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+==================================
+VFIO - "Virtual Function I/O" [1]_
+==================================
+
+Many modern systems now provide DMA and interrupt remapping facilities
+to help ensure I/O devices behave within the boundaries they've been
+allotted. This includes x86 hardware with AMD-Vi and Intel VT-d,
+POWER systems with Partitionable Endpoints (PEs) and embedded PowerPC
+systems such as Freescale PAMU. The VFIO driver is an IOMMU/device
+agnostic framework for exposing direct device access to userspace, in
+a secure, IOMMU protected environment. In other words, this allows
+safe [2]_, non-privileged, userspace drivers.
+
+Why do we want that? Virtual machines often make use of direct device
+access ("device assignment") when configured for the highest possible
+I/O performance. From a device and host perspective, this simply
+turns the VM into a userspace driver, with the benefits of
+significantly reduced latency, higher bandwidth, and direct use of
+bare-metal device drivers [3]_.
+
+Some applications, particularly in the high performance computing
+field, also benefit from low-overhead, direct device access from
+userspace. Examples include network adapters (often non-TCP/IP based)
+and compute accelerators. Prior to VFIO, these drivers had to either
+go through the full development cycle to become proper upstream
+driver, be maintained out of tree, or make use of the UIO framework,
+which has no notion of IOMMU protection, limited interrupt support,
+and requires root privileges to access things like PCI configuration
+space.
+
+The VFIO driver framework intends to unify these, replacing both the
+KVM PCI specific device assignment code as well as provide a more
+secure, more featureful userspace driver environment than UIO.
+
+Groups, Devices, and IOMMUs
+---------------------------
+
+Devices are the main target of any I/O driver. Devices typically
+create a programming interface made up of I/O access, interrupts,
+and DMA. Without going into the details of each of these, DMA is
+by far the most critical aspect for maintaining a secure environment
+as allowing a device read-write access to system memory imposes the
+greatest risk to the overall system integrity.
+
+To help mitigate this risk, many modern IOMMUs now incorporate
+isolation properties into what was, in many cases, an interface only
+meant for translation (ie. solving the addressing problems of devices
+with limited address spaces). With this, devices can now be isolated
+from each other and from arbitrary memory access, thus allowing
+things like secure direct assignment of devices into virtual machines.
+
+This isolation is not always at the granularity of a single device
+though. Even when an IOMMU is capable of this, properties of devices,
+interconnects, and IOMMU topologies can each reduce this isolation.
+For instance, an individual device may be part of a larger multi-
+function enclosure. While the IOMMU may be able to distinguish
+between devices within the enclosure, the enclosure may not require
+transactions between devices to reach the IOMMU. Examples of this
+could be anything from a multi-function PCI device with backdoors
+between functions to a non-PCI-ACS (Access Control Services) capable
+bridge allowing redirection without reaching the IOMMU. Topology
+can also play a factor in terms of hiding devices. A PCIe-to-PCI
+bridge masks the devices behind it, making transaction appear as if
+from the bridge itself. Obviously IOMMU design plays a major factor
+as well.
+
+Therefore, while for the most part an IOMMU may have device level
+granularity, any system is susceptible to reduced granularity. The
+IOMMU API therefore supports a notion of IOMMU groups. A group is
+a set of devices which is isolatable from all other devices in the
+system. Groups are therefore the unit of ownership used by VFIO.
+
+While the group is the minimum granularity that must be used to
+ensure secure user access, it's not necessarily the preferred
+granularity. In IOMMUs which make use of page tables, it may be
+possible to share a set of page tables between different groups,
+reducing the overhead both to the platform (reduced TLB thrashing,
+reduced duplicate page tables), and to the user (programming only
+a single set of translations). For this reason, VFIO makes use of
+a container class, which may hold one or more groups. A container
+is created by simply opening the /dev/vfio/vfio character device.
+
+On its own, the container provides little functionality, with all
+but a couple version and extension query interfaces locked away.
