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-rw-r--r--net/sunrpc/auth_gss/svcauth_gss.c2134
1 files changed, 2134 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/svcauth_gss.c b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/svcauth_gss.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..18734e70c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/svcauth_gss.c
@@ -0,0 +1,2134 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * Neil Brown <neilb@cse.unsw.edu.au>
+ * J. Bruce Fields <bfields@umich.edu>
+ * Andy Adamson <andros@umich.edu>
+ * Dug Song <dugsong@monkey.org>
+ *
+ * RPCSEC_GSS server authentication.
+ * This implements RPCSEC_GSS as defined in rfc2203 (rpcsec_gss) and rfc2078
+ * (gssapi)
+ *
+ * The RPCSEC_GSS involves three stages:
+ * 1/ context creation
+ * 2/ data exchange
+ * 3/ context destruction
+ *
+ * Context creation is handled largely by upcalls to user-space.
+ * In particular, GSS_Accept_sec_context is handled by an upcall
+ * Data exchange is handled entirely within the kernel
+ * In particular, GSS_GetMIC, GSS_VerifyMIC, GSS_Seal, GSS_Unseal are in-kernel.
+ * Context destruction is handled in-kernel
+ * GSS_Delete_sec_context is in-kernel
+ *
+ * Context creation is initiated by a RPCSEC_GSS_INIT request arriving.
+ * The context handle and gss_token are used as a key into the rpcsec_init cache.
+ * The content of this cache includes some of the outputs of GSS_Accept_sec_context,
+ * being major_status, minor_status, context_handle, reply_token.
+ * These are sent back to the client.
+ * Sequence window management is handled by the kernel. The window size if currently
+ * a compile time constant.
+ *
+ * When user-space is happy that a context is established, it places an entry
+ * in the rpcsec_context cache. The key for this cache is the context_handle.
+ * The content includes:
+ * uid/gidlist - for determining access rights
+ * mechanism type
+ * mechanism specific information, such as a key
+ *
+ */
+
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/pagemap.h>
+#include <linux/user_namespace.h>
+
+#include <linux/sunrpc/auth_gss.h>
+#include <linux/sunrpc/gss_err.h>
+#include <linux/sunrpc/svcauth.h>
+#include <linux/sunrpc/svcauth_gss.h>
+#include <linux/sunrpc/cache.h>
+#include <linux/sunrpc/gss_krb5.h>
+
+#include <trace/events/rpcgss.h>
+
+#include "gss_rpc_upcall.h"
+
+/*
+ * Unfortunately there isn't a maximum checksum size exported via the
+ * GSS API. Manufacture one based on GSS mechanisms supported by this
+ * implementation.
+ */
+#define GSS_MAX_CKSUMSIZE (GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN + GSS_KRB5_MAX_CKSUM_LEN)
+
+/*
+ * This value may be increased in the future to accommodate other
+ * usage of the scratch buffer.
+ */
+#define GSS_SCRATCH_SIZE GSS_MAX_CKSUMSIZE
+
+struct gss_svc_data {
+ /* decoded gss client cred: */
+ struct rpc_gss_wire_cred clcred;
+ u32 gsd_databody_offset;
+ struct rsc *rsci;
+
+ /* for temporary results */
+ __be32 gsd_seq_num;
+ u8 gsd_scratch[GSS_SCRATCH_SIZE];
+};
+
+/* The rpcsec_init cache is used for mapping RPCSEC_GSS_{,CONT_}INIT requests
+ * into replies.
+ *
+ * Key is context handle (\x if empty) and gss_token.
+ * Content is major_status minor_status (integers) context_handle, reply_token.
+ *
+ */
+
+static int netobj_equal(struct xdr_netobj *a, struct xdr_netobj *b)
+{
+ return a->len == b->len && 0 == memcmp(a->data, b->data, a->len);
+}
+
+#define RSI_HASHBITS 6
+#define RSI_HASHMAX (1<<RSI_HASHBITS)
+
+struct rsi {
+ struct cache_head h;
+ struct xdr_netobj in_handle, in_token;
+ struct xdr_netobj out_handle, out_token;
+ int major_status, minor_status;
+ struct rcu_head rcu_head;
+};
+
+static struct rsi *rsi_update(struct cache_detail *cd, struct rsi *new, struct rsi *old);
+static struct rsi *rsi_lookup(struct cache_detail *cd, struct rsi *item);
+
+static void rsi_free(struct rsi *rsii)
+{
+ kfree(rsii->in_handle.data);
+ kfree(rsii->in_token.data);
+ kfree(rsii->out_handle.data);
+ kfree(rsii->out_token.data);
+}
+
+static void rsi_free_rcu(struct rcu_head *head)
+{
+ struct rsi *rsii = container_of(head, struct rsi, rcu_head);
+
+ rsi_free(rsii);
+ kfree(rsii);
+}
+
+static void rsi_put(struct kref *ref)
+{
+ struct rsi *rsii = container_of(ref, struct rsi, h.ref);
+
+ call_rcu(&rsii->rcu_head, rsi_free_rcu);
+}
+
+static inline int rsi_hash(struct rsi *item)
+{
+ return hash_mem(item->in_handle.data, item->in_handle.len, RSI_HASHBITS)
+ ^ hash_mem(item->in_token.data, item->in_token.len, RSI_HASHBITS);
+}
+
+static int rsi_match(struct cache_head *a, struct cache_head *b)
+{
+ struct rsi *item = container_of(a, struct rsi, h);
+ struct rsi *tmp = container_of(b, struct rsi, h);
+ return netobj_equal(&item->in_handle, &tmp->in_handle) &&
+ netobj_equal(&item->in_token, &tmp->in_token);
+}
+
+static int dup_to_netobj(struct xdr_netobj *dst, char *src, int len)
+{
+ dst->len = len;
+ dst->data = (len ? kmemdup(src, len, GFP_KERNEL) : NULL);
+ if (len && !dst->data)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static inline int dup_netobj(struct xdr_netobj *dst, struct xdr_netobj *src)
+{
+ return dup_to_netobj(dst, src->data, src->len);
+}
+
+static void rsi_init(struct cache_head *cnew, struct cache_head *citem)
+{
+ struct rsi *new = container_of(cnew, struct rsi, h);
+ struct rsi *item = container_of(citem, struct rsi, h);
+
+ new->out_handle.data = NULL;
+ new->out_handle.len = 0;
+ new->out_token.data = NULL;
+ new->out_token.len = 0;
+ new->in_handle.len = item->in_handle.len;
+ item->in_handle.len = 0;
+ new->in_token.len = item->in_token.len;
+ item->in_token.len = 0;
+ new->in_handle.data = item->in_handle.data;
+ item->in_handle.data = NULL;
+ new->in_token.data = item->in_token.data;
+ item->in_token.data = NULL;
+}
+
+static void update_rsi(struct cache_head *cnew, struct cache_head *citem)
+{
+ struct rsi *new = container_of(cnew, struct rsi, h);
+ struct rsi *item = container_of(citem, struct rsi, h);
+
+ BUG_ON(new->out_handle.data || new->out_token.data);
+ new->out_handle.len = item->out_handle.len;
+ item->out_handle.len = 0;
+ new->out_token.len = item->out_token.len;
+ item->out_token.len = 0;
+ new->out_handle.data = item->out_handle.data;
+ item->out_handle.data = NULL;
+ new->out_token.data = item->out_token.data;
+ item->out_token.data = NULL;
+
+ new->major_status = item->major_status;
+ new->minor_status = item->minor_status;
+}
+
+static struct cache_head *rsi_alloc(void)
+{
+ struct rsi *rsii = kmalloc(sizeof(*rsii), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (rsii)
+ return &rsii->h;
+ else
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static int rsi_upcall(struct cache_detail *cd, struct cache_head *h)
+{
+ return sunrpc_cache_pipe_upcall_timeout(cd, h);
+}
+
+static void rsi_request(struct cache_detail *cd,
+ struct cache_head *h,
+ char **bpp, int *blen)
+{
+ struct rsi *rsii = container_of(h, struct rsi, h);
+
+ qword_addhex(bpp, blen, rsii->in_handle.data, rsii->in_handle.len);
