From ace9429bb58fd418f0c81d4c2835699bddf6bde6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Daniel Baumann Date: Thu, 11 Apr 2024 10:27:49 +0200 Subject: Adding upstream version 6.6.15. Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann --- net/ipv4/syncookies.c | 449 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 449 insertions(+) create mode 100644 net/ipv4/syncookies.c (limited to 'net/ipv4/syncookies.c') diff --git a/net/ipv4/syncookies.c b/net/ipv4/syncookies.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..3b4dafefb4 --- /dev/null +++ b/net/ipv4/syncookies.c @@ -0,0 +1,449 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later +/* + * Syncookies implementation for the Linux kernel + * + * Copyright (C) 1997 Andi Kleen + * Based on ideas by D.J.Bernstein and Eric Schenk. + */ + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +static siphash_aligned_key_t syncookie_secret[2]; + +#define COOKIEBITS 24 /* Upper bits store count */ +#define COOKIEMASK (((__u32)1 << COOKIEBITS) - 1) + +/* TCP Timestamp: 6 lowest bits of timestamp sent in the cookie SYN-ACK + * stores TCP options: + * + * MSB LSB + * | 31 ... 6 | 5 | 4 | 3 2 1 0 | + * | Timestamp | ECN | SACK | WScale | + * + * When we receive a valid cookie-ACK, we look at the echoed tsval (if + * any) to figure out which TCP options we should use for the rebuilt + * connection. + * + * A WScale setting of '0xf' (which is an invalid scaling value) + * means that original syn did not include the TCP window scaling option. + */ +#define TS_OPT_WSCALE_MASK 0xf +#define TS_OPT_SACK BIT(4) +#define TS_OPT_ECN BIT(5) +/* There is no TS_OPT_TIMESTAMP: + * if ACK contains timestamp option, we already know it was + * requested/supported by the syn/synack exchange. + */ +#define TSBITS 6 + +static u32 cookie_hash(__be32 saddr, __be32 daddr, __be16 sport, __be16 dport, + u32 count, int c) +{ + net_get_random_once(syncookie_secret, sizeof(syncookie_secret)); + return siphash_4u32((__force u32)saddr, (__force u32)daddr, + (__force u32)sport << 16 | (__force u32)dport, + count, &syncookie_secret[c]); +} + + +/* + * when syncookies are in effect and tcp timestamps are enabled we encode + * tcp options in the lower bits of the timestamp value that will be + * sent in the syn-ack. + * Since subsequent timestamps use the normal tcp_time_stamp value, we + * must make sure that the resulting initial timestamp is <= tcp_time_stamp. + */ +u64 cookie_init_timestamp(struct request_sock *req, u64 now) +{ + const struct inet_request_sock *ireq = inet_rsk(req); + u64 ts, ts_now = tcp_ns_to_ts(now); + u32 options = 0; + + options = ireq->wscale_ok ? ireq->snd_wscale : TS_OPT_WSCALE_MASK; + if (ireq->sack_ok) + options |= TS_OPT_SACK; + if (ireq->ecn_ok) + options |= TS_OPT_ECN; + + ts = (ts_now >> TSBITS) << TSBITS; + ts |= options; + if (ts > ts_now) + ts -= (1UL << TSBITS); + + return ts * (NSEC_PER_SEC / TCP_TS_HZ); +} + + +static __u32 secure_tcp_syn_cookie(__be32 saddr, __be32 daddr, __be16 sport, + __be16 dport, __u32 sseq, __u32 data) +{ + /* + * Compute the secure sequence number. + * The output should be: + * HASH(sec1,saddr,sport,daddr,dport,sec1) + sseq + (count * 2^24) + * + (HASH(sec2,saddr,sport,daddr,dport,count,sec2) % 2^24). + * Where sseq is their sequence number and count increases every + * minute by 1. + * As an extra hack, we add a small "data" value that encodes the + * MSS into the second hash value. + */ + u32 count = tcp_cookie_time(); + return (cookie_hash(saddr, daddr, sport, dport, 0, 0) + + sseq + (count << COOKIEBITS) + + ((cookie_hash(saddr, daddr, sport, dport, count, 1) + data) + & COOKIEMASK)); +} + +/* + * This retrieves the small "data" value from the syncookie. + * If the syncookie is bad, the data returned will be out of + * range. This must be checked by the caller. + * + * The count value used to generate the cookie must be less than + * MAX_SYNCOOKIE_AGE minutes in the past. + * The return value (__u32)-1 if this test fails. + */ +static __u32 check_tcp_syn_cookie(__u32 cookie, __be32 saddr, __be32 daddr, + __be16 sport, __be16 dport, __u32 sseq) +{ + u32 diff, count = tcp_cookie_time(); + + /* Strip away the layers from the cookie */ + cookie -= cookie_hash(saddr, daddr, sport, dport, 0, 0) + sseq; + + /* Cookie is now reduced to (count * 2^24) ^ (hash % 2^24) */ + diff = (count - (cookie >> COOKIEBITS)) & ((__u32) -1 >> COOKIEBITS); + if (diff >= MAX_SYNCOOKIE_AGE) + return (__u32)-1; + + return (cookie - + cookie_hash(saddr, daddr, sport, dport, count - diff, 1)) + & COOKIEMASK; /* Leaving the data behind */ +} + +/* + * MSS Values are chosen based on the 2011 paper + * 'An Analysis of TCP Maximum Segement Sizes' by S. Alcock and R. Nelson. + * Values .. + * .. lower than 536 are rare (< 0.2%) + * .. between 537 and 1299 account for less than < 1.5% of observed values + * .. in the 1300-1349 range account for about 15 to 20% of observed mss values + * .. exceeding 1460 are very rare (< 0.04%) + * + * 1460 is the single most frequently announced mss value (30 to 46% depending + * on monitor location). Table must be sorted. + */ +static __u16 const msstab[] = { + 536, + 1300, + 1440, /* 1440, 1452: PPPoE */ + 1460, +}; + +/* + * Generate a syncookie. mssp points to the mss, which is returned + * rounded down to the value encoded in the cookie. + */ +u32 __cookie_v4_init_sequence(const struct iphdr *iph, const struct tcphdr *th, + u16 *mssp) +{ + int mssind; + const __u16 mss = *mssp; + + for (mssind = ARRAY_SIZE(msstab) - 1; mssind ; mssind--) + if (mss >= msstab[mssind]) + break; + *mssp = msstab[mssind]; + + return secure_tcp_syn_cookie(iph->saddr, iph->daddr, + th->source, th->dest, ntohl(th->seq), + mssind); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__cookie_v4_init_sequence); + +__u32 cookie_v4_init_sequence(const struct sk_buff *skb, __u16 *mssp) +{ + const struct iphdr *iph = ip_hdr(skb); + const struct tcphdr *th = tcp_hdr(skb); + + return __cookie_v4_init_sequence(iph, th, mssp); +} + +/* + * Check if a ack sequence number is a valid syncookie. + * Return the decoded mss if it is, or 0 if not. + */ +int __cookie_v4_check(const struct iphdr *iph, const struct tcphdr *th, + u32 cookie) +{ + __u32 seq = ntohl(th->seq) - 1; + __u32 mssind = check_tcp_syn_cookie(cookie, iph->saddr, iph->daddr, + th->source, th->dest, seq); + + return mssind < ARRAY_SIZE(msstab) ? msstab[mssind] : 0; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__cookie_v4_check); + +struct sock *tcp_get_cookie_sock(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, + struct request_sock *req, + struct dst_entry *dst, u32 tsoff) +{ + struct inet_connection_sock *icsk = inet_csk(sk); + struct sock *child; + bool own_req; + + child = icsk->icsk_af_ops->syn_recv_sock(sk, skb, req, dst, + NULL, &own_req); + if (child) { + refcount_set(&req->rsk_refcnt, 1); + tcp_sk(child)->tsoffset = tsoff; + sock_rps_save_rxhash(child, skb); + + if (rsk_drop_req(req)) { + reqsk_put(req); + return child; + } + + if (inet_csk_reqsk_queue_add(sk, req, child)) + return child; + + bh_unlock_sock(child); + sock_put(child); + } + __reqsk_free(req); + + return