1 files changed, 285 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/security/safesetid/lsm.c b/security/safesetid/lsm.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..5be5894aa
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/safesetid/lsm.c
@@ -0,0 +1,285 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * SafeSetID Linux Security Module
+ *
+ * Author: Micah Morton <mortonm@chromium.org>
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2018 The Chromium OS Authors.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2, as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation.
+ *
+ */
+
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) "SafeSetID: " fmt
+
+#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/ptrace.h>
+#include <linux/sched/task_stack.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
+#include "lsm.h"
+
+/* Flag indicating whether initialization completed */
+int safesetid_initialized __initdata;
+
+struct setid_ruleset __rcu *safesetid_setuid_rules;
+struct setid_ruleset __rcu *safesetid_setgid_rules;
+
+
+/* Compute a decision for a transition from @src to @dst under @policy. */
+enum sid_policy_type _setid_policy_lookup(struct setid_ruleset *policy,
+		kid_t src, kid_t dst)
+{
+	struct setid_rule *rule;
+	enum sid_policy_type result = SIDPOL_DEFAULT;
+
+	if (policy->type == UID) {
+		hash_for_each_possible(policy->rules, rule, next, __kuid_val(src.uid)) {
+			if (!uid_eq(rule->src_id.uid, src.uid))
+				continue;
+			if (uid_eq(rule->dst_id.uid, dst.uid))
+				return SIDPOL_ALLOWED;
+			result = SIDPOL_CONSTRAINED;
+		}
+	} else if (policy->type == GID) {
+		hash_for_each_possible(policy->rules, rule, next, __kgid_val(src.gid)) {
+			if (!gid_eq(rule->src_id.gid, src.gid))
+				continue;
+			if (gid_eq(rule->dst_id.gid, dst.gid)){
+				return SIDPOL_ALLOWED;
+			}
+			result = SIDPOL_CONSTRAINED;
+		}
+	} else {
+		/* Should not reach here, report the ID as contrainsted */
+		result = SIDPOL_CONSTRAINED;
+	}
+	return result;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Compute a decision for a transition from @src to @dst under the active
+ * policy.
+ */
+static enum sid_policy_type setid_policy_lookup(kid_t src, kid_t dst, enum setid_type new_type)
+{
+	enum sid_policy_type result = SIDPOL_DEFAULT;
+	struct setid_ruleset *pol;
+
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	if (new_type == UID)
+		pol = rcu_dereference(safesetid_setuid_rules);
+	else if (new_type == GID)
+		pol = rcu_dereference(safesetid_setgid_rules);
+	else { /* Should not reach here */
+		result = SIDPOL_CONSTRAINED;
+		rcu_read_unlock();
+		return result;
+	}
+
+	if (pol) {
+		pol->type = new_type;
+		result = _setid_policy_lookup(pol, src, dst);
+	}
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+	return result;
+}
+
+static int safesetid_security_capable(const struct cred *cred,
+				      struct user_namespace *ns,
+				      int cap,
+				      unsigned int opts)
+{
+	/* We're only interested in CAP_SETUID and CAP_SETGID. */
+	if (cap != CAP_SETUID && cap != CAP_SETGID)
+		return 0;
+
+	/*
+	 * If CAP_SET{U/G}ID is currently used for a setid or setgroups syscall, we
+	 * want to let it go through here; the real security check happens later, in
+	 * the task_fix_set{u/g}id or task_fix_setgroups hooks.
+	 */
+	if ((opts & CAP_OPT_INSETID) != 0)
+		return 0;
+
+	switch (cap) {
+	case CAP_SETUID:
+		/*
+		* If no policy applies to this task, allow the use of CAP_SETUID for
+		* other purposes.
+		*/
+		if (setid_policy_lookup((kid_t){.uid = cred->uid}, INVALID_ID, UID) == SIDPOL_DEFAULT)
+			return 0;
+		/*
+		 * Reject use of CAP_SETUID for functionality other than calling
+		 * set*uid() (e.g. setting up userns uid mappings).
+		 */
+		pr_warn("Operation requires CAP_SETUID, which is not available to UID %u for operations besides approved set*uid transitions\n",
+			__kuid_val(cred->uid));
+		return -EPERM;
+	case CAP_SETGID:
+		/*
+		* If no policy applies to this task, allow the use of CAP_SETGID for
+		* other purposes.
+		*/
+		if (setid_policy_lookup((kid_t){.gid = cred->gid}, INVALID_ID, GID) == SIDPOL_DEFAULT)
+			return 0;
+		/*
+		 * Reject use of CAP_SETUID for functionality other than calling
+		 * set*gid() (e.g. setting up userns gid mappings).
+		 */
+		pr_warn("Operation requires CAP_SETGID, which is not available to GID %u for operations besides approved set*gid transitions\n",
+			__kgid_val(cred->gid));
+		return -EPERM;
+	default:
+		/* Error, the only capabilities were checking for is CAP_SETUID/GID */
+		return 0;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check whether a caller with old credentials @old is allowed to switch to
+ * credentials that contain @new_id.
