3 files changed, 610 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/virt/Makefile b/arch/x86/virt/Makefile
index 1e36502cd7..ea343fc392 100644
--- a/arch/x86/virt/Makefile
+++ b/arch/x86/virt/Makefile
@@ -1,2 +1,2 @@
 # SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
-obj-y	+= vmx/
+obj-y	+= svm/ vmx/
diff --git a/arch/x86/virt/svm/Makefile b/arch/x86/virt/svm/Makefile
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..ef2a31bdcc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/virt/svm/Makefile
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+obj-$(CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV) += sev.o
diff --git a/arch/x86/virt/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/virt/svm/sev.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..0ae10535c6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/virt/svm/sev.c
@@ -0,0 +1,606 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * AMD SVM-SEV Host Support.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2023 Advanced Micro Devices, Inc.
+ *
+ * Author: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>
+ *
+ */
+
+#include <linux/cc_platform.h>
+#include <linux/printk.h>
+#include <linux/mm_types.h>
+#include <linux/set_memory.h>
+#include <linux/memblock.h>
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/mm.h>
+#include <linux/cpumask.h>
+#include <linux/iommu.h>
+#include <linux/amd-iommu.h>
+
+#include <asm/sev.h>
+#include <asm/processor.h>
+#include <asm/setup.h>
+#include <asm/svm.h>
+#include <asm/smp.h>
+#include <asm/cpu.h>
+#include <asm/apic.h>
+#include <asm/cpuid.h>
+#include <asm/cmdline.h>
+#include <asm/iommu.h>
+
+/*
+ * The RMP entry format is not architectural. The format is defined in PPR
+ * Family 19h Model 01h, Rev B1 processor.
+ */
+struct rmpentry {
+	union {
+		struct {
+			u64 assigned	: 1,
+			    pagesize	: 1,
+			    immutable	: 1,
+			    rsvd1	: 9,
+			    gpa		: 39,
+			    asid	: 10,
+			    vmsa	: 1,
+			    validated	: 1,
+			    rsvd2	: 1;
+		};
+		u64 lo;
+	};
+	u64 hi;
+} __packed;
+
+/*
+ * The first 16KB from the RMP_BASE is used by the processor for the
+ * bookkeeping, the range needs to be added during the RMP entry lookup.
+ */
+#define RMPTABLE_CPU_BOOKKEEPING_SZ	0x4000
+
+/* Mask to apply to a PFN to get the first PFN of a 2MB page */
+#define PFN_PMD_MASK	GENMASK_ULL(63, PMD_SHIFT - PAGE_SHIFT)
+
+static u64 probed_rmp_base, probed_rmp_size;
+static struct rmpentry *rmptable __ro_after_init;
+static u64 rmptable_max_pfn __ro_after_init;
+
+static LIST_HEAD(snp_leaked_pages_list);
+static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(snp_leaked_pages_list_lock);
+
+static unsigned long snp_nr_leaked_pages;
+
+#undef pr_fmt
+#define pr_fmt(fmt)	"SEV-SNP: " fmt
+
+static int __mfd_enable(unsigned int cpu)
+{
+	u64 val;
+
+	if (!cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_HOST_SEV_SNP))
+		return 0;
+
+	rdmsrl(MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG, val);
+
+	val |= MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG_MFDM;
+
+	wrmsrl(MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG, val);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static __init void mfd_enable(void *arg)
+{
+	__mfd_enable(smp_processor_id());
+}
+
+static int __snp_enable(unsigned int cpu)
+{
+	u64 val;
+
+	if (!cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_HOST_SEV_SNP))
+		return 0;
+
+	rdmsrl(MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG, val);
+
+	val |= MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG_SNP_EN;
+	val |= MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG_SNP_VMPL_EN;
+
+	wrmsrl(MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG, val);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static __init void snp_enable(void *arg)
+{
+	__snp_enable(smp_processor_id());
+}
+
+#define RMP_ADDR_MASK GENMASK_ULL(51, 13)
+
+bool snp_probe_rmptable_info(void)
+{
+	u64 max_rmp_pfn, calc_rmp_sz, rmp_sz, rmp_base, rmp_end;
+
+	rdmsrl(MSR_AMD64_RMP_BASE, rmp_base);
+	rdmsrl(MSR_AMD64_RMP_END, rmp_end);
+
+	if (!(rmp_base & RMP_ADDR_MASK) || !(rmp_end & RMP_ADDR_MASK)) {
+		pr_err("Memory for the RMP table has not been reserved by BIOS\n");
+		return false;
+	}
+
+	if (rmp_base > rmp_end) {
+		pr_err("RMP configuration not valid: base=%#llx, end=%#llx\n", rmp_base, rmp_end);
+		return false;
+	}
+
+	rmp_sz = rmp_end - rmp_base + 1;
+
+	/*
+	 * Calculate the amount the memory that must be reserved by the BIOS to
+	 * address the whole RAM, including the bookkeeping area. The RMP itself
+	 * must also be covered.
