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-rw-r--r--samples/seccomp/.gitignore5
-rw-r--r--samples/seccomp/Makefile6
-rw-r--r--samples/seccomp/bpf-direct.c191
-rw-r--r--samples/seccomp/bpf-fancy.c105
-rw-r--r--samples/seccomp/bpf-helper.c96
-rw-r--r--samples/seccomp/bpf-helper.h263
-rw-r--r--samples/seccomp/dropper.c77
-rw-r--r--samples/seccomp/user-trap.c375
8 files changed, 1118 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/samples/seccomp/.gitignore b/samples/seccomp/.gitignore
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..a6df0da77c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/samples/seccomp/.gitignore
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/bpf-direct
+/bpf-fancy
+/dropper
+/user-trap
diff --git a/samples/seccomp/Makefile b/samples/seccomp/Makefile
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..c85ae0ed83
--- /dev/null
+++ b/samples/seccomp/Makefile
@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+userprogs-always-y += bpf-fancy dropper bpf-direct user-trap
+
+bpf-fancy-objs := bpf-fancy.o bpf-helper.o
+
+userccflags += -I usr/include
diff --git a/samples/seccomp/bpf-direct.c b/samples/seccomp/bpf-direct.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..c09e4a17ac
--- /dev/null
+++ b/samples/seccomp/bpf-direct.c
@@ -0,0 +1,191 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * Seccomp filter example for x86 (32-bit and 64-bit) with BPF macros
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 2012 The Chromium OS Authors <chromium-os-dev@chromium.org>
+ * Author: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
+ *
+ * The code may be used by anyone for any purpose,
+ * and can serve as a starting point for developing
+ * applications using prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, 2, ...).
+ */
+#if defined(__i386__) || defined(__x86_64__)
+#define SUPPORTED_ARCH 1
+#endif
+
+#if defined(SUPPORTED_ARCH)
+#define __USE_GNU 1
+#define _GNU_SOURCE 1
+
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/filter.h>
+#include <linux/seccomp.h>
+#include <linux/unistd.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stddef.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <sys/prctl.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#define syscall_arg(_n) (offsetof(struct seccomp_data, args[_n]))
+#define syscall_nr (offsetof(struct seccomp_data, nr))
+
+#if defined(__i386__)
+#define REG_RESULT REG_EAX
+#define REG_SYSCALL REG_EAX
+#define REG_ARG0 REG_EBX
+#define REG_ARG1 REG_ECX
+#define REG_ARG2 REG_EDX
+#define REG_ARG3 REG_ESI
+#define REG_ARG4 REG_EDI
+#define REG_ARG5 REG_EBP
+#elif defined(__x86_64__)
+#define REG_RESULT REG_RAX
+#define REG_SYSCALL REG_RAX
+#define REG_ARG0 REG_RDI
+#define REG_ARG1 REG_RSI
+#define REG_ARG2 REG_RDX
+#define REG_ARG3 REG_R10
+#define REG_ARG4 REG_R8
+#define REG_ARG5 REG_R9
+#endif
+
+#ifndef PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS
+#define PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS 38
+#endif
+
+#ifndef SYS_SECCOMP
+#define SYS_SECCOMP 1
+#endif
+
+static void emulator(int nr, siginfo_t *info, void *void_context)
+{
+ ucontext_t *ctx = (ucontext_t *)(void_context);
+ int syscall;
+ char *buf;
+ ssize_t bytes;
+ size_t len;
+ if (info->si_code != SYS_SECCOMP)
+ return;
+ if (!ctx)
+ return;
+ syscall = ctx->uc_mcontext.gregs[REG_SYSCALL];
+ buf = (char *) ctx->uc_mcontext.gregs[REG_ARG1];
+ len = (size_t) ctx->uc_mcontext.gregs[REG_ARG2];
+
+ if (syscall != __NR_write)
+ return;
+ if (ctx->uc_mcontext.gregs[REG_ARG0] != STDERR_FILENO)
+ return;
+ /* Redirect stderr messages to stdout. Doesn't handle EINTR, etc */
+ ctx->uc_mcontext.gregs[REG_RESULT] = -1;
+ if (write(STDOUT_FILENO, "[ERR] ", 6) > 0) {
+ bytes = write(STDOUT_FILENO, buf, len);
+ ctx->uc_mcontext.gregs[REG_RESULT] = bytes;
+ }
+ return;
+}
+
+static int install_emulator(void)
+{
+ struct sigaction act;
+ sigset_t mask;
+ memset(&act, 0, sizeof(act));
+ sigemptyset(&mask);
+ sigaddset(&mask, SIGSYS);
+
+ act.sa_sigaction = &emulator;
+ act.sa_flags = SA_SIGINFO;
+ if (sigaction(SIGSYS, &act, NULL) < 0) {
+ perror("sigaction");
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if (sigprocmask(SIG_UNBLOCK, &mask, NULL)) {
