From 01a69402cf9d38ff180345d55c2ee51c7e89fbc7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Daniel Baumann Date: Sat, 18 May 2024 20:50:03 +0200 Subject: Adding upstream version 6.8.9. Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann --- arch/x86/coco/core.c | 41 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx-shared.c | 6 +++--- arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c | 2 +- 3 files changed, 45 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) (limited to 'arch/x86/coco') diff --git a/arch/x86/coco/core.c b/arch/x86/coco/core.c index d07be9d05c..ddd4efdc79 100644 --- a/arch/x86/coco/core.c +++ b/arch/x86/coco/core.c @@ -3,13 +3,17 @@ * Confidential Computing Platform Capability checks * * Copyright (C) 2021 Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. + * Copyright (C) 2024 Jason A. Donenfeld . All Rights Reserved. * * Author: Tom Lendacky */ #include #include +#include +#include +#include #include #include @@ -148,3 +152,40 @@ u64 cc_mkdec(u64 val) } } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(cc_mkdec); + +__init void cc_random_init(void) +{ + /* + * The seed is 32 bytes (in units of longs), which is 256 bits, which + * is the security level that the RNG is targeting. + */ + unsigned long rng_seed[32 / sizeof(long)]; + size_t i, longs; + + if (!cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT)) + return; + + /* + * Since the CoCo threat model includes the host, the only reliable + * source of entropy that can be neither observed nor manipulated is + * RDRAND. Usually, RDRAND failure is considered tolerable, but since + * CoCo guests have no other unobservable source of entropy, it's + * important to at least ensure the RNG gets some initial random seeds. + */ + for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(rng_seed); i += longs) { + longs = arch_get_random_longs(&rng_seed[i], ARRAY_SIZE(rng_seed) - i); + + /* + * A zero return value means that the guest doesn't have RDRAND + * or the CPU is physically broken, and in both cases that + * means most crypto inside of the CoCo instance will be + * broken, defeating the purpose of CoCo in the first place. So + * just panic here because it's absolutely unsafe to continue + * executing. + */ + if (longs == 0) + panic("RDRAND is defective."); + } + add_device_randomness(rng_seed, sizeof(rng_seed)); + memzero_explicit(rng_seed, sizeof(rng_seed)); +} diff --git a/arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx-shared.c b/arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx-shared.c index 78e4132697..1655aa56a0 100644 --- a/arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx-shared.c +++ b/arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx-shared.c @@ -22,13 +22,13 @@ static unsigned long try_accept_one(phys_addr_t start, unsigned long len, */ switch (pg_level) { case PG_LEVEL_4K: - page_size = 0; + page_size = TDX_PS_4K; break; case PG_LEVEL_2M: - page_size = 1; + page_size = TDX_PS_2M; break; case PG_LEVEL_1G: - page_size = 2; + page_size = TDX_PS_1G; break; default: return 0; diff --git a/arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c b/arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c index cf1f13c821..c1cb903699 100644 --- a/arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c +++ b/arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c @@ -887,7 +887,7 @@ void __init tdx_early_init(void) * there. * * Intel-TDX has a secure RDMSR hypercall, but that needs to be - * implemented seperately in the low level startup ASM code. + * implemented separately in the low level startup ASM code. * Until that is in place, disable parallel bringup for TDX. */ x86_cpuinit.parallel_bringup = false; -- cgit v1.2.3