From ace9429bb58fd418f0c81d4c2835699bddf6bde6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Daniel Baumann Date: Thu, 11 Apr 2024 10:27:49 +0200 Subject: Adding upstream version 6.6.15. Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann --- Documentation/security/IMA-templates.rst | 111 ++ Documentation/security/SCTP.rst | 344 ++++ Documentation/security/credentials.rst | 564 +++++++ Documentation/security/digsig.rst | 101 ++ Documentation/security/index.rst | 20 + Documentation/security/keys/core.rst | 1849 +++++++++++++++++++++ Documentation/security/keys/ecryptfs.rst | 73 + Documentation/security/keys/index.rst | 11 + Documentation/security/keys/request-key.rst | 207 +++ Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst | 428 +++++ Documentation/security/landlock.rst | 129 ++ Documentation/security/lsm-development.rst | 17 + Documentation/security/lsm.rst | 131 ++ Documentation/security/sak.rst | 91 + Documentation/security/secrets/coco.rst | 103 ++ Documentation/security/secrets/index.rst | 9 + Documentation/security/self-protection.rst | 316 ++++ Documentation/security/siphash.rst | 199 +++ Documentation/security/tpm/index.rst | 10 + Documentation/security/tpm/tpm_event_log.rst | 55 + Documentation/security/tpm/tpm_ftpm_tee.rst | 27 + Documentation/security/tpm/tpm_vtpm_proxy.rst | 50 + Documentation/security/tpm/xen-tpmfront.rst | 124 ++ 23 files changed, 4969 insertions(+) create mode 100644 Documentation/security/IMA-templates.rst create mode 100644 Documentation/security/SCTP.rst create mode 100644 Documentation/security/credentials.rst create mode 100644 Documentation/security/digsig.rst create mode 100644 Documentation/security/index.rst create mode 100644 Documentation/security/keys/core.rst create mode 100644 Documentation/security/keys/ecryptfs.rst create mode 100644 Documentation/security/keys/index.rst create mode 100644 Documentation/security/keys/request-key.rst create mode 100644 Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst create mode 100644 Documentation/security/landlock.rst create mode 100644 Documentation/security/lsm-development.rst create mode 100644 Documentation/security/lsm.rst create mode 100644 Documentation/security/sak.rst create mode 100644 Documentation/security/secrets/coco.rst create mode 100644 Documentation/security/secrets/index.rst create mode 100644 Documentation/security/self-protection.rst create mode 100644 Documentation/security/siphash.rst create mode 100644 Documentation/security/tpm/index.rst create mode 100644 Documentation/security/tpm/tpm_event_log.rst create mode 100644 Documentation/security/tpm/tpm_ftpm_tee.rst create mode 100644 Documentation/security/tpm/tpm_vtpm_proxy.rst create mode 100644 Documentation/security/tpm/xen-tpmfront.rst (limited to 'Documentation/security') diff --git a/Documentation/security/IMA-templates.rst b/Documentation/security/IMA-templates.rst new file mode 100644 index 000000000..15b4add31 --- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/security/IMA-templates.rst @@ -0,0 +1,111 @@ +================================= +IMA Template Management Mechanism +================================= + + +Introduction +============ + +The original ``ima`` template is fixed length, containing the filedata hash +and pathname. The filedata hash is limited to 20 bytes (md5/sha1). +The pathname is a null terminated string, limited to 255 characters. +To overcome these limitations and to add additional file metadata, it is +necessary to extend the current version of IMA by defining additional +templates. For example, information that could be possibly reported are +the inode UID/GID or the LSM labels either of the inode and of the process +that is accessing it. + +However, the main problem to introduce this feature is that, each time +a new template is defined, the functions that generate and display +the measurements list would include the code for handling a new format +and, thus, would significantly grow over the time. + +The proposed solution solves this problem by separating the template +management from the remaining IMA code. The core of this solution is the +definition of two new data structures: a template descriptor, to determine +which information should be included in the measurement list; a template +field, to generate and display data of a given type. + +Managing templates with these structures is very simple. To support +a new data type, developers define the field identifier and implement +two functions, init() and show(), respectively to generate and display +measurement entries. Defining a new template descriptor requires +specifying the template format (a string of field identifiers separated +by the ``|`` character) through the ``ima_template_fmt`` kernel command line +parameter. At boot time, IMA initializes the chosen template descriptor +by translating the format into an array of template fields structures taken +from the set of the supported ones. + +After the initialization step, IMA will call ``ima_alloc_init_template()`` +(new function defined within the patches for the new template management +mechanism) to generate a new measurement entry by using the template +descriptor chosen through the kernel configuration or through the newly +introduced ``ima_template`` and ``ima_template_fmt`` kernel command line parameters. +It is during this phase that the advantages of the new architecture are +clearly shown: the latter function will not contain specific code to handle +a given template but, instead, it simply calls the ``init()`` method of the template +fields associated to the chosen template descriptor and store the result +(pointer to allocated data and data length) in the measurement entry structure. + +The same mechanism is employed to display measurements entries. +The functions ``ima[_ascii]_measurements_show()`` retrieve, for each entry, +the template descriptor used to produce that entry and call the show() +method for each item of the array of template fields structures. + + + +Supported Template Fields and Descriptors +========================================= + +In the following, there is the list of supported template fields +``('': description)``, that can be used to define new template +descriptors by adding their identifier to the format string +(support for more data types will be added later): + + - 'd': the digest of the event (i.e. the digest of a measured file), + calculated with the SHA1 or MD5 hash algorithm; + - 'n': the name of the event (i.e. the file name), with size up to 255 bytes; + - 'd-ng': the digest of the event, calculated with an arbitrary hash + algorithm (field format: :digest); + - 'd-ngv2': same as d-ng, but prefixed with the "ima" or "verity" digest type + (field format: ::digest); + - 'd-modsig': the digest of the event without the appended modsig; + - 'n-ng': the name of the event, without size limitations; + - 'sig': the file signature, based on either the file's/fsverity's digest[1], + or the EVM portable signature, if 'security.ima' contains a file hash. + - 'modsig' the appended file signature; + - 'buf': the buffer data that was used to generate the hash without size limitations; + - 'evmsig': the EVM portable signature; + - 'iuid': the inode UID; + - 'igid': the inode GID; + - 'imode': the inode mode; + - 'xattrnames': a list of xattr names (separated by ``|``), only if the xattr is + present; + - 'xattrlengths': a list of xattr lengths (u32), only if the xattr is present; + - 'xattrvalues': a list of xattr values; + + +Below, there is the list of defined template descriptors: + + - "ima": its format is ``d|n``; + - "ima-ng" (default): its format is ``d-ng|n-ng``; + - "ima-ngv2": its format is ``d-ngv2|n-ng``; + - "ima-sig": its format is ``d-ng|n-ng|sig``; + - "ima-sigv2": its format is ``d-ngv2|n-ng|sig``; + - "ima-buf": its format is ``d-ng|n-ng|buf``; + - "ima-modsig": its format is ``d-ng|n-ng|sig|d-modsig|modsig``; + - "evm-sig": its format is ``d-ng|n-ng|evmsig|xattrnames|xattrlengths|xattrvalues|iuid|igid|imode``; + + +Use +=== + +To specify the template descriptor to be used to generate measurement entries, +currently the following methods are supported: + + - select a template descriptor among those supported in the kernel + configuration (``ima-ng`` is the default choice); + - specify a template descriptor name from the kernel command line through + the ``ima_template=`` parameter; + - register a new template descriptor with custom format through the kernel + command line parameter ``ima_template_fmt=``. diff --git a/Documentation/security/SCTP.rst b/Documentation/security/SCTP.rst new file mode 100644 index 000000000..b73eb764a --- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/security/SCTP.rst @@ -0,0 +1,344 @@ +.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 + +==== +SCTP +==== + +SCTP LSM Support +================ + +Security Hooks +-------------- + +For security module support, three SCTP specific hooks have been implemented:: + + security_sctp_assoc_request() + security_sctp_bind_connect() + security_sctp_sk_clone() + security_sctp_assoc_established() + +The usage of these hooks are described below with the SELinux implementation +described in the `SCTP SELinux Support`_ chapter. + + +security_sctp_assoc_request() +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ +Passes the ``@asoc`` and ``@chunk->skb`` of the association INIT packet to the +security module. Returns 0 on success, error on failure. +:: + + @asoc - pointer to sctp association structure. + @skb - pointer to skbuff of association packet. + + +security_sctp_bind_connect() +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ +Passes one or more ipv4/ipv6 addresses to the security module for validation +based on the ``@optname`` that will result in either a bind or connect +service as shown in the permission check tables below. +Returns 0 on success, error on failure. +:: + + @sk - Pointer to sock structure. + @optname - Name of the option to validate. + @address - One or more ipv4 / ipv6 addresses. + @addrlen - The total length of address(s). This is calculated on each + ipv4 or ipv6 address using sizeof(struct sockaddr_in) or + sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6). + + ------------------------------------------------------------------ + | BIND Type Checks | + | @optname | @address contains | + |----------------------------|-----------------------------------| + | SCTP_SOCKOPT_BINDX_ADD | One or more ipv4 / ipv6 addresses | + | SCTP_PRIMARY_ADDR | Single ipv4 or ipv6 address | + | SCTP_SET_PEER_PRIMARY_ADDR | Single ipv4 or ipv6 address | + ------------------------------------------------------------------ + + ------------------------------------------------------------------ + | CONNECT Type Checks | + | @optname | @address contains | + |----------------------------|-----------------------------------| + | SCTP_SOCKOPT_CONNECTX | One or more ipv4 / ipv6 addresses | + | SCTP_PARAM_ADD_IP | One or more ipv4 / ipv6 addresses | + | SCTP_SENDMSG_CONNECT | Single ipv4 or ipv6 address | + | SCTP_PARAM_SET_PRIMARY | Single ipv4 or ipv6 address | + ------------------------------------------------------------------ + +A summary of the ``@optname`` entries is as follows:: + + SCTP_SOCKOPT_BINDX_ADD - Allows additional bind addresses to be + associated after (optionally) calling + bind(3). + sctp_bindx(3) adds a set of bind + addresses on a socket. + + SCTP_SOCKOPT_CONNECTX - Allows the allocation of multiple + addresses for reaching a peer + (multi-homed). + sctp_connectx(3) initiates a connection + on an SCTP socket using multiple + destination addresses. + + SCTP_SENDMSG_CONNECT - Initiate a connection that is generated by a + sendmsg(2) or sctp_sendmsg(3) on a new asociation. + + SCTP_PRIMARY_ADDR - Set local primary address. + + SCTP_SET_PEER_PRIMARY_ADDR - Request peer sets address as + association primary. + + SCTP_PARAM_ADD_IP - These are used when Dynamic Address + SCTP_PARAM_SET_PRIMARY - Reconfiguration is enabled as explained below. + + +To support Dynamic Address Reconfiguration the following parameters must be +enabled on both endpoints (or use the appropriate **setsockopt**\(2)):: + + /proc/sys/net/sctp/addip_enable + /proc/sys/net/sctp/addip_noauth_enable + +then the following *_PARAM_*'s are sent to the peer in an +ASCONF chunk when the corresponding ``@optname``'s are present:: + + @optname ASCONF Parameter + ---------- ------------------ + SCTP_SOCKOPT_BINDX_ADD -> SCTP_PARAM_ADD_IP + SCTP_SET_PEER_PRIMARY_ADDR -> SCTP_PARAM_SET_PRIMARY + + +security_sctp_sk_clone() +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ +Called whenever a new socket is created by **accept**\(2) +(i.e. a TCP style socket) or when a socket is 'peeled off' e.g userspace +calls **sctp_peeloff**\(3). +:: + + @asoc - pointer to current sctp association structure. + @sk - pointer to current sock structure. + @newsk - pointer to new sock structure. + + +security_sctp_assoc_established() +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ +Called when a COOKIE ACK is received, and the peer secid will be +saved into ``@asoc->peer_secid`` for client:: + + @asoc - pointer to sctp association structure. + @skb - pointer to skbuff of the COOKIE ACK packet. + + +Security Hooks used for Association Establishment +------------------------------------------------- + +The following diagram shows the use of ``security_sctp_bind_connect()``, +``security_sctp_assoc_request()``, ``security_sctp_assoc_established()`` when +establishing an association. +:: + + SCTP endpoint "A" SCTP endpoint "Z" + ================= ================= + sctp_sf_do_prm_asoc() + Association setup can be initiated + by a connect(2), sctp_connectx(3), + sendmsg(2) or sctp_sendmsg(3). + These will result in a call to + security_sctp_bind_connect() to + initiate an association to + SCTP peer endpoint "Z". + INIT ---------------------------------------------> + sctp_sf_do_5_1B_init() + Respond to an INIT chunk. + SCTP peer endpoint "A" is asking + for a temporary association. + Call security_sctp_assoc_request() + to set the peer label if first + association. + If not first association, check + whether allowed, IF so send: + <----------------------------------------------- INIT ACK + | ELSE audit event and silently + | discard the packet. + | + COOKIE ECHO ------------------------------------------> + sctp_sf_do_5_1D_ce() + Respond to an COOKIE ECHO chunk. + Confirm the cookie and create a + permanent association. + Call security_sctp_assoc_request() to + do the same as for INIT chunk Response. + <------------------------------------------- COOKIE ACK + | | + sctp_sf_do_5_1E_ca | + Call security_sctp_assoc_established() | + to set the peer label. | + | | + | If SCTP_SOCKET_TCP or peeled off + | socket security_sctp_sk_clone() is + | called to clone the new socket. + | | + ESTABLISHED ESTABLISHED + | | + ------------------------------------------------------------------ + | Association Established | + ------------------------------------------------------------------ + + +SCTP SELinux Support +==================== + +Security Hooks +-------------- + +The `SCTP LSM Support`_ chapter above describes the following SCTP security +hooks with the SELinux specifics expanded below:: + + security_sctp_assoc_request() + security_sctp_bind_connect() + security_sctp_sk_clone() + security_sctp_assoc_established() + + +security_sctp_assoc_request() +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ +Passes the ``@asoc`` and ``@chunk->skb`` of the association INIT packet to the +security module. Returns 0 on success, error on failure. +:: + + @asoc - pointer to sctp association structure. + @skb - pointer to skbuff of association packet. + +The security module performs the following operations: + IF this is the first association on ``@asoc->base.sk``, then set the peer + sid to that in ``@skb``. This will ensure there is only one peer sid + assigned to ``@asoc->base.sk`` that may support multiple associations. + + ELSE validate the ``@asoc->base.sk peer_sid`` against the ``@skb peer sid`` + to determine whether the association should be allowed or denied. + + Set the sctp ``@asoc sid`` to socket's sid (from ``asoc->base.sk``) with + MLS portion taken from ``@skb peer sid``. This will be used by SCTP + TCP style sockets and peeled off connections as they cause a new socket + to be generated. + + If IP security options are configured (CIPSO/CALIPSO), then the ip + options are set on the socket. + + +security_sctp_bind_connect() +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ +Checks permissions required for ipv4/ipv6 addresses based on the ``@optname`` +as follows:: + + ------------------------------------------------------------------ + | BIND Permission Checks | + | @optname | @address contains | + |----------------------------|-----------------------------------| + | SCTP_SOCKOPT_BINDX_ADD | One or more ipv4 / ipv6 addresses | + | SCTP_PRIMARY_ADDR | Single ipv4 or ipv6 address | + | SCTP_SET_PEER_PRIMARY_ADDR | Single ipv4 or ipv6 address | + ------------------------------------------------------------------ + + ------------------------------------------------------------------ + | CONNECT Permission Checks | + | @optname | @address contains | + |----------------------------|-----------------------------------| + | SCTP_SOCKOPT_CONNECTX | One or more ipv4 / ipv6 addresses | + | SCTP_PARAM_ADD_IP | One or more ipv4 / ipv6 addresses | + | SCTP_SENDMSG_CONNECT | Single ipv4 or ipv6 address | + | SCTP_PARAM_SET_PRIMARY | Single ipv4 or ipv6 address | + ------------------------------------------------------------------ + + +`SCTP LSM Support`_ gives a summary of the ``@optname`` +entries and also describes ASCONF chunk processing when Dynamic Address +Reconfiguration is enabled. + + +security_sctp_sk_clone() +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ +Called whenever a new socket is created by **accept**\(2) (i.e. a TCP style +socket) or when a socket is 'peeled off' e.g userspace calls +**sctp_peeloff**\(3). ``security_sctp_sk_clone()`` will set the new +sockets sid and peer sid to that contained in the ``@asoc sid`` and +``@asoc peer sid`` respectively. +:: + + @asoc - pointer to current sctp association structure. + @sk - pointer to current sock structure. + @newsk - pointer to new sock structure. + + +security_sctp_assoc_established() +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ +Called when a COOKIE ACK is received where it sets the connection's peer sid +to that in ``@skb``:: + + @asoc - pointer to sctp association structure. + @skb - pointer to skbuff of the COOKIE ACK packet. + + +Policy Statements +----------------- +The following class and permissions to support SCTP are available within the +kernel:: + + class sctp_socket inherits socket { node_bind } + +whenever the following policy capability is enabled:: + + policycap extended_socket_class; + +SELinux SCTP support adds the ``name_connect`` permission for connecting +to a specific port type and the ``association`` permission that is explained +in the section below. + +If userspace tools have been updated, SCTP will support the ``portcon`` +statement as shown in the following example:: + + portcon sctp 1024-1036 system_u:object_r:sctp_ports_t:s0 + + +SCTP Peer Labeling +------------------ +An SCTP socket will only have one peer label assigned to it. This will be +assigned during the establishment of the first association. Any further +associations on this socket will have their packet peer label compared to +the sockets peer label, and only if they are different will the +``association`` permission be validated. This is validated by checking the +socket peer sid against the received packets peer sid to determine whether +the association should be allowed or denied. + +NOTES: + 1) If peer labeling is not enabled, then the peer context will always be + ``SECINITSID_UNLABELED`` (``unlabeled_t`` in Reference Policy). + + 2) As SCTP can support more than one transport address per endpoint + (multi-homing) on a single socket, it is possible to configure policy + and NetLabel to provide different peer labels for each of these. As the + socket peer label is determined by the first associations transport + address, it is recommended that all peer labels are consistent. + + 3) **getpeercon**\(3) may be used by userspace to retrieve the sockets peer + context. + + 4) While not SCTP specific, be aware when using NetLabel that if a label + is assigned to a specific interface, and that interface 'goes down', + then the NetLabel service will remove the entry. Therefore ensure that + the network startup scripts call **netlabelctl**\(8) to set the required + label (see **netlabel-config**\(8) helper script for details). + + 5) The NetLabel SCTP peer labeling rules apply as discussed in the following + set of posts tagged "netlabel" at: https://www.paul-moore.com/blog/t. + + 6) CIPSO is only supported for IPv4 addressing: ``socket(AF_INET, ...)`` + CALIPSO is only supported for IPv6 addressing: ``socket(AF_INET6, ...)`` + + Note the following when testing CIPSO/CALIPSO: + a) CIPSO will send an ICMP packet if an SCTP packet cannot be + delivered because of an invalid label. + b) CALIPSO does not send an ICMP packet, just silently discards it. + + 7) IPSEC is not supported as RFC 3554 - sctp/ipsec support has not been + implemented in userspace (**racoon**\(8) or **ipsec_pluto**\(8)), + although the kernel supports SCTP/IPSEC. diff --git a/Documentation/security/credentials.rst b/Documentation/security/credentials.rst new file mode 100644 index 000000000..357328d56 --- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/security/credentials.rst @@ -0,0 +1,564 @@ +==================== +Credentials in Linux +==================== + +By: David Howells + +.. contents:: :local: + +Overview +======== + +There are several parts to the security check performed by Linux when one +object acts upon another: + + 1. Objects. + + Objects are things in the system that may be acted upon directly by + userspace programs. Linux has a variety of actionable objects, including: + + - Tasks + - Files/inodes + - Sockets + - Message queues + - Shared memory segments + - Semaphores + - Keys + + As a part of the description of all these objects there is a set of + credentials. What's in the set depends on the type of object. + + 2. Object ownership. + + Amongst the credentials of most objects, there will be a subset that + indicates the ownership of that object. This is used for resource + accounting and limitation (disk quotas and task rlimits for example). + + In a standard UNIX filesystem, for instance, this will be defined by the + UID marked on the inode. + + 3. The objective context. + + Also amongst the credentials of those objects, there will be a subset that + indicates the 'objective context' of that object. This may or may not be + the same set as in (2) - in standard UNIX files, for instance, this is the + defined by the UID and the GID marked on the inode. + + The objective context is used as part of the security calculation that is + carried out when an object is acted upon. + + 4. Subjects. + + A subject is an object that is acting upon another object. + + Most of the objects in the system are inactive: they don't act on other + objects within the system. Processes/tasks are the obvious exception: + they do stuff; they access and manipulate things. + + Objects other than tasks may under some circumstances also be subjects. + For instance an open file may send SIGIO to a task using the UID and EUID + given to it by a task that called ``fcntl(F_SETOWN)`` upon it. In this case, + the file struct will have a subjective context too. + + 5. The subjective context. + + A subject has an additional interpretation of its credentials. A subset + of its credentials forms the 'subjective context'. The subjective context + is used as part of the security calculation that is carried out when a + subject acts. + + A Linux task, for example, has the FSUID, FSGID and the supplementary + group list for when it is acting upon a file - which are quite separate + from the real UID and GID that normally form the objective context of the + task. + + 6. Actions. + + Linux has a number of actions available that a subject may perform upon an + object. The set of actions available depends on the nature of the subject + and the object. + + Actions include reading, writing, creating and deleting files; forking or + signalling and tracing tasks. + + 7. Rules, access control lists and security calculations. + + When a subject acts upon an object, a security calculation is made. This + involves taking the subjective context, the objective context and the + action, and searching one or more sets of rules to see whether the subject + is granted or denied permission to act in the desired manner on the + object, given those contexts. + + There are two main sources of rules: + + a. Discretionary access control (DAC): + + Sometimes the object will include sets of rules as part of its + description. This is an 'Access Control List' or 'ACL'. A Linux + file may supply more than one