+ perror("sigprocmask");
+ return -1;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int install_filter(void)
+{
+ struct sock_filter filter[] = {
+ /* Grab the system call number */
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_W+BPF_ABS, syscall_nr),
+ /* Jump table for the allowed syscalls */
+ BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, __NR_rt_sigreturn, 0, 1),
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_RET+BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW),
+#ifdef __NR_sigreturn
+ BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, __NR_sigreturn, 0, 1),
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_RET+BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW),
+#endif
+ BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, __NR_exit_group, 0, 1),
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_RET+BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW),
+ BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, __NR_exit, 0, 1),
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_RET+BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW),
+ BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, __NR_read, 1, 0),
+ BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, __NR_write, 3, 2),
+
+ /* Check that read is only using stdin. */
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_W+BPF_ABS, syscall_arg(0)),
+ BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, STDIN_FILENO, 4, 0),
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_RET+BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_KILL),
+
+ /* Check that write is only using stdout */
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_W+BPF_ABS, syscall_arg(0)),
+ BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, STDOUT_FILENO, 1, 0),
+ /* Trap attempts to write to stderr */
+ BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, STDERR_FILENO, 1, 2),
+
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_RET+BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW),
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_RET+BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_TRAP),
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_RET+BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_KILL),
+ };
+ struct sock_fprog prog = {
+ .len = (unsigned short)(sizeof(filter)/sizeof(filter[0])),
+ .filter = filter,
+ };
+
+ if (prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0)) {
+ perror("prctl(NO_NEW_PRIVS)");
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+
+ if (prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &prog)) {
+ perror("prctl");
+ return 1;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+#define payload(_c) (_c), sizeof((_c))
+int main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+ char buf[4096];
+ ssize_t bytes = 0;
+ if (install_emulator())
+ return 1;
+ if (install_filter())
+ return 1;
+ syscall(__NR_write, STDOUT_FILENO,
+ payload("OHAI! WHAT IS YOUR NAME? "));
+ bytes = syscall(__NR_read, STDIN_FILENO, buf, sizeof(buf));
+ syscall(__NR_write, STDOUT_FILENO, payload("HELLO, "));
+ syscall(__NR_write, STDOUT_FILENO, buf, bytes);
+ syscall(__NR_write, STDERR_FILENO,
+ payload("Error message going to STDERR\n"));
+ return 0;
+}
+#else /* SUPPORTED_ARCH */
+/*
+ * This sample is x86-only. Since kernel samples are compiled with the
+ * host toolchain, a non-x86 host will result in using only the main()
+ * below.
+ */
+int main(void)
+{
+ return 1;
+}
+#endif /* SUPPORTED_ARCH */
diff --git a/samples/seccomp/bpf-fancy.c b/samples/seccomp/bpf-fancy.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..1ccb435025
--- /dev/null
+++ b/samples/seccomp/bpf-fancy.c
@@ -0,0 +1,105 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * Seccomp BPF example using a macro-based generator.
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 2012 The Chromium OS Authors <chromium-os-dev@chromium.org>
+ * Author: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
+ *
+ * The code may be used by anyone for any purpose,
+ * and can serve as a starting point for developing
+ * applications using prctl(PR_ATTACH_SECCOMP_FILTER).
