diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'Documentation')
-rw-r--r-- | Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu | 1 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.rst | 1 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/reg-file-data-sampling.rst | 104 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 25 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | Documentation/arch/x86/amd-memory-encryption.rst | 16 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | Documentation/conf.py | 6 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | Documentation/devicetree/bindings/display/msm/qcom,mdss.yaml | 1 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | Documentation/netlink/specs/devlink.yaml | 2 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | Documentation/netlink/specs/dpll.yaml | 1 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | Documentation/userspace-api/media/mediactl/media-types.rst | 11 |
10 files changed, 147 insertions, 21 deletions
diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu b/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu index a1db6db475..710d47be11 100644 --- a/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu +++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu @@ -516,6 +516,7 @@ What: /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/mds /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/meltdown /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/mmio_stale_data + /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/reg_file_data_sampling /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/retbleed /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spec_store_bypass /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spectre_v1 diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.rst index de99caabf6..ff0b440ef2 100644 --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.rst +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.rst @@ -21,3 +21,4 @@ are configurable at compile, boot or run time. cross-thread-rsb srso gather_data_sampling + reg-file-data-sampling diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/reg-file-data-sampling.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/reg-file-data-sampling.rst new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..0585d02b9a --- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/reg-file-data-sampling.rst @@ -0,0 +1,104 @@ +================================== +Register File Data Sampling (RFDS) +================================== + +Register File Data Sampling (RFDS) is a microarchitectural vulnerability that +only affects Intel Atom parts(also branded as E-cores). RFDS may allow +a malicious actor to infer data values previously used in floating point +registers, vector registers, or integer registers. RFDS does not provide the +ability to choose which data is inferred. CVE-2023-28746 is assigned to RFDS. + +Affected Processors +=================== +Below is the list of affected Intel processors [#f1]_: + + =================== ============ + Common name Family_Model + =================== ============ + ATOM_GOLDMONT 06_5CH + ATOM_GOLDMONT_D 06_5FH + ATOM_GOLDMONT_PLUS 06_7AH + ATOM_TREMONT_D 06_86H + ATOM_TREMONT 06_96H + ALDERLAKE 06_97H + ALDERLAKE_L 06_9AH + ATOM_TREMONT_L 06_9CH + RAPTORLAKE 06_B7H + RAPTORLAKE_P 06_BAH + ATOM_GRACEMONT 06_BEH + RAPTORLAKE_S 06_BFH + =================== ============ + +As an exception to this table, Intel Xeon E family parts ALDERLAKE(06_97H) and +RAPTORLAKE(06_B7H) codenamed Catlow are not affected. They are reported as +vulnerable in Linux because they share the same family/model with an affected +part. Unlike their affected counterparts, they do not enumerate RFDS_CLEAR or +CPUID.HYBRID. This information could be used to distinguish between the +affected and unaffected parts, but it is deemed not worth adding complexity as +the reporting is fixed automatically when these parts enumerate RFDS_NO. + +Mitigation +========== +Intel released a microcode update that enables software to clear sensitive +information using the VERW instruction. Like MDS, RFDS deploys the same +mitigation strategy to force the CPU to clear the affected buffers before an +attacker can extract the secrets. This is achieved by using the otherwise +unused and obsolete VERW instruction in combination with a microcode update. +The microcode clears the affected CPU buffers when the VERW instruction is +executed. + +Mitigation