diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'fs/overlayfs/inode.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | fs/overlayfs/inode.c | 1434 |
1 files changed, 1434 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/inode.c b/fs/overlayfs/inode.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..fca29dba7b --- /dev/null +++ b/fs/overlayfs/inode.c @@ -0,0 +1,1434 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only +/* + * + * Copyright (C) 2011 Novell Inc. + */ + +#include <linux/fs.h> +#include <linux/slab.h> +#include <linux/cred.h> +#include <linux/xattr.h> +#include <linux/posix_acl.h> +#include <linux/ratelimit.h> +#include <linux/fiemap.h> +#include <linux/fileattr.h> +#include <linux/security.h> +#include <linux/namei.h> +#include <linux/posix_acl.h> +#include <linux/posix_acl_xattr.h> +#include "overlayfs.h" + + +int ovl_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry, + struct iattr *attr) +{ + int err; + struct ovl_fs *ofs = OVL_FS(dentry->d_sb); + bool full_copy_up = false; + struct dentry *upperdentry; + const struct cred *old_cred; + + err = setattr_prepare(&nop_mnt_idmap, dentry, attr); + if (err) + return err; + + err = ovl_want_write(dentry); + if (err) + goto out; + + if (attr->ia_valid & ATTR_SIZE) { + /* Truncate should trigger data copy up as well */ + full_copy_up = true; + } + + if (!full_copy_up) + err = ovl_copy_up(dentry); + else + err = ovl_copy_up_with_data(dentry); + if (!err) { + struct inode *winode = NULL; + + upperdentry = ovl_dentry_upper(dentry); + + if (attr->ia_valid & ATTR_SIZE) { + winode = d_inode(upperdentry); + err = get_write_access(winode); + if (err) + goto out_drop_write; + } + + if (attr->ia_valid & (ATTR_KILL_SUID|ATTR_KILL_SGID)) + attr->ia_valid &= ~ATTR_MODE; + + /* + * We might have to translate ovl file into real file object + * once use cases emerge. For now, simply don't let underlying + * filesystem rely on attr->ia_file + */ + attr->ia_valid &= ~ATTR_FILE; + + /* + * If open(O_TRUNC) is done, VFS calls ->setattr with ATTR_OPEN + * set. Overlayfs does not pass O_TRUNC flag to underlying + * filesystem during open -> do not pass ATTR_OPEN. This + * disables optimization in fuse which assumes open(O_TRUNC) + * already set file size to 0. But we never passed O_TRUNC to + * fuse. So by clearing ATTR_OPEN, fuse will be forced to send + * setattr request to server. + */ + attr->ia_valid &= ~ATTR_OPEN; + + inode_lock(upperdentry->d_inode); + old_cred = ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb); + err = ovl_do_notify_change(ofs, upperdentry, attr); + revert_creds(old_cred); + if (!err) + ovl_copyattr(dentry->d_inode); + inode_unlock(upperdentry->d_inode); + + if (winode) + put_write_access(winode); + } +out_drop_write: + ovl_drop_write(dentry); +out: + return err; +} + +static void ovl_map_dev_ino(struct dentry *dentry, struct kstat *stat, int fsid) +{ + struct ovl_fs *ofs = OVL_FS(dentry->d_sb); + bool samefs = ovl_same_fs(ofs); + unsigned int xinobits = ovl_xino_bits(ofs); + unsigned int xinoshift = 64 - xinobits; + + if (samefs) { + /* + * When all layers are on the same fs, all real inode + * number are unique, so we use the overlay st_dev, + * which is friendly to du -x. + */ + stat->dev = dentry->d_sb->s_dev; + return; + } else if (xinobits) { + /* + * All inode numbers of underlying fs should not be using the + * high xinobits, so we use high xinobits to partition the + * overlay st_ino address space. The high bits holds the fsid + * (upper fsid is 0). The lowest xinobit is reserved for mapping + * the non-persistent inode numbers range in case of overflow. + * This way all overlay inode numbers are unique and use the + * overlay st_dev. + */ + if (likely(!(stat->ino >> xinoshift))) { + stat->ino |= ((u64)fsid) << (xinoshift + 1); + stat->dev = dentry->d_sb->s_dev; + return; + } else if (ovl_xino_warn(ofs)) { + pr_warn_ratelimited("inode number too big (%pd2, ino=%llu, xinobits=%d)\n", + dentry, stat->ino, xinobits); + } + } + + /* The inode could not be mapped to a unified st_ino address space */ + if (S_ISDIR(dentry->d_inode->i_mode)) { + /* + * Always use the overlay st_dev for directories, so 'find + * -xdev' will scan the entire overlay mount and won't cross the + * overlay mount boundaries. + * + * If not all layers are on the same fs the pair {real st_ino; + * overlay st_dev} is not unique, so use the non persistent + * overlay st_ino for directories. + */ + stat->dev = dentry->d_sb->s_dev; + stat->ino = dentry->d_inode->i_ino; + } else { + /* + * For non-samefs setup, if we cannot map all layers st_ino + * to a unified address space, we need to make sure that st_dev + * is unique per underlying fs, so we use the unique anonymous + * bdev assigned to the underlying fs. + */ + stat->dev = ofs->fs[fsid].pseudo_dev; + } +} + +int ovl_getattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, const struct path *path, + struct kstat *stat, u32 request_mask, unsigned int flags) +{ + struct dentry *dentry = path->dentry; + enum ovl_path_type type; + struct path realpath; + const struct cred *old_cred; + struct inode *inode = d_inode(dentry); + bool