+ */
+
+#include <linux/filter.h>
+#include <linux/seccomp.h>
+#include <linux/unistd.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <sys/prctl.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#include "bpf-helper.h"
+
+#ifndef PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS
+#define PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS 38
+#endif
+
+int main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+ struct bpf_labels l = {
+ .count = 0,
+ };
+ static const char msg1[] = "Please type something: ";
+ static const char msg2[] = "You typed: ";
+ char buf[256];
+ struct sock_filter filter[] = {
+ /* TODO: LOAD_SYSCALL_NR(arch) and enforce an arch */
+ LOAD_SYSCALL_NR,
+ SYSCALL(__NR_exit, ALLOW),
+ SYSCALL(__NR_exit_group, ALLOW),
+ SYSCALL(__NR_write, JUMP(&l, write_fd)),
+ SYSCALL(__NR_read, JUMP(&l, read)),
+ DENY, /* Don't passthrough into a label */
+
+ LABEL(&l, read),
+ ARG(0),
+ JNE(STDIN_FILENO, DENY),
+ ARG(1),
+ JNE((unsigned long)buf, DENY),
+ ARG(2),
+ JGE(sizeof(buf), DENY),
+ ALLOW,
+
+ LABEL(&l, write_fd),
+ ARG(0),
+ JEQ(STDOUT_FILENO, JUMP(&l, write_buf)),
+ JEQ(STDERR_FILENO, JUMP(&l, write_buf)),
+ DENY,
+
+ LABEL(&l, write_buf),
+ ARG(1),
+ JEQ((unsigned long)msg1, JUMP(&l, msg1_len)),
+ JEQ((unsigned long)msg2, JUMP(&l, msg2_len)),
+ JEQ((unsigned long)buf, JUMP(&l, buf_len)),
+ DENY,
+
+ LABEL(&l, msg1_len),
+ ARG(2),
+ JLT(sizeof(msg1), ALLOW),
+ DENY,
+
+ LABEL(&l, msg2_len),
+ ARG(2),
+ JLT(sizeof(msg2), ALLOW),
+ DENY,
+
+ LABEL(&l, buf_len),
+ ARG(2),
+ JLT(sizeof(buf), ALLOW),
+ DENY,
+ };
+ struct sock_fprog prog = {
+ .filter = filter,
+ .len = (unsigned short)(sizeof(filter)/sizeof(filter[0])),
+ };
+ ssize_t bytes;
+ bpf_resolve_jumps(&l, filter, sizeof(filter)/sizeof(*filter));
+
+ if (prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0)) {
+ perror("prctl(NO_NEW_PRIVS)");
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ if (prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &prog)) {
+ perror("prctl(SECCOMP)");
+ return 1;
+ }
+ syscall(__NR_write, STDOUT_FILENO, msg1, strlen(msg1));
+ bytes = syscall(__NR_read, STDIN_FILENO, buf, sizeof(buf)-1);
+ bytes = (bytes > 0 ? bytes : 0);
+ syscall(__NR_write, STDERR_FILENO, msg2, strlen(msg2));
+ syscall(__NR_write, STDERR_FILENO, buf, bytes);
+ /* Now get killed */
+ syscall(__NR_write, STDERR_FILENO, msg2, strlen(msg2)+2);
+ return 0;
+}
diff --git a/samples/seccomp/bpf-helper.c b/samples/seccomp/bpf-helper.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..ae260d77a8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/samples/seccomp/bpf-helper.c
@@ -0,0 +1,96 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * Seccomp BPF helper functions
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 2012 The Chromium OS Authors <chromium-os-dev@chromium.org>
+ * Author: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
+ *
+ * The code may be used by anyone for any purpose,
+ * and can serve as a starting point for developing
+ * applications using prctl(PR_ATTACH_SECCOMP_FILTER).
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include "bpf-helper.h"
+
+int bpf_resolve_jumps(struct bpf_labels *labels,
+ struct sock_filter *filter, size_t count)
+{
+ size_t i;
+
+ if (count < 1 || count > BPF_MAXINSNS)
+ return -1;
+ /*
+ * Walk it once, backwards, to build the label table and do fixups.
+ * Since backward jumps are disallowed by BPF, this is easy.
+ */
+ for (i = 0; i < count; ++i) {
+ size_t offset = count - i - 1;
+ struct sock_filter *instr = &filter[offset];
+ if (instr->code != (BPF_JMP+BPF_JA))
+ continue;
+ switch ((instr->jt<<8)|instr->jf) {
+ case (JUMP_JT<<8)|JUMP_JF:
+ if (labels->labels[instr->k].location == 0xffffffff) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Unresolved label: '%s'\n",
+ labels->labels[instr->k].label);
+ return 1;
+ }
+ instr->k = labels->labels[instr->k].location -
+ (offset + 1);
+ instr->jt = 0;
+ instr->jf = 0;
+ continue;
+ case (LABEL_JT<<8)|LABEL_JF:
+ if (labels->labels[instr->k].location != 0xffffffff) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Duplicate label use: '%s'\n",
+ labels->labels[instr->k].label);
+ return 1;
+ }
+ labels->labels[instr->k].location = offset;
+ instr->k = 0; /* fall through */
+ instr->jt = 0;
+ instr->jf = 0;
+ continue;
+ }
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* Simple lookup table for labels. */
+__u32 seccomp_bpf_label(struct bpf_labels *labels, const char *label)
+{
+ struct __bpf_label *begin = labels->labels, *end;
+ int id;
+
+ if (labels->count == BPF_LABELS_MAX) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Too many labels\n");
+ exit(1);
+ }
+ if (labels->count == 0) {
+ begin->label = label;
+ begin->location = 0xffffffff;
+ labels->count++;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ end = begin + labels->count;
+ for (id = 0; begin < end; ++begin, ++id) {
+ if (!strcmp(label, begin->label))
+ return id;
+ }
+ begin->label = label;
+ begin->location = 0xffffffff;
+ labels->count++;
+ return id;
+}
+
+void seccomp_bpf_print(struct sock_filter *filter, size_t count)
+{
+ struct sock_filter *end = filter + count;
+ for ( ; filter < end; ++filter)
+ printf("{ code=%u,jt=%u,jf=%u,k=%u },\n",
+ filter->code, filter->jt, filter->jf, filter->k);
+}
diff --git a/samples/seccomp/bpf-helper.h b/samples/seccomp/bpf-helper.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..417e48a4c4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/samples/seccomp/bpf-helper.h
@@ -0,0 +1,263 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+/*
+ * Example wrapper around BPF macros.
