17 files changed, 6972 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/mm/kasan/Makefile b/mm/kasan/Makefile
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..7634dd2a61
--- /dev/null
+++ b/mm/kasan/Makefile
@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+KASAN_SANITIZE := n
+UBSAN_SANITIZE := n
+KCOV_INSTRUMENT := n
+
+# Disable ftrace to avoid recursion.
+CFLAGS_REMOVE_common.o = $(CC_FLAGS_FTRACE)
+CFLAGS_REMOVE_generic.o = $(CC_FLAGS_FTRACE)
+CFLAGS_REMOVE_init.o = $(CC_FLAGS_FTRACE)
+CFLAGS_REMOVE_quarantine.o = $(CC_FLAGS_FTRACE)
+CFLAGS_REMOVE_report.o = $(CC_FLAGS_FTRACE)
+CFLAGS_REMOVE_report_generic.o = $(CC_FLAGS_FTRACE)
+CFLAGS_REMOVE_report_hw_tags.o = $(CC_FLAGS_FTRACE)
+CFLAGS_REMOVE_report_sw_tags.o = $(CC_FLAGS_FTRACE)
+CFLAGS_REMOVE_shadow.o = $(CC_FLAGS_FTRACE)
+CFLAGS_REMOVE_hw_tags.o = $(CC_FLAGS_FTRACE)
+CFLAGS_REMOVE_sw_tags.o = $(CC_FLAGS_FTRACE)
+
+# Function splitter causes unnecessary splits in __asan_load1/__asan_store1
+# see: https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=63533
+CC_FLAGS_KASAN_RUNTIME := $(call cc-option, -fno-conserve-stack)
+CC_FLAGS_KASAN_RUNTIME += -fno-stack-protector
+# Disable branch tracing to avoid recursion.
+CC_FLAGS_KASAN_RUNTIME += -DDISABLE_BRANCH_PROFILING
+
+CFLAGS_common.o := $(CC_FLAGS_KASAN_RUNTIME)
+CFLAGS_generic.o := $(CC_FLAGS_KASAN_RUNTIME)
+CFLAGS_init.o := $(CC_FLAGS_KASAN_RUNTIME)
+CFLAGS_quarantine.o := $(CC_FLAGS_KASAN_RUNTIME)
+CFLAGS_report.o := $(CC_FLAGS_KASAN_RUNTIME)
+CFLAGS_report_generic.o := $(CC_FLAGS_KASAN_RUNTIME)
+CFLAGS_report_hw_tags.o := $(CC_FLAGS_KASAN_RUNTIME)
+CFLAGS_report_sw_tags.o := $(CC_FLAGS_KASAN_RUNTIME)
+CFLAGS_shadow.o := $(CC_FLAGS_KASAN_RUNTIME)
+CFLAGS_hw_tags.o := $(CC_FLAGS_KASAN_RUNTIME)
+CFLAGS_sw_tags.o := $(CC_FLAGS_KASAN_RUNTIME)
+
+CFLAGS_KASAN_TEST := $(CFLAGS_KASAN) $(call cc-disable-warning, vla)
+ifndef CONFIG_CC_HAS_KASAN_MEMINTRINSIC_PREFIX
+# If compiler instruments memintrinsics by prefixing them with __asan/__hwasan,
+# we need to treat them normally (as builtins), otherwise the compiler won't
+# recognize them as instrumentable. If it doesn't instrument them, we need to
+# pass -fno-builtin, so the compiler doesn't inline them.
+CFLAGS_KASAN_TEST += -fno-builtin
+endif
+
+CFLAGS_kasan_test.o := $(CFLAGS_KASAN_TEST)
+CFLAGS_kasan_test_module.o := $(CFLAGS_KASAN_TEST)
+
+obj-y := common.o report.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC) += init.o generic.o report_generic.o shadow.o quarantine.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS) += hw_tags.o report_hw_tags.o tags.o report_tags.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS) += init.o report_sw_tags.o shadow.o sw_tags.o tags.o report_tags.o
+
+obj-$(CONFIG_KASAN_KUNIT_TEST) += kasan_test.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_KASAN_MODULE_TEST) += kasan_test_module.o
diff --git a/mm/kasan/common.c b/mm/kasan/common.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..256930da57
--- /dev/null
+++ b/mm/kasan/common.c
@@ -0,0 +1,452 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * This file contains common KASAN code.
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 2014 Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd.
+ * Author: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>
+ *
+ * Some code borrowed from https://github.com/xairy/kasan-prototype by
+ *        Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com>
+ */
+
+#include <linux/export.h>
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/kasan.h>
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/linkage.h>
+#include <linux/memblock.h>
+#include <linux/memory.h>
+#include <linux/mm.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/printk.h>
+#include <linux/sched.h>
+#include <linux/sched/task_stack.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/stacktrace.h>
+#include <linux/string.h>
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/bug.h>
+
+#include "kasan.h"
+#include "../slab.h"
+
+struct slab *kasan_addr_to_slab(const void *addr)
+{
+	if (virt_addr_valid(addr))
+		return virt_to_slab(addr);
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+depot_stack_handle_t kasan_save_stack(gfp_t flags, bool can_alloc)
+{
+	unsigned long entries[KASAN_STACK_DEPTH];
+	unsigned int nr_entries;
+
+	nr_entries = stack_trace_save(entries, ARRAY_SIZE(entries), 0);
+	return __stack_depot_save(entries, nr_entries, flags, can_alloc);
+}
+
+void kasan_set_track(struct kasan_track *track, gfp_t flags)
+{
+	track->pid = current->pid;
+	track->stack = kasan_save_stack(flags, true);
+}
+
+#if defined(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC) || defined(CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS)
+void kasan_enable_current(void)
+{
+	current->kasan_depth++;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(kasan_enable_current);
+
+void kasan_disable_current(void)
+{
+	current->kasan_depth--;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(kasan_disable_current);
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC || CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS */
+
+void __kasan_unpoison_range(const void *address, size_t size)
+{
+	kasan_unpoison(address, size, false);
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_STACK
+/* Unpoison the entire stack for a task. */
+void kasan_unpoison_task_stack(struct task_struct *task)
+{
+	void *base = task_stack_page(task);
+
+	kasan_unpoison(base, THREAD_SIZE, false);
+}
+
+/* Unpoison the stack for the current task beyond a watermark sp value. */
+asmlinkage void kasan_unpoison_task_stack_below(const void *watermark)
+{
+	/*
+	 * Calculate the task stack base address.  Avoid using 'current'
+	 * because this function is called by early resume code which hasn't
+	 * yet set up the percpu register (%gs).
+	 */
+	void *base = (void *)((unsigned long)watermark & ~(THREAD_SIZE - 1));
+
+	kasan_unpoison(base, watermark - base, false);
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_KASAN_STACK */
+
+bool __kasan_unpoison_pages(struct page *page, unsigned int order, bool init)
+{
+	u8 tag;
+	unsigned long i;
+
+	if (unlikely(PageHighMem(page)))
+		return false;
+
+	if (!kasan_sample_page_alloc(order))
+		return false;
+
+	tag = kasan_random_tag();
+	kasan_unpoison(set_tag(page_address(page), tag),
+		       PAGE_SIZE << order, init);
+	for (i = 0; i < (1 << order); i++)
+		page_kasan_tag_set(page + i, tag);
+
+	return true;
+}
+
+void __kasan_poison_pages(struct page *page, unsigned int order, bool init)
+{
+	if (likely(!PageHighMem(page)))
+		kasan_poison(page_address(page), PAGE_SIZE << order,
+			     KASAN_PAGE_FREE, init);
+}
+
+void __kasan_poison_slab(struct slab *slab)
+{
+	struct page *page = slab_page(slab);
+	unsigned long i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < compound_nr(page); i++)
+		page_kasan_tag_reset(page + i);
+	kasan_poison(page_address(page), page_size(page),
+		     KASAN_SLAB_REDZONE, false);
+}
+
+void __kasan_unpoison_object_data(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object)
+{
+	kasan_unpoison(object, cache->object_size, false);
+}
+
+void __kasan_poison_object_data(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object)
+{
+	kasan_poison(object, round_up(cache->object_size, KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE),
+			KASAN_SLAB_REDZONE, false);
+}
+
+/*
+ * This function assigns a tag to an object considering the following:
+ * 1. A cache might have a constructor, which might save a pointer to a slab
+ *    object somewhere (e.g. in the object itself). We preassign a tag for
+ *    each object in caches with constructors during slab creation and reuse
+ *    the same tag each time a particular object is allocated.
+ * 2. A cache might be SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU, which means objects can be
+ *    accessed after being freed. We preassign tags for objects in these
+ *    caches as well.
+ * 3. For SLAB allocator we can't preassign tags randomly since the freelist
+ *    is stored as an array of indexes instead of a linked list. Assign tags
+ *    based on objects indexes, so that objects that are next to each other
+ *    get different tags.
+ */
+static inline u8 assign_tag(struct kmem_cache *cache,
+					const void *object, bool init)
+{
+	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC))
+		return 0xff;
+
+	/*
+	 * If the cache neither has a constructor nor has SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU
+	 * set, assign a tag when the object is being allocated (init == false).
+	 */
+	if (!cache->ctor && !(cache->flags & SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU))
+		return init ? KASAN_TAG_KERNEL : kasan_random_tag();
+
+	/* For caches that either have a constructor or SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU: */
+#ifdef CONFIG_SLAB
+	/* For SLAB assign tags based on the object index in the freelist. */
+	return (u8)obj_to_index(cache, virt_to_slab(object), (void *)object);
+#else
+	/*
+	 * For SLUB assign a random tag during slab creation, otherwise reuse
+	 * the already assigned tag.
+	 */
+	return init ? kasan_random_tag() : get_tag(object);
+#endif
+}
+
+void * __must_check __kasan_init_slab_obj(struct kmem_cache *cache,
+						const void *object)
+{
+	/* Initialize per-object metadata if it is present. */
+	if (kasan_requires_meta())
+		kasan_init_object_meta(cache, object);
+
+	/* Tag is ignored in set_tag() without CONFIG_KASAN_SW/HW_TAGS */
+	object = set_tag(object, assign_tag(cache, object, true));
+
+	return (void *)object;
+}
+
+static inline bool ____kasan_slab_free(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object,
+				unsigned long ip, bool quarantine, bool init)
+{
+	void *tagged_object;
+
+	if (!kasan_arch_is_ready())
+		return false;
+
+	tagged_object = object;
+	object = kasan_reset_tag(object);
+
+	if (is_kfence_address(object))
+		return false;
+
+	if (unlikely(nearest_obj(cache, virt_to_slab(object), object) !=
+	    object)) {
+		kasan_report_invalid_free(tagged_object, ip, KASAN_REPORT_INVALID_FREE);
+		return true;
+	}
+
+	/* RCU slabs could be legally used after free within the RCU period */
+	if (unlikely(cache->flags & SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU))
+		return false;
+
+	if (!kasan_byte_accessible(tagged_object)) {
+		kasan_report_invalid_free(tagged_object, ip, KASAN_REPORT_DOUBLE_FREE);
+		return true;
+	}
+
+	kasan_poison(object, round_up(cache->object_size, KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE),
+			KASAN_SLAB_FREE, init);
+
+	if ((IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC) && !quarantine))
+		return false;
+
+	if (kasan_stack_collection_enabled())
+		kasan_save_free_info(cache, tagged_object);
+
+	return kasan_quarantine_put(cache, object);
+}
+
+bool __kasan_slab_free(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object,
+				unsigned long ip, bool init)
+{
+	return ____kasan_slab_free(cache, object, ip, true, init);
+}
+
+static inline bool ____kasan_kfree_large(void *ptr, unsigned long ip)
+{
+	if (!kasan_arch_is_ready())
+		return false;
+
+	if (ptr != page_address(virt_to_head_page(ptr))) {
+		kasan_report_invalid_free(ptr, ip, KASAN_REPORT_INVALID_FREE);
+		return true;
+	}
+
+	if (!kasan_byte_accessible(ptr)) {
+		kasan_report_invalid_free(ptr, ip, KASAN_REPORT_DOUBLE_FREE);
+		return true;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * The object will be poisoned by kasan_poison_pages() or
+	 * kasan_slab_free_mempool().
+	 */
+
+	return false;
+}
+
+void __kasan_kfree_large(void *ptr, unsigned long ip)
+{
+	____kasan_kfree_large(ptr, ip);
+}
+
+void __kasan_slab_free_mempool(void *ptr, unsigned long ip)
+{
+	struct folio *folio;
+
+	folio = virt_to_folio(ptr);
+
+	/*
+	 * Even though this function is only called for kmem_cache_alloc and
+	 * kmalloc backed mempool allocations, those allocations can still be
+	 * !PageSlab() when the size provided to kmalloc is larger than
+	 * KMALLOC_MAX_SIZE, and kmalloc falls back onto page_alloc.
+	 */
+	if (unlikely(!folio_test_slab(folio))) {
+		if (____kasan_kfree_large(ptr, ip))
+			return;
+		kasan_poison(ptr, folio_size(folio), KASAN_PAGE_FREE, false);
+	} else {
+		struct slab *slab = folio_slab(folio);
+
+		____kasan_slab_free(slab->slab_cache, ptr, ip, false, false);
+	}
+}
+
+void * __must_check __kasan_slab_alloc(struct kmem_cache *cache,
+					void *object, gfp_t flags, bool init)
+{
+	u8 tag;
+	void *tagged_object;
+
+	if (gfpflags_allow_blocking(flags))
+		kasan_quarantine_reduce();
+
+	if (unlikely(object == NULL))
+		return NULL;
+
+	if (is_kfence_address(object))
+		return (void *)object;
+
+	/*
+	 * Generate and assign random tag for tag-based modes.
+	 * Tag is ignored in set_tag() for the generic mode.
+	 */
+	tag = assign_tag(cache, object, false);
+	tagged_object = set_tag(object, tag);
+
+	/*
+	 * Unpoison the whole object.
+	 * For kmalloc() allocations, kasan_kmalloc() will do precise poisoning.
+	 */
+	kasan_unpoison(tagged_object, cache->object_size, init);
+
+	/* Save alloc info (if possible) for non-kmalloc() allocations. */
+	if (kasan_stack_collection_enabled() && !is_kmalloc_cache(cache))
+		kasan_save_alloc_info(cache, tagged_object, flags);
+
+	return tagged_object;
+}
+
+static inline void *____kasan_kmalloc(struct kmem_cache *cache,
+				const void *object, size_t size, gfp_t flags)
+{
+	unsigned long redzone_start;
+	unsigned long redzone_end;
+
+	if (gfpflags_allow_blocking(flags))
+		kasan_quarantine_reduce();
+
+	if (unlikely(object == NULL))
+		return NULL;
+
+	if (is_kfence_address(kasan_reset_tag(object)))
+		return (void *)object;
+
+	/*
+	 * The object has already been unpoisoned by kasan_slab_alloc() for
+	 * kmalloc() or by kasan_krealloc() for krealloc().
+	 */
+
+	/*
+	 * The redzone has byte-level precision for the generic mode.
+	 * Partially poison the last object granule to cover the unaligned
+	 * part of the redzone.
+	 */
+	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC))
+		kasan_poison_last_granule((void *)object, size);
+
+	/* Poison the aligned part of the redzone. */
+	redzone_start = round_up((unsigned long)(object + size),
+				KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE);
+	redzone_end = round_up((unsigned long)(object + cache->object_size),
+				KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE);
+	kasan_poison((void *)redzone_start, redzone_end - redzone_start,
+			   KASAN_SLAB_REDZONE, false);
+
+	/*
+	 * Save alloc info (if possible) for kmalloc() allocations.
+	 * This also rewrites the alloc info when called from kasan_krealloc().
+	 */
+	if (kasan_stack_collection_enabled() && is_kmalloc_cache(cache))
+		kasan_save_alloc_info(cache, (void *)object, flags);
+
+	/* Keep the tag that was set by kasan_slab_alloc(). */
+	return (void *)object;
+}
+
+void * __must_check __kasan_kmalloc(struct kmem_cache *cache, const void *object,
+					size_t size, gfp_t flags)
+{
+	return ____kasan_kmalloc(cache, object, size, flags);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(__kasan_kmalloc);
+
+void * __must_check __kasan_kmalloc_large(const void *ptr, size_t size,
+						gfp_t flags)
+{
+	unsigned long redzone_start;
+	unsigned long redzone_end;
+
+	if (gfpflags_allow_blocking(flags))
+		kasan_quarantine_reduce();
+
+	if (unlikely(ptr == NULL))
+		return NULL;
+
+	/*
+	 * The object has already been unpoisoned by kasan_unpoison_pages() for
+	 * alloc_pages() or by kasan_krealloc() for krealloc().
+	 */
+
+	/*
+	 * The redzone has byte-level precision for the generic mode.
+	 * Partially poison the last object granule to cover the unaligned
+	 * part of the redzone.
+	 */
+	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC))
+		kasan_poison_last_granule(ptr, size);
+
+	/* Poison the aligned part of the redzone. */
+	redzone_start = round_up((unsigned long)(ptr + size),
+				KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE);
+	redzone_end = (unsigned long)ptr + page_size(virt_to_page(ptr));
+	kasan_poison((void *)redzone_start, redzone_end - redzone_start,
+		     KASAN_PAGE_REDZONE, false);
+
+	return (void *)ptr;
+}
+
+void * __must_check __kasan_krealloc(const void *object, size_t size, gfp_t flags)
+{
+	struct slab *slab;
+
+	if (unlikely(object == ZERO_SIZE_PTR))
+		return (void *)object;
+
+	/*
+	 * Unpoison the object's data.
+	 * Part of it might already have been unpoisoned, but it's unknown
+	 * how big that part is.
+	 */
+	kasan_unpoison(object, size, false);
+
+	slab = virt_to_slab(object);
+
+	/* Piggy-back on kmalloc() instrumentation to poison the redzone. */
+	if (unlikely(!slab))
+		return __kasan_kmalloc_large(object, size, flags);
+	else
+		return ____kasan_kmalloc(slab->slab_cache, object, size, flags);
+}
+
+bool __kasan_check_byte(const void *address, unsigned long ip)
+{
+	if (!kasan_byte_accessible(address)) {
+		kasan_report(address, 1, false, ip);
+		return false;
+	}
+	return true;
+}
diff --git a/mm/kasan/generic.c b/mm/kasan/generic.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..4d837ab83f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/mm/kasan/generic.c
@@ -0,0 +1,525 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * This file contains core generic KASAN code.
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 2014 Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd.
+ * Author: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>
+ *
+ * Some code borrowed from https://github.com/xairy/kasan-prototype by
+ *        Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com>
+ */
+
+#include <linux/export.h>
+#include <linux/interrupt.h>
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/kasan.h>
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/kfence.h>
+#include <linux/kmemleak.h>
+#include <linux/linkage.h>
+#include <linux/memblock.h>
+#include <linux/memory.h>
+#include <linux/mm.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/printk.h>
+#include <linux/sched.h>
+#include <linux/sched/task_stack.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/stacktrace.h>
+#include <linux/string.h>
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/vmalloc.h>
+#include <linux/bug.h>
+
+#include "kasan.h"
+#include "../slab.h"
+
+/*
+ * All functions below always inlined so compiler could
+ * perform better optimizations in each of __asan_loadX/__assn_storeX
+ * depending on memory access size X.
+ */
+
+static __always_inline bool memory_is_poisoned_1(const void *addr)
+{
+	s8 shadow_value = *(s8 *)kasan_mem_to_shadow(addr);
+
+	if (unlikely(shadow_value)) {
+		s8 last_accessible_byte = (unsigned long)addr & KASAN_GRANULE_MASK;
+		return unlikely(last_accessible_byte >= shadow_value);
+	}
+
+	return false;
+}
+
+static __always_inline bool memory_is_poisoned_2_4_8(const void *addr,
+						unsigned long size)
+{
+	u8 *shadow_addr = (u8 *)kasan_mem_to_shadow(addr);
+
+	/*
+	 * Access crosses 8(shadow size)-byte boundary. Such access maps
+	 * into 2 shadow bytes, so we need to check them both.
+	 */
+	if (unlikely((((unsigned long)addr + size - 1) & KASAN_GRANULE_MASK) < size - 1))
+		return *shadow_addr || memory_is_poisoned_1(addr + size - 1);
+
+	return memory_is_poisoned_1(addr + size - 1);
+}
+
+static __always_inline bool memory_is_poisoned_16(const void *addr)
+{
+	u16 *shadow_addr = (u16 *)kasan_mem_to_shadow(addr);
+
+	/* Unaligned 16-bytes access maps into 3 shadow bytes. */
+	if (unlikely(!IS_ALIGNED((unsigned long)addr, KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE)))
+		return *shadow_addr || memory_is_poisoned_1(addr + 15);
+
+	return *shadow_addr;
+}
+
+static __always_inline unsigned long bytes_is_nonzero(const u8 *start,
+					size_t size)
+{
+	while (size) {
+		if (unlikely(*start))
+			return (unsigned long)start;
+		start++;
+		size--;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static __always_inline unsigned long memory_is_nonzero(const void *start,
+						const void *end)
+{
+	unsigned int words;
+	unsigned long ret;
+	unsigned int prefix = (unsigned long)start % 8;
+
+	if (end - start <= 16)
+		return bytes_is_nonzero(start, end - start);
+
+	if (prefix) {
+		prefix = 8 - prefix;
+		ret = bytes_is_nonzero(start, prefix);
+		if (unlikely(ret))
+			return ret;
+		start += prefix;
+	}
+
+	words = (end - start) / 8;
+	while (words) {
+		if (unlikely(*(u64 *)start))
+			return bytes_is_nonzero(start, 8);
+		start += 8;
+		words--;
+	}
+
+	return bytes_is_nonzero(start, (end - start) % 8);
+}
+
+static __always_inline bool memory_is_poisoned_n(const void *addr, size_t size)
+{
+	unsigned long ret;
+
+	ret = memory_is_nonzero(kasan_mem_to_shadow(addr),
+			kasan_mem_to_shadow(addr + size - 1) + 1);
+
+	if (unlikely(ret)) {
+		const void *last_byte = addr + size - 1;
+		s8 *last_shadow = (s8 *)kasan_mem_to_shadow(last_byte);
+		s8 last_accessible_byte = (unsigned long)last_byte & KASAN_GRANULE_MASK;
+
+		if (unlikely(ret != (unsigned long)last_shadow ||
+			     last_accessible_byte >= *last_shadow))
+			return true;
+	}
+	return false;
+}
+
+static __always_inline bool memory_is_poisoned(const void *addr, size_t size)
+{
+	if (__builtin_constant_p(size)) {
+		switch (size) {
+		case 1:
+			return memory_is_poisoned_1(addr);
+		case 2:
+		case 4:
+		case 8:
+			return memory_is_poisoned_2_4_8(addr, size);
+		case 16:
+			return memory_is_poisoned_16(addr);
+		default:
+			BUILD_BUG();
+		}
+	}
+
+	return memory_is_poisoned_n(addr, size);
+}
+
+static __always_inline bool check_region_inline(const void *addr,
+						size_t size, bool write,
+						unsigned long ret_ip)
+{
+	if (!kasan_arch_is_ready())
+		return true;
+
+	if (unlikely(size == 0))
+		return true;
+
+	if (unlikely(addr + size < addr))
+		return !kasan_report(addr, size, write, ret_ip);
+
+	if (unlikely(!addr_has_metadata(addr)))
+		return !kasan_report(addr, size, write, ret_ip);
+
+	if (likely(!memory_is_poisoned(addr, size)))
+		return true;
+
+	return !kasan_report(addr, size, write, ret_ip);
+}
+
+bool kasan_check_range(const void *addr, size_t size, bool write,
+					unsigned long ret_ip)
+{
+	return check_region_inline(addr, size, write, ret_ip);
+}
+
+bool kasan_byte_accessible(const void *addr)
+{
+	s8 shadow_byte;
+
+	if (!kasan_arch_is_ready())
+		return true;
+
+	shadow_byte = READ_ONCE(*(s8 *)kasan_mem_to_shadow(addr));
+
+	return shadow_byte >= 0 && shadow_byte < KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE;
+}
+
+void kasan_cache_shrink(struct kmem_cache *cache)
+{
+	kasan_quarantine_remove_cache(cache);
+}
+
+void kasan_cache_shutdown(struct kmem_cache *cache)
+{
+	if (!__kmem_cache_empty(cache))
+		kasan_quarantine_remove_cache(cache);
+}
+
+static void register_global(struct kasan_global *global)
+{
+	size_t aligned_size = round_up(global->size, KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE);
+
+	kasan_unpoison(global->beg, global->size, false);
+
+	kasan_poison(global->beg + aligned_size,
+		     global->size_with_redzone - aligned_size,
+		     KASAN_GLOBAL_REDZONE, false);
+}
+
+void __asan_register_globals(void *ptr, ssize_t size)
+{
+	int i;
+	struct kasan_global *globals = ptr;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < size; i++)
+		register_global(&globals[i]);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(__asan_register_globals);
+
+void __asan_unregister_globals(void *ptr, ssize_t size)
+{
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(__asan_unregister_globals);
+
+#define DEFINE_ASAN_LOAD_STORE(size)					\
+	void __asan_load##size(void *addr)				\
+	{								\
+		check_region_inline(addr, size, false, _RET_IP_);	\
+	}								\
+	EXPORT_SYMBOL(__asan_load##size);				\
+	__alias(__asan_load##size)					\
+	void __asan_load##size##_noabort(void *);			\
+	EXPORT_SYMBOL(__asan_load##size##_noabort);			\
+	void __asan_store##size(void *addr)				\
+	{								\
+		check_region_inline(addr, size, true, _RET_IP_);	\
+	}								\
+	EXPORT_SYMBOL(__asan_store##size);				\
+	__alias(__asan_store##size)					\
+	void __asan_store##size##_noabort(void *);			\
+	EXPORT_SYMBOL(__asan_store##size##_noabort)
+
+DEFINE_ASAN_LOAD_STORE(1);
+DEFINE_ASAN_LOAD_STORE(2);
+DEFINE_ASAN_LOAD_STORE(4);
+DEFINE_ASAN_LOAD_STORE(8);
+DEFINE_ASAN_LOAD_STORE(16);
+
+void __asan_loadN(void *addr, ssize_t size)
+{
+	kasan_check_range(addr, size, false, _RET_IP_);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(__asan_loadN);
+
+__alias(__asan_loadN)
+void __asan_loadN_noabort(void *, ssize_t);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(__asan_loadN_noabort);
+
+void __asan_storeN(void *addr, ssize_t size)
+{
+	kasan_check_range(addr, size, true, _RET_IP_);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(__asan_storeN);
+
+__alias(__asan_storeN)
+void __asan_storeN_noabort(void *, ssize_t);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(__asan_storeN_noabort);
+
+/* to shut up compiler complaints */
+void __asan_handle_no_return(void) {}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(__asan_handle_no_return);
+
+/* Emitted by compiler to poison alloca()ed objects. */
+void __asan_alloca_poison(void *addr, ssize_t size)
+{
+	size_t rounded_up_size = round_up(size, KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE);
+	size_t padding_size = round_up(size, KASAN_ALLOCA_REDZONE_SIZE) -
+			rounded_up_size;
+	size_t rounded_down_size = round_down(size, KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE);
+
+	const void *left_redzone = (const void *)(addr -
+			KASAN_ALLOCA_REDZONE_SIZE);
+	const void *right_redzone = (const void *)(addr + rounded_up_size);
+
+	WARN_ON(!IS_ALIGNED((unsigned long)addr, KASAN_ALLOCA_REDZONE_SIZE));
+
+	kasan_unpoison((const void *)(addr + rounded_down_size),
+			size - rounded_down_size, false);
+	kasan_poison(left_redzone, KASAN_ALLOCA_REDZONE_SIZE,
+		     KASAN_ALLOCA_LEFT, false);
+	kasan_poison(right_redzone, padding_size + KASAN_ALLOCA_REDZONE_SIZE,
+		     KASAN_ALLOCA_RIGHT, false);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(__asan_alloca_poison);
+
+/* Emitted by compiler to unpoison alloca()ed areas when the stack unwinds. */
+void __asan_allocas_unpoison(void *stack_top, ssize_t stack_bottom)
+{
+	if (unlikely(!stack_top || stack_top > (void *)stack_bottom))
+		return;
+
+	kasan_unpoison(stack_top, (void *)stack_bottom - stack_top, false);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(__asan_allocas_unpoison);
+
+/* Emitted by the compiler to [un]poison local variables. */
+#define DEFINE_ASAN_SET_SHADOW(byte) \
+	void __asan_set_shadow_##byte(const void *addr, ssize_t size)	\
+	{								\
+		__memset((void *)addr, 0x##byte, size);			\
+	}								\
+	EXPORT_SYMBOL(__asan_set_shadow_##byte)
+
+DEFINE_ASAN_SET_SHADOW(00);
+DEFINE_ASAN_SET_SHADOW(f1);
+DEFINE_ASAN_SET_SHADOW(f2);
+DEFINE_ASAN_SET_SHADOW(f3);
+DEFINE_ASAN_SET_SHADOW(f5);
+DEFINE_ASAN_SET_SHADOW(f8);
+
+/* Only allow cache merging when no per-object metadata is present. */
+slab_flags_t kasan_never_merge(void)
+{
+	if (!kasan_requires_meta())
+		return 0;
+	return SLAB_KASAN;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Adaptive redzone policy taken from the userspace AddressSanitizer runtime.
+ * For larger allocations larger redzones are used.