ACL. + + A traditional UNIX file, for example, includes a permissions mask that + is an abbreviated ACL with three fixed classes of subject ('user', + 'group' and 'other'), each of which may be granted certain privileges + ('read', 'write' and 'execute' - whatever those map to for the object + in question). UNIX file permissions do not allow the arbitrary + specification of subjects, however, and so are of limited use. + + A Linux file might also sport a POSIX ACL. This is a list of rules + that grants various permissions to arbitrary subjects. + + b. Mandatory access control (MAC): + + The system as a whole may have one or more sets of rules that get + applied to all subjects and objects, regardless of their source. + SELinux and Smack are examples of this. + + In the case of SELinux and Smack, each object is given a label as part + of its credentials. When an action is requested, they take the + subject label, the object label and the action and look for a rule + that says that this action is either granted or denied. + + +Types of Credentials +==================== + +The Linux kernel supports the following types of credentials: + + 1. Traditional UNIX credentials. + + - Real User ID + - Real Group ID + + The UID and GID are carried by most, if not all, Linux objects, even if in + some cases it has to be invented (FAT or CIFS files for example, which are + derived from Windows). These (mostly) define the objective context of + that object, with tasks being slightly different in some cases. + + - Effective, Saved and FS User ID + - Effective, Saved and FS Group ID + - Supplementary groups + + These are additional credentials used by tasks only. Usually, an + EUID/EGID/GROUPS will be used as the subjective context, and real UID/GID + will be used as the objective. For tasks, it should be noted that this is + not always true. + + 2. Capabilities. + + - Set of permitted capabilities + - Set of inheritable capabilities + - Set of effective capabilities + - Capability bounding set + + These are only carried by tasks. They indicate superior capabilities + granted piecemeal to a task that an ordinary task wouldn't otherwise have. + These are manipulated implicitly by changes to the traditional UNIX + credentials, but can also be manipulated directly by the ``capset()`` + system call. + + The permitted capabilities are those caps that the process might grant + itself to its effective or permitted sets through ``capset()``. This + inheritable set might also be so constrained. + + The effective capabilities are the ones that a task is actually allowed to + make use of itself. + + The inheritable capabilities are the ones that may get passed across + ``execve()``. + + The bounding set limits the capabilities that may be inherited across + ``execve()``, especially when a binary is executed that will execute as + UID 0. + + 3. Secure management flags (securebits). + + These are only carried by tasks. These govern the way the above + credentials are manipulated and inherited over certain operations such as + execve(). They aren't used directly as objective or subjective + credentials. + + 4. Keys and keyrings. + + These are only carried by tasks. They carry and cache security tokens + that don't fit into the other standard UNIX credentials. They are for + making such things as network filesystem keys available to the file + accesses performed by processes, without the necessity of ordinary + programs having to know about security details involved. + + Keyrings are a special type of key. They carry sets of other keys and can + be searched for the desired key. Each process may subscribe to a number + of keyrings: + + Per-thread keying + Per-process keyring + Per-session keyring + + When a process accesses a key, if not already present, it will normally be + cached on one of these keyrings for future accesses to find. + + For more information on using keys, see ``Documentation/security/keys/*``. + + 5. LSM + + The Linux Security Module allows extra controls to be placed over the + operations that a task may do. Currently Linux supports several LSM + options. + + Some work by labelling the objects in a system and then applying sets of + rules (policies) that say what operations a task with one label may do to + an object with another label. + + 6. AF_KEY + + This is a socket-based approach to credential management for networking + stacks [RFC 2367]. It isn't discussed by this document as it doesn't + interact directly with task and file credentials; rather it keeps system + level credentials. + + +When a file is opened, part of the opening task's subjective context is +recorded in the file struct created. This allows operations using that file +struct to use those credentials instead of the subjective context of the task +that issued the operation. An example of this would be a file opened on a +network filesystem where the credentials of the opened file should be presented +to the server, regardless of who is actually doing a read or a write upon it. + + +File Markings +============= + +Files on disk or obtained over the network may have annotations that form the +objective security context of that file. Depending on the type of filesystem, +this may include one or more of the following: + + * UNIX UID, GID, mode; + * Windows user ID; + * Access control list; + * LSM security label; + * UNIX exec privilege escalation bits (SUID/SGID); + * File capabilities exec privilege escalation bits. + +These are compared to the task's subjective security context, and certain +operations allowed or disallowed as a result. In the case of execve(), the +privilege escalation bits come into play, and may allow the resulting process +extra privileges, based on the annotations on the executable file. + + +Task Credentials +================ + +In Linux, all of a task's credentials are held in (uid, gid) or through +(groups, keys, LSM security) a refcounted structure of type 'struct cred'. +Each task points to its credentials by a pointer called 'cred' in its +task_struct. + +Once a set of credentials has been prepared and committed, it may not be +changed, barring the following exceptions: + + 1. its reference count may be changed; + + 2. the reference count on the group_info struct it points to may be changed; + + 3. the reference count on the security data it points to may be changed; + + 4. the reference count on any keyrings it points to may be changed; + + 5. any keyrings it points to may be revoked, expired or have their security + attributes changed; and + + 6. the contents of any keyrings to which it points may be changed (the whole + point of keyrings being a shared set of credentials, modifiable by anyone + with appropriate access). + +To alter anything in the cred struct, the copy-and-replace principle must be +adhered to. First take a copy, then alter the copy and then use RCU to change +the task pointer to make it point to the new copy. There are wrappers to aid +with this (see below). + +A task may only alter its _own_ credentials; it is no longer permitted for a +task to alter another's credentials. This means the ``capset()`` system call +is no longer permitted to take any PID other than the one of the current +process. Also ``keyctl_instantiate()`` and ``keyctl_negate()`` functions no +longer permit attachment to process-specific keyrings in the requesting +process as the instantiating process may need to create them. + + +Immutable Credentials +--------------------- + +Once a set of credentials has been made public (by calling ``commit_creds()`` +for example), it must be considered immutable, barring two exceptions: + + 1. The reference count may be altered. + + 2. While the keyring subscriptions of a set of credentials may not be + changed, the keyrings subscribed to may have their contents altered. + +To catch accidental credential alteration at compile time, struct task_struct +has _const_ pointers to its credential sets, as does struct file. Furthermore, +certain functions such as ``get_cred()`` and ``put_cred()`` operate on const +pointers, thus rendering casts unnecessary, but require to temporarily ditch +the const qualification to be able to alter the reference count. + + +Accessing Task Credentials +-------------------------- + +A task being able to alter only its own credentials permits the current process +to read or replace its own credentials without the need for any form of locking +-- which simplifies things greatly. It can just call:: + + const struct cred *current_cred() + +to get a pointer to its credentials structure, and it doesn't have to release +it afterwards. + +There are convenience wrappers for retrieving specific aspects of a task's +credentials (the value is simply returned in each case):: + + uid_t current_uid(void) Current's real UID + gid_t current_gid(void) Current's real GID + uid_t current_euid(void) Current's effective UID + gid_t current_egid(void) Current's effective GID + uid_t current_fsuid(void) Current's file access UID + gid_t current_fsgid(void) Current's file access GID + kernel_cap_t current_cap(void) Current's effective capabilities + struct user_struct *current_user(void) Current's user account + +There are also convenience wrappers for retrieving specific associated pairs of +a task's credentials:: + + void current_uid_gid(uid_t *, gid_t *); + void current_euid_egid(uid_t *, gid_t *); + void current_fsuid_fsgid(uid_t *, gid_t *); + +which return these pairs of values through their arguments after retrieving +them from the current task's credentials. + + +In addition, there is a function for obtaining a reference on the current +process's current set of credentials:: + + const struct cred *get_current_cred(void); + +and functions for getting references to one of the credentials that don't +actually live in struct cred:: + + struct user_struct *get_current_user(void); + struct group_info *get_current_groups(void); + +which get references to the current process's user accounting structure and +supplementary groups list respectively. + +Once a reference has been obtained, it must be released with ``put_cred()``, +``free_uid()`` or ``put_group_info()`` as appropriate. + + +Accessing Another Task's Credentials +------------------------------------ + +While a task may access its own credentials without the need for locking, the +same is not true of a task wanting to access another task's credentials. It +must use the RCU read lock and ``rcu_dereference()``. + +The ``rcu_dereference()`` is wrapped by:: + + const struct cred *__task_cred(struct task_struct *task); + +This should be used inside the RCU read lock, as in the following example:: + + void foo(struct task_struct *t, struct foo_data *f) + { + const struct cred *tcred; + ... + rcu_read_lock(); + tcred = __task_cred(t); + f->uid = tcred->uid; + f->gid = tcred->gid; + f->groups = get_group_info(tcred->groups); + rcu_read_unlock(); + ... + } + +Should it be necessary to hold another task's credentials for a long period of +time, and possibly to sleep while doing so, then the caller should get a +reference on them using:: + + const struct cred *get_task_cred(struct task_struct *task); + +This does all the RCU magic inside of it. The caller must call put_cred() on +the credentials so obtained when they're finished with. + +.. note:: + The result of ``__task_cred()`` should not be passed directly to + ``get_cred()`` as this may race with ``commit_cred()``. + +There are a couple of convenience functions to access bits of another task's +credentials, hiding the RCU magic from the caller:: + + uid_t task_uid(task) Task's real UID + uid_t task_euid(task) Task's effective UID + +If the caller is holding the RCU read lock at the time anyway, then:: + + __task_cred(task)->uid + __task_cred(task)->euid + +should be used instead. Similarly, if multiple aspects of a task's credentials +need to be accessed, RCU read lock should be used, ``__task_cred()`` called, +the result stored in a temporary pointer and then the credential aspects called +from that before dropping the lock. This prevents the potentially expensive +RCU magic from being invoked multiple times. + +Should some other single aspect of another task's credentials need to be +accessed, then this can be used:: + + task_cred_xxx(task, member) + +where 'member' is a non-pointer member of the cred struct. For instance:: + + uid_t task_cred_xxx(task, suid); + +will retrieve 'struct cred::suid' from the task, doing the appropriate RCU +magic. This may not be used for pointer members as what they point to may +disappear the moment the RCU read lock is dropped. + + +Altering Credentials +-------------------- + +As previously mentioned, a task may only alter its own credentials, and may not +alter those of another task. This means that it doesn't need to use any +locking to alter its own credentials. + +To alter the current process's credentials, a function should first prepare a +new set of credentials by calling:: + + struct cred *prepare_creds(void); + +this locks current->cred_replace_mutex and then allocates and constructs a +duplicate of the current process's credentials, returning with the mutex still +held if successful. It returns NULL if not successful (out of memory). + +The mutex prevents ``ptrace()`` from altering the ptrace state of a process +while security checks on credentials construction and changing is taking place +as the ptrace state may alter the outcome, particularly in the case of +``execve()``. + +The new credentials set should be altered appropriately, and any security +checks and hooks done. Both the current and the proposed sets of credentials +are available for this purpose as current_cred() will return the current set +still at this point. + +When replacing the group list, the new list must be sorted before it +is added to the credential, as a binary search is used to test for +membership. In practice, this means groups_sort() should be +called before set_groups() or set_current_groups(). +groups_sort() must not be called on a ``struct group_list`` which +is shared as it may permute elements as part of the sorting process +even if the array is already sorted. + +When the credential set is ready, it should be committed to the current process +by calling:: + + int commit_creds(struct cred *new); + +This will alter various aspects of the credentials and the process, giving the +LSM a chance to do likewise, then it will use ``rcu_assign_pointer()`` to +actually commit the new credentials to ``current->cred``, it will release +``current->cred_replace_mutex`` to allow ``ptrace()`` to take place, and it +will notify the scheduler and others of the changes. + +This function is guaranteed to return 0, so that it can be tail-called at the +end of such functions as ``sys_setresuid()``. + +Note that this function consumes the caller's reference to the new credentials. +The caller should _not_ call ``put_cred()`` on the new credentials afterwards. + +Furthermore, once this function has been called on a new set of credentials, +those credentials may _not_ be changed further. + + +Should the security checks fail or some other error occur after +``prepare_creds()`` has been called, then the following function should be +invoked:: + + void abort_creds(struct cred *new); + +This releases the lock on ``current->cred_replace_mutex`` that +``prepare_creds()`` got and then releases the new credentials. + + +A typical credentials alteration function would look something like this:: + + int alter_suid(uid_t suid) + { + struct cred *new; + int ret; + + new = prepare_creds(); + if (!new) + return -ENOMEM; + + new->suid = suid; + ret = security_alter_suid(new); + if (ret < 0) { + abort_creds(new); + return ret; + } + + return commit_creds(new); + } + + +Managing Credentials +-------------------- + +There are some functions to help manage credentials: + + - ``void put_cred(const struct cred *cred);`` + + This releases a reference to the given set of credentials. If the + reference count reaches zero, the credentials will be scheduled for + destruction by the RCU system. + + - ``const struct cred *get_cred(const struct cred *cred);`` + + This gets a reference on a live set of credentials, returning a pointer to + that set of credentials. + + - ``struct cred *get_new_cred(struct cred *cred);`` + + This gets a reference on a set of credentials that is under construction + and is thus still mutable, returning a pointer to that set of credentials. + + +Open File Credentials +===================== + +When a new file is opened, a reference is obtained on the opening task's +credentials and this is attached to the file struct as ``f_cred`` in place of +``f_uid`` and ``f_gid``. Code that used to access ``file->f_uid`` and +``file->f_gid`` should now access ``file->f_cred->fsuid`` and +``file->f_cred->fsgid``. + +It is safe to access ``f_cred`` without the use of RCU or locking because the +pointer will not change over the lifetime of the file struct, and nor will the +contents of the cred struct pointed to, barring the exceptions listed above +(see the Task Credentials section). + +To avoid "confused deputy" privilege escalation attacks, access control checks +during subsequent operations on an opened file should use these credentials +instead of "current"'s credentials, as the file may have been passed to a more +privileged process. + +Overriding the VFS's Use of Credentials +======================================= + +Under some circumstances it is desirable to override the credentials used by +the VFS, and that can be done by calling into such as ``vfs_mkdir()`` with a +different set of credentials. This is done in the following places: + + * ``sys_faccessat()``. + * ``do_coredump()``. + * nfs4recover.c. diff --git a/Documentation/security/digsig.rst b/Documentation/security/digsig.rst new file mode 100644 index 000000000..de035f282 --- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/security/digsig.rst @@ -0,0 +1,101 @@ +================================== +Digital Signature Verification API +================================== + +:Author: Dmitry Kasatkin +:Date: 06.10.2011 + + +.. CONTENTS + + 1. Introduction + 2. API + 3. User-space utilities + + +Introduction +============ + +Digital signature verification API provides a method to verify digital signature. +Currently digital signatures are used by the IMA/EVM integrity protection subsystem. + +Digital signature verification is implemented using cut-down kernel port of +GnuPG multi-precision integers (MPI) library. The kernel port provides +memory allocation errors handling, has been refactored according to kernel +coding style, and checkpatch.pl reported errors and warnings have been fixed. + +Public key and signature consist of header and MPIs:: + + struct pubkey_hdr { + uint8_t version; /* key format version */ + time_t timestamp; /* key made, always 0 for now */ + uint8_t algo; + uint8_t nmpi; + char mpi[0]; + } __packed; + + struct signature_hdr { + uint8_t version; /* signature format version */ + time_t timestamp; /* signature made */ + uint8_t algo; + uint8_t hash; + uint8_t keyid[8]; + uint8_t nmpi; + char mpi[0]; + } __packed; + +keyid equals to SHA1[12-19] over the total key content. +Signature header is used as an input to generate a signature. +Such approach insures that key or signature header could not be changed. +It protects timestamp from been changed and can be used for rollback +protection. + +API +=== + +API currently includes only 1 function:: + + digsig_verify() - digital signature verification with public key + + + /** + * digsig_verify() - digital signature verification with public key + * @keyring: keyring to search key in + * @sig: digital signature + * @sigen: length of the signature + * @data: data + * @datalen: length of the data + * @return: 0 on success, -EINVAL otherwise + * + * Verifies data integrity against digital signature. + * Currently only RSA is supported. + * Normally hash of the content is used as a data for this function. + * + */ + int digsig_verify(struct key *keyring, const char *sig, int siglen, + const char *data, int datalen); + +User-space utilities +==================== + +The signing and key management utilities evm-utils provide functionality +to generate signatures, to load keys into the kernel keyring. +Keys can be in PEM or converted to the kernel format. +When the key is added to the kernel keyring, the keyid defines the name +of the key: 5D2B05FC633EE3E8 in the example below. + +Here is example output of the keyctl utility:: + + $ keyctl show + Session Keyring + -3 --alswrv 0 0 keyring: _ses + 603976250 --alswrv 0 -1 \_ keyring: _uid.0 + 817777377 --alswrv 0 0 \_ user: kmk + 891974900 --alswrv 0 0 \_ encrypted: evm-key + 170323636 --alswrv 0 0 \_ keyring: _module + 548221616 --alswrv 0 0 \_ keyring: _ima + 128198054 --alswrv 0 0 \_ keyring: _evm + + $ keyctl list 128198054 + 1 key in keyring: + 620789745: --alswrv 0 0 user: 5D2B05FC633EE3E8 diff --git a/Documentation/security/index.rst b/Documentation/security/index.rst new file mode 100644 index 000000000..6ed8d2fa6 --- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/security/index.rst @@ -0,0 +1,20 @@ +====================== +Security Documentation +====================== + +.. toctree:: + :maxdepth: 1 + + credentials + IMA-templates + keys/index + lsm + lsm-development + sak + SCTP + self-protection + siphash + tpm/index + digsig + landlock + secrets/index diff --git a/Documentation/security/keys/core.rst b/Documentation/security/keys/core.rst new file mode 100644 index 000000000..326b8a973 --- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/security/keys/core.rst @@ -0,0 +1,1849 @@ +============================ +Kernel Key Retention Service +============================ + +This service allows cryptographic keys, authentication tokens, cross-domain +user mappings, and similar to be cached in the kernel for the use of +filesystems and other kernel services. + +Keyrings are permitted; these are a special type of key that can hold links to +other keys. Processes each have three standard keyring subscriptions that a +kernel service can search for relevant keys. + +The key service can be configured on by enabling: + + "Security options"/"Enable access key retention support" (CONFIG_KEYS) + +This document has the following sections: + +.. contents:: :local: + + +Key Overview +============ + +In this context, keys represent units of cryptographic data, authentication +tokens, keyrings, etc.. These are represented in the kernel by struct key. + +Each key has a number of attributes: + + - A serial number. + - A type. + - A description (for matching a key in a search). + - Access control information. + - An expiry time. + - A payload. + - State. + + + * Each key is issued a serial number of type key_serial_t that is unique for + the lifetime of that key. All serial numbers are positive non-zero 32-bit + integers. + + Userspace programs can use a key's serial numbers as a way to gain access + to it, subject to permission checking. + + * Each key is of a defined "type". Types must be registered inside the + kernel by a kernel service (such as a filesystem) before keys of that type + can be added or used. Userspace programs cannot define new types directly. + + Key types are represented in the kernel by struct key_type. This defines a + number of operations that can be performed on a key of that type. + + Should a type be removed from the system, all the keys of that type will + be invalidated. + + * Each key has a description. This should be a printable string. The key + type provides an operation to perform a match between the description on a + key and a criterion string. + + * Each key has an owner user ID, a group ID and a permissions mask. These + are used to control what a process may do to a key from userspace, and + whether a kernel service will be able to find the key. + + * Each key can be set to expire at a specific time by the key type's + instantiation function. Keys can also be immortal. + + * Each key can have a payload. This is a quantity of data that represent the + actual "key". In the case of a keyring, this is a list of keys to which + the keyring links; in the case of a user-defined key, it's an arbitrary + blob of data. + + Having a payload is not required; and the payload can, in fact, just be a + value stored in the struct key itself. + + When a key is instantiated, the key type's instantiation function is + called with a blob of data, and that then creates the key's payload in + some way. + + Similarly, when userspace wants to read back the contents of the key, if + permitted, another key type operation will be called to convert the key's + attached payload back into a blob of data. + + * Each key can be in one of a number of basic states: + + * Uninstantiated. The key exists, but does not have any data attached. + Keys being requested from userspace will be in this state. + + * Instantiated. This is the normal state. The key is fully formed, and + has data attached. + + * Negative. This is a relatively short-lived state. The key acts as a + note saying that a previous call out to userspace failed, and acts