diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/x86/virt/svm')
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/virt/svm/Makefile | 3 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/virt/svm/sev.c | 606 |
2 files changed, 609 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/virt/svm/Makefile b/arch/x86/virt/svm/Makefile new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..ef2a31bdcc --- /dev/null +++ b/arch/x86/virt/svm/Makefile @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 + +obj-$(CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV) += sev.o diff --git a/arch/x86/virt/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/virt/svm/sev.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..0ae10535c6 --- /dev/null +++ b/arch/x86/virt/svm/sev.c @@ -0,0 +1,606 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only +/* + * AMD SVM-SEV Host Support. + * + * Copyright (C) 2023 Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. + * + * Author: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com> + * + */ + +#include <linux/cc_platform.h> +#include <linux/printk.h> +#include <linux/mm_types.h> +#include <linux/set_memory.h> +#include <linux/memblock.h> +#include <linux/kernel.h> +#include <linux/mm.h> +#include <linux/cpumask.h> +#include <linux/iommu.h> +#include <linux/amd-iommu.h> + +#include <asm/sev.h> +#include <asm/processor.h> +#include <asm/setup.h> +#include <asm/svm.h> +#include <asm/smp.h> +#include <asm/cpu.h> +#include <asm/apic.h> +#include <asm/cpuid.h> +#include <asm/cmdline.h> +#include <asm/iommu.h> + +/* + * The RMP entry format is not architectural. The format is defined in PPR + * Family 19h Model 01h, Rev B1 processor. + */ +struct rmpentry { + union { + struct { + u64 assigned : 1, + pagesize : 1, + immutable : 1, + rsvd1 : 9, + gpa : 39, + asid : 10, + vmsa : 1, + validated : 1, + rsvd2 : 1; + }; + u64 lo; + }; + u64 hi; +} __packed; + +/* + * The first 16KB from the RMP_BASE is used by the processor for the + * bookkeeping, the range needs to be added during the RMP entry lookup. + */ +#define RMPTABLE_CPU_BOOKKEEPING_SZ 0x4000 + +/* Mask to apply to a PFN to get the first PFN of a 2MB page */ +#define PFN_PMD_MASK GENMASK_ULL(63, PMD_SHIFT - PAGE_SHIFT) + +static u64 probed_rmp_base, probed_rmp_size; +static struct rmpentry *rmptable __ro_after_init; +static u64 rmptable_max_pfn __ro_after_init; + +static LIST_HEAD(snp_leaked_pages_list); +static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(snp_leaked_pages_list_lock); + +static unsigned long snp_nr_leaked_pages; + +#undef pr_fmt +#define pr_fmt(fmt) "SEV-SNP: " fmt + +static int __mfd_enable(unsigned int cpu) +{ + u64 val; + + if (!cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_HOST_SEV_SNP)) + return 0; + + rdmsrl(MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG, val); + + val |= MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG_MFDM; + + wrmsrl(MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG, val); + + return 0; +} + +static __init void mfd_enable(void *arg) +{ + __mfd_enable(smp_processor_id()); +} + +static int __snp_enable(unsigned int cpu) +{ + u64 val; + + if (!cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_HOST_SEV_SNP)) + return 0; + + rdmsrl(MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG, val); + + val |= MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG_SNP_EN; + val |= MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG_SNP_VMPL_EN; + + wrmsrl(MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG, val); + + return 0; +} + +static __init void snp_enable(void *arg) +{ + __snp_enable(smp_processor_id()); +} + +#define RMP_ADDR_MASK GENMASK_ULL(51, 13) + +bool snp_probe_rmptable_info(void) +{ + u64 max_rmp_pfn, calc_rmp_sz, rmp_sz, rmp_base, rmp_end; + + rdmsrl(MSR_AMD64_RMP_BASE, rmp_base); + rdmsrl(MSR_AMD64_RMP_END, rmp_end); + + if (!