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Diffstat (limited to '')
| -rw-r--r-- | kernel/kcmp.c | 239 |
1 files changed, 239 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/kernel/kcmp.c b/kernel/kcmp.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..5353edfad8 --- /dev/null +++ b/kernel/kcmp.c @@ -0,0 +1,239 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +#include <linux/kernel.h> +#include <linux/syscalls.h> +#include <linux/fdtable.h> +#include <linux/string.h> +#include <linux/random.h> +#include <linux/module.h> +#include <linux/ptrace.h> +#include <linux/init.h> +#include <linux/errno.h> +#include <linux/cache.h> +#include <linux/bug.h> +#include <linux/err.h> +#include <linux/kcmp.h> +#include <linux/capability.h> +#include <linux/list.h> +#include <linux/eventpoll.h> +#include <linux/file.h> + +#include <asm/unistd.h> + +/* + * We don't expose the real in-memory order of objects for security reasons. + * But still the comparison results should be suitable for sorting. So we + * obfuscate kernel pointers values and compare the production instead. + * + * The obfuscation is done in two steps. First we xor the kernel pointer with + * a random value, which puts pointer into a new position in a reordered space. + * Secondly we multiply the xor production with a large odd random number to + * permute its bits even more (the odd multiplier guarantees that the product + * is unique ever after the high bits are truncated, since any odd number is + * relative prime to 2^n). + * + * Note also that the obfuscation itself is invisible to userspace and if needed + * it can be changed to an alternate scheme. + */ +static unsigned long cookies[KCMP_TYPES][2] __read_mostly; + +static long kptr_obfuscate(long v, int type) +{ + return (v ^ cookies[type][0]) * cookies[type][1]; +} + +/* + * 0 - equal, i.e. v1 = v2 + * 1 - less than, i.e. v1 < v2 + * 2 - greater than, i.e. v1 > v2 + * 3 - not equal but ordering unavailable (reserved for future) + */ +static int kcmp_ptr(void *v1, void *v2, enum kcmp_type type) +{ + long t1, t2; + + t1 = kptr_obfuscate((long)v1, type); + t2 = kptr_obfuscate((long)v2, type); + + return (t1 < t2) | ((t1 > t2) << 1); +} + +/* The caller must have pinned the task */ +static struct file * +get_file_raw_ptr(struct task_struct *task, unsigned int idx) +{ + struct file *file; + + rcu_read_lock(); + file = task_lookup_fd_rcu(task, idx); + rcu_read_unlock(); + + return file; +} + +static void kcmp_unlock(struct rw_semaphore *l1, struct rw_semaphore *l2) +{ + if (likely(l2 != l1)) + up_read(l2); + up_read(l1); +} + +static int kcmp_lock(struct rw_semaphore *l1, struct rw_semaphore *l2) +{ + int err; + + if (l2 > l1) + swap(l1, l2); + + err = down_read_killable(l1); + if (!err && likely(l1 != l2)) { + err = down_read_killable_nested(l2, SINGLE_DEPTH_NESTING); + if (err) + up_read(l1); + } + + return err; +} + +#ifdef CONFIG_EPOLL +static int kcmp_epoll_target(struct task_struct *task1, + struct task_struct *task2, + unsigned long idx1, + struct kcmp_epoll_slot __user *uslot) +{ + struct file *filp, *filp_epoll, *filp_tgt; + struct kcmp_epoll_slot slot; + + if (copy_from_user(&slot, uslot, sizeof(slot))) + return -EFAULT; + + filp = get_file_raw_ptr(task1, idx1); + if (!filp) + return -EBADF; + + filp_epoll = fget_task(task2, slot.efd); + if (!filp_epoll) + return -EBADF; + + filp_tgt = get_epoll_tfile_raw_ptr(filp_epoll, slot.tfd, slot.toff); + fput(filp_epoll); + + if (IS_ERR(filp_tgt)) + return PTR_ERR(filp_tgt); + + return kcmp_ptr(filp, filp_tgt, KCMP_FILE); +} +#else +static int kcmp_epoll_target(struct task_struct *task1, + struct task_struct *task2, + unsigned long idx1, + struct kcmp_epoll_slot __user *uslot) +{ + return -EOPNOTSUPP; +} +#endif + +SYSCALL_DEFINE5(kcmp, pid_t, pid1, pid_t, pid2, int, type, + unsigned long, idx1, unsigned long, idx2) +{ + struct task_struct *task1, *task2; + int ret; + + rcu_read_lock(); + + /* + * Tasks are looked up in caller's PID namespace only. + */ + task1 = find_task_by_vpid(pid1); + task2 = find_task_by_vpid(pid2); + if (!task1 || !task2) + goto err_no_task; + + get_task_struct(task1); + get_task_struct(task2); + + rcu_read_unlock(); + + /* + * One should have enough rights to inspect task details. + */ + ret = kcmp_lock(&task1->signal->exec_update_lock, + &task2->signal->exec_update_lock); + if (ret) + goto err; + if (!ptrace_may_access(task1, PTRACE_MODE_READ_REALCREDS) || + !ptrace_may_access(task2, PTRACE_MODE_READ_REALCREDS)) { + ret = -EPERM; + goto err_unlock; + } + + switch (type) { + case KCMP_FILE: { + struct file *filp1, *filp2; + + filp1 = get_file_raw_ptr(task1, idx1); + filp2 = get_file_raw_ptr(task2, idx2); + + if (filp1 && filp2) + ret = kcmp_ptr(filp1, filp2, KCMP_FILE); + else + ret = -EBADF; + break; + } + case KCMP_VM: + ret = kcmp_ptr(task1->mm, task2->mm, KCMP_VM); + break; + case KCMP_FILES: + ret = kcmp_ptr(task1->files, task2->files, KCMP_FILES); + break; + case KCMP_FS: + ret = kcmp_ptr(task1->fs, task2->fs, KCMP_FS); + break; + case KCMP_SIGHAND: + ret = kcmp_ptr(task1->sighand, task2->sighand, KCMP_SIGHAND); + break; + case KCMP_IO: + ret = kcmp_ptr(task1->io_context, task2->io_context, KCMP_IO); + break; + case KCMP_SYSVSEM: +#ifdef CONFIG_SYSVIPC + ret = kcmp_ptr(task1->sysvsem.undo_list, + task2->sysvsem.undo_list, + KCMP_SYSVSEM); +#else + ret = -EOPNOTSUPP; +#endif + break; + case KCMP_EPOLL_TFD: + ret = kcmp_epoll_target(task1, task2, idx1, (void *)idx2); + break; + default: + ret = -EINVAL; + break; + } + +err_unlock: + kcmp_unlock(&task1->signal->exec_update_lock, + &task2->signal->exec_update_lock); +err: + put_task_struct(task1); + put_task_struct(task2); + + return ret; + +err_no_task: + rcu_read_unlock(); + return -ESRCH; +} + +static __init int kcmp_cookies_init(void) +{ + int i; + + get_random_bytes(cookies, sizeof(cookies)); + + for (i = 0; i < KCMP_TYPES; i++) + cookies[i][1] |= (~(~0UL >> 1) | 1); + + return 0; +} +arch_initcall(kcmp_cookies_init); |