as + a throttle on key lookups. A negative key can be updated to a normal + state. + + * Expired. Keys can have lifetimes set. If their lifetime is exceeded, + they traverse to this state. An expired key can be updated back to a + normal state. + + * Revoked. A key is put in this state by userspace action. It can't be + found or operated upon (apart from by unlinking it). + + * Dead. The key's type was unregistered, and so the key is now useless. + +Keys in the last three states are subject to garbage collection. See the +section on "Garbage collection". + + +Key Service Overview +==================== + +The key service provides a number of features besides keys: + + * The key service defines three special key types: + + (+) "keyring" + + Keyrings are special keys that contain a list of other keys. Keyring + lists can be modified using various system calls. Keyrings should not + be given a payload when created. + + (+) "user" + + A key of this type has a description and a payload that are arbitrary + blobs of data. These can be created, updated and read by userspace, + and aren't intended for use by kernel services. + + (+) "logon" + + Like a "user" key, a "logon" key has a payload that is an arbitrary + blob of data. It is intended as a place to store secrets which are + accessible to the kernel but not to userspace programs. + + The description can be arbitrary, but must be prefixed with a non-zero + length string that describes the key "subclass". The subclass is + separated from the rest of the description by a ':'. "logon" keys can + be created and updated from userspace, but the payload is only + readable from kernel space. + + * Each process subscribes to three keyrings: a thread-specific keyring, a + process-specific keyring, and a session-specific keyring. + + The thread-specific keyring is discarded from the child when any sort of + clone, fork, vfork or execve occurs. A new keyring is created only when + required. + + The process-specific keyring is replaced with an empty one in the child on + clone, fork, vfork unless CLONE_THREAD is supplied, in which case it is + shared. execve also discards the process's process keyring and creates a + new one. + + The session-specific keyring is persistent across clone, fork, vfork and + execve, even when the latter executes a set-UID or set-GID binary. A + process can, however, replace its current session keyring with a new one + by using PR_JOIN_SESSION_KEYRING. It is permitted to request an anonymous + new one, or to attempt to create or join one of a specific name. + + The ownership of the thread keyring changes when the real UID and GID of + the thread changes. + + * Each user ID resident in the system holds two special keyrings: a user + specific keyring and a default user session keyring. The default session + keyring is initialised with a link to the user-specific keyring. + + When a process changes its real UID, if it used to have no session key, it + will be subscribed to the default session key for the new UID. + + If a process attempts to access its session key when it doesn't have one, + it will be subscribed to the default for its current UID. + + * Each user has two quotas against which the keys they own are tracked. One + limits the total number of keys and keyrings, the other limits the total + amount of description and payload space that can be consumed. + + The user can view information on this and other statistics through procfs + files. The root user may also alter the quota limits through sysctl files + (see the section "New procfs files"). + + Process-specific and thread-specific keyrings are not counted towards a + user's quota. + + If a system call that modifies a key or keyring in some way would put the + user over quota, the operation is refused and error EDQUOT is returned. + + * There's a system call interface by which userspace programs can create and + manipulate keys and keyrings. + + * There's a kernel interface by which services can register types and search + for keys. + + * There's a way for the a search done from the kernel to call back to + userspace to request a key that can't be found in a process's keyrings. + + * An optional filesystem is available through which the key database can be + viewed and manipulated. + + +Key Access Permissions +====================== + +Keys have an owner user ID, a group access ID, and a permissions mask. The mask +has up to eight bits each for possessor, user, group and other access. Only +six of each set of eight bits are defined. These permissions granted are: + + * View + + This permits a key or keyring's attributes to be viewed - including key + type and description. + + * Read + + This permits a key's payload to be viewed or a keyring's list of linked + keys. + + * Write + + This permits a key's payload to be instantiated or updated, or it allows a + link to be added to or removed from a keyring. + + * Search + + This permits keyrings to be searched and keys to be found. Searches can + only recurse into nested keyrings that have search permission set. + + * Link + + This permits a key or keyring to be linked to. To create a link from a + keyring to a key, a process must have Write permission on the keyring and + Link permission on the key. + + * Set Attribute + + This permits a key's UID, GID and permissions mask to be changed. + +For changing the ownership, group ID or permissions mask, being the owner of +the key or having the sysadmin capability is sufficient. + + +SELinux Support +=============== + +The security class "key" has been added to SELinux so that mandatory access +controls can be applied to keys created within various contexts. This support +is preliminary, and is likely to change quite significantly in the near future. +Currently, all of the basic permissions explained above are provided in SELinux +as well; SELinux is simply invoked after all basic permission checks have been +performed. + +The value of the file /proc/self/attr/keycreate influences the labeling of +newly-created keys. If the contents of that file correspond to an SELinux +security context, then the key will be assigned that context. Otherwise, the +key will be assigned the current context of the task that invoked the key +creation request. Tasks must be granted explicit permission to assign a +particular context to newly-created keys, using the "create" permission in the +key security class. + +The default keyrings associated with users will be labeled with the default +context of the user if and only if the login programs have been instrumented to +properly initialize keycreate during the login process. Otherwise, they will +be labeled with the context of the login program itself. + +Note, however, that the default keyrings associated with the root user are +labeled with the default kernel context, since they are created early in the +boot process, before root has a chance to log in. + +The keyrings associated with new threads are each labeled with the context of +their associated thread, and both session and process keyrings are handled +similarly. + + +New ProcFS Files +================ + +Two files have been added to procfs by which an administrator can find out +about the status of the key service: + + * /proc/keys + + This lists the keys that are currently viewable by the task reading the + file, giving information about their type, description and permissions. + It is not possible to view the payload of the key this way, though some + information about it may be given. + + The only keys included in the list are those that grant View permission to + the reading process whether or not it possesses them. Note that LSM + security checks are still performed, and may further filter out keys that + the current process is not authorised to view. + + The contents of the file look like this:: + + SERIAL FLAGS USAGE EXPY PERM UID GID TYPE DESCRIPTION: SUMMARY + 00000001 I----- 39 perm 1f3f0000 0 0 keyring _uid_ses.0: 1/4 + 00000002 I----- 2 perm 1f3f0000 0 0 keyring _uid.0: empty + 00000007 I----- 1 perm 1f3f0000 0 0 keyring _pid.1: empty + 0000018d I----- 1 perm 1f3f0000 0 0 keyring _pid.412: empty + 000004d2 I--Q-- 1 perm 1f3f0000 32 -1 keyring _uid.32: 1/4 + 000004d3 I--Q-- 3 perm 1f3f0000 32 -1 keyring _uid_ses.32: empty + 00000892 I--QU- 1 perm 1f000000 0 0 user metal:copper: 0 + 00000893 I--Q-N 1 35s 1f3f0000 0 0 user metal:silver: 0 + 00000894 I--Q-- 1 10h 003f0000 0 0 user metal:gold: 0 + + The flags are:: + + I Instantiated + R Revoked + D Dead + Q Contributes to user's quota + U Under construction by callback to userspace + N Negative key + + + * /proc/key-users + + This file lists the tracking data for each user that has at least one key + on the system. Such data includes quota information and statistics:: + + [root@andromeda root]# cat /proc/key-users + 0: 46 45/45 1/100 13/10000 + 29: 2 2/2 2/100 40/10000 + 32: 2 2/2 2/100 40/10000 + 38: 2 2/2 2/100 40/10000 + + The format of each line is:: + + : User ID to which this applies + Structure refcount + / Total number of keys and number instantiated + / Key count quota + / Key size quota + + +Four new sysctl files have been added also for the purpose of controlling the +quota limits on keys: + + * /proc/sys/kernel/keys/root_maxkeys + /proc/sys/kernel/keys/root_maxbytes + + These files hold the maximum number of keys that root may have and the + maximum total number of bytes of data that root may have stored in those + keys. + + * /proc/sys/kernel/keys/maxkeys + /proc/sys/kernel/keys/maxbytes + + These files hold the maximum number of keys that each non-root user may + have and the maximum total number of bytes of data that each of those + users may have stored in their keys. + +Root may alter these by writing each new limit as a decimal number string to +the appropriate file. + + +Userspace System Call Interface +=============================== + +Userspace can manipulate keys directly through three new syscalls: add_key, +request_key and keyctl. The latter provides a number of functions for +manipulating keys. + +When referring to a key directly, userspace programs should use the key's +serial number (a positive 32-bit integer). However, there are some special +values available for referring to special keys and keyrings that relate to the +process making the call:: + + CONSTANT VALUE KEY REFERENCED + ============================== ====== =========================== + KEY_SPEC_THREAD_KEYRING -1 thread-specific keyring + KEY_SPEC_PROCESS_KEYRING -2 process-specific keyring + KEY_SPEC_SESSION_KEYRING -3 session-specific keyring + KEY_SPEC_USER_KEYRING -4 UID-specific keyring + KEY_SPEC_USER_SESSION_KEYRING -5 UID-session keyring + KEY_SPEC_GROUP_KEYRING -6 GID-specific keyring + KEY_SPEC_REQKEY_AUTH_KEY -7 assumed request_key() + authorisation key + + +The main syscalls are: + + * Create a new key of given type, description and payload and add it to the + nominated keyring:: + + key_serial_t add_key(const char *type, const char *desc, + const void *payload, size_t plen, + key_serial_t keyring); + + If a key of the same type and description as that proposed already exists + in the keyring, this will try to update it with the given payload, or it + will return error EEXIST if that function is not supported by the key + type. The process must also have permission to write to the key to be able + to update it. The new key will have all user permissions granted and no + group or third party permissions. + + Otherwise, this will attempt to create a new key of the specified type and + description, and to instantiate it with the supplied payload and attach it + to the keyring. In this case, an error will be generated if the process + does not have permission to write to the keyring. + + If the key type supports it, if the description is NULL or an empty + string, the key type will try and generate a description from the content + of the payload. + + The payload is optional, and the pointer can be NULL if not required by + the type. The payload is plen in size, and plen can be zero for an empty + payload. + + A new keyring can be generated by setting type "keyring", the keyring name + as the description (or NULL) and setting the payload to NULL. + + User defined keys can be created by specifying type "user". It is + recommended that a user defined key's description by prefixed with a type + ID and a colon, such as "krb5tgt:" for a Kerberos 5 ticket granting + ticket. + + Any other type must have been registered with the kernel in advance by a + kernel service such as a filesystem. + + The ID of the new or updated key is returned if successful. + + + * Search the process's keyrings for a key, potentially calling out to + userspace to create it:: + + key_serial_t request_key(const char *type, const char *description, + const char *callout_info, + key_serial_t dest_keyring); + + This function searches all the process's keyrings in the order thread, + process, session for a matching key. This works very much like + KEYCTL_SEARCH, including the optional attachment of the discovered key to + a keyring. + + If a key cannot be found, and if callout_info is not NULL, then + /sbin/request-key will be invoked in an attempt to obtain a key. The + callout_info string will be passed as an argument to the program. + + To link a key into the destination keyring the key must grant link + permission on the key to the caller and the keyring must grant write + permission. + + See also Documentation/security/keys/request-key.rst. + + +The keyctl syscall functions are: + + * Map a special key ID to a real key ID for this process:: + + key_serial_t keyctl(KEYCTL_GET_KEYRING_ID, key_serial_t id, + int create); + + The special key specified by "id" is looked up (with the key being created + if necessary) and the ID of the key or keyring thus found is returned if + it exists. + + If the key does not yet exist, the key will be created if "create" is + non-zero; and the error ENOKEY will be returned if "create" is zero. + + + * Replace the session keyring this process subscribes to with a new one:: + + key_serial_t keyctl(KEYCTL_JOIN_SESSION_KEYRING, const char *name); + + If name is NULL, an anonymous keyring is created attached to the process + as its session keyring, displacing the old session keyring. + + If name is not NULL, if a keyring of that name exists, the process + attempts to attach it as the session keyring, returning an error if that + is not permitted; otherwise a new keyring of that name is created and + attached as the session keyring. + + To attach to a named keyring, the keyring must have search permission for + the process's ownership. + + The ID of the new session keyring is returned if successful. + + + * Update the specified key:: + + long keyctl(KEYCTL_UPDATE, key_serial_t key, const void *payload, + size_t plen); + + This will try to update the specified key with the given payload, or it + will return error EOPNOTSUPP if that function is not supported by the key + type. The process must also have permission to write to the key to be able + to update it. + + The payload is of length plen, and may be absent or empty as for + add_key(). + + + * Revoke a key:: + + long keyctl(KEYCTL_REVOKE, key_serial_t key); + + This makes a key unavailable for further operations. Further attempts to + use the key will be met with error EKEYREVOKED, and the key will no longer + be findable. + + + * Change the ownership of a key:: + + long keyctl(KEYCTL_CHOWN, key_serial_t key, uid_t uid, gid_t gid); + + This function permits a key's owner and group ID to be changed. Either one + of uid or gid can be set to -1 to suppress that change. + + Only the superuser can change a key's owner to something other than the + key's current owner. Similarly, only the superuser can change a key's + group ID to something other than the calling process's group ID or one of + its group list members. + + + * Change the permissions mask on a key:: + + long keyctl(KEYCTL_SETPERM, key_serial_t key, key_perm_t perm); + + This function permits the owner of a key or the superuser to change the + permissions mask on a key. + + Only bits the available bits are permitted; if any other bits are set, + error EINVAL will be returned. + + + * Describe a key:: + + long keyctl(KEYCTL_DESCRIBE, key_serial_t key, char *buffer, + size_t buflen); + + This function returns a summary of the key's attributes (but not its + payload data) as a string in the buffer provided. + + Unless there's an error, it always returns the amount of data it could + produce, even if that's too big for the buffer, but it won't copy more + than requested to userspace. If the buffer pointer is NULL then no copy + will take place. + + A process must have view permission on the key for this function to be + successful. + + If successful, a string is placed in the buffer in the following format:: + + ;;;; + + Where type and description are strings, uid and gid are decimal, and perm + is hexadecimal. A NUL character is included at the end of the string if + the buffer is sufficiently big. + + This can be parsed with:: + + sscanf(buffer, "%[^;];%d;%d;%o;%s", type, &uid, &gid, &mode, desc); + + + * Clear out a keyring:: + + long keyctl(KEYCTL_CLEAR, key_serial_t keyring); + + This function clears the list of keys attached to a keyring. The calling + process must have write permission on the keyring, and it must be a + keyring (or else error ENOTDIR will result). + + This function can also be used to clear special kernel keyrings if they + are appropriately marked if the user has CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability. The + DNS resolver cache keyring is an example of this. + + + * Link a key into a keyring:: + + long keyctl(KEYCTL_LINK, key_serial_t keyring, key_serial_t key); + + This function creates a link from the keyring to the key. The process must + have write permission on the keyring and must have link permission on the + key. + + Should the keyring not be a keyring, error ENOTDIR will result; and if the + keyring is full, error ENFILE will result. + + The link procedure checks the nesting of the keyrings, returning ELOOP if + it appears too deep or EDEADLK if the link would introduce a cycle. + + Any links within the keyring to keys that match the new key in terms of + type and description will be discarded from the keyring as the new one is + added. + + + * Move a key from one keyring to another:: + + long keyctl(KEYCTL_MOVE, + key_serial_t id, + key_serial_t from_ring_id, + key_serial_t to_ring_id, + unsigned int flags); + + Move the key specified by "id" from the keyring specified by + "from_ring_id" to the keyring specified by "to_ring_id". If the two + keyrings are the same, nothing is done. + + "flags" can have KEYCTL_MOVE_EXCL set in it to cause the operation to fail + with EEXIST if a matching key exists in the destination keyring, otherwise + such a key will be replaced. + + A process must have link permission on the key for this function to be + successful and write permission on both keyrings. Any errors that can + occur from KEYCTL_LINK also apply on the destination keyring here. + + + * Unlink a key or keyring from another keyring:: + + long keyctl(KEYCTL_UNLINK, key_serial_t keyring, key_serial_t key); + + This function looks through the keyring for the first link to the + specified key, and removes it if found. Subsequent links to that key are + ignored. The process must have write permission on the keyring. + + If the keyring is not a keyring, error ENOTDIR will result; and if the key + is not present, error ENOENT will be the result. + + + * Search a keyring tree for a key:: + + key_serial_t keyctl(KEYCTL_SEARCH, key_serial_t keyring, + const char *type, const char *description, + key_serial_t dest_keyring); + + This searches the keyring tree headed by the specified keyring until a key + is found that matches the type and description criteria. Each keyring is + checked for keys before recursion into its children occurs. + + The process must have search permission on the top level keyring, or else + error EACCES will result. Only keyrings that the process has search + permission on will be recursed into, and only keys and keyrings for which + a process has search permission can be matched. If the specified keyring + is not a keyring, ENOTDIR will result. + + If the search succeeds, the function will attempt to link the found key + into the destination keyring if one is supplied (non-zero ID). All the + constraints applicable to KEYCTL_LINK apply in this case too. + + Error ENOKEY, EKEYREVOKED or EKEYEXPIRED will be returned if the search + fails. On success, the resulting key ID will be returned. + + + * Read the payload data from a key:: + + long keyctl(KEYCTL_READ, key_serial_t keyring, char *buffer, + size_t buflen); + + This function attempts to read the payload data from the specified key + into the buffer. The process must have read permission on the key to + succeed. + + The returned data will be processed for presentation by the key type. For + instance, a keyring will return an array of key_serial_t entries + representing the IDs of all the keys to which it is subscribed. The user + defined key type will return its data as is. If a key type does not + implement this function, error EOPNOTSUPP will result. + + If the specified buffer is too small, then the size of the buffer required + will be returned. Note that in this case, the contents of the buffer may + have been overwritten in some undefined way. + + Otherwise, on success, the function will return the amount of data copied + into the buffer. + + * Instantiate a partially constructed key:: + + long keyctl(KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE, key_serial_t key, + const void *payload, size_t plen, + key_serial_t keyring); + long keyctl(KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE_IOV, key_serial_t key, + const struct iovec *payload_iov, unsigned ioc, + key_serial_t keyring); + + If the kernel calls back to userspace to complete the instantiation of a + key, userspace should use this call to supply data for the key before the + invoked process returns, or else the key will be marked negative + automatically. + + The process must have write access on the key to be able to instantiate + it, and the key must be uninstantiated. + + If a keyring is specified (non-zero), the key will also be linked into + that keyring, however all the constraints applying in KEYCTL_LINK apply in + this case too. + + The payload and plen arguments describe the payload data as for add_key(). + + The payload_iov and ioc arguments describe the payload data in an iovec + array instead of a single buffer. + + + * Negatively instantiate a partially constructed key:: + + long keyctl(KEYCTL_NEGATE, key_serial_t key, + unsigned timeout, key_serial_t keyring); + long keyctl(KEYCTL_REJECT, key_serial_t key, + unsigned timeout, unsigned error, key_serial_t keyring); + + If the kernel calls back to userspace to complete the instantiation of a + key, userspace should use this call mark the key as negative before the + invoked process returns if it is unable to fulfill the request. + + The process must have write access on the key to be able to instantiate + it, and the key must be uninstantiated. + + If a keyring is specified (non-zero), the key will also be linked into + that keyring, however all the constraints applying in KEYCTL_LINK apply in + this case too. + + If the key is rejected, future searches for it will return the specified + error code until the rejected key expires. Negating the key is the same + as rejecting the key with ENOKEY as the error code. + + + * Set the default request-key destination keyring:: + + long keyctl(KEYCTL_SET_REQKEY_KEYRING, int reqkey_defl); + + This sets the default keyring to which implicitly requested keys will be + attached for this thread. reqkey_defl should be one of these constants:: + + CONSTANT VALUE NEW DEFAULT KEYRING + ====================================== ====== ======================= + KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_NO_CHANGE -1 No change + KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_DEFAULT 0 Default[1] + KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_THREAD_KEYRING 1 Thread keyring + KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_PROCESS_KEYRING 2 Process keyring + KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_SESSION_KEYRING 3 Session keyring + KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_USER_KEYRING 4 User keyring + KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_USER_SESSION_KEYRING 5 User session keyring + KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_GROUP_KEYRING 6 Group keyring + + The old default will be returned if successful and error EINVAL will be + returned if reqkey_defl is not one of the above values. + + The default keyring can be overridden by the keyring indicated to the + request_key() system call. + + Note that this setting is inherited across fork/exec. + + [1] The default is: the thread keyring if there is one, otherwise + the process keyring if there is one, otherwise the session keyring