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Diffstat (limited to '')
| -rw-r--r-- | kernel/capability.c | 523 |
1 files changed, 523 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/kernel/capability.c b/kernel/capability.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..dac4df77e3 --- /dev/null +++ b/kernel/capability.c @@ -0,0 +1,523 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* + * linux/kernel/capability.c + * + * Copyright (C) 1997 Andrew Main <zefram@fysh.org> + * + * Integrated into 2.1.97+, Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org> + * 30 May 2002: Cleanup, Robert M. Love <rml@tech9.net> + */ + +#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt + +#include <linux/audit.h> +#include <linux/capability.h> +#include <linux/mm.h> +#include <linux/export.h> +#include <linux/security.h> +#include <linux/syscalls.h> +#include <linux/pid_namespace.h> +#include <linux/user_namespace.h> +#include <linux/uaccess.h> + +int file_caps_enabled = 1; + +static int __init file_caps_disable(char *str) +{ + file_caps_enabled = 0; + return 1; +} +__setup("no_file_caps", file_caps_disable); + +#ifdef CONFIG_MULTIUSER +/* + * More recent versions of libcap are available from: + * + * http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/libs/security/linux-privs/ + */ + +static void warn_legacy_capability_use(void) +{ + char name[sizeof(current->comm)]; + + pr_info_once("warning: `%s' uses 32-bit capabilities (legacy support in use)\n", + get_task_comm(name, current)); +} + +/* + * Version 2 capabilities worked fine, but the linux/capability.h file + * that accompanied their introduction encouraged their use without + * the necessary user-space source code changes. As such, we have + * created a version 3 with equivalent functionality to version 2, but + * with a header change to protect legacy source code from using + * version 2 when it wanted to use version 1. If your system has code + * that trips the following warning, it is using version 2 specific + * capabilities and may be doing so insecurely. + * + * The remedy is to either upgrade your version of libcap (to 2.10+, + * if the application is linked against it), or recompile your + * application with modern kernel headers and this warning will go + * away. + */ + +static void warn_deprecated_v2(void) +{ + char name[sizeof(current->comm)]; + + pr_info_once("warning: `%s' uses deprecated v2 capabilities in a way that may be insecure\n", + get_task_comm(name, current)); +} + +/* + * Version check. Return the number of u32s in each capability flag + * array, or a negative value on error. + */ +static int cap_validate_magic(cap_user_header_t header, unsigned *tocopy) +{ + __u32 version; + + if (get_user(version, &header->version)) + return -EFAULT; + + switch (version) { + case _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION_1: + warn_legacy_capability_use(); + *tocopy = _LINUX_CAPABILITY_U32S_1; + break; + case _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION_2: + warn_deprecated_v2(); + fallthrough; /* v3 is otherwise equivalent to v2 */ + case _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION_3: + *tocopy = _LINUX_CAPABILITY_U32S_3; + break; + default: + if (put_user((u32)_KERNEL_CAPABILITY_VERSION, &header->version)) + return -EFAULT; + return -EINVAL; + } + + return 0; +} + +/* + * The only thing that can change the capabilities of the current + * process is the current process. As such, we can't be in this code + * at the same time as we are in the process of setting capabilities + * in this process. The net result is that we can limit our use of + * locks to when we are reading the caps of another process. + */ +static inline int cap_get_target_pid(pid_t pid, kernel_cap_t *pEp, + kernel_cap_t *pIp, kernel_cap_t *pPp) +{ + int ret; + + if (pid && (pid != task_pid_vnr(current))) { + const struct task_struct *target; + + rcu_read_lock(); + + target = find_task_by_vpid(pid); + if (!target) + ret = -ESRCH; + else + ret = security_capget(target, pEp, pIp, pPp); + + rcu_read_unlock(); + } else + ret = security_capget(current, pEp, pIp, pPp); + + return ret; +} + +/** + * sys_capget - get the capabilities of a given process. + * @header: pointer to struct that contains capability version and + * target pid data + * @dataptr: pointer to struct that contains the effective, permitted, + * and inheritable capabilities that are returned + * + * Returns 0 on success and < 0 on error. + */ +SYSCALL_DEFINE2(capget, cap_user_header_t, header, cap_user_data_t, dataptr) +{ + int ret = 0; + pid_t pid; + unsigned tocopy; + kernel_cap_t pE, pI, pP; + struct __user_cap_data_struct kdata[2]; + + ret = cap_validate_magic(header, &tocopy); + if ((dataptr == NULL) || (ret != 0)) + return ((dataptr == NULL) && (ret == -EINVAL)) ? 