+The user needs to add a group into the container for the next level
+of functionality. To do this, the user first needs to identify the
+group associated with the desired device. This can be done using
+the sysfs links described in the example below. By unbinding the
+device from the host driver and binding it to a VFIO driver, a new
+VFIO group will appear for the group as /dev/vfio/$GROUP, where
+$GROUP is the IOMMU group number of which the device is a member.
+If the IOMMU group contains multiple devices, each will need to
+be bound to a VFIO driver before operations on the VFIO group
+are allowed (it's also sufficient to only unbind the device from
+host drivers if a VFIO driver is unavailable; this will make the
+group available, but not that particular device). TBD - interface
+for disabling driver probing/locking a device.
+
+Once the group is ready, it may be added to the container by opening
+the VFIO group character device (/dev/vfio/$GROUP) and using the
+VFIO_GROUP_SET_CONTAINER ioctl, passing the file descriptor of the
+previously opened container file. If desired and if the IOMMU driver
+supports sharing the IOMMU context between groups, multiple groups may
+be set to the same container. If a group fails to set to a container
+with existing groups, a new empty container will need to be used
+instead.
+
+With a group (or groups) attached to a container, the remaining
+ioctls become available, enabling access to the VFIO IOMMU interfaces.
+Additionally, it now becomes possible to get file descriptors for each
+device within a group using an ioctl on the VFIO group file descriptor.
+
+The VFIO device API includes ioctls for describing the device, the I/O
+regions and their read/write/mmap offsets on the device descriptor, as
+well as mechanisms for describing and registering interrupt
+notifications.
+
+VFIO Usage Example
+------------------
+
+Assume user wants to access PCI device 0000:06:0d.0::
+
+ $ readlink /sys/bus/pci/devices/0000:06:0d.0/iommu_group
+ ../../../../kernel/iommu_groups/26
+
+This device is therefore in IOMMU group 26. This device is on the
+pci bus, therefore the user will make use of vfio-pci to manage the
+group::
+
+ # modprobe vfio-pci
+
+Binding this device to the vfio-pci driver creates the VFIO group
+character devices for this group::
+
+ $ lspci -n -s 0000:06:0d.0
+ 06:0d.0 0401: 1102:0002 (rev 08)
+ # echo 0000:06:0d.0 > /sys/bus/pci/devices/0000:06:0d.0/driver/unbind
+ # echo 1102 0002 > /sys/bus/pci/drivers/vfio-pci/new_id
+
+Now we need to look at what other devices are in the group to free
+it for use by VFIO::
+
+ $ ls -l /sys/bus/pci/devices/0000:06:0d.0/iommu_group/devices
+ total 0
+ lrwxrwxrwx. 1 root root 0 Apr 23 16:13 0000:00:1e.0 ->
+ ../../../../devices/pci0000:00/0000:00:1e.0
+ lrwxrwxrwx. 1 root root 0 Apr 23 16:13 0000:06:0d.0 ->
+ ../../../../devices/pci0000:00/0000:00:1e.0/0000:06:0d.0
+ lrwxrwxrwx. 1 root root 0 Apr 23 16:13 0000:06:0d.1 ->
+ ../../../../devices/pci0000:00/0000:00:1e.0/0000:06:0d.1
+
+This device is behind a PCIe-to-PCI bridge [4]_, therefore we also
+need to add device 0000:06:0d.1 to the group following the same
+procedure as above. Device 0000:00:1e.0 is a bridge that does
+not currently have a host driver, therefore it's not required to
+bind this device to the vfio-pci driver (vfio-pci does not currently
+support PCI bridges).
