Adding upstream version 4.22.0.upstream/4.22.0

Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>

1 files changed, 173 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/upstream/archlinux/man3/CMS_decrypt.3ssl b/upstream/archlinux/man3/CMS_decrypt.3ssl
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+.\" -*- mode: troff; coding: utf-8 -*-
+.\" Automatically generated by Pod::Man 5.01 (Pod::Simple 3.43)
+.\"
+.\" Standard preamble:
+.\" ========================================================================
+.de Sp \" Vertical space (when we can't use .PP)
+.if t .sp .5v
+.if n .sp
+..
+.de Vb \" Begin verbatim text
+.ft CW
+.nf
+.ne \\$1
+..
+.de Ve \" End verbatim text
+.ft R
+.fi
+..
+.\" \*(C` and \*(C' are quotes in nroff, nothing in troff, for use with C<>.
+.ie n \{\
+.    ds C` ""
+.    ds C' ""
+'br\}
+.el\{\
+.    ds C`
+.    ds C'
+'br\}
+.\"
+.\" Escape single quotes in literal strings from groff's Unicode transform.
+.ie \n(.g .ds Aq \(aq
+.el       .ds Aq '
+.\"
+.\" If the F register is >0, we'll generate index entries on stderr for
+.\" titles (.TH), headers (.SH), subsections (.SS), items (.Ip), and index
+.\" entries marked with X<> in POD.  Of course, you'll have to process the
+.\" output yourself in some meaningful fashion.
+.\"
+.\" Avoid warning from groff about undefined register 'F'.
+.de IX
+..
+.nr rF 0
+.if \n(.g .if rF .nr rF 1
+.if (\n(rF:(\n(.g==0)) \{\
+.    if \nF \{\
+.        de IX
+.        tm Index:\\$1\t\\n%\t"\\$2"
+..
+.        if !\nF==2 \{\
+.            nr % 0
+.            nr F 2
+.        \}
+.    \}
+.\}
+.rr rF
+.\" ========================================================================
+.\"
+.IX Title "CMS_DECRYPT 3ssl"
+.TH CMS_DECRYPT 3ssl 2024-01-30 3.2.1 OpenSSL
+.\" For nroff, turn off justification.  Always turn off hyphenation; it makes
+.\" way too many mistakes in technical documents.
+.if n .ad l
+.nh
+.SH NAME
+CMS_decrypt, CMS_decrypt_set1_pkey_and_peer,
+CMS_decrypt_set1_pkey, CMS_decrypt_set1_password
+\&\- decrypt content from a CMS envelopedData structure
+.SH SYNOPSIS
+.IX Header "SYNOPSIS"
+.Vb 1
+\& #include <openssl/cms.h>
+\&
+\& int CMS_decrypt(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, EVP_PKEY *pkey, X509 *cert,
+\&                 BIO *dcont, BIO *out, unsigned int flags);
+\& int CMS_decrypt_set1_pkey_and_peer(CMS_ContentInfo *cms,
+\&                 EVP_PKEY *pk, X509 *cert, X509 *peer);
+\& int CMS_decrypt_set1_pkey(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, EVP_PKEY *pk, X509 *cert);
+\& int CMS_decrypt_set1_password(CMS_ContentInfo *cms,
+\&                               unsigned char *pass, ossl_ssize_t passlen);
+.Ve
+.SH DESCRIPTION
+.IX Header "DESCRIPTION"
+\&\fBCMS_decrypt()\fR extracts the decrypted content from a CMS EnvelopedData
+or AuthEnvelopedData structure.
+It uses \fBCMS_decrypt_set1_pkey()\fR to decrypt the content
+with the recipient private key \fIpkey\fR if \fIpkey\fR is not NULL.
+In this case, the associated certificate is recommended to provide in \fIcert\fR \-
+see the NOTES below.
+\&\fIout\fR is a BIO to write the content to and
+\&\fIflags\fR is an optional set of flags.
+If \fIpkey\fR is NULL the function assumes that decryption was already done
+(e.g., using \fBCMS_decrypt_set1_pkey()\fR or \fBCMS_decrypt_set1_password()\fR) and just
+provides the content unless \fIcert\fR, \fIdcont\fR, and \fIout\fR are NULL as well.
+The \fIdcont\fR parameter is used in the rare case where the encrypted content
+is detached. It will normally be set to NULL.