(rmp_base & RMP_ADDR_MASK) || !(rmp_end & RMP_ADDR_MASK)) { + pr_err("Memory for the RMP table has not been reserved by BIOS\n"); + return false; + } + + if (rmp_base > rmp_end) { + pr_err("RMP configuration not valid: base=%#llx, end=%#llx\n", rmp_base, rmp_end); + return false; + } + + rmp_sz = rmp_end - rmp_base + 1; + + /* + * Calculate the amount the memory that must be reserved by the BIOS to + * address the whole RAM, including the bookkeeping area. The RMP itself + * must also be covered. + */ + max_rmp_pfn = max_pfn; + if (PHYS_PFN(rmp_end) > max_pfn) + max_rmp_pfn = PHYS_PFN(rmp_end); + + calc_rmp_sz = (max_rmp_pfn << 4) + RMPTABLE_CPU_BOOKKEEPING_SZ; + + if (calc_rmp_sz > rmp_sz) { + pr_err("Memory reserved for the RMP table does not cover full system RAM (expected 0x%llx got 0x%llx)\n", + calc_rmp_sz, rmp_sz); + return false; + } + + probed_rmp_base = rmp_base; + probed_rmp_size = rmp_sz; + + pr_info("RMP table physical range [0x%016llx - 0x%016llx]\n", + probed_rmp_base, probed_rmp_base + probed_rmp_size - 1); + + return true; +} + +static void __init __snp_fixup_e820_tables(u64 pa) +{ + if (IS_ALIGNED(pa, PMD_SIZE)) + return; + + /* + * Handle cases where the RMP table placement by the BIOS is not + * 2M aligned and the kexec kernel could try to allocate + * from within that chunk which then causes a fatal RMP fault. + * + * The e820_table needs to be updated as it is converted to + * kernel memory resources and used by KEXEC_FILE_LOAD syscall + * to load kexec segments. + * + * The e820_table_firmware needs to be updated as it is exposed + * to sysfs and used by the KEXEC_LOAD syscall to load kexec + * segments. + * + * The e820_table_kexec needs to be updated as it passed to + * the kexec-ed kernel. + */ + pa = ALIGN_DOWN(pa, PMD_SIZE); + if (e820__mapped_any(pa, pa + PMD_SIZE, E820_TYPE_RAM)) { + pr_info("Reserving start/end of RMP table on a 2MB boundary [0x%016llx]\n", pa); + e820__range_update(pa, PMD_SIZE, E820_TYPE_RAM, E820_TYPE_RESERVED); + e820__range_update_table(e820_table_kexec, pa, PMD_SIZE, E820_TYPE_RAM, E820_TYPE_RESERVED); + e820__range_update_table(e820_table_firmware, pa, PMD_SIZE, E820_TYPE_RAM, E820_TYPE_RESERVED); + } +} + +void __init snp_fixup_e820_tables(void) +{ + __snp_fixup_e820_tables(probed_rmp_base); + __snp_fixup_e820_tables(probed_rmp_base + probed_rmp_size); +} + +/* + * Do the necessary preparations which are verified by the firmware as + * described in the SNP_INIT_EX firmware command description in the SNP + * firmware ABI spec. + */ +static int __init snp_rmptable_init(void) +{ + void *rmptable_start; + u64 rmptable_size; + u64 val; + + if (!cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_HOST_SEV_SNP)) + return 0; + + if (!amd_iommu_snp_en) + goto nosnp; + + if (!probed_rmp_size) + goto nosnp; + + rmptable_start = memremap(probed_rmp_base, probed_rmp_size, MEMREMAP_WB); + if (!rmptable_start) { + pr_err("Failed to map RMP table\n"); + return 1; + } + + /* + * Check if SEV-SNP is already enabled, this can happen in case of + * kexec boot. + */ + rdmsrl(MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG, val); + if (val & MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG_SNP_EN) + goto skip_enable; + + memset(rmptable_start, 