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-rw-r--r--kernel/kexec.c302
1 files changed, 302 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/kernel/kexec.c b/kernel/kexec.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..8f35a5a42a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/kernel/kexec.c
@@ -0,0 +1,302 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * kexec.c - kexec_load system call
+ * Copyright (C) 2002-2004 Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
+ */
+
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
+
+#include <linux/capability.h>
+#include <linux/mm.h>
+#include <linux/file.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
+#include <linux/kexec.h>
+#include <linux/mutex.h>
+#include <linux/list.h>
+#include <linux/syscalls.h>
+#include <linux/vmalloc.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+
+#include "kexec_internal.h"
+
+static int kimage_alloc_init(struct kimage **rimage, unsigned long entry,
+ unsigned long nr_segments,
+ struct kexec_segment *segments,
+ unsigned long flags)
+{
+ int ret;
+ struct kimage *image;
+ bool kexec_on_panic = flags & KEXEC_ON_CRASH;
+
+ if (kexec_on_panic) {
+ /* Verify we have a valid entry point */
+ if ((entry < phys_to_boot_phys(crashk_res.start)) ||
+ (entry > phys_to_boot_phys(crashk_res.end)))
+ return -EADDRNOTAVAIL;
+ }
+
+ /* Allocate and initialize a controlling structure */
+ image = do_kimage_alloc_init();
+ if (!image)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ image->start = entry;
+ image->nr_segments = nr_segments;
+ memcpy(image->segment, segments, nr_segments * sizeof(*segments));
+
+ if (kexec_on_panic) {
+ /* Enable special crash kernel control page alloc policy. */
+ image->control_page = crashk_res.start;
+ image->type = KEXEC_TYPE_CRASH;
+ }
+
+ ret = sanity_check_segment_list(image);
+ if (ret)
+ goto out_free_image;
+
+ /*
+ * Find a location for the control code buffer, and add it
+ * the vector of segments so that it's pages will also be
+ * counted as destination pages.
+ */
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
+ image->control_code_page = kimage_alloc_control_pages(image,
+ get_order(KEXEC_CONTROL_PAGE_SIZE));
+ if (!image->control_code_page) {
+ pr_err("Could not allocate control_code_buffer\n");
+ goto out_free_image;
+ }
+
+ if (!kexec_on_panic) {
+ image->swap_page = kimage_alloc_control_pages(image, 0);
+ if (!image->swap_page) {
+ pr_err("Could not allocate swap buffer\n");
+ goto out_free_control_pages;
+ }
+ }
+
+ *rimage = image;
+ return 0;
+out_free_control_pages:
+ kimage_free_page_list(&image->control_pages);
+out_free_image:
+ kfree(image);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int do_kexec_load(unsigned long entry, unsigned long nr_segments,
+ struct kexec_segment *segments, unsigned long flags)
+{
+ struct kimage **dest_image, *image;
+ unsigned long i;
+ int ret;
+
+ /*
+ * Because we write directly to the reserved memory region when loading
+ * crash kernels we need a serialization here to prevent multiple crash
+ * kernels from attempting to load simultaneously.
+ */
+ if (!kexec_trylock())
+ return -EBUSY;
+
+ if (flags & KEXEC_ON_CRASH) {
+ dest_image = &kexec_crash_image;
+ if (kexec_crash_image)
+ arch_kexec_unprotect_crashkres();
+ } else {
+ dest_image = &kexec_image;
+ }
+
+ if (nr_segments == 0) {
+ /* Uninstall image */
+ kimage_free(xchg(dest_image, NULL));
+ ret = 0;
+ goto out_unlock;
+ }
+ if (flags & KEXEC_ON_CRASH) {
+ /*
+ * Loading another kernel to switch to if this one
+ * crashes. Free any current crash dump kernel before
+ * we corrupt it.
+ */
+ kimage_free(xchg(&kexec_crash_image, NULL));
+ }
+
+ ret = kimage_alloc_init(&image, entry, nr_segments, segments, flags);
+ if (ret)
+ goto out_unlock;
+
+ if (flags & KEXEC_PRESERVE_CONTEXT)
+ image->preserve_context = 1;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_CRASH_HOTPLUG
+ if (flags & KEXEC_UPDATE_ELFCOREHDR)
+ image->update_elfcorehdr = 1;
+#endif
+
+ ret = machine_kexec_prepare(image);
+ if (ret)
+ goto out;
+
+ /*
+ * Some architecture(like S390) may touch the crash memory before
+ * machine_kexec_prepare(), we must copy vmcoreinfo data after it.