+ qword_addhex(bpp, blen, rsii->in_token.data, rsii->in_token.len);
+ (*bpp)[-1] = '\n';
+ WARN_ONCE(*blen < 0,
+ "RPCSEC/GSS credential too large - please use gssproxy\n");
+}
+
+static int rsi_parse(struct cache_detail *cd,
+ char *mesg, int mlen)
+{
+ /* context token expiry major minor context token */
+ char *buf = mesg;
+ char *ep;
+ int len;
+ struct rsi rsii, *rsip = NULL;
+ time64_t expiry;
+ int status = -EINVAL;
+
+ memset(&rsii, 0, sizeof(rsii));
+ /* handle */
+ len = qword_get(&mesg, buf, mlen);
+ if (len < 0)
+ goto out;
+ status = -ENOMEM;
+ if (dup_to_netobj(&rsii.in_handle, buf, len))
+ goto out;
+
+ /* token */
+ len = qword_get(&mesg, buf, mlen);
+ status = -EINVAL;
+ if (len < 0)
+ goto out;
+ status = -ENOMEM;
+ if (dup_to_netobj(&rsii.in_token, buf, len))
+ goto out;
+
+ rsip = rsi_lookup(cd, &rsii);
+ if (!rsip)
+ goto out;
+
+ rsii.h.flags = 0;
+ /* expiry */
+ status = get_expiry(&mesg, &expiry);
+ if (status)
+ goto out;
+
+ status = -EINVAL;
+ /* major/minor */
+ len = qword_get(&mesg, buf, mlen);
+ if (len <= 0)
+ goto out;
+ rsii.major_status = simple_strtoul(buf, &ep, 10);
+ if (*ep)
+ goto out;
+ len = qword_get(&mesg, buf, mlen);
+ if (len <= 0)
+ goto out;
+ rsii.minor_status = simple_strtoul(buf, &ep, 10);
+ if (*ep)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* out_handle */
+ len = qword_get(&mesg, buf, mlen);
+ if (len < 0)
+ goto out;
+ status = -ENOMEM;
+ if (dup_to_netobj(&rsii.out_handle, buf, len))
+ goto out;
+
+ /* out_token */
+ len = qword_get(&mesg, buf, mlen);
+ status = -EINVAL;
+ if (len < 0)
+ goto out;
+ status = -ENOMEM;
+ if (dup_to_netobj(&rsii.out_token, buf, len))
+ goto out;
+ rsii.h.expiry_time = expiry;
+ rsip = rsi_update(cd, &rsii, rsip);
+ status = 0;
+out:
+ rsi_free(&rsii);
+ if (rsip)
+ cache_put(&rsip->h, cd);
+ else
+ status = -ENOMEM;
+ return status;
+}
+
+static const struct cache_detail rsi_cache_template = {
+ .owner = THIS_MODULE,
+ .hash_size = RSI_HASHMAX,
+ .name = "auth.rpcsec.init",
+ .cache_put = rsi_put,
+ .cache_upcall = rsi_upcall,
+ .cache_request = rsi_request,
+ .cache_parse = rsi_parse,
+ .match = rsi_match,
+ .init = rsi_init,
+ .update = update_rsi,
+ .alloc = rsi_alloc,
+};
+
+static struct rsi *rsi_lookup(struct cache_detail *cd, struct rsi *item)
+{
+ struct cache_head *ch;
+ int hash = rsi_hash(item);
+
+ ch = sunrpc_cache_lookup_rcu(cd, &item->h, hash);
+ if (ch)
+ return container_of(ch, struct rsi, h);
+ else
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static struct rsi *rsi_update(struct cache_detail *cd, struct rsi *new, struct rsi *old)
+{
+ struct cache_head *ch;
+ int hash = rsi_hash(new);
+
+ ch = sunrpc_cache_update(cd, &new->h,
+ &old->h, hash);
+ if (ch)
+ return container_of(ch, struct rsi, h);
+ else
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * The rpcsec_context cache is used to store a context that is
+ * used in data exchange.
+ * The key is a context handle. The content is:
+ * uid, gidlist, mechanism, service-set, mech-specific-data
+ */
+
+#define RSC_HASHBITS 10
+#define RSC_HASHMAX (1<<RSC_HASHBITS)
+
+#define GSS_SEQ_WIN 128
+
+struct gss_svc_seq_data {
+ /* highest seq number seen so far: */
+ u32 sd_max;
+ /* for i such that sd_max-GSS_SEQ_WIN < i <= sd_max, the i-th bit of
+ * sd_win is nonzero iff sequence number i has been seen already: */
+ unsigned long sd_win[GSS_SEQ_WIN/BITS_PER_LONG];
+ spinlock_t sd_lock;
+};
+
+struct rsc {
+ struct cache_head h;
+ struct xdr_netobj handle;
+ struct svc_cred cred;
+ struct gss_svc_seq_data seqdata;
+ struct gss_ctx *mechctx;
+ struct rcu_head rcu_head;
+};
+
+static struct rsc *rsc_update(struct cache_detail *cd, struct rsc *new, struct rsc *old);
+static struct rsc *rsc_lookup(struct cache_detail *cd, struct rsc *item);
+
+static void rsc_free(struct rsc *rsci)
+{
+ kfree(rsci->handle.data);
+ if (rsci->mechctx)
+ gss_delete_sec_context(&rsci->mechctx);
+ free_svc_cred(&rsci->cred);
+}
+
+static void rsc_free_rcu(struct rcu_head *head)
+{
+ struct rsc *rsci = container_of(head, struct rsc, rcu_head);
+
+ kfree(rsci->handle.data);
+ kfree(rsci);
+}
+
+static void rsc_put(struct kref *ref)
+{
+ struct rsc *rsci = container_of(ref, struct rsc, h.ref);
+
+ if (rsci->mechctx)
+ gss_delete_sec_context(&rsci->mechctx);
+ free_svc_cred(&rsci->cred);
+ call_rcu(&rsci->rcu_head, rsc_free_rcu);
+}
+
+static inline int
+rsc_hash(struct rsc *rsci)
+{
+ return hash_mem(rsci->handle.data, rsci->handle.len, RSC_HASHBITS);
+}
+
+static int
+rsc_match(struct cache_head *a, struct cache_head *b)
+{
+ struct rsc *new = container_of(a, struct rsc, h);
+ struct rsc *tmp = container_of(b, struct rsc, h);
+
+ return netobj_equal(&new->handle, &tmp->handle);
+}
+
+static void
+rsc_init(struct cache_head *cnew, struct cache_head *ctmp)
+{
+ struct rsc *new = container_of(cnew, struct rsc, h);
+ struct rsc *tmp = container_of(ctmp, struct rsc, h);
+
+ new->handle.len = tmp->handle.len;
+ tmp->handle.len = 0;
+ new->handle.data = tmp->handle.data;
+ tmp->handle.data = NULL;
+ new->mechctx = NULL;
+ init_svc_cred(&new->cred);
+}
+
+static void
+update_rsc(struct cache_head *cnew, struct cache_head *ctmp)
+{
+ struct rsc *new = container_of(cnew, struct rsc, h);
+ struct rsc *tmp = container_of(ctmp, struct rsc, h);
+
+ new->mechctx = tmp->mechctx;
+ tmp->mechctx = NULL;
+ memset(&new->seqdata, 0, sizeof(new->seqdata));
+ spin_lock_init(&new->seqdata.sd_lock);
+ new->cred = tmp->cred;
+ init_svc_cred(&tmp->cred);
+}
+
+static struct cache_head *
+rsc_alloc(void)
+{
+ struct rsc *rsci = kmalloc(sizeof(*rsci), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (rsci)
+ return &rsci->h;
+ else
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static int rsc_upcall(struct cache_detail *cd, struct cache_head *h)
+{
+ return -EINVAL;
+}
+
+static int rsc_parse(struct cache_detail *cd,
+ char *mesg, int mlen)
+{
+ /* contexthandle expiry [ uid gid N <n gids> mechname ...mechdata... ] */
+ char *buf = mesg;
+ int id;
+ int len, rv;
+ struct rsc rsci, *rscp = NULL;
+ time64_t expiry;
+ int status = -EINVAL;
+ struct gss_api_mech *gm = NULL;
+
+ memset(&rsci, 0, sizeof(rsci));
+ /* context handle */
+ len = qword_get(&mesg, buf, mlen);
+ if (len < 0) goto out;
+ status = -ENOMEM;
+ if (dup_to_netobj(&rsci.handle, buf, len))
+ goto out;
+
+ rsci.h.flags = 0;
+ /* expiry */
+ status = get_expiry(&mesg, &expiry);
+ if (status)
+ goto out;
+
+ status = -EINVAL;
+ rscp = rsc_lookup(cd, &rsci);
+ if (!rscp)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* uid, or NEGATIVE */
+ rv = get_int(&mesg, &id);
+ if (rv == -EINVAL)
+ goto out;
+ if (rv == -ENOENT)
+ set_bit(CACHE_NEGATIVE, &rsci.h.flags);
+ else {
+ int N, i;
+
+ /*
+ * NOTE: we skip uid_valid()/gid_valid() checks here:
+ * instead, * -1 id's are later mapped to the
+ * (export-specific) anonymous id by nfsd_setuser.
+ *
+ * (But supplementary gid's get no such special
+ * treatment so are checked for validity here.)