points +----------------- +VERW is executed by the kernel before returning to user space, and by KVM +before VMentry. None of the affected cores support SMT, so VERW is not required +at C-state transitions. + +New bits in IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES +---------------------------------- +Newer processors and microcode update on existing affected processors added new +bits to IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR. These bits can be used to enumerate +vulnerability and mitigation capability: + +- Bit 27 - RFDS_NO - When set, processor is not affected by RFDS. +- Bit 28 - RFDS_CLEAR - When set, processor is affected by RFDS, and has the + microcode that clears the affected buffers on VERW execution. + +Mitigation control on the kernel command line +--------------------------------------------- +The kernel command line allows to control RFDS mitigation at boot time with the +parameter "reg_file_data_sampling=". The valid arguments are: + + ========== ================================================================= + on If the CPU is vulnerable, enable mitigation; CPU buffer clearing + on exit to userspace and before entering a VM. + off Disables mitigation. + ========== ================================================================= + +Mitigation default is selected by CONFIG_MITIGATION_RFDS. + +Mitigation status information +----------------------------- +The Linux kernel provides a sysfs interface to enumerate the current +vulnerability status of the system: whether the system is vulnerable, and +which mitigations are active. The relevant sysfs file is: + + /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/reg_file_data_sampling + +The possible values in this file are: + + .. list-table:: + + * - 'Not affected' + - The processor is not vulnerable + * - 'Vulnerable' + - The processor is vulnerable, but no mitigation enabled + * - 'Vulnerable: No microcode' + - The processor is vulnerable but microcode is not updated. + * - 'Mitigation: Clear Register File' + - The processor is vulnerable and the CPU buffer clearing mitigation is + enabled. + +References +---------- +.. [#f1] Affected Processors + https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/developer/topic-technology/software-security-guidance/processors-affected-consolidated-product-cpu-model.html diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt index b72e2049c4..7120c4e169 100644 --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt @@ -1137,6 +1137,26 @@ The filter can be disabled or changed to another driver later using sysfs. + reg_file_data_sampling= + [X86] Controls mitigation for Register File Data + Sampling (RFDS) vulnerability. RFDS is a CPU + vulnerability which may allow userspace to infer + kernel data values previously stored in floating point + registers, vector registers, or integer registers. + RFDS only affects Intel Atom processors. + + on: Turns ON the mitigation. + off: Turns OFF the mitigation. + + This parameter overrides the compile time default set + by CONFIG_MITIGATION_RFDS. Mitigation cannot be + disabled when other VERW based mitigations (like MDS) + are enabled. In order to disable RFDS mitigation all + VERW based mitigations need to be disabled. + + For details see: + Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/reg-file-data-sampling.rst + driver_async_probe= [KNL] List of driver names to be probed asynchronously. * matches with all driver names. If * is specified, the @@ -3307,9 +3327,7 @@ mem_encrypt= [X86-64] AMD Secure Memory Encryption (SME) control Valid arguments: on, off - Default (depends on kernel configuration option): - on (CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT_ACTIVE_BY_DEFAULT=y) - off (CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT_ACTIVE_BY_DEFAULT=n) + Default: off mem_encrypt=on: Activate SME mem_encrypt=off: Do not activate SME @@ -3385,6 +3403,7 @@ nospectre_bhb [ARM64] nospectre_v1 [X86,PPC] nospectre_v2 [X86,PPC,S390,ARM64] + reg_file_data_sampling=off [X86] retbleed=off [X86] spec_store_bypass_disable=off [X86,PPC] spectre_v2_user=off [X86] diff --git a/Documentation/arch/x86/amd-memory-encryption.rst b/Documentation/arch/x86/amd-memory-encryption.rst index 07caa8fff8..414bc7402a 100644 --- a/Documentation/arch/x86/amd-memory-encryption.rst +++ b/Documentation/arch/x86/amd-memory-encryption.rst @@ -87,14 +87,14 @@ The state of SME in the Linux kernel can be documented as follows: kernel is non-zero). SME can also