521,7 +4509,7 @@ int security_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, int size)
 int security_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
 			    int size, int flags)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(socket_recvmsg, 0, sock, msg, size, flags);
+	return call_int_hook(socket_recvmsg, sock, msg, size, flags);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -4535,7 +4523,7 @@ int security_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
  */
 int security_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(socket_getsockname, 0, sock);
+	return call_int_hook(socket_getsockname, sock);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -4548,7 +4536,7 @@ int security_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock)
  */
 int security_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(socket_getpeername, 0, sock);
+	return call_int_hook(socket_getpeername, sock);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -4564,7 +4552,7 @@ int security_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock)
  */
 int security_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(socket_getsockopt, 0, sock, level, optname);
+	return call_int_hook(socket_getsockopt, sock, level, optname);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -4579,7 +4567,7 @@ int security_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname)
  */
 int security_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(socket_setsockopt, 0, sock, level, optname);
+	return call_int_hook(socket_setsockopt, sock, level, optname);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -4594,7 +4582,7 @@ int security_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname)
  */
 int security_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(socket_shutdown, 0, sock, how);
+	return call_int_hook(socket_shutdown, sock, how);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -4611,7 +4599,7 @@ int security_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how)
  */
 int security_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(socket_sock_rcv_skb, 0, sk, skb);
+	return call_int_hook(socket_sock_rcv_skb, sk, skb);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sock_rcv_skb);
 
@@ -4633,20 +4621,8 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sock_rcv_skb);
 int security_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, sockptr_t optval,
 				      sockptr_t optlen, unsigned int len)
 {
-	struct security_hook_list *hp;
-	int rc;
-
-	/*
-	 * Only one module will provide a security context.
-	 */
-	hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.socket_getpeersec_stream,
-			     list) {
-		rc = hp->hook.socket_getpeersec_stream(sock, optval, optlen,
-						       len);
-		if (rc != LSM_RET_DEFAULT(socket_getpeersec_stream))
-			return rc;
-	}
-	return LSM_RET_DEFAULT(socket_getpeersec_stream);
+	return call_int_hook(socket_getpeersec_stream, sock, optval, optlen,
+			     len);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -4666,19 +4642,7 @@ int security_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, sockptr_t optval,
 int security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock,
 				     struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
 {
-	struct security_hook_list *hp;
-	int rc;
-
-	/*
-	 * Only one module will provide a security context.
-	 */
-	hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.socket_getpeersec_dgram,
-			     list) {
-		rc = hp->hook.socket_getpeersec_dgram(sock, skb, secid);
-		if (rc != LSM_RET_DEFAULT(socket_getpeersec_dgram))
-			return rc;
-	}
-	return LSM_RET_DEFAULT(socket_getpeersec_dgram);
+	return call_int_hook(socket_getpeersec_dgram, sock, skb, secid);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_socket_getpeersec_dgram);
 
@@ -4695,7 +4659,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_socket_getpeersec_dgram);
  */
 int security_sk_alloc(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(sk_alloc_security, 0, sk, family, priority);
+	return call_int_hook(sk_alloc_security, sk, family, priority);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -4776,7 +4740,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sock_graft);
 int security_inet_conn_request(const struct sock *sk,
 			       struct sk_buff *skb, struct request_sock *req)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(inet_conn_request, 0, sk, skb, req);
+	return call_int_hook(inet_conn_request, sk, skb, req);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inet_conn_request);
 
@@ -4817,7 +4781,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inet_conn_established);
  */
 int security_secmark_relabel_packet(u32 secid)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(secmark_relabel_packet, 0, secid);
+	return call_int_hook(secmark_relabel_packet, secid);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secmark_relabel_packet);
 
@@ -4854,7 +4818,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secmark_refcount_dec);
  */
 int security_tun_dev_alloc_security(void **security)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(tun_dev_alloc_security, 0, security);
+	return call_int_hook(tun_dev_alloc_security, security);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_tun_dev_alloc_security);
 
@@ -4879,7 +4843,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_tun_dev_free_security);
  */
 int security_tun_dev_create(void)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(tun_dev_create, 0);
+	return call_int_hook(tun_dev_create);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_tun_dev_create);
 
@@ -4893,7 +4857,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_tun_dev_create);
  */
 int security_tun_dev_attach_queue(void *security)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(tun_dev_attach_queue, 0, security);
+	return call_int_hook(tun_dev_attach_queue, security);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_tun_dev_attach_queue);
 
@@ -4909,7 +4873,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_tun_dev_attach_queue);
  */
 int security_tun_dev_attach(struct sock *sk, void *security)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(tun_dev_attach, 0, sk, security);
+	return call_int_hook(tun_dev_attach, sk, security);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_tun_dev_attach);
 
@@ -4924,7 +4888,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_tun_dev_attach);
  */
 int security_tun_dev_open(void *security)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(tun_dev_open, 0, security);
+	return call_int_hook(tun_dev_open, security);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_tun_dev_open);
 
@@ -4940,7 +4904,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_tun_dev_open);
 int security_sctp_assoc_request(struct sctp_association *asoc,
 				struct sk_buff *skb)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(sctp_assoc_request, 0, asoc, skb);
+	return call_int_hook(sctp_assoc_request, asoc, skb);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sctp_assoc_request);
 
@@ -4961,8 +4925,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sctp_assoc_request);
 int security_sctp_bind_connect(struct sock *sk, int optname,
 			       struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(sctp_bind_connect, 0, sk, optname,
-			     address, addrlen);
+	return call_int_hook(sctp_bind_connect, sk, optname, address, addrlen);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sctp_bind_connect);
 
@@ -4996,7 +4959,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sctp_sk_clone);
 int security_sctp_assoc_established(struct sctp_association *asoc,
 				    struct sk_buff *skb)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(sctp_assoc_established, 0, asoc, skb);
+	return call_int_hook(sctp_assoc_established, asoc, skb);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sctp_assoc_established);
 
@@ -5014,7 +4977,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sctp_assoc_established);
  */
 int security_mptcp_add_subflow(struct sock *sk, struct sock *ssk)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(mptcp_add_subflow, 0, sk, ssk);
+	return call_int_hook(mptcp_add_subflow, sk, ssk);
 }
 
 #endif	/* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK */
@@ -5032,7 +4995,7 @@ int security_mptcp_add_subflow(struct sock *sk, struct sock *ssk)
  */
 int security_ib_pkey_access(void *sec, u64 subnet_prefix, u16 pkey)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(ib_pkey_access, 0, sec, subnet_prefix, pkey);
+	return call_int_hook(ib_pkey_access, sec, subnet_prefix, pkey);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_ib_pkey_access);
 
@@ -5049,8 +5012,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_ib_pkey_access);
 int security_ib_endport_manage_subnet(void *sec,
 				      const char *dev_name, u8 port_num)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(ib_endport_manage_subnet, 0, sec,
-			     dev_name, port_num);
+	return call_int_hook(ib_endport_manage_subnet, sec, dev_name, port_num);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_ib_endport_manage_subnet);
 
@@ -5064,7 +5026,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_ib_endport_manage_subnet);
  */
 int security_ib_alloc_security(void **sec)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(ib_alloc_security, 0, sec);
+	return call_int_hook(ib_alloc_security, sec);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_ib_alloc_security);
 
@@ -5097,7 +5059,7 @@ int security_xfrm_policy_alloc(struct xfrm_sec_ctx **ctxp,
 			       struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *sec_ctx,
 			       gfp_t gfp)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(xfrm_policy_alloc_security, 0, ctxp, sec_ctx, gfp);
+	return call_int_hook(xfrm_policy_alloc_security, ctxp, sec_ctx, gfp);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_xfrm_policy_alloc);
 
@@ -5114,7 +5076,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_xfrm_policy_alloc);
 int security_xfrm_policy_clone(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *old_ctx,
 			       struct xfrm_sec_ctx **new_ctxp)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(xfrm_policy_clone_security, 0, old_ctx, new_ctxp);
+	return call_int_hook(xfrm_policy_clone_security, old_ctx, new_ctxp);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -5139,7 +5101,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_xfrm_policy_free);
  */
 int security_xfrm_policy_delete(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(xfrm_policy_delete_security, 0, ctx);
+	return call_int_hook(xfrm_policy_delete_security, ctx);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -5156,7 +5118,7 @@ int security_xfrm_policy_delete(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx)
 int security_xfrm_state_alloc(struct xfrm_state *x,
 			      struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *sec_ctx)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(xfrm_state_alloc, 0, x, sec_ctx);
+	return call_int_hook(xfrm_state_alloc, x, sec_ctx);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_xfrm_state_alloc);
 
@@ -5175,7 +5137,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_xfrm_state_alloc);
 int security_xfrm_state_alloc_acquire(struct xfrm_state *x,
 				      struct xfrm_sec_ctx *polsec, u32 secid)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(xfrm_state_alloc_acquire, 0, x, polsec, secid);
+	return call_int_hook(xfrm_state_alloc_acquire, x, polsec, secid);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -5188,7 +5150,7 @@ int security_xfrm_state_alloc_acquire(struct xfrm_state *x,
  */
 int security_xfrm_state_delete(struct xfrm_state *x)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(xfrm_state_delete_security, 0, x);
+	return call_int_hook(xfrm_state_delete_security, x);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_xfrm_state_delete);
 
@@ -5217,7 +5179,7 @@ void security_xfrm_state_free(struct xfrm_state *x)
  */
 int security_xfrm_policy_lookup(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx, u32 fl_secid)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(xfrm_policy_lookup, 0, ctx, fl_secid);
+	return call_int_hook(xfrm_policy_lookup, ctx, fl_secid);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -5265,12 +5227,12 @@ int security_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match(struct xfrm_state *x,
  */
 int security_xfrm_decode_session(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(xfrm_decode_session, 0, skb, secid, 1);
+	return call_int_hook(xfrm_decode_session, skb, secid, 1);
 }
 
 void security_skb_classify_flow(struct sk_buff *skb, struct flowi_common *flic)
 {
-	int rc = call_int_hook(xfrm_decode_session, 0, skb, &flic->flowic_secid,
+	int rc = call_int_hook(xfrm_decode_session, skb, &flic->flowic_secid,
 			       0);
 
 	BUG_ON(rc);
@@ -5293,7 +5255,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_skb_classify_flow);
 int security_key_alloc(struct key *key, const struct cred *cred,
 		       unsigned long flags)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(key_alloc, 0, key, cred, flags);
+	return call_int_hook(key_alloc, key, cred, flags);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -5320,7 +5282,7 @@ void security_key_free(struct key *key)
 int security_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref, const struct cred *cred,
 			    enum key_need_perm need_perm)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(key_permission, 0, key_ref, cred, need_perm);
+	return call_int_hook(key_permission, key_ref, cred, need_perm);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -5339,7 +5301,26 @@ int security_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref, const struct cred *cred,
 int security_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **buffer)
 {
 	*buffer = NULL;
-	return call_int_hook(key_getsecurity, 0, key, buffer);
+	return call_int_hook(key_getsecurity, key, buffer);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_key_post_create_or_update() - Notification of key create or update
+ * @keyring: keyring to which the key is linked to
+ * @key: created or updated key
+ * @payload: data used to instantiate or update the key
+ * @payload_len: length of payload
+ * @flags: key flags
+ * @create: flag indicating whether the key was created or updated
+ *
+ * Notify the caller of a key creation or update.
+ */
+void security_key_post_create_or_update(struct key *keyring, struct key *key,
+					const void *payload, size_t payload_len,
+					unsigned long flags, bool create)
+{
+	call_void_hook(key_post_create_or_update, keyring, key, payload,
+		       payload_len, flags, create);
 }
 #endif	/* CONFIG_KEYS */
 
@@ -5350,15 +5331,17 @@ int security_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **buffer)
  * @op: rule operator
  * @rulestr: rule context
  * @lsmrule: receive buffer for audit rule struct
+ * @gfp: GFP flag used for kmalloc
  *
  * Allocate and initialize an LSM audit rule structure.
  *
  * Return: Return 0 if @lsmrule has been successfully set, -EINVAL in case of
  *         an invalid rule.
  */
-int security_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule)
+int security_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule,
+			     gfp_t gfp)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(audit_rule_init, 0, field, op, rulestr, lsmrule);
+	return call_int_hook(audit_rule_init, field, op, rulestr, lsmrule, gfp);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -5372,7 +5355,7 @@ int security_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule)
  */
 int security_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(audit_rule_known, 0, krule);
+	return call_int_hook(audit_rule_known, krule);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -5402,7 +5385,7 @@ void security_audit_rule_free(void *lsmrule)
  */
 int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(audit_rule_match, 0, secid, field, op, lsmrule);
+	return call_int_hook(audit_rule_match, secid, field, op, lsmrule);
 }
 #endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
 
@@ -5421,7 +5404,7 @@ int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule)
  */
 int security_bpf(int cmd, union bpf_attr *attr, unsigned int size)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(bpf, 0, cmd, attr, size);
+	return call_int_hook(bpf, cmd, attr, size);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -5436,7 +5419,7 @@ int security_bpf(int cmd, union bpf_attr *attr, unsigned int size)
  */
 int security_bpf_map(struct bpf_map *map, fmode_t fmode)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(bpf_map, 0, map, fmode);
+	return call_int_hook(bpf_map, map, fmode);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -5450,33 +5433,91 @@ int security_bpf_map(struct bpf_map *map, fmode_t fmode)
  */
 int security_bpf_prog(struct bpf_prog *prog)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(bpf_prog, 0, prog);
+	return call_int_hook(bpf_prog, prog);
 }
 
 /**
- * security_bpf_map_alloc() - Allocate a bpf map LSM blob
- * @map: bpf map
+ * security_bpf_map_create() - Check if BPF map creation is allowed
+ * @map: BPF map object
+ * @attr: BPF syscall attributes used to create BPF map
+ * @token: BPF token used to grant user access
  *
- * Initialize the security field inside bpf map.
+ * Do a check when the kernel creates a new BPF map. This is also the
+ * point where LSM blob is allocated for LSMs that need them.
  *
  * Return: Returns 0 on success, error on failure.
  */
-int security_bpf_map_alloc(struct bpf_map *map)
+int security_bpf_map_create(struct bpf_map *map, union bpf_attr *attr,
+			    struct bpf_token *token)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(bpf_map_alloc_security, 0, map);
+	return call_int_hook(bpf_map_create, map, attr, token);
 }
 
 /**
- * security_bpf_prog_alloc() - Allocate a bpf program LSM blob
- * @aux: bpf program aux info struct
+ * security_bpf_prog_load() - Check if loading of BPF program is allowed
+ * @prog: BPF program object
+ * @attr: BPF syscall attributes used to create BPF program
+ * @token: BPF token used to grant user access to BPF subsystem
  *
- * Initialize the security field inside bpf program.
+ * Perform an access control check when the kernel loads a BPF program and
+ * allocates associated BPF program object. This hook is also responsible for
+ * allocating any required LSM state for the BPF program.
  *
  * Return: Returns 0 on success, error on failure.
  */
-int security_bpf_prog_alloc(struct bpf_prog_aux *aux)
+int security_bpf_prog_load(struct bpf_prog *prog, union bpf_attr *attr,
+			   struct bpf_token *token)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(bpf_prog_alloc_security, 0, aux);
+	return call_int_hook(bpf_prog_load, prog, attr, token);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_bpf_token_create() - Check if creating of BPF token is allowed
+ * @token: BPF token object
+ * @attr: BPF syscall attributes used to create BPF token
+ * @path: path pointing to BPF FS mount point from which BPF token is created
+ *
+ * Do a check when the kernel instantiates a new BPF token object from BPF FS
+ * instance. This is also the point where LSM blob can be allocated for LSMs.
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 0 on success, error on failure.
+ */
+int security_bpf_token_create(struct bpf_token *token, union bpf_attr *attr,
+			      struct path *path)
+{
+	return call_int_hook(bpf_token_create, token, attr, path);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_bpf_token_cmd() - Check if BPF token is allowed to delegate
+ * requested BPF syscall command
+ * @token: BPF token object
+ * @cmd: BPF syscall command requested to be delegated by BPF token
+ *
+ * Do a check when the kernel decides whether provided BPF token should allow
+ * delegation of requested BPF syscall command.
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 0 on success, error on failure.
+ */
+int security_bpf_token_cmd(const struct bpf_token *token, enum bpf_cmd cmd)
+{
+	return call_int_hook(bpf_token_cmd, token, cmd);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_bpf_token_capable() - Check if BPF token is allowed to delegate
+ * requested BPF-related capability
+ * @token: BPF token object
+ * @cap: capabilities requested to be delegated by BPF token
+ *
+ * Do a check when the kernel decides whether provided BPF token should allow
+ * delegation of requested BPF-related capabilities.
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 0 on success, error on failure.
+ */
+int security_bpf_token_capable(const struct bpf_token *token, int cap)
+{
+	return call_int_hook(bpf_token_capable, token, cap);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -5487,18 +5528,29 @@ int security_bpf_prog_alloc(struct bpf_prog_aux *aux)
  */
 void security_bpf_map_free(struct bpf_map *map)
 {
-	call_void_hook(bpf_map_free_security, map);
+	call_void_hook(bpf_map_free, map);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_bpf_prog_free() - Free a BPF program's LSM blob
+ * @prog: BPF program struct
+ *
+ * Clean up the security information stored inside BPF program.
+ */
+void security_bpf_prog_free(struct bpf_prog *prog)
+{
+	call_void_hook(bpf_prog_free, prog);
 }
 
 /**
- * security_bpf_prog_free() - Free a bpf program's LSM blob
- * @aux: bpf program aux info struct
+ * security_bpf_token_free() - Free a BPF token's LSM blob
+ * @token: BPF token struct
  *
- * Clean up the security information stored inside bpf prog.
+ * Clean up the security information stored inside BPF token.
  */
-void security_bpf_prog_free(struct bpf_prog_aux *aux)
+void security_bpf_token_free(struct bpf_token *token)
 {
-	call_void_hook(bpf_prog_free_security, aux);
+	call_void_hook(bpf_token_free, token);
 }
 #endif /* CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL */
 
@@ -5513,7 +5565,7 @@ void security_bpf_prog_free(struct bpf_prog_aux *aux)
  */
 int security_locked_down(enum lockdown_reason what)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(locked_down, 0, what);
+	return call_int_hook(locked_down, what);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_locked_down);
 
@@ -5529,7 +5581,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_locked_down);
  */
 int security_perf_event_open(struct perf_event_attr *attr, int type)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(perf_event_open, 0, attr, type);
+	return call_int_hook(perf_event_open, attr, type);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -5542,7 +5594,7 @@ int security_perf_event_open(struct perf_event_attr *attr, int type)
  */
 int security_perf_event_alloc(struct perf_event *event)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(perf_event_alloc, 0, event);
+	return call_int_hook(perf_event_alloc, event);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -5566,7 +5618,7 @@ void security_perf_event_free(struct perf_event *event)
  */
 int security_perf_event_read(struct perf_event *event)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(perf_event_read, 0, event);
+	return call_int_hook(perf_event_read, event);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -5579,7 +5631,7 @@ int security_perf_event_read(struct perf_event *event)
  */
 int security_perf_event_write(struct perf_event *event)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(perf_event_write, 0, event);
+	return call_int_hook(perf_event_write, event);
 }
 #endif /* CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS */
 
@@ -5595,7 +5647,7 @@ int security_perf_event_write(struct perf_event *event)
  */
 int security_uring_override_creds(const struct cred *new)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(uring_override_creds, 0, new);
+	return call_int_hook(uring_override_creds, new);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -5608,7 +5660,7 @@ int security_uring_override_creds(const struct cred *new)
  */
 int security_uring_sqpoll(void)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(uring_sqpoll, 0);
+	return call_int_hook(uring_sqpoll);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -5621,6 +5673,6 @@ int security_uring_sqpoll(void)
  */
 int security_uring_cmd(struct io_uring_cmd *ioucmd)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(uring_cmd, 0, ioucmd);
+	return call_int_hook(uring_cmd, ioucmd);
 }
 #endif /* CONFIG_IO_URING */
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 71e6e7079d..3448454c82 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -2920,23 +2920,22 @@ static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
 	struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
 	struct xattr *xattr = lsm_get_xattr_slot(xattrs, xattr_count);
 	u32 newsid, clen;
+	u16 newsclass;
 	int rc;
 	char *context;
 
 	sbsec = selinux_superblock(dir->i_sb);
 
 	newsid = tsec->create_sid;
-
-	rc = selinux_determine_inode_label(tsec, dir, qstr,
-		inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode),
-		&newsid);
+	newsclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
+	rc = selinux_determine_inode_label(tsec, dir, qstr, newsclass, &newsid);
 	if (rc)
 		return rc;
 
 	/* Possibly defer initialization to selinux_complete_init. */
 	if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) {
 		struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode);
-		isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
+		isec->sclass = newsclass;
 		isec->sid = newsid;
 		isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
 	}
@@ -3136,7 +3135,8 @@ static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
 	return rc;
 }
 