+ */
+ ret = kimage_crash_copy_vmcoreinfo(image);
+ if (ret)
+ goto out;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < nr_segments; i++) {
+ ret = kimage_load_segment(image, &image->segment[i]);
+ if (ret)
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ kimage_terminate(image);
+
+ ret = machine_kexec_post_load(image);
+ if (ret)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* Install the new kernel and uninstall the old */
+ image = xchg(dest_image, image);
+
+out:
+ if ((flags & KEXEC_ON_CRASH) && kexec_crash_image)
+ arch_kexec_protect_crashkres();
+
+ kimage_free(image);
+out_unlock:
+ kexec_unlock();
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Exec Kernel system call: for obvious reasons only root may call it.
+ *
+ * This call breaks up into three pieces.
+ * - A generic part which loads the new kernel from the current
+ * address space, and very carefully places the data in the
+ * allocated pages.
+ *
+ * - A generic part that interacts with the kernel and tells all of
+ * the devices to shut down. Preventing on-going dmas, and placing
+ * the devices in a consistent state so a later kernel can
+ * reinitialize them.
+ *
+ * - A machine specific part that includes the syscall number
+ * and then copies the image to it's final destination. And
+ * jumps into the image at entry.
+ *
+ * kexec does not sync, or unmount filesystems so if you need
+ * that to happen you need to do that yourself.
+ */
+
+static inline int kexec_load_check(unsigned long nr_segments,
+ unsigned long flags)
+{
+ int image_type = (flags & KEXEC_ON_CRASH) ?
+ KEXEC_TYPE_CRASH : KEXEC_TYPE_DEFAULT;
+ int result;
+
+ /* We only trust the superuser with rebooting the system. */
+ if (!kexec_load_permitted(image_type))
+ return -EPERM;
+
+ /* Permit LSMs and IMA to fail the kexec */
+ result = security_kernel_load_data(LOADING_KEXEC_IMAGE, false);
+ if (result < 0)
+ return result;
+
+ /*
+ * kexec can be used to circumvent module loading restrictions, so
+ * prevent loading in that case
+ */
+ result = security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_KEXEC);
+ if (result)
+ return result;
+
+ /*
+ * Verify we have a legal set of flags
+ * This leaves us room for future extensions.
+ */
+ if ((flags & KEXEC_FLAGS) != (flags & ~KEXEC_ARCH_MASK))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ /* Put an artificial cap on the number
+ * of segments passed to kexec_load.
+ */
+ if (nr_segments > KEXEC_SEGMENT_MAX)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+SYSCALL_DEFINE4(kexec_load, unsigned long, entry, unsigned long, nr_segments,
+ struct kexec_segment __user *, segments, unsigned long, flags)
+{
+ struct kexec_segment *ksegments;
+ unsigned long result;
+
+ result = kexec_load_check(nr_segments, flags);
+ if (result)
+ return result;
+
+ /* Verify we are on the appropriate architecture */
+ if (((flags & KEXEC_ARCH_MASK) != KEXEC_ARCH) &&
+ ((flags & KEXEC_ARCH_MASK) != KEXEC_ARCH_DEFAULT))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ ksegments = memdup_array_user(segments, nr_segments, sizeof(ksegments[0]));
+ if (IS_ERR(ksegments))
+ return PTR_ERR(ksegments);
+
+ result = do_kexec_load(entry, nr_segments, ksegments, flags);
+ kfree(ksegments);
+
+ return result;
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
+COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE4(kexec_load, compat_ulong_t, entry,
+ compat_ulong_t, nr_segments,
+ struct compat_kexec_segment __user *, segments,
+ compat_ulong_t, flags)
+{
+ struct compat_kexec_segment in;
+ struct kexec_segment *ksegments;
+ unsigned long i, result;
+
+ result = kexec_load_check(nr_segments, flags);
+ if (result)
+ return result;
+
+ /* Don't allow clients that don't understand the native
+ * architecture to do anything.
+ */
+ if ((flags & KEXEC_ARCH_MASK) == KEXEC_ARCH_DEFAULT)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ ksegments = kmalloc_array(nr_segments, sizeof(ksegments[0]),
+ GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!ksegments)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < nr_segments; i++) {
+ result = copy_from_user(&in, &segments[i], sizeof(in));
+ if (result)
+ goto fail;
+
+ ksegments[i].buf = compat_ptr(in.buf);
+ ksegments[i].bufsz = in.bufsz;
+ ksegments[i].mem = in.mem;
+ ksegments[i].memsz = in.memsz;
+ }
+
+ result = do_kexec_load(entry, nr_segments, ksegments, flags);
+
+fail:
+ kfree(ksegments);
+ return result;
+}
+#endif