From ace9429bb58fd418f0c81d4c2835699bddf6bde6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Daniel Baumann Date: Thu, 11 Apr 2024 10:27:49 +0200 Subject: Adding upstream version 6.6.15. Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann --- Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/fs.rst | 334 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 334 insertions(+) create mode 100644 Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/fs.rst (limited to 'Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/fs.rst') diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/fs.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/fs.rst new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..a321b84ecc --- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/fs.rst @@ -0,0 +1,334 @@ +=============================== +Documentation for /proc/sys/fs/ +=============================== + +Copyright (c) 1998, 1999, Rik van Riel + +Copyright (c) 2009, Shen Feng + +For general info and legal blurb, please look in intro.rst. + +------------------------------------------------------------------------------ + +This file contains documentation for the sysctl files and directories +in ``/proc/sys/fs/``. + +The files in this directory can be used to tune and monitor +miscellaneous and general things in the operation of the Linux +kernel. Since some of the files *can* be used to screw up your +system, it is advisable to read both documentation and source +before actually making adjustments. + +1. /proc/sys/fs +=============== + +Currently, these files might (depending on your configuration) +show up in ``/proc/sys/fs``: + +.. contents:: :local: + + +aio-nr & aio-max-nr +------------------- + +``aio-nr`` shows the current system-wide number of asynchronous io +requests. ``aio-max-nr`` allows you to change the maximum value +``aio-nr`` can grow to. If ``aio-nr`` reaches ``aio-nr-max`` then +``io_setup`` will fail with ``EAGAIN``. Note that raising +``aio-max-nr`` does not result in the +pre-allocation or re-sizing of any kernel data structures. + + +dentry-state +------------ + +This file shows the values in ``struct dentry_stat``, as defined in +``linux/include/linux/dcache.h``:: + + struct dentry_stat_t dentry_stat { + int nr_dentry; + int nr_unused; + int age_limit; /* age in seconds */ + int want_pages; /* pages requested by system */ + int nr_negative; /* # of unused negative dentries */ + int dummy; /* Reserved for future use */ + }; + +Dentries are dynamically allocated and deallocated. + +``nr_dentry`` shows the total number of dentries allocated (active ++ unused). ``nr_unused shows`` the number of dentries that are not +actively used, but are saved in the LRU list for future reuse. + +``age_limit`` is the age in seconds after which dcache entries +can be reclaimed when memory is short and ``want_pages`` is +nonzero when ``shrink_dcache_pages()`` has been called and the +dcache isn't pruned yet. + +``nr_negative`` shows the number of unused dentries that are also +negative dentries which do not map to any files. Instead, +they help speeding up rejection of non-existing files provided +by the users. + + +file-max & file-nr +------------------ + +The value in ``file-max`` denotes the maximum number of file- +handles that the Linux kernel will allocate. When you get lots +of error messages about running out of file handles, you might +want to increase this limit. + +Historically,the kernel was able to allocate file handles +dynamically, but not to free them again. The three values in +``file-nr`` denote the number of allocated file handles, the number +of allocated but unused file handles, and the maximum number of +file handles. Linux 2.6 and later always reports 0 as the number of free +file handles -- this is not an error, it just means that the +number of allocated file handles exactly matches the number of +used file handles. + +Attempts to allocate more file descriptors than ``file-max`` are +reported with ``printk``, look for:: + + VFS: file-max limit reached + +in the kernel logs. + + +inode-nr & inode-state +---------------------- + +As with file handles, the kernel allocates the inode structures +dynamically, but can't free them yet. + +The file ``inode-nr`` contains the first two items from +``inode-state``, so we'll skip to that file... + +``inode-state`` contains three actual numbers and four dummies. +The actual numbers are, in order of appearance, ``nr_inodes``, +``nr_free_inodes`` and ``preshrink``. + +``nr_inodes`` stands for the number of inodes the system has +allocated. + +``nr_free_inodes`` represents the number of free inodes (?) and +preshrink is nonzero when the +system needs to prune the inode list instead of allocating +more. + + +mount-max +--------- + +This denotes the maximum number of mounts that may exist +in a mount namespace. + + +nr_open +------- + +This denotes the maximum number of file-handles a process can +allocate. Default value is 1024*1024 (1048576) which should be +enough for most machines. Actual limit depends on ``RLIMIT_NOFILE`` +resource limit. + + +overflowgid & overflowuid +------------------------- + +Some filesystems only support 16-bit UIDs and GIDs, although in Linux +UIDs and GIDs are 32 bits. When one of these filesystems is mounted +with writes enabled, any UID or GID that would exceed 65535 is translated +to a fixed value before being written to disk. + +These sysctls allow you to change the value of the fixed UID and GID. +The default is 65534. + + +pipe-user-pages-hard +-------------------- + +Maximum total number of pages a non-privileged user may allocate for pipes. +Once this limit is reached, no new pipes may be allocated until usage goes +below the limit again. When set to 0, no limit is applied, which is the default +setting. + + +pipe-user-pages-soft +-------------------- + +Maximum total number of pages a non-privileged user may allocate for pipes +before the pipe size gets limited to a single page. Once this limit is reached, +new pipes will be limited to a single page in size for this user in order to +limit total memory usage, and trying to increase them using ``fcntl()`` will be +denied until usage goes below the limit again. The default value allows to +allocate up to 1024 pipes at their default size. When set to 0, no limit is +applied. + + +protected_fifos +--------------- + +The intent of this protection is to avoid unintentional writes to +an attacker-controlled FIFO, where a program expected to create a regular +file. + +When set to "0", writing to FIFOs is unrestricted. + +When set to "1" don't allow ``O_CREAT`` open