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Diffstat (limited to 'arch/Kconfig')
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diff --git a/arch/Kconfig b/arch/Kconfig new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..12d51495ca --- /dev/null +++ b/arch/Kconfig @@ -0,0 +1,1510 @@ +# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +# +# General architecture dependent options +# + +# +# Note: arch/$(SRCARCH)/Kconfig needs to be included first so that it can +# override the default values in this file. +# +source "arch/$(SRCARCH)/Kconfig" + +menu "General architecture-dependent options" + +config ARCH_HAS_SUBPAGE_FAULTS + bool + help + Select if the architecture can check permissions at sub-page + granularity (e.g. arm64 MTE). The probe_user_*() functions + must be implemented. + +config HOTPLUG_SMT + bool + +config SMT_NUM_THREADS_DYNAMIC + bool + +# Selected by HOTPLUG_CORE_SYNC_DEAD or HOTPLUG_CORE_SYNC_FULL +config HOTPLUG_CORE_SYNC + bool + +# Basic CPU dead synchronization selected by architecture +config HOTPLUG_CORE_SYNC_DEAD + bool + select HOTPLUG_CORE_SYNC + +# Full CPU synchronization with alive state selected by architecture +config HOTPLUG_CORE_SYNC_FULL + bool + select HOTPLUG_CORE_SYNC_DEAD if HOTPLUG_CPU + select HOTPLUG_CORE_SYNC + +config HOTPLUG_SPLIT_STARTUP + bool + select HOTPLUG_CORE_SYNC_FULL + +config HOTPLUG_PARALLEL + bool + select HOTPLUG_SPLIT_STARTUP + +config GENERIC_ENTRY + bool + +config KPROBES + bool "Kprobes" + depends on MODULES + depends on HAVE_KPROBES + select KALLSYMS + select TASKS_RCU if PREEMPTION + help + Kprobes allows you to trap at almost any kernel address and + execute a callback function. register_kprobe() establishes + a probepoint and specifies the callback. Kprobes is useful + for kernel debugging, non-intrusive instrumentation and testing. + If in doubt, say "N". + +config JUMP_LABEL + bool "Optimize very unlikely/likely branches" + depends on HAVE_ARCH_JUMP_LABEL + select OBJTOOL if HAVE_JUMP_LABEL_HACK + help + This option enables a transparent branch optimization that + makes certain almost-always-true or almost-always-false branch + conditions even cheaper to execute within the kernel. + + Certain performance-sensitive kernel code, such as trace points, + scheduler functionality, networking code and KVM have such + branches and include support for this optimization technique. + + If it is detected that the compiler has support for "asm goto", + the kernel will compile such branches with just a nop + instruction. When the condition flag is toggled to true, the + nop will be converted to a jump instruction to execute the + conditional block of instructions. + + This technique lowers overhead and stress on the branch prediction + of the processor and generally makes the kernel faster. The update + of the condition is slower, but those are always very rare. + + ( On 32-bit x86, the necessary options added to the compiler + flags may increase the size of the kernel slightly. ) + +config STATIC_KEYS_SELFTEST + bool "Static key selftest" + depends on JUMP_LABEL + help + Boot time self-test of the branch patching code. + +config STATIC_CALL_SELFTEST + bool "Static call selftest" + depends on HAVE_STATIC_CALL + help + Boot time self-test of the call patching code. + +config OPTPROBES + def_bool y + depends on KPROBES && HAVE_OPTPROBES + select TASKS_RCU if PREEMPTION + +config KPROBES_ON_FTRACE + def_bool y + depends on KPROBES && HAVE_KPROBES_ON_FTRACE + depends on DYNAMIC_FTRACE_WITH_REGS + help + If function tracer is enabled and the arch supports full + passing of pt_regs to function tracing, then kprobes can + optimize on top of function tracing. + +config UPROBES + def_bool n + depends on ARCH_SUPPORTS_UPROBES + help + Uprobes is the user-space counterpart to kprobes: they + enable instrumentation applications (such as 'perf probe') + to establish unintrusive probes in user-space binaries and + libraries, by executing handler functions when the probes + are hit by user-space applications. + + ( These probes come in the form of single-byte breakpoints, + managed by the kernel and kept transparent to the probed + application. ) + +config HAVE_64BIT_ALIGNED_ACCESS + def_bool 64BIT && !HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS + help + Some architectures require 64 bit accesses to be 64 bit + aligned, which also requires structs containing 64 bit values + to be 64 bit aligned too. This includes some 32 bit + architectures which can do 64 bit accesses, as well as 64 bit + architectures without unaligned access. + + This symbol should be selected by an architecture if 64 bit + accesses are required to be 64 bit aligned in this way even + though it is not a 64 bit architecture. + + See Documentation/core-api/unaligned-memory-access.rst for + more information on the topic of unaligned memory accesses. + +config HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS + bool + help + Some architectures are unable to perform unaligned accesses + without the use of get_unaligned/put_unaligned. Others are + unable to perform such accesses efficiently (e.g. trap on + unaligned access and require fixing it up in the exception + handler.) + + This symbol should be selected by an architecture if it can + perform unaligned accesses efficiently to allow different + code paths to be selected for these cases. Some network + drivers, for example, could opt to not fix up alignment + problems with received packets if doing so would not help + much. + + See Documentation/core-api/unaligned-memory-access.rst for more + information on the topic of unaligned memory accesses. + +config ARCH_USE_BUILTIN_BSWAP + bool + help + Modern versions of GCC (since 4.4) have builtin functions + for handling byte-swapping. Using these, instead of the old + inline assembler that the architecture code provides in the + __arch_bswapXX() macros, allows the compiler to see what's + happening and offers more opportunity for optimisation. In + particular, the compiler will be able to combine the byteswap + with a nearby load or store and use load-and-swap or + store-and-swap instructions if the architecture has them. It + should almost *never* result in code which is worse than the + hand-coded assembler in <asm/swab.h>. But just in case it + does, the use of the builtins is optional. + + Any architecture with load-and-swap or store-and-swap + instructions should set this. And it shouldn't hurt to set it + on architectures that don't have such instructions. + +config KRETPROBES + def_bool y + depends on KPROBES && (HAVE_KRETPROBES || HAVE_RETHOOK) + +config KRETPROBE_ON_RETHOOK + def_bool y + depends on HAVE_RETHOOK + depends on KRETPROBES + select RETHOOK + +config USER_RETURN_NOTIFIER + bool + depends on HAVE_USER_RETURN_NOTIFIER + help + Provide a kernel-internal notification when a cpu is about to + switch to user mode. + +config HAVE_IOREMAP_PROT + bool + +config HAVE_KPROBES + bool + +config HAVE_KRETPROBES + bool + +config HAVE_OPTPROBES + bool + +config HAVE_KPROBES_ON_FTRACE + bool + +config ARCH_CORRECT_STACKTRACE_ON_KRETPROBE + bool + help + Since kretprobes modifies return address on the stack, the + stacktrace may see the kretprobe trampoline address instead + of correct one. If the architecture stacktrace code and + unwinder can adjust such entries, select this configuration. + +config HAVE_FUNCTION_ERROR_INJECTION + bool + +config HAVE_NMI + bool + +config HAVE_FUNCTION_DESCRIPTORS + bool + +config TRACE_IRQFLAGS_SUPPORT + bool + +config TRACE_IRQFLAGS_NMI_SUPPORT + bool + +# +# An arch should select this if it provides all these things: +# +# task_pt_regs() in asm/processor.h or asm/ptrace.h +# arch_has_single_step() if there is hardware single-step support +# arch_has_block_step() if there is hardware block-step support +# asm/syscall.h supplying asm-generic/syscall.h interface +# linux/regset.h user_regset interfaces +# CORE_DUMP_USE_REGSET #define'd in linux/elf.h +# TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE calls ptrace_report_syscall_{entry,exit} +# TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME calls resume_user_mode_work() +# +config HAVE_ARCH_TRACEHOOK + bool + +config HAVE_DMA_CONTIGUOUS + bool + +config GENERIC_SMP_IDLE_THREAD + bool + +config GENERIC_IDLE_POLL_SETUP + bool + +config ARCH_HAS_FORTIFY_SOURCE + bool + help + An architecture should select this when it can successfully + build and run with CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE. + +# +# Select if the arch provides a historic keepinit alias for the retain_initrd +# command line option +# +config ARCH_HAS_KEEPINITRD + bool + +# Select if arch has all set_memory_ro/rw/x/nx() functions in asm/cacheflush.h +config ARCH_HAS_SET_MEMORY + bool + +# Select if arch has all set_direct_map_invalid/default() functions +config ARCH_HAS_SET_DIRECT_MAP + bool + +# +# Select if the architecture provides the arch_dma_set_uncached symbol to +# either provide an uncached segment alias for a DMA allocation, or +# to remap the page tables in place. +# +config ARCH_HAS_DMA_SET_UNCACHED + bool + +# +# Select if the architectures provides the arch_dma_clear_uncached symbol +# to undo an in-place page table remap for uncached access. +# +config ARCH_HAS_DMA_CLEAR_UNCACHED + bool + +config ARCH_HAS_CPU_FINALIZE_INIT + bool + +# Select if arch init_task must go in the __init_task_data section +config ARCH_TASK_STRUCT_ON_STACK + bool + +# Select if arch has its private alloc_task_struct() function +config ARCH_TASK_STRUCT_ALLOCATOR + bool + +config HAVE_ARCH_THREAD_STRUCT_WHITELIST + bool + depends on !ARCH_TASK_STRUCT_ALLOCATOR + help + An architecture should select this to provide hardened usercopy + knowledge about what region of the thread_struct should be + whitelisted for copying to userspace. Normally this is only the + FPU registers. Specifically, arch_thread_struct_whitelist() + should be implemented. Without this, the entire thread_struct + field in task_struct will be left whitelisted. + +# Select if arch has its private alloc_thread_stack() function +config ARCH_THREAD_STACK_ALLOCATOR + bool + +# Select if arch wants to size task_struct dynamically via arch_task_struct_size: +config ARCH_WANTS_DYNAMIC_TASK_STRUCT + bool + +config ARCH_WANTS_NO_INSTR + bool + help + An architecture should select this if the noinstr macro is being used on + functions to denote that the toolchain should avoid instrumenting such + functions and is required for correctness. + +config ARCH_32BIT_OFF_T + bool + depends on !64BIT + help + All new 32-bit architectures should have 64-bit off_t type on + userspace side which corresponds to the loff_t kernel type. This + is the requirement for modern ABIs. Some existing architectures + still support 32-bit off_t. This option is enabled for all such + architectures explicitly. + +# Selected by 64 bit architectures which have a 32 bit f_tinode in struct ustat +config ARCH_32BIT_USTAT_F_TINODE + bool + +config HAVE_ASM_MODVERSIONS + bool + help + This symbol should be selected by an architecture if it provides + <asm/asm-prototypes.h> to support the module versioning for symbols + exported from assembly code. + +config HAVE_REGS_AND_STACK_ACCESS_API + bool + help + This symbol should be selected by an architecture if it supports + the API needed to access registers and stack entries from pt_regs, + declared in asm/ptrace.h + For example the kprobes-based event tracer needs this API. + +config HAVE_RSEQ + bool + depends on HAVE_REGS_AND_STACK_ACCESS_API + help + This symbol should be selected by an architecture if it + supports an implementation of restartable sequences. + +config HAVE_RUST + bool + help + This symbol should be selected by an architecture if it + supports Rust. + +config HAVE_FUNCTION_ARG_ACCESS_API + bool + help + This symbol should be selected by an architecture if it supports + the API needed to access function arguments from pt_regs, + declared in asm/ptrace.h + +config HAVE_HW_BREAKPOINT + bool + depends on PERF_EVENTS + +config HAVE_MIXED_BREAKPOINTS_REGS + bool + depends on HAVE_HW_BREAKPOINT + help + Depending on the arch implementation of hardware breakpoints, + some of them have separate registers for data and instruction + breakpoints addresses, others have mixed registers to store + them but define the access type in a control register. + Select this option if your arch implements breakpoints under the + latter fashion. + +config HAVE_USER_RETURN_NOTIFIER + bool + +config HAVE_PERF_EVENTS_NMI + bool + help + System hardware can generate an NMI using the perf event + subsystem. Also has support for calculating CPU cycle events + to determine how many clock cycles in a given period. + +config HAVE_HARDLOCKUP_DETECTOR_PERF + bool + depends on HAVE_PERF_EVENTS_NMI + help + The arch chooses to use the generic perf-NMI-based hardlockup + detector. Must define HAVE_PERF_EVENTS_NMI. + +config HAVE_HARDLOCKUP_DETECTOR_ARCH + bool + help + The arch provides its own hardlockup detector implementation instead + of the generic ones. + + It uses the same command line parameters, and sysctl interface, + as the generic hardlockup detectors. + +config HAVE_PERF_REGS + bool + help + Support selective register dumps for perf events. This includes + bit-mapping of each registers and a unique architecture id. + +config HAVE_PERF_USER_STACK_DUMP + bool + help + Support user stack dumps for perf event samples. This needs + access to the user stack pointer which is not unified across + architectures. + +config HAVE_ARCH_JUMP_LABEL + bool + +config HAVE_ARCH_JUMP_LABEL_RELATIVE + bool + +config MMU_GATHER_TABLE_FREE + bool + +config MMU_GATHER_RCU_TABLE_FREE + bool + select MMU_GATHER_TABLE_FREE + +config MMU_GATHER_PAGE_SIZE + bool + +config MMU_GATHER_NO_RANGE + bool + select MMU_GATHER_MERGE_VMAS + +config MMU_GATHER_NO_FLUSH_CACHE + bool + +config MMU_GATHER_MERGE_VMAS + bool + +config MMU_GATHER_NO_GATHER + bool + depends on MMU_GATHER_TABLE_FREE + +config ARCH_WANT_IRQS_OFF_ACTIVATE_MM + bool + help + Temporary select until all architectures can be converted to have + irqs disabled over activate_mm. Architectures that do IPI based TLB + shootdowns should enable this. + +# Use normal mm refcounting for MMU_LAZY_TLB kernel thread references. +# MMU_LAZY_TLB_REFCOUNT=n can improve the scalability of context switching +# to/from kernel threads when the same mm is running on a lot of CPUs (a large +# multi-threaded application), by reducing contention on the mm refcount. +# +# This can be disabled if the architecture ensures no CPUs are using an mm as a +# "lazy tlb" beyond its final refcount (i.e., by the time __mmdrop frees the mm +# or its kernel page tables). This could be arranged by arch_exit_mmap(), or +# final exit(2) TLB flush, for example. +# +# To implement this, an arch *must*: +# Ensure the _lazy_tlb variants of mmgrab/mmdrop are used when manipulating +# the lazy tlb reference of a kthread's ->active_mm (non-arch code has been +# converted already). +config MMU_LAZY_TLB_REFCOUNT + def_bool y + depends on !MMU_LAZY_TLB_SHOOTDOWN + +# This option allows MMU_LAZY_TLB_REFCOUNT=n. It ensures no CPUs are using an +# mm as a lazy tlb beyond its last reference count, by shooting down these +# users before the mm is deallocated. __mmdrop() first IPIs all CPUs that may +# be using the mm as a lazy tlb, so that they may switch themselves to using +# init_mm for their active mm. mm_cpumask(mm) is used to determine which CPUs +# may be using mm as a lazy tlb mm. +# +# To implement this, an arch *must*: +# - At the time of the final mmdrop of the mm, ensure mm_cpumask(mm) contains +# at least all possible CPUs in which the mm is lazy. +# - It must meet the requirements for MMU_LAZY_TLB_REFCOUNT=n (see above). +config MMU_LAZY_TLB_SHOOTDOWN + bool + +config ARCH_HAVE_NMI_SAFE_CMPXCHG + bool + +config ARCH_HAS_NMI_SAFE_THIS_CPU_OPS + bool + +config HAVE_ALIGNED_STRUCT_PAGE + bool + help + This makes sure that struct pages are double word aligned and that + e.g. the SLUB allocator can perform double word atomic operations + on a struct page for better performance. However selecting this + might increase the size of a struct page by a word. + +config HAVE_CMPXCHG_LOCAL + bool + +config HAVE_CMPXCHG_DOUBLE + bool + +config ARCH_WEAK_RELEASE_ACQUIRE + bool + +config ARCH_WANT_IPC_PARSE_VERSION + bool + +config ARCH_WANT_COMPAT_IPC_PARSE_VERSION + bool + +config ARCH_WANT_OLD_COMPAT_IPC + select ARCH_WANT_COMPAT_IPC_PARSE_VERSION + bool + +config HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP + bool + help + An arch should select this symbol to support seccomp mode 1 (the fixed + syscall policy), and must provide an overrides for __NR_seccomp_sigreturn, + and compat syscalls if the asm-generic/seccomp.h defaults need adjustment: + - __NR_seccomp_read_32 + - __NR_seccomp_write_32 + - __NR_seccomp_exit_32 + - __NR_seccomp_sigreturn_32 + +config HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER + bool + select HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP + help + An arch should select this symbol if it provides all of these things: + - all the requirements for HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP + - syscall_get_arch() + - syscall_get_arguments() + - syscall_rollback() + - syscall_set_return_value() + - SIGSYS siginfo_t support + - secure_computing is called from a ptrace_event()-safe context + - secure_computing return value is checked and a return value of -1 + results in the system call being skipped immediately. + - seccomp syscall wired up + - if !HAVE_SPARSE_SYSCALL_NR, have SECCOMP_ARCH_NATIVE, + SECCOMP_ARCH_NATIVE_NR, SECCOMP_ARCH_NATIVE_NAME defined. If + COMPAT is supported, have the SECCOMP_ARCH_COMPAT* defines too. + +config SECCOMP + prompt "Enable seccomp to safely execute untrusted bytecode" + def_bool y + depends on HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP + help + This kernel feature is useful for number crunching applications + that may need to handle untrusted bytecode during their + execution. By using pipes or other transports made available + to the process as file descriptors supporting the read/write + syscalls, it's possible to isolate those applications in their + own address space using seccomp. Once seccomp is enabled via + prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP) or the seccomp() syscall, it cannot be + disabled and the task is only allowed to execute a few safe + syscalls defined by each seccomp mode. + + If unsure, say Y. + +config SECCOMP_FILTER + def_bool y + depends on HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER && SECCOMP && NET + help + Enable tasks to build secure computing environments defined + in terms of Berkeley Packet Filter programs which implement + task-defined system call filtering polices. + + See Documentation/userspace-api/seccomp_filter.rst for details. + +config SECCOMP_CACHE_DEBUG + bool "Show seccomp filter cache status in /proc/pid/seccomp_cache" + depends on SECCOMP_FILTER && !HAVE_SPARSE_SYSCALL_NR + depends on PROC_FS + help + This enables the /proc/pid/seccomp_cache interface to monitor + seccomp cache data. The file format is subject to change. Reading + the file requires CAP_SYS_ADMIN. + + This option is for debugging only. Enabling presents the risk that + an adversary may be able to infer the seccomp filter logic. + + If unsure, say N. + +config HAVE_ARCH_STACKLEAK + bool + help + An architecture should select this if it has the code which + fills the used part of the kernel stack with the STACKLEAK_POISON + value before returning from system calls. + +config HAVE_STACKPROTECTOR + bool + help + An arch should select this symbol if: + - it has implemented a stack canary (e.g. __stack_chk_guard) + +config STACKPROTECTOR + bool "Stack Protector buffer overflow detection" + depends on HAVE_STACKPROTECTOR + depends on $(cc-option,-fstack-protector) + default y + help + This option turns on the "stack-protector" GCC feature. This + feature puts, at the beginning of functions, a canary value on + the stack just before the return address, and validates + the value just before actually returning. Stack based buffer + overflows (that need to overwrite this return address) now also + overwrite the canary, which gets detected and the attack is then + neutralized via a kernel panic. + + Functions will have the stack-protector canary logic added if they + have an 8-byte or larger character array on the stack. + + This feature requires gcc version 4.2 or above, or a distribution + gcc with the feature backported ("-fstack-protector"). + + On an x86 "defconfig" build, this feature adds canary checks to + about 3% of all kernel functions, which increases kernel code size + by about 0.3%. + +config STACKPROTECTOR_STRONG + bool "Strong Stack Protector" + depends on STACKPROTECTOR + depends on $(cc-option,-fstack-protector-strong) + default y + help + Functions will have the stack-protector canary logic added in any + of the following conditions: + + - local variable's address used as part of the right hand side of an + assignment or function argument + - local variable is an array (or union containing an array), + regardless of array type or length + - uses register local variables + + This feature requires gcc version 4.9 or above, or a distribution + gcc with the feature backported ("-fstack-protector-strong"). + + On an x86 "defconfig" build, this feature adds canary checks to + about 20% of all kernel functions, which increases the kernel code + size by about 2%. + +config ARCH_SUPPORTS_SHADOW_CALL_STACK + bool + help + An architecture should select this if it supports the compiler's + Shadow Call Stack and implements runtime support for shadow stack + switching. + +config SHADOW_CALL_STACK + bool "Shadow Call Stack" + depends on ARCH_SUPPORTS_SHADOW_CALL_STACK + depends on DYNAMIC_FTRACE_WITH_ARGS || DYNAMIC_FTRACE_WITH_REGS || !FUNCTION_GRAPH_TRACER + help + This option enables the compiler's Shadow Call Stack, which + uses a shadow stack to protect function return addresses from + being overwritten by an attacker. More information can be found + in the compiler's documentation: + + - Clang: https://clang.llvm.org/docs/ShadowCallStack.html + - GCC: https://gcc.gnu.org/onlinedocs/gcc/Instrumentation-Options.html#Instrumentation-Options + + Note that security guarantees in the kernel differ from the + ones documented for user space. The kernel must store addresses + of shadow stacks in memory, which means an attacker capable of + reading and writing arbitrary memory may be able to locate them + and hijack control flow by modifying the stacks. + +config DYNAMIC_SCS + bool + help + Set by the arch code if it relies on code patching to insert the + shadow call stack push and pop instructions rather than on the + compiler. + +config LTO + bool + help + Selected if the kernel will be built using the compiler's LTO feature. + +config LTO_CLANG + bool + select LTO + help + Selected if the kernel will be built using Clang's LTO feature. + +config ARCH_SUPPORTS_LTO_CLANG + bool + help + An architecture should select this option if it supports: + - compiling with Clang, + - compiling inline assembly with Clang's integrated assembler, + - and linking with LLD. + +config ARCH_SUPPORTS_LTO_CLANG_THIN + bool + help + An architecture should select this option if it can support Clang's + ThinLTO mode. + +config HAS_LTO_CLANG + def_bool y + depends on CC_IS_CLANG && LD_IS_LLD && AS_IS_LLVM + depends on $(success,$(NM) --help | head -n 1 | grep -qi llvm) + depends on $(success,$(AR) --help | head -n 1 | grep -qi llvm) + depends on ARCH_SUPPORTS_LTO_CLANG + depends on !FTRACE_MCOUNT_USE_RECORDMCOUNT + # https://github.com/ClangBuiltLinux/linux/issues/1721 + depends on (!KASAN || KASAN_HW_TAGS || CLANG_VERSION >= 170000) || !DEBUG_INFO + depends on (!KCOV || CLANG_VERSION >= 170000) || !DEBUG_INFO + depends on !GCOV_KERNEL + help + The compiler and Kconfig options support