+
+The final step is to provide the user with access to the group if
+unprivileged operation is desired (note that /dev/vfio/vfio provides
+no capabilities on its own and is therefore expected to be set to
+mode 0666 by the system)::
+
+ # chown user:user /dev/vfio/26
+
+The user now has full access to all the devices and the iommu for this
+group and can access them as follows::
+
+ int container, group, device, i;
+ struct vfio_group_status group_status =
+ { .argsz = sizeof(group_status) };
+ struct vfio_iommu_type1_info iommu_info = { .argsz = sizeof(iommu_info) };
+ struct vfio_iommu_type1_dma_map dma_map = { .argsz = sizeof(dma_map) };
+ struct vfio_device_info device_info = { .argsz = sizeof(device_info) };
+
+ /* Create a new container */
+ container = open("/dev/vfio/vfio", O_RDWR);
+
+ if (ioctl(container, VFIO_GET_API_VERSION) != VFIO_API_VERSION)
+ /* Unknown API version */
+
+ if (!ioctl(container, VFIO_CHECK_EXTENSION, VFIO_TYPE1_IOMMU))
+ /* Doesn't support the IOMMU driver we want. */
+
+ /* Open the group */
+ group = open("/dev/vfio/26", O_RDWR);
+
+ /* Test the group is viable and available */
+ ioctl(group, VFIO_GROUP_GET_STATUS, &group_status);
+
+ if (!(group_status.flags & VFIO_GROUP_FLAGS_VIABLE))
+ /* Group is not viable (ie, not all devices bound for vfio) */
+
+ /* Add the group to the container */
+ ioctl(group, VFIO_GROUP_SET_CONTAINER, &container);
+
+ /* Enable the IOMMU model we want */
+ ioctl(container, VFIO_SET_IOMMU, VFIO_TYPE1_IOMMU);
+
+ /* Get addition IOMMU info */
+ ioctl(container, VFIO_IOMMU_GET_INFO, &iommu_info);
+
+ /* Allocate some space and setup a DMA mapping */
+ dma_map.vaddr = mmap(0, 1024 * 1024, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE,
+ MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_ANONYMOUS, 0, 0);
+ dma_map.size = 1024 * 1024;
+ dma_map.iova = 0; /* 1MB starting at 0x0 from device view */
+ dma_map.flags = VFIO_DMA_MAP_FLAG_READ | VFIO_DMA_MAP_FLAG_WRITE;
+
+ ioctl(container, VFIO_IOMMU_MAP_DMA, &dma_map);
+
+ /* Get a file descriptor for the device */
+ device = ioctl(group, VFIO_GROUP_GET_DEVICE_FD, "0000:06:0d.0");
+
+ /* Test and setup the device */
+ ioctl(device, VFIO_DEVICE_GET_INFO, &device_info);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < device_info.num_regions; i++) {
+ struct vfio_region_info reg = { .argsz = sizeof(reg) };
+
+ reg.index = i;
+
+ ioctl(device, VFIO_DEVICE_GET_REGION_INFO, &reg);
+
+ /* Setup mappings... read/write offsets, mmaps
+ * For PCI devices, config space is a region */
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < device_info.num_irqs; i++) {
+ struct vfio_irq_info irq = { .argsz = sizeof(irq) };
+
+ irq.index = i;
+
+ ioctl(device, VFIO_DEVICE_GET_IRQ_INFO, &irq);
+
+ /* Setup IRQs... eventfds, VFIO_DEVICE_SET_IRQS */
+ }
+
+ /* Gratuitous device reset and go... */
+ ioctl(device, VFIO_DEVICE_RESET);
+
+IOMMUFD and vfio_iommu_type1
+----------------------------
+
+IOMMUFD is the new user API to manage I/O page tables from userspace.
+It intends to be the portal of delivering advanced userspace DMA
+features (nested translation [5]_, PASID [6]_, etc.) while also providing
+a backwards compatibility interface for existing VFIO_TYPE1v2_IOMMU use
+cases. Eventually the vfio_iommu_type1 driver, as well as the legacy
+vfio container and group model is intended to be deprecated.
+
+The IOMMUFD backwards compatibility interface can be enabled two ways.
+In the first method, the kernel can be configured with
+CONFIG_IOMMUFD_VFIO_CONTAINER, in which case the IOMMUFD subsystem
+transparently provides the entire infrastructure for the VFIO
+container and IOMMU backend interfaces. The compatibility mode can
+also be accessed if the VFIO container interface, ie. /dev/vfio/vfio is
+simply symlink'd to /dev/iommu. Note that at the time of writing, the
+compatibility mode is not entirely feature complete relative to
+VFIO_TYPE1v2_IOMMU (ex. DMA mapping MMIO) and does not attempt to
+provide compatibility to the VFIO_SPAPR_TCE_IOMMU interface. Therefore
+it is not generally advisable at this time to switch from native VFIO
+implementations to the IOMMUFD compatibility interfaces.