be enabled and activated in the BIOS. If SME is enabled and -activated in the BIOS, then all memory accesses will be encrypted and it will -not be necessary to activate the Linux memory encryption support. If the BIOS -merely enables SME (sets bit 23 of the MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG), then Linux can activate -memory encryption by default (CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT_ACTIVE_BY_DEFAULT=y) or -by supplying mem_encrypt=on on the kernel command line. However, if BIOS does -not enable SME, then Linux will not be able to activate memory encryption, even -if configured to do so by default or the mem_encrypt=on command line parameter -is specified. +activated in the BIOS, then all memory accesses will be encrypted and it +will not be necessary to activate the Linux memory encryption support. + +If the BIOS merely enables SME (sets bit 23 of the MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG), +then memory encryption can be enabled by supplying mem_encrypt=on on the +kernel command line. However, if BIOS does not enable SME, then Linux +will not be able to activate memory encryption, even if configured to do +so by default or the mem_encrypt=on command line parameter is specified. Secure Nested Paging (SNP) ========================== diff --git a/Documentation/conf.py b/Documentation/conf.py index dfc19c915d..e385e24fe9 100644 --- a/Documentation/conf.py +++ b/Documentation/conf.py @@ -345,9 +345,9 @@ sys.stderr.write("Using %s theme\n" % html_theme) html_static_path = ['sphinx-static'] # If true, Docutils "smart quotes" will be used to convert quotes and dashes -# to typographically correct entities. This will convert "--" to "—", -# which is not always what we want, so disable it. -smartquotes = False +# to typographically correct entities. However, conversion of "--" to "—" +# is not always what we want, so enable only quotes. +smartquotes_action = 'q' # Custom sidebar templates, maps document names to template names. # Note that the RTD theme ignores this diff --git a/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/display/msm/qcom,mdss.yaml b/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/display/msm/qcom,mdss.yaml index 0999ea07f4..e4576546bf 100644 --- a/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/display/msm/qcom,mdss.yaml +++ b/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/display/msm/qcom,mdss.yaml @@ -127,6 +127,7 @@ patternProperties: - qcom,dsi-phy-20nm - qcom,dsi-phy-28nm-8226 - qcom,dsi-phy-28nm-hpm + - qcom,dsi-phy-28nm-hpm-fam-b - qcom,dsi-phy-28nm-lp - qcom,hdmi-phy-8084 - qcom,hdmi-phy-8660 diff --git a/Documentation/netlink/specs/devlink.yaml b/Documentation/netlink/specs/devlink.yaml index 572d83a414..42a9d77803 100644 --- a/Documentation/netlink/specs/devlink.yaml +++ b/Documentation/netlink/specs/devlink.yaml @@ -244,7 +244,7 @@ attribute-sets: - name: eswitch-inline-mode - type: u16 + type: u8 enum: eswitch-inline-mode - name: dpipe-tables diff --git a/Documentation/netlink/specs/dpll.yaml b/Documentation/netlink/specs/dpll.yaml index 2b4c4bcd83..5b25ad589e 100644 --- a/Documentation/netlink/specs/dpll.yaml +++ b/Documentation/netlink/specs/dpll.yaml @@ -274,6 +274,7 @@ attribute-sets: - name: capabilities type: u32 + enum: pin-capabilities - name: parent-device type: nest diff --git a/Documentation/userspace-api/media/mediactl/media-types.rst b/Documentation/userspace-api/media/mediactl/media-types.rst index 0ffeece1e0..6332e83952 100644 --- a/Documentation/userspace-api/media/mediactl/media-types.rst +++ b/Documentation/userspace-api/media/mediactl/media-types.rst @@ -375,12 +375,11 @@ Types and flags used to represent the media graph elements are origins of links. * - ``MEDIA_PAD_FL_MUST_CONNECT`` - - If this flag is set and the pad is linked to any other pad, then - at least one of those links must be enabled for the entity to be - able to stream. There could be temporary reasons (e.g. device - configuration dependent) for the pad to need enabled links even - when this flag isn't set; the absence of the flag doesn't imply - there is none. + - If this flag is set, then for this pad to be able to stream, it must + be connected by at least one enabled link. There could be temporary + reasons (e.g. device configuration dependent) for the pad to need + enabled links even when this flag isn't set; the absence of the flag + doesn't imply there is none. One and only one of ``MEDIA_PAD_FL_SINK`` and ``MEDIA_PAD_FL_SOURCE`` |