+ */
+static inline unsigned int optimal_redzone(unsigned int object_size)
+{
+	return
+		object_size <= 64        - 16   ? 16 :
+		object_size <= 128       - 32   ? 32 :
+		object_size <= 512       - 64   ? 64 :
+		object_size <= 4096      - 128  ? 128 :
+		object_size <= (1 << 14) - 256  ? 256 :
+		object_size <= (1 << 15) - 512  ? 512 :
+		object_size <= (1 << 16) - 1024 ? 1024 : 2048;
+}
+
+void kasan_cache_create(struct kmem_cache *cache, unsigned int *size,
+			  slab_flags_t *flags)
+{
+	unsigned int ok_size;
+	unsigned int optimal_size;
+
+	if (!kasan_requires_meta())
+		return;
+
+	/*
+	 * SLAB_KASAN is used to mark caches that are sanitized by KASAN
+	 * and that thus have per-object metadata.
+	 * Currently this flag is used in two places:
+	 * 1. In slab_ksize() to account for per-object metadata when
+	 *    calculating the size of the accessible memory within the object.
+	 * 2. In slab_common.c via kasan_never_merge() to prevent merging of
+	 *    caches with per-object metadata.
+	 */
+	*flags |= SLAB_KASAN;
+
+	ok_size = *size;
+
+	/* Add alloc meta into redzone. */
+	cache->kasan_info.alloc_meta_offset = *size;
+	*size += sizeof(struct kasan_alloc_meta);
+
+	/*
+	 * If alloc meta doesn't fit, don't add it.
+	 * This can only happen with SLAB, as it has KMALLOC_MAX_SIZE equal
+	 * to KMALLOC_MAX_CACHE_SIZE and doesn't fall back to page_alloc for
+	 * larger sizes.
+	 */
+	if (*size > KMALLOC_MAX_SIZE) {
+		cache->kasan_info.alloc_meta_offset = 0;
+		*size = ok_size;
+		/* Continue, since free meta might still fit. */
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Add free meta into redzone when it's not possible to store
+	 * it in the object. This is the case when:
+	 * 1. Object is SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU, which means that it can
+	 *    be touched after it was freed, or
+	 * 2. Object has a constructor, which means it's expected to
+	 *    retain its content until the next allocation, or
+	 * 3. Object is too small.
+	 * Otherwise cache->kasan_info.free_meta_offset = 0 is implied.
+	 */
+	if ((cache->flags & SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU) || cache->ctor ||
+	    cache->object_size < sizeof(struct kasan_free_meta)) {
+		ok_size = *size;
+
+		cache->kasan_info.free_meta_offset = *size;
+		*size += sizeof(struct kasan_free_meta);
+
+		/* If free meta doesn't fit, don't add it. */
+		if (*size > KMALLOC_MAX_SIZE) {
+			cache->kasan_info.free_meta_offset = KASAN_NO_FREE_META;
+			*size = ok_size;
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* Calculate size with optimal redzone. */
+	optimal_size = cache->object_size + optimal_redzone(cache->object_size);
+	/* Limit it with KMALLOC_MAX_SIZE (relevant for SLAB only). */
+	if (optimal_size > KMALLOC_MAX_SIZE)
+		optimal_size = KMALLOC_MAX_SIZE;
+	/* Use optimal size if the size with added metas is not large enough. */
+	if (*size < optimal_size)
+		*size = optimal_size;
+}
+
+struct kasan_alloc_meta *kasan_get_alloc_meta(struct kmem_cache *cache,
+					      const void *object)
+{
+	if (!cache->kasan_info.alloc_meta_offset)
+		return NULL;
+	return (void *)object + cache->kasan_info.alloc_meta_offset;
+}
+
+struct kasan_free_meta *kasan_get_free_meta(struct kmem_cache *cache,
+					    const void *object)
+{
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(struct kasan_free_meta) > 32);
+	if (cache->kasan_info.free_meta_offset == KASAN_NO_FREE_META)
+		return NULL;
+	return (void *)object + cache->kasan_info.free_meta_offset;
+}
+
+void kasan_init_object_meta(struct kmem_cache *cache, const void *object)
+{
+	struct kasan_alloc_meta *alloc_meta;
+
+	alloc_meta = kasan_get_alloc_meta(cache, object);
+	if (alloc_meta)
+		__memset(alloc_meta, 0, sizeof(*alloc_meta));
+}
+
+size_t kasan_metadata_size(struct kmem_cache *cache, bool in_object)
+{
+	struct kasan_cache *info = &cache->kasan_info;
+
+	if (!kasan_requires_meta())
+		return 0;
+
+	if (in_object)
+		return (info->free_meta_offset ?
+			0 : sizeof(struct kasan_free_meta));
+	else
+		return (info->alloc_meta_offset ?
+			sizeof(struct kasan_alloc_meta) : 0) +
+			((info->free_meta_offset &&
+			info->free_meta_offset != KASAN_NO_FREE_META) ?
+			sizeof(struct kasan_free_meta) : 0);
+}
+
+static void __kasan_record_aux_stack(void *addr, bool can_alloc)
+{
+	struct slab *slab = kasan_addr_to_slab(addr);
+	struct kmem_cache *cache;
+	struct kasan_alloc_meta *alloc_meta;
+	void *object;
+
+	if (is_kfence_address(addr) || !slab)
+		return;
+
+	cache = slab->slab_cache;
+	object = nearest_obj(cache, slab, addr);
+	alloc_meta = kasan_get_alloc_meta(cache, object);
+	if (!alloc_meta)
+		return;
+
+	alloc_meta->aux_stack[1] = alloc_meta->aux_stack[0];
+	alloc_meta->aux_stack[0] = kasan_save_stack(0, can_alloc);
+}
+
+void kasan_record_aux_stack(void *addr)
+{
+	return __kasan_record_aux_stack(addr, true);
+}
+
+void kasan_record_aux_stack_noalloc(void *addr)
+{
+	return __kasan_record_aux_stack(addr, false);
+}
+
+void kasan_save_alloc_info(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object, gfp_t flags)
+{
+	struct kasan_alloc_meta *alloc_meta;
+
+	alloc_meta = kasan_get_alloc_meta(cache, object);
+	if (alloc_meta)
+		kasan_set_track(&alloc_meta->alloc_track, flags);
+}
+
+void kasan_save_free_info(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object)
+{
+	struct kasan_free_meta *free_meta;
+
+	free_meta = kasan_get_free_meta(cache, object);
+	if (!free_meta)
+		return;
+
+	kasan_set_track(&free_meta->free_track, 0);
+	/* The object was freed and has free track set. */
+	*(u8 *)kasan_mem_to_shadow(object) = KASAN_SLAB_FREETRACK;
+}
diff --git a/mm/kasan/hw_tags.c b/mm/kasan/hw_tags.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..06141bbc1e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/mm/kasan/hw_tags.c
@@ -0,0 +1,396 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * This file contains core hardware tag-based KASAN code.
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 2020 Google, Inc.
+ * Author: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
+ */
+
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) "kasan: " fmt
+
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/kasan.h>
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/memory.h>
+#include <linux/mm.h>
+#include <linux/static_key.h>
+#include <linux/string.h>
+#include <linux/types.h>
+
+#include "kasan.h"
+
+enum kasan_arg {
+	KASAN_ARG_DEFAULT,
+	KASAN_ARG_OFF,
+	KASAN_ARG_ON,
+};
+
+enum kasan_arg_mode {
+	KASAN_ARG_MODE_DEFAULT,
+	KASAN_ARG_MODE_SYNC,
+	KASAN_ARG_MODE_ASYNC,
+	KASAN_ARG_MODE_ASYMM,
+};
+
+enum kasan_arg_vmalloc {
+	KASAN_ARG_VMALLOC_DEFAULT,
+	KASAN_ARG_VMALLOC_OFF,
+	KASAN_ARG_VMALLOC_ON,
+};
+
+static enum kasan_arg kasan_arg __ro_after_init;
+static enum kasan_arg_mode kasan_arg_mode __ro_after_init;
+static enum kasan_arg_vmalloc kasan_arg_vmalloc __initdata;
+
+/*
+ * Whether KASAN is enabled at all.
+ * The value remains false until KASAN is initialized by kasan_init_hw_tags().
+ */
+DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(kasan_flag_enabled);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(kasan_flag_enabled);
+
+/*
+ * Whether the selected mode is synchronous, asynchronous, or asymmetric.
+ * Defaults to KASAN_MODE_SYNC.
+ */
+enum kasan_mode kasan_mode __ro_after_init;
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kasan_mode);
+
+/* Whether to enable vmalloc tagging. */
+DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_TRUE(kasan_flag_vmalloc);
+
+#define PAGE_ALLOC_SAMPLE_DEFAULT	1
+#define PAGE_ALLOC_SAMPLE_ORDER_DEFAULT	3
+
+/*
+ * Sampling interval of page_alloc allocation (un)poisoning.
+ * Defaults to no sampling.
+ */
+unsigned long kasan_page_alloc_sample = PAGE_ALLOC_SAMPLE_DEFAULT;
+
+/*
+ * Minimum order of page_alloc allocations to be affected by sampling.
+ * The default value is chosen to match both
+ * PAGE_ALLOC_COSTLY_ORDER and SKB_FRAG_PAGE_ORDER.
+ */
+unsigned int kasan_page_alloc_sample_order = PAGE_ALLOC_SAMPLE_ORDER_DEFAULT;
+
+DEFINE_PER_CPU(long, kasan_page_alloc_skip);
+
+/* kasan=off/on */
+static int __init early_kasan_flag(char *arg)
+{
+	if (!arg)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (!strcmp(arg, "off"))
+		kasan_arg = KASAN_ARG_OFF;
+	else if (!strcmp(arg, "on"))
+		kasan_arg = KASAN_ARG_ON;
+	else
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+early_param("kasan", early_kasan_flag);
+
+/* kasan.mode=sync/async/asymm */
+static int __init early_kasan_mode(char *arg)
+{
+	if (!arg)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (!strcmp(arg, "sync"))
+		kasan_arg_mode = KASAN_ARG_MODE_SYNC;
+	else if (!strcmp(arg, "async"))
+		kasan_arg_mode = KASAN_ARG_MODE_ASYNC;
+	else if (!strcmp(arg, "asymm"))
+		kasan_arg_mode = KASAN_ARG_MODE_ASYMM;
+	else
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+early_param("kasan.mode", early_kasan_mode);
+
+/* kasan.vmalloc=off/on */
+static int __init early_kasan_flag_vmalloc(char *arg)
+{
+	if (!arg)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (!strcmp(arg, "off"))
+		kasan_arg_vmalloc = KASAN_ARG_VMALLOC_OFF;
+	else if (!strcmp(arg, "on"))
+		kasan_arg_vmalloc = KASAN_ARG_VMALLOC_ON;
+	else
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+early_param("kasan.vmalloc", early_kasan_flag_vmalloc);
+
+static inline const char *kasan_mode_info(void)
+{
+	if (kasan_mode == KASAN_MODE_ASYNC)
+		return "async";
+	else if (kasan_mode == KASAN_MODE_ASYMM)
+		return "asymm";
+	else
+		return "sync";
+}
+
+/* kasan.page_alloc.sample=<sampling interval> */
+static int __init early_kasan_flag_page_alloc_sample(char *arg)
+{
+	int rv;
+
+	if (!arg)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	rv = kstrtoul(arg, 0, &kasan_page_alloc_sample);
+	if (rv)
+		return rv;
+
+	if (!kasan_page_alloc_sample || kasan_page_alloc_sample > LONG_MAX) {
+		kasan_page_alloc_sample = PAGE_ALLOC_SAMPLE_DEFAULT;
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+early_param("kasan.page_alloc.sample", early_kasan_flag_page_alloc_sample);
+
+/* kasan.page_alloc.sample.order=<minimum page order> */
+static int __init early_kasan_flag_page_alloc_sample_order(char *arg)
+{
+	int rv;
+
+	if (!arg)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	rv = kstrtouint(arg, 0, &kasan_page_alloc_sample_order);
+	if (rv)
+		return rv;
+
+	if (kasan_page_alloc_sample_order > INT_MAX) {
+		kasan_page_alloc_sample_order = PAGE_ALLOC_SAMPLE_ORDER_DEFAULT;
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+early_param("kasan.page_alloc.sample.order", early_kasan_flag_page_alloc_sample_order);
+
+/*
+ * kasan_init_hw_tags_cpu() is called for each CPU.
+ * Not marked as __init as a CPU can be hot-plugged after boot.
+ */
+void kasan_init_hw_tags_cpu(void)
+{
+	/*
+	 * There's no need to check that the hardware is MTE-capable here,
+	 * as this function is only called for MTE-capable hardware.
+	 */
+
+	/*
+	 * If KASAN is disabled via command line, don't initialize it.
+	 * When this function is called, kasan_flag_enabled is not yet
+	 * set by kasan_init_hw_tags(). Thus, check kasan_arg instead.
+	 */
+	if (kasan_arg == KASAN_ARG_OFF)
+		return;
+
+	/*
+	 * Enable async or asymm modes only when explicitly requested
+	 * through the command line.
+	 */
+	kasan_enable_hw_tags();
+}
+
+/* kasan_init_hw_tags() is called once on boot CPU. */
+void __init kasan_init_hw_tags(void)
+{
+	/* If hardware doesn't support MTE, don't initialize KASAN. */
+	if (!system_supports_mte())
+		return;
+
+	/* If KASAN is disabled via command line, don't initialize it. */
+	if (kasan_arg == KASAN_ARG_OFF)
+		return;
+
+	switch (kasan_arg_mode) {
+	case KASAN_ARG_MODE_DEFAULT:
+		/* Default is specified by kasan_mode definition. */
+		break;
+	case KASAN_ARG_MODE_SYNC:
+		kasan_mode = KASAN_MODE_SYNC;
+		break;
+	case KASAN_ARG_MODE_ASYNC:
+		kasan_mode = KASAN_MODE_ASYNC;
+		break;
+	case KASAN_ARG_MODE_ASYMM:
+		kasan_mode = KASAN_MODE_ASYMM;
+		break;
+	}
+
+	switch (kasan_arg_vmalloc) {
+	case KASAN_ARG_VMALLOC_DEFAULT:
+		/* Default is specified by kasan_flag_vmalloc definition. */
+		break;
+	case KASAN_ARG_VMALLOC_OFF:
+		static_branch_disable(&kasan_flag_vmalloc);
+		break;
+	case KASAN_ARG_VMALLOC_ON:
+		static_branch_enable(&kasan_flag_vmalloc);
+		break;
+	}
+
+	kasan_init_tags();
+
+	/* KASAN is now initialized, enable it. */
+	static_branch_enable(&kasan_flag_enabled);
+
+	pr_info("KernelAddressSanitizer initialized (hw-tags, mode=%s, vmalloc=%s, stacktrace=%s)\n",
+		kasan_mode_info(),
+		kasan_vmalloc_enabled() ? "on" : "off",
+		kasan_stack_collection_enabled() ? "on" : "off");
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_VMALLOC
+
+static void unpoison_vmalloc_pages(const void *addr, u8 tag)
+{
+	struct vm_struct *area;
+	int i;
+
+	/*
+	 * As hardware tag-based KASAN only tags VM_ALLOC vmalloc allocations
+	 * (see the comment in __kasan_unpoison_vmalloc), all of the pages
+	 * should belong to a single area.
+	 */
+	area = find_vm_area((void *)addr);
+	if (WARN_ON(!area))
+		return;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < area->nr_pages; i++) {
+		struct page *page = area->pages[i];
+
+		page_kasan_tag_set(page, tag);
+	}
+}
+
+static void init_vmalloc_pages(const void *start, unsigned long size)
+{
+	const void *addr;
+
+	for (addr = start; addr < start + size; addr += PAGE_SIZE) {
+		struct page *page = vmalloc_to_page(addr);
+
+		clear_highpage_kasan_tagged(page);
+	}
+}
+
+void *__kasan_unpoison_vmalloc(const void *start, unsigned long size,
+				kasan_vmalloc_flags_t flags)
+{
+	u8 tag;
+	unsigned long redzone_start, redzone_size;
+
+	if (!kasan_vmalloc_enabled()) {
+		if (flags & KASAN_VMALLOC_INIT)
+			init_vmalloc_pages(start, size);
+		return (void *)start;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Don't tag non-VM_ALLOC mappings, as:
+	 *
+	 * 1. Unlike the software KASAN modes, hardware tag-based KASAN only
+	 *    supports tagging physical memory. Therefore, it can only tag a
+	 *    single mapping of normal physical pages.
+	 * 2. Hardware tag-based KASAN can only tag memory mapped with special
+	 *    mapping protection bits, see arch_vmap_pgprot_tagged().
+	 *    As non-VM_ALLOC mappings can be mapped outside of vmalloc code,
+	 *    providing these bits would require tracking all non-VM_ALLOC
+	 *    mappers.
+	 *
+	 * Thus, for VM_ALLOC mappings, hardware tag-based KASAN only tags
+	 * the first virtual mapping, which is created by vmalloc().
+	 * Tagging the page_alloc memory backing that vmalloc() allocation is
+	 * skipped, see ___GFP_SKIP_KASAN.
+	 *
+	 * For non-VM_ALLOC allocations, page_alloc memory is tagged as usual.
+	 */
+	if (!(flags & KASAN_VMALLOC_VM_ALLOC)) {
+		WARN_ON(flags & KASAN_VMALLOC_INIT);
+		return (void *)start;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Don't tag executable memory.
+	 * The kernel doesn't tolerate having the PC register tagged.
+	 */
+	if (!(flags & KASAN_VMALLOC_PROT_NORMAL)) {
+		WARN_ON(flags & KASAN_VMALLOC_INIT);
+		return (void *)start;
+	}
+
+	tag = kasan_random_tag();
+	start = set_tag(start, tag);
+
+	/* Unpoison and initialize memory up to size. */
+	kasan_unpoison(start, size, flags & KASAN_VMALLOC_INIT);
+
+	/*
+	 * Explicitly poison and initialize the in-page vmalloc() redzone.
+	 * Unlike software KASAN modes, hardware tag-based KASAN doesn't
+	 * unpoison memory when populating shadow for vmalloc() space.
+	 */
+	redzone_start = round_up((unsigned long)start + size,
+				 KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE);
+	redzone_size = round_up(redzone_start, PAGE_SIZE) - redzone_start;
+	kasan_poison((void *)redzone_start, redzone_size, KASAN_TAG_INVALID,
+		     flags & KASAN_VMALLOC_INIT);
+
+	/*
+	 * Set per-page tag flags to allow accessing physical memory for the
+	 * vmalloc() mapping through page_address(vmalloc_to_page()).
+	 */
+	unpoison_vmalloc_pages(start, tag);
+
+	return (void *)start;
+}
+
+void __kasan_poison_vmalloc(const void *start, unsigned long size)
+{
+	/*
+	 * No tagging here.
+	 * The physical pages backing the vmalloc() allocation are poisoned
+	 * through the usual page_alloc paths.
+	 */
+}
+
+#endif
+
+void kasan_enable_hw_tags(void)
+{
+	if (kasan_arg_mode == KASAN_ARG_MODE_ASYNC)
+		hw_enable_tag_checks_async();
+	else if (kasan_arg_mode == KASAN_ARG_MODE_ASYMM)
+		hw_enable_tag_checks_asymm();
+	else
+		hw_enable_tag_checks_sync();
+}
+
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_KUNIT_TEST)
+
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kasan_enable_hw_tags);
+
+void kasan_force_async_fault(void)
+{
+	hw_force_async_tag_fault();
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kasan_force_async_fault);
+
+#endif
diff --git a/mm/kasan/init.c b/mm/kasan/init.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..89895f38f7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/mm/kasan/init.c
@@ -0,0 +1,504 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * This file contains KASAN shadow initialization code.
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 2015 Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd.
+ * Author: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>
+ */
+
+#include <linux/memblock.h>
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/kasan.h>
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/mm.h>
+#include <linux/pfn.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+
+#include <asm/page.h>
+#include <asm/pgalloc.h>
+
+#include "kasan.h"
+
+/*
+ * This page serves two purposes:
+ *   - It used as early shadow memory. The entire shadow region populated
+ *     with this page, before we will be able to setup normal shadow memory.
+ *   - Latter it reused it as zero shadow to cover large ranges of memory
+ *     that allowed to access, but not handled by kasan (vmalloc/vmemmap ...).
+ */
+unsigned char kasan_early_shadow_page[PAGE_SIZE] __page_aligned_bss;
+
+#if CONFIG_PGTABLE_LEVELS > 4
+p4d_t kasan_early_shadow_p4d[MAX_PTRS_PER_P4D] __page_aligned_bss;
+static inline bool kasan_p4d_table(pgd_t pgd)
+{
+	return pgd_page(pgd) == virt_to_page(lm_alias(kasan_early_shadow_p4d));
+}
+#else
+static inline bool kasan_p4d_table(pgd_t pgd)
+{
+	return false;
+}
+#endif
+#if CONFIG_PGTABLE_LEVELS > 3
+pud_t kasan_early_shadow_pud[MAX_PTRS_PER_PUD] __page_aligned_bss;
+static inline bool kasan_pud_table(p4d_t p4d)
+{
+	return p4d_page(p4d) == virt_to_page(lm_alias(kasan_early_shadow_pud));
+}
+#else
+static inline bool kasan_pud_table(p4d_t p4d)
+{
+	return false;
+}
+#endif
+#if CONFIG_PGTABLE_LEVELS > 2
+pmd_t kasan_early_shadow_pmd[MAX_PTRS_PER_PMD] __page_aligned_bss;
+static inline bool kasan_pmd_table(pud_t pud)
+{
+	return pud_page(pud) == virt_to_page(lm_alias(kasan_early_shadow_pmd));
+}
+#else
+static inline bool kasan_pmd_table(pud_t pud)
+{
+	return false;
+}
+#endif
+pte_t kasan_early_shadow_pte[MAX_PTRS_PER_PTE + PTE_HWTABLE_PTRS]
+	__page_aligned_bss;
+
+static inline bool kasan_pte_table(pmd_t pmd)
+{
+	return pmd_page(pmd) == virt_to_page(lm_alias(kasan_early_shadow_pte));
+}
+
+static inline bool kasan_early_shadow_page_entry(pte_t pte)
+{
+	return pte_page(pte) == virt_to_page(lm_alias(kasan_early_shadow_page));
+}
+
+static __init void *early_alloc(size_t size, int node)
+{
+	void *ptr = memblock_alloc_try_nid(size, size, __pa(MAX_DMA_ADDRESS),
+					   MEMBLOCK_ALLOC_ACCESSIBLE, node);
+
+	if (!ptr)
+		panic("%s: Failed to allocate %zu bytes align=%zx nid=%d from=%llx\n",
+		      __func__, size, size, node, (u64)__pa(MAX_DMA_ADDRESS));
+
+	return ptr;
+}
+
+static void __ref zero_pte_populate(pmd_t *pmd, unsigned long addr,
+				unsigned long end)
+{
+	pte_t *pte = pte_offset_kernel(pmd, addr);
+	pte_t zero_pte;
+
+	zero_pte = pfn_pte(PFN_DOWN(__pa_symbol(kasan_early_shadow_page)),
+				PAGE_KERNEL);
+	zero_pte = pte_wrprotect(zero_pte);
+
+	while (addr + PAGE_SIZE <= end) {
+		set_pte_at(&init_mm, addr, pte, zero_pte);
+		addr += PAGE_SIZE;
+		pte = pte_offset_kernel(pmd, addr);
+	}
+}
+
+static int __ref zero_pmd_populate(pud_t *pud, unsigned long addr,
+				unsigned long end)
+{
+	pmd_t *pmd = pmd_offset(pud, addr);
+	unsigned long next;
+
+	do {
+		next = pmd_addr_end(addr, end);
+
+		if (IS_ALIGNED(addr, PMD_SIZE) && end - addr >= PMD_SIZE) {
+			pmd_populate_kernel(&init_mm, pmd,
+					lm_alias(kasan_early_shadow_pte));
+			continue;
+		}
+
+		if (pmd_none(*pmd)) {
+			pte_t *p;
+
+			if (slab_is_available())
+				p = pte_alloc_one_kernel(&init_mm);
+			else
+				p = early_alloc(PAGE_SIZE, NUMA_NO_NODE);
+			if (!p)
+				return -ENOMEM;
+
+			pmd_populate_kernel(&init_mm, pmd, p);
+		}
+		zero_pte_populate(pmd, addr, next);
+	} while (pmd++, addr = next, addr != end);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+void __weak __meminit pmd_init(void *addr)
+{
+}
+
+static int __ref zero_pud_populate(p4d_t *p4d, unsigned long addr,
+				unsigned long end)
+{
+	pud_t *pud = pud_offset(p4d, addr);
+	unsigned long next;
+
+	do {
+		next = pud_addr_end(addr, end);
+		if (IS_ALIGNED(addr, PUD_SIZE) && end - addr >= PUD_SIZE) {
+			pmd_t *pmd;
+
+			pud_populate(&init_mm, pud,
+					lm_alias(kasan_early_shadow_pmd));
+			pmd = pmd_offset(pud, addr);
+			pmd_populate_kernel(&init_mm, pmd,
+					lm_alias(kasan_early_shadow_pte));
+			continue;
+		}
+
+		if (pud_none(*pud)) {
+			pmd_t *p;
+
+			if (slab_is_available()) {
+				p = pmd_alloc(&init_mm, pud, addr);
+				if (!p)
+					return -ENOMEM;
+			} else {
+				p = early_alloc(PAGE_SIZE, NUMA_NO_NODE);
+				pmd_init(p);
+				pud_populate(&init_mm, pud, p);
+			}
+		}
+		zero_pmd_populate(pud, addr, next);
+	} while (pud++, addr = next, addr != end);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+void __weak __meminit pud_init(void *addr)
+{
+}
+
+static int __ref zero_p4d_populate(pgd_t *pgd, unsigned long addr,
+				unsigned long end)
+{
+	p4d_t *p4d = p4d_offset(pgd, addr);
+	unsigned long next;
+
+	do {
+		next = p4d_addr_end(addr, end);
+		if (IS_ALIGNED(addr, P4D_SIZE) && end - addr >= P4D_SIZE) {
+			pud_t *pud;
+			pmd_t *pmd;
+
+			p4d_populate(&init_mm, p4d,
+					lm_alias(kasan_early_shadow_pud));
+			pud = pud_offset(p4d, addr);
+			pud_populate(&init_mm, pud,
+					lm_alias(kasan_early_shadow_pmd));
+			pmd = pmd_offset(pud, addr);
+			pmd_populate_kernel(&init_mm, pmd,
+					lm_alias(kasan_early_shadow_pte));
+			continue;
+		}
+
+		if (p4d_none(*p4d)) {
+			pud_t *p;
+
+			if (slab_is_available()) {
+				p = pud_alloc(&init_mm, p4d, addr);
+				if (!p)
+					return -ENOMEM;
+			} else {
+				p = early_alloc(PAGE_SIZE, NUMA_NO_NODE);
+				pud_init(p);
+				p4d_populate(&init_mm, p4d, p);
+			}
+		}
+		zero_pud_populate(p4d, addr, next);
+	} while (p4d++, addr = next, addr != end);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * kasan_populate_early_shadow - populate shadow memory region with
+ *                               kasan_early_shadow_page
+ * @shadow_start: start of the memory range to populate
+ * @shadow_end: end of the memory range to populate
+ */
+int __ref kasan_populate_early_shadow(const void *shadow_start,
+					const void *shadow_end)
+{
+	unsigned long addr = (unsigned long)shadow_start;
+	unsigned long end = (unsigned long)shadow_end;
+	pgd_t *pgd = pgd_offset_k(addr);
+	unsigned long next;
+
+	do {
+		next = pgd_addr_end(addr, end);
+
+		if (IS_ALIGNED(addr, PGDIR_SIZE) && end - addr >= PGDIR_SIZE) {
+			p4d_t *p4d;
+			pud_t *pud;
+			pmd_t *pmd;
+
+			/*
+			 * kasan_early_shadow_pud should be populated with pmds
+			 * at this moment.
+			 * [pud,pmd]_populate*() below needed only for
+			 * 3,2 - level page tables where we don't have
+			 * puds,pmds, so pgd_populate(), pud_populate()
+			 * is noops.