if + there is one, otherwise the user default session keyring. + + + * Set the timeout on a key:: + + long keyctl(KEYCTL_SET_TIMEOUT, key_serial_t key, unsigned timeout); + + This sets or clears the timeout on a key. The timeout can be 0 to clear + the timeout or a number of seconds to set the expiry time that far into + the future. + + The process must have attribute modification access on a key to set its + timeout. Timeouts may not be set with this function on negative, revoked + or expired keys. + + + * Assume the authority granted to instantiate a key:: + + long keyctl(KEYCTL_ASSUME_AUTHORITY, key_serial_t key); + + This assumes or divests the authority required to instantiate the + specified key. Authority can only be assumed if the thread has the + authorisation key associated with the specified key in its keyrings + somewhere. + + Once authority is assumed, searches for keys will also search the + requester's keyrings using the requester's security label, UID, GID and + groups. + + If the requested authority is unavailable, error EPERM will be returned, + likewise if the authority has been revoked because the target key is + already instantiated. + + If the specified key is 0, then any assumed authority will be divested. + + The assumed authoritative key is inherited across fork and exec. + + + * Get the LSM security context attached to a key:: + + long keyctl(KEYCTL_GET_SECURITY, key_serial_t key, char *buffer, + size_t buflen) + + This function returns a string that represents the LSM security context + attached to a key in the buffer provided. + + Unless there's an error, it always returns the amount of data it could + produce, even if that's too big for the buffer, but it won't copy more + than requested to userspace. If the buffer pointer is NULL then no copy + will take place. + + A NUL character is included at the end of the string if the buffer is + sufficiently big. This is included in the returned count. If no LSM is + in force then an empty string will be returned. + + A process must have view permission on the key for this function to be + successful. + + + * Install the calling process's session keyring on its parent:: + + long keyctl(KEYCTL_SESSION_TO_PARENT); + + This functions attempts to install the calling process's session keyring + on to the calling process's parent, replacing the parent's current session + keyring. + + The calling process must have the same ownership as its parent, the + keyring must have the same ownership as the calling process, the calling + process must have LINK permission on the keyring and the active LSM module + mustn't deny permission, otherwise error EPERM will be returned. + + Error ENOMEM will be returned if there was insufficient memory to complete + the operation, otherwise 0 will be returned to indicate success. + + The keyring will be replaced next time the parent process leaves the + kernel and resumes executing userspace. + + + * Invalidate a key:: + + long keyctl(KEYCTL_INVALIDATE, key_serial_t key); + + This function marks a key as being invalidated and then wakes up the + garbage collector. The garbage collector immediately removes invalidated + keys from all keyrings and deletes the key when its reference count + reaches zero. + + Keys that are marked invalidated become invisible to normal key operations + immediately, though they are still visible in /proc/keys until deleted + (they're marked with an 'i' flag). + + A process must have search permission on the key for this function to be + successful. + + * Compute a Diffie-Hellman shared secret or public key:: + + long keyctl(KEYCTL_DH_COMPUTE, struct keyctl_dh_params *params, + char *buffer, size_t buflen, struct keyctl_kdf_params *kdf); + + The params struct contains serial numbers for three keys:: + + - The prime, p, known to both parties + - The local private key + - The base integer, which is either a shared generator or the + remote public key + + The value computed is:: + + result = base ^ private (mod prime) + + If the base is the shared generator, the result is the local + public key. If the base is the remote public key, the result is + the shared secret. + + If the parameter kdf is NULL, the following applies: + + - The buffer length must be at least the length of the prime, or zero. + + - If the buffer length is nonzero, the length of the result is + returned when it is successfully calculated and copied in to the + buffer. When the buffer length is zero, the minimum required + buffer length is returned. + + The kdf parameter allows the caller to apply a key derivation function + (KDF) on the Diffie-Hellman computation where only the result + of the KDF is returned to the caller. The KDF is characterized with + struct keyctl_kdf_params as follows: + + - ``char *hashname`` specifies the NUL terminated string identifying + the hash used from the kernel crypto API and applied for the KDF + operation. The KDF implementation complies with SP800-56A as well + as with SP800-108 (the counter KDF). + + - ``char *otherinfo`` specifies the OtherInfo data as documented in + SP800-56A section 5.8.1.2. The length of the buffer is given with + otherinfolen. The format of OtherInfo is defined by the caller. + The otherinfo pointer may be NULL if no OtherInfo shall be used. + + This function will return error EOPNOTSUPP if the key type is not + supported, error ENOKEY if the key could not be found, or error + EACCES if the key is not readable by the caller. In addition, the + function will return EMSGSIZE when the parameter kdf is non-NULL + and either the buffer length or the OtherInfo length exceeds the + allowed length. + + + * Restrict keyring linkage:: + + long keyctl(KEYCTL_RESTRICT_KEYRING, key_serial_t keyring, + const char *type, const char *restriction); + + An existing keyring can restrict linkage of additional keys by evaluating + the contents of the key according to a restriction scheme. + + "keyring" is the key ID for an existing keyring to apply a restriction + to. It may be empty or may already have keys linked. Existing linked keys + will remain in the keyring even if the new restriction would reject them. + + "type" is a registered key type. + + "restriction" is a string describing how key linkage is to be restricted. + The format varies depending on the key type, and the string is passed to + the lookup_restriction() function for the requested type. It may specify + a method and relevant data for the restriction such as signature + verification or constraints on key payload. If the requested key type is + later unregistered, no keys may be added to the keyring after the key type + is removed. + + To apply a keyring restriction the process must have Set Attribute + permission and the keyring must not be previously restricted. + + One application of restricted keyrings is to verify X.509 certificate + chains or individual certificate signatures using the asymmetric key type. + See Documentation/crypto/asymmetric-keys.rst for specific restrictions + applicable to the asymmetric key type. + + + * Query an asymmetric key:: + + long keyctl(KEYCTL_PKEY_QUERY, + key_serial_t key_id, unsigned long reserved, + const char *params, + struct keyctl_pkey_query *info); + + Get information about an asymmetric key. Specific algorithms and + encodings may be queried by using the ``params`` argument. This is a + string containing a space- or tab-separated string of key-value pairs. + Currently supported keys include ``enc`` and ``hash``. The information + is returned in the keyctl_pkey_query struct:: + + __u32 supported_ops; + __u32 key_size; + __u16 max_data_size; + __u16 max_sig_size; + __u16 max_enc_size; + __u16 max_dec_size; + __u32 __spare[10]; + + ``supported_ops`` contains a bit mask of flags indicating which ops are + supported. This is constructed from a bitwise-OR of:: + + KEYCTL_SUPPORTS_{ENCRYPT,DECRYPT,SIGN,VERIFY} + + ``key_size`` indicated the size of the key in bits. + + ``max_*_size`` indicate the maximum sizes in bytes of a blob of data to be + signed, a signature blob, a blob to be encrypted and a blob to be + decrypted. + + ``__spare[]`` must be set to 0. This is intended for future use to hand + over one or more passphrases needed unlock a key. + + If successful, 0 is returned. If the key is not an asymmetric key, + EOPNOTSUPP is returned. + + + * Encrypt, decrypt, sign or verify a blob using an asymmetric key:: + + long keyctl(KEYCTL_PKEY_ENCRYPT, + const struct keyctl_pkey_params *params, + const char *info, + const void *in, + void *out); + + long keyctl(KEYCTL_PKEY_DECRYPT, + const struct keyctl_pkey_params *params, + const char *info, + const void *in, + void *out); + + long keyctl(KEYCTL_PKEY_SIGN, + const struct keyctl_pkey_params *params, + const char *info, + const void *in, + void *out); + + long keyctl(KEYCTL_PKEY_VERIFY, + const struct keyctl_pkey_params *params, + const char *info, + const void *in, + const void *in2); + + Use an asymmetric key to perform a public-key cryptographic operation a + blob of data. For encryption and verification, the asymmetric key may + only need the public parts to be available, but for decryption and signing + the private parts are required also. + + The parameter block pointed to by params contains a number of integer + values:: + + __s32 key_id; + __u32 in_len; + __u32 out_len; + __u32 in2_len; + + ``key_id`` is the ID of the asymmetric key to be used. ``in_len`` and + ``in2_len`` indicate the amount of data in the in and in2 buffers and + ``out_len`` indicates the size of the out buffer as appropriate for the + above operations. + + For a given operation, the in and out buffers are used as follows:: + + Operation ID in,in_len out,out_len in2,in2_len + ======================= =============== =============== =============== + KEYCTL_PKEY_ENCRYPT Raw data Encrypted data - + KEYCTL_PKEY_DECRYPT Encrypted data Raw data - + KEYCTL_PKEY_SIGN Raw data Signature - + KEYCTL_PKEY_VERIFY Raw data - Signature + + ``info`` is a string of key=value pairs that supply supplementary + information. These include: + + ``enc=`` The encoding of the encrypted/signature blob. This + can be "pkcs1" for RSASSA-PKCS1-v1.5 or + RSAES-PKCS1-v1.5; "pss" for "RSASSA-PSS"; "oaep" for + "RSAES-OAEP". If omitted or is "raw", the raw output + of the encryption function is specified. + + ``hash=`` If the data buffer contains the output of a hash + function and the encoding includes some indication of + which hash function was used, the hash function can be + specified with this, eg. "hash=sha256". + + The ``__spare[]`` space in the parameter block must be set to 0. This is + intended, amongst other things, to allow the passing of passphrases + required to unlock a key. + + If successful, encrypt, decrypt and sign all return the amount of data + written into the output buffer. Verification returns 0 on success. + + + * Watch a key or keyring for changes:: + + long keyctl(KEYCTL_WATCH_KEY, key_serial_t key, int queue_fd, + const struct watch_notification_filter *filter); + + This will set or remove a watch for changes on the specified key or + keyring. + + "key" is the ID of the key to be watched. + + "queue_fd" is a file descriptor referring to an open pipe which + manages the buffer into which notifications will be delivered. + + "filter" is either NULL to remove a watch or a filter specification to + indicate what events are required from the key. + + See Documentation/core-api/watch_queue.rst for more information. + + Note that only one watch may be emplaced for any particular { key, + queue_fd } combination. + + Notification records look like:: + + struct key_notification { + struct watch_notification watch; + __u32 key_id; + __u32 aux; + }; + + In this, watch::type will be "WATCH_TYPE_KEY_NOTIFY" and subtype will be + one of:: + + NOTIFY_KEY_INSTANTIATED + NOTIFY_KEY_UPDATED + NOTIFY_KEY_LINKED + NOTIFY_KEY_UNLINKED + NOTIFY_KEY_CLEARED + NOTIFY_KEY_REVOKED + NOTIFY_KEY_INVALIDATED + NOTIFY_KEY_SETATTR + + Where these indicate a key being instantiated/rejected, updated, a link + being made in a keyring, a link being removed from a keyring, a keyring + being cleared, a key being revoked, a key being invalidated or a key + having one of its attributes changed (user, group, perm, timeout, + restriction). + + If a watched key is deleted, a basic watch_notification will be issued + with "type" set to WATCH_TYPE_META and "subtype" set to + watch_meta_removal_notification. The watchpoint ID will be set in the + "info" field. + + This needs to be configured by enabling: + + "Provide key/keyring change notifications" (KEY_NOTIFICATIONS) + + +Kernel Services +=============== + +The kernel services for key management are fairly simple to deal with. They can +be broken down into two areas: keys and key types. + +Dealing with keys is fairly straightforward. Firstly, the kernel service +registers its type, then it searches for a key of that type. It should retain +the key as long as it has need of it, and then it should release it. For a +filesystem or device file, a search would probably be performed during the open +call, and the key released upon close. How to deal with conflicting keys due to +two different users opening the same file is left to the filesystem author to +solve. + +To access the key manager, the following header must be #included:: + + + +Specific key types should have a header file under include/keys/ that should be +used to access that type. For keys of type "user", for example, that would be:: + + + +Note that there are two different types of pointers to keys that may be +encountered: + + * struct key * + + This simply points to the key structure itself. Key structures will be at + least four-byte aligned. + + * key_ref_t + + This is equivalent to a ``struct key *``, but the least significant bit is set + if the caller "possesses" the key. By "possession" it is meant that the + calling processes has a searchable link to the key from one of its + keyrings. There are three functions for dealing with these:: + + key_ref_t make_key_ref(const struct key *key, bool possession); + + struct key *key_ref_to_ptr(const key_ref_t key_ref); + + bool is_key_possessed(const key_ref_t key_ref); + + The first function constructs a key reference from a key pointer and + possession information (which must be true or false). + + The second function retrieves the key pointer from a reference and the + third retrieves the possession flag. + +When accessing a key's payload contents, certain precautions must be taken to +prevent access vs modification races. See the section "Notes on accessing +payload contents" for more information. + + * To search for a key, call:: + + struct key *request_key(const struct key_type *type, + const char *description, + const char *callout_info); + + This is used to request a key or keyring with a description that matches + the description specified according to the key type's match_preparse() + method. This permits approximate matching to occur. If callout_string is + not NULL, then /sbin/request-key will be invoked in an attempt to obtain + the key from userspace. In that case, callout_string will be passed as an + argument to the program. + + Should the function fail error ENOKEY, EKEYEXPIRED or EKEYREVOKED will be + returned. + + If successful, the key will have been attached to the default keyring for + implicitly obtained request-key keys, as set by KEYCTL_SET_REQKEY_KEYRING. + + See also Documentation/security/keys/request-key.rst. + + + * To search for a key in a specific domain, call:: + + struct key *request_key_tag(const struct key_type *type, + const char *description, + struct key_tag *domain_tag, + const char *callout_info); + + This is identical to request_key(), except that a domain tag may be + specifies that causes search algorithm to only match keys matching that + tag. The domain_tag may be NULL, specifying a global domain that is + separate from any nominated domain. + + + * To search for a key, passing auxiliary data to the upcaller, call:: + + struct key *request_key_with_auxdata(const struct key_type *type, + const char *description, + struct key_tag *domain_tag, + const void *callout_info, + size_t callout_len, + void *aux); + + This is identical to request_key_tag(), except that the auxiliary data is + passed to the key_type->request_key() op if it exists, and the + callout_info is a blob of length callout_len, if given (the length may be + 0). + + + * To search for a key under RCU conditions, call:: + + struct key *request_key_rcu(const struct key_type *type, + const char *description, + struct key_tag *domain_tag); + + which is similar to request_key_tag() except that it does not check for + keys that are under construction and it will not call out to userspace to + construct a key if it can't find a match. + + + * When it is no longer required, the key should be released using:: + + void key_put(struct key *key); + + Or:: + + void key_ref_put(key_ref_t key_ref); + + These can be called from interrupt context. If CONFIG_KEYS is not set then + the argument will not be parsed. + + + * Extra references can be made to a key by calling one of the following + functions:: + + struct key *__key_get(struct key *key); + struct key *key_get(struct key *key); + + Keys so references will need to be disposed of by calling key_put() when + they've been finished with. The key pointer passed in will be returned. + + In the case of key_get(), if the pointer is NULL or CONFIG_KEYS is not set + then the key will not be dereferenced and no increment will take place. + + + * A key's serial number can be obtained by calling:: + + key_serial_t key_serial(struct key *key); + + If key is NULL or if CONFIG_KEYS is not set then 0 will be returned (in the + latter case without parsing the argument). + + + * If a keyring was found in the search, this can be further searched by:: + + key_ref_t keyring_search(key_ref_t keyring_ref, + const struct key_type *type, + const char *description, + bool recurse) + + This searches the specified keyring only (recurse == false) or keyring tree + (recurse == true) specified for a matching key. Error ENOKEY is returned + upon failure (use IS_ERR/PTR_ERR to determine). If successful, the returned + key will need to be released. + + The possession attribute from the keyring reference is used to control + access through the permissions mask and is propagated to the returned key + reference pointer if successful. + + + * A keyring can be created by:: + + struct key *keyring_alloc(const char *description, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, + const struct cred *cred, + key_perm_t perm, + struct key_restriction *restrict_link, + unsigned long flags, + struct key *dest); + + This creates a keyring with the given attributes and returns it. If dest + is not NULL, the new keyring will be linked into the keyring to which it + points. No permission checks are made upon the destination keyring. + + Error EDQUOT can be returned if the keyring would overload the quota (pass + KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA in flags if the keyring shouldn't be accounted + towards the user's quota). Error ENOMEM can also be returned. + + If restrict_link is not NULL, it should point to a structure that contains + the function that will be called each time an attempt is made to link a + key into the new keyring. The structure may also contain a key pointer + and an associated key type. The function is called to check whether a key + may be added into the keyring or not. The key type is used by the garbage + collector to clean up function or data pointers in this structure if the + given key type is unregistered. Callers of key_create_or_update() within + the kernel can pass KEY_ALLOC_BYPASS_RESTRICTION to suppress the check. + An example of using this is to manage rings of cryptographic keys that are + set up when the kernel boots where userspace is also permitted to add keys + - provided they can be verified by a key the kernel already has. + + When called, the restriction function will be passed the keyring being + added to, the key type, the payload of the key being added, and data to be + used in the restriction check. Note that when a new key is being created, + this is called between payload preparsing and actual key creation. The + function should return 0 to allow the link or an error to reject it. + + A convenience function, restrict_link_reject, exists to always return + -EPERM to in this case. + + + * To check the validity of a key, this function can be called:: + + int validate_key(struct key *key); + + This checks that the key in question hasn't expired or and hasn't been + revoked. Should the key be invalid, error EKEYEXPIRED or EKEYREVOKED will + be returned. If the key is NULL or if CONFIG_KEYS is not set then 0 will be + returned (in the latter case without parsing the argument). + + + * To register a key type, the following function should be called:: + + int register_key_type(struct key_type *type); + + This will return error EEXIST if a type of the same name is already + present. + + + * To unregister a key type, call:: + + void unregister_key_type(struct key_type *type); + + +Under some circumstances, it may be desirable to deal with a bundle of keys. +The facility provides access to the keyring type for managing such a bundle:: + + struct key_type key_type_keyring; + +This can be used with a function such as request_key() to find a specific +keyring in a process's keyrings. A keyring thus found can then be searched +with keyring_search(). Note that it is not possible to use request_key() to +search a specific keyring, so using keyrings in this way is of limited utility. + + +Notes On Accessing Payload Contents +=================================== + +The simplest payload is just data stored in key->payload directly. In this +case, there's no need to indulge in RCU or locking when accessing the payload. + +More complex payload contents must be allocated and pointers to them set in the +key->payload.data[] array. One of the following ways must be selected to +access the data: + + 1) Unmodifiable key type. + + If the key type does not have a modify method, then the key's payload can + be accessed without any form of locking, provided that it's known to be + instantiated (uninstantiated keys cannot be "found"). + + 2) The key's semaphore. + + The semaphore could be used to govern access to the payload and to control + the payload pointer. It must be write-locked for modifications and would + have to be read-locked for general access. The disadvantage of doing this + is that the accessor may be required to sleep. + + 3) RCU. + + RCU must be used when the semaphore isn't already held; if the semaphore + is held then the contents can't change under you unexpectedly as the + semaphore must still be used to serialise modifications to the key. The + key management code takes care of this for the key type. + + However, this means using:: + + rcu_read_lock() ... rcu_dereference() ... rcu_read_unlock() + + to read the pointer, and:: + + rcu_dereference() ... rcu_assign_pointer() ... call_rcu() + + to set the pointer and dispose of the old contents after a grace period. + Note that only the key type should ever modify a key's payload. + + Furthermore, an RCU controlled payload must hold a struct rcu_head for the + use of call_rcu() and, if the payload is of variable size, the length of + the payload. key->datalen cannot be relied upon to be consistent with the + payload just dereferenced if the key's semaphore is not held. + + Note that key->payload.data[0] has a shadow that is marked for __rcu + usage. This is called key->payload.rcu_data0. The following accessors + wrap the RCU calls to this element: + + a) Set or change the first payload pointer:: + + rcu_assign_keypointer(struct key *key, void *data); + + b) Read the first payload pointer with the key semaphore held:: + + [const] void *dereference_key_locked([const] struct key *key); + + Note that the return value will inherit its constness from the key + parameter. Static analysis will give an error if it things the lock + isn't held. + + c) Read the first payload pointer with the RCU read lock held:: + + const void *dereference_key_rcu(const struct key *key); + + +Defining a Key Type +=================== + +A kernel service may want to define its own key type. For instance, an AFS +filesystem might want to define a Kerberos 5 ticket key type. To do this, it +author fills in a key_type struct and registers it with the system. + +Source files that implement key types should include the following header file:: + + + +The structure has a number of fields, some of which are mandatory: + + * ``const char *name`` + + The name of the key type. This is used to translate a key type name + supplied by userspace into a pointer to the structure. + + + * ``size_t def_datalen`` + + This is optional - it supplies the default payload data length as + contributed to the quota. If the key type's payload is always or almost + always the same size, then this is a more efficient way to do things. + + The data length (and quota) on a particular key can always be