-static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
+static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
+				 struct iattr *iattr)
 {
 	const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
 	struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
@@ -3534,9 +3534,10 @@ static int selinux_inode_copy_up_xattr(const char *name)
 {
 	/* The copy_up hook above sets the initial context on an inode, but we
 	 * don't then want to overwrite it by blindly copying all the lower
-	 * xattrs up.  Instead, we have to filter out SELinux-related xattrs.
+	 * xattrs up.  Instead, filter out SELinux-related xattrs following
+	 * policy load.
 	 */
-	if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX) == 0)
+	if (selinux_initialized() && strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX) == 0)
 		return 1; /* Discard */
 	/*
 	 * Any other attribute apart from SELINUX is not claimed, supported
@@ -5194,11 +5195,11 @@ out_len:
 	return err;
 }
 
-static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
+static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock,
+					   struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
 {
 	u32 peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
 	u16 family;
-	struct inode_security_struct *isec;
 
 	if (skb && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
 		family = PF_INET;
@@ -5206,19 +5207,21 @@ static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *
 		family = PF_INET6;
 	else if (sock)
 		family = sock->sk->sk_family;
-	else
-		goto out;
+	else {
+		*secid = SECSID_NULL;
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
 
 	if (sock && family == PF_UNIX) {
+		struct inode_security_struct *isec;
 		isec = inode_security_novalidate(SOCK_INODE(sock));
 		peer_secid = isec->sid;
 	} else if (skb)
 		selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_secid);
 
-out:
 	*secid = peer_secid;
 	if (peer_secid == SECSID_NULL)
-		return -EINVAL;
+		return -ENOPROTOOPT;
 	return 0;
 }
 
@@ -6920,7 +6923,8 @@ static int selinux_bpf_prog(struct bpf_prog *prog)
 			    BPF__PROG_RUN, NULL);
 }
 
-static int selinux_bpf_map_alloc(struct bpf_map *map)
+static int selinux_bpf_map_create(struct bpf_map *map, union bpf_attr *attr,
+				  struct bpf_token *token)
 {
 	struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec;
 
@@ -6942,7 +6946,31 @@ static void selinux_bpf_map_free(struct bpf_map *map)
 	kfree(bpfsec);
 }
 
-static int selinux_bpf_prog_alloc(struct bpf_prog_aux *aux)
+static int selinux_bpf_prog_load(struct bpf_prog *prog, union bpf_attr *attr,
+				 struct bpf_token *token)
+{
+	struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec;
+
+	bpfsec = kzalloc(sizeof(*bpfsec), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!bpfsec)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	bpfsec->sid = current_sid();
+	prog->aux->security = bpfsec;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void selinux_bpf_prog_free(struct bpf_prog *prog)
+{
+	struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec = prog->aux->security;
+
+	prog->aux->security = NULL;
+	kfree(bpfsec);
+}
+
+static int selinux_bpf_token_create(struct bpf_token *token, union bpf_attr *attr,
+				    struct path *path)
 {
 	struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec;
 
@@ -6951,16 +6979,16 @@ static int selinux_bpf_prog_alloc(struct bpf_prog_aux *aux)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
 	bpfsec->sid = current_sid();
-	aux->security = bpfsec;
+	token->security = bpfsec;
 
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static void selinux_bpf_prog_free(struct bpf_prog_aux *aux)
+static void selinux_bpf_token_free(struct bpf_token *token)
 {
-	struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec = aux->security;
+	struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec = token->security;
 
-	aux->security = NULL;
+	token->security = NULL;
 	kfree(bpfsec);
 }
 #endif
@@ -7324,8 +7352,9 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __ro_after_init = {
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf, selinux_bpf),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_map, selinux_bpf_map),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_prog, selinux_bpf_prog),
-	LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_map_free_security, selinux_bpf_map_free),
-	LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_prog_free_security, selinux_bpf_prog_free),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_map_free, selinux_bpf_map_free),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_prog_free, selinux_bpf_prog_free),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_token_free, selinux_bpf_token_free),
 #endif
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS
@@ -7382,8 +7411,9 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __ro_after_init = {
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_init, selinux_audit_rule_init),
 #endif
 #ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
-	LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_map_alloc_security, selinux_bpf_map_alloc),
-	LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_prog_alloc_security, selinux_bpf_prog_alloc),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_map_create, selinux_bpf_map_create),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_prog_load, selinux_bpf_prog_load),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_token_create, selinux_bpf_token_create),
 #endif
 #ifdef CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(perf_event_alloc, selinux_perf_event_alloc),
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/audit.h b/security/selinux/include/audit.h
index 52aca71210..29c7d4c86f 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/audit.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/audit.h
@@ -21,12 +21,14 @@
  *	@op: the operator the rule uses
  *	@rulestr: the text "target" of the rule
  *	@rule: pointer to the new rule structure returned via this
+ *	@gfp: GFP flag used for kmalloc
  *
  *	Returns 0 if successful, -errno if not.  On success, the rule structure
  *	will be allocated internally.  The caller must free this structure with
  *	selinux_audit_rule_free() after use.
  */
-int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **rule);
+int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **rule,
+			    gfp_t gfp);
 
 /**
  *	selinux_audit_rule_free - free an selinux audit rule structure.
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/avtab.c b/security/selinux/ss/avtab.c
index 697eb43524..2ad98732d0 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/avtab.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/avtab.c
@@ -1,20 +1,17 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */
 /*
  * Implementation of the access vector table type.
  *
  * Author : Stephen Smalley, <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
  */
 
-/* Updated: Frank Mayer <mayerf@tresys.com> and Karl MacMillan <kmacmillan@tresys.com>
- *
- *	Added conditional policy language extensions
- *
- * Copyright (C) 2003 Tresys Technology, LLC
- *	This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
- *	it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
- *	the Free Software Foundation, version 2.
+/* Updated: Frank Mayer <mayerf@tresys.com> and
+ *          Karl MacMillan <kmacmillan@tresys.com>
+ *          Added conditional policy language extensions
+ *          Copyright (C) 2003 Tresys Technology, LLC
  *
  * Updated: Yuichi Nakamura <ynakam@hitachisoft.jp>
- *	Tuned number of hash slots for avtab to reduce memory usage
+ *          Tuned number of hash slots for avtab to reduce memory usage
  */
 
 #include <linux/bitops.h>
@@ -36,19 +33,20 @@ static inline u32 avtab_hash(const struct avtab_key *keyp, u32 mask)
 	static const u32 c2 = 0x1b873593;
 	static const u32 r1 = 15;
 	static const u32 r2 = 13;
-	static const u32 m  = 5;
-	static const u32 n  = 0xe6546b64;
+	static const u32 m = 5;
+	static const u32 n = 0xe6546b64;
 
 	u32 hash = 0;
 
-#define mix(input) do { \
-		u32 v = input; \
-		v *= c1; \
-		v = (v << r1) | (v >> (32 - r1)); \
-		v *= c2; \
-		hash ^= v; \
+#define mix(input)                                         \
+	do {                                               \
+		u32 v = input;                             \
+		v *= c1;                                   \
+		v = (v << r1) | (v >> (32 - r1));          \
+		v *= c2;                                   \
+		hash ^= v;                                 \
 		hash = (hash << r2) | (hash >> (32 - r2)); \
-		hash = hash * m + n; \
+		hash = hash * m + n;                       \
 	} while (0)
 
 	mix(keyp->target_class);
@@ -66,9 +64,10 @@ static inline u32 avtab_hash(const struct avtab_key *keyp, u32 mask)
 	return hash & mask;
 }
 
-static struct avtab_node*
-avtab_insert_node(struct avtab *h, struct avtab_node **dst,
-		  const struct avtab_key *key, const struct avtab_datum *datum)
+static struct avtab_node *avtab_insert_node(struct avtab *h,
+					    struct avtab_node **dst,
+					    const struct avtab_key *key,
+					    const struct avtab_datum *datum)
 {
 	struct avtab_node *newnode;
 	struct avtab_extended_perms *xperms;
@@ -99,7 +98,7 @@ avtab_insert_node(struct avtab *h, struct avtab_node **dst,
 static int avtab_node_cmp(const struct avtab_key *key1,
 			  const struct avtab_key *key2)
 {
-	u16 specified = key1->specified & ~(AVTAB_ENABLED|AVTAB_ENABLED_OLD);
+	u16 specified = key1->specified & ~(AVTAB_ENABLED | AVTAB_ENABLED_OLD);
 
 	if (key1->source_type == key2->source_type &&
 	    key1->target_type == key2->target_type &&
@@ -129,8 +128,7 @@ static int avtab_insert(struct avtab *h, const struct avtab_key *key,
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	hvalue = avtab_hash(key, h->mask);
-	for (prev = NULL, cur = h->htable[hvalue];
-	     cur;
+	for (prev = NULL, cur = h->htable[hvalue]; cur;
 	     prev = cur, cur = cur->next) {
 		cmp = avtab_node_cmp(key, &cur->key);
 		/* extended perms may not be unique */
@@ -163,8 +161,7 @@ struct avtab_node *avtab_insert_nonunique(struct avtab *h,
 	if (!h || !h->nslot || h->nel == U32_MAX)
 		return NULL;
 	hvalue = avtab_hash(key, h->mask);
-	for (prev = NULL, cur = h->htable[hvalue];
-	     cur;
+	for (prev = NULL, cur = h->htable[hvalue]; cur;
 	     prev = cur, cur = cur->next) {
 		cmp = avtab_node_cmp(key, &cur->key);
 		if (cmp <= 0)
@@ -188,8 +185,7 @@ struct avtab_node *avtab_search_node(struct avtab *h,
 		return NULL;
 
 	hvalue = avtab_hash(key, h->mask);
-	for (cur = h->htable[hvalue]; cur;
-	     cur = cur->next) {
+	for (cur = h->htable[hvalue]; cur; cur = cur->next) {
 		cmp = avtab_node_cmp(key, &cur->key);
 		if (cmp == 0)
 			return cur;
@@ -199,8 +195,8 @@ struct avtab_node *avtab_search_node(struct avtab *h,
 	return NULL;
 }
 
-struct avtab_node*
-avtab_search_node_next(struct avtab_node *node, u16 specified)
+struct avtab_node *avtab_search_node_next(struct avtab_node *node,
+					  u16 specified)
 {
 	struct avtab_key tmp_key;
 	struct avtab_node *cur;
@@ -314,17 +310,19 @@ void avtab_hash_eval(struct avtab *h, const char *tag)
 
 			if (chain_len > max_chain_len)
 				max_chain_len = chain_len;
-			chain2_len_sum += (unsigned long long)chain_len * chain_len;
+			chain2_len_sum +=
+				(unsigned long long)chain_len * chain_len;
 		}
 	}
 
 	pr_debug("SELinux: %s:  %d entries and %d/%d buckets used, "
-	       "longest chain length %d, sum of chain length^2 %llu\n",
-	       tag, h->nel, slots_used, h->nslot, max_chain_len,
-	       chain2_len_sum);
+		 "longest chain length %d, sum of chain length^2 %llu\n",
+		 tag, h->nel, slots_used, h->nslot, max_chain_len,
+		 chain2_len_sum);
 }
 #endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEBUG */
 
+/* clang-format off */
 static const uint16_t spec_order[] = {
 	AVTAB_ALLOWED,
 	AVTAB_AUDITDENY,
@@ -336,6 +334,7 @@ static const uint16_t spec_order[] = {
 	AVTAB_XPERMS_AUDITALLOW,
 	AVTAB_XPERMS_DONTAUDIT
 };
+/* clang-format on */
 
 int avtab_read_item(struct avtab *a, void *fp, struct policydb *pol,
 		    int (*insertf)(struct avtab *a, const struct avtab_key *k,
@@ -365,9 +364,8 @@ int avtab_read_item(struct avtab *a, void *fp, struct policydb *pol,
 		if (items2 > ARRAY_SIZE(buf32)) {
 			pr_err("SELinux: avtab: entry overflow\n");
 			return -EINVAL;
-
 		}
-		rc = next_entry(buf32, fp, sizeof(u32)*items2);
+		rc = next_entry(buf32, fp, sizeof(u32) * items2);
 		if (rc) {
 			pr_err("SELinux: avtab: truncated entry\n");
 			return rc;
@@ -400,8 +398,7 @@ int avtab_read_item(struct avtab *a, void *fp, struct policydb *pol,
 			pr_err("SELinux: avtab: null entry\n");
 			return -EINVAL;
 		}
-		if ((val & AVTAB_AV) &&
-		    (val & AVTAB_TYPE)) {
+		if ((val & AVTAB_AV) && (val & AVTAB_TYPE)) {
 			pr_err("SELinux: avtab: entry has both access vectors and types\n");
 			return -EINVAL;
 		}
@@ -428,7 +425,7 @@ int avtab_read_item(struct avtab *a, void *fp, struct policydb *pol,
 		return 0;
 	}
 
-	rc = next_entry(buf16, fp, sizeof(u16)*4);
+	rc = next_entry(buf16, fp, sizeof(u16) * 4);
 	if (rc) {
 		pr_err("SELinux: avtab: truncated entry\n");
 		return rc;
@@ -454,10 +451,11 @@ int avtab_read_item(struct avtab *a, void *fp, struct policydb *pol,
 	}
 
 	if ((vers < POLICYDB_VERSION_XPERMS_IOCTL) &&
-			(key.specified & AVTAB_XPERMS)) {
+	    (key.specified & AVTAB_XPERMS)) {
 		pr_err("SELinux:  avtab:  policy version %u does not "
-				"support extended permissions rules and one "
-				"was specified\n", vers);
+		       "support extended permissions rules and one "
+		       "was specified\n",
+		       vers);
 		return -EINVAL;
 	} else if (key.specified & AVTAB_XPERMS) {
 		memset(&xperms, 0, sizeof(struct avtab_extended_perms));
@@ -471,7 +469,8 @@ int avtab_read_item(struct avtab *a, void *fp, struct policydb *pol,
 			pr_err("SELinux: avtab: truncated entry\n");
 			return rc;
 		}
-		rc = next_entry(buf32, fp, sizeof(u32)*ARRAY_SIZE(xperms.perms.p));
+		rc = next_entry(buf32, fp,
+				sizeof(u32) * ARRAY_SIZE(xperms.perms.p));
 		if (rc) {
 			pr_err("SELinux: avtab: truncated entry\n");
 			return rc;
@@ -507,7 +506,6 @@ int avtab_read(struct avtab *a, void *fp, struct policydb *pol)
 	__le32 buf[1];
 	u32 nel, i;
 
-
 	rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
 	if (rc < 0) {
 		pr_err("SELinux: avtab: truncated table\n");
@@ -561,7 +559,8 @@ int avtab_write_item(struct policydb *p, const struct avtab_node *cur, void *fp)
 		return rc;
 
 	if (cur->key.specified & AVTAB_XPERMS) {
-		rc = put_entry(&cur->datum.u.xperms->specified, sizeof(u8), 1, fp);
+		rc = put_entry(&cur->datum.u.xperms->specified, sizeof(u8), 1,
+			       fp);
 		if (rc)
 			return rc;
 		rc = put_entry(&cur->datum.u.xperms->driver, sizeof(u8), 1, fp);
@@ -570,7 +569,7 @@ int avtab_write_item(struct policydb *p, const struct avtab_node *cur, void *fp)
 		for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(cur->datum.u.xperms->perms.p); i++)
 			buf32[i] = cpu_to_le32(cur->datum.u.xperms->perms.p[i]);
 		rc = put_entry(buf32, sizeof(u32),
-				ARRAY_SIZE(cur->datum.u.xperms->perms.p), fp);
+			       ARRAY_SIZE(cur->datum.u.xperms->perms.p), fp);
 	} else {
 		buf32[0] = cpu_to_le32(cur->datum.u.data);
 		rc = put_entry(buf32, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
@@ -593,8 +592,7 @@ int avtab_write(struct policydb *p, struct avtab *a, void *fp)
 		return rc;
 
 	for (i = 0; i < a->nslot; i++) {
-		for (cur = a->htable[i]; cur;
-		     cur = cur->next) {
+		for (cur = a->htable[i]; cur; cur = cur->next) {
 			rc = avtab_write_item(p, cur, fp);
 			if (rc)
 				return rc;
@@ -606,10 +604,9 @@ int avtab_write(struct policydb *p, struct avtab *a, void *fp)
 
 void __init avtab_cache_init(void)
 {
-	avtab_node_cachep = kmem_cache_create("avtab_node",
-					      sizeof(struct avtab_node),
-					      0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
-	avtab_xperms_cachep = kmem_cache_create("avtab_extended_perms",
-						sizeof(struct avtab_extended_perms),
-						0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
+	avtab_node_cachep = kmem_cache_create(
+		"avtab_node", sizeof(struct avtab_node), 0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
+	avtab_xperms_cachep = kmem_cache_create(
+		"avtab_extended_perms", sizeof(struct avtab_extended_perms), 0,
+		SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
 }
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/avtab.h b/security/selinux/ss/avtab.h
index 3c3904bf02..8e8820484c 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/avtab.h
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/avtab.h
@@ -9,42 +9,42 @@
  *  Author : Stephen Smalley, <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
  */
 
-/* Updated: Frank Mayer <mayerf@tresys.com> and Karl MacMillan <kmacmillan@tresys.com>
- *
- * 	Added conditional policy language extensions
- *
- * Copyright (C) 2003 Tresys Technology, LLC
+/* Updated: Frank Mayer <mayerf@tresys.com> and
+ *          Karl MacMillan <kmacmillan@tresys.com>
+ *          Added conditional policy language extensions
+ *          Copyright (C) 2003 Tresys Technology, LLC
  *
  * Updated: Yuichi Nakamura <ynakam@hitachisoft.jp>
- * 	Tuned number of hash slots for avtab to reduce memory usage
+ *          Tuned number of hash slots for avtab to reduce memory usage
  */
+
 #ifndef _SS_AVTAB_H_
 #define _SS_AVTAB_H_
 
 #include "security.h"
 
 struct avtab_key {
-	u16 source_type;	/* source type */
-	u16 target_type;	/* target type */
-	u16 target_class;	/* target object class */
-#define AVTAB_ALLOWED		0x0001
-#define AVTAB_AUDITALLOW	0x0002
-#define AVTAB_AUDITDENY		0x0004
-#define AVTAB_AV		(AVTAB_ALLOWED | AVTAB_AUDITALLOW | AVTAB_AUDITDENY)
-#define AVTAB_TRANSITION	0x0010
-#define AVTAB_MEMBER		0x0020
-#define AVTAB_CHANGE		0x0040
-#define AVTAB_TYPE		(AVTAB_TRANSITION | AVTAB_MEMBER | AVTAB_CHANGE)
+	u16 source_type; /* source type */
+	u16 target_type; /* target type */
+	u16 target_class; /* target object class */
+#define AVTAB_ALLOWED	 0x0001
+#define AVTAB_AUDITALLOW 0x0002
+#define AVTAB_AUDITDENY	 0x0004
+#define AVTAB_AV	 (AVTAB_ALLOWED | AVTAB_AUDITALLOW | AVTAB_AUDITDENY)
+#define AVTAB_TRANSITION 0x0010
+#define AVTAB_MEMBER	 0x0020
+#define AVTAB_CHANGE	 0x0040
+#define AVTAB_TYPE	 (AVTAB_TRANSITION | AVTAB_MEMBER | AVTAB_CHANGE)
 /* extended permissions */
 #define AVTAB_XPERMS_ALLOWED	0x0100
-#define AVTAB_XPERMS_AUDITALLOW	0x0200
+#define AVTAB_XPERMS_AUDITALLOW 0x0200
 #define AVTAB_XPERMS_DONTAUDIT	0x0400
-#define AVTAB_XPERMS		(AVTAB_XPERMS_ALLOWED | \
-				AVTAB_XPERMS_AUDITALLOW | \
-				AVTAB_XPERMS_DONTAUDIT)
-#define AVTAB_ENABLED_OLD   0x80000000 /* reserved for used in cond_avtab */
-#define AVTAB_ENABLED		0x8000 /* reserved for used in cond_avtab */
-	u16 specified;	/* what field is specified */
+#define AVTAB_XPERMS                                      \
+	(AVTAB_XPERMS_ALLOWED | AVTAB_XPERMS_AUDITALLOW | \
+	 AVTAB_XPERMS_DONTAUDIT)
+#define AVTAB_ENABLED_OLD 0x80000000 /* reserved for used in cond_avtab */
+#define AVTAB_ENABLED	  0x8000 /* reserved for used in cond_avtab */
+	u16 specified; /* what field is specified */
 };
 
 /*
@@ -53,8 +53,8 @@ struct avtab_key {
  */
 struct avtab_extended_perms {
 /* These are not flags. All 256 values may be used */
-#define AVTAB_XPERMS_IOCTLFUNCTION	0x01
-#define AVTAB_XPERMS_IOCTLDRIVER	0x02
+#define AVTAB_XPERMS_IOCTLFUNCTION 0x01
+#define AVTAB_XPERMS_IOCTLDRIVER   0x02
 	/* extension of the avtab_key specified */
 	u8 specified; /* ioctl, netfilter, ... */
 	/*
@@ -82,9 +82,9 @@ struct avtab_node {
 
 struct avtab {
 	struct avtab_node **htable;
-	u32 nel;	/* number of elements */
-	u32 nslot;      /* number of hash slots */
-	u32 mask;       /* mask to compute hash func */
+	u32 nel; /* number of elements */
+	u32 nslot; /* number of hash slots */
+	u32 mask; /* mask to compute hash func */
 };
 
 void avtab_init(struct avtab *h);
@@ -92,6 +92,9 @@ int avtab_alloc(struct avtab *, u32);
 int avtab_alloc_dup(struct avtab *new, const struct avtab *orig);
 void avtab_destroy(struct avtab *h);
 