+			 */
+			pgd_populate(&init_mm, pgd,
+					lm_alias(kasan_early_shadow_p4d));
+			p4d = p4d_offset(pgd, addr);
+			p4d_populate(&init_mm, p4d,
+					lm_alias(kasan_early_shadow_pud));
+			pud = pud_offset(p4d, addr);
+			pud_populate(&init_mm, pud,
+					lm_alias(kasan_early_shadow_pmd));
+			pmd = pmd_offset(pud, addr);
+			pmd_populate_kernel(&init_mm, pmd,
+					lm_alias(kasan_early_shadow_pte));
+			continue;
+		}
+
+		if (pgd_none(*pgd)) {
+			p4d_t *p;
+
+			if (slab_is_available()) {
+				p = p4d_alloc(&init_mm, pgd, addr);
+				if (!p)
+					return -ENOMEM;
+			} else {
+				pgd_populate(&init_mm, pgd,
+					early_alloc(PAGE_SIZE, NUMA_NO_NODE));
+			}
+		}
+		zero_p4d_populate(pgd, addr, next);
+	} while (pgd++, addr = next, addr != end);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void kasan_free_pte(pte_t *pte_start, pmd_t *pmd)
+{
+	pte_t *pte;
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < PTRS_PER_PTE; i++) {
+		pte = pte_start + i;
+		if (!pte_none(ptep_get(pte)))
+			return;
+	}
+
+	pte_free_kernel(&init_mm, (pte_t *)page_to_virt(pmd_page(*pmd)));
+	pmd_clear(pmd);
+}
+
+static void kasan_free_pmd(pmd_t *pmd_start, pud_t *pud)
+{
+	pmd_t *pmd;
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < PTRS_PER_PMD; i++) {
+		pmd = pmd_start + i;
+		if (!pmd_none(*pmd))
+			return;
+	}
+
+	pmd_free(&init_mm, (pmd_t *)page_to_virt(pud_page(*pud)));
+	pud_clear(pud);
+}
+
+static void kasan_free_pud(pud_t *pud_start, p4d_t *p4d)
+{
+	pud_t *pud;
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < PTRS_PER_PUD; i++) {
+		pud = pud_start + i;
+		if (!pud_none(*pud))
+			return;
+	}
+
+	pud_free(&init_mm, (pud_t *)page_to_virt(p4d_page(*p4d)));
+	p4d_clear(p4d);
+}
+
+static void kasan_free_p4d(p4d_t *p4d_start, pgd_t *pgd)
+{
+	p4d_t *p4d;
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < PTRS_PER_P4D; i++) {
+		p4d = p4d_start + i;
+		if (!p4d_none(*p4d))
+			return;
+	}
+
+	p4d_free(&init_mm, (p4d_t *)page_to_virt(pgd_page(*pgd)));
+	pgd_clear(pgd);
+}
+
+static void kasan_remove_pte_table(pte_t *pte, unsigned long addr,
+				unsigned long end)
+{
+	unsigned long next;
+	pte_t ptent;
+
+	for (; addr < end; addr = next, pte++) {
+		next = (addr + PAGE_SIZE) & PAGE_MASK;
+		if (next > end)
+			next = end;
+
+		ptent = ptep_get(pte);
+
+		if (!pte_present(ptent))
+			continue;
+
+		if (WARN_ON(!kasan_early_shadow_page_entry(ptent)))
+			continue;
+		pte_clear(&init_mm, addr, pte);
+	}
+}
+
+static void kasan_remove_pmd_table(pmd_t *pmd, unsigned long addr,
+				unsigned long end)
+{
+	unsigned long next;
+
+	for (; addr < end; addr = next, pmd++) {
+		pte_t *pte;
+
+		next = pmd_addr_end(addr, end);
+
+		if (!pmd_present(*pmd))
+			continue;
+
+		if (kasan_pte_table(*pmd)) {
+			if (IS_ALIGNED(addr, PMD_SIZE) &&
+			    IS_ALIGNED(next, PMD_SIZE)) {
+				pmd_clear(pmd);
+				continue;
+			}
+		}
+		pte = pte_offset_kernel(pmd, addr);
+		kasan_remove_pte_table(pte, addr, next);
+		kasan_free_pte(pte_offset_kernel(pmd, 0), pmd);
+	}
+}
+
+static void kasan_remove_pud_table(pud_t *pud, unsigned long addr,
+				unsigned long end)
+{
+	unsigned long next;
+
+	for (; addr < end; addr = next, pud++) {
+		pmd_t *pmd, *pmd_base;
+
+		next = pud_addr_end(addr, end);
+
+		if (!pud_present(*pud))
+			continue;
+
+		if (kasan_pmd_table(*pud)) {
+			if (IS_ALIGNED(addr, PUD_SIZE) &&
+			    IS_ALIGNED(next, PUD_SIZE)) {
+				pud_clear(pud);
+				continue;
+			}
+		}
+		pmd = pmd_offset(pud, addr);
+		pmd_base = pmd_offset(pud, 0);
+		kasan_remove_pmd_table(pmd, addr, next);
+		kasan_free_pmd(pmd_base, pud);
+	}
+}
+
+static void kasan_remove_p4d_table(p4d_t *p4d, unsigned long addr,
+				unsigned long end)
+{
+	unsigned long next;
+
+	for (; addr < end; addr = next, p4d++) {
+		pud_t *pud;
+
+		next = p4d_addr_end(addr, end);
+
+		if (!p4d_present(*p4d))
+			continue;
+
+		if (kasan_pud_table(*p4d)) {
+			if (IS_ALIGNED(addr, P4D_SIZE) &&
+			    IS_ALIGNED(next, P4D_SIZE)) {
+				p4d_clear(p4d);
+				continue;
+			}
+		}
+		pud = pud_offset(p4d, addr);
+		kasan_remove_pud_table(pud, addr, next);
+		kasan_free_pud(pud_offset(p4d, 0), p4d);
+	}
+}
+
+void kasan_remove_zero_shadow(void *start, unsigned long size)
+{
+	unsigned long addr, end, next;
+	pgd_t *pgd;
+
+	addr = (unsigned long)kasan_mem_to_shadow(start);
+	end = addr + (size >> KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT);
+
+	if (WARN_ON((unsigned long)start % KASAN_MEMORY_PER_SHADOW_PAGE) ||
+	    WARN_ON(size % KASAN_MEMORY_PER_SHADOW_PAGE))
+		return;
+
+	for (; addr < end; addr = next) {
+		p4d_t *p4d;
+
+		next = pgd_addr_end(addr, end);
+
+		pgd = pgd_offset_k(addr);
+		if (!pgd_present(*pgd))
+			continue;
+
+		if (kasan_p4d_table(*pgd)) {
+			if (IS_ALIGNED(addr, PGDIR_SIZE) &&
+			    IS_ALIGNED(next, PGDIR_SIZE)) {
+				pgd_clear(pgd);
+				continue;
+			}
+		}
+
+		p4d = p4d_offset(pgd, addr);
+		kasan_remove_p4d_table(p4d, addr, next);
+		kasan_free_p4d(p4d_offset(pgd, 0), pgd);
+	}
+}
+
+int kasan_add_zero_shadow(void *start, unsigned long size)
+{
+	int ret;
+	void *shadow_start, *shadow_end;
+
+	shadow_start = kasan_mem_to_shadow(start);
+	shadow_end = shadow_start + (size >> KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT);
+
+	if (WARN_ON((unsigned long)start % KASAN_MEMORY_PER_SHADOW_PAGE) ||
+	    WARN_ON(size % KASAN_MEMORY_PER_SHADOW_PAGE))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	ret = kasan_populate_early_shadow(shadow_start, shadow_end);
+	if (ret)
+		kasan_remove_zero_shadow(start, size);
+	return ret;
+}
diff --git a/mm/kasan/kasan.h b/mm/kasan/kasan.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..d37831b851
--- /dev/null
+++ b/mm/kasan/kasan.h
@@ -0,0 +1,644 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+#ifndef __MM_KASAN_KASAN_H
+#define __MM_KASAN_KASAN_H
+
+#include <linux/atomic.h>
+#include <linux/kasan.h>
+#include <linux/kasan-tags.h>
+#include <linux/kfence.h>
+#include <linux/stackdepot.h>
+
+#if defined(CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS) || defined(CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS)
+
+#include <linux/static_key.h>
+
+DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_TRUE(kasan_flag_stacktrace);
+
+static inline bool kasan_stack_collection_enabled(void)
+{
+	return static_branch_unlikely(&kasan_flag_stacktrace);
+}
+
+#else /* CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS || CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS */
+
+static inline bool kasan_stack_collection_enabled(void)
+{
+	return true;
+}
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS || CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS */
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS
+
+#include "../slab.h"
+
+DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_TRUE(kasan_flag_vmalloc);
+
+enum kasan_mode {
+	KASAN_MODE_SYNC,
+	KASAN_MODE_ASYNC,
+	KASAN_MODE_ASYMM,
+};
+
+extern enum kasan_mode kasan_mode __ro_after_init;
+
+extern unsigned long kasan_page_alloc_sample;
+extern unsigned int kasan_page_alloc_sample_order;
+DECLARE_PER_CPU(long, kasan_page_alloc_skip);
+
+static inline bool kasan_vmalloc_enabled(void)
+{
+	return static_branch_likely(&kasan_flag_vmalloc);
+}
+
+static inline bool kasan_async_fault_possible(void)
+{
+	return kasan_mode == KASAN_MODE_ASYNC || kasan_mode == KASAN_MODE_ASYMM;
+}
+
+static inline bool kasan_sync_fault_possible(void)
+{
+	return kasan_mode == KASAN_MODE_SYNC || kasan_mode == KASAN_MODE_ASYMM;
+}
+
+static inline bool kasan_sample_page_alloc(unsigned int order)
+{
+	/* Fast-path for when sampling is disabled. */
+	if (kasan_page_alloc_sample == 1)
+		return true;
+
+	if (order < kasan_page_alloc_sample_order)
+		return true;
+
+	if (this_cpu_dec_return(kasan_page_alloc_skip) < 0) {
+		this_cpu_write(kasan_page_alloc_skip,
+			       kasan_page_alloc_sample - 1);
+		return true;
+	}
+
+	return false;
+}
+
+#else /* CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS */
+
+static inline bool kasan_async_fault_possible(void)
+{
+	return false;
+}
+
+static inline bool kasan_sync_fault_possible(void)
+{
+	return true;
+}
+
+static inline bool kasan_sample_page_alloc(unsigned int order)
+{
+	return true;
+}
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS */
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC
+
+/* Generic KASAN uses per-object metadata to store stack traces. */
+static inline bool kasan_requires_meta(void)
+{
+	/*
+	 * Technically, Generic KASAN always collects stack traces right now.
+	 * However, let's use kasan_stack_collection_enabled() in case the
+	 * kasan.stacktrace command-line argument is changed to affect
+	 * Generic KASAN.
+	 */
+	return kasan_stack_collection_enabled();
+}
+
+#else /* CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC */
+
+/* Tag-based KASAN modes do not use per-object metadata. */
+static inline bool kasan_requires_meta(void)
+{
+	return false;
+}
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC */
+
+#if defined(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC) || defined(CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS)
+#define KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE	(1UL << KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT)
+#else
+#include <asm/mte-kasan.h>
+#define KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE	MTE_GRANULE_SIZE
+#endif
+
+#define KASAN_GRANULE_MASK	(KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE - 1)
+
+#define KASAN_MEMORY_PER_SHADOW_PAGE	(KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE << PAGE_SHIFT)
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC
+#define KASAN_PAGE_FREE		0xFF  /* freed page */
+#define KASAN_PAGE_REDZONE	0xFE  /* redzone for kmalloc_large allocation */
+#define KASAN_SLAB_REDZONE	0xFC  /* redzone for slab object */
+#define KASAN_SLAB_FREE		0xFB  /* freed slab object */
+#define KASAN_VMALLOC_INVALID	0xF8  /* inaccessible space in vmap area */
+#else
+#define KASAN_PAGE_FREE		KASAN_TAG_INVALID
+#define KASAN_PAGE_REDZONE	KASAN_TAG_INVALID
+#define KASAN_SLAB_REDZONE	KASAN_TAG_INVALID
+#define KASAN_SLAB_FREE		KASAN_TAG_INVALID
+#define KASAN_VMALLOC_INVALID	KASAN_TAG_INVALID /* only used for SW_TAGS */
+#endif
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC
+
+#define KASAN_SLAB_FREETRACK	0xFA  /* freed slab object with free track */
+#define KASAN_GLOBAL_REDZONE	0xF9  /* redzone for global variable */
+
+/* Stack redzone shadow values. Compiler ABI, do not change. */
+#define KASAN_STACK_LEFT	0xF1
+#define KASAN_STACK_MID		0xF2
+#define KASAN_STACK_RIGHT	0xF3
+#define KASAN_STACK_PARTIAL	0xF4
+
+/* alloca redzone shadow values. */
+#define KASAN_ALLOCA_LEFT	0xCA
+#define KASAN_ALLOCA_RIGHT	0xCB
+
+/* alloca redzone size. Compiler ABI, do not change. */
+#define KASAN_ALLOCA_REDZONE_SIZE	32
+
+/* Stack frame marker. Compiler ABI, do not change. */
+#define KASAN_CURRENT_STACK_FRAME_MAGIC 0x41B58AB3
+
+/* Dummy value to avoid breaking randconfig/all*config builds. */
+#ifndef KASAN_ABI_VERSION
+#define KASAN_ABI_VERSION 1
+#endif
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC */
+
+/* Metadata layout customization. */
+#define META_BYTES_PER_BLOCK 1
+#define META_BLOCKS_PER_ROW 16
+#define META_BYTES_PER_ROW (META_BLOCKS_PER_ROW * META_BYTES_PER_BLOCK)
+#define META_MEM_BYTES_PER_ROW (META_BYTES_PER_ROW * KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE)
+#define META_ROWS_AROUND_ADDR 2
+
+#define KASAN_STACK_DEPTH 64
+
+struct kasan_track {
+	u32 pid;
+	depot_stack_handle_t stack;
+};
+
+enum kasan_report_type {
+	KASAN_REPORT_ACCESS,
+	KASAN_REPORT_INVALID_FREE,
+	KASAN_REPORT_DOUBLE_FREE,
+};
+
+struct kasan_report_info {
+	/* Filled in by kasan_report_*(). */
+	enum kasan_report_type type;
+	const void *access_addr;
+	size_t access_size;
+	bool is_write;
+	unsigned long ip;
+
+	/* Filled in by the common reporting code. */
+	const void *first_bad_addr;
+	struct kmem_cache *cache;
+	void *object;
+	size_t alloc_size;
+
+	/* Filled in by the mode-specific reporting code. */
+	const char *bug_type;
+	struct kasan_track alloc_track;
+	struct kasan_track free_track;
+};
+
+/* Do not change the struct layout: compiler ABI. */
+struct kasan_source_location {
+	const char *filename;
+	int line_no;
+	int column_no;
+};
+
+/* Do not change the struct layout: compiler ABI. */
+struct kasan_global {
+	const void *beg;		/* Address of the beginning of the global variable. */
+	size_t size;			/* Size of the global variable. */
+	size_t size_with_redzone;	/* Size of the variable + size of the redzone. 32 bytes aligned. */
+	const void *name;
+	const void *module_name;	/* Name of the module where the global variable is declared. */
+	unsigned long has_dynamic_init;	/* This is needed for C++. */
+#if KASAN_ABI_VERSION >= 4
+	struct kasan_source_location *location;
+#endif
+#if KASAN_ABI_VERSION >= 5
+	char *odr_indicator;
+#endif
+};
+
+/* Structures for keeping alloc and free meta. */
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC
+
+struct kasan_alloc_meta {
+	struct kasan_track alloc_track;
+	/* Free track is stored in kasan_free_meta. */
+	depot_stack_handle_t aux_stack[2];
+};
+
+struct qlist_node {
+	struct qlist_node *next;
+};
+
+/*
+ * Free meta is stored either in the object itself or in the redzone after the
+ * object. In the former case, free meta offset is 0. In the latter case, the
+ * offset is between 0 and INT_MAX. INT_MAX marks that free meta is not present.
+ */
+#define KASAN_NO_FREE_META INT_MAX
+
+/*
+ * Free meta is only used by Generic mode while the object is in quarantine.
+ * After that, slab allocator stores the freelist pointer in the object.
+ */
+struct kasan_free_meta {
+	struct qlist_node quarantine_link;
+	struct kasan_track free_track;
+};
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC */
+
+#if defined(CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS) || defined(CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS)
+
+struct kasan_stack_ring_entry {
+	void *ptr;
+	size_t size;
+	u32 pid;
+	depot_stack_handle_t stack;
+	bool is_free;
+};
+
+struct kasan_stack_ring {
+	rwlock_t lock;
+	size_t size;
+	atomic64_t pos;
+	struct kasan_stack_ring_entry *entries;
+};
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS || CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS */
+
+#if defined(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC) || defined(CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS)
+
+#ifndef kasan_shadow_to_mem
+static inline const void *kasan_shadow_to_mem(const void *shadow_addr)
+{
+	return (void *)(((unsigned long)shadow_addr - KASAN_SHADOW_OFFSET)
+		<< KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT);
+}
+#endif
+
+#ifndef addr_has_metadata
+static __always_inline bool addr_has_metadata(const void *addr)
+{
+	return (kasan_reset_tag(addr) >=
+		kasan_shadow_to_mem((void *)KASAN_SHADOW_START));
+}
+#endif
+
+/**
+ * kasan_check_range - Check memory region, and report if invalid access.
+ * @addr: the accessed address
+ * @size: the accessed size
+ * @write: true if access is a write access
+ * @ret_ip: return address
+ * @return: true if access was valid, false if invalid
+ */
+bool kasan_check_range(const void *addr, size_t size, bool write,
+				unsigned long ret_ip);
+
+#else /* CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC || CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS */
+
+static __always_inline bool addr_has_metadata(const void *addr)
+{
+	return (is_vmalloc_addr(addr) || virt_addr_valid(addr));
+}
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC || CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS */
+
+const void *kasan_find_first_bad_addr(const void *addr, size_t size);
+size_t kasan_get_alloc_size(void *object, struct kmem_cache *cache);
+void kasan_complete_mode_report_info(struct kasan_report_info *info);
+void kasan_metadata_fetch_row(char *buffer, void *row);
+
+#if defined(CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS) || defined(CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS)
+void kasan_print_tags(u8 addr_tag, const void *addr);
+#else
+static inline void kasan_print_tags(u8 addr_tag, const void *addr) { }
+#endif
+
+#if defined(CONFIG_KASAN_STACK)
+void kasan_print_address_stack_frame(const void *addr);
+#else
+static inline void kasan_print_address_stack_frame(const void *addr) { }
+#endif
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC
+void kasan_print_aux_stacks(struct kmem_cache *cache, const void *object);
+#else
+static inline void kasan_print_aux_stacks(struct kmem_cache *cache, const void *object) { }
+#endif
+
+bool kasan_report(const void *addr, size_t size,
+		bool is_write, unsigned long ip);
+void kasan_report_invalid_free(void *object, unsigned long ip, enum kasan_report_type type);
+
+struct slab *kasan_addr_to_slab(const void *addr);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC
+void kasan_init_cache_meta(struct kmem_cache *cache, unsigned int *size);
+void kasan_init_object_meta(struct kmem_cache *cache, const void *object);
+struct kasan_alloc_meta *kasan_get_alloc_meta(struct kmem_cache *cache,
+						const void *object);
+struct kasan_free_meta *kasan_get_free_meta(struct kmem_cache *cache,
+						const void *object);
+#else
+static inline void kasan_init_cache_meta(struct kmem_cache *cache, unsigned int *size) { }
+static inline void kasan_init_object_meta(struct kmem_cache *cache, const void *object) { }
+#endif
+
+depot_stack_handle_t kasan_save_stack(gfp_t flags, bool can_alloc);
+void kasan_set_track(struct kasan_track *track, gfp_t flags);
+void kasan_save_alloc_info(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object, gfp_t flags);
+void kasan_save_free_info(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object);
+
+#if defined(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC) && \
+	(defined(CONFIG_SLAB) || defined(CONFIG_SLUB))
+bool kasan_quarantine_put(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object);
+void kasan_quarantine_reduce(void);
+void kasan_quarantine_remove_cache(struct kmem_cache *cache);
+#else
+static inline bool kasan_quarantine_put(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object) { return false; }
+static inline void kasan_quarantine_reduce(void) { }
+static inline void kasan_quarantine_remove_cache(struct kmem_cache *cache) { }
+#endif
+
+#ifndef arch_kasan_set_tag
+static inline const void *arch_kasan_set_tag(const void *addr, u8 tag)
+{
+	return addr;
+}
+#endif
+#ifndef arch_kasan_get_tag
+#define arch_kasan_get_tag(addr)	0
+#endif
+
+#define set_tag(addr, tag)	((void *)arch_kasan_set_tag((addr), (tag)))
+#define get_tag(addr)		arch_kasan_get_tag(addr)
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS
+
+#define hw_enable_tag_checks_sync()		arch_enable_tag_checks_sync()
+#define hw_enable_tag_checks_async()		arch_enable_tag_checks_async()
+#define hw_enable_tag_checks_asymm()		arch_enable_tag_checks_asymm()
+#define hw_suppress_tag_checks_start()		arch_suppress_tag_checks_start()
+#define hw_suppress_tag_checks_stop()		arch_suppress_tag_checks_stop()
+#define hw_force_async_tag_fault()		arch_force_async_tag_fault()
+#define hw_get_random_tag()			arch_get_random_tag()
+#define hw_get_mem_tag(addr)			arch_get_mem_tag(addr)
+#define hw_set_mem_tag_range(addr, size, tag, init) \
+			arch_set_mem_tag_range((addr), (size), (tag), (init))
+
+void kasan_enable_hw_tags(void);
+
+#else /* CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS */
+
+static inline void kasan_enable_hw_tags(void) { }
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS */
+
+#if defined(CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS) || defined(CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS)
+void __init kasan_init_tags(void);
+#endif /* CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS || CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS */
+
+#if defined(CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS) && IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_KUNIT_TEST)
+
+void kasan_force_async_fault(void);
+
+#else /* CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS && CONFIG_KASAN_KUNIT_TEST */
+
+static inline void kasan_force_async_fault(void) { }
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS && CONFIG_KASAN_KUNIT_TEST */
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS
+u8 kasan_random_tag(void);
+#elif defined(CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS)
+static inline u8 kasan_random_tag(void) { return hw_get_random_tag(); }
+#else
+static inline u8 kasan_random_tag(void) { return 0; }
+#endif
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS
+
+static inline void kasan_poison(const void *addr, size_t size, u8 value, bool init)
+{
+	addr = kasan_reset_tag(addr);
+
+	/* Skip KFENCE memory if called explicitly outside of sl*b. */
+	if (is_kfence_address(addr))
+		return;
+
+	if (WARN_ON((unsigned long)addr & KASAN_GRANULE_MASK))
+		return;
+	if (WARN_ON(size & KASAN_GRANULE_MASK))
+		return;
+
+	hw_set_mem_tag_range((void *)addr, size, value, init);
+}
+
+static inline void kasan_unpoison(const void *addr, size_t size, bool init)
+{
+	u8 tag = get_tag(addr);
+
+	addr = kasan_reset_tag(addr);
+
+	/* Skip KFENCE memory if called explicitly outside of sl*b. */
+	if (is_kfence_address(addr))
+		return;
+
+	if (WARN_ON((unsigned long)addr & KASAN_GRANULE_MASK))
+		return;
+	size = round_up(size, KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE);
+
+	hw_set_mem_tag_range((void *)addr, size, tag, init);
+}
+
+static inline bool kasan_byte_accessible(const void *addr)
+{
+	u8 ptr_tag = get_tag(addr);
+	u8 mem_tag = hw_get_mem_tag((void *)addr);
+
+	return ptr_tag == KASAN_TAG_KERNEL || ptr_tag == mem_tag;
+}
+
+#else /* CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS */
+
+/**
+ * kasan_poison - mark the memory range as inaccessible
+ * @addr - range start address, must be aligned to KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE
+ * @size - range size, must be aligned to KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE
+ * @value - value that's written to metadata for the range
+ * @init - whether to initialize the memory range (only for hardware tag-based)
+ *
+ * The size gets aligned to KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE before marking the range.
+ */
+void kasan_poison(const void *addr, size_t size, u8 value, bool init);
+
+/**
+ * kasan_unpoison - mark the memory range as accessible
+ * @addr - range start address, must be aligned to KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE
+ * @size - range size, can be unaligned
+ * @init - whether to initialize the memory range (only for hardware tag-based)
+ *
+ * For the tag-based modes, the @size gets aligned to KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE before
+ * marking the range.
+ * For the generic mode, the last granule of the memory range gets partially
+ * unpoisoned based on the @size.
+ */
+void kasan_unpoison(const void *addr, size_t size, bool init);
+
+bool kasan_byte_accessible(const void *addr);
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS */
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC
+
+/**
+ * kasan_poison_last_granule - mark the last granule of the memory range as
+ * inaccessible
+ * @addr - range start address, must be aligned to KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE
+ * @size - range size
+ *
+ * This function is only available for the generic mode, as it's the only mode
+ * that has partially poisoned memory granules.
+ */
+void kasan_poison_last_granule(const void *address, size_t size);
+
+#else /* CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC */
+
+static inline void kasan_poison_last_granule(const void *address, size_t size) { }
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC */
+
+#ifndef kasan_arch_is_ready
+static inline bool kasan_arch_is_ready(void)	{ return true; }
+#elif !defined(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC) || !defined(CONFIG_KASAN_OUTLINE)
+#error kasan_arch_is_ready only works in KASAN generic outline mode!
+#endif
+
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_KUNIT_TEST)
+
+void kasan_kunit_test_suite_start(void);
+void kasan_kunit_test_suite_end(void);
+
+#else /* CONFIG_KASAN_KUNIT_TEST */
+
+static inline void kasan_kunit_test_suite_start(void) { }
+static inline void kasan_kunit_test_suite_end(void) { }
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_KASAN_KUNIT_TEST */
+
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_KUNIT_TEST) || IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_MODULE_TEST)
+
+bool kasan_save_enable_multi_shot(void);
+void kasan_restore_multi_shot(bool enabled);
+
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Exported functions for interfaces called from assembly or from generated
+ * code. Declared here to avoid warnings about missing declarations.
+ */
+
+asmlinkage void kasan_unpoison_task_stack_below(const void *watermark);
+void __asan_register_globals(void *globals, ssize_t size);
+void __asan_unregister_globals(void *globals, ssize_t size);
+void __asan_handle_no_return(void);
+void __asan_alloca_poison(void *, ssize_t size);
+void __asan_allocas_unpoison(void *stack_top, ssize_t stack_bottom);
+
+void __asan_load1(void *);
+void __asan_store1(void *);
+void __asan_load2(void *);
+void __asan_store2(void *);
+void __asan_load4(void *);
+void __asan_store4(void *);
+void __asan_load8(void *);
+void __asan_store8(void *);
+void __asan_load16(void *);
+void __asan_store16(void *);
+void __asan_loadN(void *, ssize_t size);
+void __asan_storeN(void *, ssize_t size);
+
+void __asan_load1_noabort(void *);
+void __asan_store1_noabort(void *);
+void __asan_load2_noabort(void *);
+void __asan_store2_noabort(void *);
+void __asan_load4_noabort(void *);
+void __asan_store4_noabort(void *);
+void __asan_load8_noabort(void *);
+void __asan_store8_noabort(void *);
+void __asan_load16_noabort(void *);
+void __asan_store16_noabort(void *);
+void __asan_loadN_noabort(void *, ssize_t size);
+void __asan_storeN_noabort(void *, ssize_t size);
+
+void __asan_report_load1_noabort(void *);
+void __asan_report_store1_noabort(void *);
+void __asan_report_load2_noabort(void *);
+void __asan_report_store2_noabort(void *);
+void __asan_report_load4_noabort(void *);
+void __asan_report_store4_noabort(void *);
+void __asan_report_load8_noabort(void *);
+void __asan_report_store8_noabort(void *);
+void __asan_report_load16_noabort(void *);
+void __asan_report_store16_noabort(void *);
+void __asan_report_load_n_noabort(void *, ssize_t size);
+void __asan_report_store_n_noabort(void *, ssize_t size);
+
+void __asan_set_shadow_00(const void *addr, ssize_t size);
+void __asan_set_shadow_f1(const void *addr, ssize_t size);
+void __asan_set_shadow_f2(const void *addr, ssize_t size);
+void __asan_set_shadow_f3(const void *addr, ssize_t size);
+void __asan_set_shadow_f5(const void *addr, ssize_t size);
+void __asan_set_shadow_f8(const void *addr, ssize_t size);
+
+void *__asan_memset(void *addr, int c, ssize_t len);
+void *__asan_memmove(void *dest, const void *src, ssize_t len);
+void *__asan_memcpy(void *dest, const void *src, ssize_t len);
+
+void __hwasan_load1_noabort(void *);
+void __hwasan_store1_noabort(void *);
+void __hwasan_load2_noabort(void *);
+void __hwasan_store2_noabort(void *);
+void __hwasan_load4_noabort(void *);
+void __hwasan_store4_noabort(void *);
+void __hwasan_load8_noabort(void *);
+void __hwasan_store8_noabort(void *);
+void __hwasan_load16_noabort(void *);
+void __hwasan_store16_noabort(void *);
+void __hwasan_loadN_noabort(void *, ssize_t size);
+void __hwasan_storeN_noabort(void *, ssize_t size);
+
+void __hwasan_tag_memory(void *, u8 tag, ssize_t size);
+
+void *__hwasan_memset(void *addr, int c, ssize_t len);
+void *__hwasan_memmove(void *dest, const void *src, ssize_t len);
+void *__hwasan_memcpy(void *dest, const void *src, ssize_t len);
+
+void kasan_tag_mismatch(void *addr, unsigned long access_info,
+			unsigned long ret_ip);
+
+#endif /* __MM_KASAN_KASAN_H */
diff --git a/mm/kasan/kasan_test.c b/mm/kasan/kasan_test.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..b61cc6a425
--- /dev/null
+++ b/mm/kasan/kasan_test.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1581 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 2014 Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd.
+ * Author: Andrey Ryabinin <a.ryabinin@samsung.com>
+ */
+
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) "kasan_test: " fmt
+
+#include <kunit/test.h>
+#include <linux/bitops.h>
+#include <linux/delay.h>
+#include <linux/io.h>
+#include <linux/kasan.h>
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/mm.h>
+#include <linux/mman.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/printk.h>
+#include <linux/random.h>
+#include <linux/set_memory.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/string.h>
+#include <linux/tracepoint.h>
+#include <linux/uaccess.h>
+#include <linux/vmalloc.h>
+#include <trace/events/printk.h>
+
+#include <asm/page.h>
+
+#include "kasan.h"
+
+#define OOB_TAG_OFF (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC) ? 0 : KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE)
+
+static bool multishot;
+
+/* Fields set based on lines observed in the console. */
+static struct {
+	bool report_found;
+	bool async_fault;
+} test_status;
+
+/*
+ * Some tests use these global variables to store return values from function
+ * calls that could otherwise be eliminated by the compiler as dead code.