building with Clang's + LTO. + +choice + prompt "Link Time Optimization (LTO)" + default LTO_NONE + help + This option enables Link Time Optimization (LTO), which allows the + compiler to optimize binaries globally. + + If unsure, select LTO_NONE. Note that LTO is very resource-intensive + so it's disabled by default. + +config LTO_NONE + bool "None" + help + Build the kernel normally, without Link Time Optimization (LTO). + +config LTO_CLANG_FULL + bool "Clang Full LTO (EXPERIMENTAL)" + depends on HAS_LTO_CLANG + depends on !COMPILE_TEST + select LTO_CLANG + help + This option enables Clang's full Link Time Optimization (LTO), which + allows the compiler to optimize the kernel globally. If you enable + this option, the compiler generates LLVM bitcode instead of ELF + object files, and the actual compilation from bitcode happens at + the LTO link step, which may take several minutes depending on the + kernel configuration. More information can be found from LLVM's + documentation: + + https://llvm.org/docs/LinkTimeOptimization.html + + During link time, this option can use a large amount of RAM, and + may take much longer than the ThinLTO option. + +config LTO_CLANG_THIN + bool "Clang ThinLTO (EXPERIMENTAL)" + depends on HAS_LTO_CLANG && ARCH_SUPPORTS_LTO_CLANG_THIN + select LTO_CLANG + help + This option enables Clang's ThinLTO, which allows for parallel + optimization and faster incremental compiles compared to the + CONFIG_LTO_CLANG_FULL option. More information can be found + from Clang's documentation: + + https://clang.llvm.org/docs/ThinLTO.html + + If unsure, say Y. +endchoice + +config ARCH_SUPPORTS_CFI_CLANG + bool + help + An architecture should select this option if it can support Clang's + Control-Flow Integrity (CFI) checking. + +config ARCH_USES_CFI_TRAPS + bool + +config CFI_CLANG + bool "Use Clang's Control Flow Integrity (CFI)" + depends on ARCH_SUPPORTS_CFI_CLANG + depends on $(cc-option,-fsanitize=kcfi) + help + This option enables Clang’s forward-edge Control Flow Integrity + (CFI) checking, where the compiler injects a runtime check to each + indirect function call to ensure the target is a valid function with + the correct static type. This restricts possible call targets and + makes it more difficult for an attacker to exploit bugs that allow + the modification of stored function pointers. More information can be + found from Clang's documentation: + + https://clang.llvm.org/docs/ControlFlowIntegrity.html + +config CFI_PERMISSIVE + bool "Use CFI in permissive mode" + depends on CFI_CLANG + help + When selected, Control Flow Integrity (CFI) violations result in a + warning instead of a kernel panic. This option should only be used + for finding indirect call type mismatches during development. + + If unsure, say N. + +config HAVE_ARCH_WITHIN_STACK_FRAMES + bool + help + An architecture should select this if it can walk the kernel stack + frames to determine if an object is part of either the arguments + or local variables (i.e. that it excludes saved return addresses, + and similar) by implementing an inline arch_within_stack_frames(), + which is used by CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY. + +config HAVE_CONTEXT_TRACKING_USER + bool + help + Provide kernel/user boundaries probes necessary for subsystems + that need it, such as userspace RCU extended quiescent state. + Syscalls need to be wrapped inside user_exit()-user_enter(), either + optimized behind static key or through the slow path using TIF_NOHZ + flag. Exceptions handlers must be wrapped as well. Irqs are already + protected inside ct_irq_enter/ct_irq_exit() but preemption or signal + handling on irq exit still need to be protected. + +config HAVE_CONTEXT_TRACKING_USER_OFFSTACK + bool + help + Architecture neither relies on exception_enter()/exception_exit() + nor on schedule_user(). Also preempt_schedule_notrace() and + preempt_schedule_irq() can't be called in a preemptible section + while context tracking is CONTEXT_USER. This feature reflects a sane + entry implementation where the following requirements are met on + critical entry code, ie: before user_exit() or after user_enter(): + + - Critical entry code isn't preemptible (or better yet: + not interruptible). + - No use of RCU read side critical sections, unless ct_nmi_enter() + got called. + - No use of instrumentation, unless instrumentation_begin() got + called. + +config HAVE_TIF_NOHZ + bool + help + Arch relies on TIF_NOHZ and syscall slow path to implement context + tracking calls to user_enter()/user_exit(). + +config HAVE_VIRT_CPU_ACCOUNTING + bool + +config HAVE_VIRT_CPU_ACCOUNTING_IDLE + bool + help + Architecture has its own way to account idle CPU time and therefore + doesn't implement vtime_account_idle(). + +config ARCH_HAS_SCALED_CPUTIME + bool + +config HAVE_VIRT_CPU_ACCOUNTING_GEN + bool + default y if 64BIT + help + With VIRT_CPU_ACCOUNTING_GEN, cputime_t becomes 64-bit. + Before enabling this option, arch code must be audited + to ensure there are no races in concurrent read/write of + cputime_t. For example, reading/writing 64-bit cputime_t on + some 32-bit arches may require multiple accesses, so proper + locking is needed to protect against concurrent accesses. + +config HAVE_IRQ_TIME_ACCOUNTING + bool + help + Archs need to ensure they use a high enough resolution clock to + support irq time accounting and then call enable_sched_clock_irqtime(). + +config HAVE_MOVE_PUD + bool + help + Architectures that select this are able to move page tables at the + PUD level. If there are only 3 page table levels, the move effectively + happens at the PGD level. + +config HAVE_MOVE_PMD + bool + help + Archs that select this are able to move page tables at the PMD level. + +config HAVE_ARCH_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE + bool + +config HAVE_ARCH_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE_PUD + bool + +config HAVE_ARCH_HUGE_VMAP + bool + +# +# Archs that select this would be capable of PMD-sized