+#define MAX_AVTAB_HASH_BITS    16
+#define MAX_AVTAB_HASH_BUCKETS (1 << MAX_AVTAB_HASH_BITS)
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEBUG
 void avtab_hash_eval(struct avtab *h, const char *tag);
 #else
@@ -107,7 +110,8 @@ int avtab_read_item(struct avtab *a, void *fp, struct policydb *pol,
 		    void *p);
 
 int avtab_read(struct avtab *a, void *fp, struct policydb *pol);
-int avtab_write_item(struct policydb *p, const struct avtab_node *cur, void *fp);
+int avtab_write_item(struct policydb *p, const struct avtab_node *cur,
+		     void *fp);
 int avtab_write(struct policydb *p, struct avtab *a, void *fp);
 
 struct avtab_node *avtab_insert_nonunique(struct avtab *h,
@@ -116,11 +120,7 @@ struct avtab_node *avtab_insert_nonunique(struct avtab *h,
 
 struct avtab_node *avtab_search_node(struct avtab *h,
 				     const struct avtab_key *key);
+struct avtab_node *avtab_search_node_next(struct avtab_node *node,
+					  u16 specified);
 
-struct avtab_node *avtab_search_node_next(struct avtab_node *node, u16 specified);
-
-#define MAX_AVTAB_HASH_BITS 16
-#define MAX_AVTAB_HASH_BUCKETS (1 << MAX_AVTAB_HASH_BITS)
-
-#endif	/* _SS_AVTAB_H_ */
-
+#endif /* _SS_AVTAB_H_ */
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/conditional.c b/security/selinux/ss/conditional.c
index 81ff676f20..f12476855b 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/conditional.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/conditional.c
@@ -1,8 +1,7 @@
-// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */
 /* Authors: Karl MacMillan <kmacmillan@tresys.com>
  *	    Frank Mayer <mayerf@tresys.com>
- *
- * Copyright (C) 2003 - 2004 Tresys Technology, LLC
+ *          Copyright (C) 2003 - 2004 Tresys Technology, LLC
  */
 
 #include <linux/kernel.h>
@@ -166,9 +165,8 @@ void cond_policydb_destroy(struct policydb *p)
 int cond_init_bool_indexes(struct policydb *p)
 {
 	kfree(p->bool_val_to_struct);
-	p->bool_val_to_struct = kmalloc_array(p->p_bools.nprim,
-					      sizeof(*p->bool_val_to_struct),
-					      GFP_KERNEL);
+	p->bool_val_to_struct = kmalloc_array(
+		p->p_bools.nprim, sizeof(*p->bool_val_to_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!p->bool_val_to_struct)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 	return 0;
@@ -287,7 +285,8 @@ static int cond_insertf(struct avtab *a, const struct avtab_key *k,
 		if (other) {
 			node_ptr = avtab_search_node(&p->te_cond_avtab, k);
 			if (node_ptr) {
-				if (avtab_search_node_next(node_ptr, k->specified)) {
+				if (avtab_search_node_next(node_ptr,
+							   k->specified)) {
 					pr_err("SELinux: too many conflicting type rules.\n");
 					return -EINVAL;
 				}
@@ -478,8 +477,8 @@ int cond_write_bool(void *vkey, void *datum, void *ptr)
  * the conditional. This means that the avtab with the conditional
  * rules will not be saved but will be rebuilt on policy load.
  */
-static int cond_write_av_list(struct policydb *p,
-			      struct cond_av_list *list, struct policy_file *fp)
+static int cond_write_av_list(struct policydb *p, struct cond_av_list *list,
+			      struct policy_file *fp)
 {
 	__le32 buf[1];
 	u32 i;
@@ -500,7 +499,7 @@ static int cond_write_av_list(struct policydb *p,
 }
 
 static int cond_write_node(struct policydb *p, struct cond_node *node,
-		    struct policy_file *fp)
+			   struct policy_file *fp)
 {
 	__le32 buf[2];
 	int rc;
@@ -555,7 +554,7 @@ int cond_write_list(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
 }
 
 void cond_compute_xperms(struct avtab *ctab, struct avtab_key *key,
-		struct extended_perms_decision *xpermd)
+			 struct extended_perms_decision *xpermd)
 {
 	struct avtab_node *node;
 
@@ -563,7 +562,7 @@ void cond_compute_xperms(struct avtab *ctab, struct avtab_key *key,
 		return;
 
 	for (node = avtab_search_node(ctab, key); node;
-			node = avtab_search_node_next(node, key->specified)) {
+	     node = avtab_search_node_next(node, key->specified)) {
 		if (node->key.specified & AVTAB_ENABLED)
 			services_compute_xperms_decision(xpermd, node);
 	}
@@ -572,7 +571,7 @@ void cond_compute_xperms(struct avtab *ctab, struct avtab_key *key,
  * av table, and if so, add them to the result
  */
 void cond_compute_av(struct avtab *ctab, struct avtab_key *key,
-		struct av_decision *avd, struct extended_perms *xperms)
+		     struct av_decision *avd, struct extended_perms *xperms)
 {
 	struct avtab_node *node;
 
@@ -580,30 +579,29 @@ void cond_compute_av(struct avtab *ctab, struct avtab_key *key,
 		return;
 
 	for (node = avtab_search_node(ctab, key); node;
-				node = avtab_search_node_next(node, key->specified)) {
-		if ((u16)(AVTAB_ALLOWED|AVTAB_ENABLED) ==
-		    (node->key.specified & (AVTAB_ALLOWED|AVTAB_ENABLED)))
+	     node = avtab_search_node_next(node, key->specified)) {
+		if ((u16)(AVTAB_ALLOWED | AVTAB_ENABLED) ==
+		    (node->key.specified & (AVTAB_ALLOWED | AVTAB_ENABLED)))
 			avd->allowed |= node->datum.u.data;
-		if ((u16)(AVTAB_AUDITDENY|AVTAB_ENABLED) ==
-		    (node->key.specified & (AVTAB_AUDITDENY|AVTAB_ENABLED)))
+		if ((u16)(AVTAB_AUDITDENY | AVTAB_ENABLED) ==
+		    (node->key.specified & (AVTAB_AUDITDENY | AVTAB_ENABLED)))
 			/* Since a '0' in an auditdeny mask represents a
 			 * permission we do NOT want to audit (dontaudit), we use
 			 * the '&' operand to ensure that all '0's in the mask
 			 * are retained (much unlike the allow and auditallow cases).
 			 */
 			avd->auditdeny &= node->datum.u.data;
-		if ((u16)(AVTAB_AUDITALLOW|AVTAB_ENABLED) ==
-		    (node->key.specified & (AVTAB_AUDITALLOW|AVTAB_ENABLED)))
+		if ((u16)(AVTAB_AUDITALLOW | AVTAB_ENABLED) ==
+		    (node->key.specified & (AVTAB_AUDITALLOW | AVTAB_ENABLED)))
 			avd->auditallow |= node->datum.u.data;
 		if (xperms && (node->key.specified & AVTAB_ENABLED) &&
-				(node->key.specified & AVTAB_XPERMS))
+		    (node->key.specified & AVTAB_XPERMS))
 			services_compute_xperms_drivers(xperms, node);
 	}
 }
 
-static int cond_dup_av_list(struct cond_av_list *new,
-			struct cond_av_list *orig,
-			struct avtab *avtab)
+static int cond_dup_av_list(struct cond_av_list *new, struct cond_av_list *orig,
+			    struct avtab *avtab)
 {
 	u32 i;
 
@@ -614,9 +612,8 @@ static int cond_dup_av_list(struct cond_av_list *new,
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
 	for (i = 0; i < orig->len; i++) {
-		new->nodes[i] = avtab_insert_nonunique(avtab,
-						       &orig->nodes[i]->key,
-						       &orig->nodes[i]->datum);
+		new->nodes[i] = avtab_insert_nonunique(
+			avtab, &orig->nodes[i]->key, &orig->nodes[i]->datum);
 		if (!new->nodes[i])
 			return -ENOMEM;
 		new->len++;
@@ -637,8 +634,7 @@ static int duplicate_policydb_cond_list(struct policydb *newp,
 
 	newp->cond_list_len = 0;
 	newp->cond_list = kcalloc(origp->cond_list_len,
-				sizeof(*newp->cond_list),
-				GFP_KERNEL);
+				  sizeof(*newp->cond_list), GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!newp->cond_list)
 		goto error;
 
@@ -649,7 +645,8 @@ static int duplicate_policydb_cond_list(struct policydb *newp,
 		newp->cond_list_len++;
 
 		newn->cur_state = orign->cur_state;
-		newn->expr.nodes = kmemdup(orign->expr.nodes,
+		newn->expr.nodes =
+			kmemdup(orign->expr.nodes,
 				orign->expr.len * sizeof(*orign->expr.nodes),
 				GFP_KERNEL);
 		if (!newn->expr.nodes)
@@ -658,12 +655,12 @@ static int duplicate_policydb_cond_list(struct policydb *newp,
 		newn->expr.len = orign->expr.len;
 
 		rc = cond_dup_av_list(&newn->true_list, &orign->true_list,
-				&newp->te_cond_avtab);
+				      &newp->te_cond_avtab);
 		if (rc)
 			goto error;
 
 		rc = cond_dup_av_list(&newn->false_list, &orign->false_list,
-				&newp->te_cond_avtab);
+				      &newp->te_cond_avtab);
 		if (rc)
 			goto error;
 	}
@@ -683,7 +680,8 @@ static int cond_bools_destroy(void *key, void *datum, void *args)
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static int cond_bools_copy(struct hashtab_node *new, struct hashtab_node *orig, void *args)
+static int cond_bools_copy(struct hashtab_node *new, struct hashtab_node *orig,
+			   void *args)
 {
 	struct cond_bool_datum *datum;
 
@@ -709,7 +707,7 @@ static int cond_bools_index(void *key, void *datum, void *args)
 }
 
 static int duplicate_policydb_bools(struct policydb *newdb,
-				struct policydb *orig)
+				    struct policydb *orig)
 {
 	struct cond_bool_datum **cond_bool_array;
 	int rc;
@@ -721,7 +719,7 @@ static int duplicate_policydb_bools(struct policydb *newdb,
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
 	rc = hashtab_duplicate(&newdb->p_bools.table, &orig->p_bools.table,
-			cond_bools_copy, cond_bools_destroy, NULL);
+			       cond_bools_copy, cond_bools_destroy, NULL);
 	if (rc) {
 		kfree(cond_bool_array);
 		return -ENOMEM;
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/conditional.h b/security/selinux/ss/conditional.h
index 5a7b51278d..b972ce40db 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/conditional.h
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/conditional.h
@@ -1,8 +1,7 @@
 /* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */
 /* Authors: Karl MacMillan <kmacmillan@tresys.com>
  *          Frank Mayer <mayerf@tresys.com>
- *
- * Copyright (C) 2003 - 2004 Tresys Technology, LLC
+ *          Copyright (C) 2003 - 2004 Tresys Technology, LLC
  */
 
 #ifndef _CONDITIONAL_H_
@@ -20,14 +19,14 @@
  * in reverse polish notation.
  */
 struct cond_expr_node {
-#define COND_BOOL	1 /* plain bool */
-#define COND_NOT	2 /* !bool */
-#define COND_OR		3 /* bool || bool */
-#define COND_AND	4 /* bool && bool */
-#define COND_XOR	5 /* bool ^ bool */
-#define COND_EQ		6 /* bool == bool */
-#define COND_NEQ	7 /* bool != bool */
-#define COND_LAST	COND_NEQ
+#define COND_BOOL 1 /* plain bool */
+#define COND_NOT  2 /* !bool */
+#define COND_OR	  3 /* bool || bool */
+#define COND_AND  4 /* bool && bool */
+#define COND_XOR  5 /* bool ^ bool */
+#define COND_EQ	  6 /* bool == bool */
+#define COND_NEQ  7 /* bool != bool */
+#define COND_LAST COND_NEQ
 	u32 expr_type;
 	u32 boolean;
 };
@@ -75,9 +74,9 @@ int cond_write_bool(void *key, void *datum, void *ptr);
 int cond_write_list(struct policydb *p, void *fp);
 
 void cond_compute_av(struct avtab *ctab, struct avtab_key *key,
-		struct av_decision *avd, struct extended_perms *xperms);
+		     struct av_decision *avd, struct extended_perms *xperms);
 void cond_compute_xperms(struct avtab *ctab, struct avtab_key *key,
-		struct extended_perms_decision *xpermd);
+			 struct extended_perms_decision *xpermd);
 void evaluate_cond_nodes(struct policydb *p);
 void cond_policydb_destroy_dup(struct policydb *p);
 int cond_policydb_dup(struct policydb *new, struct policydb *orig);
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/constraint.h b/security/selinux/ss/constraint.h
index f76eb3128a..203033cfad 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/constraint.h
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/constraint.h
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@
  *
  * Author : Stephen Smalley, <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
  */
+
 #ifndef _SS_CONSTRAINT_H_
 #define _SS_CONSTRAINT_H_
 
@@ -21,43 +22,43 @@
 #define CEXPR_MAXDEPTH 5
 
 struct constraint_expr {
-#define CEXPR_NOT		1 /* not expr */
-#define CEXPR_AND		2 /* expr and expr */
-#define CEXPR_OR		3 /* expr or expr */
-#define CEXPR_ATTR		4 /* attr op attr */
-#define CEXPR_NAMES		5 /* attr op names */
-	u32 expr_type;		/* expression type */
-
-#define CEXPR_USER 1		/* user */
-#define CEXPR_ROLE 2		/* role */
-#define CEXPR_TYPE 4		/* type */
-#define CEXPR_TARGET 8		/* target if set, source otherwise */
-#define CEXPR_XTARGET 16	/* special 3rd target for validatetrans rule */
-#define CEXPR_L1L2 32		/* low level 1 vs. low level 2 */
-#define CEXPR_L1H2 64		/* low level 1 vs. high level 2 */
-#define CEXPR_H1L2 128		/* high level 1 vs. low level 2 */
-#define CEXPR_H1H2 256		/* high level 1 vs. high level 2 */
-#define CEXPR_L1H1 512		/* low level 1 vs. high level 1 */
-#define CEXPR_L2H2 1024		/* low level 2 vs. high level 2 */
-	u32 attr;		/* attribute */
-
-#define CEXPR_EQ     1		/* == or eq */
-#define CEXPR_NEQ    2		/* != */
-#define CEXPR_DOM    3		/* dom */
-#define CEXPR_DOMBY  4		/* domby  */
-#define CEXPR_INCOMP 5		/* incomp */
-	u32 op;			/* operator */
-
-	struct ebitmap names;	/* names */
+#define CEXPR_NOT   1 /* not expr */
+#define CEXPR_AND   2 /* expr and expr */
+#define CEXPR_OR    3 /* expr or expr */
+#define CEXPR_ATTR  4 /* attr op attr */
+#define CEXPR_NAMES 5 /* attr op names */
+	u32 expr_type; /* expression type */
+
+#define CEXPR_USER    1 /* user */
+#define CEXPR_ROLE    2 /* role */
+#define CEXPR_TYPE    4 /* type */
+#define CEXPR_TARGET  8 /* target if set, source otherwise */
+#define CEXPR_XTARGET 16 /* special 3rd target for validatetrans rule */
+#define CEXPR_L1L2    32 /* low level 1 vs. low level 2 */
+#define CEXPR_L1H2    64 /* low level 1 vs. high level 2 */
+#define CEXPR_H1L2    128 /* high level 1 vs. low level 2 */
+#define CEXPR_H1H2    256 /* high level 1 vs. high level 2 */
+#define CEXPR_L1H1    512 /* low level 1 vs. high level 1 */
+#define CEXPR_L2H2    1024 /* low level 2 vs. high level 2 */
+	u32 attr; /* attribute */
+
+#define CEXPR_EQ     1 /* == or eq */
+#define CEXPR_NEQ    2 /* != */
+#define CEXPR_DOM    3 /* dom */
+#define CEXPR_DOMBY  4 /* domby  */
+#define CEXPR_INCOMP 5 /* incomp */
+	u32 op; /* operator */
+
+	struct ebitmap names; /* names */
 	struct type_set *type_names;
 
-	struct constraint_expr *next;   /* next expression */
+	struct constraint_expr *next; /* next expression */
 };
 
 struct constraint_node {
-	u32 permissions;	/* constrained permissions */
-	struct constraint_expr *expr;	/* constraint on permissions */
-	struct constraint_node *next;	/* next constraint */
+	u32 permissions; /* constrained permissions */
+	struct constraint_expr *expr; /* constraint on permissions */
+	struct constraint_node *next; /* next constraint */
 };
 
-#endif	/* _SS_CONSTRAINT_H_ */
+#endif /* _SS_CONSTRAINT_H_ */
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/context.c b/security/selinux/ss/context.c
index 38bc0aa524..e39990f494 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/context.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/context.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
 /*
  * Implementations of the security context functions.
  *
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/context.h b/security/selinux/ss/context.h
index 1f59468c07..7ccab2e696 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/context.h
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/context.h
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@
  *
  * Author : Stephen Smalley, <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
  */
+
 #ifndef _SS_CONTEXT_H_
 #define _SS_CONTEXT_H_
 
@@ -28,9 +29,9 @@ struct context {
 	u32 user;
 	u32 role;
 	u32 type;
-	u32 len;        /* length of string in bytes */
+	u32 len; /* length of string in bytes */
 	struct mls_range range;
-	char *str;	/* string representation if context cannot be mapped. */
+	char *str; /* string representation if context cannot be mapped. */
 };
 
 static inline void mls_context_init(struct context *c)
@@ -38,7 +39,8 @@ static inline void mls_context_init(struct context *c)
 	memset(&c->range, 0, sizeof(c->range));
 }
 
-static inline int mls_context_cpy(struct context *dst, const struct context *src)
+static inline int mls_context_cpy(struct context *dst,
+				  const struct context *src)
 {
 	int rc;
 
@@ -58,7 +60,8 @@ out:
 /*
  * Sets both levels in the MLS range of 'dst' to the low level of 'src'.
  */
-static inline int mls_context_cpy_low(struct context *dst, const struct context *src)
+static inline int mls_context_cpy_low(struct context *dst,
+				      const struct context *src)
 {
 	int rc;
 
@@ -78,7 +81,8 @@ out:
 /*
  * Sets both levels in the MLS range of 'dst' to the high level of 'src'.
  */
-static inline int mls_context_cpy_high(struct context *dst, const struct context *src)
+static inline int mls_context_cpy_high(struct context *dst,
+				       const struct context *src)
 {
 	int rc;
 
@@ -95,9 +99,9 @@ out:
 	return rc;
 }
 
-
 static inline int mls_context_glblub(struct context *dst,
-				     const struct context *c1, const struct context *c2)
+				     const struct context *c1,
+				     const struct context *c2)
 {
 	struct mls_range *dr = &dst->range;
 	const struct mls_range *r1 = &c1->range, *r2 = &c2->range;
@@ -114,13 +118,13 @@ static inline int mls_context_glblub(struct context *dst,
 	/* Take the least of the high */
 	dr->level[1].sens = min(r1->level[1].sens, r2->level[1].sens);
 
-	rc = ebitmap_and(&dr->level[0].cat,
-			 &r1->level[0].cat, &r2->level[0].cat);
+	rc = ebitmap_and(&dr->level[0].cat, &r1->level[0].cat,
+			 &r2->level[0].cat);
 	if (rc)
 		goto out;
 
-	rc = ebitmap_and(&dr->level[1].cat,
-			 &r1->level[1].cat, &r2->level[1].cat);
+	rc = ebitmap_and(&dr->level[1].cat, &r1->level[1].cat,
+			 &r2->level[1].cat);
 	if (rc)
 		goto out;
 
@@ -128,7 +132,8 @@ out:
 	return rc;
 }
 
-static inline int mls_context_cmp(const struct context *c1, const struct context *c2)
+static inline int mls_context_cmp(const struct context *c1,
+				  const struct context *c2)
 {
 	return ((c1->range.level[0].sens == c2->range.level[0].sens) &&
 		ebitmap_cmp(&c1->range.level[0].cat, &c2->range.level[0].cat) &&
@@ -183,19 +188,17 @@ static inline void context_destroy(struct context *c)
 	mls_context_destroy(c);
 }
 
