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author | Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org> | 2024-06-19 21:00:30 +0000 |
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committer | Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org> | 2024-06-19 21:00:30 +0000 |
commit | e54def4ad8144ab15f826416e2e0f290ef1901b4 (patch) | |
tree | 583f8d4bd95cd67c44ff37b878a7eddfca9ab97a /tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/x86_64/sev.c | |
parent | Adding upstream version 6.8.12. (diff) | |
download | linux-e54def4ad8144ab15f826416e2e0f290ef1901b4.tar.xz linux-e54def4ad8144ab15f826416e2e0f290ef1901b4.zip |
Adding upstream version 6.9.2.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/x86_64/sev.c')
-rw-r--r-- | tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/x86_64/sev.c | 114 |
1 files changed, 114 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/x86_64/sev.c b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/x86_64/sev.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e248d3364b --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/x86_64/sev.c @@ -0,0 +1,114 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only +#define _GNU_SOURCE /* for program_invocation_short_name */ +#include <stdint.h> +#include <stdbool.h> + +#include "sev.h" + +/* + * sparsebit_next_clear() can return 0 if [x, 2**64-1] are all set, and the + * -1 would then cause an underflow back to 2**64 - 1. This is expected and + * correct. + * + * If the last range in the sparsebit is [x, y] and we try to iterate, + * sparsebit_next_set() will return 0, and sparsebit_next_clear() will try + * and find the first range, but that's correct because the condition + * expression would cause us to quit the loop. + */ +static void encrypt_region(struct kvm_vm *vm, struct userspace_mem_region *region) +{ + const struct sparsebit *protected_phy_pages = region->protected_phy_pages; + const vm_paddr_t gpa_base = region->region.guest_phys_addr; + const sparsebit_idx_t lowest_page_in_region = gpa_base >> vm->page_shift; + sparsebit_idx_t i, j; + + if (!sparsebit_any_set(protected_phy_pages)) + return; + + sev_register_encrypted_memory(vm, region); + + sparsebit_for_each_set_range(protected_phy_pages, i, j) { + const uint64_t size = (j - i + 1) * vm->page_size; + const uint64_t offset = (i - lowest_page_in_region) * vm->page_size; + + sev_launch_update_data(vm, gpa_base + offset, size); + } +} + +void sev_vm_launch(struct kvm_vm *vm, uint32_t policy) +{ + struct kvm_sev_launch_start launch_start = { + .policy = policy, + }; + struct userspace_mem_region *region; + struct kvm_sev_guest_status status; + int ctr; + + vm_sev_ioctl(vm, KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_START, &launch_start); + vm_sev_ioctl(vm, KVM_SEV_GUEST_STATUS, &status); + + TEST_ASSERT_EQ(status.policy, policy); + TEST_ASSERT_EQ(status.state, SEV_GUEST_STATE_LAUNCH_UPDATE); + + hash_for_each(vm->regions.slot_hash, ctr, region, slot_node) + encrypt_region(vm, region); + + if (policy & SEV_POLICY_ES) + vm_sev_ioctl(vm, KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_UPDATE_VMSA, NULL); + + vm->arch.is_pt_protected = true; +} + +void sev_vm_launch_measure(struct kvm_vm *vm, uint8_t *measurement) +{ + struct kvm_sev_launch_measure launch_measure; + struct kvm_sev_guest_status guest_status; + + launch_measure.len = 256; + launch_measure.uaddr = (__u64)measurement; + vm_sev_ioctl(vm, KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_MEASURE, &launch_measure); + + vm_sev_ioctl(vm, KVM_SEV_GUEST_STATUS, &guest_status); + TEST_ASSERT_EQ(guest_status.state, SEV_GUEST_STATE_LAUNCH_SECRET); +} + +void sev_vm_launch_finish(struct kvm_vm *vm) +{ + struct kvm_sev_guest_status status; + + vm_sev_ioctl(vm, KVM_SEV_GUEST_STATUS, &status); + TEST_ASSERT(status.state == SEV_GUEST_STATE_LAUNCH_UPDATE || + status.state == SEV_GUEST_STATE_LAUNCH_SECRET, + "Unexpected guest state: %d", status.state); + + vm_sev_ioctl(vm, KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_FINISH, NULL); + + vm_sev_ioctl(vm, KVM_SEV_GUEST_STATUS, &status); + TEST_ASSERT_EQ(status.state, SEV_GUEST_STATE_RUNNING); +} + +struct kvm_vm *vm_sev_create_with_one_vcpu(uint32_t policy, void *guest_code, + struct kvm_vcpu **cpu) +{ + struct vm_shape shape = { + .type = VM_TYPE_DEFAULT, + .mode = VM_MODE_DEFAULT, + .subtype = policy & SEV_POLICY_ES ? VM_SUBTYPE_SEV_ES : + VM_SUBTYPE_SEV, + }; + struct kvm_vm *vm; + struct kvm_vcpu *cpus[1]; + uint8_t measurement[512]; + + vm = __vm_create_with_vcpus(shape, 1, 0, guest_code, cpus); + *cpu = cpus[0]; + + sev_vm_launch(vm, policy); + + /* TODO: Validate the measurement is as expected. */ + sev_vm_launch_measure(vm, measurement); + + sev_vm_launch_finish(vm); + + return vm; +} |