+ */
+void *kasan_ptr_result;
+int kasan_int_result;
+
+/* Probe for console output: obtains test_status lines of interest. */
+static void probe_console(void *ignore, const char *buf, size_t len)
+{
+	if (strnstr(buf, "BUG: KASAN: ", len))
+		WRITE_ONCE(test_status.report_found, true);
+	else if (strnstr(buf, "Asynchronous fault: ", len))
+		WRITE_ONCE(test_status.async_fault, true);
+}
+
+static int kasan_suite_init(struct kunit_suite *suite)
+{
+	if (!kasan_enabled()) {
+		pr_err("Can't run KASAN tests with KASAN disabled");
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	/* Stop failing KUnit tests on KASAN reports. */
+	kasan_kunit_test_suite_start();
+
+	/*
+	 * Temporarily enable multi-shot mode. Otherwise, KASAN would only
+	 * report the first detected bug and panic the kernel if panic_on_warn
+	 * is enabled.
+	 */
+	multishot = kasan_save_enable_multi_shot();
+
+	register_trace_console(probe_console, NULL);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void kasan_suite_exit(struct kunit_suite *suite)
+{
+	kasan_kunit_test_suite_end();
+	kasan_restore_multi_shot(multishot);
+	unregister_trace_console(probe_console, NULL);
+	tracepoint_synchronize_unregister();
+}
+
+static void kasan_test_exit(struct kunit *test)
+{
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_FALSE(test, READ_ONCE(test_status.report_found));
+}
+
+/**
+ * KUNIT_EXPECT_KASAN_FAIL() - check that the executed expression produces a
+ * KASAN report; causes a test failure otherwise. This relies on a KUnit
+ * resource named "kasan_status". Do not use this name for KUnit resources
+ * outside of KASAN tests.
+ *
+ * For hardware tag-based KASAN, when a synchronous tag fault happens, tag
+ * checking is auto-disabled. When this happens, this test handler reenables
+ * tag checking. As tag checking can be only disabled or enabled per CPU,
+ * this handler disables migration (preemption).
+ *
+ * Since the compiler doesn't see that the expression can change the test_status
+ * fields, it can reorder or optimize away the accesses to those fields.
+ * Use READ/WRITE_ONCE() for the accesses and compiler barriers around the
+ * expression to prevent that.
+ *
+ * In between KUNIT_EXPECT_KASAN_FAIL checks, test_status.report_found is kept
+ * as false. This allows detecting KASAN reports that happen outside of the
+ * checks by asserting !test_status.report_found at the start of
+ * KUNIT_EXPECT_KASAN_FAIL and in kasan_test_exit.
+ */
+#define KUNIT_EXPECT_KASAN_FAIL(test, expression) do {			\
+	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS) &&				\
+	    kasan_sync_fault_possible())				\
+		migrate_disable();					\
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_FALSE(test, READ_ONCE(test_status.report_found));	\
+	barrier();							\
+	expression;							\
+	barrier();							\
+	if (kasan_async_fault_possible())				\
+		kasan_force_async_fault();				\
+	if (!READ_ONCE(test_status.report_found)) {			\
+		KUNIT_FAIL(test, KUNIT_SUBTEST_INDENT "KASAN failure "	\
+				"expected in \"" #expression		\
+				 "\", but none occurred");		\
+	}								\
+	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS) &&				\
+	    kasan_sync_fault_possible()) {				\
+		if (READ_ONCE(test_status.report_found) &&		\
+		    !READ_ONCE(test_status.async_fault))		\
+			kasan_enable_hw_tags();				\
+		migrate_enable();					\
+	}								\
+	WRITE_ONCE(test_status.report_found, false);			\
+	WRITE_ONCE(test_status.async_fault, false);			\
+} while (0)
+
+#define KASAN_TEST_NEEDS_CONFIG_ON(test, config) do {			\
+	if (!IS_ENABLED(config))					\
+		kunit_skip((test), "Test requires " #config "=y");	\
+} while (0)
+
+#define KASAN_TEST_NEEDS_CONFIG_OFF(test, config) do {			\
+	if (IS_ENABLED(config))						\
+		kunit_skip((test), "Test requires " #config "=n");	\
+} while (0)
+
+#define KASAN_TEST_NEEDS_CHECKED_MEMINTRINSICS(test) do {		\
+	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS))				\
+		break;  /* No compiler instrumentation. */		\
+	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CC_HAS_KASAN_MEMINTRINSIC_PREFIX))	\
+		break;  /* Should always be instrumented! */		\
+	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_GENERIC_ENTRY))				\
+		kunit_skip((test), "Test requires checked mem*()");	\
+} while (0)
+
+static void kmalloc_oob_right(struct kunit *test)
+{
+	char *ptr;
+	size_t size = 128 - KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE - 5;
+
+	ptr = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
+	KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_ERR_OR_NULL(test, ptr);
+
+	OPTIMIZER_HIDE_VAR(ptr);
+	/*
+	 * An unaligned access past the requested kmalloc size.
+	 * Only generic KASAN can precisely detect these.
+	 */
+	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC))
+		KUNIT_EXPECT_KASAN_FAIL(test, ptr[size] = 'x');
+
+	/*
+	 * An aligned access into the first out-of-bounds granule that falls
+	 * within the aligned kmalloc object.
+	 */
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_KASAN_FAIL(test, ptr[size + 5] = 'y');
+
+	/* Out-of-bounds access past the aligned kmalloc object. */
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_KASAN_FAIL(test, ptr[0] =
+					ptr[size + KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE + 5]);
+
+	kfree(ptr);
+}
+
+static void kmalloc_oob_left(struct kunit *test)
+{
+	char *ptr;
+	size_t size = 15;
+
+	ptr = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
+	KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_ERR_OR_NULL(test, ptr);
+
+	OPTIMIZER_HIDE_VAR(ptr);
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_KASAN_FAIL(test, *ptr = *(ptr - 1));
+	kfree(ptr);
+}
+
+static void kmalloc_node_oob_right(struct kunit *test)
+{
+	char *ptr;
+	size_t size = 4096;
+
+	ptr = kmalloc_node(size, GFP_KERNEL, 0);
+	KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_ERR_OR_NULL(test, ptr);
+
+	OPTIMIZER_HIDE_VAR(ptr);
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_KASAN_FAIL(test, ptr[0] = ptr[size]);
+	kfree(ptr);
+}
+
+/*
+ * These kmalloc_pagealloc_* tests try allocating a memory chunk that doesn't
+ * fit into a slab cache and therefore is allocated via the page allocator
+ * fallback. Since this kind of fallback is only implemented for SLUB, these
+ * tests are limited to that allocator.
+ */
+static void kmalloc_pagealloc_oob_right(struct kunit *test)
+{
+	char *ptr;
+	size_t size = KMALLOC_MAX_CACHE_SIZE + 10;
+
+	KASAN_TEST_NEEDS_CONFIG_ON(test, CONFIG_SLUB);
+
+	ptr = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
+	KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_ERR_OR_NULL(test, ptr);
+
+	OPTIMIZER_HIDE_VAR(ptr);
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_KASAN_FAIL(test, ptr[size + OOB_TAG_OFF] = 0);
+
+	kfree(ptr);
+}
+
+static void kmalloc_pagealloc_uaf(struct kunit *test)
+{
+	char *ptr;
+	size_t size = KMALLOC_MAX_CACHE_SIZE + 10;
+
+	KASAN_TEST_NEEDS_CONFIG_ON(test, CONFIG_SLUB);
+
+	ptr = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
+	KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_ERR_OR_NULL(test, ptr);
+	kfree(ptr);
+
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_KASAN_FAIL(test, ((volatile char *)ptr)[0]);
+}
+
+static void kmalloc_pagealloc_invalid_free(struct kunit *test)
+{
+	char *ptr;
+	size_t size = KMALLOC_MAX_CACHE_SIZE + 10;
+
+	KASAN_TEST_NEEDS_CONFIG_ON(test, CONFIG_SLUB);
+
+	ptr = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
+	KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_ERR_OR_NULL(test, ptr);
+
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_KASAN_FAIL(test, kfree(ptr + 1));
+}
+
+static void pagealloc_oob_right(struct kunit *test)
+{
+	char *ptr;
+	struct page *pages;
+	size_t order = 4;
+	size_t size = (1UL << (PAGE_SHIFT + order));
+
+	/*
+	 * With generic KASAN page allocations have no redzones, thus
+	 * out-of-bounds detection is not guaranteed.
+	 * See https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=210503.
+	 */
+	KASAN_TEST_NEEDS_CONFIG_OFF(test, CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC);
+
+	pages = alloc_pages(GFP_KERNEL, order);
+	ptr = page_address(pages);
+	KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_ERR_OR_NULL(test, ptr);
+
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_KASAN_FAIL(test, ptr[0] = ptr[size]);
+	free_pages((unsigned long)ptr, order);
+}
+
+static void pagealloc_uaf(struct kunit *test)
+{
+	char *ptr;
+	struct page *pages;
+	size_t order = 4;
+
+	pages = alloc_pages(GFP_KERNEL, order);
+	ptr = page_address(pages);
+	KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_ERR_OR_NULL(test, ptr);
+	free_pages((unsigned long)ptr, order);
+
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_KASAN_FAIL(test, ((volatile char *)ptr)[0]);
+}
+
+static void kmalloc_large_oob_right(struct kunit *test)
+{
+	char *ptr;
+	size_t size = KMALLOC_MAX_CACHE_SIZE - 256;
+
+	/*
+	 * Allocate a chunk that is large enough, but still fits into a slab
+	 * and does not trigger the page allocator fallback in SLUB.
+	 */
+	ptr = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
+	KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_ERR_OR_NULL(test, ptr);
+
+	OPTIMIZER_HIDE_VAR(ptr);
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_KASAN_FAIL(test, ptr[size] = 0);
+	kfree(ptr);
+}
+
+static void krealloc_more_oob_helper(struct kunit *test,
+					size_t size1, size_t size2)
+{
+	char *ptr1, *ptr2;
+	size_t middle;
+
+	KUNIT_ASSERT_LT(test, size1, size2);
+	middle = size1 + (size2 - size1) / 2;
+
+	ptr1 = kmalloc(size1, GFP_KERNEL);
+	KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_ERR_OR_NULL(test, ptr1);
+
+	ptr2 = krealloc(ptr1, size2, GFP_KERNEL);
+	KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_ERR_OR_NULL(test, ptr2);
+
+	/* Suppress -Warray-bounds warnings. */
+	OPTIMIZER_HIDE_VAR(ptr2);
+
+	/* All offsets up to size2 must be accessible. */
+	ptr2[size1 - 1] = 'x';
+	ptr2[size1] = 'x';
+	ptr2[middle] = 'x';
+	ptr2[size2 - 1] = 'x';
+
+	/* Generic mode is precise, so unaligned size2 must be inaccessible. */
+	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC))
+		KUNIT_EXPECT_KASAN_FAIL(test, ptr2[size2] = 'x');
+
+	/* For all modes first aligned offset after size2 must be inaccessible. */
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_KASAN_FAIL(test,
+		ptr2[round_up(size2, KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE)] = 'x');
+
+	kfree(ptr2);
+}
+
+static void krealloc_less_oob_helper(struct kunit *test,
+					size_t size1, size_t size2)
+{
+	char *ptr1, *ptr2;
+	size_t middle;
+
+	KUNIT_ASSERT_LT(test, size2, size1);
+	middle = size2 + (size1 - size2) / 2;
+
+	ptr1 = kmalloc(size1, GFP_KERNEL);
+	KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_ERR_OR_NULL(test, ptr1);
+
+	ptr2 = krealloc(ptr1, size2, GFP_KERNEL);
+	KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_ERR_OR_NULL(test, ptr2);
+
+	/* Suppress -Warray-bounds warnings. */
+	OPTIMIZER_HIDE_VAR(ptr2);
+
+	/* Must be accessible for all modes. */
+	ptr2[size2 - 1] = 'x';
+
+	/* Generic mode is precise, so unaligned size2 must be inaccessible. */
+	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC))
+		KUNIT_EXPECT_KASAN_FAIL(test, ptr2[size2] = 'x');
+
+	/* For all modes first aligned offset after size2 must be inaccessible. */
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_KASAN_FAIL(test,
+		ptr2[round_up(size2, KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE)] = 'x');
+
+	/*
+	 * For all modes all size2, middle, and size1 should land in separate
+	 * granules and thus the latter two offsets should be inaccessible.
+	 */
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_LE(test, round_up(size2, KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE),
+				round_down(middle, KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE));
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_LE(test, round_up(middle, KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE),
+				round_down(size1, KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE));
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_KASAN_FAIL(test, ptr2[middle] = 'x');
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_KASAN_FAIL(test, ptr2[size1 - 1] = 'x');
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_KASAN_FAIL(test, ptr2[size1] = 'x');
+
+	kfree(ptr2);
+}
+
+static void krealloc_more_oob(struct kunit *test)
+{
+	krealloc_more_oob_helper(test, 201, 235);
+}
+
+static void krealloc_less_oob(struct kunit *test)
+{
+	krealloc_less_oob_helper(test, 235, 201);
+}
+
+static void krealloc_pagealloc_more_oob(struct kunit *test)
+{
+	/* page_alloc fallback in only implemented for SLUB. */
+	KASAN_TEST_NEEDS_CONFIG_ON(test, CONFIG_SLUB);
+
+	krealloc_more_oob_helper(test, KMALLOC_MAX_CACHE_SIZE + 201,
+					KMALLOC_MAX_CACHE_SIZE + 235);
+}
+
+static void krealloc_pagealloc_less_oob(struct kunit *test)
+{
+	/* page_alloc fallback in only implemented for SLUB. */
+	KASAN_TEST_NEEDS_CONFIG_ON(test, CONFIG_SLUB);
+
+	krealloc_less_oob_helper(test, KMALLOC_MAX_CACHE_SIZE + 235,
+					KMALLOC_MAX_CACHE_SIZE + 201);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check that krealloc() detects a use-after-free, returns NULL,
+ * and doesn't unpoison the freed object.
+ */
+static void krealloc_uaf(struct kunit *test)
+{
+	char *ptr1, *ptr2;
+	int size1 = 201;
+	int size2 = 235;
+
+	ptr1 = kmalloc(size1, GFP_KERNEL);
+	KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_ERR_OR_NULL(test, ptr1);
+	kfree(ptr1);
+
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_KASAN_FAIL(test, ptr2 = krealloc(ptr1, size2, GFP_KERNEL));
+	KUNIT_ASSERT_NULL(test, ptr2);
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_KASAN_FAIL(test, *(volatile char *)ptr1);
+}
+
+static void kmalloc_oob_16(struct kunit *test)
+{
+	struct {
+		u64 words[2];
+	} *ptr1, *ptr2;
+
+	KASAN_TEST_NEEDS_CHECKED_MEMINTRINSICS(test);
+
+	/* This test is specifically crafted for the generic mode. */
+	KASAN_TEST_NEEDS_CONFIG_ON(test, CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC);
+
+	ptr1 = kmalloc(sizeof(*ptr1) - 3, GFP_KERNEL);
+	KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_ERR_OR_NULL(test, ptr1);
+
+	ptr2 = kmalloc(sizeof(*ptr2), GFP_KERNEL);
+	KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_ERR_OR_NULL(test, ptr2);
+
+	OPTIMIZER_HIDE_VAR(ptr1);
+	OPTIMIZER_HIDE_VAR(ptr2);
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_KASAN_FAIL(test, *ptr1 = *ptr2);
+	kfree(ptr1);
+	kfree(ptr2);
+}
+
+static void kmalloc_uaf_16(struct kunit *test)
+{
+	struct {
+		u64 words[2];
+	} *ptr1, *ptr2;
+
+	KASAN_TEST_NEEDS_CHECKED_MEMINTRINSICS(test);
+
+	ptr1 = kmalloc(sizeof(*ptr1), GFP_KERNEL);
+	KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_ERR_OR_NULL(test, ptr1);
+
+	ptr2 = kmalloc(sizeof(*ptr2), GFP_KERNEL);
+	KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_ERR_OR_NULL(test, ptr2);
+	kfree(ptr2);
+
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_KASAN_FAIL(test, *ptr1 = *ptr2);
+	kfree(ptr1);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Note: in the memset tests below, the written range touches both valid and
+ * invalid memory. This makes sure that the instrumentation does not only check
+ * the starting address but the whole range.
+ */
+
+static void kmalloc_oob_memset_2(struct kunit *test)
+{
+	char *ptr;
+	size_t size = 128 - KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE;
+
+	KASAN_TEST_NEEDS_CHECKED_MEMINTRINSICS(test);
+
+	ptr = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
+	KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_ERR_OR_NULL(test, ptr);
+
+	OPTIMIZER_HIDE_VAR(size);
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_KASAN_FAIL(test, memset(ptr + size - 1, 0, 2));
+	kfree(ptr);
+}
+
+static void kmalloc_oob_memset_4(struct kunit *test)
+{
+	char *ptr;
+	size_t size = 128 - KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE;
+
+	KASAN_TEST_NEEDS_CHECKED_MEMINTRINSICS(test);
+
+	ptr = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
+	KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_ERR_OR_NULL(test, ptr);
+
+	OPTIMIZER_HIDE_VAR(size);
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_KASAN_FAIL(test, memset(ptr + size - 3, 0, 4));
+	kfree(ptr);
+}
+
+static void kmalloc_oob_memset_8(struct kunit *test)
+{
+	char *ptr;
+	size_t size = 128 - KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE;
+
+	KASAN_TEST_NEEDS_CHECKED_MEMINTRINSICS(test);
+
+	ptr = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
+	KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_ERR_OR_NULL(test, ptr);
+
+	OPTIMIZER_HIDE_VAR(size);
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_KASAN_FAIL(test, memset(ptr + size - 7, 0, 8));
+	kfree(ptr);
+}
+
+static void kmalloc_oob_memset_16(struct kunit *test)
+{
+	char *ptr;
+	size_t size = 128 - KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE;
+
+	KASAN_TEST_NEEDS_CHECKED_MEMINTRINSICS(test);
+
+	ptr = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
+	KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_ERR_OR_NULL(test, ptr);
+
+	OPTIMIZER_HIDE_VAR(size);
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_KASAN_FAIL(test, memset(ptr + size - 15, 0, 16));
+	kfree(ptr);
+}
+
+static void kmalloc_oob_in_memset(struct kunit *test)
+{
+	char *ptr;
+	size_t size = 128 - KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE;
+
+	KASAN_TEST_NEEDS_CHECKED_MEMINTRINSICS(test);
+
+	ptr = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
+	KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_ERR_OR_NULL(test, ptr);
+
+	OPTIMIZER_HIDE_VAR(ptr);
+	OPTIMIZER_HIDE_VAR(size);
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_KASAN_FAIL(test,
+				memset(ptr, 0, size + KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE));
+	kfree(ptr);
+}
+
+static void kmalloc_memmove_negative_size(struct kunit *test)
+{
+	char *ptr;
+	size_t size = 64;
+	size_t invalid_size = -2;
+
+	KASAN_TEST_NEEDS_CHECKED_MEMINTRINSICS(test);
+
+	/*
+	 * Hardware tag-based mode doesn't check memmove for negative size.
+	 * As a result, this test introduces a side-effect memory corruption,
+	 * which can result in a crash.
+	 */
+	KASAN_TEST_NEEDS_CONFIG_OFF(test, CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS);
+
+	ptr = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
+	KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_ERR_OR_NULL(test, ptr);
+
+	memset((char *)ptr, 0, 64);
+	OPTIMIZER_HIDE_VAR(ptr);
+	OPTIMIZER_HIDE_VAR(invalid_size);
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_KASAN_FAIL(test,
+		memmove((char *)ptr, (char *)ptr + 4, invalid_size));
+	kfree(ptr);
+}
+
+static void kmalloc_memmove_invalid_size(struct kunit *test)
+{
+	char *ptr;
+	size_t size = 64;
+	size_t invalid_size = size;
+
+	KASAN_TEST_NEEDS_CHECKED_MEMINTRINSICS(test);
+
+	ptr = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
+	KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_ERR_OR_NULL(test, ptr);
+
+	memset((char *)ptr, 0, 64);
+	OPTIMIZER_HIDE_VAR(ptr);
+	OPTIMIZER_HIDE_VAR(invalid_size);
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_KASAN_FAIL(test,
+		memmove((char *)ptr, (char *)ptr + 4, invalid_size));
+	kfree(ptr);
+}
+
+static void kmalloc_uaf(struct kunit *test)
+{
+	char *ptr;
+	size_t size = 10;
+
+	ptr = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
+	KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_ERR_OR_NULL(test, ptr);
+
+	kfree(ptr);
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_KASAN_FAIL(test, ((volatile char *)ptr)[8]);
+}
+
+static void kmalloc_uaf_memset(struct kunit *test)
+{
+	char *ptr;
+	size_t size = 33;
+
+	KASAN_TEST_NEEDS_CHECKED_MEMINTRINSICS(test);
+
+	/*
+	 * Only generic KASAN uses quarantine, which is required to avoid a
+	 * kernel memory corruption this test causes.
+	 */
+	KASAN_TEST_NEEDS_CONFIG_ON(test, CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC);
+
+	ptr = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
+	KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_ERR_OR_NULL(test, ptr);
+
+	kfree(ptr);
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_KASAN_FAIL(test, memset(ptr, 0, size));
+}
+
+static void kmalloc_uaf2(struct kunit *test)
+{
+	char *ptr1, *ptr2;
+	size_t size = 43;
+	int counter = 0;
+
+again:
+	ptr1 = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
+	KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_ERR_OR_NULL(test, ptr1);
+
+	kfree(ptr1);
+
+	ptr2 = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
+	KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_ERR_OR_NULL(test, ptr2);
+
+	/*
+	 * For tag-based KASAN ptr1 and ptr2 tags might happen to be the same.
+	 * Allow up to 16 attempts at generating different tags.
+	 */
+	if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC) && ptr1 == ptr2 && counter++ < 16) {
+		kfree(ptr2);
+		goto again;
+	}
+
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_KASAN_FAIL(test, ((volatile char *)ptr1)[40]);
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_PTR_NE(test, ptr1, ptr2);
+
+	kfree(ptr2);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check that KASAN detects use-after-free when another object was allocated in
+ * the same slot. Relevant for the tag-based modes, which do not use quarantine.
+ */
+static void kmalloc_uaf3(struct kunit *test)
+{
+	char *ptr1, *ptr2;
+	size_t size = 100;
+
+	/* This test is specifically crafted for tag-based modes. */
+	KASAN_TEST_NEEDS_CONFIG_OFF(test, CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC);
+
+	ptr1 = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
+	KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_ERR_OR_NULL(test, ptr1);
+	kfree(ptr1);
+
+	ptr2 = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
+	KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_ERR_OR_NULL(test, ptr2);
+	kfree(ptr2);
+
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_KASAN_FAIL(test, ((volatile char *)ptr1)[8]);
+}
+
+static void kfree_via_page(struct kunit *test)
+{
+	char *ptr;
+	size_t size = 8;
+	struct page *page;
+	unsigned long offset;
+
+	ptr = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
+	KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_ERR_OR_NULL(test, ptr);
+
+	page = virt_to_page(ptr);
+	offset = offset_in_page(ptr);
+	kfree(page_address(page) + offset);
+}
+
+static void kfree_via_phys(struct kunit *test)
+{
+	char *ptr;
+	size_t size = 8;
+	phys_addr_t phys;
+
+	ptr = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
+	KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_ERR_OR_NULL(test, ptr);
+
+	phys = virt_to_phys(ptr);
+	kfree(phys_to_virt(phys));
+}
+
+static void kmem_cache_oob(struct kunit *test)
+{
+	char *p;
+	size_t size = 200;
+	struct kmem_cache *cache;
+
+	cache = kmem_cache_create("test_cache", size, 0, 0, NULL);
+	KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_ERR_OR_NULL(test, cache);
+
+	p = kmem_cache_alloc(cache, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!p) {
+		kunit_err(test, "Allocation failed: %s\n", __func__);
+		kmem_cache_destroy(cache);
+		return;
+	}
+
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_KASAN_FAIL(test, *p = p[size + OOB_TAG_OFF]);
+
+	kmem_cache_free(cache, p);
+	kmem_cache_destroy(cache);
+}
+
+static void kmem_cache_accounted(struct kunit *test)
+{
+	int i;
+	char *p;
+	size_t size = 200;
+	struct kmem_cache *cache;
+
+	cache = kmem_cache_create("test_cache", size, 0, SLAB_ACCOUNT, NULL);
+	KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_ERR_OR_NULL(test, cache);
+
+	/*
+	 * Several allocations with a delay to allow for lazy per memcg kmem
+	 * cache creation.
+	 */
+	for (i = 0; i < 5; i++) {
+		p = kmem_cache_alloc(cache, GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (!p)
+			goto free_cache;
+
+		kmem_cache_free(cache, p);
+		msleep(100);
+	}
+
+free_cache:
+	kmem_cache_destroy(cache);
+}
+
+static void kmem_cache_bulk(struct kunit *test)
+{
+	struct kmem_cache *cache;
+	size_t size = 200;
+	char *p[10];
+	bool ret;
+	int i;
+
+	cache = kmem_cache_create("test_cache", size, 0, 0, NULL);
+	KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_ERR_OR_NULL(test, cache);
+
+	ret = kmem_cache_alloc_bulk(cache, GFP_KERNEL, ARRAY_SIZE(p), (void **)&p);
+	if (!ret) {
+		kunit_err(test, "Allocation failed: %s\n", __func__);
+		kmem_cache_destroy(cache);
+		return;
+	}
+
+	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(p); i++)
+		p[i][0] = p[i][size - 1] = 42;
+
+	kmem_cache_free_bulk(cache, ARRAY_SIZE(p), (void **)&p);
+	kmem_cache_destroy(cache);
+}
+
+static char global_array[10];
+
+static void kasan_global_oob_right(struct kunit *test)
+{
+	/*
+	 * Deliberate out-of-bounds access. To prevent CONFIG_UBSAN_LOCAL_BOUNDS
+	 * from failing here and panicking the kernel, access the array via a
+	 * volatile pointer, which will prevent the compiler from being able to
+	 * determine the array bounds.
+	 *
+	 * This access uses a volatile pointer to char (char *volatile) rather
+	 * than the more conventional pointer to volatile char (volatile char *)
+	 * because we want to prevent the compiler from making inferences about
+	 * the pointer itself (i.e. its array bounds), not the data that it
+	 * refers to.
+	 */
+	char *volatile array = global_array;
+	char *p = &array[ARRAY_SIZE(global_array) + 3];
+
+	/* Only generic mode instruments globals. */
+	KASAN_TEST_NEEDS_CONFIG_ON(test, CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC);
+
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_KASAN_FAIL(test, *(volatile char *)p);
+}
+
+static void kasan_global_oob_left(struct kunit *test)
+{
+	char *volatile array = global_array;
+	char *p = array - 3;
+
+	/*
+	 * GCC is known to fail this test, skip it.
+	 * See https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=215051.
+	 */
+	KASAN_TEST_NEEDS_CONFIG_ON(test, CONFIG_CC_IS_CLANG);
+	KASAN_TEST_NEEDS_CONFIG_ON(test, CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC);
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_KASAN_FAIL(test, *(volatile char *)p);
+}
+
+/* Check that ksize() does NOT unpoison whole object. */
+static void ksize_unpoisons_memory(struct kunit *test)
+{
+	char *ptr;
+	size_t size = 128 - KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE - 5;
+	size_t real_size;
+
+	ptr = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
+	KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_ERR_OR_NULL(test, ptr);
+
+	real_size = ksize(ptr);
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_GT(test, real_size, size);
+
+	OPTIMIZER_HIDE_VAR(ptr);
+
+	/* These accesses shouldn't trigger a KASAN report. */
+	ptr[0] = 'x';
+	ptr[size - 1] = 'x';
+
+	/* These must trigger a KASAN report. */
+	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC))
+		KUNIT_EXPECT_KASAN_FAIL(test, ((volatile char *)ptr)[size]);
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_KASAN_FAIL(test, ((volatile char *)ptr)[size + 5]);
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_KASAN_FAIL(test, ((volatile char *)ptr)[real_size - 1]);
+
+	kfree(ptr);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check that a use-after-free is detected by ksize() and via normal accesses
+ * after it.