+
+Long term, VFIO users should migrate to device access through the cdev
+interface described below, and native access through the IOMMUFD
+provided interfaces.
+
+VFIO Device cdev
+----------------
+
+Traditionally user acquires a device fd via VFIO_GROUP_GET_DEVICE_FD
+in a VFIO group.
+
+With CONFIG_VFIO_DEVICE_CDEV=y the user can now acquire a device fd
+by directly opening a character device /dev/vfio/devices/vfioX where
+"X" is the number allocated uniquely by VFIO for registered devices.
+cdev interface does not support noiommu devices, so user should use
+the legacy group interface if noiommu is wanted.
+
+The cdev only works with IOMMUFD. Both VFIO drivers and applications
+must adapt to the new cdev security model which requires using
+VFIO_DEVICE_BIND_IOMMUFD to claim DMA ownership before starting to
+actually use the device. Once BIND succeeds then a VFIO device can
+be fully accessed by the user.
+
+VFIO device cdev doesn't rely on VFIO group/container/iommu drivers.
+Hence those modules can be fully compiled out in an environment
+where no legacy VFIO application exists.
+
+So far SPAPR does not support IOMMUFD yet. So it cannot support device
+cdev either.
+
+vfio device cdev access is still bound by IOMMU group semantics, ie. there
+can be only one DMA owner for the group. Devices belonging to the same
+group can not be bound to multiple iommufd_ctx or shared between native
+kernel and vfio bus driver or other driver supporting the driver_managed_dma
+flag. A violation of this ownership requirement will fail at the
+VFIO_DEVICE_BIND_IOMMUFD ioctl, which gates full device access.
+
+Device cdev Example
+-------------------
+
+Assume user wants to access PCI device 0000:6a:01.0::
+
+ $ ls /sys/bus/pci/devices/0000:6a:01.0/vfio-dev/
+ vfio0
+
+This device is therefore represented as vfio0. The user can verify
+its existence::
+
+ $ ls -l /dev/vfio/devices/vfio0
+ crw------- 1 root root 511, 0 Feb 16 01:22 /dev/vfio/devices/vfio0
+ $ cat /sys/bus/pci/devices/0000:6a:01.0/vfio-dev/vfio0/dev
+ 511:0
+ $ ls -l /dev/char/511\:0
+ lrwxrwxrwx 1 root root 21 Feb 16 01:22 /dev/char/511:0 -> ../vfio/devices/vfio0
+
+Then provide the user with access to the device if unprivileged
+operation is desired::
+
+ $ chown user:user /dev/vfio/devices/vfio0
+
+Finally the user could get cdev fd by::
+
+ cdev_fd = open("/dev/vfio/devices/vfio0", O_RDWR);
+
+An opened cdev_fd doesn't give the user any permission of accessing
+the device except binding the cdev_fd to an iommufd. After that point
+then the device is fully accessible including attaching it to an
+IOMMUFD IOAS/HWPT to enable userspace DMA::
+
+ struct vfio_device_bind_iommufd bind = {
+ .argsz = sizeof(bind),
+ .flags = 0,
+ };
+ struct iommu_ioas_alloc alloc_data = {
+ .size = sizeof(alloc_data),
+ .flags = 0,
+ };
+ struct vfio_device_attach_iommufd_pt attach_data = {
+ .argsz = sizeof(attach_data),
+ .flags = 0,
+ };
+ struct iommu_ioas_map map = {
+ .size = sizeof(map),
+ .flags = IOMMU_IOAS_MAP_READABLE |
+ IOMMU_IOAS_MAP_WRITEABLE |
+ IOMMU_IOAS_MAP_FIXED_IOVA,
+ .__reserved = 0,
+ };
+
+ iommufd = open("/dev/iommu", O_RDWR);
+
+ bind.iommufd = iommufd;
+ ioctl(cdev_fd, VFIO_DEVICE_BIND_IOMMUFD, &bind);
+
+ ioctl(iommufd, IOMMU_IOAS_ALLOC, &alloc_data);
+ attach_data.pt_id = alloc_data.out_ioas_id;
+ ioctl(cdev_fd, VFIO_DEVICE_ATTACH_IOMMUFD_PT, &attach_data);
+
+ /* Allocate some space and setup a DMA mapping */
+ map.user_va = (int64_t)mmap(0, 1024 * 1024, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE,
+ MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_ANONYMOUS, 0, 0);
+ map.iova = 0; /* 1MB starting at 0x0 from device view */
+ map.length = 1024 * 1024;
+ map.ioas_id = alloc_data.out_ioas_id;;
+
+ ioctl(iommufd, IOMMU_IOAS_MAP, &map);
+
+ /* Other device operations as stated in "VFIO Usage Example" */
+
+VFIO User API
+-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+Please see include/uapi/linux/vfio.h for complete API documentation.