-static inline int context_cmp(const struct context *c1, const struct context *c2)
+static inline int context_cmp(const struct context *c1,
+			      const struct context *c2)
 {
 	if (c1->len && c2->len)
 		return (c1->len == c2->len && !strcmp(c1->str, c2->str));
 	if (c1->len || c2->len)
 		return 0;
-	return ((c1->user == c2->user) &&
-		(c1->role == c2->role) &&
-		(c1->type == c2->type) &&
-		mls_context_cmp(c1, c2));
+	return ((c1->user == c2->user) && (c1->role == c2->role) &&
+		(c1->type == c2->type) && mls_context_cmp(c1, c2));
 }
 
 u32 context_compute_hash(const struct context *c);
 
-#endif	/* _SS_CONTEXT_H_ */
-
+#endif /* _SS_CONTEXT_H_ */
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.c b/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.c
index 77875ad355..67c1a73cd5 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
 /*
  * Implementation of the extensible bitmap type.
  *
@@ -6,14 +6,11 @@
  */
 /*
  * Updated: Hewlett-Packard <paul@paul-moore.com>
+ *          Added support to import/export the NetLabel category bitmap
+ *          (c) Copyright Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P., 2006
  *
- *      Added support to import/export the NetLabel category bitmap
- *
- * (c) Copyright Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P., 2006
- */
-/*
  * Updated: KaiGai Kohei <kaigai@ak.jp.nec.com>
- *      Applied standard bit operations to improve bitmap scanning.
+ *          Applied standard bit operations to improve bitmap scanning.
  */
 
 #include <linux/kernel.h>
@@ -24,7 +21,7 @@
 #include "ebitmap.h"
 #include "policydb.h"
 
-#define BITS_PER_U64	(sizeof(u64) * 8)
+#define BITS_PER_U64 (sizeof(u64) * 8)
 
 static struct kmem_cache *ebitmap_node_cachep __ro_after_init;
 
@@ -37,8 +34,7 @@ int ebitmap_cmp(const struct ebitmap *e1, const struct ebitmap *e2)
 
 	n1 = e1->node;
 	n2 = e2->node;
-	while (n1 && n2 &&
-	       (n1->startbit == n2->startbit) &&
+	while (n1 && n2 && (n1->startbit == n2->startbit) &&
 	       !memcmp(n1->maps, n2->maps, EBITMAP_SIZE / 8)) {
 		n1 = n1->next;
 		n2 = n2->next;
@@ -79,14 +75,16 @@ int ebitmap_cpy(struct ebitmap *dst, const struct ebitmap *src)
 	return 0;
 }
 
-int ebitmap_and(struct ebitmap *dst, const struct ebitmap *e1, const struct ebitmap *e2)
+int ebitmap_and(struct ebitmap *dst, const struct ebitmap *e1,
+		const struct ebitmap *e2)
 {
 	struct ebitmap_node *n;
 	int bit, rc;
 
 	ebitmap_init(dst);
 
-	ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(e1, n, bit) {
+	ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(e1, n, bit)
+	{
 		if (ebitmap_get_bit(e2, bit)) {
 			rc = ebitmap_set_bit(dst, bit, 1);
 			if (rc < 0)
@@ -96,7 +94,6 @@ int ebitmap_and(struct ebitmap *dst, const struct ebitmap *e1, const struct ebit
 	return 0;
 }
 
-
 #ifdef CONFIG_NETLABEL
 /**
  * ebitmap_netlbl_export - Export an ebitmap into a NetLabel category bitmap
@@ -131,10 +128,8 @@ int ebitmap_netlbl_export(struct ebitmap *ebmap,
 		for (iter = 0; iter < EBITMAP_UNIT_NUMS; iter++) {
 			e_map = e_iter->maps[iter];
 			if (e_map != 0) {
-				rc = netlbl_catmap_setlong(catmap,
-							   offset,
-							   e_map,
-							   GFP_ATOMIC);
+				rc = netlbl_catmap_setlong(catmap, offset,
+							   e_map, GFP_ATOMIC);
 				if (rc != 0)
 					goto netlbl_export_failure;
 			}
@@ -185,7 +180,8 @@ int ebitmap_netlbl_import(struct ebitmap *ebmap,
 		if (e_iter == NULL ||
 		    offset >= e_iter->startbit + EBITMAP_SIZE) {
 			e_prev = e_iter;
-			e_iter = kmem_cache_zalloc(ebitmap_node_cachep, GFP_ATOMIC);
+			e_iter = kmem_cache_zalloc(ebitmap_node_cachep,
+						   GFP_ATOMIC);
 			if (e_iter == NULL)
 				goto netlbl_import_failure;
 			e_iter->startbit = offset - (offset % EBITMAP_SIZE);
@@ -218,7 +214,8 @@ netlbl_import_failure:
  * if last_e2bit is non-zero, the highest set bit in e2 cannot exceed
  * last_e2bit.
  */
-int ebitmap_contains(const struct ebitmap *e1, const struct ebitmap *e2, u32 last_e2bit)
+int ebitmap_contains(const struct ebitmap *e1, const struct ebitmap *e2,
+		     u32 last_e2bit)
 {
 	const struct ebitmap_node *n1, *n2;
 	int i;
@@ -234,8 +231,8 @@ int ebitmap_contains(const struct ebitmap *e1, const struct ebitmap *e2, u32 las
 			n1 = n1->next;
 			continue;
 		}
-		for (i = EBITMAP_UNIT_NUMS - 1; (i >= 0) && !n2->maps[i]; )
-			i--;	/* Skip trailing NULL map entries */
+		for (i = EBITMAP_UNIT_NUMS - 1; (i >= 0) && !n2->maps[i];)
+			i--; /* Skip trailing NULL map entries */
 		if (last_e2bit && (i >= 0)) {
 			u32 lastsetbit = n2->startbit + i * EBITMAP_UNIT_SIZE +
 					 __fls(n2->maps[i]);
@@ -302,8 +299,8 @@ int ebitmap_set_bit(struct ebitmap *e, unsigned long bit, int value)
 					 * within the bitmap
 					 */
 					if (prev)
-						e->highbit = prev->startbit
-							     + EBITMAP_SIZE;
+						e->highbit = prev->startbit +
+							     EBITMAP_SIZE;
 					else
 						e->highbit = 0;
 				}
@@ -424,7 +421,8 @@ int ebitmap_read(struct ebitmap *e, void *fp)
 
 		if (!n || startbit >= n->startbit + EBITMAP_SIZE) {
 			struct ebitmap_node *tmp;
-			tmp = kmem_cache_zalloc(ebitmap_node_cachep, GFP_KERNEL);
+			tmp = kmem_cache_zalloc(ebitmap_node_cachep,
+						GFP_KERNEL);
 			if (!tmp) {
 				pr_err("SELinux: ebitmap: out of memory\n");
 				rc = -ENOMEM;
@@ -481,7 +479,8 @@ int ebitmap_write(const struct ebitmap *e, void *fp)
 	count = 0;
 	last_bit = 0;
 	last_startbit = -1;
-	ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(e, n, bit) {
+	ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(e, n, bit)
+	{
 		if (rounddown(bit, (int)BITS_PER_U64) > last_startbit) {
 			count++;
 			last_startbit = rounddown(bit, BITS_PER_U64);
@@ -497,7 +496,8 @@ int ebitmap_write(const struct ebitmap *e, void *fp)
 
 	map = 0;
 	last_startbit = INT_MIN;
-	ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(e, n, bit) {
+	ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(e, n, bit)
+	{
 		if (rounddown(bit, (int)BITS_PER_U64) > last_startbit) {
 			__le64 buf64[1];
 
@@ -559,6 +559,6 @@ u32 ebitmap_hash(const struct ebitmap *e, u32 hash)
 void __init ebitmap_cache_init(void)
 {
 	ebitmap_node_cachep = kmem_cache_create("ebitmap_node",
-							sizeof(struct ebitmap_node),
-							0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
+						sizeof(struct ebitmap_node), 0,
+						SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
 }
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.h b/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.h
index e3c807cfad..02798b35ee 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.h
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.h
@@ -12,23 +12,25 @@
  *
  * Author : Stephen Smalley, <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
  */
+
 #ifndef _SS_EBITMAP_H_
 #define _SS_EBITMAP_H_
 
 #include <net/netlabel.h>
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_64BIT
-#define	EBITMAP_NODE_SIZE	64
+#define EBITMAP_NODE_SIZE 64
 #else
-#define	EBITMAP_NODE_SIZE	32
+#define EBITMAP_NODE_SIZE 32
 #endif
 
-#define EBITMAP_UNIT_NUMS	((EBITMAP_NODE_SIZE-sizeof(void *)-sizeof(u32))\
-					/ sizeof(unsigned long))
-#define EBITMAP_UNIT_SIZE	BITS_PER_LONG
-#define EBITMAP_SIZE		(EBITMAP_UNIT_NUMS * EBITMAP_UNIT_SIZE)
-#define EBITMAP_BIT		1ULL
-#define EBITMAP_SHIFT_UNIT_SIZE(x)					\
+#define EBITMAP_UNIT_NUMS                                     \
+	((EBITMAP_NODE_SIZE - sizeof(void *) - sizeof(u32)) / \
+	 sizeof(unsigned long))
+#define EBITMAP_UNIT_SIZE BITS_PER_LONG
+#define EBITMAP_SIZE	  (EBITMAP_UNIT_NUMS * EBITMAP_UNIT_SIZE)
+#define EBITMAP_BIT	  1ULL
+#define EBITMAP_SHIFT_UNIT_SIZE(x) \
 	(((x) >> EBITMAP_UNIT_SIZE / 2) >> EBITMAP_UNIT_SIZE / 2)
 
 struct ebitmap_node {
@@ -38,8 +40,8 @@ struct ebitmap_node {
 };
 
 struct ebitmap {
-	struct ebitmap_node *node;	/* first node in the bitmap */
-	u32 highbit;	/* highest position in the total bitmap */
+	struct ebitmap_node *node; /* first node in the bitmap */
+	u32 highbit; /* highest position in the total bitmap */
 };
 
 #define ebitmap_length(e) ((e)->highbit)
@@ -80,9 +82,9 @@ static inline unsigned int ebitmap_next_positive(const struct ebitmap *e,
 	return ebitmap_length(e);
 }
 
-#define EBITMAP_NODE_INDEX(node, bit)	\
+#define EBITMAP_NODE_INDEX(node, bit) \
 	(((bit) - (node)->startbit) / EBITMAP_UNIT_SIZE)
-#define EBITMAP_NODE_OFFSET(node, bit)	\
+#define EBITMAP_NODE_OFFSET(node, bit) \
 	(((bit) - (node)->startbit) % EBITMAP_UNIT_SIZE)
 
 static inline int ebitmap_node_get_bit(const struct ebitmap_node *n,
@@ -117,15 +119,17 @@ static inline void ebitmap_node_clr_bit(struct ebitmap_node *n,
 	n->maps[index] &= ~(EBITMAP_BIT << ofs);
 }
 
-#define ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(e, n, bit)	\
-	for ((bit) = ebitmap_start_positive(e, &(n));	\
-	     (bit) < ebitmap_length(e);			\
-	     (bit) = ebitmap_next_positive(e, &(n), bit))	\
+#define ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(e, n, bit)      \
+	for ((bit) = ebitmap_start_positive(e, &(n)); \
+	     (bit) < ebitmap_length(e);               \
+	     (bit) = ebitmap_next_positive(e, &(n), bit))
 
 int ebitmap_cmp(const struct ebitmap *e1, const struct ebitmap *e2);
 int ebitmap_cpy(struct ebitmap *dst, const struct ebitmap *src);
-int ebitmap_and(struct ebitmap *dst, const struct ebitmap *e1, const struct ebitmap *e2);
-int ebitmap_contains(const struct ebitmap *e1, const struct ebitmap *e2, u32 last_e2bit);
+int ebitmap_and(struct ebitmap *dst, const struct ebitmap *e1,
+		const struct ebitmap *e2);
+int ebitmap_contains(const struct ebitmap *e1, const struct ebitmap *e2,
+		     u32 last_e2bit);
 int ebitmap_get_bit(const struct ebitmap *e, unsigned long bit);
 int ebitmap_set_bit(struct ebitmap *e, unsigned long bit, int value);
 void ebitmap_destroy(struct ebitmap *e);
@@ -151,4 +155,4 @@ static inline int ebitmap_netlbl_import(struct ebitmap *ebmap,
 }
 #endif
 
-#endif	/* _SS_EBITMAP_H_ */
+#endif /* _SS_EBITMAP_H_ */
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/hashtab.c b/security/selinux/ss/hashtab.c
index c05d8346a9..754bedbde1 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/hashtab.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/hashtab.c
@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@
  *
  * Author : Stephen Smalley, <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
  */
+
 #include <linux/kernel.h>
 #include <linux/slab.h>
 #include <linux/errno.h>
@@ -47,8 +48,8 @@ int hashtab_init(struct hashtab *h, u32 nel_hint)
 	return 0;
 }
 
-int __hashtab_insert(struct hashtab *h, struct hashtab_node **dst,
-		     void *key, void *datum)
+int __hashtab_insert(struct hashtab *h, struct hashtab_node **dst, void *key,
+		     void *datum)
 {
 	struct hashtab_node *newnode;
 
@@ -83,8 +84,7 @@ void hashtab_destroy(struct hashtab *h)
 	h->htable = NULL;
 }
 
-int hashtab_map(struct hashtab *h,
-		int (*apply)(void *k, void *d, void *args),
+int hashtab_map(struct hashtab *h, int (*apply)(void *k, void *d, void *args),
 		void *args)
 {
 	u32 i;
@@ -137,10 +137,9 @@ void hashtab_stat(struct hashtab *h, struct hashtab_info *info)
 #endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEBUG */
 
 int hashtab_duplicate(struct hashtab *new, struct hashtab *orig,
-		int (*copy)(struct hashtab_node *new,
-			struct hashtab_node *orig, void *args),
-		int (*destroy)(void *k, void *d, void *args),
-		void *args)
+		      int (*copy)(struct hashtab_node *new,
+				  struct hashtab_node *orig, void *args),
+		      int (*destroy)(void *k, void *d, void *args), void *args)
 {
 	struct hashtab_node *cur, *tmp, *tail;
 	u32 i;
@@ -178,7 +177,7 @@ int hashtab_duplicate(struct hashtab *new, struct hashtab *orig,
 
 	return 0;
 
- error:
+error:
 	for (i = 0; i < new->size; i++) {
 		for (cur = new->htable[i]; cur; cur = tmp) {
 			tmp = cur->next;
@@ -193,7 +192,7 @@ int hashtab_duplicate(struct hashtab *new, struct hashtab *orig,
 
 void __init hashtab_cache_init(void)
 {
-		hashtab_node_cachep = kmem_cache_create("hashtab_node",
-			sizeof(struct hashtab_node),
-			0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
+	hashtab_node_cachep = kmem_cache_create("hashtab_node",
+						sizeof(struct hashtab_node), 0,
+						SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
 }
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/hashtab.h b/security/selinux/ss/hashtab.h
index 09b0a37449..5f74dcc136 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/hashtab.h
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/hashtab.h
@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@
  *
  * Author : Stephen Smalley, <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
  */
+
 #ifndef _SS_HASHTAB_H_
 #define _SS_HASHTAB_H_
 
@@ -15,12 +16,11 @@
 #include <linux/errno.h>
 #include <linux/sched.h>
 
-#define HASHTAB_MAX_NODES	U32_MAX
+#define HASHTAB_MAX_NODES U32_MAX
 
 struct hashtab_key_params {
-	u32 (*hash)(const void *key);	/* hash function */
-	int (*cmp)(const void *key1, const void *key2);
-					/* key comparison function */
+	u32 (*hash)(const void *key); /* hash func */
+	int (*cmp)(const void *key1, const void *key2); /* comparison func */
 };
 
 struct hashtab_node {
@@ -30,9 +30,9 @@ struct hashtab_node {
 };
 
 struct hashtab {
-	struct hashtab_node **htable;	/* hash table */
-	u32 size;			/* number of slots in hash table */
-	u32 nel;			/* number of elements in hash table */
+	struct hashtab_node **htable; /* hash table */
+	u32 size; /* number of slots in hash table */
+	u32 nel; /* number of elements in hash table */
 };
 
 struct hashtab_info {
@@ -48,8 +48,8 @@ struct hashtab_info {
  */
 int hashtab_init(struct hashtab *h, u32 nel_hint);
 
-int __hashtab_insert(struct hashtab *h, struct hashtab_node **dst,
-		     void *key, void *datum);
+int __hashtab_insert(struct hashtab *h, struct hashtab_node **dst, void *key,
+		     void *datum);
 
 /*
  * Inserts the specified (key, datum) pair into the specified hash table.
@@ -84,8 +84,8 @@ static inline int hashtab_insert(struct hashtab *h, void *key, void *datum,
 		cur = cur->next;
 	}
 
-	return __hashtab_insert(h, prev ? &prev->next : &h->htable[hvalue],
-				key, datum);
+	return __hashtab_insert(h, prev ? &prev->next : &h->htable[hvalue], key,
+				datum);
 }
 
 /*
@@ -133,15 +133,13 @@ void hashtab_destroy(struct hashtab *h);
  * iterating through the hash table and will propagate the error
  * return to its caller.
  */
-int hashtab_map(struct hashtab *h,
-		int (*apply)(void *k, void *d, void *args),
+int hashtab_map(struct hashtab *h, int (*apply)(void *k, void *d, void *args),
 		void *args);
 
 int hashtab_duplicate(struct hashtab *new, struct hashtab *orig,
-		int (*copy)(struct hashtab_node *new,
-			struct hashtab_node *orig, void *args),
-		int (*destroy)(void *k, void *d, void *args),
-		void *args);
+		      int (*copy)(struct hashtab_node *new,
+				  struct hashtab_node *orig, void *args),
+		      int (*destroy)(void *k, void *d, void *args), void *args);
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEBUG
 /* Fill info with some hash table statistics */
@@ -149,7 +147,8 @@ void hashtab_stat(struct hashtab *h, struct hashtab_info *info);
 #else
 static inline void hashtab_stat(struct hashtab *h, struct hashtab_info *info)
 {
+	return;
 }
 #endif
 
-#endif	/* _SS_HASHTAB_H */
+#endif /* _SS_HASHTAB_H */
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/mls.c b/security/selinux/ss/mls.c
index cd38f5913b..989c809d31 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/mls.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/mls.c
@@ -4,19 +4,15 @@
  *
  * Author : Stephen Smalley, <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
  */
+
 /*
  * Updated: Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc. <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
+ *          Support for enhanced MLS infrastructure.
+ *          Copyright (C) 2004-2006 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
  *
- *	Support for enhanced MLS infrastructure.
- *
- * Copyright (C) 2004-2006 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
- */
-/*
  * Updated: Hewlett-Packard <paul@paul-moore.com>
- *
- *      Added support to import/export the MLS label from NetLabel
- *
- * (c) Copyright Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P., 2006
+ *          Added support to import/export the MLS label from NetLabel
+ *          Copyright (C) Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P., 2006
  */
 
 #include <linux/kernel.h>
@@ -52,7 +48,8 @@ int mls_compute_context_len(struct policydb *p, struct context *context)
 		head = -2;
 		prev = -2;
 		e = &context->range.level[l].cat;
-		ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(e, node, i) {
+		ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(e, node, i)
+		{
 			if (i - prev > 1) {
 				/* one or more negative bits are skipped */
 				if (head != prev) {
@@ -86,8 +83,7 @@ int mls_compute_context_len(struct policydb *p, struct context *context)
  * the MLS fields of `context' into the string `*scontext'.
  * Update `*scontext' to point to the end of the MLS fields.
  */
-void mls_sid_to_context(struct policydb *p,
-			struct context *context,
+void mls_sid_to_context(struct policydb *p, struct context *context,
 			char **scontext)
 {
 	char *scontextp, *nm;
@@ -112,7 +108,8 @@ void mls_sid_to_context(struct policydb *p,
 		head = -2;
 		prev = -2;
 		e = &context->range.level[l].cat;
-		ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(e, node, i) {
+		ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(e, node, i)
+		{
 			if (i - prev > 1) {
 				/* one or more negative bits are skipped */
 				if (prev != head) {
@@ -230,12 +227,8 @@ int mls_context_isvalid(struct policydb *p, struct context *c)
  * Policy read-lock must be held for sidtab lookup.
  *
  */
-int mls_context_to_sid(struct policydb *pol,
-		       char oldc,
-		       char *scontext,
-		       struct context *context,
-		       struct sidtab *s,
-		       u32 def_sid)
+int mls_context_to_sid(struct policydb *pol, char oldc, char *scontext,
+		       struct context *context, struct sidtab *s, u32 def_sid)
 {
 	char *sensitivity, *cur_cat, *next_cat, *rngptr;
 	struct level_datum *levdatum;
@@ -333,7 +326,8 @@ int mls_context_to_sid(struct policydb *pol,
 				return -EINVAL;
 
 			for (i = catdatum->value; i < rngdatum->value; i++) {
-				rc = ebitmap_set_bit(&context->range.level[l].cat, i, 1);
+				rc = ebitmap_set_bit(
+					&context->range.level[l].cat, i, 1);
 				if (rc)
 					return rc;
 			}
@@ -371,8 +365,8 @@ int mls_from_string(struct policydb *p, char *str, struct context *context,
 	if (!tmpstr) {
 		rc = -ENOMEM;
 	} else {
-		rc = mls_context_to_sid(p, ':', tmpstr, context,
-					NULL, SECSID_NULL);
+		rc = mls_context_to_sid(p, ':', tmpstr, context, NULL,
+					SECSID_NULL);
 		kfree(tmpstr);
 	}
 