+ */
+ /* uid */
+ rsci.cred.cr_uid = make_kuid(current_user_ns(), id);
+
+ /* gid */
+ if (get_int(&mesg, &id))
+ goto out;
+ rsci.cred.cr_gid = make_kgid(current_user_ns(), id);
+
+ /* number of additional gid's */
+ if (get_int(&mesg, &N))
+ goto out;
+ if (N < 0 || N > NGROUPS_MAX)
+ goto out;
+ status = -ENOMEM;
+ rsci.cred.cr_group_info = groups_alloc(N);
+ if (rsci.cred.cr_group_info == NULL)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* gid's */
+ status = -EINVAL;
+ for (i=0; i<N; i++) {
+ kgid_t kgid;
+ if (get_int(&mesg, &id))
+ goto out;
+ kgid = make_kgid(current_user_ns(), id);
+ if (!gid_valid(kgid))
+ goto out;
+ rsci.cred.cr_group_info->gid[i] = kgid;
+ }
+ groups_sort(rsci.cred.cr_group_info);
+
+ /* mech name */
+ len = qword_get(&mesg, buf, mlen);
+ if (len < 0)
+ goto out;
+ gm = rsci.cred.cr_gss_mech = gss_mech_get_by_name(buf);
+ status = -EOPNOTSUPP;
+ if (!gm)
+ goto out;
+
+ status = -EINVAL;
+ /* mech-specific data: */
+ len = qword_get(&mesg, buf, mlen);
+ if (len < 0)
+ goto out;
+ status = gss_import_sec_context(buf, len, gm, &rsci.mechctx,
+ NULL, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (status)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* get client name */
+ len = qword_get(&mesg, buf, mlen);
+ if (len > 0) {
+ rsci.cred.cr_principal = kstrdup(buf, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!rsci.cred.cr_principal) {
+ status = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ }
+
+ }
+ rsci.h.expiry_time = expiry;
+ rscp = rsc_update(cd, &rsci, rscp);
+ status = 0;
+out:
+ rsc_free(&rsci);
+ if (rscp)
+ cache_put(&rscp->h, cd);
+ else
+ status = -ENOMEM;
+ return status;
+}
+
+static const struct cache_detail rsc_cache_template = {
+ .owner = THIS_MODULE,
+ .hash_size = RSC_HASHMAX,
+ .name = "auth.rpcsec.context",
+ .cache_put = rsc_put,
+ .cache_upcall = rsc_upcall,
+ .cache_parse = rsc_parse,
+ .match = rsc_match,
+ .init = rsc_init,
+ .update = update_rsc,
+ .alloc = rsc_alloc,
+};
+
+static struct rsc *rsc_lookup(struct cache_detail *cd, struct rsc *item)
+{
+ struct cache_head *ch;
+ int hash = rsc_hash(item);
+
+ ch = sunrpc_cache_lookup_rcu(cd, &item->h, hash);
+ if (ch)
+ return container_of(ch, struct rsc, h);
+ else
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static struct rsc *rsc_update(struct cache_detail *cd, struct rsc *new, struct rsc *old)
+{
+ struct cache_head *ch;
+ int hash = rsc_hash(new);
+
+ ch = sunrpc_cache_update(cd, &new->h,
+ &old->h, hash);
+ if (ch)
+ return container_of(ch, struct rsc, h);
+ else
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+
+static struct rsc *
+gss_svc_searchbyctx(struct cache_detail *cd, struct xdr_netobj *handle)
+{
+ struct rsc rsci;
+ struct rsc *found;
+
+ memset(&rsci, 0, sizeof(rsci));
+ if (dup_to_netobj(&rsci.handle, handle->data, handle->len))
+ return NULL;
+ found = rsc_lookup(cd, &rsci);
+ rsc_free(&rsci);
+ if (!found)
+ return NULL;
+ if (cache_check(cd, &found->h, NULL))
+ return NULL;
+ return found;
+}
+
+/**
+ * gss_check_seq_num - GSS sequence number window check
+ * @rqstp: RPC Call to use when reporting errors
+ * @rsci: cached GSS context state (updated on return)
+ * @seq_num: sequence number to check
+ *
+ * Implements sequence number algorithm as specified in
+ * RFC 2203, Section 5.3.3.1. "Context Management".
+ *
+ * Return values:
+ * %true: @rqstp's GSS sequence number is inside the window
+ * %false: @rqstp's GSS sequence number is outside the window
+ */
+static bool gss_check_seq_num(const struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct rsc *rsci,
+ u32 seq_num)
+{
+ struct gss_svc_seq_data *sd = &rsci->seqdata;
+ bool result = false;
+
+ spin_lock(&sd->sd_lock);
+ if (seq_num > sd->sd_max) {
+ if (seq_num >= sd->sd_max + GSS_SEQ_WIN) {
+ memset(sd->sd_win, 0, sizeof(sd->sd_win));
+ sd->sd_max = seq_num;
+ } else while (sd->sd_max < seq_num) {
+ sd->sd_max++;
+ __clear_bit(sd->sd_max % GSS_SEQ_WIN, sd->sd_win);
+ }
+ __set_bit(seq_num % GSS_SEQ_WIN, sd->sd_win);
+ goto ok;
+ } else if (seq_num + GSS_SEQ_WIN <= sd->sd_max) {
+ goto toolow;
+ }
+ if (__test_and_set_bit(seq_num % GSS_SEQ_WIN, sd->sd_win))
+ goto alreadyseen;
+
+ok:
+ result = true;
+out:
+ spin_unlock(&sd->sd_lock);
+ return result;
+
+toolow:
+ trace_rpcgss_svc_seqno_low(rqstp, seq_num,
+ sd->sd_max - GSS_SEQ_WIN,
+ sd->sd_max);
+ goto out;
+alreadyseen:
+ trace_rpcgss_svc_seqno_seen(rqstp, seq_num);
+ goto out;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Decode and verify a Call's verifier field. For RPC_AUTH_GSS Calls,
+ * the body of this field contains a variable length checksum.
+ *
+ * GSS-specific auth_stat values are mandated by RFC 2203 Section
+ * 5.3.3.3.
+ */
+static int
+svcauth_gss_verify_header(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct rsc *rsci,
+ __be32 *rpcstart, struct rpc_gss_wire_cred *gc)
+{
+ struct xdr_stream *xdr = &rqstp->rq_arg_stream;
+ struct gss_ctx *ctx_id = rsci->mechctx;
+ u32 flavor, maj_stat;
+ struct xdr_buf rpchdr;
+ struct xdr_netobj checksum;
+ struct kvec iov;
+
+ /*
+ * Compute the checksum of the incoming Call from the
+ * XID field to credential field:
+ */
+ iov.iov_base = rpcstart;
+ iov.iov_len = (u8 *)xdr->p - (u8 *)rpcstart;
+ xdr_buf_from_iov(&iov, &rpchdr);
+
+ /* Call's verf field: */
+ if (xdr_stream_decode_opaque_auth(xdr, &flavor,
+ (void **)&checksum.data,
+ &checksum.len) < 0) {
+ rqstp->rq_auth_stat = rpc_autherr_badverf;
+ return SVC_DENIED;
+ }
+ if (flavor != RPC_AUTH_GSS) {
+ rqstp->rq_auth_stat = rpc_autherr_badverf;
+ return SVC_DENIED;
+ }
+
+ if (rqstp->rq_deferred)
+ return SVC_OK;
+ maj_stat = gss_verify_mic(ctx_id, &rpchdr, &checksum);
+ if (maj_stat != GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
+ trace_rpcgss_svc_mic(rqstp, maj_stat);
+ rqstp->rq_auth_stat = rpcsec_gsserr_credproblem;
+ return SVC_DENIED;
+ }
+
+ if (gc->gc_seq > MAXSEQ) {
+ trace_rpcgss_svc_seqno_large(rqstp, gc->gc_seq);
+ rqstp->rq_auth_stat = rpcsec_gsserr_ctxproblem;
+ return SVC_DENIED;
+ }
+ if (!gss_check_seq_num(rqstp, rsci, gc->gc_seq))
+ return SVC_DROP;
+ return SVC_OK;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Construct and encode a Reply's verifier field. The verifier's body
+ * field contains a variable-length checksum of the GSS sequence
+ * number.
+ */
+static bool
+svcauth_gss_encode_verf(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct gss_ctx *ctx_id, u32 seq)
+{
+ struct gss_svc_data *gsd = rqstp->rq_auth_data;
+ u32 maj_stat;
+ struct xdr_buf verf_data;
+ struct xdr_netobj checksum;
+ struct kvec iov;
+
+ gsd->gsd_seq_num = cpu_to_be32(seq);
+ iov.iov_base = &gsd->gsd_seq_num;
+ iov.iov_len = XDR_UNIT;
+ xdr_buf_from_iov(&iov, &verf_data);
+
+ checksum.data = gsd->gsd_scratch;
+ maj_stat = gss_get_mic(ctx_id, &verf_data, &checksum);
+ if (maj_stat != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
+ goto bad_mic;
+
+ return xdr_stream_encode_opaque_auth(&rqstp->rq_res_stream, RPC_AUTH_GSS,
+ checksum.data, checksum.len) > 0;
+
+bad_mic:
+ trace_rpcgss_svc_get_mic(rqstp, maj_stat);
+ return false;
+}
+
+struct gss_domain {
+ struct auth_domain h;
+ u32 pseudoflavor;
+};
+
+static struct auth_domain *
+find_gss_auth_domain(struct gss_ctx *ctx, u32 svc)
+{
+ char *name;
+
+ name = gss_service_to_auth_domain_name(ctx->mech_type, svc);
+ if (!name)
+ return NULL;
+ return auth_domain_find(name);
+}
+
+static struct auth_ops svcauthops_gss;
+
+u32 svcauth_gss_flavor(struct auth_domain *dom)
+{
+ struct gss_domain *gd = container_of(dom, struct gss_domain, h);
+
+ return gd->pseudoflavor;
+}
+
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(svcauth_gss_flavor);
+
+struct auth_domain *
+svcauth_gss_register_pseudoflavor(u32 pseudoflavor, char * name)
+{
+ struct gss_domain *new;
+ struct auth_domain *test;
+ int stat = -ENOMEM;
+
+ new = kmalloc(sizeof(*new), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!new)
+ goto out;
+ kref_init(&new->h.ref);
+ new->h.name = kstrdup(name, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!new->h.name)
+ goto out_free_dom;
+ new->h.flavour = &svcauthops_gss;
+ new->pseudoflavor = pseudoflavor;
+
+ test = auth_domain_lookup(name, &new->h);
+ if (test != &new->h) {
+ pr_warn("svc: duplicate registration of gss pseudo flavour %s.\n",
+ name);
+ stat = -EADDRINUSE;
+ auth_domain_put(test);
+ goto out_free_name;
+ }
+ return test;
+
+out_free_name:
+ kfree(new->h.name);
+out_free_dom:
+ kfree(new);
+out:
+ return ERR_PTR(stat);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(svcauth_gss_register_pseudoflavor);
+
+/*
+ * RFC 2203, Section 5.3.2.2
+ *
+ * struct rpc_gss_integ_data {
+ * opaque databody_integ<>;
+ * opaque checksum<>;
+ * };
+ *
+ * struct rpc_gss_data_t {
+ * unsigned int seq_num;
+ * proc_req_arg_t arg;
+ * };
+ */
+static noinline_for_stack int
+svcauth_gss_unwrap_integ(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, u32 seq, struct gss_ctx *ctx)
+{
+ struct gss_svc_data *gsd = rqstp->rq_auth_data;
+ struct xdr_stream *xdr = &rqstp->rq_arg_stream;
+ u32 len, offset, seq_num, maj_stat;
+ struct xdr_buf *buf = xdr->buf;
+ struct xdr_buf databody_integ;
+ struct xdr_netobj checksum;
+
+ /* NFS READ normally uses splice to send data in-place. However
+ * the data in cache can change after the reply's MIC is computed
+ * but before the RPC reply is sent. To prevent the client from
+ * rejecting the server-computed MIC in this somewhat rare case,
+ * do not use splice with the GSS integrity service.