+
+VFIO bus driver API
+-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+VFIO bus drivers, such as vfio-pci make use of only a few interfaces
+into VFIO core. When devices are bound and unbound to the driver,
+Following interfaces are called when devices are bound to and
+unbound from the driver::
+
+ int vfio_register_group_dev(struct vfio_device *device);
+ int vfio_register_emulated_iommu_dev(struct vfio_device *device);
+ void vfio_unregister_group_dev(struct vfio_device *device);
+
+The driver should embed the vfio_device in its own structure and use
+vfio_alloc_device() to allocate the structure, and can register
+@init/@release callbacks to manage any private state wrapping the
+vfio_device::
+
+ vfio_alloc_device(dev_struct, member, dev, ops);
+ void vfio_put_device(struct vfio_device *device);
+
+vfio_register_group_dev() indicates to the core to begin tracking the
+iommu_group of the specified dev and register the dev as owned by a VFIO bus
+driver. Once vfio_register_group_dev() returns it is possible for userspace to
+start accessing the driver, thus the driver should ensure it is completely
+ready before calling it. The driver provides an ops structure for callbacks
+similar to a file operations structure::
+
+ struct vfio_device_ops {
+ char *name;
+ int (*init)(struct vfio_device *vdev);
+ void (*release)(struct vfio_device *vdev);
+ int (*bind_iommufd)(struct vfio_device *vdev,
+ struct iommufd_ctx *ictx, u32 *out_device_id);
+ void (*unbind_iommufd)(struct vfio_device *vdev);
+ int (*attach_ioas)(struct vfio_device *vdev, u32 *pt_id);
+ void (*detach_ioas)(struct vfio_device *vdev);
+ int (*open_device)(struct vfio_device *vdev);
+ void (*close_device)(struct vfio_device *vdev);
+ ssize_t (*read)(struct vfio_device *vdev, char __user *buf,
+ size_t count, loff_t *ppos);
+ ssize_t (*write)(struct vfio_device *vdev, const char __user *buf,
+ size_t count, loff_t *size);
+ long (*ioctl)(struct vfio_device *vdev, unsigned int cmd,
+ unsigned long arg);
+ int (*mmap)(struct vfio_device *vdev, struct vm_area_struct *vma);
+ void (*request)(struct vfio_device *vdev, unsigned int count);
+ int (*match)(struct vfio_device *vdev, char *buf);
+ void (*dma_unmap)(struct vfio_device *vdev, u64 iova, u64 length);
+ int (*device_feature)(struct vfio_device *device, u32 flags,
+ void __user *arg, size_t argsz);
+ };
+
+Each function is passed the vdev that was originally registered
+in the vfio_register_group_dev() or vfio_register_emulated_iommu_dev()
+call above. This allows the bus driver to obtain its private data using
+container_of().
+
+::
+
+ - The init/release callbacks are issued when vfio_device is initialized
+ and released.
+
+ - The open/close device callbacks are issued when the first
+ instance of a file descriptor for the device is created (eg.
+ via VFIO_GROUP_GET_DEVICE_FD) for a user session.