@@ -382,8 +376,7 @@ int mls_from_string(struct policydb *p, char *str, struct context *context,
 /*
  * Copies the MLS range `range' into `context'.
  */
-int mls_range_set(struct context *context,
-				struct mls_range *range)
+int mls_range_set(struct context *context, struct mls_range *range)
 {
 	int l, rc = 0;
 
@@ -399,9 +392,8 @@ int mls_range_set(struct context *context,
 	return rc;
 }
 
-int mls_setup_user_range(struct policydb *p,
-			 struct context *fromcon, struct user_datum *user,
-			 struct context *usercon)
+int mls_setup_user_range(struct policydb *p, struct context *fromcon,
+			 struct user_datum *user, struct context *usercon)
 {
 	if (p->mls_enabled) {
 		struct mls_level *fromcon_sen = &(fromcon->range.level[0]);
@@ -444,10 +436,8 @@ int mls_setup_user_range(struct policydb *p,
  * policy `oldp' to the values specified in the policy `newp',
  * storing the resulting context in `newc'.
  */
-int mls_convert_context(struct policydb *oldp,
-			struct policydb *newp,
-			struct context *oldc,
-			struct context *newc)
+int mls_convert_context(struct policydb *oldp, struct policydb *newp,
+			struct context *oldc, struct context *newc)
 {
 	struct level_datum *levdatum;
 	struct cat_datum *catdatum;
@@ -468,8 +458,9 @@ int mls_convert_context(struct policydb *oldp,
 			return -EINVAL;
 		newc->range.level[l].sens = levdatum->level->sens;
 
-		ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(&oldc->range.level[l].cat,
-					      node, i) {
+		ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(&oldc->range.level[l].cat, node,
+					      i)
+		{
 			int rc;
 
 			catdatum = symtab_search(&newp->p_cats,
@@ -486,13 +477,9 @@ int mls_convert_context(struct policydb *oldp,
 	return 0;
 }
 
-int mls_compute_sid(struct policydb *p,
-		    struct context *scontext,
-		    struct context *tcontext,
-		    u16 tclass,
-		    u32 specified,
-		    struct context *newcontext,
-		    bool sock)
+int mls_compute_sid(struct policydb *p, struct context *scontext,
+		    struct context *tcontext, u16 tclass, u32 specified,
+		    struct context *newcontext, bool sock)
 {
 	struct range_trans rtr;
 	struct mls_range *r;
@@ -532,8 +519,8 @@ int mls_compute_sid(struct policydb *p,
 		case DEFAULT_TARGET_LOW_HIGH:
 			return mls_context_cpy(newcontext, tcontext);
 		case DEFAULT_GLBLUB:
-			return mls_context_glblub(newcontext,
-						  scontext, tcontext);
+			return mls_context_glblub(newcontext, scontext,
+						  tcontext);
 		}
 
 		fallthrough;
@@ -563,8 +550,7 @@ int mls_compute_sid(struct policydb *p,
  * NetLabel MLS sensitivity level field.
  *
  */
-void mls_export_netlbl_lvl(struct policydb *p,
-			   struct context *context,
+void mls_export_netlbl_lvl(struct policydb *p, struct context *context,
 			   struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr)
 {
 	if (!p->mls_enabled)
@@ -585,8 +571,7 @@ void mls_export_netlbl_lvl(struct policydb *p,
  * NetLabel MLS sensitivity level into the context.
  *
  */
-void mls_import_netlbl_lvl(struct policydb *p,
-			   struct context *context,
+void mls_import_netlbl_lvl(struct policydb *p, struct context *context,
 			   struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr)
 {
 	if (!p->mls_enabled)
@@ -607,8 +592,7 @@ void mls_import_netlbl_lvl(struct policydb *p,
  * MLS category field.  Returns zero on success, negative values on failure.
  *
  */
-int mls_export_netlbl_cat(struct policydb *p,
-			  struct context *context,
+int mls_export_netlbl_cat(struct policydb *p, struct context *context,
 			  struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr)
 {
 	int rc;
@@ -637,8 +621,7 @@ int mls_export_netlbl_cat(struct policydb *p,
  * negative values on failure.
  *
  */
-int mls_import_netlbl_cat(struct policydb *p,
-			  struct context *context,
+int mls_import_netlbl_cat(struct policydb *p, struct context *context,
 			  struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr)
 {
 	int rc;
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/mls.h b/security/selinux/ss/mls.h
index 107681dd18..0798063675 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/mls.h
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/mls.h
@@ -4,19 +4,15 @@
  *
  * Author : Stephen Smalley, <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
  */
+
 /*
  * Updated: Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc. <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
+ *          Support for enhanced MLS infrastructure.
+ *          Copyright (C) 2004-2006 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
  *
- *	Support for enhanced MLS infrastructure.
- *
- * Copyright (C) 2004-2006 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
- */
-/*
  * Updated: Hewlett-Packard <paul@paul-moore.com>
- *
- *	Added support to import/export the MLS label from NetLabel
- *
- * (c) Copyright Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P., 2006
+ *          Added support to import/export the MLS label from NetLabel
+ *          Copyright (X) Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P., 2006
  */
 
 #ifndef _SS_MLS_H_
@@ -35,47 +31,32 @@ int mls_context_isvalid(struct policydb *p, struct context *c);
 int mls_range_isvalid(struct policydb *p, struct mls_range *r);
 int mls_level_isvalid(struct policydb *p, struct mls_level *l);
 
-int mls_context_to_sid(struct policydb *p,
-		       char oldc,
-		       char *scontext,
-		       struct context *context,
-		       struct sidtab *s,
-		       u32 def_sid);
+int mls_context_to_sid(struct policydb *p, char oldc, char *scontext,
+		       struct context *context, struct sidtab *s, u32 def_sid);
 
 int mls_from_string(struct policydb *p, char *str, struct context *context,
 		    gfp_t gfp_mask);
 
 int mls_range_set(struct context *context, struct mls_range *range);
 
-int mls_convert_context(struct policydb *oldp,
-			struct policydb *newp,
-			struct context *oldc,
-			struct context *newc);
+int mls_convert_context(struct policydb *oldp, struct policydb *newp,
+			struct context *oldc, struct context *newc);
 
-int mls_compute_sid(struct policydb *p,
-		    struct context *scontext,
-		    struct context *tcontext,
-		    u16 tclass,
-		    u32 specified,
-		    struct context *newcontext,
-		    bool sock);
+int mls_compute_sid(struct policydb *p, struct context *scontext,
+		    struct context *tcontext, u16 tclass, u32 specified,
+		    struct context *newcontext, bool sock);
 
-int mls_setup_user_range(struct policydb *p,
-			 struct context *fromcon, struct user_datum *user,
-			 struct context *usercon);
+int mls_setup_user_range(struct policydb *p, struct context *fromcon,
+			 struct user_datum *user, struct context *usercon);
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_NETLABEL
-void mls_export_netlbl_lvl(struct policydb *p,
-			   struct context *context,
+void mls_export_netlbl_lvl(struct policydb *p, struct context *context,
 			   struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr);
-void mls_import_netlbl_lvl(struct policydb *p,
-			   struct context *context,
+void mls_import_netlbl_lvl(struct policydb *p, struct context *context,
 			   struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr);
-int mls_export_netlbl_cat(struct policydb *p,
-			  struct context *context,
+int mls_export_netlbl_cat(struct policydb *p, struct context *context,
 			  struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr);
-int mls_import_netlbl_cat(struct policydb *p,
-			  struct context *context,
+int mls_import_netlbl_cat(struct policydb *p, struct context *context,
 			  struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr);
 #else
 static inline void mls_export_netlbl_lvl(struct policydb *p,
@@ -112,5 +93,4 @@ static inline u32 mls_range_hash(const struct mls_range *r, u32 hash)
 	return hash;
 }
 
-#endif	/* _SS_MLS_H */
-
+#endif /* _SS_MLS_H */
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/mls_types.h b/security/selinux/ss/mls_types.h
index f492cf1488..7ef6e8cb0c 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/mls_types.h
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/mls_types.h
@@ -4,12 +4,11 @@
  *
  * Author : Stephen Smalley, <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
  */
+
 /*
  * Updated: Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc. <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
- *
- *	Support for enhanced MLS infrastructure.
- *
- * Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
+ *          Support for enhanced MLS infrastructure.
+ *          Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
  */
 
 #ifndef _SS_MLS_TYPES_H_
@@ -19,34 +18,35 @@
 #include "ebitmap.h"
 
 struct mls_level {
-	u32 sens;		/* sensitivity */
-	struct ebitmap cat;	/* category set */
+	u32 sens; /* sensitivity */
+	struct ebitmap cat; /* category set */
 };
 
 struct mls_range {
 	struct mls_level level[2]; /* low == level[0], high == level[1] */
 };
 
-static inline int mls_level_eq(const struct mls_level *l1, const struct mls_level *l2)
+static inline int mls_level_eq(const struct mls_level *l1,
+			       const struct mls_level *l2)
 {
-	return ((l1->sens == l2->sens) &&
-		ebitmap_cmp(&l1->cat, &l2->cat));
+	return ((l1->sens == l2->sens) && ebitmap_cmp(&l1->cat, &l2->cat));
 }
 
-static inline int mls_level_dom(const struct mls_level *l1, const struct mls_level *l2)
+static inline int mls_level_dom(const struct mls_level *l1,
+				const struct mls_level *l2)
 {
 	return ((l1->sens >= l2->sens) &&
 		ebitmap_contains(&l1->cat, &l2->cat, 0));
 }
 
 #define mls_level_incomp(l1, l2) \
-(!mls_level_dom((l1), (l2)) && !mls_level_dom((l2), (l1)))
+	(!mls_level_dom((l1), (l2)) && !mls_level_dom((l2), (l1)))
 
 #define mls_level_between(l1, l2, l3) \
-(mls_level_dom((l1), (l2)) && mls_level_dom((l3), (l1)))
+	(mls_level_dom((l1), (l2)) && mls_level_dom((l3), (l1)))
 
-#define mls_range_contains(r1, r2) \
-(mls_level_dom(&(r2).level[0], &(r1).level[0]) && \
- mls_level_dom(&(r1).level[1], &(r2).level[1]))
+#define mls_range_contains(r1, r2)                        \
+	(mls_level_dom(&(r2).level[0], &(r1).level[0]) && \
+	 mls_level_dom(&(r1).level[1], &(r2).level[1]))
 
-#endif	/* _SS_MLS_TYPES_H_ */
+#endif /* _SS_MLS_TYPES_H_ */
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
index 3b19ad28c9..3d22d5baa8 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
@@ -7,25 +7,21 @@
 
 /*
  * Updated: Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc. <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
+ *          Support for enhanced MLS infrastructure.
+ *          Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
  *
- *	Support for enhanced MLS infrastructure.
- *
- * Updated: Frank Mayer <mayerf@tresys.com> and Karl MacMillan <kmacmillan@tresys.com>
- *
- *	Added conditional policy language extensions
+ * Updated: Frank Mayer <mayerf@tresys.com> and
+ *          Karl MacMillan <kmacmillan@tresys.com>
+ *          Added conditional policy language extensions
+ *          Copyright (C) 2003-2004 Tresys Technology, LLC
  *
  * Updated: Hewlett-Packard <paul@paul-moore.com>
- *
- *      Added support for the policy capability bitmap
+ *          Added support for the policy capability bitmap
+ *          Copyright (C) 2007 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
  *
  * Update: Mellanox Techonologies
- *
- *	Added Infiniband support
- *
- * Copyright (C) 2016 Mellanox Techonologies
- * Copyright (C) 2007 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
- * Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
- * Copyright (C) 2003 - 2004 Tresys Technology, LLC
+ *         Added Infiniband support
+ *         Copyright (C) 2016 Mellanox Techonologies
  */
 
 #include <linux/kernel.h>
@@ -42,6 +38,7 @@
 #include "services.h"
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEBUG
+/* clang-format off */
 static const char *const symtab_name[SYM_NUM] = {
 	"common prefixes",
 	"classes",
@@ -52,6 +49,7 @@ static const char *const symtab_name[SYM_NUM] = {
 	"levels",
 	"categories",
 };
+/* clang-format off */
 #endif
 
 struct policydb_compat_info {
@@ -63,103 +61,104 @@ struct policydb_compat_info {
 /* These need to be updated if SYM_NUM or OCON_NUM changes */
 static const struct policydb_compat_info policydb_compat[] = {
 	{
-		.version	= POLICYDB_VERSION_BASE,
-		.sym_num	= SYM_NUM - 3,
-		.ocon_num	= OCON_NUM - 3,
+		.version = POLICYDB_VERSION_BASE,
+		.sym_num = SYM_NUM - 3,
+		.ocon_num = OCON_NUM - 3,
 	},
 	{
-		.version	= POLICYDB_VERSION_BOOL,
-		.sym_num	= SYM_NUM - 2,
-		.ocon_num	= OCON_NUM - 3,
+		.version = POLICYDB_VERSION_BOOL,
+		.sym_num = SYM_NUM - 2,
+		.ocon_num = OCON_NUM - 3,
 	},
 	{
-		.version	= POLICYDB_VERSION_IPV6,
-		.sym_num	= SYM_NUM - 2,
-		.ocon_num	= OCON_NUM - 2,
+		.version = POLICYDB_VERSION_IPV6,
+		.sym_num = SYM_NUM - 2,
+		.ocon_num = OCON_NUM - 2,
 	},
 	{
-		.version	= POLICYDB_VERSION_NLCLASS,
-		.sym_num	= SYM_NUM - 2,
-		.ocon_num	= OCON_NUM - 2,
+		.version = POLICYDB_VERSION_NLCLASS,
+		.sym_num = SYM_NUM - 2,
+		.ocon_num = OCON_NUM - 2,
 	},
 	{
-		.version	= POLICYDB_VERSION_MLS,
-		.sym_num	= SYM_NUM,
-		.ocon_num	= OCON_NUM - 2,
+		.version = POLICYDB_VERSION_MLS,
+		.sym_num = SYM_NUM,
+		.ocon_num = OCON_NUM - 2,
 	},
 	{
-		.version	= POLICYDB_VERSION_AVTAB,
-		.sym_num	= SYM_NUM,
-		.ocon_num	= OCON_NUM - 2,
+		.version = POLICYDB_VERSION_AVTAB,
+		.sym_num = SYM_NUM,
+		.ocon_num = OCON_NUM - 2,
 	},
 	{
-		.version	= POLICYDB_VERSION_RANGETRANS,
-		.sym_num	= SYM_NUM,
-		.ocon_num	= OCON_NUM - 2,
+		.version = POLICYDB_VERSION_RANGETRANS,
+		.sym_num = SYM_NUM,
+		.ocon_num = OCON_NUM - 2,
 	},
 	{
-		.version	= POLICYDB_VERSION_POLCAP,
-		.sym_num	= SYM_NUM,
-		.ocon_num	= OCON_NUM - 2,
+		.version = POLICYDB_VERSION_POLCAP,
+		.sym_num = SYM_NUM,
+		.ocon_num = OCON_NUM - 2,
 	},
 	{
-		.version	= POLICYDB_VERSION_PERMISSIVE,
-		.sym_num	= SYM_NUM,
-		.ocon_num	= OCON_NUM - 2,
+		.version = POLICYDB_VERSION_PERMISSIVE,
+		.sym_num = SYM_NUM,
+		.ocon_num = OCON_NUM - 2,
 	},
 	{
-		.version	= POLICYDB_VERSION_BOUNDARY,
-		.sym_num	= SYM_NUM,
-		.ocon_num	= OCON_NUM - 2,
+		.version = POLICYDB_VERSION_BOUNDARY,
+		.sym_num = SYM_NUM,
+		.ocon_num = OCON_NUM - 2,
 	},
 	{
-		.version	= POLICYDB_VERSION_FILENAME_TRANS,
-		.sym_num	= SYM_NUM,
-		.ocon_num	= OCON_NUM - 2,
+		.version = POLICYDB_VERSION_FILENAME_TRANS,
+		.sym_num = SYM_NUM,
+		.ocon_num = OCON_NUM - 2,
 	},
 	{
-		.version	= POLICYDB_VERSION_ROLETRANS,
-		.sym_num	= SYM_NUM,
-		.ocon_num	= OCON_NUM - 2,
+		.version = POLICYDB_VERSION_ROLETRANS,
+		.sym_num = SYM_NUM,
+		.ocon_num = OCON_NUM - 2,
 	},
 	{
-		.version	= POLICYDB_VERSION_NEW_OBJECT_DEFAULTS,
-		.sym_num	= SYM_NUM,
-		.ocon_num	= OCON_NUM - 2,
+		.version = POLICYDB_VERSION_NEW_OBJECT_DEFAULTS,
+		.sym_num = SYM_NUM,
+		.ocon_num = OCON_NUM - 2,
 	},
 	{
-		.version	= POLICYDB_VERSION_DEFAULT_TYPE,
-		.sym_num	= SYM_NUM,
-		.ocon_num	= OCON_NUM - 2,
+		.version = POLICYDB_VERSION_DEFAULT_TYPE,
+		.sym_num = SYM_NUM,
+		.ocon_num = OCON_NUM - 2,
 	},
 	{
-		.version	= POLICYDB_VERSION_CONSTRAINT_NAMES,
-		.sym_num	= SYM_NUM,
-		.ocon_num	= OCON_NUM - 2,
+		.version = POLICYDB_VERSION_CONSTRAINT_NAMES,
+		.sym_num = SYM_NUM,
+		.ocon_num = OCON_NUM - 2,
 	},
 	{
-		.version	= POLICYDB_VERSION_XPERMS_IOCTL,
-		.sym_num	= SYM_NUM,
-		.ocon_num	= OCON_NUM - 2,
+		.version = POLICYDB_VERSION_XPERMS_IOCTL,
+		.sym_num = SYM_NUM,
+		.ocon_num = OCON_NUM - 2,
 	},
 	{
-		.version	= POLICYDB_VERSION_INFINIBAND,
-		.sym_num	= SYM_NUM,
-		.ocon_num	= OCON_NUM,
+		.version = POLICYDB_VERSION_INFINIBAND,
+		.sym_num = SYM_NUM,
+		.ocon_num = OCON_NUM,
 	},
 	{
-		.version	= POLICYDB_VERSION_GLBLUB,
-		.sym_num	= SYM_NUM,
-		.ocon_num	= OCON_NUM,
+		.version = POLICYDB_VERSION_GLBLUB,
+		.sym_num = SYM_NUM,
+		.ocon_num = OCON_NUM,
 	},
 	{
-		.version	= POLICYDB_VERSION_COMP_FTRANS,
-		.sym_num	= SYM_NUM,
-		.ocon_num	= OCON_NUM,
+		.version = POLICYDB_VERSION_COMP_FTRANS,
+		.sym_num = SYM_NUM,
+		.ocon_num = OCON_NUM,
 	},
 };
 
-static const struct policydb_compat_info *policydb_lookup_compat(unsigned int version)
+static const struct policydb_compat_info *
+policydb_lookup_compat(unsigned int version)
 {
 	unsigned int i;
 
@@ -312,7 +311,8 @@ static int cat_destroy(void *key, void *datum, void *p)
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static int (*const destroy_f[SYM_NUM]) (void *key, void *datum, void *datap) = {
+/* clang-format off */
+static int (*const destroy_f[SYM_NUM])(void *key, void *datum, void *datap) = {
 	common_destroy,
 	cls_destroy,
 	role_destroy,
@@ -322,6 +322,7 @@ static int (*const destroy_f[SYM_NUM]) (void *key, void *datum, void *datap) = {
 	sens_destroy,
 	cat_destroy,
 };
+/* clang-format on */
 
 static int filenametr_destroy(void *key, void *datum, void *p)
 {
@@ -366,8 +367,8 @@ static void ocontext_destroy(struct ocontext *c, unsigned int i)
 
 	context_destroy(&c->context[0]);
 	context_destroy(&c->context[1]);
-	if (i == OCON_ISID || i == OCON_FS ||
-	    i == OCON_NETIF || i == OCON_FSUSE)
+	if (i == OCON_ISID || i == OCON_FS || i == OCON_NETIF ||
+	    i == OCON_FSUSE)
 		kfree(c->u.name);
 	kfree(c);
 }
@@ -429,7 +430,6 @@ static int filenametr_cmp(const void *k1, const void *k2)
 		return v;
 
 	return strcmp(ft1->name, ft2->name);
-
 }
 
 static const struct hashtab_key_params filenametr_key_params = {
@@ -437,8 +437,8 @@ static const struct hashtab_key_params filenametr_key_params = {
 	.cmp = filenametr_cmp,
 };
 