+ */
+ clear_bit(RQ_SPLICE_OK, &rqstp->rq_flags);
+
+ /* Did we already verify the signature on the original pass through? */
+ if (rqstp->rq_deferred)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (xdr_stream_decode_u32(xdr, &len) < 0)
+ goto unwrap_failed;
+ if (len & 3)
+ goto unwrap_failed;
+ offset = xdr_stream_pos(xdr);
+ if (xdr_buf_subsegment(buf, &databody_integ, offset, len))
+ goto unwrap_failed;
+
+ /*
+ * The xdr_stream now points to the @seq_num field. The next
+ * XDR data item is the @arg field, which contains the clear
+ * text RPC program payload. The checksum, which follows the
+ * @arg field, is located and decoded without updating the
+ * xdr_stream.
+ */
+
+ offset += len;
+ if (xdr_decode_word(buf, offset, &checksum.len))
+ goto unwrap_failed;
+ if (checksum.len > sizeof(gsd->gsd_scratch))
+ goto unwrap_failed;
+ checksum.data = gsd->gsd_scratch;
+ if (read_bytes_from_xdr_buf(buf, offset + XDR_UNIT, checksum.data,
+ checksum.len))
+ goto unwrap_failed;
+
+ maj_stat = gss_verify_mic(ctx, &databody_integ, &checksum);
+ if (maj_stat != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
+ goto bad_mic;
+
+ /* The received seqno is protected by the checksum. */
+ if (xdr_stream_decode_u32(xdr, &seq_num) < 0)
+ goto unwrap_failed;
+ if (seq_num != seq)
+ goto bad_seqno;
+
+ xdr_truncate_decode(xdr, XDR_UNIT + checksum.len);
+ return 0;
+
+unwrap_failed:
+ trace_rpcgss_svc_unwrap_failed(rqstp);
+ return -EINVAL;
+bad_seqno:
+ trace_rpcgss_svc_seqno_bad(rqstp, seq, seq_num);
+ return -EINVAL;
+bad_mic:
+ trace_rpcgss_svc_mic(rqstp, maj_stat);
+ return -EINVAL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * RFC 2203, Section 5.3.2.3
+ *
+ * struct rpc_gss_priv_data {
+ * opaque databody_priv<>
+ * };
+ *
+ * struct rpc_gss_data_t {
+ * unsigned int seq_num;
+ * proc_req_arg_t arg;
+ * };
+ */
+static noinline_for_stack int
+svcauth_gss_unwrap_priv(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, u32 seq, struct gss_ctx *ctx)
+{
+ struct xdr_stream *xdr = &rqstp->rq_arg_stream;
+ u32 len, maj_stat, seq_num, offset;
+ struct xdr_buf *buf = xdr->buf;
+ unsigned int saved_len;
+
+ clear_bit(RQ_SPLICE_OK, &rqstp->rq_flags);
+
+ if (xdr_stream_decode_u32(xdr, &len) < 0)
+ goto unwrap_failed;
+ if (rqstp->rq_deferred) {
+ /* Already decrypted last time through! The sequence number
+ * check at out_seq is unnecessary but harmless: */
+ goto out_seq;
+ }
+ if (len > xdr_stream_remaining(xdr))
+ goto unwrap_failed;
+ offset = xdr_stream_pos(xdr);
+
+ saved_len = buf->len;
+ maj_stat = gss_unwrap(ctx, offset, offset + len, buf);
+ if (maj_stat != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
+ goto bad_unwrap;
+ xdr->nwords -= XDR_QUADLEN(saved_len - buf->len);
+
+out_seq:
+ /* gss_unwrap() decrypted the sequence number. */
+ if (xdr_stream_decode_u32(xdr, &seq_num) < 0)
+ goto unwrap_failed;
+ if (seq_num != seq)
+ goto bad_seqno;
+ return 0;
+
+unwrap_failed:
+ trace_rpcgss_svc_unwrap_failed(rqstp);
+ return -EINVAL;
+bad_seqno:
+ trace_rpcgss_svc_seqno_bad(rqstp, seq, seq_num);
+ return -EINVAL;
+bad_unwrap:
+ trace_rpcgss_svc_unwrap(rqstp, maj_stat);
+ return -EINVAL;
+}
+
+static enum svc_auth_status
+svcauth_gss_set_client(struct svc_rqst *rqstp)
+{
+ struct gss_svc_data *svcdata = rqstp->rq_auth_data;
+ struct rsc *rsci = svcdata->rsci;
+ struct rpc_gss_wire_cred *gc = &svcdata->clcred;
+ int stat;
+
+ rqstp->rq_auth_stat = rpc_autherr_badcred;
+
+ /*
+ * A gss export can be specified either by:
+ * export *(sec=krb5,rw)
+ * or by
+ * export gss/krb5(rw)
+ * The latter is deprecated; but for backwards compatibility reasons
+ * the nfsd code will still fall back on trying it if the former
+ * doesn't work; so we try to make both available to nfsd, below.
+ */
+ rqstp->rq_gssclient = find_gss_auth_domain(rsci->mechctx, gc->gc_svc);
+ if (rqstp->rq_gssclient == NULL)
+ return SVC_DENIED;
+ stat = svcauth_unix_set_client(rqstp);
+ if (stat == SVC_DROP || stat == SVC_CLOSE)
+ return stat;
+
+ rqstp->rq_auth_stat = rpc_auth_ok;
+ return SVC_OK;
+}
+
+static bool
+svcauth_gss_proc_init_verf(struct cache_detail *cd, struct svc_rqst *rqstp,
+ struct xdr_netobj *out_handle, int *major_status,
+ u32 seq_num)
+{
+ struct xdr_stream *xdr = &rqstp->rq_res_stream;
+ struct rsc *rsci;
+ bool rc;
+
+ if (*major_status != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
+ goto null_verifier;
+ rsci = gss_svc_searchbyctx(cd, out_handle);
+ if (rsci == NULL) {
+ *major_status = GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT;
+ goto null_verifier;
+ }
+
+ rc = svcauth_gss_encode_verf(rqstp, rsci->mechctx, seq_num);
+ cache_put(&rsci->h, cd);
+ return rc;
+
+null_verifier:
+ return xdr_stream_encode_opaque_auth(xdr, RPC_AUTH_NULL, NULL, 0) > 0;
+}
+
+static void gss_free_in_token_pages(struct gssp_in_token *in_token)
+{
+ u32 inlen;
+ int i;
+
+ i = 0;
+ inlen = in_token->page_len;
+ while (inlen) {
+ if (in_token->pages[i])
+ put_page(in_token->pages[i]);
+ inlen -= inlen > PAGE_SIZE ? PAGE_SIZE : inlen;
+ }
+
+ kfree(in_token->pages);
+ in_token->pages = NULL;
+}
+
+static int gss_read_proxy_verf(struct svc_rqst *rqstp,
+ struct rpc_gss_wire_cred *gc,
+ struct xdr_netobj *in_handle,
+ struct gssp_in_token *in_token)
+{
+ struct xdr_stream *xdr = &rqstp->rq_arg_stream;
+ unsigned int length, pgto_offs, pgfrom_offs;
+ int pages, i, pgto, pgfrom;
+ size_t to_offs, from_offs;
+ u32 inlen;
+
+ if (dup_netobj(in_handle, &gc->gc_ctx))
+ return SVC_CLOSE;
+
+ /*
+ * RFC 2203 Section 5.2.2
+ *
+ * struct rpc_gss_init_arg {
+ * opaque gss_token<>;
+ * };
+ */
+ if (xdr_stream_decode_u32(xdr, &inlen) < 0)
+ goto out_denied_free;
+ if (inlen > xdr_stream_remaining(xdr))
+ goto out_denied_free;
+
+ pages = DIV_ROUND_UP(inlen, PAGE_SIZE);
+ in_token->pages = kcalloc(pages, sizeof(struct page *), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!in_token->pages)
+ goto out_denied_free;
+ in_token->page_base = 0;
+ in_token->page_len = inlen;
+ for (i = 0; i < pages; i++) {
+ in_token->pages[i] = alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!in_token->pages[i]) {
+ gss_free_in_token_pages(in_token);
+ goto out_denied_free;
+ }
+ }
+
+ length = min_t(unsigned int, inlen, (char *)xdr->end - (char *)xdr->p);
+ memcpy(page_address(in_token->pages[0]), xdr->p, length);
+ inlen -= length;
+
+ to_offs = length;
+ from_offs = rqstp->rq_arg.page_base;
+ while (inlen) {
+ pgto = to_offs >> PAGE_SHIFT;
+ pgfrom = from_offs >> PAGE_SHIFT;
+ pgto_offs = to_offs & ~PAGE_MASK;
+ pgfrom_offs = from_offs & ~PAGE_MASK;
+
+ length = min_t(unsigned int, inlen,
+ min_t(unsigned int, PAGE_SIZE - pgto_offs,
+ PAGE_SIZE - pgfrom_offs));
+ memcpy(page_address(in_token->pages[pgto]) + pgto_offs,
+ page_address(rqstp->rq_arg.pages[pgfrom]) + pgfrom_offs,
+ length);
+
+ to_offs += length;
+ from_offs += length;
+ inlen -= length;
+ }
+ return 0;
+
+out_denied_free:
+ kfree(in_handle->data);
+ return SVC_DENIED;
+}
+
+/*
+ * RFC 2203, Section 5.2.3.1.