changed + during instantiation or update by calling:: + + int key_payload_reserve(struct key *key, size_t datalen); + + With the revised data length. Error EDQUOT will be returned if this is not + viable. + + + * ``int (*vet_description)(const char *description);`` + + This optional method is called to vet a key description. If the key type + doesn't approve of the key description, it may return an error, otherwise + it should return 0. + + + * ``int (*preparse)(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep);`` + + This optional method permits the key type to attempt to parse payload + before a key is created (add key) or the key semaphore is taken (update or + instantiate key). The structure pointed to by prep looks like:: + + struct key_preparsed_payload { + char *description; + union key_payload payload; + const void *data; + size_t datalen; + size_t quotalen; + time_t expiry; + }; + + Before calling the method, the caller will fill in data and datalen with + the payload blob parameters; quotalen will be filled in with the default + quota size from the key type; expiry will be set to TIME_T_MAX and the + rest will be cleared. + + If a description can be proposed from the payload contents, that should be + attached as a string to the description field. This will be used for the + key description if the caller of add_key() passes NULL or "". + + The method can attach anything it likes to payload. This is merely passed + along to the instantiate() or update() operations. If set, the expiry + time will be applied to the key if it is instantiated from this data. + + The method should return 0 if successful or a negative error code + otherwise. + + + * ``void (*free_preparse)(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep);`` + + This method is only required if the preparse() method is provided, + otherwise it is unused. It cleans up anything attached to the description + and payload fields of the key_preparsed_payload struct as filled in by the + preparse() method. It will always be called after preparse() returns + successfully, even if instantiate() or update() succeed. + + + * ``int (*instantiate)(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep);`` + + This method is called to attach a payload to a key during construction. + The payload attached need not bear any relation to the data passed to this + function. + + The prep->data and prep->datalen fields will define the original payload + blob. If preparse() was supplied then other fields may be filled in also. + + If the amount of data attached to the key differs from the size in + keytype->def_datalen, then key_payload_reserve() should be called. + + This method does not have to lock the key in order to attach a payload. + The fact that KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED is not set in key->flags prevents + anything else from gaining access to the key. + + It is safe to sleep in this method. + + generic_key_instantiate() is provided to simply copy the data from + prep->payload.data[] to key->payload.data[], with RCU-safe assignment on + the first element. It will then clear prep->payload.data[] so that the + free_preparse method doesn't release the data. + + + * ``int (*update)(struct key *key, const void *data, size_t datalen);`` + + If this type of key can be updated, then this method should be provided. + It is called to update a key's payload from the blob of data provided. + + The prep->data and prep->datalen fields will define the original payload + blob. If preparse() was supplied then other fields may be filled in also. + + key_payload_reserve() should be called if the data length might change + before any changes are actually made. Note that if this succeeds, the type + is committed to changing the key because it's already been altered, so all + memory allocation must be done first. + + The key will have its semaphore write-locked before this method is called, + but this only deters other writers; any changes to the key's payload must + be made under RCU conditions, and call_rcu() must be used to dispose of + the old payload. + + key_payload_reserve() should be called before the changes are made, but + after all allocations and other potentially failing function calls are + made. + + It is safe to sleep in this method. + + + * ``int (*match_preparse)(struct key_match_data *match_data);`` + + This method is optional. It is called when a key search is about to be + performed. It is given the following structure:: + + struct key_match_data { + bool (*cmp)(const struct key *key, + const struct key_match_data *match_data); + const void *raw_data; + void *preparsed; + unsigned lookup_type; + }; + + On entry, raw_data will be pointing to the criteria to be used in matching + a key by the caller and should not be modified. ``(*cmp)()`` will be pointing + to the default matcher function (which does an exact description match + against raw_data) and lookup_type will be set to indicate a direct lookup. + + The following lookup_type values are available: + + * KEYRING_SEARCH_LOOKUP_DIRECT - A direct lookup hashes the type and + description to narrow down the search to a small number of keys. + + * KEYRING_SEARCH_LOOKUP_ITERATE - An iterative lookup walks all the + keys in the keyring until one is matched. This must be used for any + search that's not doing a simple direct match on the key description. + + The method may set cmp to point to a function of its choice that does some + other form of match, may set lookup_type to KEYRING_SEARCH_LOOKUP_ITERATE + and may attach something to the preparsed pointer for use by ``(*cmp)()``. + ``(*cmp)()`` should return true if a key matches and false otherwise. + + If preparsed is set, it may be necessary to use the match_free() method to + clean it up. + + The method should return 0 if successful or a negative error code + otherwise. + + It is permitted to sleep in this method, but ``(*cmp)()`` may not sleep as + locks will be held over it. + + If match_preparse() is not provided, keys of this type will be matched + exactly by their description. + + + * ``void (*match_free)(struct key_match_data *match_data);`` + + This method is optional. If given, it called to clean up + match_data->preparsed after a successful call to match_preparse(). + + + * ``void (*revoke)(struct key *key);`` + + This method is optional. It is called to discard part of the payload + data upon a key being revoked. The caller will have the key semaphore + write-locked. + + It is safe to sleep in this method, though care should be taken to avoid + a deadlock against the key semaphore. + + + * ``void (*destroy)(struct key *key);`` + + This method is optional. It is called to discard the payload data on a key + when it is being destroyed. + + This method does not need to lock the key to access the payload; it can + consider the key as being inaccessible at this time. Note that the key's + type may have been changed before this function is called. + + It is not safe to sleep in this method; the caller may hold spinlocks. + + + * ``void (*describe)(const struct key *key, struct seq_file *p);`` + + This method is optional. It is called during /proc/keys reading to + summarise a key's description and payload in text form. + + This method will be called with the RCU read lock held. rcu_dereference() + should be used to read the payload pointer if the payload is to be + accessed. key->datalen cannot be trusted to stay consistent with the + contents of the payload. + + The description will not change, though the key's state may. + + It is not safe to sleep in this method; the RCU read lock is held by the + caller. + + + * ``long (*read)(const struct key *key, char __user *buffer, size_t buflen);`` + + This method is optional. It is called by KEYCTL_READ to translate the + key's payload into something a blob of data for userspace to deal with. + Ideally, the blob should be in the same format as that passed in to the + instantiate and update methods. + + If successful, the blob size that could be produced should be returned + rather than the size copied. + + This method will be called with the key's semaphore read-locked. This will + prevent the key's payload changing. It is not necessary to use RCU locking + when accessing the key's payload. It is safe to sleep in this method, such + as might happen when the userspace buffer is accessed. + + + * ``int (*request_key)(struct key_construction *cons, const char *op, void *aux);`` + + This method is optional. If provided, request_key() and friends will + invoke this function rather than upcalling to /sbin/request-key to operate + upon a key of this type. + + The aux parameter is as passed to request_key_async_with_auxdata() and + similar or is NULL otherwise. Also passed are the construction record for + the key to be operated upon and the operation type (currently only + "create"). + + This method is permitted to return before the upcall is complete, but the + following function must be called under all circumstances to complete the + instantiation process, whether or not it succeeds, whether or not there's + an error:: + + void complete_request_key(struct key_construction *cons, int error); + + The error parameter should be 0 on success, -ve on error. The + construction record is destroyed by this action and the authorisation key + will be revoked. If an error is indicated, the key under construction + will be negatively instantiated if it wasn't already instantiated. + + If this method returns an error, that error will be returned to the + caller of request_key*(). complete_request_key() must be called prior to + returning. + + The key under construction and the authorisation key can be found in the + key_construction struct pointed to by cons: + + * ``struct key *key;`` + + The key under construction. + + * ``struct key *authkey;`` + + The authorisation key. + + + * ``struct key_restriction *(*lookup_restriction)(const char *params);`` + + This optional method is used to enable userspace configuration of keyring + restrictions. The restriction parameter string (not including the key type + name) is passed in, and this method returns a pointer to a key_restriction + structure containing the relevant functions and data to evaluate each + attempted key link operation. If there is no match, -EINVAL is returned. + + + * ``asym_eds_op`` and ``asym_verify_signature``:: + + int (*asym_eds_op)(struct kernel_pkey_params *params, + const void *in, void *out); + int (*asym_verify_signature)(struct kernel_pkey_params *params, + const void *in, const void *in2); + + These methods are optional. If provided the first allows a key to be + used to encrypt, decrypt or sign a blob of data, and the second allows a + key to verify a signature. + + In all cases, the following information is provided in the params block:: + + struct kernel_pkey_params { + struct key *key; + const char *encoding; + const char *hash_algo; + char *info; + __u32 in_len; + union { + __u32 out_len; + __u32 in2_len; + }; + enum kernel_pkey_operation op : 8; + }; + + This includes the key to be used; a string indicating the encoding to use + (for instance, "pkcs1" may be used with an RSA key to indicate + RSASSA-PKCS1-v1.5 or RSAES-PKCS1-v1.5 encoding or "raw" if no encoding); + the name of the hash algorithm used to generate the data for a signature + (if appropriate); the sizes of the input and output (or second input) + buffers; and the ID of the operation to be performed. + + For a given operation ID, the input and output buffers are used as + follows:: + + Operation ID in,in_len out,out_len in2,in2_len + ======================= =============== =============== =============== + kernel_pkey_encrypt Raw data Encrypted data - + kernel_pkey_decrypt Encrypted data Raw data - + kernel_pkey_sign Raw data Signature - + kernel_pkey_verify Raw data - Signature + + asym_eds_op() deals with encryption, decryption and signature creation as + specified by params->op. Note that params->op is also set for + asym_verify_signature(). + + Encrypting and signature creation both take raw data in the input buffer + and return the encrypted result in the output buffer. Padding may have + been added if an encoding was set. In the case of signature creation, + depending on the encoding, the padding created may need to indicate the + digest algorithm - the name of which should be supplied in hash_algo. + + Decryption takes encrypted data in the input buffer and returns the raw + data in the output buffer. Padding will get checked and stripped off if + an encoding was set. + + Verification takes raw data in the input buffer and the signature in the + second input buffer and checks that the one matches the other. Padding + will be validated. Depending on the encoding, the digest algorithm used + to generate the raw data may need to be indicated in hash_algo. + + If successful, asym_eds_op() should return the number of bytes written + into the output buffer. asym_verify_signature() should return 0. + + A variety of errors may be returned, including EOPNOTSUPP if the operation + is not supported; EKEYREJECTED if verification fails; ENOPKG if the + required crypto isn't available. + + + * ``asym_query``:: + + int (*asym_query)(const struct kernel_pkey_params *params, + struct kernel_pkey_query *info); + + This method is optional. If provided it allows information about the + public or asymmetric key held in the key to be determined. + + The parameter block is as for asym_eds_op() and co. but in_len and out_len + are unused. The encoding and hash_algo fields should be used to reduce + the returned buffer/data sizes as appropriate. + + If successful, the following information is filled in:: + + struct kernel_pkey_query { + __u32 supported_ops; + __u32 key_size; + __u16 max_data_size; + __u16 max_sig_size; + __u16 max_enc_size; + __u16 max_dec_size; + }; + + The supported_ops field will contain a bitmask indicating what operations + are supported by the key, including encryption of a blob, decryption of a + blob, signing a blob and verifying the signature on a blob. The following + constants are defined for this:: + + KEYCTL_SUPPORTS_{ENCRYPT,DECRYPT,SIGN,VERIFY} + + The key_size field is the size of the key in bits. max_data_size and + max_sig_size are the maximum raw data and signature sizes for creation and + verification of a signature; max_enc_size and max_dec_size are the maximum + raw data and signature sizes for encryption and decryption. The + max_*_size fields are measured in bytes. + + If successful, 0 will be returned. If the key doesn't support this, + EOPNOTSUPP will be returned. + + +Request-Key Callback Service +============================ + +To create a new key, the kernel will attempt to execute the following command +line:: + + /sbin/request-key create \ + + + is the key being constructed, and the three keyrings are the process +keyrings from the process that caused the search to be issued. These are +included for two reasons: + + 1 There may be an authentication token in one of the keyrings that is + required to obtain the key, eg: a Kerberos Ticket-Granting Ticket. + + 2 The new key should probably be cached in one of these rings. + +This program should set it UID and GID to those specified before attempting to +access any more keys. It may then look around for a user specific process to +hand the request off to (perhaps a path held in placed in another key by, for +example, the KDE desktop manager). + +The program (or whatever it calls) should finish construction of the key by +calling KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE or KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE_IOV, which also permits it to +cache the key in one of the keyrings (probably the session ring) before +returning. Alternatively, the key can be marked as negative with KEYCTL_NEGATE +or KEYCTL_REJECT; this also permits the key to be cached in one of the +keyrings. + +If it returns with the key remaining in the unconstructed state, the key will +be marked as being negative, it will be added to the session keyring, and an +error will be returned to the key requestor. + +Supplementary information may be provided from whoever or whatever invoked this +service. This will be passed as the parameter. If no such +information was made available, then "-" will be passed as this parameter +instead. + + +Similarly, the kernel may attempt to update an expired or a soon to expire key +by executing:: + + /sbin/request-key update \ + + +In this case, the program isn't required to actually attach the key to a ring; +the rings are provided for reference. + + +Garbage Collection +================== + +Dead keys (for which the type has been removed) will be automatically unlinked +from those keyrings that point to them and deleted as soon as possible by a +background garbage collector. + +Similarly, revoked and expired keys will be garbage collected, but only after a +certain amount of time has passed. This time is set as a number of seconds in:: + + /proc/sys/kernel/keys/gc_delay diff --git a/Documentation/security/keys/ecryptfs.rst b/Documentation/security/keys/ecryptfs.rst new file mode 100644 index 000000000..0e2be0a6b --- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/security/keys/ecryptfs.rst @@ -0,0 +1,73 @@ +========================================== +Encrypted keys for the eCryptfs filesystem +========================================== + +ECryptfs is a stacked filesystem which transparently encrypts and decrypts each +file using a randomly generated File Encryption Key (FEK). + +Each FEK is in turn encrypted with a File Encryption Key Encryption Key (FEKEK) +either in kernel space or in user space with a daemon called 'ecryptfsd'. In +the former case the operation is performed directly by the kernel CryptoAPI +using a key, the FEKEK, derived from a user prompted passphrase; in the latter +the FEK is encrypted by 'ecryptfsd' with the help of external libraries in order +to support other mechanisms like public key cryptography, PKCS#11 and TPM based +operations. + +The data structure defined by eCryptfs to contain information required for the +FEK decryption is called authentication token and, currently, can be stored in a +kernel key of the 'user' type, inserted in the user's session specific keyring +by the userspace utility 'mount.ecryptfs' shipped with the package +'ecryptfs-utils'. + +The 'encrypted' key type has been extended with the introduction of the new +format 'ecryptfs' in order to be used in conjunction with the eCryptfs +filesystem. Encrypted keys of the newly introduced format store an +authentication token in its payload with a FEKEK randomly generated by the +kernel and protected by the parent master key. + +In order to avoid known-plaintext attacks, the datablob obtained through +commands 'keyctl print' or 'keyctl pipe' does not contain the overall +authentication token, which content is well known, but only the FEKEK in +encrypted form. + +The eCryptfs filesystem may really benefit from using encrypted keys in that the +required key can be securely generated by an Administrator and provided at boot +time after the unsealing of a 'trusted' key in order to perform the mount in a +controlled environment. Another advantage is that the key is not exposed to +threats of malicious software, because it is available in clear form only at +kernel level. + +Usage:: + + keyctl add encrypted name "new ecryptfs key-type:master-key-name keylen" ring + keyctl add encrypted name "load hex_blob" ring + keyctl update keyid "update key-type:master-key-name" + +Where:: + + name:= '<16 hexadecimal characters>' + key-type:= 'trusted' | 'user' + keylen:= 64 + + +Example of encrypted key usage with the eCryptfs filesystem: + +Create an encrypted key "1000100010001000" of length 64 bytes with format +'ecryptfs' and save it using a previously loaded user key "test":: + + $ keyctl add encrypted 1000100010001000 "new ecryptfs user:test 64" @u + 19184530 + + $ keyctl print 19184530 + ecryptfs user:test 64 490045d4bfe48c99f0d465fbbbb79e7500da954178e2de0697 + dd85091f5450a0511219e9f7cd70dcd498038181466f78ac8d4c19504fcc72402bfc41c2 + f253a41b7507ccaa4b2b03fff19a69d1cc0b16e71746473f023a95488b6edfd86f7fdd40 + 9d292e4bacded1258880122dd553a661 + + $ keyctl pipe 19184530 > ecryptfs.blob + +Mount an eCryptfs filesystem using the created encrypted key "1000100010001000" +into the '/secret' directory:: + + $ mount -i -t ecryptfs -oecryptfs_sig=1000100010001000,\ + ecryptfs_cipher=aes,ecryptfs_key_bytes=32 /secret /secret diff --git a/Documentation/security/keys/index.rst b/Documentation/security/keys/index.rst new file mode 100644 index 000000000..647d58f25 --- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/security/keys/index.rst @@ -0,0 +1,11 @@ +=========== +Kernel Keys +=========== + +.. toctree:: + :maxdepth: 1 + + core + ecryptfs + request-key + trusted-encrypted diff --git a/Documentation/security/keys/request-key.rst b/Documentation/security/keys/request-key.rst new file mode 100644 index 000000000..35f2296b7 --- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/security/keys/request-key.rst @@ -0,0 +1,207 @@ +=================== +Key Request Service +=================== + +The key request service is part of the key retention service (refer to +Documentation/security/keys/core.rst). This document explains more fully how +the requesting algorithm works. + +The process starts by either the kernel requesting a service by calling +``request_key*()``:: + + struct key *request_key(const struct key_type *type, + const char *description, + const char *callout_info); + +or:: + + struct key *request_key_tag(const struct key_type *type, + const char *description, + const struct key_tag *domain_tag, + const char *callout_info); + +or:: + + struct key *request_key_with_auxdata(const struct key_type *type, + const char *description, + const struct key_tag *domain_tag, + const char *callout_info, + size_t callout_len, + void *aux); + +or:: + + struct key *request_key_rcu(const struct key_type *type, + const char *description, + const struct key_tag *domain_tag); + +Or by userspace invoking the request_key system call:: + + key_serial_t request_key(const char *type, + const char *description, + const char *callout_info, + key_serial_t dest_keyring); + +The main difference between the access points is that the in-kernel interface +does not need to link the key to a keyring to prevent it from being immediately +destroyed. The kernel interface returns a pointer directly to the key, and +it's up to the caller to destroy the key. + +The request_key_tag() call is like the in-kernel request_key(), except that it +also takes a domain tag that allows keys to be separated by namespace and +killed off as a group. + +The request_key_with_auxdata() calls is like the request_key_tag() call, except +that they permit auxiliary data to be passed to the upcaller (the default is +NULL). This is only useful for those key types that define their own upcall +mechanism rather than using /sbin/request-key. + +The request_key_rcu() call is like the request_key_tag() call, except that it +doesn't check for keys that are under construction and doesn't attempt to +construct missing keys. + +The userspace interface links the key to a keyring associated with the process +to prevent the key from going away, and returns the serial number of the key to +the caller. + + +The following example assumes that the key types involved don't define their +own upcall mechanisms. If they do, then those should be substituted for the +forking and execution of /sbin/request-key. + + +The Process +=========== + +A request proceeds in the following manner: + + 1) Process A calls request_key() [the userspace syscall calls the kernel + interface]. + + 2) request_key() searches the process's subscribed keyrings to see if there's + a suitable key there. If there is, it returns the key. If there isn't, + and callout_info is not set, an error is returned. Otherwise the process + proceeds to the next step. + + 3) request_key() sees that A doesn't have the desired key yet, so it creates + two things: + + a) An uninstantiated key U of requested type and description. + + b) An authorisation key V that refers to key U and notes that process A + is the context in which key U should be instantiated and secured, and + from which associated key requests may be satisfied. + + 4) request_key() then forks and executes /sbin/request-key with a new session + keyring that contains a link to auth key V. + + 5) /sbin/request-key assumes the authority associated with key U. + + 6) /sbin/request-key execs an appropriate program to perform the actual + instantiation. + + 7) The program may want to access another key from A's context (say a + Kerberos TGT key). It just requests the appropriate key, and the keyring + search notes that the session keyring has auth key V in its bottom level. + + This will permit it to then search the keyrings of process A with the + UID, GID, groups and security info of process A as if it was process A, + and come up with key W. + + 8) The program then does what it must to get the data with which to + instantiate key U, using key W as a reference (perhaps it contacts a + Kerberos server using the TGT) and then instantiates key U. + + 9) Upon instantiating key U, auth key V is automatically revoked so that it + may not be used again. + + 10) The program then exits 0 and request_key() deletes key V and returns key + U to the caller. + +This also extends further. If key W (step 7 above) didn't exist, key W would +be created uninstantiated, another auth key (X) would be created (as per step +3) and another copy of /sbin/request-key spawned (as per step 4); but the +context specified by auth key X will still be process A, as it was in auth key +V. + +This is because process A's keyrings can't simply be attached to +/sbin/request-key at the appropriate places because (a) execve will discard two +of them, and (b) it requires the same UID/GID/Groups all the way through. + + +Negative Instantiation And Rejection +==================================== + +Rather than instantiating a key, it is possible for the possessor of an +authorisation key to negatively instantiate a key that's under construction. +This is a short duration placeholder that causes any attempt at re-requesting +the key while it exists to fail with error ENOKEY if negated or the specified +error if rejected. + +This is provided to prevent excessive repeated spawning of /sbin/request-key +processes for a key that will never be obtainable. + +Should the /sbin/request-key process exit anything other than 0 or die on a +signal, the key under construction will be automatically negatively +instantiated for a short amount of time. + + +The Search Algorithm +==================== + +A search of any particular keyring proceeds in the following fashion: + + 1) When the key management code searches for a key (keyring_search_rcu) it + firstly calls key_permission(SEARCH) on the keyring it's starting with, + if this denies permission, it doesn't search further. + + 2) It considers all the non-keyring keys within that keyring and, if any key + matches the criteria specified, calls key_permission(SEARCH) on it to see + if the key is allowed to be found. If it is, that key is returned; if + not, the search continues, and the error code is retained if of higher + priority than the one currently set. + + 3) It then considers all the keyring-type keys in the keyring it's currently + searching. It calls key_permission(SEARCH) on each keyring, and if this + grants permission, it recurses, executing steps (2) and (3) on that + keyring. + +The process stops immediately a valid key is found with permission granted to +use it. Any error from a previous match attempt is discarded and the key is +returned. + +When request_key() is invoked, if CONFIG_KEYS_REQUEST_CACHE=y, a per-task +one-key cache is first checked for a match. + +When search_process_keyrings() is invoked, it performs the following searches +until one succeeds: + + 1) If extant, the process's thread keyring is searched. + + 2) If extant, the process's process keyring is searched. + + 3) The process's session keyring is searched. + + 4) If the process has assumed the authority associated with a request_key() + authorisation key then: + + a) If extant, the calling process's thread keyring is searched. + + b) If extant, the calling process's process keyring is searched. + + c) The calling process's session keyring is searched. + +The moment one succeeds, all pending errors are discarded and the found key is +returned. If CONFIG_KEYS_REQUEST_CACHE=y, then that key is placed in the +per-task cache, displacing the previous key. The cache is cleared on exit or +just prior to resumption of userspace. + +Only if all these fail does the whole thing fail with the highest priority +error. Note that several errors may have come from LSM. + +The error priority is:: + + EKEYREVOKED > EKEYEXPIRED > ENOKEY + +EACCES/EPERM are only returned on a direct search of a specific keyring where +the basal keyring does not grant Search permission. diff --git a/Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst b/Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst new file mode 100644 index 000000000..9bc9db8ec --- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst @@ -0,0 +1,428 @@ +========================== +Trusted and Encrypted Keys +========================== + +Trusted and Encrypted Keys are two new key types added to the existing kernel +key ring service. Both of these new types are variable length symmetric keys, +and in both cases all keys are created in the kernel, and user space sees, +stores, and loads only encrypted blobs. Trusted Keys require the availability +of a Trust Source for greater security, while Encrypted Keys can be used on any +system. All user level blobs, are displayed and loaded in hex ASCII for +convenience, and are integrity verified. + + +Trust Source +============ + +A trust source provides the source of security for Trusted Keys. This +section lists currently supported trust sources, along with their security +considerations. Whether or not a trust source is sufficiently safe depends +on the strength and correctness of its implementation, as well as the threat +environment for a specific use case. Since the kernel doesn't know what the +environment is, and there is no metric of trust, it is dependent on the +consumer of the Trusted Keys to determine if the trust source is sufficiently +safe. + + * Root of trust for storage + + (1) TPM (Trusted Platform Module: hardware device) + + Rooted to Storage Root Key (SRK) which never leaves the TPM that + provides crypto operation to establish root of trust for storage. + + (2) TEE (Trusted Execution Environment: OP-TEE based on Arm TrustZone) + + Rooted to Hardware Unique Key (HUK) which is generally burnt in on-chip + fuses and is accessible to TEE only. + + (3) CAAM (Cryptographic Acceleration and Assurance Module: IP on NXP SoCs) + + When High Assurance Boot (HAB) is enabled and the CAAM is in secure + mode, trust is rooted to the OTPMK, a never-disclosed 256-bit key + randomly generated and fused into each SoC at manufacturing time. + Otherwise, a common fixed test key is used instead. + + * Execution isolation + + (1) TPM + + Fixed set of operations running in isolated execution environment. + + (2) TEE + + Customizable set of operations running in isolated execution + environment verified via Secure/Trusted boot process. + + (3) CAAM + + Fixed set of operations running in isolated execution environment. + + * Optional binding to platform integrity state + + (1) TPM + + Keys can be optionally sealed to specified PCR (integrity measurement) + values, and only unsealed by the TPM, if PCRs and blob integrity + verifications match. A loaded Trusted Key can be updated with new + (future) PCR values, so keys are easily migrated to new PCR values, + such as when the kernel and initramfs are updated. The same key can + have many saved blobs under different PCR values, so multiple boots are + easily supported. + + (2) TEE + + Relies on Secure/Trusted boot process for platform integrity. It can + be extended with TEE based measured boot process. + + (3) CAAM + + Relies on the High Assurance Boot (HAB) mechanism of NXP SoCs + for platform integrity. + + * Interfaces and APIs + + (1) TPM + + TPMs have well-documented, standardized interfaces and APIs. + + (2) TEE + + TEEs have well-documented, standardized client interface and APIs. For + more details refer to ``Documentation/staging/tee.rst``. + + (3) CAAM + + Interface is specific to silicon vendor. + + * Threat model + + The strength and appropriateness of a particular trust source for a given + purpose must be assessed when using them to protect security-relevant data. + + +Key Generation +============== + +Trusted Keys +------------ + +New keys are created from random numbers. They are encrypted/decrypted using +a child key in the storage key hierarchy. Encryption and decryption of the +child key must be protected by a strong access control policy within the +trust source. The random number generator in use differs according to the +selected trust source: + + * TPM: hardware device based RNG + + Keys are generated within the TPM. Strength of random numbers may vary + from one device manufacturer to another. + + * TEE: OP-TEE based on Arm TrustZone based RNG + + RNG is customizable as per platform needs. It can either be direct output + from platform specific hardware RNG or a software based Fortuna CSPRNG + which can be seeded via multiple entropy sources. + + * CAAM: Kernel RNG + + The normal kernel random number generator is used. To seed it from the + CAAM HWRNG, enable CRYPTO_DEV_FSL_CAAM_RNG_API and ensure the device + is probed. + +Users may override this by specifying ``trusted.rng=kernel`` on the kernel +command-line to override the used RNG with the kernel's random number pool. + +Encrypted Keys +-------------- + +Encrypted keys do not depend on a trust source, and are faster, as they use AES +for encryption/decryption. New keys are created either from kernel-generated +random numbers or user-provided decrypted data, and are encrypted/decrypted +using a specified ‘master’ key. The ‘master’ key can either be a trusted-key or +user-key type. The main disadvantage of encrypted keys is that if they are not +rooted in a trusted key, they are only as secure as the user key encrypting +them. The master user key should therefore be loaded in as secure a way as +possible, preferably early in boot. + + +Usage +===== + +Trusted Keys usage: TPM +----------------------- + +TPM 1.2: By default, trusted keys are sealed under the SRK, which has the +default authorization value (20 bytes of 0s). This can be set at takeownership +time with the TrouSerS utility: "tpm_takeownership -u -z". + +TPM 2.0: The user must first create a storage key and make it persistent, so the +key is available after reboot. This can be done using the following commands. + +With the IBM TSS 2 stack:: + + #> tsscreateprimary -hi o -st + Handle 80000000 + #> tssevictcontrol -hi o -ho 80000000 -hp 81000001 + +Or with the Intel TSS 2 stack:: + + #> tpm2_createprimary --hierarchy o -G rsa2048 -c key.ctxt + [...] + #> tpm2_evictcontrol -c key.ctxt 0x81000001 + persistentHandle: 0x81000001 + +Usage:: + + keyctl add trusted name "new keylen [options]" ring + keyctl add trusted name "load hex_blob [pcrlock=pcrnum]" ring + keyctl update key "update [options]" + keyctl print keyid + + options: + keyhandle= ascii hex value of sealing key + TPM 1.2: default 0x40000000 (SRK) + TPM 2.0: no default; must be passed every time + keyauth= ascii hex auth for sealing key default 0x00...i + (40 ascii zeros) + blobauth= ascii hex auth for sealed data default 0x00... + (40 ascii zeros) + pcrinfo= ascii hex of PCR_INFO or PCR_INFO_LONG (no default) + pcrlock= pcr number to be extended to "lock" blob + migratable= 0|1 indicating permission to reseal to new PCR values, + default 1 (resealing allowed) + hash= hash algorithm name as a string. For TPM 1.x the only + allowed value is sha1. For TPM 2.x the allowed values + are sha1, sha256, sha384, sha512 and sm3-256. + policydigest= digest for the authorization policy. must be calculated + with the same hash algorithm as specified by the 'hash=' + option. + policyhandle= handle to an authorization policy session that defines the + same policy and with the same hash algorithm as was used to + seal the key. + +"keyctl print" returns an ascii hex copy of the sealed key, which is in standard +TPM_STORED_DATA format. The key length for new keys are always in bytes. +Trusted Keys can be 32 - 128 bytes (256 - 1024 bits), the upper limit is to fit +within the 2048 bit SRK (RSA) keylength, with all necessary structure/padding. + +Trusted Keys usage: TEE +----------------------- + +Usage:: + + keyctl add trusted name "new keylen" ring + keyctl add trusted name "load hex_blob" ring + keyctl print keyid + +"keyctl print" returns an ASCII hex copy of the sealed key, which is in format +specific to TEE device implementation. The key length for new keys is always +in bytes. Trusted Keys can be 32 - 128 bytes (256 - 1024 bits). + +Trusted Keys usage: CAAM +------------------------ + +Usage:: + + keyctl add trusted name "new keylen" ring + keyctl add trusted name "load hex_blob" ring + keyctl print keyid + +"keyctl print" returns an ASCII hex copy of the sealed key, which is in a +CAAM-specific format. The key length for new keys is always in bytes. +Trusted Keys can be 32 - 128 bytes (256 - 1024 bits). + +Encrypted Keys usage +-------------------- + +The decrypted portion of encrypted keys can contain either a simple symmetric +key or a more complex structure. The format of the more complex structure is +application specific, which is identified by 'format'. + +Usage:: + + keyctl add encrypted name "new [format] key-type:master-key-name keylen" + ring + keyctl add encrypted name "new [format] key-type:master-key-name keylen + decrypted-data" ring + keyctl add encrypted name "load hex_blob" ring + keyctl update keyid "update key-type:master-key-name" + +Where:: + + format:= 'default | ecryptfs | enc32' + key-type:= 'trusted' | 'user' + +Examples of trusted and encrypted key usage +------------------------------------------- + +Create and save a trusted key named "kmk" of length 32 bytes. + +Note: When using a TPM 2.0 with a persistent key with handle 0x81000001, +append 'keyhandle=0x81000001' to statements between quotes, such as +"new 32 keyhandle=0x81000001". + +:: + + $ keyctl add trusted kmk "new 32" @u + 440502848 + + $ keyctl show + Session Keyring + -3 --alswrv 500 500 keyring: _ses + 97833714 --alswrv 500 -1 \_ keyring: _uid.500 + 440502848 --alswrv 500 500 \_ trusted: kmk + + $ keyctl print 440502848 + 0101000000000000000001005d01b7e3f4a6be5709930f3b70a743cbb42e0cc95e18e915 + 3f60da455bbf1144ad12e4f92b452f966929f6105fd29ca28e4d4d5a031d068478bacb0b + 27351119f822911b0a11ba3d3498ba6a32e50dac7f32894dd890eb9ad578e4e292c83722 + a52e56a097e6a68b3f56f7a52ece0cdccba1eb62cad7d817f6dc58898b3ac15f36026fec + d568bd4a706cb60bb37be6d8f1240661199d640b66fb0fe3b079f97f450b9ef9c22c6d5d + dd379f0facd1cd020281dfa3c70ba21a3fa6fc2471dc6d13ecf8298b946f65345faa5ef0 + f1f8fff03ad0acb083725535636addb08d73dedb9832da198081e5deae84bfaf0409c22b + e4a8aea2b607ec96931e6f4d4fe563ba + + $ keyctl pipe 440502848 > kmk.blob + +Load a trusted key from the saved blob:: + + $ keyctl add trusted kmk "load `cat kmk.blob`" @u + 268728824 + + $ keyctl print 268728824 + 0101000000000000000001005d01b7e3f4a6be5709930f3b70a743cbb42e0cc95e18e915 + 3f60da455bbf1144ad12e4f92b452f966929f6105fd29ca28e4d4d5a031d068478bacb0b + 27351119f822911b0a11ba3d3498ba6a32e50dac7f32894dd890eb9ad578e4e292c83722 + a52e56a097e6a68b3f56f7a52ece0cdccba1eb62cad7d817f6dc58898b3ac15f36026fec + d568bd4a706cb60bb37be6d8f1240661199d640b66fb0fe3b079f97f450b9ef9c22c6d5d + dd379f0facd1cd020281dfa3c70ba21a3fa6fc2471dc6d13ecf8298b946f65345faa5ef0 + f1f8fff03ad0acb083725535636addb08d73dedb9832da198081e5deae84bfaf0409c22b + e4a8aea2b607ec96931e6f4d4fe563ba + +Reseal (TPM specific) a trusted key under new PCR values:: + + $ keyctl update 268728824 "update pcrinfo=`cat pcr.blob`" + $ keyctl print 268728824 + 010100000000002c0002800093c35a09b70fff26e7a98ae786c641e678ec6ffb6b46d805 + 77c8a6377aed9d3219c6dfec4b23ffe3000001005d37d472ac8a44023fbb3d18583a4f73 + d3a076c0858f6f1dcaa39ea0f119911ff03f5406df4f7f27f41da8d7194f45c9f4e00f2e + df449f266253aa3f52e55c53de147773e00f0f9aca86c64d94c95382265968c354c5eab4 + 9638c5ae99c89de1e0997242edfb0b501744e11ff9762dfd951cffd93227cc513384e7e6 + e782c29435c7ec2edafaa2f4c1fe6e7a781b59549ff5296371b42133777dcc5b8b971610 + 94bc67ede19e43ddb9dc2baacad374a36feaf0314d700af0a65c164b7082401740e489c9 + 7ef6a24defe4846104209bf0c3eced7fa1a672ed5b125fc9d8cd88b476a658a4434644ef + df8ae9a178e9f83ba9f08d10fa47e4226b98b0702f06b3b8 + + +The initial consumer of trusted keys is EVM, which at boot time needs a high +quality symmetric key for HMAC protection of file metadata. The use of a +trusted key provides strong guarantees that the EVM key has not been +compromised by a user level problem, and when sealed to a platform integrity +state, protects against boot and offline attacks. Create and save an +encrypted key "evm" using the above trusted key "kmk": + +option 1: omitting 'format':: + + $ keyctl add encrypted evm "new trusted:kmk 32" @u + 159771175 + +option 2: explicitly defining 'format' as 'default':: + + $ keyctl add encrypted evm "new default trusted:kmk 32" @u + 159771175 + + $ keyctl print 159771175 + default trusted:kmk 32 2375725ad57798846a9bbd240de8906f006e66c03af53b1b3 + 82dbbc55be2a44616e4959430436dc4f2a7a9659aa60bb4652aeb2120f149ed197c564e0 + 24717c64 5972dcb82ab2dde83376d82b2e3c09ffc + + $ keyctl pipe 159771175 > evm.blob + +Load an encrypted key "evm" from saved blob:: + + $ keyctl add encrypted evm "load `cat evm.blob`" @u + 831684262 + + $ keyctl print 831684262 + default trusted:kmk 32 2375725ad57798846a9bbd240de8906f006e66c03af53b1b3 + 82dbbc55be2a44616e4959430436dc4f2a7a9659aa60bb4652aeb2120f149ed197c564e0 + 24717c64 5972dcb82ab2dde83376d82b2e3c09ffc + +Instantiate an encrypted key "evm" using user-provided decrypted data:: + + $ evmkey=$(dd if=/dev/urandom bs=1 count=32 | xxd -c32 -p) + $ keyctl add encrypted evm "new default user:kmk 32 $evmkey" @u + 794890253 + + $ keyctl print 794890253 + default user:kmk 32 2375725ad57798846a9bbd240de8906f006e66c03af53b1b382d + bbc55be2a44616e4959430436dc4f2a7a9659aa60bb4652aeb2120f149ed197c564e0247 + 17c64 5972dcb82ab2dde83376d82b2e3c09ffc + +Other uses for trusted and encrypted keys, such as for disk and file encryption +are anticipated. In particular the new format 'ecryptfs' has been defined +in order to use encrypted keys to mount an eCryptfs filesystem. More details +about the usage can be found in the file +``Documentation/security/keys/ecryptfs.rst``. + +Another new format 'enc32' has been defined in order to support encrypted keys +with payload size of 32 bytes. This will initially be used for nvdimm security +but may expand to other usages that require 32 bytes payload. + + +TPM 2.0 ASN.1 Key Format +------------------------ + +The TPM 2.0 ASN.1 key format is designed to be easily recognisable, +even in binary form (fixing a problem we had with the TPM 1.2 ASN.1 +format) and to be extensible for additions like importable keys and +policy:: + + TPMKey ::= SEQUENCE { + type OBJECT IDENTIFIER + emptyAuth [0] EXPLICIT BOOLEAN OPTIONAL + parent INTEGER + pubkey OCTET STRING + privkey OCTET STRING + } + +type is what distinguishes the key even in binary form since the OID +is provided by the TCG to be unique and thus forms a recognizable +binary pattern at offset 3 in the key. The OIDs currently made +available are:: + + 2.23.133.10.1.3 TPM Loadable key. This is an asymmetric key (Usually + RSA2048 or Elliptic Curve) which can be imported by a + TPM2_Load() operation. + + 2.23.133.10.1.4 TPM Importable Key. This is an asymmetric key (Usually + RSA2048 or Elliptic Curve) which can be imported by a + TPM2_Import() operation. + + 2.23.133.10.1.5 TPM Sealed Data. This is a set of data (up to 128 + bytes) which is sealed by the TPM. It usually + represents a symmetric key and must be unsealed before + use. + +The trusted key code only uses the TPM Sealed Data OID. + +emptyAuth is true if the key has well known authorization "". If it +is false or not present, the key requires an explicit authorization +phrase. This is used by most user space consumers to decide whether +to prompt for a password. + +parent represents the parent key handle, either in the 0x81 MSO space, +like 0x81000001 for the RSA primary storage key. Userspace programmes +also support specifying the primary handle in the 0x40 MSO space. If +this happens the Elliptic Curve variant of the primary key using the +TCG defined template will be generated on the fly into a volatile +object and used as the parent. The current kernel code only supports +the 0x81 MSO form. + +pubkey is the binary representation of TPM2B_PRIVATE excluding the +initial TPM2B header, which can be reconstructed from the ASN.1 octet +string length. + +privkey is the binary representation of TPM2B_PUBLIC excluding the +initial TPM2B header which can be reconstructed from the ASN.1 octed +string length. diff --git a/Documentation/security/landlock.rst b/Documentation/security/landlock.rst new file mode 100644 index 000000000..36f26501f --- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/security/landlock.rst @@ -0,0 +1,129 @@ +.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +.. Copyright © 2017-2020 Mickaël Salaün +.. Copyright © 2019-2020 ANSSI + +================================== +Landlock LSM: kernel documentation +================================== + +:Author: Mickaël Salaün +:Date: December 2022 + +Landlock's goal is to create scoped access-control (i.e. sandboxing). To +harden a whole system, this feature should be available to any process, +including unprivileged ones. Because such process may be compromised or +backdoored (i.e. untrusted), Landlock's features must be safe to use from the +kernel and other processes point of view. Landlock's interface must therefore +expose a minimal attack surface. + +Landlock is designed to be usable by unprivileged processes while following the +system security policy enforced by other access control mechanisms (e.g. DAC, +LSM). Indeed, a Landlock rule shall not interfere with other access-controls +enforced on the system, only add more restrictions. + +Any user can enforce Landlock rulesets on their processes. They are merged and +evaluated according to the inherited ones in a way that ensures that only more +constraints can be added. + +User space documentation can be found here: +Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst. + +Guiding principles for safe access controls +=========================================== + +* A Landlock rule shall be focused on access control on kernel objects instead + of syscall filtering (i.e. syscall arguments), which is the purpose of + seccomp-bpf. +* To avoid multiple kinds of side-channel attacks (e.g. leak of security + policies, CPU-based attacks), Landlock rules shall not be able to + programmatically communicate with user space. +* Kernel access check shall not slow down access request from unsandboxed + processes. +* Computation related to Landlock operations (e.g. enforcing a ruleset) shall + only impact the processes requesting them. +* Resources (e.g. file descriptors) directly obtained from the kernel by a + sandboxed process shall retain their scoped accesses (at the time of resource + acquisition) whatever process use them. + Cf. `File descriptor access rights`_. + +Design choices +============== + +Inode access rights +------------------- + +All access rights are tied to an inode and what can be accessed through it. +Reading the content of a directory does not imply to be allowed to read the +content of a listed inode. Indeed, a file name is local to its parent +directory, and an inode can be referenced by multiple file names thanks to +(hard) links. Being able to unlink a file only has a direct impact on the +directory, not the unlinked inode. This is the reason why +``LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REMOVE_FILE`` or ``LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER`` are not +allowed to be tied to files but only to directories. + +File descriptor access rights +----------------------------- + +Access rights are checked and tied to file descriptors at open time. The +underlying principle is that equivalent sequences of operations should lead to +the same results, when they are executed under the same Landlock domain. + +Taking the ``LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE`` right as an example, it may be +allowed to open a file for writing without being allowed to +:manpage:`ftruncate` the resulting file descriptor if the related file +hierarchy doesn't grant such access right. The following sequences of +operations have the same semantic and should then have the same result: + +* ``truncate(path);`` +* ``int fd = open(path, O_WRONLY); ftruncate(fd); close(fd);`` + +Similarly to file access modes (e.g. ``O_RDWR``), Landlock access rights +attached to file descriptors are retained even if they are passed between +processes (e.g. through a Unix domain socket). Such access rights will then be +enforced even if the receiving process is not sandboxed by Landlock. Indeed, +this is required to keep a consistent access control over the whole system, and +this avoids unattended bypasses through file descriptor passing (i.e. confused +deputy attack). + +Tests +===== + +Userspace tests for backward compatibility, ptrace restrictions and filesystem +support can be found here: `tools/testing/selftests/landlock/`_. + +Kernel structures +================= + +Object +------ + +.. kernel-doc:: security/landlock/object.h + :identifiers: + +Filesystem +---------- + +.. kernel-doc:: security/landlock/fs.h + :identifiers: + +Ruleset and domain +------------------ + +A domain is a read-only ruleset tied to a set of subjects (i.e. tasks' +credentials). Each time a