-struct filename_trans_datum *policydb_filenametr_search(
-	struct policydb *p, struct filename_trans_key *key)
+struct filename_trans_datum *
+policydb_filenametr_search(struct policydb *p, struct filename_trans_key *key)
 {
 	return hashtab_search(&p->filename_trans, key, filenametr_key_params);
 }
@@ -448,7 +448,7 @@ static u32 rangetr_hash(const void *k)
 	const struct range_trans *key = k;
 
 	return key->source_type + (key->target_type << 3) +
-		(key->target_class << 5);
+	       (key->target_class << 5);
 }
 
 static int rangetr_cmp(const void *k1, const void *k2)
@@ -484,7 +484,8 @@ static u32 role_trans_hash(const void *k)
 {
 	const struct role_trans_key *key = k;
 
-	return jhash_3words(key->role, key->type, (u32)key->tclass << 16 | key->tclass, 0);
+	return jhash_3words(key->role, key->type,
+			    (u32)key->tclass << 16 | key->tclass, 0);
 }
 
 static int role_trans_cmp(const void *k1, const void *k2)
@@ -576,9 +577,8 @@ static int role_index(void *key, void *datum, void *datap)
 
 	role = datum;
 	p = datap;
-	if (!role->value
-	    || role->value > p->p_roles.nprim
-	    || role->bounds > p->p_roles.nprim)
+	if (!role->value || role->value > p->p_roles.nprim ||
+	    role->bounds > p->p_roles.nprim)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	p->sym_val_to_name[SYM_ROLES][role->value - 1] = key;
@@ -595,9 +595,8 @@ static int type_index(void *key, void *datum, void *datap)
 	p = datap;
 
 	if (typdatum->primary) {
-		if (!typdatum->value
-		    || typdatum->value > p->p_types.nprim
-		    || typdatum->bounds > p->p_types.nprim)
+		if (!typdatum->value || typdatum->value > p->p_types.nprim ||
+		    typdatum->bounds > p->p_types.nprim)
 			return -EINVAL;
 		p->sym_val_to_name[SYM_TYPES][typdatum->value - 1] = key;
 		p->type_val_to_struct[typdatum->value - 1] = typdatum;
@@ -613,9 +612,8 @@ static int user_index(void *key, void *datum, void *datap)
 
 	usrdatum = datum;
 	p = datap;
-	if (!usrdatum->value
-	    || usrdatum->value > p->p_users.nprim
-	    || usrdatum->bounds > p->p_users.nprim)
+	if (!usrdatum->value || usrdatum->value > p->p_users.nprim ||
+	    usrdatum->bounds > p->p_users.nprim)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	p->sym_val_to_name[SYM_USERS][usrdatum->value - 1] = key;
@@ -660,7 +658,8 @@ static int cat_index(void *key, void *datum, void *datap)
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static int (*const index_f[SYM_NUM]) (void *key, void *datum, void *datap) = {
+/* clang-format off */
+static int (*const index_f[SYM_NUM])(void *key, void *datum, void *datap) = {
 	common_index,
 	class_index,
 	role_index,
@@ -670,6 +669,7 @@ static int (*const index_f[SYM_NUM]) (void *key, void *datum, void *datap) = {
 	sens_index,
 	cat_index,
 };
+/* clang-format on */
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEBUG
 static void hash_eval(struct hashtab *h, const char *hash_name)
@@ -677,9 +677,10 @@ static void hash_eval(struct hashtab *h, const char *hash_name)
 	struct hashtab_info info;
 
 	hashtab_stat(h, &info);
-	pr_debug("SELinux: %s:  %d entries and %d/%d buckets used, longest chain length %d, sum of chain length^2 %llu\n",
-		 hash_name, h->nel, info.slots_used, h->size,
-		 info.max_chain_len, info.chain2_len_sum);
+	pr_debug(
+		"SELinux: %s:  %d entries and %d/%d buckets used, longest chain length %d, sum of chain length^2 %llu\n",
+		hash_name, h->nel, info.slots_used, h->size, info.max_chain_len,
+		info.chain2_len_sum);
 }
 
 static void symtab_hash_eval(struct symtab *s)
@@ -710,16 +711,17 @@ static int policydb_index(struct policydb *p)
 	int i, rc;
 
 	if (p->mls_enabled)
-		pr_debug("SELinux:  %d users, %d roles, %d types, %d bools, %d sens, %d cats\n",
-			 p->p_users.nprim, p->p_roles.nprim, p->p_types.nprim,
-			 p->p_bools.nprim, p->p_levels.nprim, p->p_cats.nprim);
+		pr_debug(
+			"SELinux:  %d users, %d roles, %d types, %d bools, %d sens, %d cats\n",
+			p->p_users.nprim, p->p_roles.nprim, p->p_types.nprim,
+			p->p_bools.nprim, p->p_levels.nprim, p->p_cats.nprim);
 	else
 		pr_debug("SELinux:  %d users, %d roles, %d types, %d bools\n",
 			 p->p_users.nprim, p->p_roles.nprim, p->p_types.nprim,
 			 p->p_bools.nprim);
 
-	pr_debug("SELinux:  %d classes, %d rules\n",
-		 p->p_classes.nprim, p->te_avtab.nel);
+	pr_debug("SELinux:  %d classes, %d rules\n", p->p_classes.nprim,
+		 p->te_avtab.nel);
 
 	avtab_hash_eval(&p->te_avtab, "rules");
 	symtab_hash_eval(p->symtab);
@@ -730,21 +732,18 @@ static int policydb_index(struct policydb *p)
 	if (!p->class_val_to_struct)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
-	p->role_val_to_struct = kcalloc(p->p_roles.nprim,
-					sizeof(*p->role_val_to_struct),
-					GFP_KERNEL);
+	p->role_val_to_struct = kcalloc(
+		p->p_roles.nprim, sizeof(*p->role_val_to_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!p->role_val_to_struct)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
-	p->user_val_to_struct = kcalloc(p->p_users.nprim,
-					sizeof(*p->user_val_to_struct),
-					GFP_KERNEL);
+	p->user_val_to_struct = kcalloc(
+		p->p_users.nprim, sizeof(*p->user_val_to_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!p->user_val_to_struct)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
-	p->type_val_to_struct = kvcalloc(p->p_types.nprim,
-					 sizeof(*p->type_val_to_struct),
-					 GFP_KERNEL);
+	p->type_val_to_struct = kvcalloc(
+		p->p_types.nprim, sizeof(*p->type_val_to_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!p->type_val_to_struct)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
@@ -754,8 +753,7 @@ static int policydb_index(struct policydb *p)
 
 	for (i = 0; i < SYM_NUM; i++) {
 		p->sym_val_to_name[i] = kvcalloc(p->symtab[i].nprim,
-						 sizeof(char *),
-						 GFP_KERNEL);
+						 sizeof(char *), GFP_KERNEL);
 		if (!p->sym_val_to_name[i])
 			return -ENOMEM;
 
@@ -857,8 +855,7 @@ void policydb_destroy(struct policydb *p)
 int policydb_load_isids(struct policydb *p, struct sidtab *s)
 {
 	struct ocontext *head, *c;
-	bool isid_init_supported = ebitmap_get_bit(&p->policycaps,
-						   POLICYDB_CAP_USERSPACE_INITIAL_CONTEXT);
+	bool isid_init;
 	int rc;
 
 	rc = sidtab_init(s);
@@ -867,6 +864,9 @@ int policydb_load_isids(struct policydb *p, struct sidtab *s)
 		return rc;
 	}
 
+	isid_init = ebitmap_get_bit(&p->policycaps,
+				    POLICYDB_CAP_USERSPACE_INITIAL_CONTEXT);
+
 	head = p->ocontexts[OCON_ISID];
 	for (c = head; c; c = c->next) {
 		u32 sid = c->sid[0];
@@ -886,7 +886,7 @@ int policydb_load_isids(struct policydb *p, struct sidtab *s)
 		 * Also ignore SECINITSID_INIT if the policy doesn't declare
 		 * support for it
 		 */
-		if (sid == SECINITSID_INIT && !isid_init_supported)
+		if (sid == SECINITSID_INIT && !isid_init)
 			continue;
 
 		rc = sidtab_set_initial(s, sid, &c->context[0]);
@@ -905,8 +905,9 @@ int policydb_load_isids(struct policydb *p, struct sidtab *s)
 		 * started before policy load would initially get the context
 		 * corresponding to SECINITSID_KERNEL.
 		 */
-		if (sid == SECINITSID_KERNEL && !isid_init_supported) {
-			rc = sidtab_set_initial(s, SECINITSID_INIT, &c->context[0]);
+		if (sid == SECINITSID_KERNEL && !isid_init) {
+			rc = sidtab_set_initial(s, SECINITSID_INIT,
+						&c->context[0]);
 			if (rc) {
 				pr_err("SELinux:  unable to load initial SID %s.\n",
 				       name);
@@ -1047,8 +1048,7 @@ out:
  * Read and validate a security context structure
  * from a policydb binary representation file.
  */
-static int context_read_and_validate(struct context *c,
-				     struct policydb *p,
+static int context_read_and_validate(struct context *c, struct policydb *p,
 				     void *fp)
 {
 	__le32 buf[3];
@@ -1211,10 +1211,8 @@ static int type_set_read(struct type_set *t, void *fp)
 	return 0;
 }
 
-
-static int read_cons_helper(struct policydb *p,
-				struct constraint_node **nodep,
-				u32 ncons, int allowxtarget, void *fp)
+static int read_cons_helper(struct policydb *p, struct constraint_node **nodep,
+			    u32 ncons, int allowxtarget, void *fp)
 {
 	struct constraint_node *c, *lc;
 	struct constraint_expr *e, *le;
@@ -1284,8 +1282,9 @@ static int read_cons_helper(struct policydb *p,
 					return rc;
 				if (p->policyvers >=
 				    POLICYDB_VERSION_CONSTRAINT_NAMES) {
-					e->type_names = kzalloc(sizeof
-						(*e->type_names), GFP_KERNEL);
+					e->type_names =
+						kzalloc(sizeof(*e->type_names),
+							GFP_KERNEL);
 					if (!e->type_names)
 						return -ENOMEM;
 					type_set_init(e->type_names);
@@ -1319,7 +1318,7 @@ static int class_read(struct policydb *p, struct symtab *s, void *fp)
 	if (!cladatum)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
-	rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32)*6);
+	rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32) * 6);
 	if (rc)
 		goto bad;
 
@@ -1345,8 +1344,8 @@ static int class_read(struct policydb *p, struct symtab *s, void *fp)
 			goto bad;
 
 		rc = -EINVAL;
-		cladatum->comdatum = symtab_search(&p->p_commons,
-						   cladatum->comkey);
+		cladatum->comdatum =
+			symtab_search(&p->p_commons, cladatum->comkey);
 		if (!cladatum->comdatum) {
 			pr_err("SELinux:  unknown common %s\n",
 			       cladatum->comkey);
@@ -1369,8 +1368,8 @@ static int class_read(struct policydb *p, struct symtab *s, void *fp)
 		if (rc)
 			goto bad;
 		ncons = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
-		rc = read_cons_helper(p, &cladatum->validatetrans,
-				ncons, 1, fp);
+		rc = read_cons_helper(p, &cladatum->validatetrans, ncons, 1,
+				      fp);
 		if (rc)
 			goto bad;
 	}
@@ -1507,7 +1506,6 @@ bad:
 	return rc;
 }
 
-
 /*
  * Read a MLS level structure from a policydb binary
  * representation file.
@@ -1659,8 +1657,9 @@ bad:
 	return rc;
 }
 
-static int (*const read_f[SYM_NUM]) (struct policydb *p,
-				     struct symtab *s, void *fp) = {
+/* clang-format off */
+static int (*const read_f[SYM_NUM])(struct policydb *p, struct symtab *s,
+				    void *fp) = {
 	common_read,
 	class_read,
 	role_read,
@@ -1670,6 +1669,7 @@ static int (*const read_f[SYM_NUM]) (struct policydb *p,
 	sens_read,
 	cat_read,
 };
+/* clang-format on */
 
 static int user_bounds_sanity_check(void *key, void *datum, void *datap)
 {
@@ -1685,12 +1685,13 @@ static int user_bounds_sanity_check(void *key, void *datum, void *datap)
 		if (++depth == POLICYDB_BOUNDS_MAXDEPTH) {
 			pr_err("SELinux: user %s: "
 			       "too deep or looped boundary\n",
-			       (char *) key);
+			       (char *)key);
 			return -EINVAL;
 		}
 
 		upper = p->user_val_to_struct[upper->bounds - 1];
-		ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(&user->roles, node, bit) {
+		ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(&user->roles, node, bit)
+		{
 			if (ebitmap_get_bit(&upper->roles, bit))
 				continue;
 
@@ -1721,12 +1722,13 @@ static int role_bounds_sanity_check(void *key, void *datum, void *datap)
 		if (++depth == POLICYDB_BOUNDS_MAXDEPTH) {
 			pr_err("SELinux: role %s: "
 			       "too deep or looped bounds\n",
-			       (char *) key);
+			       (char *)key);
 			return -EINVAL;
 		}
 
 		upper = p->role_val_to_struct[upper->bounds - 1];
-		ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(&role->types, node, bit) {
+		ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(&role->types, node, bit)
+		{
 			if (ebitmap_get_bit(&upper->types, bit))
 				continue;
 
@@ -1754,7 +1756,7 @@ static int type_bounds_sanity_check(void *key, void *datum, void *datap)
 		if (++depth == POLICYDB_BOUNDS_MAXDEPTH) {
 			pr_err("SELinux: type %s: "
 			       "too deep or looped boundary\n",
-			       (char *) key);
+			       (char *)key);
 			return -EINVAL;
 		}
 
@@ -1764,7 +1766,7 @@ static int type_bounds_sanity_check(void *key, void *datum, void *datap)
 		if (upper->attribute) {
 			pr_err("SELinux: type %s: "
 			       "bounded by attribute %s\n",
-			       (char *) key,
+			       (char *)key,
 			       sym_name(p, SYM_TYPES, upper->value - 1));
 			return -EINVAL;
 		}
@@ -1815,7 +1817,7 @@ u32 string_to_av_perm(struct policydb *p, u16 tclass, const char *name)
 	if (!tclass || tclass > p->p_classes.nprim)
 		return 0;
 
-	cladatum = p->class_val_to_struct[tclass-1];
+	cladatum = p->class_val_to_struct[tclass - 1];
 	comdatum = cladatum->comdatum;
 	if (comdatum)
 		perdatum = symtab_search(&comdatum->permissions, name);
@@ -1824,7 +1826,7 @@ u32 string_to_av_perm(struct policydb *p, u16 tclass, const char *name)
 	if (!perdatum)
 		return 0;
 
-	return 1U << (perdatum->value-1);
+	return 1U << (perdatum->value - 1);
 }
 
 static int range_read(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
@@ -2192,12 +2194,12 @@ static int genfs_read(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
 				goto out;
 
 			newc->v.sclass = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
-			rc = context_read_and_validate(&newc->context[0], p, fp);
+			rc = context_read_and_validate(&newc->context[0], p,
+						       fp);
 			if (rc)
 				goto out;
 
-			for (l = NULL, c = genfs->head; c;
-			     l = c, c = c->next) {
+			for (l = NULL, c = genfs->head; c; l = c, c = c->next) {
 				rc = -EINVAL;
 				if (!strcmp(newc->u.name, c->u.name) &&
 				    (!c->v.sclass || !newc->v.sclass ||
@@ -2231,8 +2233,8 @@ out:
 	return rc;
 }
 
-static int ocontext_read(struct policydb *p, const struct policydb_compat_info *info,
-			 void *fp)
+static int ocontext_read(struct policydb *p,
+			 const struct policydb_compat_info *info, void *fp)
 {
 	int rc;
 	unsigned int i;
@@ -2267,7 +2269,8 @@ static int ocontext_read(struct policydb *p, const struct policydb_compat_info *
 					goto out;
 
 				c->sid[0] = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
-				rc = context_read_and_validate(&c->context[0], p, fp);
+				rc = context_read_and_validate(&c->context[0],
+							       p, fp);
 				if (rc)
 					goto out;
 				break;
@@ -2286,21 +2289,24 @@ static int ocontext_read(struct policydb *p, const struct policydb_compat_info *
 					pr_warn("SELinux:  void and deprecated fs ocon %s\n",
 						c->u.name);
 
-				rc = context_read_and_validate(&c->context[0], p, fp);
+				rc = context_read_and_validate(&c->context[0],
+							       p, fp);
 				if (rc)
 					goto out;
-				rc = context_read_and_validate(&c->context[1], p, fp);
+				rc = context_read_and_validate(&c->context[1],
+							       p, fp);
 				if (rc)
 					goto out;
 				break;
 			case OCON_PORT:
-				rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32)*3);
+				rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32) * 3);
 				if (rc)
 					goto out;
 				c->u.port.protocol = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
 				c->u.port.low_port = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
 				c->u.port.high_port = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]);
-				rc = context_read_and_validate(&c->context[0], p, fp);
+				rc = context_read_and_validate(&c->context[0],
+							       p, fp);
 				if (rc)
 					goto out;
 				break;
@@ -2310,12 +2316,13 @@ static int ocontext_read(struct policydb *p, const struct policydb_compat_info *
 					goto out;
 				c->u.node.addr = nodebuf[0]; /* network order */
 				c->u.node.mask = nodebuf[1]; /* network order */
-				rc = context_read_and_validate(&c->context[0], p, fp);
+				rc = context_read_and_validate(&c->context[0],
+							       p, fp);
 				if (rc)
 					goto out;
 				break;
 			case OCON_FSUSE:
-				rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32)*2);
+				rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32) * 2);
 				if (rc)
 					goto out;
 
@@ -2332,7 +2339,8 @@ static int ocontext_read(struct policydb *p, const struct policydb_compat_info *
 				if (rc)
 					goto out;
 
-				rc = context_read_and_validate(&c->context[0], p, fp);
+				rc = context_read_and_validate(&c->context[0],
+							       p, fp);
 				if (rc)
 					goto out;
 				break;
@@ -2345,8 +2353,9 @@ static int ocontext_read(struct policydb *p, const struct policydb_compat_info *
 				for (k = 0; k < 4; k++)
 					c->u.node6.addr[k] = nodebuf[k];
 				for (k = 0; k < 4; k++)
-					c->u.node6.mask[k] = nodebuf[k+4];
-				rc = context_read_and_validate(&c->context[0], p, fp);
+					c->u.node6.mask[k] = nodebuf[k + 4];
+				rc = context_read_and_validate(&c->context[0],
+							       p, fp);
 				if (rc)
 					goto out;
 				break;
@@ -2359,7 +2368,8 @@ static int ocontext_read(struct policydb *p, const struct policydb_compat_info *
 					goto out;
 
 				/* we need to have subnet_prefix in CPU order */
-				c->u.ibpkey.subnet_prefix = be64_to_cpu(prefixbuf[0]);
+				c->u.ibpkey.subnet_prefix =
+					be64_to_cpu(prefixbuf[0]);
 
 				rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32) * 2);
 				if (rc)
@@ -2373,12 +2383,11 @@ static int ocontext_read(struct policydb *p, const struct policydb_compat_info *
 					goto out;
 				}
 
-				c->u.ibpkey.low_pkey  = pkey_lo;
+				c->u.ibpkey.low_pkey = pkey_lo;
 				c->u.ibpkey.high_pkey = pkey_hi;
 
 				rc = context_read_and_validate(&c->context[0],
-							       p,
-							       fp);
+							       p, fp);
 				if (rc)
 					goto out;
 				break;
@@ -2391,7 +2400,8 @@ static int ocontext_read(struct policydb *p, const struct policydb_compat_info *
 					goto out;
 				len = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
 
-				rc = str_read(&c->u.ibendport.dev_name, GFP_KERNEL, fp, len);
+				rc = str_read(&c->u.ibendport.dev_name,
+					      GFP_KERNEL, fp, len);
 				if (rc)
 					goto out;
 
@@ -2404,8 +2414,7 @@ static int ocontext_read(struct policydb *p, const struct policydb_compat_info *
 				c->u.ibendport.port = port;
 
 				rc = context_read_and_validate(&c->context[0],
-							       p,
-							       fp);
+							       p, fp);
 				if (rc)
 					goto out;
 				break;
@@ -2462,7 +2471,8 @@ int policydb_read(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
 	policydb_str = kmalloc(len + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!policydb_str) {
 		pr_err("SELinux:  unable to allocate memory for policydb "
-		       "string of length %d\n", len);
+		       "string of length %d\n",
+		       len);
 		goto bad;
 	}
 
@@ -2477,7 +2487,8 @@ int policydb_read(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
 	policydb_str[len] = '\0';
 	if (strcmp(policydb_str, POLICYDB_STRING)) {
 		pr_err("SELinux:  policydb string %s does not match "
-		       "my string %s\n", policydb_str, POLICYDB_STRING);
+		       "my string %s\n",
+		       policydb_str, POLICYDB_STRING);
 		kfree(policydb_str);
 		goto bad;
 	}
@@ -2486,7 +2497,7 @@ int policydb_read(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
 	policydb_str = NULL;
 
 	/* Read the version and table sizes. */
-	rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32)*4);
+	rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32) * 4);
 	if (rc)
 		goto bad;
 