+ *
+ * struct rpc_gss_init_res {
+ * opaque handle<>;
+ * unsigned int gss_major;
+ * unsigned int gss_minor;
+ * unsigned int seq_window;
+ * opaque gss_token<>;
+ * };
+ */
+static bool
+svcxdr_encode_gss_init_res(struct xdr_stream *xdr,
+ struct xdr_netobj *handle,
+ struct xdr_netobj *gss_token,
+ unsigned int major_status,
+ unsigned int minor_status, u32 seq_num)
+{
+ if (xdr_stream_encode_opaque(xdr, handle->data, handle->len) < 0)
+ return false;
+ if (xdr_stream_encode_u32(xdr, major_status) < 0)
+ return false;
+ if (xdr_stream_encode_u32(xdr, minor_status) < 0)
+ return false;
+ if (xdr_stream_encode_u32(xdr, seq_num) < 0)
+ return false;
+ if (xdr_stream_encode_opaque(xdr, gss_token->data, gss_token->len) < 0)
+ return false;
+ return true;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Having read the cred already and found we're in the context
+ * initiation case, read the verifier and initiate (or check the results
+ * of) upcalls to userspace for help with context initiation. If
+ * the upcall results are available, write the verifier and result.
+ * Otherwise, drop the request pending an answer to the upcall.
+ */
+static int
+svcauth_gss_legacy_init(struct svc_rqst *rqstp,
+ struct rpc_gss_wire_cred *gc)
+{
+ struct xdr_stream *xdr = &rqstp->rq_arg_stream;
+ struct rsi *rsip, rsikey;
+ __be32 *p;
+ u32 len;
+ int ret;
+ struct sunrpc_net *sn = net_generic(SVC_NET(rqstp), sunrpc_net_id);
+
+ memset(&rsikey, 0, sizeof(rsikey));
+ if (dup_netobj(&rsikey.in_handle, &gc->gc_ctx))
+ return SVC_CLOSE;
+
+ /*
+ * RFC 2203 Section 5.2.2
+ *
+ * struct rpc_gss_init_arg {
+ * opaque gss_token<>;
+ * };
+ */
+ if (xdr_stream_decode_u32(xdr, &len) < 0) {
+ kfree(rsikey.in_handle.data);
+ return SVC_DENIED;
+ }
+ p = xdr_inline_decode(xdr, len);
+ if (!p) {
+ kfree(rsikey.in_handle.data);
+ return SVC_DENIED;
+ }
+ rsikey.in_token.data = kmalloc(len, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (ZERO_OR_NULL_PTR(rsikey.in_token.data)) {
+ kfree(rsikey.in_handle.data);
+ return SVC_CLOSE;
+ }
+ memcpy(rsikey.in_token.data, p, len);
+ rsikey.in_token.len = len;
+
+ /* Perform upcall, or find upcall result: */
+ rsip = rsi_lookup(sn->rsi_cache, &rsikey);
+ rsi_free(&rsikey);
+ if (!rsip)
+ return SVC_CLOSE;
+ if (cache_check(sn->rsi_cache, &rsip->h, &rqstp->rq_chandle) < 0)
+ /* No upcall result: */
+ return SVC_CLOSE;
+
+ ret = SVC_CLOSE;
+ if (!svcauth_gss_proc_init_verf(sn->rsc_cache, rqstp, &rsip->out_handle,
+ &rsip->major_status, GSS_SEQ_WIN))
+ goto out;
+ if (!svcxdr_set_accept_stat(rqstp))
+ goto out;
+ if (!svcxdr_encode_gss_init_res(&rqstp->rq_res_stream, &rsip->out_handle,
+ &rsip->out_token, rsip->major_status,
+ rsip->minor_status, GSS_SEQ_WIN))
+ goto out;
+
+ ret = SVC_COMPLETE;
+out:
+ cache_put(&rsip->h, sn->rsi_cache);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int gss_proxy_save_rsc(struct cache_detail *cd,
+ struct gssp_upcall_data *ud,
+ uint64_t *handle)
+{
+ struct rsc rsci, *rscp = NULL;
+ static atomic64_t ctxhctr;
+ long long ctxh;
+ struct gss_api_mech *gm = NULL;
+ time64_t expiry;
+ int status;
+
+ memset(&rsci, 0, sizeof(rsci));
+ /* context handle */
+ status = -ENOMEM;
+ /* the handle needs to be just a unique id,
+ * use a static counter */
+ ctxh = atomic64_inc_return(&ctxhctr);
+
+ /* make a copy for the caller */
+ *handle = ctxh;
+
+ /* make a copy for the rsc cache */
+ if (dup_to_netobj(&rsci.handle, (char *)handle, sizeof(uint64_t)))
+ goto out;
+ rscp = rsc_lookup(cd, &rsci);
+ if (!rscp)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* creds */
+ if (!ud->found_creds) {
+ /* userspace seem buggy, we should always get at least a
+ * mapping to nobody */
+ goto out;
+ } else {
+ struct timespec64 boot;
+
+ /* steal creds */
+ rsci.cred = ud->creds;
+ memset(&ud->creds, 0, sizeof(struct svc_cred));
+
+ status = -EOPNOTSUPP;
+ /* get mech handle from OID */
+ gm = gss_mech_get_by_OID(&ud->mech_oid);
+ if (!gm)
+ goto out;
+ rsci.cred.cr_gss_mech = gm;
+
+ status = -EINVAL;
+ /* mech-specific data: */
+ status = gss_import_sec_context(ud->out_handle.data,
+ ud->out_handle.len,
+ gm, &rsci.mechctx,
+ &expiry, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (status)
+ goto out;
+
+ getboottime64(&boot);
+ expiry -= boot.tv_sec;
+ }
+
+ rsci.h.expiry_time = expiry;
+ rscp = rsc_update(cd, &rsci, rscp);
+ status = 0;
+out:
+ rsc_free(&rsci);
+ if (rscp)
+ cache_put(&rscp->h, cd);
+ else
+ status = -ENOMEM;
+ return status;
+}
+
+static int svcauth_gss_proxy_init(struct svc_rqst *rqstp,
+ struct rpc_gss_wire_cred *gc)
+{
+ struct xdr_netobj cli_handle;
+ struct gssp_upcall_data ud;
+ uint64_t handle;
+ int status;
+ int ret;
+ struct net *net = SVC_NET(rqstp);
+ struct sunrpc_net *sn = net_generic(net, sunrpc_net_id);
+
+ memset(&ud, 0, sizeof(ud));
+ ret = gss_read_proxy_verf(rqstp, gc, &ud.in_handle, &ud.in_token);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+
+ ret = SVC_CLOSE;
+
+ /* Perform synchronous upcall to gss-proxy */
+ status = gssp_accept_sec_context_upcall(net, &ud);
+ if (status)
+ goto out;
+
+ trace_rpcgss_svc_accept_upcall(rqstp, ud.major_status, ud.minor_status);
+
+ switch (ud.major_status) {
+ case GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED:
+ cli_handle = ud.out_handle;
+ break;
+ case GSS_S_COMPLETE:
+ status = gss_proxy_save_rsc(sn->rsc_cache, &ud, &handle);
+ if (status)
+ goto out;
+ cli_handle.data = (u8 *)&handle;
+ cli_handle.len = sizeof(handle);
+ break;
+ default:
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (!svcauth_gss_proc_init_verf(sn->rsc_cache, rqstp, &cli_handle,
+ &ud.major_status, GSS_SEQ_WIN))
+ goto out;
+ if (!svcxdr_set_accept_stat(rqstp))
+ goto out;
+ if (!svcxdr_encode_gss_init_res(&rqstp->rq_res_stream, &cli_handle,
+ &ud.out_token, ud.major_status,
+ ud.minor_status, GSS_SEQ_WIN))
+ goto out;
+
+ ret = SVC_COMPLETE;
+out:
+ gss_free_in_token_pages(&ud.in_token);
+ gssp_free_upcall_data(&ud);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Try to set the sn->use_gss_proxy variable to a new value. We only allow
+ * it to be changed if it's currently undefined (-1). If it's any other value
+ * then return -EBUSY unless the type wouldn't have changed anyway.