+ */
+static void ksize_uaf(struct kunit *test)
+{
+	char *ptr;
+	int size = 128 - KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE;
+
+	ptr = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
+	KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_ERR_OR_NULL(test, ptr);
+	kfree(ptr);
+
+	OPTIMIZER_HIDE_VAR(ptr);
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_KASAN_FAIL(test, ksize(ptr));
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_KASAN_FAIL(test, ((volatile char *)ptr)[0]);
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_KASAN_FAIL(test, ((volatile char *)ptr)[size]);
+}
+
+static void kasan_stack_oob(struct kunit *test)
+{
+	char stack_array[10];
+	/* See comment in kasan_global_oob_right. */
+	char *volatile array = stack_array;
+	char *p = &array[ARRAY_SIZE(stack_array) + OOB_TAG_OFF];
+
+	KASAN_TEST_NEEDS_CONFIG_ON(test, CONFIG_KASAN_STACK);
+
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_KASAN_FAIL(test, *(volatile char *)p);
+}
+
+static void kasan_alloca_oob_left(struct kunit *test)
+{
+	volatile int i = 10;
+	char alloca_array[i];
+	/* See comment in kasan_global_oob_right. */
+	char *volatile array = alloca_array;
+	char *p = array - 1;
+
+	/* Only generic mode instruments dynamic allocas. */
+	KASAN_TEST_NEEDS_CONFIG_ON(test, CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC);
+	KASAN_TEST_NEEDS_CONFIG_ON(test, CONFIG_KASAN_STACK);
+
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_KASAN_FAIL(test, *(volatile char *)p);
+}
+
+static void kasan_alloca_oob_right(struct kunit *test)
+{
+	volatile int i = 10;
+	char alloca_array[i];
+	/* See comment in kasan_global_oob_right. */
+	char *volatile array = alloca_array;
+	char *p = array + i;
+
+	/* Only generic mode instruments dynamic allocas. */
+	KASAN_TEST_NEEDS_CONFIG_ON(test, CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC);
+	KASAN_TEST_NEEDS_CONFIG_ON(test, CONFIG_KASAN_STACK);
+
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_KASAN_FAIL(test, *(volatile char *)p);
+}
+
+static void kmem_cache_double_free(struct kunit *test)
+{
+	char *p;
+	size_t size = 200;
+	struct kmem_cache *cache;
+
+	cache = kmem_cache_create("test_cache", size, 0, 0, NULL);
+	KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_ERR_OR_NULL(test, cache);
+
+	p = kmem_cache_alloc(cache, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!p) {
+		kunit_err(test, "Allocation failed: %s\n", __func__);
+		kmem_cache_destroy(cache);
+		return;
+	}
+
+	kmem_cache_free(cache, p);
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_KASAN_FAIL(test, kmem_cache_free(cache, p));
+	kmem_cache_destroy(cache);
+}
+
+static void kmem_cache_invalid_free(struct kunit *test)
+{
+	char *p;
+	size_t size = 200;
+	struct kmem_cache *cache;
+
+	cache = kmem_cache_create("test_cache", size, 0, SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU,
+				  NULL);
+	KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_ERR_OR_NULL(test, cache);
+
+	p = kmem_cache_alloc(cache, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!p) {
+		kunit_err(test, "Allocation failed: %s\n", __func__);
+		kmem_cache_destroy(cache);
+		return;
+	}
+
+	/* Trigger invalid free, the object doesn't get freed. */
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_KASAN_FAIL(test, kmem_cache_free(cache, p + 1));
+
+	/*
+	 * Properly free the object to prevent the "Objects remaining in
+	 * test_cache on __kmem_cache_shutdown" BUG failure.
+	 */
+	kmem_cache_free(cache, p);
+
+	kmem_cache_destroy(cache);
+}
+
+static void empty_cache_ctor(void *object) { }
+
+static void kmem_cache_double_destroy(struct kunit *test)
+{
+	struct kmem_cache *cache;
+
+	/* Provide a constructor to prevent cache merging. */
+	cache = kmem_cache_create("test_cache", 200, 0, 0, empty_cache_ctor);
+	KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_ERR_OR_NULL(test, cache);
+	kmem_cache_destroy(cache);
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_KASAN_FAIL(test, kmem_cache_destroy(cache));
+}
+
+static void kasan_memchr(struct kunit *test)
+{
+	char *ptr;
+	size_t size = 24;
+
+	/*
+	 * str* functions are not instrumented with CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT.
+	 * See https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=206337 for details.
+	 */
+	KASAN_TEST_NEEDS_CONFIG_OFF(test, CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT);
+
+	if (OOB_TAG_OFF)
+		size = round_up(size, OOB_TAG_OFF);
+
+	ptr = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO);
+	KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_ERR_OR_NULL(test, ptr);
+
+	OPTIMIZER_HIDE_VAR(ptr);
+	OPTIMIZER_HIDE_VAR(size);
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_KASAN_FAIL(test,
+		kasan_ptr_result = memchr(ptr, '1', size + 1));
+
+	kfree(ptr);
+}
+
+static void kasan_memcmp(struct kunit *test)
+{
+	char *ptr;
+	size_t size = 24;
+	int arr[9];
+
+	/*
+	 * str* functions are not instrumented with CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT.
+	 * See https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=206337 for details.
+	 */
+	KASAN_TEST_NEEDS_CONFIG_OFF(test, CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT);
+
+	if (OOB_TAG_OFF)
+		size = round_up(size, OOB_TAG_OFF);
+
+	ptr = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO);
+	KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_ERR_OR_NULL(test, ptr);
+	memset(arr, 0, sizeof(arr));
+
+	OPTIMIZER_HIDE_VAR(ptr);
+	OPTIMIZER_HIDE_VAR(size);
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_KASAN_FAIL(test,
+		kasan_int_result = memcmp(ptr, arr, size+1));
+	kfree(ptr);
+}
+
+static void kasan_strings(struct kunit *test)
+{
+	char *ptr;
+	size_t size = 24;
+
+	/*
+	 * str* functions are not instrumented with CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT.
+	 * See https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=206337 for details.
+	 */
+	KASAN_TEST_NEEDS_CONFIG_OFF(test, CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT);
+
+	ptr = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO);
+	KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_ERR_OR_NULL(test, ptr);
+
+	kfree(ptr);
+
+	/*
+	 * Try to cause only 1 invalid access (less spam in dmesg).
+	 * For that we need ptr to point to zeroed byte.
+	 * Skip metadata that could be stored in freed object so ptr
+	 * will likely point to zeroed byte.
+	 */
+	ptr += 16;
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_KASAN_FAIL(test, kasan_ptr_result = strchr(ptr, '1'));
+
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_KASAN_FAIL(test, kasan_ptr_result = strrchr(ptr, '1'));
+
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_KASAN_FAIL(test, kasan_int_result = strcmp(ptr, "2"));
+
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_KASAN_FAIL(test, kasan_int_result = strncmp(ptr, "2", 1));
+
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_KASAN_FAIL(test, kasan_int_result = strlen(ptr));
+
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_KASAN_FAIL(test, kasan_int_result = strnlen(ptr, 1));
+}
+
+static void kasan_bitops_modify(struct kunit *test, int nr, void *addr)
+{
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_KASAN_FAIL(test, set_bit(nr, addr));
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_KASAN_FAIL(test, __set_bit(nr, addr));
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_KASAN_FAIL(test, clear_bit(nr, addr));
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_KASAN_FAIL(test, __clear_bit(nr, addr));
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_KASAN_FAIL(test, clear_bit_unlock(nr, addr));
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_KASAN_FAIL(test, __clear_bit_unlock(nr, addr));
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_KASAN_FAIL(test, change_bit(nr, addr));
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_KASAN_FAIL(test, __change_bit(nr, addr));
+}
+
+static void kasan_bitops_test_and_modify(struct kunit *test, int nr, void *addr)
+{
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_KASAN_FAIL(test, test_and_set_bit(nr, addr));
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_KASAN_FAIL(test, __test_and_set_bit(nr, addr));
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_KASAN_FAIL(test, test_and_set_bit_lock(nr, addr));
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_KASAN_FAIL(test, test_and_clear_bit(nr, addr));
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_KASAN_FAIL(test, __test_and_clear_bit(nr, addr));
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_KASAN_FAIL(test, test_and_change_bit(nr, addr));
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_KASAN_FAIL(test, __test_and_change_bit(nr, addr));
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_KASAN_FAIL(test, kasan_int_result = test_bit(nr, addr));
+
+#if defined(clear_bit_unlock_is_negative_byte)
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_KASAN_FAIL(test, kasan_int_result =
+				clear_bit_unlock_is_negative_byte(nr, addr));
+#endif
+}
+
+static void kasan_bitops_generic(struct kunit *test)
+{
+	long *bits;
+
+	/* This test is specifically crafted for the generic mode. */
+	KASAN_TEST_NEEDS_CONFIG_ON(test, CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC);
+
+	/*
+	 * Allocate 1 more byte, which causes kzalloc to round up to 16 bytes;
+	 * this way we do not actually corrupt other memory.
+	 */
+	bits = kzalloc(sizeof(*bits) + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+	KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_ERR_OR_NULL(test, bits);
+
+	/*
+	 * Below calls try to access bit within allocated memory; however, the
+	 * below accesses are still out-of-bounds, since bitops are defined to
+	 * operate on the whole long the bit is in.
+	 */
+	kasan_bitops_modify(test, BITS_PER_LONG, bits);
+
+	/*
+	 * Below calls try to access bit beyond allocated memory.
+	 */
+	kasan_bitops_test_and_modify(test, BITS_PER_LONG + BITS_PER_BYTE, bits);
+
+	kfree(bits);
+}
+
+static void kasan_bitops_tags(struct kunit *test)
+{
+	long *bits;
+
+	/* This test is specifically crafted for tag-based modes. */
+	KASAN_TEST_NEEDS_CONFIG_OFF(test, CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC);
+
+	/* kmalloc-64 cache will be used and the last 16 bytes will be the redzone. */
+	bits = kzalloc(48, GFP_KERNEL);
+	KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_ERR_OR_NULL(test, bits);
+
+	/* Do the accesses past the 48 allocated bytes, but within the redone. */
+	kasan_bitops_modify(test, BITS_PER_LONG, (void *)bits + 48);
+	kasan_bitops_test_and_modify(test, BITS_PER_LONG + BITS_PER_BYTE, (void *)bits + 48);
+
+	kfree(bits);
+}
+
+static void kmalloc_double_kzfree(struct kunit *test)
+{
+	char *ptr;
+	size_t size = 16;
+
+	ptr = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
+	KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_ERR_OR_NULL(test, ptr);
+
+	kfree_sensitive(ptr);
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_KASAN_FAIL(test, kfree_sensitive(ptr));
+}
+
+/*
+ * The two tests below check that Generic KASAN prints auxiliary stack traces
+ * for RCU callbacks and workqueues. The reports need to be inspected manually.
+ *
+ * These tests are still enabled for other KASAN modes to make sure that all
+ * modes report bad accesses in tested scenarios.
+ */
+
+static struct kasan_rcu_info {
+	int i;
+	struct rcu_head rcu;
+} *global_rcu_ptr;
+
+static void rcu_uaf_reclaim(struct rcu_head *rp)
+{
+	struct kasan_rcu_info *fp =
+		container_of(rp, struct kasan_rcu_info, rcu);
+
+	kfree(fp);
+	((volatile struct kasan_rcu_info *)fp)->i;
+}
+
+static void rcu_uaf(struct kunit *test)
+{
+	struct kasan_rcu_info *ptr;
+
+	ptr = kmalloc(sizeof(struct kasan_rcu_info), GFP_KERNEL);
+	KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_ERR_OR_NULL(test, ptr);
+
+	global_rcu_ptr = rcu_dereference_protected(
+				(struct kasan_rcu_info __rcu *)ptr, NULL);
+
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_KASAN_FAIL(test,
+		call_rcu(&global_rcu_ptr->rcu, rcu_uaf_reclaim);
+		rcu_barrier());
+}
+
+static void workqueue_uaf_work(struct work_struct *work)
+{
+	kfree(work);
+}
+
+static void workqueue_uaf(struct kunit *test)
+{
+	struct workqueue_struct *workqueue;
+	struct work_struct *work;
+
+	workqueue = create_workqueue("kasan_workqueue_test");
+	KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_ERR_OR_NULL(test, workqueue);
+
+	work = kmalloc(sizeof(struct work_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
+	KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_ERR_OR_NULL(test, work);
+
+	INIT_WORK(work, workqueue_uaf_work);
+	queue_work(workqueue, work);
+	destroy_workqueue(workqueue);
+
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_KASAN_FAIL(test,
+		((volatile struct work_struct *)work)->data);
+}
+
+static void vmalloc_helpers_tags(struct kunit *test)
+{
+	void *ptr;
+
+	/* This test is intended for tag-based modes. */
+	KASAN_TEST_NEEDS_CONFIG_OFF(test, CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC);
+
+	KASAN_TEST_NEEDS_CONFIG_ON(test, CONFIG_KASAN_VMALLOC);
+
+	ptr = vmalloc(PAGE_SIZE);
+	KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_ERR_OR_NULL(test, ptr);
+
+	/* Check that the returned pointer is tagged. */
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_GE(test, (u8)get_tag(ptr), (u8)KASAN_TAG_MIN);
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_LT(test, (u8)get_tag(ptr), (u8)KASAN_TAG_KERNEL);
+
+	/* Make sure exported vmalloc helpers handle tagged pointers. */
+	KUNIT_ASSERT_TRUE(test, is_vmalloc_addr(ptr));
+	KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_ERR_OR_NULL(test, vmalloc_to_page(ptr));
+
+#if !IS_MODULE(CONFIG_KASAN_KUNIT_TEST)
+	{
+		int rv;
+
+		/* Make sure vmalloc'ed memory permissions can be changed. */
+		rv = set_memory_ro((unsigned long)ptr, 1);
+		KUNIT_ASSERT_GE(test, rv, 0);
+		rv = set_memory_rw((unsigned long)ptr, 1);
+		KUNIT_ASSERT_GE(test, rv, 0);
+	}
+#endif
+
+	vfree(ptr);
+}
+
+static void vmalloc_oob(struct kunit *test)
+{
+	char *v_ptr, *p_ptr;
+	struct page *page;
+	size_t size = PAGE_SIZE / 2 - KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE - 5;
+
+	KASAN_TEST_NEEDS_CONFIG_ON(test, CONFIG_KASAN_VMALLOC);
+
+	v_ptr = vmalloc(size);
+	KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_ERR_OR_NULL(test, v_ptr);
+
+	OPTIMIZER_HIDE_VAR(v_ptr);
+
+	/*
+	 * We have to be careful not to hit the guard page in vmalloc tests.
+	 * The MMU will catch that and crash us.
+	 */
+
+	/* Make sure in-bounds accesses are valid. */
+	v_ptr[0] = 0;
+	v_ptr[size - 1] = 0;
+
+	/*
+	 * An unaligned access past the requested vmalloc size.
+	 * Only generic KASAN can precisely detect these.
+	 */
+	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC))
+		KUNIT_EXPECT_KASAN_FAIL(test, ((volatile char *)v_ptr)[size]);
+
+	/* An aligned access into the first out-of-bounds granule. */
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_KASAN_FAIL(test, ((volatile char *)v_ptr)[size + 5]);
+
+	/* Check that in-bounds accesses to the physical page are valid. */
+	page = vmalloc_to_page(v_ptr);
+	KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_ERR_OR_NULL(test, page);
+	p_ptr = page_address(page);
+	KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_ERR_OR_NULL(test, p_ptr);
+	p_ptr[0] = 0;
+
+	vfree(v_ptr);
+
+	/*
+	 * We can't check for use-after-unmap bugs in this nor in the following
+	 * vmalloc tests, as the page might be fully unmapped and accessing it
+	 * will crash the kernel.
+	 */
+}
+
+static void vmap_tags(struct kunit *test)
+{
+	char *p_ptr, *v_ptr;
+	struct page *p_page, *v_page;
+
+	/*
+	 * This test is specifically crafted for the software tag-based mode,
+	 * the only tag-based mode that poisons vmap mappings.
+	 */
+	KASAN_TEST_NEEDS_CONFIG_ON(test, CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS);
+
+	KASAN_TEST_NEEDS_CONFIG_ON(test, CONFIG_KASAN_VMALLOC);
+
+	p_page = alloc_pages(GFP_KERNEL, 1);
+	KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_ERR_OR_NULL(test, p_page);
+	p_ptr = page_address(p_page);
+	KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_ERR_OR_NULL(test, p_ptr);
+
+	v_ptr = vmap(&p_page, 1, VM_MAP, PAGE_KERNEL);
+	KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_ERR_OR_NULL(test, v_ptr);
+
+	/*
+	 * We can't check for out-of-bounds bugs in this nor in the following
+	 * vmalloc tests, as allocations have page granularity and accessing
+	 * the guard page will crash the kernel.
+	 */
+
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_GE(test, (u8)get_tag(v_ptr), (u8)KASAN_TAG_MIN);
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_LT(test, (u8)get_tag(v_ptr), (u8)KASAN_TAG_KERNEL);
+
+	/* Make sure that in-bounds accesses through both pointers work. */
+	*p_ptr = 0;
+	*v_ptr = 0;
+
+	/* Make sure vmalloc_to_page() correctly recovers the page pointer. */
+	v_page = vmalloc_to_page(v_ptr);
+	KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_ERR_OR_NULL(test, v_page);
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_PTR_EQ(test, p_page, v_page);
+
+	vunmap(v_ptr);
+	free_pages((unsigned long)p_ptr, 1);
+}
+
+static void vm_map_ram_tags(struct kunit *test)
+{
+	char *p_ptr, *v_ptr;
+	struct page *page;
+
+	/*
+	 * This test is specifically crafted for the software tag-based mode,
+	 * the only tag-based mode that poisons vm_map_ram mappings.
+	 */
+	KASAN_TEST_NEEDS_CONFIG_ON(test, CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS);
+
+	page = alloc_pages(GFP_KERNEL, 1);
+	KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_ERR_OR_NULL(test, page);
+	p_ptr = page_address(page);
+	KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_ERR_OR_NULL(test, p_ptr);
+
+	v_ptr = vm_map_ram(&page, 1, -1);
+	KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_ERR_OR_NULL(test, v_ptr);
+
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_GE(test, (u8)get_tag(v_ptr), (u8)KASAN_TAG_MIN);
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_LT(test, (u8)get_tag(v_ptr), (u8)KASAN_TAG_KERNEL);
+
+	/* Make sure that in-bounds accesses through both pointers work. */
+	*p_ptr = 0;
+	*v_ptr = 0;
+
+	vm_unmap_ram(v_ptr, 1);
+	free_pages((unsigned long)p_ptr, 1);
+}
+
+static void vmalloc_percpu(struct kunit *test)
+{
+	char __percpu *ptr;
+	int cpu;
+
+	/*
+	 * This test is specifically crafted for the software tag-based mode,
+	 * the only tag-based mode that poisons percpu mappings.
+	 */
+	KASAN_TEST_NEEDS_CONFIG_ON(test, CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS);
+
+	ptr = __alloc_percpu(PAGE_SIZE, PAGE_SIZE);
+
+	for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) {
+		char *c_ptr = per_cpu_ptr(ptr, cpu);
+
+		KUNIT_EXPECT_GE(test, (u8)get_tag(c_ptr), (u8)KASAN_TAG_MIN);
+		KUNIT_EXPECT_LT(test, (u8)get_tag(c_ptr), (u8)KASAN_TAG_KERNEL);
+
+		/* Make sure that in-bounds accesses don't crash the kernel. */
+		*c_ptr = 0;
+	}
+
+	free_percpu(ptr);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check that the assigned pointer tag falls within the [KASAN_TAG_MIN,
+ * KASAN_TAG_KERNEL) range (note: excluding the match-all tag) for tag-based
+ * modes.
+ */
+static void match_all_not_assigned(struct kunit *test)
+{
+	char *ptr;
+	struct page *pages;
+	int i, size, order;
+
+	KASAN_TEST_NEEDS_CONFIG_OFF(test, CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC);
+
+	for (i = 0; i < 256; i++) {
+		size = get_random_u32_inclusive(1, 1024);
+		ptr = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
+		KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_ERR_OR_NULL(test, ptr);
+		KUNIT_EXPECT_GE(test, (u8)get_tag(ptr), (u8)KASAN_TAG_MIN);
+		KUNIT_EXPECT_LT(test, (u8)get_tag(ptr), (u8)KASAN_TAG_KERNEL);
+		kfree(ptr);
+	}
+
+	for (i = 0; i < 256; i++) {
+		order = get_random_u32_inclusive(1, 4);
+		pages = alloc_pages(GFP_KERNEL, order);
+		ptr = page_address(pages);
+		KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_ERR_OR_NULL(test, ptr);
+		KUNIT_EXPECT_GE(test, (u8)get_tag(ptr), (u8)KASAN_TAG_MIN);
+		KUNIT_EXPECT_LT(test, (u8)get_tag(ptr), (u8)KASAN_TAG_KERNEL);
+		free_pages((unsigned long)ptr, order);
+	}
+
+	if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_VMALLOC))
+		return;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < 256; i++) {
+		size = get_random_u32_inclusive(1, 1024);
+		ptr = vmalloc(size);
+		KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_ERR_OR_NULL(test, ptr);
+		KUNIT_EXPECT_GE(test, (u8)get_tag(ptr), (u8)KASAN_TAG_MIN);
+		KUNIT_EXPECT_LT(test, (u8)get_tag(ptr), (u8)KASAN_TAG_KERNEL);
+		vfree(ptr);
+	}
+}
+
+/* Check that 0xff works as a match-all pointer tag for tag-based modes. */
+static void match_all_ptr_tag(struct kunit *test)
+{
+	char *ptr;
+	u8 tag;
+
+	KASAN_TEST_NEEDS_CONFIG_OFF(test, CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC);
+
+	ptr = kmalloc(128, GFP_KERNEL);
+	KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_ERR_OR_NULL(test, ptr);
+
+	/* Backup the assigned tag. */
+	tag = get_tag(ptr);
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_NE(test, tag, (u8)KASAN_TAG_KERNEL);
+
+	/* Reset the tag to 0xff.*/
+	ptr = set_tag(ptr, KASAN_TAG_KERNEL);
+
+	/* This access shouldn't trigger a KASAN report. */
+	*ptr = 0;
+
+	/* Recover the pointer tag and free. */
+	ptr = set_tag(ptr, tag);
+	kfree(ptr);
+}
+
+/* Check that there are no match-all memory tags for tag-based modes. */
+static void match_all_mem_tag(struct kunit *test)
+{
+	char *ptr;
+	int tag;
+
+	KASAN_TEST_NEEDS_CONFIG_OFF(test, CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC);
+
+	ptr = kmalloc(128, GFP_KERNEL);
+	KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_ERR_OR_NULL(test, ptr);
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_NE(test, (u8)get_tag(ptr), (u8)KASAN_TAG_KERNEL);
+
+	/* For each possible tag value not matching the pointer tag. */
+	for (tag = KASAN_TAG_MIN; tag <= KASAN_TAG_KERNEL; tag++) {
+		if (tag == get_tag(ptr))
+			continue;
+
+		/* Mark the first memory granule with the chosen memory tag. */
+		kasan_poison(ptr, KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE, (u8)tag, false);
+
+		/* This access must cause a KASAN report. */
+		KUNIT_EXPECT_KASAN_FAIL(test, *ptr = 0);
+	}
+
+	/* Recover the memory tag and free. */
+	kasan_poison(ptr, KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE, get_tag(ptr), false);
+	kfree(ptr);
+}
+
+static struct kunit_case kasan_kunit_test_cases[] = {
+	KUNIT_CASE(kmalloc_oob_right),
+	KUNIT_CASE(kmalloc_oob_left),
+	KUNIT_CASE(kmalloc_node_oob_right),
+	KUNIT_CASE(kmalloc_pagealloc_oob_right),
+	KUNIT_CASE(kmalloc_pagealloc_uaf),
+	KUNIT_CASE(kmalloc_pagealloc_invalid_free),
+	KUNIT_CASE(pagealloc_oob_right),
+	KUNIT_CASE(pagealloc_uaf),
+	KUNIT_CASE(kmalloc_large_oob_right),
+	KUNIT_CASE(krealloc_more_oob),
+	KUNIT_CASE(krealloc_less_oob),
+	KUNIT_CASE(krealloc_pagealloc_more_oob),
+	KUNIT_CASE(krealloc_pagealloc_less_oob),
+	KUNIT_CASE(krealloc_uaf),
+	KUNIT_CASE(kmalloc_oob_16),
+	KUNIT_CASE(kmalloc_uaf_16),
+	KUNIT_CASE(kmalloc_oob_in_memset),
+	KUNIT_CASE(kmalloc_oob_memset_2),
+	KUNIT_CASE(kmalloc_oob_memset_4),
+	KUNIT_CASE(kmalloc_oob_memset_8),
+	KUNIT_CASE(kmalloc_oob_memset_16),
+	KUNIT_CASE(kmalloc_memmove_negative_size),
+	KUNIT_CASE(kmalloc_memmove_invalid_size),
+	KUNIT_CASE(kmalloc_uaf),
+	KUNIT_CASE(kmalloc_uaf_memset),
+	KUNIT_CASE(kmalloc_uaf2),
+	KUNIT_CASE(kmalloc_uaf3),
+	KUNIT_CASE(kfree_via_page),
+	KUNIT_CASE(kfree_via_phys),
+	KUNIT_CASE(kmem_cache_oob),
+	KUNIT_CASE(kmem_cache_accounted),
+	KUNIT_CASE(kmem_cache_bulk),
+	KUNIT_CASE(kasan_global_oob_right),
+	KUNIT_CASE(kasan_global_oob_left),
+	KUNIT_CASE(kasan_stack_oob),
+	KUNIT_CASE(kasan_alloca_oob_left),
+	KUNIT_CASE(kasan_alloca_oob_right),
+	KUNIT_CASE(ksize_unpoisons_memory),
+	KUNIT_CASE(ksize_uaf),
+	KUNIT_CASE(kmem_cache_double_free),
+	KUNIT_CASE(kmem_cache_invalid_free),
+	KUNIT_CASE(kmem_cache_double_destroy),
+	KUNIT_CASE(kasan_memchr),
+	KUNIT_CASE(kasan_memcmp),
+	KUNIT_CASE(kasan_strings),
+	KUNIT_CASE(kasan_bitops_generic),
+	KUNIT_CASE(kasan_bitops_tags),
+	KUNIT_CASE(kmalloc_double_kzfree),
+	KUNIT_CASE(rcu_uaf),
+	KUNIT_CASE(workqueue_uaf),
+	KUNIT_CASE(vmalloc_helpers_tags),
+	KUNIT_CASE(vmalloc_oob),
+	KUNIT_CASE(vmap_tags),
+	KUNIT_CASE(vm_map_ram_tags),
+	KUNIT_CASE(vmalloc_percpu),
+	KUNIT_CASE(match_all_not_assigned),
+	KUNIT_CASE(match_all_ptr_tag),
+	KUNIT_CASE(match_all_mem_tag),
+	{}
+};
+
+static struct kunit_suite kasan_kunit_test_suite = {
+	.name = "kasan",
+	.test_cases = kasan_kunit_test_cases,
+	.exit = kasan_test_exit,
+	.suite_init = kasan_suite_init,
+	.suite_exit = kasan_suite_exit,
+};
+
+kunit_test_suite(kasan_kunit_test_suite);
+
+MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
diff --git a/mm/kasan/kasan_test_module.c b/mm/kasan/kasan_test_module.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..7be7bed456
--- /dev/null
+++ b/mm/kasan/kasan_test_module.c
@@ -0,0 +1,81 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 2014 Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd.
+ * Author: Andrey Ryabinin <a.ryabinin@samsung.com>
+ */
+
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) "kasan test: %s " fmt, __func__
+
+#include <linux/mman.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/printk.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/uaccess.h>
+
+#include "kasan.h"
+
+static noinline void __init copy_user_test(void)
+{
+	char *kmem;
+	char __user *usermem;
+	size_t size = 128 - KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE;
+	int __maybe_unused unused;
+
+	kmem = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!kmem)
+		return;
+
+	usermem = (char __user *)vm_mmap(NULL, 0, PAGE_SIZE,
+			    PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE | PROT_EXEC,
+			    MAP_ANONYMOUS | MAP_PRIVATE, 0);
+	if (IS_ERR(usermem)) {
+		pr_err("Failed to allocate user memory\n");
+		kfree(kmem);
+		return;
+	}
+
+	OPTIMIZER_HIDE_VAR(size);
+
+	pr_info("out-of-bounds in copy_from_user()\n");
+	unused = copy_from_user(kmem, usermem, size + 1);
+
+	pr_info("out-of-bounds in copy_to_user()\n");
+	unused = copy_to_user(usermem, kmem, size + 1);
+
+	pr_info("out-of-bounds in __copy_from_user()\n");
+	unused = __copy_from_user(kmem, usermem, size + 1);
+
+	pr_info("out-of-bounds in __copy_to_user()\n");
+	unused = __copy_to_user(usermem, kmem, size + 1);
+
+	pr_info("out-of-bounds in __copy_from_user_inatomic()\n");
+	unused = __copy_from_user_inatomic(kmem, usermem, size + 1);
+
+	pr_info("out-of-bounds in __copy_to_user_inatomic()\n");
+	unused = __copy_to_user_inatomic(usermem, kmem, size + 1);
+
+	pr_info("out-of-bounds in strncpy_from_user()\n");
+	unused = strncpy_from_user(kmem, usermem, size + 1);
+
+	vm_munmap((unsigned long)usermem, PAGE_SIZE);
+	kfree(kmem);
+}
+
+static int __init test_kasan_module_init(void)
+{
+	/*
+	 * Temporarily enable multi-shot mode. Otherwise, KASAN would only
+	 * report the first detected bug and panic the kernel if panic_on_warn
+	 * is enabled.
+	 */
+	bool multishot = kasan_save_enable_multi_shot();
+
+	copy_user_test();
+
+	kasan_restore_multi_shot(multishot);
+	return -EAGAIN;
+}
+
+module_init(test_kasan_module_init);
+MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
diff --git a/mm/kasan/quarantine.c b/mm/kasan/quarantine.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..152dca73f3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/mm/kasan/quarantine.c
@@ -0,0 +1,420 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * KASAN quarantine.
+ *
+ * Author: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
+ * Copyright (C) 2016 Google, Inc.
+ *
+ * Based on code by Dmitry Chernenkov.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/gfp.h>
+#include <linux/hash.h>
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/mm.h>
+#include <linux/percpu.h>
+#include <linux/printk.h>
+#include <linux/shrinker.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/srcu.h>
+#include <linux/string.h>
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/cpuhotplug.h>
+
+#include "../slab.h"
+#include "kasan.h"
+
+/* Data structure and operations for quarantine queues. */
+
+/*
+ * Each queue is a single-linked list, which also stores the total size of
+ * objects inside of it.