is_dir = S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode); + int fsid = 0; + int err; + bool metacopy_blocks = false; + + metacopy_blocks = ovl_is_metacopy_dentry(dentry); + + type = ovl_path_real(dentry, &realpath); + old_cred = ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb); + err = ovl_do_getattr(&realpath, stat, request_mask, flags); + if (err) + goto out; + + /* Report the effective immutable/append-only STATX flags */ + generic_fill_statx_attr(inode, stat); + + /* + * For non-dir or same fs, we use st_ino of the copy up origin. + * This guaranties constant st_dev/st_ino across copy up. + * With xino feature and non-samefs, we use st_ino of the copy up + * origin masked with high bits that represent the layer id. + * + * If lower filesystem supports NFS file handles, this also guaranties + * persistent st_ino across mount cycle. + */ + if (!is_dir || ovl_same_dev(OVL_FS(dentry->d_sb))) { + if (!OVL_TYPE_UPPER(type)) { + fsid = ovl_layer_lower(dentry)->fsid; + } else if (OVL_TYPE_ORIGIN(type)) { + struct kstat lowerstat; + u32 lowermask = STATX_INO | STATX_BLOCKS | + (!is_dir ? STATX_NLINK : 0); + + ovl_path_lower(dentry, &realpath); + err = ovl_do_getattr(&realpath, &lowerstat, lowermask, + flags); + if (err) + goto out; + + /* + * Lower hardlinks may be broken on copy up to different + * upper files, so we cannot use the lower origin st_ino + * for those different files, even for the same fs case. + * + * Similarly, several redirected dirs can point to the + * same dir on a lower layer. With the "verify_lower" + * feature, we do not use the lower origin st_ino, if + * we haven't verified that this redirect is unique. + * + * With inodes index enabled, it is safe to use st_ino + * of an indexed origin. The index validates that the + * upper hardlink is not broken and that a redirected + * dir is the only redirect to that origin. + */ + if (ovl_test_flag(OVL_INDEX, d_inode(dentry)) || + (!ovl_verify_lower(dentry->d_sb) && + (is_dir || lowerstat.nlink == 1))) { + fsid = ovl_layer_lower(dentry)->fsid; + stat->ino = lowerstat.ino; + } + + /* + * If we are querying a metacopy dentry and lower + * dentry is data dentry, then use the blocks we + * queried just now. We don't have to do additional + * vfs_getattr(). If lower itself is metacopy, then + * additional vfs_getattr() is unavoidable. + */ + if (metacopy_blocks && + realpath.dentry == ovl_dentry_lowerdata(dentry)) { + stat->blocks = lowerstat.blocks; + metacopy_blocks = false; + } + } + + if (metacopy_blocks) { + /* + * If lower is not same as lowerdata or if there was + * no origin on upper, we can end up here. + * With lazy lowerdata lookup, guess lowerdata blocks + * from size to avoid lowerdata lookup on stat(2). + */ + struct kstat lowerdatastat; + u32 lowermask = STATX_BLOCKS; + + ovl_path_lowerdata(dentry, &realpath); + if (realpath.dentry) { + err = ovl_do_getattr(&realpath, &lowerdatastat, + lowermask, flags); + if (err) + goto out; + } else { + lowerdatastat.blocks = + round_up(stat->size, stat->blksize) >> 9; + } + stat->blocks = lowerdatastat.blocks; + } + } + + ovl_map_dev_ino(dentry, stat, fsid); + + /* + * It's probably not worth it to count subdirs to get the + * correct link count. nlink=1 seems to pacify 'find' and + * other utilities. + */ + if (is_dir && OVL_TYPE_MERGE(type)) + stat->nlink = 1; + + /* + * Return the overlay inode nlinks for indexed upper inodes. + * Overlay inode nlink counts the union of the upper hardlinks + * and non-covered lower hardlinks. It does not include the upper + * index hardlink. + */ + if (!is_dir && ovl_test_flag(OVL_INDEX, d_inode(dentry))) + stat->nlink = dentry->d_inode->i_nlink; + +out: + revert_creds(old_cred); + + return err; +} + +int ovl_permission(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, + struct inode *inode, int mask) +{ + struct inode *upperinode = ovl_inode_upper(inode); + struct inode *realinode; + struct path realpath; + const struct cred *old_cred; + int err; + + /* Careful in RCU walk mode */ + realinode = ovl_i_path_real(inode, &realpath); + if (!realinode) { + WARN_ON(!(mask & MAY_NOT_BLOCK)); + return -ECHILD; + } + + /* + * Check overlay inode with the creds of task and underlying inode + * with creds of mounter + */ + err = generic_permission(&nop_mnt_idmap, inode, mask); + if (err) + return err; + + old_cred = ovl_override_creds(inode->i_sb); + if (!upperinode && + !special_file(realinode->i_mode) && mask & MAY_WRITE) { + mask &= ~(MAY_WRITE | MAY_APPEND); + /* Make sure mounter can read file for copy up later */ + mask |= MAY_READ; + } + err = inode_permission(mnt_idmap(realpath.mnt), realinode, mask); + revert_creds(old_cred); + + return err; +} + +static const char *ovl_get_link(struct dentry *dentry, + struct inode *inode, + struct delayed_call *done) +{ + const struct cred *old_cred; + const char *p; + + if (!dentry) + return ERR_PTR(-ECHILD); + + old_cred = ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb); + p = vfs_get_link(ovl_dentry_real(dentry), done); + revert_creds(old_cred); + return p; +} + +bool ovl_is_private_xattr(struct super_block *sb, const char *name) +{ + struct ovl_fs *ofs = OVL_FS(sb); + + if (ofs->config.userxattr) + return strncmp(name, OVL_XATTR_USER_PREFIX, + sizeof(OVL_XATTR_USER_PREFIX) - 1) == 0; + else + return strncmp(name, OVL_XATTR_TRUSTED_PREFIX, + sizeof(OVL_XATTR_TRUSTED_PREFIX) - 1) == 0; +} + +int ovl_xattr_set(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode, const char *name, + const void *value, size_t size, int flags) +{ + int err; + struct ovl_fs *ofs = OVL_FS(dentry->d_sb); + struct dentry *upperdentry = ovl_i_dentry_upper(inode); + struct dentry *realdentry = upperdentry ?: ovl_dentry_lower(dentry); + struct path realpath; + const struct cred *old_cred; + + err = ovl_want_write(dentry); + if (err) + goto out; + + if (!value && !upperdentry) { + ovl_path_lower(dentry, &realpath); + old_cred = ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb); + err = vfs_getxattr(mnt_idmap(realpath.mnt), realdentry, name, NULL, 0); + revert_creds(old_cred); + if (err < 0) + goto out_drop_write; + } + + if (!upperdentry) { + err = ovl_copy_up(dentry); + if (err) + goto out_drop_write; + + realdentry = ovl_dentry_upper(dentry); + } + + old_cred = ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb); + if (value) { + err = ovl_do_setxattr(ofs, realdentry, name, value, size, + flags); + } else { + WARN_ON(flags != XATTR_REPLACE); + err = ovl_do_removexattr(ofs, realdentry, name); + } + revert_creds(old_cred); + + /* copy c/mtime */ + ovl_copyattr(inode); + +out_drop_write: + ovl_drop_write(dentry); +out: + return err; +} + +int ovl_xattr_get(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode, const char *name, + void *value, size_t size) +{ + ssize_t res; + const struct cred *old_cred; + struct path realpath; + + ovl_i_path_real(inode, &realpath); + old_cred = ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb); + res = vfs_getxattr(mnt_idmap(realpath.mnt), realpath.dentry, name, value, size); + revert_creds(old_cred); + return res; +} + +static bool ovl_can_list(struct super_block *sb, const char *s) +{ + /* Never list private (.overlay) */ + if (ovl_is_private_xattr(sb, s)) + return false; + + /* List all non-trusted xattrs */ + if (strncmp(s, XATTR_TRUSTED_PREFIX, XATTR_TRUSTED_PREFIX_LEN) != 0) + return true; + + /* list other trusted for superuser only */ + return ns_capable_noaudit(&init_user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN); +} + +ssize_t ovl_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *list, size_t size) +{ + struct dentry *realdentry = ovl_dentry_real(dentry); + ssize_t res; + size_t len; + char *s; + const struct cred *old_cred; + + old_cred = ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb); + res = vfs_listxattr(realdentry, list, size); + revert_creds(old_cred); + if (res <= 0 || size == 0) + return res; + + /* filter out private xattrs */ + for (s = list, len = res; len;) { + size_t slen = strnlen(s, len) + 1; + + /* underlying fs providing us with an broken xattr list? */ + if (WARN_ON(slen > len)) + return -EIO; + + len -= slen; + if (!ovl_can_list(dentry->d_sb, s)) { + res -= slen; + memmove(s, s + slen, len); + } else { + s += slen; + } + } + + return res; +} + +#ifdef CONFIG_FS_POSIX_ACL +/* + * Apply the idmapping of the layer to POSIX ACLs. The caller must pass a clone + * of the POSIX ACLs retrieved from the lower layer to this function to not + * alter the POSIX ACLs for the underlying filesystem. + */ +static void ovl_idmap_posix_acl(const struct inode *realinode, + struct mnt_idmap *idmap, + struct posix_acl *acl) +{ + struct user_namespace *fs_userns = i_user_ns(realinode); + + for (unsigned int i = 0; i < acl->a_count; i++) { + vfsuid_t vfsuid; + vfsgid_t vfsgid; + + struct posix_acl_entry *e = &acl->a_entries[i]; + switch (e->e_tag) { + case ACL_USER: + vfsuid = make_vfsuid(idmap, fs_userns, e->e_uid); + e->e_uid = vfsuid_into_kuid(vfsuid); + break; + case ACL_GROUP: + vfsgid = make_vfsgid(idmap, fs_userns, e->e_gid); + e->e_gid = vfsgid_into_kgid(vfsgid); + break; + } + } +} + +/* + * The @noperm argument is used to skip permission checking and is a temporary + * measure. Quoting Miklos from an earlier discussion: + * + * > So there are two paths to getting an acl: + * > 1) permission checking and 2) retrieving the value via getxattr(2). + * > This is a similar situation as reading a symlink vs. following it. + * > When following a symlink overlayfs always reads the link on the + * > underlying fs just as if it was a readlink(2) call, calling + * > security_inode_readlink() instead of security_inode_follow_link(). + * > This is logical: we are reading the link from the underlying storage, + * > and following it on overlayfs. + * > + * > Applying the same logic to acl: we do need to call the + * > security_inode_getxattr() on the underlying fs, even if just want to + * > check permissions on overlay. This is currently not done, which is an + * > inconsistency. + * > + * > Maybe adding the check to ovl_get_acl() is the right way to go, but + * > I'm a little afraid of a performance regression. Will look into that. + * + * Until we have made a decision allow this helper to take the @noperm + * argument. We