+	 */
+	max_rmp_pfn = max_pfn;
+	if (PHYS_PFN(rmp_end) > max_pfn)
+		max_rmp_pfn = PHYS_PFN(rmp_end);
+
+	calc_rmp_sz = (max_rmp_pfn << 4) + RMPTABLE_CPU_BOOKKEEPING_SZ;
+
+	if (calc_rmp_sz > rmp_sz) {
+		pr_err("Memory reserved for the RMP table does not cover full system RAM (expected 0x%llx got 0x%llx)\n",
+		       calc_rmp_sz, rmp_sz);
+		return false;
+	}
+
+	probed_rmp_base = rmp_base;
+	probed_rmp_size = rmp_sz;
+
+	pr_info("RMP table physical range [0x%016llx - 0x%016llx]\n",
+		probed_rmp_base, probed_rmp_base + probed_rmp_size - 1);
+
+	return true;
+}
+
+static void __init __snp_fixup_e820_tables(u64 pa)
+{
+	if (IS_ALIGNED(pa, PMD_SIZE))
+		return;
+
+	/*
+	 * Handle cases where the RMP table placement by the BIOS is not
+	 * 2M aligned and the kexec kernel could try to allocate
+	 * from within that chunk which then causes a fatal RMP fault.
+	 *
+	 * The e820_table needs to be updated as it is converted to
+	 * kernel memory resources and used by KEXEC_FILE_LOAD syscall
+	 * to load kexec segments.
+	 *
+	 * The e820_table_firmware needs to be updated as it is exposed
+	 * to sysfs and used by the KEXEC_LOAD syscall to load kexec
+	 * segments.
+	 *
+	 * The e820_table_kexec needs to be updated as it passed to
+	 * the kexec-ed kernel.
+	 */
+	pa = ALIGN_DOWN(pa, PMD_SIZE);
+	if (e820__mapped_any(pa, pa + PMD_SIZE, E820_TYPE_RAM)) {
+		pr_info("Reserving start/end of RMP table on a 2MB boundary [0x%016llx]\n", pa);
+		e820__range_update(pa, PMD_SIZE, E820_TYPE_RAM, E820_TYPE_RESERVED);
+		e820__range_update_table(e820_table_kexec, pa, PMD_SIZE, E820_TYPE_RAM, E820_TYPE_RESERVED);
+		e820__range_update_table(e820_table_firmware, pa, PMD_SIZE, E820_TYPE_RAM, E820_TYPE_RESERVED);
+	}
+}
+
+void __init snp_fixup_e820_tables(void)
+{
+	__snp_fixup_e820_tables(probed_rmp_base);
+	__snp_fixup_e820_tables(probed_rmp_base + probed_rmp_size);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Do the necessary preparations which are verified by the firmware as
+ * described in the SNP_INIT_EX firmware command description in the SNP
+ * firmware ABI spec.
+ */
+static int __init snp_rmptable_init(void)
+{
+	void *rmptable_start;
+	u64 rmptable_size;
+	u64 val;
+
+	if (!cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_HOST_SEV_SNP))
+		return 0;
+
+	if (!amd_iommu_snp_en)
+		goto nosnp;
+
+	if (!probed_rmp_size)
+		goto nosnp;
+
+	rmptable_start = memremap(probed_rmp_base, probed_rmp_size, MEMREMAP_WB);
+	if (!rmptable_start) {
+		pr_err("Failed to map RMP table\n");
+		return 1;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Check if SEV-SNP is already enabled, this can happen in case of
+	 * kexec boot.