+ */
+static int set_gss_proxy(struct net *net, int type)
+{
+ struct sunrpc_net *sn = net_generic(net, sunrpc_net_id);
+ int ret;
+
+ WARN_ON_ONCE(type != 0 && type != 1);
+ ret = cmpxchg(&sn->use_gss_proxy, -1, type);
+ if (ret != -1 && ret != type)
+ return -EBUSY;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static bool use_gss_proxy(struct net *net)
+{
+ struct sunrpc_net *sn = net_generic(net, sunrpc_net_id);
+
+ /* If use_gss_proxy is still undefined, then try to disable it */
+ if (sn->use_gss_proxy == -1)
+ set_gss_proxy(net, 0);
+ return sn->use_gss_proxy;
+}
+
+static noinline_for_stack int
+svcauth_gss_proc_init(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct rpc_gss_wire_cred *gc)
+{
+ struct xdr_stream *xdr = &rqstp->rq_arg_stream;
+ u32 flavor, len;
+ void *body;
+
+ /* Call's verf field: */
+ if (xdr_stream_decode_opaque_auth(xdr, &flavor, &body, &len) < 0)
+ return SVC_GARBAGE;
+ if (flavor != RPC_AUTH_NULL || len != 0) {
+ rqstp->rq_auth_stat = rpc_autherr_badverf;
+ return SVC_DENIED;
+ }
+
+ if (gc->gc_proc == RPC_GSS_PROC_INIT && gc->gc_ctx.len != 0) {
+ rqstp->rq_auth_stat = rpc_autherr_badcred;
+ return SVC_DENIED;
+ }
+
+ if (!use_gss_proxy(SVC_NET(rqstp)))
+ return svcauth_gss_legacy_init(rqstp, gc);
+ return svcauth_gss_proxy_init(rqstp, gc);
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS
+
+static ssize_t write_gssp(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
+ size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+ struct net *net = pde_data(file_inode(file));
+ char tbuf[20];
+ unsigned long i;
+ int res;
+
+ if (*ppos || count > sizeof(tbuf)-1)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ if (copy_from_user(tbuf, buf, count))
+ return -EFAULT;
+
+ tbuf[count] = 0;
+ res = kstrtoul(tbuf, 0, &i);
+ if (res)
+ return res;
+ if (i != 1)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ res = set_gssp_clnt(net);
+ if (res)
+ return res;
+ res = set_gss_proxy(net, 1);
+ if (res)
+ return res;
+ return count;
+}
+
+static ssize_t read_gssp(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
+ size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+ struct net *net = pde_data(file_inode(file));
+ struct sunrpc_net *sn = net_generic(net, sunrpc_net_id);
+ unsigned long p = *ppos;
+ char tbuf[10];
+ size_t len;
+
+ snprintf(tbuf, sizeof(tbuf), "%d\n", sn->use_gss_proxy);
+ len = strlen(tbuf);
+ if (p >= len)
+ return 0;
+ len -= p;
+ if (len > count)
+ len = count;
+ if (copy_to_user(buf, (void *)(tbuf+p), len))
+ return -EFAULT;
+ *ppos += len;
+ return len;
+}
+
+static const struct proc_ops use_gss_proxy_proc_ops = {
+ .proc_open = nonseekable_open,
+ .proc_write = write_gssp,
+ .proc_read = read_gssp,
+};
+
+static int create_use_gss_proxy_proc_entry(struct net *net)
+{
+ struct sunrpc_net *sn = net_generic(net, sunrpc_net_id);
+ struct proc_dir_entry **p = &sn->use_gssp_proc;
+
+ sn->use_gss_proxy = -1;
+ *p = proc_create_data("use-gss-proxy", S_IFREG | 0600,
+ sn->proc_net_rpc,
+ &use_gss_proxy_proc_ops, net);
+ if (!*p)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ init_gssp_clnt(sn);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void destroy_use_gss_proxy_proc_entry(struct net *net)
+{
+ struct sunrpc_net *sn = net_generic(net, sunrpc_net_id);
+
+ if (sn->use_gssp_proc) {
+ remove_proc_entry("use-gss-proxy", sn->proc_net_rpc);
+ clear_gssp_clnt(sn);
+ }
+}
+
+static ssize_t read_gss_krb5_enctypes(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
+ size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+ struct rpcsec_gss_oid oid = {
+ .len = 9,
+ .data = "\x2a\x86\x48\x86\xf7\x12\x01\x02\x02",
+ };
+ struct gss_api_mech *mech;
+ ssize_t ret;
+
+ mech = gss_mech_get_by_OID(&oid);
+ if (!mech)
+ return 0;
+ if (!mech->gm_upcall_enctypes) {
+ gss_mech_put(mech);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ ret = simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos,
+ mech->gm_upcall_enctypes,
+ strlen(mech->gm_upcall_enctypes));
+ gss_mech_put(mech);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static const struct proc_ops gss_krb5_enctypes_proc_ops = {
+ .proc_open = nonseekable_open,
+ .proc_read = read_gss_krb5_enctypes,
+};
+
+static int create_krb5_enctypes_proc_entry(struct net *net)
+{
+ struct sunrpc_net *sn = net_generic(net, sunrpc_net_id);
+
+ sn->gss_krb5_enctypes =
+ proc_create_data("gss_krb5_enctypes", S_IFREG | 0444,
+ sn->proc_net_rpc, &gss_krb5_enctypes_proc_ops,
+ net);
+ return sn->gss_krb5_enctypes ? 0 : -ENOMEM;
+}
+
+static void destroy_krb5_enctypes_proc_entry(struct net *net)
+{
+ struct sunrpc_net *sn = net_generic(net, sunrpc_net_id);
+
+ if (sn->gss_krb5_enctypes)
+ remove_proc_entry("gss_krb5_enctypes", sn->proc_net_rpc);
+}
+
+#else /* CONFIG_PROC_FS */
+
+static int create_use_gss_proxy_proc_entry(struct net *net)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void destroy_use_gss_proxy_proc_entry(struct net *net) {}
+
+static int create_krb5_enctypes_proc_entry(struct net *net)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void destroy_krb5_enctypes_proc_entry(struct net *net) {}
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_PROC_FS */
+
+/*
+ * The Call's credential body should contain a struct rpc_gss_cred_t.
+ *
+ * RFC 2203 Section 5
+ *
+ * struct rpc_gss_cred_t {
+ * union switch (unsigned int version) {
+ * case RPCSEC_GSS_VERS_1:
+ * struct {
+ * rpc_gss_proc_t gss_proc;
+ * unsigned int seq_num;
+ * rpc_gss_service_t service;
+ * opaque handle<>;
+ * } rpc_gss_cred_vers_1_t;
+ * }
+ * };
+ */
+static bool
+svcauth_gss_decode_credbody(struct xdr_stream *xdr,
+ struct rpc_gss_wire_cred *gc,
+ __be32 **rpcstart)
+{
+ ssize_t handle_len;
+ u32 body_len;
+ __be32 *p;
+
+ p = xdr_inline_decode(xdr, XDR_UNIT);
+ if (!p)
+ return false;
+ /*
+ * start of rpc packet is 7 u32's back from here:
+ * xid direction rpcversion prog vers proc flavour
+ */
+ *rpcstart = p - 7;
+ body_len = be32_to_cpup(p);
+ if (body_len > RPC_MAX_AUTH_SIZE)
+ return false;
+
+ /* struct rpc_gss_cred_t */
+ if (xdr_stream_decode_u32(xdr, &gc->gc_v) < 0)
+ return false;
+ if (xdr_stream_decode_u32(xdr, &gc->gc_proc) < 0)
+ return false;
+ if (xdr_stream_decode_u32(xdr, &gc->gc_seq) < 0)
+ return false;
+ if (xdr_stream_decode_u32(xdr, &gc->gc_svc) < 0)
+ return false;
+ handle_len = xdr_stream_decode_opaque_inline(xdr,
+ (void **)&gc->gc_ctx.data,
+ body_len);
+ if (handle_len < 0)
+ return false;
+ if (body_len != XDR_UNIT * 5 + xdr_align_size(handle_len))
+ return false;
+
+ gc->gc_ctx.len = handle_len;
+ return true;
+}
+
+/**
+ * svcauth_gss_accept - Decode and validate incoming RPC_AUTH_GSS credential
+ * @rqstp: RPC transaction
+ *
+ * Return values:
+ * %SVC_OK: Success
+ * %SVC_COMPLETE: GSS context lifetime event
+ * %SVC_DENIED: Credential or verifier is not valid
+ * %SVC_GARBAGE: Failed to decode credential or verifier
+ * %SVC_CLOSE: Temporary failure
+ *
+ * The rqstp->rq_auth_stat field is also set (see RFCs 2203 and 5531).