+
+ - The ioctl callback provides a direct pass through for some VFIO_DEVICE_*
+ ioctls.
+
+ - The [un]bind_iommufd callbacks are issued when the device is bound to
+ and unbound from iommufd.
+
+ - The [de]attach_ioas callback is issued when the device is attached to
+ and detached from an IOAS managed by the bound iommufd. However, the
+ attached IOAS can also be automatically detached when the device is
+ unbound from iommufd.
+
+ - The read/write/mmap callbacks implement the device region access defined
+ by the device's own VFIO_DEVICE_GET_REGION_INFO ioctl.
+
+ - The request callback is issued when device is going to be unregistered,
+ such as when trying to unbind the device from the vfio bus driver.
+
+ - The dma_unmap callback is issued when a range of iovas are unmapped
+ in the container or IOAS attached by the device. Drivers which make
+ use of the vfio page pinning interface must implement this callback in
+ order to unpin pages within the dma_unmap range. Drivers must tolerate
+ this callback even before calls to open_device().
+
+PPC64 sPAPR implementation note
+-------------------------------
+
+This implementation has some specifics:
+
+1) On older systems (POWER7 with P5IOC2/IODA1) only one IOMMU group per
+ container is supported as an IOMMU table is allocated at the boot time,
+ one table per a IOMMU group which is a Partitionable Endpoint (PE)
+ (PE is often a PCI domain but not always).
+
+ Newer systems (POWER8 with IODA2) have improved hardware design which allows
+ to remove this limitation and have multiple IOMMU groups per a VFIO
+ container.
+
+2) The hardware supports so called DMA windows - the PCI address range
+ within which DMA transfer is allowed, any attempt to access address space
+ out of the window leads to the whole PE isolation.
+
+3) PPC64 guests are paravirtualized but not fully emulated. There is an API
+ to map/unmap pages for DMA, and it normally maps 1..32 pages per call and
+ currently there is no way to reduce the number of calls. In order to make
+ things faster, the map/unmap handling has been implemented in real mode
+ which provides an excellent performance which has limitations such as
+ inability to do locked pages accounting in real time.
+
+4) According to sPAPR specification, A Partitionable Endpoint (PE) is an I/O
+ subtree that can be treated as a unit for the purposes of partitioning and
+ error recovery. A PE may be a single or multi-function IOA (IO Adapter), a
+ function of a multi-function IOA, or multiple IOAs (possibly including
+ switch and bridge structures above the multiple IOAs). PPC64 guests detect
+ PCI errors and recover from them via EEH RTAS services, which works on the
+ basis of additional ioctl commands.
+
+ So 4 additional ioctls have been added:
+
+ VFIO_IOMMU_SPAPR_TCE_GET_INFO
+ returns the size and the start of the DMA window on the PCI bus.
+
+ VFIO_IOMMU_ENABLE
+ enables the container. The locked pages accounting
+ is done at this point. This lets user first to know what
+ the DMA window is and adjust rlimit before doing any real job.
+
+ VFIO_IOMMU_DISABLE
+ disables the container.
+
+ VFIO_EEH_PE_OP
+ provides an API for EEH setup, error detection and recovery.
+
+ The code flow from the example above should be slightly changed::
+
+ struct vfio_eeh_pe_op pe_op = { .argsz = sizeof(pe_op), .flags = 0 };
+
+ .....
+ /* Add the group to the container */
+ ioctl(group, VFIO_GROUP_SET_CONTAINER, &container);
+
+ /* Enable the IOMMU model we want */
+ ioctl(container, VFIO_SET_IOMMU, VFIO_SPAPR_TCE_IOMMU)
+
+ /* Get addition sPAPR IOMMU info */
+ vfio_iommu_spapr_tce_info spapr_iommu_info;
+ ioctl(container, VFIO_IOMMU_SPAPR_TCE_GET_INFO, &spapr_iommu_info);
+
+ if (ioctl(container, VFIO_IOMMU_ENABLE))
+ /* Cannot enable container, may be low rlimit */
+
+ /* Allocate some space and setup a DMA mapping */
+ dma_map.vaddr = mmap(0, 1024 * 1024, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE,
+ MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_ANONYMOUS, 0, 0);
+
+ dma_map.size = 1024 * 1024;
+ dma_map.iova = 0; /* 1MB starting at 0x0 from device view */
+ dma_map.flags = VFIO_DMA_MAP_FLAG_READ | VFIO_DMA_MAP_FLAG_WRITE;
+
+ /* Check here is .iova/.size are within DMA window from spapr_iommu_info */
+ ioctl(container, VFIO_IOMMU_MAP_DMA, &dma_map);
+
+ /* Get a file descriptor for the device */
+ device = ioctl(group, VFIO_GROUP_GET_DEVICE_FD, "0000:06:0d.0");
+
+ ....
