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+MDS - Microarchitectural Data Sampling
+======================================
+
+Microarchitectural Data Sampling is a hardware vulnerability which allows
+unprivileged speculative access to data which is available in various CPU
+internal buffers.
+
+Affected processors
+-------------------
+
+This vulnerability affects a wide range of Intel processors. The
+vulnerability is not present on:
+
+ - Processors from AMD, Centaur and other non Intel vendors
+
+ - Older processor models, where the CPU family is < 6
+
+ - Some Atoms (Bonnell, Saltwell, Goldmont, GoldmontPlus)
+
+ - Intel processors which have the ARCH_CAP_MDS_NO bit set in the
+ IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR.
+
+Whether a processor is affected or not can be read out from the MDS
+vulnerability file in sysfs. See :ref:`mds_sys_info`.
+
+Not all processors are affected by all variants of MDS, but the mitigation
+is identical for all of them so the kernel treats them as a single
+vulnerability.
+
+Related CVEs
+------------
+
+The following CVE entries are related to the MDS vulnerability:
+
+ ============== ===== ===================================================
+ CVE-2018-12126 MSBDS Microarchitectural Store Buffer Data Sampling
+ CVE-2018-12130 MFBDS Microarchitectural Fill Buffer Data Sampling
+ CVE-2018-12127 MLPDS Microarchitectural Load Port Data Sampling
+ CVE-2019-11091 MDSUM Microarchitectural Data Sampling Uncacheable Memory
+ ============== ===== ===================================================
+
+Problem
+-------
+
+When performing store, load, L1 refill operations, processors write data
+into temporary microarchitectural structures (buffers). The data in the
+buffer can be forwarded to load operations as an optimization.
+
+Under certain conditions, usually a fault/assist caused by a load
+operation, data unrelated to the load memory address can be speculatively
+forwarded from the buffers. Because the load operation causes a fault or
+assist and its result will be discarded, the forwarded data will not cause
+incorrect program execution or state changes. But a malicious operation
+may be able to forward this speculative data to a disclosure gadget which
+allows in turn to infer the value via a cache side channel attack.
+
+Because the buffers are potentially shared between Hyper-Threads cross
+Hyper-Thread attacks are possible.
+
+Deeper technical information is available in the MDS specific x86
+architecture section: :ref:`Documentation/arch/x86/mds.rst <mds>`.
+
+
+Attack scenarios
+----------------
+
+Attacks against the MDS vulnerabilities can be mounted from malicious non-
+privileged user space applications running on hosts or guest. Malicious
+guest OSes can obviously mount attacks as well.
+
+Contrary to other speculation based vulnerabilities the MDS vulnerability
+does not allow the attacker to control the memory target address. As a
+consequence the attacks are purely sampling based, but as demonstrated with
+the TLBleed attack samples can be postprocessed successfully.
+
+Web-Browsers
+^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+ It's unclear whether attacks through Web-Browsers are possible at
+ all. The exploitation through Java-Script is considered very unlikely,
+ but other widely used web technologies like Webassembly could possibly be
+ abused.
+
+
+.. _mds_sys_info:
+
+MDS system information
+-----------------------
+
+The Linux kernel provides a sysfs interface to enumerate the current MDS
+status of the system: whether the system is vulnerable, and which
+mitigations are active. The relevant sysfs file is:
+
+/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/mds
+
+The possible values in this file are:
+
+ .. list-table::
+
+ * - 'Not affected'
+ - The processor is not vulnerable
+ * - 'Vulnerable'
+ - The processor is vulnerable, but no mitigation enabled
+ * - 'Vulnerable: Clear CPU buffers attempted, no microcode'
+ - The processor is vulnerable but microcode is not updated.
+
+ The mitigation is enabled on a best effort basis. See :ref:`vmwerv`
+ * - 'Mitigation: Clear CPU buffers'
+ - The processor is vulnerable and the CPU buffer clearing mitigation is
+ enabled.
+
+If the processor is vulnerable then the following information is appended
+to the above information:
+
+ ======================== ============================================
+ 'SMT vulnerable' SMT is enabled
+ 'SMT mitigated' SMT is enabled and mitigated
+ 'SMT disabled' SMT is disabled
+ 'SMT Host state unknown' Kernel runs in a VM, Host SMT state unknown
+ ======================== ============================================
+
+.. _vmwerv:
+
+Best effort mitigation mode
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+ If the processor is vulnerable, but the availability of the microcode based
+ mitigation mechanism is not advertised via CPUID the kernel selects a best
+ effort mitigation mode. This mode invokes the mitigation instructions
+ without a guarantee that they clear the CPU buffers.
+
+ This is done to address virtualization scenarios where the host has the
+ microcode update applied, but the hypervisor is not yet updated to expose
+ the CPUID to the guest. If the host has updated microcode the protection
+ takes effect otherwise a few cpu cycles are wasted pointlessly.
+
+ The state in the mds sysfs file reflects this situation accordingly.
+
+
+Mitigation mechanism
+-------------------------
+
+The kernel detects the affected CPUs and the presence of the microcode
+which is required.
+
+If a CPU is affected and the microcode is available, then the kernel
+enables the mitigation by default. The mitigation can be controlled at boot
+time via a kernel command line option. See
+:ref:`mds_mitigation_control_command_line`.