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 2012 The Chromium OS Authors <chromium-os-dev@chromium.org>
+ * Author: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
+ *
+ * The code may be used by anyone for any purpose,
+ * and can serve as a starting point for developing
+ * applications using prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, 2, ...).
+ *
+ * No guarantees are provided with respect to the correctness
+ * or functionality of this code.
+ */
+#ifndef __BPF_HELPER_H__
+#define __BPF_HELPER_H__
+
+#include <asm/bitsperlong.h> /* for __BITS_PER_LONG */
+#include <endian.h>
+#include <linux/filter.h>
+#include <linux/seccomp.h> /* for seccomp_data */
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/unistd.h>
+#include <stddef.h>
+
+#define BPF_LABELS_MAX 256
+struct bpf_labels {
+ int count;
+ struct __bpf_label {
+ const char *label;
+ __u32 location;
+ } labels[BPF_LABELS_MAX];
+};
+
+int bpf_resolve_jumps(struct bpf_labels *labels,
+ struct sock_filter *filter, size_t count);
+__u32 seccomp_bpf_label(struct bpf_labels *labels, const char *label);
+void seccomp_bpf_print(struct sock_filter *filter, size_t count);
+
+#define JUMP_JT 0xff
+#define JUMP_JF 0xff
+#define LABEL_JT 0xfe
+#define LABEL_JF 0xfe
+
+#define ALLOW \
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_RET+BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW)
+#define DENY \
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_RET+BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_KILL)
+#define JUMP(labels, label) \
+ BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JA, FIND_LABEL((labels), (label)), \
+ JUMP_JT, JUMP_JF)
+#define LABEL(labels, label) \
+ BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JA, FIND_LABEL((labels), (label)), \
+ LABEL_JT, LABEL_JF)
+#define SYSCALL(nr, jt) \
+ BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, (nr), 0, 1), \
+ jt
+
+/* Lame, but just an example */
+#define FIND_LABEL(labels, label) seccomp_bpf_label((labels), #label)
+
+#define EXPAND(...) __VA_ARGS__
+
+/* Ensure that we load the logically correct offset. */
+#if __BYTE_ORDER__ == __ORDER_LITTLE_ENDIAN__
+#define LO_ARG(idx) offsetof(struct seccomp_data, args[(idx)])
+#elif __BYTE_ORDER__ == __ORDER_BIG_ENDIAN__
+#define LO_ARG(idx) offsetof(struct seccomp_data, args[(idx)]) + sizeof(__u32)
+#else
+#error "Unknown endianness"
+#endif
+
+/* Map all width-sensitive operations */
+#if __BITS_PER_LONG == 32
+
+#define JEQ(x, jt) JEQ32(x, EXPAND(jt))
+#define JNE(x, jt) JNE32(x, EXPAND(jt))
+#define JGT(x, jt) JGT32(x, EXPAND(jt))
+#define JLT(x, jt) JLT32(x, EXPAND(jt))
+#define JGE(x, jt) JGE32(x, EXPAND(jt))
+#define JLE(x, jt) JLE32(x, EXPAND(jt))
+#define JA(x, jt) JA32(x, EXPAND(jt))
+#define ARG(i) ARG_32(i)
+
+#elif __BITS_PER_LONG == 64
+
+/* Ensure that we load the logically correct offset. */
+#if __BYTE_ORDER__ == __ORDER_LITTLE_ENDIAN__
+#define ENDIAN(_lo, _hi) _lo, _hi
+#define HI_ARG(idx) offsetof(struct seccomp_data, args[(idx)]) + sizeof(__u32)
+#elif __BYTE_ORDER__ == __ORDER_BIG_ENDIAN__
+#define ENDIAN(_lo, _hi) _hi, _lo
+#define HI_ARG(idx) offsetof(struct seccomp_data, args[(idx)])
+#endif
+
+union arg64 {
+ struct {
+ __u32 ENDIAN(lo32, hi32);
+ };
+ __u64 u64;
+};
+
+#define JEQ(x, jt) \
+ JEQ64(((union arg64){.u64 = (x)}).lo32, \
+ ((union arg64){.u64 = (x)}).hi32, \
+ EXPAND(jt))
+#define JGT(x, jt) \
+ JGT64(((union arg64){.u64 = (x)}).lo32, \
+ ((union arg64){.u64 = (x)}).hi32, \
+ EXPAND(jt))
+#define JGE(x, jt) \
+ JGE64(((union arg64){.u64 = (x)}).lo32, \
+ ((union arg64){.u64 = (x)}).hi32, \
+ EXPAND(jt))
+#define JNE(x, jt) \
+ JNE64(((union arg64){.u64 = (x)}).lo32, \
+ ((union arg64){.u64 = (x)}).hi32, \
+ EXPAND(jt))
+#define JLT(x, jt) \
+ JLT64(((union arg64){.u64 = (x)}).lo32, \
+ ((union arg64){.u64 = (x)}).hi32, \
+ EXPAND(jt))
+#define JLE(x, jt) \
+ JLE64(((union arg64){.u64 = (x)}).lo32, \
+ ((union arg64){.u64 = (x)}).hi32, \
+ EXPAND(jt))
+
+#define JA(x, jt) \
+ JA64(((union arg64){.u64 = (x)}).lo32, \
+ ((union arg64){.u64 = (x)}).hi32, \
+ EXPAND(jt))
+#define ARG(i) ARG_64(i)
+
+#else
+#error __BITS_PER_LONG value unusable.