should hopefully be able to remove it soon. + */ +struct posix_acl *ovl_get_acl_path(const struct path *path, + const char *acl_name, bool noperm) +{ + struct posix_acl *real_acl, *clone; + struct mnt_idmap *idmap; + struct inode *realinode = d_inode(path->dentry); + + idmap = mnt_idmap(path->mnt); + + if (noperm) + real_acl = get_inode_acl(realinode, posix_acl_type(acl_name)); + else + real_acl = vfs_get_acl(idmap, path->dentry, acl_name); + if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(real_acl)) + return real_acl; + + if (!is_idmapped_mnt(path->mnt)) + return real_acl; + + /* + * We cannot alter the ACLs returned from the relevant layer as that + * would alter the cached values filesystem wide for the lower + * filesystem. Instead we can clone the ACLs and then apply the + * relevant idmapping of the layer. + */ + clone = posix_acl_clone(real_acl, GFP_KERNEL); + posix_acl_release(real_acl); /* release original acl */ + if (!clone) + return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); + + ovl_idmap_posix_acl(realinode, idmap, clone); + return clone; +} + +/* + * When the relevant layer is an idmapped mount we need to take the idmapping + * of the layer into account and translate any ACL_{GROUP,USER} values + * according to the idmapped mount. + * + * We cannot alter the ACLs returned from the relevant layer as that would + * alter the cached values filesystem wide for the lower filesystem. Instead we + * can clone the ACLs and then apply the relevant idmapping of the layer. + * + * This is obviously only relevant when idmapped layers are used. + */ +struct posix_acl *do_ovl_get_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, + struct inode *inode, int type, + bool rcu, bool noperm) +{ + struct inode *realinode; + struct posix_acl *acl; + struct path realpath; + + /* Careful in RCU walk mode */ + realinode = ovl_i_path_real(inode, &realpath); + if (!realinode) { + WARN_ON(!rcu); + return ERR_PTR(-ECHILD); + } + + if (!IS_POSIXACL(realinode)) + return NULL; + + if (rcu) { + /* + * If the layer is idmapped drop out of RCU path walk + * so we can clone the ACLs. + */ + if (is_idmapped_mnt(realpath.mnt)) + return ERR_PTR(-ECHILD); + + acl = get_cached_acl_rcu(realinode, type); + } else { + const struct cred *old_cred; + + old_cred = ovl_override_creds(inode->i_sb); + acl = ovl_get_acl_path(&realpath, posix_acl_xattr_name(type), noperm); + revert_creds(old_cred); + } + + return acl; +} + +static int ovl_set_or_remove_acl(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode, + struct posix_acl *acl, int type) +{ + int err; + struct path realpath; + const char *acl_name; + const struct cred *old_cred; + struct ovl_fs *ofs = OVL_FS(dentry->d_sb); + struct dentry *upperdentry = ovl_dentry_upper(dentry); + struct dentry *realdentry = upperdentry ?: ovl_dentry_lower(dentry); + + err = ovl_want_write(dentry); + if (err) + return err; + + /* + * If ACL is to be removed from a lower file, check if it exists in + * the first place before copying it up. + */ + acl_name = posix_acl_xattr_name(type); + if (!acl && !upperdentry) { + struct posix_acl *real_acl; + + ovl_path_lower(dentry, &realpath); + old_cred = ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb); + real_acl = vfs_get_acl(mnt_idmap(realpath.mnt), realdentry, + acl_name); + revert_creds(old_cred); + if (IS_ERR(real_acl)) { + err = PTR_ERR(real_acl); + goto out_drop_write; + } + posix_acl_release(real_acl); + } + + if (!upperdentry) { + err = ovl_copy_up(dentry); + if (err) + goto out_drop_write; + + realdentry = ovl_dentry_upper(dentry); + } + + old_cred = ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb); + if (acl) + err = ovl_do_set_acl(ofs, realdentry, acl_name, acl); + else + err = ovl_do_remove_acl(ofs, realdentry, acl_name); + revert_creds(old_cred); + + /* copy c/mtime */ + ovl_copyattr(inode); + +out_drop_write: + ovl_drop_write(dentry); + return err; +} + +int ovl_set_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry, + struct posix_acl *acl, int type) +{ + int err; + struct inode *inode = d_inode(dentry); + struct dentry *workdir = ovl_workdir(dentry); + struct inode *realinode = ovl_inode_real(inode); + + if (!IS_POSIXACL(d_inode(workdir))) + return -EOPNOTSUPP; + if (!realinode->i_op->set_acl) + return -EOPNOTSUPP; + if (type == ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT && !S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode)) + return acl ? -EACCES : 0; + if (!inode_owner_or_capable(&nop_mnt_idmap, inode)) + return -EPERM; + + /* + * Check if sgid bit needs to be cleared (actual setacl operation will + * be done with mounter's capabilities and so that won't do it for us). + */ + if (unlikely(inode->i_mode & S_ISGID) && type == ACL_TYPE_ACCESS && + !in_group_p(inode->i_gid) && + !capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(&nop_mnt_idmap, inode, CAP_FSETID)) { + struct iattr iattr = { .ia_valid = ATTR_KILL_SGID }; + + err = ovl_setattr(&nop_mnt_idmap, dentry, &iattr); + if (err) + return err; + } + + return ovl_set_or_remove_acl(dentry, inode, acl, type); +} +#endif + +int ovl_update_time(struct inode *inode, int