diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/x86/Kconfig')
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/Kconfig | 56 |
1 files changed, 53 insertions, 3 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig index fe3292e310..1566748f16 100644 --- a/arch/x86/Kconfig +++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig @@ -28,7 +28,6 @@ config X86_64 select ARCH_HAS_GIGANTIC_PAGE select ARCH_SUPPORTS_INT128 if CC_HAS_INT128 select ARCH_SUPPORTS_PER_VMA_LOCK - select ARCH_USE_CMPXCHG_LOCKREF select HAVE_ARCH_SOFT_DIRTY select MODULES_USE_ELF_RELA select NEED_DMA_MAP_STATE @@ -118,6 +117,7 @@ config X86 select ARCH_SUPPORTS_LTO_CLANG select ARCH_SUPPORTS_LTO_CLANG_THIN select ARCH_USE_BUILTIN_BSWAP + select ARCH_USE_CMPXCHG_LOCKREF if X86_CMPXCHG64 select ARCH_USE_MEMTEST select ARCH_USE_QUEUED_RWLOCKS select ARCH_USE_QUEUED_SPINLOCKS @@ -1313,16 +1313,41 @@ config MICROCODE def_bool y depends on CPU_SUP_AMD || CPU_SUP_INTEL +config MICROCODE_INITRD32 + def_bool y + depends on MICROCODE && X86_32 && BLK_DEV_INITRD + config MICROCODE_LATE_LOADING bool "Late microcode loading (DANGEROUS)" default n - depends on MICROCODE + depends on MICROCODE && SMP help Loading microcode late, when the system is up and executing instructions is a tricky business and should be avoided if possible. Just the sequence of synchronizing all cores and SMT threads is one fragile dance which does not guarantee that cores might not softlock after the loading. Therefore, - use this at your own risk. Late loading taints the kernel too. + use this at your own risk. Late loading taints the kernel unless the + microcode header indicates that it is safe for late loading via the + minimal revision check. This minimal revision check can be enforced on + the kernel command line with "microcode.minrev=Y". + +config MICROCODE_LATE_FORCE_MINREV + bool "Enforce late microcode loading minimal revision check" + default n + depends on MICROCODE_LATE_LOADING + help + To prevent that users load microcode late which modifies already + in use features, newer microcode patches have a minimum revision field + in the microcode header, which tells the kernel which minimum + revision must be active in the CPU to safely load that new microcode + late into the running system. If disabled the check will not + be enforced but the kernel will be tainted when the minimal + revision check fails. + + This minimal revision check can also be controlled via the + "microcode.minrev" parameter on the kernel command line. + + If unsure say Y. config X86_MSR tristate "/dev/cpu/*/msr - Model-specific register support" @@ -1534,6 +1559,7 @@ config NUMA depends on X86_64 || (X86_32 && HIGHMEM64G && X86_BIGSMP) default y if X86_BIGSMP select USE_PERCPU_NUMA_NODE_ID + select OF_NUMA if OF help Enable NUMA (Non-Uniform Memory Access) support. @@ -1939,6 +1965,18 @@ config X86_USER_SHADOW_STACK If unsure, say N. +config INTEL_TDX_HOST + bool "Intel Trust Domain Extensions (TDX) host support" + depends on CPU_SUP_INTEL + depends on X86_64 + depends on KVM_INTEL + help + Intel Trust Domain Extensions (TDX) protects guest VMs from malicious + host and certain physical attacks. This option enables necessary TDX + support in the host kernel to run confidential VMs. + + If unsure, say N. + config EFI bool "EFI runtime service support" depends on ACPI @@ -2062,6 +2100,9 @@ config ARCH_SUPPORTS_CRASH_DUMP config ARCH_SUPPORTS_CRASH_HOTPLUG def_bool y +config ARCH_HAS_GENERIC_CRASHKERNEL_RESERVATION + def_bool CRASH_CORE + config PHYSICAL_START hex "Physical address where the kernel is loaded" if (EXPERT || CRASH_DUMP) default "0x1000000" @@ -2954,6 +2995,15 @@ config IA32_EMULATION 64-bit kernel. You should likely turn this on, unless you're 100% sure that you don't have any 32-bit programs left. +config IA32_EMULATION_DEFAULT_DISABLED + bool "IA32 emulation disabled by default" + default n + depends on IA32_EMULATION + help + Make IA32 emulation disabled by default. This prevents loading 32-bit + processes and access to 32-bit syscalls. If unsure, leave it to its + default value. + config X86_X32_ABI bool "x32 ABI for 64-bit mode" depends on X86_64 |