+.PP
+\&\fBCMS_decrypt_set1_pkey_and_peer()\fR decrypts the CMS_ContentInfo structure \fIcms\fR
+using the private key \fIpkey\fR, the corresponding certificate \fIcert\fR, which is
+recommended but may be NULL, and the (optional) originator certificate \fIpeer\fR.
+On success, it also records in \fIcms\fR the decryption key \fIpkey\fR, and then
+should be followed by \f(CW\*(C`CMS_decrypt(cms, NULL, NULL, dcont, out, flags)\*(C'\fR.
+This call deallocates any decryption key stored in \fIcms\fR.
+.PP
+\&\fBCMS_decrypt_set1_pkey()\fR is the same as
+\&\fBCMS_decrypt_set1_pkey_and_peer()\fR with \fIpeer\fR being NULL.
+.PP
+\&\fBCMS_decrypt_set1_password()\fR decrypts the CMS_ContentInfo structure \fIcms\fR
+using the secret \fIpass\fR of length \fIpasslen\fR.
+On success, it also records in \fIcms\fR the decryption key used, and then
+should be followed by \f(CW\*(C`CMS_decrypt(cms, NULL, NULL, dcont, out, flags)\*(C'\fR.
+This call deallocates any decryption key stored in \fIcms\fR.
+.SH NOTES
+.IX Header "NOTES"
+Although the recipients certificate is not needed to decrypt the data it is
+needed to locate the appropriate (of possible several) recipients in the CMS
+structure.
+.PP
+If \fIcert\fR is set to NULL all possible recipients are tried. This case however
+is problematic. To thwart the MMA attack (Bleichenbacher's attack on
+PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding) all recipients are tried whether they succeed or
+not. If no recipient succeeds then a random symmetric key is used to decrypt
+the content: this will typically output garbage and may (but is not guaranteed
+to) ultimately return a padding error only. If \fBCMS_decrypt()\fR just returned an
+error when all recipient encrypted keys failed to decrypt an attacker could
+use this in a timing attack. If the special flag \fBCMS_DEBUG_DECRYPT\fR is set
+then the above behaviour is modified and an error \fBis\fR returned if no
+recipient encrypted key can be decrypted \fBwithout\fR generating a random
+content encryption key. Applications should use this flag with
+\&\fBextreme caution\fR especially in automated gateways as it can leave them
+open to attack.
+.PP
+It is possible to determine the correct recipient key by other means (for
+example looking them up in a database) and setting them in the CMS structure
+in advance using the CMS utility functions such as \fBCMS_set1_pkey()\fR,
+or use \fBCMS_decrypt_set1_password()\fR if the recipient has a symmetric key.
+In these cases both \fIcert\fR and \fIpkey\fR should be set to NULL.
+.PP
+To process KEKRecipientInfo types \fBCMS_set1_key()\fR or \fBCMS_RecipientInfo_set0_key()\fR
+and \fBCMS_RecipientInfo_decrypt()\fR should be called before \fBCMS_decrypt()\fR and
+\&\fIcert\fR and \fIpkey\fR set to NULL.
+.PP
+The following flags can be passed in the \fIflags\fR parameter.
+.PP
+If the \fBCMS_TEXT\fR flag is set MIME headers for type \f(CW\*(C`text/plain\*(C'\fR are deleted
+from the content. If the content is not of type \f(CW\*(C`text/plain\*(C'\fR then an error is
+returned.
+.SH "RETURN VALUES"
+.IX Header "RETURN VALUES"
+\&\fBCMS_decrypt()\fR, \fBCMS_decrypt_set1_pkey_and_peer()\fR,
+\&\fBCMS_decrypt_set1_pkey()\fR, and \fBCMS_decrypt_set1_password()\fR
+return either 1 for success or 0 for failure.
+The error can be obtained from \fBERR_get_error\fR\|(3).
+.SH BUGS
+.IX Header "BUGS"
+The \fBset1_\fR part of these function names is misleading
+and should better read: \fBwith_\fR.
+.PP
+The lack of single pass processing and the need to hold all data in memory as
+mentioned in \fBCMS_verify()\fR also applies to \fBCMS_decrypt()\fR.
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
+.IX Header "SEE ALSO"
+\&\fBERR_get_error\fR\|(3), \fBCMS_encrypt\fR\|(3)
+.SH HISTORY
+.IX Header "HISTORY"
+\&\fBCMS_decrypt_set1_pkey_and_peer()\fR and \fBCMS_decrypt_set1_password()\fR
+were added in OpenSSL 3.0.
+.SH COPYRIGHT
+.IX Header "COPYRIGHT"
+Copyright 2008\-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+.PP
+Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.