NULL; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(tcp_get_cookie_sock); + +/* + * when syncookies are in effect and tcp timestamps are enabled we stored + * additional tcp options in the timestamp. + * This extracts these options from the timestamp echo. + * + * return false if we decode a tcp option that is disabled + * on the host. + */ +bool cookie_timestamp_decode(const struct net *net, + struct tcp_options_received *tcp_opt) +{ + /* echoed timestamp, lowest bits contain options */ + u32 options = tcp_opt->rcv_tsecr; + + if (!tcp_opt->saw_tstamp) { + tcp_clear_options(tcp_opt); + return true; + } + + if (!READ_ONCE(net->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_timestamps)) + return false; + + tcp_opt->sack_ok = (options & TS_OPT_SACK) ? TCP_SACK_SEEN : 0; + + if (tcp_opt->sack_ok && !READ_ONCE(net->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_sack)) + return false; + + if ((options & TS_OPT_WSCALE_MASK) == TS_OPT_WSCALE_MASK) + return true; /* no window scaling */ + + tcp_opt->wscale_ok = 1; + tcp_opt->snd_wscale = options & TS_OPT_WSCALE_MASK; + + return READ_ONCE(net->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_window_scaling) != 0; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(cookie_timestamp_decode); + +bool cookie_ecn_ok(const struct tcp_options_received *tcp_opt, + const struct net *net, const struct dst_entry *dst) +{ + bool ecn_ok = tcp_opt->rcv_tsecr & TS_OPT_ECN; + + if (!ecn_ok) + return false; + + if (READ_ONCE(net->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_ecn)) + return true; + + return dst_feature(dst, RTAX_FEATURE_ECN); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(cookie_ecn_ok); + +struct request_sock *cookie_tcp_reqsk_alloc(const struct request_sock_ops *ops, + const struct tcp_request_sock_ops *af_ops, + struct sock *sk, + struct sk_buff *skb) +{ + struct tcp_request_sock *treq; + struct request_sock *req; + + if (sk_is_mptcp(sk)) + req = mptcp_subflow_reqsk_alloc(ops, sk, false); + else + req = inet_reqsk_alloc(ops, sk, false); + + if (!req) + return NULL; + + treq = tcp_rsk(req); + + /* treq->af_specific might be used to perform TCP_MD5 lookup */ + treq->af_specific = af_ops; + + treq->syn_tos = TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->ip_dsfield; +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MPTCP) + treq->is_mptcp = sk_is_mptcp(sk); + if (treq->is_mptcp) { + int err = mptcp_subflow_init_cookie_req(req, sk, skb); + + if (err) { + reqsk_free(req); + return NULL; + } + } +#endif + + return req; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(cookie_tcp_reqsk_alloc); + +/* On input, sk is a listener. + * Output is listener if incoming packet would not create a child + * NULL if memory could not be allocated. + */ +struct sock *cookie_v4_check(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) +{ + struct ip_options *opt = &TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->header.h4.opt; + struct tcp_options_received tcp_opt; + struct inet_request_sock *ireq; + struct tcp_request_sock *treq; + struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk); + const struct tcphdr *th = tcp_hdr(skb); + __u32 cookie = ntohl(th->ack_seq) - 1; + struct sock *ret = sk; + struct request_sock *req; + int full_space, mss; + struct rtable *rt; + __u8 rcv_wscale; + struct flowi4 fl4; + u32 tsoff = 0; + + if (!READ_ONCE(sock_net(sk)->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_syncookies) || + !th->ack || th->rst) + goto out; + + if (tcp_synq_no_recent_overflow(sk)) + goto out; + + mss = __cookie_v4_check(ip_hdr(skb), th, cookie); + if (mss == 0) { + __NET_INC_STATS(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_SYNCOOKIESFAILED); + goto out; + } + + __NET_INC_STATS(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_SYNCOOKIESRECV); + + /* check for timestamp cookie support */ + memset(&tcp_opt, 0, sizeof(tcp_opt)); + tcp_parse_options(sock_net(sk), skb, &tcp_opt, 0, NULL); + + if (tcp_opt.saw_tstamp && tcp_opt.rcv_tsecr) { + tsoff = secure_tcp_ts_off(sock_net(sk), + ip_hdr(skb)->daddr, + ip_hdr(skb)->saddr); + tcp_opt.rcv_tsecr -= tsoff; + } + + if (!cookie_timestamp_decode(sock_net(sk), &tcp_opt)) + goto out; + + ret = NULL; + req = cookie_tcp_reqsk_alloc(&tcp_request_sock_ops, + &tcp_request_sock_ipv4_ops, sk, skb); + if (!req) + goto out; + + ireq = inet_rsk(req); + treq = tcp_rsk(req); + treq->rcv_isn = ntohl(th->seq) - 1; + treq->snt_isn = cookie; + treq->ts_off = 0; + treq->txhash = net_tx_rndhash(); + req->mss = mss; + ireq->ir_num = ntohs(th->dest); + ireq->ir_rmt_port = th->source; + sk_rcv_saddr_set(req_to_sk(req), ip_hdr(skb)->daddr); + sk_daddr_set(req_to_sk(req), ip_hdr(skb)->saddr); + ireq->ir_mark = inet_request_mark(sk, skb); + ireq->snd_wscale = tcp_opt.snd_wscale; + ireq->sack_ok = tcp_opt.sack_ok; + ireq->wscale_ok = tcp_opt.wscale_ok; + ireq->tstamp_ok = tcp_opt.saw_tstamp; + req->ts_recent = tcp_opt.saw_tstamp ? tcp_opt.rcv_tsval : 0; + treq->snt_synack = 0; + treq->tfo_listener = false; + + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SMC)) + ireq->smc_ok = 0; + + ireq->ir_iif = inet_request_bound_dev_if(sk, skb); + + /* We throwed the options of the initial SYN away, so we hope + * the ACK carries the same options again (see RFC1122 4.2.3.8) + */ + RCU_INIT_POINTER(ireq->ireq_opt, tcp_v4_save_options(sock_net(sk), skb)); + + if (security_inet_conn_request(sk, skb, req)) { + reqsk_free(req); + goto out; + } + + req->num_retrans = 0; + + /* + * We need to lookup the route here to get at the correct + * window size. We should better make sure that the window size + * hasn't changed since we received the original syn, but I see + * no easy way to do this. + */ + flowi4_init_output(&fl4, ireq->ir_iif, ireq->ir_mark, + ip_sock_rt_tos(sk), ip_sock_rt_scope(sk), + IPPROTO_TCP, inet_sk_flowi_flags(sk), + opt->srr ? opt->faddr : ireq->ir_rmt_addr, + ireq->ir_loc_addr, th->source, th->dest, sk->sk_uid); + security_req_classify_flow(req, flowi4_to_flowi_common(&fl4)); + rt = ip_route_output_key(sock_net(sk), &fl4); + if (IS_ERR(rt)) { + reqsk_free(req); + goto out; + } + + /* Try to redo what tcp_v4_send_synack did. */ + req->rsk_window_clamp = tp->window_clamp ? :dst_metric(&rt->dst, RTAX_WINDOW); + /* limit the window selection if the user enforce a smaller rx buffer */ + full_space = tcp_full_space(sk); + if (sk->sk_userlocks & SOCK_RCVBUF_LOCK && + (req->rsk_window_clamp > full_space || req->rsk_window_clamp == 0)) + req->rsk_window_clamp = full_space; + + tcp_select_initial_window(sk, full_space, req->mss, + &req->rsk_rcv_wnd, &req->rsk_window_clamp, + ireq->wscale_ok, &rcv_wscale, + dst_metric(&rt->dst, RTAX_INITRWND)); + + ireq->rcv_wscale = rcv_wscale; + ireq->ecn_ok = cookie_ecn_ok(&tcp_opt, sock_net(sk), &rt->dst); + + ret = tcp_get_cookie_sock(sk, skb, req, &rt->dst, tsoff); + /* ip_queue_xmit() depends on our flow being setup + * Normal sockets get it right from inet_csk_route_child_sock() + */ + if (ret) + inet_sk(ret)->cork.fl.u.ip4 = fl4; +out: return ret; +} -- cgit v1.2.3