+#endif
+
+/* Loads the arg into A */
+#define ARG_32(idx) \
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_W+BPF_ABS, LO_ARG(idx))
+
+/* Loads lo into M[0] and hi into M[1] and A */
+#define ARG_64(idx) \
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_W+BPF_ABS, LO_ARG(idx)), \
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_ST, 0), /* lo -> M[0] */ \
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_W+BPF_ABS, HI_ARG(idx)), \
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_ST, 1) /* hi -> M[1] */
+
+#define JEQ32(value, jt) \
+ BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, (value), 0, 1), \
+ jt
+
+#define JNE32(value, jt) \
+ BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, (value), 1, 0), \
+ jt
+
+#define JA32(value, jt) \
+ BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JSET+BPF_K, (value), 0, 1), \
+ jt
+
+#define JGE32(value, jt) \
+ BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JGE+BPF_K, (value), 0, 1), \
+ jt
+
+#define JGT32(value, jt) \
+ BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JGT+BPF_K, (value), 0, 1), \
+ jt
+
+#define JLE32(value, jt) \
+ BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JGT+BPF_K, (value), 1, 0), \
+ jt
+
+#define JLT32(value, jt) \
+ BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JGE+BPF_K, (value), 1, 0), \
+ jt
+
+/*
+ * All the JXX64 checks assume lo is saved in M[0] and hi is saved in both
+ * A and M[1]. This invariant is kept by restoring A if necessary.
+ */
+#define JEQ64(lo, hi, jt) \
+ /* if (hi != arg.hi) goto NOMATCH; */ \
+ BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, (hi), 0, 5), \
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_MEM, 0), /* swap in lo */ \
+ /* if (lo != arg.lo) goto NOMATCH; */ \
+ BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, (lo), 0, 2), \
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_MEM, 1), \
+ jt, \
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_MEM, 1)
+
+#define JNE64(lo, hi, jt) \
+ /* if (hi != arg.hi) goto MATCH; */ \
+ BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, (hi), 0, 3), \
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_MEM, 0), \
+ /* if (lo != arg.lo) goto MATCH; */ \
+ BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, (lo), 2, 0), \
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_MEM, 1), \
+ jt, \
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_MEM, 1)
+
+#define JA64(lo, hi, jt) \
+ /* if (hi & arg.hi) goto MATCH; */ \
+ BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JSET+BPF_K, (hi), 3, 0), \
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_MEM, 0), \
+ /* if (lo & arg.lo) goto MATCH; */ \
+ BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JSET+BPF_K, (lo), 0, 2), \
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_MEM, 1), \
+ jt, \
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_MEM, 1)
+
+#define JGE64(lo, hi, jt) \
+ /* if (hi > arg.hi) goto MATCH; */ \
+ BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JGT+BPF_K, (hi), 4, 0), \
+ /* if (hi != arg.hi) goto NOMATCH; */ \
+ BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, (hi), 0, 5), \
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_MEM, 0), \
+ /* if (lo >= arg.lo) goto MATCH; */ \
+ BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JGE+BPF_K, (lo), 0, 2), \
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_MEM, 1), \
+ jt, \
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_MEM, 1)
+
+#define JGT64(lo, hi, jt) \
+ /* if (hi > arg.hi) goto MATCH; */ \
+ BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JGT+BPF_K, (hi), 4, 0), \
+ /* if (hi != arg.hi) goto NOMATCH; */ \
+ BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, (hi), 0, 5), \
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_MEM, 0), \
+ /* if (lo > arg.lo) goto MATCH; */ \
+ BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JGT+BPF_K, (lo), 0, 2), \
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_MEM, 1), \
+ jt, \
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_MEM, 1)
+
+#define JLE64(lo, hi, jt) \
+ /* if (hi < arg.hi) goto MATCH; */ \
+ BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JGE+BPF_K, (hi), 0, 4), \
+ /* if (hi != arg.hi) goto NOMATCH; */ \
+ BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, (hi), 0, 5), \
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_MEM, 0), \
+ /* if (lo <= arg.lo) goto MATCH; */ \
+ BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JGT+BPF_K, (lo), 2, 0), \
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_MEM, 1), \
+ jt, \