flags) +{ + if (flags & S_ATIME) { + struct ovl_fs *ofs = OVL_FS(inode->i_sb); + struct path upperpath = { + .mnt = ovl_upper_mnt(ofs), + .dentry = ovl_upperdentry_dereference(OVL_I(inode)), + }; + + if (upperpath.dentry) { + touch_atime(&upperpath); + inode->i_atime = d_inode(upperpath.dentry)->i_atime; + } + } + return 0; +} + +static int ovl_fiemap(struct inode *inode, struct fiemap_extent_info *fieinfo, + u64 start, u64 len) +{ + int err; + struct inode *realinode = ovl_inode_realdata(inode); + const struct cred *old_cred; + + if (!realinode) + return -EIO; + + if (!realinode->i_op->fiemap) + return -EOPNOTSUPP; + + old_cred = ovl_override_creds(inode->i_sb); + err = realinode->i_op->fiemap(realinode, fieinfo, start, len); + revert_creds(old_cred); + + return err; +} + +/* + * Work around the fact that security_file_ioctl() takes a file argument. + * Introducing security_inode_fileattr_get/set() hooks would solve this issue + * properly. + */ +static int ovl_security_fileattr(const struct path *realpath, struct fileattr *fa, + bool set) +{ + struct file *file; + unsigned int cmd; + int err; + + file = dentry_open(realpath, O_RDONLY, current_cred()); + if (IS_ERR(file)) + return PTR_ERR(file); + + if (set) + cmd = fa->fsx_valid ? FS_IOC_FSSETXATTR : FS_IOC_SETFLAGS; + else + cmd = fa->fsx_valid ? FS_IOC_FSGETXATTR : FS_IOC_GETFLAGS; + + err = security_file_ioctl(file, cmd, 0); + fput(file); + + return err; +} + +int ovl_real_fileattr_set(const struct path *realpath, struct fileattr *fa) +{ + int err; + + err = ovl_security_fileattr(realpath, fa, true); + if (err) + return err; + + return vfs_fileattr_set(mnt_idmap(realpath->mnt), realpath->dentry, fa); +} + +int ovl_fileattr_set(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, + struct dentry *dentry, struct fileattr *fa) +{ + struct inode *inode = d_inode(dentry); + struct path upperpath; + const struct cred *old_cred; + unsigned int flags; + int err; + + err = ovl_want_write(dentry); + if (err) + goto out; + + err = ovl_copy_up(dentry); + if (!err) { + ovl_path_real(dentry, &upperpath); + + old_cred = ovl_override_creds(inode->i_sb); + /* + * Store immutable/append-only flags in xattr and clear them + * in upper fileattr (in case they were set by older kernel) + * so children of "ovl-immutable" directories lower aliases of + * "ovl-immutable" hardlinks could be copied up. + * Clear xattr when flags are cleared. + */ + err = ovl_set_protattr(inode, upperpath.dentry, fa); + if (!err) + err = ovl_real_fileattr_set(&upperpath, fa); + revert_creds(old_cred); + + /* + * Merge real inode flags with inode flags read from + * overlay.protattr xattr + */ + flags = ovl_inode_real(inode)->i_flags & OVL_COPY_I_FLAGS_MASK; + + BUILD_BUG_ON(OVL_PROT_I_FLAGS_MASK & ~OVL_COPY_I_FLAGS_MASK); + flags |= inode->i_flags & OVL_PROT_I_FLAGS_MASK; + inode_set_flags(inode, flags, OVL_COPY_I_FLAGS_MASK); + + /* Update ctime */ + ovl_copyattr(inode); + } + ovl_drop_write(dentry); +out: + return err; +} + +/* Convert inode protection flags to fileattr flags */ +static void ovl_fileattr_prot_flags(struct inode *inode, struct fileattr *fa) +{ + BUILD_BUG_ON(OVL_PROT_FS_FLAGS_MASK & ~FS_COMMON_FL); + BUILD_BUG_ON(OVL_PROT_FSX_FLAGS_MASK & ~FS_XFLAG_COMMON); + + if (inode->i_flags & S_APPEND) { + fa->flags |= FS_APPEND_FL; + fa->fsx_xflags |= FS_XFLAG_APPEND; + } + if (inode->i_flags & S_IMMUTABLE) { + fa->flags |= FS_IMMUTABLE_FL; + fa->fsx_xflags |= FS_XFLAG_IMMUTABLE; + } +} + +int ovl_real_fileattr_get(const struct path *realpath, struct fileattr *fa) +{ + int err; + + err = ovl_security_fileattr(realpath, fa, false); + if (err) + return err; + + err = vfs_fileattr_get(realpath->dentry, fa); + if (err == -ENOIOCTLCMD) + err = -ENOTTY; + return err; +} + +int ovl_fileattr_get(struct dentry *dentry, struct fileattr *fa) +{ + struct inode *inode = d_inode(dentry); + struct path realpath; + const struct cred *old_cred; + int err; + + ovl_path_real(dentry, &realpath); + + old_cred = ovl_override_creds(inode->i_sb); + err = ovl_real_fileattr_get(&realpath, fa); + ovl_fileattr_prot_flags(inode, fa); + revert_creds(old_cred); + + return err; +} + +static const struct inode_operations ovl_file_inode_operations = { + .setattr = ovl_setattr, + .permission = ovl_permission, + .getattr = ovl_getattr, + .listxattr = ovl_listxattr, + .get_inode_acl = ovl_get_inode_acl, + .get_acl = ovl_get_acl, + .set_acl = ovl_set_acl, + .update_time = ovl_update_time, + .fiemap = ovl_fiemap, + .fileattr_get = ovl_fileattr_get, + .fileattr_set = ovl_fileattr_set, +}; + +static const struct inode_operations ovl_symlink_inode_operations = { + .setattr = ovl_setattr, + .get_link = ovl_get_link, + .getattr = ovl_getattr, + .listxattr = ovl_listxattr, + .update_time = ovl_update_time, +}; + +static const struct inode_operations ovl_special_inode_operations = { + .setattr = ovl_setattr, + .permission = ovl_permission, + .getattr = ovl_getattr, + .listxattr = ovl_listxattr, + .get_inode_acl = ovl_get_inode_acl, + .get_acl = ovl_get_acl, + .set_acl = ovl_set_acl, + .update_time = ovl_update_time, +}; + +static const struct address_space_operations