diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'kernel/module/signing.c')
-rw-r--r-- | kernel/module/signing.c | 125 |
1 files changed, 125 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/kernel/module/signing.c b/kernel/module/signing.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..a2ff4242e6 --- /dev/null +++ b/kernel/module/signing.c @@ -0,0 +1,125 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later +/* Module signature checker + * + * Copyright (C) 2012 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved. + * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com) + */ + +#include <linux/kernel.h> +#include <linux/errno.h> +#include <linux/module.h> +#include <linux/module_signature.h> +#include <linux/string.h> +#include <linux/verification.h> +#include <linux/security.h> +#include <crypto/public_key.h> +#include <uapi/linux/module.h> +#include "internal.h" + +#undef MODULE_PARAM_PREFIX +#define MODULE_PARAM_PREFIX "module." + +static bool sig_enforce = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORCE); +module_param(sig_enforce, bool_enable_only, 0644); + +/* + * Export sig_enforce kernel cmdline parameter to allow other subsystems rely + * on that instead of directly to CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORCE config. + */ +bool is_module_sig_enforced(void) +{ + return sig_enforce; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(is_module_sig_enforced); + +void set_module_sig_enforced(void) +{ + sig_enforce = true; +} + +/* + * Verify the signature on a module. + */ +int mod_verify_sig(const void *mod, struct load_info *info) +{ + struct module_signature ms; + size_t sig_len, modlen = info->len; + int ret; + + pr_devel("==>%s(,%zu)\n", __func__, modlen); + + if (modlen <= sizeof(ms)) + return -EBADMSG; + + memcpy(&ms, mod + (modlen - sizeof(ms)), sizeof(ms)); + + ret = mod_check_sig(&ms, modlen, "module"); + if (ret) + return ret; + + sig_len = be32_to_cpu(ms.sig_len); + modlen -= sig_len + sizeof(ms); + info->len = modlen; + + return verify_pkcs7_signature(mod, modlen, mod + modlen, sig_len, + VERIFY_USE_SECONDARY_KEYRING, + VERIFYING_MODULE_SIGNATURE, + NULL, NULL); +} + +int module_sig_check(struct load_info *info, int flags) +{ + int err = -ENODATA; + const unsigned long markerlen = sizeof(MODULE_SIG_STRING) - 1; + const char *reason; + const void *mod = info->hdr; + bool mangled_module = flags & (MODULE_INIT_IGNORE_MODVERSIONS | + MODULE_INIT_IGNORE_VERMAGIC); + /* + * Do not allow mangled modules as a module with version information + * removed is no longer the module that was signed. + */ + if (!mangled_module && + info->len > markerlen && + memcmp(mod + info->len - markerlen, MODULE_SIG_STRING, markerlen) == 0) { + /* We truncate the module to discard the signature */ + info->len -= markerlen; + err = mod_verify_sig(mod, info); + if (!err) { + info->sig_ok = true; + return 0; + } + } + + /* + * We don't permit modules to be loaded into the trusted kernels + * without a valid signature on them, but if we're not enforcing, + * certain errors are non-fatal. + */ + switch (err) { + case -ENODATA: + reason = "unsigned module"; + break; + case -ENOPKG: + reason = "module with unsupported crypto"; + break; + case -ENOKEY: + reason = "module with unavailable key"; + break; + + default: + /* + * All other errors are fatal, including lack of memory, + * unparseable signatures, and signature check failures -- + * even if signatures aren't required. + */ + return err; + } + + if (is_module_sig_enforced()) { + pr_notice("Loading of %s is rejected\n", reason); + return -EKEYREJECTED; + } + + return security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_MODULE_SIGNATURE); +} |