diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/x86_64')
| -rw-r--r-- | tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/x86_64/pmu.c | 31 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/x86_64/processor.c | 60 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/x86_64/sev.c | 114 |
3 files changed, 198 insertions, 7 deletions
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/x86_64/pmu.c b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/x86_64/pmu.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..f31f0427c1 --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/x86_64/pmu.c @@ -0,0 +1,31 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only +/* + * Copyright (C) 2023, Tencent, Inc. + */ + +#include <stdint.h> + +#include <linux/kernel.h> + +#include "kvm_util.h" +#include "pmu.h" + +const uint64_t intel_pmu_arch_events[] = { + INTEL_ARCH_CPU_CYCLES, + INTEL_ARCH_INSTRUCTIONS_RETIRED, + INTEL_ARCH_REFERENCE_CYCLES, + INTEL_ARCH_LLC_REFERENCES, + INTEL_ARCH_LLC_MISSES, + INTEL_ARCH_BRANCHES_RETIRED, + INTEL_ARCH_BRANCHES_MISPREDICTED, + INTEL_ARCH_TOPDOWN_SLOTS, +}; +kvm_static_assert(ARRAY_SIZE(intel_pmu_arch_events) == NR_INTEL_ARCH_EVENTS); + +const uint64_t amd_pmu_zen_events[] = { + AMD_ZEN_CORE_CYCLES, + AMD_ZEN_INSTRUCTIONS_RETIRED, + AMD_ZEN_BRANCHES_RETIRED, + AMD_ZEN_BRANCHES_MISPREDICTED, +}; +kvm_static_assert(ARRAY_SIZE(amd_pmu_zen_events) == NR_AMD_ZEN_EVENTS); diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/x86_64/processor.c b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/x86_64/processor.c index f639b3e062..74a4c736c9 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/x86_64/processor.c +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/x86_64/processor.c @@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ #include "test_util.h" #include "kvm_util.h" #include "processor.h" +#include "sev.h" #ifndef NUM_INTERRUPTS #define NUM_INTERRUPTS 256 @@ -157,6 +158,8 @@ static uint64_t *virt_create_upper_pte(struct kvm_vm *vm, { uint64_t *pte = virt_get_pte(vm, parent_pte, vaddr, current_level); + paddr = vm_untag_gpa(vm, paddr); + if (!(*pte & PTE_PRESENT_MASK)) { *pte = PTE_PRESENT_MASK | PTE_WRITABLE_MASK; if (current_level == target_level) @@ -200,6 +203,8 @@ void __virt_pg_map(struct kvm_vm *vm, uint64_t vaddr, uint64_t paddr, int level) "Physical address beyond maximum supported,\n" " paddr: 0x%lx vm->max_gfn: 0x%lx vm->page_size: 0x%x", paddr, vm->max_gfn, vm->page_size); + TEST_ASSERT(vm_untag_gpa(vm, paddr) == paddr, + "Unexpected bits in paddr: %lx", paddr); /* * Allocate upper level page tables, if not already present. Return @@ -222,6 +227,15 @@ void __virt_pg_map(struct kvm_vm *vm, uint64_t vaddr, uint64_t paddr, int level) TEST_ASSERT(!(*pte & PTE_PRESENT_MASK), "PTE already present for 4k page at vaddr: 0x%lx", vaddr); *pte = PTE_PRESENT_MASK | PTE_WRITABLE_MASK | (paddr & PHYSICAL_PAGE_MASK); + + /* + * Neither SEV nor TDX supports shared page tables, so only the final + * leaf PTE needs manually set the C/S-bit. + */ + if (vm_is_gpa_protected(vm, paddr)) + *pte |= vm->arch.c_bit; + else + *pte |= vm->arch.s_bit; } void virt_arch_pg_map(struct kvm_vm *vm, uint64_t vaddr, uint64_t paddr) @@ -265,6 +279,9 @@ uint64_t *__vm_get_page_table_entry(struct kvm_vm *vm, uint64_t vaddr, { uint64_t *pml4e, *pdpe, *pde; + TEST_ASSERT(!vm->arch.is_pt_protected, + "Walking page tables of protected guests is impossible"); + TEST_ASSERT(*level >= PG_LEVEL_NONE && *level < PG_LEVEL_NUM, "Invalid PG_LEVEL_* '%d'", *level); @@ -496,7 +513,7 @@ vm_paddr_t addr_arch_gva2gpa(struct kvm_vm *vm, vm_vaddr_t gva) * No need for a hugepage mask on the PTE, x86-64 requires the "unused" * address bits to be zero. */ - return PTE_GET_PA(*pte) | (gva & ~HUGEPAGE_MASK(level)); + return vm_untag_gpa(vm, PTE_GET_PA(*pte)) | (gva & ~HUGEPAGE_MASK(level)); } static void kvm_setup_gdt(struct kvm_vm *vm, struct kvm_dtable *dt) @@ -560,10 +577,23 @@ void kvm_arch_vm_post_create(struct kvm_vm *vm) vm_create_irqchip(vm); sync_global_to_guest(vm, host_cpu_is_intel); sync_global_to_guest(vm, host_cpu_is_amd); + + if (vm->subtype == VM_SUBTYPE_SEV) + sev_vm_init(vm); + else if (vm->subtype == VM_SUBTYPE_SEV_ES) + sev_es_vm_init(vm); +} + +void vcpu_arch_set_entry_point(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, void *guest_code) +{ + struct kvm_regs regs; + + vcpu_regs_get(vcpu, ®s); + regs.rip = (unsigned long) guest_code; + vcpu_regs_set(vcpu, ®s); } -struct kvm_vcpu *vm_arch_vcpu_add(struct kvm_vm *vm, uint32_t vcpu_id, - void *guest_code) +struct kvm_vcpu *vm_arch_vcpu_add(struct kvm_vm *vm, uint32_t vcpu_id) { struct kvm_mp_state mp_state; struct kvm_regs regs; @@ -597,7 +627,6 @@ struct kvm_vcpu *vm_arch_vcpu_add(struct kvm_vm *vm, uint32_t vcpu_id, vcpu_regs_get(vcpu, ®s); regs.rflags = regs.rflags | 0x2; regs.rsp = stack_vaddr; - regs.rip = (unsigned long) guest_code; vcpu_regs_set(vcpu, ®s); /* Setup the MP state */ @@ -752,12 +781,21 @@ void vcpu_init_cpuid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, const struct kvm_cpuid2 *cpuid) vcpu_set_cpuid(vcpu); } -void vcpu_set_cpuid_maxphyaddr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, uint8_t maxphyaddr) +void vcpu_set_cpuid_property(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, + struct kvm_x86_cpu_property property, + uint32_t value) { - struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *entry = vcpu_get_cpuid_entry(vcpu, 0x80000008); + struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *entry; + + entry = __vcpu_get_cpuid_entry(vcpu, property.function, property.index); + + (&entry->eax)[property.reg] &= ~GENMASK(property.hi_bit, property.lo_bit); + (&entry->eax)[property.reg] |= value << property.lo_bit; - entry->eax = (entry->eax & ~0xff) | maxphyaddr; vcpu_set_cpuid(vcpu); + + /* Sanity check that @value doesn't exceed the bounds in any way. */ + TEST_ASSERT_EQ(kvm_cpuid_property(vcpu->cpuid, property), value); } void vcpu_clear_cpuid_entry(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, uint32_t function) @@ -1041,6 +1079,14 @@ void kvm_get_cpu_address_width(unsigned int *pa_bits, unsigned int *va_bits) } } +void kvm_init_vm_address_properties(struct kvm_vm *vm) +{ + if (vm->subtype == VM_SUBTYPE_SEV || vm->subtype == VM_SUBTYPE_SEV_ES) { + vm->arch.c_bit = BIT_ULL(this_cpu_property(X86_PROPERTY_SEV_C_BIT)); + vm->gpa_tag_mask = vm->arch.c_bit; + } +} + static void set_idt_entry(struct kvm_vm *vm, int vector, unsigned long addr, int dpl, unsigned short selector) { diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/x86_64/sev.c b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/x86_64/sev.