0, probed_rmp_size); + + /* Flush the caches to ensure that data is written before SNP is enabled. */ + wbinvd_on_all_cpus(); + + /* MtrrFixDramModEn must be enabled on all the CPUs prior to enabling SNP. */ + on_each_cpu(mfd_enable, NULL, 1); + + on_each_cpu(snp_enable, NULL, 1); + +skip_enable: + rmptable_start += RMPTABLE_CPU_BOOKKEEPING_SZ; + rmptable_size = probed_rmp_size - RMPTABLE_CPU_BOOKKEEPING_SZ; + + rmptable = (struct rmpentry *)rmptable_start; + rmptable_max_pfn = rmptable_size / sizeof(struct rmpentry) - 1; + + cpuhp_setup_state(CPUHP_AP_ONLINE_DYN, "x86/rmptable_init:online", __snp_enable, NULL); + + /* + * Setting crash_kexec_post_notifiers to 'true' to ensure that SNP panic + * notifier is invoked to do SNP IOMMU shutdown before kdump. + */ + crash_kexec_post_notifiers = true; + + return 0; + +nosnp: + cc_platform_clear(CC_ATTR_HOST_SEV_SNP); + return -ENOSYS; +} + +/* + * This must be called after the IOMMU has been initialized. + */ +device_initcall(snp_rmptable_init); + +static struct rmpentry *get_rmpentry(u64 pfn) +{ + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(pfn > rmptable_max_pfn)) + return ERR_PTR(-EFAULT); + + return &rmptable[pfn]; +} + +static struct rmpentry *__snp_lookup_rmpentry(u64 pfn, int *level) +{ + struct rmpentry *large_entry, *entry; + + if (!cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_HOST_SEV_SNP)) + return ERR_PTR(-ENODEV); + + entry = get_rmpentry(pfn); + if (IS_ERR(entry)) + return entry; + + /* + * Find the authoritative RMP entry for a PFN. This can be either a 4K + * RMP entry or a special large RMP entry that is authoritative for a + * whole 2M area. + */ + large_entry = get_rmpentry(pfn & PFN_PMD_MASK); + if (IS_ERR(large_entry)) + return large_entry; + + *level = RMP_TO_PG_LEVEL(large_entry->pagesize); + + return entry; +} + +int snp_lookup_rmpentry(u64 pfn, bool *assigned, int *level) +{ + struct rmpentry *e; + + e = __snp_lookup_rmpentry(pfn, level); + if (IS_ERR(e)) + return PTR_ERR(e); + + *assigned = !!e->assigned; + return 0; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(snp_lookup_rmpentry); + +/* + * Dump the raw RMP entry for a particular PFN. These bits are documented in the + * PPR for a particular CPU model and provide useful information about how a + * particular PFN is being utilized by the kernel/firmware at the time certain + * unexpected events occur, such as RMP faults. + */ +static void dump_rmpentry(u64 pfn) +{ + u64 pfn_i, pfn_end; + struct rmpentry *e; + int level; + + e = __snp_lookup_rmpentry(pfn, &level); + if (IS_ERR(e)) { + pr_err("Failed to read RMP entry for PFN 0x%llx, error %ld\n", + pfn, PTR_ERR(e)); + return; + } + + if (e->assigned) { + pr_info("PFN 0x%llx, RMP entry: [0x%016llx - 0x%016llx]\n", + pfn, e->lo, e->hi); + return; + } + + /* + * If the RMP entry for a particular PFN is not in an assigned state, + * then it is sometimes useful to get an idea of whether or not any RMP + * entries for other PFNs within the same 2MB region are assigned, since + * those too can affect the ability to access a particular PFN in + * certain situations, such as when the PFN is being accessed via a 2MB + * mapping in the host page table. + */ + pfn_i = ALIGN_DOWN(pfn, PTRS_PER_PMD); + pfn_end = pfn_i + PTRS_PER_PMD; + + pr_info("PFN 0x%llx unassigned, dumping non-zero entries in 2M PFN region: [0x%llx - 0x%llx]\n", + pfn, pfn_i, pfn_end); + + while (pfn_i < pfn_end) { + e = __snp_lookup_rmpentry(pfn_i, &level); + if (IS_ERR(e)) { + pr_err("Error %ld reading RMP entry for PFN 0x%llx\n", + PTR_ERR(e), pfn_i); + pfn_i++; + continue; + } + + if (e->lo || e->hi) + pr_info("PFN: 0x%llx, [0x%016llx - 0x%016llx]\n", pfn_i, e->lo, e->hi); + pfn_i++; + } +} + +void snp_dump_hva_rmpentry(unsigned long hva) +{ + unsigned long paddr; + unsigned int level; + pgd_t *pgd; + pte_t *pte; + + pgd = __va(read_cr3_pa()); + pgd += pgd_index(hva); + pte = lookup_address_in_pgd(pgd, hva, &level); + + if (!pte) { + pr_err("Can't dump RMP entry for HVA %lx: no PTE/PFN found\n", hva); + return; + } + + paddr = PFN_PHYS(pte_pfn(*pte)) | (hva & ~page_level_mask(level)); + dump_rmpentry(PHYS_PFN(paddr)); +} + +/* + * PSMASH a 2MB aligned page into 4K pages in the RMP table while preserving the + * Validated bit. + */ +int psmash(u64 pfn) +{ + unsigned long paddr = pfn << PAGE_SHIFT; + int ret; + + if (!cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_HOST_SEV_SNP)) + return -ENODEV; + + if (!pfn_valid(pfn)) + return -EINVAL; + + /* Binutils version 2.36 supports the PSMASH mnemonic. */ + asm volatile(".byte 0xF3, 0x0F, 0x01, 0xFF" + : "=a" (ret) + : "a" (paddr) + : "memory", "cc"); + + return ret; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(psmash); + +/* + * If the kernel uses a 2MB or larger directmap mapping to write to an address, + * and that mapping contains any 4KB pages that are set to private in the RMP + * table, an RMP #PF will trigger and cause a host crash. Hypervisor code that + * owns the PFNs being transitioned will never attempt such a write, but other + * kernel tasks writing to other PFNs in the range may trigger these checks + * inadvertently due a large directmap mapping that happens to overlap such a + * PFN. + * + * Prevent this by splitting any 2MB+ mappings that might end up containing a + * mix of private/shared PFNs as a result of a subsequent RMPUPDATE for the + * PFN/rmp_level passed in. + * + * Note that there is no attempt here to scan all the RMP entries for the 2MB + * physical range, since it would only be worthwhile in determining if a + * subsequent RMPUPDATE for a 4KB PFN would result in all the entries being of + * the same shared/private state, thus avoiding the need to split the mapping. + * But that would mean the entries are currently in a mixed state, and so the + * mapping would have already been split as a result of prior transitions. + * And since the 4K split is only done if the mapping is 2MB+, and there isn't + * currently a mechanism in place to restore 2MB+ mappings, such a check would + * not provide any usable benefit. + * + * More specifics on how these checks are carried out can be found in APM + * Volume 2, "RMP and VMPL Access Checks". + */ +static int adjust_direct_map(u64 pfn, int rmp_level) +{ + unsigned long vaddr; + unsigned int level; + int npages, ret; + pte_t *pte; + + /* + * pfn_to_kaddr() will return a vaddr only within the direct + * map range. + */ + vaddr = (unsigned long)pfn_to_kaddr(pfn); + + /* Only 4KB/2MB RMP entries are supported by current hardware. */ + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(rmp_level > PG_LEVEL_2M)) + return -EINVAL; + + if (!pfn_valid(pfn)) + return -EINVAL; + + if (rmp_level == PG_LEVEL_2M && + (!IS_ALIGNED(pfn, PTRS_PER_PMD) || !pfn_valid(pfn + PTRS_PER_PMD - 1))) + return -EINVAL; + + /* + * If an entire 2MB physical range is being transitioned, then there is + * no risk of RMP #PFs due to write accesses from overlapping mappings, + * since even accesses from 1GB mappings will be treated as 2MB accesses + * as far as RMP table checks are concerned. + */ + if (rmp_level == PG_LEVEL_2M) + return 0; + + pte = lookup_address(vaddr, &level); + if (!pte || pte_none(*pte)) + return 0; + + if (level == PG_LEVEL_4K) + return 0; + + npages = page_level_size(rmp_level) / PAGE_SIZE; + ret = set_memory_4k(vaddr, npages); + if (ret) + pr_warn("Failed to split direct map for PFN 0x%llx, ret: %d\n", + pfn, ret); + + return ret; +} + +/* + * It is expected that those operations are seldom enough so that no mutual + * exclusion of updaters is needed and thus the overlap error condition below + * should happen very rarely and would get resolved relatively quickly by + * the firmware. + * + * If not, one could consider introducing a mutex or so here to sync concurrent + * RMP updates and thus diminish the amount of cases where firmware needs to + * lock 2M ranges to protect against concurrent updates. + * + * The optimal solution would be range locking to avoid locking disjoint + * regions unnecessarily but there's no support for that yet. + */ +static int rmpupdate(u64 pfn, struct rmp_state *state) +{ + unsigned long paddr = pfn << PAGE_SHIFT; + int ret, level; + + if (!cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_HOST_SEV_SNP)) + return -ENODEV; + + level = RMP_TO_PG_LEVEL(state->pagesize); + + if (adjust_direct_map(pfn, level)) + return -EFAULT; + + do { + /* Binutils version 2.36 supports the RMPUPDATE mnemonic. */ + asm volatile(".byte 0xF2, 0x0F, 0x01, 0xFE" + : "=a" (ret) + : "a" (paddr), "c" ((unsigned long)state) + : "memory", "cc"); + } while (ret == RMPUPDATE_FAIL_OVERLAP); + + if (ret) { + pr_err("RMPUPDATE failed for PFN %llx, pg_level: %d, ret: %d\n", + pfn, level, ret); + dump_rmpentry(pfn); + dump_stack(); + return -EFAULT; + } + + return 0; +} + +/* Transition a page to guest-owned/private state in the RMP table. */ +int rmp_make_private(u64 pfn, u64 gpa, enum pg_level level, u32 asid, bool immutable) +{ + struct rmp_state state; + + memset(&state, 0, sizeof(state)); + state.assigned = 1; + state.asid = asid; + state.immutable = immutable; + state.gpa = gpa; + state.pagesize = PG_LEVEL_TO_RMP(level); + + return rmpupdate(pfn, &state); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(rmp_make_private); + +/* Transition a page to hypervisor-owned/shared state in the RMP table. */ +int rmp_make_shared(u64 pfn, enum pg_level level) +{ + struct rmp_state state; + + memset(&state, 0, sizeof(state)); + state.pagesize = PG_LEVEL_TO_RMP(level); + + return rmpupdate(pfn, &state); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(rmp_make_shared); + +void snp_leak_pages(u64 pfn, unsigned int npages) +{ + struct page *page = pfn_to_page(pfn); + + pr_warn("Leaking PFN range 0x%llx-0x%llx\n", pfn, pfn + npages); + + spin_lock(&snp_leaked_pages_list_lock); + while (npages--) { + + /* + * Reuse the page's buddy list for chaining into the leaked + * pages list. This page should not be on a free list currently + * and is also unsafe to be added to a free list. + */ + if (likely(!PageCompound(page)) || + + /* + * Skip inserting tail pages of compound page as + * page->buddy_list of tail pages is not usable. + */ + (PageHead(page) && compound_nr(page) <= npages)) + list_add_tail(&page->buddy_list, &snp_leaked_pages_list); + + dump_rmpentry(pfn); + snp_nr_leaked_pages++; + pfn++; + page++; + } + spin_unlock(&snp_leaked_pages_list_lock); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(snp_leak_pages); + +void kdump_sev_callback(void) +{ + /* + * Do wbinvd() on remote CPUs when SNP is enabled in order to + * safely do SNP_SHUTDOWN on the local CPU. + */ + if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_HOST_SEV_SNP)) + wbinvd(); +} |