+ */
+static bool id_permitted_for_cred(const struct cred *old, kid_t new_id, enum setid_type new_type)
+{
+	bool permitted;
+
+	/* If our old creds already had this ID in it, it's fine. */
+	if (new_type == UID) {
+		if (uid_eq(new_id.uid, old->uid) || uid_eq(new_id.uid, old->euid) ||
+			uid_eq(new_id.uid, old->suid))
+			return true;
+	} else if (new_type == GID){
+		if (gid_eq(new_id.gid, old->gid) || gid_eq(new_id.gid, old->egid) ||
+			gid_eq(new_id.gid, old->sgid))
+			return true;
+	} else /* Error, new_type is an invalid type */
+		return false;
+
+	/*
+	 * Transitions to new UIDs require a check against the policy of the old
+	 * RUID.
+	 */
+	permitted =
+	    setid_policy_lookup((kid_t){.uid = old->uid}, new_id, new_type) != SIDPOL_CONSTRAINED;
+
+	if (!permitted) {
+		if (new_type == UID) {
+			pr_warn("UID transition ((%d,%d,%d) -> %d) blocked\n",
+				__kuid_val(old->uid), __kuid_val(old->euid),
+				__kuid_val(old->suid), __kuid_val(new_id.uid));
+		} else if (new_type == GID) {
+			pr_warn("GID transition ((%d,%d,%d) -> %d) blocked\n",
+				__kgid_val(old->gid), __kgid_val(old->egid),
+				__kgid_val(old->sgid), __kgid_val(new_id.gid));
+		} else /* Error, new_type is an invalid type */
+			return false;
+	}
+	return permitted;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check whether there is either an exception for user under old cred struct to
+ * set*uid to user under new cred struct, or the UID transition is allowed (by
+ * Linux set*uid rules) even without CAP_SETUID.
+ */
+static int safesetid_task_fix_setuid(struct cred *new,
+				     const struct cred *old,
+				     int flags)
+{
+
+	/* Do nothing if there are no setuid restrictions for our old RUID. */
+	if (setid_policy_lookup((kid_t){.uid = old->uid}, INVALID_ID, UID) == SIDPOL_DEFAULT)
+		return 0;
+
+	if (id_permitted_for_cred(old, (kid_t){.uid = new->uid}, UID) &&
+	    id_permitted_for_cred(old, (kid_t){.uid = new->euid}, UID) &&
+	    id_permitted_for_cred(old, (kid_t){.uid = new->suid}, UID) &&
+	    id_permitted_for_cred(old, (kid_t){.uid = new->fsuid}, UID))
+		return 0;
+
+	/*
+	 * Kill this process to avoid potential security vulnerabilities
+	 * that could arise from a missing allowlist entry preventing a
+	 * privileged process from dropping to a lesser-privileged one.
+	 */
+	force_sig(SIGKILL);
+	return -EACCES;
+}
+
+static int safesetid_task_fix_setgid(struct cred *new,
+				     const struct cred *old,
+				     int flags)
+{
+
+	/* Do nothing if there are no setgid restrictions for our old RGID. */
+	if (setid_policy_lookup((kid_t){.gid = old->gid}, INVALID_ID, GID) == SIDPOL_DEFAULT)
+		return 0;
+
+	if (id_permitted_for_cred(old, (kid_t){.gid = new->gid}, GID) &&
+	    id_permitted_for_cred(old, (kid_t){.gid = new->egid}, GID) &&
+	    id_permitted_for_cred(old, (kid_t){.gid = new->sgid}, GID) &&
+	    id_permitted_for_cred(old, (kid_t){.gid = new->fsgid}, GID))
+		return 0;
+
+	/*
+	 * Kill this process to avoid potential security vulnerabilities
+	 * that could arise from a missing allowlist entry preventing a
+	 * privileged process from dropping to a lesser-privileged one.
+	 */
+	force_sig(SIGKILL);
+	return -EACCES;
+}
+
+static int safesetid_task_fix_setgroups(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	/* Do nothing if there are no setgid restrictions for our old RGID. */
+	if (setid_policy_lookup((kid_t){.gid = old->gid}, INVALID_ID, GID) == SIDPOL_DEFAULT)
+		return 0;
+
+	get_group_info(new->group_info);
+	for (i = 0; i < new->group_info->ngroups; i++) {
+		if (!id_permitted_for_cred(old, (kid_t){.gid = new->group_info->gid[i]}, GID)) {
+			put_group_info(new->group_info);
+			/*
+			 * Kill this process to avoid potential security vulnerabilities
+			 * that could arise from a missing allowlist entry preventing a
+			 * privileged process from dropping to a lesser-privileged one.
+			 */
+			force_sig(SIGKILL);
+			return -EACCES;
+		}
+	}
+
+	put_group_info(new->group_info);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static struct security_hook_list safesetid_security_hooks[] = {
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_fix_setuid, safesetid_task_fix_setuid),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_fix_setgid, safesetid_task_fix_setgid),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_fix_setgroups, safesetid_task_fix_setgroups),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(capable, safesetid_security_capable)
+};
+
+static int __init safesetid_security_init(void)
+{
+	security_add_hooks(safesetid_security_hooks,
+			   ARRAY_SIZE(safesetid_security_hooks), "safesetid");
+
+	/* Report that SafeSetID successfully initialized */
+	safesetid_initialized = 1;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+DEFINE_LSM(safesetid_security_init) = {
+	.init = safesetid_security_init,
+	.name = "safesetid",
+};