diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_vf_mbx.c')
-rw-r--r-- | drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_vf_mbx.c | 380 |
1 files changed, 380 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_vf_mbx.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_vf_mbx.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..40cb4ba07 --- /dev/null +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_vf_mbx.c @@ -0,0 +1,380 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* Copyright (c) 2018, Intel Corporation. */ + +#include "ice_common.h" +#include "ice_vf_mbx.h" + +/** + * ice_aq_send_msg_to_vf + * @hw: pointer to the hardware structure + * @vfid: VF ID to send msg + * @v_opcode: opcodes for VF-PF communication + * @v_retval: return error code + * @msg: pointer to the msg buffer + * @msglen: msg length + * @cd: pointer to command details + * + * Send message to VF driver (0x0802) using mailbox + * queue and asynchronously sending message via + * ice_sq_send_cmd() function + */ +int +ice_aq_send_msg_to_vf(struct ice_hw *hw, u16 vfid, u32 v_opcode, u32 v_retval, + u8 *msg, u16 msglen, struct ice_sq_cd *cd) +{ + struct ice_aqc_pf_vf_msg *cmd; + struct ice_aq_desc desc; + + ice_fill_dflt_direct_cmd_desc(&desc, ice_mbx_opc_send_msg_to_vf); + + cmd = &desc.params.virt; + cmd->id = cpu_to_le32(vfid); + + desc.cookie_high = cpu_to_le32(v_opcode); + desc.cookie_low = cpu_to_le32(v_retval); + + if (msglen) + desc.flags |= cpu_to_le16(ICE_AQ_FLAG_RD); + + return ice_sq_send_cmd(hw, &hw->mailboxq, &desc, msg, msglen, cd); +} + +static const u32 ice_legacy_aq_to_vc_speed[] = { + VIRTCHNL_LINK_SPEED_100MB, /* BIT(0) */ + VIRTCHNL_LINK_SPEED_100MB, + VIRTCHNL_LINK_SPEED_1GB, + VIRTCHNL_LINK_SPEED_1GB, + VIRTCHNL_LINK_SPEED_1GB, + VIRTCHNL_LINK_SPEED_10GB, + VIRTCHNL_LINK_SPEED_20GB, + VIRTCHNL_LINK_SPEED_25GB, + VIRTCHNL_LINK_SPEED_40GB, + VIRTCHNL_LINK_SPEED_40GB, + VIRTCHNL_LINK_SPEED_40GB, +}; + +/** + * ice_conv_link_speed_to_virtchnl + * @adv_link_support: determines the format of the returned link speed + * @link_speed: variable containing the link_speed to be converted + * + * Convert link speed supported by HW to link speed supported by virtchnl. + * If adv_link_support is true, then return link speed in Mbps. Else return + * link speed as a VIRTCHNL_LINK_SPEED_* casted to a u32. Note that the caller + * needs to cast back to an enum virtchnl_link_speed in the case where + * adv_link_support is false, but when adv_link_support is true the caller can + * expect the speed in Mbps. + */ +u32 ice_conv_link_speed_to_virtchnl(bool adv_link_support, u16 link_speed) +{ + /* convert a BIT() value into an array index */ + u32 index = fls(link_speed) - 1; + + if (adv_link_support) + return ice_get_link_speed(index); + else if (index < ARRAY_SIZE(ice_legacy_aq_to_vc_speed)) + /* Virtchnl speeds are not defined for every speed supported in + * the hardware. To maintain compatibility with older AVF + * drivers, while reporting the speed the new speed values are + * resolved to the closest known virtchnl speeds + */ + return ice_legacy_aq_to_vc_speed[index]; + + return VIRTCHNL_LINK_SPEED_UNKNOWN; +} + +/* The mailbox overflow detection algorithm helps to check if there + * is a possibility of a malicious VF transmitting too many MBX messages to the + * PF. + * 1. The mailbox snapshot structure, ice_mbx_snapshot, is initialized during + * driver initialization in ice_init_hw() using ice_mbx_init_snapshot(). + * The struct ice_mbx_snapshot helps to track and traverse