ovl_aops = { + /* For O_DIRECT dentry_open() checks f_mapping->a_ops->direct_IO */ + .direct_IO = noop_direct_IO, +}; + +/* + * It is possible to stack overlayfs instance on top of another + * overlayfs instance as lower layer. We need to annotate the + * stackable i_mutex locks according to stack level of the super + * block instance. An overlayfs instance can never be in stack + * depth 0 (there is always a real fs below it). An overlayfs + * inode lock will use the lockdep annotation ovl_i_mutex_key[depth]. + * + * For example, here is a snip from /proc/lockdep_chains after + * dir_iterate of nested overlayfs: + * + * [...] &ovl_i_mutex_dir_key[depth] (stack_depth=2) + * [...] &ovl_i_mutex_dir_key[depth]#2 (stack_depth=1) + * [...] &type->i_mutex_dir_key (stack_depth=0) + * + * Locking order w.r.t ovl_want_write() is important for nested overlayfs. + * + * This chain is valid: + * - inode->i_rwsem (inode_lock[2]) + * - upper_mnt->mnt_sb->s_writers (ovl_want_write[0]) + * - OVL_I(inode)->lock (ovl_inode_lock[2]) + * - OVL_I(lowerinode)->lock (ovl_inode_lock[1]) + * + * And this chain is valid: + * - inode->i_rwsem (inode_lock[2]) + * - OVL_I(inode)->lock (ovl_inode_lock[2]) + * - lowerinode->i_rwsem (inode_lock[1]) + * - OVL_I(lowerinode)->lock (ovl_inode_lock[1]) + * + * But lowerinode->i_rwsem SHOULD NOT be acquired while ovl_want_write() is + * held, because it is in reverse order of the non-nested case using the same + * upper fs: + * - inode->i_rwsem (inode_lock[1]) + * - upper_mnt->mnt_sb->s_writers (ovl_want_write[0]) + * - OVL_I(inode)->lock (ovl_inode_lock[1]) + */ +#define OVL_MAX_NESTING FILESYSTEM_MAX_STACK_DEPTH + +static inline void ovl_lockdep_annotate_inode_mutex_key(struct inode *inode) +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_LOCKDEP + static struct lock_class_key ovl_i_mutex_key[OVL_MAX_NESTING]; + static struct lock_class_key ovl_i_mutex_dir_key[OVL_MAX_NESTING]; + static struct lock_class_key ovl_i_lock_key[OVL_MAX_NESTING]; + + int depth = inode->i_sb->s_stack_depth - 1; + + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(depth < 0 || depth >= OVL_MAX_NESTING)) + depth = 0; + + if (S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode)) + lockdep_set_class(&inode->i_rwsem, &ovl_i_mutex_dir_key[depth]); + else + lockdep_set_class(&inode->i_rwsem, &ovl_i_mutex_key[depth]); + + lockdep_set_class(&OVL_I(inode)->lock, &ovl_i_lock_key[depth]); +#endif +} + +static void ovl_next_ino(struct inode *inode) +{ + struct ovl_fs *ofs = OVL_FS(inode->i_sb); + + inode->i_ino = atomic_long_inc_return(&ofs->last_ino); + if (unlikely(!inode->i_ino)) + inode->i_ino = atomic_long_inc_return(&ofs->last_ino); +} + +static void ovl_map_ino(struct inode *inode, unsigned long ino, int fsid) +{ + struct ovl_fs *ofs = OVL_FS(inode->i_sb); + int xinobits = ovl_xino_bits(ofs); + unsigned int xinoshift = 64 - xinobits; + + /* + * When d_ino is consistent with st_ino (samefs or i_ino has enough + * bits to encode layer), set the same value used for st_ino to i_ino, + * so inode number exposed via /proc/locks and a like will be + * consistent with d_ino and st_ino values. An i_ino value inconsistent + * with d_ino also causes nfsd readdirplus to fail. + */ + inode->i_ino = ino; + if (ovl_same_fs(ofs)) { + return; + } else if (xinobits && likely(!(ino >> xinoshift))) { + inode->i_ino |= (unsigned long)fsid << (xinoshift + 1); + return; + } + + /* + * For directory inodes on non-samefs with xino disabled or xino + * overflow, we allocate a non-persistent inode number, to be used for + * resolving st_ino collisions in ovl_map_dev_ino(). + * + * To avoid ino collision with legitimate xino values from upper + * layer (fsid 0), use the lowest xinobit to map the non + * persistent inode numbers to the unified st_ino address space. + */ + if (S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode)) { + ovl_next_ino(inode); + if (xinobits) { + inode->i_ino &= ~0UL >> xinobits; + inode->i_ino |= 1UL << xinoshift; + } + } +} + +void ovl_inode_init(struct inode *inode, struct ovl_inode_params *oip, + unsigned long ino, int fsid) +{ + struct inode *realinode; + struct ovl_inode *oi = OVL_I(inode); + + oi->__upperdentry = oip->upperdentry; + oi->oe = oip->oe; + oi->redirect = oip->redirect; + oi->lowerdata_redirect = oip->lowerdata_redirect; + + realinode = ovl_inode_real(inode); + ovl_copyattr(inode); + ovl_copyflags(realinode, inode); + ovl_map_ino(inode, ino, fsid); +} + +static void ovl_fill_inode(struct inode *inode, umode_t mode, dev_t rdev) +{ + inode->i_mode = mode; + inode->i_flags |= S_NOCMTIME; +#ifdef CONFIG_FS_POSIX_ACL + inode->i_acl = inode->i_default_acl = ACL_DONT_CACHE; +#endif + + ovl_lockdep_annotate_inode_mutex_key(inode); + + switch (mode & S_IFMT) { + case S_IFREG: + inode->i_op = &ovl_file_inode_operations; + inode->i_fop = &ovl_file_operations; + inode->i_mapping->a_ops = &ovl_aops; + break; + + case S_IFDIR: + inode->i_op = &ovl_dir_inode_operations; + inode->i_fop = &ovl_dir_operations; + break; + + case S_IFLNK: + inode->i_op = &ovl_symlink_inode_operations; + break; + + default: + inode->i_op = &ovl_special_inode_operations; + init_special_inode(inode, mode, rdev); + break; + } +} + +/* + * With inodes index enabled, an overlay inode nlink counts the union of upper + * hardlinks and non-covered lower hardlinks. During the lifetime of a non-pure + * upper inode, the following nlink modifying operations can happen: + * + * 1. Lower hardlink copy up + * 2. Upper hardlink created, unlinked or renamed over + * 3. Lower hardlink whiteout or renamed over + * + * For the first, copy up case, the union nlink does not change, whether the + * operation succeeds or fails, but the upper inode nlink may change. + * Therefore, before copy up, we store the union nlink value relative to the + * lower inode nlink in the index inode xattr .overlay.nlink. + * + * For the second, upper hardlink case, the union nlink should be incremented + * or decremented IFF the operation succeeds, aligned with nlink change of the + * upper inode. Therefore, before link/unlink/rename, we store the union nlink + * value relative to the upper inode nlink in the index inode. + * + * For the last, lower cover up case, we simplify things by preceding the + * whiteout or cover up with copy up. This makes sure that there is an index + * upper inode where the nlink xattr can be stored before the copied up upper + * entry is unlink. + */ +#define OVL_NLINK_ADD_UPPER (1 << 0) + +/* + * On-disk format for indexed nlink: + * + * nlink relative to the upper inode - "U[+-]NUM" + * nlink relative to the lower inode - "L[+-]NUM" + */ + +static int ovl_set_nlink_common(struct dentry *dentry, + struct dentry *realdentry, const char *format) +{ + struct inode *inode = d_inode(dentry); + struct inode *realinode = d_inode(realdentry); + char buf[13]; + int len; + + len = snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), format, + (int) (inode->i_nlink - realinode->i_nlink)); + + if (WARN_ON(len >= sizeof(buf))) + return -EIO; + + return ovl_setxattr(OVL_FS(inode->i_sb), ovl_dentry_upper(dentry), + OVL_XATTR_NLINK, buf, len); +} + +int ovl_set_nlink_upper(struct dentry *dentry) +{ + return ovl_set_nlink_common(dentry, ovl_dentry_upper(dentry), "U%+i"); +} + +int ovl_set_nlink_lower(struct dentry *dentry) +{ + return ovl_set_nlink_common(dentry, ovl_dentry_lower(dentry), "L%+i"); +} + +unsigned int ovl_get_nlink(struct ovl_fs *ofs, struct dentry *lowerdentry, + struct dentry *upperdentry, + unsigned int fallback) +{ + int nlink_diff; + int nlink; + char buf[13]; + int err; + + if (!lowerdentry || !upperdentry || d_inode(lowerdentry)->i_nlink == 1) + return fallback; + + err = ovl_getxattr_upper(ofs, upperdentry, OVL_XATTR_NLINK, + &buf, sizeof(buf) - 1); + if (err < 0) + goto fail; + + buf[err] = '\0'; + if ((buf[0] != 'L' && buf[0] != 'U') || + (buf[1] != '+' && buf[1] != '-')) + goto fail; + + err = kstrtoint(buf + 1, 10, &nlink_diff); + if (err < 0) + goto fail; + + nlink = d_inode(buf[0] == 'L' ? lowerdentry : upperdentry)->i_nlink; + nlink += nlink_diff; + + if (nlink <= 0) + goto fail; + + return nlink; + +fail: + pr_warn_ratelimited("failed to get index nlink (%pd2, err=%i)\n", + upperdentry, err); + return fallback; +} + +struct inode *ovl_new_inode(struct super_block *sb, umode_t mode, dev_t rdev) +{ + struct inode *inode; + + inode = new_inode(sb); + if (inode) + ovl_fill_inode(inode, mode, rdev); + + return inode; +} + +static int ovl_inode_test(struct inode *inode, void *data) +{ + return inode->i_private == data; +} + +static int ovl_inode_set(struct inode *inode, void *data) +{ + inode->i_private = data; + return 0; +} + +static bool ovl_verify_inode(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *lowerdentry, + struct dentry *upperdentry, bool strict) +{ + /* + * For directories, @strict verify from lookup path performs consistency + * checks, so NULL lower/upper in dentry must match NULL lower/upper in + * inode. Non @strict verify from NFS handle decode path passes NULL for + * 'unknown' lower/upper. + */ + if (S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode) && strict) { + /* Real lower dir moved to upper layer under us? */ + if (!lowerdentry && ovl_inode_lower(inode)) + return false; + + /* Lookup of an uncovered redirect origin? */ + if (!upperdentry && ovl_inode_upper(inode)) + return false; + } + + /* + * Allow non-NULL lower inode in ovl_inode even if lowerdentry is NULL. + * This happens when finding a copied up overlay inode for a renamed + * or hardlinked overlay dentry and lower dentry cannot be followed + * by origin because lower fs does not support file handles. + */ + if (lowerdentry && ovl_inode_lower(inode) != d_inode(lowerdentry)) + return false; + + /* + * Allow non-NULL __upperdentry in inode even if upperdentry is NULL. + * This happens when finding a lower alias for a copied up hard link. + */ + if (upperdentry && ovl_inode_upper(inode) != d_inode(upperdentry)) + return false; + + return true; +} + +struct inode *ovl_lookup_inode(struct super_block *sb, struct dentry *real, + bool is_upper) +{ + struct inode *inode, *key = d_inode(real); + + inode = ilookup5(sb, (unsigned long) key, ovl_inode_test, key); + if (!inode) + return NULL; + + if (!ovl_verify_inode(inode, is_upper ? NULL : real, + is_upper ? real : NULL, false)) { + iput(inode); + return ERR_PTR(-ESTALE); + } + + return inode; +} + +bool ovl_lookup_trap_inode(struct super_block *sb, struct dentry *dir) +{ + struct inode *key = d_inode(dir); + struct inode *trap; + bool res; + + trap = ilookup5(sb, (unsigned long) key, ovl_inode_test, key); + if (!trap) + return false; + + res = IS_DEADDIR(trap) && !ovl_inode_upper(trap) && + !ovl_inode_lower(trap); + + iput(trap); + return res; +} + +/* + * Create an inode cache entry for layer root dir, that will intentionally + * fail ovl_verify_inode(), so any lookup that will find some layer root + * will fail. + */ +struct inode *ovl_get_trap_inode(struct super_block *sb, struct dentry *dir) +{ + struct inode *key = d_inode(dir); + struct inode *trap; + + if (!d_is_dir(dir)) + return ERR_PTR(-ENOTDIR); + + trap = iget5_locked(sb, (unsigned long) key, ovl_inode_test, + ovl_inode_set, key); + if (!trap) + return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); + + if (!(trap->i_state & I_NEW)) { + /* Conflicting layer roots? */ + iput(trap); + return ERR_PTR(-ELOOP); + } + + trap->i_mode = S_IFDIR; + trap->i_flags = S_DEAD; + unlock_new_inode(trap); + + return trap; +} + +/* + * Does overlay inode need to be hashed by lower inode? + */ +static bool ovl_hash_bylower(struct super_block *sb, struct dentry *upper, + struct dentry *lower, bool index) +{ + struct ovl_fs *ofs = OVL_FS(sb); + + /* No, if pure upper */ + if (!lower) + return false; + + /* Yes, if already indexed */ + if (index) + return true; + + /* Yes, if won't be copied up */ + if (!ovl_upper_mnt(ofs)) + return true; + + /* No, if lower hardlink is or will be broken on copy up */ + if ((upper || !ovl_indexdir(sb)) && + !d_is_dir(lower) && d_inode(lower)->i_nlink > 1) + return false; + + /* No, if non-indexed upper with NFS export */ + if (ofs->config.nfs_export && upper) + return false; + + /* Otherwise, hash by lower inode for fsnotify */ + return true; +} + +static struct inode *ovl_iget5(struct super_block *sb, struct inode *newinode, + struct inode *key) +{ + return newinode ? inode_insert5(newinode, (unsigned long) key, + ovl_inode_test, ovl_inode_set, key) : + iget5_locked(sb, (unsigned long) key, + ovl_inode_test, ovl_inode_set, key); +} + +struct inode *ovl_get_inode(struct super_block *sb, + struct ovl_inode_params *oip) +{ + struct ovl_fs *ofs = OVL_FS(sb); + struct dentry *upperdentry = oip->upperdentry; + struct ovl_path *lowerpath = ovl_lowerpath(oip->oe); + struct inode *realinode = upperdentry ? d_inode(upperdentry) : NULL; + struct inode *inode; + struct dentry *lowerdentry = lowerpath ? lowerpath->dentry : NULL; + struct path realpath = { + .dentry = upperdentry ?: lowerdentry, + .mnt = upperdentry ? ovl_upper_mnt(ofs) : lowerpath->layer->mnt, + }; + bool bylower = ovl_hash_bylower(sb, upperdentry, lowerdentry, + oip->index); + int fsid = bylower ? lowerpath->layer->fsid : 0; + bool is_dir; + unsigned long ino = 0; + int err = oip->newinode ? -EEXIST : -ENOMEM; + + if (!realinode) + realinode = d_inode(lowerdentry); + + /* + * Copy up origin (lower) may exist for non-indexed upper, but we must + * not use lower as hash key if this is a broken hardlink. + */ + is_dir = S_ISDIR(realinode->i_mode); + if (upperdentry || bylower) { + struct inode *key = d_inode(bylower ? lowerdentry : + upperdentry); + unsigned int nlink = is_dir ? 1 : realinode->i_nlink; + + inode = ovl_iget5(sb, oip->newinode, key); + if (!inode) + goto out_err; + if (!(inode->i_state & I_NEW)) { + /* + * Verify that the underlying files stored in the inode + * match those in the dentry. + */ + if (!ovl_verify_inode(inode, lowerdentry, upperdentry, + true)) { + iput(inode); + err = -ESTALE; + goto out_err; + } + + dput(upperdentry); + ovl_free_entry(oip->oe); + kfree(oip->redirect); + kfree(oip->lowerdata_redirect); + goto out; + } + + /* Recalculate nlink for non-dir due to indexing */ + if (!is_dir) + nlink = ovl_get_nlink(ofs, lowerdentry, upperdentry, + nlink); + set_nlink(inode, nlink); + ino = key->i_ino; + } else { + /* Lower hardlink that will be broken on copy up */ + inode = new_inode(sb); + if (!inode) { + err = -ENOMEM; + goto out_err; + } + ino = realinode->i_ino; + fsid = lowerpath->layer->fsid; + } + ovl_fill_inode(inode, realinode->i_mode, realinode->i_rdev); + ovl_inode_init(inode, oip, ino, fsid); + + if (upperdentry && ovl_is_impuredir(sb, upperdentry)) + ovl_set_flag(OVL_IMPURE, inode); + + if (oip->index) + ovl_set_flag(OVL_INDEX, inode); + + if (bylower) + ovl_set_flag(OVL_CONST_INO, inode); + + /* Check for non-merge dir that may have whiteouts */ + if (is_dir) { + if (((upperdentry && lowerdentry) || ovl_numlower(oip->oe) > 1) || + ovl_path_check_origin_xattr(ofs, &realpath)) { + ovl_set_flag(OVL_WHITEOUTS, inode); + } + } + + /* Check for immutable/append-only inode flags in xattr */ + if (upperdentry) + ovl_check_protattr(inode, upperdentry); + + if (inode->i_state & I_NEW) + unlock_new_inode(inode); +out: + return inode; + +out_err: + pr_warn_ratelimited("failed to get inode (%i)\n", err); + inode = ERR_PTR(err); + goto out; +} |