ruleset is enforced on a task, the current domain is +duplicated and the ruleset is imported as a new layer of rules in the new +domain. Indeed, once in a domain, each rule is tied to a layer level. To +grant access to an object, at least one rule of each layer must allow the +requested action on the object. A task can then only transit to a new domain +that is the intersection of the constraints from the current domain and those +of a ruleset provided by the task. + +The definition of a subject is implicit for a task sandboxing itself, which +makes the reasoning much easier and helps avoid pitfalls. + +.. kernel-doc:: security/landlock/ruleset.h + :identifiers: + +.. Links +.. _tools/testing/selftests/landlock/: + https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/tree/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/ diff --git a/Documentation/security/lsm-development.rst b/Documentation/security/lsm-development.rst new file mode 100644 index 000000000..5895e529d --- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/security/lsm-development.rst @@ -0,0 +1,17 @@ +================================= +Linux Security Module Development +================================= + +Based on https://lore.kernel.org/r/20071026073721.618b4778@laptopd505.fenrus.org, +a new LSM is accepted into the kernel when its intent (a description of +what it tries to protect against and in what cases one would expect to +use it) has been appropriately documented in ``Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/``. +This allows an LSM's code to be easily compared to its goals, and so +that end users and distros can make a more informed decision about which +LSMs suit their requirements. + +For extensive documentation on the available LSM hook interfaces, please +see ``security/security.c`` and associated structures: + +.. kernel-doc:: security/security.c + :export: diff --git a/Documentation/security/lsm.rst b/Documentation/security/lsm.rst new file mode 100644 index 000000000..c20c7c72e --- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/security/lsm.rst @@ -0,0 +1,131 @@ +======================================================== +Linux Security Modules: General Security Hooks for Linux +======================================================== + +:Author: Stephen Smalley +:Author: Timothy Fraser +:Author: Chris Vance + +.. note:: + + The APIs described in this book are outdated. + +Introduction +============ + +In March 2001, the National Security Agency (NSA) gave a presentation +about Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) at the 2.5 Linux Kernel Summit. +SELinux is an implementation of flexible and fine-grained +nondiscretionary access controls in the Linux kernel, originally +implemented as its own particular kernel patch. Several other security +projects (e.g. RSBAC, Medusa) have also developed flexible access +control architectures for the Linux kernel, and various projects have +developed particular access control models for Linux (e.g. LIDS, DTE, +SubDomain). Each project has developed and maintained its own kernel +patch to support its security needs. + +In response to the NSA presentation, Linus Torvalds made a set of +remarks that described a security framework he would be willing to +consider for inclusion in the mainstream Linux kernel. He described a +general framework that would provide a set of security hooks to control +operations on kernel objects and a set of opaque security fields in +kernel data structures for maintaining security attributes. This +framework could then be used by loadable kernel modules to implement any +desired model of security. Linus also suggested the possibility of +migrating the Linux capabilities code into such a module. + +The Linux Security Modules (LSM) project was started by WireX to develop +such a framework. LSM was a joint development effort by several security +projects, including Immunix, SELinux, SGI and Janus, and several +individuals, including Greg Kroah-Hartman and James Morris, to develop a +Linux kernel patch that implements this framework. The work was +incorporated in the mainstream in December of 2003. This technical +report provides an overview of the framework and the capabilities +security module. + +LSM Framework +============= + +The LSM framework provides a general kernel framework to support +security modules. In particular, the LSM framework is primarily focused +on supporting access control modules, although future development is +likely to address other security needs such as sandboxing. By itself, the +framework does not provide any additional security; it merely provides +the infrastructure to support security modules. The LSM framework is +optional, requiring `CONFIG_SECURITY` to be enabled. The capabilities +logic is implemented as a security module. +This capabilities module is discussed further in +`LSM Capabilities Module`_. + +The LSM framework includes security fields in kernel data structures and +calls to hook functions at critical points in the kernel code to +manage the security fields and to perform access control. +It also adds functions for registering security modules. +An interface `/sys/kernel/security/lsm` reports a comma separated list +of security modules that are active on the system. + +The LSM security fields are simply ``void*`` pointers. +The data is referred to as a blob, which may be managed by +the framework or by the individual security modules that use it. +Security blobs that are used by more than one security module are +typically managed by the framework. +For process and +program execution security information, security fields are included in +:c:type:`struct task_struct ` and +:c:type:`struct cred `. +For filesystem +security information, a security field is included in :c:type:`struct +super_block `. For pipe, file, and socket security +information, security fields are included in :c:type:`struct inode +` and :c:type:`struct file `. +For System V IPC security information, +security fields were added to :c:type:`struct kern_ipc_perm +` and :c:type:`struct msg_msg +`; additionally, the definitions for :c:type:`struct +msg_msg `, struct msg_queue, and struct shmid_kernel +were moved to header files (``include/linux/msg.h`` and +``include/linux/shm.h`` as appropriate) to allow the security modules to +use these definitions. + +For packet and +network device security information, security fields were added to +:c:type:`struct sk_buff ` and +:c:type:`struct scm_cookie `. +Unlike the other security module data, the data used here is a +32-bit integer. The security modules are required to map or otherwise +associate these values with real security attributes. + +LSM hooks are maintained in lists. A list is maintained for each +hook, and the hooks are called in the order specified by CONFIG_LSM. +Detailed documentation for each hook is +included in the `security/security.c` source file. + +The LSM framework provides for a close approximation of +general security module stacking. It defines +security_add_hooks() to which each security module passes a +:c:type:`struct security_hooks_list `, +which are added to the lists. +The LSM framework does not provide a mechanism for removing hooks that +have been registered. The SELinux security module has implemented +a way to remove itself, however the feature has been deprecated. + +The hooks can be viewed as falling into two major +categories: hooks that are used to manage the security fields and hooks +that are used to perform access control. Examples of the first category +of hooks include the security_inode_alloc() and security_inode_free() +These hooks are used to allocate +and free security structures for inode objects. +An example of the second category of hooks +is the security_inode_permission() hook. +This hook checks permission when accessing an inode. + +LSM Capabilities Module +======================= + +The POSIX.1e capabilities logic is maintained as a security module +stored in the file ``security/commoncap.c``. The capabilities +module uses the order field of the :c:type:`lsm_info` description +to identify it as the first security module to be registered. +The capabilities security module does not use the general security +blobs, unlike other modules. The reasons are historical and are +based on overhead, complexity and performance concerns. diff --git a/Documentation/security/sak.rst b/Documentation/security/sak.rst new file mode 100644 index 000000000..260e1d368 --- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/security/sak.rst @@ -0,0 +1,91 @@ +========================================= +Linux Secure Attention Key (SAK) handling +========================================= + +:Date: 18 March 2001 +:Author: Andrew Morton + +An operating system's Secure Attention Key is a security tool which is +provided as protection against trojan password capturing programs. It +is an undefeatable way of killing all programs which could be +masquerading as login applications. Users need to be taught to enter +this key sequence before they log in to the system. + +From the PC keyboard, Linux has two similar but different ways of +providing SAK. One is the ALT-SYSRQ-K sequence. You shouldn't use +this sequence. It is only available if the kernel was compiled with +sysrq support. + +The proper way of generating a SAK is to define the key sequence using +``loadkeys``. This will work whether or not sysrq support is compiled +into the kernel. + +SAK works correctly when the keyboard is in raw mode. This means that +once defined, SAK will kill a running X server. If the system is in +run level 5, the X server will restart. This is what you want to +happen. + +What key sequence should you use? Well, CTRL-ALT-DEL is used to reboot +the machine. CTRL-ALT-BACKSPACE is magical to the X server. We'll +choose CTRL-ALT-PAUSE. + +In your rc.sysinit (or rc.local) file, add the command:: + + echo "control alt keycode 101 = SAK" | /bin/loadkeys + +And that's it! Only the superuser may reprogram the SAK key. + + +.. note:: + + 1. Linux SAK is said to be not a "true SAK" as is required by + systems which implement C2 level security. This author does not + know why. + + + 2. On the PC keyboard, SAK kills all applications which have + /dev/console opened. + + Unfortunately this includes a number of things which you don't + actually want killed. This is because these applications are + incorrectly holding /dev/console open. Be sure to complain to your + Linux distributor about this! + + You can identify processes which will be killed by SAK with the + command:: + + # ls -l /proc/[0-9]*/fd/* | grep console + l-wx------ 1 root root 64 Mar 18 00:46 /proc/579/fd/0 -> /dev/console + + Then:: + + # ps aux|grep 579 + root 579 0.0 0.1 1088 436 ? S 00:43 0:00 gpm -t ps/2 + + So ``gpm`` will be killed by SAK. This is a bug in gpm. It should + be closing standard input. You can work around this by finding the + initscript which launches gpm and changing it thusly: + + Old:: + + daemon gpm + + New:: + + daemon gpm < /dev/null + + Vixie cron also seems to have this problem, and needs the same treatment. + + Also, one prominent Linux distribution has the following three + lines in its rc.sysinit and rc scripts:: + + exec 3<&0 + exec 4>&1 + exec 5>&2 + + These commands cause **all** daemons which are launched by the + initscripts to have file descriptors 3, 4 and 5 attached to + /dev/console. So SAK kills them all. A workaround is to simply + delete these lines, but this may cause system management + applications to malfunction - test everything well. + diff --git a/Documentation/security/secrets/coco.rst b/Documentation/security/secrets/coco.rst new file mode 100644 index 000000000..a1210db8e --- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/security/secrets/coco.rst @@ -0,0 +1,103 @@ +.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 + +============================== +Confidential Computing secrets +============================== + +This document describes how Confidential Computing secret injection is handled +from the firmware to the operating system, in the EFI driver and the efi_secret +kernel module. + + +Introduction +============ + +Confidential Computing (coco) hardware such as AMD SEV (Secure Encrypted +Virtualization) allows guest owners to inject secrets into the VMs +memory without the host/hypervisor being able to read them. In SEV, +secret injection is performed early in the VM launch process, before the +guest starts running. + +The efi_secret kernel module allows userspace applications to access these +secrets via securityfs. + + +Secret data flow +================ + +The guest firmware may reserve a designated memory area for secret injection, +and publish its location (base GPA and length) in the EFI configuration table +under a ``LINUX_EFI_COCO_SECRET_AREA_GUID`` entry +(``adf956ad-e98c-484c-ae11-b51c7d336447``). This memory area should be marked +by the firmware as ``EFI_RESERVED_TYPE``, and therefore the kernel should not +be use it for its own purposes. + +During the VM's launch, the virtual machine manager may inject a secret to that +area. In AMD SEV and SEV-ES this is performed using the +``KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_SECRET`` command (see [sev]_). The structure of the injected +Guest Owner secret data should be a GUIDed table of secret values; the binary +format is described in ``drivers/virt/coco/efi_secret/efi_secret.c`` under +"Structure of the EFI secret area". + +On kernel start, the kernel's EFI driver saves the location of the secret area +(taken from the EFI configuration table) in the ``efi.coco_secret`` field. +Later it checks if the secret area is populated: it maps the area and checks +whether its content begins with ``EFI_SECRET_TABLE_HEADER_GUID`` +(``1e74f542-71dd-4d66-963e-ef4287ff173b``). If the secret area is populated, +the EFI driver will autoload the efi_secret kernel module, which exposes the +secrets to userspace applications via securityfs. The details of the +efi_secret filesystem interface are in [secrets-coco-abi]_. + + +Application usage example +========================= + +Consider a guest performing computations on encrypted files. The Guest Owner +provides the decryption key (= secret) using the secret injection mechanism. +The guest application reads the secret from the efi_secret filesystem and +proceeds to decrypt the files into memory and then performs the needed +computations on the content. + +In this example, the host can't read the files from the disk image +because they are encrypted. Host can't read the decryption key because +it is passed using the secret injection mechanism (= secure channel). +Host can't read the decrypted content from memory because it's a +confidential (memory-encrypted) guest. + +Here is a simple example for usage of the efi_secret module in a guest +to which an EFI secret area with 4 secrets was injected during launch:: + + # ls -la /sys/kernel/security/secrets/coco + total 0 + drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 . + drwxr-xr-x 3 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 .. + -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 736870e5-84f0-4973-92ec-06879ce3da0b + -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 83c83f7f-1356-4975-8b7e-d3a0b54312c6 + -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 9553f55d-3da2-43ee-ab5d-ff17f78864d2 + -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 e6f5a162-d67f-4750-a67c-5d065f2a9910 + + # hd /sys/kernel/security/secrets/coco/e6f5a162-d67f-4750-a67c-5d065f2a9910 + 00000000 74 68 65 73 65 2d 61 72 65 2d 74 68 65 2d 6b 61 |these-are-the-ka| + 00000010 74 61 2d 73 65 63 72 65 74 73 00 01 02 03 04 05 |ta-secrets......| + 00000020 06 07 |..| + 00000022 + + # rm /sys/kernel/security/secrets/coco/e6f5a162-d67f-4750-a67c-5d065f2a9910 + + # ls -la /sys/kernel/security/secrets/coco + total 0 + drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 0 Jun 28 11:55 . + drwxr-xr-x 3 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 .. + -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 736870e5-84f0-4973-92ec-06879ce3da0b + -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 83c83f7f-1356-4975-8b7e-d3a0b54312c6 + -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 9553f55d-3da2-43ee-ab5d-ff17f78864d2 + + +References +========== + +See [sev-api-spec]_ for more info regarding SEV ``LAUNCH_SECRET`` operation. + +.. [sev] Documentation/virt/kvm/x86/amd-memory-encryption.rst +.. [secrets-coco-abi] Documentation/ABI/testing/securityfs-secrets-coco +.. [sev-api-spec] https://www.amd.com/system/files/TechDocs/55766_SEV-KM_API_Specification.pdf diff --git a/Documentation/security/secrets/index.rst b/Documentation/security/secrets/index.rst new file mode 100644 index 000000000..ced34e9c4 --- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/security/secrets/index.rst @@ -0,0 +1,9 @@ +.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 + +===================== +Secrets documentation +===================== + +.. toctree:: + + coco diff --git a/Documentation/security/self-protection.rst b/Documentation/security/self-protection.rst new file mode 100644 index 000000000..910668e66 --- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/security/self-protection.rst @@ -0,0 +1,316 @@ +====================== +Kernel Self-Protection +====================== + +Kernel self-protection is the design and implementation of systems and +structures within the Linux kernel to protect against security flaws in +the kernel itself. This covers a wide range of issues, including removing +entire classes of bugs, blocking security flaw exploitation methods, +and actively detecting attack attempts. Not all topics are explored in +this document, but it should serve as a reasonable starting point and +answer any frequently asked questions. (Patches welcome, of course!) + +In the worst-case scenario, we assume an unprivileged local attacker +has arbitrary read and write access to the kernel's memory. In many +cases, bugs being exploited will not provide this level of access, +but with systems in place that defend against the worst case we'll +cover the more limited cases as well. A higher bar, and one that should +still be kept in mind, is protecting the kernel against a _privileged_ +local attacker, since the root user has access to a vastly increased +attack surface. (Especially when they have the ability to load arbitrary +kernel modules.) + +The goals for successful self-protection systems would be that they +are effective, on by default, require no opt-in by developers, have no +performance impact, do not impede kernel debugging, and have tests. It +is uncommon that all these goals can be met, but it is worth explicitly +mentioning them, since these aspects need to be explored, dealt with, +and/or accepted. + + +Attack Surface Reduction +======================== + +The most fundamental defense against security exploits is to reduce the +areas of the kernel that can be used to redirect execution. This ranges +from limiting the exposed APIs available to userspace, making in-kernel +APIs hard to use incorrectly, minimizing the areas of writable kernel +memory, etc. + +Strict kernel memory permissions +-------------------------------- + +When all of kernel memory is writable, it becomes trivial for attacks +to redirect execution flow. To reduce the availability of these targets +the kernel needs to protect its memory with a tight set of permissions. + +Executable code and read-only data must not be writable +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +Any areas of the kernel with executable memory must not be writable. +While this obviously includes the kernel text itself, we must consider +all additional places too: kernel modules, JIT memory, etc. (There are +temporary exceptions to this rule to support things like instruction +alternatives, breakpoints, kprobes, etc. If these must exist in a +kernel, they are implemented in a way where the memory is temporarily +made writable during the update, and then returned to the original +permissions.) + +In support of this are ``CONFIG_STRICT_KERNEL_RWX`` and +``CONFIG_STRICT_MODULE_RWX``, which seek to make sure that code is not +writable, data is not executable, and read-only data is neither writable +nor executable. + +Most architectures have these options on by default and not user selectable. +For some architectures like arm that wish to have these be selectable, +the architecture Kconfig can select ARCH_OPTIONAL_KERNEL_RWX to enable +a Kconfig prompt. ``CONFIG_ARCH_OPTIONAL_KERNEL_RWX_DEFAULT`` determines +the default setting when ARCH_OPTIONAL_KERNEL_RWX is enabled. + +Function pointers and sensitive variables must not be writable +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +Vast areas of kernel memory contain function pointers that are looked +up by the kernel and used to continue execution (e.g. descriptor/vector +tables, file/network/etc operation structures, etc). The number of these +variables must be reduced to an absolute minimum. + +Many such variables can be made read-only by setting them "const" +so that they live in the .rodata section instead of the .data section +of the kernel, gaining the protection of the kernel's strict memory +permissions as described above. + +For variables that are initialized once at ``__init`` time, these can +be marked with the ``__ro_after_init`` attribute. + +What remains are variables that are updated rarely (e.g. GDT). These +will need another infrastructure (similar to the temporary exceptions +made to kernel code mentioned above) that allow them to spend the rest +of their lifetime read-only. (For example, when being updated, only the +CPU thread performing the update would be given uninterruptible write +access to the memory.) + +Segregation of kernel memory from userspace memory +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +The kernel must never execute userspace memory. The kernel must also never +access userspace memory without explicit expectation to do so. These +rules can be enforced either by support of hardware-based restrictions +(x86's SMEP/SMAP, ARM's PXN/PAN) or via emulation (ARM's Memory Domains). +By blocking userspace memory in this way, execution and data parsing +cannot be passed to trivially-controlled userspace memory, forcing +attacks to operate entirely in kernel memory. + +Reduced access to syscalls +-------------------------- + +One trivial way to eliminate many syscalls for 64-bit systems is building +without ``CONFIG_COMPAT``. However, this is rarely a feasible scenario. + +The "seccomp" system provides an opt-in feature made available to +userspace, which provides a way to reduce the number of kernel entry +points available to a running process. This limits the breadth of kernel +code that can be reached, possibly reducing the availability of a given +bug to an attack. + +An area of improvement would be creating viable ways to keep access to +things like compat, user namespaces, BPF creation, and perf limited only +to trusted processes. This would keep the scope of kernel entry points +restricted to the more regular set of normally available to unprivileged +userspace. + +Restricting access to kernel modules +------------------------------------ + +The kernel should never allow an unprivileged user the ability to +load specific kernel modules, since that would provide a facility to +unexpectedly extend the available attack surface. (The on-demand loading +of modules via their predefined subsystems, e.g. MODULE_ALIAS_*, is +considered "expected" here, though additional consideration should be +given even to these.) For example, loading a filesystem module via an +unprivileged socket API is nonsense: only the root or physically local +user should trigger filesystem module loading. (And even this can be up +for debate in some scenarios.) + +To protect against even privileged users, systems may need to either +disable module loading entirely (e.g. monolithic kernel builds or +modules_disabled sysctl), or provide signed modules (e.g. +``CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORCE``, or dm-crypt with LoadPin), to keep from having +root load arbitrary kernel code via the module loader interface. + + +Memory integrity +================ + +There are many memory structures in the kernel that are regularly abused +to gain execution control during an attack, By far the most commonly +understood is that of the stack buffer overflow in which the return +address stored on the stack is overwritten. Many other examples of this +kind of attack exist, and protections exist to defend against them. + +Stack buffer overflow +--------------------- + +The classic stack buffer overflow involves writing past the expected end +of a variable stored on the stack, ultimately writing a controlled value +to the stack frame's stored return address. The most widely used defense +is the presence of a stack canary between the stack variables and the +return address (``CONFIG_STACKPROTECTOR``), which is verified just before +the function returns. Other defenses