+
+.. _cpu_buffer_clear:
+
+CPU buffer clearing
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+ The mitigation for MDS clears the affected CPU buffers on return to user
+ space and when entering a guest.
+
+ If SMT is enabled it also clears the buffers on idle entry when the CPU
+ is only affected by MSBDS and not any other MDS variant, because the
+ other variants cannot be protected against cross Hyper-Thread attacks.
+
+ For CPUs which are only affected by MSBDS the user space, guest and idle
+ transition mitigations are sufficient and SMT is not affected.
+
+.. _virt_mechanism:
+
+Virtualization mitigation
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+ The protection for host to guest transition depends on the L1TF
+ vulnerability of the CPU:
+
+ - CPU is affected by L1TF:
+
+ If the L1D flush mitigation is enabled and up to date microcode is
+ available, the L1D flush mitigation is automatically protecting the
+ guest transition.
+
+ If the L1D flush mitigation is disabled then the MDS mitigation is
+ invoked explicit when the host MDS mitigation is enabled.
+
+ For details on L1TF and virtualization see:
+ :ref:`Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln//l1tf.rst <mitigation_control_kvm>`.
+
+ - CPU is not affected by L1TF:
+
+ CPU buffers are flushed before entering the guest when the host MDS
+ mitigation is enabled.
+
+ The resulting MDS protection matrix for the host to guest transition:
+
+ ============ ===== ============= ============ =================
+ L1TF MDS VMX-L1FLUSH Host MDS MDS-State
+
+ Don't care No Don't care N/A Not affected
+
+ Yes Yes Disabled Off Vulnerable
+
+ Yes Yes Disabled Full Mitigated
+
+ Yes Yes Enabled Don't care Mitigated
+
+ No Yes N/A Off Vulnerable
+
+ No Yes N/A Full Mitigated
+ ============ ===== ============= ============ =================
+
+ This only covers the host to guest transition, i.e. prevents leakage from
+ host to guest, but does not protect the guest internally. Guests need to
+ have their own protections.
+
+.. _xeon_phi:
+
+XEON PHI specific considerations
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+ The XEON PHI processor family is affected by MSBDS which can be exploited
+ cross Hyper-Threads when entering idle states. Some XEON PHI variants allow
+ to use MWAIT in user space (Ring 3) which opens an potential attack vector
+ for malicious user space. The exposure can be disabled on the kernel
+ command line with the 'ring3mwait=disable' command line option.
+
+ XEON PHI is not affected by the other MDS variants and MSBDS is mitigated
+ before the CPU enters a idle state. As XEON PHI is not affected by L1TF
+ either disabling SMT is not required for full protection.
+
+.. _mds_smt_control:
+
+SMT control
+^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+ All MDS variants except MSBDS can be attacked cross Hyper-Threads. That
+ means on CPUs which are affected by MFBDS or MLPDS it is necessary to
+ disable SMT for full protection. These are most of the affected CPUs; the
+ exception is XEON PHI, see :ref:`xeon_phi`.
+
+ Disabling SMT can have a significant performance impact, but the impact
+ depends on the type of workloads.
+
+ See the relevant chapter in the L1TF mitigation documentation for details:
+ :ref:`Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/l1tf.rst <smt_control>`.
+
+
+.. _mds_mitigation_control_command_line:
+
+Mitigation control on the kernel command line
+---------------------------------------------
+
+The kernel command line allows to control the MDS mitigations at boot
+time with the option "mds=". The valid arguments for this option are:
+
+ ============ =============================================================
+ full If the CPU is vulnerable, enable all available mitigations
+ for the MDS vulnerability, CPU buffer clearing on exit to
+ userspace and when entering a VM. Idle transitions are
+ protected as well if SMT is enabled.
+
+ It does not automatically disable SMT.
+
+ full,nosmt The same as mds=full, with SMT disabled on vulnerable
+ CPUs. This is the complete mitigation.
+
+ off Disables MDS mitigations completely.
+
+ ============ =============================================================
+
+Not specifying this option is equivalent to "mds=full". For processors
+that are affected by both TAA (TSX Asynchronous Abort) and MDS,
+specifying just "mds=off" without an accompanying "tsx_async_abort=off"
+will have no effect as the same mitigation is used for both
+vulnerabilities.
+
+Mitigation selection guide
+--------------------------
+
+1. Trusted userspace
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+ If all userspace applications are from a trusted source and do not
+ execute untrusted code which is supplied externally, then the mitigation
+ can be disabled.
+
+
+2. Virtualization with trusted guests
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+ The same considerations as above versus trusted user space apply.
+
+3. Virtualization with untrusted guests
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+ The protection depends on the state of the L1TF mitigations.
+ See :ref:`virt_mechanism`.
+
+ If the MDS mitigation is enabled and SMT is disabled, guest to host and
+ guest to guest attacks are prevented.
+
+.. _mds_default_mitigations:
+
+Default mitigations
+-------------------
+
+ The kernel default mitigations for vulnerable processors are:
+
+ - Enable CPU buffer clearing
+
+ The kernel does not by default enforce the disabling of SMT, which leaves
+ SMT systems vulnerable when running untrusted code. The same rationale as
+ for L1TF applies.
+ See :ref:`Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln//l1tf.rst <default_mitigations>`.