+	 */
+	rdmsrl(MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG, val);
+	if (val & MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG_SNP_EN)
+		goto skip_enable;
+
+	memset(rmptable_start, 0, probed_rmp_size);
+
+	/* Flush the caches to ensure that data is written before SNP is enabled. */
+	wbinvd_on_all_cpus();
+
+	/* MtrrFixDramModEn must be enabled on all the CPUs prior to enabling SNP. */
+	on_each_cpu(mfd_enable, NULL, 1);
+
+	on_each_cpu(snp_enable, NULL, 1);
+
+skip_enable:
+	rmptable_start += RMPTABLE_CPU_BOOKKEEPING_SZ;
+	rmptable_size = probed_rmp_size - RMPTABLE_CPU_BOOKKEEPING_SZ;
+
+	rmptable = (struct rmpentry *)rmptable_start;
+	rmptable_max_pfn = rmptable_size / sizeof(struct rmpentry) - 1;
+
+	cpuhp_setup_state(CPUHP_AP_ONLINE_DYN, "x86/rmptable_init:online", __snp_enable, NULL);
+
+	/*
+	 * Setting crash_kexec_post_notifiers to 'true' to ensure that SNP panic
+	 * notifier is invoked to do SNP IOMMU shutdown before kdump.
+	 */
+	crash_kexec_post_notifiers = true;
+
+	return 0;
+
+nosnp:
+	cc_platform_clear(CC_ATTR_HOST_SEV_SNP);
+	return -ENOSYS;
+}
+
+/*
+ * This must be called after the IOMMU has been initialized.
+ */
+device_initcall(snp_rmptable_init);
+
+static struct rmpentry *get_rmpentry(u64 pfn)
+{
+	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(pfn > rmptable_max_pfn))
+		return ERR_PTR(-EFAULT);
+
+	return &rmptable[pfn];
+}
+
+static struct rmpentry *__snp_lookup_rmpentry(u64 pfn, int *level)
+{
+	struct rmpentry *large_entry, *entry;
+
+	if (!cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_HOST_SEV_SNP))
+		return ERR_PTR(-ENODEV);
+
+	entry = get_rmpentry(pfn);
+	if (IS_ERR(entry))
+		return entry;
+
+	/*
+	 * Find the authoritative RMP entry for a PFN. This can be either a 4K
+	 * RMP entry or a special large RMP entry that is authoritative for a
+	 * whole 2M area.
+	 */
+	large_entry = get_rmpentry(pfn & PFN_PMD_MASK);
+	if (IS_ERR(large_entry))
+		return large_entry;
+
+	*level = RMP_TO_PG_LEVEL(large_entry->pagesize);
+
+	return entry;
+}
+
+int snp_lookup_rmpentry(u64 pfn, bool *assigned, int *level)
+{
+	struct rmpentry *e;
+
+	e = __snp_lookup_rmpentry(pfn, level);
+	if (IS_ERR(e))
+		return PTR_ERR(e);
+
+	*assigned = !!e->assigned;
+	return 0;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(snp_lookup_rmpentry);
+
+/*
+ * Dump the raw RMP entry for a particular PFN. These bits are documented in the
+ * PPR for a particular CPU model and provide useful information about how a
+ * particular PFN is being utilized by the kernel/firmware at the time certain
+ * unexpected events occur, such as RMP faults.
+ */
+static void dump_rmpentry(u64 pfn)
+{
+	u64 pfn_i, pfn_end;
+	struct rmpentry *e;
+	int level;
+
+	e = __snp_lookup_rmpentry(pfn, &level);
+	if (IS_ERR(e)) {
+		pr_err("Failed to read RMP entry for PFN 0x%llx, error %ld\n",
+		       pfn, PTR_ERR(e));
+		return;
+	}
+
+	if (e->assigned) {
+		pr_info("PFN 0x%llx, RMP entry: [0x%016llx - 0x%016llx]\n",
+			pfn, e->lo, e->hi);
+		return;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * If the RMP entry for a particular PFN is not in an assigned state,
+	 * then it is sometimes useful to get an idea of whether or not any RMP
+	 * entries for other PFNs within the same 2MB region are assigned, since
+	 * those too can affect the ability to access a particular PFN in
+	 * certain situations, such as when the PFN is being accessed via a 2MB
+	 * mapping in the host page table.