+ */
+struct qlist_head {
+	struct qlist_node *head;
+	struct qlist_node *tail;
+	size_t bytes;
+	bool offline;
+};
+
+#define QLIST_INIT { NULL, NULL, 0 }
+
+static bool qlist_empty(struct qlist_head *q)
+{
+	return !q->head;
+}
+
+static void qlist_init(struct qlist_head *q)
+{
+	q->head = q->tail = NULL;
+	q->bytes = 0;
+}
+
+static void qlist_put(struct qlist_head *q, struct qlist_node *qlink,
+		size_t size)
+{
+	if (unlikely(qlist_empty(q)))
+		q->head = qlink;
+	else
+		q->tail->next = qlink;
+	q->tail = qlink;
+	qlink->next = NULL;
+	q->bytes += size;
+}
+
+static void qlist_move_all(struct qlist_head *from, struct qlist_head *to)
+{
+	if (unlikely(qlist_empty(from)))
+		return;
+
+	if (qlist_empty(to)) {
+		*to = *from;
+		qlist_init(from);
+		return;
+	}
+
+	to->tail->next = from->head;
+	to->tail = from->tail;
+	to->bytes += from->bytes;
+
+	qlist_init(from);
+}
+
+#define QUARANTINE_PERCPU_SIZE (1 << 20)
+#define QUARANTINE_BATCHES \
+	(1024 > 4 * CONFIG_NR_CPUS ? 1024 : 4 * CONFIG_NR_CPUS)
+
+/*
+ * The object quarantine consists of per-cpu queues and a global queue,
+ * guarded by quarantine_lock.
+ */
+static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct qlist_head, cpu_quarantine);
+
+/* Round-robin FIFO array of batches. */
+static struct qlist_head global_quarantine[QUARANTINE_BATCHES];
+static int quarantine_head;
+static int quarantine_tail;
+/* Total size of all objects in global_quarantine across all batches. */
+static unsigned long quarantine_size;
+static DEFINE_RAW_SPINLOCK(quarantine_lock);
+DEFINE_STATIC_SRCU(remove_cache_srcu);
+
+struct cpu_shrink_qlist {
+	raw_spinlock_t lock;
+	struct qlist_head qlist;
+};
+
+static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct cpu_shrink_qlist, shrink_qlist) = {
+	.lock = __RAW_SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED(shrink_qlist.lock),
+};
+
+/* Maximum size of the global queue. */
+static unsigned long quarantine_max_size;
+
+/*
+ * Target size of a batch in global_quarantine.
+ * Usually equal to QUARANTINE_PERCPU_SIZE unless we have too much RAM.
+ */
+static unsigned long quarantine_batch_size;
+
+/*
+ * The fraction of physical memory the quarantine is allowed to occupy.
+ * Quarantine doesn't support memory shrinker with SLAB allocator, so we keep
+ * the ratio low to avoid OOM.
+ */
+#define QUARANTINE_FRACTION 32
+
+static struct kmem_cache *qlink_to_cache(struct qlist_node *qlink)
+{
+	return virt_to_slab(qlink)->slab_cache;
+}
+
+static void *qlink_to_object(struct qlist_node *qlink, struct kmem_cache *cache)
+{
+	struct kasan_free_meta *free_info =
+		container_of(qlink, struct kasan_free_meta,
+			     quarantine_link);
+
+	return ((void *)free_info) - cache->kasan_info.free_meta_offset;
+}
+
+static void qlink_free(struct qlist_node *qlink, struct kmem_cache *cache)
+{
+	void *object = qlink_to_object(qlink, cache);
+	struct kasan_free_meta *meta = kasan_get_free_meta(cache, object);
+	unsigned long flags;
+
+	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SLAB))
+		local_irq_save(flags);
+
+	/*
+	 * If init_on_free is enabled and KASAN's free metadata is stored in
+	 * the object, zero the metadata. Otherwise, the object's memory will
+	 * not be properly zeroed, as KASAN saves the metadata after the slab
+	 * allocator zeroes the object.
+	 */
+	if (slab_want_init_on_free(cache) &&
+	    cache->kasan_info.free_meta_offset == 0)
+		memzero_explicit(meta, sizeof(*meta));
+
+	/*
+	 * As the object now gets freed from the quarantine, assume that its
+	 * free track is no longer valid.
+	 */
+	*(u8 *)kasan_mem_to_shadow(object) = KASAN_SLAB_FREE;
+
+	___cache_free(cache, object, _THIS_IP_);
+
+	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SLAB))
+		local_irq_restore(flags);
+}
+
+static void qlist_free_all(struct qlist_head *q, struct kmem_cache *cache)
+{
+	struct qlist_node *qlink;
+
+	if (unlikely(qlist_empty(q)))
+		return;
+
+	qlink = q->head;
+	while (qlink) {
+		struct kmem_cache *obj_cache =
+			cache ? cache :	qlink_to_cache(qlink);
+		struct qlist_node *next = qlink->next;
+
+		qlink_free(qlink, obj_cache);
+		qlink = next;
+	}
+	qlist_init(q);
+}
+
+bool kasan_quarantine_put(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object)
+{
+	unsigned long flags;
+	struct qlist_head *q;
+	struct qlist_head temp = QLIST_INIT;
+	struct kasan_free_meta *meta = kasan_get_free_meta(cache, object);
+
+	/*
+	 * If there's no metadata for this object, don't put it into
+	 * quarantine.
+	 */
+	if (!meta)
+		return false;
+
+	/*
+	 * Note: irq must be disabled until after we move the batch to the
+	 * global quarantine. Otherwise kasan_quarantine_remove_cache() can
+	 * miss some objects belonging to the cache if they are in our local
+	 * temp list. kasan_quarantine_remove_cache() executes on_each_cpu()
+	 * at the beginning which ensures that it either sees the objects in
+	 * per-cpu lists or in the global quarantine.
+	 */
+	local_irq_save(flags);
+
+	q = this_cpu_ptr(&cpu_quarantine);
+	if (q->offline) {
+		local_irq_restore(flags);
+		return false;
+	}
+	qlist_put(q, &meta->quarantine_link, cache->size);
+	if (unlikely(q->bytes > QUARANTINE_PERCPU_SIZE)) {
+		qlist_move_all(q, &temp);
+
+		raw_spin_lock(&quarantine_lock);
+		WRITE_ONCE(quarantine_size, quarantine_size + temp.bytes);
+		qlist_move_all(&temp, &global_quarantine[quarantine_tail]);
+		if (global_quarantine[quarantine_tail].bytes >=
+				READ_ONCE(quarantine_batch_size)) {
+			int new_tail;
+
+			new_tail = quarantine_tail + 1;
+			if (new_tail == QUARANTINE_BATCHES)
+				new_tail = 0;
+			if (new_tail != quarantine_head)
+				quarantine_tail = new_tail;
+		}
+		raw_spin_unlock(&quarantine_lock);
+	}
+
+	local_irq_restore(flags);
+
+	return true;
+}
+
+void kasan_quarantine_reduce(void)
+{
+	size_t total_size, new_quarantine_size, percpu_quarantines;
+	unsigned long flags;
+	int srcu_idx;
+	struct qlist_head to_free = QLIST_INIT;
+
+	if (likely(READ_ONCE(quarantine_size) <=
+		   READ_ONCE(quarantine_max_size)))
+		return;
+
+	/*
+	 * srcu critical section ensures that kasan_quarantine_remove_cache()
+	 * will not miss objects belonging to the cache while they are in our
+	 * local to_free list. srcu is chosen because (1) it gives us private
+	 * grace period domain that does not interfere with anything else,
+	 * and (2) it allows synchronize_srcu() to return without waiting
+	 * if there are no pending read critical sections (which is the
+	 * expected case).
+	 */
+	srcu_idx = srcu_read_lock(&remove_cache_srcu);
+	raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&quarantine_lock, flags);
+
+	/*
+	 * Update quarantine size in case of hotplug. Allocate a fraction of
+	 * the installed memory to quarantine minus per-cpu queue limits.
+	 */
+	total_size = (totalram_pages() << PAGE_SHIFT) /
+		QUARANTINE_FRACTION;
+	percpu_quarantines = QUARANTINE_PERCPU_SIZE * num_online_cpus();
+	new_quarantine_size = (total_size < percpu_quarantines) ?
+		0 : total_size - percpu_quarantines;
+	WRITE_ONCE(quarantine_max_size, new_quarantine_size);
+	/* Aim at consuming at most 1/2 of slots in quarantine. */
+	WRITE_ONCE(quarantine_batch_size, max((size_t)QUARANTINE_PERCPU_SIZE,
+		2 * total_size / QUARANTINE_BATCHES));
+
+	if (likely(quarantine_size > quarantine_max_size)) {
+		qlist_move_all(&global_quarantine[quarantine_head], &to_free);
+		WRITE_ONCE(quarantine_size, quarantine_size - to_free.bytes);
+		quarantine_head++;
+		if (quarantine_head == QUARANTINE_BATCHES)
+			quarantine_head = 0;
+	}
+
+	raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&quarantine_lock, flags);
+
+	qlist_free_all(&to_free, NULL);
+	srcu_read_unlock(&remove_cache_srcu, srcu_idx);
+}
+
+static void qlist_move_cache(struct qlist_head *from,
+				   struct qlist_head *to,
+				   struct kmem_cache *cache)
+{
+	struct qlist_node *curr;
+
+	if (unlikely(qlist_empty(from)))
+		return;
+
+	curr = from->head;
+	qlist_init(from);
+	while (curr) {
+		struct qlist_node *next = curr->next;
+		struct kmem_cache *obj_cache = qlink_to_cache(curr);
+
+		if (obj_cache == cache)
+			qlist_put(to, curr, obj_cache->size);
+		else
+			qlist_put(from, curr, obj_cache->size);
+
+		curr = next;
+	}
+}
+
+static void __per_cpu_remove_cache(struct qlist_head *q, void *arg)
+{
+	struct kmem_cache *cache = arg;
+	unsigned long flags;
+	struct cpu_shrink_qlist *sq;
+
+	sq = this_cpu_ptr(&shrink_qlist);
+	raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&sq->lock, flags);
+	qlist_move_cache(q, &sq->qlist, cache);
+	raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&sq->lock, flags);
+}
+
+static void per_cpu_remove_cache(void *arg)
+{
+	struct qlist_head *q;
+
+	q = this_cpu_ptr(&cpu_quarantine);
+	/*
+	 * Ensure the ordering between the writing to q->offline and
+	 * per_cpu_remove_cache.  Prevent cpu_quarantine from being corrupted
+	 * by interrupt.
+	 */
+	if (READ_ONCE(q->offline))
+		return;
+	__per_cpu_remove_cache(q, arg);
+}
+
+/* Free all quarantined objects belonging to cache. */
+void kasan_quarantine_remove_cache(struct kmem_cache *cache)
+{
+	unsigned long flags, i;
+	struct qlist_head to_free = QLIST_INIT;
+	int cpu;
+	struct cpu_shrink_qlist *sq;
+
+	/*
+	 * Must be careful to not miss any objects that are being moved from
+	 * per-cpu list to the global quarantine in kasan_quarantine_put(),
+	 * nor objects being freed in kasan_quarantine_reduce(). on_each_cpu()
+	 * achieves the first goal, while synchronize_srcu() achieves the
+	 * second.
+	 */
+	on_each_cpu(per_cpu_remove_cache, cache, 1);
+
+	for_each_online_cpu(cpu) {
+		sq = per_cpu_ptr(&shrink_qlist, cpu);
+		raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&sq->lock, flags);
+		qlist_move_cache(&sq->qlist, &to_free, cache);
+		raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&sq->lock, flags);
+	}
+	qlist_free_all(&to_free, cache);
+
+	raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&quarantine_lock, flags);
+	for (i = 0; i < QUARANTINE_BATCHES; i++) {
+		if (qlist_empty(&global_quarantine[i]))
+			continue;
+		qlist_move_cache(&global_quarantine[i], &to_free, cache);
+		/* Scanning whole quarantine can take a while. */
+		raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&quarantine_lock, flags);
+		cond_resched();
+		raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&quarantine_lock, flags);
+	}
+	raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&quarantine_lock, flags);
+
+	qlist_free_all(&to_free, cache);
+
+	synchronize_srcu(&remove_cache_srcu);
+}
+
+static int kasan_cpu_online(unsigned int cpu)
+{
+	this_cpu_ptr(&cpu_quarantine)->offline = false;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int kasan_cpu_offline(unsigned int cpu)
+{
+	struct qlist_head *q;
+
+	q = this_cpu_ptr(&cpu_quarantine);
+	/* Ensure the ordering between the writing to q->offline and
+	 * qlist_free_all. Otherwise, cpu_quarantine may be corrupted
+	 * by interrupt.
+	 */
+	WRITE_ONCE(q->offline, true);
+	barrier();
+	qlist_free_all(q, NULL);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int __init kasan_cpu_quarantine_init(void)
+{
+	int ret = 0;
+
+	ret = cpuhp_setup_state(CPUHP_AP_ONLINE_DYN, "mm/kasan:online",
+				kasan_cpu_online, kasan_cpu_offline);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		pr_err("kasan cpu quarantine register failed [%d]\n", ret);
+	return ret;
+}
+late_initcall(kasan_cpu_quarantine_init);
diff --git a/mm/kasan/report.c b/mm/kasan/report.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..6e3cb118d2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/mm/kasan/report.c
@@ -0,0 +1,662 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * This file contains common KASAN error reporting code.
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 2014 Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd.
+ * Author: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>
+ *
+ * Some code borrowed from https://github.com/xairy/kasan-prototype by
+ *        Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com>
+ */
+
+#include <kunit/test.h>
+#include <linux/bitops.h>
+#include <linux/ftrace.h>
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/lockdep.h>
+#include <linux/mm.h>
+#include <linux/printk.h>
+#include <linux/sched.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/stackdepot.h>
+#include <linux/stacktrace.h>
+#include <linux/string.h>
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/kasan.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/sched/task_stack.h>
+#include <linux/uaccess.h>
+#include <trace/events/error_report.h>
+
+#include <asm/sections.h>
+
+#include "kasan.h"
+#include "../slab.h"
+
+static unsigned long kasan_flags;
+
+#define KASAN_BIT_REPORTED	0
+#define KASAN_BIT_MULTI_SHOT	1
+
+enum kasan_arg_fault {
+	KASAN_ARG_FAULT_DEFAULT,
+	KASAN_ARG_FAULT_REPORT,
+	KASAN_ARG_FAULT_PANIC,
+	KASAN_ARG_FAULT_PANIC_ON_WRITE,
+};
+
+static enum kasan_arg_fault kasan_arg_fault __ro_after_init = KASAN_ARG_FAULT_DEFAULT;
+
+/* kasan.fault=report/panic */
+static int __init early_kasan_fault(char *arg)
+{
+	if (!arg)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (!strcmp(arg, "report"))
+		kasan_arg_fault = KASAN_ARG_FAULT_REPORT;
+	else if (!strcmp(arg, "panic"))
+		kasan_arg_fault = KASAN_ARG_FAULT_PANIC;
+	else if (!strcmp(arg, "panic_on_write"))
+		kasan_arg_fault = KASAN_ARG_FAULT_PANIC_ON_WRITE;
+	else
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+early_param("kasan.fault", early_kasan_fault);
+
+static int __init kasan_set_multi_shot(char *str)
+{
+	set_bit(KASAN_BIT_MULTI_SHOT, &kasan_flags);
+	return 1;
+}
+__setup("kasan_multi_shot", kasan_set_multi_shot);
+
+/*
+ * This function is used to check whether KASAN reports are suppressed for
+ * software KASAN modes via kasan_disable/enable_current() critical sections.
+ *
+ * This is done to avoid:
+ * 1. False-positive reports when accessing slab metadata,
+ * 2. Deadlocking when poisoned memory is accessed by the reporting code.
+ *
+ * Hardware Tag-Based KASAN instead relies on:
+ * For #1: Resetting tags via kasan_reset_tag().
+ * For #2: Suppression of tag checks via CPU, see report_suppress_start/end().
+ */
+static bool report_suppressed_sw(void)
+{
+#if defined(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC) || defined(CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS)
+	if (current->kasan_depth)
+		return true;
+#endif
+	return false;
+}
+
+static void report_suppress_start(void)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS
+	/*
+	 * Disable preemption for the duration of printing a KASAN report, as
+	 * hw_suppress_tag_checks_start() disables checks on the current CPU.
+	 */
+	preempt_disable();
+	hw_suppress_tag_checks_start();
+#else
+	kasan_disable_current();
+#endif
+}
+
+static void report_suppress_stop(void)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS
+	hw_suppress_tag_checks_stop();
+	preempt_enable();
+#else
+	kasan_enable_current();
+#endif
+}
+
+/*
+ * Used to avoid reporting more than one KASAN bug unless kasan_multi_shot
+ * is enabled. Note that KASAN tests effectively enable kasan_multi_shot
+ * for their duration.
+ */
+static bool report_enabled(void)
+{
+	if (test_bit(KASAN_BIT_MULTI_SHOT, &kasan_flags))
+		return true;
+	return !test_and_set_bit(KASAN_BIT_REPORTED, &kasan_flags);
+}
+
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_KUNIT_TEST) || IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_MODULE_TEST)
+
+bool kasan_save_enable_multi_shot(void)
+{
+	return test_and_set_bit(KASAN_BIT_MULTI_SHOT, &kasan_flags);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kasan_save_enable_multi_shot);
+
+void kasan_restore_multi_shot(bool enabled)
+{
+	if (!enabled)
+		clear_bit(KASAN_BIT_MULTI_SHOT, &kasan_flags);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kasan_restore_multi_shot);
+
+#endif
+
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_KUNIT_TEST)
+
+/*
+ * Whether the KASAN KUnit test suite is currently being executed.
+ * Updated in kasan_test.c.
+ */
+static bool kasan_kunit_executing;
+
+void kasan_kunit_test_suite_start(void)
+{
+	WRITE_ONCE(kasan_kunit_executing, true);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kasan_kunit_test_suite_start);
+
+void kasan_kunit_test_suite_end(void)
+{
+	WRITE_ONCE(kasan_kunit_executing, false);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kasan_kunit_test_suite_end);
+
+static bool kasan_kunit_test_suite_executing(void)
+{
+	return READ_ONCE(kasan_kunit_executing);
+}
+
+#else /* CONFIG_KASAN_KUNIT_TEST */
+
+static inline bool kasan_kunit_test_suite_executing(void) { return false; }
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_KASAN_KUNIT_TEST */
+
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KUNIT)
+
+static void fail_non_kasan_kunit_test(void)
+{
+	struct kunit *test;
+
+	if (kasan_kunit_test_suite_executing())
+		return;
+
+	test = current->kunit_test;
+	if (test)
+		kunit_set_failure(test);
+}
+
+#else /* CONFIG_KUNIT */
+
+static inline void fail_non_kasan_kunit_test(void) { }
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_KUNIT */
+
+static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(report_lock);
+
+static void start_report(unsigned long *flags, bool sync)
+{
+	fail_non_kasan_kunit_test();
+	/* Respect the /proc/sys/kernel/traceoff_on_warning interface. */
+	disable_trace_on_warning();
+	/* Do not allow LOCKDEP mangling KASAN reports. */
+	lockdep_off();
+	/* Make sure we don't end up in loop. */
+	report_suppress_start();
+	spin_lock_irqsave(&report_lock, *flags);
+	pr_err("==================================================================\n");
+}
+
+static void end_report(unsigned long *flags, const void *addr, bool is_write)
+{
+	if (addr)
+		trace_error_report_end(ERROR_DETECTOR_KASAN,
+				       (unsigned long)addr);
+	pr_err("==================================================================\n");
+	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&report_lock, *flags);
+	if (!test_bit(KASAN_BIT_MULTI_SHOT, &kasan_flags))
+		check_panic_on_warn("KASAN");
+	switch (kasan_arg_fault) {
+	case KASAN_ARG_FAULT_DEFAULT:
+	case KASAN_ARG_FAULT_REPORT:
+		break;
+	case KASAN_ARG_FAULT_PANIC:
+		panic("kasan.fault=panic set ...\n");
+		break;
+	case KASAN_ARG_FAULT_PANIC_ON_WRITE:
+		if (is_write)
+			panic("kasan.fault=panic_on_write set ...\n");
+		break;
+	}
+	add_taint(TAINT_BAD_PAGE, LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE);
+	lockdep_on();
+	report_suppress_stop();
+}
+
+static void print_error_description(struct kasan_report_info *info)
+{
+	pr_err("BUG: KASAN: %s in %pS\n", info->bug_type, (void *)info->ip);
+
+	if (info->type != KASAN_REPORT_ACCESS) {
+		pr_err("Free of addr %px by task %s/%d\n",
+			info->access_addr, current->comm, task_pid_nr(current));
+		return;
+	}
+
+	if (info->access_size)
+		pr_err("%s of size %zu at addr %px by task %s/%d\n",
+			info->is_write ? "Write" : "Read", info->access_size,
+			info->access_addr, current->comm, task_pid_nr(current));
+	else
+		pr_err("%s at addr %px by task %s/%d\n",
+			info->is_write ? "Write" : "Read",
+			info->access_addr, current->comm, task_pid_nr(current));
+}
+
+static void print_track(struct kasan_track *track, const char *prefix)
+{
+	pr_err("%s by task %u:\n", prefix, track->pid);
+	if (track->stack)
+		stack_depot_print(track->stack);
+	else
+		pr_err("(stack is not available)\n");
+}
+
+static inline struct page *addr_to_page(const void *addr)
+{
+	if (virt_addr_valid(addr))
+		return virt_to_head_page(addr);
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+static void describe_object_addr(const void *addr, struct kasan_report_info *info)
+{
+	unsigned long access_addr = (unsigned long)addr;
+	unsigned long object_addr = (unsigned long)info->object;
+	const char *rel_type, *region_state = "";
+	int rel_bytes;
+
+	pr_err("The buggy address belongs to the object at %px\n"
+	       " which belongs to the cache %s of size %d\n",
+		info->object, info->cache->name, info->cache->object_size);
+
+	if (access_addr < object_addr) {
+		rel_type = "to the left";
+		rel_bytes = object_addr - access_addr;
+	} else if (access_addr >= object_addr + info->alloc_size) {
+		rel_type = "to the right";
+		rel_bytes = access_addr - (object_addr + info->alloc_size);
+	} else {
+		rel_type = "inside";
+		rel_bytes = access_addr - object_addr;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Tag-Based modes use the stack ring to infer the bug type, but the
+	 * memory region state description is generated based on the metadata.
+	 * Thus, defining the region state as below can contradict the metadata.
+	 * Fixing this requires further improvements, so only infer the state
+	 * for the Generic mode.
+	 */
+	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC)) {
+		if (strcmp(info->bug_type, "slab-out-of-bounds") == 0)
+			region_state = "allocated ";
+		else if (strcmp(info->bug_type, "slab-use-after-free") == 0)
+			region_state = "freed ";
+	}
+
+	pr_err("The buggy address is located %d bytes %s of\n"
+	       " %s%zu-byte region [%px, %px)\n",
+	       rel_bytes, rel_type, region_state, info->alloc_size,
+	       (void *)object_addr, (void *)(object_addr + info->alloc_size));
+}
+
+static void describe_object_stacks(struct kasan_report_info *info)
+{
+	if (info->alloc_track.stack) {
+		print_track(&info->alloc_track, "Allocated");
+		pr_err("\n");
+	}
+
+	if (info->free_track.stack) {
+		print_track(&info->free_track, "Freed");
+		pr_err("\n");
+	}
+
+	kasan_print_aux_stacks(info->cache, info->object);
+}
+
+static void describe_object(const void *addr, struct kasan_report_info *info)
+{
+	if (kasan_stack_collection_enabled())
+		describe_object_stacks(info);
+	describe_object_addr(addr, info);
+}
+
+static inline bool kernel_or_module_addr(const void *addr)
+{
+	if (is_kernel((unsigned long)addr))
+		return true;
+	if (is_module_address((unsigned long)addr))
+		return true;
+	return false;
+}
+
+static inline bool init_task_stack_addr(const void *addr)
+{
+	return addr >= (void *)&init_thread_union.stack &&
+		(addr <= (void *)&init_thread_union.stack +
+			sizeof(init_thread_union.stack));
+}
+
+static void print_address_description(void *addr, u8 tag,
+				      struct kasan_report_info *info)
+{
+	struct page *page = addr_to_page(addr);
+
+	dump_stack_lvl(KERN_ERR);
+	pr_err("\n");
+
+	if (info->cache && info->object) {
+		describe_object(addr, info);
+		pr_err("\n");
+	}
+
+	if (kernel_or_module_addr(addr) && !init_task_stack_addr(addr)) {
+		pr_err("The buggy address belongs to the variable:\n");
+		pr_err(" %pS\n", addr);
+		pr_err("\n");
+	}
+
+	if (object_is_on_stack(addr)) {
+		/*
+		 * Currently, KASAN supports printing frame information only
+		 * for accesses to the task's own stack.
+		 */
+		kasan_print_address_stack_frame(addr);
+		pr_err("\n");
+	}
+
+	if (is_vmalloc_addr(addr)) {
+		struct vm_struct *va = find_vm_area(addr);
+
+		if (va) {
+			pr_err("The buggy address belongs to the virtual mapping at\n"
+			       " [%px, %px) created by:\n"
+			       " %pS\n",
+			       va->addr, va->addr + va->size, va->caller);
+			pr_err("\n");
+
+			page = vmalloc_to_page(addr);
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (page) {
+		pr_err("The buggy address belongs to the physical page:\n");
+		dump_page(page, "kasan: bad access detected");
+		pr_err("\n");
+	}
+}
+
+static bool meta_row_is_guilty(const void *row, const void *addr)
+{
+	return (row <= addr) && (addr < row + META_MEM_BYTES_PER_ROW);
+}
+
+static int meta_pointer_offset(const void *row, const void *addr)
+{
+	/*
+	 * Memory state around the buggy address:
+	 *  ff00ff00ff00ff00: 00 00 00 05 fe fe fe fe fe fe fe fe fe fe fe fe
+	 *  ...
+	 *
+	 * The length of ">ff00ff00ff00ff00: " is
+	 *    3 + (BITS_PER_LONG / 8) * 2 chars.
+	 * The length of each granule metadata is 2 bytes
+	 *    plus 1 byte for space.
+	 */
+	return 3 + (BITS_PER_LONG / 8) * 2 +
+		(addr - row) / KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE * 3 + 1;
+}
+
+static void print_memory_metadata(const void *addr)
+{
+	int i;
+	void *row;
+
+	row = (void *)round_down((unsigned long)addr, META_MEM_BYTES_PER_ROW)
+			- META_ROWS_AROUND_ADDR * META_MEM_BYTES_PER_ROW;
+
+	pr_err("Memory state around the buggy address:\n");
+
+	for (i = -META_ROWS_AROUND_ADDR; i <= META_ROWS_AROUND_ADDR; i++) {
+		char buffer[4 + (BITS_PER_LONG / 8) * 2];
+		char metadata[META_BYTES_PER_ROW];
+
+		snprintf(buffer, sizeof(buffer),
+				(i == 0) ? ">%px: " : " %px: ", row);
+
+		/*
+		 * We should not pass a shadow pointer to generic
+		 * function, because generic functions may try to
+		 * access kasan mapping for the passed address.
+		 */
+		kasan_metadata_fetch_row(&metadata[0], row);
+
+		print_hex_dump(KERN_ERR, buffer,
+			DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, META_BYTES_PER_ROW, 1,
+			metadata, META_BYTES_PER_ROW, 0);
+
+		if (meta_row_is_guilty(row, addr))
+			pr_err("%*c\n", meta_pointer_offset(row, addr), '^');
+
+		row += META_MEM_BYTES_PER_ROW;
+	}
+}
+
+static void print_report(struct kasan_report_info *info)
+{
+	void *addr = kasan_reset_tag((void *)info->access_addr);
+	u8 tag = get_tag((void *)info->access_addr);
+
+	print_error_description(info);
+	if (addr_has_metadata(addr))
+		kasan_print_tags(tag, info->first_bad_addr);
+	pr_err("\n");
+
+	if (addr_has_metadata(addr)) {
+		print_address_description(addr, tag, info);
+		print_memory_metadata(info->first_bad_addr);
+	} else {
+		dump_stack_lvl(KERN_ERR);
+	}
+}
+
+static void complete_report_info(struct kasan_report_info *info)
+{
+	void *addr = kasan_reset_tag((void *)info->access_addr);
+	struct slab *slab;
+
+	if (info->type == KASAN_REPORT_ACCESS)
+		info->first_bad_addr = kasan_find_first_bad_addr(
+					(void *)info->access_addr, info->access_size);
+	else
+		info->first_bad_addr = addr;
+
+	slab = kasan_addr_to_slab(addr);
+	if (slab) {
+		info->cache = slab->slab_cache;
+		info->object = nearest_obj(info->cache, slab, addr);
+
+		/* Try to determine allocation size based on the metadata. */
+		info->alloc_size = kasan_get_alloc_size(info->object, info->cache);
+		/* Fallback to the object size if failed. */
+		if (!info->alloc_size)
+			info->alloc_size = info->cache->object_size;
+	} else
+		info->cache = info->object = NULL;
+
+	switch (info->type) {
+	case KASAN_REPORT_INVALID_FREE:
+		info->bug_type = "invalid-free";
+		break;
+	case KASAN_REPORT_DOUBLE_FREE:
+		info->bug_type = "double-free";
+		break;
+	default:
+		/* bug_type filled in by kasan_complete_mode_report_info. */
+		break;
+	}
+
+	/* Fill in mode-specific report info fields. */
+	kasan_complete_mode_report_info(info);
+}
+
+void kasan_report_invalid_free(void *ptr, unsigned long ip, enum kasan_report_type type)
+{
+	unsigned long flags;
+	struct kasan_report_info info;
+
+	/*
+	 * Do not check report_suppressed_sw(), as an invalid-free cannot be
+	 * caused by accessing poisoned memory and thus should not be suppressed
+	 * by kasan_disable/enable_current() critical sections.