on FIFOs that we don't own +in world writable sticky directories, unless they are owned by the +owner of the directory. + +When set to "2" it also applies to group writable sticky directories. + +This protection is based on the restrictions in Openwall. + + +protected_hardlinks +-------------------- + +A long-standing class of security issues is the hardlink-based +time-of-check-time-of-use race, most commonly seen in world-writable +directories like ``/tmp``. The common method of exploitation of this flaw +is to cross privilege boundaries when following a given hardlink (i.e. a +root process follows a hardlink created by another user). Additionally, +on systems without separated partitions, this stops unauthorized users +from "pinning" vulnerable setuid/setgid files against being upgraded by +the administrator, or linking to special files. + +When set to "0", hardlink creation behavior is unrestricted. + +When set to "1" hardlinks cannot be created by users if they do not +already own the source file, or do not have read/write access to it. + +This protection is based on the restrictions in Openwall and grsecurity. + + +protected_regular +----------------- + +This protection is similar to `protected_fifos`_, but it +avoids writes to an attacker-controlled regular file, where a program +expected to create one. + +When set to "0", writing to regular files is unrestricted. + +When set to "1" don't allow ``O_CREAT`` open on regular files that we +don't own in world writable sticky directories, unless they are +owned by the owner of the directory. + +When set to "2" it also applies to group writable sticky directories. + + +protected_symlinks +------------------ + +A long-standing class of security issues is the symlink-based +time-of-check-time-of-use race, most commonly seen in world-writable +directories like ``/tmp``. The common method of exploitation of this flaw +is to cross privilege boundaries when following a given symlink (i.e. a +root process follows a symlink belonging to another user). For a likely +incomplete list of hundreds of examples across the years, please see: +https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvekey.cgi?keyword=/tmp + +When set to "0", symlink following behavior is unrestricted. + +When set to "1" symlinks are permitted to be followed only when outside +a sticky world-writable directory, or when the uid of the symlink and +follower match, or when the directory owner matches the symlink's owner. + +This protection is based on the restrictions in Openwall and grsecurity. + + +suid_dumpable +------------- + +This value can be used to query and set the core dump mode for setuid +or otherwise protected/tainted binaries. The modes are + += ========== =============================================================== +0 (default) Traditional behaviour. Any process which has changed + privilege levels or is execute only will not be dumped. +1 (debug) All processes dump core when possible. The core dump is + owned by the current user and no security is applied. This is + intended for system debugging situations only. + Ptrace is unchecked. + This is insecure as it allows regular users to examine the + memory contents of privileged processes. +2 (suidsafe) Any binary which normally would not be dumped is dumped + anyway, but only if the ``core_pattern`` kernel sysctl (see + :ref:`Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/kernel.rst `) + is set to + either a pipe handler or a fully qualified path. (For more + details on this limitation, see CVE-2006-2451.) This mode is + appropriate when administrators are attempting to debug + problems in a normal environment, and either have a core dump + pipe handler that knows to treat privileged core dumps with + care, or specific directory defined for catching core dumps. + If a core dump happens without a pipe handler or fully + qualified path, a message will be emitted to syslog warning + about the lack of a correct setting. += ========== =============================================================== + + + +2. /proc/sys/fs/binfmt_misc +=========================== + +Documentation for the files in ``/proc/sys/fs/binfmt_misc`` is +in Documentation/admin-guide/binfmt-misc.rst. + + +3. /proc/sys/fs/mqueue - POSIX message queues filesystem +======================================================== + + +The "mqueue" filesystem provides the necessary kernel features to enable the +creation of a user space library that implements the POSIX message queues +API (as noted by the MSG tag in the POSIX 1003.1-2001 version of the System +Interfaces specification.) + +The "mqueue" filesystem contains values for determining/setting the +amount of resources used by the file system. + +``/proc/sys/fs/mqueue/queues_max`` is a read/write file for +setting/getting the maximum number of message queues allowed on the +system. + +``/proc/sys/fs/mqueue/msg_max`` is a read/write file for +setting/getting the maximum number of messages in a queue value. In +fact it is the limiting value for another (user) limit which is set in +``mq_open`` invocation. This attribute of a queue must be less than +or equal to ``msg_max``. + +``/proc/sys/fs/mqueue/msgsize_max`` is a read/write file for +setting/getting the maximum message size value (it is an attribute of +every message queue, set during its creation). + +``/proc/sys/fs/mqueue/msg_default`` is a read/write file for +setting/getting the default number of messages in a queue value if the +``attr`` parameter of ``mq_open(2)`` is ``NULL``. If it exceeds +``msg_max``, the default value is initialized to ``msg_max``. + +``/proc/sys/fs/mqueue/msgsize_default`` is a read/write file for +setting/getting the default message size value if the ``attr`` +parameter of ``mq_open(2)`` is ``NULL``. If it exceeds +``msgsize_max``, the default value is initialized to ``msgsize_max``. + +4. /proc/sys/fs/epoll - Configuration options for the epoll interface +===================================================================== + +This directory contains configuration options for the epoll(7) interface. + +max_user_watches +---------------- + +Every epoll file descriptor can store a number of files to be monitored +for event readiness. Each one of these monitored files constitutes a "watch". +This configuration option sets the maximum number of "watches" that are +allowed for each user. +Each "watch" costs roughly 90 bytes on a 32-bit kernel, and roughly 160 bytes +on a 64-bit one. +The current default value for ``max_user_watches`` is 4% of the +available low memory, divided by the "watch" cost in bytes. -- cgit v1.2.3