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_MEM, 1)
+
+#define JLT64(lo, hi, jt) \
+ /* if (hi < arg.hi) goto MATCH; */ \
+ BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JGE+BPF_K, (hi), 0, 4), \
+ /* if (hi != arg.hi) goto NOMATCH; */ \
+ BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, (hi), 0, 5), \
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_MEM, 0), \
+ /* if (lo < arg.lo) goto MATCH; */ \
+ BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JGE+BPF_K, (lo), 2, 0), \
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_MEM, 1), \
+ jt, \
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_MEM, 1)
+
+#define LOAD_SYSCALL_NR \
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_W+BPF_ABS, \
+ offsetof(struct seccomp_data, nr))
+
+#endif /* __BPF_HELPER_H__ */
diff --git a/samples/seccomp/dropper.c b/samples/seccomp/dropper.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..4bca4b70f6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/samples/seccomp/dropper.c
@@ -0,0 +1,77 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * Naive system call dropper built on seccomp_filter.
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 2012 The Chromium OS Authors <chromium-os-dev@chromium.org>
+ * Author: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
+ *
+ * The code may be used by anyone for any purpose,
+ * and can serve as a starting point for developing
+ * applications using prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, 2, ...).
+ *
+ * When run, returns the specified errno for the specified
+ * system call number against the given architecture.
+ *
+ */
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <linux/audit.h>
+#include <linux/filter.h>
+#include <linux/seccomp.h>
+#include <linux/unistd.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stddef.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <sys/prctl.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+static int install_filter(int arch, int nr, int error)
+{
+ struct sock_filter filter[] = {
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_W+BPF_ABS,
+ (offsetof(struct seccomp_data, arch))),
+ BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, arch, 0, 3),
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_W+BPF_ABS,
+ (offsetof(struct seccomp_data, nr))),
+ BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, nr, 0, 1),
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_RET+BPF_K,
+ SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO|(error & SECCOMP_RET_DATA)),
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_RET+BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW),
+ };
+ struct sock_fprog prog = {
+ .len = (unsigned short)(sizeof(filter)/sizeof(filter[0])),
+ .filter = filter,
+ };
+ if (error == -1) {
+ struct sock_filter kill = BPF_STMT(BPF_RET+BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_KILL);
+ filter[4] = kill;
+ }
+ if (prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0)) {
+ perror("prctl(NO_NEW_PRIVS)");
+ return 1;
+ }
+ if (prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, 2, &prog)) {
+ perror("prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP)");
+ return 1;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+ if (argc < 5) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Usage:\n"
+ "dropper <arch> <syscall_nr> <errno> <prog> [<args>]\n"
+ "Hint: AUDIT_ARCH_I386: 0x%X\n"
+ " AUDIT_ARCH_X86_64: 0x%X\n"
+ " errno == -1 means SECCOMP_RET_KILL\n"
+ "\n", AUDIT_ARCH_I386, AUDIT_ARCH_X86_64);
+ return 1;
+ }
+ if (install_filter(strtol(argv[1], NULL, 0), strtol(argv[2], NULL, 0),
+ strtol(argv[3], NULL, 0)))
+ return 1;
+ execv(argv[4], &argv[4]);
+ printf("Failed to execv\n");
+ return 255;
+}
diff --git a/samples/seccomp/user-trap.c b/samples/seccomp/user-trap.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..20291ec648
--- /dev/null
+++ b/samples/seccomp/user-trap.c
@@ -0,0 +1,375 @@
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stddef.h>
+#include <sys/sysmacros.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/wait.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <sys/mman.h>
+#include <sys/syscall.h>
+#include <sys/user.h>
+#include <sys/ioctl.h>
+#include <sys/ptrace.h>
+#include <sys/mount.h>
+#include <linux/limits.h>
+#include <linux/filter.h>
+#include <linux/seccomp.h>
+
+#define ARRAY_SIZE(x) (sizeof(x) / sizeof(*(x)))
+
+static int seccomp(unsigned int op, unsigned int flags, void *args)
+{
+ errno = 0;
+ return syscall(__NR_seccomp, op, flags, args);
+}
+
+static int send_fd(int sock, int fd)
+{
+ struct msghdr msg = {};