+	 *
+	 * Note that for Hardware Tag-Based KASAN, kasan_report_invalid_free()
+	 * is triggered by explicit tag checks and not by the ones performed by
+	 * the CPU. Thus, reporting invalid-free is not suppressed as well.
+	 */
+	if (unlikely(!report_enabled()))
+		return;
+
+	start_report(&flags, true);
+
+	memset(&info, 0, sizeof(info));
+	info.type = type;
+	info.access_addr = ptr;
+	info.access_size = 0;
+	info.is_write = false;
+	info.ip = ip;
+
+	complete_report_info(&info);
+
+	print_report(&info);
+
+	/*
+	 * Invalid free is considered a "write" since the allocator's metadata
+	 * updates involves writes.
+	 */
+	end_report(&flags, ptr, true);
+}
+
+/*
+ * kasan_report() is the only reporting function that uses
+ * user_access_save/restore(): kasan_report_invalid_free() cannot be called
+ * from a UACCESS region, and kasan_report_async() is not used on x86.
+ */
+bool kasan_report(const void *addr, size_t size, bool is_write,
+			unsigned long ip)
+{
+	bool ret = true;
+	unsigned long ua_flags = user_access_save();
+	unsigned long irq_flags;
+	struct kasan_report_info info;
+
+	if (unlikely(report_suppressed_sw()) || unlikely(!report_enabled())) {
+		ret = false;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	start_report(&irq_flags, true);
+
+	memset(&info, 0, sizeof(info));
+	info.type = KASAN_REPORT_ACCESS;
+	info.access_addr = addr;
+	info.access_size = size;
+	info.is_write = is_write;
+	info.ip = ip;
+
+	complete_report_info(&info);
+
+	print_report(&info);
+
+	end_report(&irq_flags, (void *)addr, is_write);
+
+out:
+	user_access_restore(ua_flags);
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS
+void kasan_report_async(void)
+{
+	unsigned long flags;
+
+	/*
+	 * Do not check report_suppressed_sw(), as
+	 * kasan_disable/enable_current() critical sections do not affect
+	 * Hardware Tag-Based KASAN.
+	 */
+	if (unlikely(!report_enabled()))
+		return;
+
+	start_report(&flags, false);
+	pr_err("BUG: KASAN: invalid-access\n");
+	pr_err("Asynchronous fault: no details available\n");
+	pr_err("\n");
+	dump_stack_lvl(KERN_ERR);
+	/*
+	 * Conservatively set is_write=true, because no details are available.
+	 * In this mode, kasan.fault=panic_on_write is like kasan.fault=panic.
+	 */
+	end_report(&flags, NULL, true);
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS */
+
+#if defined(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC) || defined(CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS)
+/*
+ * With CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE, accesses to bogus pointers (outside the high
+ * canonical half of the address space) cause out-of-bounds shadow memory reads
+ * before the actual access. For addresses in the low canonical half of the
+ * address space, as well as most non-canonical addresses, that out-of-bounds
+ * shadow memory access lands in the non-canonical part of the address space.
+ * Help the user figure out what the original bogus pointer was.
+ */
+void kasan_non_canonical_hook(unsigned long addr)
+{
+	unsigned long orig_addr;
+	const char *bug_type;
+
+	if (addr < KASAN_SHADOW_OFFSET)
+		return;
+
+	orig_addr = (addr - KASAN_SHADOW_OFFSET) << KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT;
+	/*
+	 * For faults near the shadow address for NULL, we can be fairly certain
+	 * that this is a KASAN shadow memory access.
+	 * For faults that correspond to shadow for low canonical addresses, we
+	 * can still be pretty sure - that shadow region is a fairly narrow
+	 * chunk of the non-canonical address space.
+	 * But faults that look like shadow for non-canonical addresses are a
+	 * really large chunk of the address space. In that case, we still
+	 * print the decoded address, but make it clear that this is not
+	 * necessarily what's actually going on.
+	 */
+	if (orig_addr < PAGE_SIZE)
+		bug_type = "null-ptr-deref";
+	else if (orig_addr < TASK_SIZE)
+		bug_type = "probably user-memory-access";
+	else
+		bug_type = "maybe wild-memory-access";
+	pr_alert("KASAN: %s in range [0x%016lx-0x%016lx]\n", bug_type,
+		 orig_addr, orig_addr + KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE - 1);
+}
+#endif
diff --git a/mm/kasan/report_generic.c b/mm/kasan/report_generic.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..51a1e8a887
--- /dev/null
+++ b/mm/kasan/report_generic.c
@@ -0,0 +1,399 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * This file contains generic KASAN specific error reporting code.
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 2014 Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd.
+ * Author: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>
+ *
+ * Some code borrowed from https://github.com/xairy/kasan-prototype by
+ *        Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com>
+ */
+
+#include <linux/bitops.h>
+#include <linux/ftrace.h>
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/mm.h>
+#include <linux/printk.h>
+#include <linux/sched.h>
+#include <linux/sched/task_stack.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/stackdepot.h>
+#include <linux/stacktrace.h>
+#include <linux/string.h>
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/kasan.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
+
+#include <asm/sections.h>
+
+#include "kasan.h"
+#include "../slab.h"
+
+const void *kasan_find_first_bad_addr(const void *addr, size_t size)
+{
+	const void *p = addr;
+
+	if (!addr_has_metadata(p))
+		return p;
+
+	while (p < addr + size && !(*(u8 *)kasan_mem_to_shadow(p)))
+		p += KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE;
+
+	return p;
+}
+
+size_t kasan_get_alloc_size(void *object, struct kmem_cache *cache)
+{
+	size_t size = 0;
+	u8 *shadow;
+
+	/*
+	 * Skip the addr_has_metadata check, as this function only operates on
+	 * slab memory, which must have metadata.
+	 */
+
+	/*
+	 * The loop below returns 0 for freed objects, for which KASAN cannot
+	 * calculate the allocation size based on the metadata.
+	 */
+	shadow = (u8 *)kasan_mem_to_shadow(object);
+	while (size < cache->object_size) {
+		if (*shadow == 0)
+			size += KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE;
+		else if (*shadow >= 1 && *shadow <= KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE - 1)
+			return size + *shadow;
+		else
+			return size;
+		shadow++;
+	}
+
+	return cache->object_size;
+}
+
+static const char *get_shadow_bug_type(struct kasan_report_info *info)
+{
+	const char *bug_type = "unknown-crash";
+	u8 *shadow_addr;
+
+	shadow_addr = (u8 *)kasan_mem_to_shadow(info->first_bad_addr);
+
+	/*
+	 * If shadow byte value is in [0, KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE) we can look
+	 * at the next shadow byte to determine the type of the bad access.
+	 */
+	if (*shadow_addr > 0 && *shadow_addr <= KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE - 1)
+		shadow_addr++;
+
+	switch (*shadow_addr) {
+	case 0 ... KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE - 1:
+		/*
+		 * In theory it's still possible to see these shadow values
+		 * due to a data race in the kernel code.
+		 */
+		bug_type = "out-of-bounds";
+		break;
+	case KASAN_PAGE_REDZONE:
+	case KASAN_SLAB_REDZONE:
+		bug_type = "slab-out-of-bounds";
+		break;
+	case KASAN_GLOBAL_REDZONE:
+		bug_type = "global-out-of-bounds";
+		break;
+	case KASAN_STACK_LEFT:
+	case KASAN_STACK_MID:
+	case KASAN_STACK_RIGHT:
+	case KASAN_STACK_PARTIAL:
+		bug_type = "stack-out-of-bounds";
+		break;
+	case KASAN_PAGE_FREE:
+		bug_type = "use-after-free";
+		break;
+	case KASAN_SLAB_FREE:
+	case KASAN_SLAB_FREETRACK:
+		bug_type = "slab-use-after-free";
+		break;
+	case KASAN_ALLOCA_LEFT:
+	case KASAN_ALLOCA_RIGHT:
+		bug_type = "alloca-out-of-bounds";
+		break;
+	case KASAN_VMALLOC_INVALID:
+		bug_type = "vmalloc-out-of-bounds";
+		break;
+	}
+
+	return bug_type;
+}
+
+static const char *get_wild_bug_type(struct kasan_report_info *info)
+{
+	const char *bug_type = "unknown-crash";
+
+	if ((unsigned long)info->access_addr < PAGE_SIZE)
+		bug_type = "null-ptr-deref";
+	else if ((unsigned long)info->access_addr < TASK_SIZE)
+		bug_type = "user-memory-access";
+	else
+		bug_type = "wild-memory-access";
+
+	return bug_type;
+}
+
+static const char *get_bug_type(struct kasan_report_info *info)
+{
+	/*
+	 * If access_size is a negative number, then it has reason to be
+	 * defined as out-of-bounds bug type.
+	 *
+	 * Casting negative numbers to size_t would indeed turn up as
+	 * a large size_t and its value will be larger than ULONG_MAX/2,
+	 * so that this can qualify as out-of-bounds.
+	 */
+	if (info->access_addr + info->access_size < info->access_addr)
+		return "out-of-bounds";
+
+	if (addr_has_metadata(info->access_addr))
+		return get_shadow_bug_type(info);
+	return get_wild_bug_type(info);
+}
+
+void kasan_complete_mode_report_info(struct kasan_report_info *info)
+{
+	struct kasan_alloc_meta *alloc_meta;
+	struct kasan_free_meta *free_meta;
+
+	if (!info->bug_type)
+		info->bug_type = get_bug_type(info);
+
+	if (!info->cache || !info->object)
+		return;
+
+	alloc_meta = kasan_get_alloc_meta(info->cache, info->object);
+	if (alloc_meta)
+		memcpy(&info->alloc_track, &alloc_meta->alloc_track,
+		       sizeof(info->alloc_track));
+
+	if (*(u8 *)kasan_mem_to_shadow(info->object) == KASAN_SLAB_FREETRACK) {
+		/* Free meta must be present with KASAN_SLAB_FREETRACK. */
+		free_meta = kasan_get_free_meta(info->cache, info->object);
+		memcpy(&info->free_track, &free_meta->free_track,
+		       sizeof(info->free_track));
+	}
+}
+
+void kasan_metadata_fetch_row(char *buffer, void *row)
+{
+	memcpy(buffer, kasan_mem_to_shadow(row), META_BYTES_PER_ROW);
+}
+
+void kasan_print_aux_stacks(struct kmem_cache *cache, const void *object)
+{
+	struct kasan_alloc_meta *alloc_meta;
+
+	alloc_meta = kasan_get_alloc_meta(cache, object);
+	if (!alloc_meta)
+		return;
+
+	if (alloc_meta->aux_stack[0]) {
+		pr_err("Last potentially related work creation:\n");
+		stack_depot_print(alloc_meta->aux_stack[0]);
+		pr_err("\n");
+	}
+	if (alloc_meta->aux_stack[1]) {
+		pr_err("Second to last potentially related work creation:\n");
+		stack_depot_print(alloc_meta->aux_stack[1]);
+		pr_err("\n");
+	}
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_STACK
+static bool __must_check tokenize_frame_descr(const char **frame_descr,
+					      char *token, size_t max_tok_len,
+					      unsigned long *value)
+{
+	const char *sep = strchr(*frame_descr, ' ');
+
+	if (sep == NULL)
+		sep = *frame_descr + strlen(*frame_descr);
+
+	if (token != NULL) {
+		const size_t tok_len = sep - *frame_descr;
+
+		if (tok_len + 1 > max_tok_len) {
+			pr_err("KASAN internal error: frame description too long: %s\n",
+			       *frame_descr);
+			return false;
+		}
+
+		/* Copy token (+ 1 byte for '\0'). */
+		strscpy(token, *frame_descr, tok_len + 1);
+	}
+
+	/* Advance frame_descr past separator. */
+	*frame_descr = sep + 1;
+
+	if (value != NULL && kstrtoul(token, 10, value)) {
+		pr_err("KASAN internal error: not a valid number: %s\n", token);
+		return false;
+	}
+
+	return true;
+}
+
+static void print_decoded_frame_descr(const char *frame_descr)
+{
+	/*
+	 * We need to parse the following string:
+	 *    "n alloc_1 alloc_2 ... alloc_n"
+	 * where alloc_i looks like
+	 *    "offset size len name"
+	 * or "offset size len name:line".
+	 */
+
+	char token[64];
+	unsigned long num_objects;
+
+	if (!tokenize_frame_descr(&frame_descr, token, sizeof(token),
+				  &num_objects))
+		return;
+
+	pr_err("\n");
+	pr_err("This frame has %lu %s:\n", num_objects,
+	       num_objects == 1 ? "object" : "objects");
+
+	while (num_objects--) {
+		unsigned long offset;
+		unsigned long size;
+
+		/* access offset */
+		if (!tokenize_frame_descr(&frame_descr, token, sizeof(token),
+					  &offset))
+			return;
+		/* access size */
+		if (!tokenize_frame_descr(&frame_descr, token, sizeof(token),
+					  &size))
+			return;
+		/* name length (unused) */
+		if (!tokenize_frame_descr(&frame_descr, NULL, 0, NULL))
+			return;
+		/* object name */
+		if (!tokenize_frame_descr(&frame_descr, token, sizeof(token),
+					  NULL))
+			return;
+
+		/* Strip line number; without filename it's not very helpful. */
+		strreplace(token, ':', '\0');
+
+		/* Finally, print object information. */
+		pr_err(" [%lu, %lu) '%s'", offset, offset + size, token);
+	}
+}
+
+/* Returns true only if the address is on the current task's stack. */
+static bool __must_check get_address_stack_frame_info(const void *addr,
+						      unsigned long *offset,
+						      const char **frame_descr,
+						      const void **frame_pc)
+{
+	unsigned long aligned_addr;
+	unsigned long mem_ptr;
+	const u8 *shadow_bottom;
+	const u8 *shadow_ptr;
+	const unsigned long *frame;
+
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_STACK_GROWSUP));
+
+	aligned_addr = round_down((unsigned long)addr, sizeof(long));
+	mem_ptr = round_down(aligned_addr, KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE);
+	shadow_ptr = kasan_mem_to_shadow((void *)aligned_addr);
+	shadow_bottom = kasan_mem_to_shadow(end_of_stack(current));
+
+	while (shadow_ptr >= shadow_bottom && *shadow_ptr != KASAN_STACK_LEFT) {
+		shadow_ptr--;
+		mem_ptr -= KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE;
+	}
+
+	while (shadow_ptr >= shadow_bottom && *shadow_ptr == KASAN_STACK_LEFT) {
+		shadow_ptr--;
+		mem_ptr -= KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE;
+	}
+
+	if (shadow_ptr < shadow_bottom)
+		return false;
+
+	frame = (const unsigned long *)(mem_ptr + KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE);
+	if (frame[0] != KASAN_CURRENT_STACK_FRAME_MAGIC) {
+		pr_err("KASAN internal error: frame info validation failed; invalid marker: %lu\n",
+		       frame[0]);
+		return false;
+	}
+
+	*offset = (unsigned long)addr - (unsigned long)frame;
+	*frame_descr = (const char *)frame[1];
+	*frame_pc = (void *)frame[2];
+
+	return true;
+}
+
+void kasan_print_address_stack_frame(const void *addr)
+{
+	unsigned long offset;
+	const char *frame_descr;
+	const void *frame_pc;
+
+	if (WARN_ON(!object_is_on_stack(addr)))
+		return;
+
+	pr_err("The buggy address belongs to stack of task %s/%d\n",
+	       current->comm, task_pid_nr(current));
+
+	if (!get_address_stack_frame_info(addr, &offset, &frame_descr,
+					  &frame_pc))
+		return;
+
+	pr_err(" and is located at offset %lu in frame:\n", offset);
+	pr_err(" %pS\n", frame_pc);
+
+	if (!frame_descr)
+		return;
+
+	print_decoded_frame_descr(frame_descr);
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_KASAN_STACK */
+
+#define DEFINE_ASAN_REPORT_LOAD(size)                     \
+void __asan_report_load##size##_noabort(void *addr) \
+{                                                         \
+	kasan_report(addr, size, false, _RET_IP_);	  \
+}                                                         \
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(__asan_report_load##size##_noabort)
+
+#define DEFINE_ASAN_REPORT_STORE(size)                     \
+void __asan_report_store##size##_noabort(void *addr) \
+{                                                          \
+	kasan_report(addr, size, true, _RET_IP_);	   \
+}                                                          \
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(__asan_report_store##size##_noabort)
+
+DEFINE_ASAN_REPORT_LOAD(1);
+DEFINE_ASAN_REPORT_LOAD(2);
+DEFINE_ASAN_REPORT_LOAD(4);
+DEFINE_ASAN_REPORT_LOAD(8);
+DEFINE_ASAN_REPORT_LOAD(16);
+DEFINE_ASAN_REPORT_STORE(1);
+DEFINE_ASAN_REPORT_STORE(2);
+DEFINE_ASAN_REPORT_STORE(4);
+DEFINE_ASAN_REPORT_STORE(8);
+DEFINE_ASAN_REPORT_STORE(16);
+
+void __asan_report_load_n_noabort(void *addr, ssize_t size)
+{
+	kasan_report(addr, size, false, _RET_IP_);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(__asan_report_load_n_noabort);
+
+void __asan_report_store_n_noabort(void *addr, ssize_t size)
+{
+	kasan_report(addr, size, true, _RET_IP_);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(__asan_report_store_n_noabort);
diff --git a/mm/kasan/report_hw_tags.c b/mm/kasan/report_hw_tags.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..065e1b2fc4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/mm/kasan/report_hw_tags.c
@@ -0,0 +1,71 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * This file contains hardware tag-based KASAN specific error reporting code.
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 2020 Google, Inc.
+ * Author: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
+ */
+
+#include <linux/kasan.h>
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/memory.h>
+#include <linux/mm.h>
+#include <linux/string.h>
+#include <linux/types.h>
+
+#include "kasan.h"
+
+const void *kasan_find_first_bad_addr(const void *addr, size_t size)
+{
+	/*
+	 * Hardware Tag-Based KASAN only calls this function for normal memory
+	 * accesses, and thus addr points precisely to the first bad address
+	 * with an invalid (and present) memory tag. Therefore:
+	 * 1. Return the address as is without walking memory tags.
+	 * 2. Skip the addr_has_metadata check.
+	 */
+	return kasan_reset_tag(addr);
+}
+
+size_t kasan_get_alloc_size(void *object, struct kmem_cache *cache)
+{
+	size_t size = 0;
+	int i = 0;
+	u8 memory_tag;
+
+	/*
+	 * Skip the addr_has_metadata check, as this function only operates on
+	 * slab memory, which must have metadata.
+	 */
+
+	/*
+	 * The loop below returns 0 for freed objects, for which KASAN cannot
+	 * calculate the allocation size based on the metadata.
+	 */
+	while (size < cache->object_size) {
+		memory_tag = hw_get_mem_tag(object + i * KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE);
+		if (memory_tag != KASAN_TAG_INVALID)
+			size += KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE;
+		else
+			return size;
+		i++;
+	}
+
+	return cache->object_size;
+}
+
+void kasan_metadata_fetch_row(char *buffer, void *row)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < META_BYTES_PER_ROW; i++)
+		buffer[i] = hw_get_mem_tag(row + i * KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE);
+}
+
+void kasan_print_tags(u8 addr_tag, const void *addr)
+{
+	u8 memory_tag = hw_get_mem_tag((void *)addr);
+
+	pr_err("Pointer tag: [%02x], memory tag: [%02x]\n",
+		addr_tag, memory_tag);
+}
diff --git a/mm/kasan/report_sw_tags.c b/mm/kasan/report_sw_tags.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..689e94f9fe
--- /dev/null
+++ b/mm/kasan/report_sw_tags.c
@@ -0,0 +1,95 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * This file contains software tag-based KASAN specific error reporting code.
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 2014 Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd.
+ * Author: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>
+ *
+ * Some code borrowed from https://github.com/xairy/kasan-prototype by
+ *        Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com>
+ */
+
+#include <linux/bitops.h>
+#include <linux/ftrace.h>
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/mm.h>
+#include <linux/printk.h>
+#include <linux/sched.h>
+#include <linux/sched/task_stack.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/stackdepot.h>
+#include <linux/stacktrace.h>
+#include <linux/string.h>
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/kasan.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
+
+#include <asm/sections.h>
+
+#include "kasan.h"
+#include "../slab.h"
+
+const void *kasan_find_first_bad_addr(const void *addr, size_t size)
+{
+	u8 tag = get_tag(addr);
+	void *p = kasan_reset_tag(addr);
+	void *end = p + size;
+
+	if (!addr_has_metadata(p))
+		return p;
+
+	while (p < end && tag == *(u8 *)kasan_mem_to_shadow(p))
+		p += KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE;
+
+	return p;
+}
+
+size_t kasan_get_alloc_size(void *object, struct kmem_cache *cache)
+{
+	size_t size = 0;
+	u8 *shadow;
+
+	/*
+	 * Skip the addr_has_metadata check, as this function only operates on
+	 * slab memory, which must have metadata.
+	 */
+
+	/*
+	 * The loop below returns 0 for freed objects, for which KASAN cannot
+	 * calculate the allocation size based on the metadata.
+	 */
+	shadow = (u8 *)kasan_mem_to_shadow(object);
+	while (size < cache->object_size) {
+		if (*shadow != KASAN_TAG_INVALID)
+			size += KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE;
+		else
+			return size;
+		shadow++;
+	}
+
+	return cache->object_size;
+}
+
+void kasan_metadata_fetch_row(char *buffer, void *row)
+{
+	memcpy(buffer, kasan_mem_to_shadow(row), META_BYTES_PER_ROW);
+}
+
+void kasan_print_tags(u8 addr_tag, const void *addr)
+{
+	u8 *shadow = (u8 *)kasan_mem_to_shadow(addr);
+
+	pr_err("Pointer tag: [%02x], memory tag: [%02x]\n", addr_tag, *shadow);
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_STACK
+void kasan_print_address_stack_frame(const void *addr)
+{
+	if (WARN_ON(!object_is_on_stack(addr)))
+		return;
+
+	pr_err("The buggy address belongs to stack of task %s/%d\n",
+	       current->comm, task_pid_nr(current));
+}
+#endif
diff --git a/mm/kasan/report_tags.c b/mm/kasan/report_tags.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..8b8bfdb3cf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/mm/kasan/report_tags.c
@@ -0,0 +1,116 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2014 Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd.
+ * Copyright (c) 2020 Google, Inc.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/atomic.h>
+
+#include "kasan.h"
+
+extern struct kasan_stack_ring stack_ring;
+
+static const char *get_common_bug_type(struct kasan_report_info *info)
+{
+	/*
+	 * If access_size is a negative number, then it has reason to be
+	 * defined as out-of-bounds bug type.
+	 *
+	 * Casting negative numbers to size_t would indeed turn up as
+	 * a large size_t and its value will be larger than ULONG_MAX/2,
+	 * so that this can qualify as out-of-bounds.
+	 */
+	if (info->access_addr + info->access_size < info->access_addr)
+		return "out-of-bounds";
+
+	return "invalid-access";
+}
+
+void kasan_complete_mode_report_info(struct kasan_report_info *info)
+{
+	unsigned long flags;
+	u64 pos;
+	struct kasan_stack_ring_entry *entry;
+	void *ptr;
+	u32 pid;
+	depot_stack_handle_t stack;
+	bool is_free;
+	bool alloc_found = false, free_found = false;
+
+	if ((!info->cache || !info->object) && !info->bug_type) {
+		info->bug_type = get_common_bug_type(info);
+		return;
+	}
+
+	write_lock_irqsave(&stack_ring.lock, flags);
+
+	pos = atomic64_read(&stack_ring.pos);
+
+	/*
+	 * The loop below tries to find stack ring entries relevant to the
+	 * buggy object. This is a best-effort process.
+	 *
+	 * First, another object with the same tag can be allocated in place of
+	 * the buggy object. Also, since the number of entries is limited, the
+	 * entries relevant to the buggy object can be overwritten.
+	 */
+
+	for (u64 i = pos - 1; i != pos - 1 - stack_ring.size; i--) {
+		if (alloc_found && free_found)
+			break;
+
+		entry = &stack_ring.entries[i % stack_ring.size];
+
+		/* Paired with smp_store_release() in save_stack_info(). */
+		ptr = (void *)smp_load_acquire(&entry->ptr);
+
+		if (kasan_reset_tag(ptr) != info->object ||
+		    get_tag(ptr) != get_tag(info->access_addr))
+			continue;
+
+		pid = READ_ONCE(entry->pid);
+		stack = READ_ONCE(entry->stack);
+		is_free = READ_ONCE(entry->is_free);
+
+		if (is_free) {
+			/*
+			 * Second free of the same object.
+			 * Give up on trying to find the alloc entry.
+			 */
+			if (free_found)
+				break;
+
+			info->free_track.pid = pid;
+			info->free_track.stack = stack;
+			free_found = true;
+
+			/*
+			 * If a free entry is found first, the bug is likely
+			 * a use-after-free.
+			 */
+			if (!info->bug_type)
+				info->bug_type = "slab-use-after-free";
+		} else {
+			/* Second alloc of the same object. Give up. */
+			if (alloc_found)
+				break;
+
+			info->alloc_track.pid = pid;
+			info->alloc_track.stack = stack;
+			alloc_found = true;
+
+			/*
+			 * If an alloc entry is found first, the bug is likely
+			 * an out-of-bounds.
+			 */
+			if (!info->bug_type)
+				info->bug_type = "slab-out-of-bounds";
+		}
+	}
+
+	write_unlock_irqrestore(&stack_ring.lock, flags);
+
+	/* Assign the common bug type if no entries were found. */
+	if (!info->bug_type)
+		info->bug_type = get_common_bug_type(info);
+}
diff --git a/mm/kasan/shadow.c b/mm/kasan/shadow.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..dd772f9d0f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/mm/kasan/shadow.c
@@ -0,0 +1,650 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * This file contains KASAN runtime code that manages shadow memory for
+ * generic and software tag-based KASAN modes.
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 2014 Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd.
+ * Author: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>
+ *
+ * Some code borrowed from https://github.com/xairy/kasan-prototype by
+ *        Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com>
+ */
+
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/kasan.h>
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/kfence.h>
+#include <linux/kmemleak.h>
+#include <linux/memory.h>
+#include <linux/mm.h>
+#include <linux/string.h>
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/vmalloc.h>
+
+#include <asm/cacheflush.h>
+#include <asm/tlbflush.h>
+
+#include "kasan.h"
+
+bool __kasan_check_read(const volatile void *p, unsigned int size)
+{
+	return kasan_check_range((void *)p, size, false, _RET_IP_);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(__kasan_check_read);
+
+bool __kasan_check_write(const volatile void *p, unsigned int size)
+{
+	return kasan_check_range((void *)p, size, true, _RET_IP_);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(__kasan_check_write);
+
+#if !defined(CONFIG_CC_HAS_KASAN_MEMINTRINSIC_PREFIX) && !defined(CONFIG_GENERIC_ENTRY)
+/*
+ * CONFIG_GENERIC_ENTRY relies on compiler emitted mem*() calls to not be
+ * instrumented. KASAN enabled toolchains should emit __asan_mem*() functions
+ * for the sites they want to instrument.
+ *
+ * If we have a compiler that can instrument meminstrinsics, never override
+ * these, so that non-instrumented files can safely consider them as builtins.
+ */
+#undef memset
+void *memset(void *addr, int c, size_t len)
+{
+	if (!kasan_check_range(addr, len, true, _RET_IP_))
+		return NULL;
+
+	return __memset(addr, c, len);
+}
+
+#ifdef __HAVE_ARCH_MEMMOVE
+#undef memmove
+void *memmove(void *dest, const void *src, size_t len)
+{
+	if (!kasan_check_range(src, len, false, _RET_IP_) ||
+	    !kasan_check_range(dest, len, true, _RET_IP_))
+		return NULL;
+
+	return __memmove(dest, src, len);
+}
+#endif
+
+#undef memcpy
+void *memcpy(void *dest, const void *src, size_t len)
+{
+	if (!kasan_check_range(src, len, false, _RET_IP_) ||
+	    !kasan_check_range(dest, len, true, _RET_IP_))
+		return NULL;
+
+	return __memcpy(dest, src, len);
+}
+#endif
+
+void *__asan_memset(void *addr, int c, ssize_t len)
+{
+	if (!kasan_check_range(addr, len, true, _RET_IP_))
+		return NULL;
+
+	return __memset(addr, c, len);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(__asan_memset);
+
+#ifdef __HAVE_ARCH_MEMMOVE
+void *__asan_memmove(void *dest, const void *src, ssize_t len)
+{
+	if (!kasan_check_range(src, len, false, _RET_IP_) ||
+	    !kasan_check_range(dest, len, true, _RET_IP_))
+		return NULL;
+
+	return __memmove(dest, src, len);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(__asan_memmove);
+#endif
+
+void *__asan_memcpy(void *dest, const void *src, ssize_t len)
+{
+	if (!kasan_check_range(src, len, false, _RET_IP_) ||
+	    !kasan_check_range(dest, len, true, _RET_IP_))
+		return NULL;
+
+	return __memcpy(dest, src, len);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(__asan_memcpy);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS
+void *__hwasan_memset(void *addr, int c, ssize_t len) __alias(__asan_memset);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(__hwasan_memset);
+#ifdef __HAVE_ARCH_MEMMOVE
+void *__hwasan_memmove(void *dest, const void *src, ssize_t len) __alias(__asan_memmove);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(__hwasan_memmove);
+#endif
+void *__hwasan_memcpy(void *dest, const void *src, ssize_t len) __alias(__asan_memcpy);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(__hwasan_memcpy);
+#endif
+
+void kasan_poison(const void *addr, size_t size, u8 value, bool init)
+{
+	void *shadow_start, *shadow_end;
+
+	if (!kasan_arch_is_ready())
+		return;
+
+	/*
+	 * Perform shadow offset calculation based on untagged address, as
+	 * some of the callers (e.g. kasan_poison_object_data) pass tagged
+	 * addresses to this function.