+	 */
+	pfn_i = ALIGN_DOWN(pfn, PTRS_PER_PMD);
+	pfn_end = pfn_i + PTRS_PER_PMD;
+
+	pr_info("PFN 0x%llx unassigned, dumping non-zero entries in 2M PFN region: [0x%llx - 0x%llx]\n",
+		pfn, pfn_i, pfn_end);
+
+	while (pfn_i < pfn_end) {
+		e = __snp_lookup_rmpentry(pfn_i, &level);
+		if (IS_ERR(e)) {
+			pr_err("Error %ld reading RMP entry for PFN 0x%llx\n",
+			       PTR_ERR(e), pfn_i);
+			pfn_i++;
+			continue;
+		}
+
+		if (e->lo || e->hi)
+			pr_info("PFN: 0x%llx, [0x%016llx - 0x%016llx]\n", pfn_i, e->lo, e->hi);
+		pfn_i++;
+	}
+}
+
+void snp_dump_hva_rmpentry(unsigned long hva)
+{
+	unsigned long paddr;
+	unsigned int level;
+	pgd_t *pgd;
+	pte_t *pte;
+
+	pgd = __va(read_cr3_pa());
+	pgd += pgd_index(hva);
+	pte = lookup_address_in_pgd(pgd, hva, &level);
+
+	if (!pte) {
+		pr_err("Can't dump RMP entry for HVA %lx: no PTE/PFN found\n", hva);
+		return;
+	}
+
+	paddr = PFN_PHYS(pte_pfn(*pte)) | (hva & ~page_level_mask(level));
+	dump_rmpentry(PHYS_PFN(paddr));
+}
+
+/*
+ * PSMASH a 2MB aligned page into 4K pages in the RMP table while preserving the
+ * Validated bit.
+ */
+int psmash(u64 pfn)
+{
+	unsigned long paddr = pfn << PAGE_SHIFT;
+	int ret;
+
+	if (!cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_HOST_SEV_SNP))
+		return -ENODEV;
+
+	if (!pfn_valid(pfn))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	/* Binutils version 2.36 supports the PSMASH mnemonic. */
+	asm volatile(".byte 0xF3, 0x0F, 0x01, 0xFF"
+		      : "=a" (ret)
+		      : "a" (paddr)
+		      : "memory", "cc");
+
+	return ret;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(psmash);
+
+/*
+ * If the kernel uses a 2MB or larger directmap mapping to write to an address,
+ * and that mapping contains any 4KB pages that are set to private in the RMP
+ * table, an RMP #PF will trigger and cause a host crash. Hypervisor code that
+ * owns the PFNs being transitioned will never attempt such a write, but other
+ * kernel tasks writing to other PFNs in the range may trigger these checks
+ * inadvertently due a large directmap mapping that happens to overlap such a
+ * PFN.
+ *
+ * Prevent this by splitting any 2MB+ mappings that might end up containing a
+ * mix of private/shared PFNs as a result of a subsequent RMPUPDATE for the
+ * PFN/rmp_level passed in.
+ *
+ * Note that there is no attempt here to scan all the RMP entries for the 2MB
+ * physical range, since it would only be worthwhile in determining if a
+ * subsequent RMPUPDATE for a 4KB PFN would result in all the entries being of
+ * the same shared/private state, thus avoiding the need to split the mapping.
+ * But that would mean the entries are currently in a mixed state, and so the
+ * mapping would have already been split as a result of prior transitions.
+ * And since the 4K split is only done if the mapping is 2MB+, and there isn't
+ * currently a mechanism in place to restore 2MB+ mappings, such a check would
+ * not provide any usable benefit.
+ *
+ * More specifics on how these checks are carried out can be found in APM
+ * Volume 2, "RMP and VMPL Access Checks".
+ */
+static int adjust_direct_map(u64 pfn, int rmp_level)
+{
+	unsigned long vaddr;
+	unsigned int level;
+	int npages, ret;
+	pte_t *pte;
+
+	/*
+	 * pfn_to_kaddr() will return a vaddr only within the direct
+	 * map range.
+	 */
+	vaddr = (unsigned long)pfn_to_kaddr(pfn);
+
+	/* Only 4KB/2MB RMP entries are supported by current hardware. */
+	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(rmp_level > PG_LEVEL_2M))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (!pfn_valid(pfn))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (rmp_level == PG_LEVEL_2M &&
+	    (!IS_ALIGNED(pfn, PTRS_PER_PMD) || !pfn_valid(pfn + PTRS_PER_PMD - 1)))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	/*
+	 * If an entire 2MB physical range is being transitioned, then there is
+	 * no risk of RMP #PFs due to write accesses from overlapping mappings,
+	 * since even accesses from 1GB mappings will be treated as 2MB accesses
+	 * as far as RMP table checks are concerned.