+ struct cmsghdr *cmsg;
+ char buf[CMSG_SPACE(sizeof(int))] = {0}, c = 'c';
+ struct iovec io = {
+ .iov_base = &c,
+ .iov_len = 1,
+ };
+
+ msg.msg_iov = &io;
+ msg.msg_iovlen = 1;
+ msg.msg_control = buf;
+ msg.msg_controllen = sizeof(buf);
+ cmsg = CMSG_FIRSTHDR(&msg);
+ cmsg->cmsg_level = SOL_SOCKET;
+ cmsg->cmsg_type = SCM_RIGHTS;
+ cmsg->cmsg_len = CMSG_LEN(sizeof(int));
+ *((int *)CMSG_DATA(cmsg)) = fd;
+ msg.msg_controllen = cmsg->cmsg_len;
+
+ if (sendmsg(sock, &msg, 0) < 0) {
+ perror("sendmsg");
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int recv_fd(int sock)
+{
+ struct msghdr msg = {};
+ struct cmsghdr *cmsg;
+ char buf[CMSG_SPACE(sizeof(int))] = {0}, c = 'c';
+ struct iovec io = {
+ .iov_base = &c,
+ .iov_len = 1,
+ };
+
+ msg.msg_iov = &io;
+ msg.msg_iovlen = 1;
+ msg.msg_control = buf;
+ msg.msg_controllen = sizeof(buf);
+
+ if (recvmsg(sock, &msg, 0) < 0) {
+ perror("recvmsg");
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ cmsg = CMSG_FIRSTHDR(&msg);
+
+ return *((int *)CMSG_DATA(cmsg));
+}
+
+static int user_trap_syscall(int nr, unsigned int flags)
+{
+ struct sock_filter filter[] = {
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_W+BPF_ABS,
+ offsetof(struct seccomp_data, nr)),
+ BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, nr, 0, 1),
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_RET+BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_USER_NOTIF),
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_RET+BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW),
+ };
+
+ struct sock_fprog prog = {
+ .len = (unsigned short)ARRAY_SIZE(filter),
+ .filter = filter,
+ };
+
+ return seccomp(SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER, flags, &prog);
+}
+
+static int handle_req(struct seccomp_notif *req,
+ struct seccomp_notif_resp *resp, int listener)
+{
+ char path[PATH_MAX], source[PATH_MAX], target[PATH_MAX];
+ int ret = -1, mem;
+
+ resp->id = req->id;
+ resp->error = -EPERM;
+ resp->val = 0;
+
+ if (req->data.nr != __NR_mount) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "huh? trapped something besides mount? %d\n", req->data.nr);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /* Only allow bind mounts. */
+ if (!(req->data.args[3] & MS_BIND))
+ return 0;
+
+ /*
+ * Ok, let's read the task's memory to see where they wanted their
+ * mount to go.
+ */
+ snprintf(path, sizeof(path), "/proc/%d/mem", req->pid);
+ mem = open(path, O_RDONLY);
+ if (mem < 0) {
+ perror("open mem");
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Now we avoid a TOCTOU: we referred to a pid by its pid, but since
+ * the pid that made the syscall may have died, we need to confirm that
+ * the pid is still valid after we open its /proc/pid/mem file. We can
+ * ask the listener fd this as follows.
+ *
+ * Note that this check should occur *after* any task-specific
+ * resources are opened, to make sure that the task has not died and
+ * we're not wrongly reading someone else's state in order to make
+ * decisions.
+ */
+ if (ioctl(listener, SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_ID_VALID, &req->id) < 0) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "task died before we could map its memory\n");
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Phew, we've got the right /proc/pid/mem. Now we can read it. Note
+ * that to avoid another TOCTOU, we should read all of the pointer args
+ * before we decide to allow the syscall.
+ */
+ if (lseek(mem, req->data.args[0], SEEK_SET) < 0) {
+ perror("seek");
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ ret = read(mem, source, sizeof(source));
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ perror("read");
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (lseek(mem, req->data.args[1], SEEK_SET) < 0) {
+ perror("seek");
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ ret = read(mem, target, sizeof(target));
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ perror("read");
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Our policy is to only allow bind mounts inside /tmp. This isn't very
+ * interesting, because we could do unprivlieged bind mounts with user
+ * namespaces already, but you get the idea.
+ */
+ if (!strncmp(source, "/tmp/", 5) && !strncmp(target, "/tmp/", 5)) {
+ if (mount(source, target, NULL, req->data.args[3], NULL) < 0) {
+ ret = -1;
+ perror("actual mount");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ resp->error = 0;
+ }
+
+ /* Even if we didn't allow it because of policy, generating the
+ * response was be a success, because we want to tell the worker EPERM.