vmaps (i.e., +# arch_vmap_pmd_supported() returns true). The VM_ALLOW_HUGE_VMAP flag +# must be used to enable allocations to use hugepages. +# +config HAVE_ARCH_HUGE_VMALLOC + depends on HAVE_ARCH_HUGE_VMAP + bool + +config ARCH_WANT_HUGE_PMD_SHARE + bool + +# Archs that want to use pmd_mkwrite on kernel memory need it defined even +# if there are no userspace memory management features that use it +config ARCH_WANT_KERNEL_PMD_MKWRITE + bool + +config ARCH_WANT_PMD_MKWRITE + def_bool TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE || ARCH_WANT_KERNEL_PMD_MKWRITE + +config HAVE_ARCH_SOFT_DIRTY + bool + +config HAVE_MOD_ARCH_SPECIFIC + bool + help + The arch uses struct mod_arch_specific to store data. Many arches + just need a simple module loader without arch specific data - those + should not enable this. + +config MODULES_USE_ELF_RELA + bool + help + Modules only use ELF RELA relocations. Modules with ELF REL + relocations will give an error. + +config MODULES_USE_ELF_REL + bool + help + Modules only use ELF REL relocations. Modules with ELF RELA + relocations will give an error. + +config ARCH_WANTS_MODULES_DATA_IN_VMALLOC + bool + help + For architectures like powerpc/32 which have constraints on module + allocation and need to allocate module data outside of module area. + +config HAVE_IRQ_EXIT_ON_IRQ_STACK + bool + help + Architecture doesn't only execute the irq handler on the irq stack + but also irq_exit(). This way we can process softirqs on this irq + stack instead of switching to a new one when we call __do_softirq() + in the end of an hardirq. + This spares a stack switch and improves cache usage on softirq + processing. + +config HAVE_SOFTIRQ_ON_OWN_STACK + bool + help + Architecture provides a function to run __do_softirq() on a + separate stack. + +config SOFTIRQ_ON_OWN_STACK + def_bool HAVE_SOFTIRQ_ON_OWN_STACK && !PREEMPT_RT + +config ALTERNATE_USER_ADDRESS_SPACE + bool + help + Architectures set this when the CPU uses separate address + spaces for kernel and user space pointers. In this case, the + access_ok() check on a __user pointer is skipped. + +config PGTABLE_LEVELS + int + default 2 + +config ARCH_HAS_ELF_RANDOMIZE + bool + help + An architecture supports choosing randomized locations for + stack, mmap, brk, and ET_DYN. Defined functions: + - arch_mmap_rnd() + - arch_randomize_brk() + +config HAVE_ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS + bool + help + An arch should select this symbol if it supports setting a variable + number of bits for use in establishing the base address for mmap + allocations, has MMU enabled and provides values for both: + - ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS_MIN + - ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS_MAX + +config HAVE_EXIT_THREAD + bool + help + An architecture implements exit_thread. + +config ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS_MIN + int + +config ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS_MAX + int + +config ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS_DEFAULT + int + +config ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS + int "Number of bits to use for ASLR of mmap base address" if EXPERT + range ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS_MIN ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS_MAX + default ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS_DEFAULT if ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS_DEFAULT + default ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS_MIN + depends on HAVE_ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS + help + This value can be used to select the number of bits to use to + determine the random offset to the base address of vma regions + resulting from mmap allocations. This value will be bounded + by the architecture's minimum and maximum supported values. + + This value can be changed after boot using the + /proc/sys/vm/mmap_rnd_bits tunable + +config HAVE_ARCH_MMAP_RND_COMPAT_BITS + bool + help + An arch should select this symbol if it supports running applications + in compatibility mode, supports setting a variable number of bits for + use in establishing the base address for mmap allocations, has MMU + enabled and provides values for both: + - ARCH_MMAP_RND_COMPAT_BITS_MIN + - ARCH_MMAP_RND_COMPAT_BITS_MAX + +config ARCH_MMAP_RND_COMPAT_BITS_MIN + int + +config ARCH_MMAP_RND_COMPAT_BITS_MAX + int + +config ARCH_MMAP_RND_COMPAT_BITS_DEFAULT + int + +config ARCH_MMAP_RND_COMPAT_BITS + int "Number of bits to use for ASLR of mmap base address for compatible applications" if EXPERT + range ARCH_MMAP_RND_COMPAT_BITS_MIN ARCH_MMAP_RND_COMPAT_BITS_MAX + default ARCH_MMAP_RND_COMPAT_BITS_DEFAULT if ARCH_MMAP_RND_COMPAT_BITS_DEFAULT + default ARCH_MMAP_RND_COMPAT_BITS_MIN + depends on HAVE_ARCH_MMAP_RND_COMPAT_BITS + help + This value can be used to select the number of bits to use to + determine the random offset to the base address of vma regions + resulting from mmap allocations for compatible applications This + value will be bounded by the architecture's minimum and maximum + supported values. + + This value can be changed after boot using the + /proc/sys/vm/mmap_rnd_compat_bits tunable + +config HAVE_ARCH_COMPAT_MMAP_BASES + bool + help + This allows 64bit applications to invoke 32-bit mmap() syscall + and vice-versa 32-bit applications to call 64-bit mmap(). + Required for applications doing different bitness syscalls. + +config PAGE_SIZE_LESS_THAN_64KB + def_bool y + depends on !ARM64_64K_PAGES + depends on !IA64_PAGE_SIZE_64KB + depends on !PAGE_SIZE_64KB + depends on !PARISC_PAGE_SIZE_64KB + depends on PAGE_SIZE_LESS_THAN_256KB + +config PAGE_SIZE_LESS_THAN_256KB + def_bool y + depends on !PAGE_SIZE_256KB + +# This allows to use a set of generic functions to determine mmap base +# address by giving priority to top-down scheme only if the process +# is not in legacy mode (compat task, unlimited stack size or +# sysctl_legacy_va_layout). +# Architecture