+
+ /* Gratuitous device reset and go... */
+ ioctl(device, VFIO_DEVICE_RESET);
+
+ /* Make sure EEH is supported */
+ ioctl(container, VFIO_CHECK_EXTENSION, VFIO_EEH);
+
+ /* Enable the EEH functionality on the device */
+ pe_op.op = VFIO_EEH_PE_ENABLE;
+ ioctl(container, VFIO_EEH_PE_OP, &pe_op);
+
+ /* You're suggested to create additional data struct to represent
+ * PE, and put child devices belonging to same IOMMU group to the
+ * PE instance for later reference.
+ */
+
+ /* Check the PE's state and make sure it's in functional state */
+ pe_op.op = VFIO_EEH_PE_GET_STATE;
+ ioctl(container, VFIO_EEH_PE_OP, &pe_op);
+
+ /* Save device state using pci_save_state().
+ * EEH should be enabled on the specified device.
+ */
+
+ ....
+
+ /* Inject EEH error, which is expected to be caused by 32-bits
+ * config load.
+ */
+ pe_op.op = VFIO_EEH_PE_INJECT_ERR;
+ pe_op.err.type = EEH_ERR_TYPE_32;
+ pe_op.err.func = EEH_ERR_FUNC_LD_CFG_ADDR;
+ pe_op.err.addr = 0ul;
+ pe_op.err.mask = 0ul;
+ ioctl(container, VFIO_EEH_PE_OP, &pe_op);
+
+ ....
+
+ /* When 0xFF's returned from reading PCI config space or IO BARs
+ * of the PCI device. Check the PE's state to see if that has been
+ * frozen.
+ */
+ ioctl(container, VFIO_EEH_PE_OP, &pe_op);
+
+ /* Waiting for pending PCI transactions to be completed and don't
+ * produce any more PCI traffic from/to the affected PE until
+ * recovery is finished.
+ */
+
+ /* Enable IO for the affected PE and collect logs. Usually, the
+ * standard part of PCI config space, AER registers are dumped
+ * as logs for further analysis.
+ */
+ pe_op.op = VFIO_EEH_PE_UNFREEZE_IO;
+ ioctl(container, VFIO_EEH_PE_OP, &pe_op);
+
+ /*
+ * Issue PE reset: hot or fundamental reset. Usually, hot reset
+ * is enough. However, the firmware of some PCI adapters would
+ * require fundamental reset.
+ */
+ pe_op.op = VFIO_EEH_PE_RESET_HOT;
+ ioctl(container, VFIO_EEH_PE_OP, &pe_op);
+ pe_op.op = VFIO_EEH_PE_RESET_DEACTIVATE;
+ ioctl(container, VFIO_EEH_PE_OP, &pe_op);
+
+ /* Configure the PCI bridges for the affected PE */
+ pe_op.op = VFIO_EEH_PE_CONFIGURE;
+ ioctl(container, VFIO_EEH_PE_OP, &pe_op);
+
+ /* Restored state we saved at initialization time. pci_restore_state()
+ * is good enough as an example.
+ */
+
+ /* Hopefully, error is recovered successfully. Now, you can resume to
+ * start PCI traffic to/from the affected PE.
+ */
+
+ ....