+	 */
+	if (rmp_level == PG_LEVEL_2M)
+		return 0;
+
+	pte = lookup_address(vaddr, &level);
+	if (!pte || pte_none(*pte))
+		return 0;
+
+	if (level == PG_LEVEL_4K)
+		return 0;
+
+	npages = page_level_size(rmp_level) / PAGE_SIZE;
+	ret = set_memory_4k(vaddr, npages);
+	if (ret)
+		pr_warn("Failed to split direct map for PFN 0x%llx, ret: %d\n",
+			pfn, ret);
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * It is expected that those operations are seldom enough so that no mutual
+ * exclusion of updaters is needed and thus the overlap error condition below
+ * should happen very rarely and would get resolved relatively quickly by
+ * the firmware.
+ *
+ * If not, one could consider introducing a mutex or so here to sync concurrent
+ * RMP updates and thus diminish the amount of cases where firmware needs to
+ * lock 2M ranges to protect against concurrent updates.
+ *
+ * The optimal solution would be range locking to avoid locking disjoint
+ * regions unnecessarily but there's no support for that yet.
+ */
+static int rmpupdate(u64 pfn, struct rmp_state *state)
+{
+	unsigned long paddr = pfn << PAGE_SHIFT;
+	int ret, level;
+
+	if (!cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_HOST_SEV_SNP))
+		return -ENODEV;
+
+	level = RMP_TO_PG_LEVEL(state->pagesize);
+
+	if (adjust_direct_map(pfn, level))
+		return -EFAULT;
+
+	do {
+		/* Binutils version 2.36 supports the RMPUPDATE mnemonic. */
+		asm volatile(".byte 0xF2, 0x0F, 0x01, 0xFE"
+			     : "=a" (ret)
+			     : "a" (paddr), "c" ((unsigned long)state)
+			     : "memory", "cc");
+	} while (ret == RMPUPDATE_FAIL_OVERLAP);
+
+	if (ret) {
+		pr_err("RMPUPDATE failed for PFN %llx, pg_level: %d, ret: %d\n",
+		       pfn, level, ret);
+		dump_rmpentry(pfn);
+		dump_stack();
+		return -EFAULT;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/* Transition a page to guest-owned/private state in the RMP table. */
+int rmp_make_private(u64 pfn, u64 gpa, enum pg_level level, u32 asid, bool immutable)
+{
+	struct rmp_state state;
+
+	memset(&state, 0, sizeof(state));
+	state.assigned = 1;
+	state.asid = asid;
+	state.immutable = immutable;
+	state.gpa = gpa;
+	state.pagesize = PG_LEVEL_TO_RMP(level);
+
+	return rmpupdate(pfn, &state);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(rmp_make_private);
+
+/* Transition a page to hypervisor-owned/shared state in the RMP table. */
+int rmp_make_shared(u64 pfn, enum pg_level level)
+{
+	struct rmp_state state;
+
+	memset(&state, 0, sizeof(state));
+	state.pagesize = PG_LEVEL_TO_RMP(level);
+
+	return rmpupdate(pfn, &state);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(rmp_make_shared);
+
+void snp_leak_pages(u64 pfn, unsigned int npages)
+{
+	struct page *page = pfn_to_page(pfn);
+
+	pr_warn("Leaking PFN range 0x%llx-0x%llx\n", pfn, pfn + npages);
+
+	spin_lock(&snp_leaked_pages_list_lock);
+	while (npages--) {
+
+		/*
+		 * Reuse the page's buddy list for chaining into the leaked
+		 * pages list. This page should not be on a free list currently
+		 * and is also unsafe to be added to a free list.
+		 */
+		if (likely(!PageCompound(page)) ||
+
+			/*
+			 * Skip inserting tail pages of compound page as
+			 * page->buddy_list of tail pages is not usable.
+			 */
+		    (PageHead(page) && compound_nr(page) <= npages))
+			list_add_tail(&page->buddy_list, &snp_leaked_pages_list);
+
+		dump_rmpentry(pfn);
+		snp_nr_leaked_pages++;
+		pfn++;
+		page++;
+	}
+	spin_unlock(&snp_leaked_pages_list_lock);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(snp_leak_pages);
+
+void kdump_sev_callback(void)
+{
+	/*
+	 * Do wbinvd() on remote CPUs when SNP is enabled in order to
+	 * safely do SNP_SHUTDOWN on the local CPU.
+	 */
+	if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_HOST_SEV_SNP))
+		wbinvd();
+}