0 : ret; + + if (get_user(pid, &header->pid)) + return -EFAULT; + + if (pid < 0) + return -EINVAL; + + ret = cap_get_target_pid(pid, &pE, &pI, &pP); + if (ret) + return ret; + + /* + * Annoying legacy format with 64-bit capabilities exposed + * as two sets of 32-bit fields, so we need to split the + * capability values up. + */ + kdata[0].effective = pE.val; kdata[1].effective = pE.val >> 32; + kdata[0].permitted = pP.val; kdata[1].permitted = pP.val >> 32; + kdata[0].inheritable = pI.val; kdata[1].inheritable = pI.val >> 32; + + /* + * Note, in the case, tocopy < _KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S, + * we silently drop the upper capabilities here. This + * has the effect of making older libcap + * implementations implicitly drop upper capability + * bits when they perform a: capget/modify/capset + * sequence. + * + * This behavior is considered fail-safe + * behavior. Upgrading the application to a newer + * version of libcap will enable access to the newer + * capabilities. + * + * An alternative would be to return an error here + * (-ERANGE), but that causes legacy applications to + * unexpectedly fail; the capget/modify/capset aborts + * before modification is attempted and the application + * fails. + */ + if (copy_to_user(dataptr, kdata, tocopy * sizeof(kdata[0]))) + return -EFAULT; + + return 0; +} + +static kernel_cap_t mk_kernel_cap(u32 low, u32 high) +{ + return (kernel_cap_t) { (low | ((u64)high << 32)) & CAP_VALID_MASK }; +} + +/** + * sys_capset - set capabilities for a process or (*) a group of processes + * @header: pointer to struct that contains capability version and + * target pid data + * @data: pointer to struct that contains the effective, permitted, + * and inheritable capabilities + * + * Set capabilities for the current process only. The ability to any other + * process(es) has been deprecated and removed. + * + * The restrictions on setting capabilities are specified as: + * + * I: any raised capabilities must be a subset of the old permitted + * P: any raised capabilities must be a subset of the old permitted + * E: must be set to a subset of new permitted + * + * Returns 0 on success and < 0 on error. + */ +SYSCALL_DEFINE2(capset, cap_user_header_t, header, const cap_user_data_t, data) +{ + struct __user_cap_data_struct kdata[2] = { { 0, }, }; + unsigned tocopy, copybytes; + kernel_cap_t inheritable, permitted, effective; + struct cred *new; + int ret; + pid_t pid; + + ret = cap_validate_magic(header, &tocopy); + if (ret != 0) + return ret; + + if (get_user(pid, &header->pid)) + return -EFAULT; + + /* may only affect current now */ + if (pid != 0 && pid != task_pid_vnr(current)) + return -EPERM; + + copybytes = tocopy * sizeof(struct __user_cap_data_struct); + if (copybytes > sizeof(kdata)) + return -EFAULT; + + if (copy_from_user(&kdata, data, copybytes)) + return -EFAULT; + + effective = mk_kernel_cap(kdata[0].effective, kdata[1].effective); + permitted = mk_kernel_cap(kdata[0].permitted, kdata[1].permitted); + inheritable = mk_kernel_cap(kdata[0].inheritable, kdata[1].inheritable); + + new = prepare_creds(); + if (!new) + return -ENOMEM; + + ret = security_capset(new, current_cred(), + &effective, &inheritable, &permitted); + if (ret < 0) + goto error; + + audit_log_capset(new, current_cred()); + + return commit_creds(new); + +error: + abort_creds(new); + return ret; +} + +/** + * has_ns_capability - Does a task have a capability in a specific user ns + * @t: The task in question + * @ns: target user namespace + * @cap: The capability to be tested for + * + * Return true if the specified task has the given superior capability + * currently in effect to the specified user namespace, false if not. + * + * Note that this does not set PF_SUPERPRIV on the task. + */ +bool has_ns_capability(struct task_struct *t, + struct user_namespace *ns, int cap) +{ + int ret; + + rcu_read_lock(); + ret = security_capable(__task_cred(t), ns, cap, CAP_OPT_NONE); + rcu_read_unlock(); + + return (ret == 0); +} + +/** + * has_capability - Does a task have a capability in init_user_ns + * @t: The task in question + * @cap: The capability to be tested for + * + * Return true if the specified task has the given superior capability + * currently in effect to the initial user namespace, false if not. + * + * Note that this does not set PF_SUPERPRIV on the task. + */ +bool has_capability(struct task_struct *t, int cap) +{ + return has_ns_capability(t, &init_user_ns, cap); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(has_capability); + +/** + * has_ns_capability_noaudit - Does a task have a capability (unaudited) + * in a specific user ns. + * @t: The task in question + * @ns: target user namespace + * @cap: The capability to be tested for + * + * Return true if the specified task has the given superior capability + * currently in effect to the specified user namespace, false if not. + * Do not write an audit message for the check. + * + * Note that this does not set PF_SUPERPRIV on the task. + */ +bool has_ns_capability_noaudit(struct task_struct *t, + struct user_namespace *ns, int cap) +{ + int ret; + + rcu_read_lock(); + ret = security_capable(__task_cred(t), ns, cap, CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT); + rcu_read_unlock(); + + return (ret == 0); +} + +/** + * has_capability_noaudit - Does a task have a capability (unaudited) in the + * initial user ns + * @t: The task in question + * @cap: The capability to be tested for + * + * Return true if the specified task has the given superior capability + * currently in effect to init_user_ns, false if not. Don't write an + * audit message for the check. + * + * Note that this does not set PF_SUPERPRIV on the task. + */ +bool has_capability_noaudit(struct task_struct *t, int cap) +{ + return has_ns_capability_noaudit(t, &init_user_ns, cap); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(has_capability_noaudit); + +static bool ns_capable_common(struct user_namespace *ns, + int cap, + unsigned int opts) +{ + int capable; + + if (unlikely(!cap_valid(cap))) { + pr_crit("capable() called with invalid cap=%u\n", cap); + BUG(); + } + + capable = security_capable(current_cred(), ns, cap, opts); + if (capable == 0) { + current->flags |= PF_SUPERPRIV; + return true; + } + return false; +} + +/** + * ns_capable - Determine if the current task has a superior capability in effect + * @ns: The usernamespace we want the capability in + * @cap: The capability to be tested for + * + * Return true if the current task has the given superior capability currently + * available for use, false if not. + * + * This sets PF_SUPERPRIV on the task if the capability is available on the + * assumption that it's about to be used. + */ +bool ns_capable(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap) +{ + return ns_capable_common(ns, cap, CAP_OPT_NONE); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(ns_capable); + +/** + * ns_capable_noaudit - Determine if the current task has a superior capability + * (unaudited) in effect + * @ns: The usernamespace we want the capability in + * @cap: The capability to be tested for + * + * Return true if the current task has the given superior capability currently + * available for use, false if not. + * + * This sets PF_SUPERPRIV on the task if the capability is available on the + * assumption that it's about to be used. + */ +bool ns_capable_noaudit(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap) +{ + return ns_capable_common(ns, cap, CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(ns_capable_noaudit); + +/** + * ns_capable_setid - Determine if the current task has a superior capability + * in effect, while signalling that this check is being done from within a + * setid or setgroups syscall. + * @ns: The usernamespace we want the capability in + * @cap: The capability to be tested for + * + * Return true if the current task has the given superior capability currently + * available for use, false if not. + * + * This sets PF_SUPERPRIV on the task if the capability is available on the + * assumption that it's about to be used. + */ +bool ns_capable_setid(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap) +{ + return ns_capable_common(ns, cap, CAP_OPT_INSETID); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(ns_capable_setid); + +/** + * capable - Determine if the current task has a superior capability in effect + * @cap: The capability to be tested for + * + * Return true if the current task has the given superior capability currently + * available for use, false if not. + * + * This sets PF_SUPERPRIV on the task if the capability is available on the + * assumption that it's about to be used. + */ +bool capable(int cap) +{ + return ns_capable(&init_user_ns, cap); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(capable); +#endif /* CONFIG_MULTIUSER */ + +/** + * file_ns_capable - Determine if the file's opener had a capability in effect + * @file: The file we want to check + * @ns: The usernamespace we want the capability in + * @cap: The capability to be tested for + * + * Return true if task that opened the file had a capability in effect + * when the file was opened. + * + * This does not set PF_SUPERPRIV because the caller may not + * actually be privileged. + */ +bool file_ns_capable(const struct file *file, struct user_namespace *ns, + int cap) +{ + + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!cap_valid(cap))) + return false; + + if (security_capable(file->f_cred, ns, cap, CAP_OPT_NONE) == 0) + return true; + + return false; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(file_ns_capable); + +/** + * privileged_wrt_inode_uidgid - Do capabilities in the namespace work over the inode? + * @ns: The user namespace in question + * @idmap: idmap of the mount @inode was found from + * @inode: The inode in question + * + * Return true if the inode uid and gid are within the namespace. + */ +bool privileged_wrt_inode_uidgid(struct user_namespace *ns, + struct mnt_idmap *idmap, + const struct inode *inode) +{ + return vfsuid_has_mapping(ns, i_uid_into_vfsuid(idmap, inode)) && + vfsgid_has_mapping(ns, i_gid_into_vfsgid(idmap, inode)); +} + +/** + * capable_wrt_inode_uidgid - Check nsown_capable and uid and gid mapped + * @idmap: idmap of the mount @inode was found from + * @inode: The inode in question + * @cap: The capability in question + * + * Return true if the current task has the given capability targeted at + * its own user namespace and that the given inode's uid and gid are + * mapped into the current user namespace. + */ +bool capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, + const struct inode *inode, int cap) +{ + struct user_namespace *ns = current_user_ns(); + + return ns_capable(ns, cap) && + privileged_wrt_inode_uidgid(ns, idmap, inode); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(capable_wrt_inode_uidgid); + +/** + * ptracer_capable - Determine if the ptracer holds CAP_SYS_PTRACE in the namespace + * @tsk: The task that may be ptraced + * @ns: The user namespace to search for CAP_SYS_PTRACE in + * + * Return true if the task that is ptracing the current task had CAP_SYS_PTRACE + * in the specified user namespace. + */ +bool ptracer_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, struct user_namespace *ns) +{ + int ret = 0; /* An absent tracer adds no restrictions */ + const struct cred *cred; + + rcu_read_lock(); + cred = rcu_dereference(tsk->ptracer_cred); + if (cred) + ret = security_capable(cred, ns, CAP_SYS_PTRACE, + CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT); + rcu_read_unlock(); + return (ret == 0); +} |