@@ -2496,7 +2507,8 @@ int policydb_read(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
 	    p->policyvers > POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX) {
 		pr_err("SELinux:  policydb version %d does not match "
 		       "my version range %d-%d\n",
-		       le32_to_cpu(buf[0]), POLICYDB_VERSION_MIN, POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX);
+		       le32_to_cpu(buf[0]), POLICYDB_VERSION_MIN,
+		       POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX);
 		goto bad;
 	}
 
@@ -2506,8 +2518,8 @@ int policydb_read(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
 		rc = -EINVAL;
 		if (p->policyvers < POLICYDB_VERSION_MLS) {
 			pr_err("SELinux: security policydb version %d "
-				"(MLS) not backwards compatible\n",
-				p->policyvers);
+			       "(MLS) not backwards compatible\n",
+			       p->policyvers);
 			goto bad;
 		}
 	}
@@ -2530,22 +2542,23 @@ int policydb_read(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
 	info = policydb_lookup_compat(p->policyvers);
 	if (!info) {
 		pr_err("SELinux:  unable to find policy compat info "
-		       "for version %d\n", p->policyvers);
+		       "for version %d\n",
+		       p->policyvers);
 		goto bad;
 	}
 
 	rc = -EINVAL;
 	if (le32_to_cpu(buf[2]) != info->sym_num ||
-		le32_to_cpu(buf[3]) != info->ocon_num) {
+	    le32_to_cpu(buf[3]) != info->ocon_num) {
 		pr_err("SELinux:  policydb table sizes (%d,%d) do "
-		       "not match mine (%d,%d)\n", le32_to_cpu(buf[2]),
-			le32_to_cpu(buf[3]),
-		       info->sym_num, info->ocon_num);
+		       "not match mine (%d,%d)\n",
+		       le32_to_cpu(buf[2]), le32_to_cpu(buf[3]), info->sym_num,
+		       info->ocon_num);
 		goto bad;
 	}
 
 	for (i = 0; i < info->sym_num; i++) {
-		rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32)*2);
+		rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32) * 2);
 		if (rc)
 			goto bad;
 		nprim = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
@@ -2606,7 +2619,7 @@ int policydb_read(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
 		if (!rtd)
 			goto bad;
 
-		rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32)*3);
+		rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32) * 3);
 		if (rc)
 			goto bad;
 
@@ -2650,7 +2663,7 @@ int policydb_read(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
 			lra->next = ra;
 		else
 			p->role_allow = ra;
-		rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32)*2);
+		rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32) * 2);
 		if (rc)
 			goto bad;
 
@@ -2698,9 +2711,8 @@ int policydb_read(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
 		goto bad;
 
 	rc = -ENOMEM;
-	p->type_attr_map_array = kvcalloc(p->p_types.nprim,
-					  sizeof(*p->type_attr_map_array),
-					  GFP_KERNEL);
+	p->type_attr_map_array = kvcalloc(
+		p->p_types.nprim, sizeof(*p->type_attr_map_array), GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!p->type_attr_map_array)
 		goto bad;
 
@@ -2773,7 +2785,7 @@ static int mls_write_range_helper(struct mls_range *r, void *fp)
 		items = 2;
 	else
 		items = 3;
-	buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(items-1);
+	buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(items - 1);
 	buf[1] = cpu_to_le32(r->level[0].sens);
 	if (!eq)
 		buf[2] = cpu_to_le32(r->level[1].sens);
@@ -2916,8 +2928,7 @@ static int role_allow_write(struct role_allow *r, void *fp)
  * Write a security context structure
  * to a policydb binary representation file.
  */
-static int context_write(struct policydb *p, struct context *c,
-			 void *fp)
+static int context_write(struct policydb *p, struct context *c, void *fp)
 {
 	int rc;
 	__le32 buf[3];
@@ -3045,7 +3056,7 @@ static int write_cons_helper(struct policydb *p, struct constraint_node *node,
 				if (rc)
 					return rc;
 				if (p->policyvers >=
-					POLICYDB_VERSION_CONSTRAINT_NAMES) {
+				    POLICYDB_VERSION_CONSTRAINT_NAMES) {
 					rc = type_set_write(e->type_names, fp);
 					if (rc)
 						return rc;
@@ -3266,7 +3277,8 @@ static int user_write(void *vkey, void *datum, void *ptr)
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static int (*const write_f[SYM_NUM]) (void *key, void *datum, void *datap) = {
+/* clang-format off */
+static int (*const write_f[SYM_NUM])(void *key, void *datum, void *datap) = {
 	common_write,
 	class_write,
 	role_write,
@@ -3276,9 +3288,10 @@ static int (*const write_f[SYM_NUM]) (void *key, void *datum, void *datap) = {
 	sens_write,
 	cat_write,
 };
+/* clang-format on */
 
-static int ocontext_write(struct policydb *p, const struct policydb_compat_info *info,
-			  void *fp)
+static int ocontext_write(struct policydb *p,
+			  const struct policydb_compat_info *info, void *fp)
 {
 	unsigned int i, j;
 	int rc;
@@ -3360,9 +3373,13 @@ static int ocontext_write(struct policydb *p, const struct policydb_compat_info
 				break;
 			case OCON_NODE6:
 				for (j = 0; j < 4; j++)
-					nodebuf[j] = c->u.node6.addr[j]; /* network order */
+					nodebuf[j] =
+						c->u.node6.addr
+							[j]; /* network order */
 				for (j = 0; j < 4; j++)
-					nodebuf[j + 4] = c->u.node6.mask[j]; /* network order */
+					nodebuf[j + 4] =
+						c->u.node6.mask
+							[j]; /* network order */
 				rc = put_entry(nodebuf, sizeof(u32), 8, fp);
 				if (rc)
 					return rc;
@@ -3372,7 +3389,8 @@ static int ocontext_write(struct policydb *p, const struct policydb_compat_info
 				break;
 			case OCON_IBPKEY:
 				/* subnet_prefix is in CPU order */
-				prefixbuf[0] = cpu_to_be64(c->u.ibpkey.subnet_prefix);
+				prefixbuf[0] =
+					cpu_to_be64(c->u.ibpkey.subnet_prefix);
 
 				rc = put_entry(prefixbuf, sizeof(u64), 1, fp);
 				if (rc)
@@ -3395,7 +3413,8 @@ static int ocontext_write(struct policydb *p, const struct policydb_compat_info
 				rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 2, fp);
 				if (rc)
 					return rc;
-				rc = put_entry(c->u.ibendport.dev_name, 1, len, fp);
+				rc = put_entry(c->u.ibendport.dev_name, 1, len,
+					       fp);
 				if (rc)
 					return rc;
 				rc = context_write(p, &c->context[0], fp);
@@ -3521,7 +3540,8 @@ static int filename_write_helper_compat(void *key, void *data, void *ptr)
 	u32 bit, len = strlen(ft->name);
 
 	do {
-		ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(&datum->stypes, node, bit) {
+		ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(&datum->stypes, node, bit)
+		{
 			buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(len);
 			rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
 			if (rc)
@@ -3645,8 +3665,8 @@ int policydb_write(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
 	 */
 	if (p->policyvers < POLICYDB_VERSION_AVTAB) {
 		pr_err("SELinux: refusing to write policy version %d."
-		       "  Because it is less than version %d\n", p->policyvers,
-		       POLICYDB_VERSION_AVTAB);
+		       "  Because it is less than version %d\n",
+		       p->policyvers, POLICYDB_VERSION_AVTAB);
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
@@ -3674,7 +3694,8 @@ int policydb_write(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
 	info = policydb_lookup_compat(p->policyvers);
 	if (!info) {
 		pr_err("SELinux: compatibility lookup failed for policy "
-		    "version %d\n", p->policyvers);
+		       "version %d\n",
+		       p->policyvers);
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.h b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.h
index b97cda4897..4bba386264 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.h
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.h
@@ -8,15 +8,13 @@
 
 /*
  * Updated: Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc. <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
+ *          Support for enhanced MLS infrastructure.
+ *          Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
  *
- *	Support for enhanced MLS infrastructure.
- *
- * Updated: Frank Mayer <mayerf@tresys.com> and Karl MacMillan <kmacmillan@tresys.com>
- *
- *	Added conditional policy language extensions
- *
- * Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
- * Copyright (C) 2003 - 2004 Tresys Technology, LLC
+ * Updated: Frank Mayer <mayerf@tresys.com> and
+ *          Karl MacMillan <kmacmillan@tresys.com>
+ *          Added conditional policy language extensions
+ *          Copyright (C) 2003-2004 Tresys Technology, LLC
  */
 
 #ifndef _SS_POLICYDB_H_
@@ -39,104 +37,103 @@
 
 /* Permission attributes */
 struct perm_datum {
-	u32 value;		/* permission bit + 1 */
+	u32 value; /* permission bit + 1 */
 };
 
 /* Attributes of a common prefix for access vectors */
 struct common_datum {
-	u32 value;			/* internal common value */
-	struct symtab permissions;	/* common permissions */
+	u32 value; /* internal common value */
+	struct symtab permissions; /* common permissions */
 };
 
 /* Class attributes */
 struct class_datum {
-	u32 value;			/* class value */
-	char *comkey;			/* common name */
-	struct common_datum *comdatum;	/* common datum */
-	struct symtab permissions;	/* class-specific permission symbol table */
-	struct constraint_node *constraints;	/* constraints on class permissions */
-	struct constraint_node *validatetrans;	/* special transition rules */
+	u32 value; /* class value */
+	char *comkey; /* common name */
+	struct common_datum *comdatum; /* common datum */
+	struct symtab permissions; /* class-specific permission symbol table */
+	struct constraint_node *constraints; /* constraints on class perms */
+	struct constraint_node *validatetrans; /* special transition rules */
 /* Options how a new object user, role, and type should be decided */
-#define DEFAULT_SOURCE         1
-#define DEFAULT_TARGET         2
+#define DEFAULT_SOURCE 1
+#define DEFAULT_TARGET 2
 	char default_user;
 	char default_role;
 	char default_type;
 /* Options how a new object range should be decided */
-#define DEFAULT_SOURCE_LOW     1
-#define DEFAULT_SOURCE_HIGH    2
-#define DEFAULT_SOURCE_LOW_HIGH        3
-#define DEFAULT_TARGET_LOW     4
-#define DEFAULT_TARGET_HIGH    5
-#define DEFAULT_TARGET_LOW_HIGH        6
+#define DEFAULT_SOURCE_LOW	1
+#define DEFAULT_SOURCE_HIGH	2
+#define DEFAULT_SOURCE_LOW_HIGH 3
+#define DEFAULT_TARGET_LOW	4
+#define DEFAULT_TARGET_HIGH	5
+#define DEFAULT_TARGET_LOW_HIGH 6
 #define DEFAULT_GLBLUB		7
 	char default_range;
 };
 
 /* Role attributes */
 struct role_datum {
-	u32 value;			/* internal role value */
-	u32 bounds;			/* boundary of role */
-	struct ebitmap dominates;	/* set of roles dominated by this role */
-	struct ebitmap types;		/* set of authorized types for role */
+	u32 value; /* internal role value */
+	u32 bounds; /* boundary of role */
+	struct ebitmap dominates; /* set of roles dominated by this role */
+	struct ebitmap types; /* set of authorized types for role */
 };
 
 struct role_trans_key {
-	u32 role;		/* current role */
-	u32 type;		/* program executable type, or new object type */
-	u32 tclass;		/* process class, or new object class */
+	u32 role; /* current role */
+	u32 type; /* program executable type, or new object type */
+	u32 tclass; /* process class, or new object class */
 };
 
 struct role_trans_datum {
-	u32 new_role;		/* new role */
+	u32 new_role; /* new role */
 };
 
 struct filename_trans_key {
-	u32 ttype;		/* parent dir context */
-	u16 tclass;		/* class of new object */
-	const char *name;	/* last path component */
+	u32 ttype; /* parent dir context */
+	u16 tclass; /* class of new object */
+	const char *name; /* last path component */
 };
 
 struct filename_trans_datum {
-	struct ebitmap stypes;	/* bitmap of source types for this otype */
-	u32 otype;		/* resulting type of new object */
-	struct filename_trans_datum *next;	/* record for next otype*/
+	struct ebitmap stypes; /* bitmap of source types for this otype */
+	u32 otype; /* resulting type of new object */
+	struct filename_trans_datum *next; /* record for next otype*/
 };
 
 struct role_allow {
-	u32 role;		/* current role */
-	u32 new_role;		/* new role */
+	u32 role; /* current role */
+	u32 new_role; /* new role */
 	struct role_allow *next;
 };
 
 /* Type attributes */
 struct type_datum {
-	u32 value;		/* internal type value */
-	u32 bounds;		/* boundary of type */
-	unsigned char primary;	/* primary name? */
-	unsigned char attribute;/* attribute ?*/
+	u32 value; /* internal type value */
+	u32 bounds; /* boundary of type */
+	unsigned char primary; /* primary name? */
+	unsigned char attribute; /* attribute ?*/
 };
 
 /* User attributes */
 struct user_datum {
-	u32 value;			/* internal user value */
-	u32 bounds;			/* bounds of user */
-	struct ebitmap roles;		/* set of authorized roles for user */
-	struct mls_range range;		/* MLS range (min - max) for user */
-	struct mls_level dfltlevel;	/* default login MLS level for user */
+	u32 value; /* internal user value */
+	u32 bounds; /* bounds of user */
+	struct ebitmap roles; /* set of authorized roles for user */
+	struct mls_range range; /* MLS range (min - max) for user */
+	struct mls_level dfltlevel; /* default login MLS level for user */
 };
 
-
 /* Sensitivity attributes */
 struct level_datum {
-	struct mls_level *level;	/* sensitivity and associated categories */
-	unsigned char isalias;	/* is this sensitivity an alias for another? */
+	struct mls_level *level; /* sensitivity and associated categories */
+	unsigned char isalias; /* is this sensitivity an alias for another? */
 };
 
 /* Category attributes */
 struct cat_datum {
-	u32 value;		/* internal category bit + 1 */
-	unsigned char isalias;  /* is this category an alias for another? */
+	u32 value; /* internal category bit + 1 */
+	unsigned char isalias; /* is this category an alias for another? */
 };
 
 struct range_trans {
@@ -147,7 +144,7 @@ struct range_trans {
 
 /* Boolean data type */
 struct cond_bool_datum {
-	__u32 value;		/* internal type value */
+	__u32 value; /* internal type value */
 	int state;
 };
 
@@ -173,20 +170,20 @@ struct type_set {
  */
 struct ocontext {
 	union {
-		char *name;	/* name of initial SID, fs, netif, fstype, path */
+		char *name; /* name of initial SID, fs, netif, fstype, path */
 		struct {
 			u8 protocol;
 			u16 low_port;
 			u16 high_port;
-		} port;		/* TCP or UDP port information */
+		} port; /* TCP or UDP port information */
 		struct {
 			u32 addr;
 			u32 mask;
-		} node;		/* node information */
+		} node; /* node information */
 		struct {
 			u32 addr[4];
 			u32 mask[4];
-		} node6;        /* IPv6 node information */
+		} node6; /* IPv6 node information */
 		struct {
 			u64 subnet_prefix;
 			u16 low_pkey;
@@ -198,11 +195,11 @@ struct ocontext {
 		} ibendport;
 	} u;
 	union {
-		u32 sclass;  /* security class for genfs */
-		u32 behavior;  /* labeling behavior for fs_use */
+		u32 sclass; /* security class for genfs */
+		u32 behavior; /* labeling behavior for fs_use */
 	} v;
-	struct context context[2];	/* security context(s) */
-	u32 sid[2];	/* SID(s) */
+	struct context context[2]; /* security context(s) */
+	u32 sid[2]; /* SID(s) */
 	struct ocontext *next;
 };
 
@@ -221,19 +218,19 @@ struct genfs {
 #define SYM_BOOLS   5
 #define SYM_LEVELS  6
 #define SYM_CATS    7
-#define SYM_NUM     8
+#define SYM_NUM	    8
 
 /* object context array indices */
-#define OCON_ISID	0 /* initial SIDs */
-#define OCON_FS		1 /* unlabeled file systems (deprecated) */
-#define OCON_PORT	2 /* TCP and UDP port numbers */
-#define OCON_NETIF	3 /* network interfaces */
-#define OCON_NODE	4 /* nodes */
-#define OCON_FSUSE	5 /* fs_use */
-#define OCON_NODE6	6 /* IPv6 nodes */
-#define OCON_IBPKEY	7 /* Infiniband PKeys */
-#define OCON_IBENDPORT	8 /* Infiniband end ports */
-#define OCON_NUM	9
+#define OCON_ISID      0 /* initial SIDs */
+#define OCON_FS	       1 /* unlabeled file systems (deprecated) */
+#define OCON_PORT      2 /* TCP and UDP port numbers */
+#define OCON_NETIF     3 /* network interfaces */
+#define OCON_NODE      4 /* nodes */
+#define OCON_FSUSE     5 /* fs_use */
+#define OCON_NODE6     6 /* IPv6 nodes */
+#define OCON_IBPKEY    7 /* Infiniband PKeys */
+#define OCON_IBENDPORT 8 /* Infiniband end ports */
+#define OCON_NUM       9
 
 /* The policy database */
 struct policydb {
@@ -243,15 +240,15 @@ struct policydb {
 	struct symtab symtab[SYM_NUM];
 #define p_commons symtab[SYM_COMMONS]
 #define p_classes symtab[SYM_CLASSES]
-#define p_roles symtab[SYM_ROLES]
-#define p_types symtab[SYM_TYPES]
-#define p_users symtab[SYM_USERS]
-#define p_bools symtab[SYM_BOOLS]
-#define p_levels symtab[SYM_LEVELS]
-#define p_cats symtab[SYM_CATS]
+#define p_roles	  symtab[SYM_ROLES]
+#define p_types	  symtab[SYM_TYPES]
+#define p_users	  symtab[SYM_USERS]
+#define p_bools	  symtab[SYM_BOOLS]
+#define p_levels  symtab[SYM_LEVELS]
+#define p_cats	  symtab[SYM_CATS]
 
 	/* symbol names indexed by (value - 1) */
-	char		**sym_val_to_name[SYM_NUM];
+	char **sym_val_to_name[SYM_NUM];
 
 	/* class, role, and user attributes indexed by (value - 1) */
 	struct class_datum **class_val_to_struct;
@@ -324,25 +321,25 @@ extern int policydb_role_isvalid(struct policydb *p, unsigned int role);
 extern int policydb_read(struct policydb *p, void *fp);
 extern int policydb_write(struct policydb *p, void *fp);
 
-extern struct filename_trans_datum *policydb_filenametr_search(
-	struct policydb *p, struct filename_trans_key *key);
+extern struct filename_trans_datum *
+policydb_filenametr_search(struct policydb *p, struct filename_trans_key *key);
 
-extern struct mls_range *policydb_rangetr_search(
-	struct policydb *p, struct range_trans *key);
+extern struct mls_range *policydb_rangetr_search(struct policydb *p,
+						 struct range_trans *key);
 
-extern struct role_trans_datum *policydb_roletr_search(
-	struct policydb *p, struct role_trans_key *key);
+extern struct role_trans_datum *
+policydb_roletr_search(struct policydb *p, struct role_trans_key *key);
 
-#define POLICYDB_CONFIG_MLS    1
+#define POLICYDB_CONFIG_MLS 1
 
 /* the config flags related to unknown classes/perms are bits 2 and 3 */
-#define REJECT_UNKNOWN	0x00000002
-#define ALLOW_UNKNOWN	0x00000004
+#define REJECT_UNKNOWN 0x00000002
+#define ALLOW_UNKNOWN  0x00000004
 
-#define OBJECT_R "object_r"
+#define OBJECT_R     "object_r"
 #define OBJECT_R_VAL 1
 
-#define POLICYDB_MAGIC SELINUX_MAGIC
+#define POLICYDB_MAGIC	SELINUX_MAGIC
 #define POLICYDB_STRING "SE Linux"
 
 struct policy_file {
@@ -366,7 +363,8 @@ static inline int next_entry(void *buf, struct policy_file *fp, size_t bytes)
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static inline int put_entry(const void *buf, size_t bytes, size_t num, struct policy_file *fp)
+static inline int put_entry(const void *buf, size_t bytes, size_t num,
+			    struct policy_file *fp)
 {
 	size_t len;
 
@@ -382,7 +380,8 @@ static inline int put_entry(const void *buf, size_t bytes, size_t num, struct po
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static inline char *sym_name(struct policydb *p, unsigned int sym_num, unsigned int element_nr)
+static inline char *sym_name(struct policydb *p, unsigned int sym_num,
+			     unsigned int element_nr)
 {
 	return p->sym_val_to_name[sym_num][element_nr];
 }
@@ -390,5 +389,4 @@ static inline char *sym_name(struct policydb *p, unsigned int sym_num, unsigned
 extern u16 string_to_security_class(struct policydb *p, const char *name);
 extern u32 string_to_av_perm(struct policydb *p, u16 tclass, const char *name);
 
-#endif	/* _SS_POLICYDB_H_ */
-
+#endif /* _SS_POLICYDB_H_ */
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
index e88b1b6c4a..ded250e525 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
@@ -3508,7 +3508,8 @@ void selinux_audit_rule_free(void *vrule)
 	}
 }
 