+
+5) There is v2 of SPAPR TCE IOMMU. It deprecates VFIO_IOMMU_ENABLE/
+ VFIO_IOMMU_DISABLE and implements 2 new ioctls:
+ VFIO_IOMMU_SPAPR_REGISTER_MEMORY and VFIO_IOMMU_SPAPR_UNREGISTER_MEMORY
+ (which are unsupported in v1 IOMMU).
+
+ PPC64 paravirtualized guests generate a lot of map/unmap requests,
+ and the handling of those includes pinning/unpinning pages and updating
+ mm::locked_vm counter to make sure we do not exceed the rlimit.
+ The v2 IOMMU splits accounting and pinning into separate operations:
+
+ - VFIO_IOMMU_SPAPR_REGISTER_MEMORY/VFIO_IOMMU_SPAPR_UNREGISTER_MEMORY ioctls
+ receive a user space address and size of the block to be pinned.
+ Bisecting is not supported and VFIO_IOMMU_UNREGISTER_MEMORY is expected to
+ be called with the exact address and size used for registering
+ the memory block. The userspace is not expected to call these often.
+ The ranges are stored in a linked list in a VFIO container.
+
+ - VFIO_IOMMU_MAP_DMA/VFIO_IOMMU_UNMAP_DMA ioctls only update the actual
+ IOMMU table and do not do pinning; instead these check that the userspace
+ address is from pre-registered range.
+
+ This separation helps in optimizing DMA for guests.
+
+6) sPAPR specification allows guests to have an additional DMA window(s) on
+ a PCI bus with a variable page size. Two ioctls have been added to support
+ this: VFIO_IOMMU_SPAPR_TCE_CREATE and VFIO_IOMMU_SPAPR_TCE_REMOVE.
+ The platform has to support the functionality or error will be returned to
+ the userspace. The existing hardware supports up to 2 DMA windows, one is
+ 2GB long, uses 4K pages and called "default 32bit window"; the other can
+ be as big as entire RAM, use different page size, it is optional - guests
+ create those in run-time if the guest driver supports 64bit DMA.
+
+ VFIO_IOMMU_SPAPR_TCE_CREATE receives a page shift, a DMA window size and
+ a number of TCE table levels (if a TCE table is going to be big enough and
+ the kernel may not be able to allocate enough of physically contiguous
+ memory). It creates a new window in the available slot and returns the bus
+ address where the new window starts. Due to hardware limitation, the user
+ space cannot choose the location of DMA windows.
+
+ VFIO_IOMMU_SPAPR_TCE_REMOVE receives the bus start address of the window
+ and removes it.
+
+-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+.. [1] VFIO was originally an acronym for "Virtual Function I/O" in its
+ initial implementation by Tom Lyon while as Cisco. We've since
+ outgrown the acronym, but it's catchy.
+
+.. [2] "safe" also depends upon a device being "well behaved". It's
+ possible for multi-function devices to have backdoors between
+ functions and even for single function devices to have alternative
+ access to things like PCI config space through MMIO registers. To
+ guard against the former we can include additional precautions in the
+ IOMMU driver to group multi-function PCI devices together
+ (iommu=group_mf). The latter we can't prevent, but the IOMMU should
+ still provide isolation. For PCI, SR-IOV Virtual Functions are the
+ best indicator of "well behaved", as these are designed for
+ virtualization usage models.
+
+.. [3] As always there are trade-offs to virtual machine device
+ assignment that are beyond the scope of VFIO. It's expected that
+ future IOMMU technologies will reduce some, but maybe not all, of
+ these trade-offs.
+
+.. [4] In this case the device is below a PCI bridge, so transactions
+ from either function of the device are indistinguishable to the iommu::
+
+ -[0000:00]-+-1e.0-[06]--+-0d.0
+ \-0d.1
+
+ 00:1e.0 PCI bridge: Intel Corporation 82801 PCI Bridge (rev 90)
+
+.. [5] Nested translation is an IOMMU feature which supports two stage
+ address translations. This improves the address translation efficiency
+ in IOMMU virtualization.
+
+.. [6] PASID stands for Process Address Space ID, introduced by PCI
+ Express. It is a prerequisite for Shared Virtual Addressing (SVA)
+ and Scalable I/O Virtualization (Scalable IOV).