that selects this option can provide its own version of: +# - STACK_RND_MASK +config ARCH_WANT_DEFAULT_TOPDOWN_MMAP_LAYOUT + bool + depends on MMU + select ARCH_HAS_ELF_RANDOMIZE + +config HAVE_OBJTOOL + bool + +config HAVE_JUMP_LABEL_HACK + bool + +config HAVE_NOINSTR_HACK + bool + +config HAVE_NOINSTR_VALIDATION + bool + +config HAVE_UACCESS_VALIDATION + bool + select OBJTOOL + +config HAVE_STACK_VALIDATION + bool + help + Architecture supports objtool compile-time frame pointer rule + validation. + +config HAVE_RELIABLE_STACKTRACE + bool + help + Architecture has either save_stack_trace_tsk_reliable() or + arch_stack_walk_reliable() function which only returns a stack trace + if it can guarantee the trace is reliable. + +config HAVE_ARCH_HASH + bool + default n + help + If this is set, the architecture provides an <asm/hash.h> + file which provides platform-specific implementations of some + functions in <linux/hash.h> or fs/namei.c. + +config HAVE_ARCH_NVRAM_OPS + bool + +config ISA_BUS_API + def_bool ISA + +# +# ABI hall of shame +# +config CLONE_BACKWARDS + bool + help + Architecture has tls passed as the 4th argument of clone(2), + not the 5th one. + +config CLONE_BACKWARDS2 + bool + help + Architecture has the first two arguments of clone(2) swapped. + +config CLONE_BACKWARDS3 + bool + help + Architecture has tls passed as the 3rd argument of clone(2), + not the 5th one. + +config ODD_RT_SIGACTION + bool + help + Architecture has unusual rt_sigaction(2) arguments + +config OLD_SIGSUSPEND + bool + help + Architecture has old sigsuspend(2) syscall, of one-argument variety + +config OLD_SIGSUSPEND3 + bool + help + Even weirder antique ABI - three-argument sigsuspend(2) + +config OLD_SIGACTION + bool + help + Architecture has old sigaction(2) syscall. Nope, not the same + as OLD_SIGSUSPEND | OLD_SIGSUSPEND3 - alpha has sigsuspend(2), + but fairly different variant of sigaction(2), thanks to OSF/1 + compatibility... + +config COMPAT_OLD_SIGACTION + bool + +config COMPAT_32BIT_TIME + bool "Provide system calls for 32-bit time_t" + default !64BIT || COMPAT + help + This enables 32 bit time_t support in addition to 64 bit time_t support. + This is relevant on all 32-bit architectures, and 64-bit architectures + as part of compat syscall handling. + +config ARCH_NO_PREEMPT + bool + +config ARCH_SUPPORTS_RT + bool + +config CPU_NO_EFFICIENT_FFS + def_bool n + +config HAVE_ARCH_VMAP_STACK + def_bool n + help + An arch should select this symbol if it can support kernel stacks + in vmalloc space. This means: + + - vmalloc space must be large enough to hold many kernel stacks. + This may rule out many 32-bit architectures. + + - Stacks in vmalloc space need to work reliably. For example, if + vmap page tables are created on demand, either this mechanism + needs to work while the stack points to a virtual address with + unpopulated page tables or arch code (switch_to() and switch_mm(), + most likely) needs to ensure that the stack's page table entries + are populated before running on a possibly unpopulated stack. + + - If the stack overflows into a guard page, something reasonable + should happen. The definition of "reasonable" is flexible, but + instantly rebooting without logging anything would be unfriendly. + +config VMAP_STACK + default y + bool "Use a virtually-mapped stack" + depends on HAVE_ARCH_VMAP_STACK + depends on !KASAN || KASAN_HW_TAGS || KASAN_VMALLOC + help + Enable this if you want the use virtually-mapped kernel stacks + with guard pages. This causes kernel stack overflows to be + caught immediately rather than causing difficult-to-diagnose + corruption. + + To use this with software KASAN modes, the architecture must support + backing virtual mappings with real shadow memory, and KASAN_VMALLOC + must be enabled. + +config HAVE_ARCH_RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_OFFSET + def_bool n + help + An arch should select this symbol if it can support kernel stack + offset randomization with calls to add_random_kstack_offset() + during syscall entry and choose_random_kstack_offset() during + syscall exit. Careful removal of -fstack-protector-strong and + -fstack-protector should also be applied to the entry code and + closely examined, as the artificial stack bump looks like an array + to the compiler, so it will attempt to add canary checks regardless + of the static branch state. + +config RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_OFFSET + bool "Support for randomizing kernel stack offset on syscall entry" if EXPERT + default y + depends on HAVE_ARCH_RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_OFFSET + depends on INIT_STACK_NONE || !CC_IS_CLANG || CLANG_VERSION >= 140000 + help + The kernel stack offset can be randomized (after pt_regs) by + roughly 5 bits of entropy, frustrating memory corruption + attacks that depend on stack address determinism or + cross-syscall address exposures. + + The feature is controlled via the "randomize_kstack_offset=on/off" + kernel boot param, and if turned off has zero overhead due to its use + of static branches (see JUMP_LABEL). + + If unsure, say Y. + +config RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_OFFSET_DEFAULT + bool "Default state of kernel stack offset randomization" + depends on RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_OFFSET + help + Kernel stack offset randomization is controlled by kernel boot param + "randomize_kstack_offset=on/off", and this config chooses the default + boot state. + +config ARCH_OPTIONAL_KERNEL_RWX + def_bool n + +config ARCH_OPTIONAL_KERNEL_RWX_DEFAULT + def_bool n + +config ARCH_HAS_STRICT_KERNEL_RWX + def_bool n + +config STRICT_KERNEL_RWX + bool "Make kernel text and rodata read-only" if ARCH_OPTIONAL_KERNEL_RWX + depends on ARCH_HAS_STRICT_KERNEL_RWX + default !ARCH_OPTIONAL_KERNEL_RWX || ARCH_OPTIONAL_KERNEL_RWX_DEFAULT + help + If this is set, kernel text and rodata memory will be made read-only, + and non-text memory will be