-int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule)
+int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule,
+			    gfp_t gfp)
 {
 	struct selinux_state *state = &selinux_state;
 	struct selinux_policy *policy;
@@ -3549,7 +3550,7 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule)
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
-	tmprule = kzalloc(sizeof(struct selinux_audit_rule), GFP_KERNEL);
+	tmprule = kzalloc(sizeof(struct selinux_audit_rule), gfp);
 	if (!tmprule)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 	context_init(&tmprule->au_ctxt);
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.h b/security/selinux/ss/services.h
index d24b0a3d19..93358e7a64 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/services.h
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.h
@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@
  *
  * Author : Stephen Smalley, <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
  */
+
 #ifndef _SS_SERVICES_H_
 #define _SS_SERVICES_H_
 
@@ -43,4 +44,4 @@ int services_convert_context(struct convert_context_args *args,
 			     struct context *oldc, struct context *newc,
 			     gfp_t gfp_flags);
 
-#endif	/* _SS_SERVICES_H_ */
+#endif /* _SS_SERVICES_H_ */
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c b/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c
index 732fd8e22a..c8848cbba8 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c
@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@
  *
  * Copyright (C) 2018 Red Hat, Inc.
  */
+
 #include <linux/errno.h>
 #include <linux/kernel.h>
 #include <linux/list.h>
@@ -29,7 +30,7 @@ struct sidtab_str_cache {
 };
 
 #define index_to_sid(index) ((index) + SECINITSID_NUM + 1)
-#define sid_to_index(sid) ((sid) - (SECINITSID_NUM + 1))
+#define sid_to_index(sid)   ((sid) - (SECINITSID_NUM + 1))
 
 int sidtab_init(struct sidtab *s)
 {
@@ -140,9 +141,11 @@ int sidtab_hash_stats(struct sidtab *sidtab, char *page)
 	if (chain_len > max_chain_len)
 		max_chain_len = chain_len;
 
-	return scnprintf(page, PAGE_SIZE, "entries: %d\nbuckets used: %d/%d\n"
-			 "longest chain: %d\n", entries,
-			 slots_used, SIDTAB_HASH_BUCKETS, max_chain_len);
+	return scnprintf(page, PAGE_SIZE,
+			 "entries: %d\nbuckets used: %d/%d\n"
+			 "longest chain: %d\n",
+			 entries, slots_used, SIDTAB_HASH_BUCKETS,
+			 max_chain_len);
 }
 
 static u32 sidtab_level_from_count(u32 count)
@@ -162,15 +165,15 @@ static int sidtab_alloc_roots(struct sidtab *s, u32 level)
 	u32 l;
 
 	if (!s->roots[0].ptr_leaf) {
-		s->roots[0].ptr_leaf = kzalloc(SIDTAB_NODE_ALLOC_SIZE,
-					       GFP_ATOMIC);
+		s->roots[0].ptr_leaf =
+			kzalloc(SIDTAB_NODE_ALLOC_SIZE, GFP_ATOMIC);
 		if (!s->roots[0].ptr_leaf)
 			return -ENOMEM;
 	}
 	for (l = 1; l <= level; ++l)
 		if (!s->roots[l].ptr_inner) {
-			s->roots[l].ptr_inner = kzalloc(SIDTAB_NODE_ALLOC_SIZE,
-							GFP_ATOMIC);
+			s->roots[l].ptr_inner =
+				kzalloc(SIDTAB_NODE_ALLOC_SIZE, GFP_ATOMIC);
 			if (!s->roots[l].ptr_inner)
 				return -ENOMEM;
 			s->roots[l].ptr_inner->entries[0] = s->roots[l - 1];
@@ -203,16 +206,16 @@ static struct sidtab_entry *sidtab_do_lookup(struct sidtab *s, u32 index,
 
 		if (!entry->ptr_inner) {
 			if (alloc)
-				entry->ptr_inner = kzalloc(SIDTAB_NODE_ALLOC_SIZE,
-							   GFP_ATOMIC);
+				entry->ptr_inner = kzalloc(
+					SIDTAB_NODE_ALLOC_SIZE, GFP_ATOMIC);
 			if (!entry->ptr_inner)
 				return NULL;
 		}
 	}
 	if (!entry->ptr_leaf) {
 		if (alloc)
-			entry->ptr_leaf = kzalloc(SIDTAB_NODE_ALLOC_SIZE,
-						  GFP_ATOMIC);
+			entry->ptr_leaf =
+				kzalloc(SIDTAB_NODE_ALLOC_SIZE, GFP_ATOMIC);
 		if (!entry->ptr_leaf)
 			return NULL;
 	}
@@ -262,8 +265,7 @@ struct sidtab_entry *sidtab_search_entry_force(struct sidtab *s, u32 sid)
 	return sidtab_search_core(s, sid, 1);
 }
 
-int sidtab_context_to_sid(struct sidtab *s, struct context *context,
-			  u32 *sid)
+int sidtab_context_to_sid(struct sidtab *s, struct context *context, u32 *sid)
 {
 	unsigned long flags;
 	u32 count, hash = context_compute_hash(context);
@@ -327,8 +329,8 @@ int sidtab_context_to_sid(struct sidtab *s, struct context *context,
 			goto out_unlock;
 		}
 
-		rc = services_convert_context(convert->args,
-					      context, &dst_convert->context,
+		rc = services_convert_context(convert->args, context,
+					      &dst_convert->context,
 					      GFP_ATOMIC);
 		if (rc) {
 			context_destroy(&dst->context);
@@ -338,8 +340,8 @@ int sidtab_context_to_sid(struct sidtab *s, struct context *context,
 		dst_convert->hash = context_compute_hash(&dst_convert->context);
 		target->count = count + 1;
 
-		hash_add_rcu(target->context_to_sid,
-			     &dst_convert->list, dst_convert->hash);
+		hash_add_rcu(target->context_to_sid, &dst_convert->list,
+			     dst_convert->hash);
 	}
 
 	if (context->len)
@@ -373,8 +375,8 @@ static void sidtab_convert_hashtable(struct sidtab *s, u32 count)
 }
 
 static int sidtab_convert_tree(union sidtab_entry_inner *edst,
-			       union sidtab_entry_inner *esrc,
-			       u32 *pos, u32 count, u32 level,
+			       union sidtab_entry_inner *esrc, u32 *pos,
+			       u32 count, u32 level,
 			       struct sidtab_convert_params *convert)
 {
 	int rc;
@@ -382,8 +384,8 @@ static int sidtab_convert_tree(union sidtab_entry_inner *edst,
 
 	if (level != 0) {
 		if (!edst->ptr_inner) {
-			edst->ptr_inner = kzalloc(SIDTAB_NODE_ALLOC_SIZE,
-						  GFP_KERNEL);
+			edst->ptr_inner =
+				kzalloc(SIDTAB_NODE_ALLOC_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
 			if (!edst->ptr_inner)
 				return -ENOMEM;
 		}
@@ -399,17 +401,18 @@ static int sidtab_convert_tree(union sidtab_entry_inner *edst,
 		}
 	} else {
 		if (!edst->ptr_leaf) {
-			edst->ptr_leaf = kzalloc(SIDTAB_NODE_ALLOC_SIZE,
-						 GFP_KERNEL);
+			edst->ptr_leaf =
+				kzalloc(SIDTAB_NODE_ALLOC_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
 			if (!edst->ptr_leaf)
 				return -ENOMEM;
 		}
 		i = 0;
 		while (i < SIDTAB_LEAF_ENTRIES && *pos < count) {
-			rc = services_convert_context(convert->args,
-					&esrc->ptr_leaf->entries[i].context,
-					&edst->ptr_leaf->entries[i].context,
-					GFP_KERNEL);
+			rc = services_convert_context(
+				convert->args,
+				&esrc->ptr_leaf->entries[i].context,
+				&edst->ptr_leaf->entries[i].context,
+				GFP_KERNEL);
 			if (rc)
 				return rc;
 			(*pos)++;
@@ -489,13 +492,15 @@ void sidtab_cancel_convert(struct sidtab *s)
 	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&s->lock, flags);
 }
 
-void sidtab_freeze_begin(struct sidtab *s, unsigned long *flags) __acquires(&s->lock)
+void sidtab_freeze_begin(struct sidtab *s, unsigned long *flags)
+	__acquires(&s->lock)
 {
 	spin_lock_irqsave(&s->lock, *flags);
 	s->frozen = true;
 	s->convert = NULL;
 }
-void sidtab_freeze_end(struct sidtab *s, unsigned long *flags) __releases(&s->lock)
+void sidtab_freeze_end(struct sidtab *s, unsigned long *flags)
+	__releases(&s->lock)
 {
 	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&s->lock, *flags);
 }
@@ -600,8 +605,8 @@ out_unlock:
 	kfree_rcu(victim, rcu_member);
 }
 
-int sidtab_sid2str_get(struct sidtab *s, struct sidtab_entry *entry,
-		       char **out, u32 *out_len)
+int sidtab_sid2str_get(struct sidtab *s, struct sidtab_entry *entry, char **out,
+		       u32 *out_len)
 {
 	struct sidtab_str_cache *cache;
 	int rc = 0;
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.h b/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.h
index 22258201cd..832c85c70d 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.h
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.h
@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@
  *
  * Copyright (C) 2018 Red Hat, Inc.
  */
+
 #ifndef _SS_SIDTAB_H_
 #define _SS_SIDTAB_H_
 
@@ -29,25 +30,26 @@ struct sidtab_entry {
 
 union sidtab_entry_inner {
 	struct sidtab_node_inner *ptr_inner;
-	struct sidtab_node_leaf  *ptr_leaf;
+	struct sidtab_node_leaf *ptr_leaf;
 };
 
 /* align node size to page boundary */
 #define SIDTAB_NODE_ALLOC_SHIFT PAGE_SHIFT
-#define SIDTAB_NODE_ALLOC_SIZE  PAGE_SIZE
+#define SIDTAB_NODE_ALLOC_SIZE	PAGE_SIZE
 
-#define size_to_shift(size) ((size) == 1 ? 1 : (const_ilog2((size) - 1) + 1))
+#define size_to_shift(size) ((size) == 1 ? 1 : (const_ilog2((size)-1) + 1))
 
-#define SIDTAB_INNER_SHIFT \
-	(SIDTAB_NODE_ALLOC_SHIFT - size_to_shift(sizeof(union sidtab_entry_inner)))
+#define SIDTAB_INNER_SHIFT         \
+	(SIDTAB_NODE_ALLOC_SHIFT - \
+	 size_to_shift(sizeof(union sidtab_entry_inner)))
 #define SIDTAB_INNER_ENTRIES ((size_t)1 << SIDTAB_INNER_SHIFT)
 #define SIDTAB_LEAF_ENTRIES \
 	(SIDTAB_NODE_ALLOC_SIZE / sizeof(struct sidtab_entry))
 
 #define SIDTAB_MAX_BITS 32
-#define SIDTAB_MAX U32_MAX
+#define SIDTAB_MAX	U32_MAX
 /* ensure enough tree levels for SIDTAB_MAX entries */
-#define SIDTAB_MAX_LEVEL \
+#define SIDTAB_MAX_LEVEL                                                   \
 	DIV_ROUND_UP(SIDTAB_MAX_BITS - size_to_shift(SIDTAB_LEAF_ENTRIES), \
 		     SIDTAB_INNER_SHIFT)
 
@@ -69,7 +71,7 @@ struct sidtab_convert_params {
 	struct sidtab *target;
 };
 
-#define SIDTAB_HASH_BITS CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_SIDTAB_HASH_BITS
+#define SIDTAB_HASH_BITS    CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_SIDTAB_HASH_BITS
 #define SIDTAB_HASH_BUCKETS (1 << SIDTAB_HASH_BITS)
 
 struct sidtab {
@@ -125,8 +127,10 @@ int sidtab_convert(struct sidtab *s, struct sidtab_convert_params *params);
 
 void sidtab_cancel_convert(struct sidtab *s);
 
-void sidtab_freeze_begin(struct sidtab *s, unsigned long *flags) __acquires(&s->lock);
-void sidtab_freeze_end(struct sidtab *s, unsigned long *flags) __releases(&s->lock);
+void sidtab_freeze_begin(struct sidtab *s, unsigned long *flags)
+	__acquires(&s->lock);
+void sidtab_freeze_end(struct sidtab *s, unsigned long *flags)
+	__releases(&s->lock);
 
 int sidtab_context_to_sid(struct sidtab *s, struct context *context, u32 *sid);
 
@@ -137,8 +141,8 @@ int sidtab_hash_stats(struct sidtab *sidtab, char *page);
 #if CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_SID2STR_CACHE_SIZE > 0
 void sidtab_sid2str_put(struct sidtab *s, struct sidtab_entry *entry,
 			const char *str, u32 str_len);
-int sidtab_sid2str_get(struct sidtab *s, struct sidtab_entry *entry,
-		       char **out, u32 *out_len);
+int sidtab_sid2str_get(struct sidtab *s, struct sidtab_entry *entry, char **out,
+		       u32 *out_len);
 #else
 static inline void sidtab_sid2str_put(struct sidtab *s,
 				      struct sidtab_entry *entry,
@@ -146,13 +150,11 @@ static inline void sidtab_sid2str_put(struct sidtab *s,
 {
 }
 static inline int sidtab_sid2str_get(struct sidtab *s,
-				     struct sidtab_entry *entry,
-				     char **out, u32 *out_len)
+				     struct sidtab_entry *entry, char **out,
+				     u32 *out_len)
 {
 	return -ENOENT;
 }
 #endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_SID2STR_CACHE_SIZE > 0 */
 
-#endif	/* _SS_SIDTAB_H_ */
-
-
+#endif /* _SS_SIDTAB_H_ */
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/symtab.c b/security/selinux/ss/symtab.c
index 43d7f0319c..c04f8d4478 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/symtab.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/symtab.c
@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@
  *
  * Author : Stephen Smalley, <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
  */
+
 #include <linux/kernel.h>
 #include <linux/string.h>
 #include <linux/errno.h>
@@ -19,7 +20,8 @@ static unsigned int symhash(const void *key)
 	keyp = key;
 	size = strlen(keyp);
 	for (p = keyp; (p - keyp) < size; p++)
-		val = (val << 4 | (val >> (8*sizeof(unsigned int)-4))) ^ (*p);
+		val = (val << 4 | (val >> (8 * sizeof(unsigned int) - 4))) ^
+		      (*p);
 	return val;
 }
 
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/symtab.h b/security/selinux/ss/symtab.h
index 0a3b5de79a..8e667cdbf3 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/symtab.h
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/symtab.h
@@ -7,14 +7,15 @@
  *
  * Author : Stephen Smalley, <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
  */
+
 #ifndef _SS_SYMTAB_H_
 #define _SS_SYMTAB_H_
 
 #include "hashtab.h"
 
 struct symtab {
-	struct hashtab table;	/* hash table (keyed on a string) */
-	u32 nprim;		/* number of primary names in table */
+	struct hashtab table; /* hash table (keyed on a string) */
+	u32 nprim; /* number of primary names in table */
 };
 
 int symtab_init(struct symtab *s, u32 size);
@@ -22,6 +23,4 @@ int symtab_init(struct symtab *s, u32 size);
 int symtab_insert(struct symtab *s, char *name, void *datum);
 void *symtab_search(struct symtab *s, const char *name);
 
-#endif	/* _SS_SYMTAB_H_ */
-
-
+#endif /* _SS_SYMTAB_H_ */
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index 6f9a80783a..c6df5c00c7 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -994,57 +994,62 @@ static int smack_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
 				     struct xattr *xattrs, int *xattr_count)
 {
 	struct task_smack *tsp = smack_cred(current_cred());
+	struct inode_smack *issp = smack_inode(inode);
 	struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_task(tsp);
 	struct smack_known *isp = smk_of_inode(inode);
 	struct smack_known *dsp = smk_of_inode(dir);
 	struct xattr *xattr = lsm_get_xattr_slot(xattrs, xattr_count);
 	int may;
 
-	if (xattr) {
-		/*
-		 * If equal, transmuting already occurred in
-		 * smack_dentry_create_files_as(). No need to check again.
-		 */
-		if (tsp->smk_task != tsp->smk_transmuted) {
-			rcu_read_lock();
-			may = smk_access_entry(skp->smk_known, dsp->smk_known,
-					       &skp->smk_rules);
-			rcu_read_unlock();
-		}
+	/*
+	 * If equal, transmuting already occurred in
+	 * smack_dentry_create_files_as(). No need to check again.
+	 */
+	if (tsp->smk_task != tsp->smk_transmuted) {
+		rcu_read_lock();
+		may = smk_access_entry(skp->smk_known, dsp->smk_known,
+				       &skp->smk_rules);
+		rcu_read_unlock();
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * In addition to having smk_task equal to smk_transmuted,
+	 * if the access rule allows transmutation and the directory
+	 * requests transmutation then by all means transmute.
+	 * Mark the inode as changed.
+	 */
+	if ((tsp->smk_task == tsp->smk_transmuted) ||
+	    (may > 0 && ((may & MAY_TRANSMUTE) != 0) &&
+	     smk_inode_transmutable(dir))) {
+		struct xattr *xattr_transmute;
 
 		/*
-		 * In addition to having smk_task equal to smk_transmuted,
-		 * if the access rule allows transmutation and the directory
-		 * requests transmutation then by all means transmute.
-		 * Mark the inode as changed.
+		 * The caller of smack_dentry_create_files_as()
+		 * should have overridden the current cred, so the
+		 * inode label was already set correctly in
+		 * smack_inode_alloc_security().
 		 */
-		if ((tsp->smk_task == tsp->smk_transmuted) ||
-		    (may > 0 && ((may & MAY_TRANSMUTE) != 0) &&
-		     smk_inode_transmutable(dir))) {
-			struct xattr *xattr_transmute;
+		if (tsp->smk_task != tsp->smk_transmuted)
+			isp = issp->smk_inode = dsp;
+
+		issp->smk_flags |= SMK_INODE_TRANSMUTE;
+		xattr_transmute = lsm_get_xattr_slot(xattrs,
+						     xattr_count);
+		if (xattr_transmute) {
+			xattr_transmute->value = kmemdup(TRANS_TRUE,
+							 TRANS_TRUE_SIZE,
+							 GFP_NOFS);
+			if (!xattr_transmute->value)
+				return -ENOMEM;
 
-			/*
-			 * The caller of smack_dentry_create_files_as()
-			 * should have overridden the current cred, so the
-			 * inode label was already set correctly in
-			 * smack_inode_alloc_security().
-			 */
-			if (tsp->smk_task != tsp->smk_transmuted)
-				isp = dsp;
-			xattr_transmute = lsm_get_xattr_slot(xattrs,
-							     xattr_count);
-			if (xattr_transmute) {
-				xattr_transmute->value = kmemdup(TRANS_TRUE,
-								 TRANS_TRUE_SIZE,
-								 GFP_NOFS);
-				if (!xattr_transmute->value)
-					return -ENOMEM;
-
-				xattr_transmute->value_len = TRANS_TRUE_SIZE;
-				xattr_transmute->name = XATTR_SMACK_TRANSMUTE;
-			}
+			xattr_transmute->value_len = TRANS_TRUE_SIZE;
+			xattr_transmute->name = XATTR_SMACK_TRANSMUTE;
 		}
+	}
 
+	issp->smk_flags |= SMK_INODE_INSTANT;
+
+	if (xattr) {
 		xattr->value = kstrdup(isp->smk_known, GFP_NOFS);
 		if (!xattr->value)
 			return -ENOMEM;
@@ -1233,12 +1238,14 @@ static int smack_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
 
 /**
  * smack_inode_setattr - Smack check for setting attributes
+ * @idmap: idmap of the mount
  * @dentry: the object
  * @iattr: for the force flag
  *
  * Returns 0 if access is permitted, an error code otherwise
  */
-static int smack_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
+static int smack_inode_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
+			       struct iattr *iattr)
 {
 	struct smk_audit_info ad;
 	int rc;
@@ -2096,12 +2103,7 @@ static void smack_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
 	struct task_smack *old_tsp = smack_cred(old);
 	struct task_smack *new_tsp = smack_cred(new);
 
-	new_tsp->smk_task = old_tsp->smk_task;
-	new_tsp->smk_forked = old_tsp->smk_task;
-	mutex_init(&new_tsp->smk_rules_lock);
-	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&new_tsp->smk_rules);
-
-	/* cbs copy rule list */
+	init_task_smack(new_tsp, old_tsp->smk_task, old_tsp->smk_task);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -4690,11 +4692,13 @@ static int smack_post_notification(const struct cred *w_cred,
  * @op: required testing operator (=, !=, >, <, ...)
  * @rulestr: smack label to be audited
  * @vrule: pointer to save our own audit rule representation
+ * @gfp: type of the memory for the allocation
  *
  * Prepare to audit cases where (@field @op @rulestr) is true.
  * The label to be audited is created if necessay.
  */
-static int smack_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule)
+static int smack_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule,
+				 gfp_t gfp)
 {
 	struct smack_known *skp;
 	char **rule = (char **)vrule;