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e248d3364b --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/x86_64/sev.c @@ -0,0 +1,114 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only +#define _GNU_SOURCE /* for program_invocation_short_name */ +#include <stdint.h> +#include <stdbool.h> + +#include "sev.h" + +/* + * sparsebit_next_clear() can return 0 if [x, 2**64-1] are all set, and the + * -1 would then cause an underflow back to 2**64 - 1. This is expected and + * correct. + * + * If the last range in the sparsebit is [x, y] and we try to iterate, + * sparsebit_next_set() will return 0, and sparsebit_next_clear() will try + * and find the first range, but that's correct because the condition + * expression would cause us to quit the loop. + */ +static void encrypt_region(struct kvm_vm *vm, struct userspace_mem_region *region) +{ + const struct sparsebit *protected_phy_pages = region->protected_phy_pages; + const vm_paddr_t gpa_base = region->region.guest_phys_addr; + const sparsebit_idx_t lowest_page_in_region = gpa_base >> vm->page_shift; + sparsebit_idx_t i, j; + + if (!sparsebit_any_set(protected_phy_pages)) + return; + + sev_register_encrypted_memory(vm, region); + + sparsebit_for_each_set_range(protected_phy_pages, i, j) { + const uint64_t size = (j - i + 1) * vm->page_size; + const uint64_t offset = (i - lowest_page_in_region) * vm->page_size; + + sev_launch_update_data(vm, gpa_base + offset, size); + } +} + +void sev_vm_launch(struct kvm_vm *vm, uint32_t policy) +{ + struct kvm_sev_launch_start launch_start = { + .policy = policy, + }; + struct userspace_mem_region *region; + struct kvm_sev_guest_status status; + int ctr; + + vm_sev_ioctl(vm, KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_START, &launch_start); + vm_sev_ioctl(vm, KVM_SEV_GUEST_STATUS, &status); + + TEST_ASSERT_EQ(status.policy, policy); + TEST_ASSERT_EQ(status.state, SEV_GUEST_STATE_LAUNCH_UPDATE); + + hash_for_each(vm->regions.slot_hash, ctr, region, slot_node) + encrypt_region(vm, region); + + if (policy & SEV_POLICY_ES) + vm_sev_ioctl(vm, KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_UPDATE_VMSA, NULL); + + vm->arch.is_pt_protected = true; +} + +void sev_vm_launch_measure(struct kvm_vm *vm, uint8_t *measurement) +{ + struct kvm_sev_launch_measure launch_measure; + struct kvm_sev_guest_status guest_status; + + launch_measure.len = 256; + launch_measure.uaddr = (__u64)measurement; + vm_sev_ioctl(vm, KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_MEASURE, &launch_measure); + + vm_sev_ioctl(vm, KVM_SEV_GUEST_STATUS, &guest_status); + TEST_ASSERT_EQ(guest_status.state, SEV_GUEST_STATE_LAUNCH_SECRET); +} + +void sev_vm_launch_finish(struct kvm_vm *vm) +{ + struct kvm_sev_guest_status status; + + vm_sev_ioctl(vm, KVM_SEV_GUEST_STATUS, &status); + TEST_ASSERT(status.state == SEV_GUEST_STATE_LAUNCH_UPDATE || + status.state == SEV_GUEST_STATE_LAUNCH_SECRET, + "Unexpected guest state: %d", status.state); + + vm_sev_ioctl(vm, KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_FINISH, NULL); + + vm_sev_ioctl(vm, KVM_SEV_GUEST_STATUS, &status); + TEST_ASSERT_EQ(status.state, SEV_GUEST_STATE_RUNNING); +} + +struct kvm_vm *vm_sev_create_with_one_vcpu(uint32_t policy, void *guest_code, + struct kvm_vcpu **cpu) +{ + struct vm_shape shape = { + .type = VM_TYPE_DEFAULT, + .mode = VM_MODE_DEFAULT, + .subtype = policy & SEV_POLICY_ES ? VM_SUBTYPE_SEV_ES : + VM_SUBTYPE_SEV, + }; + struct kvm_vm *vm; + struct kvm_vcpu *cpus[1]; + uint8_t measurement[512]; + + vm = __vm_create_with_vcpus(shape, 1, 0, guest_code, cpus); + *cpu = cpus[0]; + + sev_vm_launch(vm, policy); + + /* TODO: Validate the measurement is as expected. */ + sev_vm_launch_measure(vm, measurement); + + sev_vm_launch_finish(vm); + + return vm; +} |