+ */
+static enum svc_auth_status
+svcauth_gss_accept(struct svc_rqst *rqstp)
+{
+ struct gss_svc_data *svcdata = rqstp->rq_auth_data;
+ __be32 *rpcstart;
+ struct rpc_gss_wire_cred *gc;
+ struct rsc *rsci = NULL;
+ int ret;
+ struct sunrpc_net *sn = net_generic(SVC_NET(rqstp), sunrpc_net_id);
+
+ rqstp->rq_auth_stat = rpc_autherr_badcred;
+ if (!svcdata)
+ svcdata = kmalloc(sizeof(*svcdata), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!svcdata)
+ goto auth_err;
+ rqstp->rq_auth_data = svcdata;
+ svcdata->gsd_databody_offset = 0;
+ svcdata->rsci = NULL;
+ gc = &svcdata->clcred;
+
+ if (!svcauth_gss_decode_credbody(&rqstp->rq_arg_stream, gc, &rpcstart))
+ goto auth_err;
+ if (gc->gc_v != RPC_GSS_VERSION)
+ goto auth_err;
+
+ switch (gc->gc_proc) {
+ case RPC_GSS_PROC_INIT:
+ case RPC_GSS_PROC_CONTINUE_INIT:
+ if (rqstp->rq_proc != 0)
+ goto auth_err;
+ return svcauth_gss_proc_init(rqstp, gc);
+ case RPC_GSS_PROC_DESTROY:
+ if (rqstp->rq_proc != 0)
+ goto auth_err;
+ fallthrough;
+ case RPC_GSS_PROC_DATA:
+ rqstp->rq_auth_stat = rpcsec_gsserr_credproblem;
+ rsci = gss_svc_searchbyctx(sn->rsc_cache, &gc->gc_ctx);
+ if (!rsci)
+ goto auth_err;
+ switch (svcauth_gss_verify_header(rqstp, rsci, rpcstart, gc)) {
+ case SVC_OK:
+ break;
+ case SVC_DENIED:
+ goto auth_err;
+ case SVC_DROP:
+ goto drop;
+ }
+ break;
+ default:
+ if (rqstp->rq_proc != 0)
+ goto auth_err;
+ rqstp->rq_auth_stat = rpc_autherr_rejectedcred;
+ goto auth_err;
+ }
+
+ /* now act upon the command: */
+ switch (gc->gc_proc) {
+ case RPC_GSS_PROC_DESTROY:
+ if (!svcauth_gss_encode_verf(rqstp, rsci->mechctx, gc->gc_seq))
+ goto auth_err;
+ if (!svcxdr_set_accept_stat(rqstp))
+ goto auth_err;
+ /* Delete the entry from the cache_list and call cache_put */
+ sunrpc_cache_unhash(sn->rsc_cache, &rsci->h);
+ goto complete;
+ case RPC_GSS_PROC_DATA:
+ rqstp->rq_auth_stat = rpcsec_gsserr_ctxproblem;
+ if (!svcauth_gss_encode_verf(rqstp, rsci->mechctx, gc->gc_seq))
+ goto auth_err;
+ if (!svcxdr_set_accept_stat(rqstp))
+ goto auth_err;
+ svcdata->gsd_databody_offset = xdr_stream_pos(&rqstp->rq_res_stream);
+ rqstp->rq_cred = rsci->cred;
+ get_group_info(rsci->cred.cr_group_info);
+ rqstp->rq_auth_stat = rpc_autherr_badcred;
+ switch (gc->gc_svc) {
+ case RPC_GSS_SVC_NONE:
+ break;
+ case RPC_GSS_SVC_INTEGRITY:
+ /* placeholders for body length and seq. number: */
+ xdr_reserve_space(&rqstp->rq_res_stream, XDR_UNIT * 2);
+ if (svcauth_gss_unwrap_integ(rqstp, gc->gc_seq,
+ rsci->mechctx))
+ goto garbage_args;
+ svcxdr_set_auth_slack(rqstp, RPC_MAX_AUTH_SIZE);
+ break;
+ case RPC_GSS_SVC_PRIVACY:
+ /* placeholders for body length and seq. number: */
+ xdr_reserve_space(&rqstp->rq_res_stream, XDR_UNIT * 2);
+ if (svcauth_gss_unwrap_priv(rqstp, gc->gc_seq,
+ rsci->mechctx))
+ goto garbage_args;
+ svcxdr_set_auth_slack(rqstp, RPC_MAX_AUTH_SIZE * 2);
+ break;
+ default:
+ goto auth_err;
+ }
+ svcdata->rsci = rsci;
+ cache_get(&rsci->h);
+ rqstp->rq_cred.cr_flavor = gss_svc_to_pseudoflavor(
+ rsci->mechctx->mech_type,
+ GSS_C_QOP_DEFAULT,
+ gc->gc_svc);
+ ret = SVC_OK;
+ trace_rpcgss_svc_authenticate(rqstp, gc);
+ goto out;
+ }
+garbage_args:
+ ret = SVC_GARBAGE;
+ goto out;
+auth_err:
+ xdr_truncate_encode(&rqstp->rq_res_stream, XDR_UNIT * 2);
+ ret = SVC_DENIED;
+ goto out;
+complete:
+ ret = SVC_COMPLETE;
+ goto out;
+drop:
+ ret = SVC_CLOSE;
+out:
+ if (rsci)
+ cache_put(&rsci->h, sn->rsc_cache);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static u32
+svcauth_gss_prepare_to_wrap(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct gss_svc_data *gsd)
+{
+ u32 offset;
+
+ /* Release can be called twice, but we only wrap once. */
+ offset = gsd->gsd_databody_offset;
+ gsd->gsd_databody_offset = 0;
+
+ /* AUTH_ERROR replies are not wrapped. */
+ if (rqstp->rq_auth_stat != rpc_auth_ok)
+ return 0;
+
+ /* Also don't wrap if the accept_stat is nonzero: */
+ if (*rqstp->rq_accept_statp != rpc_success)
+ return 0;
+
+ return offset;
+}
+
+/*
+ * RFC 2203, Section 5.3.2.2
+ *
+ * struct rpc_gss_integ_data {
+ * opaque databody_integ<>;
+ * opaque checksum<>;
+ * };
+ *
+ * struct rpc_gss_data_t {
+ * unsigned int seq_num;
+ * proc_req_arg_t arg;
+ * };
+ *
+ * The RPC Reply message has already been XDR-encoded. rq_res_stream
+ * is now positioned so that the checksum can be written just past
+ * the RPC Reply message.
+ */
+static int svcauth_gss_wrap_integ(struct svc_rqst *rqstp)
+{
+ struct gss_svc_data *gsd = rqstp->rq_auth_data;
+ struct xdr_stream *xdr = &rqstp->rq_res_stream;
+ struct rpc_gss_wire_cred *gc = &gsd->clcred;
+ struct xdr_buf *buf = xdr->buf;
+ struct xdr_buf databody_integ;
+ struct xdr_netobj checksum;
+ u32 offset, maj_stat;
+
+ offset = svcauth_gss_prepare_to_wrap(rqstp, gsd);
+ if (!offset)
+ goto out;
+
+ if (xdr_buf_subsegment(buf, &databody_integ, offset + XDR_UNIT,
+ buf->len - offset - XDR_UNIT))
+ goto wrap_failed;
+ /* Buffer space for these has already been reserved in
+ * svcauth_gss_accept(). */
+ if (xdr_encode_word(buf, offset, databody_integ.len))
+ goto wrap_failed;
+ if (xdr_encode_word(buf, offset + XDR_UNIT, gc->gc_seq))
+ goto wrap_failed;
+
+ checksum.data = gsd->gsd_scratch;
+ maj_stat = gss_get_mic(gsd->rsci->mechctx, &databody_integ, &checksum);
+ if (maj_stat != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
+ goto bad_mic;
+
+ if (xdr_stream_encode_opaque(xdr, checksum.data, checksum.len) < 0)
+ goto wrap_failed;
+ xdr_commit_encode(xdr);
+
+out:
+ return 0;
+
+bad_mic:
+ trace_rpcgss_svc_get_mic(rqstp, maj_stat);
+ return -EINVAL;
+wrap_failed:
+ trace_rpcgss_svc_wrap_failed(rqstp);
+ return -EINVAL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * RFC 2203, Section 5.3.2.3
+ *
+ * struct rpc_gss_priv_data {
+ * opaque databody_priv<>
+ * };
+ *
+ * struct rpc_gss_data_t {
+ * unsigned int seq_num;
+ * proc_req_arg_t arg;
+ * };
+ *
+ * gss_wrap() expands the size of the RPC message payload in the
+ * response buffer. The main purpose of svcauth_gss_wrap_priv()
+ * is to ensure there is adequate space in the response buffer to
+ * avoid overflow during the wrap.