include things like shadow stacks. + +Stack depth overflow +-------------------- + +A less well understood attack is using a bug that triggers the +kernel to consume stack memory with deep function calls or large stack +allocations. With this attack it is possible to write beyond the end of +the kernel's preallocated stack space and into sensitive structures. Two +important changes need to be made for better protections: moving the +sensitive thread_info structure elsewhere, and adding a faulting memory +hole at the bottom of the stack to catch these overflows. + +Heap memory integrity +--------------------- + +The structures used to track heap free lists can be sanity-checked during +allocation and freeing to make sure they aren't being used to manipulate +other memory areas. + +Counter integrity +----------------- + +Many places in the kernel use atomic counters to track object references +or perform similar lifetime management. When these counters can be made +to wrap (over or under) this traditionally exposes a use-after-free +flaw. By trapping atomic wrapping, this class of bug vanishes. + +Size calculation overflow detection +----------------------------------- + +Similar to counter overflow, integer overflows (usually size calculations) +need to be detected at runtime to kill this class of bug, which +traditionally leads to being able to write past the end of kernel buffers. + + +Probabilistic defenses +====================== + +While many protections can be considered deterministic (e.g. read-only +memory cannot be written to), some protections provide only statistical +defense, in that an attack must gather enough information about a +running system to overcome the defense. While not perfect, these do +provide meaningful defenses. + +Canaries, blinding, and other secrets +------------------------------------- + +It should be noted that things like the stack canary discussed earlier +are technically statistical defenses, since they rely on a secret value, +and such values may become discoverable through an information exposure +flaw. + +Blinding literal values for things like JITs, where the executable +contents may be partially under the control of userspace, need a similar +secret value. + +It is critical that the secret values used must be separate (e.g. +different canary per stack) and high entropy (e.g. is the RNG actually +working?) in order to maximize their success. + +Kernel Address Space Layout Randomization (KASLR) +------------------------------------------------- + +Since the location of kernel memory is almost always instrumental in +mounting a successful attack, making the location non-deterministic +raises the difficulty of an exploit. (Note that this in turn makes +the value of information exposures higher, since they may be used to +discover desired memory locations.) + +Text and module base +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +By relocating the physical and virtual base address of the kernel at +boot-time (``CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE``), attacks needing kernel code will be +frustrated. Additionally, offsetting the module loading base address +means that even systems that load the same set of modules in the same +order every boot will not share a common base address with the rest of +the kernel text. + +Stack base +~~~~~~~~~~ + +If the base address of the kernel stack is not the same between processes, +or even not the same between syscalls, targets on or beyond the stack +become more difficult to locate. + +Dynamic memory base +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +Much of the kernel's dynamic memory (e.g. kmalloc, vmalloc, etc) ends up +being relatively deterministic in layout due to the order of early-boot +initializations. If the base address of these areas is not the same +between boots, targeting them is frustrated, requiring an information +exposure specific to the region. + +Structure layout +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +By performing a per-build randomization of the layout of sensitive +structures, attacks must either be tuned to known kernel builds or expose +enough kernel memory to determine structure layouts before manipulating +them. + + +Preventing Information Exposures +================================ + +Since the locations of sensitive structures are the primary target for +attacks, it is important to defend against exposure of both kernel memory +addresses and kernel memory contents (since they may contain kernel +addresses or other sensitive things like canary values). + +Kernel addresses +---------------- + +Printing kernel addresses to userspace leaks sensitive information about +the kernel memory layout. Care should be exercised when using any printk +specifier that prints the raw address, currently %px, %p[ad], (and %p[sSb] +in certain circumstances [*]). Any file written to using one of these +specifiers should be readable only by privileged processes. + +Kernels 4.14 and older printed the raw address using %p. As of 4.15-rc1 +addresses printed with the specifier %p are hashed before printing. + +[*] If KALLSYMS is enabled and symbol lookup fails, the raw address is +printed. If KALLSYMS is not enabled the raw address is printed. + +Unique identifiers +------------------ + +Kernel memory addresses must never be used as identifiers exposed to +userspace. Instead, use an atomic counter, an idr, or similar unique +identifier. + +Memory initialization +--------------------- + +Memory copied to userspace must always be fully initialized. If not +explicitly memset(), this will require changes to the compiler to make +sure structure holes are cleared. + +Memory poisoning +---------------- + +When releasing memory, it is best to poison the contents, to avoid reuse +attacks that rely on the old contents of memory. E.g., clear stack on a +syscall return (``CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK``), wipe heap memory on a +free. This frustrates many uninitialized variable attacks, stack content +exposures, heap content exposures, and use-after-free attacks. + +Destination tracking +-------------------- + +To help kill classes of bugs that result in kernel addresses being +written to userspace, the destination of writes needs to be tracked. If +the buffer is destined for userspace (e.g. seq_file backed ``/proc`` files), +it should automatically censor sensitive values. diff --git a/Documentation/security/siphash.rst b/Documentation/security/siphash.rst new file mode 100644 index 000000000..023bd95c7 --- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/security/siphash.rst @@ -0,0 +1,199 @@ +=========================== +SipHash - a short input PRF +=========================== + +:Author: Written by Jason A. Donenfeld + +SipHash is a cryptographically secure PRF -- a keyed hash function -- that +performs very well for short inputs, hence the name. It was designed by +cryptographers Daniel J. Bernstein and Jean-Philippe Aumasson. It is intended +as a replacement for some uses of: `jhash`, `md5_transform`, `sha1_transform`, +and so forth. + +SipHash takes a secret key filled with randomly generated numbers and either +an input buffer or several input integers. It spits out an integer that is +indistinguishable from random. You may then use that integer as part of secure +sequence numbers, secure cookies, or mask it off for use in a hash table. + +Generating a key +================ + +Keys should always be generated from a cryptographically secure source of +random numbers, either using get_random_bytes or get_random_once:: + + siphash_key_t key; + get_random_bytes(&key, sizeof(key)); + +If you're not deriving your key from here, you're doing it wrong. + +Using the functions +=================== + +There are two variants of the function, one that takes a list of integers, and +one that takes a buffer:: + + u64 siphash(const void *data, size_t len, const siphash_key_t *key); + +And:: + + u64 siphash_1u64(u64, const siphash_key_t *key); + u64 siphash_2u64(u64, u64, const siphash_key_t *key); + u64 siphash_3u64(u64, u64, u64, const siphash_key_t *key); + u64 siphash_4u64(u64, u64, u64, u64, const siphash_key_t *key); + u64 siphash_1u32(u32, const siphash_key_t *key); + u64 siphash_2u32(u32, u32, const siphash_key_t *key); + u64 siphash_3u32(u32, u32, u32, const siphash_key_t *key); + u64 siphash_4u32(u32, u32, u32, u32, const siphash_key_t *key); + +If you pass the generic siphash function something of a constant length, it +will constant fold at compile-time and automatically choose one of the +optimized functions. + +Hashtable key function usage:: + + struct some_hashtable { + DECLARE_HASHTABLE(hashtable, 8); + siphash_key_t key; + }; + + void init_hashtable(struct some_hashtable *table) + { + get_random_bytes(&table->key, sizeof(table->key)); + } + + static inline hlist_head *some_hashtable_bucket(struct some_hashtable *table, struct interesting_input *input) + { + return &table->hashtable[siphash(input, sizeof(*input), &table->key) & (HASH_SIZE(table->hashtable) - 1)]; + } + +You may then iterate like usual over the returned hash bucket. + +Security +======== + +SipHash has a very high security margin, with its 128-bit key. So long as the +key is kept secret, it is impossible for an attacker to guess the outputs of +the function, even if being able to observe many outputs, since 2^128 outputs +is significant. + +Linux implements the "2-4" variant of SipHash. + +Struct-passing Pitfalls +======================= + +Often times the XuY functions will not be large enough, and instead you'll +want to pass a pre-filled struct to siphash. When doing this, it's important +to always ensure the struct has no padding holes. The easiest way to do this +is to simply arrange the members of the struct in descending order of size, +and to use offsetofend() instead of sizeof() for getting the size. For +performance reasons, if possible, it's probably a good thing to align the +struct to the right boundary. Here's an example:: + + const struct { + struct in6_addr saddr; + u32 counter; + u16 dport; + } __aligned(SIPHASH_ALIGNMENT) combined = { + .saddr = *(struct in6_addr *)saddr, + .counter = counter, + .dport = dport + }; + u64 h = siphash(&combined, offsetofend(typeof(combined), dport), &secret); + +Resources +========= + +Read the SipHash paper if you're interested in learning more: +https://131002.net/siphash/siphash.pdf + +------------------------------------------------------------------------------- + +=============================================== +HalfSipHash - SipHash's insecure younger cousin +=============================================== + +:Author: Written by Jason A. Donenfeld + +On the off-chance that SipHash is not fast enough for your needs, you might be +able to justify using HalfSipHash, a terrifying but potentially useful +possibility. HalfSipHash cuts SipHash's rounds down from "2-4" to "1-3" and, +even scarier, uses an easily brute-forcable 64-bit key (with a 32-bit output) +instead of SipHash's 128-bit key. However, this may appeal to some +high-performance `jhash` users. + +HalfSipHash support is provided through the "hsiphash" family of functions. + +.. warning:: + Do not ever use the hsiphash functions except for as a hashtable key + function, and only then when you can be absolutely certain that the outputs + will never be transmitted out of the kernel. This is only remotely useful + over `jhash` as a means of mitigating hashtable flooding denial of service + attacks. + +On 64-bit kernels, the hsiphash functions actually implement SipHash-1-3, a +reduced-round variant of SipHash, instead of HalfSipHash-1-3. This is because in +64-bit code, SipHash-1-3 is no slower than HalfSipHash-1-3, and can be faster. +Note, this does *not* mean that in 64-bit kernels the hsiphash functions are the +same as the siphash ones, or that they are secure; the hsiphash functions still +use a less secure reduced-round algorithm and truncate their outputs to 32 +bits. + +Generating a hsiphash key +========================= + +Keys should always be generated from a cryptographically secure source of +random numbers, either using get_random_bytes or get_random_once:: + + hsiphash_key_t key; + get_random_bytes(&key, sizeof(key)); + +If you're not deriving your key from here, you're doing it wrong. + +Using the hsiphash functions +============================ + +There are two variants of the function, one that takes a list of integers, and +one that takes a buffer:: + + u32 hsiphash(const void *data, size_t len, const hsiphash_key_t *key); + +And:: + + u32 hsiphash_1u32(u32, const hsiphash_key_t *key); + u32 hsiphash_2u32(u32, u32, const hsiphash_key_t *key); + u32 hsiphash_3u32(u32, u32, u32, const hsiphash_key_t *key); + u32 hsiphash_4u32(u32, u32, u32, u32, const hsiphash_key_t *key); + +If you pass the generic hsiphash function something of a constant length, it +will constant fold at compile-time and automatically choose one of the +optimized functions. + +Hashtable key function usage +============================ + +:: + + struct some_hashtable { + DECLARE_HASHTABLE(hashtable, 8); + hsiphash_key_t key; + }; + + void init_hashtable(struct some_hashtable *table) + { + get_random_bytes(&table->key, sizeof(table->key)); + } + + static inline hlist_head *some_hashtable_bucket(struct some_hashtable *table, struct interesting_input *input) + { + return &table->hashtable[hsiphash(input, sizeof(*input), &table->key) & (HASH_SIZE(table->hashtable) - 1)]; + } + +You may then iterate like usual over the returned hash bucket. + +Performance +=========== + +hsiphash() is roughly 3 times slower than jhash(). For many replacements, this +will not be a problem, as the hashtable lookup isn't the bottleneck. And in +general, this is probably a good sacrifice to make for the security and DoS +resistance of hsiphash(). diff --git a/Documentation/security/tpm/index.rst b/Documentation/security/tpm/index.rst new file mode 100644 index 000000000..fc40e9f23 --- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/security/tpm/index.rst @@ -0,0 +1,10 @@ +===================================== +Trusted Platform Module documentation +===================================== + +.. toctree:: + + tpm_event_log + tpm_vtpm_proxy + xen-tpmfront + tpm_ftpm_tee diff --git a/Documentation/security/tpm/tpm_event_log.rst b/Documentation/security/tpm/tpm_event_log.rst new file mode 100644 index 000000000..f00f7a1d5 --- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/security/tpm/tpm_event_log.rst @@ -0,0 +1,55 @@ +.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 + +============= +TPM Event Log +============= + +This document briefly describes what TPM log is and how it is handed +over from the preboot firmware to the operating system. + +Introduction +============ + +The preboot firmware maintains an event log that gets new entries every +time something gets hashed by it to any of the PCR registers. The events +are segregated by their type and contain the value of the hashed PCR +register. Typically, the preboot firmware will hash the components to +who execution is to be handed over or actions relevant to the boot +process. + +The main application for this is remote attestation and the reason why +it is useful is nicely put in the very first section of [1]: + +"Attestation is used to provide information about the platform’s state +to a challenger. However, PCR contents are difficult to interpret; +therefore, attestation is typically more useful when the PCR contents +are accompanied by a measurement log. While not trusted on their own, +the measurement log contains a richer set of information than do the PCR +contents. The PCR contents are used to provide the validation of the +measurement log." + +UEFI event log +============== + +UEFI provided event log has a few somewhat weird quirks. + +Before calling ExitBootServices() Linux EFI stub copies the event log to +a custom configuration table defined by the stub itself. Unfortunately, +the events generated by ExitBootServices() don't end up in the table. + +The firmware provides so called final events configuration table to sort +out this issue. Events gets mirrored to this table after the first time +EFI_TCG2_PROTOCOL.GetEventLog() gets called. + +This introduces another problem: nothing guarantees that it is not called +before the Linux EFI stub gets to run. Thus, it needs to calculate and save the +final events table size while the stub is still running to the custom +configuration table so that the TPM driver can later on skip these events when +concatenating two halves of the event log from the custom configuration table +and the final events table. + +References +========== + +- [1] https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/resource/pc-client-specific-platform-firmware-profile-specification/ +- [2] The final concatenation is done in drivers/char/tpm/eventlog/efi.c diff --git a/Documentation/security/tpm/tpm_ftpm_tee.rst b/Documentation/security/tpm/tpm_ftpm_tee.rst new file mode 100644 index 000000000..8c2bae16e --- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/security/tpm/tpm_ftpm_tee.rst @@ -0,0 +1,27 @@ +============================================= +Firmware TPM Driver +============================================= + +This document describes the firmware Trusted Platform Module (fTPM) +device driver. + +Introduction +============ + +This driver is a shim for firmware implemented in ARM's TrustZone +environment. The driver allows programs to interact with the TPM in the same +way they would interact with a hardware TPM. + +Design +====== + +The driver acts as a thin layer that passes commands to and from a TPM +implemented in firmware. The driver itself doesn't contain much logic and is +used more like a dumb pipe between firmware and kernel/userspace. + +The firmware itself is based on the following paper: +https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/research/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/ftpm1.pdf + +When the driver is loaded it will expose ``/dev/tpmX`` character devices to +userspace which will enable userspace to communicate with the firmware TPM +through this device. diff --git a/Documentation/security/tpm/tpm_vtpm_proxy.rst b/Documentation/security/tpm/tpm_vtpm_proxy.rst new file mode 100644 index 000000000..ea08e76b1 --- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/security/tpm/tpm_vtpm_proxy.rst @@ -0,0 +1,50 @@ +============================================= +Virtual TPM Proxy Driver for Linux Containers +============================================= + +| Authors: +| Stefan Berger + +This document describes the virtual Trusted Platform Module (vTPM) +proxy device driver for Linux containers. + +Introduction +============ + +The goal of this work is to provide TPM functionality to each Linux +container. This allows programs to interact with a TPM in a container +the same way they interact with a TPM on the physical system. Each +container gets its own unique, emulated, software TPM. + +Design +====== + +To make an emulated software TPM available to each container, the container +management stack needs to create a device pair consisting of a client TPM +character device ``/dev/tpmX`` (with X=0,1,2...) and a 'server side' file +descriptor. The former is moved into the container by creating a character +device with the appropriate major and minor numbers while the file descriptor +is passed to the TPM emulator. Software inside the container can then send +TPM commands using the character device and the emulator will receive the +commands via the file descriptor and use it for sending back responses. + +To support this, the virtual TPM proxy driver provides a device ``/dev/vtpmx`` +that is used to create device pairs using an ioctl. The ioctl takes as +an input flags for configuring the device. The flags for example indicate +whether TPM 1.2 or TPM 2 functionality is supported by the TPM emulator. +The result of the ioctl are the file descriptor for the 'server side' +as well as the major and minor numbers of the character device that was created. +Besides that the number of the TPM character device is returned. If for +example ``/dev/tpm10`` was created, the number (``dev_num``) 10 is returned. + +Once the device has been created, the driver will immediately try to talk +to the TPM. All commands from the driver can be read from the file descriptor +returned by the ioctl. The commands should be responded to immediately. + +UAPI +==== + +.. kernel-doc:: include/uapi/linux/vtpm_proxy.h + +.. kernel-doc:: drivers/char/tpm/tpm_vtpm_proxy.c + :functions: vtpmx_ioc_new_dev diff --git a/Documentation/security/tpm/xen-tpmfront.rst b/Documentation/security/tpm/xen-tpmfront.rst new file mode 100644 index 000000000..31c67522f --- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/security/tpm/xen-tpmfront.rst @@ -0,0 +1,124 @@ +============================= +Virtual TPM interface for Xen +============================= + +Authors: Matthew Fioravante (JHUAPL), Daniel De Graaf (NSA) + +This document describes the virtual Trusted Platform Module (vTPM) subsystem for +Xen. The reader is assumed to have familiarity with building and installing Xen, +Linux, and a basic understanding of the TPM and vTPM concepts. + +Introduction +------------ + +The goal of this work is to provide a TPM functionality to a virtual guest +operating system (in Xen terms, a DomU). This allows programs to interact with +a TPM in a virtual system the same way they interact with a TPM on the physical +system. Each guest gets its own unique, emulated, software TPM. However, each +of the vTPM's secrets (Keys, NVRAM, etc) are managed by a vTPM Manager domain, +which seals the secrets to the Physical TPM. If the process of creating each of +these domains (manager, vTPM, and guest) is trusted, the vTPM subsystem extends +the chain of trust rooted in the hardware TPM to virtual machines in Xen. Each +major component of vTPM is implemented as a separate domain, providing secure +separation guaranteed by the hypervisor. The vTPM domains are implemented in +mini-os to reduce memory and processor overhead. + +This mini-os vTPM subsystem was built on top of the previous vTPM work done by +IBM and Intel corporation. + + +Design Overview +--------------- + +The architecture of vTPM is described below:: + + +------------------+ + | Linux DomU | ... + | | ^ | + | v | | + | xen-tpmfront | + +------------------+ + | ^ + v | + +------------------+ + | mini-os/tpmback | + | | ^ | + | v | | + | vtpm-stubdom | ... + | | ^ | + | v | | + | mini-os/tpmfront | + +------------------+ + | ^ + v | + +------------------+ + | mini-os/tpmback | + | | ^ | + | v | | + | vtpmmgr-stubdom | + | | ^ | + | v | | + | mini-os/tpm_tis | + +------------------+ + | ^ + v | + +------------------+ + | Hardware TPM | + +------------------+ + +* Linux DomU: + The Linux based guest that wants to use a vTPM. There may be + more than one of these. + +* xen-tpmfront.ko: + Linux kernel virtual TPM frontend driver. This driver + provides vTPM access to a Linux-based DomU. + +* mini-os/tpmback: + Mini-os TPM backend driver. The Linux frontend driver + connects to this backend driver to facilitate communications + between the Linux DomU and its vTPM. This driver is also + used by vtpmmgr-stubdom to communicate with vtpm-stubdom. + +* vtpm-stubdom: + A mini-os stub domain that implements a vTPM. There is a + one to one mapping between running vtpm-stubdom instances and + logical vtpms on the system. The vTPM Platform Configuration + Registers (PCRs) are normally all initialized to zero. + +* mini-os/tpmfront: + Mini-os TPM frontend driver. The vTPM mini-os domain + vtpm-stubdom uses this driver to communicate with + vtpmmgr-stubdom. This driver is also used in mini-os + domains such as pv-grub that talk to the vTPM domain. + +* vtpmmgr-stubdom: + A mini-os domain that implements the vTPM manager. There is + only one vTPM manager and it should be running during the + entire lifetime of the machine. This domain regulates + access to the physical TPM on the system and secures the + persistent state of each vTPM. + +* mini-os/tpm_tis: + Mini-os TPM version 1.2 TPM Interface Specification (TIS) + driver. This driver used by vtpmmgr-stubdom to talk directly to + the hardware TPM. Communication is facilitated by mapping + hardware memory pages into vtpmmgr-stubdom. + +* Hardware TPM: + The physical TPM that is soldered onto the motherboard. + + +Integration With Xen +-------------------- + +Support for the vTPM driver was added in Xen using the libxl toolstack in Xen +4.3. See the Xen documentation (docs/misc/vtpm.txt) for details on setting up +the vTPM and vTPM Manager stub domains. Once the stub domains are running, a +vTPM device is set up in the same manner as a disk or network device in the +domain's configuration file. + +In order to use features such as IMA that require a TPM to be loaded prior to +the initrd, the xen-tpmfront driver must be compiled in to the kernel. If not +using such features, the driver can be compiled as a module and will be loaded +as usual. -- cgit v1.2.3