made non-executable. This provides + protection against certain security exploits (e.g. executing the heap + or modifying text) + + These features are considered standard security practice these days. + You should say Y here in almost all cases. + +config ARCH_HAS_STRICT_MODULE_RWX + def_bool n + +config STRICT_MODULE_RWX + bool "Set loadable kernel module data as NX and text as RO" if ARCH_OPTIONAL_KERNEL_RWX + depends on ARCH_HAS_STRICT_MODULE_RWX && MODULES + default !ARCH_OPTIONAL_KERNEL_RWX || ARCH_OPTIONAL_KERNEL_RWX_DEFAULT + help + If this is set, module text and rodata memory will be made read-only, + and non-text memory will be made non-executable. This provides + protection against certain security exploits (e.g. writing to text) + +# select if the architecture provides an asm/dma-direct.h header +config ARCH_HAS_PHYS_TO_DMA + bool + +config HAVE_ARCH_COMPILER_H + bool + help + An architecture can select this if it provides an + asm/compiler.h header that should be included after + linux/compiler-*.h in order to override macro definitions that those + headers generally provide. + +config HAVE_ARCH_PREL32_RELOCATIONS + bool + help + May be selected by an architecture if it supports place-relative + 32-bit relocations, both in the toolchain and in the module loader, + in which case relative references can be used in special sections + for PCI fixup, initcalls etc which are only half the size on 64 bit + architectures, and don't require runtime relocation on relocatable + kernels. + +config ARCH_USE_MEMREMAP_PROT + bool + +config LOCK_EVENT_COUNTS + bool "Locking event counts collection" + depends on DEBUG_FS + help + Enable light-weight counting of various locking related events + in the system with minimal performance impact. This reduces + the chance of application behavior change because of timing + differences. The counts are reported via debugfs. + +# Select if the architecture has support for applying RELR relocations. +config ARCH_HAS_RELR + bool + +config RELR + bool "Use RELR relocation packing" + depends on ARCH_HAS_RELR && TOOLS_SUPPORT_RELR + default y + help + Store the kernel's dynamic relocations in the RELR relocation packing + format. Requires a compatible linker (LLD supports this feature), as + well as compatible NM and OBJCOPY utilities (llvm-nm and llvm-objcopy + are compatible). + +config ARCH_HAS_MEM_ENCRYPT + bool + +config ARCH_HAS_CC_PLATFORM + bool + +config HAVE_SPARSE_SYSCALL_NR + bool + help + An architecture should select this if its syscall numbering is sparse + to save space. For example, MIPS architecture has a syscall array with + entries at 4000, 5000 and 6000 locations. This option turns on syscall + related optimizations for a given architecture. + +config ARCH_HAS_VDSO_DATA + bool + +config HAVE_STATIC_CALL + bool + +config HAVE_STATIC_CALL_INLINE + bool + depends on HAVE_STATIC_CALL + select OBJTOOL + +config HAVE_PREEMPT_DYNAMIC + bool + +config HAVE_PREEMPT_DYNAMIC_CALL + bool + depends on HAVE_STATIC_CALL + select HAVE_PREEMPT_DYNAMIC + help + An architecture should select this if it can handle the preemption + model being selected at boot time using static calls. + + Where an architecture selects HAVE_STATIC_CALL_INLINE, any call to a + preemption function will be patched directly. + + Where an architecture does not select HAVE_STATIC_CALL_INLINE, any + call to a preemption function will go through a trampoline, and the + trampoline will be patched. + + It is strongly advised to support inline static call to avoid any + overhead. + +config HAVE_PREEMPT_DYNAMIC_KEY + bool + depends on HAVE_ARCH_JUMP_LABEL + select HAVE_PREEMPT_DYNAMIC + help + An architecture should select this if it can handle the preemption + model being selected at boot time using static keys. + + Each preemption function will be given an early return based on a + static key. This should have slightly lower overhead than non-inline + static calls, as this effectively inlines each trampoline into the + start of its callee. This may avoid redundant work, and may + integrate better with CFI schemes. + + This will have greater overhead than using inline static calls as + the call to the preemption function cannot be entirely elided. + +config ARCH_WANT_LD_ORPHAN_WARN + bool + help + An arch should select this symbol once all linker sections are explicitly + included, size-asserted, or discarded in the linker scripts. This is + important because we never want expected sections to be placed heuristically + by the linker, since the locations of such sections can change between linker + versions. + +config HAVE_ARCH_PFN_VALID + bool + +config ARCH_SUPPORTS_DEBUG_PAGEALLOC + bool + +config ARCH_SUPPORTS_PAGE_TABLE_CHECK + bool + +config ARCH_SPLIT_ARG64 + bool + help + If a 32-bit architecture requires 64-bit arguments to be split into + pairs of 32-bit arguments, select this option. + +config ARCH_HAS_ELFCORE_COMPAT + bool + +config ARCH_HAS_PARANOID_L1D_FLUSH + bool + +config ARCH_HAVE_TRACE_MMIO_ACCESS + bool + +config DYNAMIC_SIGFRAME + bool + +# Select, if arch has a named attribute group bound to NUMA device nodes. +config HAVE_ARCH_NODE_DEV_GROUP + bool + +config ARCH_HAS_NONLEAF_PMD_YOUNG + bool + help + Architectures that select this option are capable of setting the + accessed bit in non-leaf PMD entries when using them as part of linear + address translations. Page table walkers that clear the accessed bit + may use this capability to reduce their search space. + +source "kernel/gcov/Kconfig" + +source "scripts/gcc-plugins/Kconfig" + +config FUNCTION_ALIGNMENT_4B + bool + +config FUNCTION_ALIGNMENT_8B + bool + +config FUNCTION_ALIGNMENT_16B + bool + +config FUNCTION_ALIGNMENT_32B + bool + +config FUNCTION_ALIGNMENT_64B + bool + +config FUNCTION_ALIGNMENT + int + default 64 if FUNCTION_ALIGNMENT_64B + default 32 if FUNCTION_ALIGNMENT_32B + default 16 if FUNCTION_ALIGNMENT_16B + default 8 if FUNCTION_ALIGNMENT_8B + default 4 if FUNCTION_ALIGNMENT_4B + default 0 + +endmenu |