+	 */
+	addr = kasan_reset_tag(addr);
+
+	/* Skip KFENCE memory if called explicitly outside of sl*b. */
+	if (is_kfence_address(addr))
+		return;
+
+	if (WARN_ON((unsigned long)addr & KASAN_GRANULE_MASK))
+		return;
+	if (WARN_ON(size & KASAN_GRANULE_MASK))
+		return;
+
+	shadow_start = kasan_mem_to_shadow(addr);
+	shadow_end = kasan_mem_to_shadow(addr + size);
+
+	__memset(shadow_start, value, shadow_end - shadow_start);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(kasan_poison);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC
+void kasan_poison_last_granule(const void *addr, size_t size)
+{
+	if (!kasan_arch_is_ready())
+		return;
+
+	if (size & KASAN_GRANULE_MASK) {
+		u8 *shadow = (u8 *)kasan_mem_to_shadow(addr + size);
+		*shadow = size & KASAN_GRANULE_MASK;
+	}
+}
+#endif
+
+void kasan_unpoison(const void *addr, size_t size, bool init)
+{
+	u8 tag = get_tag(addr);
+
+	/*
+	 * Perform shadow offset calculation based on untagged address, as
+	 * some of the callers (e.g. kasan_unpoison_object_data) pass tagged
+	 * addresses to this function.
+	 */
+	addr = kasan_reset_tag(addr);
+
+	/*
+	 * Skip KFENCE memory if called explicitly outside of sl*b. Also note
+	 * that calls to ksize(), where size is not a multiple of machine-word
+	 * size, would otherwise poison the invalid portion of the word.
+	 */
+	if (is_kfence_address(addr))
+		return;
+
+	if (WARN_ON((unsigned long)addr & KASAN_GRANULE_MASK))
+		return;
+
+	/* Unpoison all granules that cover the object. */
+	kasan_poison(addr, round_up(size, KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE), tag, false);
+
+	/* Partially poison the last granule for the generic mode. */
+	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC))
+		kasan_poison_last_granule(addr, size);
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_MEMORY_HOTPLUG
+static bool shadow_mapped(unsigned long addr)
+{
+	pgd_t *pgd = pgd_offset_k(addr);
+	p4d_t *p4d;
+	pud_t *pud;
+	pmd_t *pmd;
+	pte_t *pte;
+
+	if (pgd_none(*pgd))
+		return false;
+	p4d = p4d_offset(pgd, addr);
+	if (p4d_none(*p4d))
+		return false;
+	pud = pud_offset(p4d, addr);
+	if (pud_none(*pud))
+		return false;
+
+	/*
+	 * We can't use pud_large() or pud_huge(), the first one is
+	 * arch-specific, the last one depends on HUGETLB_PAGE.  So let's abuse
+	 * pud_bad(), if pud is bad then it's bad because it's huge.
+	 */
+	if (pud_bad(*pud))
+		return true;
+	pmd = pmd_offset(pud, addr);
+	if (pmd_none(*pmd))
+		return false;
+
+	if (pmd_bad(*pmd))
+		return true;
+	pte = pte_offset_kernel(pmd, addr);
+	return !pte_none(ptep_get(pte));
+}
+
+static int __meminit kasan_mem_notifier(struct notifier_block *nb,
+			unsigned long action, void *data)
+{
+	struct memory_notify *mem_data = data;
+	unsigned long nr_shadow_pages, start_kaddr, shadow_start;
+	unsigned long shadow_end, shadow_size;
+
+	nr_shadow_pages = mem_data->nr_pages >> KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT;
+	start_kaddr = (unsigned long)pfn_to_kaddr(mem_data->start_pfn);
+	shadow_start = (unsigned long)kasan_mem_to_shadow((void *)start_kaddr);
+	shadow_size = nr_shadow_pages << PAGE_SHIFT;
+	shadow_end = shadow_start + shadow_size;
+
+	if (WARN_ON(mem_data->nr_pages % KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE) ||
+		WARN_ON(start_kaddr % KASAN_MEMORY_PER_SHADOW_PAGE))
+		return NOTIFY_BAD;
+
+	switch (action) {
+	case MEM_GOING_ONLINE: {
+		void *ret;
+
+		/*
+		 * If shadow is mapped already than it must have been mapped
+		 * during the boot. This could happen if we onlining previously
+		 * offlined memory.
+		 */
+		if (shadow_mapped(shadow_start))
+			return NOTIFY_OK;
+
+		ret = __vmalloc_node_range(shadow_size, PAGE_SIZE, shadow_start,
+					shadow_end, GFP_KERNEL,
+					PAGE_KERNEL, VM_NO_GUARD,
+					pfn_to_nid(mem_data->start_pfn),
+					__builtin_return_address(0));
+		if (!ret)
+			return NOTIFY_BAD;
+
+		kmemleak_ignore(ret);
+		return NOTIFY_OK;
+	}
+	case MEM_CANCEL_ONLINE:
+	case MEM_OFFLINE: {
+		struct vm_struct *vm;
+
+		/*
+		 * shadow_start was either mapped during boot by kasan_init()
+		 * or during memory online by __vmalloc_node_range().
+		 * In the latter case we can use vfree() to free shadow.
+		 * Non-NULL result of the find_vm_area() will tell us if
+		 * that was the second case.
+		 *
+		 * Currently it's not possible to free shadow mapped
+		 * during boot by kasan_init(). It's because the code
+		 * to do that hasn't been written yet. So we'll just
+		 * leak the memory.
+		 */
+		vm = find_vm_area((void *)shadow_start);
+		if (vm)
+			vfree((void *)shadow_start);
+	}
+	}
+
+	return NOTIFY_OK;
+}
+
+static int __init kasan_memhotplug_init(void)
+{
+	hotplug_memory_notifier(kasan_mem_notifier, DEFAULT_CALLBACK_PRI);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+core_initcall(kasan_memhotplug_init);
+#endif
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_VMALLOC
+
+void __init __weak kasan_populate_early_vm_area_shadow(void *start,
+						       unsigned long size)
+{
+}
+
+static int kasan_populate_vmalloc_pte(pte_t *ptep, unsigned long addr,
+				      void *unused)
+{
+	unsigned long page;
+	pte_t pte;
+
+	if (likely(!pte_none(ptep_get(ptep))))
+		return 0;
+
+	page = __get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!page)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	memset((void *)page, KASAN_VMALLOC_INVALID, PAGE_SIZE);
+	pte = pfn_pte(PFN_DOWN(__pa(page)), PAGE_KERNEL);
+
+	spin_lock(&init_mm.page_table_lock);
+	if (likely(pte_none(ptep_get(ptep)))) {
+		set_pte_at(&init_mm, addr, ptep, pte);
+		page = 0;
+	}
+	spin_unlock(&init_mm.page_table_lock);
+	if (page)
+		free_page(page);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int kasan_populate_vmalloc(unsigned long addr, unsigned long size)
+{
+	unsigned long shadow_start, shadow_end;
+	int ret;
+
+	if (!kasan_arch_is_ready())
+		return 0;
+
+	if (!is_vmalloc_or_module_addr((void *)addr))
+		return 0;
+
+	shadow_start = (unsigned long)kasan_mem_to_shadow((void *)addr);
+	shadow_end = (unsigned long)kasan_mem_to_shadow((void *)addr + size);
+
+	/*
+	 * User Mode Linux maps enough shadow memory for all of virtual memory
+	 * at boot, so doesn't need to allocate more on vmalloc, just clear it.
+	 *
+	 * The remaining CONFIG_UML checks in this file exist for the same
+	 * reason.
+	 */
+	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_UML)) {
+		__memset((void *)shadow_start, KASAN_VMALLOC_INVALID, shadow_end - shadow_start);
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	shadow_start = PAGE_ALIGN_DOWN(shadow_start);
+	shadow_end = PAGE_ALIGN(shadow_end);
+
+	ret = apply_to_page_range(&init_mm, shadow_start,
+				  shadow_end - shadow_start,
+				  kasan_populate_vmalloc_pte, NULL);
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+
+	flush_cache_vmap(shadow_start, shadow_end);
+
+	/*
+	 * We need to be careful about inter-cpu effects here. Consider:
+	 *
+	 *   CPU#0				  CPU#1
+	 * WRITE_ONCE(p, vmalloc(100));		while (x = READ_ONCE(p)) ;
+	 *					p[99] = 1;
+	 *
+	 * With compiler instrumentation, that ends up looking like this:
+	 *
+	 *   CPU#0				  CPU#1
+	 * // vmalloc() allocates memory
+	 * // let a = area->addr
+	 * // we reach kasan_populate_vmalloc
+	 * // and call kasan_unpoison:
+	 * STORE shadow(a), unpoison_val
+	 * ...
+	 * STORE shadow(a+99), unpoison_val	x = LOAD p
+	 * // rest of vmalloc process		<data dependency>
+	 * STORE p, a				LOAD shadow(x+99)
+	 *
+	 * If there is no barrier between the end of unpoisoning the shadow
+	 * and the store of the result to p, the stores could be committed
+	 * in a different order by CPU#0, and CPU#1 could erroneously observe
+	 * poison in the shadow.
+	 *
+	 * We need some sort of barrier between the stores.
+	 *
+	 * In the vmalloc() case, this is provided by a smp_wmb() in
+	 * clear_vm_uninitialized_flag(). In the per-cpu allocator and in
+	 * get_vm_area() and friends, the caller gets shadow allocated but
+	 * doesn't have any pages mapped into the virtual address space that
+	 * has been reserved. Mapping those pages in will involve taking and
+	 * releasing a page-table lock, which will provide the barrier.
+	 */
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int kasan_depopulate_vmalloc_pte(pte_t *ptep, unsigned long addr,
+					void *unused)
+{
+	unsigned long page;
+
+	page = (unsigned long)__va(pte_pfn(ptep_get(ptep)) << PAGE_SHIFT);
+
+	spin_lock(&init_mm.page_table_lock);
+
+	if (likely(!pte_none(ptep_get(ptep)))) {
+		pte_clear(&init_mm, addr, ptep);
+		free_page(page);
+	}
+	spin_unlock(&init_mm.page_table_lock);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Release the backing for the vmalloc region [start, end), which
+ * lies within the free region [free_region_start, free_region_end).
+ *
+ * This can be run lazily, long after the region was freed. It runs
+ * under vmap_area_lock, so it's not safe to interact with the vmalloc/vmap
+ * infrastructure.
+ *
+ * How does this work?
+ * -------------------
+ *
+ * We have a region that is page aligned, labeled as A.
+ * That might not map onto the shadow in a way that is page-aligned:
+ *
+ *                    start                     end
+ *                    v                         v
+ * |????????|????????|AAAAAAAA|AA....AA|AAAAAAAA|????????| < vmalloc
+ *  -------- -------- --------          -------- --------
+ *      |        |       |                 |        |
+ *      |        |       |         /-------/        |
+ *      \-------\|/------/         |/---------------/
+ *              |||                ||
+ *             |??AAAAAA|AAAAAAAA|AA??????|                < shadow
+ *                 (1)      (2)      (3)
+ *
+ * First we align the start upwards and the end downwards, so that the
+ * shadow of the region aligns with shadow page boundaries. In the
+ * example, this gives us the shadow page (2). This is the shadow entirely
+ * covered by this allocation.
+ *
+ * Then we have the tricky bits. We want to know if we can free the
+ * partially covered shadow pages - (1) and (3) in the example. For this,
+ * we are given the start and end of the free region that contains this
+ * allocation. Extending our previous example, we could have:
+ *
+ *  free_region_start                                    free_region_end
+ *  |                 start                     end      |
+ *  v                 v                         v        v
+ * |FFFFFFFF|FFFFFFFF|AAAAAAAA|AA....AA|AAAAAAAA|FFFFFFFF| < vmalloc
+ *  -------- -------- --------          -------- --------
+ *      |        |       |                 |        |
+ *      |        |       |         /-------/        |
+ *      \-------\|/------/         |/---------------/
+ *              |||                ||
+ *             |FFAAAAAA|AAAAAAAA|AAF?????|                < shadow
+ *                 (1)      (2)      (3)
+ *
+ * Once again, we align the start of the free region up, and the end of
+ * the free region down so that the shadow is page aligned. So we can free
+ * page (1) - we know no allocation currently uses anything in that page,
+ * because all of it is in the vmalloc free region. But we cannot free
+ * page (3), because we can't be sure that the rest of it is unused.
+ *
+ * We only consider pages that contain part of the original region for
+ * freeing: we don't try to free other pages from the free region or we'd
+ * end up trying to free huge chunks of virtual address space.
+ *
+ * Concurrency
+ * -----------
+ *
+ * How do we know that we're not freeing a page that is simultaneously
+ * being used for a fresh allocation in kasan_populate_vmalloc(_pte)?
+ *
+ * We _can_ have kasan_release_vmalloc and kasan_populate_vmalloc running
+ * at the same time. While we run under free_vmap_area_lock, the population
+ * code does not.
+ *
+ * free_vmap_area_lock instead operates to ensure that the larger range
+ * [free_region_start, free_region_end) is safe: because __alloc_vmap_area and
+ * the per-cpu region-finding algorithm both run under free_vmap_area_lock,
+ * no space identified as free will become used while we are running. This
+ * means that so long as we are careful with alignment and only free shadow
+ * pages entirely covered by the free region, we will not run in to any
+ * trouble - any simultaneous allocations will be for disjoint regions.
+ */
+void kasan_release_vmalloc(unsigned long start, unsigned long end,
+			   unsigned long free_region_start,
+			   unsigned long free_region_end)
+{
+	void *shadow_start, *shadow_end;
+	unsigned long region_start, region_end;
+	unsigned long size;
+
+	if (!kasan_arch_is_ready())
+		return;
+
+	region_start = ALIGN(start, KASAN_MEMORY_PER_SHADOW_PAGE);
+	region_end = ALIGN_DOWN(end, KASAN_MEMORY_PER_SHADOW_PAGE);
+
+	free_region_start = ALIGN(free_region_start, KASAN_MEMORY_PER_SHADOW_PAGE);
+
+	if (start != region_start &&
+	    free_region_start < region_start)
+		region_start -= KASAN_MEMORY_PER_SHADOW_PAGE;
+
+	free_region_end = ALIGN_DOWN(free_region_end, KASAN_MEMORY_PER_SHADOW_PAGE);
+
+	if (end != region_end &&
+	    free_region_end > region_end)
+		region_end += KASAN_MEMORY_PER_SHADOW_PAGE;
+
+	shadow_start = kasan_mem_to_shadow((void *)region_start);
+	shadow_end = kasan_mem_to_shadow((void *)region_end);
+
+	if (shadow_end > shadow_start) {
+		size = shadow_end - shadow_start;
+		if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_UML)) {
+			__memset(shadow_start, KASAN_SHADOW_INIT, shadow_end - shadow_start);
+			return;
+		}
+		apply_to_existing_page_range(&init_mm,
+					     (unsigned long)shadow_start,
+					     size, kasan_depopulate_vmalloc_pte,
+					     NULL);
+		flush_tlb_kernel_range((unsigned long)shadow_start,
+				       (unsigned long)shadow_end);
+	}
+}
+
+void *__kasan_unpoison_vmalloc(const void *start, unsigned long size,
+			       kasan_vmalloc_flags_t flags)
+{
+	/*
+	 * Software KASAN modes unpoison both VM_ALLOC and non-VM_ALLOC
+	 * mappings, so the KASAN_VMALLOC_VM_ALLOC flag is ignored.
+	 * Software KASAN modes can't optimize zeroing memory by combining it
+	 * with setting memory tags, so the KASAN_VMALLOC_INIT flag is ignored.
+	 */
+
+	if (!kasan_arch_is_ready())
+		return (void *)start;
+
+	if (!is_vmalloc_or_module_addr(start))
+		return (void *)start;
+
+	/*
+	 * Don't tag executable memory with the tag-based mode.
+	 * The kernel doesn't tolerate having the PC register tagged.
+	 */
+	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS) &&
+	    !(flags & KASAN_VMALLOC_PROT_NORMAL))
+		return (void *)start;
+
+	start = set_tag(start, kasan_random_tag());
+	kasan_unpoison(start, size, false);
+	return (void *)start;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Poison the shadow for a vmalloc region. Called as part of the
+ * freeing process at the time the region is freed.
+ */
+void __kasan_poison_vmalloc(const void *start, unsigned long size)
+{
+	if (!kasan_arch_is_ready())
+		return;
+
+	if (!is_vmalloc_or_module_addr(start))
+		return;
+
+	size = round_up(size, KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE);
+	kasan_poison(start, size, KASAN_VMALLOC_INVALID, false);
+}
+
+#else /* CONFIG_KASAN_VMALLOC */
+
+int kasan_alloc_module_shadow(void *addr, size_t size, gfp_t gfp_mask)
+{
+	void *ret;
+	size_t scaled_size;
+	size_t shadow_size;
+	unsigned long shadow_start;
+
+	shadow_start = (unsigned long)kasan_mem_to_shadow(addr);
+	scaled_size = (size + KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE - 1) >>
+				KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT;
+	shadow_size = round_up(scaled_size, PAGE_SIZE);
+
+	if (WARN_ON(!PAGE_ALIGNED(shadow_start)))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_UML)) {
+		__memset((void *)shadow_start, KASAN_SHADOW_INIT, shadow_size);
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	ret = __vmalloc_node_range(shadow_size, 1, shadow_start,
+			shadow_start + shadow_size,
+			GFP_KERNEL,
+			PAGE_KERNEL, VM_NO_GUARD, NUMA_NO_NODE,
+			__builtin_return_address(0));
+
+	if (ret) {
+		struct vm_struct *vm = find_vm_area(addr);
+		__memset(ret, KASAN_SHADOW_INIT, shadow_size);
+		vm->flags |= VM_KASAN;
+		kmemleak_ignore(ret);
+
+		if (vm->flags & VM_DEFER_KMEMLEAK)
+			kmemleak_vmalloc(vm, size, gfp_mask);
+
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	return -ENOMEM;
+}
+
+void kasan_free_module_shadow(const struct vm_struct *vm)
+{
+	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_UML))
+		return;
+
+	if (vm->flags & VM_KASAN)
+		vfree(kasan_mem_to_shadow(vm->addr));
+}
+
+#endif
diff --git a/mm/kasan/sw_tags.c b/mm/kasan/sw_tags.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..220b5d4c68
--- /dev/null
+++ b/mm/kasan/sw_tags.c
@@ -0,0 +1,176 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * This file contains core software tag-based KASAN code.
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 2018 Google, Inc.
+ * Author: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
+ */
+
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) "kasan: " fmt
+
+#include <linux/export.h>
+#include <linux/interrupt.h>
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/kasan.h>
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/kmemleak.h>
+#include <linux/linkage.h>
+#include <linux/memblock.h>
+#include <linux/memory.h>
+#include <linux/mm.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/printk.h>
+#include <linux/random.h>
+#include <linux/sched.h>
+#include <linux/sched/task_stack.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/stacktrace.h>
+#include <linux/string.h>
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/vmalloc.h>
+#include <linux/bug.h>
+
+#include "kasan.h"
+#include "../slab.h"
+
+static DEFINE_PER_CPU(u32, prng_state);
+
+void __init kasan_init_sw_tags(void)
+{
+	int cpu;
+
+	for_each_possible_cpu(cpu)
+		per_cpu(prng_state, cpu) = (u32)get_cycles();
+
+	kasan_init_tags();
+
+	pr_info("KernelAddressSanitizer initialized (sw-tags, stacktrace=%s)\n",
+		kasan_stack_collection_enabled() ? "on" : "off");
+}
+
+/*
+ * If a preemption happens between this_cpu_read and this_cpu_write, the only
+ * side effect is that we'll give a few allocated in different contexts objects
+ * the same tag. Since tag-based KASAN is meant to be used a probabilistic
+ * bug-detection debug feature, this doesn't have significant negative impact.
+ *
+ * Ideally the tags use strong randomness to prevent any attempts to predict
+ * them during explicit exploit attempts. But strong randomness is expensive,
+ * and we did an intentional trade-off to use a PRNG. This non-atomic RMW
+ * sequence has in fact positive effect, since interrupts that randomly skew
+ * PRNG at unpredictable points do only good.
+ */
+u8 kasan_random_tag(void)
+{
+	u32 state = this_cpu_read(prng_state);
+
+	state = 1664525 * state + 1013904223;
+	this_cpu_write(prng_state, state);
+
+	return (u8)(state % (KASAN_TAG_MAX + 1));
+}
+
+bool kasan_check_range(const void *addr, size_t size, bool write,
+			unsigned long ret_ip)
+{
+	u8 tag;
+	u8 *shadow_first, *shadow_last, *shadow;
+	void *untagged_addr;
+
+	if (unlikely(size == 0))
+		return true;
+
+	if (unlikely(addr + size < addr))
+		return !kasan_report(addr, size, write, ret_ip);
+
+	tag = get_tag((const void *)addr);
+
+	/*
+	 * Ignore accesses for pointers tagged with 0xff (native kernel
+	 * pointer tag) to suppress false positives caused by kmap.
+	 *
+	 * Some kernel code was written to account for archs that don't keep
+	 * high memory mapped all the time, but rather map and unmap particular
+	 * pages when needed. Instead of storing a pointer to the kernel memory,
+	 * this code saves the address of the page structure and offset within
+	 * that page for later use. Those pages are then mapped and unmapped
+	 * with kmap/kunmap when necessary and virt_to_page is used to get the
+	 * virtual address of the page. For arm64 (that keeps the high memory
+	 * mapped all the time), kmap is turned into a page_address call.
+
+	 * The issue is that with use of the page_address + virt_to_page
+	 * sequence the top byte value of the original pointer gets lost (gets
+	 * set to KASAN_TAG_KERNEL (0xFF)).
+	 */
+	if (tag == KASAN_TAG_KERNEL)
+		return true;
+
+	untagged_addr = kasan_reset_tag((const void *)addr);
+	if (unlikely(!addr_has_metadata(untagged_addr)))
+		return !kasan_report(addr, size, write, ret_ip);
+	shadow_first = kasan_mem_to_shadow(untagged_addr);
+	shadow_last = kasan_mem_to_shadow(untagged_addr + size - 1);
+	for (shadow = shadow_first; shadow <= shadow_last; shadow++) {
+		if (*shadow != tag) {
+			return !kasan_report(addr, size, write, ret_ip);
+		}
+	}
+
+	return true;
+}
+
+bool kasan_byte_accessible(const void *addr)
+{
+	u8 tag = get_tag(addr);
+	void *untagged_addr = kasan_reset_tag(addr);
+	u8 shadow_byte;
+
+	if (!addr_has_metadata(untagged_addr))
+		return false;
+
+	shadow_byte = READ_ONCE(*(u8 *)kasan_mem_to_shadow(untagged_addr));
+	return tag == KASAN_TAG_KERNEL || tag == shadow_byte;
+}
+
+#define DEFINE_HWASAN_LOAD_STORE(size)					\
+	void __hwasan_load##size##_noabort(void *addr)			\
+	{								\
+		kasan_check_range(addr, size, false, _RET_IP_);		\
+	}								\
+	EXPORT_SYMBOL(__hwasan_load##size##_noabort);			\
+	void __hwasan_store##size##_noabort(void *addr)			\
+	{								\
+		kasan_check_range(addr, size, true, _RET_IP_);		\
+	}								\
+	EXPORT_SYMBOL(__hwasan_store##size##_noabort)
+
+DEFINE_HWASAN_LOAD_STORE(1);
+DEFINE_HWASAN_LOAD_STORE(2);
+DEFINE_HWASAN_LOAD_STORE(4);
+DEFINE_HWASAN_LOAD_STORE(8);
+DEFINE_HWASAN_LOAD_STORE(16);
+
+void __hwasan_loadN_noabort(void *addr, ssize_t size)
+{
+	kasan_check_range(addr, size, false, _RET_IP_);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(__hwasan_loadN_noabort);
+
+void __hwasan_storeN_noabort(void *addr, ssize_t size)
+{
+	kasan_check_range(addr, size, true, _RET_IP_);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(__hwasan_storeN_noabort);
+
+void __hwasan_tag_memory(void *addr, u8 tag, ssize_t size)
+{
+	kasan_poison(addr, size, tag, false);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(__hwasan_tag_memory);
+
+void kasan_tag_mismatch(void *addr, unsigned long access_info,
+			unsigned long ret_ip)
+{
+	kasan_report(addr, 1 << (access_info & 0xf), access_info & 0x10,
+		     ret_ip);
+}
diff --git a/mm/kasan/tags.c b/mm/kasan/tags.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..7dcfe341d4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/mm/kasan/tags.c
@@ -0,0 +1,144 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * This file contains common tag-based KASAN code.
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 2018 Google, Inc.
+ * Copyright (c) 2020 Google, Inc.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/atomic.h>
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/kasan.h>
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/memblock.h>
+#include <linux/memory.h>
+#include <linux/mm.h>
+#include <linux/static_key.h>
+#include <linux/string.h>
+#include <linux/types.h>
+
+#include "kasan.h"
+#include "../slab.h"
+
+#define KASAN_STACK_RING_SIZE_DEFAULT (32 << 10)
+
+enum kasan_arg_stacktrace {
+	KASAN_ARG_STACKTRACE_DEFAULT,
+	KASAN_ARG_STACKTRACE_OFF,
+	KASAN_ARG_STACKTRACE_ON,
+};
+
+static enum kasan_arg_stacktrace kasan_arg_stacktrace __initdata;
+
+/* Whether to collect alloc/free stack traces. */
+DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_TRUE(kasan_flag_stacktrace);
+
+/* Non-zero, as initial pointer values are 0. */
+#define STACK_RING_BUSY_PTR ((void *)1)
+
+struct kasan_stack_ring stack_ring = {
+	.lock = __RW_LOCK_UNLOCKED(stack_ring.lock)
+};
+
+/* kasan.stacktrace=off/on */
+static int __init early_kasan_flag_stacktrace(char *arg)
+{
+	if (!arg)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (!strcmp(arg, "off"))
+		kasan_arg_stacktrace = KASAN_ARG_STACKTRACE_OFF;
+	else if (!strcmp(arg, "on"))
+		kasan_arg_stacktrace = KASAN_ARG_STACKTRACE_ON;
+	else
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+early_param("kasan.stacktrace", early_kasan_flag_stacktrace);
+
+/* kasan.stack_ring_size=<number of entries> */
+static int __init early_kasan_flag_stack_ring_size(char *arg)
+{
+	if (!arg)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	return kstrtoul(arg, 0, &stack_ring.size);
+}
+early_param("kasan.stack_ring_size", early_kasan_flag_stack_ring_size);
+
+void __init kasan_init_tags(void)
+{
+	switch (kasan_arg_stacktrace) {
+	case KASAN_ARG_STACKTRACE_DEFAULT:
+		/* Default is specified by kasan_flag_stacktrace definition. */
+		break;
+	case KASAN_ARG_STACKTRACE_OFF:
+		static_branch_disable(&kasan_flag_stacktrace);
+		break;
+	case KASAN_ARG_STACKTRACE_ON:
+		static_branch_enable(&kasan_flag_stacktrace);
+		break;
+	}
+
+	if (kasan_stack_collection_enabled()) {
+		if (!stack_ring.size)
+			stack_ring.size = KASAN_STACK_RING_SIZE_DEFAULT;
+		stack_ring.entries = memblock_alloc(
+			sizeof(stack_ring.entries[0]) * stack_ring.size,
+			SMP_CACHE_BYTES);
+		if (WARN_ON(!stack_ring.entries))
+			static_branch_disable(&kasan_flag_stacktrace);
+	}
+}
+
+static void save_stack_info(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object,
+			gfp_t gfp_flags, bool is_free)
+{
+	unsigned long flags;
+	depot_stack_handle_t stack;
+	u64 pos;
+	struct kasan_stack_ring_entry *entry;
+	void *old_ptr;
+
+	stack = kasan_save_stack(gfp_flags, true);
+
+	/*
+	 * Prevent save_stack_info() from modifying stack ring
+	 * when kasan_complete_mode_report_info() is walking it.
+	 */
+	read_lock_irqsave(&stack_ring.lock, flags);
+
+next:
+	pos = atomic64_fetch_add(1, &stack_ring.pos);
+	entry = &stack_ring.entries[pos % stack_ring.size];
+
+	/* Detect stack ring entry slots that are being written to. */
+	old_ptr = READ_ONCE(entry->ptr);
+	if (old_ptr == STACK_RING_BUSY_PTR)
+		goto next; /* Busy slot. */
+	if (!try_cmpxchg(&entry->ptr, &old_ptr, STACK_RING_BUSY_PTR))
+		goto next; /* Busy slot. */
+
+	WRITE_ONCE(entry->size, cache->object_size);
+	WRITE_ONCE(entry->pid, current->pid);
+	WRITE_ONCE(entry->stack, stack);
+	WRITE_ONCE(entry->is_free, is_free);
+
+	/*
+	 * Paired with smp_load_acquire() in kasan_complete_mode_report_info().
+	 */
+	smp_store_release(&entry->ptr, (s64)object);
+
+	read_unlock_irqrestore(&stack_ring.lock, flags);
+}
+
+void kasan_save_alloc_info(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object, gfp_t flags)
+{
+	save_stack_info(cache, object, flags, false);
+}
+
+void kasan_save_free_info(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object)
+{
+	save_stack_info(cache, object, 0, true);
+}