+ */
+ ret = 0;
+
+out:
+ close(mem);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int main(void)
+{
+ int sk_pair[2], ret = 1, status, listener;
+ pid_t worker = 0 , tracer = 0;
+
+ if (socketpair(PF_LOCAL, SOCK_SEQPACKET, 0, sk_pair) < 0) {
+ perror("socketpair");
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ worker = fork();
+ if (worker < 0) {
+ perror("fork");
+ goto close_pair;
+ }
+
+ if (worker == 0) {
+ listener = user_trap_syscall(__NR_mount,
+ SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_NEW_LISTENER);
+ if (listener < 0) {
+ perror("seccomp");
+ exit(1);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Drop privileges. We definitely can't mount as uid 1000.
+ */
+ if (setuid(1000) < 0) {
+ perror("setuid");
+ exit(1);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Send the listener to the parent; also serves as
+ * synchronization.
+ */
+ if (send_fd(sk_pair[1], listener) < 0)
+ exit(1);
+ close(listener);
+
+ if (mkdir("/tmp/foo", 0755) < 0) {
+ perror("mkdir");
+ exit(1);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Try a bad mount just for grins.
+ */
+ if (mount("/dev/sda", "/tmp/foo", NULL, 0, NULL) != -1) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "huh? mounted /dev/sda?\n");
+ exit(1);
+ }
+
+ if (errno != EPERM) {
+ perror("bad error from mount");
+ exit(1);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Ok, we expect this one to succeed.
+ */
+ if (mount("/tmp/foo", "/tmp/foo", NULL, MS_BIND, NULL) < 0) {
+ perror("mount");
+ exit(1);
+ }
+
+ exit(0);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Get the listener from the child.
+ */
+ listener = recv_fd(sk_pair[0]);
+ if (listener < 0)
+ goto out_kill;
+
+ /*
+ * Fork a task to handle the requests. This isn't strictly necessary,
+ * but it makes the particular writing of this sample easier, since we
+ * can just wait ofr the tracee to exit and kill the tracer.
+ */
+ tracer = fork();
+ if (tracer < 0) {
+ perror("fork");
+ goto out_kill;
+ }
+
+ if (tracer == 0) {
+ struct seccomp_notif *req;
+ struct seccomp_notif_resp *resp;
+ struct seccomp_notif_sizes sizes;
+
+ if (seccomp(SECCOMP_GET_NOTIF_SIZES, 0, &sizes) < 0) {
+ perror("seccomp(GET_NOTIF_SIZES)");
+ goto out_close;
+ }
+
+ req = malloc(sizes.seccomp_notif);
+ if (!req)
+ goto out_close;
+
+ resp = malloc(sizes.seccomp_notif_resp);
+ if (!resp)
+ goto out_req;
+ memset(resp, 0, sizes.seccomp_notif_resp);
+
+ while (1) {
+ memset(req, 0, sizes.seccomp_notif);
+ if (ioctl(listener, SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_RECV, req)) {
+ perror("ioctl recv");
+ goto out_resp;
+ }
+
+ if (handle_req(req, resp, listener) < 0)
+ goto out_resp;
+
+ /*
+ * ENOENT here means that the task may have gotten a
+ * signal and restarted the syscall. It's up to the
+ * handler to decide what to do in this case, but for
+ * the sample code, we just ignore it. Probably
+ * something better should happen, like undoing the
+ * mount, or keeping track of the args to make sure we
+ * don't do it again.
+ */
+ if (ioctl(listener, SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_SEND, resp) < 0 &&
+ errno != ENOENT) {
+ perror("ioctl send");
+ goto out_resp;
+ }
+ }
+out_resp:
+ free(resp);
+out_req:
+ free(req);
+out_close:
+ close(listener);
+ exit(1);
+ }
+
+ close(listener);
+
+ if (waitpid(worker, &status, 0) != worker) {
+ perror("waitpid");
+ goto out_kill;
+ }
+
+ if (umount2("/tmp/foo", MNT_DETACH) < 0 && errno != EINVAL) {
+ perror("umount2");
+ goto out_kill;
+ }
+
+ if (remove("/tmp/foo") < 0 && errno != ENOENT) {
+ perror("remove");
+ exit(1);
+ }
+
+ if (!WIFEXITED(status) || WEXITSTATUS(status)) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "worker exited nonzero\n");
+ goto out_kill;
+ }
+
+ ret = 0;
+
+out_kill:
+ if (tracer > 0)
+ kill(tracer, SIGKILL);
+ if (worker > 0)
+ kill(worker, SIGKILL);
+
+close_pair:
+ close(sk_pair[0]);
+ close(sk_pair[1]);
+ return ret;
+}
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.39.1) at 2024-11-06 03:38:48 +0000