From 8665bd53f2f2e27e5511d90428cb3f60e6d0ce15 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Daniel Baumann Date: Sat, 18 May 2024 20:50:12 +0200 Subject: Merging upstream version 6.8.9. Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann --- Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst | 44 +++++++++++++++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 38 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) (limited to 'Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln') diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst index 32a8893e56..e0a1be97fa 100644 --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst @@ -138,11 +138,10 @@ associated with the source address of the indirect branch. Specifically, the BHB might be shared across privilege levels even in the presence of Enhanced IBRS. -Currently the only known real-world BHB attack vector is via -unprivileged eBPF. Therefore, it's highly recommended to not enable -unprivileged eBPF, especially when eIBRS is used (without retpolines). -For a full mitigation against BHB attacks, it's recommended to use -retpolines (or eIBRS combined with retpolines). +Previously the only known real-world BHB attack vector was via unprivileged +eBPF. Further research has found attacks that don't require unprivileged eBPF. +For a full mitigation against BHB attacks it is recommended to set BHI_DIS_S or +use the BHB clearing sequence. Attack scenarios ---------------- @@ -430,6 +429,23 @@ The possible values in this file are: 'PBRSB-eIBRS: Not affected' CPU is not affected by PBRSB =========================== ======================================================= + - Branch History Injection (BHI) protection status: + +.. list-table:: + + * - BHI: Not affected + - System is not affected + * - BHI: Retpoline + - System is protected by retpoline + * - BHI: BHI_DIS_S + - System is protected by BHI_DIS_S + * - BHI: SW loop, KVM SW loop + - System is protected by software clearing sequence + * - BHI: Vulnerable + - System is vulnerable to BHI + * - BHI: Vulnerable, KVM: SW loop + - System is vulnerable; KVM is protected by software clearing sequence + Full mitigation might require a microcode update from the CPU vendor. When the necessary microcode is not available, the kernel will report vulnerability. @@ -484,7 +500,11 @@ Spectre variant 2 Systems which support enhanced IBRS (eIBRS) enable IBRS protection once at boot, by setting the IBRS bit, and they're automatically protected against - Spectre v2 variant attacks. + some Spectre v2 variant attacks. The BHB can still influence the choice of + indirect branch predictor entry, and although branch predictor entries are + isolated between modes when eIBRS is enabled, the BHB itself is not isolated + between modes. Systems which support BHI_DIS_S will set it to protect against + BHI attacks. On Intel's enhanced IBRS systems, this includes cross-thread branch target injections on SMT systems (STIBP). In other words, Intel eIBRS enables @@ -638,6 +658,18 @@ kernel command line. spectre_v2=off. Spectre variant 1 mitigations cannot be disabled. + spectre_bhi= + + [X86] Control mitigation of Branch History Injection + (BHI) vulnerability. This setting affects the deployment + of the HW BHI control and the SW BHB clearing sequence. + + on + (default) Enable the HW or SW mitigation as + needed. + off + Disable the mitigation. + For spectre_v2_user see Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt Mitigation selection guide -- cgit v1.2.3