+ */
+static int svcauth_gss_wrap_priv(struct svc_rqst *rqstp)
+{
+ struct gss_svc_data *gsd = rqstp->rq_auth_data;
+ struct rpc_gss_wire_cred *gc = &gsd->clcred;
+ struct xdr_buf *buf = &rqstp->rq_res;
+ struct kvec *head = buf->head;
+ struct kvec *tail = buf->tail;
+ u32 offset, pad, maj_stat;
+ __be32 *p;
+
+ offset = svcauth_gss_prepare_to_wrap(rqstp, gsd);
+ if (!offset)
+ return 0;
+
+ /*
+ * Buffer space for this field has already been reserved
+ * in svcauth_gss_accept(). Note that the GSS sequence
+ * number is encrypted along with the RPC reply payload.
+ */
+ if (xdr_encode_word(buf, offset + XDR_UNIT, gc->gc_seq))
+ goto wrap_failed;
+
+ /*
+ * If there is currently tail data, make sure there is
+ * room for the head, tail, and 2 * RPC_MAX_AUTH_SIZE in
+ * the page, and move the current tail data such that
+ * there is RPC_MAX_AUTH_SIZE slack space available in
+ * both the head and tail.
+ */
+ if (tail->iov_base) {
+ if (tail->iov_base >= head->iov_base + PAGE_SIZE)
+ goto wrap_failed;
+ if (tail->iov_base < head->iov_base)
+ goto wrap_failed;
+ if (tail->iov_len + head->iov_len
+ + 2 * RPC_MAX_AUTH_SIZE > PAGE_SIZE)
+ goto wrap_failed;
+ memmove(tail->iov_base + RPC_MAX_AUTH_SIZE, tail->iov_base,
+ tail->iov_len);
+ tail->iov_base += RPC_MAX_AUTH_SIZE;
+ }
+ /*
+ * If there is no current tail data, make sure there is
+ * room for the head data, and 2 * RPC_MAX_AUTH_SIZE in the
+ * allotted page, and set up tail information such that there
+ * is RPC_MAX_AUTH_SIZE slack space available in both the
+ * head and tail.
+ */
+ if (!tail->iov_base) {
+ if (head->iov_len + 2 * RPC_MAX_AUTH_SIZE > PAGE_SIZE)
+ goto wrap_failed;
+ tail->iov_base = head->iov_base
+ + head->iov_len + RPC_MAX_AUTH_SIZE;
+ tail->iov_len = 0;
+ }
+
+ maj_stat = gss_wrap(gsd->rsci->mechctx, offset + XDR_UNIT, buf,
+ buf->pages);
+ if (maj_stat != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
+ goto bad_wrap;
+
+ /* Wrapping can change the size of databody_priv. */
+ if (xdr_encode_word(buf, offset, buf->len - offset - XDR_UNIT))
+ goto wrap_failed;
+ pad = xdr_pad_size(buf->len - offset - XDR_UNIT);
+ p = (__be32 *)(tail->iov_base + tail->iov_len);
+ memset(p, 0, pad);
+ tail->iov_len += pad;
+ buf->len += pad;
+
+ return 0;
+wrap_failed:
+ trace_rpcgss_svc_wrap_failed(rqstp);
+ return -EINVAL;
+bad_wrap:
+ trace_rpcgss_svc_wrap(rqstp, maj_stat);
+ return -ENOMEM;
+}
+
+/**
+ * svcauth_gss_release - Wrap payload and release resources
+ * @rqstp: RPC transaction context
+ *
+ * Return values:
+ * %0: the Reply is ready to be sent
+ * %-ENOMEM: failed to allocate memory
+ * %-EINVAL: encoding error
+ */
+static int
+svcauth_gss_release(struct svc_rqst *rqstp)
+{
+ struct sunrpc_net *sn = net_generic(SVC_NET(rqstp), sunrpc_net_id);
+ struct gss_svc_data *gsd = rqstp->rq_auth_data;
+ struct rpc_gss_wire_cred *gc;
+ int stat;
+
+ if (!gsd)
+ goto out;
+ gc = &gsd->clcred;
+ if (gc->gc_proc != RPC_GSS_PROC_DATA)
+ goto out;
+
+ switch (gc->gc_svc) {
+ case RPC_GSS_SVC_NONE:
+ break;
+ case RPC_GSS_SVC_INTEGRITY:
+ stat = svcauth_gss_wrap_integ(rqstp);
+ if (stat)
+ goto out_err;
+ break;
+ case RPC_GSS_SVC_PRIVACY:
+ stat = svcauth_gss_wrap_priv(rqstp);
+ if (stat)
+ goto out_err;
+ break;
+ /*
+ * For any other gc_svc value, svcauth_gss_accept() already set
+ * the auth_error appropriately; just fall through:
+ */
+ }
+
+out:
+ stat = 0;
+out_err:
+ if (rqstp->rq_client)
+ auth_domain_put(rqstp->rq_client);
+ rqstp->rq_client = NULL;
+ if (rqstp->rq_gssclient)
+ auth_domain_put(rqstp->rq_gssclient);
+ rqstp->rq_gssclient = NULL;
+ if (rqstp->rq_cred.cr_group_info)
+ put_group_info(rqstp->rq_cred.cr_group_info);
+ rqstp->rq_cred.cr_group_info = NULL;
+ if (gsd && gsd->rsci) {
+ cache_put(&gsd->rsci->h, sn->rsc_cache);
+ gsd->rsci = NULL;
+ }
+ return stat;
+}
+
+static void
+svcauth_gss_domain_release_rcu(struct rcu_head *head)
+{
+ struct auth_domain *dom = container_of(head, struct auth_domain, rcu_head);
+ struct gss_domain *gd = container_of(dom, struct gss_domain, h);
+
+ kfree(dom->name);
+ kfree(gd);
+}
+
+static void
+svcauth_gss_domain_release(struct auth_domain *dom)
+{
+ call_rcu(&dom->rcu_head, svcauth_gss_domain_release_rcu);
+}
+
+static struct auth_ops svcauthops_gss = {
+ .name = "rpcsec_gss",
+ .owner = THIS_MODULE,
+ .flavour = RPC_AUTH_GSS,
+ .accept = svcauth_gss_accept,
+ .release = svcauth_gss_release,
+ .domain_release = svcauth_gss_domain_release,
+ .set_client = svcauth_gss_set_client,
+};
+
+static int rsi_cache_create_net(struct net *net)
+{
+ struct sunrpc_net *sn = net_generic(net, sunrpc_net_id);
+ struct cache_detail *cd;
+ int err;
+
+ cd = cache_create_net(&rsi_cache_template, net);
+ if (IS_ERR(cd))
+ return PTR_ERR(cd);
+ err = cache_register_net(cd, net);
+ if (err) {
+ cache_destroy_net(cd, net);
+ return err;
+ }
+ sn->rsi_cache = cd;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void rsi_cache_destroy_net(struct net *net)
+{
+ struct sunrpc_net *sn = net_generic(net, sunrpc_net_id);
+ struct cache_detail *cd = sn->rsi_cache;
+
+ sn->rsi_cache = NULL;
+ cache_purge(cd);
+ cache_unregister_net(cd, net);
+ cache_destroy_net(cd, net);
+}
+
+static int rsc_cache_create_net(struct net *net)
+{
+ struct sunrpc_net *sn = net_generic(net, sunrpc_net_id);
+ struct cache_detail *cd;
+ int err;
+
+ cd = cache_create_net(&rsc_cache_template, net);
+ if (IS_ERR(cd))
+ return PTR_ERR(cd);
+ err = cache_register_net(cd, net);
+ if (err) {
+ cache_destroy_net(cd, net);
+ return err;
+ }
+ sn->rsc_cache = cd;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void rsc_cache_destroy_net(struct net *net)
+{
+ struct sunrpc_net *sn = net_generic(net, sunrpc_net_id);
+ struct cache_detail *cd = sn->rsc_cache;
+
+ sn->rsc_cache = NULL;
+ cache_purge(cd);
+ cache_unregister_net(cd, net);
+ cache_destroy_net(cd, net);
+}
+
+int
+gss_svc_init_net(struct net *net)
+{
+ int rv;
+
+ rv = rsc_cache_create_net(net);
+ if (rv)
+ return rv;
+ rv = rsi_cache_create_net(net);
+ if (rv)
+ goto out1;
+ rv = create_use_gss_proxy_proc_entry(net);
+ if (rv)
+ goto out2;
+
+ rv = create_krb5_enctypes_proc_entry(net);
+ if (rv)
+ goto out3;
+
+ return 0;
+
+out3:
+ destroy_use_gss_proxy_proc_entry(net);
+out2:
+ rsi_cache_destroy_net(net);
+out1:
+ rsc_cache_destroy_net(net);
+ return rv;
+}
+
+void
+gss_svc_shutdown_net(struct net *net)
+{
+ destroy_krb5_enctypes_proc_entry(net);
+ destroy_use_gss_proxy_proc_entry(net);
+ rsi_cache_destroy_net(net);
+ rsc_cache_destroy_net(net);
+}
+
+int
+gss_svc_init(void)
+{
+ return svc_auth_register(RPC_AUTH_GSS, &svcauthops_gss);
+}
+
+void
+gss_svc_shutdown(void)
+{
+ svc_auth_unregister(RPC_AUTH_GSS);
+}