a static window of + * messages within the mailbox queue while looking for a malicious VF. + * + * 2. When the caller starts processing its mailbox queue in response to an + * interrupt, the structure ice_mbx_snapshot is expected to be cleared before + * the algorithm can be run for the first time for that interrupt. This + * requires calling ice_mbx_reset_snapshot() as well as calling + * ice_mbx_reset_vf_info() for each VF tracking structure. + * + * 3. For every message read by the caller from the MBX Queue, the caller must + * call the detection algorithm's entry function ice_mbx_vf_state_handler(). + * Before every call to ice_mbx_vf_state_handler() the struct ice_mbx_data is + * filled as it is required to be passed to the algorithm. + * + * 4. Every time a message is read from the MBX queue, a tracking structure + * for the VF must be passed to the state handler. The boolean output + * report_malvf from ice_mbx_vf_state_handler() serves as an indicator to the + * caller whether it must report this VF as malicious or not. + * + * 5. When a VF is identified to be malicious, the caller can send a message + * to the system administrator. + * + * 6. The PF is responsible for maintaining the struct ice_mbx_vf_info + * structure for each VF. The PF should clear the VF tracking structure if the + * VF is reset. When a VF is shut down and brought back up, we will then + * assume that the new VF is not malicious and may report it again if we + * detect it again. + * + * 7. The function ice_mbx_reset_snapshot() is called to reset the information + * in ice_mbx_snapshot for every new mailbox interrupt handled. + */ +#define ICE_RQ_DATA_MASK(rq_data) ((rq_data) & PF_MBX_ARQH_ARQH_M) +/* Using the highest value for an unsigned 16-bit value 0xFFFF to indicate that + * the max messages check must be ignored in the algorithm + */ +#define ICE_IGNORE_MAX_MSG_CNT 0xFFFF + +/** + * ice_mbx_reset_snapshot - Reset mailbox snapshot structure + * @snap: pointer to the mailbox snapshot + */ +static void ice_mbx_reset_snapshot(struct ice_mbx_snapshot *snap) +{ + struct ice_mbx_vf_info *vf_info; + + /* Clear mbx_buf in the mailbox snaphot structure and setting the + * mailbox snapshot state to a new capture. + */ + memset(&snap->mbx_buf, 0, sizeof(snap->mbx_buf)); + snap->mbx_buf.state = ICE_MAL_VF_DETECT_STATE_NEW_SNAPSHOT; + + /* Reset message counts for all VFs to zero */ + list_for_each_entry(vf_info, &snap->mbx_vf, list_entry) + vf_info->msg_count = 0; +} + +/** + * ice_mbx_traverse - Pass through mailbox snapshot + * @hw: pointer to the HW struct + * @new_state: new algorithm state + * + * Traversing the mailbox static snapshot without checking + * for malicious VFs. + */ +static void +ice_mbx_traverse(struct ice_hw *hw, + enum ice_mbx_snapshot_state *new_state) +{ + struct ice_mbx_snap_buffer_data *snap_buf; + u32 num_iterations; + + snap_buf = &hw->mbx_snapshot.mbx_buf; + + /* As mailbox buffer is circular, applying a mask + * on the incremented iteration count. + */ + num_iterations = ICE_RQ_DATA_MASK(++snap_buf->num_iterations); + + /* Checking either of the below conditions to exit snapshot traversal: + * Condition-1: If the number of iterations in the mailbox is equal to + * the mailbox head which would indicate that we have reached the end + * of the static snapshot. + * Condition-2: If the maximum messages serviced in the mailbox for a + * given interrupt is the highest possible value then there is no need + * to check if the number of messages processed is equal to it. If not + * check if the number of messages processed is greater than or equal + * to the maximum number of mailbox entries serviced in current work item. + */ + if (num_iterations == snap_buf->head || + (snap_buf->max_num_msgs_mbx < ICE_IGNORE_MAX_MSG_CNT && + ++snap_buf->num_msg_proc >= snap_buf->max_num_msgs_mbx)) + *new_state = ICE_MAL_VF_DETECT_STATE_NEW_SNAPSHOT; +} + +/** + * ice_mbx_detect_malvf - Detect malicious VF in snapshot + * @hw: pointer to the HW struct + * @vf_info: mailbox tracking structure for a VF + * @new_state: new algorithm state + * @is_malvf: boolean output to indicate if VF is malicious + * + * This function tracks the number of asynchronous messages + * sent per VF and marks the VF as malicious if it exceeds + * the permissible number of messages to send. + */ +static int +ice_mbx_detect_malvf(struct ice_hw *hw, struct ice_mbx_vf_info *vf_info, + enum ice_mbx_snapshot_state *new_state, + bool *is_malvf) +{ + /* increment the message count for this VF */ + vf_info->msg_count++; + + if (vf_info->msg_count >= ICE_ASYNC_VF_MSG_THRESHOLD) + *is_malvf = true; + + /* continue to iterate through the mailbox snapshot */ + ice_mbx_traverse(hw, new_state); + + return 0; +} + +/** + * ice_mbx_vf_state_handler - Handle states of the overflow algorithm + * @hw: pointer to the HW struct + * @mbx_data: pointer to structure containing mailbox data + * @vf_info: mailbox tracking structure for the VF in question + * @report_malvf: boolean output to indicate whether VF should be reported + * + * The function serves as an entry point for the malicious VF + * detection algorithm by handling the different states and state + * transitions of the algorithm: + * New snapshot: This state is entered when creating a new static + * snapshot. The data from any previous mailbox snapshot is + * cleared and a new capture of the mailbox head and tail is + * logged. This will be the new static snapshot to detect + * asynchronous messages sent by VFs. On capturing the snapshot + * and depending on whether the number of pending messages in that + * snapshot exceed the watermark value, the state machine enters + * traverse or detect states. + * Traverse: If pending message count is below watermark then iterate + * through the snapshot without any action on VF. + * Detect: If pending message count exceeds watermark traverse + * the static snapshot and look for a malicious VF. + */ +int +ice_mbx_vf_state_handler(struct ice_hw *hw, struct ice_mbx_data *mbx_data, + struct ice_mbx_vf_info *vf_info, bool *report_malvf) +{ + struct ice_mbx_snapshot *snap = &hw->mbx_snapshot; + struct ice_mbx_snap_buffer_data *snap_buf; + struct ice_ctl_q_info *cq = &hw->mailboxq; + enum ice_mbx_snapshot_state new_state; + bool is_malvf = false; + int status = 0; + + if (!report_malvf || !mbx_data || !vf_info) + return -EINVAL; + + *report_malvf = false; + + /* When entering the mailbox state machine assume that the VF + * is not malicious until detected. + */ + /* Checking if max messages allowed to be processed while servicing current + * interrupt is not less than the defined AVF message threshold. + */ + if (mbx_data->max_num_msgs_mbx <= ICE_ASYNC_VF_MSG_THRESHOLD) + return -EINVAL; + + /* The watermark value should not be lesser than the threshold limit + * set for the number of asynchronous messages a VF can send to mailbox + * nor should it be greater than the maximum number of messages in the + * mailbox serviced in current interrupt. + */ + if (mbx_data->async_watermark_val < ICE_ASYNC_VF_MSG_THRESHOLD || + mbx_data->async_watermark_val > mbx_data->max_num_msgs_mbx) + return -EINVAL; + + new_state = ICE_MAL_VF_DETECT_STATE_INVALID; + snap_buf = &snap->mbx_buf; + + switch (snap_buf->state) { + case ICE_MAL_VF_DETECT_STATE_NEW_SNAPSHOT: + /* Clear any previously held data in mailbox snapshot structure. */ + ice_mbx_reset_snapshot(snap); + + /* Collect the pending ARQ count, number of messages processed and + * the maximum number of messages allowed to be processed from the + * Mailbox for current interrupt. + */ + snap_buf->num_pending_arq = mbx_data->num_pending_arq; + snap_buf->num_msg_proc = mbx_data->num_msg_proc; + snap_buf->max_num_msgs_mbx = mbx_data->max_num_msgs_mbx; + + /* Capture a new static snapshot of the mailbox by logging the + * head and tail of snapshot and set num_iterations to the tail + * value to mark the start of the iteration through the snapshot. + */ + snap_buf->head = ICE_RQ_DATA_MASK(cq->rq.next_to_clean + + mbx_data->num_pending_arq); + snap_buf->tail = ICE_RQ_DATA_MASK(cq->rq.next_to_clean - 1); + snap_buf->num_iterations = snap_buf->tail; + + /* Pending ARQ messages returned by ice_clean_rq_elem + * is the difference between the head and tail of the + * mailbox queue. Comparing this value against the watermark + * helps to check if we potentially have malicious VFs. + */ + if (snap_buf->num_pending_arq >= + mbx_data->async_watermark_val) { + new_state = ICE_MAL_VF_DETECT_STATE_DETECT; + status = ice_mbx_detect_malvf(hw, vf_info, &new_state, &is_malvf); + } else { + new_state = ICE_MAL_VF_DETECT_STATE_TRAVERSE; + ice_mbx_traverse(hw, &new_state); + } + break; + + case ICE_MAL_VF_DETECT_STATE_TRAVERSE: + new_state = ICE_MAL_VF_DETECT_STATE_TRAVERSE; + ice_mbx_traverse(hw, &new_state); + break; + + case ICE_MAL_VF_DETECT_STATE_DETECT: + new_state = ICE_MAL_VF_DETECT_STATE_DETECT; + status = ice_mbx_detect_malvf(hw, vf_info, &new_state, &is_malvf); + break; + + default: + new_state = ICE_MAL_VF_DETECT_STATE_INVALID; + status = -EIO; + } + + snap_buf->state = new_state; + + /* Only report VFs as malicious the first time we detect it */ + if (is_malvf && !vf_info->malicious) { + vf_info->malicious = 1; + *report_malvf = true; + } + + return status; +} + +/** + * ice_mbx_clear_malvf - Clear VF mailbox info + * @vf_info: the mailbox tracking structure for a VF + * + * In case of a VF reset, this function shall be called to clear the VF's + * current mailbox tracking state. + */ +void ice_mbx_clear_malvf(struct ice_mbx_vf_info *vf_info) +{ + vf_info->malicious = 0; + vf_info->msg_count = 0; +} + +/** + * ice_mbx_init_vf_info - Initialize a new VF mailbox tracking info + * @hw: pointer to the hardware structure + * @vf_info: the mailbox tracking info structure for a VF + * + * Initialize a VF mailbox tracking info structure and insert it into the + * snapshot list. + * + * If you remove the VF, you must also delete the associated VF info structure + * from the linked list. + */ +void ice_mbx_init_vf_info(struct ice_hw *hw, struct ice_mbx_vf_info *vf_info) +{ + struct ice_mbx_snapshot *snap = &hw->mbx_snapshot; + + ice_mbx_clear_malvf(vf_info); + list_add(&vf_info->list_entry, &snap->mbx_vf); +} + +/** + * ice_mbx_init_snapshot - Initialize mailbox snapshot data + * @hw: pointer to the hardware structure + * + * Clear the mailbox snapshot structure and initialize the VF mailbox list. + */ +void ice_mbx_init_snapshot(struct ice_hw *hw) +{ + struct ice_mbx_snapshot *snap = &hw->mbx_snapshot; + + INIT_LIST_HEAD(&snap->mbx_vf); + ice_mbx_reset_snapshot(snap); +} |